Is Evacuating 50,000 Townfolk ridiculous?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 12, 2009
In one particular county, Typhoon Morakot buried an entire town. The county executive later said that evacuating several towns would have been a major undertaking involving 40,000 to 50,000 people. What official, he asked, would have the temerity to evacuate an entire town based on a 1000 mm rainfall forecast?
One newspaper spoke out on his behalf. Its headline read "Ridiculous!"
This editorial examines how the minds of people in office think. We have no desire to become caught up in a war of words. Although everyone knows which county executive we are referring to, he will nevertheless remain nameless. Allow us to engage in a little Monday morning quarterbacking. The town has already been buried under a mountain of mud. The tragedy has already occurred. But suppose this county executive had decided to evacuate the town, and significantly reduced the number of fatalities that followed, would his evacuation still be characterized as "ridiculous?"
The public watches television. It has seen how officials in the southern United States evacuate entire populations as a result of hurricane forecasts. Often the evacuation takes place one or two days before the hurricane strikes. The skies are completely clear. But the highway leading out of the city is backed up for miles. The car tops are piled high with valuables. Tell us, is the sight of millions of people evacuating a city under completely clear skies ridiculous?
One must not of course be too hard on that particular county executive. When hurricanes strike the United States, entire towns and entire cities are often wiped out. Taiwan has not experienced such a tragedy in several decades. In the mind of the county executive, an entire town being wiped out was inconceivable. Naturally evacuating an entire town never even occurred to him. The county government probably didn't even have procedures in place for the evacuation, rescue, and resettlement of tens of thousands of residents. Even if the county executive had decided to evacuate, persuading the villagers would have been no easy task. Perhaps this is what the county executive meant when he said "What official would have the temerity to evacuate an entire town based on a 1000 mm rainfall forecast?"
On the other hand, Taiwan is such a tiny island. In the face of devastating natural disasters, the president and premier are for all practical purposes, county executives and city mayors. County executives and city mayors are for all practical purposes, village and borough chiefs. County magistrates and city mayors have responsibilities for disaster prevention and response that they cannot shirk. As for the cases cited above, they cannot blame tardy weather forecasts. After all, the Central Weather Bureau increased its rainfall forecast for the county in question to over 1000 mm that same day. During such emergencies, county executives have been effectively demoted to the level of village and borough chiefs. They must be alert to the region's soil and water conditions. They must bear greater responsibility and authority for typhoon risk assessment than local residents. If a county executive does not dare to evacuate when the forecast is 1000 mm of rainfall, how about when the forecast is 2000 mm of rainfall? Is this a lack of courage? Or is it a lack of intelligence or ability?
Besides, Kaohsiung County, Pingtung County, and Taitung County officials, to their regret, were also late to evacuate. Why was Tainan City able to make the bold decision to evacuate? Did Mayor Hsu Tien-tsai make a sacrifice to the gods?
After the painful lesson of the 8/8 Flood, officials must change their thinking. The keyword in meteorology today is "extreme weather." It refers to causeless, random, "off the chart" numbers. As noted earlier, for county executives, the notion that an entire town could be wiped out was inconceivable. That is why they considered evacuation of an entire town ridiculous. But today "extreme weather" is the norm. Officials must have the courage to make bold decisions. This applies not merely to disaster response strategies. It applies especially to future hydrological projects, whether they take into account "extreme weather" conditions. For example, can the town be promptly evacuated? If the town can not be evacuated, can one order the ground floors cleared, allowing the flood waters to wash through? Such schemes may sound "ridiculous" on Taiwan. But they are commonplace throughout areas prone to flooding in Southeast Asia. Otherwise, if one merely rebuilds in the same location, only to be flooded again next year, wouldn't that be even more "ridiculous?"
Furthermore, the role of officials must change. As pointed out earlier, when a major disaster occurs on the island of Taiwan, the president becomes a county executive or city mayor. County executives and city mayors become village and borough chiefs. Village and borough chiefs become scouts at the point. Normally the primary responsibility for water and soil conservation rests with county and city governments. In the event of a disaster, someone must decide whether to evacuate. The responsibility must fall on the shoulders of county executives and city mayors, and not officials at other levels. During past typhoons, we have seen county executives and city mayors go door to door urging residents to evacuate. This time, county executives and city mayors should reflect on their failure to respond in a timely manner. They can hardly excuse themselves by claiming that decisive action would have been "ridiculous." They should recall television images of officials in the United States evacuating entire cities!
Heaven and earth have no compassion, and regard the people as straw dogs (sacrificial beasts). Officials are unwise, and regard the people as straw dogs. The public detests officials who pass the buck back and forth in an attempt to disown responsibility. The entire government, from the central government level to the village level, should learn from its mistakes, and engage in thorough introspection. Since weather changes are so "ridiculous," future national safety, water and soil conservation, ecological protection, urban and regional infrastructure, disaster prevention and response measures must be expanded and upgraded. Independence, courage, and vision are needed to build a new, ecologically sound Taiwan.
要撤離五萬鄉民！很荒謬？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.08.12 05:16 am
莫拉克颱風使某縣發生「滅村」的慘劇。事後，縣長說，將幾個鄉撤離是四、五萬人口的大事，有哪個官員膽敢在預報一千公釐雨量時就全鄉撤離？
一家報紙的標題為縣長出氣，對撤鄉的主張加上「很荒謬」三個字。
本文在探討權力思維，不願捲入政治口水；雖可能眾人皆知所指何縣，但仍姑隱其名。事後諸葛亮，如今既已發生滅村的慘劇，這位縣長若能反省當初的決策思維，會不會仍認為倘若當時決定全鄉撤離而能大幅減低災情，還是「很荒謬」的事？
國人常在電視上看到美國南部因預報颶風而全城撤離的景象。往往是在颶風來襲前一二日，晴空萬里，但在出城的高速公路上撤離的車龍已是迤邐數十公里，車頂堆滿細軟家當。你說：這種幾百萬人在晴空下撤離的景觀，荒謬不荒謬？
但也不能過責那位縣長，美國常在颶風季發生滅鎮、滅城的事，而台灣畢竟已幾十年未發生滅村慘事。在縣長腦際既無滅村的圖像，當然也不易出現撤鄉的決策思維，說不定縣政府更從來沒有同時撤離數萬居民的救難安置方案；何況，即使當時縣長作了撤離的決策，要說服鄉民撤離亦非易事。這或許就是縣長說「有哪個官員膽敢在預報一千公釐雨量時就全鄉撤離」的道理。
不過，話說回頭，在台灣這麼一個小島上，面對慘重天災地變之時，總統及行政院長就變成了縣市長，而縣市長就變成了鄉里長；縣市長在防災救災上的決策判斷，實有其無可推諉的責任。以本文所舉之例而言，恐怕不宜推說氣象預報遲誤，畢竟當日中央氣象局早將該縣的預報值推至一千公釐以上，而此時角色變成「鄉里長」的縣長，對境內水土環境的脆弱程度，理應有比現地居民更具風險評估的責任及權力；若謂縣長「不膽敢」在一千公釐時決定撤離，難道在二千公釐也「不膽敢」？這究竟是「不膽敢」，或無知而無能？
何況，高雄縣、屏東縣及台東縣等皆有遲誤撤離的遺憾，但為何台南市卻能果斷撤離？市長許添財難道是向天公借膽？
經歷這次八八水災的慘痛教訓，官員的思維必須改變。現在氣象學的關鍵字是「極端氣象」，這就是無理可尋、隨時皆可出現「破表」數據的意思。前文言，正因縣長腦中沒有「滅村」的圖像，所以會認為撤鄉是荒謬的；但是，如今「極端氣象」的變化既是「荒謬」無常，則官員就必須有果斷決策的「膽識」。這非但是指災難發生時應變策略的拿捏，尤是指未來水土建設的規劃更不能不將「極端氣象」的變數計算在內。例如，頻災區能否斷然遷村？倘若不能遷村，能不能下令將一樓淨空，供洪汛來去之用？這種方案，在台灣聽起來「荒謬」，卻普遍行諸東南亞的洪汛區。否則，就地重建，明年再淹，豈不更「荒謬」？
再者，官員的角色也要改變。前文指出，在台灣這個小島上，大災難發生時，總統變成縣市長，縣市長就變成鄉里長，鄉里長則變成尖兵斥候。平常水土保育的主要責任在縣市政府；遇災時撤不撤離，責任也絕對是在縣市長，不會在其他層級。過去，我們也看過縣市長在颱風來襲時，親自一家一家挨戶敲門勸居民撤離者；因而，此次發生遲誤，相關縣市長理當反省愧咎，豈能以當時不敢作出「荒謬決策」來自我開脫？回憶一下美國晴空撤城的電視鏡頭吧！
天地不仁以萬物為芻狗，官員不智以百姓為芻狗。國人十分厭惡官員相互推諉卸責；整個政府，從中央到村里，皆應痛定思痛，深切反省改進。當氣象的變化既是如此「荒謬」，未來在國土保安、水土維護、生態保育、都市及社區建設、防災救災等種種政策施為上，皆應放大尺度、提升高度，以超然與遠見的膽識，來建構新的生態台灣。
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
Why is Southern Taiwan Still Under Water?
Why is Southern Taiwan Still Under Water?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 11, 2009
Typhoon Morakot brought with it torrential rains that inundated southern Taiwan. The scenes of disaster were painful to behold. The ruling and opposition parties must follow-up on rescue efforts and post-disaster reconstruction. The government is not unaware of the importance of water management. It recently plunked down over 100 billion NT on the 1999 flood control budget. The baffling result was the more it spent the worse the flooding got. A number of missing links in the causal chain require closer examination. Only by re-thinking water management can the government prevent a repeat of the tragedy.
Typhoon Morakot and its accompanying southwest pressure system had alarming repercussions that far exceeded expectations. Over a year's worth of rainfall fell in a few short days. The rain coincided with the high tide. The accumulated water had trouble draining away. It turned out to be the flood of the century. To make matters worse, weather forecasts focused on disaster prevention in the north, to the neglect of the south. But leave these factors aside for the moment. What have the vast sums spent on water management accomplished? Based on the current disaster, one can only shake one's head.
The hardest hit area was Kaohsiung. Some townships, such as Chiatung, Linbian, and Chiahsien, were already prone to flooding. Three and a half years ago, the Chen Shui-bian administration proposed an eight year, 80 billion NT water management program. The legislature even threw in an extra 116 billion NT. The first phase allocated 30 billion NT to "areas prone to flooding." So why weren't these low-lying townships included in the improvement plan? Just where did those tens of billions in water management funds go? Perhaps the government merely tinkered around the edges, and worsened local flood conditions?
The claim that "Flood control takes big bucks" is a Big Lie. It is the product of Taiwan's populist politics. Add to this Blue vs. Green partisan infighting and central government funds finding their way into local level bid-rigging. The result is the more water management planning one engages in, the farther water management gets off track. Water management has never been amenable to quick fixes. In addition to money, it requires professional planning and regular maintenance. The billions squandered on water management clearly underscores several defects in Taiwan's water management system.
One. The government emphasizes the building of infrastructure, but overlooks routine maintenance. Too many funds must be consumed within a given time frame. Therefore water management districts continuously cook up infrastructure projects and find ways to bid them out. But water management infrastructure requires comprehensive planning. It requires constant maintenance. When discretionary funds have been spent on construction, they are no longer available for maintenance. Maintenance gets neglected. Typhoon Morakot turned southern Taiwan into "Waterworld," overnight. The main reason was at least 10 levees were breached. If one neglects the maintenance of levees, and frantically builds pumping stations willy nilly, isn't that putting the cart before the horse? Typhoon Morakot destroyed 20 bridges on Taiwan. These bridges had no personnel stationed on them to warn users of impending disaster. As a result, innocent people fell into the river. This was one more mind-boggling development.
Two. The water management system is "long on politics, short on management." Water management, including disaster prevention and disaster relief, is work requiring a great degree of professionalism. But over-politicization, the arrogance of power, and the abdication of professionals, have severed both lateral and vertical lines of communication within the system. The high speed rail system and several national highways have been built in the narrow corridor on the western half of the island. These have undermined the local hydrology. This shifts the burden onto others. How can the government prevent national infrastructure projects from destroying the hydrology? Does the Water Resources Agency have any say in the matter? Just look at the operations of the central government's disaster relief center. President Ma and Premier Liu got in each others' way during their tours of inspection. As we can see, no matter how high one's rank, one never has enough information, and the information one has, fails to provide a command of the overall situation. So why not let more professionals take charge of disaster relief?
Three. The government fails to discriminate between the essential and the trivial. Corruption is widespread. When the Eight Year 80 billion Discretionary Budget was first proposed, it was criticized as being short on specifics. Later, during implementation, it was difficult to avoid favoritism. This led to the inversion of water management priorities. Many high and low ranking officials were implicated in corruption scandals involving government/business collusion. Former Vice Minister of Economic Affairs Hou Ho-hsiung alone was implicated in seven cases of corruption, and sentenced to nearly seven years in prison. This reveals the magnitude of the economic interests involved. To prevent the continued abuse and squandering of the water management budget, the government must invite experts to set up a special committee to oversee discretionary budgets. Otherwise, big bucks will be spent, but the flood waters will continue to rise. Is that fair to the public?
Water management is not a popularity contest. It is not a contest to see who is the hardest worker. It is not a matter of throwing money at a problem. If one lacks the necessary vision for comprehensive national land use planning, if one lacks respect for the people and their property, if one lacks respect for Mother Nature, one cannot succeed in water management. A half century after the 8/7 Flood, the 8/8 Flood has given us a wake-up call.
