Our Financial Situation is Dire: Do Not Invert Right and Wrong
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 12, 2010
The Republic of China's finances are not good. But domestic and foreign financial experts agree that while our financial situation may be far from ideal, it is not yet terminal. As long as the authorities understand the situation. As long as people with clear heads are in charge, we have a chance to turn the situation around. But if those in authority are confused, if they defy the basics of economics and finance, and engage in willful sophistry, then our situation cannot be turned around, and we cannot expect the situation to improve. Last week Treasury Chief Huang Ting-fang made a number of remarks reflecting the erroneous views held by the Ministry of Finance.
Over the past several months, whenever international credit rating agencies and domestic experts criticized our government's finances, Ministry of Finance officials would respond with two forms of sophistry. First, they would conflate "deficit" with "debt balance." Secondly, they would use "current account surplus" as a smoke screen for "overall deficit." Both are violations of the elementary rules of accounting and finance. And yet Ministry of Finance officials from the top down have engaged in such deceptions. But the more they dissemble, the sooner the truth will come out. They cannot deceive international credit rating agencies.
Let us clarify the meaning of debt balance. This is a basic term in accounting. A deficit means the government's annual revenue falls short of its expenditures. It is akin to corporate profit and loss. It represents annual "flow" figures. Flow figures alone cannot accurately reflect a nation's finances. Suppose a nation's total debt is high. Even if its annual income exceeds its expenditures, it may spend most of its annual revenue paying off the interest on old debts. Even if such a government shows a surplus for the year, it may not be able to make its payments.
For this reason, financial experts the world over propose using the debt balance as a replacement for the fiscal deficit when evaluating a government's financial situation. The so-called debt balance refers to a government's total outstanding debt. It is akin to the the "liabilities" on a corporate balance sheet. It refers to the amount of savings. It accurately reflects a government's total liabilities. All of the world's finance textbooks use debt balance to measure a government's finances. Credit rating agencies the world over do too. That financial authorities on Taiwan would seek to escape responsibility and cover up their dereliction of duty is not surprising. But to violate global accounting practices and engage in financial chicanery is intolerable.
Secondly, we would like to point out how the Ministry of Finance habitually uses the "current account surplus" to cover up its overall deficit. The Treasury Chief and the Minister of Finance have repeatedly told reporters Taiwan's "current account" has a surplus. They have said that its "capital accounts" are government investments that will provide future income, therefore the deficit is not that serious. But this is sophistry concealing a dangerous mistake.
Last year's financial tsunami left a number of well-known domestic flat panel manufacturers in financial straits, forcing them to accede to takeovers. The vast majority of these companies' expenses were used on depreciating their machinery. They were all "capital account" deficits. Yet the companies went under nevertheless. Consider Korea in 1997, when it received a knockout punch during the Asian financial crisis, primarily because investment was too fast and the debt ratio was too high. Korea spent most of its money on capital outlays. But its main problem was financial flow. If it could turn this around, it would succeed. It it couldn't, it would endure a painful death. The results would be the same whether it was due to current expenditures or capital expenditures. Examples of this abound. Yet the Treasury Chief and Treasury Minister offered the press so much sophistry.
Treasury officials twisted the truth each time our international credit ratings hit new lows. Their willful sophistry cannot of course fool professionals. Its only purpose is to mislead the president and the premier, who are not financial experts. If they are successful, they will have protected their rice bowls. Protecting the nation is not their concern.
We would like to remind Ma, Wu and other high officials that if they allow themselves to be duped about the basics of finance, and ignore the views of experts at home and abroad, it will reflect badly on them. Experts have invoked Tang Poet Li Bai's phrase, "Floating clouds constantly obscure the sun, I cannot no longer see the capitol and that is my sorrow." Let us hope this does not become the collective concern of Republic of China taxpayers.
財政問題嚴重 不容顛倒黑白
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.04.12 03:51 am
台灣的財政狀況不佳，幾乎是國內外財政專家的共識。這樣的財政結構儘管不理想，卻也還不至於病入膏肓；只要當局有危機意識，以理念清楚的人掌管其事，情況還是有轉圜的餘地。但是，如果主政者觀念混淆，還要以違反財政學ＡＢＣ的謬論肆意強辯，那不僅於事無補，也預告了未來情況難以改善。上周國庫署署長黃定方的一番言論，著實反映了財政部的錯謬見解，就格外值得批評。
在過去幾個月中，每當國際信評機構或國內專家學者對台灣財政有所批評，財政部高官就會抬出兩套歪理來予以抗辯，其一是以「財政赤字」混淆「負債餘額」，其二是以「經常帳剩餘」粉飾「整體赤字」。這兩種扭曲皆違反了會計學與財政學的ＡＢＣ，而財政部自部長以下的高官動輒作此等誤導，愈描愈黑，瞞不過國際信評專家。
讓我們弄清負債餘額的觀念。用最基本的會計語言來說，財政赤字是政府每年收入不及支出的數額，像是一般公司損益表上盈餘或赤字的觀念，是每年呈現的「流量」數字。只要舉個例子，就了解這流量數字不能正確反映國家的財政狀況。如果一個國家負債總量極高，即使這個國家每年收入大於支出，則每年支出的絕大多數金額都要用來支付舊債本息。因此，就算該國有年度盈餘，其財政也已經無法因應具有建設意義的支出。
正因如此，全世界財政學者才會主張以負債餘額取代財政赤字，來觀察一國的財務情況。所謂負債餘額，是指一國某一時點在外流通債務的總數，像是一般公司資產負債表中的「負債」總額，它是一個「存量」的觀念，正確刻劃出政府的總負債。全世界所有國家的財政學教科書，都是以負債餘額衡量政府財政狀況，而全世界所有信評機構也皆採用相同的指標。台灣的財政當局想要逃遁或掩飾失職的責任，外界可以理解；但要以扭曲全球共通會計原理的方式強辯，我們就萬難接受了。
其次，我們也要指出財政部喜用「經常帳剩餘」掩飾整體赤字錯誤之不當。國庫署長與財政部長多次向記者指陳，台灣的「經常帳」是有剩餘的，而「資本帳」是政府投資，將來有報酬，所以那裡產生的赤字不嚴重。但這樣的觀念又是一種狡辯式的扭曲，背後所隱藏的錯誤觀念其實非常危險。
如所周知，國內最近有知名面板公司在去年金融海嘯期間，因財務調度出問題而不得不被併購。這些公司的支出絕大多數是機器投資的折舊，都是「資本帳」的赤字，但是公司說倒就倒。再看一九九七年的韓國：當時該國受亞洲金融風暴襲擊而應聲倒地，主要也是因為該國投資太速、負債比率過高。韓國當年絕大多數的政府支出都是用在資本門，但財務問題主要就是個周轉問題，轉得過來就成功、周轉不過就死狀甚慘，不論是經常門或資本門，其後果都是一樣。外在事例不勝枚舉，而國庫署長與財政部長卻對記者講這麼多歪理，殊不足取。
財政部官員在多次國際信評墊底的情況下一再扭曲事實、強自辯解，當然不可能唬弄得了專業人士的判斷；其唯一的目的，應當就是要誤導不具財經專家訓練的總統與閣揆。一旦誤導成功，當然是保住了官位；至於是否繼續傷害台灣，那就不在他們的思慮之中了。
我們要提醒馬吳等府院高層：如果連這基本的財政學ＡＢＣ都能誤信一面之辭，完全不理會海內外所有的專家意見，其所宣示的意義是非常負面的。有學者在文章中點出「總為浮雲能蔽日、長安不見使人愁」的語句；但願這樣的憂慮，不要逐漸成為台灣人民的集體憂慮。
Monday, April 12, 2010
Friday, April 9, 2010
Industrial Innovation Act: MOE Version is Best
Industrial Innovation Act: MOE Version is Best
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 9, 2010
The sunset provisions for the "Statute for Upgrading Industries" kicked in last year. The Ministry of Economic Affairs offered its "Industrial Innovation Act" as a replacement. But just as the Legislative Yuan session was about to end, a big business operational headquarters tax provision popped up, raising a slew of side issues. Disputes erupted and the bill never became law.
During the current Legislative Yuan session, intense mobilization put the Industrial Innovation Act at the top of the to do list. Objectively speaking, it looked as if the bill would pass. But suddenly controversy arose. Two points of contention emerged. The first point of contention was the newly added Article 21. It states that "If small and medium businesses increase their staff, central government authorities must provide employment subsidies. These subsidies may be as high as 10,000 NT a month, and last up to six months. With elderly hirees, the subsidies may last up to one year." The other point of contention was the DPP's proposal that the business tax rate be lowered to 17. 5% from the 20% originally proposed by the Ministry of the Treasury. According to newspaper reports, the KMT has adopted an open-minded attitude toward the tax cuts. Given current tensions between the two parties, and our past experience with ruling and opposition party politicians, we fear compromises in the content of the Industrial Innovation Act. We hope that rationality will prevail, that matters have not gotten out of hand, and that a bill that harms our economy will not be passed.
First, let's look at the tax cuts proposed by the Democratic Progressive Party. Permit us to say in advance that it is a violation of the Budget Law. It is a populist provision that panders to voters and that has not been subjected to careful review. It makes no sense, and must not be hastily passed into law. In 2009 businesses on Taiwan paid 332.5 billion NT in income taxes. Most companies were subject to a tax rate of 25%. Every one percent reduction in tax rates equals 13.3 billion NT. The DPP proposes reducing the tax rate from its original 20% to 17.5%. In one fell swoop it is reducing the annual revenue in the national coffers by at least 33 billion NT. This is a significant loss of revenue. The DPP made this proposal without careful calcuation, without discussion, without mentioning the loss in revenues. It merely shouted tax cut slogans. What is this, if not populism? Is this the kind of behavior we should expect from a responsible political party?
Article 91 of the Budget Law stipulates that legislators who propose substantial increases or decreases in revenues must indicate how the shortfall in funds will be made up. When necessary, they must amend other laws. No matter how one slices it, a 30 billion NT reduction in annual tax revenues surely falls under this provision. The frustrating thing is that over the years both ruling and opposition party legislators have regarded the article as a dead letter. Logically speaking, amending the law is a clear violation of the Budget Law. The Executive Yuan would be well within its rights to demand a constitutional interpretation. Until then, it could treat the issue as a legal dispute and deal with it accordingly. Alas, both Blue and Green administrations have long dragged their feet when it came to tax cut cases. The Republic of China's fiscal plight is about to hit bottom. Yet the DPP insists on these spendthrift proposals. The next time our international credit rating is announced, the bill will come due, for both the KMT and the DPP. The responsibility for the current financial chaos would have been laid entirely at the feet of the ruling KMT and the Ministry of Finance. But since the opposition DPP has been complicit in this crime, it must share the blame. We would like to ask Chairman Tsai, was it really worth it?
Let's take a closer look at the Industrial Innovation Act. Article 20 provides employment subsidies. Frankly, one does not need an industry background to see that the provision of such subsidies for short-term employment will do nothing for "Industrial Innovation." To incorporate such provisions within an industrial innovation bill is absurd. Senior staff employment subsidies and short-term unemployment measures are not conducive to innovation. If anything, they discourage innovation. The administration could have pushed for employment subsidies any time it wanted. It had no reason for tacking an irrelevant provision onto such an important regulation. Secondly, the virtue of other governments' unemployment measures is their flexibility. Turning such provisions into law undermines flexibility. Worse, it is tantamount to assuming that Taiwan will remain plagued by high unemployment. It is tantamount to poor-mouthing Taiwan. Just exactly who in the ruling party proposed such a decadent, obtuse, and bizarre amendment? One really has to wonder.
In sum, we oppose the 17.5% business tax rate proposed by the DPP. We oppose the employment subsidies proposed by the KMT in Article 21. We oppose additional tax cuts for operational headquarters. We support the Ministry of Economic Affairs' original proposal. The aforementioned amendments underscore just how indolent ruling and opposition party legislators have been. Legislators receive research assistant subsidies amounting to several hundred thousands of NT a month. Who knows where these subsidies have wound up? These legislators deserve condemnation. Finally, we must blame the KMT for its failure to coordinate between the party and the administration. They have actually make such outrageous proposals regarding operational headquarters and employment benefits. They have actually allowed them to undergo a Second Reading. If the ruling and opposition parties persist in amending the law in such an irresponsible fashion, what can we say, other than "You are a disgrace!"
