Self-Confidence and Cross-Strait Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 9, 2009
The 8/8 Floods occurred two months ago. DPP legislators browbeat Premier Wu Den-yih over the amounts contributed by Mainland China. Premier Wu reportedly replied "eight to nine hundred million NT." Pan Green legislators were clearly dissatisfied. They demanded that Premier Wu guarantee that the entire amount pledged by the Mainland would actually be received. Premier Wu said he could hardly stand behind the other side's pledges. He added that some of the contributions from the Chinese Mainland were earmarked for the reconstruction of the Shuang Yuan Bridge. He said it was inappropriate for the Executive Yuan to make such an assessment, therefore he had to decline.
Premier Wu broached this subject on his own initiative. He hoped to prevent Green Camp legislators from villifying him as "pro-China," and as a "China-lover." He wanted them to believe that the government would not unconditionally accept Mainland Chinese generosity and goodwill. Elements within the Green Camp have long demagogued such issues. Will Premier Wu's public declarations make these legislators cease and desist? The answer is still unknown. But Wu's response reveals two things. The first is that the public on Taiwan has a hard time accepting other people's goodwill, especially from the other side of the Taiwan Strait. We are always on the defensive. We assume that anything the Mainland does relative to Taiwan, is always done for some ulterior motive. We view the other side through colored glasses. Therefore all we see are problems. If the Mainland fails to contribute, it has no conscience, If the Mainland contributes too little, it has no conscience. If the Mainland's pledges have yet to be fulfilled, it is guilty of bad faith. If the Mainland wants to earmark its contributions a certain way, then it is meddling in our affairs. In short, we constantly find fault, no matter what they do.
Frankly, there is nothing wrong with earmarking contributions. Contributors all want their contributions to be highly visible and long remembered. This is only human. When ordinary individuals make contributions they too think this way. But as long as the donation meets a real need and people are in fact helped, it is a good thing. Furthermore, earmarking contributions for certain high profile purposes such as major construction projects, makes it easier to solicit contributions. What's more, part of these contributions came from Taiwan businesses on the Mainland. They wanted to use the Shuang Yuan Bridge project to demonstrate their solidarity with Taiwan. Frankly there is nothing wrong with their way of thinking. When the Republic of China provides aid to other countries, doesn't it earmark its contributions the same way?
Secondly, regarding cross-Strait issues, isn't the Ma administration just a wee bit overcautious? It is deathly afraid of falling into traps set by the Green Camp. As a result, it second-guesses itself on every move. For example, the DPP alleged that rebroadcasting Mainland China's National Day troop review on local television was illegal. It demanded a Government Information Office (GIO) investigation. The GIO consulted experts and scholars, who concluded that it was not illegal. There was no need to impose fines on local rebroadcasters. The entire world has expressed an interest in Mainland China's National Day ceremonies. The Republic of China enjoys freedom of speech. How can rebroadcasting news footage of a troop review be considered illegal? Elements within the Green Camp are afflicted with a "No to everything Chinese" mentality that has left them bereft of common sense, and even their humanity. The Ma administration meanwhile, is "once bitten, twice shy." Premier Wu anxiously underscored the administration's refusal to accept contributions from the Mainland authorities. Clearly the DPP's Sinophobic propaganda has the Ma administration treading on eggshells. But the more the Ma administration cowers, the more the DPP tastes blood. The more it chomps down and refuses to let go. On cross-Strait issues, the thinnests of pretexts is enough to rally the Green Camp to arms. Why would it pass up any such opportunity? The more the Ma administration trembles before Green Camp intimidation, the more it encourages the DPP to demagogue every issue that comes along.
The Green Camp has repeatedly pummeled the Ma administration on cross-Strait issues. Clearly, it has had an impact. That is why it gleefully persists. Even more worth our attention is a certain collective mentality on Taiwan. Why is it so hard to view the other side with a normal state of mind? Why do we have so many negative feelings towards the Chinese mainland? Leave aside historical factors and the CCP regime's refusal to respond by removing its missiles. The public on Taiwan also feels unconsciously conflicted and bewildered over the gradual rise of Mainland China. Over the past three decades, Taiwan has experienced economic growth, social prosperity, democracy and freedom, diversity and openness. This has allowed the public to indulge in feelgood optimism in the face of a comparatively backward Mainland China. Now that Taiwan's economic outlook is less rosy, the public is experiencing confusion, and such feelings have faded.
When self-confidence on Taiwan becomes low, Mainland China's troop review is especially hard on the eyes. Chen Chao-jung's remark "China Will Be Strong" is especially hard on the ears. Mainland China's contribution to the 8/8 Flood relief is especially hard on the feelings. This is both sad and alarming. A lack of self-confidence may inspire some on Taiwan to adopt an Ah-Q "out of sight, out of mind" attitude toward Mainland China. It may encourage society to engage in unwarranted speculation, to constantly feel wounded and vulnerable. Frankly, such a mindset will lead to social contraction, squander energy, and yield nothing in return.
As we watch the massive 60th anniversary celebrations on the other side of the Strait, we hope the public on Taiwan will display the same confidence and proudly move ahead. The public on Taiwan must adopt a healthy attitude towards itself and toward cross-Strait relations. We must work toward a time when we too can walk with the same pride.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.10.09
社論－以更大自信看待自己 看待兩岸
本報訊
八八水災發生近兩個月，民進黨立委質詢行政院院長吳敦義，中國大陸的捐款來了多少，聽到吳揆說收到了八、九億元，綠營民意代表顯然很不滿意，直說要吳揆保證大陸捐的錢會全數到位，吳院長除了表示無法替對岸承諾些什麼之外，還說中國大陸的捐款部分指定要修建雙園大橋，但因行政院評估不適當，因此已予以婉拒。
吳揆主動把這段話說出來的目的，應是希望轉移綠營立委隨時會扣下的「親中」、「媚中」大帽子，讓這些人相信政府不會對中共「來者不拒」的，對岸的好意，台灣也不是照單全收。吳揆公開對民進黨立委做這樣一番表白，究竟能不能讓部分向來喜歡在這種議題上大開殺戒的綠營人士收歛、剎車也還未可知，倒是顯露了兩件事，第一是台灣對別人、特別是對對岸的善心好意，似乎很難心平氣和、很難就事論事的評估，總是帶著一個防衛心，認為中共如果對台灣要做什麼的話，就一定是帶著特定的目的；因為戴著有色眼鏡看對岸，所以看到的都是問題：大陸不捐款是沒良心，捐款太少一樣沒良心；捐款還沒到位是沒誠意，希望捐款用在什麼地方是干預…永遠都在挑剔。
老實講，捐款指定用途也並沒有那麼不對、不應該，一來，捐款做好事的人想做在一些明顯、容易被看見、被記住的事情上，算是人情之常，就是一般人捐款時也難免會有這種心態，只要被捐贈、被幫助的人與地方的確有此需要，就算是好事一樁；其次，捐款做一些明顯可見的事，例如重大工程，比較容易昭信，更何況，這批捐款也有些來自台商，他們希望透過像蓋雙園大橋這種比較大的工程，顯示根留台灣的心意，這種想法和做法，老實講無可厚非；當台灣對其他國家進行援助時，不也常常表明希望參與的是重要的建設嗎？
第二，關乎到兩岸議題的事，馬政府會不自覺有一種過了頭的小心翼翼，因為深怕掉進了綠營設下的陷阱，於是進行嚴格的自我檢查。如民進黨認為電視台轉播中國國慶閱兵違法，要求新聞局查處，新聞局就請了專家學者討論，結論是沒有違法，不需開罰。中國大陸的國慶典禮全世界都關注、轉播，在言論自由的台灣，人民透過新聞畫面看到閱兵畫面，竟然違法？部分綠營人士「逢中必反」的慣性已讓他們愈來愈缺乏常識，甚至於扭曲人性，而馬政府似乎也被「電」得有些矯枉過正，從吳揆主動爆料不接受中共的捐款來向反中勢力表明愛台灣、不受中共制約的心意做法看來，民進黨的反中策略的確已讓馬政府神經緊張；但愈是如此，民進黨食髓知味，愈是會緊咬不放，在兩岸議題上，任何風吹草動、任何蛛絲馬跡，綠營文章會愈做愈起勁，豈肯放手？馬政府愈是害怕，愈是讓民進黨看到出招機會。
綠營人士一再就兩岸議題猛打馬政府，顯然多少有些政治效益，因此才會如此樂此不疲，因此更值得關注的是台灣社會的某種集體心態：為什麼那麼難以平常心來看待對岸，為什麼會對中國大陸有這麼多負面感受？除了歷史性的因素以及中共政權至今仍不肯就台灣人民最在意的飛彈問題等予以正面友善的回應之外，還有一個潛在的心態是台灣面對著逐漸崛起的中國大陸有了種種矛盾和失落。台灣過去三十年因為經濟成長、社會繁榮、民主自由、多元開放，讓台灣在面對相對比較落後的中國大陸時自信樂觀、自我感覺良好；曾幾何時，這種光榮的感覺隨著台灣經濟表現不再那麼亮眼，社會又呈現某種混亂對立，有了轉淡的趨勢。
當台灣的自信心變得低落時，中國大陸的閱兵大典看起來就特別刺眼、陳昭榮的「中國一定強」聽起來就特別刺耳，捐給台灣八八風災的捐款也就特別扎心。可悲也可怕的是，沒有自信心不但會讓台灣一些人對中國大陸的現狀懷有「眼不見為淨」的阿Q心態，還會鼓動社會的集體情緒陷入不必要的敏感猜疑，動輒受傷並且脆弱；老實講，這真的會讓台灣的社會力萎縮，消耗能量、甚至於一事無成。
看到對岸的六十慶典如此聲勢浩大，我們的心裡多麼希望台灣也可以自信滿滿、昂首闊步前進！台灣應該要用健康的態度看待自己、看待兩岸關係，積極地為自己創造下一個走路有風的時代。
Friday, October 9, 2009
Thursday, October 8, 2009
Make the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region Part of the ECFA Pilot Program
Make the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region Part of the ECFA Pilot Program
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 8, 2009
The impact of the Dalai Lama's visit has receded. The Wu cabinet has assumed office. The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is again under discussion. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region on mainland China will become part of ECFA's pilot plan. This raises a new issue. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Mainland Affairs Council have each announced that ECFA and the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region are separate issues. But that is probably not true. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is closely related to ECFA. Making the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region part of ECFA's pilot plan may be the key to ECFA's successful implementation.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is primarily Fujian, but also includes part of Zhejiang, Guangdong and Jiangxi. It was first proposed in 2004. But it was only officially adopted by the PRC State Council in May this year. Its purpose is to "support economic development in Fujian Province and accelerate the building of a cross-Strait economic zone." Only then was the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region given a policy basis. Its content is rich and varied. But the key to its economic policy thinking is "total integration with Taiwan's economic resources, via a comprehensive interface." Industry, transportation, manpower, and the financial industry have all been mentioned, in an all out effort to attract Taiwan. During the same month, on the eve of the anniversary of President Ma's inauguration, Mainland China's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi announced eight measures to benefit Taiwan. A key element was the promotion of a dedicated service industry pilot program in the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region. This means Beijing intends to allow the Western Taiwan Strait Economic Region to lead the way, regardless of whether it is motivated by the strategic needs of the local economy, or the political implications of a "Fujian-Taiwan interface." From this perspective, the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region and ECFA are two different things that can be developed independently.
Now let's take a look at our side's single-minded promotion of ECFA. According to international trade practices, ECFA is a cross-Strait economic framework that includes a framework for full liberalization. Its ultimate goal is a free trade agreement (FTA). If we can achieve this, Taipei need not be concerned that its political status will be demoted to that of Hong Kong and Macao. In reality, whether Beijing is willing to take such a step remains to be seen. But as far as our side is concerned, we don't want ECFA to immediately implement such open market principles. For Taipei, this has both advantages and disadvantages. Pfficialdom and private industry may have different expectations, but everyone hopes consultations will result in ECFA. On the mainland, Taipei would enjoy "Super-WTO treatment." During cross-Strait economic and trade negotiations, Taipei would "get more and give less." Such contradictory attitudes have led to ECFA's linkage with the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region.
Another practical obstacle is that the two sides joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) under different auspices. Our side was highly liberalized and highly developed. The Mainland, on the other hand, was a developing economy with a buffer period. Today the two sides have agreed to discuss trade and economic liberalization via ECFA. Taipei must confront its outdated special defense mechanisms. It must fulfill its commitments to liberalization. It can no longer make an exception for Mainland China. Even if the other side "wants too much," and even it if wants only "normalization" of MFN treatment. Our side may find it difficult to fulfill its obligations regarding sensitive agricultural products. Under the circumstances, linking ECFA with the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is a necessity.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region's special regional provisions allow the two sides to avoid the WTO's MFN provisions. They allows our side to meet our super-WTO treatment obligations. They allow Taipei to establish buffer zones, even as the mainland fully normalizes its economy. When the two sides negotiate ECFA, they can determine how far to carry trade liberalization and normalization. They can gradually expand cooperation within the confines of the SAR. This will reduce the impact of immediate and total liberalization on sensitive industries on Taiwan, giving them time to adjust. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region will also provide a low threshold for certain industries, such as financial services. We may not be able to start late and finish first, but these provisions will offer us other advantages. They will at least allow us to regain some of the opportunities lost as a result of prohibitions against "going West." Therefore, linkage of the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region with ECFA is eminently worthwhile.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region has undeniably gotten off to a late start relative to the rest of the Mainland's coastal economic zone. This is the source of its future potential, but it also reflects its comparatively limited resources. Whether Beijing intends to exert extra effort on its behalf remains to be seen. Our side cannot treat it as a limitation. Since it is an SAR, our side should treat it as an SAR, in order to avoid being redefined as another Hong Kong and Macao. In practice, it should be classified as an ECFA cross-Strait economic cooperation pilot project. First, taxes should be lowered. Then trade should be liberalized. This will yield the most favorable outcome.
