Standing on the Front Line, Responding to Public Expectations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 20, 2009
President Ma Ying-jeou has been in office one year. The dominant feeling during this year has been frustration with the Ma administration for failing to live up to its potential.
President Ma's performance has fallen far short of public expectations. Two very different reasons are responsible for this, and both apply. First, President Ma erred, provoking public dissatisfaction. Secondly, on other issues, President Ma did not err. Instead, public expectations were unrealistic. In other words, some problems are due to President Ma's errors. Other problems are due to unrealistic public expectations.
President Ma Ying-jeou's main goal during the remainder of his term should be to identify the gaps between his performance and public expectations, and to fill them. If President Ma has erred, he must swiftly make amends. If the public has unrealistic expectations, he must communicate with the public and convince them otherwise. The president's performance will inevitably fall short of public expectations. But the shortfalls must be kept to a minimum.
Actually, when President Ma took office a year ago, the situation was more perious than first imagined. Taipei's relations with Beijing had reached new lows. Taipei's relations with Washington had also reached new lows. Taiwan's economic dependence on mainland China had reached new highs. The mainland's influence on Taiwan's political and economic lifeblood had also reached new highs. Cross-Strait relations had come to a head, and were ready for a showdown. Chen Shui-bian and the DPP had milked the national identity issue and "ethnic" relations issue for all they were worth. The Chen corruption case had devastated the system of legal justice and social justice beyond repair. Problems plagued the nation, inside and out. Add to this a global financial tsunami that occurs only once in a century. Faced with such perilous circumstances, what kind of president did Ma Ying-jeou aspire to be? What did the public expect Ma Ying-jeou to do? This is where the gap appeared.
What kind of President did Ma Ying-jeou aspire to be? The Chen Shui-bian regime was fierce, tyrannical, and reckless. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou was none of these things. He believed that people in political office must be upright, that integrity must be foremost. Chen Shui-bian was willing "to do whatever it takes." Ma Ying-jeou, by contrast, imposes limits upon himself. For example, Ma Ying-jeou declared that he was "retreating to the second line." The result was Liu Chao-hsuan became the most respected Premier in the past two decades. Ma never humiliated Vincent Siew the way Liu Tai-ying and Su Chi-cheng did. Ma never abused Premiers the way Chen Shui-bian did. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, in order to demagogue cross-Strait relations and Taipei-Washington relations, resorted to posturing and provoking external crises, to be used as political bargaining chips. Chen Shui-bian was fierce, tyrannical, and reckless to the extreme. During his "lost voyage" he ordered Air Force One flown to Libya as a gesture of protest. Ma Ying-jeou's policy was to transit on the west coast of the US, coming and going. Some suggested that he transit on the east coast, but he ignored such suggestions, saying he wanted to "keep things simple." Even Jason Hu felt Ma's style was "too bland." How does one explain Ma's style anyway?
What kind of president does the public expect Ma Ying-jeou to be? When Ma Ying-jeou said he was "retreating to the second line," the public subjected him to overwhelming criticism and ridicule. The public felt that the separation of powers between the president and the premier was something they needed to settle between themselves. But as the president, as the spiritual and political leader of the nation Ma had a responsibility to stand on the front line. Ma said "Chen Yunlin can address me as Mr. Ma," "Taiwan and mainland China are two regions," and "If re-elected I would not rule out political talks." President Ma probably felt he was merely stating some simple facts. But he really should have known his statement would provoke jibes about "Regional Administrator Ma." The public wonders how Ma can be so oblivious to the impact of his remarks. Chen Tsung-ming has refused to step down. The pre-trial investigation and the Chen corruption case have not progressed as the public hoped they would. Many people consider this President Ma's responsibility. Yet Ma's only response has been to say, "I respect the independence of the judiciary." Cross-Strait policy involves walking a tightrope. Some accuse him of "sympathizing with [Mainland] China, and selling out Taiwan." Others accuse him of promoting an "independent Taiwan and the two-states theory." As we can see, the public has sharply divergent expectations of Ma Ying-jeou.
Ma Ying-jeou got elected on the basis of his "Better Immediately!" campaign slogan. The subsequent gap between public expectations was of course, huge. Also, many factors, such as the rise and fall of cross-Strait relations were not under his control. The financial tsunami made matters worse. The Chen corruption case dragged on, making many people impatient. Faced with criticism from within and without, many members of the public almost hoped that Ma Ying-jeou would display a few "fierce, tyrannical, and reckless" traits. Instead, Ma Ying-jeou's forebearance was interpreted as weakness and incompetence. In fact Ma Ying-jeou could easily say the words or make the gestures needed to win over populist sentiment. So how did he get to be labeled as "weak and incompetent?" Is this the result of a gap in public expectations? Or is Ma Ying-jeou a person who simply will not live up to his potential?
What does Ma Ying-jeou expect of himself as a president? What does the public on Taiwan expect of him as a president? For the answers to these two questions, and to bridge the gap between public expectations and Ma's performance, we need to answer an even more fundamental question: Given the Republic of China's internal and external circumstances, what kind of leader does it need?
President Ma must stand on the front line. No matter what the separation of powers between the President and Premier might be, no matter how the party and government might interface, President Ma has symbolic and political responsibility to stand on the front line. He must stand on the front line. But Taiwan cannot endure another populist president who lives by demagoguery. Externally, he must persuade Beijing to maintain a win-win relationship. Internally, he must persuade Taiwan independence elements to see the error of their ways, and heal society's wounds. The president has taken a position on the front lines. He must be patient on the international front and forgiving on the domestic front. The president is standing on the front line, taking the point. It would be an easy matter for him to make a show of being a powerful leader, fierce, tyrannical, and reckless. But standing on the front line, taking the point, he must bite his tongue, he must make concessions. he must avoid doing the things he shouldn't do. That may well be beyond the abilities of ordinary mortals. To what extent must he remain silent? To what extent must he make concessions? How can he do what must be done, and refuse to do what must not be done? How can he avoid accusations that he has not lived up to his potential.
The public is frustrated with the Ma administration for not living up to its potential. The potential the public expects it to live up to may not be all that great. Ma Ying-jeou's own expectations may be simple and transparent. The problem is understanding our situation inside and out. What kind of potential should national leaders fulfill? Only after we have answered this question, can we fill the gap between public expectations and the president's performance.
站上第一線 回應恨鐵不成鋼的期待
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.20 05:46 am
馬英九總統就職一周年。這一年來令人感受最強烈的社會氛圍，或許就是恨鐵不成鋼。
馬總統的表現與社會期待出現巨大落差，其實有兩種迥然不同但同時並存的原因：一、馬總統的表現出錯，使社會失望；二、社會的期待可能有所偏誤，而馬總統的表現未必是錯。也就是說，有些問題出在馬總統的錯誤，有些問題出在社會的期待未必正確。
找出總統表現與社會期待的落差，並盡力修補其間的落差，應是馬英九未來任期的主要努力目標。如果是馬總統自己的錯誤，亟應改正；如果是社會期待的偏差，則須溝通及說服。總統表現與社會期待必定會有落差，但應使其間落差收縮至最小的程度。
一年前馬總統就任時的情勢，其實比想像中更要險峻。對外而言，台灣與中國大陸的關係惡化到谷底，與美國的關係亦空前惡劣；但相對地，台灣對大陸的經濟依賴度卻攀上前所未有的高點，大陸對台灣政經命脈的影響支配力則升至前所未有的高點。對內而言，則兩岸競合關係的爭議已至攤牌階段，陳水扁及民進黨對國家認同及族群關係的操作已在剃刀邊緣，而扁案對司法正義及社會公道的摧殘亦已到了無以復加的地步。內憂外患，遂使整個台灣陷於進退維谷的態勢；不僅如此，後來又加上一場百年罕見的全球金融海嘯。面對如此險峻的時勢，馬英九自己想要做一個怎樣的總統？國人又期待馬英九做一個怎樣的總統？前文所說的落差，遂告出現。
馬英九自己想做一個怎樣的總統？若與陳水扁之標榜「悍性／霸性／賭性」相較，馬英九似乎三者俱缺，他主張「政者正也」、「誠信第一」。陳水扁可謂「無所不用其極」，馬英九則是「有所不為」。例如，馬英九宣示「退居第二線」，使劉兆玄成為近二十年來最受總統尊重的行政院長；他未曾如蕭萬長被劉泰英、蘇志誠羞辱，也未曾如所有的行政院長皆被陳水扁糟蹋。再如，李扁皆以操作兩岸關係及台美關係為能事，裝腔作勢，藉挑激外部危機來做為自己的政治籌碼；陳水扁甚至將其「悍性／霸性／賭性」發揮到了極致，在「謎航之旅」把總統專機開到了利比亞，以示抗爭；但馬英九的政策卻是「美西去／美西回」，有人建議過境美國東岸，他卻連提都不提，謂為「單純化」。這樣的風格連胡志強都說「太平淡」，如何解釋這樣的風格？
相對而言，國人又期待馬英九做一個怎樣的總統？一句「退居第二線」，使馬英九面對排山倒海的抨擊與譏嘲。民間認為，總統與閣揆的權責分際是你們二人間事，但身為總統，在精神象徵及治國責任上皆必然要站在「第一線」。再如，主動表示「陳雲林可以稱我馬先生」、「台灣與中國大陸是兩個地區」、「若連任不排除觸及協商政治的議題」等等；馬總統可能覺得只是一根腸子通到底的事實陳述，但豈不知必然招致「馬區長」的譏嘲，而其實更多國人亦覺得總統發言豈能如此「白目」至作繭自縛的地步？又如，陳聰明不下台，扁案偵審的進度不符社會期待；許多國人認為責任在馬總統，他則始終以一句「尊重司法獨立」回應。再如，兩岸政策走鋼絲，有人指他「傾中賣台」，有人則指他是「獨台／兩國論」，可見社會對馬英九的期待分歧嚴重已至何等地步？
馬英九在「馬上好」的競選口號中當選，後來出現的社會期望落差自是非常之大。何況，兩岸形勢消長，諸多因素已非操之在我；復以金融海嘯狂襲，更是雪上加霜；而扁案遲久未決，亦引發部分國人極大的不耐。在如此內外交煎的情勢中，許多國人或許寄望馬英九能表現出一定程度的悍性、霸性及賭性，而馬英九的隱忍內斂則被解讀為懦弱無能。其實，以馬英九的條件，他或許僅憑說幾句話或作幾個姿態就能輕易為自己贏得民粹人氣，但何以如今「懦弱無能」居然成了他的政治標籤？這是社會期待的偏差？還是馬英九確實是一塊不可能錘鍊成精鋼的生鐵？
馬英九自期為怎樣的總統？台灣主流社會又期待他成為怎樣的總統？欲解答這兩個問題，並修補其間落差，其實應先回答另一個更高階的問題：台灣內外情勢走到今日地步，需要怎樣的國家領導人？
馬總統必須站上第一線。無論府閣分際如何，無論黨政介面如何；馬總統在精神象徵及治國責任上皆必須站上第一線。但站上第一線，台灣卻不可再出現一個以民粹操作為能事的總統。對外，要說服北京維持兩岸雙贏共生；對內，要感召台獨進行修正並撫平族群創傷。總統雖然站上第一線，但對外要忍，對內要讓；總統站在第一線的巔峰，極易表現其悍性、霸性與賭性的「能力」；但站在第一線的巔峰，要咬牙忍，願咬牙讓，能咬牙「有所不為」，那或許才是另一種非同一般的過人之能。但是，要忍到什麼地步，讓到什麼地步，要如何在「有所不為」中展現「大有為」，才不會滋生「恨鐵不成鋼」的抨擊與譏諷？
恨鐵不成鋼。社會期待的「鋼」或許是不拘一格的繞指鋼，馬英九自期的「鋼」卻可能是寧拙勿巧而幾乎可以透視的水晶鋼。問題是：先須確定台灣內外情勢走到今日，國家領導人應當是怎樣的「鋼」？解答了這個問題，才能修補其間的落差。
但無論如何，馬總統必須回應恨鐵不成鋼的社會期待。
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Is "Sympathizing with China" synonymous with "Selling Out Taiwan?"
Is "Sympathizing with China" synonymous with "Selling Out Taiwan?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 19, 2009
The theme of the May 17 protest march was "Oppose Sympathizing with China, Defend Taiwan." Its four demands were "Defend Taiwan. Ensure Sovereignty. Help the Unemployed. Protect the Disadvantaged." Unfortunately the marchers were unaware of the internal contradictions in their own demands.
Their fundamental reasoning is that "Sympathizing with [Mainland] China" means one is incapable of "Defending Taiwan." Supposedly this has two harmful effects. First, sovereignty will be lost. Second, financial hardship will follow.
Why do we say the marchers' demands contain inherent contradictions? First of all, "Sympathizing with China" is not necessarily antithetical to "Defending Taiwan. Protecting Taiwan." If "Sympathizing with China" means establishing a policy of "Cross-Strait Goodwill," of creating a mutually-beneficial, win-win scenario, then "Sympathizing with [Mainland] China" is hardly going to bring disaster down upon Taiwan, and may well bring benefits. Equating "Sympathizing with China" with "selling out Taiwan" is a logical non sequiteur. Opinion polls show that although a majority of respondents believe the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy is indeed "Sympathizing with China," it also feels that such a policy benefits Taiwan. As we can see, "Sympathizing with China" is not necessarily "Selling out Taiwan." In fact, a policy of "Sympathizing with China" can also be rooted in a desire to "Defend Taiwan. Protect Taiwan." It can also be motivated by the real world advantages of "Defending Taiwan. Protecting Taiwan."
Will "Sympathizing with China" lead to a loss in sovereignty? To answer this question, we must first understand the Republic of China's current status regarding its sovereignty. The sovereignty of the Republic of China has been been dealt a series of traumatic blows. For example, it cannot join the United Nations. It must use the name "Chinese Taipei" when participating in certain international events. These are painful to our citizens. The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy cannot fully express our sovereignty. But at least we can use the name "Chinese Taipei" while participating in WHA activities. At least no more nations have broken off diplomatic relations with us. At least we are establishing a framework for cross-Strait exchanges based on the premise of "1992 Consensus. One China, Different Interpretations," in which we refrain from repudiating each others‘ status. These subtle but significant achievements were hard won. But they have unquestionably enhanced our sovereignty. Nor has the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy undermined our sovereignty on Taiwan. The Republic of China flag continues to flutter above the Presidential Palace. Republic of China elections continue to be held, just as they always have been. The Republic of China Legislature continues to be plagued by opposition DPP antics such as locking the doors to the Legislature in protest. Tens of thousands of Mainland tourists come and go beneath the Republic of China flag every day. One could argue that the Republic of China's sovereignty has been significantly improved during this period.
Has "Sympathizing with China" led to economic difficulties? In fact, most people affirm the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy precisely because it contributes to Taiwan's economic development. The deepening of cross-Strait economic exchanges is bound to impact some sectors or businesses. We must respond appropriately. But the overall situation has unquestionably been beneficial to Taiwan. Besides, cross-Strait exchanges are an economic path we cannot refuse to take. On the one hand, the DPP complains of economic hardship. On the other hand, it contradicts itself by blasting any policy it accuses of "Sympathizing with China." Cross-Strait exchanges are essential to Taiwan's economy. On this we have a broad social consensus. This is why most people do not equate "Sympathizing with China" with "Selling out Taiwan." From an economic perspective, "Sympathizing with China" may even be motivated by a desire to "Defend Taiwan."
