Using Taiwan Test Scores to Apply to Mainland Universities

Using Taiwan Test Scores to Apply to Mainland Universities
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 13, 2009


On the basis of one's test scores, students from Taiwan will be able to gain admission to any university on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. If one cannot get into National Taiwan University, one can get into Beijing University. If one cannot get into Tsinghua University in Hsinchu, one can get into Tsinghua University at Beijing. If one cannot get into the department of one's choice at National Chengchi University, one will be able to at Fudan University in Shanghai. For students from Taiwan, this is mighty tempting.

Mainland China's Vice Minister of Education Yuan Guiren announced this policy at the bilateral forum in Changsha. Students from Taiwan will be able to apply to Mainland universities using their Taiwan test scores. Some people think this will not impact universities on Taiwan. Others think this may lead to a wave of students studying on the Mainland over the next few years.

Let's talk about some peoples' doubts and fears. If this policy takes effect and spreads, every year as many as 10,000 students from Taiwan will chose to cross the "Blackwater Ditch" (Taiwan Strait) for four or more years of academic studies in Mainland cities. This means that a a significant proportion of young people from Taiwan would be "transferred" to the Chinese mainland. Since these students are the academic elites, how should we interpret such a population movement?

A deeper concern is that because the CCP is authoritarian, it can control the admissions process to elite Mainland universities. It can even give preferential treatment through scholarships. Will this increase the temptation for students from Taiwan to cross the Strait for higher learning? After these students cross the Strait, will these young people from Taiwan eventually wind up as Beijing's political bargaining chips?

This sort of negative thinking begins with the assumption that everything must always be to our disadvantage. As a result, its conclusion will always be that we must take every possible measure to confront and obstruct such a trend.

But one can also adopt a more positive point of view. The final result of bilateral exchanges will not necessarily manifest itself in one or two generations. We hope the two sides will fully understand each other during these one or two generations. Such an understanding is only possible when people on both sides have free access to each others' social environment, educational environment, and lifestyle. Only a generation that grows up in such an environment will be able to internalize and resolve the problems the two sides face.

Over the past sixty years, several generations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have remained mired in a zero sum game of hatred and confrontation. Governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait manipulated cross-Strait relations to their own political advantage. The public on both sides of the Taiwan Strait was relegated to the role of an amen chorus, waving flags and shouting angry slogans. If we believe the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should share a vision of peace and mutual prosperity, the first task is to increase bilateral exchanges, enabling the public on both sides to guide cross-Strait relations. If we think in these terms, open exchanges between universities on both sides is a forgone conclusion. Because as university students develop concepts of right and wrong, they will be the ones who introduce and implement a vision for the future. If the Taiwan side lacks confidence even in cross-Strait exchanges between university students, then it is going to have even less confidence in cross-Strait exchanges between ordinary members of the public.

This gesture by the Beijing authorities can be described as audacious. Beijing did not ask Taiwan to open its doors. Beijing opened its doors first. Students from Taiwan need not take any additional exams. Given such an opportunity, they are highly likely to consider such alternatives. Moreover, Beijing opened the door. Once opened, Taipei can hardly demand that Beijing to close it. In other words, the situation is out of Taipei's hands. Therefore, from Taipei's perspective, it must adopt a posture of greater openness. Otherwise it will merely wind up in a posture of passivity.

This gesture by Beijing will make it even more difficult for Taiwan to reject Mainland academic credentials, and to prohibit Mainland students from studying on Taiwan. Because even under the current system, 2000 students from Taiwan went to the Mainland to study. Now that students from Taiwan can gain admission to Mainland universities based solely on their Taiwan test scores, and receive all sorts of preferential treatment to boot, their ranks will rapidly increase. Refusal to recognize Mainland academic credentials will be both infeasible and pointless. If students from Taiwan study on the Mainland, but students from the Mainland are prohibited from studying on Taiwan, such a lop-sided situation will only be disadvantageous to Taiwan.

If the two sides of the Taiwan Strait do not wish to slam their doors shut and engage in confrontation, then they must open their doors and engage in cross-Strait exchanges. Economic and trade exchanges are good, but not as good as people to people exchanges. People to people exchanges on university campuses should be encouraged. After all, young people have a powerful sense of right and wrong, a global outlook, and hope for the future. We look forward to a future in which both sides can win and create mutual prosperity. We hope such a future will germinate and grow on university campuses on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

以台灣學測成績申請大陸大學之後
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.07.13 05:55 am

只需憑學測成績，即有可能躋身於兩岸任一所大學。如果上不了台大，卻可能上北大；如果可上新竹清華，卻亦可嚮往北京清華；如果政大選不上理想科系，卻可在上海復旦找到志願。這對於台灣學生來說，很難令人不心動。

大陸教育部副部長袁貴仁在長沙兩岸論壇上宣布這個政策，台灣學測成績可以用來申請大陸的大學。有人認為撼動不了台灣的大學，有人則認為這可能在幾年內將引發登陸的留學潮。

先談帶著些許憂慮疑懼的看法。倘若此一政策發酵擴散，以至於每年出現近萬或上萬的台灣莘莘學子，寧可西渡黑水溝，到大陸各城市以四年或更長歲月勤學苦讀，這意味著台灣將有極大比例的年輕人「輸出」到中國大陸，而這批學子如果又多是秀異的學生，則這樣的人口移動將作何解讀？

更深一層的顧慮則是，由於中共是專制政體，可以充分調度大陸名校名系的籌碼，甚至加以獎學金等的優遇，會不會對台灣學生提升了渡海留學的誘因？這一群橫渡海峽、負笈登陸的台灣青年，最後會不會成為北京當局的政治籌碼？

這類的負向思考，皆以對我必不利的懷疑論出發；其結論因而必是主張採取一切對抗與封鎖的措施，必欲阻止這個趨勢的放大與延伸。

然而，也可持比較正面與積極的觀點。兩岸之間的終局解決，必不在這一兩代人的手中出現；而當寄望於兩岸之間充分理解彼此、熟知彼此的世代之手。這樣的世代只能出現於兩岸人民皆能自由地在對方社會受教育與生活的環境之中；在這樣環境下長成的世代，才有可能發展出最妥適、最為兩岸皆能接受的終局解決模式。

六十年來，兩岸數代人物皆在「漢賊不兩立」的仇恨對立中度過；兩岸關係的主調分別操縱在兩岸政權的手中，兩岸人民只能相互銜恨作搖旗吶喊的角色。爾今，倘若認為兩岸應當以和平雙贏為共同願景，則首要之務自然是在增加兩岸人民的交流，使兩岸人民的心願能夠成為兩岸關係的領航因素。那麼，在此種思維下，兩岸大學的相互開放與交流，應當是必然及應然的趨勢。因為，大學生的是非對錯觀念已漸成熟，而大學生又是未來願景的引導者及實踐者。台灣方面倘若對兩岸大學生層次的校園交流亦缺乏自信，那就更不須提兩岸人民在其他方面的深度交流了。

北京當局的這一手，可謂「來勢洶洶」。並未要求台灣開門，而是北京自己先把門打開。台灣學生在不必另外考試的便利下，極有可能憑學測成績來考慮擺在面前的這種另類選擇。何況，門是北京開的，一旦打開，台北也不可能命他關上；換句話說，情勢已非操在台灣當局手中。所以，對台灣而言，欲因應此一新情勢，已只能朝開放的方向思考，否則將更加處於被動地位。

北京的此一舉動，將使得台灣方面拒絕承認大陸學歷，及反對陸生來台讀大學等主張更站不住腳。因為，即使在現行體制下，台灣去年登陸讀大學者就有二千人；未來開放憑台灣學測成績入學，再輔以各種優遇，人數當有顯著增加。而若未來人數快速累積，不承認大陸學歷的政策非但更不能維持，且即使維持亦無意義；至於若只是台生赴陸，而不進一步開放陸生來台，此種傾斜情勢之不利台灣，尤是不言可喻。

兩岸若不欲閉門對立，就須開門交流。經濟貿易的交流，其實不如人民的親身交流；而在人民的親身交流中，應當又以大學校園的交流最應鼓勵與期待。畢竟，青年有較正確的是非心、未來感與國際觀；我們深切期待，一個有益於雙贏共榮的兩岸憧憬，能在兩岸大學校園的深度互動交流中萌發成長。

Recommendations of the Fifth cross-Strait Economic, Trade, and Cultural Forum

Recommendations of the Fifth cross-Strait Economic, Trade, and Cultural Forum
July 12, 2009

Compiled by the Chinese Nationalist Party National Policy Research Foundation, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, and the Research Center for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait; co-hosts of the Fifth cross-Strait Economic, Trade, and Cultural Forum, held in Changsha, Hunan, July 11-12, 2009.

The purpose of this forum is to promote and deepen cross-Strait cultural and educational exchanges and cooperation, to ensure the transmission and revitalization of Chinese culture, to promote cross-Strait cultural industry cooperation, to expand cross-Strait educational exchanges and cooperation, and to hold a forum on cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation. KMT Party Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung and CCP Central Standing Committee Member Jia Qinglin spoke at the forum. Over 500 experts and scholars attended, including representatives of the KMT and the CCP, other political parties on Taiwan, and representatives from the cultural, educational, economic, and trade sectors. Cultural and educational leaders from both sides of the Taiwan Strait in attendence were considered special guests.

Participants in the forum concluded that since May last year, the two sides have been presented with an historic opportunity. They have made significant progress towards peaceful development, consistent with the interests and expectations of the public on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Closer cross-Strait economic and trade relations have been accompanied by active steps to strengthen cross-Strait cultural and educational exchanges and cooperation. This will have far-reaching significance for the continued peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. An enduring and brilliant Chinese culture is our common legacy. It is an important link joining people on both sides. Given these new circumstances, we should promote and deepen cross-Strait cultural and educational exchanges and cooperation, encourage identification with Chinese culture, and create a new era for the Chinese people. After two days of discussion, participants in the forum offered the following recommendations:

1. We should increase cross-Strait cultural exchanges and cooperation, underscoring our common heritage and promoting Chinese culture.

-- Promote bilateral exchanges and cooperation in culture, art, religion, and folk customs.

-- Increase protections for our cultural heritage, tangible and intangible, ensure their transmission and continued use, thoroughly catalog our cultural artifacts, establish means to protect our cultural assets, and properly protect Chinese cultural treasures.

-- Encourage innovation in Chinese culture, stimulate creativity, and make Chinese culture relevant to the modern world.

-- Encourage concerned agencies to increase cultural exchanges, take turns holding a variety of cultural festivals, arts festivals, and other large-scale cultural exchange activities. Help literary and arts groups on Taiwan participate in the Shanghai World Expo.

-- Help cultural and artistic institutions, organizations, art institutions and artists teach, create, tour, visit, and hold performances, including commercial performances.

-- Encourage libraries, art galleries, museums, institutions dedicated to the preservation of cultural heritage, and research institutes to hold cultural exchanges, joint exhibits, and engage in collaborative research.

-- Both sides use the same Chinese characters. An objective understanding of both sides' use of Chinese characters and the cross-Strait status quo will help us find common ground while narrowing any differences. It will help us reach a consensus, making it easier for the public on both sides to learn and use Chinese characters. Both sides should cooperate in the compilation of Chinese language reference tools.

-- Support scholars in their effort to standardize terminology and proper nouns, dictionaries, the pronunciation of words with many pronunciations, computer fonts, thesauruses, the pronunciation of geographical names, and font conversion software.

-- Support cross-Strait cultural exchanges, simplify administrative procedures, provide the proper environment for exchanges and cooperation.

-- Fully develop the strengths of each side, promote dialog and exchange between Chinese culture and world culture, disseminate Chinese culture to the rest of the world.

2. We should increase cross-Strait cooperation in the cultural industries, increasing their international competitiveness.

-- Integrate cross-Strait cultural industries resources, optimize resource allocation, nurture the cultural market, create a common cultural industry production chain, enable the formation of industrial clusters.