海西區應可考慮列入ECFA的試點
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.08 03:05 am
達賴效應降溫，吳內閣上任。兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）的討論將重回檯面，中國大陸的海西經濟區會否成為ＥＣＦＡ的先行先試區域，則引出了一條新的話題軸線。經濟部、陸委會異口同聲表示，ＥＣＦＡ和海西區是兩回事；但現實恐非如此，海西區與ＥＣＦＡ的關係不只緊密，海西區成為ＥＣＦＡ的試點，更可能是順利推展ＥＣＦＡ的關鍵之一。
海西經濟區的全稱是海峽西岸經濟區，以福建為主，並跨向浙江、廣東及江西的一部分，最早於二○○四年提出，但直到今年五月中共國務院正式通過「關於支援福建省加快建設海峽經濟區的若干意見」，才賦予發展海西經濟區的政策基礎。這份「若干意見」的內容洋洋灑灑，但其經濟政策的中心思維就是「與台灣經濟的資源整合、全面對接」，因而從產業、交通、人才到金融業，無一不談吸引台灣之法。同月，中共國台辦主任王毅在馬總統就職周年前夕宣布惠台八措施，其要項之一就是推銷特定服務業在海西區的試點。凡此皆說明，無論是基於其自身的地方經濟戰略需要，或隱含「閩台對口」的政治意圖，北京政府確實有意將海西經濟區做為兩岸先行、先試的經貿特區。從這點看，海西試點與ＥＣＦＡ是兩回事，可各自獨立發展。
現在來看看我方一心一意推動的ＥＣＦＡ。從國際經貿實務而言，ＥＣＦＡ是兩岸經濟走向全面自由化的初始框架，終極目標是有朝一日簽定自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）；果能如此，台灣自無「港澳化」的政治矮化疑慮。在現實狀態中，北京是否願意走到這一步尚未可知；但就我方而言，ＥＣＦＡ若採立即對等開放市場原則，卻絕非我方所願，對台灣更是利弊參半，因而無論官方或業界的主觀期待，都是希望透過協商所達成的ＥＣＦＡ，在大陸享有「超ＷＴＯ（世貿組織）待遇」，在兩岸經貿開放談判上「多拿少給」。這樣一個矛盾的心態，就讓ＥＣＦＡ與海西經濟區有了連結。
再一個現實的障礙是，當年兩岸加入世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）的身分不同，我方是自由化程度較高的已開發國家，中國大陸則是設有開放緩衝年限的開發中國家，如今兩方要洽商議定經貿自由化時程的ＥＣＦＡ，台灣就無法不面對過去以特別防衛機制，將中國大陸例外排除適用我方自由化承諾的問題；就算對方「要」的不多，只要求最惠國待遇的「正常化」，我方仍可能因涉及多項敏感性農產品而難以完全承諾。在此情況下，ＥＣＦＡ與海西經濟區的連結更成了必要。
海西經濟區的特區化及地區化，讓兩岸間不只可以避開ＷＴＯ的最惠國規定、滿足我方的超ＷＴＯ待遇期待，更可讓台灣在面對大陸的經貿完全正常化要求時，以此建立緩衝的地帶；亦即雙方在協商ＥＣＦＡ時，可評估在限定的特區內進行經貿易自由化、正常化及逐步擴大合作的試點，以降低立即全面自由化對台灣敏感產業的衝擊，爭取產業調適的時間。此外，運用海西經濟區對特定產業如金融業的低門檻、額外優惠等優勢，縱使無法後發先至，至少可追回一部分過往因禁足西進而流失的機會。因此，海西經濟區與ＥＣＦＡ的連結對我方是有其積極意義的，這一點，應予列入考慮。
不可諱言的是，海西經濟區的發展是中國大陸沿海經濟區中相對緩慢的，這固然是它的潛力所在，但相對也凸顯了它的客觀資源限制；北京的政策加持力量仍待觀察，我方自不能以此為限。此外，既是特區，我方也應以特區對應，以避免港澳化疑慮；在作法上，則應將兩岸試點列為ＥＣＦＡ的經濟合作項目，與先期降稅的早期收穫、後續的貿易自由化進程交互運用，爭取最有利的協商結果。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 8, 2009
The impact of the Dalai Lama's visit has receded. The Wu cabinet has assumed office. The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is again under discussion. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region on mainland China will become part of ECFA's pilot plan. This raises a new issue. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Mainland Affairs Council have each announced that ECFA and the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region are separate issues. But that is probably not true. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is closely related to ECFA. Making the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region part of ECFA's pilot plan may be the key to ECFA's successful implementation.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is primarily Fujian, but also includes part of Zhejiang, Guangdong and Jiangxi. It was first proposed in 2004. But it was only officially adopted by the PRC State Council in May this year. Its purpose is to "support economic development in Fujian Province and accelerate the building of a cross-Strait economic zone." Only then was the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region given a policy basis. Its content is rich and varied. But the key to its economic policy thinking is "total integration with Taiwan's economic resources, via a comprehensive interface." Industry, transportation, manpower, and the financial industry have all been mentioned, in an all out effort to attract Taiwan. During the same month, on the eve of the anniversary of President Ma's inauguration, Mainland China's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi announced eight measures to benefit Taiwan. A key element was the promotion of a dedicated service industry pilot program in the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region. This means Beijing intends to allow the Western Taiwan Strait Economic Region to lead the way, regardless of whether it is motivated by the strategic needs of the local economy, or the political implications of a "Fujian-Taiwan interface." From this perspective, the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region and ECFA are two different things that can be developed independently.
Now let's take a look at our side's single-minded promotion of ECFA. According to international trade practices, ECFA is a cross-Strait economic framework that includes a framework for full liberalization. Its ultimate goal is a free trade agreement (FTA). If we can achieve this, Taipei need not be concerned that its political status will be demoted to that of Hong Kong and Macao. In reality, whether Beijing is willing to take such a step remains to be seen. But as far as our side is concerned, we don't want ECFA to immediately implement such open market principles. For Taipei, this has both advantages and disadvantages. Pfficialdom and private industry may have different expectations, but everyone hopes consultations will result in ECFA. On the mainland, Taipei would enjoy "Super-WTO treatment." During cross-Strait economic and trade negotiations, Taipei would "get more and give less." Such contradictory attitudes have led to ECFA's linkage with the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region.
Another practical obstacle is that the two sides joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) under different auspices. Our side was highly liberalized and highly developed. The Mainland, on the other hand, was a developing economy with a buffer period. Today the two sides have agreed to discuss trade and economic liberalization via ECFA. Taipei must confront its outdated special defense mechanisms. It must fulfill its commitments to liberalization. It can no longer make an exception for Mainland China. Even if the other side "wants too much," and even it if wants only "normalization" of MFN treatment. Our side may find it difficult to fulfill its obligations regarding sensitive agricultural products. Under the circumstances, linking ECFA with the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is a necessity.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region's special regional provisions allow the two sides to avoid the WTO's MFN provisions. They allows our side to meet our super-WTO treatment obligations. They allow Taipei to establish buffer zones, even as the mainland fully normalizes its economy. When the two sides negotiate ECFA, they can determine how far to carry trade liberalization and normalization. They can gradually expand cooperation within the confines of the SAR. This will reduce the impact of immediate and total liberalization on sensitive industries on Taiwan, giving them time to adjust. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region will also provide a low threshold for certain industries, such as financial services. We may not be able to start late and finish first, but these provisions will offer us other advantages. They will at least allow us to regain some of the opportunities lost as a result of prohibitions against "going West." Therefore, linkage of the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region with ECFA is eminently worthwhile.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region has undeniably gotten off to a late start relative to the rest of the Mainland's coastal economic zone. This is the source of its future potential, but it also reflects its comparatively limited resources. Whether Beijing intends to exert extra effort on its behalf remains to be seen. Our side cannot treat it as a limitation. Since it is an SAR, our side should treat it as an SAR, in order to avoid being redefined as another Hong Kong and Macao. In practice, it should be classified as an ECFA cross-Strait economic cooperation pilot project. First, taxes should be lowered. Then trade should be liberalized. This will yield the most favorable outcome.
海西區應可考慮列入ECFA的試點
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.08 03:05 am
達賴效應降溫，吳內閣上任。兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）的討論將重回檯面，中國大陸的海西經濟區會否成為ＥＣＦＡ的先行先試區域，則引出了一條新的話題軸線。經濟部、陸委會異口同聲表示，ＥＣＦＡ和海西區是兩回事；但現實恐非如此，海西區與ＥＣＦＡ的關係不只緊密，海西區成為ＥＣＦＡ的試點，更可能是順利推展ＥＣＦＡ的關鍵之一。
海西經濟區的全稱是海峽西岸經濟區，以福建為主，並跨向浙江、廣東及江西的一部分，最早於二○○四年提出，但直到今年五月中共國務院正式通過「關於支援福建省加快建設海峽經濟區的若干意見」，才賦予發展海西經濟區的政策基礎。這份「若干意見」的內容洋洋灑灑，但其經濟政策的中心思維就是「與台灣經濟的資源整合、全面對接」，因而從產業、交通、人才到金融業，無一不談吸引台灣之法。同月，中共國台辦主任王毅在馬總統就職周年前夕宣布惠台八措施，其要項之一就是推銷特定服務業在海西區的試點。凡此皆說明，無論是基於其自身的地方經濟戰略需要，或隱含「閩台對口」的政治意圖，北京政府確實有意將海西經濟區做為兩岸先行、先試的經貿特區。從這點看，海西試點與ＥＣＦＡ是兩回事，可各自獨立發展。
現在來看看我方一心一意推動的ＥＣＦＡ。從國際經貿實務而言，ＥＣＦＡ是兩岸經濟走向全面自由化的初始框架，終極目標是有朝一日簽定自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）；果能如此，台灣自無「港澳化」的政治矮化疑慮。在現實狀態中，北京是否願意走到這一步尚未可知；但就我方而言，ＥＣＦＡ若採立即對等開放市場原則，卻絕非我方所願，對台灣更是利弊參半，因而無論官方或業界的主觀期待，都是希望透過協商所達成的ＥＣＦＡ，在大陸享有「超ＷＴＯ（世貿組織）待遇」，在兩岸經貿開放談判上「多拿少給」。這樣一個矛盾的心態，就讓ＥＣＦＡ與海西經濟區有了連結。
再一個現實的障礙是，當年兩岸加入世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）的身分不同，我方是自由化程度較高的已開發國家，中國大陸則是設有開放緩衝年限的開發中國家，如今兩方要洽商議定經貿自由化時程的ＥＣＦＡ，台灣就無法不面對過去以特別防衛機制，將中國大陸例外排除適用我方自由化承諾的問題；就算對方「要」的不多，只要求最惠國待遇的「正常化」，我方仍可能因涉及多項敏感性農產品而難以完全承諾。在此情況下，ＥＣＦＡ與海西經濟區的連結更成了必要。
海西經濟區的特區化及地區化，讓兩岸間不只可以避開ＷＴＯ的最惠國規定、滿足我方的超ＷＴＯ待遇期待，更可讓台灣在面對大陸的經貿完全正常化要求時，以此建立緩衝的地帶；亦即雙方在協商ＥＣＦＡ時，可評估在限定的特區內進行經貿易自由化、正常化及逐步擴大合作的試點，以降低立即全面自由化對台灣敏感產業的衝擊，爭取產業調適的時間。此外，運用海西經濟區對特定產業如金融業的低門檻、額外優惠等優勢，縱使無法後發先至，至少可追回一部分過往因禁足西進而流失的機會。因此，海西經濟區與ＥＣＦＡ的連結對我方是有其積極意義的，這一點，應予列入考慮。
不可諱言的是，海西經濟區的發展是中國大陸沿海經濟區中相對緩慢的，這固然是它的潛力所在，但相對也凸顯了它的客觀資源限制；北京的政策加持力量仍待觀察，我方自不能以此為限。此外，既是特區，我方也應以特區對應，以避免港澳化疑慮；在作法上，則應將兩岸試點列為ＥＣＦＡ的經濟合作項目，與先期降稅的早期收穫、後續的貿易自由化進程交互運用，爭取最有利的協商結果。
Wednesday, October 7, 2009
When will Deng Xiaoping's Portrait be Displayed at Tiananmen Square?
When will Deng Xiaoping's Portrait be Displayed at Tiananmen Square?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 7, 2009
The Beijing authorities have been preoccupied with a number of major events. The 10/1 celebration and the Beijing Olympics convey very different notions. To the outside world, the synchronized placard displays during the Beijing Olympics hinted at peaceful development. The large scale troop review during the 10/1 celebration meanwhile, contained more than a hint of swagger.
Ideally a major power should promote peace abroad and maintain harmony at home. But prior to the Cold War, major powers used their superior might to exploit or bully smaller or weaker nations. China suffered grievously. From the Opium War of 1840, though the eight year long Japanese invasion, the Chinese people shed oceans of blood and wept rivers of tears. Mainland China's military capability now enables it to "just say no." It has minimized the likelihood of foreign aggression. This is a prerequisite for a major power. Meanwhile the evolution of human civilization makes it difficult to imagine any country ever again becoming a major aggressor. The U.S. invasion of Iraq may be the last instance of a war of aggression by a major power. In other words, instead of committing aggression and engaging in slaughter, the major powers are now forstalling conflict. In this regard, Beijing's "peaceful development" or even "peaceful rise," may constitute a new paradigm for developing nations.
Let's talk about internal harmony. Within a globalized economy, nations that refuse to open themselves up to the rest of the world cannot become major powers. Nations that open themselves up to the outside world inevitably experience an increase in freedom of thought and awareness of civil rights. They can no longer be ruled by totalitarian dictatorships. In other words, for social harmony to prevail inside a major power requires democracy and human rights.
The People's Republic of China established its authority 60 years ago. The development most worth celebrating is the transformation of the Chinese Communist Party from Mao Zedong's Communist Party to Deng Xiaoping's Communist Party. If this were not the case, today's Mainland would be little more than the Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea) writ large. Internationally, there would be no possibility of "peaceful development." Domestically, Kim Jong-il style measures would be necessary to maintain a semblance of social harmony. Given the peace and prosperity the CCP and China enjoy today, it is not Mao Zedong's portrait that ought to be displayed at Tiananmen Square, but Deng Xiaoping's.
During the 10/1 celebration, Hu Jintao continued to pay lip service to "Marxism" and "Mao Zedong Thought." The CCP "annihilated the Gang of Four" in 1976. It launched a movement to discredit Mao Zedong. It initiated three decades of reform and liberalization. The result? Today's Chinese Communist Party constitutes the largest collection of "capitalist roaders" and "revisionists" the world has ever seen. The problem is that the CCP has essentially repudiated Mao Zedong, but continues to display his portrait in Tiananmen Square. If it publicly criticized Mao, it might undermine the legitimacy of the CCP. The CCP continues to display Mao's portrait, even after it has turned its back on Mao and repudiated him. This gap between theory and practice is a major issue that the CCP must address but has yet to address. Every day the CCP refuses to talk about Mao Zedong's 30 year long debacle, is a day that it delays its own transformation and the transformation of Mainland China.