During the May 17 protest march, Yeh Chin-chuan led a delegation to the WHA. His trip touched on the matter of sovereignty. At the Cross-Strait Forum in Xiamen Wang Yi announced Beijing's "Eight Benefits for Taiwan" program. This, and the "Western Straits Economic Zone" were both the result of "economic exchanges." The Democratic Progressive Party says it champions our sovereignty. How then can it object to participation in the WHA? The DPP says it hopes to revive the economy. How then can it oppose Beijing's "Eight Benefits for Taiwan?"
The Democratic Progressive Party's vigilance regarding the risks of cross-Strait exchanges deserves affirmation. Yet its May 17 protest march was all about Taiwan independence. This is hardly the answer to the Republic of China's sovereignty and economic problems. The DPP sees the May 17 protest march as a case of successful political mobilization. But the protest march merely mired the DPP ever more deeply in Taiwan independence thinking. This poses a hidden danger for the DPP. The Ma administration proposes an amicable Mainland policy that "Sympathizes with China." If it can continue showing that dignity and sovereignty correlate positively with economic development, then the Democratic Progressive Party's strategy of equating "Sympathizing with China" with "Selling out Taiwan" will no longer be viable. How else can one explain Chen Chu's trip to the Mainland?
The May 17 protest march was a major revelation to both Beijing and Taipei. It implied that although the public opposes "Selling out Taiwan," it does not oppose "Sympathizing with China." What constitutes "Sympathizing with China?" What constitutes "Selling out Taiwan?" The Ma administration knows. So does Beijing. So does the public on Taiwan. That is why we advocate "inviting the other side to a dance," but do not advocate "inviting the other side to its own funeral."
「傾中」等於「賣台」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.19 05:55 am
「反傾中／護台灣」、「保台灣／顧主權／救失業／護弱勢」。這是五一七遊行的主題與四大訴求，卻可能有不自覺的內在矛盾。
這套論述的基本邏輯是：「傾中」就不能「保台」，其禍害有二：一、主權流失，二、造成經濟困境。
為何說這套論述有內在矛盾？首先，「傾中」未必與「保台／護台」是對立的概念。「傾中」倘若是指營造「兩岸親善」的政策思維，主張互惠雙贏；則「傾中」就未必會給台灣帶來災禍，反而可能帶來利益。因此，將「傾中」與「賣台」畫上等號，可能是一種錯誤的邏輯跳躍。民意調查顯示，多數受訪者雖認為馬政府的兩岸政策「傾中」，但多數受訪者亦表支持並認為對台灣有利。可見，「傾中」不必然就是「賣台」；其實，「傾中」政策，也可以建立在「保台／護台」的思維上，亦可追求「保台／護台」的實際效益。
「傾中」是否即會造成「主權」喪失？這先要認清中華民國的「主權」現狀。中華民國的主權現今已然處於受傷狀態，例如不能參加聯合國，或須以「中華台北」的名義參與特定國際活動，這些皆是國人心中之痛。然而，馬政府如今的兩岸政策，雖不能使主權的對外表現得到全面伸展，但至少亦初步獲得以「中華台北」名義參與ＷＨＡ的突破，且迄未進一步損傷建交國的數字，並嘗試以「九二共識／一中各表」或「互不否認」為兩岸交往的框架；這些細微但重大的成就皆得來不易，不能謂不是在「主權」方面的進展。另一方面，馬政府的兩岸政策，在主權的對內表現上更無任何損傷，總統府上的國旗依然招展，選舉照樣舉行，國會仍然出現在野黨鎖門抗爭的場景，何況每日數萬大陸觀光客在青天白日的國旗下來來往往……。或許可以這麼說，這段期間台灣的主權內外表現，反而已有約略進展。
再說，「傾中」是否造成經濟困境？其實，馬政府的兩岸政策受到多數人肯定的主要原因，正是認為有助於台灣的經濟發展。兩岸經濟交流深化，勢必對某些領域或行業產生衝擊，必須有所因應；但就大局而言則必對台灣有利，且兩岸交流亦是別無選擇的經濟出路。故而，民進黨一方面訴諸經濟困境，另一方面抨擊「傾中」政策，其中自生矛盾。因為，兩岸交流是台灣經濟不可或缺的要素，已是社會的常識與共識；這也正是民間認為「傾中」未必是「賣台」的主因。就經濟面看，「傾中」也許正因為要「保台」。
正當五一七遊行登場之際，葉金川率團參加ＷＨＡ，這是涉及「主權得失」的事件；而廈門海峽論壇，王毅又宣布「惠台八點」，再加上「海西經濟區」端上檯面，這則是「經濟交流」的事件。民進黨主張伸張主權，恐怕不能反對參與ＷＨＡ；主張振興經濟，則亦不可能一一批駁抵拒「惠台八點」。
民進黨對兩岸交流深化的風險意識是必須肯定的。然而，五一七遊行仍以台獨為主調，這對台灣的主權與經濟問題皆不是正確的解答；五一七遊行被民進黨解讀為成功的政治動員，但這場遊行使台獨論述繼續沉澱內化，卻是民進黨的隱憂；因為，馬政府主張兩岸友善的「傾中」政策，若能繼續被證實在主權尊嚴及經濟發展上皆是正數，民進黨將「傾中」與「賣台」畫上等號的論述戰略，即可能無以為繼。否則，如何解釋陳菊登陸？
當然，五一七遊行對兩岸當局亦皆有重大啟示。台灣人民或許不反對「傾中」，但必定反對「賣台」。至於，怎樣是「傾中」？怎樣是「賣台」？馬政府清楚，北京也清楚，台灣人民更是點滴在心頭一清二楚。這就是何以我們主張：要「與卿共舞」，不要「請君入甕」！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 19, 2009
The theme of the May 17 protest march was "Oppose Sympathizing with China, Defend Taiwan." Its four demands were "Defend Taiwan. Ensure Sovereignty. Help the Unemployed. Protect the Disadvantaged." Unfortunately the marchers were unaware of the internal contradictions in their own demands.
Their fundamental reasoning is that "Sympathizing with [Mainland] China" means one is incapable of "Defending Taiwan." Supposedly this has two harmful effects. First, sovereignty will be lost. Second, financial hardship will follow.
Why do we say the marchers' demands contain inherent contradictions? First of all, "Sympathizing with China" is not necessarily antithetical to "Defending Taiwan. Protecting Taiwan." If "Sympathizing with China" means establishing a policy of "Cross-Strait Goodwill," of creating a mutually-beneficial, win-win scenario, then "Sympathizing with [Mainland] China" is hardly going to bring disaster down upon Taiwan, and may well bring benefits. Equating "Sympathizing with China" with "selling out Taiwan" is a logical non sequiteur. Opinion polls show that although a majority of respondents believe the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy is indeed "Sympathizing with China," it also feels that such a policy benefits Taiwan. As we can see, "Sympathizing with China" is not necessarily "Selling out Taiwan." In fact, a policy of "Sympathizing with China" can also be rooted in a desire to "Defend Taiwan. Protect Taiwan." It can also be motivated by the real world advantages of "Defending Taiwan. Protecting Taiwan."
Will "Sympathizing with China" lead to a loss in sovereignty? To answer this question, we must first understand the Republic of China's current status regarding its sovereignty. The sovereignty of the Republic of China has been been dealt a series of traumatic blows. For example, it cannot join the United Nations. It must use the name "Chinese Taipei" when participating in certain international events. These are painful to our citizens. The Ma administration's cross-Strait policy cannot fully express our sovereignty. But at least we can use the name "Chinese Taipei" while participating in WHA activities. At least no more nations have broken off diplomatic relations with us. At least we are establishing a framework for cross-Strait exchanges based on the premise of "1992 Consensus. One China, Different Interpretations," in which we refrain from repudiating each others‘ status. These subtle but significant achievements were hard won. But they have unquestionably enhanced our sovereignty. Nor has the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy undermined our sovereignty on Taiwan. The Republic of China flag continues to flutter above the Presidential Palace. Republic of China elections continue to be held, just as they always have been. The Republic of China Legislature continues to be plagued by opposition DPP antics such as locking the doors to the Legislature in protest. Tens of thousands of Mainland tourists come and go beneath the Republic of China flag every day. One could argue that the Republic of China's sovereignty has been significantly improved during this period.
Has "Sympathizing with China" led to economic difficulties? In fact, most people affirm the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy precisely because it contributes to Taiwan's economic development. The deepening of cross-Strait economic exchanges is bound to impact some sectors or businesses. We must respond appropriately. But the overall situation has unquestionably been beneficial to Taiwan. Besides, cross-Strait exchanges are an economic path we cannot refuse to take. On the one hand, the DPP complains of economic hardship. On the other hand, it contradicts itself by blasting any policy it accuses of "Sympathizing with China." Cross-Strait exchanges are essential to Taiwan's economy. On this we have a broad social consensus. This is why most people do not equate "Sympathizing with China" with "Selling out Taiwan." From an economic perspective, "Sympathizing with China" may even be motivated by a desire to "Defend Taiwan."
During the May 17 protest march, Yeh Chin-chuan led a delegation to the WHA. His trip touched on the matter of sovereignty. At the Cross-Strait Forum in Xiamen Wang Yi announced Beijing's "Eight Benefits for Taiwan" program. This, and the "Western Straits Economic Zone" were both the result of "economic exchanges." The Democratic Progressive Party says it champions our sovereignty. How then can it object to participation in the WHA? The DPP says it hopes to revive the economy. How then can it oppose Beijing's "Eight Benefits for Taiwan?"
The Democratic Progressive Party's vigilance regarding the risks of cross-Strait exchanges deserves affirmation. Yet its May 17 protest march was all about Taiwan independence. This is hardly the answer to the Republic of China's sovereignty and economic problems. The DPP sees the May 17 protest march as a case of successful political mobilization. But the protest march merely mired the DPP ever more deeply in Taiwan independence thinking. This poses a hidden danger for the DPP. The Ma administration proposes an amicable Mainland policy that "Sympathizes with China." If it can continue showing that dignity and sovereignty correlate positively with economic development, then the Democratic Progressive Party's strategy of equating "Sympathizing with China" with "Selling out Taiwan" will no longer be viable. How else can one explain Chen Chu's trip to the Mainland?
The May 17 protest march was a major revelation to both Beijing and Taipei. It implied that although the public opposes "Selling out Taiwan," it does not oppose "Sympathizing with China." What constitutes "Sympathizing with China?" What constitutes "Selling out Taiwan?" The Ma administration knows. So does Beijing. So does the public on Taiwan. That is why we advocate "inviting the other side to a dance," but do not advocate "inviting the other side to its own funeral."
「傾中」等於「賣台」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.19 05:55 am
「反傾中／護台灣」、「保台灣／顧主權／救失業／護弱勢」。這是五一七遊行的主題與四大訴求，卻可能有不自覺的內在矛盾。
這套論述的基本邏輯是：「傾中」就不能「保台」，其禍害有二：一、主權流失，二、造成經濟困境。
為何說這套論述有內在矛盾？首先，「傾中」未必與「保台／護台」是對立的概念。「傾中」倘若是指營造「兩岸親善」的政策思維，主張互惠雙贏；則「傾中」就未必會給台灣帶來災禍，反而可能帶來利益。因此，將「傾中」與「賣台」畫上等號，可能是一種錯誤的邏輯跳躍。民意調查顯示，多數受訪者雖認為馬政府的兩岸政策「傾中」，但多數受訪者亦表支持並認為對台灣有利。可見，「傾中」不必然就是「賣台」；其實，「傾中」政策，也可以建立在「保台／護台」的思維上，亦可追求「保台／護台」的實際效益。
「傾中」是否即會造成「主權」喪失？這先要認清中華民國的「主權」現狀。中華民國的主權現今已然處於受傷狀態，例如不能參加聯合國，或須以「中華台北」的名義參與特定國際活動，這些皆是國人心中之痛。然而，馬政府如今的兩岸政策，雖不能使主權的對外表現得到全面伸展，但至少亦初步獲得以「中華台北」名義參與ＷＨＡ的突破，且迄未進一步損傷建交國的數字，並嘗試以「九二共識／一中各表」或「互不否認」為兩岸交往的框架；這些細微但重大的成就皆得來不易，不能謂不是在「主權」方面的進展。另一方面，馬政府的兩岸政策，在主權的對內表現上更無任何損傷，總統府上的國旗依然招展，選舉照樣舉行，國會仍然出現在野黨鎖門抗爭的場景，何況每日數萬大陸觀光客在青天白日的國旗下來來往往……。或許可以這麼說，這段期間台灣的主權內外表現，反而已有約略進展。
再說，「傾中」是否造成經濟困境？其實，馬政府的兩岸政策受到多數人肯定的主要原因，正是認為有助於台灣的經濟發展。兩岸經濟交流深化，勢必對某些領域或行業產生衝擊，必須有所因應；但就大局而言則必對台灣有利，且兩岸交流亦是別無選擇的經濟出路。故而，民進黨一方面訴諸經濟困境，另一方面抨擊「傾中」政策，其中自生矛盾。因為，兩岸交流是台灣經濟不可或缺的要素，已是社會的常識與共識；這也正是民間認為「傾中」未必是「賣台」的主因。就經濟面看，「傾中」也許正因為要「保台」。
正當五一七遊行登場之際，葉金川率團參加ＷＨＡ，這是涉及「主權得失」的事件；而廈門海峽論壇，王毅又宣布「惠台八點」，再加上「海西經濟區」端上檯面，這則是「經濟交流」的事件。民進黨主張伸張主權，恐怕不能反對參與ＷＨＡ；主張振興經濟，則亦不可能一一批駁抵拒「惠台八點」。
民進黨對兩岸交流深化的風險意識是必須肯定的。然而，五一七遊行仍以台獨為主調，這對台灣的主權與經濟問題皆不是正確的解答；五一七遊行被民進黨解讀為成功的政治動員，但這場遊行使台獨論述繼續沉澱內化，卻是民進黨的隱憂；因為，馬政府主張兩岸友善的「傾中」政策，若能繼續被證實在主權尊嚴及經濟發展上皆是正數，民進黨將「傾中」與「賣台」畫上等號的論述戰略，即可能無以為繼。否則，如何解釋陳菊登陸？
當然，五一七遊行對兩岸當局亦皆有重大啟示。台灣人民或許不反對「傾中」，但必定反對「賣台」。至於，怎樣是「傾中」？怎樣是「賣台」？馬政府清楚，北京也清楚，台灣人民更是點滴在心頭一清二楚。這就是何以我們主張：要「與卿共舞」，不要「請君入甕」！
Monday, May 18, 2009
May 17: A Success If Concluded on May 18
May 17: A Success If Concluded on May 18
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 18, 2009
The Ma/Liu government has been in office for one year. On May 17 the DPP launched a "Denounce Ma, Defend Taiwan" protest march. Green Camp supporters have felt frustrated for the past year. They eagerly took to the streets despite the hot sun. Meanwhile, the Cross-Strait Forum opened on the Mainland. Former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang, who rejoined the DPP during last year's presidential election, was also in attendance. He said that the Democratic Progressive Party could denounce Ma if it wanted, but "Opposing China" was pointless. President Ma Ying-jeou, target of the denunciations, chose to go south to the Hsingchu Technology Park. He said he understood the DPP's denunciations. He hoped the march could end peacefully. The low profile, moderate demeanor of the ruling KMT contrasted sharply with the high profile, combative demeanor of the opposition DPP.
