A New Definition of National Defense: Peace and Democracy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 8, 2009
Recently, two military developments have made the news. These have underscored changes in the national defense posture. The first is that no live firing exercises have been held at the Fangshan Artillery Base for the past two years. The other is that the "Han Kuang Military Maneuveurs" will allegedly be renamed the "Cheng Chun Military Maneuveurs," and will be response to natural disasters or terrorism.
The first impression such news leaves one is that national defense has become more relaxed in attitude and less aggressive in substance. The live fire Fangshan Military Maneuveurs have allegedly been discontinued due to opposition from fishermen. The military estimates that the cessation of the Fangshan Military Maneuveurs has affected 15 air defense combat exercises. How serious is this? Is this the full exent of its impact? No solutions have been found for the past two years. Does the changed purpose of the military maneuveurs represent an overly optimistic assessment of the cross-Strait situation? Should this be a cause for concern?
Over the past sixty years, the national defense posture has undergone major changes. Why we are fighting and for whom we are fighting has changed with internal and external developments. The era of "Retaking the Mainland" and "Destroying the Communist Bandits," is over. The subsequent strategy of "seven tenths politics and three tenths military affairs," and the "Reunify China via the Three People's Principles" national defense posture remains unchanged. But cross-Strait hostility since the lifting of martial law has diminished. We no longer speak of a "Communist Rebellion." But on the other hand, cross-Strait hostility fluctuates. It is sometimes relaxed and sometimes tense. Because we failed to establish a new national defense posture, the Chen Shui-bian administration's "New Centrist Path" failed. The "Rectification of Names and the Authoring of a New Constitution" political project was revived. This left the armed forces of the Republic of China at the mercy of advocates of formal Taiwan independence, wondering what are we fighting for, and whom we are fighting for? This was a contradictory, dangerous, and confusing situation.
This confusion over the national defense posture has manifested itself in another form under the Ma administration. Over the past year the two sides have engaged in across the board exchanges. Direct flights have been established. Mainland tourists have visited Taiwan. No upper limit Mainland investments on Taiwan have made the daily headlines. Taipei has proposed a policy of "win/win" and "live and let live." Beijing has stressed its "framework for peaceful development." This situation has had a different impact on the national defense posture. Namely, how many troops do we need? Do we need additional arms purchases? What kind of military procurements do we need? We must engage in a completely different way of thinking. In particular, we have yet to resolve the national defense riddle of whom are we fighting for and what are we fighting for. This national defense dilemma, has remained unresolved since the lifting of martial law 21 years ago, and has manifested itself in different ways.
The affairs of the Republic of China Minister of Defense are virtually cross-Strait affairs. The Republic of China's national defense posture is undergoing fundamental change. Military confrontation has become democratic political and economic exchange. Cross-Strait issues are dealt with using democratic and economic, rather than military means. This national defense posture is consistent with the larger interests of the public on Taiwan. It reflects public expecations regarding democracy. Moreover, it goes hand in hand with the "framework for peaceful development" advocated by Beijing. In fact, today's relaxed cross-Strait situation is a kind of national defense achievement. Military factors have been downplayed. Economic and democratic factors have been emphasized. This will be our national defense posture for the forseeable future.
Nevertheless, the Republic of China needs to maintain a certain level of military defense. This is a symbol of its sovereignty and an expression of its democracy. It is also an essential bargaining chip in cross-Strait and international negotiations. The quantity and quality of military armanents may not be that difficult to determine. But what we are we fighting and whom we are fighting for remain questions that are difficult to answer but which must be answered.
Two new factors have emerged in national defense planning. First, cross-Strait trade, close cultural exchanges, and an atmosphere of reconciliation have diminished antipathy toward the CCP and the perception of the CCP as Communist rebels. That is why we no longer speak of the "Communist Rebellion." Secondly, the conscript military is now volunteer military. Troops no longer join the military out of national duty. They join the military in the capacity of government employees. These two new factors have had a major impact on the question of what we are fighting for and whom we are fighting for.
The military can be downsized. But national defense awareness must not be diminished. The cross-Strait situation has evolved. The national defense posture must be revised. The Republic of China's military defense is no longer for the purpose of "Counterattacking the Mainland and Eradicating the Bandits." Instead, it has a more fundamental and more important function. It must act as the guarantor of cross-Strait peace and the defender of democracy.
We may have a smaller military in the future. But this ought to be a "small is beautiful" military. If it is able to fulfill its self-proclaimed role as the guarantor of cross-Strait peace and defender of democracy, its officers and troops will feel a sense of honor, a sense of responsibility, a sense of direction, and a sense of idealism.
We must struggle on behalf of cross-Strait peace. But just in case, we must know what we are fighting for, and whom we are fighting for.
國防新義：和平後盾‧民主衛士
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.08 03:21 am
最近有兩則軍事消息，令人感覺國防情態的變化。一是枋山防砲基地已有兩年未見實彈射擊訓練；一是漢光兵推據稱將改為「政軍兵推」，以天災或反恐為主題。
這類消息給人的第一個印象是：在精神上及實務上，國防的經營有否趨於鬆弛或不積極的跡象？枋山實彈射擊據謂是因漁民反對而停擺，而軍方自估已影響了十五的防空戰力（這還不嚴重嗎？僅是如此嗎？），但兩年來卻未拿出解決辦法。至於一年一度的兵推主題改變，是否顯示當局對兩岸情勢的評價懷有一廂情願的樂觀，也令人關切。
六十年來，國防情勢經歷重大變化；為何而戰與為誰而戰的國防主題，亦隨內外情勢而變遷。最早年的「反攻大陸」、「消滅共匪」，已成過去；後來的「七分政治／三分軍事」及「三民主義統一中國」，雖是國防觀念的丕變，但仍是以兩岸敵對為架構；至解嚴後，一方面終止「動員戡亂」，但另一方面兩岸敵對情勢卻時弛時張，因而未能建立一個新的國防主題；再至扁政府主政，「新中間路線」失敗，正名制憲的政治操作大興，更使中華民國的軍隊掌握在主張「法理台獨」的主政者手中，究竟將為誰而戰、為何而戰？可謂矛盾已極、凶險已極、困惑已極。
這樣的「國防主題困惑」，至馬政府主政，似乎又以另一種面貌呈現。兩岸在這一年來儼然出現全面和解交流的局面，直航、陸客來台，「上不封頂」的大陸「熱單」日日皆成頭條新聞；我方主張「雙贏共生」，對岸標榜「和平發展框架」。這樣的情勢，對國防主題自是另一種情勢的衝擊；要維持多少武裝部隊？要不要軍購？軍購何種項目？在在進入全然不同的思維頻道之中。尤其，解嚴二十一年來，迄未解決的「為何而戰、為誰而戰」的「國防主題困惑」，更以另一種面貌呈現。
台灣的國防政務，其實幾乎就等於兩岸政務。中華民國的國防情態，正在發生並已經發生根本性的變化。「國防」的基本架構，已經由軍事對立，轉移至民主政治及經濟交流；亦即以民主及經濟的基調來處理兩岸問題，而避免訴諸軍事。此一「國防」路線，符合台灣的總體利益，反映了台灣的民主期待，何況也與北京當局所主張並維繫的「和平發展框架」並行不悖。今日兩岸情勢的和緩，其實正是一種「國防」成就。而軍事元素降低，經濟及民主的因素上升，亦是未來「國防」的必趨必至之勢。
雖然如此，中華民國仍須維持一定數量及實質的「軍事國防」。這是「主權」的象徵，也是民主主體性的表彰；當然也是在兩岸及國際折衝中不能不備的籌碼。然而，軍事武備的數量規模與質量規格應如何規劃，這或許並非難事；但「為何而戰／為誰而戰」的「國防主題困惑」，仍是不易解決而必須解決的難題。
現今的國防規劃已出現兩個新元素。一、兩岸因經貿、文化交流頻密，和解的氛圍日升，「動員戡亂」的「仇匪恨匪意識」行將愈趨消減，這也是終止「動員戡亂」的必然變化；二、徵兵制改募兵制，兵員由「國民義務」變成「僱傭關係」。這兩個新元素，皆將對「為何而戰／為誰而戰」的「國防主題困惑」發生重大衝擊。
國防的軍備可以縮編，但國防的意識不能迷亂。兩岸情勢演化至今，「國防的主題」亦須有新的創設。中華民國的軍事國防，已不再是為「反攻大陸／消滅共匪」；然而，我們認為，卻有一更基本及更重大的責任，那就是：為兩岸和平作後盾，為民主政治作衛士。
今後，或許我們將有一支編製較小的軍隊；但這應是一支「小而美」的軍隊。倘若能以「和平後盾／民主衛士」自期自命，將士們的榮譽感、責任心就有了寄託，方向感與理想性也有了基礎。
我們應以兩岸和平不開戰為努力目標；但在萬一之際，我們亦當知為何而戰、為誰而戰。
Monday, June 8, 2009
Saturday, June 6, 2009
Human Rights and Clean Government
Human Rights and Clean Government
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 6, 2009
As expected, President Ma expressed his thoughts on the June 4th Tiananmen Incident yesterday. Perhaps he hoped to maintain the posture appropriate for a President. Perhaps he hoped to preserve the friendly atmosphere between Beijing and Taipei. The tone of his statement was considerably more moderate than in years past. Nevertheless, President Ma was at least consistent. Interestingly enough the Democratic Progressive Party, which has always been conspicuously silent about June 4th in the past, suddenly took an interest in June 4th. They did not offer their own thoughts on June 4th. Instead they denounced President Ma's statement as "ugly evidence of [Ma's] betrayal of the victims." Clearly this harsh rhetoric was not a commemoration of June 4, but merely the same old partisan confrontation.
The Democratic Progressive Party has long advocated the protection of human rights. It did so before the Chen Shui-bian administration. It did so during the Chen Shui-bian administration. It continues to do so after the Chen Shui-bian administration. Perhaps based on the DPP's long held position on human rights, it felt Ma Ying-jeou should have blasted Bejing on the twentieth anniversary of June 4th. But if the Democratic Progressive Party really feels this way, won't it force people to question its sincerity about protecting human rights? Isn't this an unconvincing political strategy?
Human rights was once the Democratic Progressive Party's sole demand. As well as advocating human rights, the Democratic Progressive Party also advocated clean government. But ever since Chen Shui-bian came to power and became mired in corruption scandals, the Democratic Progressive Party has shrunk from demanding clean government. It has become virtually silent on the matter. It offers ritual lip service to clean government. But its declarations ring hollow. In response to Chen Shui-bian's corruption, the Democratic Progressive Party chose to forsake its demands for clean government. It refuses to use clean government benchmarks to evaluate Chen Shui-bian and his family. Instead it uses human rights to accuse the ruling administration of political interference with the justice system. It hopes to cover up the fact that it has forsaken its demands for clean government. But its actions cannot hide its fundamental betrayal of its political and moral principles. On the contrary, they merely leave its audience skeptical of its appeals to human rights. When people learn that the DPP's advocacy of human rights has become a fig leaf to cover up DPP corruption, they realize that for the DPP, advocacy of human rights has become a political tool. It is no longer a noble ideal. The DPP's refusal to apply standards for clean government to Chen Shui-bian, merely undermines the credibility of its advocacy of human rights. The DPP has made advocacy of human rights the servant of partisan political strategy. Listeners are going to find it hard not to be skeptical.
The Democratic Progressive Party accuses President Ma Ying-jeou of no longer demanding the rehabilitation of the victims of June 4th. If this proves that Ma Ying-jeou's past advocacy of human rights was mere hypocrisy, then it also proves that the DPP's advocacy of clean government and human rights is mere hypocrisy. If the DPP's motive for criticizing Ma Ying-jeou on human rights is merely to narrow the political and moral gap between Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian, then it merely proves that the DPP's human rights demands are insincere.
On the twentieth anniversary of June 4th, the DPP still refuses to apply its own standards for clean government to Chen Shui-bian. As a result, it has lost its right to use human rights to criticize its political opponents, whether Ma Ying-jeou or Beijing. This is a tragic development for human rights on Taiwan.
As the duly elected President of the Republic of China, Ma Ying-jeou should continue stressing that he was elected on the basis of his advocacy of human rights. Advocacy of human rights should be a political goal, not a political tool. The advocacy of human rights and the promotion of cross-Strait reconciliation are not either/or choices. They are both/and choices. The promotion of cross-Strait reconciliation is the advocacy of human rights. Human rights are universal values. They must transcend any demands arising from purely regional or nativist interests. Beijing must resolve the doubts of the public on Taiwan. It must deepen cross-Strait trust. The public on Taiwan cannot ignore the way the Tiananmen Square incident was handled. It wants to know that Beijing has the willingness to admit its errors and the determination to change its ways. The public on Taiwan has undergone two changes in ruling parties. This has enabled the ruling party to tolerate and respect opposition party criticism. The June 4th Tiananment Incident was a crackdown on dissent. Cross-Strait economic relations must be improved. But unless Beijing can confront and examine the rights and wrongs of June 4th, the two sides will have a hard time bridging the psychological divide.
On the eve of his inaugural anniversary, President Ma Ying-jeou signed two UN Conventions. The point of the signing was not to join the United Nations. The point of the signing was to to introduce international human rights norms and the rule of law into our system. It was to accelerate the implementation of international human rights standards on Taiwan. This gesture means Taipei has caught up with Beijing in signing economic and social conventions. It means Taipei is ahead of Beijing in signing the Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on Human Rights. The race to sign human rights conventions has transformed the cross-Strait struggle over sovereignty into a contest over human rights. This development should be regarded as a positive development for cross-Strait relations.
The public on Taiwan cares that President Ma Ying-jeou made the proper expressions of concern on the twentieth anniversary of June 4th, and called for healthy competition between the two sides on human rights protection as the long-term basis for cross-Strait relations.