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.04.09
產創條例 經濟部原始版本最好
本報訊
《促進產業升級條例》已於去年底落日，原本經濟部要提出《產業創新條例》以為取代，但在立法院院會結束前，突然冒出一個大企業營運總部的免稅條文，徒然旁生枝節，擾攘紛爭之下，並沒有完成立法。
立法院這個會期在高層動員之下，將《產業創新條例》列為優先法案，就客觀情勢來看該法也必然會通過，但是又半路殺出程咬金，重新出現兩個爭議點。其一是新增的廿條之一，其內容是「中小企業增雇一定員工，中央主管機關得予補助，預計一個月可補助一萬元，最長六個月，聘僱高齡者，補助時可延長一年」；其二是民進黨建議將營所稅率從原先財政部建議的二○％，再降為十七．五％意見，報載國民黨對減稅採開放態度。以目前兩黨劍拔弩張的態勢，參酌以往朝野政治人物和稀泥的經驗，我們對於《產創條例》最後的協商通過內容深以為憂。我們希望及早理性推論，以免覆水難收，立出一部傷害台灣經濟的法律。
先看民進黨所提的降稅動議。讓我們先說結論：這是一個違反《預算法》、討好選民、沒有經過細密討論的民粹條文；不但沒有道理提案，更不該這樣倉卒立法。二 ○○九年台灣營利事業所得稅實收三三二五億，以絕大多數企業適用的二五％稅率計算，每降一趴稅率就是一百三十三億。當民進黨建議，將稅率由原法的二○％降至十七．五％時，就是一舉每年至少減少國庫三百卅億稅收。這麼大幅度的稅收損失，民進黨立委提案卻是未精算、未論述、未提稅損的後果，只是一股腦地狂喊降稅；這不是民粹是什麼？這像是負責任的政黨所該有的作為嗎？
《預算法》九十一條明訂，立法委員所提法律案大幅增加或減少歲入者，應指明彌補資金之來源，必要時應同時提案修正其他法律。每年減少稅收三百多億，不論用什麼角度來看都是該條文所應規範的對象，無奈朝野立委歷年來一向將該法律條文視同具文。照理說，在立委修法動議明顯違反《預算法》時，行政當局大可聲請釋憲，並在結果出爐之前以法律爭議疑義處理之。無奈不論是藍綠政黨執政期間，從來就是對所有減稅案「半推半就」。在台灣財政行將破底之際，民進黨若再去堅持這種敗家子動議，在下次國際信評出爐時，這筆帳就會由民進黨替國民黨來擔了。原本，該黨大可將當前財政亂局總歸為執政黨與財政部的責任，如今卻自己成為共犯。請問蔡主席，這樣做划得來嗎？
再分析《產創條例》廿條之一的就業補助條文。老實說，任何人不需要產業背景都能看出，這種補助短期就業的條文與「產業創新」根本八桿子打不著，放在產創條例之中簡直是精神錯亂。補助聘僱高齡員工，除了降低短期失業的作用之外，其實是不利於創新的、是反向鼓勵人員更新的。再說，此類促進就業補助案行政當局原本就可以做，犯不著放在位階極高的法律條例中畫蛇添足。其次，國外所有挽救失業的措施貴在其彈性與機動，而放在法律條文不但是最欠缺彈性的處理，更在立法背景上就等同假設台灣將「持續」處於高失業狀態，完全是唱衰台灣的心態。執政黨中究竟是誰能提出這麼墮落、這麼愚蠢、這麼脫線的修正條文，真是令人不解。
整體而言，我們反對民進黨所提營所稅降至十七．五％的修正案、反對國民黨廿條之一的就業補助案、反對營運總部擴大降稅率，而支持經濟部原始的提案。事實上，前述修正案不折不扣凸顯出朝野提案立委的不用功、不長進。立委每個月數十萬元的研究助理補助費，都不知用到哪裡去了，應該予以譴責。最後，我們也要責備國民黨的黨政協調機制；竟然連營運總部、補助就業這麼離譜的提案，也能過關斬將送到院會二讀。朝野政黨如果老是以這種態度修法，我們除了「丟人現眼」四個字之外，實在也說不出什麼好話了。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 9, 2010
The sunset provisions for the "Statute for Upgrading Industries" kicked in last year. The Ministry of Economic Affairs offered its "Industrial Innovation Act" as a replacement. But just as the Legislative Yuan session was about to end, a big business operational headquarters tax provision popped up, raising a slew of side issues. Disputes erupted and the bill never became law.
During the current Legislative Yuan session, intense mobilization put the Industrial Innovation Act at the top of the to do list. Objectively speaking, it looked as if the bill would pass. But suddenly controversy arose. Two points of contention emerged. The first point of contention was the newly added Article 21. It states that "If small and medium businesses increase their staff, central government authorities must provide employment subsidies. These subsidies may be as high as 10,000 NT a month, and last up to six months. With elderly hirees, the subsidies may last up to one year." The other point of contention was the DPP's proposal that the business tax rate be lowered to 17. 5% from the 20% originally proposed by the Ministry of the Treasury. According to newspaper reports, the KMT has adopted an open-minded attitude toward the tax cuts. Given current tensions between the two parties, and our past experience with ruling and opposition party politicians, we fear compromises in the content of the Industrial Innovation Act. We hope that rationality will prevail, that matters have not gotten out of hand, and that a bill that harms our economy will not be passed.
First, let's look at the tax cuts proposed by the Democratic Progressive Party. Permit us to say in advance that it is a violation of the Budget Law. It is a populist provision that panders to voters and that has not been subjected to careful review. It makes no sense, and must not be hastily passed into law. In 2009 businesses on Taiwan paid 332.5 billion NT in income taxes. Most companies were subject to a tax rate of 25%. Every one percent reduction in tax rates equals 13.3 billion NT. The DPP proposes reducing the tax rate from its original 20% to 17.5%. In one fell swoop it is reducing the annual revenue in the national coffers by at least 33 billion NT. This is a significant loss of revenue. The DPP made this proposal without careful calcuation, without discussion, without mentioning the loss in revenues. It merely shouted tax cut slogans. What is this, if not populism? Is this the kind of behavior we should expect from a responsible political party?
Article 91 of the Budget Law stipulates that legislators who propose substantial increases or decreases in revenues must indicate how the shortfall in funds will be made up. When necessary, they must amend other laws. No matter how one slices it, a 30 billion NT reduction in annual tax revenues surely falls under this provision. The frustrating thing is that over the years both ruling and opposition party legislators have regarded the article as a dead letter. Logically speaking, amending the law is a clear violation of the Budget Law. The Executive Yuan would be well within its rights to demand a constitutional interpretation. Until then, it could treat the issue as a legal dispute and deal with it accordingly. Alas, both Blue and Green administrations have long dragged their feet when it came to tax cut cases. The Republic of China's fiscal plight is about to hit bottom. Yet the DPP insists on these spendthrift proposals. The next time our international credit rating is announced, the bill will come due, for both the KMT and the DPP. The responsibility for the current financial chaos would have been laid entirely at the feet of the ruling KMT and the Ministry of Finance. But since the opposition DPP has been complicit in this crime, it must share the blame. We would like to ask Chairman Tsai, was it really worth it?
Let's take a closer look at the Industrial Innovation Act. Article 20 provides employment subsidies. Frankly, one does not need an industry background to see that the provision of such subsidies for short-term employment will do nothing for "Industrial Innovation." To incorporate such provisions within an industrial innovation bill is absurd. Senior staff employment subsidies and short-term unemployment measures are not conducive to innovation. If anything, they discourage innovation. The administration could have pushed for employment subsidies any time it wanted. It had no reason for tacking an irrelevant provision onto such an important regulation. Secondly, the virtue of other governments' unemployment measures is their flexibility. Turning such provisions into law undermines flexibility. Worse, it is tantamount to assuming that Taiwan will remain plagued by high unemployment. It is tantamount to poor-mouthing Taiwan. Just exactly who in the ruling party proposed such a decadent, obtuse, and bizarre amendment? One really has to wonder.
In sum, we oppose the 17.5% business tax rate proposed by the DPP. We oppose the employment subsidies proposed by the KMT in Article 21. We oppose additional tax cuts for operational headquarters. We support the Ministry of Economic Affairs' original proposal. The aforementioned amendments underscore just how indolent ruling and opposition party legislators have been. Legislators receive research assistant subsidies amounting to several hundred thousands of NT a month. Who knows where these subsidies have wound up? These legislators deserve condemnation. Finally, we must blame the KMT for its failure to coordinate between the party and the administration. They have actually make such outrageous proposals regarding operational headquarters and employment benefits. They have actually allowed them to undergo a Second Reading. If the ruling and opposition parties persist in amending the law in such an irresponsible fashion, what can we say, other than "You are a disgrace!"
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.04.09
產創條例 經濟部原始版本最好
本報訊
《促進產業升級條例》已於去年底落日，原本經濟部要提出《產業創新條例》以為取代，但在立法院院會結束前，突然冒出一個大企業營運總部的免稅條文，徒然旁生枝節，擾攘紛爭之下，並沒有完成立法。
立法院這個會期在高層動員之下，將《產業創新條例》列為優先法案，就客觀情勢來看該法也必然會通過，但是又半路殺出程咬金，重新出現兩個爭議點。其一是新增的廿條之一，其內容是「中小企業增雇一定員工，中央主管機關得予補助，預計一個月可補助一萬元，最長六個月，聘僱高齡者，補助時可延長一年」；其二是民進黨建議將營所稅率從原先財政部建議的二○％，再降為十七．五％意見，報載國民黨對減稅採開放態度。以目前兩黨劍拔弩張的態勢，參酌以往朝野政治人物和稀泥的經驗，我們對於《產創條例》最後的協商通過內容深以為憂。我們希望及早理性推論，以免覆水難收，立出一部傷害台灣經濟的法律。
先看民進黨所提的降稅動議。讓我們先說結論：這是一個違反《預算法》、討好選民、沒有經過細密討論的民粹條文；不但沒有道理提案，更不該這樣倉卒立法。二 ○○九年台灣營利事業所得稅實收三三二五億，以絕大多數企業適用的二五％稅率計算，每降一趴稅率就是一百三十三億。當民進黨建議，將稅率由原法的二○％降至十七．五％時，就是一舉每年至少減少國庫三百卅億稅收。這麼大幅度的稅收損失，民進黨立委提案卻是未精算、未論述、未提稅損的後果，只是一股腦地狂喊降稅；這不是民粹是什麼？這像是負責任的政黨所該有的作為嗎？
《預算法》九十一條明訂，立法委員所提法律案大幅增加或減少歲入者，應指明彌補資金之來源，必要時應同時提案修正其他法律。每年減少稅收三百多億，不論用什麼角度來看都是該條文所應規範的對象，無奈朝野立委歷年來一向將該法律條文視同具文。照理說，在立委修法動議明顯違反《預算法》時，行政當局大可聲請釋憲，並在結果出爐之前以法律爭議疑義處理之。無奈不論是藍綠政黨執政期間，從來就是對所有減稅案「半推半就」。在台灣財政行將破底之際，民進黨若再去堅持這種敗家子動議，在下次國際信評出爐時，這筆帳就會由民進黨替國民黨來擔了。原本，該黨大可將當前財政亂局總歸為執政黨與財政部的責任，如今卻自己成為共犯。請問蔡主席，這樣做划得來嗎？
再分析《產創條例》廿條之一的就業補助條文。老實說，任何人不需要產業背景都能看出，這種補助短期就業的條文與「產業創新」根本八桿子打不著，放在產創條例之中簡直是精神錯亂。補助聘僱高齡員工，除了降低短期失業的作用之外，其實是不利於創新的、是反向鼓勵人員更新的。再說，此類促進就業補助案行政當局原本就可以做，犯不著放在位階極高的法律條例中畫蛇添足。其次，國外所有挽救失業的措施貴在其彈性與機動，而放在法律條文不但是最欠缺彈性的處理，更在立法背景上就等同假設台灣將「持續」處於高失業狀態，完全是唱衰台灣的心態。執政黨中究竟是誰能提出這麼墮落、這麼愚蠢、這麼脫線的修正條文，真是令人不解。
整體而言，我們反對民進黨所提營所稅降至十七．五％的修正案、反對國民黨廿條之一的就業補助案、反對營運總部擴大降稅率，而支持經濟部原始的提案。事實上，前述修正案不折不扣凸顯出朝野提案立委的不用功、不長進。立委每個月數十萬元的研究助理補助費，都不知用到哪裡去了，應該予以譴責。最後，我們也要責備國民黨的黨政協調機制；竟然連營運總部、補助就業這麼離譜的提案，也能過關斬將送到院會二讀。朝野政黨如果老是以這種態度修法，我們除了「丟人現眼」四個字之外，實在也說不出什麼好話了。
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Welcome the Era of Dialogue: Do Not Tie Ourselves Down
Welcome the Era of Dialogue:
Do Not Tie Ourselves Down
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 8, 2010
Former Premier Liu Chao-hsuan is about to visit the Mainland, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Cultural Association. He will participate in the Shanghai Expo Taiwan Pavilion torch lighting ceremony. Not surprisingly, the Democratic Progressive Party has expressed its opposition. Spokesperson Tsai Chi-chang held a press conference and said that Liu's status made it inappropriate for him to visit the Mainland. The DPP said it was concerned that former officials of the Ma administration might negotiate with Beijing and arrive at agreements unfavorable to Taiwan.
Meanwhile, Shanghai Mayor Han Zheng is coming to Taiwan to conduct city to city exchanges. Elected officials from the Green Camp have protested, expressing opposition to [Mainland] China and ECFA. The Shanghai World Expo is about to open. Taipei meanwhile, is making preparations for a floral exposition. Taipei and Shanghai are now Twin Cities casting their light upon each other. This is a development many have looked forward to. Han Zheng is the highest-level local level official ever to visit Taiwan. Naturally his visit has attracted a great deal of attention. Previous visits by Mainland officials such as Chen Yunlin and Zhang Mingqing had a shock effect. By contrast the scale of protests against Han Zheng is modest. Han Zheng's itinerary takes him only as far south as Taichung. The "port cities" OTC Companies Association of Kaoshiung City, Kaohsiung County, and Pingtung expressed regret. It hoped that Mainland China would not favor northern Taiwan over the south. Their implication was that entrepreneurs in the south were eager to take advantage of commercial opportunities on the Mainland.
The public wants exchanges. Only exchanges will increase understanding and create opportunities. But the DPP has apparently decided that the Ma administration must not be permitted to have any dealings with the Mainland. Because as long as it has dealings, it might "sell out Taiwan." Tsai Chi-chang held a press conference opposing Liu Chao-hsuan's visit to the Mainland. He said the DPP cannot understand why so many retired Ma administration officials are so eager to visit the Chinese Mainland. What is the purpose behind their visits? What good are they going to do Taiwan? Tsai Chi-chang's question is a good one. The answer however, is right under the DPP's own nose. The Chen administration froze cross-Strait exchanges for eight years. It failed to do what it should have. Many matters were delayed. Can we afford to delay any longer? Consider a high school student. He has goofed off for three years. He must now take his college entrance exams. He now realizes his fellow students are well prepared. His own grades on the other hand, have stagnated, or even plummeted. So he begins working frantically in a desperate effort to catch up, hoping it is not too late.
But let's return to our point. If the Ma administration could secretly sign a treaty and "sell out Taiwan" by dispatching a single individual to the Mainland, then why is Ma Ying-jeou bothering to debate ECFA with Tsai Ing-wen? Why is he seeking the support of the public and the DPP? President Ma could simply settle the matter with the Mainland on his own and be done with it. Many voices of dissent have been raised during ECFA negotiations. The DPP ought to have a little more faith in the Republic of China's democracy. The Ma administration lacks the wherewithal to act willfully and arbitrarily. If the DPP truly believes Liu Chao-hsuan can make an illicit deal with Beijing, giving away the store, it is over-estimating the Ma administration's ability. It is also underestimated the intelligence of the public on Taiwan.