The Taipei Police Department estimated fewer than 80,000 protestors. The Democratic Progressive Party claimed up to 600,000 people. It was obviously pleased with its mobilization. Leave aside whether 600,000 or 80,000 protestors attended. The Democratic Progressive Party can not evade the fact that the approval rating of Ma Ying-jeou, the target of their denunciations, has already rebounded from its low during last year's global financial tsunami. It now stands at over 55%. On the other hand, the latest TVBS poll puts DPP chairperson Tsai Ing-wen's approval ratings at a new low of 30%.
Core support for the Democratic Progressive Party remains stuck between 30 to 45%. It has not increased in over two decades. Eight years of Chen Shui-bian administration corruption may even have caused it to shrink. The Democratic Progressive Party is pleased with itself because Ketagelan Road is packed full of people. But let's not forget that: First, this crowd was bussed in from southern and central Taiwan. Secondly, this crowd represents the hard core of the Democratic Progressive Party's shrinking support. Thirdly, and most importantly, this crowd consists of Democratic Progressive Party True Believers. They cannot help the Democratic Progressive Party return to power.
The Democratic Progressive Party denounced the Ma administration for "selling out Taiwan." How exactly is Ma supposed to have sold Taiwan out? Director of Health Yeh Chin-chuan is in Geneva preparing to attend the WHO Conference. The Democratic Progressive Party complained that the official WHA website shows Taiwan as a province of China. Yeh Chin-chuan angrily shot back, "That happened in 2005. That was the handiwork of the incompetent Chen Shui-bian administration. Don't blame that on me!" Increasing the Republic of China's breathing room should transcend Blue and Green. It should be something upon which both camps agree. We have many different ways to go about it. The results may also be very different. The Republic of China has found a way to make contact with the international community. The only problem is the Democratic Progressive Party is unwilling to face up to it. They left a mess. Now the Ma administration must clean it up.
The Democratic Progressive Party has its own rationale vis a vis Beijing. When President Chen Shui-bian ran for president, he touted his "New Centrist Path." Unfortunately, despite eight years in power, Taiwan independence forces have left the party in a mess. Even though it is now in the opposition, it remains bound hand and foot. Former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang denounced Ma Ying-jeou but also has dealings with the Mainland. Hsu has proposed "Boldly Going West." Some Democratic Progressive Party members have underground channels to Beijing, Shanghai, or Xiamen, But officially they must denounce deals with the mainland as "selling out Taiwan." Former Premier Frank Hsieh was also former Mayor of Kaohsiung. He had a chance to visit the mainland. But Chen Shui-bian stopped him dead in his tracks. On the eve of the May 17 "Denounce Ma" protest march, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu publicly confirmed that she would visit Beijing on May 21. This time, she will not be so unlucky as to encounter a president and party chairman who will forbid her from making the trip.
The two sides have carried on normal exchanges for years. Political and ideological interference aside, neither the Blue nor Green camps have "sold out Taiwan." This past year, the Ma administration has relaxed cross-Strait policy. But in fact, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party was unable to interrupt cross-strait exchanges during its eight years in office. The more tightly the government controled official exchanges, the closer non-governmental exchanges became. Increased cross-Strait relations are an irreversible trend. How can fanatical Democratic Progressive Party protests prevent them? Put bluntly, even pro-Taiwan independence businesses need the mainland market.
The Democratic Progressive Party may be satisfied with its 30% share of public support. But those in power cannot ignore the increasing rigid 30% Green Camp core support. We conducted a poll on the first anniversary of the Ma administration. Satisfaction with the Ma administration on cross-Strait policy and the outcome of recent consultations has risen significantly. It now exceeds 50%. Have these initiatives have put the sovereignty of the Republic of China at risk? The number that thinks so has also significantly increased. It now stands at 30%. The DPP cannot return to power based on the support of 30% of the electorate. But the 30% of the electorate denouncing Ma and opposing Beijing can polarize society. That may be why the Ma/Liu government's response to the May 17 protest march was so low keyed and moderate.
Taiwan has been politically liberalized for over 20 years. Social polarization reached its zenith under the Chen Shui-bian administration's eight years in office. The wounds inflicted on society by such divisions obviously cannot be healed overnight. As Premier Liu Chao-hsuan said, "Having different opinions is not a bad thing. Only this can force the government to watch its every step." Social consensus is also established step-by-step. The May 17 protest march should be seen as normal for a democracy. The success of May 17 should not measured by its numbers. It should be measured by whether it ends peacefully on May 18. Only such a result can rebuild public confidence in the Democratic Progressive Party.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.05.18
社論－五一八圓滿散場 五一七才算成功
本報訊
馬劉政府就職周年前夕，民進黨發動五一七嗆馬保台大遊行，鬱卒了一年的綠營民眾，頂著酷熱的驕陽，情緒興奮地重回街頭；同一時間，海峽論壇在對岸盛大開幕，去年總統大選才重回民進黨的前主席許信良自在與會，淡淡地建議民進黨：嗆馬可以，反中不必！被嗆的主角馬英九總統，選擇南下竹科，他對民進黨嗆馬表示理解，希望遊行順利落幕。低調溫和的執政者，與高調抗議的反對黨，恰成強烈對比。
儘管北市警方估計嗆馬民眾不到八萬人，民進黨宣稱高達六十萬人，對這場活動的動員，顯然是滿意的。但不論是八萬人或六十萬人，民進黨不能迴避的事實是：他們要嗆的馬英九，民意支持度和施政滿意度，已經從去年全球金融海嘯的低點攀升到五成五以上；至於民進黨主席蔡英文的滿意度，根據ＴＶＢＳ的最新民調，卻持續滑落到新低，只有百分之卅。
百分之卅到四十五，差不多就是民進黨創黨以來的基本盤，廿多年來沒什麼長進，經過八年執政，因為扁政府的貪腐，甚至還有萎縮的趨勢。當民進黨志得意滿於凱道擠滿人潮時，不要忘了：第一，這些群眾是公職一車一車從中南部載運上來的；第二，這些群眾只是民進黨萎縮中的基本盤；第三，也是最重要的，這群長久以來被民進黨以台灣主權圖騰所迷幻的群眾，沒有幫民進黨拓展重回執政的能量。
民進黨嗆馬政府賣台，到底賣了什麼？衛生署長葉金川正在日內瓦，準備出席世衛大會，民進黨痛批世衛大會官網上，台灣還是中國的一省，葉金川沒好氣地直接嗆回去：「那是二○○五年，扁政府無能的傑作，別賴在我頭上！」打開台灣的國際空間，不分藍綠，有志一同，但作法差很多，結果同樣差很多。台灣找得到國際社會的出口，只是民進黨不肯正視而已，至於他們搞出的爛攤子，只得後繼者收拾。
民進黨對中國不是沒有一套論述的邏輯，陳水扁競選總統「新中間路線」標舉得多麼高，偏偏八年執政，被獨派搞得七葷八素，到在野都還擺脫不了。嗆馬同時登陸的民進黨前主席許信良，早有大膽西進的主張，部分民進黨人即使私下同樣絡繹於北京、上海、或廈門，嘴上還是非得掛著登陸即賣台的扣紅言論。前行政院長謝長廷在高雄市長任內，本來有機會訪問大陸，被陳水扁硬生生擋了下來；就在五一七嗆馬前夕，高雄市長陳菊公開證實，五二一她也要赴北京，這一回，她不會再倒楣地碰上一位總統兼黨主席，不准她出訪。
兩岸正常交流多年，若非政治因素或意識形態的干擾，不論藍的、綠的，都構不成賣台，不要說馬政府這一年來兩岸政策鬆綁，事實上，民進黨八年執政兩岸亦無法中斷交流，官方管制再緊，民間交流卻愈密，兩岸關係不可逆的發展趨勢，豈是民進黨狂熱抗議能阻擋的？說穿了，即使是獨派企業，也需要大陸市場。
值得注意的是，民進黨可以滿足於已萎縮的百分之卅基本盤，執政者卻不能忽略可能愈趨僵化的百分之卅綠盤勢，根據本報最近一系列馬政府執政周年民調顯示，滿意於馬政府兩岸政策與協商成果者，比例明顯升高，都達到百分之五十以上；但是，問到這些舉措有沒有傷害台灣主權之虞？認為有傷害之虞比例同樣大幅升高，達到三成。民進黨靠不了三成熱情群眾的支持，重返執政；但三成僵硬嗆馬反中群眾，卻可能成為激化社會對立的一股力量，馬劉政府面對五一七遊行的低調溫和，與此應該也有關係。
台灣政治開放廿多年，社會激化對立以扁政府八年為最，政黨再輪替後，這樣的社會對立和分裂傷痕，顯然不是一時半刻能化解的，誠如行政院長劉兆玄所言，「有不同意見不是壞事，這才能讓政府步步為營。」社會共識的建立，也得步步為營，五一七遊行靜坐可以視為民主常態，重要的是：五一七是否成功不在人數，而在五一八好好散場，如此才能重建民眾對民進黨做為負責任政黨的信心。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 18, 2009
The Ma/Liu government has been in office for one year. On May 17 the DPP launched a "Denounce Ma, Defend Taiwan" protest march. Green Camp supporters have felt frustrated for the past year. They eagerly took to the streets despite the hot sun. Meanwhile, the Cross-Strait Forum opened on the Mainland. Former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang, who rejoined the DPP during last year's presidential election, was also in attendance. He said that the Democratic Progressive Party could denounce Ma if it wanted, but "Opposing China" was pointless. President Ma Ying-jeou, target of the denunciations, chose to go south to the Hsingchu Technology Park. He said he understood the DPP's denunciations. He hoped the march could end peacefully. The low profile, moderate demeanor of the ruling KMT contrasted sharply with the high profile, combative demeanor of the opposition DPP.
The Taipei Police Department estimated fewer than 80,000 protestors. The Democratic Progressive Party claimed up to 600,000 people. It was obviously pleased with its mobilization. Leave aside whether 600,000 or 80,000 protestors attended. The Democratic Progressive Party can not evade the fact that the approval rating of Ma Ying-jeou, the target of their denunciations, has already rebounded from its low during last year's global financial tsunami. It now stands at over 55%. On the other hand, the latest TVBS poll puts DPP chairperson Tsai Ing-wen's approval ratings at a new low of 30%.
Core support for the Democratic Progressive Party remains stuck between 30 to 45%. It has not increased in over two decades. Eight years of Chen Shui-bian administration corruption may even have caused it to shrink. The Democratic Progressive Party is pleased with itself because Ketagelan Road is packed full of people. But let's not forget that: First, this crowd was bussed in from southern and central Taiwan. Secondly, this crowd represents the hard core of the Democratic Progressive Party's shrinking support. Thirdly, and most importantly, this crowd consists of Democratic Progressive Party True Believers. They cannot help the Democratic Progressive Party return to power.
The Democratic Progressive Party denounced the Ma administration for "selling out Taiwan." How exactly is Ma supposed to have sold Taiwan out? Director of Health Yeh Chin-chuan is in Geneva preparing to attend the WHO Conference. The Democratic Progressive Party complained that the official WHA website shows Taiwan as a province of China. Yeh Chin-chuan angrily shot back, "That happened in 2005. That was the handiwork of the incompetent Chen Shui-bian administration. Don't blame that on me!" Increasing the Republic of China's breathing room should transcend Blue and Green. It should be something upon which both camps agree. We have many different ways to go about it. The results may also be very different. The Republic of China has found a way to make contact with the international community. The only problem is the Democratic Progressive Party is unwilling to face up to it. They left a mess. Now the Ma administration must clean it up.
The Democratic Progressive Party has its own rationale vis a vis Beijing. When President Chen Shui-bian ran for president, he touted his "New Centrist Path." Unfortunately, despite eight years in power, Taiwan independence forces have left the party in a mess. Even though it is now in the opposition, it remains bound hand and foot. Former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang denounced Ma Ying-jeou but also has dealings with the Mainland. Hsu has proposed "Boldly Going West." Some Democratic Progressive Party members have underground channels to Beijing, Shanghai, or Xiamen, But officially they must denounce deals with the mainland as "selling out Taiwan." Former Premier Frank Hsieh was also former Mayor of Kaohsiung. He had a chance to visit the mainland. But Chen Shui-bian stopped him dead in his tracks. On the eve of the May 17 "Denounce Ma" protest march, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu publicly confirmed that she would visit Beijing on May 21. This time, she will not be so unlucky as to encounter a president and party chairman who will forbid her from making the trip.
The two sides have carried on normal exchanges for years. Political and ideological interference aside, neither the Blue nor Green camps have "sold out Taiwan." This past year, the Ma administration has relaxed cross-Strait policy. But in fact, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party was unable to interrupt cross-strait exchanges during its eight years in office. The more tightly the government controled official exchanges, the closer non-governmental exchanges became. Increased cross-Strait relations are an irreversible trend. How can fanatical Democratic Progressive Party protests prevent them? Put bluntly, even pro-Taiwan independence businesses need the mainland market.
The Democratic Progressive Party may be satisfied with its 30% share of public support. But those in power cannot ignore the increasing rigid 30% Green Camp core support. We conducted a poll on the first anniversary of the Ma administration. Satisfaction with the Ma administration on cross-Strait policy and the outcome of recent consultations has risen significantly. It now exceeds 50%. Have these initiatives have put the sovereignty of the Republic of China at risk? The number that thinks so has also significantly increased. It now stands at 30%. The DPP cannot return to power based on the support of 30% of the electorate. But the 30% of the electorate denouncing Ma and opposing Beijing can polarize society. That may be why the Ma/Liu government's response to the May 17 protest march was so low keyed and moderate.