At the same time, we hope the Democratic Progressive Party will talk not only about human rights, but have the courage and integrity to talk about clean government in the same breath. The sooner it finds its moral conscience, the sooner it can begin anew.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.06
社論－人權與清廉都該是朝野信守的價值
本報訊
一如預期，馬總統在日前發表了六四感言，或許是為了維持總統身分的高度，也或許是為了維持兩岸當下的友善氛圍，這篇感言的語氣較之往年溫和許多，無論如何，馬總統終究維持了他的一貫性，但耐人尋味的是，往年在論述六四上一貫缺席的民進黨，今年卻突然關心起六四來了，他們並未提自己對六四的論述，卻將馬總統的六四感言批為「出賣受害者的醜陋文件」，這種在修辭上鮮明的對比，所映照出的不是紀念六四，依舊是朝野對立。
民進黨一向主張保障人權，陳水扁主政之前如此，陳水扁主政時如此，陳水扁下台後似乎仍然如此。依照民進黨一貫的人權立場，或許認為馬英九該在六四廿周年強烈表態批判北京的立場。然而，民進黨果真如此主張，會不會讓人質疑其主張並非真誠的保障人權，而只是說服力不足的政治策略呢？
人權，本來不是民進黨唯一主張；在主張人權同時，民進黨一向也主張清廉。但自從陳水扁於主政後期貪腐醜聞纏身後，民進黨清廉主張退縮了，甚至消失了，偶而唱起清廉當作裝飾音，也是荒腔走板，虛弱無力。民進黨在陳水扁議題上，選擇放棄清廉的政治堅持，不肯使用清廉做為評價陳水扁及其政治家族的標竿，而只是一味借用人權做為批判台灣政治干涉司法的旗幟，遮蓋其清廉訴求的蒼白無力，不但不能掩飾其政治道德原則的根本失落，反而使得其人權主張也難以凝聚聽眾。當人們發現人權主張竟可成為清廉缺位的遮羞布時，遂知人權政策已成民進黨的政治工具，不再是高尚的理想目的。民進黨吝於使用清廉批判阿扁，其實削弱了人權主張的信用。只是為政黨策略服務的人權論述，很難不使人於傾聽之際帶有問號。
如果民進黨指出馬英九當了總統就不再要求平反六四，足以證明馬英九過去的人權立場只是虛矯作態，這種指責恰也說中了為什麼民進黨的清廉主張甚至人權主張顯得虛矯的要害。用人權批判馬英九，如果只是為了拉近馬英九與陳水扁在政治道德評價上的距離，正也同時證明了民進黨的人權政策主張不是出自真心。
因此，至今不肯標舉清廉主張評價陳水扁所作所為的民進黨，到了六四廿周年，也就失去了標舉人權來批判其政治對手（不管是馬英九還是北京）的道德位置。這其實是台灣人權發展道路上的悲哀。
做為台灣人民選出的總統，馬英九當然應繼續堅持他選上總統所憑藉的人權主張。保障人權該是政治目的，不能是策略工具。保障人權與促進兩岸關係不是二者擇一而是可以兼籌並顧的選項；既要發展兩岸關係，也要提倡人權保障。人權做為普世價值，甚至應超越任何單純地域觀念產生的本土利益訴求。北京須瞭解，要爭取台灣人民化解心中對於北京疑慮，改善兩岸的信賴關係，當年天安門事件的處理方式，以及北京對此有無幡然改悟的政治決心，台灣人民不會不以為意。台灣累積的政權輪替經驗，使得在野者批判意見極受容忍與尊重，六四是處置鎮壓異見的事件，兩岸改善經濟關係之後，若不能正視並檢討其間是非經過，兩岸之間也仍將有極難跨越的心理鴻溝存在。
馬英九總統在就職周年前夕，簽署了兩項聯合國人公約，這次他的重點不是在於是否藉此加入聯合國，而是要將國際人權規範體系引進內國法制，加速台灣人權保障的實踐能與國際人權標準接軌。此一舉動，不僅使得台灣簽署經濟社會公約迎頭趕上對岸，也使得台灣在公民政治權利公約上的進度超前。人權公約的競賽，乃已使兩岸從主權的鬥爭，轉向人權實踐決心的比較。此項發展，應該視為兩岸關係之中一種良性互動的軌跡。
台灣人民會在乎馬英九總統在六四廿周年表達應該表達的立場，呼籲北京在兩岸之間正式展開良性的人權競賽，作為長期發展兩岸關係的基礎。於此同時，我們也期待民進黨能夠走出只敢談人權不敢談清廉的心虛困境，早日振作政黨的道德體魄，重新出發。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 6, 2009
As expected, President Ma expressed his thoughts on the June 4th Tiananmen Incident yesterday. Perhaps he hoped to maintain the posture appropriate for a President. Perhaps he hoped to preserve the friendly atmosphere between Beijing and Taipei. The tone of his statement was considerably more moderate than in years past. Nevertheless, President Ma was at least consistent. Interestingly enough the Democratic Progressive Party, which has always been conspicuously silent about June 4th in the past, suddenly took an interest in June 4th. They did not offer their own thoughts on June 4th. Instead they denounced President Ma's statement as "ugly evidence of [Ma's] betrayal of the victims." Clearly this harsh rhetoric was not a commemoration of June 4, but merely the same old partisan confrontation.
The Democratic Progressive Party has long advocated the protection of human rights. It did so before the Chen Shui-bian administration. It did so during the Chen Shui-bian administration. It continues to do so after the Chen Shui-bian administration. Perhaps based on the DPP's long held position on human rights, it felt Ma Ying-jeou should have blasted Bejing on the twentieth anniversary of June 4th. But if the Democratic Progressive Party really feels this way, won't it force people to question its sincerity about protecting human rights? Isn't this an unconvincing political strategy?
Human rights was once the Democratic Progressive Party's sole demand. As well as advocating human rights, the Democratic Progressive Party also advocated clean government. But ever since Chen Shui-bian came to power and became mired in corruption scandals, the Democratic Progressive Party has shrunk from demanding clean government. It has become virtually silent on the matter. It offers ritual lip service to clean government. But its declarations ring hollow. In response to Chen Shui-bian's corruption, the Democratic Progressive Party chose to forsake its demands for clean government. It refuses to use clean government benchmarks to evaluate Chen Shui-bian and his family. Instead it uses human rights to accuse the ruling administration of political interference with the justice system. It hopes to cover up the fact that it has forsaken its demands for clean government. But its actions cannot hide its fundamental betrayal of its political and moral principles. On the contrary, they merely leave its audience skeptical of its appeals to human rights. When people learn that the DPP's advocacy of human rights has become a fig leaf to cover up DPP corruption, they realize that for the DPP, advocacy of human rights has become a political tool. It is no longer a noble ideal. The DPP's refusal to apply standards for clean government to Chen Shui-bian, merely undermines the credibility of its advocacy of human rights. The DPP has made advocacy of human rights the servant of partisan political strategy. Listeners are going to find it hard not to be skeptical.
The Democratic Progressive Party accuses President Ma Ying-jeou of no longer demanding the rehabilitation of the victims of June 4th. If this proves that Ma Ying-jeou's past advocacy of human rights was mere hypocrisy, then it also proves that the DPP's advocacy of clean government and human rights is mere hypocrisy. If the DPP's motive for criticizing Ma Ying-jeou on human rights is merely to narrow the political and moral gap between Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian, then it merely proves that the DPP's human rights demands are insincere.
On the twentieth anniversary of June 4th, the DPP still refuses to apply its own standards for clean government to Chen Shui-bian. As a result, it has lost its right to use human rights to criticize its political opponents, whether Ma Ying-jeou or Beijing. This is a tragic development for human rights on Taiwan.
As the duly elected President of the Republic of China, Ma Ying-jeou should continue stressing that he was elected on the basis of his advocacy of human rights. Advocacy of human rights should be a political goal, not a political tool. The advocacy of human rights and the promotion of cross-Strait reconciliation are not either/or choices. They are both/and choices. The promotion of cross-Strait reconciliation is the advocacy of human rights. Human rights are universal values. They must transcend any demands arising from purely regional or nativist interests. Beijing must resolve the doubts of the public on Taiwan. It must deepen cross-Strait trust. The public on Taiwan cannot ignore the way the Tiananmen Square incident was handled. It wants to know that Beijing has the willingness to admit its errors and the determination to change its ways. The public on Taiwan has undergone two changes in ruling parties. This has enabled the ruling party to tolerate and respect opposition party criticism. The June 4th Tiananment Incident was a crackdown on dissent. Cross-Strait economic relations must be improved. But unless Beijing can confront and examine the rights and wrongs of June 4th, the two sides will have a hard time bridging the psychological divide.
On the eve of his inaugural anniversary, President Ma Ying-jeou signed two UN Conventions. The point of the signing was not to join the United Nations. The point of the signing was to to introduce international human rights norms and the rule of law into our system. It was to accelerate the implementation of international human rights standards on Taiwan. This gesture means Taipei has caught up with Beijing in signing economic and social conventions. It means Taipei is ahead of Beijing in signing the Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on Human Rights. The race to sign human rights conventions has transformed the cross-Strait struggle over sovereignty into a contest over human rights. This development should be regarded as a positive development for cross-Strait relations.
The public on Taiwan cares that President Ma Ying-jeou made the proper expressions of concern on the twentieth anniversary of June 4th, and called for healthy competition between the two sides on human rights protection as the long-term basis for cross-Strait relations.
At the same time, we hope the Democratic Progressive Party will talk not only about human rights, but have the courage and integrity to talk about clean government in the same breath. The sooner it finds its moral conscience, the sooner it can begin anew.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.06
社論－人權與清廉都該是朝野信守的價值
本報訊
一如預期，馬總統在日前發表了六四感言，或許是為了維持總統身分的高度，也或許是為了維持兩岸當下的友善氛圍，這篇感言的語氣較之往年溫和許多，無論如何，馬總統終究維持了他的一貫性，但耐人尋味的是，往年在論述六四上一貫缺席的民進黨，今年卻突然關心起六四來了，他們並未提自己對六四的論述，卻將馬總統的六四感言批為「出賣受害者的醜陋文件」，這種在修辭上鮮明的對比，所映照出的不是紀念六四，依舊是朝野對立。
民進黨一向主張保障人權，陳水扁主政之前如此，陳水扁主政時如此，陳水扁下台後似乎仍然如此。依照民進黨一貫的人權立場，或許認為馬英九該在六四廿周年強烈表態批判北京的立場。然而，民進黨果真如此主張，會不會讓人質疑其主張並非真誠的保障人權，而只是說服力不足的政治策略呢？
人權，本來不是民進黨唯一主張；在主張人權同時，民進黨一向也主張清廉。但自從陳水扁於主政後期貪腐醜聞纏身後，民進黨清廉主張退縮了，甚至消失了，偶而唱起清廉當作裝飾音，也是荒腔走板，虛弱無力。民進黨在陳水扁議題上，選擇放棄清廉的政治堅持，不肯使用清廉做為評價陳水扁及其政治家族的標竿，而只是一味借用人權做為批判台灣政治干涉司法的旗幟，遮蓋其清廉訴求的蒼白無力，不但不能掩飾其政治道德原則的根本失落，反而使得其人權主張也難以凝聚聽眾。當人們發現人權主張竟可成為清廉缺位的遮羞布時，遂知人權政策已成民進黨的政治工具，不再是高尚的理想目的。民進黨吝於使用清廉批判阿扁，其實削弱了人權主張的信用。只是為政黨策略服務的人權論述，很難不使人於傾聽之際帶有問號。
如果民進黨指出馬英九當了總統就不再要求平反六四，足以證明馬英九過去的人權立場只是虛矯作態，這種指責恰也說中了為什麼民進黨的清廉主張甚至人權主張顯得虛矯的要害。用人權批判馬英九，如果只是為了拉近馬英九與陳水扁在政治道德評價上的距離，正也同時證明了民進黨的人權政策主張不是出自真心。
因此，至今不肯標舉清廉主張評價陳水扁所作所為的民進黨，到了六四廿周年，也就失去了標舉人權來批判其政治對手（不管是馬英九還是北京）的道德位置。這其實是台灣人權發展道路上的悲哀。
做為台灣人民選出的總統，馬英九當然應繼續堅持他選上總統所憑藉的人權主張。保障人權該是政治目的，不能是策略工具。保障人權與促進兩岸關係不是二者擇一而是可以兼籌並顧的選項；既要發展兩岸關係，也要提倡人權保障。人權做為普世價值，甚至應超越任何單純地域觀念產生的本土利益訴求。北京須瞭解，要爭取台灣人民化解心中對於北京疑慮，改善兩岸的信賴關係，當年天安門事件的處理方式，以及北京對此有無幡然改悟的政治決心，台灣人民不會不以為意。台灣累積的政權輪替經驗，使得在野者批判意見極受容忍與尊重，六四是處置鎮壓異見的事件，兩岸改善經濟關係之後，若不能正視並檢討其間是非經過，兩岸之間也仍將有極難跨越的心理鴻溝存在。
馬英九總統在就職周年前夕，簽署了兩項聯合國人公約，這次他的重點不是在於是否藉此加入聯合國，而是要將國際人權規範體系引進內國法制，加速台灣人權保障的實踐能與國際人權標準接軌。此一舉動，不僅使得台灣簽署經濟社會公約迎頭趕上對岸，也使得台灣在公民政治權利公約上的進度超前。人權公約的競賽，乃已使兩岸從主權的鬥爭，轉向人權實踐決心的比較。此項發展，應該視為兩岸關係之中一種良性互動的軌跡。
台灣人民會在乎馬英九總統在六四廿周年表達應該表達的立場，呼籲北京在兩岸之間正式展開良性的人權競賽，作為長期發展兩岸關係的基礎。於此同時，我們也期待民進黨能夠走出只敢談人權不敢談清廉的心虛困境，早日振作政黨的道德體魄，重新出發。
Friday, June 5, 2009
From Flexible Diplomacy to Normal Diplomacy
From Flexible Diplomacy to Normal Diplomacy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 5, 2009
President Ma Ying-jeou has concluded his state visit to Central America and returned home. His "Voyage for Harmony" consolidated the support of ROC allies. It also demonstrated, through concrete action, Ma's new diplomatic thinking and practices.
President Ma, his wife Christine Chow, and over 100 members of his delegation visited Belize, El Salvador, and Guatemala. On the way there they transited Los Angeles. On the way back they transited Seattle. This is the second state visit President Ma has embarked upon since taking office. It is also the first time the First Lady Christine Chow took part in a state visit.
Compared to last time, this visit was much livelier. A number of surprises arose. Belize experienced a power failure. President Ma's armed bodyguard was detained by Guatemalan security services. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega postponed his meeting with President Ma three times, and the ROC decided to cancel the meeting altogether. When Ma greeted U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, he introduced himself as "Taiwan's president." This also provoked domestic political debate.
In fact the incident over Ma's bodyguard was minor. Once it was over, it was over. It was merely the result of a miscommunication between the security services of both nations, and a mishandling of the situtation by Guatemalan officials. It will not affect relations between the two nations. President Ma introduced himself as "Taiwan's president." This is also very common. After all, the international community more is familiar with the name Taiwan. It is not necessary to read too much into this.
