Monday, May 11, 2009

Cross-Strait Relations: Time for Problem Solving

Cross-Strait Relations: Time for Problem Solving
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 11, 2009

The one year anniversary of the Ma administration's inauguration is approaching. Although the broad outlines remain unclear, President Ma's cross-Strait concepts and policies have increasingly diverged from the Green Camp's. These differences show up in the opening of cross-Strait transportation, tourism, finance, culture, and education. More importantly, the thinking behind Ma's policies is entirely different. President Ma's public declarations since April have made this abundantly clear. His rhetoric has two themes. One is that "geography trumps history." The other is "first economics, then politics." At first glance these two themes are nothing new. But in the context of cross-Straits relations over the past several decades, the differences are quite striking.

His emphasis on "geography over history" stresses Taiwan's geographical location, and not historical disputes. He hopes to take maximum advantage of the world's top five economic regions, including the US to the east, Japan to the north, the Mainland to the west, and ASEAN to the south. He hopes to make Taiwan the hub of these economic zones. Frankly, this is nothing new. Lee Teng-hui's so-called "Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center" plan and Chen Shui-bian's "global operations center" were also based on Taiwan's unique geographical location. Since this is nothing new, why has it remained stuck in the slogan stage over the past decade, regardless of how many "Such and Such Center" concepts have been floated? The key lies in not thinking in terms of historical disputes.

For a long time the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and politics on Taiwan have remained mired in historical enmities. Countless contradictions and tensions prevented normal interaction and dialogue. This made it impossible for cross-Strait relations to fully enter a post-Cold War, post-Civil War era. By the same token, the historical tragedy has prevented society on Taiwan from fully entering a post-authoritarian, post-colonial era. Japan's Representative to Taipei Masaki Saito said "Taiwan's status is undetermined." This Immediately triggered different reactions and suspicions. It makes no difference whether Saito made these remarks intentionally or accidentally. If the incident escalates, it will surely have serious political consequences. The Ma administration chose to cool matters immediately, The dispute ended quickly. If not for its "geography trumps history" thinking, it could have generated plenty of political hay.

If we want geography to trump history and maximize our marginal utility, we must of course think "first economics, then politics." Ma's public statements have repeatedly stressed that he will only deal with cross-Strait economic issues. After all, current cross-Strait economic issues, such as the signing of a MOU, which affects financial interaction, or ECFA, which affects broader economic cooperation, are complex and difficult enough. They cannot be rushed. They will require considerable consultation and communication. They will require the gradual establishment of relevant mechanisms. Perhaps this is why President Ma told the media in Singapore that he would consider discussing cross-Strait political issues only if he was re-elected in 2012. Perhaps this explains why so far President Ma has not made any high level reponse to the highly political "Hu's Six Points."

Ma's "first economics, then politics" thinking is also not novel or original. But it is an important reversal in the handling of cross-Strait issues. When politics trumped economics, cross-Strait relations remained mired in confrontation and demagoguery, rather than the solving of concrete problems. When the two sides could only engage in confrontation and demagoguery, cross-Strait relations could only remain hostile and trapped in a vicious circle of conflict. The same was true on Taiwan. It could never shake off mutual suspicion and mutual recriminations. A perfect example is the cross-Strait stalemate, which has extended to confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan over the past few years.

Once economics trumps politics, then cross-Strait relations ceases to be a tool for politicians to manipulate. It becomes a means of solving practical problems, one after another. Taiwan is no longer being manipulated by means of such political issues as plebiscites, the authoring of a new constitution, and the founding of a new nation. Such issues intensify cross-Strait conflict and increase confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties. Consultations on cross-Strait shipping, tourism, investment, academic credentials involve only rational calculation, not the manipulation of negative emotions. More importantly, it forces politicians who would plunge the world into chaos to withdraw from the political stage. It permits professionals with specific problem solving abilities to make their debut.

Of course, no one would be so obtuse as set aside all historical disputes on the basis that "geography trumps history." Nor would anyone deliberately ignore political factors because he advocated "first economics, then politics." Indeed many problems are difficult to de-politicize. A leader demonstrates his political wisdom by how he handles such difficulties.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2009.05.11
社論-讓兩岸邁入「解決實際問題」的循環
本報訊

距離就任滿周年的前夕,儘管輪廓還不是非常清晰,但馬總統有關兩岸政策的理念與作為,已經與綠營執政年代的差別越來越大,這種差別不僅僅是表現在通航、觀光、金融、文教等的鬆綁與開放上,更關鍵的還是政策背後的整個思維邏輯全都變了。檢視馬總統從四月以來的幾次公開發言,明眼人都看得出來,論述修辭中存在著兩個主軸,一個是「地理重於歷史」,一個是「經濟先於政治」,初乍看這兩組主軸其實並無任何出奇新穎之處,但若是放在過去幾十年兩岸關係史的脈絡上看,讓人可以想像的空間,就非常大了。

所謂「地理重於歷史」,強調的重點是台灣的「地理位置」,而不復再是它的歷史糾葛。即是希望能善用台灣東邊的美國,北邊的日本,西邊的大陸與南邊的東協等世界前五大的幾個經濟體,讓台灣成為串聯這些經濟區的樞紐中心。很坦白的說,這其實算不上什麼新思維,李登輝年代所謂「亞太營運中心」的規畫,陳水扁年代曾倡議的「全球運籌中心」構想,所設想的基礎不就是台灣特殊的地理位置嗎?既然這根本不是什麼「新發現」,為什麼過去十數年間不論提出多少「XX中心」的構想,都只能停留在口號的階段呢?關鍵就在歷史思維的糾葛。

過往很長的一段期間,歷史記憶其實持續著糾纏著兩岸之間與台灣內部,無數的矛盾與張力阻擋了正常的互動與對話,造成兩岸關係一直未能完全邁入後冷戰與後內戰的階段,同樣的也因為執著歷史悲情,讓台灣社會內部一直未曾完全擺脫後威權與後殖民的心靈。這一點從日本駐台代表齊藤正樹一席「台灣地位未定論」的發言,立即引發各方反應與猜忌即可見一班。誰都知道齊藤這番發言不論是有心還是無意,如果無限上綱的牽扯下去,絕對可以引發很大的後續政治效應,但馬政府選擇立即而主動的降溫,讓爭議迅速落幕,如果不是因為「地理重於歷史」的思維引導,還可以做的政治文章其實非常多。

而如果期待「地理」凌駕「歷史」的思維能夠發揮最大的邊際效用,當然就必須再配合「經濟先於政治」的思維邏輯。馬總統最近的幾次公開發言曾一再強調在他第一個任期內,只會處理兩岸的經濟議題。畢竟僅就當下兩岸經濟議題所涉層面,不論是簽訂涉及金融互動的MOU,或是更廣泛經濟合作的ECFA,其實都相當繁雜難解,操作上根本急不來,還需要相當長的時間去協商溝通,也需要各自逐步建立相關的配套機制。或許也因為這樣,馬總統才會對新加坡媒體說假如他在二○一二年獲得連任,才會讓兩岸協商「不排除觸及」政治議題。這一點或許也可以說明,何以迄今為止馬總統都未針對政治意涵甚高的「胡六點」,做出任何高規格的回應。

「先經濟後政治」的提法,同樣未予人新奇或創意之感,但卻是處理兩岸問題相當重要的翻轉。在政治思維全面凌駕經濟思維的年代,兩岸關係一直沉溺擴大對立的「議題操作」上,而非落實在具體的「問題解決」上。當兩岸間只存在爭議性議題的炒作,那麼兩岸關係當然也就只能陷入敵對與衝突的惡性循環,台灣內部同樣也就永遠擺脫不了彼此猜忌與詆毀的深淵,過去幾年台灣持續陷入的兩岸僵持與朝野對立,其實就是最鮮明的寫照。

一旦經濟思維先於政治操作,兩岸關係也就不再是政客操弄的工具,而是尋求解決一樁樁、一件件實際問題的平台。換言之,台灣不再藉由操作類如公投、制憲、建國等政治議題去激化兩岸衝突與朝野對立,而是務實的針對兩岸航運、觀光、投資、學歷認證等課題進行協商,這個過程只會有理性的利益算計,不會再有負面情緒的渲染與撩撥。更重要的是,它將讓那些惟恐天下不亂的政客們從舞台上撤出,讓更多有能力解決具體問題的專業人士有機會登場表現。

當然,沒有人會笨到主張只要「地理重於歷史」,所有的歷史糾葛就可擺在一旁,更不會因為有了「經濟先於政治」的前提,就可以刻意忽略政治因素的干擾,許多問題確實不容易切割,但領導者政治智慧的發揮,不正就是該表現在這些層面上!

