The NTU College of Medicine isn't the only Institution in need of Soul-searching
China News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 11, 2009
Prominent neuroscience professor Hong Lan told the media yesterday that students at the National Taiwan University College of Medicine were sleeping in class. They gnaw on chicken drumsticks, slurp down ramen noodles, chat on their cell phones, and send out text messages. They are unserious about their studies, and display scant respect for their teachers. Professor Hung denounced such behavior as the result of "sinecures."
After the story broke, the National Taiwan University College of Medicine responded in three different ways. First President Yang Pan-chyr said such mistakes must be corrected. Then students protested that the courses Hong Lan audited may have been elective non-major courses taken purely for credit, and that the professor was guilty of generalization. Finally the College of Medicine expressed extreme dissatisfaction with Professor Hung for going public with his complaints. Each of the three views have merit, but also require closer examination.
NTU is hardly alone. Observers have noticed that students on many college campuses today are increasingly self-absorbed. From childhood to adulthood, students are forced to memorize texts, attend cram schools, and take entrance exams. They have been all but suffocated by the educational monolith. Once they succeed in getting into college however, they suddenly find themselve absolved of the need to study. They soon undergo a process of untrammeled self-liberation. Their decade long educational experience forced them to neglect their athletic and social development. The result is "Anything Goes." This of course accounts for the outlandish behavior described by Professor Hung.
This syndrome is widespread. It is not confined to National Taiwan University. It is not confined to the students' first choice among three possible majors. From an educational perspective, it must be addressed. We need not single out the Faculty of Medicine at National Taiwan University. Their higher joint entrance exam scores invite criticism and calls for them to "vacate their seat to others."
Professor Hung does not teach at National Taiwan University. She was observing National Taiwan University classrooms merely because she was participating in a College of Medicine evaluation program. The courses she audited were probably not part of the core curriculum. Students in medical school labor under a heavy course load. Liberal arts courses have little to do with medical licensing exams. Are students wrong to attach little importance to liberal arts courses? That is a question worth asking. That said, in almost all professionally oriented university disciplines, including engineering, law, finance, accounting, students take liberal arts courses only to gain academic credits. If one wishes to review the liberal arts curriculum, it would be best to initiate a comprehensive review of the entire educational system. It would be best to avoid making a fuss over any particular discipline.
Even if the National Taiwan University College of Medicine or other colleges were to improve their liberal arts curricula, NTU is hardly alone. In fact, even high schools and their system for advancement should be reviewed. Taiwan's university entrance exams are divided into three categories. Apart from a handful of interdisciplinary applicants, the vast majority of high school students have already chosen their majors by their senior year. Medical students for example, stop studying history, geography, and civics in their junior year. Needless to say, they are utterly uninterested in humanities courses such as "Medicine and Society." Suppose they are forced to attend liberal arts courses. The class schedule may be inconvenient, the teacher may insist on calling roll, and the classroom location may be remote. Is it any surprise students sleep or surf the Net in class?
Compare this to the liberal arts curricula at well-known universities in the United States such as Harvard and Yale. Medical school is considered postgraduate education. At least half of the curriculum is devoted to liberal arts subjects. By contrast, on Taiwan, we do not provide students with a liberal education before allowing them to specialize. Just the opposite. We allow them to begin specializing during their junior and senior year in high school. We allow them to tread a narrow and specialized path. Anyway you look at it, liberal arts education on Taiwan is a systemic failure of major proportions. Singling out NTU for harsh criticism is unfair.
Finally, we would like to offer the following observations regarding Professor Hong's critique of the National Taiwan University College of Medicine. Education has only one goal. To put students on the right track, enabling them to fulfill their own potential. During the educational process, structured guidance is essential, and so is the occasional wake-up call. Children's dignity and honor must be respected. If primary and secondary students do not shape up, one can reprimand them in private. One must not call them onto the carpet to be humiliated. As Professor Chen Ting-hsing, a teacher at the College of Medicine said, since the medical evaluation is not yet over, all constructive suggestions should be given a proper hearing. It is better not to vent one's emotions via outside journals. Even though the magazine used the term "the top medical school on Taiwan," everyone knew what they meant. Professors and students at the College of Medicine have in effect been summoned before a military reviewing stand, to be humiliated. Isn't the Medical Evaluation Committee's move, made before the evaluation is complete, a little excessive?
The College of Medicine's core curriculum must be reviewed. But what about other colleges? Classroom discipline at NTU must be improved. But this is hardly a problem confined to National Taiwan University. Slacking off in the classroom must be criticized. But so must professors' disregard for students' heartfelt criticisms.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.11
社論－該檢討的不止是台大醫學系
本報訊
知名神經科學教授洪蘭日前對媒體表示，台大醫學系的學生上課睡覺、啃雞腿、吃泡麵、打手機、發簡訊，非常不認真，也不尊重授課老師。洪教授對這樣的言行作為予批判，說是「尸位素餐」。
新聞曝光之後，台大醫學院出現了三種聲音：其一是楊泮池院長表示要有錯就要改進，其二是學生辯稱洪蘭旁聽之課可能是通識營養學分，有以偏蓋全之嫌；其三則是醫院大老對於洪教授近似對外放話的意見表示方式極為不滿。以上這三種意見，都有些道理，也都值得拿出來好好檢視。
其實不止台大，許多在各大學校園有所觀察的人都會發現，現在的大學生確實越來越「自我」。就學生而言，他們從小到大，漫無目的地Ｋ書、補習、聯考，幾乎在一元化的升學管道被壓到窒息，一旦考上大學，他們瞬時掙脫了唯一升學的桎梏，遂開始了漫無邊際的自我「解放」。由於學生們在十幾年的求學過程中，其體育與群育都受到忽視，因此孩子們未受引領而恣意行為，當然會出現洪教授描述的脫軌現象。
但是，這種現象應該相當普遍，既不限於台灣大學，也不止學測三類組的第一志願科系。從教育的立場我們確實應該正視這個問題，但也不必特別把台大醫學系視為標靶；只因為他們聯考分數高，就特別予以批判，叫他們「把位子讓出來」。
洪教授並沒有在台大授課；她之所以對台大課堂有所觀察，是因為她參與醫學系評鑑。而其所訪視的課程，恐怕也如外界所說，是與醫學專業無關的通識課程。醫學系學生專業課程負擔很重，通識課又與醫師考照無關，學生不重視通識課程確實不該，背後也有相當值得檢討的問題；但是話又說回來，大凡專業取向較重的大學科系，不論工程、法律、金融、會計，學生們都是將通識課程當成營養學分；要檢討通識教育最好能全面性的開放檢討，最好宜避免針對特定科系大作文章。
就算台大醫學院或其他學院的通識教育要做改善，其背後牽動的環結，也不止是台大；其實連高中教育與升學制度也該一併檢討。台灣升大學的學測分為三大類組，除了少數跨組考生之外，絕大多數高中生在三年級就已經志趣有專攻。就醫學院學生而言，他們從高二開始就已經不碰史地公民，對於類似「醫學與社會」這樣的人文課程，當然也就興趣缺缺。如果再加上大班上課、時段不佳、老師點名、學院地點偏僻等因素，學生們到課堂上睡覺、上網、恐怕就不是新聞了。
如果拿美國通識教育知名的哈佛、耶魯做對比，則人家醫學教育根本是「學士後」的訓練，其在大學階段則至少有一半課程是在做通識學科的全面吸收。反觀台灣，我們不但不是先通識、後專業的延後分流，反而在高二、高三就提前分殊，讓學生走進又窄又專的小路。無論如何，台灣通識教育失敗是體制性的大問題，單單挑台大嚴批，恐怕是找偏了切入點。
最後，我們也要對洪蘭教授對台大醫學院的責觀方式做些檢視。教育的目的只有一個：將學生導向正軌，鼓勵其自我實踐。在教育的過程中，循循善誘絕不嫌少，而偶爾的當頭棒喝，也一定要顧及孩子們的尊嚴與榮譽。中、小學生們再不成材，頂多也只能私下訓斥鞭策，而不宜在朝會「叫到司令台上」予以羞辱。誠如醫學院陳定信教授所言，既然醫學評鑑還沒有結束，所有為孩子們好的意見，都該在會議中理性抒發，而不宜向外部雜誌做情緒宣洩。即便在雜誌上是用「台灣最頂尖醫學院」稱呼，但所指為何大家心知肚明。對醫學系教授與學生而言，他們似乎都有被請上朝會的司令台，體驗被羞辱的感受。醫科評鑑委員在評鑑結束之前這樣的舉措，是不是動作也太大了一些？
總之，醫學院的通識課要檢討，但別的學院又何嘗不然？台大的課堂倫理待改進，但這又豈止是台大一校獨然？學生們課堂無狀該批評，而教授們不顧學生顏面的評論，恐怕亦非全無可議之處。
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
The Executive Yuan should Confront Taiwan's Brain Drain
The Executive Yuan should Confront Taiwan's Brain Drain
China News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 10, 2009
Recently the domestic media reported on the difference in starting salaries for beginning university professors in places such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Chinese Mainland, and Singapore. The discrepancy has many knowledgeable individuals worried. The data shows that accredited universities in Hong Kong, Singapore and mainland China offered starting Assistant Professors salaries three to four times as much as those offered by National Taiwan University. Even ignoring elite schools, 15% of all universities on Mainland China offer new teacher salaries higher than those offered by universities on Taiwan. National Taiwan University, the Academia Sinica, and other institutions are having difficulty recruiting outstanding professors. The Executive Yuan's Science and Technology Advisors have also warned that over time, talented people on Taiwan will gradually be lost. If we are unable to attract talent to Taiwan, we will wind up with nothing.
Over the past decade, the economic situation on Taiwan has not been favorable compared to other Asian regions. In terms of real wages, university professors have gone 10 years without a salary increase. But society on Taiwan is highly populistic. Many people demand coercive egalitarianism. But in a knowledge economy, the driving force behind economic growth is research and innovation. If we are unable to offer higher pay to R&D personnel, then our economy will decline. Everyone's income will decrease. Put simply, the consequence of radical populist refusals to tolerate salary increases for others, will be salary cuts for oneself.
In fact, enhancing R&D competitiveness on Taiwan does not require increasing the salary of every university professor. It only requires a small increase in budgets, a minor operation, in order to have an effect. This is how it can be done:
First, under current rules, universities may set up visiting professorships, and enjoy some degree of flexibility in setting salaries. Therefore, experienced, internationally sought after professors with outstanding teaching records, may receive higher than average salaries. But universities have no flexibility in how much they pay new, inexperienced professors. Our reforms call for increases in the salaries of some new, inexperienced professors, rather than a comprehensive, across the board salary increase.
Second, there are 170 universities on Taiwan. Perhaps fewer than 20 of these are competing with Singapore, Hong Kong, and other places for talent. Therefore only a few universities need to increase their salaries in order to compete for qualified personnel. In other words, not all universities require salary increases -- only those under international competitive pressure.
Third, not every professor has an objective need for a salary increase, even at internationally competitive universities such as National Taiwan University and National Cheng Kung University. Some disciplines are internationally unpopular. Some professors have less than outstanding records. Therefore only a few disciplines actually require salary increases.
In short, attracting talent does not require across the board salary increases. Distinctions must be made between experienced and inexperienced professors, between better schools and lesser schools, between better teachers and lesser teachers within each school. The problem seems complicated. But one merely needs to grasp two principles. (A) Distinctions must be made within schools, in accordance with university autonomy. (B) Distinctions must be made between schools, in accordance with school performance and international competitiveness. Grasp these two principles, and the details will be a simple matter. Because salary increases will not be across the board, any budget increases will be insignificant.
According to newspaper reports six months ago, the Academia Sinica made just such a proposal to the Executive Yuan. Its proposal was endorsed by the Ministry of Education, the National Science Council, the Central Personnel Administration, the DGBAS, and well-known universities on Taiwan. The proposal inclued even the necessary budget and the means of raising the funds. Alas, as soon as such motions encounter political obstacles, they are either stalled or derailed. Basically the Academia Sinica proposed to increase management budgets for university research projects. It would allow professors' salaries to vary. Allocations would be determined by each university, in accordance with its own internal procedures. But recently the Ministry of Education said it wanted to make fundamental changes in the payroll system.
Basically, we agree with making professors' salaries variable. This flexibility must be linked with the university's performance in research. Only then can salaries reflect the realities of international competition for talent. Even if the Executive Yuan intends to make fundamental changes in the payroll system, it must create a system that is flexible, that reflects the distinctions between one school and the next, between experienced professors and inexperienced professors, and between one discipline and the next. The approach proposed by the Academia Sinica reflects the aforementioned real world distinctions. Objectively speaking it is highly feasible. The Ministry of Education may wish to start from scratch, and come up with some other flexible system. But if one wishes to ensure the aforementioned three types of flexibility, one cannot avoid linking salaries with research funding. If the Ministry of Education cannot come up with a better approach, it should consider accepting the current proposal. Surely it cannot cite long-term planning as an excuse to do nothing for the next half year. Loss of competitiveness on Taiwan is a serious problem. The Executive Yuan must urge its agencies to work harder, and swiftly offer corrective measures!