投千億治水，何以南台灣仍成水鄉？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.08.11 06:25 am
莫拉克颱風引進豪雨，水淹南台，災情讓人不忍卒睹；朝野必須全力以赴，投入後續搶救及災後重建。其實，政府並非不了解水利之重要，近年更大手筆投入八年一千多億的治水預算，結果卻是越治越淹，讓人困惑。其間失落的環節，必須潛心反省，重整治水思維，才能防止悲劇一再重演。
這次莫拉克颱風和西南氣流產生的驚人牽引作用，遠遠超乎想像，短短幾天降下超過一年的雨量，又適逢大潮，積水難退，是這場世紀水患的大背景。再加上氣象預報一直將焦點防災地區放在北部，導致南台灣受到輕忽。撇開這些因素不談，若追問政府近年花大錢治水究竟發揮了什麼效用，就這次的災情檢視，恐怕只能令人搖頭。
以這次災情最慘重的高屏為例，有些鄉鎮如佳冬、林邊、甲仙，原本就是易致水患的地區。三年半前，扁政府提出八年八百億的治水條例，立法院還追加到一千一百六十億；其中首期三百億元就用在「易淹水地區」的水患治理，但為何這些低窪鄉鎮沒有被納入改善計畫？那數百億的龐大治水經費究竟被用到哪裡去了？或者政府只在周邊作了零星整治，卻反而集中強化了當地的災情？
要花大錢才能治水，這是台灣民粹政治的一張大牛皮；再加上藍綠惡鬥、中央用水利經費來綁樁地方，也就越發使治水的規劃和事權偏離正軌。事實上，治水從來不是一蹴可幾的工作，除了金錢，它更需要的是體系性的專業規劃，以及更多經常性的細心維護。但從「千億治水」的失利，我們分明看到台灣水利建設出現了許多畸形現象：
其一，只強調建設，卻輕忽保養。由於有太多經費要在限期內花掉，所以水利部門的工作就是不斷巧立工程名目，並想方設法將其發包出去。但水利建設是需要完整規劃、且高度維護的工程，特別預算被用在建設，水利部門的保養經費相對緊縮，維護工作便也受到輕忽。這次，南台灣一夕變成水鄉澤國，主因是至少有十條以上的溪流潰堤；試想，放著基礎的河川堤防不維護，卻拚命在那裡加蓋抽水站、買抽水機，這不是本末倒置嗎？再看，這次全台有廿座橋斷裂，有些橋樑完全沒有警示人員或設備，導致無辜民眾墜河，這也是難以想像的事。
其二，治水體系呈現「強政治、弱行政」。治水，包括防災和救災，都是高度專業的工作；但過度政治化的結果，就出現權力掛帥、專業退位的現象，體系的橫向乃至上下聯繫都支離破碎。狹窄的西部走廊興建了多條國道和高鐵，當然會破壞地方水文，形成以鄰為壑狀態；但要如何解決國家建設導致的水文破壞，水利署有發言權嗎？光看這次中央救災指揮中心的運作，馬總統和劉揆都在巡視途中受阻；可見，權位再高然而資訊依舊不足，無助於指揮大局。那麼，為何不讓更專業的人來指揮救災？
其三，輕重失調，弊端叢生：當年八年八百億特別預算提出時，即遭批評缺乏具體計畫；後來執行時更難免徇私，導致治水優先順序失度，而許多大小官員更因而捲入官商勾結及貪瀆的弊案。前經濟部次長侯和雄一人即身涉七案被判近七年，可見其中牽涉利益之龐大。若要防止治水預算繼續遭到濫用及虛擲，政府應邀集專家成立特別委員會，來監督並導正特別預算的運用。否則，花了大錢，大水照淹，這對得起人民嗎？
治水，不是在拚人氣，也不是比辛勞，更不是比砸錢。如果胸中沒有國土總體規劃的見識，沒有惜民愛物的襟懷，沒有敬畏天地的精神，不可能做好治水大業。在八七水災半個世紀後，八八水災又給了我們一次當頭棒喝。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 11, 2009
Typhoon Morakot brought with it torrential rains that inundated southern Taiwan. The scenes of disaster were painful to behold. The ruling and opposition parties must follow-up on rescue efforts and post-disaster reconstruction. The government is not unaware of the importance of water management. It recently plunked down over 100 billion NT on the 1999 flood control budget. The baffling result was the more it spent the worse the flooding got. A number of missing links in the causal chain require closer examination. Only by re-thinking water management can the government prevent a repeat of the tragedy.
Typhoon Morakot and its accompanying southwest pressure system had alarming repercussions that far exceeded expectations. Over a year's worth of rainfall fell in a few short days. The rain coincided with the high tide. The accumulated water had trouble draining away. It turned out to be the flood of the century. To make matters worse, weather forecasts focused on disaster prevention in the north, to the neglect of the south. But leave these factors aside for the moment. What have the vast sums spent on water management accomplished? Based on the current disaster, one can only shake one's head.
The hardest hit area was Kaohsiung. Some townships, such as Chiatung, Linbian, and Chiahsien, were already prone to flooding. Three and a half years ago, the Chen Shui-bian administration proposed an eight year, 80 billion NT water management program. The legislature even threw in an extra 116 billion NT. The first phase allocated 30 billion NT to "areas prone to flooding." So why weren't these low-lying townships included in the improvement plan? Just where did those tens of billions in water management funds go? Perhaps the government merely tinkered around the edges, and worsened local flood conditions?
The claim that "Flood control takes big bucks" is a Big Lie. It is the product of Taiwan's populist politics. Add to this Blue vs. Green partisan infighting and central government funds finding their way into local level bid-rigging. The result is the more water management planning one engages in, the farther water management gets off track. Water management has never been amenable to quick fixes. In addition to money, it requires professional planning and regular maintenance. The billions squandered on water management clearly underscores several defects in Taiwan's water management system.
One. The government emphasizes the building of infrastructure, but overlooks routine maintenance. Too many funds must be consumed within a given time frame. Therefore water management districts continuously cook up infrastructure projects and find ways to bid them out. But water management infrastructure requires comprehensive planning. It requires constant maintenance. When discretionary funds have been spent on construction, they are no longer available for maintenance. Maintenance gets neglected. Typhoon Morakot turned southern Taiwan into "Waterworld," overnight. The main reason was at least 10 levees were breached. If one neglects the maintenance of levees, and frantically builds pumping stations willy nilly, isn't that putting the cart before the horse? Typhoon Morakot destroyed 20 bridges on Taiwan. These bridges had no personnel stationed on them to warn users of impending disaster. As a result, innocent people fell into the river. This was one more mind-boggling development.
Two. The water management system is "long on politics, short on management." Water management, including disaster prevention and disaster relief, is work requiring a great degree of professionalism. But over-politicization, the arrogance of power, and the abdication of professionals, have severed both lateral and vertical lines of communication within the system. The high speed rail system and several national highways have been built in the narrow corridor on the western half of the island. These have undermined the local hydrology. This shifts the burden onto others. How can the government prevent national infrastructure projects from destroying the hydrology? Does the Water Resources Agency have any say in the matter? Just look at the operations of the central government's disaster relief center. President Ma and Premier Liu got in each others' way during their tours of inspection. As we can see, no matter how high one's rank, one never has enough information, and the information one has, fails to provide a command of the overall situation. So why not let more professionals take charge of disaster relief?
Three. The government fails to discriminate between the essential and the trivial. Corruption is widespread. When the Eight Year 80 billion Discretionary Budget was first proposed, it was criticized as being short on specifics. Later, during implementation, it was difficult to avoid favoritism. This led to the inversion of water management priorities. Many high and low ranking officials were implicated in corruption scandals involving government/business collusion. Former Vice Minister of Economic Affairs Hou Ho-hsiung alone was implicated in seven cases of corruption, and sentenced to nearly seven years in prison. This reveals the magnitude of the economic interests involved. To prevent the continued abuse and squandering of the water management budget, the government must invite experts to set up a special committee to oversee discretionary budgets. Otherwise, big bucks will be spent, but the flood waters will continue to rise. Is that fair to the public?
Water management is not a popularity contest. It is not a contest to see who is the hardest worker. It is not a matter of throwing money at a problem. If one lacks the necessary vision for comprehensive national land use planning, if one lacks respect for the people and their property, if one lacks respect for Mother Nature, one cannot succeed in water management. A half century after the 8/7 Flood, the 8/8 Flood has given us a wake-up call.
投千億治水，何以南台灣仍成水鄉？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.08.11 06:25 am
莫拉克颱風引進豪雨，水淹南台，災情讓人不忍卒睹；朝野必須全力以赴，投入後續搶救及災後重建。其實，政府並非不了解水利之重要，近年更大手筆投入八年一千多億的治水預算，結果卻是越治越淹，讓人困惑。其間失落的環節，必須潛心反省，重整治水思維，才能防止悲劇一再重演。
這次莫拉克颱風和西南氣流產生的驚人牽引作用，遠遠超乎想像，短短幾天降下超過一年的雨量，又適逢大潮，積水難退，是這場世紀水患的大背景。再加上氣象預報一直將焦點防災地區放在北部，導致南台灣受到輕忽。撇開這些因素不談，若追問政府近年花大錢治水究竟發揮了什麼效用，就這次的災情檢視，恐怕只能令人搖頭。
以這次災情最慘重的高屏為例，有些鄉鎮如佳冬、林邊、甲仙，原本就是易致水患的地區。三年半前，扁政府提出八年八百億的治水條例，立法院還追加到一千一百六十億；其中首期三百億元就用在「易淹水地區」的水患治理，但為何這些低窪鄉鎮沒有被納入改善計畫？那數百億的龐大治水經費究竟被用到哪裡去了？或者政府只在周邊作了零星整治，卻反而集中強化了當地的災情？
要花大錢才能治水，這是台灣民粹政治的一張大牛皮；再加上藍綠惡鬥、中央用水利經費來綁樁地方，也就越發使治水的規劃和事權偏離正軌。事實上，治水從來不是一蹴可幾的工作，除了金錢，它更需要的是體系性的專業規劃，以及更多經常性的細心維護。但從「千億治水」的失利，我們分明看到台灣水利建設出現了許多畸形現象：
其一，只強調建設，卻輕忽保養。由於有太多經費要在限期內花掉，所以水利部門的工作就是不斷巧立工程名目，並想方設法將其發包出去。但水利建設是需要完整規劃、且高度維護的工程，特別預算被用在建設，水利部門的保養經費相對緊縮，維護工作便也受到輕忽。這次，南台灣一夕變成水鄉澤國，主因是至少有十條以上的溪流潰堤；試想，放著基礎的河川堤防不維護，卻拚命在那裡加蓋抽水站、買抽水機，這不是本末倒置嗎？再看，這次全台有廿座橋斷裂，有些橋樑完全沒有警示人員或設備，導致無辜民眾墜河，這也是難以想像的事。
其二，治水體系呈現「強政治、弱行政」。治水，包括防災和救災，都是高度專業的工作；但過度政治化的結果，就出現權力掛帥、專業退位的現象，體系的橫向乃至上下聯繫都支離破碎。狹窄的西部走廊興建了多條國道和高鐵，當然會破壞地方水文，形成以鄰為壑狀態；但要如何解決國家建設導致的水文破壞，水利署有發言權嗎？光看這次中央救災指揮中心的運作，馬總統和劉揆都在巡視途中受阻；可見，權位再高然而資訊依舊不足，無助於指揮大局。那麼，為何不讓更專業的人來指揮救災？
其三，輕重失調，弊端叢生：當年八年八百億特別預算提出時，即遭批評缺乏具體計畫；後來執行時更難免徇私，導致治水優先順序失度，而許多大小官員更因而捲入官商勾結及貪瀆的弊案。前經濟部次長侯和雄一人即身涉七案被判近七年，可見其中牽涉利益之龐大。若要防止治水預算繼續遭到濫用及虛擲，政府應邀集專家成立特別委員會，來監督並導正特別預算的運用。否則，花了大錢，大水照淹，這對得起人民嗎？
治水，不是在拚人氣，也不是比辛勞，更不是比砸錢。如果胸中沒有國土總體規劃的見識，沒有惜民愛物的襟懷，沒有敬畏天地的精神，不可能做好治水大業。在八七水災半個世紀後，八八水災又給了我們一次當頭棒喝。
Monday, August 10, 2009
Problems Even the Control Yuan Cannot Correct
Problems Even the Control Yuan Cannot Correct
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 10, 2009
Typhoon Morakot brought with it the heaviest rainfall in Taiwan's history. The volume far exceeded that of the 8/7 Flood more than half a century ago. The torrential rains refused to stop. They ravaged southern Taiwan. Before Typhoon Morakot swept through Taiwan, the Control Yuan had just finished reprimanding 14 ministry organs for flooding in central and southern Taiwan caused by last year's typhoons. Flood control measures were Ineffective. Weather forecasting was inaccurate. All were subject to Control Yuan criticism. Unfortunately Morakot proved yet again that typhoon disaster measures have never been improved. Force Majeure weather conditions are of course unavoidable. But what about the organizational defects and human errors that result in the same ineffectual typhoon disaster responses, year after year?
Using the Control Yuan's review of Typhoon Kalmaegi as a basis of comparison, Control Yuan members criticized the Central Weather Bureau rainfall forecasts as inaccurate. The Central Weather Bureau admitted that it needed to update its weather radar systems. But even after its radar system is updated, it will only provide "three additional hours" of advance warning. How much will that help disaster prevention? The Control Yuan has doubts. Forty-eight hours before Typhoon Morak arrived, CNN television headline news reported that it might "heavily impact Asia." Our own Central Weather Bureau however, did nothing but revise its rainfall estimates along the way. CNN used US Weather Bureau language such as "must take care to prevent flooding" in its reports. Our own ministries meanwhile, were cheering the fact that the typhoon would alleviate water shortages. Overnight, our Central Weather Bureau revised its rainfall estimates for Chiayi from 700 millimeters to 2900 millimeters. This is what led to disaster.
We expect the Central Weather Bureau's forecasts to be more precise. Is that so unreasonable? In fact the Central Weather Bureau, in addition to having access to its own forecasts, has access to the same information as the United States and Japan. Based on past experience it is better to err on the side of caution. It is better to underscore the possibility that the storm might become more serious. This ought to be Standard Operating Procedure for the Central Weather Bureau when dealing with typhoons.
It is difficult to completely prevent typhoon damage. Especially after a major earthquake such as the 9/21 Earthquake. It changed Taiwan's landscape. It loosened its geological structure. Even though ten years have passed, the most heavily hit disaster regions have yet to recover. Heavy rains can easily cause mudslides. This is a situation those in the mountain regions face every year. There is no short-term solution to the problem. Local leaders have overlooked the potential consequences of typhoons. When disaster struck, some of them weren't even in the country. Yet they pointed fingers at the Central Weather Bureau. forecasts. Such shirking of responsibility is totally unacceptable.
The Control Yuan severely criticized central and local government river management authorities and their lack of a unified command. This criticism can be summed up as "insightful nonsense." It is insightful because the Control Yuan is aware of the problem. It is nonsense because the problem has been around for years. When we still had a provincial government, the central government and local governments would scramble to provide disaster relief. Disaster relief was a means of showing off their administrative efficiency. Once the Taiwan Provincial Government was frozen however, Taiwan found itself minus one provincial governor, one who roamed the island far and wide, and burst into tears upon meeting disaster victims. Without competition in disaster relief, river management became a thankless task. No one bothered to inquire about it. Each year when typhoons led to disaster, officials would go through the motions talking about it. After they talked about it, they shelved it. No one bothered to ask about how to unify the command.