Taiwan has been politically liberalized for over 20 years. Social polarization reached its zenith under the Chen Shui-bian administration's eight years in office. The wounds inflicted on society by such divisions obviously cannot be healed overnight. As Premier Liu Chao-hsuan said, "Having different opinions is not a bad thing. Only this can force the government to watch its every step." Social consensus is also established step-by-step. The May 17 protest march should be seen as normal for a democracy. The success of May 17 should not measured by its numbers. It should be measured by whether it ends peacefully on May 18. Only such a result can rebuild public confidence in the Democratic Progressive Party.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.05.18
社論－五一八圓滿散場 五一七才算成功
本報訊
馬劉政府就職周年前夕，民進黨發動五一七嗆馬保台大遊行，鬱卒了一年的綠營民眾，頂著酷熱的驕陽，情緒興奮地重回街頭；同一時間，海峽論壇在對岸盛大開幕，去年總統大選才重回民進黨的前主席許信良自在與會，淡淡地建議民進黨：嗆馬可以，反中不必！被嗆的主角馬英九總統，選擇南下竹科，他對民進黨嗆馬表示理解，希望遊行順利落幕。低調溫和的執政者，與高調抗議的反對黨，恰成強烈對比。
儘管北市警方估計嗆馬民眾不到八萬人，民進黨宣稱高達六十萬人，對這場活動的動員，顯然是滿意的。但不論是八萬人或六十萬人，民進黨不能迴避的事實是：他們要嗆的馬英九，民意支持度和施政滿意度，已經從去年全球金融海嘯的低點攀升到五成五以上；至於民進黨主席蔡英文的滿意度，根據ＴＶＢＳ的最新民調，卻持續滑落到新低，只有百分之卅。
百分之卅到四十五，差不多就是民進黨創黨以來的基本盤，廿多年來沒什麼長進，經過八年執政，因為扁政府的貪腐，甚至還有萎縮的趨勢。當民進黨志得意滿於凱道擠滿人潮時，不要忘了：第一，這些群眾是公職一車一車從中南部載運上來的；第二，這些群眾只是民進黨萎縮中的基本盤；第三，也是最重要的，這群長久以來被民進黨以台灣主權圖騰所迷幻的群眾，沒有幫民進黨拓展重回執政的能量。
民進黨嗆馬政府賣台，到底賣了什麼？衛生署長葉金川正在日內瓦，準備出席世衛大會，民進黨痛批世衛大會官網上，台灣還是中國的一省，葉金川沒好氣地直接嗆回去：「那是二○○五年，扁政府無能的傑作，別賴在我頭上！」打開台灣的國際空間，不分藍綠，有志一同，但作法差很多，結果同樣差很多。台灣找得到國際社會的出口，只是民進黨不肯正視而已，至於他們搞出的爛攤子，只得後繼者收拾。
民進黨對中國不是沒有一套論述的邏輯，陳水扁競選總統「新中間路線」標舉得多麼高，偏偏八年執政，被獨派搞得七葷八素，到在野都還擺脫不了。嗆馬同時登陸的民進黨前主席許信良，早有大膽西進的主張，部分民進黨人即使私下同樣絡繹於北京、上海、或廈門，嘴上還是非得掛著登陸即賣台的扣紅言論。前行政院長謝長廷在高雄市長任內，本來有機會訪問大陸，被陳水扁硬生生擋了下來；就在五一七嗆馬前夕，高雄市長陳菊公開證實，五二一她也要赴北京，這一回，她不會再倒楣地碰上一位總統兼黨主席，不准她出訪。
兩岸正常交流多年，若非政治因素或意識形態的干擾，不論藍的、綠的，都構不成賣台，不要說馬政府這一年來兩岸政策鬆綁，事實上，民進黨八年執政兩岸亦無法中斷交流，官方管制再緊，民間交流卻愈密，兩岸關係不可逆的發展趨勢，豈是民進黨狂熱抗議能阻擋的？說穿了，即使是獨派企業，也需要大陸市場。
值得注意的是，民進黨可以滿足於已萎縮的百分之卅基本盤，執政者卻不能忽略可能愈趨僵化的百分之卅綠盤勢，根據本報最近一系列馬政府執政周年民調顯示，滿意於馬政府兩岸政策與協商成果者，比例明顯升高，都達到百分之五十以上；但是，問到這些舉措有沒有傷害台灣主權之虞？認為有傷害之虞比例同樣大幅升高，達到三成。民進黨靠不了三成熱情群眾的支持，重返執政；但三成僵硬嗆馬反中群眾，卻可能成為激化社會對立的一股力量，馬劉政府面對五一七遊行的低調溫和，與此應該也有關係。
台灣政治開放廿多年，社會激化對立以扁政府八年為最，政黨再輪替後，這樣的社會對立和分裂傷痕，顯然不是一時半刻能化解的，誠如行政院長劉兆玄所言，「有不同意見不是壞事，這才能讓政府步步為營。」社會共識的建立，也得步步為營，五一七遊行靜坐可以視為民主常態，重要的是：五一七是否成功不在人數，而在五一八好好散場，如此才能重建民眾對民進黨做為負責任政黨的信心。
Friday, May 15, 2009
Tsai Ing-wen's Justification as DPP Chairperson Shattered
Tsai Ing-wen's Justification as DPP Chairperson Shattered
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 15, 2009
Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen visited Chen Shui-bian at the Taipei Detention Center. To understand the meaning of her gesture, we need ask only, "What would have happened if Tsai Ing-wen refused to visit Chen Shui-bian?"
Everyones' attention has been focused on President Ma Ying-jeou's first year in office. But DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has also been DPP Chairperson for one year. One year ago, Tsai Ing-wen vowed to lead the DPP toward an "Era without Chen Shui-bian." But one year later, as an anniversary present, Tsai Ing-wen has actually visited the Taipei Detention Center.
Pale Green elements at all levels, reformist elements within the party, centrist voters, and others who still have expectations of the Democratic Progressive Party, have hoped that as DPP Chairperson, Tsai Ing-wen could lead the DPP out of the shadow of Chen Shui-bian. When she took office a year ago, she said that only by soul-searching can the DPP regain the public trust. But yesterday, when Tsai Ing-wen marched into the Taipei Detention Center, she symbolically signaled that the hopes of distancing the DPP from Chen Shui-bian over the past year have been shattered. Tsai Ing-wen's justification as DPP Chairman has also been shattered.
Politicians who hold important positions know that their political image depends on an implicit contract with society. Tsai Ing-wen's political image was predicated upon ridding the Democratic Progressive Party of Chen influences, on meeting the needs of the party and the expectations of society. This is the contract Chairman Tsai Ing-wen reached with reformers within the party and mainstream society. Today however, Tsai Ing-wen submitted her instrument of surrender to Chen Shui-bian. Her raison d'etre as DPP Chairperson has been nullified. Did Tsai Ing-wen betray her promise to reform the Democratic Progressive Party? Or did the DPP destroy Tsai Ing-wen?
Looking back, what would have happened had Tsai Ing-wen refused to visit Chen Shui-bian? The problem is Chen Shui-bian has used the May 17 protest march to take Tsai Ing-wen hostage. Tsai Ing-wen envisioned the May 17 march as an opportunity to "Denounce Ma, Defend Taiwan." But Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence forces have used the event to "Denounce Tsai, Defend Ah-Bian." First, Taiwan independence elements threatened to stage their own, separate protest in southern Taiwan. Next, Chen Shui-bian called for north and south to join forces. He called for Taiwan independence forces in the south to end their march in Kaohsiung and head north. One can imagine the "support Chen Shui-bian" and "denounce Tsai" slogans and incidents that were likely to occur. During past demonstrations, Tsai Ing-wen forbade support Chen Shui-bian banners and gestures. But this line of defense has now been broken. If Tsai were to hold firm, the denunciations of Tsai on May 17 would be ugly indeed.
Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the Taipei Detention Center was an attempt to preempt potential protests against her during the march. Gathered crowds have repeatedly asked her why she hadn't visited Chen Shui-bian. They denounced her as "heartless," right to her face. If Tsai Ing-wen did not bow to them, all sorts of embarrassing denunciations of Tsai were likely to occur. But on the other hand, this May 17 "Denounce Ma" march has become a kind of anvil on which Tsai Ing-wen's political image is being reforged. Tsai Ing-wen has effectively shredded her contract with society. Tsai Ing-wen, from this day hence, will no longer be the Tsai Ing-wen on whom so many people pinned their hopes.
This visit was obviously arranged. Frank Hsieh was first in line. Su Tseng-chang was second, but could not see him due to visiting restrictions. As a result Tsai and Su both went yesterday. Hsieh, Su, and Tsai have not been to the Taipei Detention Center in over one hundred days. Obviously they each have their own political calculus. But for each of them to schedule visits now was of course by mutual agreement. Each of them is looking after his or her own interests. If we look at past protest marches, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP Central Committee's impregnable line of defense has now been breached in a hundred different places. Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence forces are now on the offensive. They once had to bite their tongues. Now they are the tail wagging the dog. Now they are in control. Taiwan independence forces want not merely to protest that Chen Shui-bian has been a victim of injustice. They want to hold Chen Shui-bian up as the spiritual leader of the DPP and the Taiwan independence movement. They have hijacked every Green Camp protest march held since last year's march on May 20. Again and again, they have used protests agains Ma as opportunities to further their own agenda. They have finally succeeded in forcing Tsai Ing-wen to visit the Taipei Detention Center. They have successfully transformed the protests into a denunciation of Tsai and a defense of Ah-Bian. Yesterday, when Tsai Ing-wen marched into the Taipei Detention Center, she effectively conceded leadership to Chen Shui-bian and the forces of Taiwan independence forces. Was this Tsai Ing-wen's intent when she orginally sought the party chairmanship last year? Is this the implicit contract drawn up between Tsai Ing-wen and reformers within the party and mainstream society?
We can now attempt to answer this question. What would have happened had Tsai Ing-wen refused to visit the Taipei Detention Center? Had she refused to visit the Taipei Detention Center, Taiwan independence forces would have used May 17 to force a showdown with her. She would have been put on the spot. The march would have been ruined. Therefore it is reasonable to speculate that Tsai Ing-wen visited the Taipei Detention Center in exchange for promises from Taiwan independence forces not to provoke a showdown on May 17. Tsai Ing-wen's status as chairperson and her political future requires the recognition and blessing of Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence elements.
Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen's raison d'etre as DPP Party Chairperson was shattered.
蔡英文出任黨主席的應有意義已告破滅
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.15 06:03 am
蔡英文昨日赴北所探視陳水扁。欲解讀此事，可先反問：如果蔡英文不去看陳水扁，會怎樣？
大家都只注意馬英九總統就職一周年，其實蔡英文出任民進黨主席也已一周年了。一年前，蔡英文宣示要帶領民進黨邁向「沒有陳水扁的時代」；但是，一年後，蔡英文卻以赴北所探監作為她就職周年的政治獻禮。
蔡英文出任民進黨主席，對於不論淺綠階層、黨內改革派，或中間選民，及社會上對民進黨尚有善意期許者而言，最大的期待就是希望她能帶領民進黨走出陳水扁的陰影。正如她在一年前就職時所說：只有反省，重拾人民對民進黨的信賴。然而，當蔡英文昨日一腳踏進了北所，象徵著她一年來意欲與陳水扁切割的作為已經失敗；事既至此，蔡英文之所以出任民進黨主席的應有意義亦告破滅！
任何位居要津的政治人物，其政治品牌皆是建立在社會共同認知的政治契約之上；而蔡英文的政治品牌，無疑是建立在帶領民進黨「去扁化」的黨內實際需要及社會期待之上。這就是蔡英文主席與黨內改革派及台灣主流社會之間的政治契約。然而，如今蔡英文既然向陳水扁遞上降書，她出任民進黨主席的應有意義自告破滅。這是蔡英文辜負了她應當承擔的民進黨改革大業？還是民進黨毀了蔡英文？
回過頭來談，如果蔡英文不去看陳水扁，會怎樣？問題是在陳水扁藉五一七遊行挾持了蔡英文。蔡英文原以為五一七是「嗆馬保台」，但陳水扁及獨派卻將之用為「嗆蔡挺扁」的政治槓桿。第一步，獨派揚言南北拚場，分道揚鑣；第二步，陳水扁呼籲南北合流，獨派南場結束高雄遊行後北上會師。可以想像，屆時挺扁標語及嗆蔡的場景皆可能出現。在過去幾場遊行中，蔡英文曾禁止挺扁的標語及動作出現，但這個防線如今已經潰破，蔡若仍力拒，五一七嗆蔡的場面必定十分難看！
蔡英文赴北所探監，其實是對遊行中可能出現的嗆蔡場面預作安撫。過去，她曾多次被群眾質問：「為何不去看扁？」並當面斥她「無情」。蔡英文若再不向這些群眾低頭，五一七就可能出現極為難堪的嗆蔡場面。然而，如此一來，這一場「嗆馬」的五一七遊行，竟然成了蔡英文品牌形象的刀砧，不啻將出現蔡英文親手當眾撕毀其前述社會契約的場景。今後的蔡英文，已不可能再是從前那個令人有所期待的蔡英文了！
此次的探監動作，顯然經過安排。謝長廷排第一，蘇貞昌排第二天因禁見而沒有去成，遂成了蔡蘇昨日同行的場面。謝蘇蔡百餘日未探監，顯然各有盤算；但如今排班探監，則當然是經三人相互約定而一起撤守防線。觀察過去幾次遊行，蔡英文黨中央的防線由滴水不漏而至破洞百出，陳水扁及獨派的攻勢則是由幾至噤聲到如今尾巴搖狗、喧賓奪主。獨派不只是要聲援陳水扁的司法訴訟，而是根本認為陳水扁才是民進黨及台獨的精神領袖；他們挾持了去年五二○以來的每一場綠營遊行，一次又一次以嗆馬遊行來借力使力，至這次五一七終於把蔡英文逼到北所探監，將之轉化為成功的嗆蔡挺扁。蔡英文昨天走進了北所，形同承認了陳水扁及獨派不可取代的精神領導地位。這是蔡英文一年前出任黨主席的初衷嗎？這是蔡英文與黨內改革派及主流社會之間默認的政治契約嗎？
現在可以嘗試回答蔡英文若不探監會怎樣？若不探監，獨派會藉五一七與蔡攤牌，當場嗆蔡使她下不了台，也毀了大遊行。因而，若謂蔡英文探監其實是化解獨派不藉五一七與她撕破臉的交換條件，亦屬合理的推測。蔡英文的主席地位與政治生命，必須獲得陳水扁及獨派的認可與加持。
蔡英文之所以為蔡英文的意義，在昨天已告破滅！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 15, 2009
Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen visited Chen Shui-bian at the Taipei Detention Center. To understand the meaning of her gesture, we need ask only, "What would have happened if Tsai Ing-wen refused to visit Chen Shui-bian?"
Everyones' attention has been focused on President Ma Ying-jeou's first year in office. But DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has also been DPP Chairperson for one year. One year ago, Tsai Ing-wen vowed to lead the DPP toward an "Era without Chen Shui-bian." But one year later, as an anniversary present, Tsai Ing-wen has actually visited the Taipei Detention Center.
Pale Green elements at all levels, reformist elements within the party, centrist voters, and others who still have expectations of the Democratic Progressive Party, have hoped that as DPP Chairperson, Tsai Ing-wen could lead the DPP out of the shadow of Chen Shui-bian. When she took office a year ago, she said that only by soul-searching can the DPP regain the public trust. But yesterday, when Tsai Ing-wen marched into the Taipei Detention Center, she symbolically signaled that the hopes of distancing the DPP from Chen Shui-bian over the past year have been shattered. Tsai Ing-wen's justification as DPP Chairman has also been shattered.
Politicians who hold important positions know that their political image depends on an implicit contract with society. Tsai Ing-wen's political image was predicated upon ridding the Democratic Progressive Party of Chen influences, on meeting the needs of the party and the expectations of society. This is the contract Chairman Tsai Ing-wen reached with reformers within the party and mainstream society. Today however, Tsai Ing-wen submitted her instrument of surrender to Chen Shui-bian. Her raison d'etre as DPP Chairperson has been nullified. Did Tsai Ing-wen betray her promise to reform the Democratic Progressive Party? Or did the DPP destroy Tsai Ing-wen?
