President Ma Ying-jeou Should Assume Chairmanship of the Ruling Party
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 9, 2009
Yesterday this newspaper conducted a poll. We asked people how they felt about Ma Ying-jeou assuming the role of KMT party chairman. The result showed 46.7% of the public opposed, and 47.2% in favor. Another 26.0% expressed no opinion. An astonishing 38.7% of the respondents thought the KMT would not be able to implement President Ma's policies, much higher than the number who answered "the party will be able to implement President Ma's policies." The answers to these two questions reveal a number of contradictions. On the one hand, the public thinks the KMT is engaging in obstructionism, making it impossible for the president to act. On the other hand, the public is skeptical and fearful of the Party/Government/Military Complex of old. Therefore, it opposes the president simultaneously assuming the role of party chairman. We feel compelled to clarify a few concepts in order to gain a better understanding of the problem.
First, let's look at the KMT's performance over the past year. Instead of asking whether the KMT is able to implement President Ma's policies, we ought to ask whether the party's performance conforms with public expectations. Frankly we have to give the KMT a C minus. Take Legislative Yuan approval of Presidential appointments. Last year, amidst internal KMT power struggles, the Legislative Yuan vetoed Shen Fu-hsiung's appointment as Vice President of the Control Yuan. Never mind the fact that Shen Fu-hsiung had a sound reputation. This newspaper published an editorial denouncing the Legislative Yuan as "contemptible." Take Legislative Yuan review of bills. Last year a small number of KMT legislators boycotted the Public Servants' Unaccounted For Assets Act. This year the Legislative Yuan has diluted the bill three or four different ways. Its motive for obstructing such legislation is clear to see. Take the County Executive and City Mayor By-election candidates. The list of nominees included wives running in place of their husbands, candidates who are implicated in a long list of crimes, and candidates who are unqualifed but who were born to the right parents. Yet the party adopted a "What can we do?" attitude. It ignored public perception. Take the handling of party assets. The KMT has been in power almost a year. The manager of the KMT's party-owned enterprises has already been promoted to President of the Examination Yuan. The Bureau of Administration no longer exists. Yet the party assets remain. The KMT appears determined to drag its feet until the next general election, providing the DPP with a ready-made campaign issue. Such a political party is not merely disappointing the public, it is holding back society.
Ma Ying-jeou's image is fresh. The KMT's image is stale. That is why President Ma should assume the role of party chairman. Only then can he implement his policies. Only then can he live up to the expectations of the 58% majority who voted for him. Legislative elections are conducted in accordance with the single-member district, two-vote system. But the presidential election links the candidate to the party. Every vote cast for a candidate is a vote cast for the candidate's party. Voters expect both the candidate and his party to implement reform. In advanced democracies, political parties are neutral campaign organizations. ROC political parties should head in that direction. But the KMT is burdened by its decades long past. It is soiled, diseased, and defective. An entity so corrupt cannot cure or transform itself. The KMT's transformation must rely on external forces. And the most effective external force, is a Chief Executive who commands public support.
If President Ma does not assume the role of party chairman, then all he can do is to fix the barn door after the horse has been stolen. Often such remedies will be to no avail. Take the County Executive and City Mayor By-election nominations for example. Once the KMT juggernaut nominates a list of scandal-ridden candidates, how can President Ma refuse to support them? How can he refuse to endorse them? This hijacking of the President by the party machine plays out again and again because the intent of the party machine is miles apart from the intent of the president.
Finally, we need to address a number of outsider doubts. Some people are afraid that if the President assumes the role of party chairman, that will mean a "return to authoritarianism." But that is a fallacy. The reason the two Chiangs were criticized as authoritarian, was that the President lacked popular support, as well as legislative and administrative checks and balances. But the situation today is different. Today the Republic of China president is installed in office one vote at a time. The Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion no longer apply. Government policy is under the supervision of the Legislative Yuan. Nor is there any possibility of favoritism. Even if the President assumes the role of party chairman, his impact on political patronage will remain marginal. He cannot possibly enjoy the same powers the two Chiangs wielded during the authoritarian era. Quite the contrary. President Ma insists on avoiding party affairs. He watches idly as competing political forces rule the roost, entrenched in perpetuity. At the end of the day, public dissatisfaction will be vented on President Ma during the next election. In any event, assuming the party chairmanship has no relationship with authoritarism.
Does President Ma intend to transform the ROC and reform the KMT or not? Since the 1980's, many nations have engaged in economic reform. The Soviet Union, Mainland China, India and other nations each have their own model. Not every kind of reform is correct. The public on Taiwan wants to move toward democracy. It wants party politics to work. It has never established a rule saying "no president may be a party chairman." The KMT party machine is so antiquated that if the president does not assume the role of party chairman, transformation will be impossible. Rather than allow this albatross to remain around his neck, President Ma should cast it off, roll up his sleeves, and get down to work.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.04.09
社論－馬總統確該考慮兼任執政黨主席
本報訊
本報日前舉行民調，詢問社會大眾對於馬英九是否該兼黨主席的看法。結果顯示，有四六．七％的人不贊成、廿七．二％的人贊成。另有廿六．○％的人無意見。另一方面，竟然有三八．七％的受訪者認為國民黨不能貫徹馬總統的施政理念，遠高於回答「黨能貫徹馬總統理念」的比例。這兩個問題的答案似乎透露若干矛盾：一方面人民認為國民黨在扯後腿，以至於總統的理念推不動，但另一方面人民似乎對於以往「黨政軍一體」的情況猶有疑懼，所以並不贊成總統兼任黨主席。我們認為，這裡面確實有些觀念需要釐清，才能把道理談透徹。
首先，我們來看看國民黨過去一年的表現。與其問國民黨能不能貫徹馬總統的施政理念，倒不如問該黨表現是否符合人民的期待。坦白說，我們對此要給國民黨打個「丙下」級分，以表達嚴重不滿。就立法院人事同意權而言，去年中監察院副院長案，立法院在黨內相關勢力的操作下，竟然把形象不差的沈富雄當掉，本報社論當時就以「討人厭」重批。就立法院法案審查而言，去年底少數國民黨立委杯葛「財產來源不明罪」的審查，今年又給法條中穿了三、四雙小鞋，也是司馬昭之心路人皆知。就縣市長與民意代表補選提名而言，目前浮出檯面的名單，有人代夫出征、有人所涉弊案一籮筐、有人是內舉不避親，但黨部迄今一副莫可奈何狀，完全不理會社會觀感。就黨產處理而言，國民黨已經執政快一年，黨營事業主管都升官到考試院了，行管處人事全非，卻黨產依舊，似乎要拖到下一次大選，再送給民進黨一個現成的炒作題材。這樣的黨，不僅不在實踐人民的改革期待，根本就是在扯台灣的後腿！
正因為馬英九形象清新，而國民黨依然陳舊腐朽，我們才認為馬總統需要兼黨主席，才能貫徹其施政理念，也才能不辜負台灣人民五八％選票的期待。立委選舉有所謂單一選區兩票制，但總統選舉是人黨合一的，每一票背後既是人也是黨，總而言之就是對改革的期待。在民主先進國家中，黨都只是中性的選舉機器；台灣的政黨要往那個方向走，並沒有錯。但問題是：國民黨有它數十年的包袱、汙點、痼疾、缺陷；這麼一個久病纏身的腐朽機器，它不可能不藥而癒、自行轉型成功。國民黨若要轉型，必須要靠外力，而最有可能加諸的外力，就是有民意支撐的行政首長。
馬總統如果不兼黨主席，他就只能在一件件人民挫折之後亡羊補牢。有時候，甚至事後補救都無濟於事。以縣市長提名為例，一旦國民黨「自走炮」真的提名了身掛一串弊案的人做候選人，馬總統還能表態不支持嗎？能不站台嗎？這種黨機器綁架總統的戲碼之所以能夠一再上演，不就是因為黨機器的意志與總統的意志天差地遠嗎？
最後，我們也要談一談外界的質疑論點。有人認為，總統兼黨主席有「回到威權」的疑慮，但這顯然有情境錯置的謬誤。兩蔣時代之所以被人批評為威權，是因為總統沒有民意的支持，且行政欠缺立法的制衡。但是現在的情況早已全然改變。目前台灣的總統，可是人民一票一票選出來的，並沒有《動員戡亂時期臨時條款》的庇廕。我們政府的施政，完全受立法院鋪天蓋地的監督，也沒有挾帶徇私的可能。就算總統兼任黨主席，只可能稍抑制目前政治上的各項分贓，不可能扯上什麼兩蔣時代的威權。相反的，馬總統堅持不碰黨務，卻是坐視政壇勢力據地為王，盤踞串連，到頭來人民的不滿還是得在下次大選時由馬總統埋單。無論如何，兼不兼黨主席與威權與否，八竿子也扯不上關係。
今天的重點是：馬總統是否想改造台灣、改革國民黨？自一九八○年代起，全世界許多國家都在從事經濟改革；蘇聯、中共、印度等國各有其模式，也沒有哪一種改革就一定是對的。台灣人民希望走向民主、希望政黨政治邁向健康之路，並沒有設下「總統不准兼黨主席」的明顯路障。我們認為，以國民黨如此陳舊的機器，總統不兼黨主席恐怕斷無改造的可能。與其讓一個沉重的包袱拖累自己，馬總統實在可以考慮做包袱的主人，親自打開包袱，好好清理一番。
Thursday, April 9, 2009
Tuesday, April 7, 2009
The Financial Supervisory Commission: A Protector of Financial Conglomerates, or the People?
The Financial Supervisory Commission: A Protector of Financial Conglomerates, or the People?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 7, 2009
Summary: Past or present, east or west, con artists have always had one thing in common. They are willing to use any means available for the sake of personal gain. The American public was shocked to learn that for over ten years former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission Bernard Madoff had been operating a Ponzi scheme. On Taiwan, prosecutors have indicted the head of the Yuanta Group for illegal structural deficits amounting to 700 million NTD. Specifically, prosecutors are seeking a 10 year sentence for violations of securities and exchange regulations and for breach of trust.
Full Text below:
Past or present, east or west, con artists have always had one thing in common. They are willing to use any means available for the sake of personal gain. The American public was shocked to learn that for over ten years former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission Bernard Madoff had been operating a Ponzi scheme. On Taiwan, prosecutors have indicted the head of the Yuanta Group for illegal structural deficits amounting to 700 million NTD. Specifically, prosecutors are seeking a 10 year sentence for violations of securities and exchange regulations and for breach of trust.
According to the Bill of Indictment, the Ma family used their proxies to take illegal advantage of unconventional equity only transactions. It had Yuanta Securities make up the structural deficits. The Ma family should have taken responsibility for the structural deficits. Instead, after resort to massive sleights-of-hand, it raked in huge profits. Yuanta Securities' small shareholders were forced to bear the burden of huge and inexplicable losses. The Ma family insists that the Yuanta structural deficits were entirely legal. Had the Ma family's perfect crime not been uncovered by the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) and turned over to prosecutors in late 2008, investors would still be in the dark.
The Ma family has left a deep impression on the public, and not merely for the structural deficit case. The Ma family gave First Son Chen Chi-chung a wedding present of six million dollars cash. Yuanta General Manager Ma Wei-chien is suspected of helping First Lady Wu Shu-chen transport 740 million dollars in cash from Cathay United Bank vaults to Yuanta's office. Yuanta Chief Operating Officer Ma Wei-cheng then transported two billion dollars in cash to the Presidential Mansion. Both Ma brothers have been indicted in the Chen family money-laundering case. The public is wondering why professional bankers were willing to risk laundering money for the Chen family. Why weren't the Ma family's "campaign contributions" made openly and above board, complete with receipts, the way Taiwan Semiconductor's were?
The Yuanta structural deficits case Bill of Indictment includes at least seven Yuanta Securities company officers. The eldest and second-eldest sons of the Koo family have also been implicated. Breach of trust and money-laundering are violations of the most important principle of the financial sector -- trust. That is why they are so difficult for the public to accept. In order to uphold the rights and interests of depositors, the FSC must conduct a thorough investigation of financial conglomerates. It must not dally.
Once the Chen family money-laundering case exploded, the tribute large financial holding companies and conglomerates paid to the Chen family, and the help they provided the Chen family in its money laundering operations, was exposed. The public has no difficulty imagining the quid pro quo involved behind these conglomerates' contributions. Yuanta Securities acquired Fuhwa Financial Holdings. Chinatrust acquired China Development Financial Holdings. China Development Financial Holdings acquired Taiwan International Investment Management. Chinatrust acquired Mega Holdings. Taishing Holdings acquired Changhwa Bank as a result of Ah-Bian's "Second Financial Reform." If prosecutors amass clear evidence of illegal conduct, the restoration of shareholders' rights and shareholders' compensation will become an issue. The FSC must be prepared to deal with the aftermath of the case, and return small shareholders some measure of justice.
Consider the American International Group (AIG) executive bonuses. Obama's handling of the case offers the Ma Ying-jeou administration a point of reference. AIG initially declared that executive bonuses were specified in executive contracts, and entirely legal. But Obama concluded that the public would not tolerate them, and demanded that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner recover the bonuses, in full. Over 200 million U.S. dollars in bonuses had already been handed out. To mollify the public, congress expedited legislation levying high taxes on dividends, forcing the recipients to cough up their windfall profits. Only then did he resolve the crisis. Given the AIG fat cats case, FSC officials should have realized that when injustice has provoked public anger, pleas that "We have no legal basis to act" are no excuse. The attitude of FSC officials is critical. From the perspective of Wall Street businessmen, the AIG dividends were fully deserved. But from the perspective of the public, they were utterly unacceptable. Geithner was criticized most vehemently for seeing the world entirely through the eyes of Wall Street.
In fact the FSC has more than sufficient legal cause to prosecute the heads of domestic financial conglomerates. According to Article 54 of the Financial Holding Company Act, any financial conglomerate that violates the law or company procedures, or obstructs the sound operation of the company, may be subject to FSC sanctions. The company must make timely adjustments to its behavior, and may be subject to punishment, depending on the seriousness of the offense. Punishments include removal from managerial positions, and the firing or temporary suspension of board directors or board supervisors. Such administrative sanctions need not await the results of a trial. Otherwise, the Financial Holding Company Act would be superfluous.
From the Yuanta structural deficits case, the FSC gained first-hand information. It is the government agency most familiar with the problem. Evidence clearly shows that the Ma brothers helped the Chen family launder money. The FSC is akin to the US Department of the Treasury. If the FSC, whose head comes from the financial sector, fails to deal with the problem, then it is acting like the major domo of a financial conglomerate, and not like a defender of the rights of the people.
Ever since the financial tsunami struck, con artists the world over have resorted to all means to stick it to the little guy. They want to steal the taxpayer's hard-earned money and use it to issue executive bonuses. The public is thoroughly disgusted with such behavior. Is the FSC committed to covering up financial conglomerate wrongdoing, or defending the rights of the public? If the FSC thinks it can turn a blind eye to their wrongdoing by adopting an attitude of passivity, the public will not merely be disillusioned, it will pay an even higher price in the future. If the FSC fails to impose the strictest possible sanctions upon wrongdoers, then it will become the target of the strictest possible sanctions by the public.