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.10
社論－行政院應正視台灣人才流失的危機
本報訊
國內若干媒體最近報導了台、港、新、中幾地大學新進教師的薪資差異，相當令有識之士憂心。資料顯示，香港、新加坡以及中國大陸上軌道的好大學，他們給助理教授的起薪，大約是台灣國立大學的三至四倍。即使不看名校，中國大陸已有約十五％的大學其新聘薪給優於台灣，而台大與中研院等單位也逐漸感受到招募不到優秀教授的壓力。行政院科技顧問們也提出警告：長此以往，台灣的人才優勢將逐漸流失。坦白說，一旦台灣無法吸引人才，我們將一無所有。
過去十年，台灣的經濟情況相對於亞洲諸國不算好；以實質薪資來看，大學教授已經有十幾年不曾調薪。但台灣是個民粹極強的社會，許多民眾都要求齊頭平等。然而在知識經濟時代，研發創新幾乎是一切經濟成長的原動力。如果我們不能對研發人才給與較高薪酬，吸引他們加入，則台灣的經濟必將走下坡，每一個人的待遇都會再往下修。簡單地說。以民粹觀點極端地看不得別人加薪，其結果就是自己也會減薪。
其實，要提升台灣的科研競爭力，並不需對「所有」的大學教師加薪，只需要花點小預算、動點小手術，就能克竟其功。以下，我們就描述一下這局部手術要怎麼做。
第一，在大學法的規定下，各大學原本就可以設置講座教授，對他們提供彈性薪給。因此，表現優良、國際上爭相挖角的資深教授，原本就可以得到頗高的待遇，但新進資淺者的待遇卻是全無彈性。故我們想要改革的，是部分新進資淺教師的薪給調整，而不是全面性的薪水調整。
第二，全台灣一百七十幾所大學中，真正在與新、港等地爭搶人才的，也許不到廿所，故為爭搶人才而需要調整待遇的大學，為數並不多。換言之，並不是所有大學都需要調薪，而只有受到國際競爭壓力的才有此需要。
第三，即使在台大、成大等具有國際競爭力的大學裡，也不是每個領域、每個教授都有調薪的客觀必要。有些學域是國際冷門、有些教授表現也不見得傑出。故真正要有薪給彈性的領域與範圍，只有一小部分。
總之，為吸引人才而設計的彈性薪給，並不需要統統有獎，但必須要做到資深/資淺區隔、學校品類區隔、校內教師區隔。這裡的問題看似複雜，但只要把握兩個原則即可：（一）學校之「內」的區分，依大學自治原則由各校自行決定。（二）學校之「間」的區分，依各校研究表現、國際競爭情況決定。把握住這兩個原則，則其他細節就不難處理了。由於並不是全面調薪，故需要增加的預算金額並不大。
報載大約半年前，中央研究院曾經向行政院提出了一套符合前述原則的解決辦法，也得到了教育部、國科會、人事行政局、主計處、與全台各知名大學的支持，甚至連所需預算、挪籌方式都設想好了。無奈所有的動議一旦遇上政治，不是停擺就是脫軌。中研院所提辦法的基本概念，是以提高研究計畫管理費比例的方式，將新增管理費撥給大學，並指定用於彈性教授薪給，由各大學的內部程序決定其校內分配。但最近教育部表示，他們希望從薪給制度上做根本的改變。
基本上，我們贊成教授薪水的彈性化，而且這個彈性一定要與大學的研究表現掛勾，如此才能正確反映國際人才競爭的實情。而即使行政院想在薪給制度上做根本改變，也一定要創造出彈性，反映跨校之間、資深與資淺之間、跨領域之間的需求差異。中研院所提做法，其實就是一種實質反映前述三種差異的建議，客觀上頗具可行性。當然，教育部可另起爐灶，訂出其他的彈性做法。但平心而論，如果要照顧到前述三種彈性，恐怕也逃不出與研究經費掛勾的設計。無論如何，假若教育部想不出更好的做法，就必須要考慮接受現有的提案，總不能以從長計議為由，半年下來一事無成吧！台灣人才競爭力流失的問題如此嚴重，行政院應督促所屬加把勁，趕緊提出矯治的辦法吧！
China News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 10, 2009
Recently the domestic media reported on the difference in starting salaries for beginning university professors in places such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Chinese Mainland, and Singapore. The discrepancy has many knowledgeable individuals worried. The data shows that accredited universities in Hong Kong, Singapore and mainland China offered starting Assistant Professors salaries three to four times as much as those offered by National Taiwan University. Even ignoring elite schools, 15% of all universities on Mainland China offer new teacher salaries higher than those offered by universities on Taiwan. National Taiwan University, the Academia Sinica, and other institutions are having difficulty recruiting outstanding professors. The Executive Yuan's Science and Technology Advisors have also warned that over time, talented people on Taiwan will gradually be lost. If we are unable to attract talent to Taiwan, we will wind up with nothing.
Over the past decade, the economic situation on Taiwan has not been favorable compared to other Asian regions. In terms of real wages, university professors have gone 10 years without a salary increase. But society on Taiwan is highly populistic. Many people demand coercive egalitarianism. But in a knowledge economy, the driving force behind economic growth is research and innovation. If we are unable to offer higher pay to R&D personnel, then our economy will decline. Everyone's income will decrease. Put simply, the consequence of radical populist refusals to tolerate salary increases for others, will be salary cuts for oneself.
In fact, enhancing R&D competitiveness on Taiwan does not require increasing the salary of every university professor. It only requires a small increase in budgets, a minor operation, in order to have an effect. This is how it can be done:
First, under current rules, universities may set up visiting professorships, and enjoy some degree of flexibility in setting salaries. Therefore, experienced, internationally sought after professors with outstanding teaching records, may receive higher than average salaries. But universities have no flexibility in how much they pay new, inexperienced professors. Our reforms call for increases in the salaries of some new, inexperienced professors, rather than a comprehensive, across the board salary increase.
Second, there are 170 universities on Taiwan. Perhaps fewer than 20 of these are competing with Singapore, Hong Kong, and other places for talent. Therefore only a few universities need to increase their salaries in order to compete for qualified personnel. In other words, not all universities require salary increases -- only those under international competitive pressure.
Third, not every professor has an objective need for a salary increase, even at internationally competitive universities such as National Taiwan University and National Cheng Kung University. Some disciplines are internationally unpopular. Some professors have less than outstanding records. Therefore only a few disciplines actually require salary increases.
In short, attracting talent does not require across the board salary increases. Distinctions must be made between experienced and inexperienced professors, between better schools and lesser schools, between better teachers and lesser teachers within each school. The problem seems complicated. But one merely needs to grasp two principles. (A) Distinctions must be made within schools, in accordance with university autonomy. (B) Distinctions must be made between schools, in accordance with school performance and international competitiveness. Grasp these two principles, and the details will be a simple matter. Because salary increases will not be across the board, any budget increases will be insignificant.
According to newspaper reports six months ago, the Academia Sinica made just such a proposal to the Executive Yuan. Its proposal was endorsed by the Ministry of Education, the National Science Council, the Central Personnel Administration, the DGBAS, and well-known universities on Taiwan. The proposal inclued even the necessary budget and the means of raising the funds. Alas, as soon as such motions encounter political obstacles, they are either stalled or derailed. Basically the Academia Sinica proposed to increase management budgets for university research projects. It would allow professors' salaries to vary. Allocations would be determined by each university, in accordance with its own internal procedures. But recently the Ministry of Education said it wanted to make fundamental changes in the payroll system.
Basically, we agree with making professors' salaries variable. This flexibility must be linked with the university's performance in research. Only then can salaries reflect the realities of international competition for talent. Even if the Executive Yuan intends to make fundamental changes in the payroll system, it must create a system that is flexible, that reflects the distinctions between one school and the next, between experienced professors and inexperienced professors, and between one discipline and the next. The approach proposed by the Academia Sinica reflects the aforementioned real world distinctions. Objectively speaking it is highly feasible. The Ministry of Education may wish to start from scratch, and come up with some other flexible system. But if one wishes to ensure the aforementioned three types of flexibility, one cannot avoid linking salaries with research funding. If the Ministry of Education cannot come up with a better approach, it should consider accepting the current proposal. Surely it cannot cite long-term planning as an excuse to do nothing for the next half year. Loss of competitiveness on Taiwan is a serious problem. The Executive Yuan must urge its agencies to work harder, and swiftly offer corrective measures!
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.10
社論－行政院應正視台灣人才流失的危機
本報訊
國內若干媒體最近報導了台、港、新、中幾地大學新進教師的薪資差異，相當令有識之士憂心。資料顯示，香港、新加坡以及中國大陸上軌道的好大學，他們給助理教授的起薪，大約是台灣國立大學的三至四倍。即使不看名校，中國大陸已有約十五％的大學其新聘薪給優於台灣，而台大與中研院等單位也逐漸感受到招募不到優秀教授的壓力。行政院科技顧問們也提出警告：長此以往，台灣的人才優勢將逐漸流失。坦白說，一旦台灣無法吸引人才，我們將一無所有。
過去十年，台灣的經濟情況相對於亞洲諸國不算好；以實質薪資來看，大學教授已經有十幾年不曾調薪。但台灣是個民粹極強的社會，許多民眾都要求齊頭平等。然而在知識經濟時代，研發創新幾乎是一切經濟成長的原動力。如果我們不能對研發人才給與較高薪酬，吸引他們加入，則台灣的經濟必將走下坡，每一個人的待遇都會再往下修。簡單地說。以民粹觀點極端地看不得別人加薪，其結果就是自己也會減薪。
其實，要提升台灣的科研競爭力，並不需對「所有」的大學教師加薪，只需要花點小預算、動點小手術，就能克竟其功。以下，我們就描述一下這局部手術要怎麼做。
第一，在大學法的規定下，各大學原本就可以設置講座教授，對他們提供彈性薪給。因此，表現優良、國際上爭相挖角的資深教授，原本就可以得到頗高的待遇，但新進資淺者的待遇卻是全無彈性。故我們想要改革的，是部分新進資淺教師的薪給調整，而不是全面性的薪水調整。
第二，全台灣一百七十幾所大學中，真正在與新、港等地爭搶人才的，也許不到廿所，故為爭搶人才而需要調整待遇的大學，為數並不多。換言之，並不是所有大學都需要調薪，而只有受到國際競爭壓力的才有此需要。
第三，即使在台大、成大等具有國際競爭力的大學裡，也不是每個領域、每個教授都有調薪的客觀必要。有些學域是國際冷門、有些教授表現也不見得傑出。故真正要有薪給彈性的領域與範圍，只有一小部分。
總之，為吸引人才而設計的彈性薪給，並不需要統統有獎，但必須要做到資深/資淺區隔、學校品類區隔、校內教師區隔。這裡的問題看似複雜，但只要把握兩個原則即可：（一）學校之「內」的區分，依大學自治原則由各校自行決定。（二）學校之「間」的區分，依各校研究表現、國際競爭情況決定。把握住這兩個原則，則其他細節就不難處理了。由於並不是全面調薪，故需要增加的預算金額並不大。
報載大約半年前，中央研究院曾經向行政院提出了一套符合前述原則的解決辦法，也得到了教育部、國科會、人事行政局、主計處、與全台各知名大學的支持，甚至連所需預算、挪籌方式都設想好了。無奈所有的動議一旦遇上政治，不是停擺就是脫軌。中研院所提辦法的基本概念，是以提高研究計畫管理費比例的方式，將新增管理費撥給大學，並指定用於彈性教授薪給，由各大學的內部程序決定其校內分配。但最近教育部表示，他們希望從薪給制度上做根本的改變。
基本上，我們贊成教授薪水的彈性化，而且這個彈性一定要與大學的研究表現掛勾，如此才能正確反映國際人才競爭的實情。而即使行政院想在薪給制度上做根本改變，也一定要創造出彈性，反映跨校之間、資深與資淺之間、跨領域之間的需求差異。中研院所提做法，其實就是一種實質反映前述三種差異的建議，客觀上頗具可行性。當然，教育部可另起爐灶，訂出其他的彈性做法。但平心而論，如果要照顧到前述三種彈性，恐怕也逃不出與研究經費掛勾的設計。無論如何，假若教育部想不出更好的做法，就必須要考慮接受現有的提案，總不能以從長計議為由，半年下來一事無成吧！台灣人才競爭力流失的問題如此嚴重，行政院應督促所屬加把勁，趕緊提出矯治的辦法吧！
Monday, November 9, 2009
The Fall of the Berlin Wall vs. the Opening of the Taiwan Strait
The Fall of the Berlin Wall vs. the Opening of the Taiwan Strait
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 9, 2009
Today is the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Germany presented the Republic of China a section of the Berlin Wall. President Ma Ying-jeou was invited to address a ribbon-cutting ceremony at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy on Xinyi Road, in Taipei.
On November 9, 1989, the people of the two Germanies tore down the Berlin Wall. According to Western historians, this event marked the collapse of the Communist political and economic system, and the end of the Cold War global stand-off.
But in fact, from a larger historical perspective, the collapse of Communism and the end of Cold War confrontation did not begin in Berlin, but rather in the Taiwan Strait. Many people believe disillusionment with the Communist leadership began in 1986, with Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking" in the Soviet Union. But in fact it began in 1978, with Deng Xiaoping's "Reform and Liberalization" on Mainland China. Many people consider the demolition of the Berlin Wall by citizens of the two Germanies in November 1989, a classic case of protests against the Communist political and economic system. But in fact such protests began between April 15 and June 4 of the same year, in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. The Tiananmen Incident inspired citizens of the two Germanies. Many people believe the resolution of the Cold War began with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. But in fact it began with the lifting of martial law and the opening of cross-Strait exchanges by Chiang Ching-kuo in 1987.
In fact, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall was a random event. At the time, East German authorities merely meant to loosen travel restrictions for citizens of East Germany. This decision was mistakenly interpreted as an order to open up the Berlin Wall. But this mistaken decree was warmly welcomed by the people. As a result citizens of the two Germanies took to the streets to celebrate, and in their enthusiasm demolished the wall. By contrast, when Chiang Ching-kuo announced the lifting of martial law and the opening of links across the Taiwan Strait, it was the result of at least a decade of soul-searching and preparations. Only after taking full advantage of the time he had to prepare, did he announce the opening of links across the Taiwan Strait. For decades, Beijing has been much stronger than Taipei. The disparity in military might and overall strength between Beijing and Taipei has long been greater than the disparity between rival regimes in other divided countries, such as North and South Vietnam, East and West Germany, North and South Korea. Taipei therefore, has lived under a greater threat from the Communist political and economic system. But Chiang Ching-kuo took into account this dangerous disparity in size when making his preparations. He made today's situation, in which Taipei has full democracy, and Beijing is undergoing reform and liberalization, possible. For Chiang Ching-kuo and Taipei, the opening of links across the Taiwan Strait was not a random event. It was the result of careful planning and preparation.
By the same token, Beijing began "smashing the Gang of Four" as early as 1976. Talk of "Reform and Liberalization" emerged in 1978. These were more cataclysmic than the events of the pro-democracy movement of 1989 in Tiananmen Square. These important historical events were not random, like the collapse of the Berlin Wall. They were the result of "Thirty Years of Disaster." The preceding three decades of Chinese Communist rule imposed upon its citizens the most brutally obtuse political and economic system in recorded history. Therefore party insiders underwent the deepest soul-searching, leading to the "Smash the Gang of Four" coup, and to "Reform and Liberalization." Public protests were intense. Public expectations were high. Hence the 6/4 Tiananmen Incident. Mainland China is what it is today, as a result of internal soul-searching by the Communist Party inspired by Deng Xiaoping's reforms, and public expectations symbolized by the 6/4 Incident. These turning points were hardly accidental. They were the result of decades of blood, sweat, and tears.
It is no exaggeration to say that the disintegration of the Communist political and economic system, and the extinguishing of the flames of Cold War military confrontation during the last century, did not begin with Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking." It began with Deng Xiaoping's "Reform and Liberalization." Nor did it begin with the collapse of the Berlin Wall. It began with Chiang Ching-kuo's opening of links across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing's "Reform and Liberalization" will continue to be the model for the reformation of Communist dictatorships. Cross-Strait interactions are likely to author a new page in the "peaceful development" of human civilization.