Cross-Strait politics is a sensitive issue. But even cross-Strait economic exchanges provoke complex feelings many on Taiwan have difficulty voicing. Taiwan's economic development once led the Mainland's by a wide margin. Now however, the Mainland has caught up. Now, when the Mainland talks of "profit sharing," many on Taiwan become uncomfortable. It means Taiwan no longer has a clear advantage, changing cross-Strait economic interaction. Politically sensitive issues also affect what should be purely economic issues. Taiwan cannot realistically terminate exchanges and interaction with the Mainland due to such concerns. The DPP's deliberately recalcitrant attitude is unworkable. We must find the best way to provide the public with greater opportunities, and the best way to relate to the Mainland. The best way is through shared culture. The two sides share a common culture. But accidents of history, differences in life experiences and in political systems have led to different cultural highlights. The political and social environment on Taiwan is diverse and open. Traditional culture has been reborn, even as popular culture flourishes. Our rich cultural assets have become our most potent form of soft power in our exchanges with the Mainland.
Liu Chao-hsuan was once premier. He is highly qualified and resourceful. He has President Ma's trust. He has considerable status both Internally and externally. He is well qualified to promote certain matters. He would make an excellent cultural ambassador. Does Chen Chu realize the importance of promoting Kaohsiung as a transport center? If she does, then others surely realize that in this highly competitive era we must seize every opportunity. We must not fear that Taiwan will be "sold out." What we ought to fear is egotism and isolationism. Those are what will leave us out in the cold.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.04.08
迎接對話的年代 別再綁死自己
本報訊
前行政院長劉兆玄即將以「國家文化總會會長」身分訪問大陸，參加上海世博台灣館的點燈儀式。不意外的，民進黨立刻發聲反對，發言人蔡其昌召開記者會表示，劉兆玄身分敏感，不宜赴大陸。民進黨擔心的是：馬政府卸任官員與對岸進行談判，做對台灣不利的決定。
另一方面，上海市長韓正來台灣進行城市交流，也有部分綠營民意代表出面嗆聲，表達反中、反ＥＣＦＡ的訴求。上海世博即將開幕，台北則正在熱鬧準備花博，台北、上海雙城互放光亮，本是許多人的願望，而韓正是歷次大陸訪台最高層級的地方官員，他的台灣首行自然引起高度關注。不過，相較於過往大陸官員如陳雲林、張銘清來台灣受到的震撼教育，抗議韓正的規模並不算太大，甚至因為這次韓正的行程只到台中，沒有南下，高高屏上市、上櫃公司聯誼會的「港都會」還表示遺憾，希望大陸對台灣不要「重北輕南」，言下之意，對爭取大陸的關注和商機，南部企業家們充滿期待。
人民要的是交流，因為只有透過交流，人與人之間才會更了解，也才能夠創造出更發展的機會。不過，似乎民進黨還是認為馬政府不應該跟大陸有什麼來往，因為只要一有來往，就有賣台的嫌疑。在反對劉兆玄赴大陸記者會中，蔡其昌表示，民進黨無法理解，為何有這麼多馬政府的卸任官員，急著去中國大陸，背後有什麼目的、對台灣又有何好處？蔡其昌問的是個好問題，但是答案其實是在民進黨自己身上：扁政府執政八年兩岸關係冰凍，該做的沒做，很多事被耽誤了，現在能不拚嗎？這就像一個高中生混了三年，最近要考大學，發覺同學個個都有不錯的準備，自己的成績卻停滯不前，甚至一落千丈，於是發奮圖強，天天追趕進度，為的就是希望一切還來得及。
話說回來，如果馬政府派一個什麼人去大陸，就可以偷偷簽兩黨密約，把台灣給賣了，那馬英九又何必跟蔡英文針對ＥＣＦＡ舉行什麼辯論會、要積極爭取民意與民進黨的支持呢？不是馬總統跟大陸方面談好就好了嗎。從ＥＣＦＡ洽簽過程中出現了各種不同的聲音，民進黨就應該對台灣的民主政治有信心，馬政府沒有那麼大的本事可以一意孤行，隨心所欲；如果民進黨到現在還相信，劉兆玄去一趟大陸就可以跟對岸私相授受，簽訂什麼對台灣不利的條約，這是高估了馬政府的能耐，也是低估了台灣人民的智慧。
當然，在政治上，兩岸之間畢竟還是存在著一定的敏感性；而在經濟議題上，老實講，很多台灣人心中有著一種難以言說的複雜感受。因為台灣與大陸的經濟發展，從一開始台灣的大幅領先到目前大陸的迎頭趕上，使得很多台灣人聽到大陸的「讓利說」，會打從心底感覺到不舒服；因為台灣不再擁有明顯的優勢，使得兩岸經濟互動的相對位置出現變化，一些政治上的敏感議題，經濟上也漸漸難以逃避，對台灣來說，兩岸實際上又不可能因為有顧忌或者難題，而停止交流、互動，現實上，民進黨處處刻意拉高姿態的邏輯和做法也行不通，我們總要尋找適當的議題，讓台灣可以有機會用最好的態度與對岸展開交流，為自己創造更多機會，「文化」可以說是最好的切入點：兩岸既有共同的文化淵源，又因為歷史機遇、生活經驗和政治體制之不同，各自創造了不同的文化亮點，特別是台灣因為多元開放的政治與社會環境，從流行文化到傳統文化再生，豐富的文化資產早已成為我們與大陸交流時最有能量也最溫柔的一分利器。
劉兆玄以其曾經擔任行政院長的資歷與資源，加上得到馬總統的信任，對內、對外，都擁有一定的高度，也有比較好的條件真正有效地推動一些事情，是合適的文化大使人選；如果陳菊也知道到對岸推銷高雄市運很重要，相信更多人會了解在這個高度競爭的時代，台灣一定要緊緊抓住每一個可以行銷台灣的機會──不要怕台灣會被賣掉，要擔心的是如果再這樣自以為是、自我封閉，台灣恐怕有行無市。
Do Not Tie Ourselves Down
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 8, 2010
Former Premier Liu Chao-hsuan is about to visit the Mainland, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Cultural Association. He will participate in the Shanghai Expo Taiwan Pavilion torch lighting ceremony. Not surprisingly, the Democratic Progressive Party has expressed its opposition. Spokesperson Tsai Chi-chang held a press conference and said that Liu's status made it inappropriate for him to visit the Mainland. The DPP said it was concerned that former officials of the Ma administration might negotiate with Beijing and arrive at agreements unfavorable to Taiwan.
Meanwhile, Shanghai Mayor Han Zheng is coming to Taiwan to conduct city to city exchanges. Elected officials from the Green Camp have protested, expressing opposition to [Mainland] China and ECFA. The Shanghai World Expo is about to open. Taipei meanwhile, is making preparations for a floral exposition. Taipei and Shanghai are now Twin Cities casting their light upon each other. This is a development many have looked forward to. Han Zheng is the highest-level local level official ever to visit Taiwan. Naturally his visit has attracted a great deal of attention. Previous visits by Mainland officials such as Chen Yunlin and Zhang Mingqing had a shock effect. By contrast the scale of protests against Han Zheng is modest. Han Zheng's itinerary takes him only as far south as Taichung. The "port cities" OTC Companies Association of Kaoshiung City, Kaohsiung County, and Pingtung expressed regret. It hoped that Mainland China would not favor northern Taiwan over the south. Their implication was that entrepreneurs in the south were eager to take advantage of commercial opportunities on the Mainland.
The public wants exchanges. Only exchanges will increase understanding and create opportunities. But the DPP has apparently decided that the Ma administration must not be permitted to have any dealings with the Mainland. Because as long as it has dealings, it might "sell out Taiwan." Tsai Chi-chang held a press conference opposing Liu Chao-hsuan's visit to the Mainland. He said the DPP cannot understand why so many retired Ma administration officials are so eager to visit the Chinese Mainland. What is the purpose behind their visits? What good are they going to do Taiwan? Tsai Chi-chang's question is a good one. The answer however, is right under the DPP's own nose. The Chen administration froze cross-Strait exchanges for eight years. It failed to do what it should have. Many matters were delayed. Can we afford to delay any longer? Consider a high school student. He has goofed off for three years. He must now take his college entrance exams. He now realizes his fellow students are well prepared. His own grades on the other hand, have stagnated, or even plummeted. So he begins working frantically in a desperate effort to catch up, hoping it is not too late.
But let's return to our point. If the Ma administration could secretly sign a treaty and "sell out Taiwan" by dispatching a single individual to the Mainland, then why is Ma Ying-jeou bothering to debate ECFA with Tsai Ing-wen? Why is he seeking the support of the public and the DPP? President Ma could simply settle the matter with the Mainland on his own and be done with it. Many voices of dissent have been raised during ECFA negotiations. The DPP ought to have a little more faith in the Republic of China's democracy. The Ma administration lacks the wherewithal to act willfully and arbitrarily. If the DPP truly believes Liu Chao-hsuan can make an illicit deal with Beijing, giving away the store, it is over-estimating the Ma administration's ability. It is also underestimated the intelligence of the public on Taiwan.
Cross-Strait politics is a sensitive issue. But even cross-Strait economic exchanges provoke complex feelings many on Taiwan have difficulty voicing. Taiwan's economic development once led the Mainland's by a wide margin. Now however, the Mainland has caught up. Now, when the Mainland talks of "profit sharing," many on Taiwan become uncomfortable. It means Taiwan no longer has a clear advantage, changing cross-Strait economic interaction. Politically sensitive issues also affect what should be purely economic issues. Taiwan cannot realistically terminate exchanges and interaction with the Mainland due to such concerns. The DPP's deliberately recalcitrant attitude is unworkable. We must find the best way to provide the public with greater opportunities, and the best way to relate to the Mainland. The best way is through shared culture. The two sides share a common culture. But accidents of history, differences in life experiences and in political systems have led to different cultural highlights. The political and social environment on Taiwan is diverse and open. Traditional culture has been reborn, even as popular culture flourishes. Our rich cultural assets have become our most potent form of soft power in our exchanges with the Mainland.
Liu Chao-hsuan was once premier. He is highly qualified and resourceful. He has President Ma's trust. He has considerable status both Internally and externally. He is well qualified to promote certain matters. He would make an excellent cultural ambassador. Does Chen Chu realize the importance of promoting Kaohsiung as a transport center? If she does, then others surely realize that in this highly competitive era we must seize every opportunity. We must not fear that Taiwan will be "sold out." What we ought to fear is egotism and isolationism. Those are what will leave us out in the cold.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.04.08
迎接對話的年代 別再綁死自己
本報訊
前行政院長劉兆玄即將以「國家文化總會會長」身分訪問大陸，參加上海世博台灣館的點燈儀式。不意外的，民進黨立刻發聲反對，發言人蔡其昌召開記者會表示，劉兆玄身分敏感，不宜赴大陸。民進黨擔心的是：馬政府卸任官員與對岸進行談判，做對台灣不利的決定。
另一方面，上海市長韓正來台灣進行城市交流，也有部分綠營民意代表出面嗆聲，表達反中、反ＥＣＦＡ的訴求。上海世博即將開幕，台北則正在熱鬧準備花博，台北、上海雙城互放光亮，本是許多人的願望，而韓正是歷次大陸訪台最高層級的地方官員，他的台灣首行自然引起高度關注。不過，相較於過往大陸官員如陳雲林、張銘清來台灣受到的震撼教育，抗議韓正的規模並不算太大，甚至因為這次韓正的行程只到台中，沒有南下，高高屏上市、上櫃公司聯誼會的「港都會」還表示遺憾，希望大陸對台灣不要「重北輕南」，言下之意，對爭取大陸的關注和商機，南部企業家們充滿期待。
人民要的是交流，因為只有透過交流，人與人之間才會更了解，也才能夠創造出更發展的機會。不過，似乎民進黨還是認為馬政府不應該跟大陸有什麼來往，因為只要一有來往，就有賣台的嫌疑。在反對劉兆玄赴大陸記者會中，蔡其昌表示，民進黨無法理解，為何有這麼多馬政府的卸任官員，急著去中國大陸，背後有什麼目的、對台灣又有何好處？蔡其昌問的是個好問題，但是答案其實是在民進黨自己身上：扁政府執政八年兩岸關係冰凍，該做的沒做，很多事被耽誤了，現在能不拚嗎？這就像一個高中生混了三年，最近要考大學，發覺同學個個都有不錯的準備，自己的成績卻停滯不前，甚至一落千丈，於是發奮圖強，天天追趕進度，為的就是希望一切還來得及。
話說回來，如果馬政府派一個什麼人去大陸，就可以偷偷簽兩黨密約，把台灣給賣了，那馬英九又何必跟蔡英文針對ＥＣＦＡ舉行什麼辯論會、要積極爭取民意與民進黨的支持呢？不是馬總統跟大陸方面談好就好了嗎。從ＥＣＦＡ洽簽過程中出現了各種不同的聲音，民進黨就應該對台灣的民主政治有信心，馬政府沒有那麼大的本事可以一意孤行，隨心所欲；如果民進黨到現在還相信，劉兆玄去一趟大陸就可以跟對岸私相授受，簽訂什麼對台灣不利的條約，這是高估了馬政府的能耐，也是低估了台灣人民的智慧。
當然，在政治上，兩岸之間畢竟還是存在著一定的敏感性；而在經濟議題上，老實講，很多台灣人心中有著一種難以言說的複雜感受。因為台灣與大陸的經濟發展，從一開始台灣的大幅領先到目前大陸的迎頭趕上，使得很多台灣人聽到大陸的「讓利說」，會打從心底感覺到不舒服；因為台灣不再擁有明顯的優勢，使得兩岸經濟互動的相對位置出現變化，一些政治上的敏感議題，經濟上也漸漸難以逃避，對台灣來說，兩岸實際上又不可能因為有顧忌或者難題，而停止交流、互動，現實上，民進黨處處刻意拉高姿態的邏輯和做法也行不通，我們總要尋找適當的議題，讓台灣可以有機會用最好的態度與對岸展開交流，為自己創造更多機會，「文化」可以說是最好的切入點：兩岸既有共同的文化淵源，又因為歷史機遇、生活經驗和政治體制之不同，各自創造了不同的文化亮點，特別是台灣因為多元開放的政治與社會環境，從流行文化到傳統文化再生，豐富的文化資產早已成為我們與大陸交流時最有能量也最溫柔的一分利器。
劉兆玄以其曾經擔任行政院長的資歷與資源，加上得到馬總統的信任，對內、對外，都擁有一定的高度，也有比較好的條件真正有效地推動一些事情，是合適的文化大使人選；如果陳菊也知道到對岸推銷高雄市運很重要，相信更多人會了解在這個高度競爭的時代，台灣一定要緊緊抓住每一個可以行銷台灣的機會──不要怕台灣會被賣掉，要擔心的是如果再這樣自以為是、自我封閉，台灣恐怕有行無市。
Wednesday, April 7, 2010
Can Chen Chu invite Bo Xi to Kaohsiung?