Thursday, May 7, 2009

How Can Financial Officials View the Budget Act with Such Contempt?

How Can Financial Officials View the Budget Act with Such Contempt?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 8, 2009

First, several provisions of the Budget Act must be mentioned.

Article 34 of the Budget Act states that "Before major policy plans are promoted, alternatives and cost-benefit analyses must be made, and the source of financing and the use of funds explained."

Article 45 of the Budget Act states that "When general budget revenues and expenditures are imbalanced, the (Executive Yuan) must work with central government financial officials to seek solutions."

The Republic of China currently has two problems. One. Leave aside the growing deficit in public infrastructure construction projects. The Ministry of Finance estimates that expenditures this year will exceed revenues by at least 200 billion. This is a clear violation of the Budget Act. Yet no one in the cabinet cares. Two. The Executive Yuan Financial Supervisory Commission and other agencies care only about protecting themselves. They have repeatedly proposed a variety of tax cuts.

A few days ago the FSC proposed tax cuts to attract foreign capital back to Taiwan. It wants future bank income from interest, funds, bonds, and insurance to benefit from cuts in business taxes, stamp duties, and business income taxes. This of course constitutes a "major policy plan" as defined in Article 34 of the Budget Act. Yet the FSC has never mentiond cost-benefit analyses and alternative sources of financing. No one, from finance ministers to the Vice President of the Executive Yuan bothered to look at the Budget Act. It is rumored that the Ministry of Finance supports the Financial Supervisory Commission's policy. The Executive Yuan has suddenly inherited yet another tax cut proposal. financial officials at the FSC apparently view the nation's laws as nothing more than waste paper.

Since the Financial Supervisory Commission is so enthusiastic about tax cuts for financial services, let's analyze the pros and cons. We would like to ask three questions: On what basis? For what reason? For what purpose? First, on what basis must financial services be exempted from taxation? Chairman Chen said that if the aforementioned three financial services are tax exempt, profit margins will increase, making them more attractive to customers. Such an argument seems plausible at first. But when applied universally, one realizes it is nonsense. What industry won't show higher profits once it is exempt from taxes? What industry won't attract more customers if it has larger profit margins? If this is the rationale for tax exemption, then why not make agricultural products tax-free, service sector services tax-free, IC products tax-free? Why should anyone pay taxes on anything? The FSC chairman spoke out on behalf of the financial industry. Other government agencies may well speak out on behalf of other industries. Does the cabinet give a damn about the Republic of China Budget Act?

Next, the Financial Supervisory Commission wants to exempt financial services from taxation in order to attract foreign investment. But for what reason? The foreign investment the FSC wants to attract pertain to funds, structural debt, insurance policies, and other financial assets. Once these financial assets enter Taiwan, most of them will flow into the stock market and real estate. They are different from investment in physical infrastructure construction. In fact, Taiwan's private capital is abundant. So abundant that bank are refusing large deposits. If the FSC is right about five trillion in funds flowing into the Taiwan stock market and housing market, it could lead to asset bubbles akin to those in Iceland and Ireland. If signs of trouble appear and capital flees, what will happen to Taiwan? Chairman Chen was trained in the law. He does not seem to understand that capital flows into Taiwan do not mean increased GDP. His desire to attract investments to Taiwan financial assets is the result of conceptual confusion and erroneous thinking.

We must also ask, for what purpose is the Executive Yuan's economic team constantly calling for tax cuts? Executive Yuan officials cite Paul Krugman. They say they are promoting the same Keynesian policies that Bill Clinton advocated. But what they are doing runs counter to Krugman's policy. Krugman advocated increased government spending and increased public construction. Therefore they were willing to endure a temporary deficit. Clinton opposed tax cuts. He believed in the indirect multiplier effect of taxes. Furthermore, many tax cuts often benefit only select groups among the wealthy. They fail to boost social spending. Yet over the past year our financial officials have repeatedly proposed indiscriminate "Pseudo-Krugman" tax cut policies. They have said one thing, but done another. We really have no idea where they are going.

Finally, let's get back to the Budget Act. The Budget Act has hundreds of provisions. But its essence is balance. On the one hand, the ruling adminstration must live within its means, avoiding unnecessary expenditures, and imposing only essential taxes. On the other hand, the ruling administration should also take into account sustainable management. It must ensure opportunities for our children and grandchildren. Responsible political leaders will be guided by past budget planning lessons. Instead, financial officials are constantly attempting to curry favor with the public, scattering money in every direction, and treating the Budget Act with contempt. Seeing the Financial Supervisory Commission and the Ministry of Finance treat the taxation system and budget process with such contempt forces us to level our harsh criticisms.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報  2009.05.08
社論-財經閣員怎可視「預算法」如無物?
本報訊

在進入主題前,我們想先引幾條預算法的法律條文,再闡述我們的論點。

預算法卅四條:「重大施政計畫,應先行製作選擇方案及替代方案之成本效益分析報告,並提供財源籌措及資金運用之說明。」

預算法第四十五條第二項:「總預算案歲入、歲出未平衡時,(行政院)應會同中央財政主管機關提出解決辦法。」

現在台灣的明顯情況有二,一是即使不論擴大公共建設方案的赤字,財政部預估今年稅收將短收兩千多億,明顯違反預算法,但內閣卻無人理會。二是金管會等行政院機關只顧本位,一再提出各種減稅案。

就拿日前金管會所提吸引外資回台減稅案為例:該會希望將來銀行的利息收入、出售基金與結構債收入、出售保單收入,都能享受營業稅、印花稅、營所稅三項租稅的減免;這當然屬於預算法卅四條所列重大政策。但金管會既沒有提成本效益分析與替代財源籌措說明,下自財經閣員上自行政院副院長也無人正眼瞧一下預算法的規範。據說財政部對金管會的政策頗為支持,似乎一時之間行政院又多了一項減稅案。看來,堂堂國家法律文書,在金管會等財金首長眼中,連廢紙都不如。

既然金管會主事者這樣熱中金融商品的租稅減免,我們就來好好分析一下其利弊取捨。在這裡要問三個問題:憑什麼?為什麼?幹什麼?首先,我們要問「憑什麼」金融商品要免稅?陳主委說,金融商品專戶的資金若能免除前述三種稅捐,則理專利潤空間變大,將更能吸引客戶。這樣的論述乍看言之成理,但卻是適用各行各業的廢話。哪一個行業免稅之後利潤空間不會變大?又有哪一個行業利潤空間變大了不能吸引客戶?如果這樣的理由也能合理化免稅,那麼農產品也該免稅、服務業也該免稅、IC產品該免稅,天下還有什麼東西需要繳稅?金管會主委就為金融業講話,那麼各個事業主管部會也都為其事業發聲,我們真不知道,中華民國的預算法內閣究竟還關不關心?