Sun Yat-sen's portrait can still be seen in Tiananmen Square. It remained on display during this year's 60th anniversary 10/1 celebration. Meanwhile, the portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are already gone. This says that the CCP hopes to distance itself from Mao Zedong and Communism. Instead, it is attempting to preserve another grander, more open political tradition. Having evaluated their internal and external circumstances, they continue to argue that "Mao's merits outnumber his demerits, seven to three." But this is not a position they can maintain long-term. Mao Zedong is not an appropriate national icon for China, anymore than Adolf Hitler is an appropriate national icon for Germany. If the CCP and Mainland China wish to undergo gradual transformation, they should adopt a gradual strategy for transformation. They should gradually elevate the political status of Deng Xiaoping. They should gradually relieve themselves of the historical baggage of Mao Zedong. This is a viable approach. In fact, Deng Xiaoping and lower level CCP leaders such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang liberated themselves from the bonds of Mao Zedong some time ago. If the CCP hopes to transform the party and the nation, it must liberate itself from the bonds of Mao Zedong, in form as well as in substance. This is an inevitable process. Otherwise it will be difficult to undergo rebirth. If the CCP seeks rebirth in an increasingly democratic Chinese society, it must negotiate this passage, sooner if not later. If it cannot repudiate Mao as a national icon, he will forever remain an obstacle to the transformation of the CCP and Mainland China.
The CCP and Mainland China have a long way to go in their transformation. They must gradually rid themselves of old baggage. They must gradually give themselves a makeover. The day Mao Zedong's portrait comes down at Tiananmen Square will be the day the CCP and Mainland China complete their political tranformation.
天安門城樓該掛鄧小平像？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.07 03:32 am
同為北京當局全神貫注的大活動，十一與京奧的演示意象旨趣迥異。京奧的主題，是用活字演出多彩多姿的「和」字，對外象徵「和平發展」，對內意指「和諧社會」；十一則以大閱兵為主場景，當然有「耀武揚威」的意味。
理想的大國境界，就是對外「和平」，對內維持「和諧」。人類在二十世紀冷戰以前的「大國」，皆是仗恃武力剝削或欺凌弱小。中國受害甚劇，自一八四○鴉片戰爭至日本侵華八年，山河血淚，委實創鉅痛深。中國大陸如今擁有這般武備，已具說「不」的實力，大抵已使外患外侮的可能性降至最低，這是成為「大國」的條件。但人類歷史文明演化至今，已難想像任何國家再能以窮兵黷武而成為「大國」；美國侵辱伊拉克可能是最後一個「大國侵略戰爭」。也就是說，大國的武力在「止戈」，而不是用在侵略及殺戮。就此而言，北京政權能以「和平發展」為對外的立國基調（甚至不說「和平崛起」），不無可能成為「大國」的新思潮與新典範。
再言對內「和諧」。在全球化的經濟情境中，國家不對外開放不可能成為「大國」；而對外開放的國家，國內自由思潮與民權意識必是有增無已，殆不可能再以專制極權為治國手段。也就是說，大國之內的「和諧社會」，終究須以民主及人權來維繫。
中華人民共和國建政六十周年，最值得慶幸者是：今日的中國共產黨已從「毛澤東的共產黨」，變成「鄧小平的共產黨」。倘非如此，今日的中國大陸也許只是大一號的「朝鮮民主主義人民共和國」（北韓）而已；對外不可能「和平發展」，對內則須以金正日那一套始能維持所謂的「和諧社會」。就此而言，中共與中國有今日，掛在天安門城樓上的巨像，不該是毛澤東，而應是鄧小平。
胡錦濤十一文告中，仍高舉「馬克思主義」及「毛澤東思想」。但是，今天的中共，其實是出自一九七六年中共舉黨透過「粉碎四人幫」而對毛澤東發動的鞭屍政變；三十年來的「改革開放」，已使現在的中共成為共產黨史上最大的「走資派」與「修正主義」。問題正在於此：現在的中共實質上是否定了毛澤東，卻又在天安門上掛著毛像。因為，如果發動公開批毛，中共的正當性亦可能動搖；但是，掛著毛像的中共，現在的實際作為卻是對毛的背離與否定。這種理論與實際乖離的異象，一直是中共必須解決但迄未解決的重大的議題。對毛澤東「三十年浩劫」的議論只要被中共捂著一天，中共即難望有使自己及中國轉型過渡的一天。
直至今年六十周年的十一，天安門廣場仍見豎起孫中山巨像，但「馬克思／恩格斯／列寧／斯大林」的巨像則早已不見，這顯示中共欲在毛澤東及共產主義以外，試圖保留另一個更開闊恢宏的政治傳承；但盱衡內外情勢，若對毛澤東的評價永遠停留在「功過七三開」的說法，其實仍非長久之計。中國之不宜以毛澤東為國家象徵，正如德國不宜以希特勒為國家象徵。中共與中國若欲一步一步轉型，逐漸升高鄧小平的政治象徵地位，相對地慢慢放下毛澤東的包袱，應是可以採行的過渡性作法。事實上，鄧小平以降的兩個梯隊的中共領導人，包括胡耀邦及趙紫陽等，已然相當程度地超越並跳脫了毛澤東的綑綁；未來中共欲進一步帶動黨及國家的轉型，最後必須一併解脫掉在形式上仍然存在的毛澤東束縛，這是一必經的過程，否則難以脫胎換骨。中共想在日漸民主化的中國社會尋求新生，恐怕早晚必須要過這一關。若不能否棄毛澤東的國家象徵地位，中共與中國轉型過渡的障礙始終存在。
中共及中國的轉型還有很長的路要走，舊包袱要慢慢地放下，新面貌要慢慢地形塑；當天安門城樓的毛像可以卸下的那一天，也許就是中共及中國政治轉型瀕近成功之日。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 7, 2009
The Beijing authorities have been preoccupied with a number of major events. The 10/1 celebration and the Beijing Olympics convey very different notions. To the outside world, the synchronized placard displays during the Beijing Olympics hinted at peaceful development. The large scale troop review during the 10/1 celebration meanwhile, contained more than a hint of swagger.
Ideally a major power should promote peace abroad and maintain harmony at home. But prior to the Cold War, major powers used their superior might to exploit or bully smaller or weaker nations. China suffered grievously. From the Opium War of 1840, though the eight year long Japanese invasion, the Chinese people shed oceans of blood and wept rivers of tears. Mainland China's military capability now enables it to "just say no." It has minimized the likelihood of foreign aggression. This is a prerequisite for a major power. Meanwhile the evolution of human civilization makes it difficult to imagine any country ever again becoming a major aggressor. The U.S. invasion of Iraq may be the last instance of a war of aggression by a major power. In other words, instead of committing aggression and engaging in slaughter, the major powers are now forstalling conflict. In this regard, Beijing's "peaceful development" or even "peaceful rise," may constitute a new paradigm for developing nations.
Let's talk about internal harmony. Within a globalized economy, nations that refuse to open themselves up to the rest of the world cannot become major powers. Nations that open themselves up to the outside world inevitably experience an increase in freedom of thought and awareness of civil rights. They can no longer be ruled by totalitarian dictatorships. In other words, for social harmony to prevail inside a major power requires democracy and human rights.
The People's Republic of China established its authority 60 years ago. The development most worth celebrating is the transformation of the Chinese Communist Party from Mao Zedong's Communist Party to Deng Xiaoping's Communist Party. If this were not the case, today's Mainland would be little more than the Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea) writ large. Internationally, there would be no possibility of "peaceful development." Domestically, Kim Jong-il style measures would be necessary to maintain a semblance of social harmony. Given the peace and prosperity the CCP and China enjoy today, it is not Mao Zedong's portrait that ought to be displayed at Tiananmen Square, but Deng Xiaoping's.
During the 10/1 celebration, Hu Jintao continued to pay lip service to "Marxism" and "Mao Zedong Thought." The CCP "annihilated the Gang of Four" in 1976. It launched a movement to discredit Mao Zedong. It initiated three decades of reform and liberalization. The result? Today's Chinese Communist Party constitutes the largest collection of "capitalist roaders" and "revisionists" the world has ever seen. The problem is that the CCP has essentially repudiated Mao Zedong, but continues to display his portrait in Tiananmen Square. If it publicly criticized Mao, it might undermine the legitimacy of the CCP. The CCP continues to display Mao's portrait, even after it has turned its back on Mao and repudiated him. This gap between theory and practice is a major issue that the CCP must address but has yet to address. Every day the CCP refuses to talk about Mao Zedong's 30 year long debacle, is a day that it delays its own transformation and the transformation of Mainland China.
Sun Yat-sen's portrait can still be seen in Tiananmen Square. It remained on display during this year's 60th anniversary 10/1 celebration. Meanwhile, the portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are already gone. This says that the CCP hopes to distance itself from Mao Zedong and Communism. Instead, it is attempting to preserve another grander, more open political tradition. Having evaluated their internal and external circumstances, they continue to argue that "Mao's merits outnumber his demerits, seven to three." But this is not a position they can maintain long-term. Mao Zedong is not an appropriate national icon for China, anymore than Adolf Hitler is an appropriate national icon for Germany. If the CCP and Mainland China wish to undergo gradual transformation, they should adopt a gradual strategy for transformation. They should gradually elevate the political status of Deng Xiaoping. They should gradually relieve themselves of the historical baggage of Mao Zedong. This is a viable approach. In fact, Deng Xiaoping and lower level CCP leaders such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang liberated themselves from the bonds of Mao Zedong some time ago. If the CCP hopes to transform the party and the nation, it must liberate itself from the bonds of Mao Zedong, in form as well as in substance. This is an inevitable process. Otherwise it will be difficult to undergo rebirth. If the CCP seeks rebirth in an increasingly democratic Chinese society, it must negotiate this passage, sooner if not later. If it cannot repudiate Mao as a national icon, he will forever remain an obstacle to the transformation of the CCP and Mainland China.
The CCP and Mainland China have a long way to go in their transformation. They must gradually rid themselves of old baggage. They must gradually give themselves a makeover. The day Mao Zedong's portrait comes down at Tiananmen Square will be the day the CCP and Mainland China complete their political tranformation.
天安門城樓該掛鄧小平像？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.07 03:32 am
同為北京當局全神貫注的大活動，十一與京奧的演示意象旨趣迥異。京奧的主題，是用活字演出多彩多姿的「和」字，對外象徵「和平發展」，對內意指「和諧社會」；十一則以大閱兵為主場景，當然有「耀武揚威」的意味。
理想的大國境界，就是對外「和平」，對內維持「和諧」。人類在二十世紀冷戰以前的「大國」，皆是仗恃武力剝削或欺凌弱小。中國受害甚劇，自一八四○鴉片戰爭至日本侵華八年，山河血淚，委實創鉅痛深。中國大陸如今擁有這般武備，已具說「不」的實力，大抵已使外患外侮的可能性降至最低，這是成為「大國」的條件。但人類歷史文明演化至今，已難想像任何國家再能以窮兵黷武而成為「大國」；美國侵辱伊拉克可能是最後一個「大國侵略戰爭」。也就是說，大國的武力在「止戈」，而不是用在侵略及殺戮。就此而言，北京政權能以「和平發展」為對外的立國基調（甚至不說「和平崛起」），不無可能成為「大國」的新思潮與新典範。
再言對內「和諧」。在全球化的經濟情境中，國家不對外開放不可能成為「大國」；而對外開放的國家，國內自由思潮與民權意識必是有增無已，殆不可能再以專制極權為治國手段。也就是說，大國之內的「和諧社會」，終究須以民主及人權來維繫。
中華人民共和國建政六十周年，最值得慶幸者是：今日的中國共產黨已從「毛澤東的共產黨」，變成「鄧小平的共產黨」。倘非如此，今日的中國大陸也許只是大一號的「朝鮮民主主義人民共和國」（北韓）而已；對外不可能「和平發展」，對內則須以金正日那一套始能維持所謂的「和諧社會」。就此而言，中共與中國有今日，掛在天安門城樓上的巨像，不該是毛澤東，而應是鄧小平。
胡錦濤十一文告中，仍高舉「馬克思主義」及「毛澤東思想」。但是，今天的中共，其實是出自一九七六年中共舉黨透過「粉碎四人幫」而對毛澤東發動的鞭屍政變；三十年來的「改革開放」，已使現在的中共成為共產黨史上最大的「走資派」與「修正主義」。問題正在於此：現在的中共實質上是否定了毛澤東，卻又在天安門上掛著毛像。因為，如果發動公開批毛，中共的正當性亦可能動搖；但是，掛著毛像的中共，現在的實際作為卻是對毛的背離與否定。這種理論與實際乖離的異象，一直是中共必須解決但迄未解決的重大的議題。對毛澤東「三十年浩劫」的議論只要被中共捂著一天，中共即難望有使自己及中國轉型過渡的一天。
直至今年六十周年的十一，天安門廣場仍見豎起孫中山巨像，但「馬克思／恩格斯／列寧／斯大林」的巨像則早已不見，這顯示中共欲在毛澤東及共產主義以外，試圖保留另一個更開闊恢宏的政治傳承；但盱衡內外情勢，若對毛澤東的評價永遠停留在「功過七三開」的說法，其實仍非長久之計。中國之不宜以毛澤東為國家象徵，正如德國不宜以希特勒為國家象徵。中共與中國若欲一步一步轉型，逐漸升高鄧小平的政治象徵地位，相對地慢慢放下毛澤東的包袱，應是可以採行的過渡性作法。事實上，鄧小平以降的兩個梯隊的中共領導人，包括胡耀邦及趙紫陽等，已然相當程度地超越並跳脫了毛澤東的綑綁；未來中共欲進一步帶動黨及國家的轉型，最後必須一併解脫掉在形式上仍然存在的毛澤東束縛，這是一必經的過程，否則難以脫胎換骨。中共想在日漸民主化的中國社會尋求新生，恐怕早晚必須要過這一關。若不能否棄毛澤東的國家象徵地位，中共與中國轉型過渡的障礙始終存在。
中共及中國的轉型還有很長的路要走，舊包袱要慢慢地放下，新面貌要慢慢地形塑；當天安門城樓的毛像可以卸下的那一天，也許就是中共及中國政治轉型瀕近成功之日。
Tuesday, October 6, 2009
A Passing Grade on Typhoon Parma: But What About the Future?
A Passing Grade on Typhoon Parma: But What About the Future?