Looking back, what would have happened had Tsai Ing-wen refused to visit Chen Shui-bian? The problem is Chen Shui-bian has used the May 17 protest march to take Tsai Ing-wen hostage. Tsai Ing-wen envisioned the May 17 march as an opportunity to "Denounce Ma, Defend Taiwan." But Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence forces have used the event to "Denounce Tsai, Defend Ah-Bian." First, Taiwan independence elements threatened to stage their own, separate protest in southern Taiwan. Next, Chen Shui-bian called for north and south to join forces. He called for Taiwan independence forces in the south to end their march in Kaohsiung and head north. One can imagine the "support Chen Shui-bian" and "denounce Tsai" slogans and incidents that were likely to occur. During past demonstrations, Tsai Ing-wen forbade support Chen Shui-bian banners and gestures. But this line of defense has now been broken. If Tsai were to hold firm, the denunciations of Tsai on May 17 would be ugly indeed.
Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the Taipei Detention Center was an attempt to preempt potential protests against her during the march. Gathered crowds have repeatedly asked her why she hadn't visited Chen Shui-bian. They denounced her as "heartless," right to her face. If Tsai Ing-wen did not bow to them, all sorts of embarrassing denunciations of Tsai were likely to occur. But on the other hand, this May 17 "Denounce Ma" march has become a kind of anvil on which Tsai Ing-wen's political image is being reforged. Tsai Ing-wen has effectively shredded her contract with society. Tsai Ing-wen, from this day hence, will no longer be the Tsai Ing-wen on whom so many people pinned their hopes.
This visit was obviously arranged. Frank Hsieh was first in line. Su Tseng-chang was second, but could not see him due to visiting restrictions. As a result Tsai and Su both went yesterday. Hsieh, Su, and Tsai have not been to the Taipei Detention Center in over one hundred days. Obviously they each have their own political calculus. But for each of them to schedule visits now was of course by mutual agreement. Each of them is looking after his or her own interests. If we look at past protest marches, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP Central Committee's impregnable line of defense has now been breached in a hundred different places. Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence forces are now on the offensive. They once had to bite their tongues. Now they are the tail wagging the dog. Now they are in control. Taiwan independence forces want not merely to protest that Chen Shui-bian has been a victim of injustice. They want to hold Chen Shui-bian up as the spiritual leader of the DPP and the Taiwan independence movement. They have hijacked every Green Camp protest march held since last year's march on May 20. Again and again, they have used protests agains Ma as opportunities to further their own agenda. They have finally succeeded in forcing Tsai Ing-wen to visit the Taipei Detention Center. They have successfully transformed the protests into a denunciation of Tsai and a defense of Ah-Bian. Yesterday, when Tsai Ing-wen marched into the Taipei Detention Center, she effectively conceded leadership to Chen Shui-bian and the forces of Taiwan independence forces. Was this Tsai Ing-wen's intent when she orginally sought the party chairmanship last year? Is this the implicit contract drawn up between Tsai Ing-wen and reformers within the party and mainstream society?
We can now attempt to answer this question. What would have happened had Tsai Ing-wen refused to visit the Taipei Detention Center? Had she refused to visit the Taipei Detention Center, Taiwan independence forces would have used May 17 to force a showdown with her. She would have been put on the spot. The march would have been ruined. Therefore it is reasonable to speculate that Tsai Ing-wen visited the Taipei Detention Center in exchange for promises from Taiwan independence forces not to provoke a showdown on May 17. Tsai Ing-wen's status as chairperson and her political future requires the recognition and blessing of Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence elements.
Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen's raison d'etre as DPP Party Chairperson was shattered.
蔡英文出任黨主席的應有意義已告破滅
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.15 06:03 am
蔡英文昨日赴北所探視陳水扁。欲解讀此事，可先反問：如果蔡英文不去看陳水扁，會怎樣？
大家都只注意馬英九總統就職一周年，其實蔡英文出任民進黨主席也已一周年了。一年前，蔡英文宣示要帶領民進黨邁向「沒有陳水扁的時代」；但是，一年後，蔡英文卻以赴北所探監作為她就職周年的政治獻禮。
蔡英文出任民進黨主席，對於不論淺綠階層、黨內改革派，或中間選民，及社會上對民進黨尚有善意期許者而言，最大的期待就是希望她能帶領民進黨走出陳水扁的陰影。正如她在一年前就職時所說：只有反省，重拾人民對民進黨的信賴。然而，當蔡英文昨日一腳踏進了北所，象徵著她一年來意欲與陳水扁切割的作為已經失敗；事既至此，蔡英文之所以出任民進黨主席的應有意義亦告破滅！
任何位居要津的政治人物，其政治品牌皆是建立在社會共同認知的政治契約之上；而蔡英文的政治品牌，無疑是建立在帶領民進黨「去扁化」的黨內實際需要及社會期待之上。這就是蔡英文主席與黨內改革派及台灣主流社會之間的政治契約。然而，如今蔡英文既然向陳水扁遞上降書，她出任民進黨主席的應有意義自告破滅。這是蔡英文辜負了她應當承擔的民進黨改革大業？還是民進黨毀了蔡英文？
回過頭來談，如果蔡英文不去看陳水扁，會怎樣？問題是在陳水扁藉五一七遊行挾持了蔡英文。蔡英文原以為五一七是「嗆馬保台」，但陳水扁及獨派卻將之用為「嗆蔡挺扁」的政治槓桿。第一步，獨派揚言南北拚場，分道揚鑣；第二步，陳水扁呼籲南北合流，獨派南場結束高雄遊行後北上會師。可以想像，屆時挺扁標語及嗆蔡的場景皆可能出現。在過去幾場遊行中，蔡英文曾禁止挺扁的標語及動作出現，但這個防線如今已經潰破，蔡若仍力拒，五一七嗆蔡的場面必定十分難看！
蔡英文赴北所探監，其實是對遊行中可能出現的嗆蔡場面預作安撫。過去，她曾多次被群眾質問：「為何不去看扁？」並當面斥她「無情」。蔡英文若再不向這些群眾低頭，五一七就可能出現極為難堪的嗆蔡場面。然而，如此一來，這一場「嗆馬」的五一七遊行，竟然成了蔡英文品牌形象的刀砧，不啻將出現蔡英文親手當眾撕毀其前述社會契約的場景。今後的蔡英文，已不可能再是從前那個令人有所期待的蔡英文了！
此次的探監動作，顯然經過安排。謝長廷排第一，蘇貞昌排第二天因禁見而沒有去成，遂成了蔡蘇昨日同行的場面。謝蘇蔡百餘日未探監，顯然各有盤算；但如今排班探監，則當然是經三人相互約定而一起撤守防線。觀察過去幾次遊行，蔡英文黨中央的防線由滴水不漏而至破洞百出，陳水扁及獨派的攻勢則是由幾至噤聲到如今尾巴搖狗、喧賓奪主。獨派不只是要聲援陳水扁的司法訴訟，而是根本認為陳水扁才是民進黨及台獨的精神領袖；他們挾持了去年五二○以來的每一場綠營遊行，一次又一次以嗆馬遊行來借力使力，至這次五一七終於把蔡英文逼到北所探監，將之轉化為成功的嗆蔡挺扁。蔡英文昨天走進了北所，形同承認了陳水扁及獨派不可取代的精神領導地位。這是蔡英文一年前出任黨主席的初衷嗎？這是蔡英文與黨內改革派及主流社會之間默認的政治契約嗎？
現在可以嘗試回答蔡英文若不探監會怎樣？若不探監，獨派會藉五一七與蔡攤牌，當場嗆蔡使她下不了台，也毀了大遊行。因而，若謂蔡英文探監其實是化解獨派不藉五一七與她撕破臉的交換條件，亦屬合理的推測。蔡英文的主席地位與政治生命，必須獲得陳水扁及獨派的認可與加持。
蔡英文之所以為蔡英文的意義，在昨天已告破滅！
Thursday, May 14, 2009
A March Not Rooted in Self-Pity?
A March Not Rooted in Self-Pity?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 14, 2009
The DPP got its start on the streets. It has no other strengths. All it knows is how to butt heads with the system. To its embarrassment, 20 years after the party was founded, the political situation has changed. Most embarrassing of all, this 20 year period includes eight years of Democratic Progressive Party rule. Yet its eight years in power failed to teach the DPP the importance of obeying the law. The DPP often forgets that when it butts heads with the system, the DPP was at one time the defender of the system.
For politicians to suffer from amnesia is not surprising. For the sake of power, they must change with the political winds. They must always weave some sort of rationale to convince themselves they are always right, and their opponents are always wrong. Unfortunately for them, the public's memory is better than theirs. What they did and what they said, the public remembers. It has been nearly a year since the second change in ruling parties. On the eve of the first anniversary of the Ma/Liu government's inauguration, the Democratic Progressive Party is again taking to the streets. It is organizing a May 17 "Protest Ma, Defend Taiwan March." As the opposition party, opposition to the party in power is perfectly normal. The Democratic Progressive Party has called for full public mobilization. It has set quotas for the marchers, and quotas for the tour buses, lest the public forget the Democratic Progressive Party aptitude at "remaking the world."
This is the first street demonstration launched by the DPP since it lost power. The Democratic Progressive Party has also produced two promotional videos. The first asks people whether they had enough to eat? It mocks the Ma administration for the past year's economic recession. Unfortunately for the DPP, the stock market refused to cooperate. It rose eight days in a row. The second video features former DPP Chairman Huang Hsing-chieh. He called for the masses to summon their past enthusiasm. Twenty years ago he strenuously protested the "ten thousand year parliament." He won support for direct presidential elections. But people were unmoved. Without these two films, people might not have been so strongly reminded of how far the DPP degenerated once it tasted power. It might not have felt such anguish over the eight years Taiwan lost as a result of Democratic Progressive Party misrule.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. It trumpeted its defense of "Taiwan's sovereignty." Meanwhile, the ROC found itself in dire diplomatic straits. Cross-Strait relations became increasingly tense. We were unable to join the WHO. We even became known in the international community as a troublemaker. The DPP government built "international airports" in cities and counties all over the island. These airports soon resembled ghost towns. The DPP's talk of doubling tourism became an empty boast. Its "Two Trillion, Twin Stars" plan was a day late and a dollar short. In the end it was only the Ma administration's mainland policy that brought Taiwan and foreign capital back to the island, and Mainland tourists to Taiwan to boost spending. The Democratic Progressive Party is castigating the Ma administration for "selling out Taiwan" even as the ROC is preparing to attend the WHA as an observer.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. It shouted empty "wage war on behalf of the economy" slogans for eight years. In the end the only war it waged was on behalf of its own ideology. Now that it is again out of power, the Democratic Progressive Party has reverted to peddling its false idol of Taiwan independence. It is attempting to delude the public on Taiwan. DPP officials denounce the Ma administration for recognizing Mainland academic credentials, even as their own spouses work toward degrees at Mainland universities. DPP officials obstruct the opening of cross-strait economic and trade, even as its own officials conduct business on the Mainland. DPP officials shout themselves hoarse denouncing the Parade and Assembly Law as a relic of the martial law era. Meanwhile they forget that they were in power for eight years, during which they made not the slightest move to amend this unconstitutional law. DPP officials accuse the Ma administration of turning the clock back on democracy. Meanwhile have they ever reflected upon their own eight years in office? What if anything did they do for democracy? Twenty years after Taiwan's political liberalization, all they can do is spout the same old political platitudes, and play the same old political games.
For an opposition party to engage in confrontation is perfectly natural. But it must offer convincing reasons for its opposition. If it cannot offer hard data to prove its case, at least it should offer a reasoned argument. What is the DPP's argument? DPP officials have declared they will take to the streets. They may even even stay overnight. They boast that they are even "willing to be arrested and jailed." In order to avoid conflicts, the Taipei City Government has urged the KMT to withdraw its application for a similar permit on May 18. It is allowing the DPP to protest. But the DPP is utterly unappreciative. It is unwilling to abide by existing legal norms. it forgets that when the Red Shirt Army took to the streets to protest Chen Shui-bian and his family's corruption, the DPP invoked the very same law they oppose to prevent the Red Shirt Army from passing through cities and counties ruled by the Democratic Progressive Party.
The primary battlefield in a democracy is in the halls of parliament. Yet the DPP had the temerity to barricade itself inside the Legislature, preventing the Legislature from conducting business. Its primary motive in taking to the streets is to provoke violent conflict. When the Democratic Progressive Party was in power it sanctimoniously demanded that opposition parties behave as the "loyal opposition." But the Pan Blue opposition parties never barricaded themselves inside the Legislature by attaching locks to the doors of the Legislature. They never led the masses onto the streets for the express purpose of provoking violent clashes. Now that the DPP is in the opposition, it refuses to behave as a loyal opposition party. But the least it can do is behave as a responsible opposition party. If it has the ability to lead the masses onto the streets, it has the responsibilty to ensure that they safely return home. It should at least be able to find its own way home.
The ROC has undergone two ruling party changes. Its political system is not in danger of collapsing, dire warnings by the Democratic Progressive Party to the contrary notwithstanding. Instead, it is the Democratic Progressive Party that faces a crisis. The Democratic Progressive Party is doing nothing for the public on Taiwan. It is doing nothing for social progress. At least it should do something for itself. It should hold a peaceful demonstration. it should refrain from mawkish appeals to self-pity. It should ensure that incidents of violence do not leave an indelible stamp on the DPP's forehead reading, "The Party of Violence."