金管會要守著財團還是守著人民
2009-04-07
中國時報
古今中外騙子的共通點，就是無所不用其極地牟取私利。在美國，前證管會主委馬多夫主導超級「龐氏騙局」至少十年以上，震驚各界；在台灣，元大集團負責人因結構債弊案不法套利六．七億元，遭檢方依違反證交法、背信等罪嫌起訴，具體求刑十年。
根據檢方起訴書，元大馬家利用股權轉換與非常規交易，把結構債相關的虧損套給元京證，經過乾坤大挪移，原本應承擔結構債損失的馬家，卻因此獲得大筆不法利益，而讓元京證的小股東莫名其妙地承接巨額損失。針對元大結構債事件，馬家堅稱一切合法；不過，這個超完美的設局，若不是金管會於九十七年底進行金檢時主動發現，並移送檢調單位，投資人迄今都還被蒙在鼓裡。
元大馬家令國人印象深刻的不只結構債事件，先前馬家在陳致中結婚時送出六百萬元大禮；其次，元大金總經理馬維建涉嫌協助吳淑珍，搬運國泰世華銀行保管室裡七．四億元巨款至元大的辦公室；元大金營運長馬維辰則送二億元現金到扁家官邸，兄弟兩人都因扁家洗錢案被列為被告。民眾不禁質疑，為何「專業」的銀行家甘冒風險協助扁家洗錢？馬家的「政治獻金」，為何不學學台積電光明正大捐出，並且領取收據存查？
這次元大結構債遭起訴名單加上先前因洗錢案列為被告者，元大金至少有七人涉案，與先前辜家大少二少的涉案相呼應。無論背信或洗錢，都嚴重違反金融業最重要的誠信原則，也難以讓社會大眾接受。為維護投資人與存款戶權益，我們認為，金管會必須嚴肅檢討金控公司負責人的適格性問題，不能再蹉跎!
自從扁家洗錢案爆發以來，國內許多大型金控與財團爭先恐後前往扁家進貢或協助洗錢的行徑紛紛曝光，看在一般老百姓的眼裡，不難推測財團捐錢的背後，當然另有所圖。不論元大金併復華金、中信辜家入主開發金、開發金併金鼎證、中信金插旗兆豐金、台新金併彰銀等泛二次金改中的案件，未來檢調若查獲有明確不法事證，可能牽涉到股權回復與補償的問題，對此，金管會更必須做好善後處理的準備，還給小股東一個公道。
以美國國際集團（ＡＩＧ）高階主管領取紅利事件為例，歐巴馬的處理態度提供馬政府一個很好的借鏡。ＡＩＧ最初聲稱領取紅利是依契約行事，一切合法。不過歐巴馬認為民意絕非如此，要求財長蓋特納全面追回紅利。由於高達二億多美元的紅利已經發出去，為平息民怨，美國國會火速完成立法課徵高額紅利稅，逼得受領者吐出紅利，才化解這次的危機。從ＡＩＧ的肥貓事件來看，金管會官員應深刻體會:當不公不義的事件激發民眾怒火時，「沒有法源」不能成為藉口；金管人員的心態，才是真正的關鍵。站在華爾街生意人的立場，ＡＩＧ分紅理所當然。但站在人民的立場，卻萬萬不能接受。蓋特納所被人批評最厲者，就在於他習慣從華爾街看世界。
其實，金管會處理國內金控負責人的適格性問題，確實有足夠的法源。依據金融控股公司法第五十四條，金融控股公司有違反法律、章程或有礙健全經營之虞時，主管機關得予以糾正、限期改善，並得視情節輕重處分，包括解除經理人職務、解除董事、監察人職務或停止其於一定期間內執行職務。重點是:這個行政處分不必、也不應等到法律審判，否則金控法即形同蛇足。
以元大的結構債事件來看，金管會掌握第一手資料最了解內情。其次，馬家兄弟協助扁家洗錢的事證亦非常明確。在這樣的情況下，金管會再不處理，該機關就如同美國的財政部，首長來自金融界，像是大財團的管家，而不是人民的保母。
金融大海嘯發生以來，各國金融賊貓用盡各種手段坑殺小老百姓，還要拿納稅人的血汗錢來發紅利，民眾對於這樣無恥行徑厭惡到了極點。對於國內部分金控財團的胡作非為，金管會究竟是守著財團，還是守著人民？金管會如果認為閉起眼睛就看不見了，採取消極態度因應，那不僅令人民失望，未來可能要付出更大的代價。職司金融監理的金管會若無法對為非作歹者予以嚴厲的制裁，最後也必須接受民意嚴厲的檢驗。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 7, 2009
Summary: Past or present, east or west, con artists have always had one thing in common. They are willing to use any means available for the sake of personal gain. The American public was shocked to learn that for over ten years former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission Bernard Madoff had been operating a Ponzi scheme. On Taiwan, prosecutors have indicted the head of the Yuanta Group for illegal structural deficits amounting to 700 million NTD. Specifically, prosecutors are seeking a 10 year sentence for violations of securities and exchange regulations and for breach of trust.
Full Text below:
Past or present, east or west, con artists have always had one thing in common. They are willing to use any means available for the sake of personal gain. The American public was shocked to learn that for over ten years former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission Bernard Madoff had been operating a Ponzi scheme. On Taiwan, prosecutors have indicted the head of the Yuanta Group for illegal structural deficits amounting to 700 million NTD. Specifically, prosecutors are seeking a 10 year sentence for violations of securities and exchange regulations and for breach of trust.
According to the Bill of Indictment, the Ma family used their proxies to take illegal advantage of unconventional equity only transactions. It had Yuanta Securities make up the structural deficits. The Ma family should have taken responsibility for the structural deficits. Instead, after resort to massive sleights-of-hand, it raked in huge profits. Yuanta Securities' small shareholders were forced to bear the burden of huge and inexplicable losses. The Ma family insists that the Yuanta structural deficits were entirely legal. Had the Ma family's perfect crime not been uncovered by the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) and turned over to prosecutors in late 2008, investors would still be in the dark.
The Ma family has left a deep impression on the public, and not merely for the structural deficit case. The Ma family gave First Son Chen Chi-chung a wedding present of six million dollars cash. Yuanta General Manager Ma Wei-chien is suspected of helping First Lady Wu Shu-chen transport 740 million dollars in cash from Cathay United Bank vaults to Yuanta's office. Yuanta Chief Operating Officer Ma Wei-cheng then transported two billion dollars in cash to the Presidential Mansion. Both Ma brothers have been indicted in the Chen family money-laundering case. The public is wondering why professional bankers were willing to risk laundering money for the Chen family. Why weren't the Ma family's "campaign contributions" made openly and above board, complete with receipts, the way Taiwan Semiconductor's were?
The Yuanta structural deficits case Bill of Indictment includes at least seven Yuanta Securities company officers. The eldest and second-eldest sons of the Koo family have also been implicated. Breach of trust and money-laundering are violations of the most important principle of the financial sector -- trust. That is why they are so difficult for the public to accept. In order to uphold the rights and interests of depositors, the FSC must conduct a thorough investigation of financial conglomerates. It must not dally.
Once the Chen family money-laundering case exploded, the tribute large financial holding companies and conglomerates paid to the Chen family, and the help they provided the Chen family in its money laundering operations, was exposed. The public has no difficulty imagining the quid pro quo involved behind these conglomerates' contributions. Yuanta Securities acquired Fuhwa Financial Holdings. Chinatrust acquired China Development Financial Holdings. China Development Financial Holdings acquired Taiwan International Investment Management. Chinatrust acquired Mega Holdings. Taishing Holdings acquired Changhwa Bank as a result of Ah-Bian's "Second Financial Reform." If prosecutors amass clear evidence of illegal conduct, the restoration of shareholders' rights and shareholders' compensation will become an issue. The FSC must be prepared to deal with the aftermath of the case, and return small shareholders some measure of justice.
Consider the American International Group (AIG) executive bonuses. Obama's handling of the case offers the Ma Ying-jeou administration a point of reference. AIG initially declared that executive bonuses were specified in executive contracts, and entirely legal. But Obama concluded that the public would not tolerate them, and demanded that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner recover the bonuses, in full. Over 200 million U.S. dollars in bonuses had already been handed out. To mollify the public, congress expedited legislation levying high taxes on dividends, forcing the recipients to cough up their windfall profits. Only then did he resolve the crisis. Given the AIG fat cats case, FSC officials should have realized that when injustice has provoked public anger, pleas that "We have no legal basis to act" are no excuse. The attitude of FSC officials is critical. From the perspective of Wall Street businessmen, the AIG dividends were fully deserved. But from the perspective of the public, they were utterly unacceptable. Geithner was criticized most vehemently for seeing the world entirely through the eyes of Wall Street.
In fact the FSC has more than sufficient legal cause to prosecute the heads of domestic financial conglomerates. According to Article 54 of the Financial Holding Company Act, any financial conglomerate that violates the law or company procedures, or obstructs the sound operation of the company, may be subject to FSC sanctions. The company must make timely adjustments to its behavior, and may be subject to punishment, depending on the seriousness of the offense. Punishments include removal from managerial positions, and the firing or temporary suspension of board directors or board supervisors. Such administrative sanctions need not await the results of a trial. Otherwise, the Financial Holding Company Act would be superfluous.
From the Yuanta structural deficits case, the FSC gained first-hand information. It is the government agency most familiar with the problem. Evidence clearly shows that the Ma brothers helped the Chen family launder money. The FSC is akin to the US Department of the Treasury. If the FSC, whose head comes from the financial sector, fails to deal with the problem, then it is acting like the major domo of a financial conglomerate, and not like a defender of the rights of the people.
Ever since the financial tsunami struck, con artists the world over have resorted to all means to stick it to the little guy. They want to steal the taxpayer's hard-earned money and use it to issue executive bonuses. The public is thoroughly disgusted with such behavior. Is the FSC committed to covering up financial conglomerate wrongdoing, or defending the rights of the public? If the FSC thinks it can turn a blind eye to their wrongdoing by adopting an attitude of passivity, the public will not merely be disillusioned, it will pay an even higher price in the future. If the FSC fails to impose the strictest possible sanctions upon wrongdoers, then it will become the target of the strictest possible sanctions by the public.
金管會要守著財團還是守著人民
2009-04-07
中國時報
古今中外騙子的共通點，就是無所不用其極地牟取私利。在美國，前證管會主委馬多夫主導超級「龐氏騙局」至少十年以上，震驚各界；在台灣，元大集團負責人因結構債弊案不法套利六．七億元，遭檢方依違反證交法、背信等罪嫌起訴，具體求刑十年。
根據檢方起訴書，元大馬家利用股權轉換與非常規交易，把結構債相關的虧損套給元京證，經過乾坤大挪移，原本應承擔結構債損失的馬家，卻因此獲得大筆不法利益，而讓元京證的小股東莫名其妙地承接巨額損失。針對元大結構債事件，馬家堅稱一切合法；不過，這個超完美的設局，若不是金管會於九十七年底進行金檢時主動發現，並移送檢調單位，投資人迄今都還被蒙在鼓裡。
元大馬家令國人印象深刻的不只結構債事件，先前馬家在陳致中結婚時送出六百萬元大禮；其次，元大金總經理馬維建涉嫌協助吳淑珍，搬運國泰世華銀行保管室裡七．四億元巨款至元大的辦公室；元大金營運長馬維辰則送二億元現金到扁家官邸，兄弟兩人都因扁家洗錢案被列為被告。民眾不禁質疑，為何「專業」的銀行家甘冒風險協助扁家洗錢？馬家的「政治獻金」，為何不學學台積電光明正大捐出，並且領取收據存查？
這次元大結構債遭起訴名單加上先前因洗錢案列為被告者，元大金至少有七人涉案，與先前辜家大少二少的涉案相呼應。無論背信或洗錢，都嚴重違反金融業最重要的誠信原則，也難以讓社會大眾接受。為維護投資人與存款戶權益，我們認為，金管會必須嚴肅檢討金控公司負責人的適格性問題，不能再蹉跎!
自從扁家洗錢案爆發以來，國內許多大型金控與財團爭先恐後前往扁家進貢或協助洗錢的行徑紛紛曝光，看在一般老百姓的眼裡，不難推測財團捐錢的背後，當然另有所圖。不論元大金併復華金、中信辜家入主開發金、開發金併金鼎證、中信金插旗兆豐金、台新金併彰銀等泛二次金改中的案件，未來檢調若查獲有明確不法事證，可能牽涉到股權回復與補償的問題，對此，金管會更必須做好善後處理的準備，還給小股東一個公道。
以美國國際集團（ＡＩＧ）高階主管領取紅利事件為例，歐巴馬的處理態度提供馬政府一個很好的借鏡。ＡＩＧ最初聲稱領取紅利是依契約行事，一切合法。不過歐巴馬認為民意絕非如此，要求財長蓋特納全面追回紅利。由於高達二億多美元的紅利已經發出去，為平息民怨，美國國會火速完成立法課徵高額紅利稅，逼得受領者吐出紅利，才化解這次的危機。從ＡＩＧ的肥貓事件來看，金管會官員應深刻體會:當不公不義的事件激發民眾怒火時，「沒有法源」不能成為藉口；金管人員的心態，才是真正的關鍵。站在華爾街生意人的立場，ＡＩＧ分紅理所當然。但站在人民的立場，卻萬萬不能接受。蓋特納所被人批評最厲者，就在於他習慣從華爾街看世界。
其實，金管會處理國內金控負責人的適格性問題，確實有足夠的法源。依據金融控股公司法第五十四條，金融控股公司有違反法律、章程或有礙健全經營之虞時，主管機關得予以糾正、限期改善，並得視情節輕重處分，包括解除經理人職務、解除董事、監察人職務或停止其於一定期間內執行職務。重點是:這個行政處分不必、也不應等到法律審判，否則金控法即形同蛇足。
以元大的結構債事件來看，金管會掌握第一手資料最了解內情。其次，馬家兄弟協助扁家洗錢的事證亦非常明確。在這樣的情況下，金管會再不處理，該機關就如同美國的財政部，首長來自金融界，像是大財團的管家，而不是人民的保母。
金融大海嘯發生以來，各國金融賊貓用盡各種手段坑殺小老百姓，還要拿納稅人的血汗錢來發紅利，民眾對於這樣無恥行徑厭惡到了極點。對於國內部分金控財團的胡作非為，金管會究竟是守著財團，還是守著人民？金管會如果認為閉起眼睛就看不見了，採取消極態度因應，那不僅令人民失望，未來可能要付出更大的代價。職司金融監理的金管會若無法對為非作歹者予以嚴厲的制裁，最後也必須接受民意嚴厲的檢驗。
From Miaoli to Da-an to Taipei County
From Miaoli to Da-an to Taipei County
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 7, 2009
We could begin our tale in Taitung County, with Kuang Li-cheng. Kuang's declaration that she would "go to war in her husband's place" made her a laughing stock. Undeterred, the KMT stuck with her strategy in the Miaoli County Legislative by-election. The result? Even ultra popular Miaoli County Executive Liu Cheng-hung, who backed Chen Luan-ying, was shaken by the final count. Apparently the voters knew the score. Their conclusion? Go to war in your husband's place if you like. But don't expect us to go with you.