其次,金管會主張金融商品免稅以吸引外資入台,我們還要問「為什麼」?金管會所想要吸引的外資,是指購買基金、結構債、保單等金融資產。這些金融款項進入台灣體系之後,絕大多數會流向股市與房地產,其與實體建設的投資截然不同。其實,台灣民間資金淹腳目,錢多到銀行都想拒收大額存款。如果真的如金管會所期望的,有五兆資金回台炒作股市房市,恐怕台灣也會掀起一波「冰島級」、「愛爾蘭級」的資產泡沫。萬一將來有什麼風吹草動以致資金流出,則台灣又是什麼下場?陳主委是習法出身,他似乎並不理解:錢流入台灣並不表示會創造GDP。莫名其妙地要吸引熱錢來台灣投資金融資產,其實是觀念混淆的錯誤思維。

此外,我們也要請問,行政院的財經團隊整天呼籲減稅,究竟在「幹什麼」?行政院閣員人手一冊克魯曼的書籍,也口口聲聲地說在推動克氏所主張的凱因斯經濟學,但所作所為卻盡是些背道而馳的政策。克魯曼主張增加政府支出、擴大公共建設,因此而有暫時的赤字亦在所不惜。但是克氏卻一再反對減稅,他認為減稅的乘數效果間接,且諸多減稅也往往圖利了特定有錢群體,無助於提升社會支出。但是我們的財經部會過去一年卻一再提出胡亂減稅的「假克魯曼」政策,這樣說一套做一套,實在令人看不懂財經閣員的施政方向。

最後,還是回到預算法,談談我們的感觸。我們想說的是:預算法雖然條文逾百,其精義卻只有兩個字:「平衡」。一方面,執政者要量入為出,避免不必要的開支、課徵必要的稅收;另一方面,執政也要顧及永續經營,保住子孫的發展機會。負責任的政治人物,一定會把僅具訓示意義的預算規範奉為圭臬。但財經官員卻永遠搶著做大眾情人,四處討好、隨時散財,視預算法如蔽屣。看到金管會與財政部對稅制與預算的藐視,我們不得不做出如此沉重的評論。

The Key to Cross-Strait Educational Exchanges is in the Details

The Key to Cross-Strait Educational Exchanges is in the Details
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 7, 2009

The DPP staged yet another farcical "blockade" of the Legislative Yuan this week. But why DPP legislators locked themselves inside the Legislature has everyone scratching their heads. At first DPP legislators said they were protesting the KMT's amending of the Parade and Assembly Law. They threatened to "fight to the death to prevent passage of the bill." But then on Monday they said they were protesting the official recognition of Mainland academic credentials. According to reports, DPP legislators took advantage of a rest period to barricade themselves inside the Legislature. As a result nothing got done the entire day. The opposition DPP currently has very few legislators. Faced with a crushing ruling KMT majority, the DPP's occasional resort to such obstructionist tactics is understandable. But habitual resort to such tactics every time the issue involves the Mainland, amounts to an admission that the DPP is incapable of approaching problems on their own merits, and is incapable of learning from experience. We have two things to offer regarding education and cross-strait affairs: One. We offer the ruling KMT a reminder. Two. We offer the opposition DPP a warning.

Cross-strait academic exchanges involve two issues. One is whether to recognize mainland academic credentials, and under what conditions. The second is whether to allow Mainland students to come to Taiwan, and under what conditions. These two problems are fundamentally different. One must not conflate the two by lumping them under "cross-Strait educational issues." Doing so will lead only to confusion.

First, let us clarify what we mean when we say "recognition of Mainland academic credentials." When we talk about Mainland academic credentials, we mean students from Taiwan or children of Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland acquiring Mainland academic credits. Mainland China locals pursuing academic credentials number in the hundreds of millions. They are not what we mean when we talk about recognizing Mainland academic credentials. Secondly, the reason they wish to obtain academic accreditation is they wish to apply for licenses, take civil service examinations, and pursue advanced studies. As long as those taking licensing exams have Republic of China citizenship, they have a constitutional right to take Republic of China civil service exams. The fact that our academic accreditation is restricted to our own citizens may well be unconstitutional. Imposing restrictions on particular geographical regions on the basis of ideology is even more dubious.

Is the reason for such restrictions limited opportunities or administrative costs? Is that why we must limit the rights of our own citizens? If it is, then the only reasonable criterion ought to be the quality of the schools or the credibility of the academic credentials. One must not discriminate on the basis of geographical location. Frankly speaking, Mainland Chinese universities such as Beijing University, National Tsing Hua University, Nanking University, Zhejiang University are hardly inferior to universities on Taiwan. If children of Taiwan businessmen graduate from Beijing University, yet are forbidden to return to Taiwan to take Republic of China civil service exams, that is evidence of a closed mind and a refusal to recognize talent. If we deny children of Taiwan businessmen who graduate from Beijing University academic accreditation merely to protect the so-called "rights" of local Taiwan graduates, that is discrimination against one's fellow citizens.

In short, Republic of China citizens' academic credentials must be recognized by the other side. Republic of China citizens must also be allowed to take Republic of China civil service exams on the basis of their Mainland academic credentials. We can of course impose limits on the number of families during the initial phase. This will enable us to verify the quality of their academic credentials. We can wait until the situation has improved before relaxing these restrictions. But no matter what, the academic credentials of elite universities on the other side must be recognized. If we can't do even this, then Taiwan's image will be as tarnished as the Democratic Progressive Party's as it barricades itself against progress behind closed doors.

On the other hand, we do have a number of concerns about allowing Mainland students to study on Taiwan. President Ma advocates allowing Mainland students to study on Taiwan, primarily on the grounds that "harmonious interaction is beneficial to mutual understanding." On this point, we could not agree more. But Mainland students studying on Taiwan will inevitably consume Taiwan's educational resources. Any crowding out effect is likely to trigger a backlash. Students on Taiwan fight tooth and nail to get into famous institutions such as National Taiwan University and National Chengchi University. When they are admitted their families set off firecrackers to celebrate. Who is willing to open them up to students from the other side? Even if the government announces that any Mainland students would be an "additional" quota, quotas are still quotas. Numbers games hardly ameliorate public doubts. Everyone is fighting to get into a good school. Mainland students are not interested in getting into bad schools. The government talks about opening up our schools to Mainland students. But it has not offered us comprehensive plans. We really have no idea what sort of chaos will ensue.

Perhaps the government is looking to the United States and Europe. They absorb a high percentage of foreign students. But the Republic of China truly is different from Europe and the United States. When it comes to expectations regarding their childrens' education, the Republic of China is an extremely conservative nation. The premise "Above all, Education" is deeply rooted within society. The Republic of China is a far cry from nations in Europe and the United States, which admit students from far and wide. The public might be willing to accept small-scale. short-term student exchanges. But do not expect it to accept large numbers of Mainland students arriving on Taiwan.

In any event, cross-Strait educational exchanges must be phased in gradually. They must be properly planned. The KMT must not ram its policy through in order to fulfill the President's campaign promises. The DPP should not oppose every policy that involves the Mainland. It must not inexplicably resist debate. The ruling and opposition parties cannot make progress on opposite sides of a locked door, and neither can Taiwan.