-- Explore traditional Chinese culture in depth, create distinctive and original Chinese styles and brands.

-- Integrate culture with science and technology, develop new cultural industries, build a modern system of cultural industries, promote cross-Strait cultural industry development.

-- Promote cross-Strait cultural industry standards, strengthen protections for intellectual property rights (IPR), establish a platform for communication and co-operation, and optimize cross-Strait cultural industry development.

-- Increase cooperation in the cultural and creative industries, sponsor cross-Strait cultural and creative industry expos, establish bodies to promote cultural and creative industry exchanges and cooperation.

-- Increase exchanges and cooperation in film, television and other fields, increase exchanges and cooperation in the production of film and television dramas, increase exchanges and cooperation among film and television professionals.

-- Establish a mechanism for publication exchanges, expand publications and copyrights, increase publishing industry cooperation, develop a market for overseas Chinese-language publishing.

3. We should promote cross-Strait educational exchanges and cooperation, enhancing the quality of education on both sides.

-- Promote educational development, highlight the spirit and essence of Chinese culture, increase exchanges, shared opportunities, and cultivate cultural talent.

-- Develop the unique strengths of each side, open up and share educational resources, create a favorable environment for cross-Strait academic exchanges.

-- Support exchanges and cooperation among schools at all levels, establish platforms for cooperation, and mechanisms for the transfer, recognition and accumulation of academic credits, improve school standards through inter-school exchanges and cooperation.

-- Recognize each others' academic qualifications, and engage in substantive educational exchanges and cooperation.

-- Encourage students on both sides to learn, and create favorable conditions for learning.

-- Increase teacher and student exchanges, help young students hold large-scale exchanges, and establish channels of communication.

-- Encourage concerned groups and schools to hold primary and middle school student exchanges, teaching them to read the Chinese classics and write about them.

4. We should consider signing a cultural and educational exchange agreement, establishing mechanisms for cross-Strait cultural and educational cooperation.

-- Encourage experts and scholars to conduct research and planning on cultural and educational exchange agreements, establish cultural and educational exchanges and cooperation mechanisms, institutionalize and standardize cultural and educational exchanges.

5. We should strengthen cross-Strait news exchanges.

-- Expand the exchange of information, establish permanent institutions to promote cross-Strait news media as soon as possible, encourage and strengthen cross-Strait media exchanges and cooperation.

6. We should encourage the growth of Taiwan-funded enterprises on the mainland, and promote cooperation in energy conservation, environmental protection, and new energy sectors.

-- Help Taiwan-funded enterprises respond to dramatic changes in the global financial environment, take advantage of opportunities provided by the mainland's regional development strategy for expanding domestic demand, adjust our development strategy and market position in light of actual circumstances, accelerate our transformation and upgrading and the pace of industrial relocation in order to accelerate development.

-- Increase energy-saving, environmental protection, research and development of new energy sources and industrial technology, product applications, marketing, investment and cooperation, encourage businesses to study, use, and promote energy saving and environmental protection products and new energy technologies, hold seminars on a regular basis, establish communication platforms, build an energy conservation oriented, environmentally friendly community.

-- Engage in research in order to respond to climate changes, exchange information on weather observation and forecasting technology, raise standards for weather forecasting for torrential rains, typhoons and other forms of severe weather, increase cooperation and establish communication mechanisms to respond to environmental issues.

第五屆兩岸經貿文化論壇共同建議
（2009年7月12日）

由中國國民黨國家政策研究基金會與中共中央台灣工作辦公室海峽兩岸關係研究中心共同主辦的第五屆兩岸經貿文化論壇，於2009年7月11日至12日在湖南長沙舉行。

本屆論壇以推進和深化兩岸文化教育交流合作為主題，與會人士就中華文化的傳承與創新、推進兩岸文化產業合作、拓展兩岸教育交流合作三項議題進行深入討論，並舉行了兩岸經貿合作座談會。中國國民黨主席吳伯雄和中共中央政治局常委賈慶林出席論壇並發表演講。國共兩黨有關方面負責人、台灣其他黨派、兩岸文化界、教育界、經貿界等各界人士、專家學者500餘人出席。兩岸文化和教育主管部門人士做為特邀嘉賓和特邀專家出席了本屆論壇。

會議認為，去年5月以來，兩岸關係出現了歷史性機遇，取得重大積極進展，步入和平發展的正軌，符合兩岸人民的共同利益與期盼。在進一步密切兩岸經貿關係的同時，積極加強兩岸文化教育交流合作，對持續推動兩岸關係和平發展具有重要深遠意義。悠久燦爛的中華文化是兩岸的共同財富，是維繫兩岸民族感情的重要紐帶。新形勢下，應全面推進和深化兩岸文化教育交流合作，增進兩岸對中華文化的認同，締造中華民族的新時代。與會各界人士經過兩天的研討，提出以下共同建議：

1. 加強兩岸文化交流合作，共同傳承和弘揚中華文化

----不斷推進兩岸在文化、藝術、宗教及民間信仰等各領域的交流合作。

----加強兩岸在文化古蹟和非物質文化遺產的保護、傳承和利用等方面的交流合作，共同做好文化典籍整理工作，建立維護文化資產的溝通合作平台，切實保護好中華文化瑰寶。

----共同促進中華文化創新，激發創造活力，不斷增強中華文化的時代性。

----鼓勵兩岸各地各有關機構加強文化交流，輪流舉辦或相互參加各種主題的文化節、藝術節等大型文化交流活動。協助台灣文藝團體參加上海世博會展演。

----支持兩岸文化藝術機構、團體、院校和藝術家開展藝術教學、聯合創作、互訪巡演及合作演出、商業演出等交流合作。

----鼓勵兩岸圖書館、美術館、博物館、文物保護機構和文化研究機構開展多種形式交流和合作研究、聯合辦展等活動。

----兩岸使用的漢字屬於同一系統，客觀認識漢字在兩岸使用的歷史和現狀，求同存異，逐步縮小差異，達成更多共識，使兩岸民眾在學習和使用方面更為便利。鼓勵兩岸民間合作編纂中華語文工具書。

----支持兩岸學者就術語和專有名詞規範化、辭典編纂進行合作，推動破音字審音、電腦字庫和詞庫、地名審音定字及正、簡字體轉換軟體等方面的合作。

----支持制訂有利於兩岸文化交流的政策，簡化相關行政手續，為交流合作營造良好的環境。

----發揮雙方的優勢，共同推動中華文化同世界各民族文化的對話與交流，促進中華文化在全球傳播。

2. 深化兩岸文化產業合作，增強兩岸文化產業的國際競爭力

----積極整合兩岸文化產業資源，優化資源配置和佈局結構，培育文化市場，共同打造文化產業鏈，形成產業群。

----深入發掘中華傳統文化資源，共同打造具有民族特色、風格、氣派和原創性的知名品牌。

----共同加強推進文化與科技融合，發展新興文化產業，建設現代文化產業體系，促進兩岸文化產業發展。

----共同推動制定兩岸文化產業標準，加強保護智慧財產權（知識產權），建立溝通合作平台，優化兩岸文化產業發展條件。

----加強文化創意產業合作。合辦兩岸文化創意產業博覽會。推動成立促進兩岸文化創意產業交流合作的權責單位。

----擴大及深化兩岸廣播、電影、電視等領域之交流合作。在兩岸影視劇合拍、影視劇及電視節目之市場准入、影視演職人員交流等方面，積極探討擴大交流合作。

----建立兩岸出版交流機制，積極擴大出版物貿易與版權貿易、加強出版合作，並共同開拓海外華文出版市場。

3. 促進兩岸教育交流與合作，提升兩岸教育品質

----促進兩岸教育發展，在教育中展現中華文化的精神與精髓，加強交流，相互切磋砥礪，培養具有文化內涵的優秀人才。

----發揮兩岸各自優勢，努力實現教育資源相互開放和共享，並營造有利於兩岸學術交流的環境。

----支持兩岸各級各類學校深入開展交流合作，構建多種合作平台，透過校際交流合作，共同提高辦學水準。推動兩岸院校建立學分轉換承認及累積機制。

----兩岸互認學歷有利於兩岸教育交流與合作向實質性階段邁進。

----鼓勵兩岸學生互至對岸學習，並為此創造良好條件。

----加強兩岸教師和學生互訪、交流。鼓勵舉辦兩岸青少年學生大型交流活動，並逐步構建交流平台。

----鼓勵兩岸相關團體和學校合辦以誦讀和書寫中華經典為主題的中小學生交流活動。

4. 共同探討協商簽訂兩岸文化教育交流協議，建立兩岸文化教育合作機制

----支持兩岸相關機構和專家學者就協商兩岸文化教育交流協議進行研究規劃，以利建立兩岸文化教育交流合作機制，實現兩岸文化教育交流制度化、規範化、長期化。

5. 加強兩岸新聞交流

----擴大兩岸資訊交流，促進儘快實現兩岸新聞媒體互設常駐機構，鼓勵兩岸新聞界加強交流合作。

6. 支持台資企業在大陸發展壯大，推動兩岸在節能環保和新能源產業領域的合作

----支持台資企業積極因應全球金融環境劇烈變動，進一步運用大陸實施中部崛起等區域發展戰略和擴大內需市場的有利時機，結合自身實際情況，調整發展策略和市場佈局，加快轉型升級和產業轉移步伐，努力實現更好更快發展。

----加強兩岸節能環保、新能源產業在技術研發、產品應用、市場推廣、雙向投資等方面的合作，鼓勵兩岸企業積極研究、使用和推廣節能環保產品和新能源技術，定期召開兩岸研討會，建立溝通平台，推動兩岸建設節能、環保社會。

----促進兩岸共同研究及合作因應氣候變化；進行氣象觀測及預報技術和資料的交流；共同提高對暴雨、颱風等災害性天氣的預報預警水準；針對環保議題，加強交流合作，建立溝通機制。

China's Developmental Challenges, Goals and Paths: Six Decades of Observations and Prospects

China's Developmental Challenges, Goals and Paths: Six Decades of Observations and Prospects
by Chairman Lien Chan
July 10, 2009

ONE: FOREWORD

In terms of international politics, the twentieth century and the twenty-first century are very different. The twentieth century experienced a half century-long Cold War, which ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. During the twenty-first century, mainland China became a rising power. The international political structure became a kind of "soft unipolar system." In other words, power was distributed among one superpower and several major powers. This led to an international environment different from the past, and to a China with a dramatically different view of its role than the former Soviet Union.

As China rises, it must deal with serious internal problems. Therefore it needs a peaceful and stable international environment. Only then can it maintain economic development and cope with its internal problems. As for the United States, it must deal with the global financial crisis. It also needs China's support and cooperation. Only then can it avoid worsening its economic situation. All in all, China and the United States need to cooperate with each other far more than they need to compete with each other.

Taiwan is clearly an important variable in Sino-US relations. Peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations not only contributes to peace between Beijing and Washington, it also provides Taipei with a welcome peace dividend.

This triangular pursuit of peace and stability has undergone changes over the past six decades that echo internal changes within the Chinese Communist Party. Understanding this change will help us better understand future developments in Beijing.

TWO: TWO GENERATIONS

The traditional Chinese way of computing time uses "tian gan" and "di zhi," or "Heavenly Stems and Earthly Branches." A "jia zi" is six decades. Six decades is one cycle. It is followed by another six decade cycle. Everything has its origins in chaos. The Chinese also have another way of computing time, a sociological one. This involves the concept of "shi," or "generations." Three decades is one generation. The Chinese have a saying: For three decades, [power resides] East of the River. For three decades, [power resides] West of the River. Three decades is one generation. Since 1949, the Beijing government has undergone one cycle or two generations. This one cycle or two generations has completely changed its outside appearance.

The first generation lasted from 1949 to 1978. This was basically the Mao Zedong led era. During this generation, China experienced the Three Antis, Five Antis Campaign, People's Communes, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and other political baptisms by fire. Mao Zedong said class struggle was the key. Given class struggle as their goal, this generation could best be characterized as the generation of confrontation.