President Ma Ying-jeou took office a year ago. During this visit his "huo lu wai jiao," i.e., "Viable Diplomacy," or "Flexible Diplomacy," clearly distinguished itself from the diplomacy of the past. Past "Scorched Earth Diplomacy" called for the playing of zero-sum games and the fighting of battles that cannot be won. It was a strategy of reckless provocation. Taipei butted its head against a brick wall until it was left broken and bleeding. Its plight within the international community worsened. President Ma's foreign policy reversed this manner of thinking and operating. It moved toward cross-Strait reconciliation. It allowed the two sides to renounce their life or death zero-sum game. It allowed Taipei to stop squandering resources fighting over allies with Beijing. It allowed Taipei to stop writing huge checks to buy allies.
While In Belize, President Ma explained his five major foreign aid goals. These include eliminating extreme poverty and hunger, strengthening human resources development, fighting infectious diseases, promoting environmentally sustainable development, and strengthening global partnerships. Foreign aid programs require money. Only money that must be spent will be spent. Diplomacy will be forthright. Its "goals must be legitimate, its procedures must be lawful, its implementation must be effective." Only this will win others' respect.
Such a change has come at just the right time. Our past policy of checkbook diplomacy often reduced us to victims of blackmail. Large contributions often lined the pockets of local politicians. They failed to achieve their goal as foreign aid. In the spate of ensuing corruption scandals, they tainted Taipei's image. The result was a loss of both wealth and honor.
Beijing knew Taipei would be forced to compromise in order to retain its allies. Beijing and Taipei would often both offer money and deliver ultimatums. Taipei would spend freely. Oversight of these aid packages would be difficult. One could never determined where the aid would wind up. We never knew who had embezzled the funds and never dared to demand an accounting.
Vast sums were paid out to retain diplomatic allies. But all we received in return was a loss of national dignity, damage to our international image, and the loss of hard-earned taxpayer dollars. The result was clearly harmful to our overall national interests. We had to make a fresh start. But in the past Beijing stood in Taipei's way. We were forced to continue playing this meaningless game.
The main reason President Ma can now say no to such unreasonable demands, is the easing of cross-Strait relations. The two sides have now reached a tacit understanding not to steal each others' allies. Beijing has given the cold shoulder to several nations which have habitually threatened to break relations with Taipei and establish relations with Beijing. Beijing has also turned down El Salvador's invitation to send representatives to its presdential inauguration. When President of El Salvador Mauricio Funes expressed the desire to develop economic and trade relations with mainland China, Ma Ying-jeou made clear he has "no objections," and that Taipei and Beijing have such relations too. Clearly the two sides have jettisoned their previous zero-sum competition in the international arena. Other countries must understand this and adapt to it.
Such a change, has allowed both sides to forsake checkbook diplomacy. It has allowed the relationship between Taipei and its allies to finally return to normal, The two sides must seek substantive consensus, and demonstrate mutual respect. Beijing must also understand that a diplomatic truce is not a favor to Taiwan, but rather a fresh start for cross-Strait relations.
The spotlight was on Christine Chow. During her first state visit she made a concerted effort to fulfill her assigned role. She threw herself into her interactions with the local population. Chow, who has long maintained a low profile and has never attempted to curry favor with the media, demonstrated an authentic and natural style of her own. This is something rare in the political arena, and something the people deeply appreciate.
In conclusion, President Ma's "Voyage of Harmony" could be termed a ringing success. We hope he will continue implementing his new foreign policy, and correcting outdated foreign aid practices. We hope the two sides can deepen cross-Strait reconciliation. We hope both sides will demonstrate mutual respect, and contemplate the future with vision and courage.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.05
社論－從活路外交到正常外交
本報訊
馬英九總統一行結束中美洲的訪問行程返抵國門，這次的「久睦之旅」不僅鞏固了友邦的邦誼，更以具體行動展現出全新的外交思維與作為。
馬總統偕夫人周美青與一百多位訪問團成員，此行先後走訪貝里斯、薩爾瓦多與瓜地馬拉，去程過境美國洛杉磯，回程過境西雅圖。這是馬總統就任後第二次出訪，也是第一夫人周美青首次參與國事訪問。
和上次比較，這次的訪問「熱鬧」得多，也出現若干意外狀況。不但在貝里斯遇上停電，還在瓜地馬拉發生馬總統的配槍隨扈遭到瓜國安全單位阻擋事件。而尼加拉瓜總統奧蒂嘉三度延宕與馬總統的會晤後，我方主動取消會面。在與美國國務卿希拉蕊寒暄時，馬總統自我介紹為「台灣的總統」，也引發國內政壇議論紛紛。
其實隨扈的衝突事件，比較是雙方安全單位溝通不良與瓜國相關人員處理不當的問題，只是枝節，過了就過了，不致影響到兩國關係。而馬總統自我介紹為「台灣的總統」，也是很常見的用語，畢竟國際對台灣之名較熟識，不必太予政治解讀。
比較值得注意的是，就任一年以來，馬英九總統所推行的「活路外交」，在這次出訪中，更加清楚明確地表達出和以往迥然不同的理念。往昔堅持零和遊戲的「烽火外交」，總是選擇成功率最低的戰場，以莽撞挑釁的策略，把台灣衝撞得頭破血流，國際處境也日益退縮。而馬總統扭轉了外交政策的基本思維模式和操作策略，藉著兩岸走向和解，也讓和兩岸關係一體兩面的外交揚棄你死我活的零和遊戲，不再和中共耗費資源搶奪邦交國，也不再拿著支票簿任邦交國予取予求。
在貝里斯時，馬總統也親自說明了援外五大策略，以消除極度貧窮及飢餓、加強人力資源開發、對抗傳染病、推動環境永續發展、強化全球發展夥伴為主要方向。任何援外支出必須先有計畫才有預算，不會有不該花的錢，依循「目標要正當、過程要合法、執行要有效」原則，正派辦外交，才會贏得尊重。
這樣的改變來得正是時候。因為，台灣過去的支票簿外交，不但常淪為被敲詐的冤大頭，大筆捐款還常常被當地政客納入私囊。既沒有達到援助目的，又在連番爆發貪汙醜聞後，台灣的形象也無辜遭到牽連，落得名財兩失。
而之所以如此，歸根結柢，是對方吃定了台灣為保邦交而不得不委屈求全，經常兩邊開價要脅。而花了大錢的台灣，對援助計畫的執行難以監督，援助款項的去向也無從考核，即使最後錢不知道被Ａ到哪裡去了，也不敢翻臉追查。
這種只為了維持邦交國數字，而損失國家尊嚴、國際形象及納稅人血汗錢的做法，加減相抵，顯然已經對整體國家利益造成了負面的損傷，亟待改弦更張。但過去因為中共全力封殺台灣外交空間，我們不得不勉力繼續這樣缺乏意義的遊戲。
馬總統現在之所以有本錢對不合理的需索說不，主要還是兩岸關係和緩，雙方達成互不挖牆腳的默契。幾個仍然習慣性放話要和中共建交的國家，至今未獲中共搭理，薩爾瓦多邀請中國共產黨派代表出席總統就職典禮，也遭到婉拒。當薩爾瓦多總統富內斯表示希望和中國大陸發展經貿關係時，馬英九還明確表示「不反對」，而且台灣和大陸也有交流。很顯然的，兩岸在國際間已經拋下了過去的零和競爭，其他國家必須重新理解及適應。
這樣的改變，除了讓兩岸擺脫金錢外交外，也讓台灣與友邦的關係終於能回歸到正常的基本面，就雙方實質需要尋求共識，在平等尊重中相互扶持。而中共也應該理解到，外交休兵不是在給予台灣恩惠，而是在給兩岸關係一個重新開始的機會。
這次鋒頭最健的，可能反而是周美青了。第一次出訪的她努力扮好自己的角色，手舞足蹈地投入表演並親切地與當地民眾互動。低調而且無意討好媒體的她，所展現的真實與自然作風，為政壇所少見，因此很能得到民眾的欣賞。
總結而言，馬總統這次的「久睦之旅」堪稱圓滿成功，我們希望新的外交政策能繼續落實，矯正已過時的援外作法。也期望兩岸和解的氣氛能繼續深化，讓雙方都能以尊重、視野與勇氣思考全新的未來。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 5, 2009
President Ma Ying-jeou has concluded his state visit to Central America and returned home. His "Voyage for Harmony" consolidated the support of ROC allies. It also demonstrated, through concrete action, Ma's new diplomatic thinking and practices.
President Ma, his wife Christine Chow, and over 100 members of his delegation visited Belize, El Salvador, and Guatemala. On the way there they transited Los Angeles. On the way back they transited Seattle. This is the second state visit President Ma has embarked upon since taking office. It is also the first time the First Lady Christine Chow took part in a state visit.
Compared to last time, this visit was much livelier. A number of surprises arose. Belize experienced a power failure. President Ma's armed bodyguard was detained by Guatemalan security services. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega postponed his meeting with President Ma three times, and the ROC decided to cancel the meeting altogether. When Ma greeted U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, he introduced himself as "Taiwan's president." This also provoked domestic political debate.
In fact the incident over Ma's bodyguard was minor. Once it was over, it was over. It was merely the result of a miscommunication between the security services of both nations, and a mishandling of the situtation by Guatemalan officials. It will not affect relations between the two nations. President Ma introduced himself as "Taiwan's president." This is also very common. After all, the international community more is familiar with the name Taiwan. It is not necessary to read too much into this.
President Ma Ying-jeou took office a year ago. During this visit his "huo lu wai jiao," i.e., "Viable Diplomacy," or "Flexible Diplomacy," clearly distinguished itself from the diplomacy of the past. Past "Scorched Earth Diplomacy" called for the playing of zero-sum games and the fighting of battles that cannot be won. It was a strategy of reckless provocation. Taipei butted its head against a brick wall until it was left broken and bleeding. Its plight within the international community worsened. President Ma's foreign policy reversed this manner of thinking and operating. It moved toward cross-Strait reconciliation. It allowed the two sides to renounce their life or death zero-sum game. It allowed Taipei to stop squandering resources fighting over allies with Beijing. It allowed Taipei to stop writing huge checks to buy allies.
While In Belize, President Ma explained his five major foreign aid goals. These include eliminating extreme poverty and hunger, strengthening human resources development, fighting infectious diseases, promoting environmentally sustainable development, and strengthening global partnerships. Foreign aid programs require money. Only money that must be spent will be spent. Diplomacy will be forthright. Its "goals must be legitimate, its procedures must be lawful, its implementation must be effective." Only this will win others' respect.
Such a change has come at just the right time. Our past policy of checkbook diplomacy often reduced us to victims of blackmail. Large contributions often lined the pockets of local politicians. They failed to achieve their goal as foreign aid. In the spate of ensuing corruption scandals, they tainted Taipei's image. The result was a loss of both wealth and honor.
Beijing knew Taipei would be forced to compromise in order to retain its allies. Beijing and Taipei would often both offer money and deliver ultimatums. Taipei would spend freely. Oversight of these aid packages would be difficult. One could never determined where the aid would wind up. We never knew who had embezzled the funds and never dared to demand an accounting.
Vast sums were paid out to retain diplomatic allies. But all we received in return was a loss of national dignity, damage to our international image, and the loss of hard-earned taxpayer dollars. The result was clearly harmful to our overall national interests. We had to make a fresh start. But in the past Beijing stood in Taipei's way. We were forced to continue playing this meaningless game.
The main reason President Ma can now say no to such unreasonable demands, is the easing of cross-Strait relations. The two sides have now reached a tacit understanding not to steal each others' allies. Beijing has given the cold shoulder to several nations which have habitually threatened to break relations with Taipei and establish relations with Beijing. Beijing has also turned down El Salvador's invitation to send representatives to its presdential inauguration. When President of El Salvador Mauricio Funes expressed the desire to develop economic and trade relations with mainland China, Ma Ying-jeou made clear he has "no objections," and that Taipei and Beijing have such relations too. Clearly the two sides have jettisoned their previous zero-sum competition in the international arena. Other countries must understand this and adapt to it.
Such a change, has allowed both sides to forsake checkbook diplomacy. It has allowed the relationship between Taipei and its allies to finally return to normal, The two sides must seek substantive consensus, and demonstrate mutual respect. Beijing must also understand that a diplomatic truce is not a favor to Taiwan, but rather a fresh start for cross-Strait relations.
The spotlight was on Christine Chow. During her first state visit she made a concerted effort to fulfill her assigned role. She threw herself into her interactions with the local population. Chow, who has long maintained a low profile and has never attempted to curry favor with the media, demonstrated an authentic and natural style of her own. This is something rare in the political arena, and something the people deeply appreciate.