It is not necessary to sing about the collapse of the Berlin Wall. People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be aware that, historically speaking, the opening of links across the Taiwan Strait was a far more significant event. The German people dismantled the artificially made Berlin Wall. People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait opened links across a naturally made body of water. When the Berlin Wall fell, the two Germanies were forced to react immediately. But the Taiwan Strait both links and separates, allowing the two sides to calmly engage in "peaceful development." Sixty years ago, the two sides spoke of "Liberating Taiwan" and "Retaking the Mainland." Today we speak of feform and liberalization, of opening links, of win-win scenarios, and of seeking commonalities and resolving differences. We have gone from "peaceful reunification" to "peaceful development." In fact, the two sides have long been in the forefront of history, well ahead of Gorbachev and the Berlin Wall. We have even more opportunities to establish historical precedents worthy of emulation in the future.
The fall of the Berlin Wall was not the final answer to the transformation of Communist dictatorships and the elimination of the shadow of war. The final answer came from leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. After two decades of interaction they are now undergoing "peaceful development." Relations are increasingly rational and tranquil. People the world over are seeking models to emulate. Such models will soon become evident.
柏林圍牆倒塌與台灣海峽開通
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.09 03:21 am
今天是柏林圍牆倒塌廿周年，德國方面贈送台灣的一堵柏林圍牆切體，在台北市信義路台灣民主基金會前庭剪綵展示，馬英九總統應邀致詞。
一九八九年十一月九日，柏林圍牆被兩德民眾聯手推倒，在西方本位的歷史詮釋中，此一事件標誌著共產主義政經體制的瓦解與將世界撕裂對立的冷戰之結束。
其實，若以更具高度的大歷史觀點來看，共產主義的動搖，與冷戰對立的結束，皆非始自柏林，而是肇發於台灣海峽。世人以為，共產主義的醒悟始自一九八六年蘇聯元首戈巴契夫的「新思維」，但真正的答案卻是始自一九七八年鄧小平的「改革開放」；世人也以為，一九八九年十一月兩德民眾推倒柏林圍牆，是受統治者對共產政經體制的抗議經典事件，但真正的答案則應是早在當年四月十五日至六月四日持續了七周的北京天安門事件，給了兩德民眾啟示；世人又以為，冷戰局面的化解，始自一九八九年的柏林圍牆的倒塌，但真正的答案卻應是肇端自一九八七年蔣經國的解嚴與開放台海兩岸交流。
柏林圍牆的推倒，其實是一個偶發事件。當時，東德當局原本只是計劃開放東德人民的旅遊限制，此一決策卻被錯誤地發布成即將開放柏林圍牆的命令；但這個錯誤的政令立即受到民眾熱烈歡迎，使上街慶祝的兩德民眾在激情中將圍牆推翻。相對而言，蔣經國宣布解嚴與開放海峽交通，卻是經歷了至少十餘年的反省及經營，而在他用盡了上天給他的準備時間後，才宣布並啟動開放海峽。幾十年來，台灣因與大陸的軍力與綜合國力相去懸殊，在所有「分裂國家」間（南北越、東西德、南北韓）受共產政經體制的威脅最大；但因蔣經國的因應、經營、準備，遂在大小懸殊的凶險情勢中，仍能將局面撐持至「台灣全面民主／大陸改革開放」的今日。因此，對蔣經國及台灣而言，海峽開放不是偶發事件，而是一個經歷深刻規劃與經營的事件。
同樣的道理，對於中國大陸而言，早在一九七六年就發生「粉碎四人幫」，及一九七八年就出現了「改革開放」的思維，更在一九八九年發生驚天動地的天安門民運；這些重大的歷史事件，皆不像柏林圍牆倒塌那般臨機性，而是因經歷了「三十年浩劫」長期蘊蓄而爆發。畢竟，前三十年的中共政經體制，相對而言，是同期歷史中最殘暴愚昧的政經體制；因此，黨內的反省也最深刻（所以有「粉碎四人幫」的鞭屍政變，及「改革開放」的大修正主義），民間的抗議與期待也最強烈（所以有六四事件）。就某種意義來說，中國大陸之所以有今日，其實是由中共內部以鄧小平為首的反省改革，與以六四事件為代表的民間期待，所協力完成。這些轉折殊非偶然，而皆是幾十年的生靈血淚所催動。
可以毫不誇張地說，上世紀末葉共產主義政經體制的瓦解，與軍事對立的冷戰之熄火，不是始自戈巴契夫的「新思維」，而是始自鄧小平的「改革開放」；也不是始自柏林圍牆倒塌，而是始自蔣經國開通了台灣海峽。而且，朝今後的歷史來看，中共的「改革開放」仍將是共產專政修正轉型的指標樣板，而台海兩岸的互動更有可能為人類文明的「和平發展」寫下新頁。
不須讚嘆柏林圍牆的倒塌，兩岸人民應知，台灣海峽的開通其實是更重大的歷史事件。德國人拆除了人造的柏林圍牆，兩岸則開通了天然的台灣海峽。柏林圍牆既倒，兩德必須立即面對；但台灣海峽既開通又區隔，卻給了兩岸從容進行「和平發展」的條件。六十年來，從解放台灣、反攻大陸，走到改革開放、開放交流、雙贏共生、求同化異；從「和平統一」，走到「和平發展」；兩岸其實一直走在歷史（戈巴契夫／柏林圍牆）的前面，未來更有機會為人類歷史創造新的典範。
共產專政的轉型與戰爭陰影的消除，其實柏林圍牆尚未給世人最後的答案；此一答案是由台海兩岸領先作答，經二十年來的互動激盪，如今在「和平發展」的主旋律下，愈來愈理智，愈來愈昇華，世人應可期待一個典範式的答案，將在不日繳卷時呈現。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 9, 2009
Today is the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Germany presented the Republic of China a section of the Berlin Wall. President Ma Ying-jeou was invited to address a ribbon-cutting ceremony at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy on Xinyi Road, in Taipei.
On November 9, 1989, the people of the two Germanies tore down the Berlin Wall. According to Western historians, this event marked the collapse of the Communist political and economic system, and the end of the Cold War global stand-off.
But in fact, from a larger historical perspective, the collapse of Communism and the end of Cold War confrontation did not begin in Berlin, but rather in the Taiwan Strait. Many people believe disillusionment with the Communist leadership began in 1986, with Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking" in the Soviet Union. But in fact it began in 1978, with Deng Xiaoping's "Reform and Liberalization" on Mainland China. Many people consider the demolition of the Berlin Wall by citizens of the two Germanies in November 1989, a classic case of protests against the Communist political and economic system. But in fact such protests began between April 15 and June 4 of the same year, in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. The Tiananmen Incident inspired citizens of the two Germanies. Many people believe the resolution of the Cold War began with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. But in fact it began with the lifting of martial law and the opening of cross-Strait exchanges by Chiang Ching-kuo in 1987.
In fact, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall was a random event. At the time, East German authorities merely meant to loosen travel restrictions for citizens of East Germany. This decision was mistakenly interpreted as an order to open up the Berlin Wall. But this mistaken decree was warmly welcomed by the people. As a result citizens of the two Germanies took to the streets to celebrate, and in their enthusiasm demolished the wall. By contrast, when Chiang Ching-kuo announced the lifting of martial law and the opening of links across the Taiwan Strait, it was the result of at least a decade of soul-searching and preparations. Only after taking full advantage of the time he had to prepare, did he announce the opening of links across the Taiwan Strait. For decades, Beijing has been much stronger than Taipei. The disparity in military might and overall strength between Beijing and Taipei has long been greater than the disparity between rival regimes in other divided countries, such as North and South Vietnam, East and West Germany, North and South Korea. Taipei therefore, has lived under a greater threat from the Communist political and economic system. But Chiang Ching-kuo took into account this dangerous disparity in size when making his preparations. He made today's situation, in which Taipei has full democracy, and Beijing is undergoing reform and liberalization, possible. For Chiang Ching-kuo and Taipei, the opening of links across the Taiwan Strait was not a random event. It was the result of careful planning and preparation.
By the same token, Beijing began "smashing the Gang of Four" as early as 1976. Talk of "Reform and Liberalization" emerged in 1978. These were more cataclysmic than the events of the pro-democracy movement of 1989 in Tiananmen Square. These important historical events were not random, like the collapse of the Berlin Wall. They were the result of "Thirty Years of Disaster." The preceding three decades of Chinese Communist rule imposed upon its citizens the most brutally obtuse political and economic system in recorded history. Therefore party insiders underwent the deepest soul-searching, leading to the "Smash the Gang of Four" coup, and to "Reform and Liberalization." Public protests were intense. Public expectations were high. Hence the 6/4 Tiananmen Incident. Mainland China is what it is today, as a result of internal soul-searching by the Communist Party inspired by Deng Xiaoping's reforms, and public expectations symbolized by the 6/4 Incident. These turning points were hardly accidental. They were the result of decades of blood, sweat, and tears.
It is no exaggeration to say that the disintegration of the Communist political and economic system, and the extinguishing of the flames of Cold War military confrontation during the last century, did not begin with Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking." It began with Deng Xiaoping's "Reform and Liberalization." Nor did it begin with the collapse of the Berlin Wall. It began with Chiang Ching-kuo's opening of links across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing's "Reform and Liberalization" will continue to be the model for the reformation of Communist dictatorships. Cross-Strait interactions are likely to author a new page in the "peaceful development" of human civilization.
It is not necessary to sing about the collapse of the Berlin Wall. People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be aware that, historically speaking, the opening of links across the Taiwan Strait was a far more significant event. The German people dismantled the artificially made Berlin Wall. People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait opened links across a naturally made body of water. When the Berlin Wall fell, the two Germanies were forced to react immediately. But the Taiwan Strait both links and separates, allowing the two sides to calmly engage in "peaceful development." Sixty years ago, the two sides spoke of "Liberating Taiwan" and "Retaking the Mainland." Today we speak of feform and liberalization, of opening links, of win-win scenarios, and of seeking commonalities and resolving differences. We have gone from "peaceful reunification" to "peaceful development." In fact, the two sides have long been in the forefront of history, well ahead of Gorbachev and the Berlin Wall. We have even more opportunities to establish historical precedents worthy of emulation in the future.
The fall of the Berlin Wall was not the final answer to the transformation of Communist dictatorships and the elimination of the shadow of war. The final answer came from leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. After two decades of interaction they are now undergoing "peaceful development." Relations are increasingly rational and tranquil. People the world over are seeking models to emulate. Such models will soon become evident.
柏林圍牆倒塌與台灣海峽開通
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.09 03:21 am
今天是柏林圍牆倒塌廿周年，德國方面贈送台灣的一堵柏林圍牆切體，在台北市信義路台灣民主基金會前庭剪綵展示，馬英九總統應邀致詞。
一九八九年十一月九日，柏林圍牆被兩德民眾聯手推倒，在西方本位的歷史詮釋中，此一事件標誌著共產主義政經體制的瓦解與將世界撕裂對立的冷戰之結束。
其實，若以更具高度的大歷史觀點來看，共產主義的動搖，與冷戰對立的結束，皆非始自柏林，而是肇發於台灣海峽。世人以為，共產主義的醒悟始自一九八六年蘇聯元首戈巴契夫的「新思維」，但真正的答案卻是始自一九七八年鄧小平的「改革開放」；世人也以為，一九八九年十一月兩德民眾推倒柏林圍牆，是受統治者對共產政經體制的抗議經典事件，但真正的答案則應是早在當年四月十五日至六月四日持續了七周的北京天安門事件，給了兩德民眾啟示；世人又以為，冷戰局面的化解，始自一九八九年的柏林圍牆的倒塌，但真正的答案卻應是肇端自一九八七年蔣經國的解嚴與開放台海兩岸交流。
柏林圍牆的推倒，其實是一個偶發事件。當時，東德當局原本只是計劃開放東德人民的旅遊限制，此一決策卻被錯誤地發布成即將開放柏林圍牆的命令；但這個錯誤的政令立即受到民眾熱烈歡迎，使上街慶祝的兩德民眾在激情中將圍牆推翻。相對而言，蔣經國宣布解嚴與開放海峽交通，卻是經歷了至少十餘年的反省及經營，而在他用盡了上天給他的準備時間後，才宣布並啟動開放海峽。幾十年來，台灣因與大陸的軍力與綜合國力相去懸殊，在所有「分裂國家」間（南北越、東西德、南北韓）受共產政經體制的威脅最大；但因蔣經國的因應、經營、準備，遂在大小懸殊的凶險情勢中，仍能將局面撐持至「台灣全面民主／大陸改革開放」的今日。因此，對蔣經國及台灣而言，海峽開放不是偶發事件，而是一個經歷深刻規劃與經營的事件。
同樣的道理，對於中國大陸而言，早在一九七六年就發生「粉碎四人幫」，及一九七八年就出現了「改革開放」的思維，更在一九八九年發生驚天動地的天安門民運；這些重大的歷史事件，皆不像柏林圍牆倒塌那般臨機性，而是因經歷了「三十年浩劫」長期蘊蓄而爆發。畢竟，前三十年的中共政經體制，相對而言，是同期歷史中最殘暴愚昧的政經體制；因此，黨內的反省也最深刻（所以有「粉碎四人幫」的鞭屍政變，及「改革開放」的大修正主義），民間的抗議與期待也最強烈（所以有六四事件）。就某種意義來說，中國大陸之所以有今日，其實是由中共內部以鄧小平為首的反省改革，與以六四事件為代表的民間期待，所協力完成。這些轉折殊非偶然，而皆是幾十年的生靈血淚所催動。
可以毫不誇張地說，上世紀末葉共產主義政經體制的瓦解，與軍事對立的冷戰之熄火，不是始自戈巴契夫的「新思維」，而是始自鄧小平的「改革開放」；也不是始自柏林圍牆倒塌，而是始自蔣經國開通了台灣海峽。而且，朝今後的歷史來看，中共的「改革開放」仍將是共產專政修正轉型的指標樣板，而台海兩岸的互動更有可能為人類文明的「和平發展」寫下新頁。
不須讚嘆柏林圍牆的倒塌，兩岸人民應知，台灣海峽的開通其實是更重大的歷史事件。德國人拆除了人造的柏林圍牆，兩岸則開通了天然的台灣海峽。柏林圍牆既倒，兩德必須立即面對；但台灣海峽既開通又區隔，卻給了兩岸從容進行「和平發展」的條件。六十年來，從解放台灣、反攻大陸，走到改革開放、開放交流、雙贏共生、求同化異；從「和平統一」，走到「和平發展」；兩岸其實一直走在歷史（戈巴契夫／柏林圍牆）的前面，未來更有機會為人類歷史創造新的典範。
共產專政的轉型與戰爭陰影的消除，其實柏林圍牆尚未給世人最後的答案；此一答案是由台海兩岸領先作答，經二十年來的互動激盪，如今在「和平發展」的主旋律下，愈來愈理智，愈來愈昇華，世人應可期待一個典範式的答案，將在不日繳卷時呈現。
Friday, November 6, 2009
Can the Administration Really Blame Failed Policy on Experts?