The second generation lasted from 1979 to 2008. This generation was led by three leaders: Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. It was was not a generation of mad unrest like the previous generation. This was a generation characterized by rationality and pragmatism. Deng Xiaoping said: Practice is the sole criterion for determining the truth. This represents the spirit of a generation. This was the generation of detente.

Two generations later, China has begun its rise. How China deals with its internal and external problems during its rise is an issue that will challenge China's leaders and become the focus of global concern. To understand this issue, one must understand the changes that have taken place over the past six decades, and from them uncover the clues.

THREE: CHALLENGES, GOALS, AND PATHS

The changes the Chinese mainland has undergone during the six decades and two generations since the establishment of the PRC, can be characterized as fundamental, dramatic, and systemic. Anyone with even a rudimentary understanding of contemporary Chinese history, knows the difference between the two generations.

The changes that have taken place during these two generations are so great, how are we to make sense of them? I believe our understanding of this period will influence our predictions about how Beijing will change.

Today, I would like to share my observations about the changes Beijing has undergone during the past cycle, beginning with the challenges it faced, the goals it set, and the paths it took. Every society faces major challenges at different stages in its development. How a society determines its objectives and chooses its paths in the face of such challenges helps us understand the basis of its development.

Beijing has undergone many changes over the past six decades and two generations. Whether we are talking about the challenges it faced, the goals it set, or the paths it took, the changes it underwent were pendulum swings from extreme to the other. The challenge faced by the first generation was how to establish a new order on the ruins of World War II. Its goal was to establish a Communist society. Its path was characterized by ideological fervor and the cult of personality. The challange faced by the second generation was how to find a new direction after the Cultural Revolution had deconstructed society. Its goal was to eliminate poverty and create prosperity. Its path was characterized by rational pragmatism and collective leadership.

1. Freeing a Communist Society from Poverty

The People's Republic of China was founded in 1949. Mao Zedong's ability to mobilize the masses was rooted in the demands of Communism and the Chinese people's desire to become rich and powerful. When Mao stood at the gates of Tiananmen Square and shouted: "The Chinese people have stood up!" he echoed the feelings of the Chinese people at the time. The biggest challenge the Communist Party faced, was how to create a new order on the ruins of World War II. Confronted with such a challenge, Mao Zedong chose as his goal a Communist society. A Communist society is a utopian society, far removed from the real world. Yet Mao Zedong wanted to instantly create a Communist society. Hence the need for fundamental change. Hence the Cultural Revolution.

After the chaotic madness of the Cultural Revolution, China was an economic basket case. It had endured all sorts of brutal political struggles. The future was shrouded in gray. By this time, the challenge for the Communist Party was no longer the establishment of a Communist society. It was to find a new direction for China amidst the fallen idols and discredited myths. At this time, Deng Xiaoping consolidated the political elites, toppled the Gang of Four, and set forth his Initial Stage of Socialism theory. Simply put, its primary goal was to escape poverty. Everything centered on economic reconstruction. When Deng Xiaoping visited Shenzhen in 1984, he said: Poverty is not socialism. This remark was the most succinct summation of his belief.

2. The Paths Chosen by Two Generations

The paths Beijing took during these two generations, swung from one extreme to the other, from ideological fervor to rationality and pragmatism.

The first generation was goal-oriented. It engaged in hero worship. The second generation was scientifically oriented. It stressed the experimental method. As Deng Xiaoping put it, "feeling our way across the river," "black cats or white cats," and "seeking truth from facts." As for the specifics, the means was the introduction of market mechanisms, and the goal was a prosperous society. Politically speaking, collective leadership was the result of rationality and pragmatism. Collective leadership ensured compromise. Collective leadership helped institutionalize China's leadership succession and contributed to the stability of its leadership.

FOUR: THE NEXT CHALLENGES, GOALS AND PATHS?

One cycle or two generations have passed. A new era is opening up ahead of us. What style will this new generation exhibit? At this point, I would like to stress the relationship between the leader and the path. This is especially important in a society such as China, where change is still determined by political forces.

1. Leaders and the Choice of Paths

The process of arriving at a path can roughly be divided into three phases: catalyzation, deepening, and stabilization. A great leader, poised on the brink of a new era, is the catalyst for the emergence of a new path. In other words, when the goal changes, leaders must discover a new path, so that the path will remain consistent with the goal. They will complement each other and contribute to the achievement of the goal. They will also ensure stability along the path. In other words, the leader is the key force responsible for setting goals and choosing paths.

During the catalytic process, the leader's decisions are critical. This is how turning points in history take place. Take the Chinese Communist Party for example. During the first three decades Mao Zedong was the catalyst for an ideologically oriented society. Deng Xiaoping ensured that during the second three decades society would be oriented toward rationality and pragmatism. Today General Secretary Hu Jintao stands on the threshold of the third generation, as well as the beginning of another cycle. He has a great historical opportunity, to set a new goal, and blaze a new path.

During the past cycle of development the public on the mainland gradually lost faith in a Communist society, and lifted itself out of abject poverty. During the second generation, following three decades of development, the mainland left a world of gray and entered a world of color. New challenges already confront them. One challenge is how to address the imbalance between development and the threat of damage to the system. Another is how to use its strength to play an appropriate role in the international community. This is the historic mission of General Secretary Hu Jintao and the next generation of leaders.

2. The Challenges Faced by the New Leaders: The Collapse of the Old Order

From an international perspective, China is the world's factory, and also the world's marketplace. Amidst the current financial turmoil, it is the only nation in the world that can still aspire to an 8% annual growth rate. Her international influence is increasing. But at the same time, that influence is a cause for increasing concern. For China's leadership, a major challenge is how to actively participate in the international community while simultaneously assuming greater responsibility, becoming a force for greater international peace and prosperity.

From a domestic perspective, China faces even more serious challenges. I believe the structure developed by the second generation faces the threat of destruction. This threat is rooted primarily in imbalanced development.

Over the past three decades, the mainland has developed certain laws. Perhaps these are what are meant by "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics."

Law Number One: Stability trumps everything else. According to this law, the prospect of democracy offers many risks.

Law Number Two: Economic development is non-negotiable. Some may become wealthy before others, but everyones' lives must be improved.

Law Number Three: Establish transparent collective leadership, resolve social conflict.

By the third generation, these laws will gradually be challenged. Lien Chan believes that for the third generation balanced development will become a new law. China now has serious regional imbalances between her urban and rural areas. It has systemic imbalances over such issues as culture. These will affect the next generation of development. Among these the most crucial is institutional imbalance.

Systemic imbalance refers mainly to imbalances in the political system and the socio-economic system. Ever since the mainland underwent reform and liberalization, it has used Socialism with Chinese Characteristics to describe its structure. But in fact private ownership, the core value of capitalism, has already seeped into its bones. The political system however remains under Chinese Communist Party one-party leadership. Political participation is subject to tight restrictions. Theoretically speaking, a contradiction remains between authoritarian rule and the market place. Authoritarian rulers value control. The market place values freedom of choice. Excessive regulation inevitably creates many opportunities for corruption. Unless Beijing improves this systemic imbalance, its hope of reducing corruption will remain impossible. In other words, systemic imbalances have provided opportunities for corruption. Corruption invariably undermines a regime's political legitimacy, thereby affecting its stability.

3. New Goals and a New Path

Confronted with these challenges, Beijing, under the leadership of General Secretary Hu Jintao, is now establishing a new goal and a new developmental path. What is this new goal? I think the theme of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games: One World, One Dream, the peaceful development of human society, sums up this new goal. China's leaders and people appear to have a new awareness of their status and role on the international stage. General Secretary Hu believes that China's development cannot be separated from the world, and the world cannot be separated from China's prosperity and stability. Therefore he proposes that people of all nations work together to promote an enduring peace, and a prosperous and harmonious world. The financial tsunami has provided Beijing with the perfect opportunity. From top to bottom, everyone on the mainland is trying to assume greater global responsibilities, as befits a great world power. The mainland has moved from confrontation to detente to entente. It is attempting to be part of the global village. It is a place quite different from what it was during the past six decades.

The goal of One World, One Dream is to resolve the imbalance in development, both internationally and domestically. The central government on the mainland attaches considerable importance to this problem. Because regional imbalance is not just an economic issue. It is a social issue, a political issue, even a cultural issue. Jiang Zemin proposed the establishment of a "prosperous society." Hu Jintao proposed the establishment of a "harmonious society." This means Beijing's national reconstruction process already has a new goal, and solving the problem of imbalance is the key to achieving that goal. This involves the allocation of resources to education, medical treatment, as well as the three agricultural issues.

In terms of path, in its attempt to make China a prosperous society for all, Beijing has set forth such concepts as "humanism," "a nation rooted in the rule of law," "coordinated development," "common prosperity," and "scientific development." Among these, "a nation rooted in the rule of law" represents Beijing's growing concern for human rights and the rule of law. Meanwhile "coordinated development," "common prosperity" represent Beijing's growing concern for the problem of imbalanced development. As for "scientific development," that carries on the spirit of rationality and pragmatism. Just what will China look like after adopting such a path? This, perhaps, is the topic that most fascinates contemporary Sinologists.

4. The International Community Viewed from the New Path

As previously mentioned, during the past six decades, China and the world experienced three decades of confrontation and conflict. During the second three decades, it experienced stalemate and detente. A new cycle has begun. China and the world have now turned to negotiation and entente. This leaves us filled with optimism and expectation for the next three decades.

Now let's look at the different paths taken by these three generations, from the perspective of foreign relations. During the Mao Zedong era, Beijing aligned itself with the Third World against U.S. imperialism. This underscored its mentality of international class struggle. But beginning in the 70's, Beijing's foreign policy thinking began to change. It became more rational and pragmatic about the international realities. It even began looking forward to building a harmonious society. We can clearly see how Beijing went from confrontation, to an acceptance of other nations and a wilingness to engage in international consultation. It went from rejection of the outside world, to isolation from the outside world, to acceptance of the outside world, to integration with the outside world. Today it even plays a responsible role in the international community, and is no longer regarded as a global security threat. What this reveals is the peaceful rise of a responsible major world power, beginning with a pragmatic orientation initiated by Deng Xiaoping and carried on by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

Along with Beijing's peaceful development, a great economic power and political power is rapidly rising. Many people may be worried that the international community will return to the bipolar system of the past. Fortunately a new generation of leaders have indicated that Beijing will never seek hegemony, and will not become a global threat. During General Secretary Jiang Zemin's term of office, he repeatedly stressed that "China's development will not pose a threat to any country. When China becomes prosperous it will never seek hegemony." (from the Fifteenth National Congress Political Report) In the Seventeenth National Congress Political Report Mr. Hu Jintao vowed that China will unswervingly adhere to "the path of peaceful development." It would "pursue a win/win strategy of mutually beneficial development." If we boldly assume that Beijing is pursuing a multicultural international community, then this is consistent with U.S. President Barack Obama's policy of multilateralism. If so, we can expect the advent of a harmonious and mutually respectful era of consultation. This may provide the next several generations of mankind with stability and peace.

As we look back over the past several centuries, too often we have witnessed the tragic consequences of powerful nations using hard power against each other. We anticipate that as China's overall strength gradually increases, Beijing will use its soft power to shape a positive international image for itself. We expect it to provide a positive model for international cooperation. In the past, Beijing pursued utopian socialist ideals. We now look forward to Beijing reshaping the content of its ideals. We expect it to behave pragmatically and reasonably, establishing a society characterized by lasting peace, bringing lasting benefits to the Chinese people and to the global community.