Typhoon season is just around the corner. Government departments cannot possibly be unaware of this. Quite the contrary. two or three months ago, Premier Liu Chao-hsuan made a local inspection. He was keeping track of reconstruction on a damaged bridge. The contract for the bridge had not been issued. He was so concerned that he nearly threw a fit. Last year's damaged bridges were left unrepaired. As a result, Typhoon Morakot wound up destroying several major highway bridges in central and southern Taiwan. The problem is painful to contemplate. Over-development may already have damaged Taiwan's mountains and rivers beyond recovery.
River management is a major problem. Everyone knows its importance. But no one has the patience to suspend development. Following the 9/12 Earthquake, countless hot springs hotels, hotels, and bed and breakfast inns were built in both heavily and lightly damaged regions. Did no one think to ask whether these regions were suitable for such developments? The result? Every year storms topple at least one hot springs hotel. After they collapse, they are rebuilt. Is this to be the fate of Taiwan's disaster areas? Apart from mountain regions, low-lying areas are flooded every year during the rainy season. The worst disaster sites this time were Linbian and Chiatung. They were the star attractions. Alas, over the past three or four decades Pingtung has subsided 3.76 meters. The government has attempted to make improvements. It has provided job retraining. It has built pumping systems. But these are emergencies. Help delayed is help denied. Its benefits are limited. A similar situation prevailed in Yunlin Taihsi. It escaped the typhoon, but it could not escape the southward air turbulence once the typhoon departed. It was flooded anyway.
Nothing is as urgent as disaster relief. The Executive Yuan has set up a forward command center in the south to take control of disaster relief. More importantly, disaster relief truly requires that officials feel the public's pain, Officials must not engage in the cumbersome process of processing official documents. The president can take direct command of Taipei City's pumps. The premier and even southern region relief officials can ask the Department of Defense to deploy additional manpower. Local governments must not confine themselves to begging the central government for help, or shirking their responsibilities. They are the local disaster victims' first line of defense. If they aren't, they they have betrayed the voters' trust. Natural disasters are a harsh test. People need to set aside blue vs. green partisanship. Central and local governments need to work together to see everyone through difficult times.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.08.10
社論－監察院嚴厲糾正都治不了的老問題
本報訊
莫拉克颱風來襲，夾帶台灣有史以來的最大雨量，遠遠超過半世紀前的八七水災，暴雨不歇，重創南台灣。就在莫拉克席捲台灣前夕，監察院才剛剛為去年玫基颱風造成中南部水患，一口氣糾正了十四個部會機關，從治水不力到氣象預報不準，無一不是監委檢討的對象。很遺憾，莫拉克再次證明：年年颱風年年災的情況，顯然很難改善。除了不可抗力的天候因素，還有什麼結構因素或人為疏失，讓台灣年復一年地重蹈風災之覆轍？
從監察院對卡玫基風災的糾正，做為一個檢討的基礎，監委指責中央氣象局對雨量預測不準，氣象局坦承不諱，希望能更新降雨雷達，不過，這雷達更新後，頂多「提前三個小時」知道雨量，對防災有多大作用，監委持保留態度。對比這次莫拉克颱風登陸前四十八小時，美國電視台ＣＮＮ就用頭條報導這個莫拉克可能「重創亞洲」，台灣的氣象局卻只能一路上修降雨量，當ＣＮＮ以美國氣象資料，用「嚴防洪水」字眼報導的時候，我們的相關部會還在慶幸缺水旱象緩解，就在這一夜之間，嘉義甚至從七百毫米上修到二千九百毫米，災害就這麼發生了。
要求氣象預報「精準」，真的有這麼困難嗎？事實上，氣象局除了自己的預測，包括美、日的資料同樣都可掌握，累積過去寧可謹慎不可輕忽的經驗，嚴重化風災的可能性，幾乎是氣象局和相關部會面對颱風的基本動作。
颱風災害很難完全防堵，特別是在九二一大地震之後，台灣山川風貌改變，地質結構鬆動，即使經過十年休養生息，多數重災區地質仍未恢復健康，遇大雨輕易就爆發土石流，這幾乎是台灣山區年年都要面對、卻無短期解決之道的問題。至於地方首長輕忽颱風可能的災害，災情發生時人不在國內，卻把矛頭指向氣象局預測不準，就是完全不能接受的卸責說詞。
監委也嚴厲批評中央、地方河川治理事權不統一，這個批評可以用幾個字形容：「極有見地的廢話！」極有見地，是因為監委看到了問題，說這是廢話，因為這個問題存在多年，過去還有省政府的時代，是中央、地方搶勘災，拿勘災當政績；凍廢省之後，少了一位全台趴趴走遇災民就流淚的省長，勘災沒人爭先恐後，河川治理這種吃力不討好的工作，就更無人聞問了，每年颱風造成災害，行禮如儀再拿出來談一次，談完就又束之高閣，沒人再計較要如何事權統一。
政府部門對颱風季節即將來臨，絕對不是無知無覺，相反的，就在二、三個月前，行政院長劉兆玄到地方視察，追蹤危橋改建工程進度，當時他為了一座橋沒發包，急得大發雷霆，結果，去年斷的橋未及修復，莫拉克就又摧毀了中南部好幾座重要道路橋梁。沉痛點看這個問題，台灣的過度開發，可能已經讓台灣的山川地質，面臨永難復原的劫難。
河川治理是個大問題，每個人都知道其重要性，卻沒有人有這個耐心暫緩開發。九二一之後，從重災區到輕災區，無數溫泉飯店、旅館、民宿林立，沒有人思考這樣的開發適宜與否？於是年年風災都要倒毀一幢溫泉飯店，倒了再蓋，這就是台灣「災區」的宿命嗎？山區之外，低窪區更是年年遇雨年年淹，這次災情最慘烈的林邊、佳冬簡直可說是「明星淹水區」，沒辦法，這三、四十年來，屏東地層下陷已達三點七六公尺，政府想盡改善方案，從輔導養殖轉業到最簡單的建立抽排水系統，卻緩不濟急，效果有限，有類似情況的還有雲林台西，躲過了颱風，卻躲不過颱風出海後的迴南氣流，照淹不誤。
萬事莫如救災急，行政院在南部成立前進指揮中心，掌握救災時效，更重要的，救災真得苦民所苦，別再搞繁瑣的公文流程，總統可以直接指揮調度台北市的抽水機，就像行政院長、乃至南部救災指揮官都能要求國防部加派人力。至於地方政府絕對不能只是哀哀求告或卸責控訴的角色，做為地方父母官就得在第一線安定災民之心，否則就是有負選民付託。在天災的嚴厲考驗中，台灣需要摒除藍綠，中央與地方同心，共度難關。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 10, 2009
Typhoon Morakot brought with it the heaviest rainfall in Taiwan's history. The volume far exceeded that of the 8/7 Flood more than half a century ago. The torrential rains refused to stop. They ravaged southern Taiwan. Before Typhoon Morakot swept through Taiwan, the Control Yuan had just finished reprimanding 14 ministry organs for flooding in central and southern Taiwan caused by last year's typhoons. Flood control measures were Ineffective. Weather forecasting was inaccurate. All were subject to Control Yuan criticism. Unfortunately Morakot proved yet again that typhoon disaster measures have never been improved. Force Majeure weather conditions are of course unavoidable. But what about the organizational defects and human errors that result in the same ineffectual typhoon disaster responses, year after year?
Using the Control Yuan's review of Typhoon Kalmaegi as a basis of comparison, Control Yuan members criticized the Central Weather Bureau rainfall forecasts as inaccurate. The Central Weather Bureau admitted that it needed to update its weather radar systems. But even after its radar system is updated, it will only provide "three additional hours" of advance warning. How much will that help disaster prevention? The Control Yuan has doubts. Forty-eight hours before Typhoon Morak arrived, CNN television headline news reported that it might "heavily impact Asia." Our own Central Weather Bureau however, did nothing but revise its rainfall estimates along the way. CNN used US Weather Bureau language such as "must take care to prevent flooding" in its reports. Our own ministries meanwhile, were cheering the fact that the typhoon would alleviate water shortages. Overnight, our Central Weather Bureau revised its rainfall estimates for Chiayi from 700 millimeters to 2900 millimeters. This is what led to disaster.
We expect the Central Weather Bureau's forecasts to be more precise. Is that so unreasonable? In fact the Central Weather Bureau, in addition to having access to its own forecasts, has access to the same information as the United States and Japan. Based on past experience it is better to err on the side of caution. It is better to underscore the possibility that the storm might become more serious. This ought to be Standard Operating Procedure for the Central Weather Bureau when dealing with typhoons.
It is difficult to completely prevent typhoon damage. Especially after a major earthquake such as the 9/21 Earthquake. It changed Taiwan's landscape. It loosened its geological structure. Even though ten years have passed, the most heavily hit disaster regions have yet to recover. Heavy rains can easily cause mudslides. This is a situation those in the mountain regions face every year. There is no short-term solution to the problem. Local leaders have overlooked the potential consequences of typhoons. When disaster struck, some of them weren't even in the country. Yet they pointed fingers at the Central Weather Bureau. forecasts. Such shirking of responsibility is totally unacceptable.
The Control Yuan severely criticized central and local government river management authorities and their lack of a unified command. This criticism can be summed up as "insightful nonsense." It is insightful because the Control Yuan is aware of the problem. It is nonsense because the problem has been around for years. When we still had a provincial government, the central government and local governments would scramble to provide disaster relief. Disaster relief was a means of showing off their administrative efficiency. Once the Taiwan Provincial Government was frozen however, Taiwan found itself minus one provincial governor, one who roamed the island far and wide, and burst into tears upon meeting disaster victims. Without competition in disaster relief, river management became a thankless task. No one bothered to inquire about it. Each year when typhoons led to disaster, officials would go through the motions talking about it. After they talked about it, they shelved it. No one bothered to ask about how to unify the command.
Typhoon season is just around the corner. Government departments cannot possibly be unaware of this. Quite the contrary. two or three months ago, Premier Liu Chao-hsuan made a local inspection. He was keeping track of reconstruction on a damaged bridge. The contract for the bridge had not been issued. He was so concerned that he nearly threw a fit. Last year's damaged bridges were left unrepaired. As a result, Typhoon Morakot wound up destroying several major highway bridges in central and southern Taiwan. The problem is painful to contemplate. Over-development may already have damaged Taiwan's mountains and rivers beyond recovery.
River management is a major problem. Everyone knows its importance. But no one has the patience to suspend development. Following the 9/12 Earthquake, countless hot springs hotels, hotels, and bed and breakfast inns were built in both heavily and lightly damaged regions. Did no one think to ask whether these regions were suitable for such developments? The result? Every year storms topple at least one hot springs hotel. After they collapse, they are rebuilt. Is this to be the fate of Taiwan's disaster areas? Apart from mountain regions, low-lying areas are flooded every year during the rainy season. The worst disaster sites this time were Linbian and Chiatung. They were the star attractions. Alas, over the past three or four decades Pingtung has subsided 3.76 meters. The government has attempted to make improvements. It has provided job retraining. It has built pumping systems. But these are emergencies. Help delayed is help denied. Its benefits are limited. A similar situation prevailed in Yunlin Taihsi. It escaped the typhoon, but it could not escape the southward air turbulence once the typhoon departed. It was flooded anyway.
Nothing is as urgent as disaster relief. The Executive Yuan has set up a forward command center in the south to take control of disaster relief. More importantly, disaster relief truly requires that officials feel the public's pain, Officials must not engage in the cumbersome process of processing official documents. The president can take direct command of Taipei City's pumps. The premier and even southern region relief officials can ask the Department of Defense to deploy additional manpower. Local governments must not confine themselves to begging the central government for help, or shirking their responsibilities. They are the local disaster victims' first line of defense. If they aren't, they they have betrayed the voters' trust. Natural disasters are a harsh test. People need to set aside blue vs. green partisanship. Central and local governments need to work together to see everyone through difficult times.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.08.10
社論－監察院嚴厲糾正都治不了的老問題
本報訊
莫拉克颱風來襲，夾帶台灣有史以來的最大雨量，遠遠超過半世紀前的八七水災，暴雨不歇，重創南台灣。就在莫拉克席捲台灣前夕，監察院才剛剛為去年玫基颱風造成中南部水患，一口氣糾正了十四個部會機關，從治水不力到氣象預報不準，無一不是監委檢討的對象。很遺憾，莫拉克再次證明：年年颱風年年災的情況，顯然很難改善。除了不可抗力的天候因素，還有什麼結構因素或人為疏失，讓台灣年復一年地重蹈風災之覆轍？
從監察院對卡玫基風災的糾正，做為一個檢討的基礎，監委指責中央氣象局對雨量預測不準，氣象局坦承不諱，希望能更新降雨雷達，不過，這雷達更新後，頂多「提前三個小時」知道雨量，對防災有多大作用，監委持保留態度。對比這次莫拉克颱風登陸前四十八小時，美國電視台ＣＮＮ就用頭條報導這個莫拉克可能「重創亞洲」，台灣的氣象局卻只能一路上修降雨量，當ＣＮＮ以美國氣象資料，用「嚴防洪水」字眼報導的時候，我們的相關部會還在慶幸缺水旱象緩解，就在這一夜之間，嘉義甚至從七百毫米上修到二千九百毫米，災害就這麼發生了。
要求氣象預報「精準」，真的有這麼困難嗎？事實上，氣象局除了自己的預測，包括美、日的資料同樣都可掌握，累積過去寧可謹慎不可輕忽的經驗，嚴重化風災的可能性，幾乎是氣象局和相關部會面對颱風的基本動作。
颱風災害很難完全防堵，特別是在九二一大地震之後，台灣山川風貌改變，地質結構鬆動，即使經過十年休養生息，多數重災區地質仍未恢復健康，遇大雨輕易就爆發土石流，這幾乎是台灣山區年年都要面對、卻無短期解決之道的問題。至於地方首長輕忽颱風可能的災害，災情發生時人不在國內，卻把矛頭指向氣象局預測不準，就是完全不能接受的卸責說詞。
監委也嚴厲批評中央、地方河川治理事權不統一，這個批評可以用幾個字形容：「極有見地的廢話！」極有見地，是因為監委看到了問題，說這是廢話，因為這個問題存在多年，過去還有省政府的時代，是中央、地方搶勘災，拿勘災當政績；凍廢省之後，少了一位全台趴趴走遇災民就流淚的省長，勘災沒人爭先恐後，河川治理這種吃力不討好的工作，就更無人聞問了，每年颱風造成災害，行禮如儀再拿出來談一次，談完就又束之高閣，沒人再計較要如何事權統一。
政府部門對颱風季節即將來臨，絕對不是無知無覺，相反的，就在二、三個月前，行政院長劉兆玄到地方視察，追蹤危橋改建工程進度，當時他為了一座橋沒發包，急得大發雷霆，結果，去年斷的橋未及修復，莫拉克就又摧毀了中南部好幾座重要道路橋梁。沉痛點看這個問題，台灣的過度開發，可能已經讓台灣的山川地質，面臨永難復原的劫難。
河川治理是個大問題，每個人都知道其重要性，卻沒有人有這個耐心暫緩開發。九二一之後，從重災區到輕災區，無數溫泉飯店、旅館、民宿林立，沒有人思考這樣的開發適宜與否？於是年年風災都要倒毀一幢溫泉飯店，倒了再蓋，這就是台灣「災區」的宿命嗎？山區之外，低窪區更是年年遇雨年年淹，這次災情最慘烈的林邊、佳冬簡直可說是「明星淹水區」，沒辦法，這三、四十年來，屏東地層下陷已達三點七六公尺，政府想盡改善方案，從輔導養殖轉業到最簡單的建立抽排水系統，卻緩不濟急，效果有限，有類似情況的還有雲林台西，躲過了颱風，卻躲不過颱風出海後的迴南氣流，照淹不誤。
萬事莫如救災急，行政院在南部成立前進指揮中心，掌握救災時效，更重要的，救災真得苦民所苦，別再搞繁瑣的公文流程，總統可以直接指揮調度台北市的抽水機，就像行政院長、乃至南部救災指揮官都能要求國防部加派人力。至於地方政府絕對不能只是哀哀求告或卸責控訴的角色，做為地方父母官就得在第一線安定災民之心，否則就是有負選民付託。在天災的嚴厲考驗中，台灣需要摒除藍綠，中央與地方同心，共度難關。
Thursday, August 6, 2009
Piecemeal Tax Reform Will Undermine President Ma's Public Support
Piecemeal Tax Reform Will Undermine President Ma's Public Support
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 6, 2009
Over the past several weeks, the Executive Yuan Tax Reform Commission has made a complete about face regarding energy and pollution taxes. They have left outside observers' heads spinning. It has reminded the general public of the Tax Reform Commission's blundering and blindness. Let us review these events and the machinations behind them.