中時電子報
中國時報  2009.05.07
社論-兩岸教育交流 關鍵在配套
本報訊

本周一的立法院又上演了一場民進黨封鎖議場的戲碼。至於為什麼要封鎖,大家也弄不太清楚。先前,民進黨說是為了抗議國民黨要強行通過集遊法修正案,揚言「死也要把法案擋下來」。但是周一抗爭的場景卻是兩岸教育與學歷認證。據報導,民進黨立委趁中場休息時間把自己反鎖在議場內,弄得一整天一事無成。在野黨立委現在人數少,遇上鴨霸的多數場面偶爾施些癱瘓議事的手段本也無可厚非。但若同樣的招式一再施演,逢「中」必反,卻完全不能就事論事地解決問題,那就是不長進。我們在此要對與兩岸有關的教育事務做些評論,一則提醒執政黨,二則也告誡在野黨。

有關兩岸學術交流的議題其實有兩塊,其一是「是否承認大陸學歷,有何限制」,其二是「是否開放陸生來台,有何配套」。這兩個問題本質上截然不同,絕不能一體放在兩岸教育開放的大帽子下混同討論,否則即會失焦。

首先,讓我們澄清「承認大陸學歷」問題的本質。當我們談論大陸學歷時,其意義當然是針對台灣學生或台商子女在對岸就學取得當地學歷;中國大陸本地人在內地就讀者動輒上億,完全不是台灣學歷認證的目標對象。其次,要為台灣人民辦學歷認證,其目的就是要容許當事人考照、國考、升學。只要這些考照、考試的人具中華民國國籍,應考試服公職原本就是他們憲法的權利。即便是以台灣的學歷限制本國國民應考就職,已然有違憲之虞,更何況是以意識形態的理由,對特定地區的學歷做限制。

如果基於機會有限、行政成本的考量,而一定要對本國國民應考或就職的權利做規範,那就只能依據學校的品質或文件的可信度做篩選標準,而不能以地區別一概而論。坦白說,中國大陸如北大、清大、南大、浙大等重點大學的水準並不在台灣之下。如果台商子女能在北大畢業,卻不能返台應考試服公職,那就是台灣以封閉的心態在排拒人才。而如果拒絕台商子女北大畢業生來台應考只是為了要保護台灣本地畢業生的所謂「權益」,那就是對本國國民的歧視。

總之,我們同意要對中華民國國民取得對岸學歷予以認證,也贊成要容許他們依此學歷而應考、就職。基於對岸學歷驗證困難與品質不一的考量,在初期當然可以對開放家數有所限制,如此亦可便於有效查證,等到以後視改善情況而酌予放寬,但無論如何,對岸重點大學等頂級名校的學歷是一定要承認的;如果連這一點都做不到,台灣的形象就像是自鎖於議場的民進黨,簡直是封閉而不知長進。

但另一方面,我們對於開放陸生來台,卻有頗多的顧慮。馬總統主張開放陸生來台就學,主要是基於「交流互動有利和諧了解」的觀念,這一點我們完全贊成。但陸生來台無論如何會耗用台灣的教育資源,當然有排擠效果與衍生反彈。像台大政大這樣的知名學府,台灣人自己入學都擠破頭,考上了家裡都還會燃放鞭炮慶祝,怎麼可能願意開放給對岸學生就讀?就算政府聲稱陸生名額是「外加」,但是名額就是名額,加減方式的小把戲完全無助於釋群疑。好學校大家搶著唸,爛學校陸生沒興趣。奢談開放,當局卻全無配套規畫,真不知後續戲碼會亂成什麼樣子。

主政者也許拿美國、歐洲為例,認為他們國家都會吸收高比例的外籍生。但是我們不得不說:台灣與歐美的國情真的大不相同。就家庭中對子女升學的期待而言,台灣其實是非常保守的國家,「萬般皆下品,唯有讀書高」的升學期待根深柢固。在這樣普遍的民間心理下,台灣其實離歐美諸國廣納四方學子的社會情境相距甚遠。如果要以極小的規模先做短暫的學生交流,也許民間還可以接受,但千萬不要現在就大張旗鼓地宣稱要開放陸生來台。

無論如何,兩岸教育交流要循序漸進、也要妥善規畫。國民黨千萬不要因為它是總統政見,就要強渡關山。民進黨也不要逢「中」必反,莫名其妙地一再抵制討論。隔著上鎖的一道門,朝野雙方沒有進展,台灣也沒有進展。

Wednesday, May 6, 2009

Why Bring Up a Dead Issue?

Why Bring Up a Dead Issue?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 6, 2009

Masaki Saito, Japan's representative to Taipei, declared that "Taiwan's status is still undetermined," causing a huge stir. But domestically and internationally, this perspective is long obsolete, and bears no relationship whatsoever to the actual status of the Republic of China.

Domestically, after four presidential elections, and two changes in ruling parties, the Republic of China has fully affirmed its legality and legitimacy. Internationally, the Ma administration's adherence to the 1992 Consensus and "One China, Different Interpretations" has allowed the two sides to avoid denying each other's legitimacy. Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory is hardly something that needs to be brought up again.

That being the case, why has Japan trotted out the Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory now, triggering a major domestic and international controversy?

Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory had its roots in the Treaty of San Francisco. Is had a major impact on the Republic of China over the past five decades, particularly on its political development. According to the Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory, even after Washington established diplomatic relations with Beijing, it could still apply domestic law in the form of the Taiwan Relations Act in order to maintain semi-official relations with Taipei. Even after the rise of Mainland China, this allowed Taipei a certain amount of international breathing room.

The most significant impact of the Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory however, was in domestic politics. Because if Taiwan's status was undetermined, that implied it could choose independence via a public referendum. As a result, beginning with early 1950's Taiwan independence activist Liao Wen-yi, the Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory became the theoretical foundation for the Taiwan independence movement. The Dang Wai (Party Outsider) Central Committee was the predecessor to the Democratic Progressive Party. In 1983 it first set forth its view that "Taiwan's future should be decided collectively by the inhabitants of Taiwan." After the Democratic Progressive Party was founded in 1991, it adopted the Taiwan Independence Party Platform. It advocated using the initiative and referendum process to establish an independent "Republic of Taiwan."

The Democratic Progressive Party heavily promoted the Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory. But it was also the Democratic Progressive Party that turned the Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory on its head. The turning point was the 1996 Presidential Election. Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Shih Ming-teh, who was in Washington at the time, proclaimed that "If the Democratic Progressive Party assumes office, it has no need to declare Taiwan independence and will not declare Taiwan independence." He proclaimed that as long as Taiwan maintained the status quo, that would be enough to ensure its sovereignty and independence. Shih Ming-teh drifted further and further away as a result of political struggles with the Democratic Progressive Party. Nevertheless, during the 1999 Presidential Election, the Democratic Progressive Party passed its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." For the first time it formally recognized the "Republic of China" as a nation. At this point, the Democratic Progressive Party effectively abandoned the Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory, and recognized the Republic of China.

The key to the Democratic Progressive Party's turnabout was Taiwan's democratization. Following the re-election of every member of the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, and the direct election of President Lee Teng-hui in 1996, the KMT's rule had been fully legitimized. Allegations that Taiwan's status remained undetermined no longer corresponded to public perception. In 2000, after Chen Shui-bian came to power, he still advocated maintaining the status quo. However, beginning in 2004, as President of the Republic of China Chen Shui-bian actually returned to the Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory. He demanded a constitutional referendum and a change in the nation's name.

During his last two years as president, Chen pushed Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory to the limit, with painful consequences.

The first painful consequence was worsening relations with Washington. In order to block Chen Shui-bian's constitutional referendum, Washington changed its policy. In the past it would declare only that it did not support Taiwan independence. By 2004, U.S. State Department officials openly declared that they "agree that Taiwan is part of China." Chen Shui-bian's aggressive promotion of Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory and de jure independence, had the opposite effect on Taiwan's status.

Of course the bloodiest battle in this war was fought on Taiwan. Reunification vs. independence has long been controversial on Taiwan. It is a matter of personal belief. It is hard to talk about right and wrong. Maintaining the status quo is the greatest common denominator. When Chen Shui-bian used the machinery of state to aggressively promote independence, he Intensified controversy over reunification vs. independence. He also provoked tensions between social and ethnic groups. The harm he inflicted will be difficult to remedy any time soon.

The book Chen Shui-bian wrote in prison expressed regrets that he failed to rectify names and author a new constitution. The unspoken truth was that Chen Shui-bian's failure to rectify names and author a new constitution during his term of office was not due to caution on Ah-Bian's part. It was simply impossible given the international situation. American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Raymond Burghardt visited Taiwan twice in 2008 to prevent Ah-Bian from moving toward Taiwan independence.