5. Cross-Strait Relations, Viewed from the New Path

One of the key issues affecting China's future is how the next generation will handle cross-Strait relations. As we look back over the past six decades, cross-Strait relations have repeatedly been characterized by confrontation and conflict. I visited the mainland for the first time in 2005, and participated in a dialogue with General Secretary Hu Jintao. We both felt that "peace and development" would be the theme of the 21st century. The peaceful development of cross-strait relations accorded with the common interests of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. It also accorded with the interests of the Asia-Pacific region and the world. Therefore, we proposed the resumption of cross-Strait negotiations as soon as possible. We proposed five different scenarios for the promotion of cross-strait relations and economic exchanges. We sought opportunities for the peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait relations, allowing cross-Strait relations to enter a new phase.

On March 22, 2008, KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou won his bid for the presidency, bringing cross-strait relations an historic opportunity. President Ma Ying-jeou's mainland policy was based on "opening up" and "loosening restraints." Once the SEF and ARATS resumed negotiations, cross-Strait relations have been moving in a positive and healthy direction. On December 31, 2008, General Secretary Hu Jintao announced his "Hu Six Points," outlining his proposal for the future of cross-strait relations. This will continue to have an important impact on cross-Strait relations.

I myself agree in principle to the views of General Secretary Hu Jintao. Political negotiations between the two sides is unavoidable. But it cannot be denied that the two sides still have certain differences over political, military, and diplomatic issues. Realities must be confronted. Problems must be resolved. Mutual trust must be maintained. Consultations must be sincere. Based on the results of mainland reform and liberalization, Beijing ought to feel greater self-confidence and show greater empathy in its handling of cross-Strait relations. Given the premise of rationality and pragmatism, it ought to demonstrte greater respect for the reality of the Republic of China, and greater acceptance of its existence. It ought to engage in consultation and dialogue on the premise that we are equal in status. It ought to make reasonable concessions regarding Taipei's international space and cross-strait political situation. The two sides have with great difficulty agreed to shelve disputes and transcend ideological barriers. Beijing must not repeat the same mistakes. It must not attempt to force the public on Taiwan to accept its "One Country, Two Systems" framework. If Beijing can do this, then for the next three decades, the public will witness the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the Asia-Pacific region's contribution to world stability and prosperity.

6. Core Challenges: Solving the Problem of Imbalances

At the domestic level, the problem of institutional imbalances is inescapable. Based on other countries' experience with development, economic development leads to changes in social structure. Changes in social structure lead to political liberalization and the democratization of the social infrastructure. Based on this democratization is a path the mainland must take. But it will be difficult to infer from other countries' experience what path to democratization China will take. After all, the world does not have a large number of countries as large as China to use as reference. In his report to the Seventeeth National Congress General Secretary Hu Jintao mentioned an "unswervingly determination to develop socialist democratic politics." He listed it as an important step in China's future political development, and declared that "the expansion of socialist democracy," was an important element of a prosperous society. But gaps remain in the pace of economic reform and liberalization. How China promotes is political democratization will remain the focus of worldwide attention.

Compared to the past three decades, the next three decades will be more challenging and more unpredictable. These are not merely academic issues. To the leaders in Beijing, these issues are immediate and pressing. Their problem is how to maintain economic growth, and at the same time mobilize society in a steady and orderly manner, how to address the primary problem of long term, deepening imbalances.

In terms of economic reform, Deng Xiaoping used the expression "feeling our way across the river" to describe Beijing's solution to the problem of institutional imbalances. Current leaders find themselves in the same situation. It now depends upon how Hu Jintao catalyzes a new structure. Deng Xiaoping was the chief architect of the economy. Hu Jintao ought to be the chief architect of the political system. He must draw a road map for a vast country with a large population that has never experienced democracy.

From the first wave to the third wave, the process of democratization was bottom up. There were successes and failures. Personally I hope mainland leaders can learn from the experience of democratic countries, and keep pace with changes in the socio-economic structure. The establishment of a democratic system started from the grass roots, then expanded upwards. The steady hand and experience of upper level leaders maintained stable development, and avoided chaos and disorder. This is a vast and complex project. Many universities in the United States have departments dedicated to studying China. Integrating and enriching research in this area will help everyone get a more complete picture of the elephant. This may turn out to be their greatest contribution to change in China.

中國發展的挑戰、目標與路徑：一甲子的觀察與展望

壹、 前言

從國際政治結構來看， 二十世紀與二十一世紀有一項很重要的對比。 二十世紀曾經有長達近半世紀的冷戰， 而冷戰結構隨著蘇聯的解體而解構。到了二十一世紀， 中國成了另一個崛起的大國， 而國際結構卻是一種柔性單極體系， 也就是說一個超強、 數個強國的權力分配型態。 這個變化，一方面造成國際環境與以往不同， 另一方面則是因為中國對自身角色的界定與當時的蘇聯大不相同。

中國在崛起的過程中， 內部也有很嚴峻的挑戰， 因此它需要一個和平安定的國際環境， 才能維持經濟發展並處理內部問題。 至於美國，面對金融風暴的威脅， 也需要中國的支持與合作， 以免經濟情勢更為惡化。 總而言之， 中美之間從競合策略的角度來看， 合作的需要遠遠大於競爭。

台灣顯然是影響中美關係的一個重要變數。 對台灣而言， 一個和平而穩定的台海關係， 不僅有助於中美之間的和平， 也會帶給台灣和平紅利。

目前這種追求和平穩定的三角關係， 是六十年來所僅見， 這樣的變化， 恰好與中共內部的變化相呼應。 理解這一段變化， 有助於我們更進一步了解中共未來的發展。

貳、 兩個世代

中國人傳統計算時間的方式， 是用天干地支， 一個甲子剛好是六十年。 六十年一個輪迴， 接下來又是另一個六十年的開始, 一切又從混沌出發。中國人計算時間， 還有另外一種具有社會學意義的方式， 也就是「世」的觀念， 「一世」剛好是三十年。 中國人有一句俗話說： 三十年河東，三十年河西。 三十年，就是一個世代， 而中共自一九四九年至今， 剛好經過了一個甲子兩個世代。 這一甲子兩世代， 呈現幾乎完全不同的面貌。

第一個世代是從一九四九年到一九七八年。 這一個世代基本上是毛澤東主政的世代， 在這個世代， 大陸經歷了三反、五反、 人民公社、大躍進、以及文化大革命等等一連串政治鬥爭的洗禮。 毛澤東說以階級鬥爭為綱， 以鬥爭為目， 最能反映這一個世代的特色，也可以說是對抗（confrontation）的世代。

第二個世代是從一九七九年到二００八年。 這一個世代經歷了鄧小平、江澤民、 以及胡錦濤三位領導人。 沒有前一個世代的瘋狂動盪，也就沒有這一個世代的理性務實。 鄧小平說： 實踐是檢驗真理的唯一標準， 代表了這一個世代的精神， 也就是緩和(detente)的世代。

在歷經兩個世代之後， 中國已呈現崛起之姿， 但中國要如何面對以及處理崛起過程中所產生的內部與外部問題， 不僅是中國領導人的挑戰， 也是全球關注的焦點。 要了解這些問題， 不能不了解這六十年來的變化， 並從中找到一些線索。

參、 挑戰、目標、與路徑

中共建國六十年來兩個世代的變化， 可以說是根本性（fundamental）, 戲劇性（ dramatic）, 以及系統性（systematic）的變化。 只要對中國現代史稍有研究者， 都能明白這兩個世代的差異。

這兩個世代的變化， 看起來如此之大， 我們應當如何理解這一段的變化？ 我個人認為， 如何理解這個階段， 也會影響我們對中共未來的變化的預測。

今天，我想從挑戰、 目標與路徑的觀點來和各位分享我對中共這一甲子變化的觀察。 每一個社會在其不同發展階段中， 都會面臨主要的挑戰， 面對挑戰， 一個社會如何決定其目標， 選擇其路徑， 可做為我們了解其發展的依據。

中共過去六十年兩個世代的變化， 不論是挑戰、 目標或路徑， 其變化之大， 猶如鐘擺由一端擺到另一端。 就第一個世代而言，其挑戰是如何在戰後廢墟上建立新秩序， 其目標是建立共產主義的社會， 其路徑則是充滿意識型態的個人崇拜； 就第二個世代而言，其挑戰是如何在文化大革命的社會解構後找到新方向， 其目標是要脫離貧窮， 走向富強， 其路徑則是充滿理性務實主義的集體領導。

一、 從共產社會到脫離貧窮

一九四九年， 中華人民共和國成立。 當初毛澤東的動員能力來自於共產主義的訴求以及中國人想要追求富強的心理。 當毛澤東站在天安門城門上高喊：「中國人站起來了！」它所反映的， 基本上就是中國人當時的心理。 對當時的共產黨來說， 最大的挑戰就是如何在戰後殘敗的土地上建立新秩序。面臨這樣一個挑戰， 毛澤東選擇了共產社會做為他的目標。 共產社會是一個理想性的社會， 與現實社會有很大的距離， 而毛澤東想要立即進入共產社會，於是必須進行根本性的變革─文化大革命於焉誕生。

經過文化大革命翻天覆地的瘋狂之後， 中國成了經濟赤貧的國家， 政治上則經歷了種種殘酷的鬥爭， 整個社會呈現一片灰色的景象。 這個時候，共產黨所面臨的挑戰， 不再是建立共產社會了， 而是要在神話破滅， 偶像倒下的基礎上， 為中國找到一個新的方向。 鄧小平在那個時候，凝結了主要的精英力量， 打倒了四人幫， 並且提出了社會主義初期階段論。 所謂的社會主義初期階段論， 簡單說，就是以擺脫貧窮為首要目標，一切以經濟建設為中心。 一九八四年鄧小平巡視深圳時曾說： 貧窮不是社會主義。 這句話，是最好的註腳。

二、 兩個世代的路徑選擇

中共這兩個世代的變化， 從路徑來看， 是由意識型態的一端擺到理性務實主義另一端。

第一個世代是目標決定論， 大搞個人崇拜， 第二個世代是科學主義， 講究實驗方法， 也就是鄧小平所說的”摸著石頭過河論”、 ”黑貓白貓論”、 ”實踐檢驗真理論”， 至於其具體表現， 則是市場機制的引進、 小康社會的目標。 在政治運作上， 集體領導也是理性務實主義的結果，因為集體領導避免不了妥協， 而且集體領導也使得大陸的領導接班可以朝向制度化的方向發展，有助於領導階層的穩定。

肆、 下一個挑戰、目標與路徑？

一個甲子兩個世代過去了， 一個新的世代將在我們眼前展開。 這個新世代又會呈現什麼樣的風貌呢？ 說到這裡， 我要特別強調領導者與路徑的關係， 尤其是在中國這樣一個仍由政治力在主導變遷的社會。

一、領導人與路徑選擇

一個路徑的形成， 其過程大致可分為： 催化－深化－穩定三個階段； 而一個偉大的領導者， 在於一個新時代開始時， 催化一個新路徑的產生。也就是說， 當目標改變時， 領導者必須開拓一個新的路徑， 使這個路徑與目標相對應， 彼此之間相輔相成， 既有助於目標之達成，也有助於路徑之穩定。 換句話說， 領導人是目標與路徑選擇的關鍵力量。

在催化過程中， 領導人的抉擇具有關鍵性的作用。 歷史的轉捩點即在此發生。 以中共為例， 毛澤東在前三十年是意識型態社會結構的催化者，而鄧小平又決定了後三十年理性務實主義的社會變遷結構。今天的胡錦濤總書記不僅處在第三個世代的開端， 也是另一個甲子的開端， 他有絕佳的歷史機遇，創造一個新的目標， 開拓一條新的路徑誕生。

在過去一甲子發展之後， 大陸人民實際上已逐漸失去了對共產社會的信念與熱誠， 也擺脫了赤貧的生活。 然而，在第二個世代發展了三十年之後，大陸僅管已從灰色世界進入了彩色世界， 新的挑戰已然橫在眼前。 這個挑戰就是如何化解發展失衡對體系破壞的威脅，以及如何運用其力量在國際上扮演適當的角色。 這是胡總書記及其下一代領導人的歷史任務。