The Republic of China's energy conservation and carbon reduction measures are ineffective. Per capita carbon dioxide emissions are among the highest in the world. This is common knowledge. If the Ma administration wants to use taxation as a means of curbing energy use and reducing emissions, it must adopt the correct policies. According to the Tax Reform Commission's research report, it will integrate the various ministries' random taxes, surcharges, and fees. These will be replaced by a combination energy tax and environmental tax. The rates will be gradually increased over the coming decade. The study used computer simulations. A decade from now, energy and pollution taxes alone will bring in about 800 billion in tax revenue, They will be enough to replace the current income tax. Based on the figures cited above, such large-scale changes are very different from the existing income tax and sales tax-based system.
Prior to the August 3 about face on Green Taxes, the Executive Yuan had already mentioned the case in numerous internal conference reports. Senior officials had already ruled. It made available to members of a joint conference with the Advisory Committee only on June 19. During the conference, Vice-President Chiu of the Executive Yuan publicly announced that "The tax rates will be adjusted annually. The conference has reached a consensus... a public hearing should be held to explain the impact of the policy on industry." During that day's conference there was some debate, but scant dissent. Everyone went along with the program. Six weeks later however, special interest groups had clearly found a number of entry points. They openly overturned the previously approved policy consensus.
Have Green Taxes been given adequate discussion? They have not. Energy and pollution taxes are "sin taxes." Their purpose is to conserve energy and reduce carbon, rather than to generate revenues. By their very nature, they should not be used to generate revenue. It is even less appropriate to talk about an energy tax in the same breath as revenue neutrality. Energy and pollution taxes are by nature consumption taxes. They are indirect taxes. They are passed on to others. The income tax is based on the ability to pay. Energy/pollution taxes and the income tax are as different as night and day. To propose that the income tax be replaced with consumption taxes such as energy and pollution taxes, within the decade, is a controversial move. Besides, energy reduction and carbon reduction are not part of the Tax Reform Commission's mandate. One should not expect taxation to bear the entire responsibility for environmental protection. Jumping from Green Taxes to tax neutrality tells us that amateurs are in charge of the Executive Yuan.
The Tax Reform Commission was a plank in President Ma's campaign platform. It has bee discussing a dozen large and small tax cut proposals for over a year. So many tax cuts and so many tax increases. But according to what criteria? According to what principles? The question has no technical answer. But it does have a political answer - just count the votes. President Ma knows that individual tax cuts mean more votes. But one cannot cut every tax. Therefore a nation's tax structure must optimize tax increases and tax cuts. Only then can one both win votes and broaden one's public support. Piecemeal responses to special interest group demands may allow Tax Reform Commission politicians to engage in deception. But they will be a detriment to voter support.
We are not necessarily opposed to Green Tax policy changes. But we must condemn the Executive Yuan's decision-making process. National taxes are a necessary evil. They are decisions that must be made on a discretionary basis, out of many options. They must not be made individually. If the Tax Reform Commission addresses estate taxes, income taxes, Green Taxes, investment taxes, tonnage taxes, capital gains, and luxury taxes individually, they are bound to encounter internal contradictions. When decisions are reached on an individual basis, it facilitates special interest group lobbying efforts. When push comes to shove, this makes it impossible for the ruling administration to resist. The result is a tax structure that favors a small number of wealthy industries and businesses. The Tax Reform Commission's "reforms" over the past year have been a patchwork quilt. They can only undermine President Ma's public support.
Procedurally speaking, the Tax Reform Commission is a clear vestige of authoritarianism. Major cases must be approved by high-level administration officials before the Tax Reform Commission even discusses them. A professional committee has been reduced to a rubber stamp for the Executive Yuan. Substantively speaking, a major Green Tax reform proposal involving 800 billions in tax revenues was decided during a single high-level Executive Yuan session. The decision-making process is clearly permeated with the sycophantic premise that "the higher one's rank, the greater one's wisdom."
The Tax Reform Commission has been in existence for over a year. The Executive Yuan repeatedly approves or disapproves proposals, then goes through the motions of "consulting" the Tax Reform Commission. The charade is nauseating. One year later, the Republic of China tax system has been shattered. Tax rates continue to fall. Tax revenues continue to fall. The government's sovereign rating continues to fall. The farce has no audience. But the public on Taiwan is forced to be part of it. But can President Ma turn a blind eye to his falling public support?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.08.06
片斷式稅改 將侵蝕馬總統民意基礎
本報訊
在過去數周，行政院賦改會對於能源與汙染稅的規畫有一百八十度的轉變，不僅讓外界看得頭昏眼花，也令社會大眾再一次領教了賦改會整體運作的錯誤與盲點。讓我們先回顧事件發展，再評論其背後的運作機制。
台灣節能減碳效果不彰，平均每人二氧化碳排放名列世界前茅，皆為眾所周知。因此，馬政府若要以課稅方式抑制能源使用與減少汙染排放，當然是個正確的方向。依賦改會研究報告，將來要統合目前散見於各部會的稅、捐、費諸多項目，改以能源稅、環境稅整合，並在十年間逐步調升稅率。研究報告用電腦模擬估算，十年後單單從能源汙染稅項下就能收到約八千億的稅收，將可取代目前的若干所得稅。由前引數字可知，這樣的變革規模，實在與現行所得稅與營業稅為主的稅制「差很大」。
在八月三日綠稅「翻案」之前，該案已經在賦改會工作會議與行政院內部會議中提出多次報告，經高層裁定之後，才發交六月十九日賦改會的委員與諮詢委員聯席會議討論。會中行政院邱副院長公開裁示：「稅額逐年調整，會議上已達共識。…衝擊應舉行公聽會向產業界說明。」在當天會中，會場雖有爭辯但雜音不多，大家都行禮如儀。無奈六周之後，利益團體顯然還是找到了遊說切入點，活生生地把先前通過的共識方向給推翻。
平心而論，綠稅議案有沒有經過充分討論呢？其實沒有。能源與汙染稅都是「寓禁於徵」的稅種，其目的是為節能減碳而非稅收，本質上就不應以未來稅收做為估算標的，更不宜由能源稅所增稅收去談所謂租稅中立。能源與汙染稅是消費稅的性質，其為間接稅、可以轉嫁，與所得稅「量能課稅」的本質天差地遠。要在十年之內以能源汙染的消費稅大幅取代所得稅現制，本身就是個有爭議的議題。更何況，節能減碳終究不是「賦稅」改革委員會的任務宗旨，也不該以租稅扛起環境保護的所有重責大任。由綠稅研議跳躍到租稅中立，也凸顯了行政院主事者的外行。
成立賦改會是馬總統的政見；該會一年多來已經討論了十數種大小稅目的加加減減。這麼多的稅目稅項加減之間，究竟有什麼總體判準原則呢？這個問題在學理上無解，但是在政治實務上，答案卻非常簡單，惟「選票」二字而已矣。馬總統當然了解，個別的減稅有利於其選票擴充，但由於稅收不可能樣樣都減，故在國家租稅與建設的整體架構中，必然有一個升升降降的最佳組合，依此施為才能夠增加選票、擴大民意的支持。支離破碎地回應利益團體的個別要求，固然讓賦改會政客得以輕鬆地糊弄，卻是有害於整體選票布局的。
因此，我們並不非難綠稅政策的轉變，但必須要責怪賦改會與行政院的決策模式。國家租稅是必要之惡，也是一個整體，總要在諸多選項之中斟酌取捨，萬萬不宜一項一項分開來談。一旦賦改會將遺產稅、所得稅、綠稅、投資保單稅、噸位稅、資本利得稅、奢侈稅、租稅補貼等議題切割討論，就必然會產生諸多前後矛盾。此外，個別議題逐一定案，也方便利益團體動員遊說，導致行政當局無法在關鍵處予以抵擋，最後往往形成租稅架構向工商團體與少數富人一面倒的局面。過去一年間賦改會拼拼湊湊的所謂改革，對於馬總統的民意基礎，絕對只有侵蝕作用。
就程序而言，賦改會顯然也還拘泥於威權體制的餘緒，諸多重大案件都要先呈報高層拍板，才敢提到賦改會討論，直將一個專業的委員會貶抑為行政院的橡皮圖章。就議題實質內容而言，一個涉及八千億稅收的綠稅重大改革案，居然也能在短短一次會議中由行政院高層定案，也顯示出整個決策體制「官大智慧高」的阿諛氣氛。
賦改會成立一年多了，經歷了若干次政院先拍板、會議再討論的「真戲假做」場景，令人作嘔。一年多下來，台灣的租稅架構支離破碎：稅率一個一個降、稅收一分一分減、主權評等一日一日落。歹戲拖棚，台灣人民沒有什麼選擇，但民意流失的凌遲，馬總統不能坐視不理吧？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 6, 2009
Over the past several weeks, the Executive Yuan Tax Reform Commission has made a complete about face regarding energy and pollution taxes. They have left outside observers' heads spinning. It has reminded the general public of the Tax Reform Commission's blundering and blindness. Let us review these events and the machinations behind them.
The Republic of China's energy conservation and carbon reduction measures are ineffective. Per capita carbon dioxide emissions are among the highest in the world. This is common knowledge. If the Ma administration wants to use taxation as a means of curbing energy use and reducing emissions, it must adopt the correct policies. According to the Tax Reform Commission's research report, it will integrate the various ministries' random taxes, surcharges, and fees. These will be replaced by a combination energy tax and environmental tax. The rates will be gradually increased over the coming decade. The study used computer simulations. A decade from now, energy and pollution taxes alone will bring in about 800 billion in tax revenue, They will be enough to replace the current income tax. Based on the figures cited above, such large-scale changes are very different from the existing income tax and sales tax-based system.
Prior to the August 3 about face on Green Taxes, the Executive Yuan had already mentioned the case in numerous internal conference reports. Senior officials had already ruled. It made available to members of a joint conference with the Advisory Committee only on June 19. During the conference, Vice-President Chiu of the Executive Yuan publicly announced that "The tax rates will be adjusted annually. The conference has reached a consensus... a public hearing should be held to explain the impact of the policy on industry." During that day's conference there was some debate, but scant dissent. Everyone went along with the program. Six weeks later however, special interest groups had clearly found a number of entry points. They openly overturned the previously approved policy consensus.
Have Green Taxes been given adequate discussion? They have not. Energy and pollution taxes are "sin taxes." Their purpose is to conserve energy and reduce carbon, rather than to generate revenues. By their very nature, they should not be used to generate revenue. It is even less appropriate to talk about an energy tax in the same breath as revenue neutrality. Energy and pollution taxes are by nature consumption taxes. They are indirect taxes. They are passed on to others. The income tax is based on the ability to pay. Energy/pollution taxes and the income tax are as different as night and day. To propose that the income tax be replaced with consumption taxes such as energy and pollution taxes, within the decade, is a controversial move. Besides, energy reduction and carbon reduction are not part of the Tax Reform Commission's mandate. One should not expect taxation to bear the entire responsibility for environmental protection. Jumping from Green Taxes to tax neutrality tells us that amateurs are in charge of the Executive Yuan.
The Tax Reform Commission was a plank in President Ma's campaign platform. It has bee discussing a dozen large and small tax cut proposals for over a year. So many tax cuts and so many tax increases. But according to what criteria? According to what principles? The question has no technical answer. But it does have a political answer - just count the votes. President Ma knows that individual tax cuts mean more votes. But one cannot cut every tax. Therefore a nation's tax structure must optimize tax increases and tax cuts. Only then can one both win votes and broaden one's public support. Piecemeal responses to special interest group demands may allow Tax Reform Commission politicians to engage in deception. But they will be a detriment to voter support.
We are not necessarily opposed to Green Tax policy changes. But we must condemn the Executive Yuan's decision-making process. National taxes are a necessary evil. They are decisions that must be made on a discretionary basis, out of many options. They must not be made individually. If the Tax Reform Commission addresses estate taxes, income taxes, Green Taxes, investment taxes, tonnage taxes, capital gains, and luxury taxes individually, they are bound to encounter internal contradictions. When decisions are reached on an individual basis, it facilitates special interest group lobbying efforts. When push comes to shove, this makes it impossible for the ruling administration to resist. The result is a tax structure that favors a small number of wealthy industries and businesses. The Tax Reform Commission's "reforms" over the past year have been a patchwork quilt. They can only undermine President Ma's public support.
Procedurally speaking, the Tax Reform Commission is a clear vestige of authoritarianism. Major cases must be approved by high-level administration officials before the Tax Reform Commission even discusses them. A professional committee has been reduced to a rubber stamp for the Executive Yuan. Substantively speaking, a major Green Tax reform proposal involving 800 billions in tax revenues was decided during a single high-level Executive Yuan session. The decision-making process is clearly permeated with the sycophantic premise that "the higher one's rank, the greater one's wisdom."