The KMT lost in Miaoli because their prime directive was: accomodate the vested interests. They never bothered to ask how the voters felt. Liu Cheng-hung is a Big Shot in Miaoli. What he says, goes. If he says "Back Chen Chen Luan-ying," then back Chen Luan-ying it is. He ignored public antipathy toward Chen Luan-ying "going to war in her husband's place." He rejected the possibility of alternative candidates. In the end, Liu Cheng-hung overestimated his own clout. In the end, he could not override the will of the electorate.
In Da-an District, the Diane Lee incident was left unresolved. Again, the prime directive was: accomodate the vested interests. KMT leaders weren't willing to be the bad guys who made the tough decisions. They waffled endlessly. They never bothered to ask how the voters how felt. When the Diane Lee incident erupted, the KMT had just scored smashing victories in the legislative and presidential elections. They were confident the public was behind them. The relationship between the Lee family and the KMT leadership was tangled and complex. Diane Lee's image was positive. Her ability to cope was estimable. As a result, both the KMT and Diane Lee adopted a wait and see attitude. They crossed their fingers and hoped for the best. They made the same mistake over and over again, digging themselves in, deeper and deeper. In the end, Lee had no choice left but to resign. The KMT lost popular support, and in the by-election scored a humiliating "victory."
How to interpret the results of the Da-an District by-election is to some extent subjective. But the key message was Pan Blue voters are alienated and angry, while Pan Green voters are relatively united. Compare the Da-an District by-election to the 2008 Legislative Elections. The Pan Blue turnout fell by 44%. The Pan Green turnout fell by only 25%. In other words, the total voter turnout was under 40%, but Pan Green voter turnout was 75%. If we take Yao Li-ming into account, the KMT received 54% fewer votes than last time.
The results of the Da-an District by-election is a model that reflects the existing political scene. It shows that political evolution has accelerated. It shows that the KMT's "victory" in 2008 is rapidly being eroded, and that the DPP is unable to dig itself out of its hole. On the one hand, the public is disillusioned with the KMT. On the other hand, the public has no confidence in the DPP either.
The upcoming County and Municipal Elections, Taipei County in particular, merely reinforce these perceptions. Su Tseng-chang will run. That is a foregone conclusion. Rumors suggest several former DPP legislators will run for Taipei County township and village mayors. How this will play out is difficult to predict. The DPP has already seized the initiative. It is gathering momentum, and preparing for a comeback. But the DPP has not even begun to reform and restructure itself. Unless Su Tseng-chang's candidacy leads to some sort of breakthrough, factions within the Green Camp will collide over national identity and cross-Strait policy. Sowing discord through negative campaigning and street theater, in the hope of snatching a few chesnuts out of the fire, will lead only to partial victories, possibly in Taipei County. Without genuine reform, the DPP will find itself mired in myopic political intrigue, inside and outside the party, domestically and internationally. If the DPP is preoccupied with ratcheting up political tensions, internally and externally, how can it possibly have energy left over for reform?
The KMT has the same problem with Chou Hsi-wei that it had with Chen Luan-ying and Diane Lee. On the one hand, Chou Hsi-wei may no longer be a viable candidate. On the other hand, Chou Hsi-wei is unwilling to withdraw. The KMT is unable to prop him up, and unable to force him out. Chou Hsi-wei may well turn out to be Diane Lee redux.
The KMT's problem is a lack of leadership. The KMT is adrift. By bowing to realpolitik, the KMT avoids its responsibility to lead. Making tough decisions, acting decisively, and changing the course of history, is only necessary if one wishes to lead. For example, the Public Servants' Unaccounted For Assets Act has been stalled in the Legislative Yuan for years. Only after public opinion turned against the KMT, did it sheepishly put the bill up for a vote. The KMT Legislative Caucus has betrayed its constituents. The reason is the KMT party leadership lacks leadership. The Public Servants' Unaccounted For Assets Act, the Diane Lee incident, and most other problems stem from the KMT's lack of leadership. This includes its current problems with Chou Hsi-wei, which did not begin yesterday. Most of these problems stem from a lack of decisiveness. The public could not tolerate Chen Luan-ying "going to war in her husband's place," because in Liu Cheng-hung's eyes there was only Chen Luan-ying.
From Miaoli County, to Da-an District, to Taipei County, the political scene is deadlocked, again. Suppose as a result of Chou Hsi-wei the KMT suffers an election defeat in 2008, and loses the chance to fulfill its election promises. Suppose the DPP, which has yet to undergo genuine reformation, moves up its 2012 presidential campaign for the sake of Su Tseng-chang. What will become of the long-suffering public on Taiwan?
從苗栗經大安區到台北縣
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.04.07 06:04 am
事情甚至可從台東縣長鄺麗貞談起，她的「代夫出征」成為話柄。但國民黨在苗栗立委補選仍搞這一套，結果輸得連力挺陳鑾英的超人氣縣長劉政鴻也面色鐵青；可見，選民心中自有一把尺，妳要「代夫出征」，我們不抬轎子總可以吧！
苗栗輸在國民黨遷就既得利益及既成事實，不問選民的感受。劉政鴻在苗栗走路有風，他要挺陳鑾英就是陳鑾英；不計「代夫出征」的爭議性，也排除了另覓人選的可能性。但是，劉政鴻自我高估的民間聲望，畢竟未能高過選民的自主意識。
大安區李慶安事件終至不可收拾，同樣也因國民黨遷就既得利益及既成事實，鄉愿，和稀泥，不問選民的感受。李案伊始，國民黨在立委及總統選舉新勝，覺得在民意上倘可支撐，且對李家在國民黨高層盤根錯節的關係亦多顧忌，而李慶安又是形象及應對能力均不差的角色；因而，國民黨及李慶安皆心存僥倖，猶豫觀望，一錯再錯，愈陷愈深，結果仍然不免落到李慶安辭職，國民黨流失民心，一場補選更「贏」得灰頭土臉的下場。
大安區的開票結果，有見仁見智的解讀。但其中最重要的政治訊息應是：藍營選民的疏離憤懣，及相對而言綠營選民的團結。倘與二○○八年立委選舉相較，藍營選民此次有四十四%未投票，綠營則僅二十五%；換句話說，在不到四成的總投票率下，有七十五％的綠營選民出門投票。另若計入姚立明的因素，國民黨的選票更較上次少了五十四%。
倘若大安區此次開票可以視為反映現今政局的一個「型模」，已足顯示：政治演變的時間表似乎已經壓縮加速，國民黨二○○八年的「勝利」效應正在快速消蝕，而民進黨則不無從谷底漸漸走出來的可能性。此中透露的警訊是：國民黨的政績難如民眾期許，而民進黨的改革轉型亦可能無望。
再往下看縣市長選舉，尤其是台北縣長選舉，更可強化此種預感。蘇貞昌出馬似成定局，且傳將率領幾名前立委出馬競選北縣的鄉鎮市長；此雖難料後續發展如何，卻已有先聲奪人的氣勢，大有捲土重來的氣概。然而，此時此際民進黨改革轉型根本尚未開始，倘若即以蘇貞昌參選找到了突破口，則必仍是在綠營各種勢力的扭曲平衡中向前衝撞，國家認同依然混沌，兩岸政策仍舊錯亂，而僅憑藉「負面政治」及街頭運動來攪亂政局，渾水摸魚，火中取栗。這樣的民進黨，可能會獲得局部的勝利，如北縣選贏；卻不可能再有改革，而必會再陷於黨內外、國內外的短線政治鬥爭中，難以自拔。今後，民進黨僅為維持高張力的內外政治鬥爭已恐不逮，如何再有餘裕進行轉型改革？
反觀國民黨與周錫瑋的處境，其實已與陳鑾英及李慶安二事如出一轍。一方面，周錫瑋撐不住的危機已經浮現；但另一方面，周錫瑋卻不認栽，國民黨則扶不起他又勸不下他。倘係如此，提不起、放不下，周錫瑋恐又是另一個李慶安。
國民黨的問題是沒有「領導」。隨波逐流、遷就現實，即不需「領導」；打破鄉愿，不和稀泥，扭轉乾坤，才需要「領導」。例如，「財產來源不明罪」在立院擱淺近年，鬧到如今輿論與國民黨翻臉，才狼狽不堪地立案；這固然是立院黨團背叛民意，卻更是黨政中樞沒有「領導力」所致。其實，財產來源不明罪與李慶安事件，及國民黨現今出現的絕大多數問題，包括今日面對的周錫瑋難題（周的難題已非一日之寒），大多皆出自沒有大開大闔的「領導力」。正如，為什麼老百姓不能再忍受「代夫出征」，而國民黨及劉政鴻的眼中卻只有陳鑾英？
從苗栗經大安區到台北縣，政局儼然再陷僵局。倘若國民黨因周錫瑋敗選而將二○○八大選的改革契機盡付東流，而根本尚未調整體質的民進黨，又因蘇貞昌當選而將二○一二總統大選提前開打；苦命的台灣，苦命的台灣人，將伊於胡底？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 7, 2009
We could begin our tale in Taitung County, with Kuang Li-cheng. Kuang's declaration that she would "go to war in her husband's place" made her a laughing stock. Undeterred, the KMT stuck with her strategy in the Miaoli County Legislative by-election. The result? Even ultra popular Miaoli County Executive Liu Cheng-hung, who backed Chen Luan-ying, was shaken by the final count. Apparently the voters knew the score. Their conclusion? Go to war in your husband's place if you like. But don't expect us to go with you.
The KMT lost in Miaoli because their prime directive was: accomodate the vested interests. They never bothered to ask how the voters felt. Liu Cheng-hung is a Big Shot in Miaoli. What he says, goes. If he says "Back Chen Chen Luan-ying," then back Chen Luan-ying it is. He ignored public antipathy toward Chen Luan-ying "going to war in her husband's place." He rejected the possibility of alternative candidates. In the end, Liu Cheng-hung overestimated his own clout. In the end, he could not override the will of the electorate.
In Da-an District, the Diane Lee incident was left unresolved. Again, the prime directive was: accomodate the vested interests. KMT leaders weren't willing to be the bad guys who made the tough decisions. They waffled endlessly. They never bothered to ask how the voters how felt. When the Diane Lee incident erupted, the KMT had just scored smashing victories in the legislative and presidential elections. They were confident the public was behind them. The relationship between the Lee family and the KMT leadership was tangled and complex. Diane Lee's image was positive. Her ability to cope was estimable. As a result, both the KMT and Diane Lee adopted a wait and see attitude. They crossed their fingers and hoped for the best. They made the same mistake over and over again, digging themselves in, deeper and deeper. In the end, Lee had no choice left but to resign. The KMT lost popular support, and in the by-election scored a humiliating "victory."
How to interpret the results of the Da-an District by-election is to some extent subjective. But the key message was Pan Blue voters are alienated and angry, while Pan Green voters are relatively united. Compare the Da-an District by-election to the 2008 Legislative Elections. The Pan Blue turnout fell by 44%. The Pan Green turnout fell by only 25%. In other words, the total voter turnout was under 40%, but Pan Green voter turnout was 75%. If we take Yao Li-ming into account, the KMT received 54% fewer votes than last time.
The results of the Da-an District by-election is a model that reflects the existing political scene. It shows that political evolution has accelerated. It shows that the KMT's "victory" in 2008 is rapidly being eroded, and that the DPP is unable to dig itself out of its hole. On the one hand, the public is disillusioned with the KMT. On the other hand, the public has no confidence in the DPP either.
The upcoming County and Municipal Elections, Taipei County in particular, merely reinforce these perceptions. Su Tseng-chang will run. That is a foregone conclusion. Rumors suggest several former DPP legislators will run for Taipei County township and village mayors. How this will play out is difficult to predict. The DPP has already seized the initiative. It is gathering momentum, and preparing for a comeback. But the DPP has not even begun to reform and restructure itself. Unless Su Tseng-chang's candidacy leads to some sort of breakthrough, factions within the Green Camp will collide over national identity and cross-Strait policy. Sowing discord through negative campaigning and street theater, in the hope of snatching a few chesnuts out of the fire, will lead only to partial victories, possibly in Taipei County. Without genuine reform, the DPP will find itself mired in myopic political intrigue, inside and outside the party, domestically and internationally. If the DPP is preoccupied with ratcheting up political tensions, internally and externally, how can it possibly have energy left over for reform?
The KMT has the same problem with Chou Hsi-wei that it had with Chen Luan-ying and Diane Lee. On the one hand, Chou Hsi-wei may no longer be a viable candidate. On the other hand, Chou Hsi-wei is unwilling to withdraw. The KMT is unable to prop him up, and unable to force him out. Chou Hsi-wei may well turn out to be Diane Lee redux.
The KMT's problem is a lack of leadership. The KMT is adrift. By bowing to realpolitik, the KMT avoids its responsibility to lead. Making tough decisions, acting decisively, and changing the course of history, is only necessary if one wishes to lead. For example, the Public Servants' Unaccounted For Assets Act has been stalled in the Legislative Yuan for years. Only after public opinion turned against the KMT, did it sheepishly put the bill up for a vote. The KMT Legislative Caucus has betrayed its constituents. The reason is the KMT party leadership lacks leadership. The Public Servants' Unaccounted For Assets Act, the Diane Lee incident, and most other problems stem from the KMT's lack of leadership. This includes its current problems with Chou Hsi-wei, which did not begin yesterday. Most of these problems stem from a lack of decisiveness. The public could not tolerate Chen Luan-ying "going to war in her husband's place," because in Liu Cheng-hung's eyes there was only Chen Luan-ying.
From Miaoli County, to Da-an District, to Taipei County, the political scene is deadlocked, again. Suppose as a result of Chou Hsi-wei the KMT suffers an election defeat in 2008, and loses the chance to fulfill its election promises. Suppose the DPP, which has yet to undergo genuine reformation, moves up its 2012 presidential campaign for the sake of Su Tseng-chang. What will become of the long-suffering public on Taiwan?