Can Chen Chu invite Bo Xi to Kaohsiung?
A Translation
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
April 7, 2010
During the 60s, author Pai Hsien-yung wrote "The Eternal Ying Hsueh-yian." The most he could do with his delicate brush strokes in Taipei, was to replicate fading memories of Shanghai. He could never have imagined that a half century later, a Shanghai mayor would pay an official visit to Taipei.
Pai Hsien-yung, Chang Ai-ling and other surviving emigres from Shanghai to Taipei brought with them remnants of Shanghai style to Taipei. But long separated by the "black water" of the Taiwan Strait, Shanghai is merely a nostalgic dream for a small number of people in Taipei. To natives of Taipei, Shanghai is a distant mirage. Just how prosperous and just how extravagant were the ten miles of foreign concessions? They have never witnessed for themselves. But yesterday Han Zheng flew across the Taiwan Strait. He became part of Taipei's history and cultural legacy. He made exchanges between the two cities far more real.
After several decades of development, both Taipei and Shanghai have sought to position themselves in the international marketplace. Both are located at the center of East Asia. Both are competing fiercely for the role of regional hub. But a wave of democratization on Taiwan led to a countercurrent of "be patient, avoid haste" thinking, and put Taiwan out of the running for over ten years. The role of regional economic hub was relinquished to Shanghai.
Taiwan forfeited its strategic political and economic goal of becoming the Asia-Pacific operations center. It focused all its energy on "amending the constitution and rectifying names." Politics degenerated into "ethnic" struggles, or to be more precise, communal group struggles. Shanghai meanwhile, shrugged off the shackles of dogmatic socialist ideology. It experimented with reform. It opened itself up as an SAR and re-embraced the world.
After Ma Ying-jeou took office, many of his policies, major and minor, have become targets of criticism. But his plan to restore Taipei's competitiveness was unquestionably correct. During his term as Taipei mayor, he favored direct links from Taipei's Songshan Airport to Shanghai. He wanted Shanghai and Taipei to be mentioned in the same breath. Once he was elected president, he pushed through direct links, and spoke of making Tokyo, Shanghai and Taipei three points of a Golden Triangle. He hoped to reestablish Taipei's competitiveness with Shanghai.
Han Zheng's visit to Taipei moves us one step closer to just such a possibility. Today's world involves both competition and cooperation. Such "coopetition" is not always between nations. Often it is between cities. If Taipei and Shanghai can reenact the scenario from "The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers," this might break "monolithic" cross-Strait relations into smaller and leaner "fragmentary" relations, enabling us to achieve more precisely targeted goals.
Consider the Five Cities elections at the end of the year. Five directly administered municipalities are undergoing replacement surgery for their political skeletons. If the new skeleton develops properly, these five metropolises will become five powerful engines of economic growth for the island. They will help the nation reverse its sinking fortunes and leap ahead. But this new skeleton requires all five metropolises to move in unision. Otherwise they will tear the body apart. This includes cross-Strait policy. As we have mentioned before, the DPP is solidly rooted in the Greater Kaohsiung and Greater Tainan regions. This is the result of successful indoctrination in Taiwan independence ideology and its Closed Door Policy. The DPP should use Greater Tainan's human resources and cultural assets, along with Greater Kaohsiung's resources as a seaport to offer a new urban vision. Otherwise, southern Taiwan will be unable to rise, and Taiwan will find it hard to escape the same fate.
Greater Kaohsiung and Greater Tainan will soon be upgraded. When Han Zheng makes his official visit to Taipei, that may be the right moment for Greater Kaohsiung and Greater Tainan to consider "Municipal Level Cross-Strait Policy." Take ECFA. Do Greater Kaohsiung and Greater Tainan really wish to continue haranguing their opponents for "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan?" Or do they wish to take advantage of the conditions created by ECFA to encourage investment?
Last year Chen Chu visited Shanghai for the sake of the World Games in Kaohsiung, and officially met with Han Zheng. Chen Chu was clearly seeking a political and economic solution for Kaohsiung's dilemma. But Han Zheng will end his visit in Taichung. He will meet with Jason Hu, He cannot visit Kaohsiung again and meet with Chen Chu. Internal Blue vs. Green political struggles on Taiwan are bounded by Cho Shui Creek. Han Zheng will not cross the Cho Shui Creek during his visit. The most fatal wounds have been inflicted upon Taiwan by cross-Strait policies that divide both the island and the Taiwan Strait.
Taipei has Yin Hsueh-yian or Ching Ta-ban. Tainan has the first Confucian temple on Taiwan. Merchantmen from Kaohsiung harbor have sailed as far up the Yangtze River as Chongqing. If Chen Chu would invite Chongqing Mayor Bo Xi to Kaohsiung as part of her campaign platform, perhaps it could change the cross-Straits thinking that has torn Taiwan apart at the Cho Shui Creek.
陳菊能否邀薄熙來訪問高雄？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.04.07 03:02 am
作家白先勇在六○年代書寫「永遠的尹雪艷」時，大約只能用他細膩溫婉的筆觸描繪一幅台北複製的上海舊夢，卻絕不能想像半世紀後，一位上海市長正式訪問台北。
因為白先勇，因為張愛玲，以及因為許多自上海移居台北的遺老舊貴，而將片段的上海風情抖落在台北，可是隔著一帶黑水，上海畢竟只是台北一小群人士的舊夢與鄉愁；對於土生的台北人，上海卻是一個遙遠不真實的印象，十里洋場究竟如何繁華，租界裡頭到底怎麼奢靡，終究難以親睹。可是，這樣的一頁歷史，卻不失為韓正昨天跨越那一灣海峽飛到台北的文化底蘊與歷史襯裡，而使得兩個城市交往互動，有了更真實的憑託。
然而，台北與上海並稱卻是這十幾年的發展，兩個城市各自在國際的城市競爭中，尋求自我的定位，又因彼此都位處東亞的中心位置，搶奪區域樞紐的競爭更是激烈；但台灣終究因為內部的民主化風潮，橫生出「戒急用忍」的思維逆流，而在十餘年前退出競爭的行列，這個區域經濟樞紐的追逐賽事，台北最終拱手讓給了上海。
而在台灣放棄了亞太營運中心的政經戰略，而聚焦於修憲、正名，並變質成族群鬥爭等政治議程的同時，上海則掙脫了教條式社會主義意識形態的束縛，以改革開放的實驗特區之姿，重新擁抱世界。
無論馬英九執政後小大施政如何受到不同的責難，但對挽回台北競爭頹勢的理解與規畫卻無疑是正確的；他在台北市長任內即主張盡速三通，從松山機場直飛上海，將上海與台北聲息相通；待他當選總統主政後，實現直航，並提出東京、上海與台北構成黃金三角，希望重建台北與上海的競合關係。
韓正訪問台北向這樣的想像跨近了一步。如今世界的競合關係，往往並非以國家為號召，反而常以城市為名。故而，台北與上海若能上演一場「雙城奇謀」，這可以使「一整塊」的兩岸關係，切分成較小也更精實的「一小塊」，從而也就更可期待有較細緻的成就。
由此以觀年底的五都選舉，五個直轄市正是台灣一次砥筋礪骨的政經置換手術，這個架構若能發展得宜，正可為台灣裝置五個經濟強力引擎，讓國家反轉下沉氣旋，而快步躍進；但這個架構必須五都俱邁向同一方向，方不致相互撕裂抵銷，包括兩岸政策在內。我們曾經提出，民進黨在大高雄與大台南根基穩定，卻是台獨意識與鎖國政策的成功教育所致；民進黨應該以大台南的人文資產、與大高雄的港市資源，提出新的城市願景，否則南台灣無以昇華，台灣也無以脫困。
當韓正正式訪問台北之際，似乎也是即將升格的大高雄與大台南思考「城市兩岸政策」的時會。比如ＥＣＦＡ，大高雄及大台南究竟要繼續喊「傾中賣台」，還是善用ＥＣＦＡ所創造的條件趁機招商？
陳菊去年曾經為高雄世運拜訪上海，與韓正見面，可見陳菊確曾思考高雄的政經角色與出路；但韓正此次行程卻只到台中止步，與胡志強見面，而不能再到高雄與陳菊一敘。台灣因內部藍綠政爭而以濁水溪為界，如今韓正到訪也未跨過濁水溪。撕裂的台灣，撕裂的兩岸政策，這或許正是台灣最致命的困局。
台北固然有尹雪艷或金大班，台南也有全台首學的孔廟，高雄大港的商船更已可深入長江到達重慶市；如果陳菊能以邀請重慶的薄熙來市長造訪大高雄為競選政見，不知能否改變台灣被濁水溪撕裂的兩岸思維？
A Translation
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
April 7, 2010
During the 60s, author Pai Hsien-yung wrote "The Eternal Ying Hsueh-yian." The most he could do with his delicate brush strokes in Taipei, was to replicate fading memories of Shanghai. He could never have imagined that a half century later, a Shanghai mayor would pay an official visit to Taipei.
Pai Hsien-yung, Chang Ai-ling and other surviving emigres from Shanghai to Taipei brought with them remnants of Shanghai style to Taipei. But long separated by the "black water" of the Taiwan Strait, Shanghai is merely a nostalgic dream for a small number of people in Taipei. To natives of Taipei, Shanghai is a distant mirage. Just how prosperous and just how extravagant were the ten miles of foreign concessions? They have never witnessed for themselves. But yesterday Han Zheng flew across the Taiwan Strait. He became part of Taipei's history and cultural legacy. He made exchanges between the two cities far more real.
After several decades of development, both Taipei and Shanghai have sought to position themselves in the international marketplace. Both are located at the center of East Asia. Both are competing fiercely for the role of regional hub. But a wave of democratization on Taiwan led to a countercurrent of "be patient, avoid haste" thinking, and put Taiwan out of the running for over ten years. The role of regional economic hub was relinquished to Shanghai.
Taiwan forfeited its strategic political and economic goal of becoming the Asia-Pacific operations center. It focused all its energy on "amending the constitution and rectifying names." Politics degenerated into "ethnic" struggles, or to be more precise, communal group struggles. Shanghai meanwhile, shrugged off the shackles of dogmatic socialist ideology. It experimented with reform. It opened itself up as an SAR and re-embraced the world.
After Ma Ying-jeou took office, many of his policies, major and minor, have become targets of criticism. But his plan to restore Taipei's competitiveness was unquestionably correct. During his term as Taipei mayor, he favored direct links from Taipei's Songshan Airport to Shanghai. He wanted Shanghai and Taipei to be mentioned in the same breath. Once he was elected president, he pushed through direct links, and spoke of making Tokyo, Shanghai and Taipei three points of a Golden Triangle. He hoped to reestablish Taipei's competitiveness with Shanghai.
Han Zheng's visit to Taipei moves us one step closer to just such a possibility. Today's world involves both competition and cooperation. Such "coopetition" is not always between nations. Often it is between cities. If Taipei and Shanghai can reenact the scenario from "The Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers," this might break "monolithic" cross-Strait relations into smaller and leaner "fragmentary" relations, enabling us to achieve more precisely targeted goals.
Consider the Five Cities elections at the end of the year. Five directly administered municipalities are undergoing replacement surgery for their political skeletons. If the new skeleton develops properly, these five metropolises will become five powerful engines of economic growth for the island. They will help the nation reverse its sinking fortunes and leap ahead. But this new skeleton requires all five metropolises to move in unision. Otherwise they will tear the body apart. This includes cross-Strait policy. As we have mentioned before, the DPP is solidly rooted in the Greater Kaohsiung and Greater Tainan regions. This is the result of successful indoctrination in Taiwan independence ideology and its Closed Door Policy. The DPP should use Greater Tainan's human resources and cultural assets, along with Greater Kaohsiung's resources as a seaport to offer a new urban vision. Otherwise, southern Taiwan will be unable to rise, and Taiwan will find it hard to escape the same fate.
Greater Kaohsiung and Greater Tainan will soon be upgraded. When Han Zheng makes his official visit to Taipei, that may be the right moment for Greater Kaohsiung and Greater Tainan to consider "Municipal Level Cross-Strait Policy." Take ECFA. Do Greater Kaohsiung and Greater Tainan really wish to continue haranguing their opponents for "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan?" Or do they wish to take advantage of the conditions created by ECFA to encourage investment?
Last year Chen Chu visited Shanghai for the sake of the World Games in Kaohsiung, and officially met with Han Zheng. Chen Chu was clearly seeking a political and economic solution for Kaohsiung's dilemma. But Han Zheng will end his visit in Taichung. He will meet with Jason Hu, He cannot visit Kaohsiung again and meet with Chen Chu. Internal Blue vs. Green political struggles on Taiwan are bounded by Cho Shui Creek. Han Zheng will not cross the Cho Shui Creek during his visit. The most fatal wounds have been inflicted upon Taiwan by cross-Strait policies that divide both the island and the Taiwan Strait.
Taipei has Yin Hsueh-yian or Ching Ta-ban. Tainan has the first Confucian temple on Taiwan. Merchantmen from Kaohsiung harbor have sailed as far up the Yangtze River as Chongqing. If Chen Chu would invite Chongqing Mayor Bo Xi to Kaohsiung as part of her campaign platform, perhaps it could change the cross-Straits thinking that has torn Taiwan apart at the Cho Shui Creek.