Can the Administration Really Blame Failed Policy on Experts?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 6, 2009
Speculation over whether an energy tax would be levied provoked panic in the stock market. In the Legislative Yuan Premier Wu Deng-yi publicly declared that the administration had no intention of levying such a tax for the moment, and the storm gradually subsided. But afterwards, President Ma and Premier Wu each solemnly declared that the energy tax controversy arose because researcher issued a statement before the policy was finalized, creating a headache for the administration. In the future, they said, researcher should be more discreet, etc, etc. We are deeply puzzled by both chief executives' statements. We believe that passing the buck for policy disputes onto the researchers is extremely irresponsible. But the mindset and contradictions behind this incident are what really deserve closer attention.
As we understand it, the professors researching the energy tax were commissioned by the Ministry of Finance. They were merely implementing its research projects. In mid-October, before the tempest over the energy tax erupted, the case had already been presented to the Executive Yuan many times. It had also been discussed four or five times during working sessions, joint sessions of commissioners and consultants, and formal sessions of the Tax Reform Commission. Take the joint session for example. Nearly 50 people attended. If one includes outsiders, no fewer than 100 people attended. They all saw the research data and the presentation. The composition of the Tax Advisory Commission is complex. It includes business and industry representatives, legislators, former heads of government, and others too numerous to list.
Tax Reform Commission members include academics and a number of government officials. Every time the commission holds a seminar, it supplies almost every reporter with a press kit. Ministry of Finance officials were forthcoming in their response to questions from reporters. The matter has been discussed repeatedly, far and wide. The media has reported on it. The Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan know about it. How did it suddenly become an problem of unauthorized statements to the public? Over a hundred people people have deliberated the issue for nearly two months. How can President Ma and Premier Wu possibly know that those who spoke without authorization were the academics in charge of research? Are we to understand the National Security Bureau has carried out an investigation? Can government officials indiscriminately blame academics in order to shirk their responsibility? Do they think the academics will silently accept the blame?
In fact, the role of scholars and the media is similar. Both are loved and hated by government officials. The media criticizes and comments on current affairs, it presents the truth, it reports policy, it exposes the darkside, it comments on the current situation. It often exerts no small pressure on the ruling administration. Academics are good at studying policies from a detached and abstract perspective. Their systematic and rational analysis constitutes another form of criticism. Because the media can harm them, politicians generally attempt to cultivate their goodwill. They hope to moderate the criticism to some degree. They hope the media will work with the ruling administration, that it will become its cheerleader. But as soon as a policy provokes controversy, and invites a public backlash, many officials will say "The media took my statement out of context. It was irresponsible in its reporting." They will completely disown all responsibility for mishandling their affairs.
The energy tax controversy is about proposed tax increases. Tax increases of any kind, at any time, levied by any means, will always be controversial and invite protests. This is virtually inevitable given the political environment on Taiwan. It has nothing to do with which academic said too much or too little. The real issue lies elsewhere. Since the content of the energy tax is consistent with President Ma's White Paper, these politicians must ask themselves, "Do I dare implement it?" Is the chief executive psychologically prepared to face the problem and solve the problem? Will he back down the moment a controversy erupts? Will he blame the academics helping him research the issue? If so, that can only be described as disappointing.
With regards the media, scholars on Taiwan have an even more awkward role. Because the media has the ability to counter-attack, politicians who criticize the media seldom go beyond a certain point. Seldom do they speak in tones of contempt or blame. But that is not the case with academics. Traditionally Chinese intellectuals have conventions they abide by when criticizing others. But in an era in which science and technology are king, these conventions are declining. Government heads are surrounded by large coteries of political appointees with Ph.Ds. This makes it harder for them to distinguish between independent academics and their own subordinates. They are under the misconception that intellectuals are underlings at their beck and call. Hence the ridiculous phenomenon of high officials putting down scholars and experts.
Chiang Kai-shek was trained in a Japanese military academy. He always demonstrated heartfelt respect for experts from academia. He frequently hosted scholars from universities for days on end, consulting them on state affairs. He is said to have paid personal visits to scholars, bringing them blankets and other gifts. Today, the President and the Premier are both star alumni from National Taiwan University. The tiniest of controversies panicked them into laying the blame on the doorstop of academics. Regarding the ministries responsible, they were utterly silent. Scholars engaged in research dedicate themselves the pursuit of knowledge. The ruling administration might not give them the respect they are due. But must they make them scapegoats for their policy troubles? The controversy touched off by energy taxes has been blamed on academics. But what about the controversy over the loosening of restrictions on imports of U.S. beef? Surely no academics leaked this information? Is the adminstration going to search for an official with an academic background, and parade him through the streets for shirking his duties?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.06
社論－政策挫敗歸咎學者 真是莫名奇妙
本報訊
在能源稅是否開徵炒上檯面、引起股市恐慌之後，行政院吳院長在立法院公開宣示並沒有立即開徵該稅的打算，風波遂告平息。但在事後，馬總統與吳院長分別都對外鄭重其事地表示，能源稅風波是因為研究執行單位在政策定案之前先行對外發言，才造成政府的困擾；以後研究單位應該要謹言慎行云云。我們對於兩位最高行政首長這樣的發言深感不解，也認為把政策紛擾的責任推給學者極為不負責任。但這件事背後的心態與矛盾，恐怕更值得提出來檢討。
據了解，負責能源稅研究的教授，其實是接受賦改會與財政部的委託，而執行其研究計畫。在十月中旬能源稅案引發風波之前，該案早已向行政院簡報多次，並在賦改會的工作會議、委員與諮詢委員聯席會議、委員會正式會議總共討論過四、五次。以聯席會議為例，出席人數近五十人，外加列席者總共不下百人，他們都看過研究資料與簡報。諮詢委員組成複雜，有工商界代表、立法委員、前任政府首長，族繁不及備載。
而賦改會委員之中，除了學者也包含多位政府首長。每次賦改會討論會後，媒體記者幾乎人手一份資料，財政部官員對於記者查詢也不吝回答。這麼長程、這麼廣泛的公開討論過程，媒體都有披露、府院亦皆知曉，怎麼突然有所謂對外發言困擾的問題？百餘人長達兩個月的反覆討論，馬總統與吳院長又怎麼知道這對外發言的人只有負責研究的學者？難道國安局進行過調查？難道官員胡亂怪罪學者以為己卸責，他們就全盤接受？
其實學者與媒體的角色十分相似，都是政府官員又愛又恨的對象。媒體針砭批評時政，其呈現真相、報導政策、揭發陰暗、評論時局，常常給主政者帶來不小的壓力。學者則是擅長從冷靜與抽象的角度切入政策，予以系統與理性的抽絲剝繭，提出另一種層次的批判。正因為媒體對政客有殺傷力，所以政治人物平常都習慣性地懷柔親善，希望批判的聲音能和善一些、溫和一些，最好能與主政者合流，對當權派多所吹捧。但是，一旦政策引發爭議、輿論群起撻伐，許多官員都會說：「那是媒體斷章取義、亂寫的」，把自己處理不善的責任，完全推得一乾二淨。
以這次能源稅爭議來看吧，既然是增稅之議，則不論是增哪一種稅、要何時開徵、如何執行，都一定會有爭議與反彈；這幾乎是台灣政治生態所能預期的必然，與哪一位學者多講話或少講話都無關。問題的關鍵是：既然能源稅與馬總統政策白皮書內容一致，則政客們就必須要認真地捫心自問：「我究竟敢不敢執行？」如果行政首長根本就沒有面對問題與解決問題的心理準備，在爭議掀起之後就立刻撤守，再責怪幫忙做研究的學者，那就相當令人失望了。
相對於媒體，台灣學者的角色更是難堪。因為媒體有反擊的力量，政客們批判媒體總是點到為止，極少有鄙夷的口氣或責怪的語調。但是他們對學者則不然；中國傳統知識分子的人文批判之風，在科技掛帥的時代已然式微；而政府首長身邊有一大群身掛博士證書的政務官，也使得他們不太能分辨學者與部屬之異同，誤以為知識分子也是呼之即來、揮之即去的僚屬，遂有首長高官動輒貶抑學者專家的荒謬現象。
當年，蔣介石是日本士官學校出身，對於學界奢宿總有一分發自內心的尊重。他不時招待大學者數日長聚請益國是，據說還親自挨門挨房為學者們送棉被，以示禮賢下士。現在，總統與行政院長都是台大畢業的高材生，小小能源稅的爭議就輕率地歸咎學者發言，主管部會一事無成的責任卻是隻字不提。學者做研究只是木訥剛毅地奉獻自己的智慧，就算沒有主政者噓寒問暖的形式尊重，也不該成為政策紛擾的替罪羔羊吧？能源稅掀起波瀾可以亂怪學者，美國牛肉弄得烏煙瘴氣，總沒有學者事先走漏風聲吧？難道也該找個學者出身的官員，遊街示眾以為己卸責呢？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 6, 2009
Speculation over whether an energy tax would be levied provoked panic in the stock market. In the Legislative Yuan Premier Wu Deng-yi publicly declared that the administration had no intention of levying such a tax for the moment, and the storm gradually subsided. But afterwards, President Ma and Premier Wu each solemnly declared that the energy tax controversy arose because researcher issued a statement before the policy was finalized, creating a headache for the administration. In the future, they said, researcher should be more discreet, etc, etc. We are deeply puzzled by both chief executives' statements. We believe that passing the buck for policy disputes onto the researchers is extremely irresponsible. But the mindset and contradictions behind this incident are what really deserve closer attention.
As we understand it, the professors researching the energy tax were commissioned by the Ministry of Finance. They were merely implementing its research projects. In mid-October, before the tempest over the energy tax erupted, the case had already been presented to the Executive Yuan many times. It had also been discussed four or five times during working sessions, joint sessions of commissioners and consultants, and formal sessions of the Tax Reform Commission. Take the joint session for example. Nearly 50 people attended. If one includes outsiders, no fewer than 100 people attended. They all saw the research data and the presentation. The composition of the Tax Advisory Commission is complex. It includes business and industry representatives, legislators, former heads of government, and others too numerous to list.
Tax Reform Commission members include academics and a number of government officials. Every time the commission holds a seminar, it supplies almost every reporter with a press kit. Ministry of Finance officials were forthcoming in their response to questions from reporters. The matter has been discussed repeatedly, far and wide. The media has reported on it. The Presidential Office and the Executive Yuan know about it. How did it suddenly become an problem of unauthorized statements to the public? Over a hundred people people have deliberated the issue for nearly two months. How can President Ma and Premier Wu possibly know that those who spoke without authorization were the academics in charge of research? Are we to understand the National Security Bureau has carried out an investigation? Can government officials indiscriminately blame academics in order to shirk their responsibility? Do they think the academics will silently accept the blame?
In fact, the role of scholars and the media is similar. Both are loved and hated by government officials. The media criticizes and comments on current affairs, it presents the truth, it reports policy, it exposes the darkside, it comments on the current situation. It often exerts no small pressure on the ruling administration. Academics are good at studying policies from a detached and abstract perspective. Their systematic and rational analysis constitutes another form of criticism. Because the media can harm them, politicians generally attempt to cultivate their goodwill. They hope to moderate the criticism to some degree. They hope the media will work with the ruling administration, that it will become its cheerleader. But as soon as a policy provokes controversy, and invites a public backlash, many officials will say "The media took my statement out of context. It was irresponsible in its reporting." They will completely disown all responsibility for mishandling their affairs.
The energy tax controversy is about proposed tax increases. Tax increases of any kind, at any time, levied by any means, will always be controversial and invite protests. This is virtually inevitable given the political environment on Taiwan. It has nothing to do with which academic said too much or too little. The real issue lies elsewhere. Since the content of the energy tax is consistent with President Ma's White Paper, these politicians must ask themselves, "Do I dare implement it?" Is the chief executive psychologically prepared to face the problem and solve the problem? Will he back down the moment a controversy erupts? Will he blame the academics helping him research the issue? If so, that can only be described as disappointing.
With regards the media, scholars on Taiwan have an even more awkward role. Because the media has the ability to counter-attack, politicians who criticize the media seldom go beyond a certain point. Seldom do they speak in tones of contempt or blame. But that is not the case with academics. Traditionally Chinese intellectuals have conventions they abide by when criticizing others. But in an era in which science and technology are king, these conventions are declining. Government heads are surrounded by large coteries of political appointees with Ph.Ds. This makes it harder for them to distinguish between independent academics and their own subordinates. They are under the misconception that intellectuals are underlings at their beck and call. Hence the ridiculous phenomenon of high officials putting down scholars and experts.