The Tax Reform Commission has been in existence for over a year. The Executive Yuan repeatedly approves or disapproves proposals, then goes through the motions of "consulting" the Tax Reform Commission. The charade is nauseating. One year later, the Republic of China tax system has been shattered. Tax rates continue to fall. Tax revenues continue to fall. The government's sovereign rating continues to fall. The farce has no audience. But the public on Taiwan is forced to be part of it. But can President Ma turn a blind eye to his falling public support?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.08.06
片斷式稅改 將侵蝕馬總統民意基礎
本報訊
在過去數周，行政院賦改會對於能源與汙染稅的規畫有一百八十度的轉變，不僅讓外界看得頭昏眼花，也令社會大眾再一次領教了賦改會整體運作的錯誤與盲點。讓我們先回顧事件發展，再評論其背後的運作機制。
台灣節能減碳效果不彰，平均每人二氧化碳排放名列世界前茅，皆為眾所周知。因此，馬政府若要以課稅方式抑制能源使用與減少汙染排放，當然是個正確的方向。依賦改會研究報告，將來要統合目前散見於各部會的稅、捐、費諸多項目，改以能源稅、環境稅整合，並在十年間逐步調升稅率。研究報告用電腦模擬估算，十年後單單從能源汙染稅項下就能收到約八千億的稅收，將可取代目前的若干所得稅。由前引數字可知，這樣的變革規模，實在與現行所得稅與營業稅為主的稅制「差很大」。
在八月三日綠稅「翻案」之前，該案已經在賦改會工作會議與行政院內部會議中提出多次報告，經高層裁定之後，才發交六月十九日賦改會的委員與諮詢委員聯席會議討論。會中行政院邱副院長公開裁示：「稅額逐年調整，會議上已達共識。…衝擊應舉行公聽會向產業界說明。」在當天會中，會場雖有爭辯但雜音不多，大家都行禮如儀。無奈六周之後，利益團體顯然還是找到了遊說切入點，活生生地把先前通過的共識方向給推翻。
平心而論，綠稅議案有沒有經過充分討論呢？其實沒有。能源與汙染稅都是「寓禁於徵」的稅種，其目的是為節能減碳而非稅收，本質上就不應以未來稅收做為估算標的，更不宜由能源稅所增稅收去談所謂租稅中立。能源與汙染稅是消費稅的性質，其為間接稅、可以轉嫁，與所得稅「量能課稅」的本質天差地遠。要在十年之內以能源汙染的消費稅大幅取代所得稅現制，本身就是個有爭議的議題。更何況，節能減碳終究不是「賦稅」改革委員會的任務宗旨，也不該以租稅扛起環境保護的所有重責大任。由綠稅研議跳躍到租稅中立，也凸顯了行政院主事者的外行。
成立賦改會是馬總統的政見；該會一年多來已經討論了十數種大小稅目的加加減減。這麼多的稅目稅項加減之間，究竟有什麼總體判準原則呢？這個問題在學理上無解，但是在政治實務上，答案卻非常簡單，惟「選票」二字而已矣。馬總統當然了解，個別的減稅有利於其選票擴充，但由於稅收不可能樣樣都減，故在國家租稅與建設的整體架構中，必然有一個升升降降的最佳組合，依此施為才能夠增加選票、擴大民意的支持。支離破碎地回應利益團體的個別要求，固然讓賦改會政客得以輕鬆地糊弄，卻是有害於整體選票布局的。
因此，我們並不非難綠稅政策的轉變，但必須要責怪賦改會與行政院的決策模式。國家租稅是必要之惡，也是一個整體，總要在諸多選項之中斟酌取捨，萬萬不宜一項一項分開來談。一旦賦改會將遺產稅、所得稅、綠稅、投資保單稅、噸位稅、資本利得稅、奢侈稅、租稅補貼等議題切割討論，就必然會產生諸多前後矛盾。此外，個別議題逐一定案，也方便利益團體動員遊說，導致行政當局無法在關鍵處予以抵擋，最後往往形成租稅架構向工商團體與少數富人一面倒的局面。過去一年間賦改會拼拼湊湊的所謂改革，對於馬總統的民意基礎，絕對只有侵蝕作用。
就程序而言，賦改會顯然也還拘泥於威權體制的餘緒，諸多重大案件都要先呈報高層拍板，才敢提到賦改會討論，直將一個專業的委員會貶抑為行政院的橡皮圖章。就議題實質內容而言，一個涉及八千億稅收的綠稅重大改革案，居然也能在短短一次會議中由行政院高層定案，也顯示出整個決策體制「官大智慧高」的阿諛氣氛。
賦改會成立一年多了，經歷了若干次政院先拍板、會議再討論的「真戲假做」場景，令人作嘔。一年多下來，台灣的租稅架構支離破碎：稅率一個一個降、稅收一分一分減、主權評等一日一日落。歹戲拖棚，台灣人民沒有什麼選擇，但民意流失的凌遲，馬總統不能坐視不理吧？
Tuesday, August 4, 2009
Hualien County Executive Election: An Unavoidable Choice for the KMT
Hualien County Executive Election:
An Unavoidable Choice for the KMT
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 4, 2009
When the Influenza A (H1N1) epidemic struck, Yeh Chin-chuan chose to resign his position and run for Hualien County Executive. He was mocked as the "Runaway Health Commissioner." For the KMT, its primary concern in the Hualien County Executive Election is that convicted candidate Fu Kuen-chi not be nominated. Is Yeh Chin-chuan a suitable candidate? Was his timing right and the nomination process fair? These are separate issues.
In terms of local politics, the public in Hualien County needs a County Executive who is competent and dedicated. Yeh Chin-chuan does not have to be the KMT candidate. But the Blue Camp primary candidate who has been receiving the loudest cheers is convicted felon Fu Kuen-chi. Therefore preventing Fu Kuen-chi from winning the election has become the KMT's number one priority.
Fu Kuen-chi has a wide lead in the polls. This is his payoff for long years of cultivating his political base. He has solid connections in both government and business, in the KMT and the PFP, in the central government and local government. This has given him national visibility. Unfortunately he violated the Securities Exchange Act and has been sentenced to four years in prison. This is the most serious blow to his candidacy. Given his political strength, he could decide to defect and campaign to the bitter end. A number of local candidates could choose to run against him. Fu could defeat both the Blue Camp and Green Camp candidates and win the County Executive seat. In the event he is elected County Executive but convicted and sentenced, a County Executive By-Election will be required. The result will be yet another case of "going to battle on behalf of so and so." Must the public in Hualien put up with such a farce?
The by-election would not merely require voters to cast their ballots a second time. Last year's legislative elections have already led to three by-elections this year. Each time the winning candidate was disqualified because he was convicted of a crime. Not only has this squandered human and material resources, it has led to political turmoil at the local level. For the KMT, that is bad enough. If this same farce is reenacted in Hualien, how can the KMT face the public? From this perspective, the KMT is right to run Yeh Chin-chuan in Hualien County. It must prevent Fu Kuen-chi from leaving the party and running as an independent. This proves that the KMT is sincere about reforming the partly,
The Taitung County Executive By-Election was dogged by controversy. The Yunlin County Legislative By-Election also turned into a giant muddle. If the KMT Central Committee allows itself to be hijacked by Fu Kuen-chi, what happens to its commitment to reform? What will the media say?
Can Yeh Chin-chuan prove that he is a reform candidate? Was this the right time for him to enter the race, and was the nomination process fair? These are separate issues. Yeh resigned his post during the Infuenza A epidemic, and threw his hat in the ring. The public may have trouble understanding his decision. But let's not forget he marched straight into Heping Hospital during the SARS crisis to combat the epidemic. No one can dismiss him as a deserter in the face of fire. Especially when Yeh Chin-chuan is lagging far behind in the polls, yet refuses to back out. This proves he is willing to lay himself on the line. Have Hualien voters rejected Yeh Chin-chuan as a candidate? Or are they merely unhappy about how he won the nomination? The answer may be reflected in opinion polls conducted just before the primaries.
Ma Ying-jeou cannot accept Fu Kuen-chi as candidate for Hualien County Executive. Tsai Ing-wen cannot accept Chen Tang-shan as candidate for Tainan County Executive Both cases involve matters of principle. There is no room for compromise. Unfortunately this kind of operation must be carried out while under fire, making it hard to be thorough. Is it more important to fight an epidemic or to fight corruption? That is a matter of opinion. But the Ma administration has sounded the trumpet of reform. If Fu Kuen-chi is elected Hualien County Executive, that will be a major blow to his reform campaign. The KMT candidate for Hualien County Executive may well lose to potential defector Fu Kuen-chi. Nevertheless the KMT must back someone like Yeh Chin-chuan in order to demonstrate the KMT's determination and sincerity to the public.
Yeh Chin-chuan is not a bad candidate. But he has been put forth as a candidate under awkward circumstances. The blame must fall on the KMT, for its clumsiness. First of all, the Kuomintang has ruled in Hualien for a long time. Yet it still resorts to its old practice of "air dropping" a candidate in. This shows that the KMT central leadership has not properly cultivated local talent. It is belatedly digging a well, now that it feels thirsty. Secondly, it is right to clarify the objectives of the government. But because it is unable to move quickly, decisively, and accurately, its opponent has struck preemptively. This makes it appear to be in the wrong. Its methods were not in accord with its objectives. Third, if we think back, Yeh Chin-chuan planned to run for Hualien County Executive long ago. But he was reluctant to make this public while he assessed his election prospects. He let the matter drag on, and resigned only when the influenza epidemic broke. He lost the initiative, and left himself vulnerable to attack.
The KMT is trying to do the right thing. Yet it cannot avoid tripping over its own feet. Such is the KMT. Is Yeh Chin-chuan the right candidate? That will be up to Hualien voters to decide. Hualien voters can choose not to vote for Yeh Chin-chuan. But not the KMT.
國民黨在花蓮縣長選舉無可迴避的抉擇
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.08.05 04:11 am
在新流感疫情升高之際，葉金川選擇辭官參選花蓮縣長，招致「落跑署長」之譏。對於國民黨而言，花蓮選情的第一考慮是絕對不能提名已被判刑的傅?萁；至於葉金川是不是一個適合的人選，則又與他的參選時機與程序爭議是兩個不同的議題。
從在地政治的角度看，花蓮人選縣長，是要一個有能力、有熱誠的人，不是非葉金川不可。然而，看藍軍的初選名單，呼聲最高卻是有案在身的傅?萁，所以不能讓傅?萁當選成了國民黨的第一目標。
傅?萁能在民調上遙遙領先，足見其長年經營地方有成，人脈厚實。他橫跨政商、跨國親兩黨、跨中央和地方的資歷，都形塑了相當的全國知名度。問題在他因違反證交法判刑四年，成了參選最大的致命傷。以他的實力，如果他未來選擇脫黨參選到底，倘若即以地方上露臉的幾名參選者與他對抗，傅仍有打敗藍綠兩營的對手當選縣長的可能。接著，如果他當選縣長，未來若被判有罪定讞，縣長勢必又要改選，恐怕又將上演「代Ｘ出征」的戲碼，花蓮人要忍受這樣的折騰嗎？
何況，改選並不只是重新投票的折騰而已。去年初的立委選舉，今年來已歷經三次補選，主要都是當選人涉案喪失資格；不僅徒然耗費人力物力，也使地方政治一再陷於鬥爭的風暴中。對國民黨而言，這已夠灰頭土臉，如果再讓同樣的戲碼在花蓮重演，如何對得起人民？從這個角度看，僅以防備傅?萁脫黨參選這個目標而論，葉金川出馬角逐花蓮縣長，代表了國民黨推動黨內改革的一點誠意和努力，其實可予肯定。
試想，以台東縣長改選的爭議多端，乃至雲林立委補選的混沌未明，如果國民黨中央今天仍被已被判刑的傅?萁挾持了選情，如何彰顯改革理想？輿論又將如何批評？
葉金川是不是一個能夠顯示改革理念的候選人，與他在此時參選的程序爭議，則是兩個不同的問題。葉在疫情擴大之際辭職參選，的確不容易取得社會的諒解；但記得他在ＳＡＲＳ期間隻身進入和平醫院抗煞的民眾，應該也不會輕易認定他是畏怯的「逃兵」。尤其，葉金川在民調遠遠落後的情況下，仍不退縮，可見他願意接受民意的考驗。花蓮選民究竟是根本否定葉金川這個人選，或只是對他參選的程序不以為然，應可反映在初選的民調中。
馬英九不能接受傅?萁選花蓮縣長，其實有如當時蔡英文不能接受陳唐山選台南縣長。其中涉及原則，沒有退讓餘地。問題是，這類的操作必然是捉襟見肘，不易面面周到。至於說，到底是抗疫重要，還是澄清政風重要，這確實是見仁見智；但就馬政府的政治號召言，如果讓傅?萁當選花蓮縣長，必將成為改革的重大創傷。所以，即使花蓮縣長一役國民黨仍會輸給可能脫黨競選的傅?萁，也應當用葉金川這樣的牌教國人感受到國民黨的決心與誠意。
葉金川原本是張不差的牌，卻出現這麼狼狽的情狀，應怪國民黨的操作手法太過拙劣。首先，國民黨在花蓮執政了這麼久，到頭來卻還在用「空降」的老招，顯示中央未曾好好在地方培養人才，才會臨渴掘井。其次，澄清政風的目標是正確的，但因操作上不能把握快、狠、準的原則，遭到對方反咬，反顯得自己理虧，這是手段與目標不對稱。第三，如今回顧，葉金川參選花蓮縣長早在規劃之中，但為評估選情遲遲不願公開，一直拖到疫情緊張再辭官，不免喪失機先，落人口實。
一件目標正確的事，卻無法用流利的手法來達成，這是國民黨的笨拙。至於「葉金川」是不是一個好選項，就留待花蓮選民決定吧。花蓮選民可以不選葉金川，但國民黨卻難有其他的選擇！
An Unavoidable Choice for the KMT
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 4, 2009
When the Influenza A (H1N1) epidemic struck, Yeh Chin-chuan chose to resign his position and run for Hualien County Executive. He was mocked as the "Runaway Health Commissioner." For the KMT, its primary concern in the Hualien County Executive Election is that convicted candidate Fu Kuen-chi not be nominated. Is Yeh Chin-chuan a suitable candidate? Was his timing right and the nomination process fair? These are separate issues.