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 6, 2009
The 8/8 Flood taught us some painful lessons. Typhoon Parma has the Ma administration on tenterhooks. It mobilized in advance. Central and local governments are on full alert. President Ma Ying-jeou has repeatedly stressed that his administration "prepared for any eventuality," and that its defenses are "tight as a drum." Judging by their performance over the past two days, disaster prevention measures by government at all levels have passed muster. Local governments and members of the public have for the most part cooperated by evacuating danger zones. The Ma administration's clueless and inept behavior during Typhoon Morakot is hopefully a thing of the past.
Typhoon Parma did not result in disaster. Nevertheless it forced officials and civilians in threatened areas to run around in circles. The Yilan region in particular bore the brunt of the storm. The county government made four different announcements regarding school closures before finally getting it right. The main reason was that Typhoon Parma's path was erratic. It was a "peculiar typhoon."
Typhoon Parma was so peculiar, American, Japanese and our own weather services all found it difficult to track. Neither its path nor the amount of rainfall could be accurately predicted. According to typhoon reports issued by our own Central Weather Bureau over the weekend, Parma was downgraded to a standard typhoon on October 2. The radius of the typhoon however, increased from 200 kilometers to 250 kilometers, expanding its sphere of influence.
After Typhoon Parma battered Taiwan, it was affected by Typhoon Melor in waters surrounding the Philippine Islands. Typhoon Melor drew Typhoon Parma toward the Bashi Channel, where it hovered for a time, leading to a "Fujiwara Effect." Melor repeatedly altered Parma's path. It caused Parma to make a 180 degree about face, from northeast to southwest. Weather services in the Philippines were even worried that Parma might draw Melor back, to batter the Philippines a second time.
Another factor affecting Parma was a "combined effect," leading to rainfall variations. Parma was clearly far to the south, in the Bashi Channel. Yet the heaviest rainfall was in Yilan, on the northern coast of Taiwan. The Bureau of Meteorology had to amend its forecast five times, a record in typhoon forecasting. Parma's strange behavior inspired experts to characterize it as the most difficult to forecast typhoon so far this year.
Under the impact of climate change, Taiwan has experienced many "peculiar typhoons" in recent years. Last year's Typhoon Sinlaku and Typhoon Kalmaegi were not super typhoons. But heavy rains led to disaster. Looking at the larger picture, the entire world faces dramatic climate change. In recent years some regions have received 50 or even 100 year record rainfalls. The Philippines, Vietnam, and Turkey have experienced major floods. Arid regions such as the Deccan Plateau in northern India have experienced major floods -- even after the conclusion of the rainy season. Hurricane Katrina, which struck the US in 2005, was a major disaster seldom seen in North America.
Not long ago, Nature Magazine published a study by a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, who said that the world is currently experiencing a once in a millennium "storm peak." Global warming has not increased not merely the frequency of storms, but also their strength. Mankind faces an angry planet, whose anger has yet to fully erupt.
Nature is cruel, and its wrath unpredictable. Weather forecasting and disaster prevention systems in the twenty-first century face an unexpected challenge. As for Taiwan, the threat of typhoons looms especially large. Nearby Guam is an infamous Pacific Ocean "Typhoon nest." Due to the earth's rotational effect, most typhoons generated in this nest head towards Taiwan. People are therefore increasingly concerned about the accuracy of typhoon weather forecasts.
The accuracy of Central Weather Bureau typhoon forecasts has long been in dispute. The CWB's explanations have seldom satisfied the public. The accuracy of its typhoon forecasts affects "typhoon holidays." If CWB reports are inaccurate, if the standards are unclear, local governments don't know whether to declare typhoon holidays. For years the sole criterion for typhoon holidays was wind strength. After years of urging from experts, it finally added rainfall volume, an even greater threat. Recently there have been calls to add landslide predictions forecasts. For mountain regions hard hit by mudslides, this is a necessary correction.
The government has been slow to invest in disaster prevention technology. For example since Typhoon Xangsane in 2000, it has become clear that rainfall is more and more often the cause of serious damage. But domestic rainfall measurement stations are too few and too unevenly distributed. Most stations are established by county and municipal governments. It was only early this year, that the CEPD approved one billion NT in funding for rainfall measurement station improvements, mainly in villages and towns. Increasing the density of rainfall measurement stations is long overdue.
The public has long been in the habit of criticizing the government for ineffectiveness in disaster prevention. But the public must increase its own understanding as well. For example, Typhoon Morakot finally forced people living in threatened areas to acknowledge the need for village relocation. Yet during Typhoon Parma some people in threatened areas still refused to leave. The government was forced to spend money and manpower helping them pile sandbags. Some mocked these efforts as useless. But if people don't know enough to look after themselves, what gives them the right to waste precious public resources?
The government received a passing grade during Typhoon Parma. But what about in the future? Natural disasters never sleep. Heaven's blessings are capricious. The blood and tears shed during natural disasters must be translated into lessons. They must be integrated into the system and into our lives. That is the only way to prepare for natural disasters.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.10.06
這次芭瑪颱風過關 但未來呢？
本報訊
經過八八風災的慘痛教訓，這次面對芭瑪颱風，馬政府上下繃緊神經，提早動員，從中央到縣市政府全面進入防颱備戰狀態，務求做到馬英九總統一再強調的「料敵從寬，禦敵從嚴」。從這兩天的結果看來，各級政府的防災動作還算到位，該撤離的危險區域，地方政府與民眾也多半能配合執行，馬政府終於不再像莫拉克颱風來襲時一般，全無章法，徹底失能。
不過，芭瑪雖未釀災，卻仍讓預警區內的政府及民眾手忙腳亂，尤其是首當其衝的宜蘭地區，為了是否停班停課，縣政府發布了四次新聞，才算全部搞定。主因就是，芭瑪行徑詭異，又是一個「怪颱」。
芭瑪之怪，讓美、日各國氣象單位都難以捉摸，它的路徑和雨量都「測不準」。根據我國中央氣象局上周末發布的颱風消息，芭瑪在十月二日減弱為中颱，但暴風半徑反而由二百公里增加到二百五十公里，影響範圍擴大。
而芭瑪侵台後，又受菲律賓海域上另一個強颱米勒的牽引、拉扯而在巴士海峽滯留踱步，徘徊不去，形成若有似無的「藤原效應」，一再影響芭瑪的路徑，使它一度出現由東北轉向西南的一八○度大轉變；而菲律賓氣象單位還擔心芭瑪是否會被米勒拉回去，二度侵菲。
另一個影響芭瑪的因素是「共伴效應」，主要反映在雨量變化，明明颱風遠在南邊的巴士海峽，但最大雨量落在宜蘭，氣象局連續上、下修正達五次之多，創歷年颱風預報僅見。這麼怪異的表現，使芭瑪被學者定義為今年至今最難預報的颱風。
在氣候變遷的影響下，台灣近年多次面臨「怪颱」，去年的辛樂克、卡玫基都不是強颱，但都因雨量超大而成災。放大範圍看，這幾年，全球都面臨劇烈氣候變異，動輒降下以五十年、甚至百年為頻率周期的大雨，菲律賓、越南、土耳其最近都出現大水災，連向來是乾旱地區的印度北部德干高原，都在雨季結束後出現大洪水，而二○○五年美國卡崔娜風災，更是北美洲少見的巨災。
不久前，《自然雜誌》刊登的一篇由美國賓州大學教授進行的研究指出，目前地球正處於千年一次的「風暴高峰期」，而全球暖化不但提高了風暴形成的頻率，也加驟其強度。人類面臨的是一個發怒的地球，而且怒氣顯然尚未完全爆發。
大地無情，天威難測，氣象預報與防災體系成為各國進入廿一世紀後一個始料未及的挑戰。對台灣而言，颱風的威脅尤其大；關島附近的太平洋海域是有名的「颱風窩」，因地球自轉效應，這個颱風窩生成的颱風，多會往台灣方向前進。因此國人愈來愈關心颱風氣象預報的準確與否。
但中央氣象局的颱風預報準頭，一直是一個爭議，氣象局的解釋和民眾的感受始終有極大落差。尤其，颱風預報準確與否，關係到放「颱風假」與否，如果氣象局報不準、標準不明，地方政府面對是否放颱風假時，就更感到為難。多年來，國內放颱風假的唯一標準是風力，學者呼籲多年後，總算加入威脅性更大的雨量，最近則出現應加入土石流預測的討論，對飽受土石流重創的山區而言，應是必要的修正。
在防災體系方面，政府對防災科技的整體投入與相關建置，仍慢了好幾拍。舉一例，從二○○○年的象神颱風開始，颱風因雨成災的趨勢就愈來愈明顯而劇烈，但國內的雨量測站不足、地點又分配不均，多是以縣市為設站規畫。直到今年初，經建會才通過十多億的經費，用於改善雨量測站設站問題，將落實到以鄉鎮為主，加強防災網格的密度。其實，這個工作早就應該進行了。
另一個需要指出的是，長久以來，社會習慣批評政府防災不力，但民眾的防災意識也要加強。譬如，莫拉克終於使危險地區的民眾認識到遷村的必要性。而在芭瑪颱風中，仍然有災區民眾不願撤離，政府只好出錢出力替他們堆沙包，但又有人站在旁邊譏諷「沒用啦」。自己不知保護自己，又憑什麼浪費社會國家資源呢？
這次面對芭瑪颱風，政府或許過關了，但未來呢？天災不會休止，天佑也不牢靠，歷次災難的血淚一定要化為教訓，落實到制度與生活中，才是防災之道。
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 6, 2009
The 8/8 Flood taught us some painful lessons. Typhoon Parma has the Ma administration on tenterhooks. It mobilized in advance. Central and local governments are on full alert. President Ma Ying-jeou has repeatedly stressed that his administration "prepared for any eventuality," and that its defenses are "tight as a drum." Judging by their performance over the past two days, disaster prevention measures by government at all levels have passed muster. Local governments and members of the public have for the most part cooperated by evacuating danger zones. The Ma administration's clueless and inept behavior during Typhoon Morakot is hopefully a thing of the past.
Typhoon Parma did not result in disaster. Nevertheless it forced officials and civilians in threatened areas to run around in circles. The Yilan region in particular bore the brunt of the storm. The county government made four different announcements regarding school closures before finally getting it right. The main reason was that Typhoon Parma's path was erratic. It was a "peculiar typhoon."
Typhoon Parma was so peculiar, American, Japanese and our own weather services all found it difficult to track. Neither its path nor the amount of rainfall could be accurately predicted. According to typhoon reports issued by our own Central Weather Bureau over the weekend, Parma was downgraded to a standard typhoon on October 2. The radius of the typhoon however, increased from 200 kilometers to 250 kilometers, expanding its sphere of influence.
After Typhoon Parma battered Taiwan, it was affected by Typhoon Melor in waters surrounding the Philippine Islands. Typhoon Melor drew Typhoon Parma toward the Bashi Channel, where it hovered for a time, leading to a "Fujiwara Effect." Melor repeatedly altered Parma's path. It caused Parma to make a 180 degree about face, from northeast to southwest. Weather services in the Philippines were even worried that Parma might draw Melor back, to batter the Philippines a second time.
Another factor affecting Parma was a "combined effect," leading to rainfall variations. Parma was clearly far to the south, in the Bashi Channel. Yet the heaviest rainfall was in Yilan, on the northern coast of Taiwan. The Bureau of Meteorology had to amend its forecast five times, a record in typhoon forecasting. Parma's strange behavior inspired experts to characterize it as the most difficult to forecast typhoon so far this year.
Under the impact of climate change, Taiwan has experienced many "peculiar typhoons" in recent years. Last year's Typhoon Sinlaku and Typhoon Kalmaegi were not super typhoons. But heavy rains led to disaster. Looking at the larger picture, the entire world faces dramatic climate change. In recent years some regions have received 50 or even 100 year record rainfalls. The Philippines, Vietnam, and Turkey have experienced major floods. Arid regions such as the Deccan Plateau in northern India have experienced major floods -- even after the conclusion of the rainy season. Hurricane Katrina, which struck the US in 2005, was a major disaster seldom seen in North America.
Not long ago, Nature Magazine published a study by a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, who said that the world is currently experiencing a once in a millennium "storm peak." Global warming has not increased not merely the frequency of storms, but also their strength. Mankind faces an angry planet, whose anger has yet to fully erupt.
Nature is cruel, and its wrath unpredictable. Weather forecasting and disaster prevention systems in the twenty-first century face an unexpected challenge. As for Taiwan, the threat of typhoons looms especially large. Nearby Guam is an infamous Pacific Ocean "Typhoon nest." Due to the earth's rotational effect, most typhoons generated in this nest head towards Taiwan. People are therefore increasingly concerned about the accuracy of typhoon weather forecasts.
The accuracy of Central Weather Bureau typhoon forecasts has long been in dispute. The CWB's explanations have seldom satisfied the public. The accuracy of its typhoon forecasts affects "typhoon holidays." If CWB reports are inaccurate, if the standards are unclear, local governments don't know whether to declare typhoon holidays. For years the sole criterion for typhoon holidays was wind strength. After years of urging from experts, it finally added rainfall volume, an even greater threat. Recently there have been calls to add landslide predictions forecasts. For mountain regions hard hit by mudslides, this is a necessary correction.
The government has been slow to invest in disaster prevention technology. For example since Typhoon Xangsane in 2000, it has become clear that rainfall is more and more often the cause of serious damage. But domestic rainfall measurement stations are too few and too unevenly distributed. Most stations are established by county and municipal governments. It was only early this year, that the CEPD approved one billion NT in funding for rainfall measurement station improvements, mainly in villages and towns. Increasing the density of rainfall measurement stations is long overdue.
The public has long been in the habit of criticizing the government for ineffectiveness in disaster prevention. But the public must increase its own understanding as well. For example, Typhoon Morakot finally forced people living in threatened areas to acknowledge the need for village relocation. Yet during Typhoon Parma some people in threatened areas still refused to leave. The government was forced to spend money and manpower helping them pile sandbags. Some mocked these efforts as useless. But if people don't know enough to look after themselves, what gives them the right to waste precious public resources?