二、新領導人的挑戰：舊規律的崩解

從國際的層次來看， 中國是世界的工廠， 也是世界的市場， 在當前金融風暴下， 甚至是全球唯一還能以保八為目標的國家。 她在國際上的影響力日增，但與此同時， 所引起的疑慮也日增。 對中國領導人來說， 在積極參與國際社會的同時， 如何承擔更多的責任， 以及成為國際和平與繁榮的穩定力量，是一項很大的挑戰。

從國內的層次來看， 中國所面臨的挑戰更形嚴峻。 連戰認為， 第二個世代所發展出來的結構正面臨破壞因子的威脅， 這些因子主要是發展失衡問題。

這三十年來， 大陸的發展呈現一些規律， 或許這就是具有他們所說的「中國特色的社會主義」。

規律一：穩定壓倒一切。 在這個規律下，民主的發展前途，險阻重重。

規律二：發展是硬道理。 要讓一部份人先富起來， 但也要整體改善人民的生活。

規律三：建立開明的集體領導， 化解社會的矛盾。

這些規律到了第三個世代， 都會漸漸受到挑戰。 連戰個人相信， 均衡發展將會是第三個世代的新規律。 大陸現在有嚴重的區域失衡、 城鄉失衡、 體制失衡、 文化失衡等問題， 將會影響到下一世代的發展， 其中以體制失衡最為關鍵。

所謂體制失衡主要是指政治體制與社經體制的失衡。 大陸自從改革開放之後， 雖然以具有中國特色的社會主義來形容其體制， 但實際上，以私有制為核心的資本主義已經從皮膚表層滲透到骨髓裏去了。 但在政治體制上， 大陸仍然維持共產黨一黨領導， 政治參與受到相當的限制。就理論而言， 專制與市場彼此之間有矛盾。 專制也者， 重視的是控制， 市場也者重視的是選擇的自由， 而管制過多， 必然製造許多貪腐的機會。在不改善失衡的情況下， 共產黨想要消減貪腐， 根本就是緣木求魚。 換句話說， 體制失衡提供了貪腐的機會， 而貪腐必然會腐蝕一個政權的正當性，進而影響到其穩定。

三、新目標與新路徑

面對這些挑戰， 在胡總書記領導之下的中共政權， 正在形成一個新的目標與發展路徑。新的目標是什麼？ 我想2008北京奧運的主題： One World one dream所展現的精神-人類社會的和平與發展，可以概括這個新目標。 現在的中國領導人及人民，對於他們在國際舞台上的位置（status）與角色(role)， 似乎有了新的認知， 胡總書記認為， 中國發展離不開世界，世界繁榮穩定也離不開中國。 所以他主張： 各國人民攜手努力， 推動建設持久和平， 共同繁榮的和諧世界。 尤其這一波的金融海嘯，更提供了他們絕佳的機會。 大陸上下， 正在努力學習如何對世界承擔更重大的責任， 做一個名實相符的大國。從對抗(confrontation)走向緩和(de'tente)再走向協商(entente)， 學習作為地球村的一份子，這是與過去一甲子相當不同的地方。

不只在國際層次上， 即使在國內， One world one dream也是化解發展失衡問題的目標。 大陸中央政府相當重視這個問題，因為區域失衡問題， 不僅是經濟問題， 也是社會問題與政治問題、 甚至文化問題。 江澤民時期提出的建設「小康社會」，胡錦濤時期的建設「和諧社會」， 所代表的正是中共的國家建設已經轉向了另一個目標， 而解決發展失衡問題是這個目標的核心問題。這個問題牽涉到教育資源的配置、 醫療資源的配置、 以及三農問題的處理等等。

在路徑方面， 中共提出了「以人為本」、 「依法治國」、 「協調發展」、 「共同富裕」、 「科學發展觀」等， 追求中國成為全面的小康社會。其中「以人為本」、 「依法治國」代表了人權、 法治的觀念漸漸受到重視， 而「協調發展」、 「共同富裕」代表中共對於發展失衡問題的重視，至於「科學發展觀」， 則是延續了理性務實主義的精神。 這一條路徑， 究竟會為中國帶來什麼樣的面貌呢？ 這恐怕是目前中國研究社群最熱門的一個主題。

四、從新路徑看國際社會

前面已經提及， 舊的一甲子， 中國和世界經歷了第一個30年的對抗與衝突(confrontation and conflict)、第二個30年的僵持與和解(stalemate and de'tente)， 新的一甲子伊始，中國和世界已經轉向協商與合作（negotiation and entente）， 令人對未來新的30年充滿樂觀和期待。

我們再從對外關係來看這三個世代在路徑上的差異之處。 中共在毛澤東時代結合第三世界反對美帝， 正凸顯其國際社會階級鬥爭的心態。 然自七０年代起，中共開始改變外交思維。 由面對國際現實到理性務實， 乃至於期盼建構和諧社會。 我們清楚地看到中共如何由對立到接受各國到願意從事國際協商，如何從對外排斥的孤立心態到願意面向國際社會， 再到融入國際社會， 乃至於到今日扮演國際社會負責任的角色， 而不再被全球視為安全威脅。這當中顯現的是由鄧小平到江澤民到胡錦濤的務實取向演變軌跡， 展現的是一個負責任大國的和平崛起。

隨著中共的和平發展， 一個經貿大國和政治大國正在迅速興起。 很多人或許會憂心國際社會是否會重回過去的兩極體系。好在我們欣見中共新一代的領導人標示中國絕不追求霸權， 也不會成為全球威脅。 江澤民任總書記時， 即已一再強調：「中國的發展不會對任何國家構成威脅。 今後中國發達起來了， 也永遠不稱霸。」 （十五大政治報告）胡錦濤先生在十七大政治報告中也保證中國將始終不渝「走和平發展道路」、 「奉行互利共贏的開發戰略」。 我們如果大膽假設，北京所追求的應該是一個多元的國際社會， 此與當今美國總統歐巴馬傾向多邊主義的政策有其相合或近似之處。假若如此， 一個和諧， 相互尊重，協商的世代可望降臨， 這也許會為人類未來幾個世代帶來安定與和平。

回顧過去幾個世紀， 我們看到太多強權以硬實力相互爭鬥所帶來的悲慘結果。 我們期盼中共在國力日漸上升之際，能以軟實力來塑造其在國際間的良好形象， 並且為國際合作帶來良好的示範。 設如中共過去曾經追求烏托邦式的社會主義理想，那麼我們期望它能重塑理想的內涵， 以務實理性來建構和平永續的社會， 為中國人乃至於全球社群帶來恆久的幸福。

五、從新路徑看兩岸關係

就兩岸關係而言， 下一個世代如何妥善處理兩岸關係是一個關係到中國前途的關鍵問題。 回顧過去的六十年當中， 兩岸關係曾一再遭遇到對抗與衝突。 2005年本人首次到大陸訪問， 並與胡錦濤總書記展開對話， 我們共同體會到： 「和平與發展」是21世紀的潮流，兩岸關係和平發展符合兩岸同胞的共同利益， 也符合亞太地區與世界的利益。 因此，我們共同提出促進儘速恢復兩岸談判、促進兩岸經濟全面交流等五項願景 ， 共同謀求兩岸關係和平穩定發展的機會， 讓兩岸關係進入一個新的里程碑。

2008年3月22日， 國民黨籍總統候選人馬英九先生勝出後， 為兩岸關係帶來了歷史性的機遇，馬英九總統主導的大陸政策以「開放」與「鬆綁」為原則， 在海基會與海協會恢復談判後， 兩岸關係已經朝正面良性的發展。而胡錦濤總書記在2008年12月31日針對未來的兩岸關係提出了「胡六點」的重要方針， 必將對後續的兩岸關係帶來重大的影響。

我本人原則同意胡總書記的意見， 兩岸政治談判必然不可避免。 但不可否認， 兩岸在政治、 軍事、外交等領域仍然存在一些分歧， 現實必須正視，問題必須解決， 互信必須堅持， 協商必須真誠。 基於大陸改革開放所展現的成果， 大陸在處理兩岸關係上應有更大的自信心與同理心。在理性務實主義的前提下， 對台灣的現實存在給予更多的尊重與接納， 並在平等的基礎上進行協商對話，為台灣的國際空間與兩岸政治定位做出合情合理的安排。 兩岸雙方好不容易都同意擱置爭議， 走出意識型態的藩籬， 大陸千萬不要重蹈覆轍，避免再以「一國兩制」的框架來逼迫台灣人民接受。 在這些前提下， 未來30年， 人們將看到兩岸關係和平發展對亞太地區和世界繁華安定的貢獻。

六、核心挑戰：解決失衡問題

在國內層次上， 體制失衡也是無法逃避的問題。 從其它國家發展的經驗來看， 經濟發展帶動社會結構的變遷，而社會變遷又進而提供政治自由化與民主化的社會基礎。 依此看來， 大陸的民主化將是一條必經的道路。但我們也很難從其它國家的經驗來推論中國大陸會採取什麼樣的民主化路徑， 畢竟全世界還沒有像中國這麼大規模的國家可供參考。儘管胡錦濤總書記在中共十七大的報告中已經把 「堅定不移發展社會主義民主政治」 列為未來中國政治發展的重要步驟， 並且宣示「擴大社會主義民主」是全面建設小康社會的重要內容； 但這畢竟與經濟改革開放的速度仍有落差， 未來中國政治民主化道路將如何推動，仍將是全世界共同注意的焦點。

與過去的三十年比起來， 未來的三十年將更具挑戰性以及不可預測性。 這不只是學術問題， 對中共領導人而言， 更是切身的問題。 這個問題， 就是如何在維持經濟成長的同時， 能夠穩定有序地涵納社會動員的力量， 其中以解決長期以來日漸深化的失衡問題為首要。

在經濟改革上， 鄧小平當初以「摸著石頭過河」來形容； 在解決體制失衡問題上， 現在的領導人也是碰到相同的情形。現在，就看胡錦濤如何催化一個新的結構。 鄧小平是經濟的總設計師， 胡錦濤應該做政治的總設計師， 為一個如此幅員廣大，人口眾多而又從無民主經驗的國家， 設計一個民主化的路徑圖（road map）。

從第一波到第三波民主化， 都是由下而上發展的歷程， 其中有成功也有失敗。 我個人深深期盼， 大陸的領導人能夠吸取各國民主化的經驗，配合社會經濟結構的改變， 開始從基層建立民主的制度， 然後逐步擴大範圍， 並以上層的穩定與經驗來維繫民主化平穩發展的過程，以免造成混亂與失序的現象。 這是一項龐大而複雜的工程， 美國很多大學都有研究中國的學門， 如何整合與充實這方面的研究，大家共同嚐試拚出較完整的大象， 或許是對中國轉變最大的貢獻。

Can Daniel Ortega Really Pull Our Strings?

Can Daniel Ortega Really Pull Our Strings?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 6, 2009

President Ma's "Journey of Enduring Friendships" has run into one problem after another. First, a coup in Honduras forced him to cancel that leg of his trip. Next, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega failed to appear at either the airport or the state banquet. His guests wondered whether they had been deliberately left out in the cold. These episodes suggest that such elaborate visits by our head of state, replete with vast entourages, no longer serve any purpose, and ought to be changed.

First Ortega said he could not be at the airport to greet President Ma because he had to preside over the funeral of the mayor of their capital city. Then he said he could not come to the state dinner because he had to deal with the coup in Honduras. These were extreme breaches of diplomatic protocol. After all, this was a scheduled state visit. Failure to make an appearance will inevitably make people wonder whether one's absence was intentional. One month ago President Ma planned to meet with Daniel Ortega in El Salvador. But Ortega postponed the meeting three times, leading to its eventual cancellation altogether. View the two events in conjunction and Daniel Ortega's posturing is unmistakable.

Daniel Ortega postponed his meeting three times. He failed to show up two times. He then personally drove Ma Ying-jeou on a trip to the countryside. He apologized to Ma at his hotel. As we can see, Ortega has run hot and cold. His behavior was deliberate posturing. Assuming our fellow citizens are correct in suspecting Ortega of ulterior motives, then our government must not cave in. If Ortega's ploy were to succeed, our other allies would follow suit. How then could President Ma uphold his pledge to maintain "honest, legitimate, and forthright" diplomatic relations?