陳菊能否邀薄熙來訪問高雄？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.04.07 03:02 am
作家白先勇在六○年代書寫「永遠的尹雪艷」時，大約只能用他細膩溫婉的筆觸描繪一幅台北複製的上海舊夢，卻絕不能想像半世紀後，一位上海市長正式訪問台北。
因為白先勇，因為張愛玲，以及因為許多自上海移居台北的遺老舊貴，而將片段的上海風情抖落在台北，可是隔著一帶黑水，上海畢竟只是台北一小群人士的舊夢與鄉愁；對於土生的台北人，上海卻是一個遙遠不真實的印象，十里洋場究竟如何繁華，租界裡頭到底怎麼奢靡，終究難以親睹。可是，這樣的一頁歷史，卻不失為韓正昨天跨越那一灣海峽飛到台北的文化底蘊與歷史襯裡，而使得兩個城市交往互動，有了更真實的憑託。
然而，台北與上海並稱卻是這十幾年的發展，兩個城市各自在國際的城市競爭中，尋求自我的定位，又因彼此都位處東亞的中心位置，搶奪區域樞紐的競爭更是激烈；但台灣終究因為內部的民主化風潮，橫生出「戒急用忍」的思維逆流，而在十餘年前退出競爭的行列，這個區域經濟樞紐的追逐賽事，台北最終拱手讓給了上海。
而在台灣放棄了亞太營運中心的政經戰略，而聚焦於修憲、正名，並變質成族群鬥爭等政治議程的同時，上海則掙脫了教條式社會主義意識形態的束縛，以改革開放的實驗特區之姿，重新擁抱世界。
無論馬英九執政後小大施政如何受到不同的責難，但對挽回台北競爭頹勢的理解與規畫卻無疑是正確的；他在台北市長任內即主張盡速三通，從松山機場直飛上海，將上海與台北聲息相通；待他當選總統主政後，實現直航，並提出東京、上海與台北構成黃金三角，希望重建台北與上海的競合關係。
韓正訪問台北向這樣的想像跨近了一步。如今世界的競合關係，往往並非以國家為號召，反而常以城市為名。故而，台北與上海若能上演一場「雙城奇謀」，這可以使「一整塊」的兩岸關係，切分成較小也更精實的「一小塊」，從而也就更可期待有較細緻的成就。
由此以觀年底的五都選舉，五個直轄市正是台灣一次砥筋礪骨的政經置換手術，這個架構若能發展得宜，正可為台灣裝置五個經濟強力引擎，讓國家反轉下沉氣旋，而快步躍進；但這個架構必須五都俱邁向同一方向，方不致相互撕裂抵銷，包括兩岸政策在內。我們曾經提出，民進黨在大高雄與大台南根基穩定，卻是台獨意識與鎖國政策的成功教育所致；民進黨應該以大台南的人文資產、與大高雄的港市資源，提出新的城市願景，否則南台灣無以昇華，台灣也無以脫困。
當韓正正式訪問台北之際，似乎也是即將升格的大高雄與大台南思考「城市兩岸政策」的時會。比如ＥＣＦＡ，大高雄及大台南究竟要繼續喊「傾中賣台」，還是善用ＥＣＦＡ所創造的條件趁機招商？
陳菊去年曾經為高雄世運拜訪上海，與韓正見面，可見陳菊確曾思考高雄的政經角色與出路；但韓正此次行程卻只到台中止步，與胡志強見面，而不能再到高雄與陳菊一敘。台灣因內部藍綠政爭而以濁水溪為界，如今韓正到訪也未跨過濁水溪。撕裂的台灣，撕裂的兩岸政策，這或許正是台灣最致命的困局。
台北固然有尹雪艷或金大班，台南也有全台首學的孔廟，高雄大港的商船更已可深入長江到達重慶市；如果陳菊能以邀請重慶的薄熙來市長造訪大高雄為競選政見，不知能否改變台灣被濁水溪撕裂的兩岸思維？
Tuesday, April 6, 2010
Expedite ECFA: Keep It Simple, Tackle Fewer Issues
Expedite ECFA: Keep It Simple, Tackle Fewer Issues
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 6, 2010
The second formal consultation over the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was held last week. The two sides' official remarks sounded good. But the public detected a whiff of impatience among negotiators. The public sensed that the negotiations were rather trying, and that the two sides wanted to "expedite the signing by keeping the agreement simple and tackling fewer issues."
Chiang and Chen met four times and signed the cross-Strait tax agreement. The two sides reached a consensus. Nevertheless they ran into more than a few roadblocks. Therefore the decision to "expedite the signing by keeping the agreement simple and tackling fewer issues" may be applied not merely to the "early harvest," but also to ECFA as a whole. Only then can cross-Strait economic and trade negotiations continue.
The Mainland's negotiator for ECFA is Tang Wei, head of the Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs under the Mainland's Ministry of Commerce. On the very first day of consultations he suggested expediting tariff reductions and exemptions by keeping the agreement simple and tackling fewer issues. As he explained in an interview, if one wishes to expedite the signing, one simply cannot cover every issue. His remark triggered concern that the 500 items proposed by our side may be cut down. The next day, the two sides explained their conclusions. Minister of Economic Affairs Liang Kuo-hsing remained vague, saying "All we ought to demand we have demanded. All we ought to retain we have retained." The two sides reiterated that farmers on Taiwan, ordinary people, and small and medium businesses will be taken care of, and that negotiations over place of origin rules would soon begin. But information remained fragmentary. The public still does not know what was demanded and what was retained. Rumors proliferated. Unknown variables may lead to repeated changes in the early harvest list.
Meanwhile, negative developments have emerged that may impede consultations. One development concerns the wording of the ECFA preamble, whether Taipei would be explicitly permitted to "participate in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization." This is part of our attempt to sign regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with other Asia-Pacific countries. If this is incorporated into ECFA, it will mean Beijing has formally agreed not to prevent us from signing FTAs with other countries. This would enable the Republic of China's economy to become more closely integrated with the global economy, and prevent our marginalization. The two sides have yet to reach a consensus.
The second negative development is that the other side wants the "normalization of cross-Straits economic and trade relations" and "full liberalization." Our side has not agreed. According to the ECFA liberalization timetable, our side would no longer have any reason to refuse to open our markets to sensitive products from the Mainland, including the disparity in the size of our markets. Full liberalization would involve the financial services industry and other service industries. It would drag in more complex bilateral problems. Even if we hope to liberalize ten years from now, this cannot be decided now. As a result, consultations remain stuck.
The failure to determine which items will be on the early harvest list may be merely the result of haggling between the negotiators. The items may need further study before they can be announced. We need not read too much into the failure. But the government must help people understand the principles by which the early harvest list was created, and the benefits each side will offer the other. The Mainland is giving Taiwan tariff reductions and exemptions. We are giving the Mainland similar treatment for some of its products. Which items did the Mainland mention? Which industries on Taiwan will be affected? The government must explain and put the public's mind at ease. We believe the government's decisions about what to ask for, what to give, how much to ask for, and how little to give were based on the Ministry of Economics' best calculations of what in our interest. Nevertheless the government must explain its thinking to the public.
Other, more complex issues may create obstacles to ECFA. Should decisions be made during the initial stages of consultation? The government can conduct a reevaluation. After all, ECFA is an agreement to promote cross-Strait economic and trade liberalization. The two sides have agreed to gradual, not instant liberalization. First stage consultation should follow the principle of "expedite the signing by keeping the agreement simple and tackling fewer issues." We must first establish a framework, a preamble, a liberalization procedure, an early harvest list, economic cooperation projects, a defense mechanism, and a termination mechanism. The details can be dealt with once ECFA has been signed. One item can be signed at a time. This is reminiscent of ASEAN talks with the Mainland. Liberalization will be accelerated, decelerated, or even halted altogether, based on the economic situation. This will prevent negotiations from becoming stalled over any particular issue.
Academia Sinica scholar Chu Ching-yi and National Taiwan University economics professor Lin Chuan recently published a book entitled, "A New Vision of Economics." They note that the impact of regional trade organizations has yet to fully emerge. Only by acting here and now, can we avoid disaster. Therefore, signing ECFA is not merely about normalizing cross-Strait trade. It is also about responding and preparing for regional economic eventualities. The Republic of China must seize this opportunity. It can no longer delay.
ECFA「快易少」可以有新解
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.04.06 02:38 am
兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ECFA）上周舉行第二次正式協商。不容諱言，雙方檯面上的話雖說得好聽，但社會大眾卻完全嗅不到彼岸代表所稱「快易少」的氣氛，反而覺得這是場談得頗為辛苦的硬仗。
或許，就跟四次江陳會緩簽兩岸租稅協議一樣，雙方雖有簽署的共識，但一時卻跨不過若干路障。因而，「快易少」似不只適用於早期收穫清單，或也可適用於整體 ECFA架構的議定；這樣，兩岸的經貿協商才走得下去。
ECFA的大陸協商代表商務部台港澳司長唐煒在協商第一天，就先為提早減免關稅的早期收穫清單協商定調為「快易少」，並在接受媒體訪問時解釋，早收清單要好簽、快簽，就不可能面面俱到，也因而引發我方提出的五百項清單可能再縮水的疑慮。到了第二天雙方說明結論時，經濟部次長梁國新則含混地說：「該要都要了，該守都守住」；雙方並重申會照顧台灣農民、基層民眾及中小企業，及啟動原產地規則協商。然而，從這些片段資訊中，其實民間還是不知道守住了什麼、又要到了什麼，企業界耳語滿天飛，而未知的協商變數也可能讓清單一改再改。
相對的，卻傳出了一些可能阻礙協商進展的負面訊息。其一是ECFA協議文本的序言用字，是否要明言「參與亞太經濟合作機制」。這是我方企圖以此做為與亞太國家洽簽區域自由貿易區協定（FTA）的安排，如獲寫入文本，意謂北京至少在形式上同意不再阻礙我方與其他國家簽FTA，以利台灣經濟得以與全球經濟緊密接軌，突破邊緣化危機。然而，這段用字似未立獲共識。
其二則是彼岸要求寫入文本的「兩岸經貿正常化」及「全面自由化」等用語，我方未接受；因其意謂在達到ECFA設定的自由化時間表時，我方無法再以雙方經濟規模差距懸殊等理由，拒絕對大陸開放敏感性產品的市場；而且，全面自由化的範疇尚涉及金融等服務貿易市場，這又將擴及雙方人員流動等更複雜的問題，即使是遠在十年以後才要開放，也非現在就能決定。於是，相關的協商又卡住。
有關早期收穫清單的協商結果不明，可能只是兩岸代表討價還價，還要再攜回研究，一時難以宣布，倒也不必過度解讀；但政府應該讓民眾了解，早期收穫清單的選定原則與相互提供的待遇，亦即大陸給予台灣早收項目的關稅減免優惠，我們也同樣要回饋大陸產品相同的待遇，而大陸到底提出那些項目、台灣那些產業會受到影響，政府必須以清楚的解說讓社會安心。我們相信政府在決定那些要、那些給、那些多要、那些少給時，是依據外部經濟利益最大化的考量，但還是須有明確的交代。
至於可能讓ECFA協商遇阻的其他更複雜的問題，是否要在此一架構性協商的初始階段就做出決定，政府可以再做評估，畢竟ECFA是兩岸相互推展經貿自由化的架構性協議，雙方也已同意是分階段推進自由化，而不是一次到位；第一階段的協商宜應秉持「快易少」的原則，先搭好架子，例如序言、自由化進程、早期收穫清單、經濟合作項目、防衛機制及中止機制等，再於簽署ECFA後分項細談，然後一項項簽署分項協議，就如同東協與中國大陸的談判模式，依當時的經濟情境加快或放慢自由化進度，甚至可以叫停，以免因特定議題喬不定而原地踏步。
中研院院士朱敬一與台大經濟系教授林全的新書「經濟學的新視野」指出，區域性貿易組織的衝擊其實尚未完全浮現，但也唯有此時此刻，才可能及早預習以求避禍；因此，簽署ECFA的意義，不只是為了兩岸經貿正常化，而是可藉由ECFA學習應對區域經濟的知能，並作前置的準備，台灣必須抓住這個機會，不能再耽擱了。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 6, 2010
The second formal consultation over the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was held last week. The two sides' official remarks sounded good. But the public detected a whiff of impatience among negotiators. The public sensed that the negotiations were rather trying, and that the two sides wanted to "expedite the signing by keeping the agreement simple and tackling fewer issues."
Chiang and Chen met four times and signed the cross-Strait tax agreement. The two sides reached a consensus. Nevertheless they ran into more than a few roadblocks. Therefore the decision to "expedite the signing by keeping the agreement simple and tackling fewer issues" may be applied not merely to the "early harvest," but also to ECFA as a whole. Only then can cross-Strait economic and trade negotiations continue.
The Mainland's negotiator for ECFA is Tang Wei, head of the Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs under the Mainland's Ministry of Commerce. On the very first day of consultations he suggested expediting tariff reductions and exemptions by keeping the agreement simple and tackling fewer issues. As he explained in an interview, if one wishes to expedite the signing, one simply cannot cover every issue. His remark triggered concern that the 500 items proposed by our side may be cut down. The next day, the two sides explained their conclusions. Minister of Economic Affairs Liang Kuo-hsing remained vague, saying "All we ought to demand we have demanded. All we ought to retain we have retained." The two sides reiterated that farmers on Taiwan, ordinary people, and small and medium businesses will be taken care of, and that negotiations over place of origin rules would soon begin. But information remained fragmentary. The public still does not know what was demanded and what was retained. Rumors proliferated. Unknown variables may lead to repeated changes in the early harvest list.
Meanwhile, negative developments have emerged that may impede consultations. One development concerns the wording of the ECFA preamble, whether Taipei would be explicitly permitted to "participate in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization." This is part of our attempt to sign regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with other Asia-Pacific countries. If this is incorporated into ECFA, it will mean Beijing has formally agreed not to prevent us from signing FTAs with other countries. This would enable the Republic of China's economy to become more closely integrated with the global economy, and prevent our marginalization. The two sides have yet to reach a consensus.