The government received a passing grade during Typhoon Parma. But what about in the future? Natural disasters never sleep. Heaven's blessings are capricious. The blood and tears shed during natural disasters must be translated into lessons. They must be integrated into the system and into our lives. That is the only way to prepare for natural disasters.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.10.06
這次芭瑪颱風過關 但未來呢？
本報訊
經過八八風災的慘痛教訓，這次面對芭瑪颱風，馬政府上下繃緊神經，提早動員，從中央到縣市政府全面進入防颱備戰狀態，務求做到馬英九總統一再強調的「料敵從寬，禦敵從嚴」。從這兩天的結果看來，各級政府的防災動作還算到位，該撤離的危險區域，地方政府與民眾也多半能配合執行，馬政府終於不再像莫拉克颱風來襲時一般，全無章法，徹底失能。
不過，芭瑪雖未釀災，卻仍讓預警區內的政府及民眾手忙腳亂，尤其是首當其衝的宜蘭地區，為了是否停班停課，縣政府發布了四次新聞，才算全部搞定。主因就是，芭瑪行徑詭異，又是一個「怪颱」。
芭瑪之怪，讓美、日各國氣象單位都難以捉摸，它的路徑和雨量都「測不準」。根據我國中央氣象局上周末發布的颱風消息，芭瑪在十月二日減弱為中颱，但暴風半徑反而由二百公里增加到二百五十公里，影響範圍擴大。
而芭瑪侵台後，又受菲律賓海域上另一個強颱米勒的牽引、拉扯而在巴士海峽滯留踱步，徘徊不去，形成若有似無的「藤原效應」，一再影響芭瑪的路徑，使它一度出現由東北轉向西南的一八○度大轉變；而菲律賓氣象單位還擔心芭瑪是否會被米勒拉回去，二度侵菲。
另一個影響芭瑪的因素是「共伴效應」，主要反映在雨量變化，明明颱風遠在南邊的巴士海峽，但最大雨量落在宜蘭，氣象局連續上、下修正達五次之多，創歷年颱風預報僅見。這麼怪異的表現，使芭瑪被學者定義為今年至今最難預報的颱風。
在氣候變遷的影響下，台灣近年多次面臨「怪颱」，去年的辛樂克、卡玫基都不是強颱，但都因雨量超大而成災。放大範圍看，這幾年，全球都面臨劇烈氣候變異，動輒降下以五十年、甚至百年為頻率周期的大雨，菲律賓、越南、土耳其最近都出現大水災，連向來是乾旱地區的印度北部德干高原，都在雨季結束後出現大洪水，而二○○五年美國卡崔娜風災，更是北美洲少見的巨災。
不久前，《自然雜誌》刊登的一篇由美國賓州大學教授進行的研究指出，目前地球正處於千年一次的「風暴高峰期」，而全球暖化不但提高了風暴形成的頻率，也加驟其強度。人類面臨的是一個發怒的地球，而且怒氣顯然尚未完全爆發。
大地無情，天威難測，氣象預報與防災體系成為各國進入廿一世紀後一個始料未及的挑戰。對台灣而言，颱風的威脅尤其大；關島附近的太平洋海域是有名的「颱風窩」，因地球自轉效應，這個颱風窩生成的颱風，多會往台灣方向前進。因此國人愈來愈關心颱風氣象預報的準確與否。
但中央氣象局的颱風預報準頭，一直是一個爭議，氣象局的解釋和民眾的感受始終有極大落差。尤其，颱風預報準確與否，關係到放「颱風假」與否，如果氣象局報不準、標準不明，地方政府面對是否放颱風假時，就更感到為難。多年來，國內放颱風假的唯一標準是風力，學者呼籲多年後，總算加入威脅性更大的雨量，最近則出現應加入土石流預測的討論，對飽受土石流重創的山區而言，應是必要的修正。
在防災體系方面，政府對防災科技的整體投入與相關建置，仍慢了好幾拍。舉一例，從二○○○年的象神颱風開始，颱風因雨成災的趨勢就愈來愈明顯而劇烈，但國內的雨量測站不足、地點又分配不均，多是以縣市為設站規畫。直到今年初，經建會才通過十多億的經費，用於改善雨量測站設站問題，將落實到以鄉鎮為主，加強防災網格的密度。其實，這個工作早就應該進行了。
另一個需要指出的是，長久以來，社會習慣批評政府防災不力，但民眾的防災意識也要加強。譬如，莫拉克終於使危險地區的民眾認識到遷村的必要性。而在芭瑪颱風中，仍然有災區民眾不願撤離，政府只好出錢出力替他們堆沙包，但又有人站在旁邊譏諷「沒用啦」。自己不知保護自己，又憑什麼浪費社會國家資源呢？
這次面對芭瑪颱風，政府或許過關了，但未來呢？天災不會休止，天佑也不牢靠，歷次災難的血淚一定要化為教訓，落實到制度與生活中，才是防災之道。
Monday, October 5, 2009
The Problem is Factional Style, not Factions
The Problem is Factional Style, not Factions
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 5, 2009
After being out of power for eight years, the Kuomintang has finally regained power. But it now faces a serious crisis with its political support at the local level.
The KMT lost the Miaoli County legislative by-election, and the Yunlin County legislative by-election. Yunlin County Magistrate Chang Li-shan announced her withdrawal from the election. The KMT failed to win passage of its referendum on legalized gambling in Penghu. This was only the beginning. Factional infighting soon erupted in the Hualien, Taitung, Hsinchu, Nantou and Chiayi county elections. This is shaking the very foundations of the party, and its structure is in danger of collapse.
The Conventional Wisdom is that the problem is with "local factions." But that is only half the answer. Democracies throughout the world must cope with local factions. Factions can actually help political integration. They can actually help the public evaluate party performance. The real problem is factional style, quality, and image. The faction headed by Chang Jung-wei, the "King of Yunlin," is now ridiculted as "qing pu gong / zheng wan peng" (hogging everything for itself). Lin Ping-kun is the "King of Penghu." What government and business interests stand behind his investments in the gaming industry? Voters have their doubts. The Chang/Lin merger crystalizes public perceptions of the KMT's factional politics. Chang and Lin are both "non-partisan." Yet they are able to hijack the KMT. Such factions are clearly tails wagging the dog.
In 2008 the central government experienced a change in ruling parties. The main reason Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party lost power was their handling of corruption and Taiwan independence. They lost the people's trust. The KMT was presented with an opportunity to regain power. Now, however the KMT's local political machine faces a test of legitimacy. Kuang Li-chen in Taitung, Fu Kuen-chi in Hualien, Chang Yung-wei in Yunlin, and Lin Ping-kun in Penghu all represent the same problem.
Why has the KMT's local political machine broken into so many pieces? Let's compare the KMT to the DPP. One. The DPP's rise was due to national level political campaigns, to a strong, clear-cut political platform. Therefore its first and second generation political leaders have national level name recognition. They characterized themselves as "spokespersons for Taiwanese values." By contrast, the KMT central government and local government have long been two separate worlds. Local political leaders have long been concerned only with the distribution of political benefits. Almost none of them are "spokespersons for Taiwan." Almost none of them offer spiritual or ideological inspiration. They represent no political values, only the distribution of political benefits. This is one reason why the KMT finds it difficult to upgrade the quality of its local political leadership. Two. The DPP has national level political factions such as the Justice Alliance and the New Wave Faction. To a considerable extent, these national level political factions are able to moderate and control local factions. By contrast, today's KMT lacks the ideological fervor to generate political factions. The party's central leadership suppresses political factions, even as it remains incapable of restraining local factions. Three. The DPP's political factions have a training function. For example, they help city and county council members to become national legislators, their assistants to become council members, national legislators to become county executives and city mayors, and their assistants to become national legislators. Local KMT factions, on the other hand, are predominantly family enterprises that help spouses or offspring run for office, or worse, allow the family to hog everything for itself. Therefore the problem is not factions, but factional style. The public has seen Wang Yu-yun and Yu Teng-fa style factions come and go. The Chang Jung-wei and Lin Ping-kun style factions will also eventually run their course.
Take Yunlin for example. The KMT can no longer consider Chang Jung-wei its spokesperson. By the same token, Chang Yung-wei is no longer the KMT's political tool. This is not a question of who is willing to do business with whom. Society has evolved to the point where such games are no longer acceptable.
President Ma has assumed the party chairmanship. The central government is already stretched to its limits. It is in no position to deal effectively with the fragmentation of its local political machine. Chang Li-shan, Fu Kun-chi, and Kuang Li-chen are giving Ma headaches. Former Hualien and Hsinchu county executives have opposed the party's primary candidates. As we can see, the KMT Central Committee is neither able to deter local political bosses, nor inspire the party leadership to do better. Chang Jung-wei is hardly alone. Anyone can confidently declare "I no longer want to do business with the party leadership."
The KMT cannot eliminate local factions. But it should ask itself a fundamental question. Why are local DPP leaders, even low-ranking ones, afraid to criticize the mess Chen Shui-bian left behind, while simultaneously boasting that they represent "Taiwan's values?" Why can't bona fide, local KMT grass-roots leaders claim that they represent "Taiwan's values" and "Taiwan's spirit?" Why can't they extricate themselves from their quagmire? Why are they content to do nothing except distribute benefits? When the KMT handles local disputes, why can't it appeal to the voters on a higher level, and force local political bosses to back down? Why is even Chang Hui-yuan able to "campaign on behalf of his son" and hold the KMT leadership in utter contempt
Both are Taiwanese. So why are "DPP Taiwanese" more equal than "KMT Taiwanese?" This is a question for which the KMT has no answer. Even if it had an answer, it feels no urgency concerning the answer. But this is one of the most fundamental questions confronting the KMT, and one for which it must find an answer, sooner or later.
派系不是問題，問題在派系的風格
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.05 11:58 am
剛爭回喪失了八年中央執政權的國民黨，現正面臨地方根基動搖的嚴重危機。
輸掉苗栗立委補選，再輸掉雲林立委補選，雲林縣長提名候選人張麗善又宣布退選，澎湖博弈公投亦告失敗……。事情還沒完，花蓮、台東、新竹、南投及嘉義的縣長選舉皆出現分裂內訌……。根基動搖，大廈亦岌岌告危。
一般認為，問題出在「地方派系」。此說似只說對了一半。在全世界的民主政治中，地方派系皆不能免，且派系有助政治整合及政績的累積；所以，問題其實出在派系的風格、品質與形象。「雲林王」張榮味的派系，如今落得「青埔宮／整碗捧」的譏評，引起了選民的質疑；「澎湖王」林炳坤對博弈產業的投入，其背後的政商結構也使選民疑懼。而張、林二人的派系形象，可謂正是一般國人對國民黨地方派系的既成印象。何況，張、林皆是「無黨籍」，卻能挾制國民黨，可見派系已是尾大不掉。
二○○八年中央政權的政黨輪替，主要是因陳水扁的民進黨政權在貪腐失政及操作台獨上，失去了國人的信任；國民黨因而有了取而代之的機遇。現在眼前出現的問題則是：國民黨在地方政治上的正當性面臨了社會的考驗，從台東鄺麗貞、花蓮傅?萁、雲林張榮味到澎湖林炳坤，皆是同樣的課題。
為什麼國民黨的地方政治會出現這種四分五裂、捉襟見肘的現象？試與民進黨相較，探其隱微。一、民進黨崛起於全國性的政治運動，一直有強烈鮮明的政治號召，因而第一、二代的地方政治人物亦有全國性的知名度，皆以「台灣價值的代言人」自居；反觀國民黨，中央與地方幾乎一直是井水不犯河水的兩個世界，因而地方政治人物一向以利益分配為政治操作的主題，幾乎無人能在精神感召或意識形態上成為「台灣的代言人」。沒有政治號召的精神主題，只有利益分配，這是國民黨地方政治人物及地方派系難以提升的因素之一。二、民進黨內有全國性的「政治派系」（如正義連線、新潮流），相當程度地疏導及節制了「地方派系」；相對而言，國民黨的精神主題不足以分化出政治派系，黨中央亦壓制政治派系，卻無力節制地方派系。三、民進黨的「政治派系」亦有人才培訓的功能；例如：議員選上立委，助理即選議員；立委選上縣市長，助理即選立委。反觀國民黨，比較凸顯的印象是家族世襲，代夫出征、代子出征，甚至「青埔宮／全碗捧」。因而，派系不是問題，問題在於風格。王玉雲、余登發那類的派系，國人都眼看它樓起樓塌；張榮味、林炳坤之類的派系亦必有強弩之末的時候。
以雲林的例子來看，國民黨再也不能以張榮味為「代理人」，張榮味亦再也不能以國民黨為「政治工具」。這不是誰不跟誰玩的問題，而是社會發展至今日，已經不容許這樣的玩法。
馬英九總統兼黨主席，中央大局已是捉襟見肘，遑論有效處理分崩離析的地方政治。現在不只張麗善、傅?萁、鄺麗貞給他出難題，連花蓮及新竹縣也出現老縣長力挺否定初選者；可見，國民黨中央既無強人以威懾地方，又無精神號召或優異的中央政績以感召地方，何只張榮味，任何人皆可理直氣壯地宣示：「不跟黨中央玩下去！」這般情狀，如何了得？
國民黨不可能終結地方派系，但應當回頭問一個最根本的問題：為什麼民進黨的地方人物，不論什麼小蘿蔔頭，都敢不問陳水扁的爛攤子，而大言不慚地說：我代表台灣價值！而為什麼國民黨的真正草根地方人物卻不能說：我代表台灣價值，我代表台灣精神？為什麼不能從利益分配的泥淖中走出來？又為什麼國民黨在處理地方傾軋時，不能向選民訴諸一個更高遠的價值目標，使地方投機人物知難而退？以致連張輝元也敢玩「代子出征」，視黨中央如無物。
平平是台灣人，難道「國民黨的台灣人」不如「民進黨的台灣人」？這個問題很大，且現在也找不出答案，即使找出答案亦已無濟於燃眉之急。但是，這卻是一個最根本的問題，對國民黨而言，不找出答案不行。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 5, 2009
After being out of power for eight years, the Kuomintang has finally regained power. But it now faces a serious crisis with its political support at the local level.
The KMT lost the Miaoli County legislative by-election, and the Yunlin County legislative by-election. Yunlin County Magistrate Chang Li-shan announced her withdrawal from the election. The KMT failed to win passage of its referendum on legalized gambling in Penghu. This was only the beginning. Factional infighting soon erupted in the Hualien, Taitung, Hsinchu, Nantou and Chiayi county elections. This is shaking the very foundations of the party, and its structure is in danger of collapse.
The Conventional Wisdom is that the problem is with "local factions." But that is only half the answer. Democracies throughout the world must cope with local factions. Factions can actually help political integration. They can actually help the public evaluate party performance. The real problem is factional style, quality, and image. The faction headed by Chang Jung-wei, the "King of Yunlin," is now ridiculted as "qing pu gong / zheng wan peng" (hogging everything for itself). Lin Ping-kun is the "King of Penghu." What government and business interests stand behind his investments in the gaming industry? Voters have their doubts. The Chang/Lin merger crystalizes public perceptions of the KMT's factional politics. Chang and Lin are both "non-partisan." Yet they are able to hijack the KMT. Such factions are clearly tails wagging the dog.