So-called "Head of State Diplomacy" is a remnant of the Chen Shui-bian era's "diplomatic war" strategy. During his administration Chen personally led ten large scale state visits, for the express purpose of setting brushfires on every one of our diplomatic fronts. These foreign visits were purely for domestic political consumption, to stroke his vanity by depicting himself as a national hero. But his highly politicized "Head of State Diplomacy" has turned out to be more costly than it was worth. Chen Shui-bian took domestic issues and pushed them onto the international stage. His attempts to turn transits through the US into political victories went awry. His attempts to buy officials in allied nations created political chaos in those nations. Such "Head of State Diplomacy" may glitter on the outside, but is rotten on the inside. It is nothing more than bribery on our part, and corruption on our allies' part. In the light of today's changed circumstances, it should be thoroughly reviewed.

The Republic of China's circumstances are special. One cannot dismiss state visits as entirely meaningless. But the public must be aware that the real work of diplomacy is not the product of such rituals and protocols. If every state visit is accompanied by loud fanfare, large entourages, and hordes of reporters, attention will be focused on a range of superficial issues. The cart will end up ahead of the horse. Others will see Taipei using money to suborn defections. They will naturally resort to bluffing to get what they want. Daniel Ortega saw a perfect opportunity to put on a show for Taiwan's media. That is why he ran hot and cold. He was using any and all means possible to pull his visitor's strings.

Too many state visits tend to mislead diplomatic personnel. They encourage them to pay attention only to appearances, and to overlook the real work of diplomacy. Take President Ma's visit to Nicaragua for example. Daniel Ortega being at the airport was not actually necessary. But our ambassador in Nicaragua may have wanted to make up for Daniel Ortega's previous refusal to meet with Ma Ying-jeou. He may have twisted Ortega's arm about meeting Ma at the airport. As a result the situation got out of control yet again. A president must deal with countless matters each day. If an allied nation's head of state were to visit Taiwan, our government would never arrange for the president to personally accompany him or her ten or more hours a day. Why then must we arrange so many meetings with foreign heads of state each day? Are they merely to prove how chummy we are with them? As a result the media devoted its attention to counting who stood up whom, and how many times.

President Ma's trip shows no traces of Beijing's interference. Rather, our own allies ran hot and cold, demonstrating little constancy for us in their hearts. The recklessness of our own diplomats was even more alarming. It now appears "Head of State Diplomacy" has run its course. If we cannot maintain even the appearances, then President Ma Ying-jeou, as the new president, should finish his rounds, then call an end to such theatrics, replacing them with the hard work of genuine diplomacy. At least we will no longer have to make so many outlays. At least we will not be providing others with so many pretexts to make demands upon us.

Daniel Ortega was rude. Our fellow citizens should arrive at a consensus regarding our nation's response to our diplomatic situation. Daniel Ortega attempted to manipulate Republic of China citizens into pressuring President Ma and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to cave in to his demands. But if our fellow citizens refuse to buy into such tricks, then they will not work. In order to change our diplomatic situation, in order to ensure that we are no longer held hostage, we must see past appearances, and not allow people with agendas to manipulate us.

奧蒂嘉難道能扯動全體台灣人民的神經？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.07.06 05:56 am

馬總統此次「久誼之旅」枝節橫生。先是因宏都拉斯政變而緊急取消該國行程，隨後又遇上尼國總統奧蒂嘉在接機、國宴場合兩度臨時缺席，予人遭刻意冷落之感。這些插曲顯示這種元首率團出訪的模式已逐漸失去滋味，有改弦易轍之必要。

奧蒂嘉先以主持首都市長葬禮為由未去接機，又以處理宏國問題為由缺席國宴，皆極失東道之禮。畢竟，這些都是早已排定的行程，臨時爽約，難免讓人懷疑他是出於故意。回顧月前馬總統出訪，原本要在薩爾瓦多會見奧蒂嘉，卻遭對方三次更改時間而取消；兩相對照，奧蒂嘉賣弄身段確實有跡可循。

奧蒂嘉從「三次改期」到「二度放鴿子」，其間卻親自開車陪馬英九參訪鄉間，狀至熱絡，後又到飯店向馬致歉；可見，所有冷熱起伏，皆在故作姿態。倘若國人對於奧蒂嘉別有用心的猜測無誤，恐怕我方更不能就範；因為，如果奧蒂嘉此計得售，則其他邦交國亦必將爭相倣效。如此，馬總統所謂「正派、正當、正統」的外交原則將何以維繫？

元首外交是陳水扁時代「烽火外交」戰略下的產物。他任內十度親自率團大規模出訪，為的是在各個外交陣線搧風點火，出口轉內銷，並滿足其個人英雄主義的虛榮。但經過高度政治化的操作，元首外交其實已呈本末倒置，包括：陳水扁迭將內爭議題帶至國外消費、志在「過境」美國的目的與手段失調，乃至動用大量金錢收買邦交國官員，反助長友邦政治亂象。這樣的元首外交，看起來華麗奪目，卻幾乎是用我方的賄賂與對方的貪腐所建構而成。這些，如今都該因應新形勢通盤檢討了。

以台灣的特殊處境，元首出訪當然不能說沒有意義；但民眾也應了解：真正的外交工作，絕對不是寄託在這類行禮如儀的節目上推動。如果每次出訪都敲鑼打鼓，攜帶大批成員和媒體隨行，結果卻只能聚焦在各種浮面的事物上，很容易就會走上捨本逐末的歧路。而從對手的立場看，既然台灣當局喜歡用金錢賄買場面，自然懂得用虛浮的手法投其所好；奧蒂嘉不也正因為看準了在成群台灣媒體面前有絕佳的表演機會，他才可以如此反反覆覆，用盡忽冷忽熱的手法來扯動來客的神經。

過於頻繁的元首出訪，也容易誤導外交人員的認知，養成他們重視送往迎來的表面功夫，反忽略了真正的外交工作。以這次馬總統造訪尼加拉瓜為例，奧蒂嘉要不要接機，其實並無絕對必要；但我駐瓜使節可能為了彌補前次奧蒂嘉拒見馬英九之失，強要他接機表態，結果反而再度失控。試想，以總統之日理萬機，如果友邦元首來台訪問，我方也絕不可能安排總統作十幾小時的親自接待；那麼，為何馬總統出訪，一天要安排那麼多回合的元首晤面來表示親善？結果，卻只落得媒體在那裡細數誰放了誰幾次鴿子。

馬總統此行，未見中共干擾作梗的痕跡，倒是友邦的多事、冷熱無常讓我們點滴在心頭，外交人員的輕率更讓人捏把冷汗。如今看來，元首外交已經被操練到顯露疲態，如果連儀式性演出都無法把握全部細節，那麼在馬英九以新總統之姿走訪一圈之後，這類大陣仗的出訪似應適可而止，改以更深層而實質的外交耕耘；至少不必太過鋪陳，而授對方要索的口實。

看奧蒂嘉的失禮，國人對因應國家外交處境，更應凝聚共識。奧蒂嘉是想用無禮的手段來扯動台灣人民的情緒，以迫使馬總統及外交部就範；但若國人皆能不吃這一套，想要玩弄戲法者即不易得逞。要改變受人挾持的外交處境，國人先要看破虛華的表相，勿讓有心者所乘。

Essential Building Blocks to Recreating Kyoto on Taiwan

Essential Building Blocks to Recreating Kyoto on Taiwan
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 3, 2009

Everyone assumed the merger of Tainan City and Tainan County was a lost cause. But to everyone's surprise, Premier Liu's supplementary review allowed it to rise, phoenix-like, from the ashes. According to the Executive Yuan, the go ahead was based on two factors: Tainan's "status as an historical and cultural city," and "its lead in regional development." Tainan City and Tainan County were finally given the green light for upgrade to Directly Administered status. Leave aside for the moment whether the ruling party and ruling administration were motivated by electoral concerns. Recreating Kyoto on Taiwan is a major undertaking. Winning approval is merely the first step. How to turn these blueprints into reality is far more important.

We have to wonder why only a handful of scholars and officials have paid any attention to the case. No public hearings or citizens review boards were convened. The entire process seemed rushed and slap-dash. We affirm Premier Liu's desire to balance development in the North and South, and his determination to avoid old patterns of development. After all, upgrading may return Tainan to its old glory, and ease fears that Southern Taiwan will not be taken seriously. It may allow the concept of a dual-core in the South to take root. The blueprint for a "Kyoto on Taiwan" is persuasive for Premier Liu and other officials. We should review the history of Kyoto from its very beginning. It will allow Kyoto to serve as an historical precedent. It will allow us to solicit diverse opinions. It will prevent the concept of an "historic cultural city" from being stillborn.

During the reign of Emperor Kammu, the government attemped to break free of Buddhist influences. It moved the capital away from Nara. First it moved the capital to Nagaokakyo. Later, in 794, it founded the city of Heian-kyo, in Yamashiro, where it remained until 1869. Eventually its name was changed from Heian-kyo to Kyoto. During the Kamakura period it was the center of power for the Edo shogunate, as well as a refuge from war. Kyoto had much authority but little real power. These factors allowed Kyoto to remain the capital of the Japanese empire. But just as the human body is subject to birth, aging, sickness, and death, a boom and bust cycle appeared. It created Heian-kyo's aristocratic culture. Various Buddhist sects and buildings followed. Natural and man-made disasters destroyed the old world. But they also brought new opportunities for the common man. When the Emperor Meiji visited the East then failed to return, people in Kyoto suddenly realized Kyoto had lost its status as political hub. It had also lost its traditional status as a thousand year old center of culture.

The proud people of Kyoto did not give up. Officials and the public promoted a "Kyoto Strategy." First, they stressed education. Then they expanded and updated their transportation system. Finally, they implemented comprehensive urban renewal. They decided that Kyoto would both tradition but also welcome modernization. Today, Kyoto has 17 properties on the World Heritage list. It has hundreds of national treasures, and thousands of Buddhist temples and shrines. It has one of Japan's largest, most unique, post-modern train stations. It has Nintendo, Wacoal, Kyocera and other multinational companies. The people of Japan have never doubted Kyoto's historical and cultural role. Kyoto's population is merely the seventh largest in Japan. Its trade and industry cannot compare with that of Tokyo or Osaka. But Kyoto and Osaka, separated by only 40 kilometers, along with Kobe, form a regional triangle. Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe in Kansai, together with Tokyo as capital, constitute two ends of a lever. This continues a history of struggle between the East and West. It is also necessary to unify power at the center. Kanto and Kansai look very different. The differences between Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe may be great. But the revitalization of Kyoto shows us its importance to contemporary Japan.

Let's return to Tainan. Tainan was the capital of Taiwan during the Dutch occupation, during the Ming Dynasty under Koxinga, and during the Qing Dynasty. Its cultural heritage, architecture, and cultural values lead Taiwan, both in quantity and quality. The tea, sugar, camphor trade shifted Taiwan's historical center of gravity northward during the 1880s. But during Japanese colonial occupation many of members of the gentry in Tainan (including Lien Heng, Feng-Yuan Chen, Maw-Sheng Lin, and Han Shiquan) joined with idealists in Taichung under traditional Confucianists or the Presbyterian Church. They formed a covert resistance against Taipei, analogous to the antagonism between Kanto and Kansai. When the Nationalist government moved the capital to Taiwan, Tainan's status was uncertain. During the 1970 trade and industry took off. The imbalance between the North and the South became increasingly serious. Tainan's political and economic power and cultural influence continued to decline. Even today a sense of crisis remains, leading to the emergence of a self-help movement. For the above reasons, Kyoto provides a perfect prototype.