從苗栗經大安區到台北縣
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.04.07 06:04 am
事情甚至可從台東縣長鄺麗貞談起，她的「代夫出征」成為話柄。但國民黨在苗栗立委補選仍搞這一套，結果輸得連力挺陳鑾英的超人氣縣長劉政鴻也面色鐵青；可見，選民心中自有一把尺，妳要「代夫出征」，我們不抬轎子總可以吧！
苗栗輸在國民黨遷就既得利益及既成事實，不問選民的感受。劉政鴻在苗栗走路有風，他要挺陳鑾英就是陳鑾英；不計「代夫出征」的爭議性，也排除了另覓人選的可能性。但是，劉政鴻自我高估的民間聲望，畢竟未能高過選民的自主意識。
大安區李慶安事件終至不可收拾，同樣也因國民黨遷就既得利益及既成事實，鄉愿，和稀泥，不問選民的感受。李案伊始，國民黨在立委及總統選舉新勝，覺得在民意上倘可支撐，且對李家在國民黨高層盤根錯節的關係亦多顧忌，而李慶安又是形象及應對能力均不差的角色；因而，國民黨及李慶安皆心存僥倖，猶豫觀望，一錯再錯，愈陷愈深，結果仍然不免落到李慶安辭職，國民黨流失民心，一場補選更「贏」得灰頭土臉的下場。
大安區的開票結果，有見仁見智的解讀。但其中最重要的政治訊息應是：藍營選民的疏離憤懣，及相對而言綠營選民的團結。倘與二○○八年立委選舉相較，藍營選民此次有四十四%未投票，綠營則僅二十五%；換句話說，在不到四成的總投票率下，有七十五％的綠營選民出門投票。另若計入姚立明的因素，國民黨的選票更較上次少了五十四%。
倘若大安區此次開票可以視為反映現今政局的一個「型模」，已足顯示：政治演變的時間表似乎已經壓縮加速，國民黨二○○八年的「勝利」效應正在快速消蝕，而民進黨則不無從谷底漸漸走出來的可能性。此中透露的警訊是：國民黨的政績難如民眾期許，而民進黨的改革轉型亦可能無望。
再往下看縣市長選舉，尤其是台北縣長選舉，更可強化此種預感。蘇貞昌出馬似成定局，且傳將率領幾名前立委出馬競選北縣的鄉鎮市長；此雖難料後續發展如何，卻已有先聲奪人的氣勢，大有捲土重來的氣概。然而，此時此際民進黨改革轉型根本尚未開始，倘若即以蘇貞昌參選找到了突破口，則必仍是在綠營各種勢力的扭曲平衡中向前衝撞，國家認同依然混沌，兩岸政策仍舊錯亂，而僅憑藉「負面政治」及街頭運動來攪亂政局，渾水摸魚，火中取栗。這樣的民進黨，可能會獲得局部的勝利，如北縣選贏；卻不可能再有改革，而必會再陷於黨內外、國內外的短線政治鬥爭中，難以自拔。今後，民進黨僅為維持高張力的內外政治鬥爭已恐不逮，如何再有餘裕進行轉型改革？
反觀國民黨與周錫瑋的處境，其實已與陳鑾英及李慶安二事如出一轍。一方面，周錫瑋撐不住的危機已經浮現；但另一方面，周錫瑋卻不認栽，國民黨則扶不起他又勸不下他。倘係如此，提不起、放不下，周錫瑋恐又是另一個李慶安。
國民黨的問題是沒有「領導」。隨波逐流、遷就現實，即不需「領導」；打破鄉愿，不和稀泥，扭轉乾坤，才需要「領導」。例如，「財產來源不明罪」在立院擱淺近年，鬧到如今輿論與國民黨翻臉，才狼狽不堪地立案；這固然是立院黨團背叛民意，卻更是黨政中樞沒有「領導力」所致。其實，財產來源不明罪與李慶安事件，及國民黨現今出現的絕大多數問題，包括今日面對的周錫瑋難題（周的難題已非一日之寒），大多皆出自沒有大開大闔的「領導力」。正如，為什麼老百姓不能再忍受「代夫出征」，而國民黨及劉政鴻的眼中卻只有陳鑾英？
從苗栗經大安區到台北縣，政局儼然再陷僵局。倘若國民黨因周錫瑋敗選而將二○○八大選的改革契機盡付東流，而根本尚未調整體質的民進黨，又因蘇貞昌當選而將二○一二總統大選提前開打；苦命的台灣，苦命的台灣人，將伊於胡底？
Monday, April 6, 2009
The G20 is Changing the World
The G20 is Changing the World
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 6, 2009
The Group of Twenty (G20) London Summit, the focus of world attention as major stock markets rose and fell, has adjourned. The results of the summit were better than expected. They have already changed the face of a world suffering from economic recession. In the face of such change, Taipei must acknowledge the harsh realities, and change in response.
The cacophy surrounding the G20 summit cast a shadow over the prospects of the member nations. But this is the weakest the global economy has been since World War II. No one could afford to have the summit fail. Therefore it adjourned with smiles all around. Never mind that France and Germany walked out. Never mind that Mainland China and the United States failed to address the divisive issue of international reserve currencies. Never mind that the London Summit Communique set grand goals and made long-winded declarations. It nevertheless came up with three specific measures to save the global economy. These include tripling the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reserves, expanding IMF issued Special Drawing Rights (SDR), and providing trade financing. The communique remained deliberately ambiguous regarding increased fiscal stimulus programs, international financial regulation, and anti-protectionism measures.
The summit failed to persuade the United States to honor the G20's collective commitment to increase public expenditures. But President Obama successfully prevented the G20 from becoming a "Badmouth the United States" summit. France and Germany, which wanted to establish an explicit regulatory framework in international financial law, failed to achieve their goal. Mainland China, Russia, India, and Brazil, as emerging nations, wanted their voices heard. Although the IMF offered a pulpit, they were unable to make themselves heard. The G20 Summit Communique failed to satisfy participants, but it gave outsiders a field day, especially the new democracies of Eastern Europe. IMF funds have been increased to 750 billion USD. Therefore the IMF can act as an emergency fire brigade. It can provide financial assistance to governments in crisis. It can prevent financial crises in individual nations from becoming regional crises. It can provide insurance against global financial instability. Every nation benefitted. Once the communique was issued, every major stock market rose.
The G20's large-scale injection of resources into the IMF increased its ability to rescue ailing economies. Emerging economies have also injected resources into the fund. This will promote substantive reform of the IMF, including improved representation, changes in financing, and the establishment of SDRs. Long standing mismatches between IMF representation and the economic strength of member nations has led to imbalances in IMF member nation oversight. It has also allowed poor countries to become the economic tools of rich countries. This has led to even more uneven development, and current demands for reform.
More importantly, the issuance of SDRs is the exclusive prerogative of the IMF. The expansion of this prerogative will pave the way for a new international reserve currency. Next year is critical. The SDR basket composition is reviewed every five years. In addition to the US Dollar, the Euro, the Japanese Yen, and the British Pound, the rapidly rising Renminbi is the international currency that has caught everyones' attention. A prerequisite for the review of the SDR basket composition is the internationalization of the RMB. This is a major challenge for the Mainland Chinese economy. Beijing has been aggressively signing currency exchange agreements with other nations recently. Beijing is clearly proceeding methodically. Under these circumstances, Taiwan, which is highly dependent upon trade with Mainland China, will be affected. Secure business transactions, cross-Strait currency electronic clearing, and currency exchange mechanisms all require advance planning. The G20 summit has committed five trillion USD to implement the largest economic rescue package in human history. But because increases are already planned, this commitment will not provide any additional stimulus. What's new is demands that the IMF regularly reassess of the effectiveness of various governments' implementation. This will establish constraints. It will also demonstrate the degree of determination summit leaders have toward saving their economies. It will give the world economy what it needs most -- confidence. Once confidence has been ignited, additional fuel can be added to the flame, in the form of various nations' stimulus packages over the past half-year. The resulting recovery may proceed at a better-than-expected pace. Once the pace picks up, it will be time to think about exit strategies.
Of course, Mainland China's initiative at the G20 summit cannot be ignored. The G20 is a multilateral political forum. Based on their economic development, its members fall into three camps: the United States, Europe, and emerging countries. But just prior to the summit, Beijing introduced a controversial topic. It once again used the Sino-US leaders' dialogue to shape the G20. This has allowed Beijing, which was an opinion leader during past international forums, to display its newly-gained confidence. It means that Beijing will actively participate in and even take the lead on more and more international issues. This is a development that is free of ideology. Taipei must neither accept it in its entirety, nor reject in its entirety. It must understand how Mainland China is changing under Beijing, and learn how to respond.
G20正在改變世界
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.04.06 04:30 am
全球矚目的二十國集團（G20）領袖會議在各大股市的漲聲中落幕，並以超乎預期的成果，改變正苦於經濟衰退的世界；面對轉變中的世界，台灣既要認清事實，更要積極應變。
各國在G20高峰會前發出的雜音，一度為這次集會的前景蒙上陰影。不過，值此二次世界大戰後經濟最脆弱的時刻，任誰也承受不起峰會失敗之過的無形壓力，還是讓峰會在微笑中結束，既未發生法、德退席的尷尬，中、美也未討論尖銳對立的國際儲備貨幣議題；儘管倫敦公報依舊是目標宏偉、論述冗長的宣言，但還是拿出了三項拯救世界經濟的具體對策，包括將國際貨幣基金（IMF）的資金規模增加兩倍、擴大發行IMF特別提款權（SDR），並提供貿易融資等；而在強化財政刺激、改善國際金融監管及反貿易保護主義上，則持續保持各有解讀空間的模糊。
對期待G20共同承諾擴大公共支出的美國而言，這次峰會是不成功的，但歐巴馬總統的柔軟身段，成功地讓G20未淪為「批鬥美國」大會；對要求明確訂立國際金融監管架構的法、德來說，當然也沒有達陣；至於一心提升新興國家發言權的中國、俄羅斯、印度及巴西，雖然找到了IMF這個使力點，卻還無法使上力。不過，G20結論雖沒能讓圈內人滿載而歸，卻讓圈外人樂不可支，尤其是東歐等新興民主國家，因為IMF資金規模擴增至七千五百億美元，可讓IMF扮演強大的金融救火隊，提供危難國家資金援助，避免個別國家的金融危機擴大為區域危機，無疑是為全球金融安定提供了保險，各國同受其惠，因而結論一出，主要股市無不報以熱烈的「漲」聲。
G20大手筆挹注IMF的資源，除了增強其救援實力，隨著新興經濟體資金的進駐，也將在實質層面上推進IMF的改革，包括代表權的分配、籌資方式的改變、 SDR的組成等。IMF的代表權與經濟規模長期不相稱，不只讓IMF對成員國的監督尺度失衡，還成為富國藉以干預窮國經濟體制的工具，導致發展更不平衡，如今已面臨改變壓力。
更重要的是，SDR此一專屬IMF的國際準備資產將擴大發行，為成為新的國際儲備貨幣鋪路，加上明年就是五年一調SDR內含貨幣及權重的關鍵期，其會否在現有的美元、歐元、日圓及英鎊之外，加上快速崛起的人民幣，已是國際貨幣體系最關注的事；SDR貨幣重組的前提是人民幣的國際化，這對大中國經濟更是一大挑戰，而以近期中國與各國積極簽署貨幣互換協議的動作，北京政府顯然已在有序推動。依此情勢，高度依賴中國大陸貿易的台灣，勢將受到牽動，企業交易安排、兩岸貨幣清算及兌換安全等方面都已須及早規劃。
另方面，G20峰會雖然承諾執行人類史上最大規模的五兆美元振興經濟方案，但因是既有計畫的加總，這項承諾沒有帶來更多的刺激；新穎之處在於要求IMF定期評估各國執行成效，形成了另一種約束力，也展現了與會領袖齊心挽救經濟的決心，帶給世界經濟現下最需要的信心；而信心一旦點燃，輔以各國過去半年來種種刺激措施備置的薪柴，復甦之火也可能以超乎預期的速度、幅度竄起，屆時需要的政策退場之路已須預想。
當然，中國大陸在這次G20峰會的主動出擊，更是不容忽視的發展。G20是個多邊政治論壇，也可依發展模式及程度簡化為美、歐及新興國家的三方陣營，但北京在會前連續拋出爭議話題、再運用中美領袖對話塑造的G2格局，已讓中國從昔日國際論壇的聽眾躍升為意見領袖；其所展現的外交自信，也意謂在愈來愈多的國際議題上，中國將積極參與，甚至可能主導，並將產生影響。這是一個無涉意識形態的發展，台灣該做的既不是一味的迎合，也非完全的排斥，而是重新去認識正在轉變中的中國，找出自己的路。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 6, 2009
The Group of Twenty (G20) London Summit, the focus of world attention as major stock markets rose and fell, has adjourned. The results of the summit were better than expected. They have already changed the face of a world suffering from economic recession. In the face of such change, Taipei must acknowledge the harsh realities, and change in response.
The cacophy surrounding the G20 summit cast a shadow over the prospects of the member nations. But this is the weakest the global economy has been since World War II. No one could afford to have the summit fail. Therefore it adjourned with smiles all around. Never mind that France and Germany walked out. Never mind that Mainland China and the United States failed to address the divisive issue of international reserve currencies. Never mind that the London Summit Communique set grand goals and made long-winded declarations. It nevertheless came up with three specific measures to save the global economy. These include tripling the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reserves, expanding IMF issued Special Drawing Rights (SDR), and providing trade financing. The communique remained deliberately ambiguous regarding increased fiscal stimulus programs, international financial regulation, and anti-protectionism measures.
The summit failed to persuade the United States to honor the G20's collective commitment to increase public expenditures. But President Obama successfully prevented the G20 from becoming a "Badmouth the United States" summit. France and Germany, which wanted to establish an explicit regulatory framework in international financial law, failed to achieve their goal. Mainland China, Russia, India, and Brazil, as emerging nations, wanted their voices heard. Although the IMF offered a pulpit, they were unable to make themselves heard. The G20 Summit Communique failed to satisfy participants, but it gave outsiders a field day, especially the new democracies of Eastern Europe. IMF funds have been increased to 750 billion USD. Therefore the IMF can act as an emergency fire brigade. It can provide financial assistance to governments in crisis. It can prevent financial crises in individual nations from becoming regional crises. It can provide insurance against global financial instability. Every nation benefitted. Once the communique was issued, every major stock market rose.
The G20's large-scale injection of resources into the IMF increased its ability to rescue ailing economies. Emerging economies have also injected resources into the fund. This will promote substantive reform of the IMF, including improved representation, changes in financing, and the establishment of SDRs. Long standing mismatches between IMF representation and the economic strength of member nations has led to imbalances in IMF member nation oversight. It has also allowed poor countries to become the economic tools of rich countries. This has led to even more uneven development, and current demands for reform.
More importantly, the issuance of SDRs is the exclusive prerogative of the IMF. The expansion of this prerogative will pave the way for a new international reserve currency. Next year is critical. The SDR basket composition is reviewed every five years. In addition to the US Dollar, the Euro, the Japanese Yen, and the British Pound, the rapidly rising Renminbi is the international currency that has caught everyones' attention. A prerequisite for the review of the SDR basket composition is the internationalization of the RMB. This is a major challenge for the Mainland Chinese economy. Beijing has been aggressively signing currency exchange agreements with other nations recently. Beijing is clearly proceeding methodically. Under these circumstances, Taiwan, which is highly dependent upon trade with Mainland China, will be affected. Secure business transactions, cross-Strait currency electronic clearing, and currency exchange mechanisms all require advance planning. The G20 summit has committed five trillion USD to implement the largest economic rescue package in human history. But because increases are already planned, this commitment will not provide any additional stimulus. What's new is demands that the IMF regularly reassess of the effectiveness of various governments' implementation. This will establish constraints. It will also demonstrate the degree of determination summit leaders have toward saving their economies. It will give the world economy what it needs most -- confidence. Once confidence has been ignited, additional fuel can be added to the flame, in the form of various nations' stimulus packages over the past half-year. The resulting recovery may proceed at a better-than-expected pace. Once the pace picks up, it will be time to think about exit strategies.