The second negative development is that the other side wants the "normalization of cross-Straits economic and trade relations" and "full liberalization." Our side has not agreed. According to the ECFA liberalization timetable, our side would no longer have any reason to refuse to open our markets to sensitive products from the Mainland, including the disparity in the size of our markets. Full liberalization would involve the financial services industry and other service industries. It would drag in more complex bilateral problems. Even if we hope to liberalize ten years from now, this cannot be decided now. As a result, consultations remain stuck.
The failure to determine which items will be on the early harvest list may be merely the result of haggling between the negotiators. The items may need further study before they can be announced. We need not read too much into the failure. But the government must help people understand the principles by which the early harvest list was created, and the benefits each side will offer the other. The Mainland is giving Taiwan tariff reductions and exemptions. We are giving the Mainland similar treatment for some of its products. Which items did the Mainland mention? Which industries on Taiwan will be affected? The government must explain and put the public's mind at ease. We believe the government's decisions about what to ask for, what to give, how much to ask for, and how little to give were based on the Ministry of Economics' best calculations of what in our interest. Nevertheless the government must explain its thinking to the public.
Other, more complex issues may create obstacles to ECFA. Should decisions be made during the initial stages of consultation? The government can conduct a reevaluation. After all, ECFA is an agreement to promote cross-Strait economic and trade liberalization. The two sides have agreed to gradual, not instant liberalization. First stage consultation should follow the principle of "expedite the signing by keeping the agreement simple and tackling fewer issues." We must first establish a framework, a preamble, a liberalization procedure, an early harvest list, economic cooperation projects, a defense mechanism, and a termination mechanism. The details can be dealt with once ECFA has been signed. One item can be signed at a time. This is reminiscent of ASEAN talks with the Mainland. Liberalization will be accelerated, decelerated, or even halted altogether, based on the economic situation. This will prevent negotiations from becoming stalled over any particular issue.
Academia Sinica scholar Chu Ching-yi and National Taiwan University economics professor Lin Chuan recently published a book entitled, "A New Vision of Economics." They note that the impact of regional trade organizations has yet to fully emerge. Only by acting here and now, can we avoid disaster. Therefore, signing ECFA is not merely about normalizing cross-Strait trade. It is also about responding and preparing for regional economic eventualities. The Republic of China must seize this opportunity. It can no longer delay.
ECFA「快易少」可以有新解
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.04.06 02:38 am
兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ECFA）上周舉行第二次正式協商。不容諱言，雙方檯面上的話雖說得好聽，但社會大眾卻完全嗅不到彼岸代表所稱「快易少」的氣氛，反而覺得這是場談得頗為辛苦的硬仗。
或許，就跟四次江陳會緩簽兩岸租稅協議一樣，雙方雖有簽署的共識，但一時卻跨不過若干路障。因而，「快易少」似不只適用於早期收穫清單，或也可適用於整體 ECFA架構的議定；這樣，兩岸的經貿協商才走得下去。
ECFA的大陸協商代表商務部台港澳司長唐煒在協商第一天，就先為提早減免關稅的早期收穫清單協商定調為「快易少」，並在接受媒體訪問時解釋，早收清單要好簽、快簽，就不可能面面俱到，也因而引發我方提出的五百項清單可能再縮水的疑慮。到了第二天雙方說明結論時，經濟部次長梁國新則含混地說：「該要都要了，該守都守住」；雙方並重申會照顧台灣農民、基層民眾及中小企業，及啟動原產地規則協商。然而，從這些片段資訊中，其實民間還是不知道守住了什麼、又要到了什麼，企業界耳語滿天飛，而未知的協商變數也可能讓清單一改再改。
相對的，卻傳出了一些可能阻礙協商進展的負面訊息。其一是ECFA協議文本的序言用字，是否要明言「參與亞太經濟合作機制」。這是我方企圖以此做為與亞太國家洽簽區域自由貿易區協定（FTA）的安排，如獲寫入文本，意謂北京至少在形式上同意不再阻礙我方與其他國家簽FTA，以利台灣經濟得以與全球經濟緊密接軌，突破邊緣化危機。然而，這段用字似未立獲共識。
其二則是彼岸要求寫入文本的「兩岸經貿正常化」及「全面自由化」等用語，我方未接受；因其意謂在達到ECFA設定的自由化時間表時，我方無法再以雙方經濟規模差距懸殊等理由，拒絕對大陸開放敏感性產品的市場；而且，全面自由化的範疇尚涉及金融等服務貿易市場，這又將擴及雙方人員流動等更複雜的問題，即使是遠在十年以後才要開放，也非現在就能決定。於是，相關的協商又卡住。
有關早期收穫清單的協商結果不明，可能只是兩岸代表討價還價，還要再攜回研究，一時難以宣布，倒也不必過度解讀；但政府應該讓民眾了解，早期收穫清單的選定原則與相互提供的待遇，亦即大陸給予台灣早收項目的關稅減免優惠，我們也同樣要回饋大陸產品相同的待遇，而大陸到底提出那些項目、台灣那些產業會受到影響，政府必須以清楚的解說讓社會安心。我們相信政府在決定那些要、那些給、那些多要、那些少給時，是依據外部經濟利益最大化的考量，但還是須有明確的交代。
至於可能讓ECFA協商遇阻的其他更複雜的問題，是否要在此一架構性協商的初始階段就做出決定，政府可以再做評估，畢竟ECFA是兩岸相互推展經貿自由化的架構性協議，雙方也已同意是分階段推進自由化，而不是一次到位；第一階段的協商宜應秉持「快易少」的原則，先搭好架子，例如序言、自由化進程、早期收穫清單、經濟合作項目、防衛機制及中止機制等，再於簽署ECFA後分項細談，然後一項項簽署分項協議，就如同東協與中國大陸的談判模式，依當時的經濟情境加快或放慢自由化進度，甚至可以叫停，以免因特定議題喬不定而原地踏步。
中研院院士朱敬一與台大經濟系教授林全的新書「經濟學的新視野」指出，區域性貿易組織的衝擊其實尚未完全浮現，但也唯有此時此刻，才可能及早預習以求避禍；因此，簽署ECFA的意義，不只是為了兩岸經貿正常化，而是可藉由ECFA學習應對區域經濟的知能，並作前置的準備，台灣必須抓住這個機會，不能再耽擱了。
Friday, April 2, 2010
ECFA Debate Finalized: Ma, Tsai to Cross Swords
ECFA Debate Finalized: Ma, Tsai to Cross Swords
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2, 2010
In response to public expectations, the ruling and opposition parties have finally come to an agreement. They will debate the cross-Strait Economic Framework Agreement (ECFA) before the end of April. The debate will be covered on public television. This is the first time the ruling and opposition parties have held an open debate on major policy. It is a momentous occasion. The debate will not necessarily allow the ruling and opposition parties to sing the same tune or resolve their differences. But it will at least enable them to take a first step towards rational policy debate. We now have a chance to engage in rational discussion of major policy issues, rather than empty name-calling.
To ascertain whether the public wants a debate on ECFA, the Want Want China Times Media Group conducted two opinion polls during the last half month. Real world data would let government and opposition leaders know that the public has had it with politicians indifferent to right and wrong. The polls showed that 70% of the public favored a government vs. opposition debate. Over 90% of Green Camp supporters favored a debate. Ruling and opposition leaders realized they had no choice but to debate. The DPP and the Presidential Office each set preconditions for the debate. But both parties realized they could no longer drag their feet or dodge the issue, no matter what excuses they might offer.
Although the Want Want Media Group promoted the debate, it will be hosted by the public television network. This is a highly positive development. The Public Broadcasting System is the head of public television. It ought to assume a leading role. Since it was launched, public television has held many large-scale election debates, and is well qualified to provide a public platform. A public platform will allow the ruling and opposition political parties and their media allies to lower their guards, to cross Blue vs. Green barriers, and allow the debate to proceed smoothly.
Past experience and mutual trust within the broadcasting industry will enable the first major policy debate on Taiwan to take place. Government and opposition leaders will personally cross swords. The debate should be a lively one. President Ma Ying-jeou and Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen, as well as their parties, their think tanks, and their policy advisors will have to make thorough preparations.
The debate over ECFA involves policy positions held by the government and the opposition. The pressure felt by both sides will be considerable. The media will also be under great pressure. This will not be like previous election debates. The two sides' political tactics, their party lines, their candidate images, and even their family backgrounds may become grist for the mill. The debate may become very technically oriented, or may not. ECFA is a highly technical issue. The media must do its homework. Media standards on Taiwan have undeniably deteriorated. Scandal-mongering and name-calling are the norm. Little space remains for serious policy discussion. When ruling and opposition leaders focus on a major policy issue, the media must not reflexively express support or opposition based on preconceived ideology. The media must not pass judgment on the merits and demerits of the arguments based on comfortable assumptions. Scholars and experts, both on location and off, will be essential participants in this debate.
We hope that members of the public on Taiwan, whether they wanted this debate or not, will welcome the arrival of an era of more mature and rational policy debate. Supporters and opponents of ECFA must understand that the debate is not a Legislative Yuan session. In the Legislative Yuan a Third Reading vote without objections means a final resolution. The debate on the other hand, is merely an opportunity for the two sides to lay their cards on the table and see what the other has. A policy debate might not enable you to convert me to your way of thinking, but at least it will enable me to understand how you think.
Following the debate, the Ma administration will still sign ECFA with the other side in June, according to schedule. The framework agreement is nothing more than a table of contents. The details outside the agreement however, include the early harvest list, and whether it will provide better terms for our side. The debate may reveal whether the government has paid sufficient attention to the details, and give it a chance to make adjustments. Meanwhile, the Democratic Progressive Party is preparing to use its ECFA referendum as a major plank in its election platform. It is unlikely to alter its position as a result of the debate. It will continue to push for a referendum. It is not about to change its mind and support the government. But the debate will at least provide an opportunity for the DPP to set aside its reunification vs. independence political rhetoric, and evaluate the pros and cons of government policy on their own merits, and not reflexively resorting to "Selling out Taiwan!" name-calling.
Nearly two years have passed since the second change in ruling parties. President Ma Ying-jeou and Chairman Tsai Ing-wen will finally meet. Their meeting will be a war of words. But the public has great expectations. Politics is not a dinner party. Harsh exchanges will be unavoidable. Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen are both educated and gracious individuals. Neither is about to attack the other's family background. These two professors cum political leaders are policy wonks. Their enthusiasm for policy is far greater than their enthusiasm for politics. Ma and Tsai are unlikely to resort to emotional attacks on the podium. This will enable them to set an example for other politicians, and to show that one need not become red in face with outrage and sputter with apoplexy while debating sensitive issues. After the two cross swords, we hope that whenever any future policy disputes arise, President Ma and Chairman Tsai will calmly and confidently say to the other: What reasons can you offer for your position? What's wrong with what I said? Allow us to be clear. There is no need for fisticuffs, either in the legislature or on the streets.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.04.02
社論－ECFA辯論敲定 期許雙英交鋒
本報訊
在民意期待聲中，朝野終於敲定，兩岸經濟架構合作協議（ＥＣＦＡ）辯論會將在四月底前進行辯論，相關事宜由公共電視台處理。這是朝野第一次就重大政策公開辯論，意義非比尋常。儘管朝野在辯論之後，未必就能水乳交融，化解歧見；但是，邁開政策辯論的第一步，就有機會讓台灣就重大政策理性討論，而非口水謾罵。
為了ＥＣＦＡ辯論與否，旺旺中時媒體集團從去年到最近半個多月，做了兩次民意調查，以實際數據告訴朝野領導人，民眾已經對不問是非的政治攻詰忍耐到極限。民意調查顯示，高達六成七的民眾贊成朝野辯論，綠營支持者的贊成度更在九成以上；讓朝野領袖都體認：終須一辯。雖然在過程中，不論是民進黨或總統府，都對辯論這件事提出不同的前提和條件，但是，最後兩方都能了解，民意的催促已使辯論不能再用任何說詞拖延或逃避。
儘管，辯論是由旺旺中時媒體集團倡議，最終由公視主辦，這也是極好的結果。做為公廣集團的龍頭，公視理應擔當重任。事實上，公共電視自開播以來，也多次舉辦大型選舉辯論會，相當稱職地扮演公共平台的角色，讓朝野政黨與媒體跨越藍綠和同業競爭的心防，折衝調和促成辯論會順利進行。
累積過去的經驗和同業間的互信，這一次籌辦台灣首見的重大政策辯論會，且由朝野領導人親上火線，辯論會精采可期。相信不論是馬英九總統或者民進黨主席蔡英文，以及雙方背後的智庫與政策幕僚，都會做好最完全的準備。
ＥＣＦＡ辯論會涉及朝野堅持的政策立場，辯論雙方壓力都不小；同樣的，媒體壓力也很大。因為不同於過去的選舉辯論會，兩方政治攻防，從政黨路線、候選人形象、乃至家族背景，都是可以交鋒的重點；可以很專業，也可以不專業；ＥＣＦＡ則是高度專業的政策議題，媒體也得做足功課。不容諱言，台灣媒體生態惡化，八卦口水當道，政策討論在媒體環境中空間有限；當朝野領導人為了重大政策進行焦點攻防時，媒體再不能以僵化的意識形態贊成或反對；對兩方論辯依據也得熟悉，才能據以評斷優劣。因此，學者專家在這場辯論會也是不可或缺的，不論是場中提問或者場外評點。
當然，我們更希望台灣社會、所有贊成、不贊成辯論的民眾，都要更成熟地迎接理性辯論政策的時代到來。支持或反對兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ的民眾都要了解，辯論會不是立法院會，三讀無異議或表決就有一個終極解決方案；辯論會是把雙方立場端出檯面，彼此檢視。辯論會無法做到政策說服，但至少要做到：你說服不了我，但我理解你的想法。
辯論會結束之後，可以想見，馬政府還是會在六月依既定時程與對岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ；架構協議內容本身只是綱要，差別不大。但，在架構協議之外的細節磋商，包括早收清單等能不能再爭取更有利於我方的條件，或者經過辯論會看到哪些是政府思慮不夠細密之處，還有機會調整。同樣的，準備以ＥＣＦＡ公投做為選舉主議題的民進黨，不大可能因為辯論會而放棄既有立場，應會繼續發動公投連署；更不可能因為一場辯論會，就態度丕變，大力支持政府與對岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ。但，辯論會至少有機會讓民進黨改變唯統獨論的政治語言，以政策利弊評價政府施政，而非動輒以「賣台」帽子框架台灣民意和政策走向。
二次政黨輪替快兩年，馬英九總統和蔡英文主席終於能聚首，雖然是在一個言詞交鋒的辯論會上，還是讓人無限期待。政治不是請客吃飯，寒暄問暖確實可免；以馬英九和蔡英文的學養與風度，都不是會揭人祖宗八代瘡疤之人；相反的，兩位教授型的政治領袖，對政策的熱情，都遠高過對政治的執迷，馬、蔡兩人在辯論場上，顯然不會出現過去選舉舞台上的激情詰亢，正可以給台灣政治人物一個範例，談事論理不必臉紅脖子粗。交鋒過後，我們更期待未來碰到任何重大政策爭議，馬總統與蔡主席都能理直氣壯地跟對方說一句：你的道理在哪？我說的有什麼不對？咱們把話講清楚，不必在立法院或街頭打架。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2, 2010
In response to public expectations, the ruling and opposition parties have finally come to an agreement. They will debate the cross-Strait Economic Framework Agreement (ECFA) before the end of April. The debate will be covered on public television. This is the first time the ruling and opposition parties have held an open debate on major policy. It is a momentous occasion. The debate will not necessarily allow the ruling and opposition parties to sing the same tune or resolve their differences. But it will at least enable them to take a first step towards rational policy debate. We now have a chance to engage in rational discussion of major policy issues, rather than empty name-calling.