Chiang Kai-shek was trained in a Japanese military academy. He always demonstrated heartfelt respect for experts from academia. He frequently hosted scholars from universities for days on end, consulting them on state affairs. He is said to have paid personal visits to scholars, bringing them blankets and other gifts. Today, the President and the Premier are both star alumni from National Taiwan University. The tiniest of controversies panicked them into laying the blame on the doorstop of academics. Regarding the ministries responsible, they were utterly silent. Scholars engaged in research dedicate themselves the pursuit of knowledge. The ruling administration might not give them the respect they are due. But must they make them scapegoats for their policy troubles? The controversy touched off by energy taxes has been blamed on academics. But what about the controversy over the loosening of restrictions on imports of U.S. beef? Surely no academics leaked this information? Is the adminstration going to search for an official with an academic background, and parade him through the streets for shirking his duties?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.06
社論－政策挫敗歸咎學者 真是莫名奇妙
本報訊
在能源稅是否開徵炒上檯面、引起股市恐慌之後，行政院吳院長在立法院公開宣示並沒有立即開徵該稅的打算，風波遂告平息。但在事後，馬總統與吳院長分別都對外鄭重其事地表示，能源稅風波是因為研究執行單位在政策定案之前先行對外發言，才造成政府的困擾；以後研究單位應該要謹言慎行云云。我們對於兩位最高行政首長這樣的發言深感不解，也認為把政策紛擾的責任推給學者極為不負責任。但這件事背後的心態與矛盾，恐怕更值得提出來檢討。
據了解，負責能源稅研究的教授，其實是接受賦改會與財政部的委託，而執行其研究計畫。在十月中旬能源稅案引發風波之前，該案早已向行政院簡報多次，並在賦改會的工作會議、委員與諮詢委員聯席會議、委員會正式會議總共討論過四、五次。以聯席會議為例，出席人數近五十人，外加列席者總共不下百人，他們都看過研究資料與簡報。諮詢委員組成複雜，有工商界代表、立法委員、前任政府首長，族繁不及備載。
而賦改會委員之中，除了學者也包含多位政府首長。每次賦改會討論會後，媒體記者幾乎人手一份資料，財政部官員對於記者查詢也不吝回答。這麼長程、這麼廣泛的公開討論過程，媒體都有披露、府院亦皆知曉，怎麼突然有所謂對外發言困擾的問題？百餘人長達兩個月的反覆討論，馬總統與吳院長又怎麼知道這對外發言的人只有負責研究的學者？難道國安局進行過調查？難道官員胡亂怪罪學者以為己卸責，他們就全盤接受？
其實學者與媒體的角色十分相似，都是政府官員又愛又恨的對象。媒體針砭批評時政，其呈現真相、報導政策、揭發陰暗、評論時局，常常給主政者帶來不小的壓力。學者則是擅長從冷靜與抽象的角度切入政策，予以系統與理性的抽絲剝繭，提出另一種層次的批判。正因為媒體對政客有殺傷力，所以政治人物平常都習慣性地懷柔親善，希望批判的聲音能和善一些、溫和一些，最好能與主政者合流，對當權派多所吹捧。但是，一旦政策引發爭議、輿論群起撻伐，許多官員都會說：「那是媒體斷章取義、亂寫的」，把自己處理不善的責任，完全推得一乾二淨。
以這次能源稅爭議來看吧，既然是增稅之議，則不論是增哪一種稅、要何時開徵、如何執行，都一定會有爭議與反彈；這幾乎是台灣政治生態所能預期的必然，與哪一位學者多講話或少講話都無關。問題的關鍵是：既然能源稅與馬總統政策白皮書內容一致，則政客們就必須要認真地捫心自問：「我究竟敢不敢執行？」如果行政首長根本就沒有面對問題與解決問題的心理準備，在爭議掀起之後就立刻撤守，再責怪幫忙做研究的學者，那就相當令人失望了。
相對於媒體，台灣學者的角色更是難堪。因為媒體有反擊的力量，政客們批判媒體總是點到為止，極少有鄙夷的口氣或責怪的語調。但是他們對學者則不然；中國傳統知識分子的人文批判之風，在科技掛帥的時代已然式微；而政府首長身邊有一大群身掛博士證書的政務官，也使得他們不太能分辨學者與部屬之異同，誤以為知識分子也是呼之即來、揮之即去的僚屬，遂有首長高官動輒貶抑學者專家的荒謬現象。
當年，蔣介石是日本士官學校出身，對於學界奢宿總有一分發自內心的尊重。他不時招待大學者數日長聚請益國是，據說還親自挨門挨房為學者們送棉被，以示禮賢下士。現在，總統與行政院長都是台大畢業的高材生，小小能源稅的爭議就輕率地歸咎學者發言，主管部會一事無成的責任卻是隻字不提。學者做研究只是木訥剛毅地奉獻自己的智慧，就算沒有主政者噓寒問暖的形式尊重，也不該成為政策紛擾的替罪羔羊吧？能源稅掀起波瀾可以亂怪學者，美國牛肉弄得烏煙瘴氣，總沒有學者事先走漏風聲吧？難道也該找個學者出身的官員，遊街示眾以為己卸責呢？
Thursday, November 5, 2009
Taiwan Independence "Castles in the Air," Revisited
Taiwan Independence "Castles in the Air," Revisited
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 5, 2009
Yesterday Lin Cho-shui responded to our October 31 editorial, "Is There any Form of Taiwan independence that doesn't erect Castles in the Air?" He said "The paradox is that Taiwan independence has protected the Republic of China. It would be unwise to eliminate it."
Lin Cho-shui said that "As long as the Taiwan independence movement remains in existence, it will be the common enemy of both the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China. But once the Taiwan independence movement has been eliminated, the Republic of China will become the Peoples Republic of China's number one enemy." This is the logic behind his argument that "Taiwan independence has protected the Republic of China."
Unfortunately, Lin Cho-shui misunderstood the meaning of our editorial. We did not advocate "eliminating the Taiwan independence movement." Within the larger framework of cross-Strait relations, Taiwan independence cannot be eliminated. Taiwan independence has long played a role in cross-Strait interaction. One reason Taiwan has become more and more cohesive, is the Taiwan independence movement. Furthermore, Taiwan independence rhetoric has long played the role of "bad cop" in a game of "good cop/bad cop." It has also been an important factor in guiding Taipei and Beijng toward the middle path. Cross-Strait reconciliation and coexistence can be considered a reaction to Taiwan independence moves by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. Therefore when Lin Cho-shui says that "Taiwan independence has protected the Republic of China," he has a point. But our question was whether the DPP, as a major political party on Taiwan, intends to wave the banner of Taiwan independence in perpetuity? Either "impulsive Taiwan independence" or "measured Taiwan independence" makes no difference.
The Democratic Progressive Party's advocacy of Taiwan independence can indeed play a "good cop/bad cop" role. Taiwan independence can to some extent protect the Republic of China. But it has also thrown party politics on Taiwan out of balance, preventing it from functioning normally. It has ripped society apart along the lines of national and ethnic identity. It has left society incapable of extricating itself from this trap. Can the Democratic Progressive Party rule the nation on such a basis? What sort of future will this sort of Taiwan have?
Our editorial did not advocate "the elimination of Taiwan independence." On the contrary, it acknowledged that Taiwan independence has protected the Republic of China. But the primary force responsible for protecting the Republic of China for the past sixty years has been the Republic of China. Even "measured Taiwan independence" does not forsake the rectification of names, and the authoring of a new constitution, or de jure Taiwan independence. So-called "measured Taiwan independence" is merely Taiwan independence, Postponed. In other words "measured Taiwan independence," still calls for the eradication of the Republic of China. Otherwise, it is not Taiwan independence. Or is Lin Cho-shui advocating Taiwan independence merely to protect the Republic of China in perpetuity?
The Taiwan independence movement cannot be eliminated on Taiwan. The issue is whether the Democratic Progressive Party's continued advocacy of Taiwan independence will perpetuate an imbalance in party politics on Taiwan, and contribute to the degeneration of its democracy? In recent years, elements within the DPP, including Lin Cho-shui, have been contemplating these issues, searching for a way out for Taiwan independence. But "measured Taiwan independence" and other disguised forms of Taiwan independence were the cause of today's dilemma. They were responsible for our current plight, under which "Taiwan independence cannot be achieved, but the Republic of China cannot be reaffirmed?" Besides, "measured Taiwan independence" is not prevailing orthodoxy within the DPP. Nor is it representive of Taiwan independence at the grass roots. We do not deny the creativity behind "measured Taiwan independence." But we don't think it constitutes a feasible policy for a Democratic Progressive Party that aspires to rule.
In his letter, Lin Cho-shui apparently confuse the roots of Taiwan independence with the issue of whether Taiwan independence could resolve cross-Strait issues. Lin revisited our withdrawal from the United Nations. But at the time mainland China was still mired in the Cultural Revolution. The Cold War between the East and the West was still going on. Lin also revisited the martial law era. But the Republic of China has undergone four presidential elections and a second change in ruling parties since then. The Taiwan independence movement insists on dredging up our withdrawal from the United Nations and the lack of democracy during the martial law era as justifications for Taiwan independence. But is that any different than dredging up the "Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory" or the 2-28 Incident as justifications for Taiwan independence? After all, six decades have passed. The world has changed. Significant changes have occurred throughout the world, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and on Taiwan. The Taiwan independence movement rejects the notion that "both Taipei and Beijing claim to be the sole legitimate government of China." It rejects the notion that the "1992 Consensus / One China, Different Interpretations" constitutes a breakthrough. Can it really argue that these are instances in which "Taiwan independence has protected the Republic of China?" The tragedy of history was responsible for the rise of the Taiwan independence movement. But the Taiwan independence movement refuses to recognize new opportunities that have emerged as a result of historic changes. This is why the Taiwan independence movement remains incapable of providing leadership for democracy on Taiwan, or for relations across the Taiwan Strait. This may be the inevitable fate of the Taiwan independence movement. But is it to the benefit of the DPP to assume this role? Does it meet with the aspirations of the public on Taiwan?
As we see it, we cannot "eliminate Taiwan independence." But the DPP must unburden itself of the albatross of Taiwan independence. It must not continue advocating Taiwan independence under different guises. Otherwise, democracy on Taiwan and relations across the Taiwan Strait can never be normalized.
Our editorial and Lin Cho-shui's reply share a common vision. No cross-Strait policy, including "maintaining the status quo," "One China, Different Interpretations," or "Taiwan independence" is going to be easy. But our position differs from Lin Cho-shui's. Lin believes that "measured Taiwan independence" is the better alternative. We believe that "using the Republic of China to defend the Republic of China" is the better alternative. The Taiwan independence movement still has a role to play as "bad cop." The question is whether this is a role the DPP still wishes to play.
再論「還有不是空想的台獨嗎？」
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.05 04:11 am
十月三十一日社論〈還有不是空想的台獨嗎？〉，承林濁水先生昨日在民意論壇作出回應。他說：「吊詭的是，台獨反而對中華民國形成了保護作用，若必去之而後快，並不明智。」
林濁水說：「當台獨存在時，中華民國是（中共的）聯合對象；當台獨消滅了，中華民國必成頭號敵人。」這是他「台獨保護中華民國」的立論邏輯。
這一點卻正是林濁水對社論的主要誤解，因為社論向未主張「欲去台獨而後快」。其實，在兩岸的大結構中，台獨是「去」不掉的；且台獨在兩岸互動中一直有其角色及功能。今日台灣的「主體性」愈來愈堅實，主要的原因之一，即是台獨運動的影響所致；再者，台獨論述亦始終扮演「黑臉／白臉」的角色，這也是近年來引導兩岸主流思維趨向中道的重要因素。眾所共見，今日兩岸關係之所以能趨向和解共生，其實可說是出自對李登輝及陳水扁兩朝台獨操作的反省。所以，林濁水說「台獨保護中華民國」，其實有其見地；但我們的問題是：作為台灣最重要政黨之一的民進黨，要不要永遠擎著台獨的大旗？不論是「冒進台獨」，或「穩健台獨」。
民進黨主張台獨，確可發生「黑臉／白臉」的作用，在某種程度上也能發生「台獨保護中華民國」的效應。但是，這卻也使得台灣的政黨政治失衡，不能正常地進行民主運作，而使社會陷於國家及族群的撕裂之中，不能自拔。這樣的民進黨如何執政？這樣的台灣有什麼前途？
所以，社論並未「欲去台獨而後快」，反而一向對「台獨保護中華民國」亦有認知。但是，六十年來保護「中華民國」的主力，畢竟仍是「中華民國」本身；而台獨論述即使縮減至「穩健台獨」，亦不會放棄「正名制憲」與「法理台獨」（台獨，但不是今天）；也就是說，「穩健台獨」最後仍「應」主張「消滅中華民國」，否則即不成「台獨」。如若不然，難道林濁水是在主張「永遠以保護中華民國為宗旨」的「台獨」？
台灣不可能沒有「台獨」，問題在民進黨若仍承負台獨的角色，是否會使台灣的政黨政治失衡、民主政治變質？近年來，民進黨內如林濁水等勤學深思之士對此多所思考，皆在為台獨探尋出路；但所謂「穩健台獨」等變相的台獨論述，難道不正是造成今日「台獨不能實現／中華民國也不能鞏固」的主要原因？何況，「穩健台獨」並非民進黨內的顯學，在台獨基層中其實不具代表性。我們不否定「穩健台獨」的創意，但不認為這是仍想執政的民進黨的可行政策。
林濁水在投書中，似仍對「台獨因何發生」與「台獨能否解決兩岸問題」，略有混淆。林文又回溯到「退出聯合國時期」，但那時中國大陸仍陷於文化大革命，亦是東西冷戰方熾的年代；林文也又回顧到「戒嚴時期」，但如今中華民國業已經歷四次總統直選及兩度政黨輪替。台獨論述如果一直要以「退出聯合國」、「戒嚴時期的不民主」為立論基礎，則與回復到「台灣地位未定論」何異？又與「因為二二八／所以要台獨」何異？畢竟，六十年來的時空變遷極大，今日的世界、兩岸及台灣皆有重大變化；台獨若仍要堅持「海峽兩岸皆宣稱自己是中國唯一合法政府」，而不認為「九二共識／一中各表」可能存有某種程度的突破空間，難道這也是「台獨保護中華民國」的作為？歷史的悲情，是台獨發生的原因；但台獨不願面對今日歷史巨變出現的新機遇，卻亦使台獨不能成為引導台灣民主政治及兩岸關係發展的主流。這也許是台獨的必然宿命及應然使命，但如果是由民進黨來承負這個角色，是否不成比例？是否對得起台灣主流民意的期待？
我們的看法是：不可能「去台獨而後快」，但民進黨卻應蛻去台獨，而不宜再用任何化名化身來玩弄台獨；否則，台灣民主及兩岸關係皆不可能趨於正常與平衡。
社論與林濁水有一共同見解：任何兩岸方案，包括「維持現狀」、「一中各表」或「台獨」，無一容易。但是，社論與林濁水相左之處則在：林文認為「穩健台獨仍屬『比較不壞』的選擇」，而我們認為，「以中華民國來保護中華民國」，始是「比較不壞」的選擇。「台獨」仍有「黑臉」的角色可扮，問題在要不要由民進黨來扮演。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 5, 2009
Yesterday Lin Cho-shui responded to our October 31 editorial, "Is There any Form of Taiwan independence that doesn't erect Castles in the Air?" He said "The paradox is that Taiwan independence has protected the Republic of China. It would be unwise to eliminate it."
Lin Cho-shui said that "As long as the Taiwan independence movement remains in existence, it will be the common enemy of both the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China. But once the Taiwan independence movement has been eliminated, the Republic of China will become the Peoples Republic of China's number one enemy." This is the logic behind his argument that "Taiwan independence has protected the Republic of China."