In terms of local politics, the public in Hualien County needs a County Executive who is competent and dedicated. Yeh Chin-chuan does not have to be the KMT candidate. But the Blue Camp primary candidate who has been receiving the loudest cheers is convicted felon Fu Kuen-chi. Therefore preventing Fu Kuen-chi from winning the election has become the KMT's number one priority.
Fu Kuen-chi has a wide lead in the polls. This is his payoff for long years of cultivating his political base. He has solid connections in both government and business, in the KMT and the PFP, in the central government and local government. This has given him national visibility. Unfortunately he violated the Securities Exchange Act and has been sentenced to four years in prison. This is the most serious blow to his candidacy. Given his political strength, he could decide to defect and campaign to the bitter end. A number of local candidates could choose to run against him. Fu could defeat both the Blue Camp and Green Camp candidates and win the County Executive seat. In the event he is elected County Executive but convicted and sentenced, a County Executive By-Election will be required. The result will be yet another case of "going to battle on behalf of so and so." Must the public in Hualien put up with such a farce?
The by-election would not merely require voters to cast their ballots a second time. Last year's legislative elections have already led to three by-elections this year. Each time the winning candidate was disqualified because he was convicted of a crime. Not only has this squandered human and material resources, it has led to political turmoil at the local level. For the KMT, that is bad enough. If this same farce is reenacted in Hualien, how can the KMT face the public? From this perspective, the KMT is right to run Yeh Chin-chuan in Hualien County. It must prevent Fu Kuen-chi from leaving the party and running as an independent. This proves that the KMT is sincere about reforming the partly,
The Taitung County Executive By-Election was dogged by controversy. The Yunlin County Legislative By-Election also turned into a giant muddle. If the KMT Central Committee allows itself to be hijacked by Fu Kuen-chi, what happens to its commitment to reform? What will the media say?
Can Yeh Chin-chuan prove that he is a reform candidate? Was this the right time for him to enter the race, and was the nomination process fair? These are separate issues. Yeh resigned his post during the Infuenza A epidemic, and threw his hat in the ring. The public may have trouble understanding his decision. But let's not forget he marched straight into Heping Hospital during the SARS crisis to combat the epidemic. No one can dismiss him as a deserter in the face of fire. Especially when Yeh Chin-chuan is lagging far behind in the polls, yet refuses to back out. This proves he is willing to lay himself on the line. Have Hualien voters rejected Yeh Chin-chuan as a candidate? Or are they merely unhappy about how he won the nomination? The answer may be reflected in opinion polls conducted just before the primaries.
Ma Ying-jeou cannot accept Fu Kuen-chi as candidate for Hualien County Executive. Tsai Ing-wen cannot accept Chen Tang-shan as candidate for Tainan County Executive Both cases involve matters of principle. There is no room for compromise. Unfortunately this kind of operation must be carried out while under fire, making it hard to be thorough. Is it more important to fight an epidemic or to fight corruption? That is a matter of opinion. But the Ma administration has sounded the trumpet of reform. If Fu Kuen-chi is elected Hualien County Executive, that will be a major blow to his reform campaign. The KMT candidate for Hualien County Executive may well lose to potential defector Fu Kuen-chi. Nevertheless the KMT must back someone like Yeh Chin-chuan in order to demonstrate the KMT's determination and sincerity to the public.
Yeh Chin-chuan is not a bad candidate. But he has been put forth as a candidate under awkward circumstances. The blame must fall on the KMT, for its clumsiness. First of all, the Kuomintang has ruled in Hualien for a long time. Yet it still resorts to its old practice of "air dropping" a candidate in. This shows that the KMT central leadership has not properly cultivated local talent. It is belatedly digging a well, now that it feels thirsty. Secondly, it is right to clarify the objectives of the government. But because it is unable to move quickly, decisively, and accurately, its opponent has struck preemptively. This makes it appear to be in the wrong. Its methods were not in accord with its objectives. Third, if we think back, Yeh Chin-chuan planned to run for Hualien County Executive long ago. But he was reluctant to make this public while he assessed his election prospects. He let the matter drag on, and resigned only when the influenza epidemic broke. He lost the initiative, and left himself vulnerable to attack.
The KMT is trying to do the right thing. Yet it cannot avoid tripping over its own feet. Such is the KMT. Is Yeh Chin-chuan the right candidate? That will be up to Hualien voters to decide. Hualien voters can choose not to vote for Yeh Chin-chuan. But not the KMT.
國民黨在花蓮縣長選舉無可迴避的抉擇
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.08.05 04:11 am
在新流感疫情升高之際，葉金川選擇辭官參選花蓮縣長，招致「落跑署長」之譏。對於國民黨而言，花蓮選情的第一考慮是絕對不能提名已被判刑的傅?萁；至於葉金川是不是一個適合的人選，則又與他的參選時機與程序爭議是兩個不同的議題。
從在地政治的角度看，花蓮人選縣長，是要一個有能力、有熱誠的人，不是非葉金川不可。然而，看藍軍的初選名單，呼聲最高卻是有案在身的傅?萁，所以不能讓傅?萁當選成了國民黨的第一目標。
傅?萁能在民調上遙遙領先，足見其長年經營地方有成，人脈厚實。他橫跨政商、跨國親兩黨、跨中央和地方的資歷，都形塑了相當的全國知名度。問題在他因違反證交法判刑四年，成了參選最大的致命傷。以他的實力，如果他未來選擇脫黨參選到底，倘若即以地方上露臉的幾名參選者與他對抗，傅仍有打敗藍綠兩營的對手當選縣長的可能。接著，如果他當選縣長，未來若被判有罪定讞，縣長勢必又要改選，恐怕又將上演「代Ｘ出征」的戲碼，花蓮人要忍受這樣的折騰嗎？
何況，改選並不只是重新投票的折騰而已。去年初的立委選舉，今年來已歷經三次補選，主要都是當選人涉案喪失資格；不僅徒然耗費人力物力，也使地方政治一再陷於鬥爭的風暴中。對國民黨而言，這已夠灰頭土臉，如果再讓同樣的戲碼在花蓮重演，如何對得起人民？從這個角度看，僅以防備傅?萁脫黨參選這個目標而論，葉金川出馬角逐花蓮縣長，代表了國民黨推動黨內改革的一點誠意和努力，其實可予肯定。
試想，以台東縣長改選的爭議多端，乃至雲林立委補選的混沌未明，如果國民黨中央今天仍被已被判刑的傅?萁挾持了選情，如何彰顯改革理想？輿論又將如何批評？
葉金川是不是一個能夠顯示改革理念的候選人，與他在此時參選的程序爭議，則是兩個不同的問題。葉在疫情擴大之際辭職參選，的確不容易取得社會的諒解；但記得他在ＳＡＲＳ期間隻身進入和平醫院抗煞的民眾，應該也不會輕易認定他是畏怯的「逃兵」。尤其，葉金川在民調遠遠落後的情況下，仍不退縮，可見他願意接受民意的考驗。花蓮選民究竟是根本否定葉金川這個人選，或只是對他參選的程序不以為然，應可反映在初選的民調中。
馬英九不能接受傅?萁選花蓮縣長，其實有如當時蔡英文不能接受陳唐山選台南縣長。其中涉及原則，沒有退讓餘地。問題是，這類的操作必然是捉襟見肘，不易面面周到。至於說，到底是抗疫重要，還是澄清政風重要，這確實是見仁見智；但就馬政府的政治號召言，如果讓傅?萁當選花蓮縣長，必將成為改革的重大創傷。所以，即使花蓮縣長一役國民黨仍會輸給可能脫黨競選的傅?萁，也應當用葉金川這樣的牌教國人感受到國民黨的決心與誠意。
葉金川原本是張不差的牌，卻出現這麼狼狽的情狀，應怪國民黨的操作手法太過拙劣。首先，國民黨在花蓮執政了這麼久，到頭來卻還在用「空降」的老招，顯示中央未曾好好在地方培養人才，才會臨渴掘井。其次，澄清政風的目標是正確的，但因操作上不能把握快、狠、準的原則，遭到對方反咬，反顯得自己理虧，這是手段與目標不對稱。第三，如今回顧，葉金川參選花蓮縣長早在規劃之中，但為評估選情遲遲不願公開，一直拖到疫情緊張再辭官，不免喪失機先，落人口實。
一件目標正確的事，卻無法用流利的手法來達成，這是國民黨的笨拙。至於「葉金川」是不是一個好選項，就留待花蓮選民決定吧。花蓮選民可以不選葉金川，但國民黨卻難有其他的選擇！
Red Ink, the Budget, and the Economic Outlook
Red Ink, the Budget, and the Economic Outlook
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 4, 2009
[ Editor's note: For the record, the Keynesian economic analysis and economic policy prescriptions recommended in this editorial are exactly wrong.
For the correct analysis and economic policy prescriptions, see:
The Myth of Good Government, by Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
http://www.lewrockwell.com/rockwell/myth-of-good-govt.html ]
The central government is working on next year's budget. Should the government concentrate on balancing the budget and reducing the deficit? Should it concentrate on limiting the expansion of fiscal policy and bolstering the economy? No one can agree. Now would be a good time to offer some views on the current situation, the prospects for the economy, and the lessons of history.
It has been nearly a year since the global financial tsunami broke out. Most economies are still experiencing negative growth. Their annual growth rates are negative. But their quarterly growth rates have turned positive. Taiwan's fourth quarter growth rate last year was -8.61%. This year's first quarter growth rate was -10.24%. This year's second quarter growth rate will be -8.5% In this year's fourth quarter however, the growth rate will be 5.2%. Last year's fourth quarter and this year's first quarter were both down over 5%. But this year's second quarter turned positive and showed a growth rate of 0.34% This year's third quarter showed a growth rate of 7.66%. Therefore the current tsunami probably bottomed out in the first quarter of this year.
Global financial markets have also rebounded strongly. The Dow now stands at 9000 points. The Hangseng has jumped to over 20,000 points. The Nikkei has zoomed to 10,000 points. The Shanghai Composite Index may return to 3400 points. The TAIEX has returned to 7000 points. Orders for listed companies and revenue expectations for the future have also turned positive. Although annual growth rates are still negative, quarterly or monthly growth rates are positive. Order visibility has been increased to several months. Based on these figures and on vendor reactions, we are undoubtedly seeing the seeds of recovery.
But as we revisit the past, so-called economic recovery is not a matter of course, straight-line trend. One must understand the cause of an economic downturn. Premature removal of the factors aiding economic recovery could cause the economy and financial markets to return to previous lows.
During the normal business cycle, economic decline naturally leads to lower interest rates and lower production costs. Eventually the economy reaches a point where manufacturers decide there is a profit to be made. Manufacturers increase their investments. Consumption gradually increases. And the economy gradually recovers. But in the event of a bubble economy and the financial turmoil that follows, national wealth is often substantially reduced. In order to survive, companies must drastically reduce corporate debt. Financial institutions are unable to provide loans. Companies across the nation deleverage themselves. At this point, one must rely on strong fiscal measures by the government to bridge the gaps. If the government prematurely withdraws its financial support, the economy may bottom out once again.
Japan's experience with a bubble economy is a living history lesson. After Japan's bubble economy of the 1990s burst, Japan lost more than half of her wealth. The economy depended entirely on 10 to 20 trillion yen in annual government debt. It was revived by fiscal policy support. This ensured that Japan's GDP would not be significantly reduced by the global recession. But in 1997, as the economy began to recover, the Ryutaro Hashimoto government promoted its fiscal consolidation program. As a result the economy immediately collapsed. It experienced five quarters of negative growth. In 2001 the Koizumi government made the same mistake. Koizumi trumpeted financial consolidation. He limited the amount of new bonds that could be issued annually to 30 trillion yen. This was insufficient to make up for the economic shortfall. The results was a rapid deterioration in the economy, and a blow to the financial markets.
What was the payoff for financial consolidation? The answer is, it was a negative one. Hashimoto's goal was to reduce the deficit by 15 trillion Yen. But the economy was dealt a serious blow. Major tax cuts were counterproductive, and eventually increased the deficit by 16 trillion Yen. Koizumi's fiscal consolidation ultimately increased the debt to 35 trillion Yen. Earlier, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the United States government's New Deal fiscal stimulus led to an economic recovery. In 1937 however, in order to "balance the budget," it scaled back prematurely. It reduced expenditures. This dealt the economy another blow. Industrial production plummeted 33%. The stock market plummeted 50%. Instead of decreasing the deficit, it increased the deficit.
The financial tsunami has forced governments the world over to join hands to save the market. They have injected liquidity into financial markets. They have also adopted an expansionary fiscal policy. So far these policies have been effective. Global financial markets have rebounded. The real economy has successfully negotiated the trough, and is beginning to take off. Recently they held several large-scale international conferences. The participating countries agreed to consider exit mechanisms to avoid future inflation. But they also stressed that "now is not the time to exit."
Therefore, the government's 2010 budget will remain a deficit budget. Overall expenditures fell 3.8% from 2009. But an economic stimulus package will increase domestic demand. The budget adopted will reflect continued expansion. We believe that the weak economic recovery must continue to receive support. The government must make these expenditures and assume responsibility for them. During the coming year, domestic unemployment will continue to increase. The government must not prematurely withdraw its fiscal support in order to balance the budget.