In conclusion, President Ma's "Voyage of Harmony" could be termed a ringing success. We hope he will continue implementing his new foreign policy, and correcting outdated foreign aid practices. We hope the two sides can deepen cross-Strait reconciliation. We hope both sides will demonstrate mutual respect, and contemplate the future with vision and courage.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.05
社論－從活路外交到正常外交
本報訊
馬英九總統一行結束中美洲的訪問行程返抵國門，這次的「久睦之旅」不僅鞏固了友邦的邦誼，更以具體行動展現出全新的外交思維與作為。
馬總統偕夫人周美青與一百多位訪問團成員，此行先後走訪貝里斯、薩爾瓦多與瓜地馬拉，去程過境美國洛杉磯，回程過境西雅圖。這是馬總統就任後第二次出訪，也是第一夫人周美青首次參與國事訪問。
和上次比較，這次的訪問「熱鬧」得多，也出現若干意外狀況。不但在貝里斯遇上停電，還在瓜地馬拉發生馬總統的配槍隨扈遭到瓜國安全單位阻擋事件。而尼加拉瓜總統奧蒂嘉三度延宕與馬總統的會晤後，我方主動取消會面。在與美國國務卿希拉蕊寒暄時，馬總統自我介紹為「台灣的總統」，也引發國內政壇議論紛紛。
其實隨扈的衝突事件，比較是雙方安全單位溝通不良與瓜國相關人員處理不當的問題，只是枝節，過了就過了，不致影響到兩國關係。而馬總統自我介紹為「台灣的總統」，也是很常見的用語，畢竟國際對台灣之名較熟識，不必太予政治解讀。
比較值得注意的是，就任一年以來，馬英九總統所推行的「活路外交」，在這次出訪中，更加清楚明確地表達出和以往迥然不同的理念。往昔堅持零和遊戲的「烽火外交」，總是選擇成功率最低的戰場，以莽撞挑釁的策略，把台灣衝撞得頭破血流，國際處境也日益退縮。而馬總統扭轉了外交政策的基本思維模式和操作策略，藉著兩岸走向和解，也讓和兩岸關係一體兩面的外交揚棄你死我活的零和遊戲，不再和中共耗費資源搶奪邦交國，也不再拿著支票簿任邦交國予取予求。
在貝里斯時，馬總統也親自說明了援外五大策略，以消除極度貧窮及飢餓、加強人力資源開發、對抗傳染病、推動環境永續發展、強化全球發展夥伴為主要方向。任何援外支出必須先有計畫才有預算，不會有不該花的錢，依循「目標要正當、過程要合法、執行要有效」原則，正派辦外交，才會贏得尊重。
這樣的改變來得正是時候。因為，台灣過去的支票簿外交，不但常淪為被敲詐的冤大頭，大筆捐款還常常被當地政客納入私囊。既沒有達到援助目的，又在連番爆發貪汙醜聞後，台灣的形象也無辜遭到牽連，落得名財兩失。
而之所以如此，歸根結柢，是對方吃定了台灣為保邦交而不得不委屈求全，經常兩邊開價要脅。而花了大錢的台灣，對援助計畫的執行難以監督，援助款項的去向也無從考核，即使最後錢不知道被Ａ到哪裡去了，也不敢翻臉追查。
這種只為了維持邦交國數字，而損失國家尊嚴、國際形象及納稅人血汗錢的做法，加減相抵，顯然已經對整體國家利益造成了負面的損傷，亟待改弦更張。但過去因為中共全力封殺台灣外交空間，我們不得不勉力繼續這樣缺乏意義的遊戲。
馬總統現在之所以有本錢對不合理的需索說不，主要還是兩岸關係和緩，雙方達成互不挖牆腳的默契。幾個仍然習慣性放話要和中共建交的國家，至今未獲中共搭理，薩爾瓦多邀請中國共產黨派代表出席總統就職典禮，也遭到婉拒。當薩爾瓦多總統富內斯表示希望和中國大陸發展經貿關係時，馬英九還明確表示「不反對」，而且台灣和大陸也有交流。很顯然的，兩岸在國際間已經拋下了過去的零和競爭，其他國家必須重新理解及適應。
這樣的改變，除了讓兩岸擺脫金錢外交外，也讓台灣與友邦的關係終於能回歸到正常的基本面，就雙方實質需要尋求共識，在平等尊重中相互扶持。而中共也應該理解到，外交休兵不是在給予台灣恩惠，而是在給兩岸關係一個重新開始的機會。
這次鋒頭最健的，可能反而是周美青了。第一次出訪的她努力扮好自己的角色，手舞足蹈地投入表演並親切地與當地民眾互動。低調而且無意討好媒體的她，所展現的真實與自然作風，為政壇所少見，因此很能得到民眾的欣賞。
總結而言，馬總統這次的「久睦之旅」堪稱圓滿成功，我們希望新的外交政策能繼續落實，矯正已過時的援外作法。也期望兩岸和解的氣氛能繼續深化，讓雙方都能以尊重、視野與勇氣思考全新的未來。
Thursday, June 4, 2009
The NCC's Cognitive Dissonance
The NCC's Cognitive Dissonance
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 4, 2009
The National Communications Commission (NCC) passed a seven-point amendment changing the directors and supervisors of Chung Tien Television (CTI TV) and the China Television Company (CTV). This provoked intense official and public criticism. Charges and countercharges of "illegal abuse of power" and "immoral behavior" were bandied back and forth. Serious doubts were cast on the NCC's authority. The China Times Group's public image was also damaged.
The main reason the "Twin Chinas Case" has come to this is that a small number of NCC Commissioners acted willfully. They failed to operate within to the law. They exceeded the limits of the law. As a result applicants were disgruntled. They also failed to gain the support of the community. This is the NCC's biggest problem. It wields immense power and has grand ambitions. But it refuses to operate within the law. Consequently its ideals have remained unfulfilled. It can neither advance nor retreat. It has lost its focus.
The China Times Group launched a counter-attack. Through proxies, it published ads lambasting specific Commissioners. Its methods were unorthodox. This led the NCC to criticize its "manner of doing business." But the root of the problem was the NCC's hasty decision-making. It even disparaged new investors, referring to them as "rice dumpling vendors." Why else would the concerned parties launch such a fierce counter-attack? The NCC criticized the China Times Group coverage of the controversy as "irrational and unbalanced." But one reaps what one sows. The NCC cannot escape blame.
Suppose the NCC had allowed the Tu family to simultaneously own the "Three Chinas?" Why does it have a problem with the Tsai family taking them over now? The provisions of the Broadcasting Law have not changed. Can NCC Commissioners make up their own regulations? Can they allow their individual whims to override the law? The NCC feels it must speak out against investors from other industries buying into the media. But even so, it must offer a logical and persuasive case for its position. The NCC exceeded its authority. It insulted new investors. It insulted many people within the media industry. This hardly accords with the NCC's role as a neutral mediator.
The NCC was established over three years ago. Yet it is still referred to by its English acronym. It still lacks a catchy sounding name in Chinese. This suggests it still has not found public acceptance. Ever since the NCC was established, the public has had high expectations. But the NCC has failed to understand its role, and has failed to fulfill its duties. The "Twin Chinas case" is one example. The earlier TVBS case is another. It mishandled the case of provocative video game commercials. The crux of the problem is that although the NCC has enormous power, it lacks managerial experience and expertise. As a result, whenever it draws its sword, it wounds either someone else or itself.
Take the "Twin Chinas case." Only three Commissioners were able to dicate the rulings of the seven member Commission. Clearly its organization contains a number of structural defects. These have led to defective judgments. For an entity that wields such immense power, this is a serious problem. It is rumored that one or two Commissioners obssessed with "media reform" were the cause of its arbitrary decision-making. If so, the NCC must find ways to address the problem of its own biases. The public of course would like to see officials retain their reformist ideals. But the NCC is not a social reform group. It is a government agency. Its Commissioners may harbor reformist ideals. But they must have the patience to change the media and change the laws. They must not resort to arbitrary means outside the system.
Furthermore, if NCC Commissioners focus only on "monitoring the media," they are defining their duties too narrowly. Society and times change. The NCC's management responsibilities in the world of the Internet are now greater than ever. They include coping with rampant telephone fraud, all-pervasive spam, and the appropriate allocation of telecommunications resources and the rational setting of telecommunications fees. These are all huge issues that affect the livelihood of the general public. They have attracted public attention. They require greater effort by NCC Commissioners. The problem of pirate radio stations has remained unresolved for years. The content of many television shows is vulgar or even fraudulent. But the NCC has turned a blind eye to them. So-called media reformers are concerned about "rice dumpling vendors" buying into the television industry. Yet they have absolutely no reaction to the corruption that threatens to indundate them. Doesn't this indicate some cognitive dissonance regarding their job definition?
The NCC treated the new investors in the "Twin Chinas case" as delinquents. It violated the spirit of the law. This led to today's asymmetrical warfare. This is hardly something the public wants to see. We recommend that the two sides return to the table. The China Times Group may seek administrative relief. The NCC should make a stronger case or re-examine the case. Only then can this conflict between the government and the public end in a lawful and reasonable manner.
NCC的不對稱認知引發不對稱戰爭
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.04 06:02 am
國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ）以七點「附帶決議」通過中天、中視董監事變更案，引發官民猛烈攻防。在你罵我「違法濫權」、我罵你「不道德」的砲火中，ＮＣＣ的權威受到嚴重質疑，中時集團的媒體形象也不無損傷。
「雙中案」之所以演變至此，主要原因在少數ＮＣＣ委員意欲有所作為，卻未能持守依法行政的基本原則。超越法制勉強而為的結果，不僅申請人難以心服，也未能爭取到社會大眾的支持。這恐怕正是ＮＣＣ本身最大的困境：握有偌大的權力，也懷抱大志，卻不知依法行政，終致理想蹈空，進退失據。
就媒體而言，中時集團除多方發動反擊，並以刊登人頭廣告的方式大肆抨擊特定委員，作法殊非尋常，已引致ＮＣＣ對其「經營風格」的批評。但從源頭看，若非ＮＣＣ草率決策，甚至以「賣米?的」之貶抑詞歧視新投資人，當事人怎會採取如此激烈的反擊？ＮＣＣ批中時集團的報導「違反理性衡平」，但惡質引發惡質，ＮＣＣ亦難辭其咎。
試想，如果上次ＮＣＣ核准余家可同時持有「三中」，為何這次蔡家接手就有問題？如果廣電法的規定未變，ＮＣＣ委員憑什麼可以自創規定，將個人意志置於法律之上？就算ＮＣＣ認為有必要對「異業」跨業投資媒體作出表態，也應提出符合外界認知的論述和邏輯，而不是訂出不符常情的附帶規範。何況，ＮＣＣ表態過當，除羞辱了新投資人，更傷及眾多相關媒體工作者的自尊，這又豈符合ＮＣＣ作為管理人應有的中立原則？
成立逾三年的ＮＣＣ，如今還在使用英文縮寫，仍未產生一個全民琅琅上口的本土稱呼，可見其移植而來的概念仍未融入台灣的水土。成立以來，ＮＣＣ承受社會極高的期待，但其角色認知及決策作為有時卻與期待有所落差，除了雙中案，過去的ＴＶＢＳ案，乃至日前的清涼電玩廣告處分案均如此。癥結就在，ＮＣＣ雖握有極大的權力，卻缺乏成熟的管制文化，以致刀一出鞘，不是傷人就是自傷。
以這次的「雙中案」為例，不過是三個委員的堅持，卻能左右七人委員會的決定，可見其內部某種結構性的不對稱，導致其終極決策的不對稱。這對一個握有偌大權力的機構而言，其實是嚴重的問題。若果真如傳言，因一二委員特別執著於「媒體改造」，而造成決策的專斷與失衡，則ＮＣＣ自需設法改善其自身偏倚的問題。外界當然樂意看到官員抱持改革的理想，但ＮＣＣ畢竟不是社會運動團體，而是政府公權力機構；委員的改革理想，必須耐心打造足以改變媒體生態的法律環境，而不是任意訴諸體制外手段。
進一步說，ＮＣＣ委員若只將關注焦點放在「監督媒體」，亦未免太窄化了己身的職責。隨著社會及時代的變遷，ＮＣＣ對於通訊及網路世界的管理職責也越來越重大，包括詐騙電話的猖獗，垃圾郵件的無孔不入，乃至電信資源的合理分配及電信資費的合理化，在在都是影響民生大眾更鉅的議題，也更受民眾關注，值得ＮＣＣ委員多下功夫。何況，地下電台林立的問題多少年懸而未決，遑論許多電視節目內容低俗、充斥偽詐，ＮＣＣ卻視若無睹。所謂媒體改造派的委員若對一位「賣米? 的」商人入主電視耿耿於懷，卻對現實環境中四溢的腥臭腐敗毫無反應，這豈非職務認知太過失衡？
ＮＣＣ將雙中案新投資人當成「虞犯」對待，並不符合依法行政的精神；雙方演成今天的不對稱戰爭，更非外界所樂見。我們建議，雙方不妨回歸體制，中時集團可以尋求行政救濟，ＮＣＣ則補強論述或重新審核。如此，這齣官民衝突大戲，才有可能合法合理地收場。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 4, 2009
The National Communications Commission (NCC) passed a seven-point amendment changing the directors and supervisors of Chung Tien Television (CTI TV) and the China Television Company (CTV). This provoked intense official and public criticism. Charges and countercharges of "illegal abuse of power" and "immoral behavior" were bandied back and forth. Serious doubts were cast on the NCC's authority. The China Times Group's public image was also damaged.
The main reason the "Twin Chinas Case" has come to this is that a small number of NCC Commissioners acted willfully. They failed to operate within to the law. They exceeded the limits of the law. As a result applicants were disgruntled. They also failed to gain the support of the community. This is the NCC's biggest problem. It wields immense power and has grand ambitions. But it refuses to operate within the law. Consequently its ideals have remained unfulfilled. It can neither advance nor retreat. It has lost its focus.
The China Times Group launched a counter-attack. Through proxies, it published ads lambasting specific Commissioners. Its methods were unorthodox. This led the NCC to criticize its "manner of doing business." But the root of the problem was the NCC's hasty decision-making. It even disparaged new investors, referring to them as "rice dumpling vendors." Why else would the concerned parties launch such a fierce counter-attack? The NCC criticized the China Times Group coverage of the controversy as "irrational and unbalanced." But one reaps what one sows. The NCC cannot escape blame.
Suppose the NCC had allowed the Tu family to simultaneously own the "Three Chinas?" Why does it have a problem with the Tsai family taking them over now? The provisions of the Broadcasting Law have not changed. Can NCC Commissioners make up their own regulations? Can they allow their individual whims to override the law? The NCC feels it must speak out against investors from other industries buying into the media. But even so, it must offer a logical and persuasive case for its position. The NCC exceeded its authority. It insulted new investors. It insulted many people within the media industry. This hardly accords with the NCC's role as a neutral mediator.
The NCC was established over three years ago. Yet it is still referred to by its English acronym. It still lacks a catchy sounding name in Chinese. This suggests it still has not found public acceptance. Ever since the NCC was established, the public has had high expectations. But the NCC has failed to understand its role, and has failed to fulfill its duties. The "Twin Chinas case" is one example. The earlier TVBS case is another. It mishandled the case of provocative video game commercials. The crux of the problem is that although the NCC has enormous power, it lacks managerial experience and expertise. As a result, whenever it draws its sword, it wounds either someone else or itself.
Take the "Twin Chinas case." Only three Commissioners were able to dicate the rulings of the seven member Commission. Clearly its organization contains a number of structural defects. These have led to defective judgments. For an entity that wields such immense power, this is a serious problem. It is rumored that one or two Commissioners obssessed with "media reform" were the cause of its arbitrary decision-making. If so, the NCC must find ways to address the problem of its own biases. The public of course would like to see officials retain their reformist ideals. But the NCC is not a social reform group. It is a government agency. Its Commissioners may harbor reformist ideals. But they must have the patience to change the media and change the laws. They must not resort to arbitrary means outside the system.