Of course, Mainland China's initiative at the G20 summit cannot be ignored. The G20 is a multilateral political forum. Based on their economic development, its members fall into three camps: the United States, Europe, and emerging countries. But just prior to the summit, Beijing introduced a controversial topic. It once again used the Sino-US leaders' dialogue to shape the G20. This has allowed Beijing, which was an opinion leader during past international forums, to display its newly-gained confidence. It means that Beijing will actively participate in and even take the lead on more and more international issues. This is a development that is free of ideology. Taipei must neither accept it in its entirety, nor reject in its entirety. It must understand how Mainland China is changing under Beijing, and learn how to respond.
G20正在改變世界
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.04.06 04:30 am
全球矚目的二十國集團（G20）領袖會議在各大股市的漲聲中落幕，並以超乎預期的成果，改變正苦於經濟衰退的世界；面對轉變中的世界，台灣既要認清事實，更要積極應變。
各國在G20高峰會前發出的雜音，一度為這次集會的前景蒙上陰影。不過，值此二次世界大戰後經濟最脆弱的時刻，任誰也承受不起峰會失敗之過的無形壓力，還是讓峰會在微笑中結束，既未發生法、德退席的尷尬，中、美也未討論尖銳對立的國際儲備貨幣議題；儘管倫敦公報依舊是目標宏偉、論述冗長的宣言，但還是拿出了三項拯救世界經濟的具體對策，包括將國際貨幣基金（IMF）的資金規模增加兩倍、擴大發行IMF特別提款權（SDR），並提供貿易融資等；而在強化財政刺激、改善國際金融監管及反貿易保護主義上，則持續保持各有解讀空間的模糊。
對期待G20共同承諾擴大公共支出的美國而言，這次峰會是不成功的，但歐巴馬總統的柔軟身段，成功地讓G20未淪為「批鬥美國」大會；對要求明確訂立國際金融監管架構的法、德來說，當然也沒有達陣；至於一心提升新興國家發言權的中國、俄羅斯、印度及巴西，雖然找到了IMF這個使力點，卻還無法使上力。不過，G20結論雖沒能讓圈內人滿載而歸，卻讓圈外人樂不可支，尤其是東歐等新興民主國家，因為IMF資金規模擴增至七千五百億美元，可讓IMF扮演強大的金融救火隊，提供危難國家資金援助，避免個別國家的金融危機擴大為區域危機，無疑是為全球金融安定提供了保險，各國同受其惠，因而結論一出，主要股市無不報以熱烈的「漲」聲。
G20大手筆挹注IMF的資源，除了增強其救援實力，隨著新興經濟體資金的進駐，也將在實質層面上推進IMF的改革，包括代表權的分配、籌資方式的改變、 SDR的組成等。IMF的代表權與經濟規模長期不相稱，不只讓IMF對成員國的監督尺度失衡，還成為富國藉以干預窮國經濟體制的工具，導致發展更不平衡，如今已面臨改變壓力。
更重要的是，SDR此一專屬IMF的國際準備資產將擴大發行，為成為新的國際儲備貨幣鋪路，加上明年就是五年一調SDR內含貨幣及權重的關鍵期，其會否在現有的美元、歐元、日圓及英鎊之外，加上快速崛起的人民幣，已是國際貨幣體系最關注的事；SDR貨幣重組的前提是人民幣的國際化，這對大中國經濟更是一大挑戰，而以近期中國與各國積極簽署貨幣互換協議的動作，北京政府顯然已在有序推動。依此情勢，高度依賴中國大陸貿易的台灣，勢將受到牽動，企業交易安排、兩岸貨幣清算及兌換安全等方面都已須及早規劃。
另方面，G20峰會雖然承諾執行人類史上最大規模的五兆美元振興經濟方案，但因是既有計畫的加總，這項承諾沒有帶來更多的刺激；新穎之處在於要求IMF定期評估各國執行成效，形成了另一種約束力，也展現了與會領袖齊心挽救經濟的決心，帶給世界經濟現下最需要的信心；而信心一旦點燃，輔以各國過去半年來種種刺激措施備置的薪柴，復甦之火也可能以超乎預期的速度、幅度竄起，屆時需要的政策退場之路已須預想。
當然，中國大陸在這次G20峰會的主動出擊，更是不容忽視的發展。G20是個多邊政治論壇，也可依發展模式及程度簡化為美、歐及新興國家的三方陣營，但北京在會前連續拋出爭議話題、再運用中美領袖對話塑造的G2格局，已讓中國從昔日國際論壇的聽眾躍升為意見領袖；其所展現的外交自信，也意謂在愈來愈多的國際議題上，中國將積極參與，甚至可能主導，並將產生影響。這是一個無涉意識形態的發展，台灣該做的既不是一味的迎合，也非完全的排斥，而是重新去認識正在轉變中的中國，找出自己的路。
Friday, April 3, 2009
ECFA, A Chance for a Brighter Future
ECFA, A Chance for a Brighter Future
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 3, 2009
After prolonged controversy, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has finally invited representatives from industry and academia to discuss the merits of signing ECFA. Opinion remains divided over the pros and cons of ECFA. But the parties have at least agreed to meet face-to-face. This dialogue should continue, as it will help clarify the relevant issues. Only then can we avoid the ideological confrontation that has hijacked substantive discussion of CECA and ECFA for the past several months.
Dialog has gradually made clear whether we should sign ECFA. Proponents and opponents alike are clearly concerned about the consequences of signing or not signing. Those who advocate signing as soon as possible feel that if we fail to seize the moment, those industries on Taiwan that are still competitive may face high tariffs and the loss of their competitive advantage. They will be forced to relocate in toto, leading to a decline in our GDP. Those who oppose signing worry that given lingering cross-Strait hostility, the hasty signing of ECFA will mean the loss of a bargaining chip. In the absence of tariff protection, less competitive small and medium enterprises may suffer from the dumping of cheap goods by the mainland.
Comparing these two very different positions brings us back to the fundamental question, should ECFA be seen as a threat, or an opportunity? Should the ROC aggressively face this challenge? Or simply bar the doors, curl up in a ball, and do nothing?
If we are willing only to see the signing of ECFA as a threat, then the conclusion is simple. We can refuse to discuss anything. We can lock ourselves behind closed doors and repeat to ourselves that we are masters in our own home. Why should we care about changes in the outside world? Whenever cross-Strait disputes arise, we need only invoke the issue of "sovereignty," of "missiles," and so on. We needn't discuss the issue at all. Approaching problems from such a mindset is easy. Essentially one need do nothing. Those in charge need only issue an impromptu provocation against the other side. If anyone criticizes them, they can accuse critics of "insufficient patriotism toward Taiwan." They can even paint them red. Isn't this what the ruling Democratic Progressive Party did during its eight years in office? The Democratic Progressive Party leadership relentlessly points the finger at the Ma administration. But the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy liberalization measures were formulated during the DPP's eight years in office. The measures were correctly formulated. So why weren't they implemented? The two sides have finally arrived at a promising consensus. Whether to sign ECFA is still under discussion. Yet the alarmists are already inciting fear. They even hope to transform that fear into some form of political mobilization. They hope to obliterate or distort the substance of the issue.
If, one the other hand, we are willing to see the bilateral signing of ECFA as an opportunity, then our work is cut out for us. For example, many internationally competitive industries must alter their regional strategies before the ASEAN Plus One Free Trade Area is officially established. They must position themselves properly before the new international division of labor takes shape. Industries that may be affected must respond or restructure themselves as soon as possible. They may face competition from cheaper goods. But at least they ought to have confidence in the "Made in Taiwan" label! After all, over the next few years an entirely new scenario will prevail. Only by seeing changes as an opportunity, can one deal with them wisely. Only then can one take decisive action, choose the right path, and discover one's proper role. One must not cower in fright behind closed doors, hurl wild accusations, or incite conflict.
Looking back over the past half century, when has the ROC's situation been better? When have the risks the ROC faces been fewer? Over the many winters that have gone by, what has the ROC had to be afraid of? Really? Haven't we who live on Taiwan characterized ourselves as adept at seizing opportunities amidst danger, at creating miracles in the face of adversity? In future consultations with the other side over ECFA, we will of course consider all sorts of risks. We will of course consider prudent responses to a wide range of variables. But we should have confidence in ourselves. We should seize opportunities that arise in a timely manner. We should take appropriate action to deal with them. We must not be afraid of taking even the first step, poor-mouthing our prospects all the way, frightening ourselves to death!
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.04.03
社論－險中掌握生機 才能締造未來
本報訊
紛擾了許久，經濟部終於在日前正式邀集產學界代表，就未來是否與大陸洽簽ＥＣＦＡ的事宜，舉行座談會，這場對話儘管正反觀點依舊壁壘分明，但至少立場對立的各方總算有了面對面對話的機會。展望未來，這種對話與溝通形式應該持續下去，讓相關問題的全貌能夠呈現的更清晰，才能避免像過去幾個月，不論是ＣＥＣＡ還是ＥＣＦＡ，都一再讓意識形態的對立凌駕實質問題的討論。
透過對話，圍繞在應否洽簽ＥＣＦＡ的爭議核心，其實也漸漸明朗了。很顯然，正反雙方都在乎簽或不簽所可能造成的後果。譬如主張應儘快洽簽的論者，就認為若不儘快掌握時機，台灣現有若干還有競爭性的產業，很可能將面臨高關稅衝擊而喪失優勢，進一步被迫全面外移，造成台灣ＧＤＰ的下降；相對的反對者則擔心在兩岸敵意尚未完全消解下，倉促洽簽ＥＣＦＡ反而會讓台灣喪失談判籌碼，而少數競爭力薄弱的中小企業，也很可能在少了關稅保護後，將面臨對岸廉價品傾銷的衝擊。
對比這兩種截然不同的立場，其實還是可以將之歸結到問題的基本面：亦即面對兩岸未來是否應洽簽ＥＣＦＡ的爭議，究竟是要將之視為對台灣的一種威脅，還是一種機會？台灣該選擇的是面對挑戰，積極作為？還是乾脆關門鎖國，退縮無為？
假若只肯將兩岸洽簽ＥＣＦＡ視做是一種威脅，那麼結論倒也很簡單，乾脆什麼都不必談，就關起門來當皇帝就好了，何必還在乎外面世界的變化？什麼關乎兩岸的所有爭議，只須搬出「主權議題」、「飛彈議題」等論述就收住了，根本就不必再往下談了。要堅持這種思維邏輯其實最輕鬆，因為根本不必有任何作為，主事者只須三不五時發表個聲明挑釁對岸即可。若是碰到有人批評，既可指責對方「不愛台灣」，還可給對方扣上個紅帽子。不諱言的說，這種選擇，不就是民進黨在過去八年執政年代的具體寫照？民進黨主事者曾不斷的強調，指馬政府在兩岸政策上的諸多開放措施，都是在該黨執政期間所規畫，說得好，但為什麼過了八年的歲月，永遠只見規畫卻不見落實呢？如今兩岸之間好不容易見到難得的緩和榮景，連要否洽簽ＥＣＦＡ都還停留在討論階段，卻只見威脅論者已在不斷升高恐嚇的聲浪，甚至還有意將之轉化成一種政治動員，讓問題的實質層面持續被掩蓋，甚至被扭曲。
相對的，如果將兩岸能否洽簽ＥＣＦＡ視為一種機會，那麼台灣此刻需要做的功課，需要趕的進度就實在太多了。譬如不少還具有國際競爭性的產業，恐怕得趕在「東協加一」自由貿易區正式形成前，先調整好區域布局的策略，以便能在全新的國際產業分工新局中卡到位；而那些可能會受到波及的產業，也必須盡快做好因應或是轉型的準備，就算可能必須面對廉價品的競爭，至少也該對「台灣製造」的品牌具備最起碼的信心吧！畢竟，在接下來幾年全新的局面中，惟有將一切的變局視做是一種機會，才能有效展現智慧，也才能採取果斷的行動，選擇對台灣最有利的途徑，也找到對台灣最合適的角色與定位。終究不該是關起門來自己嚇自己，甚至扣帽子搞對立吧。
回顧過去半個世紀，台灣的處境有什麼時候真正好過？台灣所曾面對過的風險又何嘗真正少過？但幾十年寒暑過去了，台灣其實不曾真正畏懼過什麼，不是嗎？台灣人經常自我標榜的精神，不就是善於在風險中看到機會，在逆境中締造奇蹟嗎？未來若是要與對岸協商洽簽ＥＣＦＡ，本來就該考量各種風險，也本來就該審慎因應各種變數，不是嗎？台灣該有這個自信，善於在機會來到時，採取適當行動打開局面吧！總不能連第一步都還未踏出去，就一路唱衰，就頻頻自我恐嚇吧！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 3, 2009
After prolonged controversy, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has finally invited representatives from industry and academia to discuss the merits of signing ECFA. Opinion remains divided over the pros and cons of ECFA. But the parties have at least agreed to meet face-to-face. This dialogue should continue, as it will help clarify the relevant issues. Only then can we avoid the ideological confrontation that has hijacked substantive discussion of CECA and ECFA for the past several months.
Dialog has gradually made clear whether we should sign ECFA. Proponents and opponents alike are clearly concerned about the consequences of signing or not signing. Those who advocate signing as soon as possible feel that if we fail to seize the moment, those industries on Taiwan that are still competitive may face high tariffs and the loss of their competitive advantage. They will be forced to relocate in toto, leading to a decline in our GDP. Those who oppose signing worry that given lingering cross-Strait hostility, the hasty signing of ECFA will mean the loss of a bargaining chip. In the absence of tariff protection, less competitive small and medium enterprises may suffer from the dumping of cheap goods by the mainland.
Comparing these two very different positions brings us back to the fundamental question, should ECFA be seen as a threat, or an opportunity? Should the ROC aggressively face this challenge? Or simply bar the doors, curl up in a ball, and do nothing?
If we are willing only to see the signing of ECFA as a threat, then the conclusion is simple. We can refuse to discuss anything. We can lock ourselves behind closed doors and repeat to ourselves that we are masters in our own home. Why should we care about changes in the outside world? Whenever cross-Strait disputes arise, we need only invoke the issue of "sovereignty," of "missiles," and so on. We needn't discuss the issue at all. Approaching problems from such a mindset is easy. Essentially one need do nothing. Those in charge need only issue an impromptu provocation against the other side. If anyone criticizes them, they can accuse critics of "insufficient patriotism toward Taiwan." They can even paint them red. Isn't this what the ruling Democratic Progressive Party did during its eight years in office? The Democratic Progressive Party leadership relentlessly points the finger at the Ma administration. But the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy liberalization measures were formulated during the DPP's eight years in office. The measures were correctly formulated. So why weren't they implemented? The two sides have finally arrived at a promising consensus. Whether to sign ECFA is still under discussion. Yet the alarmists are already inciting fear. They even hope to transform that fear into some form of political mobilization. They hope to obliterate or distort the substance of the issue.