Unfortunately, Lin Cho-shui misunderstood the meaning of our editorial. We did not advocate "eliminating the Taiwan independence movement." Within the larger framework of cross-Strait relations, Taiwan independence cannot be eliminated. Taiwan independence has long played a role in cross-Strait interaction. One reason Taiwan has become more and more cohesive, is the Taiwan independence movement. Furthermore, Taiwan independence rhetoric has long played the role of "bad cop" in a game of "good cop/bad cop." It has also been an important factor in guiding Taipei and Beijng toward the middle path. Cross-Strait reconciliation and coexistence can be considered a reaction to Taiwan independence moves by Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. Therefore when Lin Cho-shui says that "Taiwan independence has protected the Republic of China," he has a point. But our question was whether the DPP, as a major political party on Taiwan, intends to wave the banner of Taiwan independence in perpetuity? Either "impulsive Taiwan independence" or "measured Taiwan independence" makes no difference.
The Democratic Progressive Party's advocacy of Taiwan independence can indeed play a "good cop/bad cop" role. Taiwan independence can to some extent protect the Republic of China. But it has also thrown party politics on Taiwan out of balance, preventing it from functioning normally. It has ripped society apart along the lines of national and ethnic identity. It has left society incapable of extricating itself from this trap. Can the Democratic Progressive Party rule the nation on such a basis? What sort of future will this sort of Taiwan have?
Our editorial did not advocate "the elimination of Taiwan independence." On the contrary, it acknowledged that Taiwan independence has protected the Republic of China. But the primary force responsible for protecting the Republic of China for the past sixty years has been the Republic of China. Even "measured Taiwan independence" does not forsake the rectification of names, and the authoring of a new constitution, or de jure Taiwan independence. So-called "measured Taiwan independence" is merely Taiwan independence, Postponed. In other words "measured Taiwan independence," still calls for the eradication of the Republic of China. Otherwise, it is not Taiwan independence. Or is Lin Cho-shui advocating Taiwan independence merely to protect the Republic of China in perpetuity?
The Taiwan independence movement cannot be eliminated on Taiwan. The issue is whether the Democratic Progressive Party's continued advocacy of Taiwan independence will perpetuate an imbalance in party politics on Taiwan, and contribute to the degeneration of its democracy? In recent years, elements within the DPP, including Lin Cho-shui, have been contemplating these issues, searching for a way out for Taiwan independence. But "measured Taiwan independence" and other disguised forms of Taiwan independence were the cause of today's dilemma. They were responsible for our current plight, under which "Taiwan independence cannot be achieved, but the Republic of China cannot be reaffirmed?" Besides, "measured Taiwan independence" is not prevailing orthodoxy within the DPP. Nor is it representive of Taiwan independence at the grass roots. We do not deny the creativity behind "measured Taiwan independence." But we don't think it constitutes a feasible policy for a Democratic Progressive Party that aspires to rule.
In his letter, Lin Cho-shui apparently confuse the roots of Taiwan independence with the issue of whether Taiwan independence could resolve cross-Strait issues. Lin revisited our withdrawal from the United Nations. But at the time mainland China was still mired in the Cultural Revolution. The Cold War between the East and the West was still going on. Lin also revisited the martial law era. But the Republic of China has undergone four presidential elections and a second change in ruling parties since then. The Taiwan independence movement insists on dredging up our withdrawal from the United Nations and the lack of democracy during the martial law era as justifications for Taiwan independence. But is that any different than dredging up the "Taiwan's Undetermined Status Theory" or the 2-28 Incident as justifications for Taiwan independence? After all, six decades have passed. The world has changed. Significant changes have occurred throughout the world, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and on Taiwan. The Taiwan independence movement rejects the notion that "both Taipei and Beijing claim to be the sole legitimate government of China." It rejects the notion that the "1992 Consensus / One China, Different Interpretations" constitutes a breakthrough. Can it really argue that these are instances in which "Taiwan independence has protected the Republic of China?" The tragedy of history was responsible for the rise of the Taiwan independence movement. But the Taiwan independence movement refuses to recognize new opportunities that have emerged as a result of historic changes. This is why the Taiwan independence movement remains incapable of providing leadership for democracy on Taiwan, or for relations across the Taiwan Strait. This may be the inevitable fate of the Taiwan independence movement. But is it to the benefit of the DPP to assume this role? Does it meet with the aspirations of the public on Taiwan?
As we see it, we cannot "eliminate Taiwan independence." But the DPP must unburden itself of the albatross of Taiwan independence. It must not continue advocating Taiwan independence under different guises. Otherwise, democracy on Taiwan and relations across the Taiwan Strait can never be normalized.
Our editorial and Lin Cho-shui's reply share a common vision. No cross-Strait policy, including "maintaining the status quo," "One China, Different Interpretations," or "Taiwan independence" is going to be easy. But our position differs from Lin Cho-shui's. Lin believes that "measured Taiwan independence" is the better alternative. We believe that "using the Republic of China to defend the Republic of China" is the better alternative. The Taiwan independence movement still has a role to play as "bad cop." The question is whether this is a role the DPP still wishes to play.
再論「還有不是空想的台獨嗎？」
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.05 04:11 am
十月三十一日社論〈還有不是空想的台獨嗎？〉，承林濁水先生昨日在民意論壇作出回應。他說：「吊詭的是，台獨反而對中華民國形成了保護作用，若必去之而後快，並不明智。」
林濁水說：「當台獨存在時，中華民國是（中共的）聯合對象；當台獨消滅了，中華民國必成頭號敵人。」這是他「台獨保護中華民國」的立論邏輯。
這一點卻正是林濁水對社論的主要誤解，因為社論向未主張「欲去台獨而後快」。其實，在兩岸的大結構中，台獨是「去」不掉的；且台獨在兩岸互動中一直有其角色及功能。今日台灣的「主體性」愈來愈堅實，主要的原因之一，即是台獨運動的影響所致；再者，台獨論述亦始終扮演「黑臉／白臉」的角色，這也是近年來引導兩岸主流思維趨向中道的重要因素。眾所共見，今日兩岸關係之所以能趨向和解共生，其實可說是出自對李登輝及陳水扁兩朝台獨操作的反省。所以，林濁水說「台獨保護中華民國」，其實有其見地；但我們的問題是：作為台灣最重要政黨之一的民進黨，要不要永遠擎著台獨的大旗？不論是「冒進台獨」，或「穩健台獨」。
民進黨主張台獨，確可發生「黑臉／白臉」的作用，在某種程度上也能發生「台獨保護中華民國」的效應。但是，這卻也使得台灣的政黨政治失衡，不能正常地進行民主運作，而使社會陷於國家及族群的撕裂之中，不能自拔。這樣的民進黨如何執政？這樣的台灣有什麼前途？
所以，社論並未「欲去台獨而後快」，反而一向對「台獨保護中華民國」亦有認知。但是，六十年來保護「中華民國」的主力，畢竟仍是「中華民國」本身；而台獨論述即使縮減至「穩健台獨」，亦不會放棄「正名制憲」與「法理台獨」（台獨，但不是今天）；也就是說，「穩健台獨」最後仍「應」主張「消滅中華民國」，否則即不成「台獨」。如若不然，難道林濁水是在主張「永遠以保護中華民國為宗旨」的「台獨」？
台灣不可能沒有「台獨」，問題在民進黨若仍承負台獨的角色，是否會使台灣的政黨政治失衡、民主政治變質？近年來，民進黨內如林濁水等勤學深思之士對此多所思考，皆在為台獨探尋出路；但所謂「穩健台獨」等變相的台獨論述，難道不正是造成今日「台獨不能實現／中華民國也不能鞏固」的主要原因？何況，「穩健台獨」並非民進黨內的顯學，在台獨基層中其實不具代表性。我們不否定「穩健台獨」的創意，但不認為這是仍想執政的民進黨的可行政策。
林濁水在投書中，似仍對「台獨因何發生」與「台獨能否解決兩岸問題」，略有混淆。林文又回溯到「退出聯合國時期」，但那時中國大陸仍陷於文化大革命，亦是東西冷戰方熾的年代；林文也又回顧到「戒嚴時期」，但如今中華民國業已經歷四次總統直選及兩度政黨輪替。台獨論述如果一直要以「退出聯合國」、「戒嚴時期的不民主」為立論基礎，則與回復到「台灣地位未定論」何異？又與「因為二二八／所以要台獨」何異？畢竟，六十年來的時空變遷極大，今日的世界、兩岸及台灣皆有重大變化；台獨若仍要堅持「海峽兩岸皆宣稱自己是中國唯一合法政府」，而不認為「九二共識／一中各表」可能存有某種程度的突破空間，難道這也是「台獨保護中華民國」的作為？歷史的悲情，是台獨發生的原因；但台獨不願面對今日歷史巨變出現的新機遇，卻亦使台獨不能成為引導台灣民主政治及兩岸關係發展的主流。這也許是台獨的必然宿命及應然使命，但如果是由民進黨來承負這個角色，是否不成比例？是否對得起台灣主流民意的期待？
我們的看法是：不可能「去台獨而後快」，但民進黨卻應蛻去台獨，而不宜再用任何化名化身來玩弄台獨；否則，台灣民主及兩岸關係皆不可能趨於正常與平衡。
社論與林濁水有一共同見解：任何兩岸方案，包括「維持現狀」、「一中各表」或「台獨」，無一容易。但是，社論與林濁水相左之處則在：林文認為「穩健台獨仍屬『比較不壞』的選擇」，而我們認為，「以中華民國來保護中華民國」，始是「比較不壞」的選擇。「台獨」仍有「黑臉」的角色可扮，問題在要不要由民進黨來扮演。
Wednesday, November 4, 2009
US Beef: The Administration Should Have Stuck to the Script
US Beef: The Administration Should Have Stuck to the Script
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 4, 2009
The controversy over U.S. beef imports has become a full-blown prairie fire. The question everybody wants to ask is, wasn't it entirely predictable?
Was the government merely overconfident, or just plain arrogant? Either way, senior government officials underestimated the amount of fallout. Could loosening restrictions on U.S. beef imports lead to a public backlash? The answer was abundantly clear last year, when the same crisis played out in South Korea. Intense public protests mired South Korean President Lee Myung-bak in a major political crisis. On Taiwan meanwhile, the Ma administration learned nothing from this lesson of history. It was totally unprepared for the public reaction to its decision to loosen restrictions on U.S. beef imports. It was concerned only with policy level maneuveuring, with what sort of quid pro quo it would get from the United States, with what sort of agreements would be signed. It never considered the social and political firestorm that might follow once restrictions on U.S. beef imports were loosened. The result was like the movie "Chronicle of a Death Foretold." The loosening of restrictions on U.S. beef imports caused major shockwaves to Taiwan. It is hard to believe that while negotiating restrictions on U.S. beef imports, the Ma administration never seriously considered the experience of Korea. It never considered offering the public a thorough explanation.
Actually, this sort of sluggish, even oblivious response, is not confined to the issue of U.S. beef imports. Over a year ago, nearly all of the Ma administration's key policies were plagued by this problem. The officials responsible were too politically naive. As a result minor issues often snowballed until they were beyond repair. The Ma administration was not necessarily the real culprit. But because it failed to handle matters properly, it often ended up as the scapegoat. For example, the Chen Shui-bian administration allowed in mainland China milk products. But melamine contamination was blamed on the Ma administration all the same.
The impact of policies and decisions should be explained to the public in advance, in order to increase public understanding, reduce public resistance, and prevent the political opposition from demagoguing the issue. The Ma administration has access to experts and scholars able to provide professional advice. It has access to politicians, civil servants, and elected representatives with long experience in politics. They have their fingers on the pulse of public opinion. They know how the political opposition will respond. They know opposition pundits will find the chinks in the administration's armor. They know how the administration must respond so that its policies can be successfully implemented. But high officials in the Ma administration have always assumed that the public would never question its policies, that the public would dutifully applaud its policies, giving it a free pass, and that all would be well under heaven. But is Taiwan society really like this? Was the Ma administration, from the president on down, born yesterday? The KMT may not fear sniping from the DPP. But when people lack sufficient information, when the government makes no effort to communicate, then no matter how well-intentioned those in power might be, the public will not automatically buy what they say. Besides, when policies are made by a handful of people, any blind spots and any ill-considered aspects have little chance of being corrected before being put into practice.
Did senior government officials conduct sand table exercises to gauge public reaction before loosening restrictions on U.S. beef imports? Shouldn't a ruling administration that hopes to act responsibly provide the the public with detailed information? Shouldn't it provide everyone with as much information possible about U.S. beef? For example, which countries have loosened which requirements on which beef parts? On which beef parts does our government intend to loosen restrictions? The Ma administration has a responsibility to provide the public with the facts before it decides to loosen restrictions. These policies have an impact on people's lives and property. The people have a right to be informed about the administration's policy measures.