In the wake of Ah-Bian's brinksmanship, Ma Ying-jeou came to power. Ma returned to strategic ambiguity. He did not trumpet the sovereignty of the Republic of China. But he aggressively used the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952 to resolve historical issues surrounding the Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory.

If we reaffirm the Republic of China, and cross-Strait relations develop harmoniously, the Republic of China government in Taipei may be able to participate in international activities and carry on exchanges with Beijing. By that time Taiwan's status will not longer be undetermined.

中時電子報
中國時報  2009.05.06
既已時過境遷 何必重提?
本報訊

日本駐台代表齋藤正樹發表「台灣地位未定論」,引發軒然大波,但是,無論是國內外情勢,此一角度皆可說是「時過境遷」,已不能確實的描繪中華民國現狀。

因為,就國內而言,經過四次總統大選、二次政黨輪替,中華民國政府的統治權具充分的合法性及正當性;就對外關係而言,馬政府堅持的九二共識、一中各表主張,至少讓兩岸關係呈現互不否認的狀態,亦無重提「台灣地位未定論」的急迫性。

既然如此,為何此時冒出的台灣地位未定論,仍在國內政壇引發重大爭議?

源生於舊金山和約的「台灣地位未定論」,對中華民國過去五十年來的發展、尤其是政治發展,確實發生了重大的形塑效果,基於台灣地位未定論,美國即使和中國建交之後,仍以國內法形式的「台灣關係法」,和台灣維持半官方關係,台灣也得以在中國興起之後,仍維持有限的國際空間。

台灣地位未定論真正重大的影響,則在國內政治。由於地位未定論隱涵台灣可以透過住民自決、來選擇台灣獨立,因此,從一九五○年代早期的台獨運動人士廖文毅開始,台灣地位未定就成為台獨運動最重要的理論基礎,影響所及,一九八三年民進黨前身的「黨外中央後援會」,就首度推出「台灣前途,應由台灣全體住民共同決定」的政見。民進黨成立後在一九九一年通過的「台獨黨綱」,更是倡議以公民投票方式,建立獨立自主的台灣共和國。

值得注意的是,民進黨將台灣地位未定論發揚光大,但也是民進黨,將台灣地位未定論整個翻轉,轉折點在一九九六年的總統大選,當時的民進黨黨主席施明德在華府宣布「民進黨如果執政,不必也不會宣布台灣獨立」,他認為台灣只要維持現狀,即可確保主權獨立,施明德雖因民進黨政治鬥爭,而與該黨漸行漸遠,但是,一九九九年為了總統大選,民進黨舉黨在全代會通過「台灣前途決議文」,首次在正式文件中承認「中華民國」國號。至此,民進黨已形同拋棄「台灣地位未定論」,承認中華民國現狀。

民進黨這段轉折的真正關鍵,在於台灣的民主化,經過國會全面改選、一九九六年總統直選選出李登輝後,當時執政的國民黨已取得充分的合法性,再持台灣地位未定主張,和民眾的感受相當背離。二千年陳水扁上台後仍持維持現狀主張,但是二○○四年開始,已經身為中華民國總統的陳水扁,竟然重返未定論,堅持要以公投來推動制憲及國號正名。

扁在總統最後兩年,更將台灣地位未定論推到極致,但也造成極為慘痛的後果。

首當其衝的是對美關係,為了防堵陳水扁的制憲公投,美國政府一改過去公開僅表示不支持台獨的慣例,到了二○○四年,美國國務院官員更公開說出「同意台灣是中國的一部分」,可以說,陳水扁基於台灣地位未定論而積極推動的法理台獨,反而讓台灣地位遭受重挫。

當然,這一場戰爭最慘烈的戰場還是在台灣,尤其,台灣本來就有統獨爭議,這是個人信仰問題,難言對錯,「維持現狀」是雙方最大的交集,當陳水扁以國家機器強力推動極獨時,激化了統獨爭議,也挑起族群間的緊張關係,其造成的傷害,短期內難以彌補。

陳水扁的獄中家書悔恨的說,當時應落實正名制憲的主張,他沒有說出的實情是,陳水扁任內之所以沒有宣布正名制憲,並非扁的慎重,而是國際情勢不允許,美國在台協會主席薄瑞光,就曾於二○○八年兩次赴台阻擋扁的極獨路線。

在扁極端的「實驗」之後,馬英九上台,又重回戰略模糊的老路,他雖不強調中華民國的主權地位,但是積極的以一九五二年的中日和約來解決台灣地位未定的歷史問題。

長期而言,如果在台灣回歸中國民國之後,能在兩岸關係和諧發展的情勢下,順利的以中華民國身分參與國際社會、與對岸進行交流,那時,台灣也許就有機會真正擺脫地位未定的陰影。

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

Ghostly Tentacles: "Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory"

Ghostly Tentacles: "Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 5, 2009

Masaki Saito, Japan's representative to Taipei, openly proclaimed that "Taiwan's status is undetermined." This cannot be explained away as "merely his personal opinion." Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs' "expressions of regret and solemn protest" are tough on the exterior but soft in the interior. Demands that he be expelled and replaced are fully justified.

Taiwan's status never has been undetermined. Japan, via the Makuan Treaty of 1895, forcibly annexed Taiwan. But following the War of Resistance against Japan, the Nationalist Government nullified all treaties with Japan. The Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, and Japan's signing of the instrument of surrender, repeatedly affirmed Taiwan's retrocession to China. Therefore no legal or historical doubt whatsoever remains about Taiwan's retrocession.

However, when we condemn Japan for alleging that "Taiwan's status is undetermined," we must realize that post-war Japan was essentially a vassal of the United States. The real mastermind was the United States. The so-called "Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory" was concocted by the United States. It later realized the theory was untenable and let it drop. Japan is merely playing the part of the United States' parrot.

The United States has coveted Taiwan ever since the nineteenth century. It has never forgotten it. Despite numerous failed attempts to annex it, it has never given up. It has always adjusted to the situation as it develops. Taiwan was retroceded to China following the war. But soon afterwards the Nationalist government was defeated on the Mainland. The Korean War broke out. The United States was presented with another opportunity. When Truman dispatched the Seventh Fleet, he declared that Taiwan's status was still undetermined. The U.S. military command in Japan also asserted that Taiwan's status was undetermined. It attempted to use the Peace Treaty with Japan to place Taiwan under the trusteeship of the United States or the United Nations. Therefore the United States concocted its "Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory." It used the Soviet Union's refusal to recognize the Nationalist Government as a pretext to exclude both Taipei and Beijing from the proceedings. It stage-managed its "San Francisco Peace Treaty." Because the KMT government needed the support of the United States back then, it bit its tongue. Ever since then the San Francisco Peace Treaty has been the basis for claims that "Taiwan's status is undetermined."

Therefore, when we condemn Japanese officials for alleging that "Taiwan's status is undetermined." We must not target only Japan. Instead, we should thoroughly understand the context.

One. In terms of historical context: "Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory" is an example of U.S. meddling in China's internal affairs. It was an attempt to use extralegal force, using the San Francisco Peace Treaty as a pretext to override the Cairo Declaration and other legal documents. It was an attempt to use "Taiwan's Undecided Status Theory" to create for itself some political maneuvering room. It was a throwback to an era of imperialist hegemony. For example, a subsequent United States/apan "two-plus-two meeting" dealt with Taiwan as a "peripheral matter."

Two. In terms of its significance at the time: The United States deliberately muddied the meaning of the Cairo Declaration and other international treaties. It concocted the "San Francisco Peace Treaty." It turned Taiwan into its protectorate. It ensured that Taiwan and the rest of China would preserve the status quo and remain separate. Meanwhile on Taiwan two movements developed: "Taiwan independence" and "an independent Taiwan." Following the Saito incident, some Pan Blue legislators even said, "In fact he's helping Taiwan." This reveals that even within the KMT many people have internalized the premise.