We celebrate the fact that Premier Liu appreciates Tainan's status as the first capital of Taiwan. It has a wealth of monuments, historical buildings, and traditional crafts. It has seven lagoons and four wetlands, enough to attract international tourists. It has the Tainan Science-Based Industrial Park, the Tainan Technology Industrial Park, the Southern Branch of the Industrial Technology Research Institute, and the Southern Taiwan Innovation Park. These make it the center of science and technology research in the South. These provide an economic base for its cultural history. These can help revitalize the Yunlin, Chiayi, and Tainan region as a whole. After all, for the population and resources on Taiwan to be overly concentrated in the North benefits no one.

More importantly, Premier Liu's "three living circles, seven development zones" proposal allows us to escape the myth of the three capitals. It allows us to see that all seven development zones are essential to national land planning. This converges with the five states, three offices plan during the Japanese occupation. In all fairness, the Japanese five states, three offices plan was an even better match for life on Taiwan. We need not evade this fact. Today Tainan City and Tainan County have unexpectedly broken out and inspired new thinking about national land planning.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2009.07.03
社論－打造台灣的京都 他山之石不可少
本報訊

出人意表，各界咸認「補考」無望的台南市縣合併改制案，竟在劉揆召開「複審會議」後浴火重生。據行政院表示，基於「歷史文化重鎮」和「帶頭區域發展」兩大關鍵因素，終讓台南市縣升格案拍板！暫撇黨政部門是否有選舉的權謀；當扛著「打造台灣的京都」的堂皇大纛，繼而攻城掠地後，如何落實藍圖，恐更為重要。

我們質疑，如斯重大的國土規畫，竟只有少數學者與官員與聞其事。畢竟少了諸如公聽會、公民審議等由下而上的草根民主後，整個過程就予人倉卒、拼湊的印象；然而，我們還是得肯定劉揆本於南北均衡、避開發展主義舊窠臼的魄力。畢竟升格之舉不但可讓台南重返歷史榮光、緩和南台不被重視的恐慌，且讓南部雙核心概念得以綻露生機。當然，「台灣的京都」藍圖對於劉揆暨與會官員似頗具說服力。循此，我們有必要將日本京都歷史細說從頭，既可做為他山之石，又能集思廣義，讓「歷史文化重鎮」之說不致蹈空。

日本在桓武天皇時期，為擺脫舊佛教勢力的牽絆，遂決意遷離平城京（奈良）。先是遷至長岡京，其後在七九四年於山背國興建了平安京，如此以迄一八六九年，幽幽歲月裡名號也由平安改為京都，其間鎌倉、江戶幕府的別立權力核心，以及戰國的離亂，都讓京都徒擁權威而少實權，但其做為日本帝都的身分未曾或變。千年光陰猶如人體有生老病死、繁華災厄互替諸現象。它既造就平安貴族文化，各類佛教宗派、建築也踵繼添華；而天災人禍的不時侵襲，既毀棄舊世界，也帶來庶民新契機。然而等到明治天皇東巡不返後，京都人赫然驚覺，京都不僅失去其政治樞紐地位，也喪失了千年來傳統權力與文化中心的角色。

驕傲的京都人並未屈服，官民努力推動「京都策」，先是扎根教育，次為廣興交通，最後是全面的都市更新，奠定了京都既恪守傳統，又不時迎納現代化的成就。如今的京都不僅坐擁十七項世界遺產、數以百計的國寶、上千座的佛寺與神社，它也擁有全日本最大、最具後現代特色的車站，任天堂、華歌爾及京瓷等跨國公司亦駐於其間。另一方面，日本人從未曾質疑京都崇隆的歷史文化地位，所以盡管京都人口僅居日本第七、工商產業更無法和東京、大阪相埒，然而它就是京都府，和相隔僅有四十多公里的大阪府（以及神戶市）合組為近畿三角。關西的京阪神和以東京都為首的關東地區形成槓桿兩端，這不只是歷史上東西軍合戰的延續，更是矯治一元化中央集權的必要之舉。而且，關東和關西樣貌固然大異其趣，即便是京阪神之間也是差異鮮明，可知京都活化在日本現代史上何其重要。

回過頭來看台南的例子。自荷據、明鄭到清領時期，台南做為台灣的首府，傳承的文化、建築和價值風尚於質於量都冠於全台，即使因為茶、糖、樟腦貿易導致台灣歷史重心在一八八○年代北移；但日治時期諸多台南仕紳（如連橫、陳逢源、林茂生、韓石泉…等）在傳統儒家或基督長老教會的化育下和台中志士聯手，隱約和台北城形成抗衡關係，猶如日本關東、關西的頡頏意象。直到國民政府遷台，由於對台南定位不明，以及七○年代工商起飛後，南北失衡日益嚴重，台南的政經實力和文化影響日墮，乃至今日因危機感加深，遂興起自覺自救運動。凡此，京都前例足供示範。

我們慶喜劉揆認知到，台南做為開台首府，不但擁有豐富的古蹟、歷史建築、傳統工藝，且其境內有七股潟湖、四草溼地，足以吸引國際觀光客；而台南科學園區、台南科技工業區、工研院南部分院、南台灣創新園區，使其成為南部產學研的科技重鎮，種種都可做為文化歷史和經濟的基礎，帶動雲嘉南的全面活化。畢竟人口、資源過度傾北，絕非全民之福。

更重要者，劉揆「三生活圈、七發展區」的新提示，讓我們得以跳脫三都的幻影，直視七發展區才是國土規畫要務，這隱然已和日治時期的五州三廳規畫相銜接了。平心而論，日人的五州三廳較貼近台灣生活圈，所以不須諱而避之。如今台南市縣的意外突圍反倒啟動由下而上的國土規畫想像。

The Flag at the World Games: Not a Political Tool

The Flag at the World Games: Not a Political Tool
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 2, 2009

The 2009 World Games will open in Kaohsiung on the 16th of this month. The public may bring Republic of China flags onto the grounds and cheer for Republic of China competitors. This is a highly sensitive situation for an international sports arena. It is also a litmus test for cross-Strait relations.

The World Games is not an Olympic event. But Taipei's membership in the World Games conforms to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) model. During last year's World Games Theme Song Conference, the Kaohsiung Municipal Government hung Republic of China flags on the podium. International World Games Association Chairman Ron Froehlich took one look at the arrangement and walked out. But the latest reports indicate that the concerned parties have reached a consensus. The World Games flags will be displayed according to IOC rules. But this will not apply to audience members' personal flags. This is a wise decision. It is also the only feasible solution. After all, the world's eyes are on us, the host. Is it really possible to prevent audience members from bringing their own Republic of China flags?

In the past, even during international events we hosted, such as baseball games, Beijing would protest if audience members waved Republic of China flags. This provoked considerable controversy. In September 2007, it was rumored that Beijing would not allow the Olympic Torch to come to Taiwan because people lining the roadsides might wave Republic of China flags. This also provoked considerable controversy. The Olympic Torch never made it to Taiwan.

In the past, frequent disputes would erupt over the display of flags in sports arenas. Two years ago Chan Yung-ran participated in the Australian Open. Mainland sports fans snatched Republic of China flags from our cheerleaders and snapped them in two. But as people have noted, the situation is changing. For example, in March of this year, at the World Baseball Classic in Tokyo, audience members waved the Republic of China national flag, but Beijing did not lodge any protest.

We hope the Beijing authorities have changed their thinking and their methods. The decades long bilateral dispute over flags, has its roots in the "zero-sum" KMT vs. CCP political standoff. It has left lingering resentments among the public on both sides. The more Beijing suppressed the Republic of China in the international arena, the more it attempted to shut out the Republic of China flag and the Republic of China name, the more resentful and angry the public on Taiwan felt about a cross-Strait situation that kept the two sides in a perpetual state of limbo. In fact, cross-strait disputes about flags should be dealt with separately, apart from the issue of national identity, as understood by the public on both sides. Today the World Games has separated the issues. The World Games will adopt the IOC model. But audience members will be allowed to bring their own flags. This kind of buffer is essential. It is the only solution to the dilemma. Otherwise, Beijing will be find it impossible to change reality, but merely alienate the public on Taiwan. It will also find it hard to gain international sympathy.

From any point of view, if Beijing cannot even tolerate the appearance of the Republic of China flag among audience members at international sports events, how can it possibly uphold the cross-Strait status quo? When Mainland tourists first arrived on Taiwan, they were forbidden to stand beneath the Republic of China flag. Today Mainland tourists arrive on Taiwan. They take snapshots of themselves in front of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and the Republic of China flag. It has become their idealized vision of a future in which the two sides are once again members of the same family. Times have changed. The ice in the Taiwan Strait is melting. The battle over flags has yet reach a resolution. But at least it now has a buffer. The Kaohsiung World Games is the beginning of this new understanding.

The Kaohsiung World Games will not forbid audience members from waving Republic of China flags. Presumably this involves a tacit understanding among the World Games authorities, Beijing, and Taipei. If so, the World Games will be a rare opportunity for the Republic of China to host an international sporting event. It will also be an important milestone in cross-Strait interaction. All citizens should cherish this opportunity. As much as possible, flags should be treated as a natural expression of public sentiment. They should not become a tool for cross-Strait and Blue vs. Green political struggles. The World Games will be an important test. We hope it will encourage cross-Strait progress, and not become a pretext for political reaction.

In particular, this event is a test for the DPP and the Green Camp. The Democratic Progressive Party has long considered the Republic of China flag a pair of worn out shoes. But with the Kaohsiung World Games, it has acquired a new enthusiasm for the flag. It is urging the public to wave the flag, to wear ROC flag shirts. It is even urging President Ma to wear an ROC flag shirt to the games. The Democratic Progressive Party has long repudiated the Republic of China. The World Games in Kaohsiung has inspired the DPP to identify enthusiastically with the Republic of China. This is a promising development. The public will be pleased to see the Republic of China flag appear in public meetings and processions held by the DPP. But the DPP must not attempt to exploit the audience members' flags. It must not attempt to treat them as grist for the cross-Strait and Blue vs. Green mill. It must not attempt to turn a sports arena into a political stage. If it attempts to use the occasion for rabble-rousing, then it will be contemptible beyond belief.

If the parties concerned act in good faith and with restraint, they can have a significant impact on domestic and cross-Strait harmony. The public is unwilling to allow political vultures exploit or degrade the Republic of China flag.