In 2008 the central government experienced a change in ruling parties. The main reason Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party lost power was their handling of corruption and Taiwan independence. They lost the people's trust. The KMT was presented with an opportunity to regain power. Now, however the KMT's local political machine faces a test of legitimacy. Kuang Li-chen in Taitung, Fu Kuen-chi in Hualien, Chang Yung-wei in Yunlin, and Lin Ping-kun in Penghu all represent the same problem.
Why has the KMT's local political machine broken into so many pieces? Let's compare the KMT to the DPP. One. The DPP's rise was due to national level political campaigns, to a strong, clear-cut political platform. Therefore its first and second generation political leaders have national level name recognition. They characterized themselves as "spokespersons for Taiwanese values." By contrast, the KMT central government and local government have long been two separate worlds. Local political leaders have long been concerned only with the distribution of political benefits. Almost none of them are "spokespersons for Taiwan." Almost none of them offer spiritual or ideological inspiration. They represent no political values, only the distribution of political benefits. This is one reason why the KMT finds it difficult to upgrade the quality of its local political leadership. Two. The DPP has national level political factions such as the Justice Alliance and the New Wave Faction. To a considerable extent, these national level political factions are able to moderate and control local factions. By contrast, today's KMT lacks the ideological fervor to generate political factions. The party's central leadership suppresses political factions, even as it remains incapable of restraining local factions. Three. The DPP's political factions have a training function. For example, they help city and county council members to become national legislators, their assistants to become council members, national legislators to become county executives and city mayors, and their assistants to become national legislators. Local KMT factions, on the other hand, are predominantly family enterprises that help spouses or offspring run for office, or worse, allow the family to hog everything for itself. Therefore the problem is not factions, but factional style. The public has seen Wang Yu-yun and Yu Teng-fa style factions come and go. The Chang Jung-wei and Lin Ping-kun style factions will also eventually run their course.
Take Yunlin for example. The KMT can no longer consider Chang Jung-wei its spokesperson. By the same token, Chang Yung-wei is no longer the KMT's political tool. This is not a question of who is willing to do business with whom. Society has evolved to the point where such games are no longer acceptable.
President Ma has assumed the party chairmanship. The central government is already stretched to its limits. It is in no position to deal effectively with the fragmentation of its local political machine. Chang Li-shan, Fu Kun-chi, and Kuang Li-chen are giving Ma headaches. Former Hualien and Hsinchu county executives have opposed the party's primary candidates. As we can see, the KMT Central Committee is neither able to deter local political bosses, nor inspire the party leadership to do better. Chang Jung-wei is hardly alone. Anyone can confidently declare "I no longer want to do business with the party leadership."
The KMT cannot eliminate local factions. But it should ask itself a fundamental question. Why are local DPP leaders, even low-ranking ones, afraid to criticize the mess Chen Shui-bian left behind, while simultaneously boasting that they represent "Taiwan's values?" Why can't bona fide, local KMT grass-roots leaders claim that they represent "Taiwan's values" and "Taiwan's spirit?" Why can't they extricate themselves from their quagmire? Why are they content to do nothing except distribute benefits? When the KMT handles local disputes, why can't it appeal to the voters on a higher level, and force local political bosses to back down? Why is even Chang Hui-yuan able to "campaign on behalf of his son" and hold the KMT leadership in utter contempt
Both are Taiwanese. So why are "DPP Taiwanese" more equal than "KMT Taiwanese?" This is a question for which the KMT has no answer. Even if it had an answer, it feels no urgency concerning the answer. But this is one of the most fundamental questions confronting the KMT, and one for which it must find an answer, sooner or later.
派系不是問題，問題在派系的風格
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.05 11:58 am
剛爭回喪失了八年中央執政權的國民黨，現正面臨地方根基動搖的嚴重危機。
輸掉苗栗立委補選，再輸掉雲林立委補選，雲林縣長提名候選人張麗善又宣布退選，澎湖博弈公投亦告失敗……。事情還沒完，花蓮、台東、新竹、南投及嘉義的縣長選舉皆出現分裂內訌……。根基動搖，大廈亦岌岌告危。
一般認為，問題出在「地方派系」。此說似只說對了一半。在全世界的民主政治中，地方派系皆不能免，且派系有助政治整合及政績的累積；所以，問題其實出在派系的風格、品質與形象。「雲林王」張榮味的派系，如今落得「青埔宮／整碗捧」的譏評，引起了選民的質疑；「澎湖王」林炳坤對博弈產業的投入，其背後的政商結構也使選民疑懼。而張、林二人的派系形象，可謂正是一般國人對國民黨地方派系的既成印象。何況，張、林皆是「無黨籍」，卻能挾制國民黨，可見派系已是尾大不掉。
二○○八年中央政權的政黨輪替，主要是因陳水扁的民進黨政權在貪腐失政及操作台獨上，失去了國人的信任；國民黨因而有了取而代之的機遇。現在眼前出現的問題則是：國民黨在地方政治上的正當性面臨了社會的考驗，從台東鄺麗貞、花蓮傅?萁、雲林張榮味到澎湖林炳坤，皆是同樣的課題。
為什麼國民黨的地方政治會出現這種四分五裂、捉襟見肘的現象？試與民進黨相較，探其隱微。一、民進黨崛起於全國性的政治運動，一直有強烈鮮明的政治號召，因而第一、二代的地方政治人物亦有全國性的知名度，皆以「台灣價值的代言人」自居；反觀國民黨，中央與地方幾乎一直是井水不犯河水的兩個世界，因而地方政治人物一向以利益分配為政治操作的主題，幾乎無人能在精神感召或意識形態上成為「台灣的代言人」。沒有政治號召的精神主題，只有利益分配，這是國民黨地方政治人物及地方派系難以提升的因素之一。二、民進黨內有全國性的「政治派系」（如正義連線、新潮流），相當程度地疏導及節制了「地方派系」；相對而言，國民黨的精神主題不足以分化出政治派系，黨中央亦壓制政治派系，卻無力節制地方派系。三、民進黨的「政治派系」亦有人才培訓的功能；例如：議員選上立委，助理即選議員；立委選上縣市長，助理即選立委。反觀國民黨，比較凸顯的印象是家族世襲，代夫出征、代子出征，甚至「青埔宮／全碗捧」。因而，派系不是問題，問題在於風格。王玉雲、余登發那類的派系，國人都眼看它樓起樓塌；張榮味、林炳坤之類的派系亦必有強弩之末的時候。
以雲林的例子來看，國民黨再也不能以張榮味為「代理人」，張榮味亦再也不能以國民黨為「政治工具」。這不是誰不跟誰玩的問題，而是社會發展至今日，已經不容許這樣的玩法。
馬英九總統兼黨主席，中央大局已是捉襟見肘，遑論有效處理分崩離析的地方政治。現在不只張麗善、傅?萁、鄺麗貞給他出難題，連花蓮及新竹縣也出現老縣長力挺否定初選者；可見，國民黨中央既無強人以威懾地方，又無精神號召或優異的中央政績以感召地方，何只張榮味，任何人皆可理直氣壯地宣示：「不跟黨中央玩下去！」這般情狀，如何了得？
國民黨不可能終結地方派系，但應當回頭問一個最根本的問題：為什麼民進黨的地方人物，不論什麼小蘿蔔頭，都敢不問陳水扁的爛攤子，而大言不慚地說：我代表台灣價值！而為什麼國民黨的真正草根地方人物卻不能說：我代表台灣價值，我代表台灣精神？為什麼不能從利益分配的泥淖中走出來？又為什麼國民黨在處理地方傾軋時，不能向選民訴諸一個更高遠的價值目標，使地方投機人物知難而退？以致連張輝元也敢玩「代子出征」，視黨中央如無物。
平平是台灣人，難道「國民黨的台灣人」不如「民進黨的台灣人」？這個問題很大，且現在也找不出答案，即使找出答案亦已無濟於燃眉之急。但是，這卻是一個最根本的問題，對國民黨而言，不找出答案不行。
Friday, October 2, 2009
Time for Mainland China to Do Away with Communist Sloganeering
Time for Mainland China to Do Away with Communist Sloganeering
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 2, 2009
Summary: On today's Mainland China only the CCP remains committed to a "red sea" of giant statues and banners proclaiming "socialism with Chinese characteristics." The aesthetics and politics of the Beijing Olympics and the 10/1 celebration are still collectivist, and are still based on the "four cardinal principles." By contrast, the Chinese civil society encompassing both sides of the Taiwan Strait shares the same view of democracy, freedom, and people's livelihood. The Chinese Communist leaders' next step must be self-liberation, specifically, the liberation of the mind. They must learn from the people. They must get close to the people. Only then can they can contribute to the transformation of the CCP and Mainland China.
Full Text below:
Recall the images from Beijing's 10/1 celebration and the Beijing Olympic ceremonies. Now recall the images from the World Games in Kaohsiung and the Deaflympics in Taipei. The difference in style and mindset is unmistakable.
Beijing's displays involve large masses of people. They stress order and collectivity. The synchronized placard displays of the Beijing Olympics spoke of peace. The troop review on 10/1 spoke of military might. But both were rooted in collectivism. By contrast, Taipei's displays placed a greater emphasis on freedom and individuality. The "dian ying san tai zi" (electronic versions of three traditional Chinese demigods) during the World Games in Kaohsiung, and the "da bian zuo" (great roundtable) at the Deaflympics in Taipei were free and unconstrained. Their liberated nature spoke of ordinary people's lives.
The Beijing Olympics and the 10/1 celebration were dazzling and majestic. The world was impressed. They underscored Mainland China's three decades of achievements in reform and liberalization. But they failed to underscore the basic values that underpin a nation's founding. Yesterday in Tiananmen Square, Hu Jintao repeated Mao Zedong's statement: "The Chinese people have stood up!" In fact Mao Zedong never enabled "the Chinese people to stand up." Deng Xiaoping and his successors, including Hu Jintao, enabled the Chinese people to stand up. Although some have become wealthy before others, the Chinese have indeed stood up. Unfortunately the Chinese people as a whole are still far from full freedom and democracy. Full liberation is still a long way off.
President Hu Jintao's statement reiterated "socialism with Chinese characteristics." But the Chinese Communist Party's path today is utterly devoid of Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought. By Mao Zedong's standards, all 1.3 billion Chinese are "capitalist roaders." All of them should be paraded through the streets wearing dunce caps. In fact, so-called "socialism with Chinese characteristics" has only one purpose, as a pretext for maintaining the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party. This perhaps is a contingency measure the CCP and Mainland China must adopt during a period of transition. But it is not a long term solution.
The portion of President Hu Jintao's speech with the most meat was the "liberation of the mind." Could Chinese Communist leaders have achieved what they have today without first liberating their own minds? They liberated themselves from the bonds of "Marx/Engels/Lenin/Stalin." They liberated themselves from "Mao Zedong Thought." They liberated themselves from "Communist," correction, "socialist" dogma. Had they not done so, they could hardly have accomplished what they have today. The next step is to liberate themselves from "socialism with Chinese characteristics." Only then can they achieve full democracy and freedom. Only then can Chinese Communist leaders achieve "true liberation." Only then can the Chinese people as a whole achieve "true liberation."
The public on Taiwan witnessed the razzle-dazzle of the Beijing Olympics, and the majesty of the 10/1 celebration. They can hardly disagree. China has indeed stood up. But the synchronized placard displays reduced the individual to atoms and cogs in a machine. As we watched crowds bearing giant statues, and a "red sea" of banners declaring allegiance to the state, we gained a deeper appreciation of how freedom and democracy differs from "Socialism with Chinese characteristics." In terms of military weaponry, the Republic of China government in Taipei is considerably weaker than the PRC government in Beijing. But in terms of freedom and democracy, the Taiwan Region is far better off than the Chinese Mainland.
The nation's unity is not maintained by means of giant statues and slogans. A nation's highest achievements are not missiles and tanks. The parades bearing giant statues and banners honoring "Marx/Engels/Lenin/Stalin" were once far longer. That was also when the standard of living was the lowest. Today's achievements are the fruits of "reform and liberalization," including the "liberation of the mind." The CCP and Mainland China have just celebrated the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC government. They should now shift their attention from giant statues and banners, to transforming the hearts and minds of the people, and to the adoption of democracy and freedom.
On today's Mainland China only the CCP remains committed to a "red sea" of giant statues and banners proclaiming "socialism with Chinese characteristics." The aesthetics and politics of the Beijing Olympics and the 10/1 celebration are still collectivist, and are still based on the "four cardinal principles." By contrast, the Chinese civil society encompassing both sides of the Taiwan Strait shares the same view of democracy, freedom, and people's livelihood. The Chinese Communist leaders' next step must be self-liberation, specifically, the liberation of the mind. They must learn from the people. They must get close to the people. Only then can they can contribute to the transformation of the CCP and Mainland China.
The Beijing Olympics and the 10/1 celebrations should have bolstered public confidence on Taiwan. Military confrontation is a thing of the past. The two sides are busy improving the people's livelihood. Democracy and freedom has granted the Republic of China government on Taiwan a voice. Within the the framework of "One China, Different Interpretations," the Republic of China's democracy and freedom endow it with enormous authority. Departing from "One China, Different Interpretations" merely robs it of that authority.