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.05.14
社論－走出悲情，辦個漂亮的遊行吧
本報訊
民進黨街頭起家，別的長處沒有，就是擅於衝撞體制，尷尬的是，創黨迄今廿多年，政治形勢丕變，更難堪的是，這中間還包括民進黨八年執政。八年執政，沒讓他們學會「守法」對民主政治的重要性，輕易就忘記了他們一意要衝撞的體制，曾是他們主事且捍衛過的體制。
政治人物或政黨有失憶症並不稀奇，為了權力，他們必須隨勢逆變，永遠找得到一套說詞說服自己永遠是對的，而競爭對手永遠是錯的，偏偏人民的記性永遠比政客要好，他們曾經做過的事、說過的話，民眾可不會輕易忘得了。政黨再輪替即將一年，就在馬劉政府就職一周年前夕，民進黨重回街頭，發動五一七嗆馬保台遊行，做為反對黨，站在執政者的對立面也是常態，民進黨為此要求公職全面動員，群眾有配額、遊覽車有配額，就怕群眾忘記民進黨「打出天下」的本事。
為了這場在野後第一次由黨發起的街頭遊行，民進黨還特別製作兩支宣傳影片，第一支以民眾互道「呷飽未」？諷刺馬劉政府上台一年來的經濟蕭條，偏偏股市很不給面子地連漲八天；第二支影片則請出前主席信介仙，呼喚支持群眾的往日熱情，廿年前民進黨力抗萬年國會、爭取總統直選的身形重現，卻感動不了人心。沒有這兩支影片，民眾或許還沒這麼強烈地感受到民進黨享受權力滋味時的墮落，對台灣因民進黨執政而失落的八年，這麼沉痛。
民進黨執政八年，高喊捍衛台灣主權的時候，台灣外交處境最困窘、兩岸關係最緊張、我們既無法參與世衛組織，甚至成國際間認定的「麻煩製造者」；民進黨政府任內興建各縣市的國際機場，都成了班機空蕩蕩的半報廢機場，觀光客倍增成為空談，兩兆雙星眼看著成為明日黃花，還是得靠馬政府的大陸政策，吸引台資回流、外資搶進、大陸觀光客刺激消費。當民進黨口沫橫飛痛罵馬政府出賣台灣的時候，台灣正準備以觀察員身分出席世衛大會。
民進黨執政八年，空喊拚經濟八年，拚得還是政治口水；在野之後，民進黨賣的還是主權圖騰，企圖以此迷幻台灣民眾，民進黨人一方面痛罵開放大陸學歷，自己的配偶卻早已赴大陸修習學位；他們一方面阻撓兩岸經貿開放政策，卻不乏在大陸經商之人；他們聲嘶力竭地指責戒嚴版集會遊行法，卻忘了自己執政八年，絲毫未曾動念修一修這個大法官解釋認為違憲的條文，民進黨人大剌剌地批評馬政府民主倒退，卻從未反省執政八年，到底為民主進步做了什麼事？讓台灣在政治開放廿多年後，還在老套的政治語言與遊戲中打轉。
在野黨搞對抗搞反對，天經地義，但是得拿出足以說服人的道理，沒有數據，好歹要有個說法，民進黨的說法在哪？民進黨揚言上街頭，還要徹夜靜坐，「被關也在所不惜」，台北市政府為避免衝突，勸退五一八也申請路權的國民黨，讓民進黨「嗆個夠」，民進黨卻完全不領情，就是不願遵循現行的法律規範，他們也忘了，當紅衫軍為了陳水扁及其親信家人的貪腐弊案上街頭時，甚至運用這個他們此時反對的法律，拒絕紅衫軍途經民進黨執政縣市。
民主運作主戰場在國會議事殿堂，民進黨人卻可以反鎖國會議事場上的大門，阻絕議事的進行；走上街頭還非要以釀成衝突為第一目標。民進黨執政時動輒呼籲在野黨要做個「忠誠的反對黨」，當時在野黨抗爭既不會反鎖國會議事場的大門，更不會帶了群眾上街頭以製造衝突為樂，如今在野，民進黨即使做不到他們口中的「忠誠反對黨」，至少學會做一個負責任的反對黨吧，既有本事帶群眾上街頭，就要有本事讓群眾平安回家，也要自己找到離開街頭的路。
當台灣民主已經歷兩次政黨輪替，台灣民主沒有民進黨危言聳聽的存亡關頭，倒是民進黨的發展到了關鍵時刻，民進黨不為台灣人民、不為社會發展，至少為自己做一件事：搞一次平安的集會遊行，不要再賣弄悲情，不要再有任何意外讓暴力黨的陰影，成為頭上撕都撕不掉的標籤。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 14, 2009
The DPP got its start on the streets. It has no other strengths. All it knows is how to butt heads with the system. To its embarrassment, 20 years after the party was founded, the political situation has changed. Most embarrassing of all, this 20 year period includes eight years of Democratic Progressive Party rule. Yet its eight years in power failed to teach the DPP the importance of obeying the law. The DPP often forgets that when it butts heads with the system, the DPP was at one time the defender of the system.
For politicians to suffer from amnesia is not surprising. For the sake of power, they must change with the political winds. They must always weave some sort of rationale to convince themselves they are always right, and their opponents are always wrong. Unfortunately for them, the public's memory is better than theirs. What they did and what they said, the public remembers. It has been nearly a year since the second change in ruling parties. On the eve of the first anniversary of the Ma/Liu government's inauguration, the Democratic Progressive Party is again taking to the streets. It is organizing a May 17 "Protest Ma, Defend Taiwan March." As the opposition party, opposition to the party in power is perfectly normal. The Democratic Progressive Party has called for full public mobilization. It has set quotas for the marchers, and quotas for the tour buses, lest the public forget the Democratic Progressive Party aptitude at "remaking the world."
This is the first street demonstration launched by the DPP since it lost power. The Democratic Progressive Party has also produced two promotional videos. The first asks people whether they had enough to eat? It mocks the Ma administration for the past year's economic recession. Unfortunately for the DPP, the stock market refused to cooperate. It rose eight days in a row. The second video features former DPP Chairman Huang Hsing-chieh. He called for the masses to summon their past enthusiasm. Twenty years ago he strenuously protested the "ten thousand year parliament." He won support for direct presidential elections. But people were unmoved. Without these two films, people might not have been so strongly reminded of how far the DPP degenerated once it tasted power. It might not have felt such anguish over the eight years Taiwan lost as a result of Democratic Progressive Party misrule.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. It trumpeted its defense of "Taiwan's sovereignty." Meanwhile, the ROC found itself in dire diplomatic straits. Cross-Strait relations became increasingly tense. We were unable to join the WHO. We even became known in the international community as a troublemaker. The DPP government built "international airports" in cities and counties all over the island. These airports soon resembled ghost towns. The DPP's talk of doubling tourism became an empty boast. Its "Two Trillion, Twin Stars" plan was a day late and a dollar short. In the end it was only the Ma administration's mainland policy that brought Taiwan and foreign capital back to the island, and Mainland tourists to Taiwan to boost spending. The Democratic Progressive Party is castigating the Ma administration for "selling out Taiwan" even as the ROC is preparing to attend the WHA as an observer.
The Democratic Progressive Party ruled for eight years. It shouted empty "wage war on behalf of the economy" slogans for eight years. In the end the only war it waged was on behalf of its own ideology. Now that it is again out of power, the Democratic Progressive Party has reverted to peddling its false idol of Taiwan independence. It is attempting to delude the public on Taiwan. DPP officials denounce the Ma administration for recognizing Mainland academic credentials, even as their own spouses work toward degrees at Mainland universities. DPP officials obstruct the opening of cross-strait economic and trade, even as its own officials conduct business on the Mainland. DPP officials shout themselves hoarse denouncing the Parade and Assembly Law as a relic of the martial law era. Meanwhile they forget that they were in power for eight years, during which they made not the slightest move to amend this unconstitutional law. DPP officials accuse the Ma administration of turning the clock back on democracy. Meanwhile have they ever reflected upon their own eight years in office? What if anything did they do for democracy? Twenty years after Taiwan's political liberalization, all they can do is spout the same old political platitudes, and play the same old political games.
For an opposition party to engage in confrontation is perfectly natural. But it must offer convincing reasons for its opposition. If it cannot offer hard data to prove its case, at least it should offer a reasoned argument. What is the DPP's argument? DPP officials have declared they will take to the streets. They may even even stay overnight. They boast that they are even "willing to be arrested and jailed." In order to avoid conflicts, the Taipei City Government has urged the KMT to withdraw its application for a similar permit on May 18. It is allowing the DPP to protest. But the DPP is utterly unappreciative. It is unwilling to abide by existing legal norms. it forgets that when the Red Shirt Army took to the streets to protest Chen Shui-bian and his family's corruption, the DPP invoked the very same law they oppose to prevent the Red Shirt Army from passing through cities and counties ruled by the Democratic Progressive Party.
The primary battlefield in a democracy is in the halls of parliament. Yet the DPP had the temerity to barricade itself inside the Legislature, preventing the Legislature from conducting business. Its primary motive in taking to the streets is to provoke violent conflict. When the Democratic Progressive Party was in power it sanctimoniously demanded that opposition parties behave as the "loyal opposition." But the Pan Blue opposition parties never barricaded themselves inside the Legislature by attaching locks to the doors of the Legislature. They never led the masses onto the streets for the express purpose of provoking violent clashes. Now that the DPP is in the opposition, it refuses to behave as a loyal opposition party. But the least it can do is behave as a responsible opposition party. If it has the ability to lead the masses onto the streets, it has the responsibilty to ensure that they safely return home. It should at least be able to find its own way home.
The ROC has undergone two ruling party changes. Its political system is not in danger of collapsing, dire warnings by the Democratic Progressive Party to the contrary notwithstanding. Instead, it is the Democratic Progressive Party that faces a crisis. The Democratic Progressive Party is doing nothing for the public on Taiwan. It is doing nothing for social progress. At least it should do something for itself. It should hold a peaceful demonstration. it should refrain from mawkish appeals to self-pity. It should ensure that incidents of violence do not leave an indelible stamp on the DPP's forehead reading, "The Party of Violence."
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.05.14
社論－走出悲情，辦個漂亮的遊行吧
本報訊
民進黨街頭起家，別的長處沒有，就是擅於衝撞體制，尷尬的是，創黨迄今廿多年，政治形勢丕變，更難堪的是，這中間還包括民進黨八年執政。八年執政，沒讓他們學會「守法」對民主政治的重要性，輕易就忘記了他們一意要衝撞的體制，曾是他們主事且捍衛過的體制。
政治人物或政黨有失憶症並不稀奇，為了權力，他們必須隨勢逆變，永遠找得到一套說詞說服自己永遠是對的，而競爭對手永遠是錯的，偏偏人民的記性永遠比政客要好，他們曾經做過的事、說過的話，民眾可不會輕易忘得了。政黨再輪替即將一年，就在馬劉政府就職一周年前夕，民進黨重回街頭，發動五一七嗆馬保台遊行，做為反對黨，站在執政者的對立面也是常態，民進黨為此要求公職全面動員，群眾有配額、遊覽車有配額，就怕群眾忘記民進黨「打出天下」的本事。
為了這場在野後第一次由黨發起的街頭遊行，民進黨還特別製作兩支宣傳影片，第一支以民眾互道「呷飽未」？諷刺馬劉政府上台一年來的經濟蕭條，偏偏股市很不給面子地連漲八天；第二支影片則請出前主席信介仙，呼喚支持群眾的往日熱情，廿年前民進黨力抗萬年國會、爭取總統直選的身形重現，卻感動不了人心。沒有這兩支影片，民眾或許還沒這麼強烈地感受到民進黨享受權力滋味時的墮落，對台灣因民進黨執政而失落的八年，這麼沉痛。
民進黨執政八年，高喊捍衛台灣主權的時候，台灣外交處境最困窘、兩岸關係最緊張、我們既無法參與世衛組織，甚至成國際間認定的「麻煩製造者」；民進黨政府任內興建各縣市的國際機場，都成了班機空蕩蕩的半報廢機場，觀光客倍增成為空談，兩兆雙星眼看著成為明日黃花，還是得靠馬政府的大陸政策，吸引台資回流、外資搶進、大陸觀光客刺激消費。當民進黨口沫橫飛痛罵馬政府出賣台灣的時候，台灣正準備以觀察員身分出席世衛大會。
民進黨執政八年，空喊拚經濟八年，拚得還是政治口水；在野之後，民進黨賣的還是主權圖騰，企圖以此迷幻台灣民眾，民進黨人一方面痛罵開放大陸學歷，自己的配偶卻早已赴大陸修習學位；他們一方面阻撓兩岸經貿開放政策，卻不乏在大陸經商之人；他們聲嘶力竭地指責戒嚴版集會遊行法，卻忘了自己執政八年，絲毫未曾動念修一修這個大法官解釋認為違憲的條文，民進黨人大剌剌地批評馬政府民主倒退，卻從未反省執政八年，到底為民主進步做了什麼事？讓台灣在政治開放廿多年後，還在老套的政治語言與遊戲中打轉。
在野黨搞對抗搞反對，天經地義，但是得拿出足以說服人的道理，沒有數據，好歹要有個說法，民進黨的說法在哪？民進黨揚言上街頭，還要徹夜靜坐，「被關也在所不惜」，台北市政府為避免衝突，勸退五一八也申請路權的國民黨，讓民進黨「嗆個夠」，民進黨卻完全不領情，就是不願遵循現行的法律規範，他們也忘了，當紅衫軍為了陳水扁及其親信家人的貪腐弊案上街頭時，甚至運用這個他們此時反對的法律，拒絕紅衫軍途經民進黨執政縣市。
民主運作主戰場在國會議事殿堂，民進黨人卻可以反鎖國會議事場上的大門，阻絕議事的進行；走上街頭還非要以釀成衝突為第一目標。民進黨執政時動輒呼籲在野黨要做個「忠誠的反對黨」，當時在野黨抗爭既不會反鎖國會議事場的大門，更不會帶了群眾上街頭以製造衝突為樂，如今在野，民進黨即使做不到他們口中的「忠誠反對黨」，至少學會做一個負責任的反對黨吧，既有本事帶群眾上街頭，就要有本事讓群眾平安回家，也要自己找到離開街頭的路。
當台灣民主已經歷兩次政黨輪替，台灣民主沒有民進黨危言聳聽的存亡關頭，倒是民進黨的發展到了關鍵時刻，民進黨不為台灣人民、不為社會發展，至少為自己做一件事：搞一次平安的集會遊行，不要再賣弄悲情，不要再有任何意外讓暴力黨的陰影，成為頭上撕都撕不掉的標籤。
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Good Cross-Strait Economic Relations Equals Good Cross-Strait Political Relations
Good Cross-Strait Economic Relations Equals Good Cross-Strait Political Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2009
ECFA is not on the agenda of the fourth round of talks later this year, leading to all sorts of speculation and debate. Some people think it has merely been postponed, not ruled out. Some people think Beijing has no intention of going along with it, and that ECFA is probably done for.
Over the past year, the two sides have made unprecedented progress in cross-Strait relations. But the rapid development of cross-Strait relations means economics must be brought in synch with politics. Some people think the Ma administration's concept of "first economics, then politics" is "only economics, no politics." They think the Ma administration is too pro-Beijing. They fear that if Taiwan's economy is integrated with the Mainland's, Taiwan's poltical system will be as well. Others think that the Ma administration's concept of "first economics, then politics" is perceived by Beijing as a variation of the two-states theory. They think cross-Strait mutual trust is on the brink of disintegration, and that is why the mainland has little interest in ECFA.
These two viewpoints differ sharply. But they are a matter of opinion. One side thinks Ma Ying-jeou is pro-Beijing, and therefore Taiwan will be swallowed up by the mainland. The other side thinks Ma Ying-jeou is pro-independence, and Beijing has targeted him for punishment.
Actually, the Ma administration is not the only one to endorse the concept of "first economics, then politics." The Beijing authorities also hold this view. Their intention is to ease the pressure on both sides, to create more breathing room, to separate economics from politics, and to give economics priority over politics. But what isn't political between the two sides? How can the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic interaction not have political repercussions? Are the three links purely economic? Aren't they political? Are financial agreement purely economic? Aren't they political?
The rapid institutionalization of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges over the past year was a highly political decision. The two sides knew what the political impact would be. The political impact may make Taiwan independence even less possible. But Beijing also knows it must forsake military force as a means of achieving reunification. Cross-Strait relations are currently in a state of "neither reunification, nor independence, both reunification, and independence." It is in an upward spriral, contained within a framework of peaceful development.