讓世運看得見國旗，別拿它當鬥爭工具
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.07.02 02:21 am

二○○九高雄世運十六日揭幕，民眾可以帶著國旗進場為台灣選手加油。這非但是國際運動場上相當敏感的政治景象，也可謂是兩岸關係的水溫測試器。

世運會雖非奧運機構，但在台灣的會籍問題上仍採奧會模式。去年在世運會主題歌曲發布會上，因高雄市政府在主席台上掛了國旗，國際世運會協會總會長朗佛契見狀掉頭就走。然而，最新的消息顯示，有關各方似已取得共識：大會的旗幟遵照奧會模式，但不干預觀眾持旗。這是一個明智的決定，也是唯一可能執行的準則。畢竟這是全球矚目的台灣主場，若強制觀眾不准持國旗，豈有可能執行？

過去，即使在台灣主場的國際賽事，如棒球賽，北京方面對觀眾持國旗亦屢提抗議，因此鬧出許多爭議；二○○七年九月，更傳出北京不准奧運聖火來台時沿路觀眾持國旗，果然掀起軒然大波，終致聖火未能來台。

過去在競技場上，關於旗幟的爭執屢見不鮮。兩年前詹詠然參加澳洲網球公開賽，甚至發生大陸球迷搶奪我啦啦隊手上國旗並折斷旗桿的事件。然而，許多國人也注意到，情勢似乎漸有改變，例如今年三月東京的世界棒球經典賽，觀眾席上出現青天白日滿地紅的國旗，未聞政治抗議。

我們希望其中確實存在著北京當局在思考及方法上的調整。兩岸數十年的旗幟之爭，是源於國共「漢賊不兩立」的政治共業，卻也造成兩岸人民莫大的心結。不僅如此，北京愈是在國際上打壓、封殺中華民國的旗號，就愈使台灣人民對兩岸間聯不起來、又斷不了的關係感到怨艾與憤恨。其實，兩岸政治對立的旗幟之爭，與兩岸人民的政治認同應有區隔處理的空間。如今世運會「大會採奧會模式／觀眾自主持旗」的區隔，正是一個必須存在的緩衝空間，也是非如此不能執行的現實方法。否則，北京不但未能改變這面旗幟仍然存在的事實，且等於是與全體台灣人民的自尊與感情為敵，恐也難見容於國際。

從任何角度看，北京若連運動場上的觀眾席也不容中華民國國旗出現，海峽兩岸的「現狀」將如何維持？試想，早年大陸訪客來台，站在青天白日旗下是絕對的禁忌；而如今陸客來台觀光，在中正紀念堂前與國旗合影，卻已變成他們想像兩岸一家的最佳場景。時空遷移，兩岸融冰，旗幟之戰就算不能立即產生新論述，至少也該畫出一個緩衝地帶，不是嗎？這次高雄世運正是這個新思維的發起處。

我們認為，高雄世運「不干預觀眾持旗」，應是出自包括世運當局、北京及台灣方面的某種協議或默契。倘係如此，此次世運非但是台灣難得主辦的國際運動盛典，也將成為兩岸互動的重要里程碑。全體國人理應珍惜這個機遇，盡量讓旗幟成為自然而然的社會情感流露，而切勿使之成為操作兩岸鬥爭及藍綠鬥爭的工具。因為，這次世運會將是一個非常重要的測試器，我們希望其效應有利於未來發展，而不要演成各方又走回頭路的藉口。

此一事件對民進黨及綠營尤其是一考驗。一向視國旗如敝屣的民進黨，最近為了高雄世運大發「國旗熱」，鼓吹民眾拿國旗、穿國旗裝，甚至主張馬總統穿「國旗裝」出席。如果因高雄市舉辦世運，可使一向否定中華民國的民進黨有了積極的國家認同，這樣的發展讓人期待，國人當亦樂見未來能看到國旗也出現在民進黨的集會遊行中。但是，綠營最好不要將觀眾席上的國旗，操作成兩岸鬥爭及藍綠鬥爭的廉價題材；亦即不要把一場運動賽事變成政治舞台，想要從中玩弄政爭情緒，那就真是居心叵測了。

此事若能在各方的善意與節制中自然而然地體現，對台灣內部及兩岸關係皆有重大意義。國人當不願見任何政治禿鷹以操作國旗而做出傷害國旗的事！

Politics Must Not Interfere with Justice, Individual Cases Must Not Undermine the Rule of Law

Politics Must Not Interfere with Justice, Individual Cases Must Not Undermine the Rule of Law
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 1, 2009


Ah-Bian's corruption case continues to make its way through the system. Chen Shui-bian remains in the custody of the court. His children have been forbidden to leave the country pending charges of perjury. From prison, Chen Shui-bian announced that he had sent a letter to President Ma, asking him to ease the restrictions preventing Chen Hsing-yu from leaving the island. He said excessively tight restrictions might provoke the accused to commit suicide, and even taking her son with her.

No one knows how the Democratic Progressive Party will view President Chen Shui-bian's letter to Ma. But Chen Shui-bian's actions have subtly undercut the rule of law on Taiwan, in at least two ways. Whether a person should be prevented from leaving the country is an issue that must be decided with an even hand, in accordance with the law. Threatening suicide convinces no one. To claim that being prevented from leaving the island is so traumatic that she no longer wants to live and plans to commit suicide, along with her son, is hardly a normal reaction. It is hardly likely to gain public sympathy. On the contrary. It makes people wonder whether the Chen family is impatient to leave the country to manage its overseas accounts. Either that, or it is using the threat of suicide to bring pressure to bear on law enforcement officials. To put it bluntly, it comes across as nothing more than a political ploy intended to obstruct justice.

Politicians interfere with the administration of justice. They refuse to offer rational defenses in a court of law. They doggedly attempt to engage in political struggles by screaming "political persecution," eliciting stock responses from ruling and opposition party politicians. Such methods don't help their cases. They merely leave the impression they are attempting to use political passions to discredit the judicial process.

When Chen Shui-bian was president, he would order high-level prosecutors and investigators to jump, and they would ask how high. Today, it would seem, he still takes such an arrangement for granted. It was an arrangement he vehemently condemned during his years in the political opposition. But no sooner did he come to power, and he consciously perpetuated the same outrage. If that is not despicable enough, he is now in prison, yet he has the temerity to write President Ma, calling for the lifting of exit restrictions. How can people not suspect a political agenda? He wants his supporters to believe that the courts' rulings are still subject to the president's whims. Since those in power must not manipulate the justice system, how can President Ma possibly lift the exit restrictions on Chen's daughter? When Chen Shui-bian was president, he meddled in the administration of justice. How can one refuse to condemn this? Chen Shui-bian was telling his supporters the only political decision they need to make, is to support Chen Shui-bian. They need not wonder about right and wrong or the rule of law. He has used politics to undermine the rule of law on Taiwan.

Chen Shui-bian's political interference has undercut the rule of law on Taiwan, This is not news. Will the Democratic Progressive Party continue allowing itself to be taken hostage, and follow Chen blindly? The number of people willing to put their trust in Chen Shui-bian grows fewer and fewer. Therefore we should adopt a different perspective. Chen Shui-bian's attitude gives people the chills. The political motivation behind the DPP's expressions of solidarity can be debated. But among them are two issues that call for a cool head, and that warrant further investigation and systemic reform.

The first issue is the system of pre-trial detention. We must not undermine the presumption of innocence. Pre-trial detention must remain the exception and not the rule. This must be true for Chen Shui-bian. This must also be true for the ordinary citizen. Chen Shui-bian must not be considered special due to his political status. He must not be granted privileges denied others. Chen Shui-bian may be contemptible. But that does not mean the treatment he has received is necessarily questionable, or that most people ought to receive the same treatment. The main reason for pre-trial detention is to prevent flight and further criminal wrongdoing. That the crime is a felony is not grounds for detention. Detention to prevent coordination of testimony runs the risk of overly restricting the rights of the defendant. Detention to prevent coordination of testimony must be strictly monitored and not applied lightly. The court should consider the posting of bail and regular reporting as an alternative. A "strong suspicion of guilt" alone must never become cause for pre-trial detention. Until the law is amended, Chen Shui-bian must not be an exception accorded special treatment. On the other hand, the amending of the law must not be obstructed merely because Chen Shui-bian has established a bad precedent. If the DPP refrains from selective appeals on behalf of a specific individual, and instead advocates amending the law for the sake of human rights, it may gain greater political credibility.

The second issue is exit restrictions. Exit restrictions are actually way to restrict where the defendant lives. We do not intend to discuss the current exit restrictions against Chen Hsing-yu. But exit restrictions on her are not necessarily unwarranted. What we wish to discuss is who should be barred from leaving the country. The current practice is for prosecutors to determine who may not leave the country, and then declare that a defendant may not leave the country. This must remain an exception to the principle of presumption of innocence, and not the rule. Such restrictions constitute a threat to personal freedom and freedom of travel. The threat it poses to human rights is comparable to that posed by wiretaps. Today, wiretaps must first be approved by the court. But prosecutors still have the power to impose exit restrictions. Whether this accords with due process is debatable. This is true for Chen Hsing-yu, and it is true for the average person. The relevant laws should be reviewed, not for Chen Hsing-yu, but for everyone.

President Ma can of course submit a request to have prosecutors review an individual case. But why not use the controversy over detention and exit restrictions as an opportunity to reform the system? Why not use it as an opportunity to fulfill your campaign promise to improve human rights?

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2009.07.01
社論－政治不能干預司法，個案也不能破壞法治
本報訊

扁案司法審判持續進行，陳水扁仍受到法院羈押，其子女亦因偽證等事由遭到限制出境。陳水扁在獄中聲言致函馬總統，要求對於陳幸妤遭到限制出境網開一面，理由是限制過度恐將引起當事人自己甚或攜子尋短。

對陳水扁致函馬總統的舉措，民進黨不知會如何看待，但陳水扁的做法對台灣的法治至少形成兩項無形的傷害。某人應否受到限制出境的待遇是司法應該公平對待的問題，但以尋死做為抗議限制出境的對策，並不具有說服力。說是遭到限制出境者將會痛不欲生到攜子尋短的地步，恐非正常反應，也難激發社會同情，反予人質疑是否急於出國理財或是以死要脅執法者的觀感，說穿了，只是對抗司法的政治手腕罷了。

政治人物涉及司法，不肯在法院中以理自辯，而只是一味以遭到「政治追殺」為名從事政治鬥爭，引發朝野政客諸多制式反應，對自己的案件不但沒有幫助，反予人利用政治情緒抹黑司法程序的印象。

陳水扁擔任總統期間，對於司法高層與檢調首長，呼喚隨心，任加指使，今日看來，顯是他心目中認為理所當然之事，這原是他昔年在野期間極力撻伐聲討的景象，後來明知故犯，已是令人不齒；現在繫獄期間，竟又致函總統要求解除出境限制，如何不令人質疑此中懷有政治算計，想要讓支持者繼續相信司法可受執政的總統擺布左右。然而執政者既然不該左右司法，馬總統又何能解除出境限制？陳水扁當年與司法的瓜葛糾纏，於今又豈能不受非議？所以誰都知道，陳水扁不過是在告訴支持者，只需要在政治上選擇支持陳水扁就是了，不必去問任何體制是非、法治道理。赤裸裸地使用政治手段踐踏法治體制的行徑，難道不是在傷害台灣法治？

陳水扁決定盲目地訴諸政治手段，傷害台灣的法治，早已不是新聞了，民進黨是否繼續遭他裹脅，盲從追隨，恐怕社會上願意寄以期待的人也愈來愈少了。饒是如此，我們也還要從另一個角度提出觀察。陳水扁的態度令人齒冷，民進黨的聲援政治動機可議，但是此中也確定有兩項議題，值得跳出情緒陷阱，純就制度改革的面向做持平的探討。

第一是審前羈押制度。在無罪推定原則無論如何不容破壞的前提之下，審前羈押一定只能是例外，不能是原則。不僅陳水扁案如此，一般升斗小民的案件尤然。固然不能因為陳水扁政治身分特殊，就給予一般人不能享受的特權，也不能因為陳水扁令人痛恨，就認為他所受到的待遇，必然沒有可資檢討之處，以致一般人也該同樣對待。審前羈押的主要理由應該是防止逃亡與制止虞犯。重罪羈押絕對不是理由，串證羈押也極易成為過度限制辯護權利的弊端，應該嚴格把關，不許輕用。交保以及定期報到，也恆該是法院思考逃亡羈押的優先替代選擇。「犯罪嫌疑甚重」本身絕對不能成為審前羈押的理由。陳水扁不應該在修法之前享受例外特權，但也不能因為有了陳水扁的惡例，就閉塞修法的努力。民進黨不去聲援個案，致力修法以造福通案人權，或許能贏得更多的政治公信力。

第二是限制出境的問題。限制出境其實是限制被告住居的一種方法，我們無意當下討論陳幸妤是否應該限制出境，也並不認為她受到限制的實質顧慮並不存在。所要討論的是，應該由誰來限制出境。目前的實務是由檢察官限制出境，然則限制被告出境，仍是無罪推定原則的例外，也構成人身自由、旅行自由的限制性強制處分，其威脅人權的程度，並不亞於監聽。監聽已經改為要經法院許可始得為之，檢察官仍然握有限制住居與限制出境的強制處分大權，正當程序上極有可議之處，陳幸妤如此，一般人也是如此。不是為了陳幸妤，為了一般人，相關的制度與程序立法，應該進行檢討。

馬總統可以將個案請求送檢座處理，何妨在羈押與限制出境的制度之上，進行改革，以兌現提升司法人權的競選政見？