Three. In terms of ideology: After World War II, United States regarded Taiwan as "spoils of war," as something it can order about as it wishes. The United States believes it has an extralegal prerogative to dispose of Taiwan as it pleases, to give its "spoils of war" to whomever it desires. For example, the United States combined the Ryukyu Islands with Diaoytai and "gave" them to Japan. For example, on the one hand, its "Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory" helps it contain Beijing. On the other hand, it manipulates Taipei by casting doubt on the legitimacy of the ROC govenment's rule. During the 1950s the U.S. attempted to stage a military coup on Taiwan. It wanted to promote the notion that the ROC government was a "foreign power." This was an extension of its "Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory."

Just as cross-Strait relations are warming up, enabling the resolution of past disputes, Saito brings up "Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory." This is hardly something that can be explained away as "merely his personal opinion." Do Japan and the US really want to turn back the clock? Do they really want to provoke conflict between the two sides?

Under the circumstances, the Ma administration must not merely express regret and allow the matter to drop. It must review the entire "Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory" and thoroughly expose it for what it is. It must take a stand and offer a vision for the nation's future. Saito's proclamation was merely an interlude. The ghostly tentacles that remain poised over Taiwan, ever ready to meddle in our internal affairs and provoke hatred and confrontation, is what we must be truly vigilant against.

章魚般的幽靈:「台灣地位未定論」
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.05 06:35 am

日本駐台代表齋藤正樹公開發表「台灣地位未定論」,這當然不是他事後所謂的「個人見解」能夠緩解的;外交部的「表示遺憾及嚴正抗議」也是色厲內荏,若命其離境換人亦在情理之中。

台灣從來就不曾有地位問題。日本於一八九五年以馬關條約強行割據台灣,但後來對日抗戰,國民政府宣布廢止對日一切條約;而後開羅宣言、波茨坦公告,以及日本簽署降書,都一再確定台灣的歸還。因此,所謂「台灣光復」無論就法律或歷史而言,皆毫無任何疑義。

不過,當我們為了「台灣地位未定論」而譴責日本時,不能不知道戰後的日本,在本質上只是美國的從屬,真正的主宰則是美國;所謂「台灣地位未定論」原是美國一度想炮製的東西,後已知難而退,日本所扮演的只不過是美國的反舌鳥而已。

美國對台,溯自十九世紀起即念茲在茲,從未或忘,儘管它的許多圖謀並未成真,但初衷不變,總是隨著情勢的發展而做著調整。戰後台灣光復,但緊接著國民政府在大陸失敗、韓戰爆發,美國的企圖遂又有了機會;杜魯門在派遣第七艦隊的文告中,即曾楬櫫台灣地位未定的說法。美軍駐日司令部更曾表示過要透過台灣地位未定這種說法,藉著對日和約,而將台灣置於美國或聯合國託管下;因而,美國為了炮製「台灣地位未定論」,以蘇俄不承認國府為藉口,將兩岸排除在外,導演了一場「舊金山和約」。由於當時的國民黨政府需要美國的支援,遂低調處理,但此後舊金山和約即屢屢成為「未定論」的張本。

因此,當人們在譴責日本官員的「台灣地位未定論」時,不能只是選擇性的拿日本當箭靶,而更應深入探討它的時代脈絡。歸納起來,我們可說:

一、就歷史脈絡而言:「台灣地位未定論」乃是美國介入中國內政,企圖以「超法律」實力為後盾的「舊金山和約」,凌駕「開羅宣言」等一系列法律文件的炮製手法;企圖透過「台灣地位未定論」,形成政治操作空間,故是一種帝國霸權主義的餘緒。例如,後來美日「二加二會議」將台灣納入「周邊有事」之範圍,即由此而延伸出來。

二、就時代意義而言:美國模糊化開羅宣言等一系列國際條約文件,炮製出「舊金山和約」,將台灣納為保護,固然使得台灣得以維持住與中國分離的「現狀」,但台灣內部也因而出現「台獨」與「獨台」這兩種發展。齋藤風波後,藍營還有立委表示「他其實是在幫台灣利益講話」,所反映的即是國民黨內不少人早已內化了的心態。

三、就意識形態而言:二戰之後,美國始終將台灣視為是它的「戰利品」,可以任意支配,美國自認擁有超法律的支配權,要把「戰利品」給誰皆可;美國將琉球群島連釣魚台列嶼一併「給」予日本即是例證。「台灣地位未定論」其實也是一方面牽制中國,另方面又對國民政府統治合法性故示模糊的某種操控;五○年代美國曾企圖在台導演軍事政變,以及宣揚「外來政權論」,都是「台灣地位未定論」的延長。

因此,齋藤代表在兩岸開始良性互動、已漸有可能解決爭端的此刻,再提「台灣地位未定論」,恐怕不是「個人意見」所能解釋;難道想要倒撥時鐘,挑激兩岸之間的矛盾對立?

正基於此,政府當局不能只做一番表態即讓事情過去,而是應該對整個「台灣地位未定論」重做回顧及嚴正駁斥,並對國家立場提出願景。齋藤的發言只是插曲,那個縈繞台灣上空,始終企圖干涉內政及炮製仇恨對立,有如章魚般無所不在的幽靈,才是我們要警惕並防範的。

Mainland Spouses Will Command 3-5% of the Vote

Mainland Spouses Will Command 3-5% of the Vote
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 5, 2009

The Legislative Yuan is amending the "Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area." Mainland spouses' political status, right to work, and right to property will be expanded. If 260,000 Mainland spouses acquire citizenship, they along with their spouses and relatives on Taiwan will become a social group that can no longer be ignored. During national elections they will constitute 3-5 percent of the vote. Given this trend, politicians can no longer discriminate on the basis of political ideology. The public should also toss such demeaning terms as "Mainland sister" into the dustbin.

The amending of Mainland spouses' rights is essential if we wish to respect human rights. It is also essential to cross-Strait interaction. Over the past decade, under the influence of "nativization," society on Taiwan has been slow to accept foreign spouses. The DPP is also strategically "anti-China." Mainland spouses are the most severely discriminated against members among the new wave of immigrants. [Translator's Note: Strictly speaking, Chinese citizens who move from the Mainland to Taiwan are not "immigrants." They are merely Chinese citizens who have changed their residency.] The obstacles in the way of Mainland spouses obtaining work permits, owning property, and acquiring ID cards are greater than for other foreign spouses. Mainland spouses are tantamount to "Third-Class Citizens."

Our government prides itself on its democracy. Yet it classifies and treats people differently according to their identity. This is flagrant discrimination. Unfortunately the Democratic Progressive Party, which boasts that it champions "human rights," is also the mastermind of this discriminatory policy. The amended law will return only a few of the rights Mainland spouses were deprived of previously. Strictly speaking, their status has not really been upgraded. For example, in the past Mainland spouses had to wait eight long years go obtain an identity card. This has now been reduced to six. But it is still not comparable to foreign spouses in general, who need only wait four.

The Democratic Progressive Party contradicts its own rhetoric. It attempts to distort society to justify Taiwan independence. The DPP's supreme value is Taiwan independence. To achieve it, the DPP must violate human rights and oppresses other social and ethnic groups. The DPP's "Us vs. Them" mentality trumps all. This has led to partisan chaos, and worse, injected a deadly toxin into our society.

When the law was being amended, DPP Legislator Chiu Yi-ying actually said "The streets are swarming with the spawn of Mainlanders. Very scary." Ong Ching-chu said they would deprive "Taiwanese" of job opportunities. In their eyes, even if a Mainland spouse has acquired a Republic of China identity card entirely in accordance with the law, he or she still does not qualify as a "citizen of Taiwan." In Ong Ching-chu's eyes, it makes no difference whether a Mainland spouse is unemployed. But a "Taiwanese" must not be unemployed. In Chiu Yi-ying's eyes, as long as a child's mother is a Mainlander, then that child is "very scary." The fathers of these children may be bona fide Taiwanese, but she still considers them the Spawn of the Enemy.