To ascertain whether the public wants a debate on ECFA, the Want Want China Times Media Group conducted two opinion polls during the last half month. Real world data would let government and opposition leaders know that the public has had it with politicians indifferent to right and wrong. The polls showed that 70% of the public favored a government vs. opposition debate. Over 90% of Green Camp supporters favored a debate. Ruling and opposition leaders realized they had no choice but to debate. The DPP and the Presidential Office each set preconditions for the debate. But both parties realized they could no longer drag their feet or dodge the issue, no matter what excuses they might offer.
Although the Want Want Media Group promoted the debate, it will be hosted by the public television network. This is a highly positive development. The Public Broadcasting System is the head of public television. It ought to assume a leading role. Since it was launched, public television has held many large-scale election debates, and is well qualified to provide a public platform. A public platform will allow the ruling and opposition political parties and their media allies to lower their guards, to cross Blue vs. Green barriers, and allow the debate to proceed smoothly.
Past experience and mutual trust within the broadcasting industry will enable the first major policy debate on Taiwan to take place. Government and opposition leaders will personally cross swords. The debate should be a lively one. President Ma Ying-jeou and Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen, as well as their parties, their think tanks, and their policy advisors will have to make thorough preparations.
The debate over ECFA involves policy positions held by the government and the opposition. The pressure felt by both sides will be considerable. The media will also be under great pressure. This will not be like previous election debates. The two sides' political tactics, their party lines, their candidate images, and even their family backgrounds may become grist for the mill. The debate may become very technically oriented, or may not. ECFA is a highly technical issue. The media must do its homework. Media standards on Taiwan have undeniably deteriorated. Scandal-mongering and name-calling are the norm. Little space remains for serious policy discussion. When ruling and opposition leaders focus on a major policy issue, the media must not reflexively express support or opposition based on preconceived ideology. The media must not pass judgment on the merits and demerits of the arguments based on comfortable assumptions. Scholars and experts, both on location and off, will be essential participants in this debate.
We hope that members of the public on Taiwan, whether they wanted this debate or not, will welcome the arrival of an era of more mature and rational policy debate. Supporters and opponents of ECFA must understand that the debate is not a Legislative Yuan session. In the Legislative Yuan a Third Reading vote without objections means a final resolution. The debate on the other hand, is merely an opportunity for the two sides to lay their cards on the table and see what the other has. A policy debate might not enable you to convert me to your way of thinking, but at least it will enable me to understand how you think.
Following the debate, the Ma administration will still sign ECFA with the other side in June, according to schedule. The framework agreement is nothing more than a table of contents. The details outside the agreement however, include the early harvest list, and whether it will provide better terms for our side. The debate may reveal whether the government has paid sufficient attention to the details, and give it a chance to make adjustments. Meanwhile, the Democratic Progressive Party is preparing to use its ECFA referendum as a major plank in its election platform. It is unlikely to alter its position as a result of the debate. It will continue to push for a referendum. It is not about to change its mind and support the government. But the debate will at least provide an opportunity for the DPP to set aside its reunification vs. independence political rhetoric, and evaluate the pros and cons of government policy on their own merits, and not reflexively resorting to "Selling out Taiwan!" name-calling.
Nearly two years have passed since the second change in ruling parties. President Ma Ying-jeou and Chairman Tsai Ing-wen will finally meet. Their meeting will be a war of words. But the public has great expectations. Politics is not a dinner party. Harsh exchanges will be unavoidable. Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen are both educated and gracious individuals. Neither is about to attack the other's family background. These two professors cum political leaders are policy wonks. Their enthusiasm for policy is far greater than their enthusiasm for politics. Ma and Tsai are unlikely to resort to emotional attacks on the podium. This will enable them to set an example for other politicians, and to show that one need not become red in face with outrage and sputter with apoplexy while debating sensitive issues. After the two cross swords, we hope that whenever any future policy disputes arise, President Ma and Chairman Tsai will calmly and confidently say to the other: What reasons can you offer for your position? What's wrong with what I said? Allow us to be clear. There is no need for fisticuffs, either in the legislature or on the streets.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.04.02
社論－ECFA辯論敲定 期許雙英交鋒
本報訊
在民意期待聲中，朝野終於敲定，兩岸經濟架構合作協議（ＥＣＦＡ）辯論會將在四月底前進行辯論，相關事宜由公共電視台處理。這是朝野第一次就重大政策公開辯論，意義非比尋常。儘管朝野在辯論之後，未必就能水乳交融，化解歧見；但是，邁開政策辯論的第一步，就有機會讓台灣就重大政策理性討論，而非口水謾罵。
為了ＥＣＦＡ辯論與否，旺旺中時媒體集團從去年到最近半個多月，做了兩次民意調查，以實際數據告訴朝野領導人，民眾已經對不問是非的政治攻詰忍耐到極限。民意調查顯示，高達六成七的民眾贊成朝野辯論，綠營支持者的贊成度更在九成以上；讓朝野領袖都體認：終須一辯。雖然在過程中，不論是民進黨或總統府，都對辯論這件事提出不同的前提和條件，但是，最後兩方都能了解，民意的催促已使辯論不能再用任何說詞拖延或逃避。
儘管，辯論是由旺旺中時媒體集團倡議，最終由公視主辦，這也是極好的結果。做為公廣集團的龍頭，公視理應擔當重任。事實上，公共電視自開播以來，也多次舉辦大型選舉辯論會，相當稱職地扮演公共平台的角色，讓朝野政黨與媒體跨越藍綠和同業競爭的心防，折衝調和促成辯論會順利進行。
累積過去的經驗和同業間的互信，這一次籌辦台灣首見的重大政策辯論會，且由朝野領導人親上火線，辯論會精采可期。相信不論是馬英九總統或者民進黨主席蔡英文，以及雙方背後的智庫與政策幕僚，都會做好最完全的準備。
ＥＣＦＡ辯論會涉及朝野堅持的政策立場，辯論雙方壓力都不小；同樣的，媒體壓力也很大。因為不同於過去的選舉辯論會，兩方政治攻防，從政黨路線、候選人形象、乃至家族背景，都是可以交鋒的重點；可以很專業，也可以不專業；ＥＣＦＡ則是高度專業的政策議題，媒體也得做足功課。不容諱言，台灣媒體生態惡化，八卦口水當道，政策討論在媒體環境中空間有限；當朝野領導人為了重大政策進行焦點攻防時，媒體再不能以僵化的意識形態贊成或反對；對兩方論辯依據也得熟悉，才能據以評斷優劣。因此，學者專家在這場辯論會也是不可或缺的，不論是場中提問或者場外評點。
當然，我們更希望台灣社會、所有贊成、不贊成辯論的民眾，都要更成熟地迎接理性辯論政策的時代到來。支持或反對兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ的民眾都要了解，辯論會不是立法院會，三讀無異議或表決就有一個終極解決方案；辯論會是把雙方立場端出檯面，彼此檢視。辯論會無法做到政策說服，但至少要做到：你說服不了我，但我理解你的想法。
辯論會結束之後，可以想見，馬政府還是會在六月依既定時程與對岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ；架構協議內容本身只是綱要，差別不大。但，在架構協議之外的細節磋商，包括早收清單等能不能再爭取更有利於我方的條件，或者經過辯論會看到哪些是政府思慮不夠細密之處，還有機會調整。同樣的，準備以ＥＣＦＡ公投做為選舉主議題的民進黨，不大可能因為辯論會而放棄既有立場，應會繼續發動公投連署；更不可能因為一場辯論會，就態度丕變，大力支持政府與對岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ。但，辯論會至少有機會讓民進黨改變唯統獨論的政治語言，以政策利弊評價政府施政，而非動輒以「賣台」帽子框架台灣民意和政策走向。
二次政黨輪替快兩年，馬英九總統和蔡英文主席終於能聚首，雖然是在一個言詞交鋒的辯論會上，還是讓人無限期待。政治不是請客吃飯，寒暄問暖確實可免；以馬英九和蔡英文的學養與風度，都不是會揭人祖宗八代瘡疤之人；相反的，兩位教授型的政治領袖，對政策的熱情，都遠高過對政治的執迷，馬、蔡兩人在辯論場上，顯然不會出現過去選舉舞台上的激情詰亢，正可以給台灣政治人物一個範例，談事論理不必臉紅脖子粗。交鋒過後，我們更期待未來碰到任何重大政策爭議，馬總統與蔡主席都能理直氣壯地跟對方說一句：你的道理在哪？我說的有什麼不對？咱們把話講清楚，不必在立法院或街頭打架。
Thursday, April 1, 2010
The Two Yings Meeting: Both a Debate and a Discussion
The Two Yings Meeting: Both a Debate and a Discussion
United Daily News editorial
A Translation
April 1, 2010
Differences have arisen over whether the "Two Yings Meeting" between Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen should be a "debate" or a "discussion." We feel as long as it is a "dialogue on national policy," it makes no difference whether it is a "debate" or a "discussion."
Yesterday the United Daily News editorial column "In Black and White" weighed in on the so-called debate. It said that the format proposed by the president was too restrictive. Each side would have six minutes to present their views, three minutes to answer four to five questions, and six minutes to make any concluding remarks. Such a format might create dramatic confrontation, but would stress tactical skills at the expense of strategic significance. Such a format is essentially that of a martial arts "grudge match." It might be appropriate for an election debate, but it might not be ideal for the Two Yings Meeting.
The Two Yings Meeting should not be viewed as a martial arts grudge match. The issue being addressed might be cross-strait economic agreements such as ECFA. The issue might be the personality differences between Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen. But the public has a right to expect a dialogue on national policy and not a martial arts grudge match.
Let's begin by looking at the Two Yings' character traits. Ma is a Juris Doctor from Harvard University. Tsai Ing-wen is a Doctor of Law from the London School of Economics. Both are qualified to be professors. They have both gone into politics, but many still address them as "Professor Ma" and "Professor Tsai." Based on their qualifications, to replicate the political equivalent of a martial arts grudge match would not be difficult. But it would squander an opportunity for in-depth dialogue. If one adopts the format of a "dialogue on national policy" the two may be less bound by the format of a martial arts grudge match. The two sides could alleviate the pressure to "pin one's opponent in three minutes." They could create space for rational debate and analysis.
Furthermore, ECFA is not an issue that ought to be dealt with using the format of a martial arts grudge match. ECFA has profound and far-reaching national policy implications. One of the most important questions is: Should we sign ECFA? The answer involves constitutional strategy issues such as "maintaining the status quo," "One China, Different Interpretations," or "Taiwan independence," the "Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution." It involves issues of global economic strategy, such as how to respond to ASEAN plus N, and the marginalization of Taiwan's economy. Another important question is, How should we go about signing ECFA? The answer involves defense mechanisms, an early harvest list, protection for small and medium enterprises (SME) and agriculture, a Sunset Clause, and prohibitions against Mainland workers coming to Taiwan. In other words, even if the Two Yings Meeting addresses only two questions: "Should we sign ECFA?" and "How should we go about signing ECFA?" the two questions will still require additional analysis and debate. If one's conclusion is that one must not sign ECFA, then it is pointless to talk about how to go about signing ECFA. Any debate would be pointless as well. Conversely, if one is talking about "How should we go about signing ECFA?" then the "debate" need not preclude the possibility of a "discussion."
In fact, the political deadlock on Taiwan is a result of a lack of dialogue between the ruling Blues and the opposition Greens. All we have is name-calling and even cursing. In fact, the political issues that demand a dialogue between the government and the political opposition are hardly confined to ECFA. For the sake of the public welfare, in order to find a way out of political deadlock, ruling and opposition party leaders should sit down and talk about national identity, the constitution, cross-Strait issues, community relations (erroneously referred to as "ethnic relations"), responses to globalization, economic and trade policies, and social security. Alas the ruling and opposition parties' standard operating procedure is invariably confrontation. Some politicians even stoop to inciting social divisions. Sadly, the ruling and opposition parties' refusal to dialogue has turned the entire nation into their hostages. Not only are the ruling and opposition parties unable to dialogue, they aren't even aware of the need to dialogue.
As mentioned earlier, given both Ma and Tsai's character traits, there is little need to replicate any martial arts grudge match. Instead, they should establish a dialogue on national policy. ECFA is a topic with profound and far-reaching implications at all levels, including constitutional strategy and the day to day welfare of ordinary citizens. If the Two Yings clarified these issues, it would be the first time anyone on Taiwan ever got to the bottom of these matters. Their contribution to the nation and the public welfare would be inestimable.