But what about leaving the debt to our children and grandchildren? What are we to do about that? If the government attempts to balance the budget, and thereby reduce the debt left to our children and grandchildren, the results may be counterproductive. Japan's example is a warning. Once the economy has recovered and stabilized, tax revenue will naturally increase. The budget deficit can then be reduced. The government can gradually reduce the support it provides the economy. That will be the right time for fiscal consolidation.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.08.04
就先暫時赤字吧─談總預算與景氣
本報訊
明年中央政府總預算正籌編中，對政府該以預算平衡、減少赤字為重，抑是持續擴張財政政策，以支撐經濟為主，各界一直有爭論。在此不妨以景氣現況與前景、過去歷史的殷鑑，嘗試提出一些看法。
去年爆發全球金融海嘯至今，已接近一年了，雖然大部分國家的經濟年成長率，仍在負數，全年也仍難轉負為正，但季成長率則已轉負為正。以台灣而言，經歷去年第四季八．六一％的衰退，今年第一季衰退更達十．二四％，第二季預估也將衰退八．五％，一直要到第四季才轉為五．二％的正成長。但以季成長率而言，去年第四季與今年第一季衰退幅度都在五％上下，但第二季則轉為○．三四％的正成長，第三季更成長七．六六％，因此，這波海嘯的谷底應落在第一季。
此外，全球金融市場也都已強勁反彈；美股站穩九千點，港股飛躍過二萬點，日股衝上萬點，陸股上證指數看回不回到三千四百點，台股也回到七千點。上市公司的接單、營收及對未來的預期，也已轉負為正，縱然年成長率仍在負數，季或月成長率則多已呈現正數，訂單能見度已提高到數月。由這些數據與廠商反應看，復甦幼苗已現當無疑義。
不過，回顧過去的歷史，所謂的經濟復甦，不是一個「理所當然」的直線趨勢，如不能深入理解經濟滑落的原因，過早撤除幫助經濟復甦的助力，經濟與金融市場，仍有可能回落到低點。
在一般的景氣循環中，景氣滑落後自然產生利率下滑、各項生產成本降低，終而到廠商認為「有利可圖」的區間，接著是廠商增加投資、消費逐步加溫，終而讓景氣上揚。但在大型泡沫與金融風暴之後發生的景氣循環，則往往面臨全國財富大幅縮水、企業為求生存強力減債、金融機構貸放能力縮水等全國性的「去槓桿化」收縮效果，此時，就是要靠政府強力的財政措施去彌平這個缺口。如果政府過早撤回財政支持，景氣可能再落回谷底。
日本走過泡沫經濟的歷史就是一幕活生生的教訓。九○年代日本泡沫經濟之後，全日本財富損失過半，經濟全靠政府每年十幾到廿幾兆日圓的預算赤字，所推動的財政政策支撐起來，因而讓日本不至於陷入ＧＤＰ大幅衰減的大蕭條困境。但一九九七年，在景氣已漸有生息之際，橋本龍太郎政府推動財政整頓方案，結果經濟隨即重挫，產值連五季萎縮。二○○一年的小泉政府再重蹈覆轍，小泉鼓吹鞏固財政，限制年度新公債發行額數量在三○兆日圓內，但卻無法彌補經濟缺口，結果讓景氣再急速惡化，金融市場重挫。
整頓財政的成果呢？答案是適得其反。橋本的目標是降低財政赤字十五兆日圓，但因經濟大受打擊，稅收大減，最後反而是預算赤字增加十六兆日圓。小泉的整頓財政最終也讓預算赤字膨脹到卅五兆日圓。而更早前的三○年代大蕭條，美國靠新政的政府財政刺激出來的經濟復甦，到一九三七年又為了「平衡財政」而過早縮手、削減支出，結果經濟再受重創，工業生產急跌卅三％，股市又暴跌五○％，財政赤字則反而增加。
這次的金融海嘯，全球政府聯手救市，除了挹注流動性資金到金融市場外，也採擴張性的財政政策。目前看來，這些政策已發揮功效，全球金融市場紛紛反彈，實質經濟也走過谷底穩步上升。過去一段時間的幾個大型國際會議中，雖然與會各國都同意該考慮政府的「退場機制」，以避免未來發生通貨膨脹；但也同時強調，現在「還不到退場的時候」。
因此，對政府在九九年度預算中，繼續採赤字預算，整體歲出雖然較九八年減少三．八％，但對擴大內需的刺激經濟方案，預算額度將採持續擴張的編列，我們認為是現階段支持微弱的經濟復甦幼苗，政府必要的支出與承擔的責任。更何況，在未來一年中，國內失業率仍將持續飆高下，政府不應過早為平衡財政而撤回對經濟的挹注與支持。
那麼，債留子孫，怎麼辦？務實的講，現在政府為平衡財政、不要債留子孫而削減財政支出，結果可能適得其反，日本的例子殷鑑不遠；經濟回春穩定後，稅收自然增加，財政狀況即有改善餘地，政府亦可逐步抽回減少對經濟的支撐。這時，才是整頓財政的適當時機。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 4, 2009
[ Editor's note: For the record, the Keynesian economic analysis and economic policy prescriptions recommended in this editorial are exactly wrong.
For the correct analysis and economic policy prescriptions, see:
The Myth of Good Government, by Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
http://www.lewrockwell.com/rockwell/myth-of-good-govt.html ]
The central government is working on next year's budget. Should the government concentrate on balancing the budget and reducing the deficit? Should it concentrate on limiting the expansion of fiscal policy and bolstering the economy? No one can agree. Now would be a good time to offer some views on the current situation, the prospects for the economy, and the lessons of history.
It has been nearly a year since the global financial tsunami broke out. Most economies are still experiencing negative growth. Their annual growth rates are negative. But their quarterly growth rates have turned positive. Taiwan's fourth quarter growth rate last year was -8.61%. This year's first quarter growth rate was -10.24%. This year's second quarter growth rate will be -8.5% In this year's fourth quarter however, the growth rate will be 5.2%. Last year's fourth quarter and this year's first quarter were both down over 5%. But this year's second quarter turned positive and showed a growth rate of 0.34% This year's third quarter showed a growth rate of 7.66%. Therefore the current tsunami probably bottomed out in the first quarter of this year.
Global financial markets have also rebounded strongly. The Dow now stands at 9000 points. The Hangseng has jumped to over 20,000 points. The Nikkei has zoomed to 10,000 points. The Shanghai Composite Index may return to 3400 points. The TAIEX has returned to 7000 points. Orders for listed companies and revenue expectations for the future have also turned positive. Although annual growth rates are still negative, quarterly or monthly growth rates are positive. Order visibility has been increased to several months. Based on these figures and on vendor reactions, we are undoubtedly seeing the seeds of recovery.
But as we revisit the past, so-called economic recovery is not a matter of course, straight-line trend. One must understand the cause of an economic downturn. Premature removal of the factors aiding economic recovery could cause the economy and financial markets to return to previous lows.
During the normal business cycle, economic decline naturally leads to lower interest rates and lower production costs. Eventually the economy reaches a point where manufacturers decide there is a profit to be made. Manufacturers increase their investments. Consumption gradually increases. And the economy gradually recovers. But in the event of a bubble economy and the financial turmoil that follows, national wealth is often substantially reduced. In order to survive, companies must drastically reduce corporate debt. Financial institutions are unable to provide loans. Companies across the nation deleverage themselves. At this point, one must rely on strong fiscal measures by the government to bridge the gaps. If the government prematurely withdraws its financial support, the economy may bottom out once again.
Japan's experience with a bubble economy is a living history lesson. After Japan's bubble economy of the 1990s burst, Japan lost more than half of her wealth. The economy depended entirely on 10 to 20 trillion yen in annual government debt. It was revived by fiscal policy support. This ensured that Japan's GDP would not be significantly reduced by the global recession. But in 1997, as the economy began to recover, the Ryutaro Hashimoto government promoted its fiscal consolidation program. As a result the economy immediately collapsed. It experienced five quarters of negative growth. In 2001 the Koizumi government made the same mistake. Koizumi trumpeted financial consolidation. He limited the amount of new bonds that could be issued annually to 30 trillion yen. This was insufficient to make up for the economic shortfall. The results was a rapid deterioration in the economy, and a blow to the financial markets.
What was the payoff for financial consolidation? The answer is, it was a negative one. Hashimoto's goal was to reduce the deficit by 15 trillion Yen. But the economy was dealt a serious blow. Major tax cuts were counterproductive, and eventually increased the deficit by 16 trillion Yen. Koizumi's fiscal consolidation ultimately increased the debt to 35 trillion Yen. Earlier, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the United States government's New Deal fiscal stimulus led to an economic recovery. In 1937 however, in order to "balance the budget," it scaled back prematurely. It reduced expenditures. This dealt the economy another blow. Industrial production plummeted 33%. The stock market plummeted 50%. Instead of decreasing the deficit, it increased the deficit.
The financial tsunami has forced governments the world over to join hands to save the market. They have injected liquidity into financial markets. They have also adopted an expansionary fiscal policy. So far these policies have been effective. Global financial markets have rebounded. The real economy has successfully negotiated the trough, and is beginning to take off. Recently they held several large-scale international conferences. The participating countries agreed to consider exit mechanisms to avoid future inflation. But they also stressed that "now is not the time to exit."
Therefore, the government's 2010 budget will remain a deficit budget. Overall expenditures fell 3.8% from 2009. But an economic stimulus package will increase domestic demand. The budget adopted will reflect continued expansion. We believe that the weak economic recovery must continue to receive support. The government must make these expenditures and assume responsibility for them. During the coming year, domestic unemployment will continue to increase. The government must not prematurely withdraw its fiscal support in order to balance the budget.
But what about leaving the debt to our children and grandchildren? What are we to do about that? If the government attempts to balance the budget, and thereby reduce the debt left to our children and grandchildren, the results may be counterproductive. Japan's example is a warning. Once the economy has recovered and stabilized, tax revenue will naturally increase. The budget deficit can then be reduced. The government can gradually reduce the support it provides the economy. That will be the right time for fiscal consolidation.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.08.04
就先暫時赤字吧─談總預算與景氣
本報訊
明年中央政府總預算正籌編中，對政府該以預算平衡、減少赤字為重，抑是持續擴張財政政策，以支撐經濟為主，各界一直有爭論。在此不妨以景氣現況與前景、過去歷史的殷鑑，嘗試提出一些看法。
去年爆發全球金融海嘯至今，已接近一年了，雖然大部分國家的經濟年成長率，仍在負數，全年也仍難轉負為正，但季成長率則已轉負為正。以台灣而言，經歷去年第四季八．六一％的衰退，今年第一季衰退更達十．二四％，第二季預估也將衰退八．五％，一直要到第四季才轉為五．二％的正成長。但以季成長率而言，去年第四季與今年第一季衰退幅度都在五％上下，但第二季則轉為○．三四％的正成長，第三季更成長七．六六％，因此，這波海嘯的谷底應落在第一季。
此外，全球金融市場也都已強勁反彈；美股站穩九千點，港股飛躍過二萬點，日股衝上萬點，陸股上證指數看回不回到三千四百點，台股也回到七千點。上市公司的接單、營收及對未來的預期，也已轉負為正，縱然年成長率仍在負數，季或月成長率則多已呈現正數，訂單能見度已提高到數月。由這些數據與廠商反應看，復甦幼苗已現當無疑義。
不過，回顧過去的歷史，所謂的經濟復甦，不是一個「理所當然」的直線趨勢，如不能深入理解經濟滑落的原因，過早撤除幫助經濟復甦的助力，經濟與金融市場，仍有可能回落到低點。
在一般的景氣循環中，景氣滑落後自然產生利率下滑、各項生產成本降低，終而到廠商認為「有利可圖」的區間，接著是廠商增加投資、消費逐步加溫，終而讓景氣上揚。但在大型泡沫與金融風暴之後發生的景氣循環，則往往面臨全國財富大幅縮水、企業為求生存強力減債、金融機構貸放能力縮水等全國性的「去槓桿化」收縮效果，此時，就是要靠政府強力的財政措施去彌平這個缺口。如果政府過早撤回財政支持，景氣可能再落回谷底。
日本走過泡沫經濟的歷史就是一幕活生生的教訓。九○年代日本泡沫經濟之後，全日本財富損失過半，經濟全靠政府每年十幾到廿幾兆日圓的預算赤字，所推動的財政政策支撐起來，因而讓日本不至於陷入ＧＤＰ大幅衰減的大蕭條困境。但一九九七年，在景氣已漸有生息之際，橋本龍太郎政府推動財政整頓方案，結果經濟隨即重挫，產值連五季萎縮。二○○一年的小泉政府再重蹈覆轍，小泉鼓吹鞏固財政，限制年度新公債發行額數量在三○兆日圓內，但卻無法彌補經濟缺口，結果讓景氣再急速惡化，金融市場重挫。
整頓財政的成果呢？答案是適得其反。橋本的目標是降低財政赤字十五兆日圓，但因經濟大受打擊，稅收大減，最後反而是預算赤字增加十六兆日圓。小泉的整頓財政最終也讓預算赤字膨脹到卅五兆日圓。而更早前的三○年代大蕭條，美國靠新政的政府財政刺激出來的經濟復甦，到一九三七年又為了「平衡財政」而過早縮手、削減支出，結果經濟再受重創，工業生產急跌卅三％，股市又暴跌五○％，財政赤字則反而增加。
這次的金融海嘯，全球政府聯手救市，除了挹注流動性資金到金融市場外，也採擴張性的財政政策。目前看來，這些政策已發揮功效，全球金融市場紛紛反彈，實質經濟也走過谷底穩步上升。過去一段時間的幾個大型國際會議中，雖然與會各國都同意該考慮政府的「退場機制」，以避免未來發生通貨膨脹；但也同時強調，現在「還不到退場的時候」。
因此，對政府在九九年度預算中，繼續採赤字預算，整體歲出雖然較九八年減少三．八％，但對擴大內需的刺激經濟方案，預算額度將採持續擴張的編列，我們認為是現階段支持微弱的經濟復甦幼苗，政府必要的支出與承擔的責任。更何況，在未來一年中，國內失業率仍將持續飆高下，政府不應過早為平衡財政而撤回對經濟的挹注與支持。
那麼，債留子孫，怎麼辦？務實的講，現在政府為平衡財政、不要債留子孫而削減財政支出，結果可能適得其反，日本的例子殷鑑不遠；經濟回春穩定後，稅收自然增加，財政狀況即有改善餘地，政府亦可逐步抽回減少對經濟的支撐。這時，才是整頓財政的適當時機。
Monday, August 3, 2009
The Chen Family's Overseas Funds Must Be Accounted For
The Chen Family's Overseas Funds Must Be Accounted For
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 3, 2009
The Chen family corruption case is coming to an end in the Taipei District Court. Public attention is focused on which crimes the four members of he Chen family will be convicted of, and the severity of their sentences. Whether justice is done however, will depend on whether the vast sums of money can be recovered. The courts, the prosecutors, and the defense attorneys will be attempting to strike a balance.
Based on the Special Investigation Unit's Bill of Indictment and Supplementary Indictment, conservative estimates are that Chen family income from corruption and illegal campaign contributions exceeds 2 billion NTD. The vast majority of the money has been transferred overseas. So far the prosecution hasn't been able to get a handle on it. Once the court rules that these funds are the result of political corruption or illegal campaign contributions, they will be confiscated in accordance with the law. If it is not possible to confiscate them, they should be treated as the property of a criminal offender. Chen family assets on Taiwan are clearly far short of these sums. If these vast sums of illicit funds cannot be recovered, it will be a flagrant travesty of justice.
Among the four defendants of the Chen family, Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-cheng refuse to admit guilt. Chen Chi-chung and Huang Jiu-ching have admitted guilt. But whether they have confessed to laundering the proceeds of Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's political corruption, and helped prosecutors to recover the funds, remains unknown. Under the circumstances, prosecutors have little room to negotiate with the Chen family. One can only wait for the court's decision. If the court finds the Chen family guilty, the Chen family's unrepentant attitude following the commission of its crimes means their sentences will not be light. But even if the sentences are heavy, what if the Chen family still refuses to hand over its ill-gotten gains?