中國何時走出巨像標語紅海洋？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.02 03:32 am
若以北京十一慶典及京奧場景，與高雄世運及台北聽奧的演示比較，可以發現海峽兩岸的思維與風格確有極大差異。
北京的節目，人多勢眾，強調格律與整體；不論是京奧用活字展現「和」，或閱兵用導彈展現「武」，皆是以「集體主義」為基調。相對而言，台灣的節目，比較強調自由與個性；不論是高雄世運的電音三太子，或台北聽奧的「大辦桌」，皆是自由奔放，皆在釋放性情與禮讚民生。
京奧的炫麗與十一的壯盛，令世人印象深刻；唯其景象雖然展現了中國大陸改革開放三十年來的成就，卻似在立國的基本思維上找不到落點。胡錦濤昨天在天安門上重複毛澤東的那句話：「中國人民站起來了！」其實，終毛澤東一生，他並未使「中國站起來」；現在，胡錦濤等繼鄧小平後，雖可謂已使「中國站起來」，但「中國人民」卻難謂也已「站起來了」。畢竟，雖然已使「一部分人先富起來」，但距使全體中國人民自由民主，完全解放，尚有很長很遠的努力空間。
胡錦濤昨日文告，仍以「有中國特色的社會主義」為基調。但是，盡人皆知，中共今日所走的路線，還有什麼「馬克思主義」？還有什麼「毛澤東思想」？倘依毛澤東的標準，今日十三億中國人誰人不是「走資派」？又何人不該戴尖帽子遊街示眾？其實，所謂的「有中國特色的社會主義」，如今只有一個效用，那就是做為堅持中國共產黨專政的口實；這或許是中共及中國轉型過渡不得不採行的權變方法，卻未必是可長可久的立國之道。
胡錦濤昨日演說中，最有血肉的一句話，就是「解放思想」。現今的中共，如果不是從「馬／恩／列／斯」的綑綁中「解放」出來，如果不是從「毛澤東思想」中「解放」出來，如果不是從「共產主義（已改稱社會主義）」教條中「解放」出來，豈可能有今日的成就？下一步，應當即是要從「有中國特色的社會主義」中「解放」出來。如此，直到有了完全的民主自由，中共自己始能得到「真解放」，全體中國人亦始能得到「真解放」。
對於台灣人來說，看京奧的炫麗與十一的壯盛，不免也有「中國崛起」的感思。但是，穿透那種將每一個人徹底原子化、機器化的「真人動畫」；穿透那種眾人抬著巨像、標語宣示效忠奉獻的「紅海洋」；卻也能深刻感受真正的民主自由與「有中國特色的社會主義」的差異所在。就國家武備而言，台灣也許未必那麼強大；但是，若就每一個人民享有的自由民主言，台灣卻遠逾於中國大陸。
國家的最高維繫，不在巨像與標語；國家的最高成就，亦不在導彈與坦克。中國大陸早年巨像與標語的隊伍更長，包括「馬／恩／列／斯」在內，那卻是民生水準最為慘痛的年代；能有今日成就，自是緣自「改革開放」，亦是緣自「解放思想」。跨越建政六十周年以後，中共及中國皆應立志於將立國的根基，從巨像標語，移植到民主自由的人心上。
今日中國大陸，只有中共最致力於維持由巨像、標語、紅海洋所支撐的「有中國特色的社會主義」；因而，不論京奧或十一的演示所呈現的美學與哲學，仍是集體主義與「四個堅持」。但是，在兩岸民間社會，對於民主、自由及人生或民生的美學或哲學，卻幾乎已經全無差異；未來的發展方向，應是中共自我解放、解放思想，向民間學習，向民間靠攏，如此始能促成中共與中國的過渡與轉型。
經過京奧與十一的激盪，台灣方面更應相信，軍事的對抗應當過去，民生的相互提升正在進行，而民主自由始是台灣最珍貴的「話語權」。台灣的民主自由，在「一中各表」中存有極大的能量；唯若離開「一中各表」的架構，台灣民主自由的能量恐失憑藉。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 2, 2009
Summary: On today's Mainland China only the CCP remains committed to a "red sea" of giant statues and banners proclaiming "socialism with Chinese characteristics." The aesthetics and politics of the Beijing Olympics and the 10/1 celebration are still collectivist, and are still based on the "four cardinal principles." By contrast, the Chinese civil society encompassing both sides of the Taiwan Strait shares the same view of democracy, freedom, and people's livelihood. The Chinese Communist leaders' next step must be self-liberation, specifically, the liberation of the mind. They must learn from the people. They must get close to the people. Only then can they can contribute to the transformation of the CCP and Mainland China.
Full Text below:
Recall the images from Beijing's 10/1 celebration and the Beijing Olympic ceremonies. Now recall the images from the World Games in Kaohsiung and the Deaflympics in Taipei. The difference in style and mindset is unmistakable.
Beijing's displays involve large masses of people. They stress order and collectivity. The synchronized placard displays of the Beijing Olympics spoke of peace. The troop review on 10/1 spoke of military might. But both were rooted in collectivism. By contrast, Taipei's displays placed a greater emphasis on freedom and individuality. The "dian ying san tai zi" (electronic versions of three traditional Chinese demigods) during the World Games in Kaohsiung, and the "da bian zuo" (great roundtable) at the Deaflympics in Taipei were free and unconstrained. Their liberated nature spoke of ordinary people's lives.
The Beijing Olympics and the 10/1 celebration were dazzling and majestic. The world was impressed. They underscored Mainland China's three decades of achievements in reform and liberalization. But they failed to underscore the basic values that underpin a nation's founding. Yesterday in Tiananmen Square, Hu Jintao repeated Mao Zedong's statement: "The Chinese people have stood up!" In fact Mao Zedong never enabled "the Chinese people to stand up." Deng Xiaoping and his successors, including Hu Jintao, enabled the Chinese people to stand up. Although some have become wealthy before others, the Chinese have indeed stood up. Unfortunately the Chinese people as a whole are still far from full freedom and democracy. Full liberation is still a long way off.
President Hu Jintao's statement reiterated "socialism with Chinese characteristics." But the Chinese Communist Party's path today is utterly devoid of Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought. By Mao Zedong's standards, all 1.3 billion Chinese are "capitalist roaders." All of them should be paraded through the streets wearing dunce caps. In fact, so-called "socialism with Chinese characteristics" has only one purpose, as a pretext for maintaining the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party. This perhaps is a contingency measure the CCP and Mainland China must adopt during a period of transition. But it is not a long term solution.
The portion of President Hu Jintao's speech with the most meat was the "liberation of the mind." Could Chinese Communist leaders have achieved what they have today without first liberating their own minds? They liberated themselves from the bonds of "Marx/Engels/Lenin/Stalin." They liberated themselves from "Mao Zedong Thought." They liberated themselves from "Communist," correction, "socialist" dogma. Had they not done so, they could hardly have accomplished what they have today. The next step is to liberate themselves from "socialism with Chinese characteristics." Only then can they achieve full democracy and freedom. Only then can Chinese Communist leaders achieve "true liberation." Only then can the Chinese people as a whole achieve "true liberation."
The public on Taiwan witnessed the razzle-dazzle of the Beijing Olympics, and the majesty of the 10/1 celebration. They can hardly disagree. China has indeed stood up. But the synchronized placard displays reduced the individual to atoms and cogs in a machine. As we watched crowds bearing giant statues, and a "red sea" of banners declaring allegiance to the state, we gained a deeper appreciation of how freedom and democracy differs from "Socialism with Chinese characteristics." In terms of military weaponry, the Republic of China government in Taipei is considerably weaker than the PRC government in Beijing. But in terms of freedom and democracy, the Taiwan Region is far better off than the Chinese Mainland.
The nation's unity is not maintained by means of giant statues and slogans. A nation's highest achievements are not missiles and tanks. The parades bearing giant statues and banners honoring "Marx/Engels/Lenin/Stalin" were once far longer. That was also when the standard of living was the lowest. Today's achievements are the fruits of "reform and liberalization," including the "liberation of the mind." The CCP and Mainland China have just celebrated the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC government. They should now shift their attention from giant statues and banners, to transforming the hearts and minds of the people, and to the adoption of democracy and freedom.
On today's Mainland China only the CCP remains committed to a "red sea" of giant statues and banners proclaiming "socialism with Chinese characteristics." The aesthetics and politics of the Beijing Olympics and the 10/1 celebration are still collectivist, and are still based on the "four cardinal principles." By contrast, the Chinese civil society encompassing both sides of the Taiwan Strait shares the same view of democracy, freedom, and people's livelihood. The Chinese Communist leaders' next step must be self-liberation, specifically, the liberation of the mind. They must learn from the people. They must get close to the people. Only then can they can contribute to the transformation of the CCP and Mainland China.
The Beijing Olympics and the 10/1 celebrations should have bolstered public confidence on Taiwan. Military confrontation is a thing of the past. The two sides are busy improving the people's livelihood. Democracy and freedom has granted the Republic of China government on Taiwan a voice. Within the the framework of "One China, Different Interpretations," the Republic of China's democracy and freedom endow it with enormous authority. Departing from "One China, Different Interpretations" merely robs it of that authority.
中國何時走出巨像標語紅海洋？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.02 03:32 am
若以北京十一慶典及京奧場景，與高雄世運及台北聽奧的演示比較，可以發現海峽兩岸的思維與風格確有極大差異。
北京的節目，人多勢眾，強調格律與整體；不論是京奧用活字展現「和」，或閱兵用導彈展現「武」，皆是以「集體主義」為基調。相對而言，台灣的節目，比較強調自由與個性；不論是高雄世運的電音三太子，或台北聽奧的「大辦桌」，皆是自由奔放，皆在釋放性情與禮讚民生。
京奧的炫麗與十一的壯盛，令世人印象深刻；唯其景象雖然展現了中國大陸改革開放三十年來的成就，卻似在立國的基本思維上找不到落點。胡錦濤昨天在天安門上重複毛澤東的那句話：「中國人民站起來了！」其實，終毛澤東一生，他並未使「中國站起來」；現在，胡錦濤等繼鄧小平後，雖可謂已使「中國站起來」，但「中國人民」卻難謂也已「站起來了」。畢竟，雖然已使「一部分人先富起來」，但距使全體中國人民自由民主，完全解放，尚有很長很遠的努力空間。
胡錦濤昨日文告，仍以「有中國特色的社會主義」為基調。但是，盡人皆知，中共今日所走的路線，還有什麼「馬克思主義」？還有什麼「毛澤東思想」？倘依毛澤東的標準，今日十三億中國人誰人不是「走資派」？又何人不該戴尖帽子遊街示眾？其實，所謂的「有中國特色的社會主義」，如今只有一個效用，那就是做為堅持中國共產黨專政的口實；這或許是中共及中國轉型過渡不得不採行的權變方法，卻未必是可長可久的立國之道。
胡錦濤昨日演說中，最有血肉的一句話，就是「解放思想」。現今的中共，如果不是從「馬／恩／列／斯」的綑綁中「解放」出來，如果不是從「毛澤東思想」中「解放」出來，如果不是從「共產主義（已改稱社會主義）」教條中「解放」出來，豈可能有今日的成就？下一步，應當即是要從「有中國特色的社會主義」中「解放」出來。如此，直到有了完全的民主自由，中共自己始能得到「真解放」，全體中國人亦始能得到「真解放」。
對於台灣人來說，看京奧的炫麗與十一的壯盛，不免也有「中國崛起」的感思。但是，穿透那種將每一個人徹底原子化、機器化的「真人動畫」；穿透那種眾人抬著巨像、標語宣示效忠奉獻的「紅海洋」；卻也能深刻感受真正的民主自由與「有中國特色的社會主義」的差異所在。就國家武備而言，台灣也許未必那麼強大；但是，若就每一個人民享有的自由民主言，台灣卻遠逾於中國大陸。
國家的最高維繫，不在巨像與標語；國家的最高成就，亦不在導彈與坦克。中國大陸早年巨像與標語的隊伍更長，包括「馬／恩／列／斯」在內，那卻是民生水準最為慘痛的年代；能有今日成就，自是緣自「改革開放」，亦是緣自「解放思想」。跨越建政六十周年以後，中共及中國皆應立志於將立國的根基，從巨像標語，移植到民主自由的人心上。
今日中國大陸，只有中共最致力於維持由巨像、標語、紅海洋所支撐的「有中國特色的社會主義」；因而，不論京奧或十一的演示所呈現的美學與哲學，仍是集體主義與「四個堅持」。但是，在兩岸民間社會，對於民主、自由及人生或民生的美學或哲學，卻幾乎已經全無差異；未來的發展方向，應是中共自我解放、解放思想，向民間學習，向民間靠攏，如此始能促成中共與中國的過渡與轉型。
經過京奧與十一的激盪，台灣方面更應相信，軍事的對抗應當過去，民生的相互提升正在進行，而民主自由始是台灣最珍貴的「話語權」。台灣的民主自由，在「一中各表」中存有極大的能量；唯若離開「一中各表」的架構，台灣民主自由的能量恐失憑藉。
Thursday, October 1, 2009
1949: Catastrophe or Blessing for Taiwan?
1949: Catastrophe or Blessing for Taiwan?
United Daily News editorial
A Translation
October 1, 2009
Since 1949 the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been under divided rule. According to the rhetoric of Taiwan independence, 1949, the year the Republic of China government retreated to Taiwan, was the beginning of a catastrophe. But from an historical perspective, the larger meaning of 1949 was that Taiwan did not become part of the Peoples Republic of China.
If the Republic of China government had not moved to Taiwan, Taiwan would have inevitably become a province of the People's Republic of China. If so, Taiwan's landlords would have been purged. Taiwan's intellectuals would have been subjected to rightist rectification. Taiwan's streets and alleys would have been filled with backyard steel furnaces. Peoples' communes would have served "da guo fan" meals filled with sand and rocks. Students would have taken to the streets wearing the red armbands of Red Guards. People stigmatized as the "Five Black Categories" would have been paraded through the streets as demons. 1949 ensured that Taiwan did not go down this road, but instead went down a different road than the Chinese mainland for the next 60 years.
1949 has long been a taboo subject on Taiwan. For example, it was obviously a major rout. Yet it is described as a "transfer." Because of these taboos, politicians each use their own biased framework to interpret the events of 1949. The general public has never given much thought to the meaning of 1949, but 60 years later, some people are determined to restore the truth about 1949. They include Chi Pang-yuan, in her book "Ju Liu He" and Lung Ying-tai, in her book "Da Jiang Da Hai." Some scholars have attempted to initiate an academic debate. They are asking whether 1949 a catastrophe or blessing for Taiwan.
If one wishes to be glib and split the difference, one can it was a blessing plagued by catastrophes, or a catastrophe rich with blessings. But viewed from the perspective of history, 1949 ensured that Taiwan would not become part of the PRC. It was not merely a blessing for the Taiwan region, it was a blessing for China as a whole. Without 1949, the Chinese-speaking world would not have a directly-elected president. It would not have a free and democratic Republic of China, capable of successfully prosecuting a former president for crimes against society. The continued survival of the Republic of China on Taiwan since 1949 spared Taiwan three decades of catastrophe, beginning with the Three Antis, Five Antis Campaigns and ending with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It made possible today's environment of freedom and democracy.
A few years before 1949, there was talk of "KMT/CCP Divided Rule Across the [Yangzi] River." Had that come to pass, Taiwan would have been the rear echelon. It would not have been spared the consequences of bloody KMT vs. CCP warfare. The KMT retreated to Taiwan and severed all connections with the Communist regime. That is why Taiwan was able to hold out until today. Today this side of the Strait is holding presidential elections, and the other side is undergoing reform and liberalization. During these 60 years Taiwan also experienced catastrophes, including the 2/28 Incident and the White Terror. But seen in proportion, within the framework of history, 1949 was overwhelmingly a blessing for Taiwan. Without 1949, today's Taiwan would never have emerged.