Furthermore, if NCC Commissioners focus only on "monitoring the media," they are defining their duties too narrowly. Society and times change. The NCC's management responsibilities in the world of the Internet are now greater than ever. They include coping with rampant telephone fraud, all-pervasive spam, and the appropriate allocation of telecommunications resources and the rational setting of telecommunications fees. These are all huge issues that affect the livelihood of the general public. They have attracted public attention. They require greater effort by NCC Commissioners. The problem of pirate radio stations has remained unresolved for years. The content of many television shows is vulgar or even fraudulent. But the NCC has turned a blind eye to them. So-called media reformers are concerned about "rice dumpling vendors" buying into the television industry. Yet they have absolutely no reaction to the corruption that threatens to indundate them. Doesn't this indicate some cognitive dissonance regarding their job definition?
The NCC treated the new investors in the "Twin Chinas case" as delinquents. It violated the spirit of the law. This led to today's asymmetrical warfare. This is hardly something the public wants to see. We recommend that the two sides return to the table. The China Times Group may seek administrative relief. The NCC should make a stronger case or re-examine the case. Only then can this conflict between the government and the public end in a lawful and reasonable manner.
NCC的不對稱認知引發不對稱戰爭
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.04 06:02 am
國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ）以七點「附帶決議」通過中天、中視董監事變更案，引發官民猛烈攻防。在你罵我「違法濫權」、我罵你「不道德」的砲火中，ＮＣＣ的權威受到嚴重質疑，中時集團的媒體形象也不無損傷。
「雙中案」之所以演變至此，主要原因在少數ＮＣＣ委員意欲有所作為，卻未能持守依法行政的基本原則。超越法制勉強而為的結果，不僅申請人難以心服，也未能爭取到社會大眾的支持。這恐怕正是ＮＣＣ本身最大的困境：握有偌大的權力，也懷抱大志，卻不知依法行政，終致理想蹈空，進退失據。
就媒體而言，中時集團除多方發動反擊，並以刊登人頭廣告的方式大肆抨擊特定委員，作法殊非尋常，已引致ＮＣＣ對其「經營風格」的批評。但從源頭看，若非ＮＣＣ草率決策，甚至以「賣米?的」之貶抑詞歧視新投資人，當事人怎會採取如此激烈的反擊？ＮＣＣ批中時集團的報導「違反理性衡平」，但惡質引發惡質，ＮＣＣ亦難辭其咎。
試想，如果上次ＮＣＣ核准余家可同時持有「三中」，為何這次蔡家接手就有問題？如果廣電法的規定未變，ＮＣＣ委員憑什麼可以自創規定，將個人意志置於法律之上？就算ＮＣＣ認為有必要對「異業」跨業投資媒體作出表態，也應提出符合外界認知的論述和邏輯，而不是訂出不符常情的附帶規範。何況，ＮＣＣ表態過當，除羞辱了新投資人，更傷及眾多相關媒體工作者的自尊，這又豈符合ＮＣＣ作為管理人應有的中立原則？
成立逾三年的ＮＣＣ，如今還在使用英文縮寫，仍未產生一個全民琅琅上口的本土稱呼，可見其移植而來的概念仍未融入台灣的水土。成立以來，ＮＣＣ承受社會極高的期待，但其角色認知及決策作為有時卻與期待有所落差，除了雙中案，過去的ＴＶＢＳ案，乃至日前的清涼電玩廣告處分案均如此。癥結就在，ＮＣＣ雖握有極大的權力，卻缺乏成熟的管制文化，以致刀一出鞘，不是傷人就是自傷。
以這次的「雙中案」為例，不過是三個委員的堅持，卻能左右七人委員會的決定，可見其內部某種結構性的不對稱，導致其終極決策的不對稱。這對一個握有偌大權力的機構而言，其實是嚴重的問題。若果真如傳言，因一二委員特別執著於「媒體改造」，而造成決策的專斷與失衡，則ＮＣＣ自需設法改善其自身偏倚的問題。外界當然樂意看到官員抱持改革的理想，但ＮＣＣ畢竟不是社會運動團體，而是政府公權力機構；委員的改革理想，必須耐心打造足以改變媒體生態的法律環境，而不是任意訴諸體制外手段。
進一步說，ＮＣＣ委員若只將關注焦點放在「監督媒體」，亦未免太窄化了己身的職責。隨著社會及時代的變遷，ＮＣＣ對於通訊及網路世界的管理職責也越來越重大，包括詐騙電話的猖獗，垃圾郵件的無孔不入，乃至電信資源的合理分配及電信資費的合理化，在在都是影響民生大眾更鉅的議題，也更受民眾關注，值得ＮＣＣ委員多下功夫。何況，地下電台林立的問題多少年懸而未決，遑論許多電視節目內容低俗、充斥偽詐，ＮＣＣ卻視若無睹。所謂媒體改造派的委員若對一位「賣米? 的」商人入主電視耿耿於懷，卻對現實環境中四溢的腥臭腐敗毫無反應，這豈非職務認知太過失衡？
ＮＣＣ將雙中案新投資人當成「虞犯」對待，並不符合依法行政的精神；雙方演成今天的不對稱戰爭，更非外界所樂見。我們建議，雙方不妨回歸體制，中時集團可以尋求行政救濟，ＮＣＣ則補強論述或重新審核。如此，這齣官民衝突大戲，才有可能合法合理地收場。
Wednesday, June 3, 2009
Was the June 4th Tiananmen Movement "Counter-Revolutionary?"
Was the June 4th Tiananmen Movement "Counter-Revolutionary?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 3, 2009
Twenty years ago, on April 17, 1989, the first wave of students gathered in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, to honor the memory of Hu Yaobang. This sparked a conflagration that once ablaze, could no longer be contained. On April 26, the People's Daily published an editorial entitled, "The government must take a clear stand against the turmoil." It characterized the pro-democracy movement as "a counter-revolution launched by a tiny minority of the people."
The April 26 editorial added fuel to the fire. The Tiananmen movement spread to all parts of the country, eventually resulting in "Liu Si," the June 4th Tiananmen Incident. Now fast forward 20 years. The meaning of June 4th remains unresolved.
The April 26 People's Daily editorial does not stand up to scrutiny. It claimed that "a tiny minority of people launched a counter-revolutionary movement leading to turmoil." But the hundreds of millions of people across the nation who participated in the movement were hardly a "tiny minority." Besides, the concept of democratic liberation was orginally part of the Chinese Communist Party's call for "people's revolution." It was hardly "counter-revolutionary." To characterize the turmoil as counter-revolution was arbitrary and unwarranted.
Over the past two decades, the Beijing authorities have attempted to revise this characterization. One seldom sees the incident referred to as "counter-revolutionary turmoil." Such neutral terms as the "Beijing Incident" and "that incident in 1989" have gradually appeared. The new generation of Chinese Communist leaders know perfectly well why the June 4th Incident happened. The government's performance at the time fell considerably short of public expectations. Twenty years later, the authorities have even less reason to denigrate the students' ideas and expectations. They must admit that the students were merely pointing out the defects and shortcomings in the government's "revolution." The students cannot be characterized as a "counter-revolutionary." One might even say that reform and liberalization was the students' heartfelt desire. They merely had higher expectations. Therefore, even according to the letter and spirit of Chinese Communist Party orthodoxy, June 4th was "revolutionary" rather than "counter-revolutionary."
June 4th and May 4th are historically connected. The year June 4th occurred was the 70th anniversary of the May 4th movement. June 4th can be considered an extension of May 4th. It represented thinking about China's democracy reaching down to the grass-roots level. For example, scholars remembered for their participation in the May 4th movement include Hu Shih and Chen Du-hsiu. But those remembered for their participation in the June 4th movement are the real leaders of the student movement. During the May 4th movement, even big name scholars rushed about like headless chickens. It was not difficult for the average student during the June 4th movement, given 70 years of historical trials and tribulations, to surpass the stereotypes of the May 4th movement. If the May 4th movement is considered sacred in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party's democratic movement, then June 4th ought to be as well. The Beijing authorities have no need to characterize the June 4th movement as "counter-revolutionary." Shouldn't they respond to the expectations the Chinese people have about May 4th and June 4th? Shouldn't they attempt to fulfill those expectations?
The public on the Mainland has two views about June 4th. One. The aftermath of June 4th brought two decades of economic development, and enabled the rise of a great nation. Two. The June 4th movement lives. The lessons of June 4th inspired the Chinese Communists to rule wisely and benefit the public. These two views affirm the meaning of June 4th. For Mainland China, June 4th demanded democracy, freedom and liberation. The ruling and opposition parties may differ on the degree and extent to which these proposals have been realized. But they cannot deny its revolutionary nature. They certainly cannot dismiss it as "counter-revolutionary." As future generations see May 4th, so they will see June 4th.
Let's examine the impact of June 4th on cross-Strait relations. The KMT/CCP civil war also occurred during a time of turmoil. It was a desperate effort to "pull chesnuts from the fire," hardly conducive to clarifying one's view of the world. Authoritarian rule by the Nationalist government eventually moved towards democracy. The Communist regime, after a number of catastrophic blunders, finally underwent reform and liberalization. That may not have been true yesterday, but it is today. It is now the generation of Ma Ying-jeou and Hu Jintao. Cross-Strait relations still contains many gaps. But the two sides fully understand what is right but temporarily unachievable, and what is wrong and must never be done.
June 4th did not have a deep impact on cross-Strait relations. But the June 4th vision of democracy is the same on both sides of the Strait. Internally and externally, the Beijing authorities may not be able to meet the standards of democracy, but neither can they repudiate them. This is what we mean by "what is right but temporarily unachievable." As far as "what is wrong and must never be done," this means that the two sides can now look back at May 4th and conduct a major debate on the future of the nation, and must never again allow a civil war.
June 4th disturbed order on the Chinese Mainland. One could call it "turmoil." But the spirit of June 4th was not "counter-revolutionary." Rather, it represented a naive faith in "revolution," and its passionate pursuit by the youth of the nation. Chinese Communist Party leaders may find it difficult to admit this out loud. But they know it in their hearts. China can go in only one direction. That direction was made clear during the May 4th and June 4th movements.
六四是不是「反革命」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.03 05:39 am
二十年前，一九八九年四月十七日，首波悼念胡耀邦的北京學生聚集天安門廣場，星火燎原，情勢一發不可遏止；四月二十六日，人民日報發表社論，題為〈必須旗幟鮮明地反對動亂〉，並將這場民主運動指為「少數人發動的反革命動亂」。
四二六社論的「定性」，火上加油；運動頓時從天安門漸漸蔓延擴展至全國各地，終於演成六四事件。如今匆匆二十年過去，六四事件的「定性」問題，仍未解決。
四二六社論的定性站不住腳。若謂是「少數人發動的反革命動亂」，但全國數億人次參與的運動並不是「少數人」，且民主解放的主張其實原是中共「人民革命」的號召而非「反革命」，動亂若係指叛變亦是莫須有的欲加之罪。
二十年來，北京當局似亦嘗試修正對六四的定性，「反革命動亂」的說法已經罕見，而漸漸出現「北京事件」、「八九那件事」之類中性詞彙。因為，中共新一代領導人心裡應當皆很明白，之所以造成六四事件，是因當時的黨政治理與民間的期待出現重大落差；時至二十年後的今日，主政者其實更沒有理由斥責學生當年所表達的理念與期待；而必須承認，學生們其實是指出了主政者在「革命」表現上的殘缺與落後，自不能將學生指為「反革命」。甚至可以這麼說，改革開放也是六四學生心之所嚮，只是他們的期待更高於此而已。因此，即使就中共在文字章典上的精神正統而言，六四也是「革命」的，而不是「反革命」！
六四已與五四的歷史脈絡聯結。六四發生當年，正是五四運動七十周年；而六四可謂是五四的晉階，亦是中國的民主思維更趨草根化的重大進程。例如，五四人物存留在記憶中的是胡適、陳獨秀等學者；但六四存留在記憶中的人物，卻是真正的學運領袖。何況，五四當年，即使大師級的學者，也仍如無頭蒼蠅一般地在九流十家中衝闖；但六四畢竟加上了七十年的歷史滄桑，一般學生的定見已不難超越五四當年的先驅。如果五四是中共眼中的神聖民主運動，六四當然也是。北京當局應思考的是，不必將六四打成「反革命」，而當自我檢討，是否回應並實踐了自五四至六四一脈相承的中國人民的期待？
中國大陸民間，對六四有兩種評價。一、六四收場，換來二十年的經濟發展、大國崛起；二、六四不死，中共在六四的教訓之後勵精圖治，回饋人民。這兩種看法皆證實了六四的重大意義。就中國而言，六四對民主自由的解放主張，也許在朝野間對程度及階段有不同的思慮，但終究不能否認其「革命性」，亦即不能指其為「反革命」。後人將永遠如此看待五四，也將永遠如此看待六四。
再以六四看兩岸關係。其實，國共內戰，也是發生在前述那個「沒頭蒼蠅的時代」，火中取栗，卻未必確有澄清天下的真知灼見；現在國民黨政府經威權統治終於走上民主，共產黨政權經幾次治理浩劫終於走上改革開放，即可證昨非而今是。如今到了馬英九、胡錦濤這一代，兩岸關係當然仍舊存有許多程度及階段的缺口，但雙方心中皆應十分明白，什麼是正確的而暫時做不到的，什麼又是錯的而千萬不能做的。
六四雖未深入兩岸關係，但六四的民主憧憬卻無兩岸的分際可言。準此以言，不論對內對外，北京當局眼前應只是尚做不到「民主」的標準，卻不能否定這個標準。此即所謂「是正確的而暫時做不到的」。至於什麼是錯的而千萬不能做的？這應是指，兩岸如今可謂是重新又回頭面對在五四尚未了結的治國方案大辯論，而絕不能再是一場軍事內戰。
六四曾經造成中國秩序動盪，就此或許也可說是一場「動亂」吧；但六四的精神卻不是「反革命」，反而是青年們對「革命」最天真與最熾烈的信仰與追求。中共領導人即使口裡不便如此說，但心裡要明白：中國的方向只有一個，從五四到六四皆是指往這個方向。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 3, 2009
Twenty years ago, on April 17, 1989, the first wave of students gathered in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, to honor the memory of Hu Yaobang. This sparked a conflagration that once ablaze, could no longer be contained. On April 26, the People's Daily published an editorial entitled, "The government must take a clear stand against the turmoil." It characterized the pro-democracy movement as "a counter-revolution launched by a tiny minority of the people."
