Responses to External Forces, Past and Present, by Japan and China
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 24, 2010
The proposed signing of the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) has provoked arguments over whether the government should have an Open Door Policy or a Closed Door Policy, and over internationalization and marginalization.
The nineteenth century Meiji Restoration in Japan and the Qing dynasty Reform Movement of 1898 on the Chinese mainland have often been compared to each other. In fact, the slogans "zun wang rang yi" 尊王攘夷 (honor the emperor by resisting foreigners) and "fu qing mie yang" 扶清滅洋 (help the Qing court, exterminate the foreigners), show the difficulties both experienced resisting aggression by "foreign barbarians." Both were struggles for national salvation, but each of them led to a very different result.
In 1853 America's "black ships" knocked on Japan's door. They provoked a debate over whether Japan should adopt an Open Door Policy or a Closed Door Policy. The political slogan "zun wang rang yi" spoke of resisting the invaders. The debate was fierce, and even led to a small scale civil war. In the end however, the advocates of an Open Door Policy prevailed. Their advocacy of an Open Door Policy over a Closed Door Policy was motivated by a desire to "resist foreigners." Japan witnessed the bloody results of the Sino-British Opium War. They realized that only an Open Door Policy could save their nation.
The Meiji Restoration produced two main results. First, the Meiji Restoration's "da zheng feng huan" 大政奉還 ended the rule of the Tokugawa shogunate. A constitutional monarchy helped the new government consolidate its rule. Secondly, a strategy of rapid opening up and comprehensive reform led to regime change, economic prosperity, a strengthening of the military, the transplantation of new industries, and civilizational advances. Fukuzawa Yukichi's "detachment from Asia and entry into Europe" sums up the thinking of the Meiji Restoration. It denoted total transformation. Finally, Japan's victory in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War essentially validated the Meiji Restoration.
By contrast, consider the Qing court's Self-Strengthening and Reform Movement which occurred at roughly the same time. After 30 years or so, the Self Strengthening Movement begun in 1860 ended in defeat with the Sino-Japanese War. In 1898 the Reform Movement petered out after only one hundred days. All of the Qing court's reform efforts were coopted by the Boxer Rebellion and spun as "Support the Qing, exterminate the foreigners." This led to the humiliation suffered in 1900 at the hands of the Eight Nation Alliance, and the disastrous Boxer Protocol and Boxer Indemnity. Eleven years later, Sun Yat-sen's revolution overthrew the Qing Dynasty. The two slogans "zun wang rang yi" and "fu qing mie yang" were so similar. So why did they lead to such dramatically different outcomes?
Nor was China's tragedy over. Mainland China closed its doors with an Iron Curtain. Only after Mao Zedong's death in 1976, did it introduce its policy of Reform and Liberalization. Only later, in 1992, when Deng Xiaoping gave his "Southern Tour Speech" did the mainland authorities reach a Point of No Return. The Meiji Restoration completed its reform and liberalization in just a few decades. Mainland China's Reform and Liberalization was delayed 110 to 130 years.
But once it passed the 1992 Point of No Return, the Beijing government's courage and wisdom in its Reform and Liberalization efforts have been impressive indeed. The issue of whether to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) provoked a fierce controversy within the mainland government and among the public. Zhu Rongji, its chief sponsor, was denounced as a traitor. His critics compared the acceptance of WTO provisions to Yuan Shi-kai's acceptance of Japan's 21 Demands. Opening up involves pain. One must open up the nation's doors, reduce tariffs, allow "vulnerable industries" to be impacted. But only opening up can create opportunities, and transform the economy from a stagnant pond into a living stream. Lastly, the Beijing authorities are using WTO, and external influence, to compel internal political reform and liberalization, as well as economic transformation and upgrading. As a result, mainland China has become the number one beneficiary of the WTO system, and Zhu Rongji can shrug off the label of "traitor."