If, one the other hand, we are willing to see the bilateral signing of ECFA as an opportunity, then our work is cut out for us. For example, many internationally competitive industries must alter their regional strategies before the ASEAN Plus One Free Trade Area is officially established. They must position themselves properly before the new international division of labor takes shape. Industries that may be affected must respond or restructure themselves as soon as possible. They may face competition from cheaper goods. But at least they ought to have confidence in the "Made in Taiwan" label! After all, over the next few years an entirely new scenario will prevail. Only by seeing changes as an opportunity, can one deal with them wisely. Only then can one take decisive action, choose the right path, and discover one's proper role. One must not cower in fright behind closed doors, hurl wild accusations, or incite conflict.
Looking back over the past half century, when has the ROC's situation been better? When have the risks the ROC faces been fewer? Over the many winters that have gone by, what has the ROC had to be afraid of? Really? Haven't we who live on Taiwan characterized ourselves as adept at seizing opportunities amidst danger, at creating miracles in the face of adversity? In future consultations with the other side over ECFA, we will of course consider all sorts of risks. We will of course consider prudent responses to a wide range of variables. But we should have confidence in ourselves. We should seize opportunities that arise in a timely manner. We should take appropriate action to deal with them. We must not be afraid of taking even the first step, poor-mouthing our prospects all the way, frightening ourselves to death!
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.04.03
社論－險中掌握生機 才能締造未來
本報訊
紛擾了許久，經濟部終於在日前正式邀集產學界代表，就未來是否與大陸洽簽ＥＣＦＡ的事宜，舉行座談會，這場對話儘管正反觀點依舊壁壘分明，但至少立場對立的各方總算有了面對面對話的機會。展望未來，這種對話與溝通形式應該持續下去，讓相關問題的全貌能夠呈現的更清晰，才能避免像過去幾個月，不論是ＣＥＣＡ還是ＥＣＦＡ，都一再讓意識形態的對立凌駕實質問題的討論。
透過對話，圍繞在應否洽簽ＥＣＦＡ的爭議核心，其實也漸漸明朗了。很顯然，正反雙方都在乎簽或不簽所可能造成的後果。譬如主張應儘快洽簽的論者，就認為若不儘快掌握時機，台灣現有若干還有競爭性的產業，很可能將面臨高關稅衝擊而喪失優勢，進一步被迫全面外移，造成台灣ＧＤＰ的下降；相對的反對者則擔心在兩岸敵意尚未完全消解下，倉促洽簽ＥＣＦＡ反而會讓台灣喪失談判籌碼，而少數競爭力薄弱的中小企業，也很可能在少了關稅保護後，將面臨對岸廉價品傾銷的衝擊。
對比這兩種截然不同的立場，其實還是可以將之歸結到問題的基本面：亦即面對兩岸未來是否應洽簽ＥＣＦＡ的爭議，究竟是要將之視為對台灣的一種威脅，還是一種機會？台灣該選擇的是面對挑戰，積極作為？還是乾脆關門鎖國，退縮無為？
假若只肯將兩岸洽簽ＥＣＦＡ視做是一種威脅，那麼結論倒也很簡單，乾脆什麼都不必談，就關起門來當皇帝就好了，何必還在乎外面世界的變化？什麼關乎兩岸的所有爭議，只須搬出「主權議題」、「飛彈議題」等論述就收住了，根本就不必再往下談了。要堅持這種思維邏輯其實最輕鬆，因為根本不必有任何作為，主事者只須三不五時發表個聲明挑釁對岸即可。若是碰到有人批評，既可指責對方「不愛台灣」，還可給對方扣上個紅帽子。不諱言的說，這種選擇，不就是民進黨在過去八年執政年代的具體寫照？民進黨主事者曾不斷的強調，指馬政府在兩岸政策上的諸多開放措施，都是在該黨執政期間所規畫，說得好，但為什麼過了八年的歲月，永遠只見規畫卻不見落實呢？如今兩岸之間好不容易見到難得的緩和榮景，連要否洽簽ＥＣＦＡ都還停留在討論階段，卻只見威脅論者已在不斷升高恐嚇的聲浪，甚至還有意將之轉化成一種政治動員，讓問題的實質層面持續被掩蓋，甚至被扭曲。
相對的，如果將兩岸能否洽簽ＥＣＦＡ視為一種機會，那麼台灣此刻需要做的功課，需要趕的進度就實在太多了。譬如不少還具有國際競爭性的產業，恐怕得趕在「東協加一」自由貿易區正式形成前，先調整好區域布局的策略，以便能在全新的國際產業分工新局中卡到位；而那些可能會受到波及的產業，也必須盡快做好因應或是轉型的準備，就算可能必須面對廉價品的競爭，至少也該對「台灣製造」的品牌具備最起碼的信心吧！畢竟，在接下來幾年全新的局面中，惟有將一切的變局視做是一種機會，才能有效展現智慧，也才能採取果斷的行動，選擇對台灣最有利的途徑，也找到對台灣最合適的角色與定位。終究不該是關起門來自己嚇自己，甚至扣帽子搞對立吧。
回顧過去半個世紀，台灣的處境有什麼時候真正好過？台灣所曾面對過的風險又何嘗真正少過？但幾十年寒暑過去了，台灣其實不曾真正畏懼過什麼，不是嗎？台灣人經常自我標榜的精神，不就是善於在風險中看到機會，在逆境中締造奇蹟嗎？未來若是要與對岸協商洽簽ＥＣＦＡ，本來就該考量各種風險，也本來就該審慎因應各種變數，不是嗎？台灣該有這個自信，善於在機會來到時，採取適當行動打開局面吧！總不能連第一步都還未踏出去，就一路唱衰，就頻頻自我恐嚇吧！
Thursday, April 2, 2009
Local Elections in the North and South
Local Elections in the North and South
A Preview of the Presidential Election?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2, 2009
Tsai Ing-wen appears to have found the political lever she needs. Su Tseng-chang's campaign for Taipei County Commissioner will be the engine that allows the Democratic Progressive Party to make a comeback. The nomination of Li Chun-yi for Tainan County Commissioner, and rejection of Chen Tang-shan, will be the big move that draws a line in the sand between the DPP and Ah-Bian.
Chen Tang-shan is seen as Chen Shui-bian's proxy. Chen Tang-shan sees himself as Chen Shui-bian's proxy. Therefore the nomination of Chen Tang-shan has become the acid test for whether Tsai Ing-wen can get Chen Shui-bian off her back. Chen Tang-shan enjoys a wide lead in the polls. Yet Tsai Ing-wen has nominated Li Chun-yi. She runs the risk that Chen Shui-bian may enter the Legislative by-election. Her decision means she has steeled her nerves. No wonder Tainan County Legislator Wang Hsing-nan says "The DPP will be officially divided."
Su Tseng-chang is expected to run for Taipei County Commissioner. This probably motivated Tsai Ing-wen to reject Chen Tang-shan. Hopes that the DPP can make a comeback in Taipei County, and distance itself from Ah-Bian in Tainan County, have suddenly provided her with a lever and a clarion call. This may provide the Democratic Progressive Party with the strategic framework for its campaigns in the year end County and Municipal Elections. Their political calculus is that distancing the party from Ah-Bian will help the DPP make a successful comeback, and conversely, making a successful comeback will help the DPP distance itself from Ah-Bian.
By contrast, the KMT finds itself on the horns of a dilemma, in both Taipei County and Tainan County. Chou Hsi-wei in Taipei County is no longer politically viable, but cannot be persuaded to withdraw. As for Tainan County, if Chen Tang-shan and Li Chun-yi engage in a mutually-destructive duel to the death, the KMT may reap the rewards. But the KMT lacks a candidate in Tainan County able to take advantage of the opportunity. The KMT fears it will lose in Taipei County. The KMT fears it can't win in Tainan County. If it watches idly as it loses in Taipei County and fails to win in Tainan County, the Democratic Progressive Party's leverage in both the North and the South will break the KMT's hold on the larger scenario. The consequences of such a strategic reversal of fortune could be disastrous.
The Battle over Taipei County will be a preliminary skirmish in the Battle for the 2012 Presidency. Add to this the impact of the Tainan County Commissioner Election. Tsai Ing-wen is hoping for a succession of victories, beginning with Su Tseng-chang winning the Taipei County Election, successfully distancing the DPP from Ah-bian, and finally, regaining the Presidency in 2012. By contrast, the KMT's strategic objective must be to disrupt any such chain of victories. Su Tseng-chang must not be allowed to win Taipei County. The DPP must not be allowed to regroup. The DPP must not be allowed to launch its campaign for the Presidency in advance of 2012. If the KMT cannot defeat the DPP's strategy, the consequences will be disastrous.
The current scenario is the result of Tsai Ing-wen's willingness to face down Chen Tang-shan despite his high poll numbers. She is doing so to establish her authority within the party, and to assert her right to set the party's agenda. Conversely, the KMT can neither boost Chou Hsi-wei's dismal prospects, nor persuade him to withdraw from the race. It has lost its leadership status. and needless to say, its ability to set the party's agenda.
The County Commissioner and City Mayor Elections have been elevated to the status of preliminary skirmishs to the 2012 presidential election. The Tainan County Election has become an indicator of whether the DPP can distance itself from Ah-Bian. Therefore the DPP and the KMT are under pressure to win at all cost. For Tsai Ing-wen, Taipei County must be won. Only then can the DPP obtain a powerful political engine. The function of the Tainan County Election meanwhile, is merely to deny the KMT the opportunity to disrupt the DPP's political momentum. It is also an opportunity to draw a line in sand between the DPP and Ah-Bian. In doing so, it must not split the DPP. Conversely, if the Democratic Progressive Party loses Taipei County and Tainan County, Tsai Ing-wen will suffer a crushing defeat. The Democratic Progressive Party will be plunged into even greater crisis. By contrast, if Ma Ying-jeou loses Taipei County, the Democratic Progressive Party will launch its 2012 presidential campaign in advance, and the political scene will have no peace.
If the DPP begins its 2012 presidential campaign with the County Commissioner and City Mayor Elections, the political scene on Taiwan will become even more chaotic. For the KMT, increased social unrest will make governing the nation even more difficult. For the DPP, it has yet to sort out its position on the nation's identity and cross-Strait policy. If it touches off a battle for the 2012 presidency under such circumstances, it will have a difficult time transitioning from its current internal "balance of terror." Even assuming it succeeds, it may not be able to bolster the strength of the Democratic Progressive Party. It may not be able to improve Taiwan's plight.
Compare Ma Ying-jeou to Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai can nominate Su Tseng-chang in Taipei County. She can force Chen Tang-shan to withdraw in Tainan County. She has demonstrated that she can maintain party discipline. She can maintain the initiative. She can set the agenda, and put the ball in Ma Ying-jeou's court. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou cannot deal with Chou Hsi-wei. He cannot deal with Tainan County. He watches idly as Tsai Ing-wen lobs the ball into his court. Surely he isn't going to stand there doing nothing as the ball caroms all over the court?
Whether the 2012 presidential election is moved up or not, the Taipei County and Tainan County Commissioner Elections will be watershed moments.
南北帶動 二○一二總統大選提前開打？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.04.02 04:50 am
蔡英文似乎已為她的政治槓桿找到了支點。蘇貞昌參選台北縣長是帶領民進黨「捲土重來」的火車頭，台南縣長候選人提名李俊毅（棄陳唐山）則是「與扁切割」的大動作。
陳唐山被陳水扁視為代理人，陳唐山本身也以陳水扁的代理人自居。因而，是否提名陳唐山，成為蔡英文能否擺脫陳水扁的指標。蔡英文在陳唐山民調大幅領先的情勢下提名李俊毅，且冒著陳水扁可能參與立委補選的風險；這樣的決定可說是吃了秤砣鐵了心。難怪南縣立委王幸男說：「民進黨將正式分裂。」
蘇貞昌可望參選台北縣長，應是促成蔡英文排除陳唐山的支撐因素。一時之間，台北縣的「捲土重來」之勢，與台南縣的「與扁切割」之勢，互為支點，互成犄角，堪可構成民進黨年底縣市長選舉的主要戰略架構。其考量是，與扁切割有助捲土重來，捲土重來有助與扁切割。
相對而言，國民黨在台北縣及台南縣均陷困境。台北縣的周錫瑋，扶不起，勸不退；至於台南縣，則若出現陳唐山、李俊毅鷸蚌相爭之局，應是國民黨漁翁得利的機會，但國民黨在南縣卻似無足可趁勢崛起的人選。倘若國民黨在北縣有會輸的感覺而眼睜睜看著它輸掉，而在南縣有贏的可能亦眼睜睜看著它贏不了；則國民黨支撐大局的政治槓桿，將因民進黨南北兩個支點的衝擊，而告摧折斷裂，從而大局翻盤，後果不堪設想。
北縣之戰，就是二○一二年總統大選的前哨戰。如今，加上南縣的對照效應，蔡英文欲將「蘇貞昌北縣勝選／與扁切割／進軍二○一二」連成一氣。相對而言，國民黨的戰略目標，自會思考及時將「蘇貞昌北縣勝選／民進黨整合／民進黨提前發動二○一二總統大選」三者的連鎖效應切斷，否則後果將難以收拾。
今日情勢之所以形成，關鍵在於：蔡英文能對民調高的陳唐山開刀，以取得自己在黨內與黨際的議題設定權；而國民黨對民調低落的周錫瑋，扶不起，勸不退，完全失去領導的主控地位，亦當然失去了黨內及黨際的議題設定權。
由於已將縣市長選舉拉高到「二○一二總統大選前哨戰」的高度，且又因南縣的選局已成為民進黨能否與扁切割的指標；使民進黨與國民黨在此次選舉皆有非贏不可的壓力。對蔡英文而言，北縣固然要贏，才能獲得高動能的政治引擎；而南縣之役，則非但不能給國民黨趁虛蹈隙之機，且要趁勢與扁切割，又不能分裂民進黨。反過來說，若民進黨輸掉北縣南縣，蔡英文固然一敗塗地，民進黨亦將陷入更大危機。相對而言，馬英九若輸了北縣南縣，則將使民進黨操持提早發動二○一二總統大選的主動地位，政局恐將無有寧日。
二○一二年總統大選若提前在縣市長選舉後開打，台灣的政局不免更形扭曲。就國民黨而言，一旦社會衝突升高、社會動盪加劇，施政環境的變數亦將相對增加，必將更感左支右絀。至於民進黨，迄今在國家定位及兩岸政策上皆尚未整理出頭緒，若就此掀起二○一二大選的大潮，則在黨內「恐怖均衡」的妥協中，轉型恐更難期待，即使能有一時的突破，卻未必能改善民進黨的體質，因而亦終不能改變台灣的難局。
若以蔡英文與馬英九對比。蔡能在北縣推出蘇貞昌，又在南縣逼退陳唐山，均顯示她這個黨主席，至少在黨內及黨際，操持了主動，掌握了議題設定權，並將球打到馬英九的那一邊；相對而言，馬英九卻似不知如何處理周錫瑋，也對南縣的新形勢拿不出新對策，眼看著蔡英文將球擊來，總不能讓觀賽者覺得只見球在滿地亂滾吧！
二○一二總統大選是否提前開打，北縣南縣的縣長選舉將是決定性的因素。
A Preview of the Presidential Election?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2, 2009
Tsai Ing-wen appears to have found the political lever she needs. Su Tseng-chang's campaign for Taipei County Commissioner will be the engine that allows the Democratic Progressive Party to make a comeback. The nomination of Li Chun-yi for Tainan County Commissioner, and rejection of Chen Tang-shan, will be the big move that draws a line in the sand between the DPP and Ah-Bian.