The April 26 editorial added fuel to the fire. The Tiananmen movement spread to all parts of the country, eventually resulting in "Liu Si," the June 4th Tiananmen Incident. Now fast forward 20 years. The meaning of June 4th remains unresolved.
The April 26 People's Daily editorial does not stand up to scrutiny. It claimed that "a tiny minority of people launched a counter-revolutionary movement leading to turmoil." But the hundreds of millions of people across the nation who participated in the movement were hardly a "tiny minority." Besides, the concept of democratic liberation was orginally part of the Chinese Communist Party's call for "people's revolution." It was hardly "counter-revolutionary." To characterize the turmoil as counter-revolution was arbitrary and unwarranted.
Over the past two decades, the Beijing authorities have attempted to revise this characterization. One seldom sees the incident referred to as "counter-revolutionary turmoil." Such neutral terms as the "Beijing Incident" and "that incident in 1989" have gradually appeared. The new generation of Chinese Communist leaders know perfectly well why the June 4th Incident happened. The government's performance at the time fell considerably short of public expectations. Twenty years later, the authorities have even less reason to denigrate the students' ideas and expectations. They must admit that the students were merely pointing out the defects and shortcomings in the government's "revolution." The students cannot be characterized as a "counter-revolutionary." One might even say that reform and liberalization was the students' heartfelt desire. They merely had higher expectations. Therefore, even according to the letter and spirit of Chinese Communist Party orthodoxy, June 4th was "revolutionary" rather than "counter-revolutionary."
June 4th and May 4th are historically connected. The year June 4th occurred was the 70th anniversary of the May 4th movement. June 4th can be considered an extension of May 4th. It represented thinking about China's democracy reaching down to the grass-roots level. For example, scholars remembered for their participation in the May 4th movement include Hu Shih and Chen Du-hsiu. But those remembered for their participation in the June 4th movement are the real leaders of the student movement. During the May 4th movement, even big name scholars rushed about like headless chickens. It was not difficult for the average student during the June 4th movement, given 70 years of historical trials and tribulations, to surpass the stereotypes of the May 4th movement. If the May 4th movement is considered sacred in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party's democratic movement, then June 4th ought to be as well. The Beijing authorities have no need to characterize the June 4th movement as "counter-revolutionary." Shouldn't they respond to the expectations the Chinese people have about May 4th and June 4th? Shouldn't they attempt to fulfill those expectations?
The public on the Mainland has two views about June 4th. One. The aftermath of June 4th brought two decades of economic development, and enabled the rise of a great nation. Two. The June 4th movement lives. The lessons of June 4th inspired the Chinese Communists to rule wisely and benefit the public. These two views affirm the meaning of June 4th. For Mainland China, June 4th demanded democracy, freedom and liberation. The ruling and opposition parties may differ on the degree and extent to which these proposals have been realized. But they cannot deny its revolutionary nature. They certainly cannot dismiss it as "counter-revolutionary." As future generations see May 4th, so they will see June 4th.
Let's examine the impact of June 4th on cross-Strait relations. The KMT/CCP civil war also occurred during a time of turmoil. It was a desperate effort to "pull chesnuts from the fire," hardly conducive to clarifying one's view of the world. Authoritarian rule by the Nationalist government eventually moved towards democracy. The Communist regime, after a number of catastrophic blunders, finally underwent reform and liberalization. That may not have been true yesterday, but it is today. It is now the generation of Ma Ying-jeou and Hu Jintao. Cross-Strait relations still contains many gaps. But the two sides fully understand what is right but temporarily unachievable, and what is wrong and must never be done.
June 4th did not have a deep impact on cross-Strait relations. But the June 4th vision of democracy is the same on both sides of the Strait. Internally and externally, the Beijing authorities may not be able to meet the standards of democracy, but neither can they repudiate them. This is what we mean by "what is right but temporarily unachievable." As far as "what is wrong and must never be done," this means that the two sides can now look back at May 4th and conduct a major debate on the future of the nation, and must never again allow a civil war.
June 4th disturbed order on the Chinese Mainland. One could call it "turmoil." But the spirit of June 4th was not "counter-revolutionary." Rather, it represented a naive faith in "revolution," and its passionate pursuit by the youth of the nation. Chinese Communist Party leaders may find it difficult to admit this out loud. But they know it in their hearts. China can go in only one direction. That direction was made clear during the May 4th and June 4th movements.
六四是不是「反革命」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.03 05:39 am
二十年前，一九八九年四月十七日，首波悼念胡耀邦的北京學生聚集天安門廣場，星火燎原，情勢一發不可遏止；四月二十六日，人民日報發表社論，題為〈必須旗幟鮮明地反對動亂〉，並將這場民主運動指為「少數人發動的反革命動亂」。
四二六社論的「定性」，火上加油；運動頓時從天安門漸漸蔓延擴展至全國各地，終於演成六四事件。如今匆匆二十年過去，六四事件的「定性」問題，仍未解決。
四二六社論的定性站不住腳。若謂是「少數人發動的反革命動亂」，但全國數億人次參與的運動並不是「少數人」，且民主解放的主張其實原是中共「人民革命」的號召而非「反革命」，動亂若係指叛變亦是莫須有的欲加之罪。
二十年來，北京當局似亦嘗試修正對六四的定性，「反革命動亂」的說法已經罕見，而漸漸出現「北京事件」、「八九那件事」之類中性詞彙。因為，中共新一代領導人心裡應當皆很明白，之所以造成六四事件，是因當時的黨政治理與民間的期待出現重大落差；時至二十年後的今日，主政者其實更沒有理由斥責學生當年所表達的理念與期待；而必須承認，學生們其實是指出了主政者在「革命」表現上的殘缺與落後，自不能將學生指為「反革命」。甚至可以這麼說，改革開放也是六四學生心之所嚮，只是他們的期待更高於此而已。因此，即使就中共在文字章典上的精神正統而言，六四也是「革命」的，而不是「反革命」！
六四已與五四的歷史脈絡聯結。六四發生當年，正是五四運動七十周年；而六四可謂是五四的晉階，亦是中國的民主思維更趨草根化的重大進程。例如，五四人物存留在記憶中的是胡適、陳獨秀等學者；但六四存留在記憶中的人物，卻是真正的學運領袖。何況，五四當年，即使大師級的學者，也仍如無頭蒼蠅一般地在九流十家中衝闖；但六四畢竟加上了七十年的歷史滄桑，一般學生的定見已不難超越五四當年的先驅。如果五四是中共眼中的神聖民主運動，六四當然也是。北京當局應思考的是，不必將六四打成「反革命」，而當自我檢討，是否回應並實踐了自五四至六四一脈相承的中國人民的期待？
中國大陸民間，對六四有兩種評價。一、六四收場，換來二十年的經濟發展、大國崛起；二、六四不死，中共在六四的教訓之後勵精圖治，回饋人民。這兩種看法皆證實了六四的重大意義。就中國而言，六四對民主自由的解放主張，也許在朝野間對程度及階段有不同的思慮，但終究不能否認其「革命性」，亦即不能指其為「反革命」。後人將永遠如此看待五四，也將永遠如此看待六四。
再以六四看兩岸關係。其實，國共內戰，也是發生在前述那個「沒頭蒼蠅的時代」，火中取栗，卻未必確有澄清天下的真知灼見；現在國民黨政府經威權統治終於走上民主，共產黨政權經幾次治理浩劫終於走上改革開放，即可證昨非而今是。如今到了馬英九、胡錦濤這一代，兩岸關係當然仍舊存有許多程度及階段的缺口，但雙方心中皆應十分明白，什麼是正確的而暫時做不到的，什麼又是錯的而千萬不能做的。
六四雖未深入兩岸關係，但六四的民主憧憬卻無兩岸的分際可言。準此以言，不論對內對外，北京當局眼前應只是尚做不到「民主」的標準，卻不能否定這個標準。此即所謂「是正確的而暫時做不到的」。至於什麼是錯的而千萬不能做的？這應是指，兩岸如今可謂是重新又回頭面對在五四尚未了結的治國方案大辯論，而絕不能再是一場軍事內戰。
六四曾經造成中國秩序動盪，就此或許也可說是一場「動亂」吧；但六四的精神卻不是「反革命」，反而是青年們對「革命」最天真與最熾烈的信仰與追求。中共領導人即使口裡不便如此說，但心裡要明白：中國的方向只有一個，從五四到六四皆是指往這個方向。
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
Chaiwan: The Imaginary and the Real
Chaiwan: The Imaginary and the Real
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 2, 2009
A few days ago the South Korean media "provided intense coverage of Chaiwan." It vividly depicted the impact cross-Strait economic cooperation is having on South Korea.
"Chaiwan" is a term coined by the South Korean media. It denotes [Mainland] China plus Taiwan. It reveals South Korea's sensitivities. It also shows that the so-called thaw between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is not merely a figment of the imagination, but has in fact brought about a change in the political climate, one that has spread to the entire region. South Korea, due to its geopolitical proximity and its highly competitive relationship with both sides of the Taiwan Strait, has been the first to feel the impact of this change.
In fact, over a month and a half ago, the South Korean media reported that the "Chaiwan LCD industry was launching a pincers movement against South Korea." It said that Mainland China was "stimulating domestic demand" and "marketing home appliances to rural households" in order to draw Taiwan businesses closer. It was making large purchases of Taiwan products and promoting cross-Strait business cooperation to expand production capacity. This was seriously crowding out products manufactured by South Korea's Samsung and LG. Call it "Joint [Mainland] China and Taiwan Forces" if you like. Call it "Chaiwan" if you like. Either way, it demonstrates that cross-Strait economic cooperation is a force to be reckoned with.
Let's take a closer look at the meaning of "Joint [Mainland] China and Taiwan Forces." The first half of the compound term "Chaiwan" refers to Mainland China's substantial capital and markets. The second half refers to Taiwan's electronics industry and its abundant skilled labor, technology, and global perspective. In other words, the two sides each have strengths which complement each other, link to each other, thereby creating synergies. This is why South Korea is so nervous. If the two sides struggle independently, or even struggle against each other, then the two sides can only watch idly as South Korean brands retain their lead.
From this perspective, South Korea should thank Lee Teng-hui's "No Haste, Be Patient" policy, and Chen Shui-bian's "Closed Door" policy. Here one can find the cross-Strait contradictions that provided South Korea with the room to grow. Taiwan wasted over a decade. Only then did it cast off its enmity for the Mainland. Only then did it emerge from the shadow of hate. Cross-Strait economic cooperation is still anathema to some elements on Taiwan. But at least Taiwan has emerged from the doldrums of the financial crisis, and liberated itself from the Closed Door Policy. Doesn't the South Korean business community's terror of "Joint [Mainland] China and Taiwan Forces" help us see the time and opportunities we lost?
Language is often filled with illusions. The term "Chaiwan" breezily links the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, as if the "Joint [Mainland] China and Taiwan Forces" constituted an actual force. In fact, we all know that the Taiwan Strait hasn't been filled in. A large gap remains between the two sides. Chaiwan is merely a concept invented by the foreign media. It doesn't even rate the term "imaginary entity." So the next question is, can the governments and people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait give "Chaiwan" real meaning? The cross-Strait division of labor will help maintain a healthy, mutually beneficial relationship. It will increase equality, and help the two sides systematically move away from short term rush orders, hot money/refugee capital, and no cap procurements, to a cross-Strait economic platform. Only then will "Chaiwan" cease being a neologism, and metamorphose into a concept of historical significance.
To say that "Chaiwan" has left South Korea trembling is of course an exaggeration. South Korean companies still see "Joint [Mainland] China and Taiwan Forces" playing catch-up. But during the first quarter of this year, Taiwan's flat panel industry racked up a 56% share of the Mainland China market. It reduced South Korea's market share from 46% last year to less than 30% this year. For Taiwan this is a victory worth celebrating. Had the governments on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait not forsaken hostilities and evinced good faith, how could Taiwan businesses have enjoyed such an opportunity amidst the global chill?
Cross-Strait co-operation has led to satisfying results. But the two sides have also discovered differences, disagreements, even conflicts. These have yet to be overcome and worked out. Especially important is how to keep cross-Strait relationship neither too hot nor too cold. This includes the pace at which Mainland capital is allowed in, and its extent. This includes the "cross-Strait peace dividend" that stock market analysts have been speculating about. All these could lead to unexpected conflicts in cross-Strait cooperation, endangering the whole enterprise. Caution is essential.
South Korea's biggest lament as it watches "Chaiwan's" rise is that both Korea and China are divided countries. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are now able to work with each other. South Korea meanwhile, must face the threat of North Korean missiles. Opportunities for peace do not come easily. Taiwan has already missed many opportunities over the years. People on Taiwan should be able to understand South Koreans' anxiety. As for Taiwan, its challenge is how to maintain its cherished values and long-term viability. This test has only just begun!