Now it is Taipei's turn to choose between an Open Door Policy and a Closed Door Policy. The debate is essentially over whether to resist Beijing and globalization by opening up, or to resist Beijing and globalization by closing down. The Meiji Restoration policy of "zun wang rang yi" helped the new government consolidate its rule. It created social cohesion, enabling it to withstand external shocks. On Taiwan however, the opposition DPP wants use "resisting foreign aggression" merely as a pretext for internecine political struggle. It wants to use "love for Taiwan" merely as a populist rallying cry, and merely to incite hatred for [mainland] China. In fact it is little different from the Boxer Rebellion's "support the Qing court, exterminate the foreigners." At least the Boxer Rebellion's "zun wang rang yi" (honoring the emperor by resisting foreigners) supported the Qing court. Slogans such as "love Taiwan, hate China" on the other hand, are intended merely to force Ma Ying-jeou to step down over the "early harvest list." The "zun wang rang yi" policy of honoring the emperor by resisting foreigners and the "fu qing mie yang" policy of helping the Qing court eliminate foreign influences, advocated national unity in response to foreign aggression. Opposition DPP accusations that the Ma administration "panders to [mainland] China and is selling out Taiwan" on the other hand, deliberately distort the facts. They are clearly merely about political infighting. Pitting "vulnerable industries" against "conglomerates" meanwhile, merely replicates the internal power struggles that occurred during the Cultural Revolution, inciting the proletariat to exterminate the capitalists.
In the controversy between an Open Door Policy and a Closed Door Policy, the opposition DPP has failed to match Japan's wisdom during the Meiji Restoration, or mainland China's courage during Reform and Liberalization. Advocates of a Closed Door Policy on Taiwan have the same mindset as the Boxers. They have merely substituted "love Taiwan, hate China" for "honor the emperor, exterminate foreigners." They are merely using "vulnerable industries" as a bargaining chip during internal power struggles. They are merely parroting the "support the proletariat, exterminate the capitalists" slogans popular during the Cultural Revolution.
Zhu Rongji has finally gotten his day in court. He is finally able to shrug off the label of "traitor." How long do advocates of a Closed Door Policy on Taiwan intend to demagogue the issue of "pandering to [mainland] China and selling out Taiwan?"
尊王攘夷 扶清滅洋 傾中賣台
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.24 02:36 am
兩岸經濟協議（ＥＣＦＡ）的議簽，引發了開放與鎖國之辯，及國際化與邊緣化之爭。
十九世紀日本的明治維新，與中國清朝的自強變法運動，常被引為對照。其實，從「尊王攘夷」與「扶清滅洋」兩句口號，即可看出兩國當時皆面臨如何抵拒「洋夷」侵略的問題，但同為救亡圖存的變革，最後在兩國卻有大相逕庭的結果。
一八五三年，美國「黑船來航」，向日本敲門，引發「開國／鎖國」的論戰。「尊王攘夷」這個政治號召，原本寓有抵拒入侵者的意旨；那場論戰不可謂不激烈，甚至發生局部內戰，但最後「開國派」取得勝利。亦即主張以「開國」來「攘夷」，而不是用「鎖國」來「攘夷」。因為，隔海中英鴉片戰爭血淋淋的事例擺在日本眼前；變法開國是唯一的自救之道。
明治維新的主要成效有二：一、以「大政奉還」倒幕置縣，再以「君主立憲」鞏固政府；二、在迅速開放及全面改革的戰略原則下，將政體改造、富國強兵、殖產興業、文明開化等畢其功於一役。福澤諭吉的「脫亞入歐」，可謂總括了明治維新的思維，其實就是「脫胎換骨」的意思。最後，一八九五年，日本贏得中日甲午戰爭，形同明治維新開國政策的驗收成績單。
反觀約略同一時期的清朝自強變法運動。一八六○年以降三十餘年的自強運動，以甲午戰敗收場；一八九八年的戊戌變法，僅百日即夭折。至此，清廷變法維新的一切努力，竟被義和團「扶清滅洋」的口號所襲奪；最後引致一九○○年八國聯軍、辛丑條約及庚子賠款的慘禍。十一年後，清朝因孫中山革命而覆亡。「尊王攘夷」、「扶清滅洋」這兩句孿生子一般相似的口號，為何卻有如此殊同天壤的結局？
悲劇在中國並未結束。中國大陸以「鐵幕」鎖國，至一九七六年毛澤東死後，始能端出「改革開放」的政策，且更遲至一九九二年鄧小平「南巡講話」才通過了不折返點。明治維新可謂在數年之間即確立「改革開放」，中國大陸的「改革開放」則整整遲了一百一十年至一百三十年。
然而，過了一九九二年的不折返點後，北京政府「改革開放」的勇氣與智慧皆予人深刻印象。是否加入世界貿易組織（ＷＴＯ），一度成為中國朝野激烈的爭議。主其事的朱鎔基，被斥為「漢奸」、「賣國賊」；又指接受ＷＴＯ條款，不啻等同袁世凱接受日本的「二十一條」。開放有其痛苦，必須打開國門，降低關稅，使「弱勢產業」遭到衝擊；但開放才能創造機會，使經濟成為活水。最後，「藉由ＷＴＯ的外力，強迫改革開放及經濟轉型升級」成為決策主軸，如今中國已成ＷＴＯ體制下最大的受益國，朱鎔基也脫掉了「賣國賊」的帽子。