Chen Tang-shan is seen as Chen Shui-bian's proxy. Chen Tang-shan sees himself as Chen Shui-bian's proxy. Therefore the nomination of Chen Tang-shan has become the acid test for whether Tsai Ing-wen can get Chen Shui-bian off her back. Chen Tang-shan enjoys a wide lead in the polls. Yet Tsai Ing-wen has nominated Li Chun-yi. She runs the risk that Chen Shui-bian may enter the Legislative by-election. Her decision means she has steeled her nerves. No wonder Tainan County Legislator Wang Hsing-nan says "The DPP will be officially divided."
Su Tseng-chang is expected to run for Taipei County Commissioner. This probably motivated Tsai Ing-wen to reject Chen Tang-shan. Hopes that the DPP can make a comeback in Taipei County, and distance itself from Ah-Bian in Tainan County, have suddenly provided her with a lever and a clarion call. This may provide the Democratic Progressive Party with the strategic framework for its campaigns in the year end County and Municipal Elections. Their political calculus is that distancing the party from Ah-Bian will help the DPP make a successful comeback, and conversely, making a successful comeback will help the DPP distance itself from Ah-Bian.
By contrast, the KMT finds itself on the horns of a dilemma, in both Taipei County and Tainan County. Chou Hsi-wei in Taipei County is no longer politically viable, but cannot be persuaded to withdraw. As for Tainan County, if Chen Tang-shan and Li Chun-yi engage in a mutually-destructive duel to the death, the KMT may reap the rewards. But the KMT lacks a candidate in Tainan County able to take advantage of the opportunity. The KMT fears it will lose in Taipei County. The KMT fears it can't win in Tainan County. If it watches idly as it loses in Taipei County and fails to win in Tainan County, the Democratic Progressive Party's leverage in both the North and the South will break the KMT's hold on the larger scenario. The consequences of such a strategic reversal of fortune could be disastrous.
The Battle over Taipei County will be a preliminary skirmish in the Battle for the 2012 Presidency. Add to this the impact of the Tainan County Commissioner Election. Tsai Ing-wen is hoping for a succession of victories, beginning with Su Tseng-chang winning the Taipei County Election, successfully distancing the DPP from Ah-bian, and finally, regaining the Presidency in 2012. By contrast, the KMT's strategic objective must be to disrupt any such chain of victories. Su Tseng-chang must not be allowed to win Taipei County. The DPP must not be allowed to regroup. The DPP must not be allowed to launch its campaign for the Presidency in advance of 2012. If the KMT cannot defeat the DPP's strategy, the consequences will be disastrous.
The current scenario is the result of Tsai Ing-wen's willingness to face down Chen Tang-shan despite his high poll numbers. She is doing so to establish her authority within the party, and to assert her right to set the party's agenda. Conversely, the KMT can neither boost Chou Hsi-wei's dismal prospects, nor persuade him to withdraw from the race. It has lost its leadership status. and needless to say, its ability to set the party's agenda.
The County Commissioner and City Mayor Elections have been elevated to the status of preliminary skirmishs to the 2012 presidential election. The Tainan County Election has become an indicator of whether the DPP can distance itself from Ah-Bian. Therefore the DPP and the KMT are under pressure to win at all cost. For Tsai Ing-wen, Taipei County must be won. Only then can the DPP obtain a powerful political engine. The function of the Tainan County Election meanwhile, is merely to deny the KMT the opportunity to disrupt the DPP's political momentum. It is also an opportunity to draw a line in sand between the DPP and Ah-Bian. In doing so, it must not split the DPP. Conversely, if the Democratic Progressive Party loses Taipei County and Tainan County, Tsai Ing-wen will suffer a crushing defeat. The Democratic Progressive Party will be plunged into even greater crisis. By contrast, if Ma Ying-jeou loses Taipei County, the Democratic Progressive Party will launch its 2012 presidential campaign in advance, and the political scene will have no peace.
If the DPP begins its 2012 presidential campaign with the County Commissioner and City Mayor Elections, the political scene on Taiwan will become even more chaotic. For the KMT, increased social unrest will make governing the nation even more difficult. For the DPP, it has yet to sort out its position on the nation's identity and cross-Strait policy. If it touches off a battle for the 2012 presidency under such circumstances, it will have a difficult time transitioning from its current internal "balance of terror." Even assuming it succeeds, it may not be able to bolster the strength of the Democratic Progressive Party. It may not be able to improve Taiwan's plight.
Compare Ma Ying-jeou to Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai can nominate Su Tseng-chang in Taipei County. She can force Chen Tang-shan to withdraw in Tainan County. She has demonstrated that she can maintain party discipline. She can maintain the initiative. She can set the agenda, and put the ball in Ma Ying-jeou's court. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou cannot deal with Chou Hsi-wei. He cannot deal with Tainan County. He watches idly as Tsai Ing-wen lobs the ball into his court. Surely he isn't going to stand there doing nothing as the ball caroms all over the court?
Whether the 2012 presidential election is moved up or not, the Taipei County and Tainan County Commissioner Elections will be watershed moments.
南北帶動 二○一二總統大選提前開打？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.04.02 04:50 am
蔡英文似乎已為她的政治槓桿找到了支點。蘇貞昌參選台北縣長是帶領民進黨「捲土重來」的火車頭，台南縣長候選人提名李俊毅（棄陳唐山）則是「與扁切割」的大動作。
陳唐山被陳水扁視為代理人，陳唐山本身也以陳水扁的代理人自居。因而，是否提名陳唐山，成為蔡英文能否擺脫陳水扁的指標。蔡英文在陳唐山民調大幅領先的情勢下提名李俊毅，且冒著陳水扁可能參與立委補選的風險；這樣的決定可說是吃了秤砣鐵了心。難怪南縣立委王幸男說：「民進黨將正式分裂。」
蘇貞昌可望參選台北縣長，應是促成蔡英文排除陳唐山的支撐因素。一時之間，台北縣的「捲土重來」之勢，與台南縣的「與扁切割」之勢，互為支點，互成犄角，堪可構成民進黨年底縣市長選舉的主要戰略架構。其考量是，與扁切割有助捲土重來，捲土重來有助與扁切割。
相對而言，國民黨在台北縣及台南縣均陷困境。台北縣的周錫瑋，扶不起，勸不退；至於台南縣，則若出現陳唐山、李俊毅鷸蚌相爭之局，應是國民黨漁翁得利的機會，但國民黨在南縣卻似無足可趁勢崛起的人選。倘若國民黨在北縣有會輸的感覺而眼睜睜看著它輸掉，而在南縣有贏的可能亦眼睜睜看著它贏不了；則國民黨支撐大局的政治槓桿，將因民進黨南北兩個支點的衝擊，而告摧折斷裂，從而大局翻盤，後果不堪設想。
北縣之戰，就是二○一二年總統大選的前哨戰。如今，加上南縣的對照效應，蔡英文欲將「蘇貞昌北縣勝選／與扁切割／進軍二○一二」連成一氣。相對而言，國民黨的戰略目標，自會思考及時將「蘇貞昌北縣勝選／民進黨整合／民進黨提前發動二○一二總統大選」三者的連鎖效應切斷，否則後果將難以收拾。
今日情勢之所以形成，關鍵在於：蔡英文能對民調高的陳唐山開刀，以取得自己在黨內與黨際的議題設定權；而國民黨對民調低落的周錫瑋，扶不起，勸不退，完全失去領導的主控地位，亦當然失去了黨內及黨際的議題設定權。
由於已將縣市長選舉拉高到「二○一二總統大選前哨戰」的高度，且又因南縣的選局已成為民進黨能否與扁切割的指標；使民進黨與國民黨在此次選舉皆有非贏不可的壓力。對蔡英文而言，北縣固然要贏，才能獲得高動能的政治引擎；而南縣之役，則非但不能給國民黨趁虛蹈隙之機，且要趁勢與扁切割，又不能分裂民進黨。反過來說，若民進黨輸掉北縣南縣，蔡英文固然一敗塗地，民進黨亦將陷入更大危機。相對而言，馬英九若輸了北縣南縣，則將使民進黨操持提早發動二○一二總統大選的主動地位，政局恐將無有寧日。
二○一二年總統大選若提前在縣市長選舉後開打，台灣的政局不免更形扭曲。就國民黨而言，一旦社會衝突升高、社會動盪加劇，施政環境的變數亦將相對增加，必將更感左支右絀。至於民進黨，迄今在國家定位及兩岸政策上皆尚未整理出頭緒，若就此掀起二○一二大選的大潮，則在黨內「恐怖均衡」的妥協中，轉型恐更難期待，即使能有一時的突破，卻未必能改善民進黨的體質，因而亦終不能改變台灣的難局。
若以蔡英文與馬英九對比。蔡能在北縣推出蘇貞昌，又在南縣逼退陳唐山，均顯示她這個黨主席，至少在黨內及黨際，操持了主動，掌握了議題設定權，並將球打到馬英九的那一邊；相對而言，馬英九卻似不知如何處理周錫瑋，也對南縣的新形勢拿不出新對策，眼看著蔡英文將球擊來，總不能讓觀賽者覺得只見球在滿地亂滾吧！
二○一二總統大選是否提前開打，北縣南縣的縣長選舉將是決定性的因素。
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
Clean Up the Mess, Before It Gets Even Worse
Clean Up the Mess, Before It Gets Even Worse
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 1, 2009
That Taipei County Magistrate Chou Hsi-wei's approval ratings are in the cellar is not news. They have been low from his first year in office. Even going into the mountains to catch a tiger did nothing to improve his ratings. His ratings have been low for three years. But the KMT has never taken the problem seriously. It never bothered to think about how to help him. Only when the Democratic Progressive Party floated the notion of Su Tseng-chang returning to run in the year end Taipei County Magistrate Election, did Chou Hsi-wei's poll numbers alarm the Kuomintang. It's ironic. Green Camp "Prince" Su Tseng-chang is the reason Chou Hsi-wei's approval ratings fell so far. They fell so far the KMT blasted him constantly. But Su Tseng-chang is also the reason the KMT in unable to replace Chou for now. No Blue Camp "Prince" is willing to go head to head with Su. Others watching from the sidelines have expressed a desire to run. But their poll numbers range from 1% to 5%, many times worse than Chou Hsi-wei's.
The Kuomintang has been back in power less than a year. But it has already back to its old tricks. It is again "expert at fighting one's comrades, but amateurs at fighting one's enemies." Unable to win against the Democratic Progressive Party, its officials float rumors undermining their own comrades. The KMT is a perverse party that never learns its lessons. Party Chairman Wu Po-hsiung loves to go on about how "United we may not win, but disunited we will surely lose." He is talking to himself. No one inside the party listens to this old chairman's dire warnings. The KMT, like the DPP, doesn't understand that being in power and being in the opposition are not the same. The public has dramatically different expectations of those in power. When the KMT lost control of the central government, the KMT's younger generation "Princes" ran for county magistrates and city mayors. The KMT chose not to "airdrop" senior officials into these positions. These younger generation "Princes" had little hope of winning these County Magistrate and City Mayor Elections. But eight years ago they entered the fray and held down the fort. During its eight years in the political wilderness, the KMT failed to cultivate any new talent. When it returned to power, it fell back on the same old political appointees. Its political campaigns were still being fought by these same younger generation "Princes." More senior party officials who did nothing for eight years, thought only about jockeying for official appointments amidst the turmoil. Based on their poll numbers, if any of them were actually to go into battle, the casualty reports would read: KIA (Killed in Action).
So what can the KMT do? Would "airdropping" younger generation candidates into these local elections do the trick? For example, Taoyuan County Magistrate Chu Li-lun and Taichung Mayor Jason Hu are two of the names most frequently mentioned by the KMT leadership. If they are to run for Taipei County Magistrate, they will have to transfer their residency to Taipei County by June. They would no longer be qualified to serve in Taoyuan County and Taichung City. To Taoyuan County and Taichung City citizens, it would look as if the KMT cared only about Taipei County, and nothing about them. This is hardly an impression the KMT can afford to leave. Not to mention the public probably wants them to join the Central Government in order to develop their full potential. The KMT habitually strands its talent at the local level. This is not right.
Former governor James Soong, who has been out of the picture, has been trotted out as a heavyweight able to defeat Su Tseng-chang. When James Soong was elected governor he ascended to the peak of his political career. Ever since then he has been a hard luck case. The provincial government was frozen. He lost the Presidential Election as a result of the Chung Hsing Bills case. One can hardly blame him for fulminating as Chen Shui-bian engaged in eight years of wholesale corruption and money-laundering. During these eight years not a single office he aspired to, from Premier to Taipei Mayor, has come to fruition.
It's not that James Soong shouldn't run for Taipei County Magistrate. The Democratic Progressive Party wants former County Commissioner Chen Tang-shan to run in the Tainan County Commissioner's race. If he can run, why can't James Soong? Chou Hsi-wei was one of Soong's loyal soldiers. If Soong chooses to run, how can Chou oppose him? The problem is that ever since the provincial government was frozen, the KMT has been unwilling to accommodate Soong. It has no problem maintaining amicable relations with him. But no one in the KMT is willing to allow Soong to wield real power, even a humble local office. Most importantly, the People First Party dissolved itself and joined the KMT. James Soong, who was once a member of the KMT's center of power, declared that he was quitting politics. He has yet to return to the KMT. To expect him to participate in the KMT primaries is impossible, Even if Soong were drafted, would he really be willing to run under the KMT banner again? Given James Soong's political character, the KMT would have to do more than merely ask him before he would consent.
The KMT knows Chou Hsi-wei may have trouble winning a second term, but it has yet to find a solution to the problem. Instead, it has stupidly used poll results to pressure Chou Hsi-wei. Unfortunately this will neither force Chou to back down, nor produce a better replacement. The result has been chaos. Chou Hsi-wei has openly vented his anger, blasting the party leadership for undermining him. The KMT probably never intended to undermine Chou. Its undermining of Chou was probably unintentional, the result of stupidity. It also undermined itself, turning the KMT into an object of ridicule.
Taipei County is Taiwan's largest county. It boasts the largest population. Whoever wins Taipei County is halfway to winning the Presidential Election. Put simply, in the year-end elections, other constituencies are small fry. Minor changes may take place, but the bigger picture is set. The difference between losing and winning will be slight. The key to success or failure will be Taipei County. It is the region most likely to become a vote of confidence in the Ma administration and the Liu cabinet. Even Chou Hsi-wei understands the heavy burden on his shoulders. Even he cannot afford defeat. As long as the KMT is truly determined to win this election, Chou Hsi-wei entering or withdrawing from the race is not the issue. The issue is whether the KMT is truly determined. The party chairman must do more than merely repeat calls for "unity." If the KMT lacks determination, its plight will only worsen. It's not as if the KMT has never lost. But is the KMT really willing to be blasted as incompetent?