Chaiwan的想像與真實
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.02 06:21 am
南韓媒體日前一篇「凶猛追擊的Chaiwan」報導，生動描繪了台海兩岸經濟合作威力對南韓形成的震撼。
「Chaiwan」（中國China加台灣Taiwan）一詞由南韓媒體創製出來，除了反映南韓的敏感神經，也顯示所謂的兩岸融冰已不純然是政治想像的圖景，它已帶來氣候變化，且正向區域擴散。南韓由於地緣上的鄰近，加以經貿上與兩岸具有高度競合關係，因而最早敏銳感受到變化的滋味。
其實，更早在一個半月前，南韓媒體即曾出現「中台ＬＣＤ聯軍夾攻韓國」的報導，指出中國利用「刺激內需」及「家電下鄉」政策拉攏台灣企業，大舉購買台灣產品，並促使兩岸企業合作擴大產能，對韓國三星及ＬＧ等企業的產品造成嚴重擠壓。稱之為「中台聯軍」也好，稱之為「Chaiwan」也罷，都顯示兩岸經濟合作已產生不容忽視的威力。
如果進一步探討「中台聯軍」的意涵，在Chaiwan這個複合詞中，前半截包涵了中國大陸龐大的資金和市場，後半截則包涵了台灣電子產業豐沛的人才、技術和世界觀。亦即，兩岸各具所長，且彼此條件互補，兩者聯結，效果相乘，才出現這支讓南韓發抖的大軍。如果雙方各自單打獨鬥，或彼此勾心鬥角，兩岸也只能看著南韓品牌繼續領其風騷了。
從這個角度看，南韓恐怕要感謝李登輝的「戒急用忍」和陳水扁的「鎖國」，它才能在兩岸的矛盾中找到坐大的空間。台灣耗費了十多年，才走出兩岸「敵對」、「仇視」的陰影；今天兩岸的經濟合作，在台灣雖仍遭到異議人士的詛咒，卻至少幫台灣提早走出金融風暴的低谷和鎖國的困境。從南韓企業界對「中台聯軍」的戒懼，不也讓我們看到曾經錯失的時光和機會？
然而，語言也經常充滿虛幻。Chaiwan一詞，毫不費力地將兩岸連成一氣，彷彿「中台聯軍」是一支具體存在的大軍；實際上，大家都知道台灣海峽還沒有被填平，兩岸間各方面的偌大差距依然存在，Chaiwan只是一個外國媒體塑造的概念，連「想像的共同體」都還稱不上。接下來的問題是：兩岸政府和人民將如何賦予Chaiwan以正確的意涵？兩岸經濟的分工合作，只有維持穩健、互利、對等的深化，並從「急單」、「熱錢」、「上不封頂的熱單」，步步進化至「海峽平台」，Chaiwan才有可能突破新詞之繭，蛻變成有歷史意義的概念。
說Chaiwan讓南韓「發抖」，當然是誇張之詞；因為在韓國企業眼中，仍將中台聯軍視為「追兵」而已。但無論如何，今年第一季台灣面板業在中國市場奪下五成六的市占率，把去年市占四成六的南韓擠到三成以下，對台灣當然是值得慶賀的勝利。若非兩岸政府放下敵意、釋出善意，台灣企業如何在全球景氣寒冬中得到這個機會？
兩岸合作儘管寫下了令人滿意的成績，但雙方也陸續發現彼此的差異，甚至出現歧見和摩擦，這些都仍有待克服及調適。尤其值得注意的是，兩岸交流熱度如何保持不慍不火，包括對陸資開放的速度與範圍，包括股市名嘴信口炒作「兩岸和平紅利」概念，都可能使兩岸合作因在意想不到的地方擦槍走火，而危及全盤棋局，不可不慎。
面對Chaiwan崛起，南韓最大的慨嘆其實是：同是分裂國家，台海兩岸正在攜手合作，而南韓卻須面對北韓發射飛彈的威脅。的確，和平的機會並不是唾手可得，曾經錯過機會多年的台灣，應可以體會韓國的焦慮。至於台灣在Chaiwan概念中，如何保持自己珍視的價值而永續經營，考驗才剛開始呢！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 2, 2009
A few days ago the South Korean media "provided intense coverage of Chaiwan." It vividly depicted the impact cross-Strait economic cooperation is having on South Korea.
"Chaiwan" is a term coined by the South Korean media. It denotes [Mainland] China plus Taiwan. It reveals South Korea's sensitivities. It also shows that the so-called thaw between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is not merely a figment of the imagination, but has in fact brought about a change in the political climate, one that has spread to the entire region. South Korea, due to its geopolitical proximity and its highly competitive relationship with both sides of the Taiwan Strait, has been the first to feel the impact of this change.
In fact, over a month and a half ago, the South Korean media reported that the "Chaiwan LCD industry was launching a pincers movement against South Korea." It said that Mainland China was "stimulating domestic demand" and "marketing home appliances to rural households" in order to draw Taiwan businesses closer. It was making large purchases of Taiwan products and promoting cross-Strait business cooperation to expand production capacity. This was seriously crowding out products manufactured by South Korea's Samsung and LG. Call it "Joint [Mainland] China and Taiwan Forces" if you like. Call it "Chaiwan" if you like. Either way, it demonstrates that cross-Strait economic cooperation is a force to be reckoned with.
Let's take a closer look at the meaning of "Joint [Mainland] China and Taiwan Forces." The first half of the compound term "Chaiwan" refers to Mainland China's substantial capital and markets. The second half refers to Taiwan's electronics industry and its abundant skilled labor, technology, and global perspective. In other words, the two sides each have strengths which complement each other, link to each other, thereby creating synergies. This is why South Korea is so nervous. If the two sides struggle independently, or even struggle against each other, then the two sides can only watch idly as South Korean brands retain their lead.
From this perspective, South Korea should thank Lee Teng-hui's "No Haste, Be Patient" policy, and Chen Shui-bian's "Closed Door" policy. Here one can find the cross-Strait contradictions that provided South Korea with the room to grow. Taiwan wasted over a decade. Only then did it cast off its enmity for the Mainland. Only then did it emerge from the shadow of hate. Cross-Strait economic cooperation is still anathema to some elements on Taiwan. But at least Taiwan has emerged from the doldrums of the financial crisis, and liberated itself from the Closed Door Policy. Doesn't the South Korean business community's terror of "Joint [Mainland] China and Taiwan Forces" help us see the time and opportunities we lost?
Language is often filled with illusions. The term "Chaiwan" breezily links the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, as if the "Joint [Mainland] China and Taiwan Forces" constituted an actual force. In fact, we all know that the Taiwan Strait hasn't been filled in. A large gap remains between the two sides. Chaiwan is merely a concept invented by the foreign media. It doesn't even rate the term "imaginary entity." So the next question is, can the governments and people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait give "Chaiwan" real meaning? The cross-Strait division of labor will help maintain a healthy, mutually beneficial relationship. It will increase equality, and help the two sides systematically move away from short term rush orders, hot money/refugee capital, and no cap procurements, to a cross-Strait economic platform. Only then will "Chaiwan" cease being a neologism, and metamorphose into a concept of historical significance.
To say that "Chaiwan" has left South Korea trembling is of course an exaggeration. South Korean companies still see "Joint [Mainland] China and Taiwan Forces" playing catch-up. But during the first quarter of this year, Taiwan's flat panel industry racked up a 56% share of the Mainland China market. It reduced South Korea's market share from 46% last year to less than 30% this year. For Taiwan this is a victory worth celebrating. Had the governments on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait not forsaken hostilities and evinced good faith, how could Taiwan businesses have enjoyed such an opportunity amidst the global chill?
Cross-Strait co-operation has led to satisfying results. But the two sides have also discovered differences, disagreements, even conflicts. These have yet to be overcome and worked out. Especially important is how to keep cross-Strait relationship neither too hot nor too cold. This includes the pace at which Mainland capital is allowed in, and its extent. This includes the "cross-Strait peace dividend" that stock market analysts have been speculating about. All these could lead to unexpected conflicts in cross-Strait cooperation, endangering the whole enterprise. Caution is essential.
South Korea's biggest lament as it watches "Chaiwan's" rise is that both Korea and China are divided countries. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are now able to work with each other. South Korea meanwhile, must face the threat of North Korean missiles. Opportunities for peace do not come easily. Taiwan has already missed many opportunities over the years. People on Taiwan should be able to understand South Koreans' anxiety. As for Taiwan, its challenge is how to maintain its cherished values and long-term viability. This test has only just begun!
Chaiwan的想像與真實
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.02 06:21 am
南韓媒體日前一篇「凶猛追擊的Chaiwan」報導，生動描繪了台海兩岸經濟合作威力對南韓形成的震撼。
「Chaiwan」（中國China加台灣Taiwan）一詞由南韓媒體創製出來，除了反映南韓的敏感神經，也顯示所謂的兩岸融冰已不純然是政治想像的圖景，它已帶來氣候變化，且正向區域擴散。南韓由於地緣上的鄰近，加以經貿上與兩岸具有高度競合關係，因而最早敏銳感受到變化的滋味。
其實，更早在一個半月前，南韓媒體即曾出現「中台ＬＣＤ聯軍夾攻韓國」的報導，指出中國利用「刺激內需」及「家電下鄉」政策拉攏台灣企業，大舉購買台灣產品，並促使兩岸企業合作擴大產能，對韓國三星及ＬＧ等企業的產品造成嚴重擠壓。稱之為「中台聯軍」也好，稱之為「Chaiwan」也罷，都顯示兩岸經濟合作已產生不容忽視的威力。
如果進一步探討「中台聯軍」的意涵，在Chaiwan這個複合詞中，前半截包涵了中國大陸龐大的資金和市場，後半截則包涵了台灣電子產業豐沛的人才、技術和世界觀。亦即，兩岸各具所長，且彼此條件互補，兩者聯結，效果相乘，才出現這支讓南韓發抖的大軍。如果雙方各自單打獨鬥，或彼此勾心鬥角，兩岸也只能看著南韓品牌繼續領其風騷了。
從這個角度看，南韓恐怕要感謝李登輝的「戒急用忍」和陳水扁的「鎖國」，它才能在兩岸的矛盾中找到坐大的空間。台灣耗費了十多年，才走出兩岸「敵對」、「仇視」的陰影；今天兩岸的經濟合作，在台灣雖仍遭到異議人士的詛咒，卻至少幫台灣提早走出金融風暴的低谷和鎖國的困境。從南韓企業界對「中台聯軍」的戒懼，不也讓我們看到曾經錯失的時光和機會？
然而，語言也經常充滿虛幻。Chaiwan一詞，毫不費力地將兩岸連成一氣，彷彿「中台聯軍」是一支具體存在的大軍；實際上，大家都知道台灣海峽還沒有被填平，兩岸間各方面的偌大差距依然存在，Chaiwan只是一個外國媒體塑造的概念，連「想像的共同體」都還稱不上。接下來的問題是：兩岸政府和人民將如何賦予Chaiwan以正確的意涵？兩岸經濟的分工合作，只有維持穩健、互利、對等的深化，並從「急單」、「熱錢」、「上不封頂的熱單」，步步進化至「海峽平台」，Chaiwan才有可能突破新詞之繭，蛻變成有歷史意義的概念。
說Chaiwan讓南韓「發抖」，當然是誇張之詞；因為在韓國企業眼中，仍將中台聯軍視為「追兵」而已。但無論如何，今年第一季台灣面板業在中國市場奪下五成六的市占率，把去年市占四成六的南韓擠到三成以下，對台灣當然是值得慶賀的勝利。若非兩岸政府放下敵意、釋出善意，台灣企業如何在全球景氣寒冬中得到這個機會？
兩岸合作儘管寫下了令人滿意的成績，但雙方也陸續發現彼此的差異，甚至出現歧見和摩擦，這些都仍有待克服及調適。尤其值得注意的是，兩岸交流熱度如何保持不慍不火，包括對陸資開放的速度與範圍，包括股市名嘴信口炒作「兩岸和平紅利」概念，都可能使兩岸合作因在意想不到的地方擦槍走火，而危及全盤棋局，不可不慎。
面對Chaiwan崛起，南韓最大的慨嘆其實是：同是分裂國家，台海兩岸正在攜手合作，而南韓卻須面對北韓發射飛彈的威脅。的確，和平的機會並不是唾手可得，曾經錯過機會多年的台灣，應可以體會韓國的焦慮。至於台灣在Chaiwan概念中，如何保持自己珍視的價值而永續經營，考驗才剛開始呢！
Monday, June 1, 2009
The KMT and DPP: Racing to Beijing?
The KMT and DPP: Racing to Beijing?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 1, 2009
Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland has decreased tensions on both Taiwan and the Mainland. But on closer examination, it also conceals potentially chilling risks.
Chen Chu visited the Mainland during the May 17 protest march. The contrast between the two events was extreme. The march protested "Sympathy for [Mainland] China and betrayal of Taiwan." The visit to the Mainland on the other hand, "promoted Kaohsiung." The Democratic Progressive Party tried to conceal its actions. But when the show was over, it was clear that behind the scenes planning had gone on for a long time. Deep Greens were not the only ones who felt deceived. Most people were surprised by the sudden and dramatic change. Clearly the Democratic Progressive Party neither discussed nor sanctioned Chen Chu's visit. Such an earth-shaking event was decided in such a non-transparent manner, and implemented in such a deceitful fashion. Overnight, the political winds changed direction. Overnight, heaven and earth were turned upside down. Is this not terrifying? How can people not shudder?
How hypocritical are these political slogans? Yesterday they denounced "Sympathy for China and betrayal of Taiwan." Today Chen Chu toasts Mainland officials in Beijing. How capricious are these political changes? Yesterday they were diehard advocates of Taiwan independence. Today they stand on the banks of the Huangpu River and declare that "The ends of the world are right next door." They gush over Yangshan Port. They bask in their red carpet treatment. Politics means change. But such metamorphoses and mutations, out of nowhere, leave one stunned. Politics truly is incomprehensible. Politics truly is untrustworthy.
From this day forward, the public on Taiwan must have a new understanding of political change. Suppose some day the KMT and DPP fall over each other in their rush to "promote Taiwan" to Beijing. We will not only have a "KMT/CCP Forum." We will even have a "DPP/CCP Forum." Don't be surprised. Be nervous.
Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland is not an isolated case. The Democratic Progressive Party must account for its actions. If Chen Chu can affirm the Republic of China before the Beijing authorities, what reason does the Democratic Progressive Party have to demand Taiwan independence? If Chen Chu can be wined and dined by Mainland officials in Beijing and Shanghai, what reason does the Democratic Progressive Party have to beseige hotels hosting Mainland officials, and vandalize cars transporting Mainland officials?
The DPP must explain Chen Chu's visit. She cannot mysteriously go and mysteriously return. Prior to Chen Chu's visit, the DPP's official line was the "Wang Ting-yu Standard." Enmity, conflict, denunciations, violence, demands for Taiwan independence, and opposition to "sympathy for China and the betrayal of Taiwan." After Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland, the DPP apparently came up with a new set of "Chen Chu Standards." Peace, friendship, communication, exchanges, a revisionist form of Taiwan independence, and a mutually beneficial, win-win, cross-Strait relationship. This change in standards will change future dynamics within the Democratic Progressive Party. It will change the way the DPP interacts with hardline Deep Green Taiwan independence elements. It will change the way the DPP and the Pan Blue Camp grapple over the issues. It will change the way the Democratic Progressive Party negotiates with Beijing. Does the Democratic Progressive Party have the ability to undergo such a huge change? Can the "Chen Chu Standards" replace the "Wang Ting-yu Standards?" The Mainland authorities have given Chen Chu the red carpet treatment. Does the Democratic Progressive Party still intend to insult officials from Beijing? Chen Chu has proposed cooperation between Kaohsiung Port and Yangshan Port. Does the DPP still intend to boycott cross-Strait joint operation of these ports in the Legislative Yuan?