現在，輪到台灣面對「開放／鎖國」的抉擇。這是「以開放來因應中國及全球化（攘夷？）」，或「以鎖國來因應中國及全球化」的爭議。明治維新「尊王攘夷」，以鞏固政府、凝聚社會，來面對外力衝擊；但台灣卻儼然只是「藉攘夷的口實來操作內鬥」；以「愛台灣」的民粹號召，煽動「愛台仇中」，其實亦與義和團的「扶清滅洋」不啻異曲同工。何況，義和團的「扶清滅洋」尚主張支持清政府，但「愛台仇中」卻是欲以「馬英九下台」為「早收清單」的唯一項目。再者，無論「尊王攘夷」或「扶清滅洋」，皆是舉國一致因應外侮；但是，將馬政府指為「傾中賣台」，卻刻意扭曲國家處境，明明只是政治內鬥。至於以「弱勢產業」與「財團」相對立，亦儼然是文化大革命中「興無滅資」內鬥口號的翻版。
面對「開放／鎖國」的爭議，台灣的表現不如明治維新的智慧，亦不如中國改革開放的魄力；台灣的鎖國派，不啻是以「愛台仇中」取代了「扶清滅洋」的義和團思想，甚且是以「弱勢產業」為內鬥籌碼，翻唱文革「興無滅資」的口號。
朱鎔基終於討回公道，熬到了摘掉「賣國賊」帽子的一天。台灣的鎖國派，還要將那頂「傾中賣台」的帽子操弄到何年何月？
Monday, May 24, 2010
Friday, May 21, 2010
Beijing Must Rethink Its Cross-Strait Relations Map
Beijing Must Rethink Its Cross-Strait Relations Map
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2010
Yesterday former premier Liu Chao-hsuan spoke at Tsinghua University in Beijing. He pointed out that cross-strait relations should contribute to human civilization. For example, England's Industrial Revolution introduced the rule of law and human rights. America's independence and founding brought about popular rule.
The last time the two sides of the Taiwan Strait clashed then merged, was during the Ming dynasty, when Koxinga and the Qing court clashed. In the end, Shi Lang resolved the issue by means of military force. The Qing dynasty, a large absolute monarchy, swallowed up the Ming dynasty Koxinga regime, a small absolute monarchy. That cross-Strait merger expanded the Qing empire's territory. But otherwise it contributed nothing to human civilization. Subsequently, in 1894, the Qing court ceded Taiwan to Japan.
Since 1949, the separation of the two sides has made a significant contribution to world civilization. On Taiwan, the Republic of China government became a model for the political and economic development of emerging nations. On the mainland meanwhile, the People's Republic of China government rose to its feet following a "Thirty Year Long Catastrophe." The world's attention is focused on the miracle of "China's Rise." Today the two sides have moved from life or death struggle to "peaceful development." This remarkable cross-Strait interaction no longer poses the question of "who will swallow up whom" faced by the Ming dynasty Koxinga regime and the Qing Court. Instead, it has the potential to make a significant contribution human civilization.
The mainland has a responsibility toward Taiwan. The mainland is big. Taiwan is small. Taiwan has a liberal democratic society. It occupies the moral and civilizational high ground. The mainland has no reason to drag Taiwan down. If in the end the matter is settled by means of military force, on the basis of "who swallows up whom," that would be intolerable to human civilization.
Fortunately, there is reason for optimism amidst pessimism. [Mainland] China's "peaceful rise" is already contributing to world civilization. Historically the "rise of great nations" has always been based on military invasions and economic exploitation. The Industrial Revolution was followed by eighteenth and nineteenth-century imperialism. The major powers used their powerful navies to aid and abet greedy and bloodthirsty capitalists in their plunder. The working classes within these major powers however, did not benefit. They too were exploited. But this time, the rise of [mainland] China is based on the exchange of meager profits between cheap labor and powerful capitalists. Sweatshop laborers have become the prime movers and first wave of beneficiaries in this rise. This is the first time in history that sweatshops instigated the rise of a great power from the bottom-up. In fact, it is the only time in history that a great nation has ever risen peacefully. During the nineteenth century, the great powers rose, then forced China to cede territory and pay reparations. Today, China has been reborn. It has become the US's largest creditor. The Beijing authorities must take pride in this example of a "peaceful rise" created by sweatshops. It must not relinquish this honor lightly.