Some have asked, why does Ma Ying-jeou object to a debate? Others have asked, why does Tsai Ing-wen object to a discussion? In fact seeing a "debate" and a "discussion" as mutually exclusive is fundamentally wrong. Any "dialogue" would necessarily include both "discussion" and "debate." Besides, what the public is seeking with ECFA is not the theatrics of a martial arts "grudge match." What they seek is an earnest, rational, and pragmatic dialogue on national policy regarding the future of the Republic of China. Hopefully we can set an agenda that takes into account the Big Picture. Hopefully the Two Yings will engage in a one day, two session or a two day, four session "summit on national policy."
Ma and Tsai each have their own peculiar character traits. Before the two can engage in a dialogue, certain conditions must be met. ECFA is an appropriate subject for just such a dialogue. In fact the Two Yings need not engage in a "cock-fight." We expect the two to participate in a dialogue on national policy that includes both debate and discussion, all for the sake of the public. We hope our expectations do not turn out to be mere wishful thinking.
雙英對話：既有辯論 也有討論
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.04.01 01:50 am
雙英會以「辯論」或「討論」的方式為宜，出現歧見。我們認為：若能以「國政對話」為目標，即可既有辯論，又有討論。
昨日「黑白集」指出，所謂「辯論」，似是指總統政見辯論會那種方式，申論六分鐘、答覆四五個問題各三分鐘、結論六分鐘；此種方式，形式束縛較大，因此較能製造針鋒相對的戲劇性效果，但其缺憾則是常以「戰術」表現為能事，對「戰略」的探討則不易深入。這種方式，其實是「政治擂台」，適用於競選場合的捉對角力；但未必是此次雙英會的最佳形式。
不宜用「打擂台」的心態來看雙英會。無論就兩岸經濟協議（ECFA）這個議題而論，或以馬英九及蔡英文兩人的人格特質而言，國人皆有權利期待二人進行一場有別於「辯論擂台」的「國政對話」。
先談雙英的人格特質。馬英九是美國哈佛大學法學博士，蔡英文是倫敦政經學院法學博士，二人皆有教授資格，從政後仍有「馬教授」與「蔡教授」的稱號；以二人的資質，去複製一場「辯論擂台」應非難事，卻是完全糟蹋了二人可能進行深入對話的才具。若採「國政對話」的方式進行，二人可較不受「辯論擂台」的形式束縛，雙方皆可卸下「三分鐘內撂倒你」的戰術壓力，始有可能出現理性辯析的寬闊空間。
再者，ECFA這個議題，也不宜採用「辯論擂台」的形式。ECFA是一個既深又廣的國策議題。其中一大主題是：為何要簽訂ECFA？牽涉到憲法戰略的問題（要「維持現狀」、「一中各表」，或「台獨建國」、「正名制憲」）；又涉及全球化經濟戰略的問題（如何因應東協加N及台灣經濟可能邊緣化）。另一大主題是：如何簽訂ECFA？包括防衛機制、早收清單、中小企業及農業的保護、「終止條款」、禁止陸勞來台等。也就是說，雙英會僅就「是否簽訂ECFA」或「如何簽訂ECFA」二大主題，即須詳加析論。若是根本「反對簽」ECFA，即不必談「如何簽」，那麼「辯論」也沒有用；反之，若是要談「如何簽」，則「辯論」亦無須排斥「討論」。
其實，台灣政治的死結，就是朝野藍綠沒有開誠布公的「對話」，而只有相互辱罵，甚至相互詛咒。然而，台灣理當進行朝野「對話」的政治議題，又何止ECFA 而已？諸如國家認同、憲法定位、兩岸問題、族群關係、因應全球化、經貿政策、社會安全機制等等，無一不需朝野高層「坐下來好好談」，為國計民生尋找出路。但是，朝野兩方卻始終以「衝突」為操作手法，有些政客更以撕裂為能事；可悲的是，因為朝野兩黨拒絕「對話」，進而使全體國人受到藍綠分別挾持，非但不能「對話」，甚至亦不知應當「對話」。
如前所述，以馬蔡二人的人格特質，大可不必複製等而下之的「政治擂台」，其實可以開創一場「國政對話」的典範。再以ECFA這個議題的廣深而言，可謂覆蓋了自憲法戰略至基層民生的所有層面，雙英若能藉此把方方面面談清楚，即不啻是台灣一次刨根挖底、伐毛洗髓的深思猛省，其有益國脈民命不言可喻。
有人問：馬英九為何反對辯論？有人問：蔡英文為何反對討論？其實，將「辯論」與「討論」視為相互排斥的概念，在根本上就是錯誤的；因為，「對話」就能同時包括「討論」與「辯論」。何況，對於ECFA這個議題，國人追求的絕對不是一場「辯論擂台」的戲劇性效果，而是藉此對「中華民國何去何從」進行一場真誠、理性、務實的「國政對話」。若能安排出一個關照全局的對話題綱，期待雙英為國人進行一次一天兩場或兩天四場的「國政巔峰對話」，亦非異想天開。
馬蔡二人的人格特質有「對話」的條件，ECFA又是一個適合「對話」的題材；雙英其實不必演出一場「鬥雞式」的辯論，期待他們為國人推出一場有既有辯論、也有討論的「國政對話」，難道竟是天方夜譚？
United Daily News editorial
A Translation
April 1, 2010
Differences have arisen over whether the "Two Yings Meeting" between Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen should be a "debate" or a "discussion." We feel as long as it is a "dialogue on national policy," it makes no difference whether it is a "debate" or a "discussion."
Yesterday the United Daily News editorial column "In Black and White" weighed in on the so-called debate. It said that the format proposed by the president was too restrictive. Each side would have six minutes to present their views, three minutes to answer four to five questions, and six minutes to make any concluding remarks. Such a format might create dramatic confrontation, but would stress tactical skills at the expense of strategic significance. Such a format is essentially that of a martial arts "grudge match." It might be appropriate for an election debate, but it might not be ideal for the Two Yings Meeting.
The Two Yings Meeting should not be viewed as a martial arts grudge match. The issue being addressed might be cross-strait economic agreements such as ECFA. The issue might be the personality differences between Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen. But the public has a right to expect a dialogue on national policy and not a martial arts grudge match.
Let's begin by looking at the Two Yings' character traits. Ma is a Juris Doctor from Harvard University. Tsai Ing-wen is a Doctor of Law from the London School of Economics. Both are qualified to be professors. They have both gone into politics, but many still address them as "Professor Ma" and "Professor Tsai." Based on their qualifications, to replicate the political equivalent of a martial arts grudge match would not be difficult. But it would squander an opportunity for in-depth dialogue. If one adopts the format of a "dialogue on national policy" the two may be less bound by the format of a martial arts grudge match. The two sides could alleviate the pressure to "pin one's opponent in three minutes." They could create space for rational debate and analysis.
Furthermore, ECFA is not an issue that ought to be dealt with using the format of a martial arts grudge match. ECFA has profound and far-reaching national policy implications. One of the most important questions is: Should we sign ECFA? The answer involves constitutional strategy issues such as "maintaining the status quo," "One China, Different Interpretations," or "Taiwan independence," the "Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution." It involves issues of global economic strategy, such as how to respond to ASEAN plus N, and the marginalization of Taiwan's economy. Another important question is, How should we go about signing ECFA? The answer involves defense mechanisms, an early harvest list, protection for small and medium enterprises (SME) and agriculture, a Sunset Clause, and prohibitions against Mainland workers coming to Taiwan. In other words, even if the Two Yings Meeting addresses only two questions: "Should we sign ECFA?" and "How should we go about signing ECFA?" the two questions will still require additional analysis and debate. If one's conclusion is that one must not sign ECFA, then it is pointless to talk about how to go about signing ECFA. Any debate would be pointless as well. Conversely, if one is talking about "How should we go about signing ECFA?" then the "debate" need not preclude the possibility of a "discussion."
In fact, the political deadlock on Taiwan is a result of a lack of dialogue between the ruling Blues and the opposition Greens. All we have is name-calling and even cursing. In fact, the political issues that demand a dialogue between the government and the political opposition are hardly confined to ECFA. For the sake of the public welfare, in order to find a way out of political deadlock, ruling and opposition party leaders should sit down and talk about national identity, the constitution, cross-Strait issues, community relations (erroneously referred to as "ethnic relations"), responses to globalization, economic and trade policies, and social security. Alas the ruling and opposition parties' standard operating procedure is invariably confrontation. Some politicians even stoop to inciting social divisions. Sadly, the ruling and opposition parties' refusal to dialogue has turned the entire nation into their hostages. Not only are the ruling and opposition parties unable to dialogue, they aren't even aware of the need to dialogue.
As mentioned earlier, given both Ma and Tsai's character traits, there is little need to replicate any martial arts grudge match. Instead, they should establish a dialogue on national policy. ECFA is a topic with profound and far-reaching implications at all levels, including constitutional strategy and the day to day welfare of ordinary citizens. If the Two Yings clarified these issues, it would be the first time anyone on Taiwan ever got to the bottom of these matters. Their contribution to the nation and the public welfare would be inestimable.
Some have asked, why does Ma Ying-jeou object to a debate? Others have asked, why does Tsai Ing-wen object to a discussion? In fact seeing a "debate" and a "discussion" as mutually exclusive is fundamentally wrong. Any "dialogue" would necessarily include both "discussion" and "debate." Besides, what the public is seeking with ECFA is not the theatrics of a martial arts "grudge match." What they seek is an earnest, rational, and pragmatic dialogue on national policy regarding the future of the Republic of China. Hopefully we can set an agenda that takes into account the Big Picture. Hopefully the Two Yings will engage in a one day, two session or a two day, four session "summit on national policy."
Ma and Tsai each have their own peculiar character traits. Before the two can engage in a dialogue, certain conditions must be met. ECFA is an appropriate subject for just such a dialogue. In fact the Two Yings need not engage in a "cock-fight." We expect the two to participate in a dialogue on national policy that includes both debate and discussion, all for the sake of the public. We hope our expectations do not turn out to be mere wishful thinking.
雙英對話：既有辯論 也有討論
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.04.01 01:50 am
雙英會以「辯論」或「討論」的方式為宜，出現歧見。我們認為：若能以「國政對話」為目標，即可既有辯論，又有討論。
昨日「黑白集」指出，所謂「辯論」，似是指總統政見辯論會那種方式，申論六分鐘、答覆四五個問題各三分鐘、結論六分鐘；此種方式，形式束縛較大，因此較能製造針鋒相對的戲劇性效果，但其缺憾則是常以「戰術」表現為能事，對「戰略」的探討則不易深入。這種方式，其實是「政治擂台」，適用於競選場合的捉對角力；但未必是此次雙英會的最佳形式。
不宜用「打擂台」的心態來看雙英會。無論就兩岸經濟協議（ECFA）這個議題而論，或以馬英九及蔡英文兩人的人格特質而言，國人皆有權利期待二人進行一場有別於「辯論擂台」的「國政對話」。
先談雙英的人格特質。馬英九是美國哈佛大學法學博士，蔡英文是倫敦政經學院法學博士，二人皆有教授資格，從政後仍有「馬教授」與「蔡教授」的稱號；以二人的資質，去複製一場「辯論擂台」應非難事，卻是完全糟蹋了二人可能進行深入對話的才具。若採「國政對話」的方式進行，二人可較不受「辯論擂台」的形式束縛，雙方皆可卸下「三分鐘內撂倒你」的戰術壓力，始有可能出現理性辯析的寬闊空間。
再者，ECFA這個議題，也不宜採用「辯論擂台」的形式。ECFA是一個既深又廣的國策議題。其中一大主題是：為何要簽訂ECFA？牽涉到憲法戰略的問題（要「維持現狀」、「一中各表」，或「台獨建國」、「正名制憲」）；又涉及全球化經濟戰略的問題（如何因應東協加N及台灣經濟可能邊緣化）。另一大主題是：如何簽訂ECFA？包括防衛機制、早收清單、中小企業及農業的保護、「終止條款」、禁止陸勞來台等。也就是說，雙英會僅就「是否簽訂ECFA」或「如何簽訂ECFA」二大主題，即須詳加析論。若是根本「反對簽」ECFA，即不必談「如何簽」，那麼「辯論」也沒有用；反之，若是要談「如何簽」，則「辯論」亦無須排斥「討論」。
其實，台灣政治的死結，就是朝野藍綠沒有開誠布公的「對話」，而只有相互辱罵，甚至相互詛咒。然而，台灣理當進行朝野「對話」的政治議題，又何止ECFA 而已？諸如國家認同、憲法定位、兩岸問題、族群關係、因應全球化、經貿政策、社會安全機制等等，無一不需朝野高層「坐下來好好談」，為國計民生尋找出路。但是，朝野兩方卻始終以「衝突」為操作手法，有些政客更以撕裂為能事；可悲的是，因為朝野兩黨拒絕「對話」，進而使全體國人受到藍綠分別挾持，非但不能「對話」，甚至亦不知應當「對話」。
如前所述，以馬蔡二人的人格特質，大可不必複製等而下之的「政治擂台」，其實可以開創一場「國政對話」的典範。再以ECFA這個議題的廣深而言，可謂覆蓋了自憲法戰略至基層民生的所有層面，雙英若能藉此把方方面面談清楚，即不啻是台灣一次刨根挖底、伐毛洗髓的深思猛省，其有益國脈民命不言可喻。
有人問：馬英九為何反對辯論？有人問：蔡英文為何反對討論？其實，將「辯論」與「討論」視為相互排斥的概念，在根本上就是錯誤的；因為，「對話」就能同時包括「討論」與「辯論」。何況，對於ECFA這個議題，國人追求的絕對不是一場「辯論擂台」的戲劇性效果，而是藉此對「中華民國何去何從」進行一場真誠、理性、務實的「國政對話」。若能安排出一個關照全局的對話題綱，期待雙英為國人進行一次一天兩場或兩天四場的「國政巔峰對話」，亦非異想天開。
馬蔡二人的人格特質有「對話」的條件，ECFA又是一個適合「對話」的題材；雙英其實不必演出一場「鬥雞式」的辯論，期待他們為國人推出一場有既有辯論、也有討論的「國政對話」，難道竟是天方夜譚？
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