Over the past year cross-Strait relations have undergone positive changes. But viewed from the context of the past six decades, such a minor shift is merely one step amidst countless advances and retreats. Today when we refer to "Mainland spouses," the "Mainlanders" who arrived on Taiwan in 1949 have apparently become "Taiwanese." And if we turn the clock even further back, weren't Chiu Yi-ying and Ong Ching-chu's male ancestors bachelors "fresh off the boat" from "Tangshan?"

Mainland spouses currently number 260,000. That number will increase. If they obtain full Republic of China citizenship, they will constitute over one percent of the population. They could have a direct impact on elections as high as 3-5 percentage points. If the total turnout is 80%, each percentage point is about 130,000 votes. The voting strength of Mainland spouses and their relatives will be considerable. How can we ignore the existence of such a large demographic? How can we oppress them? From the perspective of elections alone, no political party can afford to ignore these new voters. In fact, three years ago the number of Mainland spouses and foreign spouses exceeded the number of Aborigines. It is now the fourth largest social or ethnic group on Taiwan. Unless we impose a total ban on Mainland spouses, or deny them full political status, they are bound to change the demographics of the island. Those who hope to distort this social reality will lose their chance six to eight years from now.

The Fan Lan-qin incident reflected the anxieties felt by different social and ethnic groups on Taiwan. Actually the most serious social and ethnic problem on Taiwan is not bigoted exchanges about "Tai Ba Zhi" or "High-Class Mainlanders." It is Mainland spouses and foreign spouses who have no political voice.

Attempts to deal with social and ethnic problems on Taiwan have failed. This has led to the bitter divisions in today's society. Today the problem of Mainland spouses and foreign spouses has intensified. We must not backslide. As we amend the law and restore the rights of Mainland and foreign spouses, political parties must realize that society on Taiwan will be different tomorrow, Therefore they must treat these new members of our society in a civilized, equitable, and open manner.

陸配夫妻將有三至五個百分點的投票實力
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.04 03:15 am

立法院修正兩岸人民關係條例,大陸配偶身分權、工作權和財產權均將放寬。廿六萬陸配若遲早會陸續取得公民資格,加上其配偶及在台親屬,將成為社會結構中不容忽視的一群,在全國選舉中亦將有三至五個百分點的投票實力。面對此一趨勢,政治人物不能昧於形勢再刻意歧視,民眾也該把「大陸妹」這類名詞丟進垃圾箱了。

陸配權益獲得放寬,本是回歸人權原則的必要修正,更是兩岸互動之勢所必然。十幾年來,在「本土化」政策的影響下,台灣社會對外籍配偶的接納一直相當遲緩;再加上民進黨戰略性的「反中」,陸配更成為這波新移民中最受歧視的一群。不論工作、財產、身分的取得,陸配都較其他外籍配偶來得嚴苛且漫長,形同台灣的「三等公民」。

在一個自詡民主的國家,卻依身分將人民分等級,對人民的權益作區別待遇,這當然是赤裸裸的歧視。遺憾的是,喜歡唱「人權」高調的民進黨,卻也正是此一歧視政策的主控者。這次修法,雖將陸配過去被剝奪及侵壓的權益稍作回復,其實仍談不上提升;只消看,過去陸配要八年的漫長等待才能取得身分證,如今縮短為六年,比起一般外籍配偶之只需四年仍有差別待遇。

民進黨的矛盾,在欲扭曲社會來維持其台獨主張。在台獨至上的前提下,必須違反人權打壓不同族群。如此無限上綱的敵我意識,不僅導致政黨的價值錯亂,更將敵意的毒素注入了民間。

且看這次修法過程,綠營立委邱議瑩竟說:「滿街都是大陸之子,很可怕。」翁金珠則認為,這將排擠台灣人的工作機會。以她們二人的政治認知,陸配就算依法取得了台灣身分證,也仍不配稱為台灣公民吧!在翁金珠眼裡,似乎陸配沒有工作沒關係;陸配可以失業,但「台灣人」不能失業。在邱議瑩眼裡,孩子的母親只要是大陸人,都會「很可怕」;但這些孩子的父親皆是正港台灣人,她卻視之為敵人之子?

近一年,兩岸關係有了相對善意的變化;但如果放在過去六十年的脈絡裡看,這樣的推移,也是在進進退退之間才走到這一步。當今天我們提到「陸配」時,四九年來台的「外省人」似乎皆已變成了「台灣人」;再往前看,如翁金珠和邱議瑩的先祖,不也是早年「唐山」渡海來台的羅漢腳嗎?

目前廿六萬陸配的數字仍將持續增加,若悉數取得台灣公民資格,已超過總人口一個百分點,他們所能直接牽動的投票意向,亦可能高達三至五個百分點。倘若以總投票率八成,每個百分點約十三萬票計,則陸配及其關係人的投票實力更可從高估計。這麼大的族群,台灣如何可能一再漠視或壓抑他們的存在?即使只問民主選舉的運作,恐怕任何政黨也不能再輕視或漠視這些新選民。事實上,包括陸配和外配在內的新移民,三年前人數即已超越原住民,成為台灣第四大族群。除非完全禁止或在法理上根本不承認陸配或外配,這是台灣必然要面對的人口結構變遷;想要扭曲此一現實的人,不論拖八年或六年,恐怕終將失去對潮流的掌握。

稍早的范蘭欽事件,反映出台灣社會的族群焦慮,事實上,台灣社會最嚴重的族群問題並不在相互戲謔的「台巴子」或「高級外省人」身上,而在那些根本發不出聲音的陸配和外配身上。

台灣在處理族群問題上,可謂相當失敗,造成今日社會的慘痛分裂。如今面對陸配及外配問題已見升高,不可再蹈覆車之轍。因此,在修法還給陸配公民地位之際,所有的政黨皆應意識到未來台灣社會已然不同,並以文明、平等、開放的態度來面對這些新加入者。

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Confronting New Strains of Influenza

Confronting New Strains of Influenza
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 30, 2009

In April 2009, the world was just beginning to recover from the havoc wreaked by the financial tsunami. US President Barack Obama confidently declared that signs of an economic recovery were already evident. Who knew another storm was already brewing? The World Health Organization (WHO) upgraded the epidemic caused by the H1N1 virus, a "new type of influenza," to a Level Four Alert. This may be revised at any time to a Level Five Alert. Many nations, including the Republic of China, have begun working to prevent a repeat of the panic and harm caused In 2003 by SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome).

At the same time, we have good news. This year, 12 years later, the Republic of China government will finally acquire observer status under the name "Chinese Taipei." On May 18 it will participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA). Some people consider WHA observer status under the name "Chinese Taipei" unsatisfactory. They compare it to World Trade Organization (WTO) membership under the name "Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Customs Territory." But this is nevertheless an important step in the Republic of China government's return to the international community. Especially since this new type of influenza may touch off international concerns. Taipei has been invited to the meeting. It has been presented with the opportunity to join the international dialogue on public health and the cross-border health cooperation program led by the World Health Organization (WHO). This will provide Taipei with valuable experience in public health surveillance and the prevention of enterovirus infections and Influenza epidemics. For Taipei, participation in WHA is an important breakthrough.

Participation in international organizations is one thing. But disaster prevention efforsts must not be taken lightly. A new outbreak of influenza caused by a four-year-old boy's illness on a pig farm near the US-Mexican border appears random, like the outbreak of SARS in 2003. On February 26, 2003, an American businessman who fell ill in Hanoi and was hospitalized in Hong Kong, died. This was the prelude to SARS, known as the 21st Century plague. Soon afterwards, Hong Kong, Mainland China, Vietnam, and other Asian regions reported cases of SARS.