To this day, Taiwan remains mired in debates over whether 1949 was a catastrophe or a blessing. Those who insist it was nothing but a catastrophe have their own terminology. They refer to Japan's surrender as the "Cessation of Conflict." They refer to Mainlanders as "Chinese pigs," who "invaded Taiwan" in 1949 and brought with them an "alien regime." They refer to the "Republic of China" as a "government in exile," one which mired Taiwan in a civil war from which it cannot escape. Those who consider 1949 a blessing on the other hand, remind us that 1949 spared Taiwan from the Red Terror. The Cold War era anti-Communist defense of Taiwan depended upon the Republic of China's military and diplomatic struggles against the Chinese Communist regime. This struggle included the 8/23 Artillery Battle. The post-Cold War lifting of martial law by the Republic of China implemented full democracy and made possible calls for "peaceful development" with Beijing.
Those who consider 1949 a blessing are not prettifying it. They have learned painful lessons from defeat. The overarching framework of "divided government on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait" deserves affirmation, for providing an historic opporunity for Taiwan. On the other hand, those who insist that 1949 was an unmitigated catastrophe, compel themselves to repudiate the past 60 years in toto. To them, even the Republic of China belongs to the Kuomintang, not to "Taiwanese." They make it impossible for themselves to acknowledge the true meaning of the past 60 years on Taiwan.
As a result of 1949, Taiwan experienced much suffering. But as a result of 1949, Taiwan also received many blessings. 1949 was a catastrophe and blessing for China as a whole as well. Over the past 60 years, the Mainland has emerged, through rivers of blood, from Communist dogma. Taiwan has achieved freedom and democracy, becoming an example for Beijing to emulate. The two sides have emerged from a struggle to the death, and are now walking side by side toward "peaceful development." If not for 1949, we would not have experienced the past 60 years. We would not be where we are today.
一九四九年：台灣的苦難或恩典？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.01 04:46 am
兩岸自一九四九年分裂分治已六十周年。就台獨的論述言，一九四九年是台灣災難的開端，因中華民國中央政府在這一年撤遷來台；但從大歷史觀而論，一九四九年更重要的意義是：這一年決定了台灣沒有成為中華人民共和國的一部分。
如果中華民國中央政府當年未撤遷來台，則台灣成為中華人民共和國的一個行省，是必然的結局。倘係如此，台灣今天也早已經歷了地主掃地出門，知識分子反右整風，街巷裡的土高爐燒得火紅，人民公社裡的大鍋飯摻沙摻石，年輕學生以戴上紅臂章的紅衛兵為榮，四處皆見被戴上紙紮高帽子遊街的黑五類及牛鬼蛇神……。一九四九年，決定了台灣沒有走上這一條路，而走上六十年來與中國大陸不同的另一條路。
一九四九年在台灣一向是一個社會禁忌話題。例如，明明是大敗逃，卻說是「轉進」；由於此類禁忌，不同的政治人物各自以偏頗的理念來解釋及操作一九四九，一般人民亦從未對一九四九進行深思。然而，在六十年後的今日，漸有較多的有心人設法還原一九四九，如齊邦媛的《巨流河》與龍應台的《大江大海》，並有一些學者嘗試啟動一項學術討論；大意是：一九四九是台灣的苦難或恩典？
如果想要媚俗地調和雙方歧見，不妨說：這是帶著苦難的恩典，或帶著恩典的苦難。然而，若從大歷史的宏觀角度來看，一九四九年決定了台灣沒有成為中華人民共和國的一部分，這非但是台灣的恩典，也是中國的恩典。沒有一九四九年，就沒有今天華人世界唯一能直選總統、並對犯罪的總統判刑的自由民主國家中華民國。持平而論，中華民國在一九四九年賴台灣始能延續，而台灣則因中華民國而免於「三十年浩劫」（自三反五反至文化大革命），並能臻至今日自由民主的境地。
一九四九前幾年，曾有「國共隔江分治」的議論；但若隔江而治，台灣就成了大後方，仍然不能免於國共面對面的肉搏。正因完全撤到台灣，與共產政權完全切割，台灣始有可能將情勢撐持到今日「這邊直選總統／那邊改革開放」的境地。當然，台灣在這六十年來的過程中，亦曾歷經苦難（二二八、白色恐怖），但若就大比例的歷史觀而論，一九四九對台灣應當主要是一個恩典。沒有一九四九年，就沒有今日的台灣。
一直到今天，台灣其實仍然陷於「一九四九年是苦難或恩典」的分歧之中。持「災難說」者認為：「終戰」後外省人（現在成了中國豬）侵入台灣，一九四九帶來了「外來政權」，「中華民國」是「流亡政府」，使台灣深陷國共內戰而不能跳脫；持「恩典論」者則認為，一九四九使台灣未陷赤禍，冷戰時代反共保台，靠「中華民國」與中共的政權進行軍事及外交鬥爭（八二三砲戰），後冷戰時代的中華民國則正好解嚴而實現了完全的民主政治，又能與中共政權爭取到「和平發展」的立足點。
「恩典論」並未美化一九四九，卻願從失敗與痛苦中，對「兩岸分裂分治」這個大架構為台灣生機創造的歷史大機遇給予肯定。相對而言，持「災難說」者欲否定一九四九的轉折，就很容易自陷於「必須完全否定這六十年」的邏輯陷阱；對「災難說」而言，既然連「中華民國」都是「國民黨的」，而不是「台灣人的」，將如何建立這六十年對台灣的正面意義？
本文的觀點是：台灣因一九四九而承受相當的苦難，但台灣也因一九四九而獲得了重大恩典。不僅如此，一九四九年對中國也是苦難與恩典的化合物。六十年來，大陸從山河血淚中走出了共產主義教條，台灣則實現了自由民主，並成為北京新思維的範本，兩岸亦由你死我活走向「和平發展」；如果沒有一九四九，沒有這六十年，就不會有今天。
United Daily News editorial
A Translation
October 1, 2009
Since 1949 the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been under divided rule. According to the rhetoric of Taiwan independence, 1949, the year the Republic of China government retreated to Taiwan, was the beginning of a catastrophe. But from an historical perspective, the larger meaning of 1949 was that Taiwan did not become part of the Peoples Republic of China.
If the Republic of China government had not moved to Taiwan, Taiwan would have inevitably become a province of the People's Republic of China. If so, Taiwan's landlords would have been purged. Taiwan's intellectuals would have been subjected to rightist rectification. Taiwan's streets and alleys would have been filled with backyard steel furnaces. Peoples' communes would have served "da guo fan" meals filled with sand and rocks. Students would have taken to the streets wearing the red armbands of Red Guards. People stigmatized as the "Five Black Categories" would have been paraded through the streets as demons. 1949 ensured that Taiwan did not go down this road, but instead went down a different road than the Chinese mainland for the next 60 years.
1949 has long been a taboo subject on Taiwan. For example, it was obviously a major rout. Yet it is described as a "transfer." Because of these taboos, politicians each use their own biased framework to interpret the events of 1949. The general public has never given much thought to the meaning of 1949, but 60 years later, some people are determined to restore the truth about 1949. They include Chi Pang-yuan, in her book "Ju Liu He" and Lung Ying-tai, in her book "Da Jiang Da Hai." Some scholars have attempted to initiate an academic debate. They are asking whether 1949 a catastrophe or blessing for Taiwan.
If one wishes to be glib and split the difference, one can it was a blessing plagued by catastrophes, or a catastrophe rich with blessings. But viewed from the perspective of history, 1949 ensured that Taiwan would not become part of the PRC. It was not merely a blessing for the Taiwan region, it was a blessing for China as a whole. Without 1949, the Chinese-speaking world would not have a directly-elected president. It would not have a free and democratic Republic of China, capable of successfully prosecuting a former president for crimes against society. The continued survival of the Republic of China on Taiwan since 1949 spared Taiwan three decades of catastrophe, beginning with the Three Antis, Five Antis Campaigns and ending with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It made possible today's environment of freedom and democracy.
A few years before 1949, there was talk of "KMT/CCP Divided Rule Across the [Yangzi] River." Had that come to pass, Taiwan would have been the rear echelon. It would not have been spared the consequences of bloody KMT vs. CCP warfare. The KMT retreated to Taiwan and severed all connections with the Communist regime. That is why Taiwan was able to hold out until today. Today this side of the Strait is holding presidential elections, and the other side is undergoing reform and liberalization. During these 60 years Taiwan also experienced catastrophes, including the 2/28 Incident and the White Terror. But seen in proportion, within the framework of history, 1949 was overwhelmingly a blessing for Taiwan. Without 1949, today's Taiwan would never have emerged.
To this day, Taiwan remains mired in debates over whether 1949 was a catastrophe or a blessing. Those who insist it was nothing but a catastrophe have their own terminology. They refer to Japan's surrender as the "Cessation of Conflict." They refer to Mainlanders as "Chinese pigs," who "invaded Taiwan" in 1949 and brought with them an "alien regime." They refer to the "Republic of China" as a "government in exile," one which mired Taiwan in a civil war from which it cannot escape. Those who consider 1949 a blessing on the other hand, remind us that 1949 spared Taiwan from the Red Terror. The Cold War era anti-Communist defense of Taiwan depended upon the Republic of China's military and diplomatic struggles against the Chinese Communist regime. This struggle included the 8/23 Artillery Battle. The post-Cold War lifting of martial law by the Republic of China implemented full democracy and made possible calls for "peaceful development" with Beijing.
Those who consider 1949 a blessing are not prettifying it. They have learned painful lessons from defeat. The overarching framework of "divided government on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait" deserves affirmation, for providing an historic opporunity for Taiwan. On the other hand, those who insist that 1949 was an unmitigated catastrophe, compel themselves to repudiate the past 60 years in toto. To them, even the Republic of China belongs to the Kuomintang, not to "Taiwanese." They make it impossible for themselves to acknowledge the true meaning of the past 60 years on Taiwan.
As a result of 1949, Taiwan experienced much suffering. But as a result of 1949, Taiwan also received many blessings. 1949 was a catastrophe and blessing for China as a whole as well. Over the past 60 years, the Mainland has emerged, through rivers of blood, from Communist dogma. Taiwan has achieved freedom and democracy, becoming an example for Beijing to emulate. The two sides have emerged from a struggle to the death, and are now walking side by side toward "peaceful development." If not for 1949, we would not have experienced the past 60 years. We would not be where we are today.
一九四九年：台灣的苦難或恩典？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.01 04:46 am
兩岸自一九四九年分裂分治已六十周年。就台獨的論述言，一九四九年是台灣災難的開端，因中華民國中央政府在這一年撤遷來台；但從大歷史觀而論，一九四九年更重要的意義是：這一年決定了台灣沒有成為中華人民共和國的一部分。
如果中華民國中央政府當年未撤遷來台，則台灣成為中華人民共和國的一個行省，是必然的結局。倘係如此，台灣今天也早已經歷了地主掃地出門，知識分子反右整風，街巷裡的土高爐燒得火紅，人民公社裡的大鍋飯摻沙摻石，年輕學生以戴上紅臂章的紅衛兵為榮，四處皆見被戴上紙紮高帽子遊街的黑五類及牛鬼蛇神……。一九四九年，決定了台灣沒有走上這一條路，而走上六十年來與中國大陸不同的另一條路。
一九四九年在台灣一向是一個社會禁忌話題。例如，明明是大敗逃，卻說是「轉進」；由於此類禁忌，不同的政治人物各自以偏頗的理念來解釋及操作一九四九，一般人民亦從未對一九四九進行深思。然而，在六十年後的今日，漸有較多的有心人設法還原一九四九，如齊邦媛的《巨流河》與龍應台的《大江大海》，並有一些學者嘗試啟動一項學術討論；大意是：一九四九是台灣的苦難或恩典？
如果想要媚俗地調和雙方歧見，不妨說：這是帶著苦難的恩典，或帶著恩典的苦難。然而，若從大歷史的宏觀角度來看，一九四九年決定了台灣沒有成為中華人民共和國的一部分，這非但是台灣的恩典，也是中國的恩典。沒有一九四九年，就沒有今天華人世界唯一能直選總統、並對犯罪的總統判刑的自由民主國家中華民國。持平而論，中華民國在一九四九年賴台灣始能延續，而台灣則因中華民國而免於「三十年浩劫」（自三反五反至文化大革命），並能臻至今日自由民主的境地。
一九四九前幾年，曾有「國共隔江分治」的議論；但若隔江而治，台灣就成了大後方，仍然不能免於國共面對面的肉搏。正因完全撤到台灣，與共產政權完全切割，台灣始有可能將情勢撐持到今日「這邊直選總統／那邊改革開放」的境地。當然，台灣在這六十年來的過程中，亦曾歷經苦難（二二八、白色恐怖），但若就大比例的歷史觀而論，一九四九對台灣應當主要是一個恩典。沒有一九四九年，就沒有今日的台灣。
一直到今天，台灣其實仍然陷於「一九四九年是苦難或恩典」的分歧之中。持「災難說」者認為：「終戰」後外省人（現在成了中國豬）侵入台灣，一九四九帶來了「外來政權」，「中華民國」是「流亡政府」，使台灣深陷國共內戰而不能跳脫；持「恩典論」者則認為，一九四九使台灣未陷赤禍，冷戰時代反共保台，靠「中華民國」與中共的政權進行軍事及外交鬥爭（八二三砲戰），後冷戰時代的中華民國則正好解嚴而實現了完全的民主政治，又能與中共政權爭取到「和平發展」的立足點。
「恩典論」並未美化一九四九，卻願從失敗與痛苦中，對「兩岸分裂分治」這個大架構為台灣生機創造的歷史大機遇給予肯定。相對而言，持「災難說」者欲否定一九四九的轉折，就很容易自陷於「必須完全否定這六十年」的邏輯陷阱；對「災難說」而言，既然連「中華民國」都是「國民黨的」，而不是「台灣人的」，將如何建立這六十年對台灣的正面意義？
本文的觀點是：台灣因一九四九而承受相當的苦難，但台灣也因一九四九而獲得了重大恩典。不僅如此，一九四九年對中國也是苦難與恩典的化合物。六十年來，大陸從山河血淚中走出了共產主義教條，台灣則實現了自由民主，並成為北京新思維的範本，兩岸亦由你死我活走向「和平發展」；如果沒有一九四九，沒有這六十年，就不會有今天。
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