During criminal investigations and trials, suspects often respond like toothpaste in a tube. However much pressure one applies, however much toothpaste one gets. However much evidence the prosecution obtains, however much the suspect confesses to. Frankly, the current administration is acting remarkably like a criminal suspect. However much the public complains and the political opposition criticizes, however much the Ma administration is willing to respond. Are we to conclude that if the public failed to complain, the administration would not even bother explaining its position? In an era of democracy, the public has strong opinions. Opposition parties are constantly sniffing for the scent of blood. If the Ma administration keeps its head in the sand, it will have an ever harder time. The DPP understands public sentiment only too well. It uses this understanding to lead the public around by the nose. The ruling KMT, on the other hand, understands public sentiment not at all. It does many things without first providing appropriate explanations. It has been blasted repeatedly, but never seems to awaken from its stupor. No wonder so many characterize the Ma administration as brain-dead. Some need a longer learning curve than others, but the Ma administration's learning curve is just a little too long.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.04
社論－早知如此 還是照著劇本走
本報訊
美國牛肉議題會發展到今天這樣如火燎原之勢，令大家最想追問的一個問題就是：這一切，難道事先完全都沒有預期嗎？
不論是太自信還是太自傲，可以確定的是，政府高層肯定是完全輕忽了它的後續效應。開放美國牛肉進口所可能引起的民間反彈，早在去年韓國就已經扎扎實實、明明白白地演練過一次了，激烈的社會抗爭讓韓國總統李明博陷入極為嚴重的政治危機；台灣的馬政府竟然完全沒有「前車可鑑」的意識，對開放美國牛肉一事的民間反應竟完全不做任何防備；只關注政策層面的攻防，要跟美國交換什麼、達成什麼協議，卻不去設想一旦美國牛肉開放進口之後，會在台灣社會以及政治層面引起什麼樣的風暴；結果就像電影《預知死亡紀事》一般，美國牛肉開放進口會帶來的大震撼，一一在台灣出現，真的很難讓人相信，政府當局在談判開放美牛時，沒有認真觀察、思考過韓國社會曾經出現的狀況，沒有因此想過應該要建立一套完整、負責任的說帖來說服社會大眾。
事實上，這種遲鈍、後知後覺甚至不知不覺，並不只有顯現在開放美國牛肉進口的這件事情上，老實說，一年多來，幾乎所有重要的政策都面臨這種問題。因為相關主事官員的神經太大條，結果常常讓本來不大的問題如滾雪球般變得難以收拾，或者本來馬政府不見得是最主要的肇事者，卻因為處理不當，大背黑鍋。如陳水扁時期通過了開放大陸奶品，但三聚氰胺的苦果，卻由馬政府概括承受一樣。
很多政策、決策會造成什麼樣的影響和結果，應該早在事前就跟人民做解釋說明，以增加社會的了解、減少施政的阻力，也預防在野黨藉機大肆炒作等，種種竅門，馬政府有許多專家學者可提供專業意見，也有許多長期從事政治活動的政治人物、官員、民意代表，可以抓得住民意脈動，知道在野黨會如何出招，名嘴會如何見縫插針，因此事前提出完整的對策，讓政策可以順利推動。然而，政府高層的反應卻好似總是「天真地」以為只要政府說一，整個社會就不會說二，大家拍拍手就過關了、天下太平了──台灣社會是這個樣子的嗎？馬政府從總統以降，是第一天從政嗎？國民黨就不怕被民進黨追著打、就不知道當人們資訊不足時，當人民看不到政府溝通的誠意時，哪管執政者的立意有多良善，誰說大家就一定要埋單？更何況，當決策只是集中於一小撮人拍案時，是不是有什麼盲點、是不是有什麼不周到的地方，恐怕根本沒有機會在付諸實行前被導正。
在這次開放美國牛肉進口之前，政府高層到底有沒有沙盤推演過社會大眾會有什麼樣的反應？是不是思考過做為一個負責任的執政者，應該給人民充分翔實的資訊，盡可能讓大家知道美國牛肉的資訊？例如，哪些國家開放了哪些部分，台灣政府又打算開放哪些部位、哪些類別不會開放等等，這些都是馬政府在決定開放之前，有責任要讓人民知道的；關係到人民身家性命財產安全的政策，人民本來就有權利知道政策全貌。
人們常說某些司法案件的偵辦過程，嫌疑人總像擠牙膏一樣，證據到哪裡，他才吐出那個部分的案情，老實講，當前政府的施政給人的感覺也跟擠牙膏很像，好像民意催到哪裡、反對黨罵到哪裡，馬政府才會處理到那裡，難道，假如社會沒有什麼意見，政府當局就不打算跟大家講清楚了嗎？當然，在這個民主時代，民意高漲，在野黨四處狩獵，如果馬政府果真如此心存僥倖，那日子肯定愈來愈難過；過往的民進黨是太會操作民意了，把社會集體意識放在手上把玩，現在的執政黨又似乎太不知民意需求了，做許多事之前都不考慮向人民做合宜的說明，事後被罵了不知幾次也不覺悟，難怪有人說馬政府麻木；這個執政團隊的學習曲線未免也太長了。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 4, 2009
The controversy over U.S. beef imports has become a full-blown prairie fire. The question everybody wants to ask is, wasn't it entirely predictable?
Was the government merely overconfident, or just plain arrogant? Either way, senior government officials underestimated the amount of fallout. Could loosening restrictions on U.S. beef imports lead to a public backlash? The answer was abundantly clear last year, when the same crisis played out in South Korea. Intense public protests mired South Korean President Lee Myung-bak in a major political crisis. On Taiwan meanwhile, the Ma administration learned nothing from this lesson of history. It was totally unprepared for the public reaction to its decision to loosen restrictions on U.S. beef imports. It was concerned only with policy level maneuveuring, with what sort of quid pro quo it would get from the United States, with what sort of agreements would be signed. It never considered the social and political firestorm that might follow once restrictions on U.S. beef imports were loosened. The result was like the movie "Chronicle of a Death Foretold." The loosening of restrictions on U.S. beef imports caused major shockwaves to Taiwan. It is hard to believe that while negotiating restrictions on U.S. beef imports, the Ma administration never seriously considered the experience of Korea. It never considered offering the public a thorough explanation.
Actually, this sort of sluggish, even oblivious response, is not confined to the issue of U.S. beef imports. Over a year ago, nearly all of the Ma administration's key policies were plagued by this problem. The officials responsible were too politically naive. As a result minor issues often snowballed until they were beyond repair. The Ma administration was not necessarily the real culprit. But because it failed to handle matters properly, it often ended up as the scapegoat. For example, the Chen Shui-bian administration allowed in mainland China milk products. But melamine contamination was blamed on the Ma administration all the same.
The impact of policies and decisions should be explained to the public in advance, in order to increase public understanding, reduce public resistance, and prevent the political opposition from demagoguing the issue. The Ma administration has access to experts and scholars able to provide professional advice. It has access to politicians, civil servants, and elected representatives with long experience in politics. They have their fingers on the pulse of public opinion. They know how the political opposition will respond. They know opposition pundits will find the chinks in the administration's armor. They know how the administration must respond so that its policies can be successfully implemented. But high officials in the Ma administration have always assumed that the public would never question its policies, that the public would dutifully applaud its policies, giving it a free pass, and that all would be well under heaven. But is Taiwan society really like this? Was the Ma administration, from the president on down, born yesterday? The KMT may not fear sniping from the DPP. But when people lack sufficient information, when the government makes no effort to communicate, then no matter how well-intentioned those in power might be, the public will not automatically buy what they say. Besides, when policies are made by a handful of people, any blind spots and any ill-considered aspects have little chance of being corrected before being put into practice.
Did senior government officials conduct sand table exercises to gauge public reaction before loosening restrictions on U.S. beef imports? Shouldn't a ruling administration that hopes to act responsibly provide the the public with detailed information? Shouldn't it provide everyone with as much information possible about U.S. beef? For example, which countries have loosened which requirements on which beef parts? On which beef parts does our government intend to loosen restrictions? The Ma administration has a responsibility to provide the public with the facts before it decides to loosen restrictions. These policies have an impact on people's lives and property. The people have a right to be informed about the administration's policy measures.
During criminal investigations and trials, suspects often respond like toothpaste in a tube. However much pressure one applies, however much toothpaste one gets. However much evidence the prosecution obtains, however much the suspect confesses to. Frankly, the current administration is acting remarkably like a criminal suspect. However much the public complains and the political opposition criticizes, however much the Ma administration is willing to respond. Are we to conclude that if the public failed to complain, the administration would not even bother explaining its position? In an era of democracy, the public has strong opinions. Opposition parties are constantly sniffing for the scent of blood. If the Ma administration keeps its head in the sand, it will have an ever harder time. The DPP understands public sentiment only too well. It uses this understanding to lead the public around by the nose. The ruling KMT, on the other hand, understands public sentiment not at all. It does many things without first providing appropriate explanations. It has been blasted repeatedly, but never seems to awaken from its stupor. No wonder so many characterize the Ma administration as brain-dead. Some need a longer learning curve than others, but the Ma administration's learning curve is just a little too long.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.11.04
社論－早知如此 還是照著劇本走
本報訊
美國牛肉議題會發展到今天這樣如火燎原之勢，令大家最想追問的一個問題就是：這一切，難道事先完全都沒有預期嗎？
不論是太自信還是太自傲，可以確定的是，政府高層肯定是完全輕忽了它的後續效應。開放美國牛肉進口所可能引起的民間反彈，早在去年韓國就已經扎扎實實、明明白白地演練過一次了，激烈的社會抗爭讓韓國總統李明博陷入極為嚴重的政治危機；台灣的馬政府竟然完全沒有「前車可鑑」的意識，對開放美國牛肉一事的民間反應竟完全不做任何防備；只關注政策層面的攻防，要跟美國交換什麼、達成什麼協議，卻不去設想一旦美國牛肉開放進口之後，會在台灣社會以及政治層面引起什麼樣的風暴；結果就像電影《預知死亡紀事》一般，美國牛肉開放進口會帶來的大震撼，一一在台灣出現，真的很難讓人相信，政府當局在談判開放美牛時，沒有認真觀察、思考過韓國社會曾經出現的狀況，沒有因此想過應該要建立一套完整、負責任的說帖來說服社會大眾。
事實上，這種遲鈍、後知後覺甚至不知不覺，並不只有顯現在開放美國牛肉進口的這件事情上，老實說，一年多來，幾乎所有重要的政策都面臨這種問題。因為相關主事官員的神經太大條，結果常常讓本來不大的問題如滾雪球般變得難以收拾，或者本來馬政府不見得是最主要的肇事者，卻因為處理不當，大背黑鍋。如陳水扁時期通過了開放大陸奶品，但三聚氰胺的苦果，卻由馬政府概括承受一樣。
很多政策、決策會造成什麼樣的影響和結果，應該早在事前就跟人民做解釋說明，以增加社會的了解、減少施政的阻力，也預防在野黨藉機大肆炒作等，種種竅門，馬政府有許多專家學者可提供專業意見，也有許多長期從事政治活動的政治人物、官員、民意代表，可以抓得住民意脈動，知道在野黨會如何出招，名嘴會如何見縫插針，因此事前提出完整的對策，讓政策可以順利推動。然而，政府高層的反應卻好似總是「天真地」以為只要政府說一，整個社會就不會說二，大家拍拍手就過關了、天下太平了──台灣社會是這個樣子的嗎？馬政府從總統以降，是第一天從政嗎？國民黨就不怕被民進黨追著打、就不知道當人們資訊不足時，當人民看不到政府溝通的誠意時，哪管執政者的立意有多良善，誰說大家就一定要埋單？更何況，當決策只是集中於一小撮人拍案時，是不是有什麼盲點、是不是有什麼不周到的地方，恐怕根本沒有機會在付諸實行前被導正。
在這次開放美國牛肉進口之前，政府高層到底有沒有沙盤推演過社會大眾會有什麼樣的反應？是不是思考過做為一個負責任的執政者，應該給人民充分翔實的資訊，盡可能讓大家知道美國牛肉的資訊？例如，哪些國家開放了哪些部分，台灣政府又打算開放哪些部位、哪些類別不會開放等等，這些都是馬政府在決定開放之前，有責任要讓人民知道的；關係到人民身家性命財產安全的政策，人民本來就有權利知道政策全貌。
人們常說某些司法案件的偵辦過程，嫌疑人總像擠牙膏一樣，證據到哪裡，他才吐出那個部分的案情，老實講，當前政府的施政給人的感覺也跟擠牙膏很像，好像民意催到哪裡、反對黨罵到哪裡，馬政府才會處理到那裡，難道，假如社會沒有什麼意見，政府當局就不打算跟大家講清楚了嗎？當然，在這個民主時代，民意高漲，在野黨四處狩獵，如果馬政府果真如此心存僥倖，那日子肯定愈來愈難過；過往的民進黨是太會操作民意了，把社會集體意識放在手上把玩，現在的執政黨又似乎太不知民意需求了，做許多事之前都不考慮向人民做合宜的說明，事後被罵了不知幾次也不覺悟，難怪有人說馬政府麻木；這個執政團隊的學習曲線未免也太長了。
Tuesday, November 3, 2009
Ma Yung-cheng's Confession: The Lamentations of a Political Lackey
Ma Yung-cheng's Confession: The Lamentations of a Political Lackey
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 3, 2009
Ma Yung-cheng bian has been sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for his role in the Chen family corruption case. In a recent interview, Ma spoke for the first time about the despair he felt since his fall from grace. But all he did was air his grievances against Chen Shui-bian. He expressed no remorse for aiding and abetting the president's law-breaking and dereliction of duty. His entire confession read like the whining of an out of power political lackey.
Ma Yung-chen invested his entire youth on Chen Shui-bian. Ma Yung-cheng became Ah-Bian's assistant when he was in his twenties. As Chen Shui-bian's poltical fortune grew, so did his. Within ten years, he went from a star of the student movement to a member of the new political artistocracy. During his eight years in power, Ah-Bian made a swift downward slide into decadence. When it came time to mediate under the table government business agreements, Ma Yung-cheng was the Chen family's third in command. Oblivious to the perversion of his own values and goals, he and Ah-Bian plummeted from the summit of political power into the abyss, and from there, the custody of the law.
Neither Chen Shui-bian or Ma Yung-cheng are traditional politicians. Nevertheless they held high the banner of progress and reform. That is why their fall was especially distressing. Ma Yung-cheng criticized Chen Shui-bian, saying Chen should have had more guts. Instead "He's just like anybody else who has compromised his ideals." Actually Chen Shui-bian is not like anybody else. Because the average person is not so irredeemably corrupt. But the question is, who built Chen Shui-bian up, depicting him as the savior of Taiwan's democracy? Who helped him to amass such immense wealth through extortion, to abuse his power, and to cover up his crimes? Ah-Bian has already debased himself beyond recognition. But has Ma Yung-cheng ever asked himself, what about his own ideals? Why did he turn his back on political reform, and pursue the exact opposite path?
In Ma Yung-cheng's eyes, Chen Shui-bian committed only two sins. One, he transferred the money overseas. Second, he had an opportunity to deal with the problem, yet failed to do so. He could not persuade Wu Shu-chen to give the money back. In other words, In Ma Yung-cheng's eyes, Ah-Bian's sin was not the abuse of power or amassing vast wealth by means of extortion. Ah-Bian's sin was that he "should have hidden the money better, but didn't." In other words, as long as one hides the money away shrewdly enough, as long as one is not found out, whether the Chen family is greedy or breaks the law doesn't matter. Ma Yung-cheng also said Ah-Bian was wrong not to keep Wu Shu-chen under control. He implied that Ah-Bian was Ah-Cheng's victim. In reality, Chen Shui-bian is the source of the Chen family's corruption. Wu Shu-chen and Chen Chih-chung were merely "good managers" of the wealth illicitly amassed by Chen Shui-bian. In other words, Ah-Cheng was Ah-Bian's victim. Unless we intend to claim that Ah-Bian was Chen Chih-chung's victim?
To this day, Ma Yung-cheng feels that Chen Shui-bian's only sin was to fail to stash the money securely, and to allow himself to be victimized by Ah-Cheng. Therefore, to this day, Ma Yung-cheng has yet to engage in earnest soul-searching. Ma Yung-cheng said that "as I helped Ah-Bian maintain his political power, as I manipulated the apparatus of state, I always thought about what was in Ah-Bian's interest. I consulted my own conscience. I felt it was right to do what I did." Ma Yung-cheng wanted to underscore his "loyalty." But he was loyal not to his country, or his political philosophy, or even his duty. He was loyal to Chen Shui-bian alone. Does Ma Yung-cheng even remember why he got into politics? Does he not see the extent to which Ah-Bian and his family have betrayed the nation, and to which Ah-Bian has betrayed his duty as head of state? Why does he remain mired in self-delusion? Why doesn't he come to his senses? Why does he continue helping Ah-Bian conceal his crimes, including his "South Strategy Project" and his "Rewards Roster?"