中國時報 2009.04.01
處理不了這個亂局 繼續擺爛吧
本報訊
台北縣長周錫瑋施政滿意度低，不是新聞，從他就任第一年開始，始終盤桓低點，上山打老虎都沒救，民調低了三年多，國民黨從來不當回事，沒人動念如何出手幫他，直到民進黨迸出前縣長蘇貞昌可能回鍋參選年底縣市長，周錫瑋的民調數字，天崩地裂般驚醒了國民黨。絕的是，因為綠天王蘇貞昌，周錫瑋的支持度被國民黨嫌到臭頭；卻也因為蘇貞昌，此刻還換不下周，因為藍天王沒人有這個意願與蘇對決，至於看著爐子喊燒，也表態想選的人，民調數字從一％到五％，比周錫瑋難看不知多少倍。
重新執政的國民黨，一年不到，又開始玩著內鬥內行、外鬥外行的把戲，競選贏不了民進黨，放話肯定整得倒同志。國民黨這個怪黨，從來學不會生聚教訓，黨主席吳伯雄老愛掛在嘴邊的一句話，「團結不一定贏，不團結肯定輸」，彷彿只是說給自己聽的笑話，黨內沒人理這個老主席的苦心孤詣。國民黨也搞不清楚，在野與執政形勢不同，民意期待也大不相同。當年中生代天王投入縣市長選舉，因為國民黨輸掉中央政權，不搞戰將空降，地方縣市長選舉幾無勝選空間，這群戰將八年前投入選舉，為國民黨守住一席之地，在野八年，國民黨什麼人才都沒培養，重新執政靠得是老政務官，打選戰數數還是這群中生代，至於八年中沒有立下汗馬功勞的黨內人士，一腦袋想的還是分官授爵之事，看看自己能不能在人多嘴雜的亂局中，分得一官半職，真要他們披掛上陣，從民調數字看只能用四個字形容：立馬陣亡。
國民黨能怎麼辦呢？中生代空降還有用嗎？隨便舉例，被國民黨高層提到最多的桃園縣長朱立倫、台中市長胡志強，若要參選台北縣，立刻面臨六月即要遷戶籍而喪失現任縣市長資格，對桃園、台中民眾而言，國民黨要北縣不要他們，觀感上不會好；遑論民意可能更期待他們進入中央發揮政務長才，國民黨老把人才留在地方也不是辦法。
一籌莫展中，前省長宋楚瑜又被提起，是可以打敗蘇貞昌的戰將。宋楚瑜從當選省長那一刻起，攀上了個人政治生涯的高峰，從此一路倒楣，省被凍掉不說，總統大選硬是被興票案擊退，看到當總統八年的陳水扁弊案如此之多，海外洗錢金額之巨，沒氣到吐血也怪，這八年多來，任何職務都有好事者點名，從行政院長到競選台北市長不一而足，就從沒成真過。
宋楚瑜不是不能競選台北縣長，民進黨出了個老縣長陳唐山要回鍋選台南縣，誰還敢說宋楚瑜老？周錫瑋是宋的子弟兵，宋要選，周敢說不服嗎？問題是，從凍省開始，國民黨就沒這個度量容宋，保持友好不是問題，真要讓宋再掌握實權，即使這個權只是區區地方父母官，國民黨人沒一個甘願；最重要的，親民黨棄橘投藍，唯獨這個宣布要淡出政壇、曾是國民黨權力最核心的宋楚瑜，猶未回黨，要宋參與國民黨初選不可能，即令徵召宋，宋到底肯不肯再掛藍旗？以宋楚瑜的政治性格，可能也不是國民黨一句話就能讓宋低頭。
國民黨看到了周錫瑋連任的危機，卻找不出辦法因應，甚至用了最笨的辦法不斷以民調對周錫瑋施壓，問題是逼退不了周又找不出強棒出馬，鬧得黨內一團亂，周錫瑋公開翻臉，痛批黨中央整人。國民黨大概沒這心要整周，只是笨到整了周錫瑋，也整了自己，讓外人看國民黨笑話。
台北縣是全台最大縣，人口數最多，贏得台北縣就穩住大半個總統大選，簡單講，年底縣市長選舉其他選區是小局有變數但基本盤穩定，輸贏落差不大，成敗指標就是台北縣，也最容易成為民意對馬劉團隊的抒發標的，包括周錫瑋都看得到自己肩膀上的重任，也擔不起敗選重責，只要國民黨真有心打贏這場選戰，周錫瑋的進退根本不是問題，真正的問題是：國民黨有心嗎？「團結」不能只是黨主席的口頭禪，國民黨若沒心，就繼續擺爛，橫豎國民黨又不是沒輸過，只是，國民黨甘心被民意指著鼻子罵無能嗎？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 1, 2009
That Taipei County Magistrate Chou Hsi-wei's approval ratings are in the cellar is not news. They have been low from his first year in office. Even going into the mountains to catch a tiger did nothing to improve his ratings. His ratings have been low for three years. But the KMT has never taken the problem seriously. It never bothered to think about how to help him. Only when the Democratic Progressive Party floated the notion of Su Tseng-chang returning to run in the year end Taipei County Magistrate Election, did Chou Hsi-wei's poll numbers alarm the Kuomintang. It's ironic. Green Camp "Prince" Su Tseng-chang is the reason Chou Hsi-wei's approval ratings fell so far. They fell so far the KMT blasted him constantly. But Su Tseng-chang is also the reason the KMT in unable to replace Chou for now. No Blue Camp "Prince" is willing to go head to head with Su. Others watching from the sidelines have expressed a desire to run. But their poll numbers range from 1% to 5%, many times worse than Chou Hsi-wei's.
The Kuomintang has been back in power less than a year. But it has already back to its old tricks. It is again "expert at fighting one's comrades, but amateurs at fighting one's enemies." Unable to win against the Democratic Progressive Party, its officials float rumors undermining their own comrades. The KMT is a perverse party that never learns its lessons. Party Chairman Wu Po-hsiung loves to go on about how "United we may not win, but disunited we will surely lose." He is talking to himself. No one inside the party listens to this old chairman's dire warnings. The KMT, like the DPP, doesn't understand that being in power and being in the opposition are not the same. The public has dramatically different expectations of those in power. When the KMT lost control of the central government, the KMT's younger generation "Princes" ran for county magistrates and city mayors. The KMT chose not to "airdrop" senior officials into these positions. These younger generation "Princes" had little hope of winning these County Magistrate and City Mayor Elections. But eight years ago they entered the fray and held down the fort. During its eight years in the political wilderness, the KMT failed to cultivate any new talent. When it returned to power, it fell back on the same old political appointees. Its political campaigns were still being fought by these same younger generation "Princes." More senior party officials who did nothing for eight years, thought only about jockeying for official appointments amidst the turmoil. Based on their poll numbers, if any of them were actually to go into battle, the casualty reports would read: KIA (Killed in Action).
So what can the KMT do? Would "airdropping" younger generation candidates into these local elections do the trick? For example, Taoyuan County Magistrate Chu Li-lun and Taichung Mayor Jason Hu are two of the names most frequently mentioned by the KMT leadership. If they are to run for Taipei County Magistrate, they will have to transfer their residency to Taipei County by June. They would no longer be qualified to serve in Taoyuan County and Taichung City. To Taoyuan County and Taichung City citizens, it would look as if the KMT cared only about Taipei County, and nothing about them. This is hardly an impression the KMT can afford to leave. Not to mention the public probably wants them to join the Central Government in order to develop their full potential. The KMT habitually strands its talent at the local level. This is not right.
Former governor James Soong, who has been out of the picture, has been trotted out as a heavyweight able to defeat Su Tseng-chang. When James Soong was elected governor he ascended to the peak of his political career. Ever since then he has been a hard luck case. The provincial government was frozen. He lost the Presidential Election as a result of the Chung Hsing Bills case. One can hardly blame him for fulminating as Chen Shui-bian engaged in eight years of wholesale corruption and money-laundering. During these eight years not a single office he aspired to, from Premier to Taipei Mayor, has come to fruition.
It's not that James Soong shouldn't run for Taipei County Magistrate. The Democratic Progressive Party wants former County Commissioner Chen Tang-shan to run in the Tainan County Commissioner's race. If he can run, why can't James Soong? Chou Hsi-wei was one of Soong's loyal soldiers. If Soong chooses to run, how can Chou oppose him? The problem is that ever since the provincial government was frozen, the KMT has been unwilling to accommodate Soong. It has no problem maintaining amicable relations with him. But no one in the KMT is willing to allow Soong to wield real power, even a humble local office. Most importantly, the People First Party dissolved itself and joined the KMT. James Soong, who was once a member of the KMT's center of power, declared that he was quitting politics. He has yet to return to the KMT. To expect him to participate in the KMT primaries is impossible, Even if Soong were drafted, would he really be willing to run under the KMT banner again? Given James Soong's political character, the KMT would have to do more than merely ask him before he would consent.
The KMT knows Chou Hsi-wei may have trouble winning a second term, but it has yet to find a solution to the problem. Instead, it has stupidly used poll results to pressure Chou Hsi-wei. Unfortunately this will neither force Chou to back down, nor produce a better replacement. The result has been chaos. Chou Hsi-wei has openly vented his anger, blasting the party leadership for undermining him. The KMT probably never intended to undermine Chou. Its undermining of Chou was probably unintentional, the result of stupidity. It also undermined itself, turning the KMT into an object of ridicule.
Taipei County is Taiwan's largest county. It boasts the largest population. Whoever wins Taipei County is halfway to winning the Presidential Election. Put simply, in the year-end elections, other constituencies are small fry. Minor changes may take place, but the bigger picture is set. The difference between losing and winning will be slight. The key to success or failure will be Taipei County. It is the region most likely to become a vote of confidence in the Ma administration and the Liu cabinet. Even Chou Hsi-wei understands the heavy burden on his shoulders. Even he cannot afford defeat. As long as the KMT is truly determined to win this election, Chou Hsi-wei entering or withdrawing from the race is not the issue. The issue is whether the KMT is truly determined. The party chairman must do more than merely repeat calls for "unity." If the KMT lacks determination, its plight will only worsen. It's not as if the KMT has never lost. But is the KMT really willing to be blasted as incompetent?
中國時報 2009.04.01
處理不了這個亂局 繼續擺爛吧
本報訊
台北縣長周錫瑋施政滿意度低，不是新聞，從他就任第一年開始，始終盤桓低點，上山打老虎都沒救，民調低了三年多，國民黨從來不當回事，沒人動念如何出手幫他，直到民進黨迸出前縣長蘇貞昌可能回鍋參選年底縣市長，周錫瑋的民調數字，天崩地裂般驚醒了國民黨。絕的是，因為綠天王蘇貞昌，周錫瑋的支持度被國民黨嫌到臭頭；卻也因為蘇貞昌，此刻還換不下周，因為藍天王沒人有這個意願與蘇對決，至於看著爐子喊燒，也表態想選的人，民調數字從一％到五％，比周錫瑋難看不知多少倍。
重新執政的國民黨，一年不到，又開始玩著內鬥內行、外鬥外行的把戲，競選贏不了民進黨，放話肯定整得倒同志。國民黨這個怪黨，從來學不會生聚教訓，黨主席吳伯雄老愛掛在嘴邊的一句話，「團結不一定贏，不團結肯定輸」，彷彿只是說給自己聽的笑話，黨內沒人理這個老主席的苦心孤詣。國民黨也搞不清楚，在野與執政形勢不同，民意期待也大不相同。當年中生代天王投入縣市長選舉，因為國民黨輸掉中央政權，不搞戰將空降，地方縣市長選舉幾無勝選空間，這群戰將八年前投入選舉，為國民黨守住一席之地，在野八年，國民黨什麼人才都沒培養，重新執政靠得是老政務官，打選戰數數還是這群中生代，至於八年中沒有立下汗馬功勞的黨內人士，一腦袋想的還是分官授爵之事，看看自己能不能在人多嘴雜的亂局中，分得一官半職，真要他們披掛上陣，從民調數字看只能用四個字形容：立馬陣亡。
國民黨能怎麼辦呢？中生代空降還有用嗎？隨便舉例，被國民黨高層提到最多的桃園縣長朱立倫、台中市長胡志強，若要參選台北縣，立刻面臨六月即要遷戶籍而喪失現任縣市長資格，對桃園、台中民眾而言，國民黨要北縣不要他們，觀感上不會好；遑論民意可能更期待他們進入中央發揮政務長才，國民黨老把人才留在地方也不是辦法。
一籌莫展中，前省長宋楚瑜又被提起，是可以打敗蘇貞昌的戰將。宋楚瑜從當選省長那一刻起，攀上了個人政治生涯的高峰，從此一路倒楣，省被凍掉不說，總統大選硬是被興票案擊退，看到當總統八年的陳水扁弊案如此之多，海外洗錢金額之巨，沒氣到吐血也怪，這八年多來，任何職務都有好事者點名，從行政院長到競選台北市長不一而足，就從沒成真過。
宋楚瑜不是不能競選台北縣長，民進黨出了個老縣長陳唐山要回鍋選台南縣，誰還敢說宋楚瑜老？周錫瑋是宋的子弟兵，宋要選，周敢說不服嗎？問題是，從凍省開始，國民黨就沒這個度量容宋，保持友好不是問題，真要讓宋再掌握實權，即使這個權只是區區地方父母官，國民黨人沒一個甘願；最重要的，親民黨棄橘投藍，唯獨這個宣布要淡出政壇、曾是國民黨權力最核心的宋楚瑜，猶未回黨，要宋參與國民黨初選不可能，即令徵召宋，宋到底肯不肯再掛藍旗？以宋楚瑜的政治性格，可能也不是國民黨一句話就能讓宋低頭。
國民黨看到了周錫瑋連任的危機，卻找不出辦法因應，甚至用了最笨的辦法不斷以民調對周錫瑋施壓，問題是逼退不了周又找不出強棒出馬，鬧得黨內一團亂，周錫瑋公開翻臉，痛批黨中央整人。國民黨大概沒這心要整周，只是笨到整了周錫瑋，也整了自己，讓外人看國民黨笑話。
台北縣是全台最大縣，人口數最多，贏得台北縣就穩住大半個總統大選，簡單講，年底縣市長選舉其他選區是小局有變數但基本盤穩定，輸贏落差不大，成敗指標就是台北縣，也最容易成為民意對馬劉團隊的抒發標的，包括周錫瑋都看得到自己肩膀上的重任，也擔不起敗選重責，只要國民黨真有心打贏這場選戰，周錫瑋的進退根本不是問題，真正的問題是：國民黨有心嗎？「團結」不能只是黨主席的口頭禪，國民黨若沒心，就繼續擺爛，橫豎國民黨又不是沒輸過，只是，國民黨甘心被民意指著鼻子罵無能嗎？
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)