Such a strategy ensures that Taiwan is unable to declare independence, and that Beijing is unable to compel reunification. Beijing hopes that Taiwan independence sentiment on Taiwan will fade. The Ma administration hopes to turn cross-Strait hostility into a win-win scenario of peaceful coexistence. Beijing hopes of course to move toward reunification. It knows it must first convince the public on Taiwan. It must pass the test of democracy. The Ma administration does not advocate Taiwan independence. But "no independence" plus "no reunification" involves a delicate balance. Under the circumstances, Beijing knows that no government on Taiwan that advocates reunification can survive. The Ma administration also knows the "two states theory" cannot resolve the cross-Strait impasse.
In this delicate balance, what Taipei wants is for Beijing to realize that Taipei is not hostile toward it. What Beijing wants is for the public on Taiwan to understand that improved cross-Strait relations will enhance Taipei's dignity and interests. After all, the Taiwan region has a vibrant system of government. The majority of the public wants to maintain the status quo. Therefore the authorities in Taipei dare not engage in Taiwan independence. Nor can the authorities in Beijing demote the authorities in Taipei to the status of Beijing's "caretaker government." Beijing is unlikely to harbor such illusions. Therefore Beijing is unlikely to resort to violence to achieve reunification. It cannot turn Taipei into its charity case via procurement policies. That is not what the public on Taiwan wants from cross-Strait relations. Nor can it make the public on Taiwan feel good about cross-Strait relations by such means. Most importantly, it is not conducive to Taipei's survival and development. If the ROC finds it difficult to survive and develop because Beijing undermines cross-Strait relations, Beijing will also feel the pressure.
Therefore, we believe ECFA has merely been postponed, not necessarily ruled out. If our speculation is incorrect, we hope the situation can be turned around. After all, ECFA or CECA was Hu Jintao's idea, as formulated in his Six Points. High ranking officials in Beijing have repeatedly declared that "the name is not important." The authorities on both sides claim that ECFA is "economic in nature." But as we said earlier, it is essentially a political decision, and will have profound a political impact. Because of ECFA, the two sides will have a better framework for win/win, mutually beneficial peaceful development.
It is unnecessary to put bilateral opportunities and thinking over the past year into a stereotypical "reunification vs. independence" framework. As long as the two sides maintain good economic relations, there will be good political relations. The political impact will be positive. The result will be better than independence, and also better than reunification.
Therefore declaimers that the two sides are "only talking about economics and not politics" are untrue.
好的兩岸經濟關係，就是好的政治關係
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.13 04:38 am
ＥＣＦＡ未列入兩岸下半年第四次談判的議程，引發種種揣測及議論。有人認為只是推遲，而非破局；有人則認為北京方面已無意於此，ＥＣＦＡ恐怕沒戲唱了。
一年來，兩岸關係進展快速，確實展現出空前歷史機遇的氣勢。然而，伴隨著兩岸關係快速發展，卻也立即出現了經濟與政治如何協調整合的問題。有人認為，馬政府「先經濟／後政治」的主張，「只談經濟／不談政治」，將使馬政府太過傾中，而恐有「經濟被（大陸）內化／政治被消化」的疑慮。另有一類看法則認為，馬政府「先經濟／後政治」的態度，已被北京視為另類兩國論，兩岸互信瀕於解體，因而大陸方面已對ＥＣＦＡ的議題興趣缺缺。
這兩類議論皆甚尖銳深刻，卻見仁見智至南轅北轍的地步。一方認為馬英九傾中，將被大陸「消化」；另一方則認為馬英九傾獨，將受北京懲罰。
其實，「先經濟／後政治」不僅是馬政府的主張；中共領導人亦一向持此觀點。此類主張，用意是在緩解雙方壓力，創造空間；所以將「經濟」與「政治」作二分法，並作出「先／後」的區隔。然而，兩岸之間何事不含政治，何事不是政治？兩岸經濟互動的法制化，又何一不是政治所決定，更何一不會產生政治效應？三通只是經濟嗎？難道不是政治？金融協議又只是經濟嗎？難道不具政治效應？
一年來，兩岸經貿法制化的快速發展，原即是雙方高度政治性的決定，而其必然衍生的政治效應亦當在雙方的估算之中。此種政治效應，或許使得台獨變成更不可能，卻亦顯示北京已知必須駛離武力統一的軌轍；兩岸關係於「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」之間，在「和平發展框架」上呈螺旋上升狀態演進。
這樣的策略，應當是在「台灣不能台獨／北京不能武力統一」的包夾中形成的思考。北京方面希望台獨意識能夠在台灣淡化，而馬政府方面則希望化兩岸敵對為雙贏共存。北京當然希望朝統一方向發展，卻知首應說服台灣的民意，亦即通過台灣民主機制的檢驗；馬政府則不主張台獨，但「不獨」亦「不統」。這是一個「包夾中的平衡」。在現狀下，北京不會傻到認為一個主張「統一」的台灣政府能夠維持得下去；馬政府也不會愚至認為主張「兩國論」是解決兩岸僵局的處方。
在這個「包夾中的平衡」中，台灣要做到的是，使北京認為台灣對中國不是一個敵對的存在；北京要做到的則是，使台灣人民相信改善兩岸關係有助於提升台灣的尊嚴與利益。台灣畢竟是一極有活力的民主體制，多數民意主張維持現狀，台灣的主政者因此不可能冒進搞台獨，而北京亦不可能令台灣政府淪為北京的「看守政府」而妄想其尚能維持。所以，北京不至於用粗暴的手段求統一，也不可能使台灣淪為在北京施捨性「採購」政策下的餵養物。因為，那不是台灣人民要的兩岸關係，也不是能使台灣人民產生好感的兩岸關係。最重要的，那不是台灣能夠生存發展之道；台灣若因北京所扭曲的兩岸關係而難以生存發展，北京感受的壓力亦將相對升高。
因而，我們相信，ＥＣＦＡ只是推遲，而未必是破局；倘若我們的推測有誤，也希望情勢能夠迴轉。畢竟，ＥＣＦＡ或ＣＥＣＡ，是胡六點的主張；且北京高層還屢屢聲明「名稱不重要」。兩岸當局雖皆聲稱ＥＣＦＡ是「經濟性」的，但正如前文所言，在本質上卻是一個政治性的決定，且亦將產生深刻的政治效應。那個效應是：兩岸將因ＥＣＦＡ而有一個更能互利雙贏的和平發展框架。
不必再將一年以來的兩岸新機遇及新思維套進陳腐的「統／獨」公式中。只要兩岸能維持一個好的經濟互動關係，那就絕對也就是一個好的政治關係，亦必會發生好的政治效應。比獨好，也比統好！
所以，「只談經濟／不談政治」的說法，是說不通的。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2009
ECFA is not on the agenda of the fourth round of talks later this year, leading to all sorts of speculation and debate. Some people think it has merely been postponed, not ruled out. Some people think Beijing has no intention of going along with it, and that ECFA is probably done for.
Over the past year, the two sides have made unprecedented progress in cross-Strait relations. But the rapid development of cross-Strait relations means economics must be brought in synch with politics. Some people think the Ma administration's concept of "first economics, then politics" is "only economics, no politics." They think the Ma administration is too pro-Beijing. They fear that if Taiwan's economy is integrated with the Mainland's, Taiwan's poltical system will be as well. Others think that the Ma administration's concept of "first economics, then politics" is perceived by Beijing as a variation of the two-states theory. They think cross-Strait mutual trust is on the brink of disintegration, and that is why the mainland has little interest in ECFA.
These two viewpoints differ sharply. But they are a matter of opinion. One side thinks Ma Ying-jeou is pro-Beijing, and therefore Taiwan will be swallowed up by the mainland. The other side thinks Ma Ying-jeou is pro-independence, and Beijing has targeted him for punishment.
Actually, the Ma administration is not the only one to endorse the concept of "first economics, then politics." The Beijing authorities also hold this view. Their intention is to ease the pressure on both sides, to create more breathing room, to separate economics from politics, and to give economics priority over politics. But what isn't political between the two sides? How can the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic interaction not have political repercussions? Are the three links purely economic? Aren't they political? Are financial agreement purely economic? Aren't they political?
The rapid institutionalization of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges over the past year was a highly political decision. The two sides knew what the political impact would be. The political impact may make Taiwan independence even less possible. But Beijing also knows it must forsake military force as a means of achieving reunification. Cross-Strait relations are currently in a state of "neither reunification, nor independence, both reunification, and independence." It is in an upward spriral, contained within a framework of peaceful development.
Such a strategy ensures that Taiwan is unable to declare independence, and that Beijing is unable to compel reunification. Beijing hopes that Taiwan independence sentiment on Taiwan will fade. The Ma administration hopes to turn cross-Strait hostility into a win-win scenario of peaceful coexistence. Beijing hopes of course to move toward reunification. It knows it must first convince the public on Taiwan. It must pass the test of democracy. The Ma administration does not advocate Taiwan independence. But "no independence" plus "no reunification" involves a delicate balance. Under the circumstances, Beijing knows that no government on Taiwan that advocates reunification can survive. The Ma administration also knows the "two states theory" cannot resolve the cross-Strait impasse.
In this delicate balance, what Taipei wants is for Beijing to realize that Taipei is not hostile toward it. What Beijing wants is for the public on Taiwan to understand that improved cross-Strait relations will enhance Taipei's dignity and interests. After all, the Taiwan region has a vibrant system of government. The majority of the public wants to maintain the status quo. Therefore the authorities in Taipei dare not engage in Taiwan independence. Nor can the authorities in Beijing demote the authorities in Taipei to the status of Beijing's "caretaker government." Beijing is unlikely to harbor such illusions. Therefore Beijing is unlikely to resort to violence to achieve reunification. It cannot turn Taipei into its charity case via procurement policies. That is not what the public on Taiwan wants from cross-Strait relations. Nor can it make the public on Taiwan feel good about cross-Strait relations by such means. Most importantly, it is not conducive to Taipei's survival and development. If the ROC finds it difficult to survive and develop because Beijing undermines cross-Strait relations, Beijing will also feel the pressure.
Therefore, we believe ECFA has merely been postponed, not necessarily ruled out. If our speculation is incorrect, we hope the situation can be turned around. After all, ECFA or CECA was Hu Jintao's idea, as formulated in his Six Points. High ranking officials in Beijing have repeatedly declared that "the name is not important." The authorities on both sides claim that ECFA is "economic in nature." But as we said earlier, it is essentially a political decision, and will have profound a political impact. Because of ECFA, the two sides will have a better framework for win/win, mutually beneficial peaceful development.
It is unnecessary to put bilateral opportunities and thinking over the past year into a stereotypical "reunification vs. independence" framework. As long as the two sides maintain good economic relations, there will be good political relations. The political impact will be positive. The result will be better than independence, and also better than reunification.
Therefore declaimers that the two sides are "only talking about economics and not politics" are untrue.
好的兩岸經濟關係，就是好的政治關係
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.13 04:38 am
ＥＣＦＡ未列入兩岸下半年第四次談判的議程，引發種種揣測及議論。有人認為只是推遲，而非破局；有人則認為北京方面已無意於此，ＥＣＦＡ恐怕沒戲唱了。
一年來，兩岸關係進展快速，確實展現出空前歷史機遇的氣勢。然而，伴隨著兩岸關係快速發展，卻也立即出現了經濟與政治如何協調整合的問題。有人認為，馬政府「先經濟／後政治」的主張，「只談經濟／不談政治」，將使馬政府太過傾中，而恐有「經濟被（大陸）內化／政治被消化」的疑慮。另有一類看法則認為，馬政府「先經濟／後政治」的態度，已被北京視為另類兩國論，兩岸互信瀕於解體，因而大陸方面已對ＥＣＦＡ的議題興趣缺缺。
這兩類議論皆甚尖銳深刻，卻見仁見智至南轅北轍的地步。一方認為馬英九傾中，將被大陸「消化」；另一方則認為馬英九傾獨，將受北京懲罰。
其實，「先經濟／後政治」不僅是馬政府的主張；中共領導人亦一向持此觀點。此類主張，用意是在緩解雙方壓力，創造空間；所以將「經濟」與「政治」作二分法，並作出「先／後」的區隔。然而，兩岸之間何事不含政治，何事不是政治？兩岸經濟互動的法制化，又何一不是政治所決定，更何一不會產生政治效應？三通只是經濟嗎？難道不是政治？金融協議又只是經濟嗎？難道不具政治效應？
一年來，兩岸經貿法制化的快速發展，原即是雙方高度政治性的決定，而其必然衍生的政治效應亦當在雙方的估算之中。此種政治效應，或許使得台獨變成更不可能，卻亦顯示北京已知必須駛離武力統一的軌轍；兩岸關係於「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」之間，在「和平發展框架」上呈螺旋上升狀態演進。
這樣的策略，應當是在「台灣不能台獨／北京不能武力統一」的包夾中形成的思考。北京方面希望台獨意識能夠在台灣淡化，而馬政府方面則希望化兩岸敵對為雙贏共存。北京當然希望朝統一方向發展，卻知首應說服台灣的民意，亦即通過台灣民主機制的檢驗；馬政府則不主張台獨，但「不獨」亦「不統」。這是一個「包夾中的平衡」。在現狀下，北京不會傻到認為一個主張「統一」的台灣政府能夠維持得下去；馬政府也不會愚至認為主張「兩國論」是解決兩岸僵局的處方。
在這個「包夾中的平衡」中，台灣要做到的是，使北京認為台灣對中國不是一個敵對的存在；北京要做到的則是，使台灣人民相信改善兩岸關係有助於提升台灣的尊嚴與利益。台灣畢竟是一極有活力的民主體制，多數民意主張維持現狀，台灣的主政者因此不可能冒進搞台獨，而北京亦不可能令台灣政府淪為北京的「看守政府」而妄想其尚能維持。所以，北京不至於用粗暴的手段求統一，也不可能使台灣淪為在北京施捨性「採購」政策下的餵養物。因為，那不是台灣人民要的兩岸關係，也不是能使台灣人民產生好感的兩岸關係。最重要的，那不是台灣能夠生存發展之道；台灣若因北京所扭曲的兩岸關係而難以生存發展，北京感受的壓力亦將相對升高。
因而，我們相信，ＥＣＦＡ只是推遲，而未必是破局；倘若我們的推測有誤，也希望情勢能夠迴轉。畢竟，ＥＣＦＡ或ＣＥＣＡ，是胡六點的主張；且北京高層還屢屢聲明「名稱不重要」。兩岸當局雖皆聲稱ＥＣＦＡ是「經濟性」的，但正如前文所言，在本質上卻是一個政治性的決定，且亦將產生深刻的政治效應。那個效應是：兩岸將因ＥＣＦＡ而有一個更能互利雙贏的和平發展框架。
不必再將一年以來的兩岸新機遇及新思維套進陳腐的「統／獨」公式中。只要兩岸能維持一個好的經濟互動關係，那就絕對也就是一個好的政治關係，亦必會發生好的政治效應。比獨好，也比統好！
所以，「只談經濟／不談政治」的說法，是說不通的。
Peace Dividend, Capital Convergence
Peace Dividend, Capital Convergence
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2009
Huge Rise! Swift Rise! Wild Rise! Insane Rise! Reckless Rise! The Fourth Chiang/Chen Meeting reached four agreements and one consensus. Increasing stock market momentum then inspired the above headlines.