The DPP is undergoing changes. This is both heartening and worrisome. It is heartening that conflicts on Taiwan can be reduced, and that bipartisan cross-Strait policy can be improved. It is worrisome that the "good cop/bad cop" framework, in which the KMT reconciles with the CPP, while the DPP checks reconciliation with the CPP, may disintegrate. The two parties may compete with each other in their attempt to establish public or private channels with Beijing. Who knew that Chen Chu and the DPP also had "secret envoys" to Beijing, making it even easier for Beijing to manipulate the political situation on Taiwan? This situation has incalculable risks. Chen Chu successfully visited the Mainland, by means of deceitful, non-transparent means. Now that we know politicians can cavalierly betray their own May 17 protest march, what remains of public trust?
The Democratic Progressive Party applauded Chen Chu's performance on the Mainland. The Democratic Progressive Party did not explain the reasons for its change in behavior, before the fact. Nor has it accounted for the impact of its change in behavior, after the fact. The public sees only the Democratic Progressive Party, filled with vanity, competing with the KMT in front of the Mainland authorities. It denies deny betraying its own Deep Green supporters. It refuses to explain its 180 degree about face. If the Democratic Progressive Party cannot explain Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland to its Deep Green supporters and party insiders, how can it gain the trust of mainstream society?
Chen Chu's sudden visit to the Mainland gave the public a surprise. It also left them filled with suspicion and mistrust.
想像國民兩黨皆競相奔赴北京的那一天
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.01 05:49 am
陳菊登陸，為台灣內部及兩岸帶來些許寬鬆和緩的氛圍。但若進一步思量，其間潛藏的莫名風險卻亦令人不寒而慄。
陳菊在五一七遊行的背景下登陸，兩相對比的反差極大。遊行是反「傾中賣台」，登陸則是在杯觥交錯中「行銷高雄」。民進黨事前試圖全面掩藏消息，事後則顯示幕後籌劃已久。不但深綠極獨覺得受到欺騙，多數國人也對突如其來的巨變感到驚奇，在民進黨內則顯然未經體制機構的論證及決議。這麼一件翻天覆地的大事，就這樣在不透明的黑箱之中決策，又以瞞天過海的手段執行；一夕之間，風雲變色，乾坤顛倒，這可怕不可怕，豈能不教人不寒而慄？
政治的口號多麼虛偽，昨天傾中賣台的咒罵，今天皆消融於陳菊在北京高舉的酒杯中；政治的變化更是多麼難測，昨天還是鐵桿台獨，今天卻在黃浦江畔宣稱「天涯若比鄰」，盛讚洋山港，並享受「高規格」的豪華款待。政治當然寓藏變化，但這種不知來龍、難窺去脈，丈二金剛摸不到頭腦般的突變、遽變，確實令人頭皮發麻。說變就變，政治真是不可理解，不可信任！
從今以後，台灣人民必須對政治風雲持有新的想像力。如果某一天，出現國民黨、民進黨雙雙競相奔赴北京「行銷台灣」的景象，且非但有「國共論壇」，又有「民共論壇」；大家不必驚奇，但要繃緊神經。
陳菊登陸絕非「個案」，民進黨必須交代這個行動的前因與後果。如果陳菊可以在北京當局面前宣示對中華民國的國家認同，民進黨還有什麼理由搞台獨？如果陳菊在京滬接受中國官方的豪華宴席，則民進黨未來還有什麼理由在中國官員來訪時包圍酒店、砸爛來客的座車？
民進黨不能教陳菊不明不白地去，又不明不白地回來。陳菊登陸以前，民進黨認可的是「王定宇基準」：敵對、衝突、叫罵、暴力、台獨，與反傾中賣台；陳菊登陸後，民進黨似乎必須拿出一套新的「陳菊基準」：和平、友善、溝通、交流，修正的台獨，與兩岸互惠雙贏。這種基準的移變，將使民進黨內的互動改變，亦使民進黨與深綠極獨的互動改變，民進黨與藍營角力的題材改變，並使民進黨與北京的折衝策略改變。民進黨是否有能力承當得起這樣的巨大改變？「陳菊基準」是否可能取代「王定宇基準」？總不能在陳菊享盡中國官方的溫馨禮遇後，民進黨卻仍要將北京來客羞辱得灰頭土臉吧？總不能一面陳菊主張高雄港與洋山港合作，另一面民進黨卻在立院鬧場杯葛兩岸合營碼頭吧？
面對民進黨可能出現的變化，令人一則以喜一則以憂。喜的是台灣內部的內耗可能降低，兩黨的兩岸政策可能出現較佳的競合。憂的卻是今後「國民黨和解／民進黨牽制」的「黑白臉」架構可能解體，甚至兩黨競相以公開或私密的管道奔赴北京（啊，原來陳菊與民進黨也有「密使」！），以致中國更易操控台灣政局，其間不免有不測的風險。只消再回想陳菊如何經由完全不透明的黑箱、瞞天過海地登陸成功，即可知政治人物既能如此任意翻臉出賣五一七大遊行，還有什麼社會信任可言？
陳菊在大陸的表現，民進黨內一片喝采。民進黨事前不說明作此巨變的理由為何，事後也不交代經此巨變的後續效應如何。國人只看到民進黨內，充滿著一種能在中國當局面前與國民黨爭奇鬥艷、爭風吃醋的虛榮感；他們完全不認為他們背叛了一直被他們利用的深綠極獨群眾，也不對一百八十度的大轉彎作出任何解釋交代。民進黨若不能對深綠及黨內說清楚陳菊登陸的全盤因果關係，更如何建立主流社會對它的信賴？
陳菊突然一夕登陸，這對國人是一個驚奇，且也充滿了猜疑與不信任。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 1, 2009
Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland has decreased tensions on both Taiwan and the Mainland. But on closer examination, it also conceals potentially chilling risks.
Chen Chu visited the Mainland during the May 17 protest march. The contrast between the two events was extreme. The march protested "Sympathy for [Mainland] China and betrayal of Taiwan." The visit to the Mainland on the other hand, "promoted Kaohsiung." The Democratic Progressive Party tried to conceal its actions. But when the show was over, it was clear that behind the scenes planning had gone on for a long time. Deep Greens were not the only ones who felt deceived. Most people were surprised by the sudden and dramatic change. Clearly the Democratic Progressive Party neither discussed nor sanctioned Chen Chu's visit. Such an earth-shaking event was decided in such a non-transparent manner, and implemented in such a deceitful fashion. Overnight, the political winds changed direction. Overnight, heaven and earth were turned upside down. Is this not terrifying? How can people not shudder?
How hypocritical are these political slogans? Yesterday they denounced "Sympathy for China and betrayal of Taiwan." Today Chen Chu toasts Mainland officials in Beijing. How capricious are these political changes? Yesterday they were diehard advocates of Taiwan independence. Today they stand on the banks of the Huangpu River and declare that "The ends of the world are right next door." They gush over Yangshan Port. They bask in their red carpet treatment. Politics means change. But such metamorphoses and mutations, out of nowhere, leave one stunned. Politics truly is incomprehensible. Politics truly is untrustworthy.
From this day forward, the public on Taiwan must have a new understanding of political change. Suppose some day the KMT and DPP fall over each other in their rush to "promote Taiwan" to Beijing. We will not only have a "KMT/CCP Forum." We will even have a "DPP/CCP Forum." Don't be surprised. Be nervous.
Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland is not an isolated case. The Democratic Progressive Party must account for its actions. If Chen Chu can affirm the Republic of China before the Beijing authorities, what reason does the Democratic Progressive Party have to demand Taiwan independence? If Chen Chu can be wined and dined by Mainland officials in Beijing and Shanghai, what reason does the Democratic Progressive Party have to beseige hotels hosting Mainland officials, and vandalize cars transporting Mainland officials?
The DPP must explain Chen Chu's visit. She cannot mysteriously go and mysteriously return. Prior to Chen Chu's visit, the DPP's official line was the "Wang Ting-yu Standard." Enmity, conflict, denunciations, violence, demands for Taiwan independence, and opposition to "sympathy for China and the betrayal of Taiwan." After Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland, the DPP apparently came up with a new set of "Chen Chu Standards." Peace, friendship, communication, exchanges, a revisionist form of Taiwan independence, and a mutually beneficial, win-win, cross-Strait relationship. This change in standards will change future dynamics within the Democratic Progressive Party. It will change the way the DPP interacts with hardline Deep Green Taiwan independence elements. It will change the way the DPP and the Pan Blue Camp grapple over the issues. It will change the way the Democratic Progressive Party negotiates with Beijing. Does the Democratic Progressive Party have the ability to undergo such a huge change? Can the "Chen Chu Standards" replace the "Wang Ting-yu Standards?" The Mainland authorities have given Chen Chu the red carpet treatment. Does the Democratic Progressive Party still intend to insult officials from Beijing? Chen Chu has proposed cooperation between Kaohsiung Port and Yangshan Port. Does the DPP still intend to boycott cross-Strait joint operation of these ports in the Legislative Yuan?
The DPP is undergoing changes. This is both heartening and worrisome. It is heartening that conflicts on Taiwan can be reduced, and that bipartisan cross-Strait policy can be improved. It is worrisome that the "good cop/bad cop" framework, in which the KMT reconciles with the CPP, while the DPP checks reconciliation with the CPP, may disintegrate. The two parties may compete with each other in their attempt to establish public or private channels with Beijing. Who knew that Chen Chu and the DPP also had "secret envoys" to Beijing, making it even easier for Beijing to manipulate the political situation on Taiwan? This situation has incalculable risks. Chen Chu successfully visited the Mainland, by means of deceitful, non-transparent means. Now that we know politicians can cavalierly betray their own May 17 protest march, what remains of public trust?
The Democratic Progressive Party applauded Chen Chu's performance on the Mainland. The Democratic Progressive Party did not explain the reasons for its change in behavior, before the fact. Nor has it accounted for the impact of its change in behavior, after the fact. The public sees only the Democratic Progressive Party, filled with vanity, competing with the KMT in front of the Mainland authorities. It denies deny betraying its own Deep Green supporters. It refuses to explain its 180 degree about face. If the Democratic Progressive Party cannot explain Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland to its Deep Green supporters and party insiders, how can it gain the trust of mainstream society?
Chen Chu's sudden visit to the Mainland gave the public a surprise. It also left them filled with suspicion and mistrust.
想像國民兩黨皆競相奔赴北京的那一天
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.01 05:49 am
陳菊登陸，為台灣內部及兩岸帶來些許寬鬆和緩的氛圍。但若進一步思量，其間潛藏的莫名風險卻亦令人不寒而慄。
陳菊在五一七遊行的背景下登陸，兩相對比的反差極大。遊行是反「傾中賣台」，登陸則是在杯觥交錯中「行銷高雄」。民進黨事前試圖全面掩藏消息，事後則顯示幕後籌劃已久。不但深綠極獨覺得受到欺騙，多數國人也對突如其來的巨變感到驚奇，在民進黨內則顯然未經體制機構的論證及決議。這麼一件翻天覆地的大事，就這樣在不透明的黑箱之中決策，又以瞞天過海的手段執行；一夕之間，風雲變色，乾坤顛倒，這可怕不可怕，豈能不教人不寒而慄？
政治的口號多麼虛偽，昨天傾中賣台的咒罵，今天皆消融於陳菊在北京高舉的酒杯中；政治的變化更是多麼難測，昨天還是鐵桿台獨，今天卻在黃浦江畔宣稱「天涯若比鄰」，盛讚洋山港，並享受「高規格」的豪華款待。政治當然寓藏變化，但這種不知來龍、難窺去脈，丈二金剛摸不到頭腦般的突變、遽變，確實令人頭皮發麻。說變就變，政治真是不可理解，不可信任！
從今以後，台灣人民必須對政治風雲持有新的想像力。如果某一天，出現國民黨、民進黨雙雙競相奔赴北京「行銷台灣」的景象，且非但有「國共論壇」，又有「民共論壇」；大家不必驚奇，但要繃緊神經。
陳菊登陸絕非「個案」，民進黨必須交代這個行動的前因與後果。如果陳菊可以在北京當局面前宣示對中華民國的國家認同，民進黨還有什麼理由搞台獨？如果陳菊在京滬接受中國官方的豪華宴席，則民進黨未來還有什麼理由在中國官員來訪時包圍酒店、砸爛來客的座車？
民進黨不能教陳菊不明不白地去，又不明不白地回來。陳菊登陸以前，民進黨認可的是「王定宇基準」：敵對、衝突、叫罵、暴力、台獨，與反傾中賣台；陳菊登陸後，民進黨似乎必須拿出一套新的「陳菊基準」：和平、友善、溝通、交流，修正的台獨，與兩岸互惠雙贏。這種基準的移變，將使民進黨內的互動改變，亦使民進黨與深綠極獨的互動改變，民進黨與藍營角力的題材改變，並使民進黨與北京的折衝策略改變。民進黨是否有能力承當得起這樣的巨大改變？「陳菊基準」是否可能取代「王定宇基準」？總不能在陳菊享盡中國官方的溫馨禮遇後，民進黨卻仍要將北京來客羞辱得灰頭土臉吧？總不能一面陳菊主張高雄港與洋山港合作，另一面民進黨卻在立院鬧場杯葛兩岸合營碼頭吧？
面對民進黨可能出現的變化，令人一則以喜一則以憂。喜的是台灣內部的內耗可能降低，兩黨的兩岸政策可能出現較佳的競合。憂的卻是今後「國民黨和解／民進黨牽制」的「黑白臉」架構可能解體，甚至兩黨競相以公開或私密的管道奔赴北京（啊，原來陳菊與民進黨也有「密使」！），以致中國更易操控台灣政局，其間不免有不測的風險。只消再回想陳菊如何經由完全不透明的黑箱、瞞天過海地登陸成功，即可知政治人物既能如此任意翻臉出賣五一七大遊行，還有什麼社會信任可言？
陳菊在大陸的表現，民進黨內一片喝采。民進黨事前不說明作此巨變的理由為何，事後也不交代經此巨變的後續效應如何。國人只看到民進黨內，充滿著一種能在中國當局面前與國民黨爭奇鬥艷、爭風吃醋的虛榮感；他們完全不認為他們背叛了一直被他們利用的深綠極獨群眾，也不對一百八十度的大轉彎作出任何解釋交代。民進黨若不能對深綠及黨內說清楚陳菊登陸的全盤因果關係，更如何建立主流社會對它的信賴？
陳菊突然一夕登陸，這對國人是一個驚奇，且也充滿了猜疑與不信任。
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