Chen Shui-bian and Ma Yung-cheng have long been adept at crisis management. Over the years they have demonstrated an aptitude for spin doctoring. As long as they can adminster enough spin, they can lead the public around by the nose. To this day, Ma Yung-cheng remains unwilling to examine the Chen family corruption case from the perspective of democratic values and the legitimate use of power. Is politics for him nothing more than an amoral power game?
The most regrettable development was not that Ma Yung-cheng invested his youth on a political swindler, but that an entire generation of student movement leaders such as Ma Yung-cheng and Lin Teh-hsiung lost their way and lost their values. Chen Shui-bian has brought himself to ruin. But the most regrettable development is that Ma Yung-cheng and the "Boy Scouts" who helped Chen Shui-bian run the country never held any political values of their own. They were merely hangers-on content to cling to the margins of political power. Chen Shui-bian's wrongdoing was a mirror, one in which Ma Yung-cheng never saw his own reflection.
Ma Yung-cheng described how every day over the past year, he has woken up in a fog, and looked forward only to the time when he could again go to asleep. This "political golden boy" was once fast, accurate and relentless. He squandered his youth on Chen Shui-bian. Does he intend to squander the rest of his life on Chen Shui-bian as well? Ma Yung-cheng, open your eyes and ask yourself a question. Namely, how can a star of the student movement use his quiet time to atone to the student movement.
馬永成告白：一個政治轎夫的惆悵
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.03 04:39 am
在扁案被判廿年的馬永成最近接受媒體訪問，首度談到自己從雲端跌入深淵的失落。言談中，只聞他對陳水扁有怨尤，未見他對自己輔佐總統的違法失職有什麼悔意，通篇告白讀來像是一個失勢轎夫的喟嘆。
將自己的青春全部押給陳水扁，馬永成廿幾歲就擔任扁的助理，伴隨陳水扁的快速竄升，十幾年內，從一名學運紅人搖身變成當權政治新貴。扁執政八年一路走向墮落，馬永成則儼然是扁家操弄政商的第三隻手，在未及意識到自己的追求變質之際，已隨扁從政治頂峰栽落法網。
陳水扁和馬永成都不是傳統型的政治人物，而是打著改革、進步的大旗崛起；也正因為如此，他們的沉淪更讓人痛心。馬永成批評說，陳水扁其實可以更有Guts 一點，「他現在像個普通人了，某些理想的東西減低」。事實上，陳水扁現在仍然不是一個普通人，因為普通人不會怙惡不悛到此地步。問題是，當年誰把阿扁塑造成台灣民主救星？又是誰從旁幫他聚斂、濫權、遮掩？阿扁固已面目全非，但馬永成有沒有問過自己：理想還在不在？何以竟走到了改革的反面？
在馬永成眼中，阿扁的罪過只有兩項：一是把錢匯到海外，二是有機會處理卻未處理，因為他無法說服吳淑珍把錢弄回來。也就是說，在馬永成眼裡，扁的惡行不是濫權斂財，而是「應該把錢藏好卻沒藏好」；亦即，只要把錢藏得夠好，沒被發現，扁家貪不貪、違不違法根本無所謂。此外，馬永成又說扁錯在未能駕御吳淑珍，而暗指扁是被珍所害。其實，扁家整個貪腐的源頭及中樞皆在陳水扁，吳淑珍及陳致中等，只是扁所聚斂的贓款的「善良管理人」而已。就此以言，珍是被扁所害，難道能說成扁是被陳致中所害？
正因馬永成迄今仍認為陳水扁只是罪在「錢未藏好／被珍所害」，所以馬永成至今對自己亦無正確的反省。馬永成說，「在幫扁維持政權、運轉國家機器上，自己幾乎都是站在他的立場替扁思考；捫心自問，我覺得可以了。」馬永成要強調的是自己的「忠誠」，但他效忠的既不是國家，不是政治理念，也不是己身職務，而只是阿扁一人。馬永成若是猶記得自己從政的初衷，難道會看不出扁和家人背棄這個國家和他的元首職位有多遠嗎？為何仍執迷不悟地以「南線專案」及「犒賞清冊」為扁遮掩罪行？
在陳水扁和馬永成一向擅長的「危機處理」，多年來充斥著這類技術性的操作，只要把謊說得夠圓，就可以把社會大眾耍得團團轉。直至今日，馬永成還不願從民主的價值面及權力的正當性去反省扁案，對他而言，政治難道只是一場沒有價值信念的權力遊戲嗎？
令人遺憾的，不是馬永成把他的青春陪葬給一個政治騙子，而是整個學運世代的榮光隨著馬永成、林德訓等人的迷途而喪失意義。陳水扁身敗名裂倒也罷了，令人深憾的是：簇擁阿扁治國的馬永成等學運「童子軍」一夥，其實竟從來不曾擁有真正獨立的政治人格，而只是依附在政客身邊分享權力的糟粕而沾沾自喜。如果陳水扁的惡行是一面鏡子，馬永成別說沒在其中看見自己的身影。
馬永成形容，一年來，自己每天醒來，就昏昏沉沉等著再睡。當年以快、準、狠著稱的「政治金童」，將青春歲月在陳水扁身上輸得精光之後，難道還要把後半生也賠給陳水扁？馬永成何不睜開眼睛好好反省，一個人沾盡學運世代的榮光那麼多年，在回歸沉寂之際，應當用足夠深刻的反省向殞落的學運贖罪。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 3, 2009
Ma Yung-cheng bian has been sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for his role in the Chen family corruption case. In a recent interview, Ma spoke for the first time about the despair he felt since his fall from grace. But all he did was air his grievances against Chen Shui-bian. He expressed no remorse for aiding and abetting the president's law-breaking and dereliction of duty. His entire confession read like the whining of an out of power political lackey.
Ma Yung-chen invested his entire youth on Chen Shui-bian. Ma Yung-cheng became Ah-Bian's assistant when he was in his twenties. As Chen Shui-bian's poltical fortune grew, so did his. Within ten years, he went from a star of the student movement to a member of the new political artistocracy. During his eight years in power, Ah-Bian made a swift downward slide into decadence. When it came time to mediate under the table government business agreements, Ma Yung-cheng was the Chen family's third in command. Oblivious to the perversion of his own values and goals, he and Ah-Bian plummeted from the summit of political power into the abyss, and from there, the custody of the law.
Neither Chen Shui-bian or Ma Yung-cheng are traditional politicians. Nevertheless they held high the banner of progress and reform. That is why their fall was especially distressing. Ma Yung-cheng criticized Chen Shui-bian, saying Chen should have had more guts. Instead "He's just like anybody else who has compromised his ideals." Actually Chen Shui-bian is not like anybody else. Because the average person is not so irredeemably corrupt. But the question is, who built Chen Shui-bian up, depicting him as the savior of Taiwan's democracy? Who helped him to amass such immense wealth through extortion, to abuse his power, and to cover up his crimes? Ah-Bian has already debased himself beyond recognition. But has Ma Yung-cheng ever asked himself, what about his own ideals? Why did he turn his back on political reform, and pursue the exact opposite path?
In Ma Yung-cheng's eyes, Chen Shui-bian committed only two sins. One, he transferred the money overseas. Second, he had an opportunity to deal with the problem, yet failed to do so. He could not persuade Wu Shu-chen to give the money back. In other words, In Ma Yung-cheng's eyes, Ah-Bian's sin was not the abuse of power or amassing vast wealth by means of extortion. Ah-Bian's sin was that he "should have hidden the money better, but didn't." In other words, as long as one hides the money away shrewdly enough, as long as one is not found out, whether the Chen family is greedy or breaks the law doesn't matter. Ma Yung-cheng also said Ah-Bian was wrong not to keep Wu Shu-chen under control. He implied that Ah-Bian was Ah-Cheng's victim. In reality, Chen Shui-bian is the source of the Chen family's corruption. Wu Shu-chen and Chen Chih-chung were merely "good managers" of the wealth illicitly amassed by Chen Shui-bian. In other words, Ah-Cheng was Ah-Bian's victim. Unless we intend to claim that Ah-Bian was Chen Chih-chung's victim?
To this day, Ma Yung-cheng feels that Chen Shui-bian's only sin was to fail to stash the money securely, and to allow himself to be victimized by Ah-Cheng. Therefore, to this day, Ma Yung-cheng has yet to engage in earnest soul-searching. Ma Yung-cheng said that "as I helped Ah-Bian maintain his political power, as I manipulated the apparatus of state, I always thought about what was in Ah-Bian's interest. I consulted my own conscience. I felt it was right to do what I did." Ma Yung-cheng wanted to underscore his "loyalty." But he was loyal not to his country, or his political philosophy, or even his duty. He was loyal to Chen Shui-bian alone. Does Ma Yung-cheng even remember why he got into politics? Does he not see the extent to which Ah-Bian and his family have betrayed the nation, and to which Ah-Bian has betrayed his duty as head of state? Why does he remain mired in self-delusion? Why doesn't he come to his senses? Why does he continue helping Ah-Bian conceal his crimes, including his "South Strategy Project" and his "Rewards Roster?"
Chen Shui-bian and Ma Yung-cheng have long been adept at crisis management. Over the years they have demonstrated an aptitude for spin doctoring. As long as they can adminster enough spin, they can lead the public around by the nose. To this day, Ma Yung-cheng remains unwilling to examine the Chen family corruption case from the perspective of democratic values and the legitimate use of power. Is politics for him nothing more than an amoral power game?
The most regrettable development was not that Ma Yung-cheng invested his youth on a political swindler, but that an entire generation of student movement leaders such as Ma Yung-cheng and Lin Teh-hsiung lost their way and lost their values. Chen Shui-bian has brought himself to ruin. But the most regrettable development is that Ma Yung-cheng and the "Boy Scouts" who helped Chen Shui-bian run the country never held any political values of their own. They were merely hangers-on content to cling to the margins of political power. Chen Shui-bian's wrongdoing was a mirror, one in which Ma Yung-cheng never saw his own reflection.
Ma Yung-cheng described how every day over the past year, he has woken up in a fog, and looked forward only to the time when he could again go to asleep. This "political golden boy" was once fast, accurate and relentless. He squandered his youth on Chen Shui-bian. Does he intend to squander the rest of his life on Chen Shui-bian as well? Ma Yung-cheng, open your eyes and ask yourself a question. Namely, how can a star of the student movement use his quiet time to atone to the student movement.
馬永成告白：一個政治轎夫的惆悵
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.11.03 04:39 am
在扁案被判廿年的馬永成最近接受媒體訪問，首度談到自己從雲端跌入深淵的失落。言談中，只聞他對陳水扁有怨尤，未見他對自己輔佐總統的違法失職有什麼悔意，通篇告白讀來像是一個失勢轎夫的喟嘆。
將自己的青春全部押給陳水扁，馬永成廿幾歲就擔任扁的助理，伴隨陳水扁的快速竄升，十幾年內，從一名學運紅人搖身變成當權政治新貴。扁執政八年一路走向墮落，馬永成則儼然是扁家操弄政商的第三隻手，在未及意識到自己的追求變質之際，已隨扁從政治頂峰栽落法網。
陳水扁和馬永成都不是傳統型的政治人物，而是打著改革、進步的大旗崛起；也正因為如此，他們的沉淪更讓人痛心。馬永成批評說，陳水扁其實可以更有Guts 一點，「他現在像個普通人了，某些理想的東西減低」。事實上，陳水扁現在仍然不是一個普通人，因為普通人不會怙惡不悛到此地步。問題是，當年誰把阿扁塑造成台灣民主救星？又是誰從旁幫他聚斂、濫權、遮掩？阿扁固已面目全非，但馬永成有沒有問過自己：理想還在不在？何以竟走到了改革的反面？
在馬永成眼中，阿扁的罪過只有兩項：一是把錢匯到海外，二是有機會處理卻未處理，因為他無法說服吳淑珍把錢弄回來。也就是說，在馬永成眼裡，扁的惡行不是濫權斂財，而是「應該把錢藏好卻沒藏好」；亦即，只要把錢藏得夠好，沒被發現，扁家貪不貪、違不違法根本無所謂。此外，馬永成又說扁錯在未能駕御吳淑珍，而暗指扁是被珍所害。其實，扁家整個貪腐的源頭及中樞皆在陳水扁，吳淑珍及陳致中等，只是扁所聚斂的贓款的「善良管理人」而已。就此以言，珍是被扁所害，難道能說成扁是被陳致中所害？
正因馬永成迄今仍認為陳水扁只是罪在「錢未藏好／被珍所害」，所以馬永成至今對自己亦無正確的反省。馬永成說，「在幫扁維持政權、運轉國家機器上，自己幾乎都是站在他的立場替扁思考；捫心自問，我覺得可以了。」馬永成要強調的是自己的「忠誠」，但他效忠的既不是國家，不是政治理念，也不是己身職務，而只是阿扁一人。馬永成若是猶記得自己從政的初衷，難道會看不出扁和家人背棄這個國家和他的元首職位有多遠嗎？為何仍執迷不悟地以「南線專案」及「犒賞清冊」為扁遮掩罪行？
在陳水扁和馬永成一向擅長的「危機處理」，多年來充斥著這類技術性的操作，只要把謊說得夠圓，就可以把社會大眾耍得團團轉。直至今日，馬永成還不願從民主的價值面及權力的正當性去反省扁案，對他而言，政治難道只是一場沒有價值信念的權力遊戲嗎？
令人遺憾的，不是馬永成把他的青春陪葬給一個政治騙子，而是整個學運世代的榮光隨著馬永成、林德訓等人的迷途而喪失意義。陳水扁身敗名裂倒也罷了，令人深憾的是：簇擁阿扁治國的馬永成等學運「童子軍」一夥，其實竟從來不曾擁有真正獨立的政治人格，而只是依附在政客身邊分享權力的糟粕而沾沾自喜。如果陳水扁的惡行是一面鏡子，馬永成別說沒在其中看見自己的身影。
馬永成形容，一年來，自己每天醒來，就昏昏沉沉等著再睡。當年以快、準、狠著稱的「政治金童」，將青春歲月在陳水扁身上輸得精光之後，難道還要把後半生也賠給陳水扁？馬永成何不睜開眼睛好好反省，一個人沾盡學運世代的榮光那麼多年，在回歸沉寂之際，應當用足夠深刻的反省向殞落的學運贖罪。
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