We have enjoyed an eight-day winning streak. This wave of stock market rises is a response to a changed reality. It also reflects the expectations of society. The phenomenon can be summed up as "peace dividend, capital convergence."
By "response to a changed reality," we mean that investors can see the practical results of the institutionalization of cross-Strait trade and economic interaction. By "expectations of society," we mean that the practical achievements may be less than perfect. But investor psychology has idealized its potential.
In fact, a huge gap remains between real word achievements and society's expectations, Investors refer to this wave of market rises as "market psychology." That means psychological factors have overridden actual market conditions. So the next question is, how can the energy behind this capital be directed into specific investments such as trade? Otherwise, if we remain stuck in speculation, the stock market will remain mere "market psychology." A stock market bubble can pop in the blink of an eye.
The atmosphere of a "peace dividend" has formed. But we talk about dividends, we should first establish what we mean by peace. Only then can we ensure that any dividend does not come to nothing. Peace should mean that cross-Strait relations will be conducted on the basis of the general welfare and rule by the people. It should eschew force and intrigue. This will avoid the dilemma of "who will gobble up whom." It should be a mutually beneficial "What's good for you is good for me, what's good for me is good for you" win/win scenario.
Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan said that for cross-Strait exchanges, rhythm is more important than tempo. Actually, for cross-Strait exchanges, melody is even more important than rhythm or tempo. As long as the melody is "peaceful development / win-win," and as long as we keep the public welfare and the rule of the people in mind, the rhythm and tempo will come naturally. Conversely, if we deviate from the theme of "peaceful development/ win-win," the rhythm and tempo are sure to lose synch, resulting in mere noise. In other words, without peace as the melody, any expectation of a dividend will be in vain.
The guiding theme of cross-Strait relations is the "peace dividend." At the operational level it is the "convergence of three forms of capital." The convergence of the three forms of capital creates a virtuous circle. The reality and imagined potential of mainland capital has restored the vitality and power of Taiwan capital. If Taiwan capital and mainland capital are invested in production, they will attract foreign capital. Three forms of capital will then converge. Two conditions are essential. First, the capital must not be "hot money." It must be invested in production, not merely be used to speculate. Second, foreign capital must pass certain benchmark tests. Inflows of foreign capital will prove that Taiwan's economy is showing genuine improvement. Of course this includes Taiwan's ability to successfully sign FTA with other countries.
Overall improvements and upgrades in cross-Strait relations and economic and trade exchanges should create a positive market trend. But some individuals are still opposed, still skeptical, still uneasy. That is because they lack confidence and harbor deep suspicions regarding cross-Strait "peaceful development / win-win." They worry, won't Taiwan will be gobbled up by the mainland? Won't Taiwan become feedstock for Beijing's "procurement policy?"
Such concerns are understandable. But there is no need for excessive pessimism. Beijing has chosen a cross-Strait policy of peaceful development over force. That means it must uphold the general welfare and the rule of the people. The framework for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations must maintain the dignity and defend the interests of the public on Taiwan. Beijing will of course express goodwill by allowing mainland tourists to come to Taiwan to spend money. It is unlikely to imagine that it can "buy" Taiwan by means of mainland capital. In fact Taiwan cannot be be supported by mainland capital alone. Therefore Beijing's policies must hew to the principle of "peaceful development / win-win." They must maintain the dignity of the public on Taiwan. The public on Taiwan must feel that a "peaceful development / win-win" cross-strait policy is trustworthy and worth pursuing.
When improving cross-Strait relations, peace is more important than money. Without genuine peace, any capital will be at political risk. Conversely, the establishment of a theme of "peaceful development / win-win" will surely honor peace, the rule of the people, and the public welfare. With peace as the melody, the rhythm and tempo will follow in due course.
和平紅利 三資匯流
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.12 03:28 am
大漲、急漲、暴漲、狂漲、飆漲。江陳會完成四大協議及一項共識，股市上漲的氣勢，令媒體的標題詞窮。
連漲八天，看回不回。這波股市漲勢，反應了現實的變化，也反映了社會心理的期待，可用八個字來形容，那就是：和平紅利，三資匯流。
所謂反應現實的變化，是指投資人看到了兩岸經貿互動法制化的具體成果；所謂反映社會心理的期待，則是指現實成就未必完足，但投資人的心理想像卻加以放大與美化。
其實，現實成就與社會心理期待之間，仍有極大的落差。市場人士將這波漲勢稱作「資金行情」，即是意謂心理因素高過真實的市場條件。今後的問題是：必須將這種「資金」的能量，落實在具體實際的投資生產等經貿成就上。否則，倘若只是停留在炒炒股票的「資金行情」，虛浮的股市表現，轉眼就能化為泡沫。
眼前確已出現「和平紅利」的氛圍。因而，首先要確立「和平」的內涵，「紅利」始不致落空。所謂「和平」，應是意味著兩岸關係的發展將以民生及民主為準則，而遠離武力及權謀。這將不再是「誰吃掉誰」的問題，而是一種「我為你好／你為我好」的追求，及互惠雙贏的信念。
陸委會主委賴幸媛曾說，兩岸交流，節奏比速度重要。其實，兩岸交流，旋律比節奏及速度都重要。若能維持「和平雙贏」的主旋律，以民生及民主為依歸，則自然會相應出現賞心悅耳的節奏及速度；反之，倘若偏離了「和平雙贏」的主旋律，即必將出現節奏失衡、速度失拍，以致荒腔走板的噪音。也就是說，「和平」的主旋律若走調，「紅利」亦必落空。
「和平紅利」是對兩岸大氛圍的主題定調，在運作層次則是「三資匯流」。對三資匯流，可有一個良性循環的憧憬，亦即：陸資已經發動的事實及將要發動的想像，可使台資恢復及增加活力與動力；台資及陸資若能落實在投資生產層次，又將吸引外資參與，於是三資匯流的景觀即可出現。其中有兩個關鍵：一、「資金」不能只是「熱錢」，必須引導落實在投資生產，而不可只是炒股炒樓。二、應以外資為測試成就的標尺，外資參與，始能顯示台灣經濟體質的真正改善；當然亦包括台灣能順利與他國簽訂ＦＴＡ。
兩岸總體關係的改善與經貿交流的提升，應是可以期待及祝福的大趨勢。但若有人仍然反對，仍然質疑，或仍然不放心；那是因為對於兩岸「和平雙贏」的主旋律沒有信心而深懷疑懼。例如：台灣會不會被大陸吃掉？台灣會不會成為北京「採購政策」下的被餵養物？
這樣的擔心是可以理解的，卻亦不必過度悲觀。北京既然決定在兩岸政策上以「和平」取代「武力」，即不能偏離民生與民主的準則；而應當全力維持一個能使台灣人民感到有尊嚴及有利益的「兩岸關係和平發展框架」。在這樣的政策原則下，就財經面而言，北京固然會以採購及陸客來台等表達善意，卻不至於妄想用陸資來「包養」台灣，而事實上台灣亦不是僅憑陸資所能養得起的。因而，北京的政策，應當是把持「和平雙贏」的最高原則，讓台灣能夠有尊嚴地自主發展；只要使台灣人民相信，此種「和平雙贏」的兩岸關係是值得信任及值得追求的即可。
兩岸關係的改善，「和平比資金重要」。倘若對「和平」沒有真正的信仰，「資金」反會成為政治風險。反之，若能建立「和平雙贏」的主旋律，而和平必然以民生及民主為依歸，則和平的主調既定，節奏及速度也都有了可資依憑的準據！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2009
Huge Rise! Swift Rise! Wild Rise! Insane Rise! Reckless Rise! The Fourth Chiang/Chen Meeting reached four agreements and one consensus. Increasing stock market momentum then inspired the above headlines.
We have enjoyed an eight-day winning streak. This wave of stock market rises is a response to a changed reality. It also reflects the expectations of society. The phenomenon can be summed up as "peace dividend, capital convergence."
By "response to a changed reality," we mean that investors can see the practical results of the institutionalization of cross-Strait trade and economic interaction. By "expectations of society," we mean that the practical achievements may be less than perfect. But investor psychology has idealized its potential.
In fact, a huge gap remains between real word achievements and society's expectations, Investors refer to this wave of market rises as "market psychology." That means psychological factors have overridden actual market conditions. So the next question is, how can the energy behind this capital be directed into specific investments such as trade? Otherwise, if we remain stuck in speculation, the stock market will remain mere "market psychology." A stock market bubble can pop in the blink of an eye.
The atmosphere of a "peace dividend" has formed. But we talk about dividends, we should first establish what we mean by peace. Only then can we ensure that any dividend does not come to nothing. Peace should mean that cross-Strait relations will be conducted on the basis of the general welfare and rule by the people. It should eschew force and intrigue. This will avoid the dilemma of "who will gobble up whom." It should be a mutually beneficial "What's good for you is good for me, what's good for me is good for you" win/win scenario.
Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan said that for cross-Strait exchanges, rhythm is more important than tempo. Actually, for cross-Strait exchanges, melody is even more important than rhythm or tempo. As long as the melody is "peaceful development / win-win," and as long as we keep the public welfare and the rule of the people in mind, the rhythm and tempo will come naturally. Conversely, if we deviate from the theme of "peaceful development/ win-win," the rhythm and tempo are sure to lose synch, resulting in mere noise. In other words, without peace as the melody, any expectation of a dividend will be in vain.
The guiding theme of cross-Strait relations is the "peace dividend." At the operational level it is the "convergence of three forms of capital." The convergence of the three forms of capital creates a virtuous circle. The reality and imagined potential of mainland capital has restored the vitality and power of Taiwan capital. If Taiwan capital and mainland capital are invested in production, they will attract foreign capital. Three forms of capital will then converge. Two conditions are essential. First, the capital must not be "hot money." It must be invested in production, not merely be used to speculate. Second, foreign capital must pass certain benchmark tests. Inflows of foreign capital will prove that Taiwan's economy is showing genuine improvement. Of course this includes Taiwan's ability to successfully sign FTA with other countries.
Overall improvements and upgrades in cross-Strait relations and economic and trade exchanges should create a positive market trend. But some individuals are still opposed, still skeptical, still uneasy. That is because they lack confidence and harbor deep suspicions regarding cross-Strait "peaceful development / win-win." They worry, won't Taiwan will be gobbled up by the mainland? Won't Taiwan become feedstock for Beijing's "procurement policy?"
Such concerns are understandable. But there is no need for excessive pessimism. Beijing has chosen a cross-Strait policy of peaceful development over force. That means it must uphold the general welfare and the rule of the people. The framework for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations must maintain the dignity and defend the interests of the public on Taiwan. Beijing will of course express goodwill by allowing mainland tourists to come to Taiwan to spend money. It is unlikely to imagine that it can "buy" Taiwan by means of mainland capital. In fact Taiwan cannot be be supported by mainland capital alone. Therefore Beijing's policies must hew to the principle of "peaceful development / win-win." They must maintain the dignity of the public on Taiwan. The public on Taiwan must feel that a "peaceful development / win-win" cross-strait policy is trustworthy and worth pursuing.
When improving cross-Strait relations, peace is more important than money. Without genuine peace, any capital will be at political risk. Conversely, the establishment of a theme of "peaceful development / win-win" will surely honor peace, the rule of the people, and the public welfare. With peace as the melody, the rhythm and tempo will follow in due course.
和平紅利 三資匯流
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.05.12 03:28 am
大漲、急漲、暴漲、狂漲、飆漲。江陳會完成四大協議及一項共識，股市上漲的氣勢，令媒體的標題詞窮。
連漲八天，看回不回。這波股市漲勢，反應了現實的變化，也反映了社會心理的期待，可用八個字來形容，那就是：和平紅利，三資匯流。
所謂反應現實的變化，是指投資人看到了兩岸經貿互動法制化的具體成果；所謂反映社會心理的期待，則是指現實成就未必完足，但投資人的心理想像卻加以放大與美化。
其實，現實成就與社會心理期待之間，仍有極大的落差。市場人士將這波漲勢稱作「資金行情」，即是意謂心理因素高過真實的市場條件。今後的問題是：必須將這種「資金」的能量，落實在具體實際的投資生產等經貿成就上。否則，倘若只是停留在炒炒股票的「資金行情」，虛浮的股市表現，轉眼就能化為泡沫。
眼前確已出現「和平紅利」的氛圍。因而，首先要確立「和平」的內涵，「紅利」始不致落空。所謂「和平」，應是意味著兩岸關係的發展將以民生及民主為準則，而遠離武力及權謀。這將不再是「誰吃掉誰」的問題，而是一種「我為你好／你為我好」的追求，及互惠雙贏的信念。
陸委會主委賴幸媛曾說，兩岸交流，節奏比速度重要。其實，兩岸交流，旋律比節奏及速度都重要。若能維持「和平雙贏」的主旋律，以民生及民主為依歸，則自然會相應出現賞心悅耳的節奏及速度；反之，倘若偏離了「和平雙贏」的主旋律，即必將出現節奏失衡、速度失拍，以致荒腔走板的噪音。也就是說，「和平」的主旋律若走調，「紅利」亦必落空。
「和平紅利」是對兩岸大氛圍的主題定調，在運作層次則是「三資匯流」。對三資匯流，可有一個良性循環的憧憬，亦即：陸資已經發動的事實及將要發動的想像，可使台資恢復及增加活力與動力；台資及陸資若能落實在投資生產層次，又將吸引外資參與，於是三資匯流的景觀即可出現。其中有兩個關鍵：一、「資金」不能只是「熱錢」，必須引導落實在投資生產，而不可只是炒股炒樓。二、應以外資為測試成就的標尺，外資參與，始能顯示台灣經濟體質的真正改善；當然亦包括台灣能順利與他國簽訂ＦＴＡ。
兩岸總體關係的改善與經貿交流的提升，應是可以期待及祝福的大趨勢。但若有人仍然反對，仍然質疑，或仍然不放心；那是因為對於兩岸「和平雙贏」的主旋律沒有信心而深懷疑懼。例如：台灣會不會被大陸吃掉？台灣會不會成為北京「採購政策」下的被餵養物？
這樣的擔心是可以理解的，卻亦不必過度悲觀。北京既然決定在兩岸政策上以「和平」取代「武力」，即不能偏離民生與民主的準則；而應當全力維持一個能使台灣人民感到有尊嚴及有利益的「兩岸關係和平發展框架」。在這樣的政策原則下，就財經面而言，北京固然會以採購及陸客來台等表達善意，卻不至於妄想用陸資來「包養」台灣，而事實上台灣亦不是僅憑陸資所能養得起的。因而，北京的政策，應當是把持「和平雙贏」的最高原則，讓台灣能夠有尊嚴地自主發展；只要使台灣人民相信，此種「和平雙贏」的兩岸關係是值得信任及值得追求的即可。
兩岸關係的改善，「和平比資金重要」。倘若對「和平」沒有真正的信仰，「資金」反會成為政治風險。反之，若能建立「和平雙贏」的主旋律，而和平必然以民生及民主為依歸，則和平的主調既定，節奏及速度也都有了可資依憑的準據！
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)