After the verdict in the first instance, regardless of whether the Chen family hands over its dirty money, the judge in the second instance must determine whether Chen Shui-bian should remain in custody or be allowed to post bail. Travel restrictions on their children may be lifted by the court in the second instance, based on legal precedents. Otherwise restrictions will be lifted immediately. If Chen Shui-bian is released on bail, and travel restrictions are lifted on his children, allowing them to leave the country, the Chen family may go overseas to dispose of its ill-gotten gains. This will make it even more difficult to solve the case and recover the funds in the future. Therefore, the court and prosecution must carefully consider their decisions in this case.
First, until the verdict has been rendered in the first instance, Chen Shui-bian will remain in custody and his children will not be allowed to leave the country. Until the Chen family has fulfilled its promise to turn over its dirty money, the above restrictions should not be lifted, and the prosecution will be in no position to offer a plea bargain. After the first instance verdict has been delivered, the court of the second instance must take into account the issue of money yet to be recovered. The judge must consider extending Chen Shui-bian's detention, and extending the travel limitations on his family members, in order to keep them from leaving the country.
If during the trial in the second instance, the Chen family remains unrepentant, if it chooses to serve time in prison rather than turn over its dirty money, then the judge has no room for clemency. But if the Chen family's attitude changes, if it cooperates with the prosecution and helps recover the money, their children may be given lighter sentences or probation, or be forgiven by society. But if the Chen family's attitude remains unchanged, all the way to the court of the third instance, then the court may have no choice but to immediately carry out the sentence rendered upon Chen Shui-bian. Chen family members may also be barred from leaving the country until a sentence has been imposed. If that turns out to be the case, then it will be because the Chen family prefers to hold on to the money even if it means serving time in prison. It will have only itself to blame.
These are matters the court and the prosecution must consider to ensure justice. If the Chen family insists on keeping its dirty money, it may be kept in detention or be forbidden to leave the country until a verdict has been rendered, and they have served out their sentences. After they have regained their freedom, they may still be able to enjoy their loot. The Chen family may intend to keep its ill-gotten gains even if it means its members must go to prison.
The Chen family's rosy scenario may not pan out. It may not be able to transfer its overseas funds back to Taiwan. After all, its funds have already been identified by foreign banks as dirty money. The Chen family may not be able to recover it. Consider Wang Chuan-pu's illicit gains. The government can't get it back, but neither can the Wang family. If so, on the one hand the Chen family won't be able to retrieve its illicit funds from overseas. On the other hand, the court is after the Chen family for unpaid taxes. Attempting to keep the money is probably a lose/lose proposition. Therefore the Chen family ought to find a way to return the money as soon as possible, and avoid digging itself in any deeper.
The court must account for the whereabouts of the money. Whether the money is returned should have a bearing on the sentencing. The court is about to conclude its deliberations. Today is the prosecution's last chance to consult with the Chen family, The Chen family and its defense attorneys should think long and hard about their final move.
扁家海外贓款必須作出交代
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.08.03 04:33 am
台北地方法院審理扁家弊案已近尾聲，扁家四人將判處何種罪名和刑度，固為社會關注的焦點；但本案所涉鉅額的贓款能否追回，亦是社會公義能否伸張的關鍵。如何求取平衡，應是院檢辯三方思考的重點。
依特偵組起訴及追加起訴扁家的弊案，保守估計扁家貪汙所得、違反政治獻金法之所得，應在二十億元以上；這些錢絕大多數匯往海外，至今檢方無法掌握。一旦判決認定這是貪汙所得或違反政治獻金法之所得，依法均應沒收；如無法沒收，即應就犯罪者之財產追徵之。扁家留在台灣的曝光財產顯然不足此數，則如此鉅額贓款若不能追回，顯然有違公平正義。
扁家四被告目前動態，陳水扁及吳淑珍皆不認罪；陳致中等人雖稱認罪，但對是否承認參與扁珍犯罪所得之洗錢，以及協助檢方取回贓款，均態度不明。在此情況下，檢方自無與扁家協商之餘地，唯有交由法院判決；而若法院認定扁家有罪，以扁家的犯後態度，恐怕刑度不輕。然而，判處重刑，若扁家仍不交出贓款又當如何？
在第一審判決之後，不論扁家是否交出贓款，在押的陳水扁都必須由第二審法官判斷其得否交保。至於其子女解除限制出境的問題，依實務上習慣，亦將交由第二審決定，否則即行解除限制。陳水扁若獲得交保，其子女解除限制出境，則扁家人即很有可能自由到海外處置贓款，以致日後更難令其匯回結案。因此，院檢方面對此必須有更審慎的考慮。
首先，在第一審宣判之前，陳水扁繼續羈押固已確定，其子女之限制出境，在扁家未確實履行交出贓款之承諾以前，當然也不宜解除，且檢方亦不宜與之協商。至第一審宣判之後，第二審因考慮到贓款仍未追回的問題，法官恐怕亦應慎重處理陳水扁是否繼續羈押，以及扁家成員是否繼續限制出境的問題。
倘若在第二審審理期間，扁家的態度依然強硬，寧坐牢也不交出贓款，承審法官自無從輕發落的迴旋空間；但若扁家態度改變，配合檢方追回贓款，則兒輩從輕量刑甚至給予緩刑，或能獲得社會諒解。唯若扁家態度不變，直至三審定讞，則恐法院也別無選擇，或許會將陳水扁由羈押直接發送執行，扁家成員亦可能限制出境直至判決確定發送執行。倘是如此，自是扁家寧可要錢不惜坐牢的心態所致，怨不得人。
以上或是法院和檢察官站在社會公義的立場，不得不有的考慮。但就扁家而言，倘若堅持保有贓款，則最不濟的情況，縱使扁家人一直在押或限制出境，直至判決確定、服刑完畢，則在扁家人坐完牢之後，恢復自由之身，還是可以享用到贓款。實務上，為了錢寧可坐牢也拒不交出贓款的案例比比皆是，扁家未必不會心存此念。
不過，扁家的如意算盤亦可能難如所願。因為，海外贓款若不能匯回給國家，但畢竟已被外國銀行認定為涉案金錢，扁家也未必即能取回。正如汪傳浦的錢，國家取不回，汪家也拿不到。倘係如此，扁家一方面取不回海外贓款，另一方面又要面臨法院追徵，恐將兩頭損失。因而，扁家較平衡的作法仍應是設法及時將錢匯回，以免愈陷愈深。
法院必須對贓款下落作出交代，而贓款是否交代又與扁家的刑度及人身自由有關。法院即將辯論終結，檢方今日將有最後一次與扁家協商之機會，扁家以及辯護律師應該好好想想這最後的一步了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 3, 2009
The Chen family corruption case is coming to an end in the Taipei District Court. Public attention is focused on which crimes the four members of he Chen family will be convicted of, and the severity of their sentences. Whether justice is done however, will depend on whether the vast sums of money can be recovered. The courts, the prosecutors, and the defense attorneys will be attempting to strike a balance.
Based on the Special Investigation Unit's Bill of Indictment and Supplementary Indictment, conservative estimates are that Chen family income from corruption and illegal campaign contributions exceeds 2 billion NTD. The vast majority of the money has been transferred overseas. So far the prosecution hasn't been able to get a handle on it. Once the court rules that these funds are the result of political corruption or illegal campaign contributions, they will be confiscated in accordance with the law. If it is not possible to confiscate them, they should be treated as the property of a criminal offender. Chen family assets on Taiwan are clearly far short of these sums. If these vast sums of illicit funds cannot be recovered, it will be a flagrant travesty of justice.
Among the four defendants of the Chen family, Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-cheng refuse to admit guilt. Chen Chi-chung and Huang Jiu-ching have admitted guilt. But whether they have confessed to laundering the proceeds of Ah-Bian and Ah-Cheng's political corruption, and helped prosecutors to recover the funds, remains unknown. Under the circumstances, prosecutors have little room to negotiate with the Chen family. One can only wait for the court's decision. If the court finds the Chen family guilty, the Chen family's unrepentant attitude following the commission of its crimes means their sentences will not be light. But even if the sentences are heavy, what if the Chen family still refuses to hand over its ill-gotten gains?
After the verdict in the first instance, regardless of whether the Chen family hands over its dirty money, the judge in the second instance must determine whether Chen Shui-bian should remain in custody or be allowed to post bail. Travel restrictions on their children may be lifted by the court in the second instance, based on legal precedents. Otherwise restrictions will be lifted immediately. If Chen Shui-bian is released on bail, and travel restrictions are lifted on his children, allowing them to leave the country, the Chen family may go overseas to dispose of its ill-gotten gains. This will make it even more difficult to solve the case and recover the funds in the future. Therefore, the court and prosecution must carefully consider their decisions in this case.
First, until the verdict has been rendered in the first instance, Chen Shui-bian will remain in custody and his children will not be allowed to leave the country. Until the Chen family has fulfilled its promise to turn over its dirty money, the above restrictions should not be lifted, and the prosecution will be in no position to offer a plea bargain. After the first instance verdict has been delivered, the court of the second instance must take into account the issue of money yet to be recovered. The judge must consider extending Chen Shui-bian's detention, and extending the travel limitations on his family members, in order to keep them from leaving the country.
If during the trial in the second instance, the Chen family remains unrepentant, if it chooses to serve time in prison rather than turn over its dirty money, then the judge has no room for clemency. But if the Chen family's attitude changes, if it cooperates with the prosecution and helps recover the money, their children may be given lighter sentences or probation, or be forgiven by society. But if the Chen family's attitude remains unchanged, all the way to the court of the third instance, then the court may have no choice but to immediately carry out the sentence rendered upon Chen Shui-bian. Chen family members may also be barred from leaving the country until a sentence has been imposed. If that turns out to be the case, then it will be because the Chen family prefers to hold on to the money even if it means serving time in prison. It will have only itself to blame.
These are matters the court and the prosecution must consider to ensure justice. If the Chen family insists on keeping its dirty money, it may be kept in detention or be forbidden to leave the country until a verdict has been rendered, and they have served out their sentences. After they have regained their freedom, they may still be able to enjoy their loot. The Chen family may intend to keep its ill-gotten gains even if it means its members must go to prison.
The Chen family's rosy scenario may not pan out. It may not be able to transfer its overseas funds back to Taiwan. After all, its funds have already been identified by foreign banks as dirty money. The Chen family may not be able to recover it. Consider Wang Chuan-pu's illicit gains. The government can't get it back, but neither can the Wang family. If so, on the one hand the Chen family won't be able to retrieve its illicit funds from overseas. On the other hand, the court is after the Chen family for unpaid taxes. Attempting to keep the money is probably a lose/lose proposition. Therefore the Chen family ought to find a way to return the money as soon as possible, and avoid digging itself in any deeper.
The court must account for the whereabouts of the money. Whether the money is returned should have a bearing on the sentencing. The court is about to conclude its deliberations. Today is the prosecution's last chance to consult with the Chen family, The Chen family and its defense attorneys should think long and hard about their final move.
扁家海外贓款必須作出交代
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.08.03 04:33 am
台北地方法院審理扁家弊案已近尾聲，扁家四人將判處何種罪名和刑度，固為社會關注的焦點；但本案所涉鉅額的贓款能否追回，亦是社會公義能否伸張的關鍵。如何求取平衡，應是院檢辯三方思考的重點。
依特偵組起訴及追加起訴扁家的弊案，保守估計扁家貪汙所得、違反政治獻金法之所得，應在二十億元以上；這些錢絕大多數匯往海外，至今檢方無法掌握。一旦判決認定這是貪汙所得或違反政治獻金法之所得，依法均應沒收；如無法沒收，即應就犯罪者之財產追徵之。扁家留在台灣的曝光財產顯然不足此數，則如此鉅額贓款若不能追回，顯然有違公平正義。
扁家四被告目前動態，陳水扁及吳淑珍皆不認罪；陳致中等人雖稱認罪，但對是否承認參與扁珍犯罪所得之洗錢，以及協助檢方取回贓款，均態度不明。在此情況下，檢方自無與扁家協商之餘地，唯有交由法院判決；而若法院認定扁家有罪，以扁家的犯後態度，恐怕刑度不輕。然而，判處重刑，若扁家仍不交出贓款又當如何？
在第一審判決之後，不論扁家是否交出贓款，在押的陳水扁都必須由第二審法官判斷其得否交保。至於其子女解除限制出境的問題，依實務上習慣，亦將交由第二審決定，否則即行解除限制。陳水扁若獲得交保，其子女解除限制出境，則扁家人即很有可能自由到海外處置贓款，以致日後更難令其匯回結案。因此，院檢方面對此必須有更審慎的考慮。
首先，在第一審宣判之前，陳水扁繼續羈押固已確定，其子女之限制出境，在扁家未確實履行交出贓款之承諾以前，當然也不宜解除，且檢方亦不宜與之協商。至第一審宣判之後，第二審因考慮到贓款仍未追回的問題，法官恐怕亦應慎重處理陳水扁是否繼續羈押，以及扁家成員是否繼續限制出境的問題。
倘若在第二審審理期間，扁家的態度依然強硬，寧坐牢也不交出贓款，承審法官自無從輕發落的迴旋空間；但若扁家態度改變，配合檢方追回贓款，則兒輩從輕量刑甚至給予緩刑，或能獲得社會諒解。唯若扁家態度不變，直至三審定讞，則恐法院也別無選擇，或許會將陳水扁由羈押直接發送執行，扁家成員亦可能限制出境直至判決確定發送執行。倘是如此，自是扁家寧可要錢不惜坐牢的心態所致，怨不得人。
以上或是法院和檢察官站在社會公義的立場，不得不有的考慮。但就扁家而言，倘若堅持保有贓款，則最不濟的情況，縱使扁家人一直在押或限制出境，直至判決確定、服刑完畢，則在扁家人坐完牢之後，恢復自由之身，還是可以享用到贓款。實務上，為了錢寧可坐牢也拒不交出贓款的案例比比皆是，扁家未必不會心存此念。
不過，扁家的如意算盤亦可能難如所願。因為，海外贓款若不能匯回給國家，但畢竟已被外國銀行認定為涉案金錢，扁家也未必即能取回。正如汪傳浦的錢，國家取不回，汪家也拿不到。倘係如此，扁家一方面取不回海外贓款，另一方面又要面臨法院追徵，恐將兩頭損失。因而，扁家較平衡的作法仍應是設法及時將錢匯回，以免愈陷愈深。
法院必須對贓款下落作出交代，而贓款是否交代又與扁家的刑度及人身自由有關。法院即將辯論終結，檢方今日將有最後一次與扁家協商之機會，扁家以及辯護律師應該好好想想這最後的一步了。
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