The first SARS cases were discovered in March. Initially, health authorities believed the epidemic was under control. But in April Heping Hospital experienced a massive outbreak. Patients, health care workers, and nursing personnel were all infected. This was Taiwan's first mass infection of SARS. The public experienced widespread panic and confusion. The government classified it as a fourth category of SARS Notifiable Diseases. For the first time since 1949, hospitals, streets, and buildings were quarantined. Both the central government Director of Health and the Taipei City Director of Health were forced to step down. The "anti-SARS hero" at the time, the man who on his own initiative entered the already quarantined Heping Hospital and took command, is today's Director of Health Yeh Chin-chuan.

SARS reminded many people of what well-known sociologist Ulrich Beck calls the "risk society." Society treats individuals as units. But modern risk is globalized (Glocal Risk). Individual behavior has collective consequences. Many people believe that one reason the SARS epidemic got out of control was that the Beijing government covered it up during its outset. The global community means constant interaction. Public health is an issue that requires everyone's participation. Any one nation or region's negligence may lead to unpredictable and unfortunate consequences. On Taiwan, SARS screening and isolation measures led to widespread public discussion of ethical issues. For example, a high school student quarantined at home violated quarantine to attend a cram school class. This created a hole in the quarantine system, and widespread criticism that the high school student had "absolutely no sense of public spirit." Some Heping Hospital medical staff refused to go back to work. Then Taipei mayor Ma Ying-jeou had some harsh words for them. He said fighting SARS was akin to waging war. If health care workers refuse to work, it is akin to cowardice in the face of the enemy. He would punish them according to the "Infectious Diseases Prevention Law," and seek administrative accountability.

The SARS epidemic taught Taiwan valuable lessons about collective risk, personal responsibility, and medical ethics. The fight against SARS also helped established standard operating procedures. Three and a half months after SARS erupted on Taiwan, WHO announced Taiwan's removal from its list of SARS infected areas. During this period, 664 were infected and 73 died. Approximately 110,000 were quarantine at home. Three in ten thousand returning to Taiwan from infected areas became infected. Twelve in ten thousand who came in contact with them became infected. The incidence of SARS on Taiwan was low. But the risk of death among those infected was high.

During that period, Taipei's application for WHA observer status was rejected. Six years later, a new type of influenza led to 160 deaths in nine countries. Asia already has its first confirmed cases, in South Korea. Will it cause a global pandemic? Everyone is concerned. In addition to public health security issues, scholarly studies reveal that the economic damage caused by the epidemic on Taiwan caused a drop in consumption of over 200 billion NT. Excluding the cost of fighting SARS, the financial losses amounted to 16 billion NT. Will the new type of influenza have a similar impact on a still recovering economy? The nations of the world must work together to survive the economic and social impact of the disease. During the SARS crisis, US Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson said pandemics remind us that public health knows no borders and is not a political issue. Without a global public health cooperation mechanism, we will not be able to control such diseases.

中時電子報
中國時報  2009.04.30
社論-以萬全準備迎接新流感挑戰
本報訊

二 ○○九年四月,這個世界剛剛開始要從金融海嘯的肆虐中回神過來、準備迎接美國總統歐巴馬的信心喊話:「景氣已看到復甦的契機。」沒想到新風暴又成形,世界衛生組織(WHO)已將因H1N1病毒感染所造成的「新型流感」升級為第四級警戒,並且隨時可能上修為大量流行的第五級警戒。包括台灣在內,各國已紛紛投入防疫工作,以免二○○三年SARS(嚴重急性呼吸道症候群)恐慌與傷害再現。

與此同時,台灣接獲一樁好消息。叩關十二年後,台灣終於在今年以「中華台北」名義的觀察員身分,參加五月十八日舉行的「世界衛生大會」(WHA)。或許對某些想比照世界貿易組織(WTO)「台澎金馬關稅領域」會籍名稱的人來說,WHA觀察員「中華台北」這個名稱不盡如人意,但是這畢竟是台灣重返國際社會所跨出的重要一步;特別是在這次新型流感可能引爆國際流行的隱憂之際,台灣此時獲邀與會,不但有機會加入國際公衛對話,參與世界衛生組織(WHO)主導的跨國醫衛合作計畫,台灣更能在腸病毒、流感疫情監控等公共衛生及疾病預防上,提供寶貴的經驗,因此參與WHA堪稱近年來台灣的一項重要突破。

能夠參與國際組織是一回事,但防疫抗災的努力更不可掉以輕心。這次從美墨邊境一家豬隻養殖場裡的四歲小男童生病所引發的新流感,彷彿出於一個看似輕微的偶然,一如二○○三年的SARS。二○○三年二月二十六日,越南河內一位美商發病送至香港就醫後,不幸死亡,揭開了SARS這個被稱為是二十一世紀人類第一場流行瘟疫的序幕;之後香港、中國大陸、越南等亞洲國家紛紛傳出了SARS病例。

記得當時三月間發現第一個SARS病例,起初衛生主管機關還認為疫情在控制中;四月就爆發和平醫院集體感染,病患、看護工、醫護人員先後發病,這個台灣第一次發生的SARS集體感染,讓台灣進入了集體恐慌,社會氣氛大亂。政府宣布將SARS列入為第四類法定傳染病,並創下自一九四九年以來,首度封院(醫院)、封街封樓、院外發燒篩檢的景況;中央和台北市的衛生首長雙雙下台。當時主動進入已遭封院的和平醫院指揮大局「抗煞英雄」就是今天的衛生署長葉金川。

SARS讓很多人深刻體認到著名的社會學家貝克(Ulrich Beck)所一再提醒的「風險社會」特質:社會看似以「個人」為單位,但現代風險卻已展現出一種全球在地化的趨勢(Glocal Risk),個別行為具有集體的影響力。很多人相信,SARS疫情之所以會一發不可拾,原因之一是中國大陸一開始隱瞞疫情;對交流頻繁的國際社會而言,公衛是「一個都不能少」風險連動課題,任何一個國家、地區的疏忽,都可能造成難以估計的不幸後果;而在台灣,SARS的篩檢與隔離措施,也引發了公共倫理議題的高度討論,例如,某位被居家隔離的高中生跑去補習,造成防疫漏洞,引發各界責難,認為這名高中生「完全沒有公共道德意識」;此外,當時和平醫院有醫護人員不願意返回醫院工作,進行抗爭,時任台北市長的馬英九特別說了重話,強調抗煞視同作戰,醫護人員如有抗爭,即視同敵前抗命,將依《傳染病防治法》懲處,並追究行政責任。

在SARS流行期間,在有關集體風險中個人的道德倫理與醫療專業等議題上,台灣上了寶貴的一課,也建立了抗煞的SOP(標準作業模式),SARS病例在台灣出現的三個半月後,WHO宣布台灣從SARS感染區除名。在此期間,台灣共有六六四個病例,其中七十三人死亡;居家隔離者共有十一萬人左右,由疫區返台者的發病率為○○三%(一萬人有三人),接觸者則有○一二%發病;SARS在台灣可以說是一種獲病比例低,但是死亡風險高的疾病。

那段期間,台灣也曾申請成為WHA觀察員未成。六年後,新型流感已在九國家造成一六○例死亡,亞洲也已在韓國出現第一起確定病例,是否會進一步造成全球大流行,世人極為憂慮;除了公共衛生安全的問題之外,從SARS的經驗看來,疫情還會造成經濟損害,以台灣為例,學者研究,SARS期間,台灣的消費減少了二百餘億元,不計抗煞經費,財務損失約為一六○億元,新型流感是否會對尚未恢復元氣的經濟造成新的打擊,同樣令人關切。總之,無論是疫情本身或者經濟、社會層面,各國必須通力合作才有可能度過這場猛烈的疫情危機。一如SARS期間,美國衛生部長湯普森強調的:疫情讓世人警惕到,公共衛生是沒有國界的,也是非政治性的,若沒有全球公共衛生合作的機制,就無法控制疾病。