At the macro level, this "peaceful rise" is beneficial to cross-Strait "peaceful development." It is also why the two sides have no choice but to engage in "peaceful development." Today mainland China is closely intertwined with the global economy. That is why politically it cannot afford to have its rise called into question. If the two sides of the Taiwan Strait cannot engage in "peaceful development," if Beijing hopes to swallow up Taipei by force, that would offer grounds to reject [mainland] China's rise. Beijing's situation would be far more embarrassing than Washington's during the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It would surely be a disaster.
In fact, the two sides already have a basic framework for "peaceful development." That framework is the "1992 Consensus" and "One China, Different Interpretations." The Beijing authorities should rethink their cross-Strait relations road map. They must not make "who swallows up whom" the ultimate goal in cross-Strait relations. Such a goal could turn into a trap for Beijing, one from which it could not extricate itself.
Beijing has long relied on fanatical nationalism to justify its Taiwan policy. In fact this has mired the Beijing authorities in an unwanted quagmire. The public on the mainland may favor getting tough with Taipei, and this sentiment can be exploited. But if Beijing swallows up the liberal democratic Republic of China by force, it would constitute a blow to world civilization and the Chinese people that the Beijing authorities could not withstand. But if we can change course, in a positive direction, we can arrive at a consensus with the mainland that contributes to world civilization. Cross-Strait relations has enormous opportunities for positive development. Therefore, the Beijing authorities should rethink their map for cross-Strait relations. It should not paint itself into a corner with self-imposed commitments. Cross-Strait relations must be allowed greater leeway. If the two sides cannot engage in "peaceful development," then the internal and external repercussions will make it impossible for [mainland] China to continue its "peaceful rise."
In fact, [mainland] China's "peaceful rise" and cross-Strait "peaceful development" are already off to a positive start. Cross-Strait coopetition offers an opportunity to make a significant contribution to world civilization. Do not forsake this precious opportunity. Moving towards "One China, Different Interpretations" is a path Beijing should consider.
The current framework, established by Ma Ying-jeou and Hu Jintao, has already reached its profit-taking and stop-loss points. This is a one time opportunity. If we miss the peak, if Beijing fails to rethink its road map, the impact on cross-Strait "peaceful development" will be difficult to predict. The risk to [mainland] China's "peaceful rise" is sure to increase.
北京必須修正兩岸關係路徑圖
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.21 02:21 am
行政院前院長劉兆玄日前在北京清華大學演說指出，兩岸關係的發展，應對人類文化有所貢獻；例如，英國在工業革命外帶來法治、人權，美國獨立建國則帶來平民政治等。
上一次兩岸關係的衝突與整合，發生在明鄭與清廷的對抗；最後是以施琅武力犯台收場，清朝那個大的君主專制政體，併吞了明鄭這個小的君主專制朝廷。那一次兩岸整合，除了為滿清帝國擴增疆域外，難謂對世界文明或人類文化作出任何貢獻。嗣後，在一八九四年，清廷甲午戰敗，將台灣割給日本。
此次自一九四九年以來的兩岸分離，已為世界文明創造了重大的貢獻。在台灣的中華民國，成為新興國家自由民主政經發展的典範；在大陸的中華人民共和國，則從「三十年浩劫」後重新站起，舉世皆在注目「中國崛起」的奇蹟。如今，兩岸從不共戴天的殊死惡鬥中，走向「和平發展」，這場舉世矚目的兩岸競合互動，應當不再是如明鄭清廷那一般「誰吃掉誰」的問題，而是很有可能為世界文明及人類文化作出重大貢獻。
大陸的責任大於台灣。因為大陸大，台灣小；而且台灣已是自由民主社會，在文明及道德上占了高度及優勢，大陸沒有道理將台灣往下拖。倘若最後只是以「誰吃掉誰」的武力吞滅收場，必為世界文明及人類文化所不容。
情勢在悲觀中存有樂觀的理由。中國大陸的「和平崛起」其實已為世界文明作出貢獻。歷史上的「大國崛起」，從來皆是軍事進犯與經濟侵略。以十八、十九世紀的帝國主義論，工業革命後，列強以艦炮為貪婪嗜血的資本家護航，四出掠奪；與此同時，這些強國在國內的勞工階級並未受惠，同樣飽受剝削。然而，此際的中國崛起，卻是以廉價勞工與列強資本家交換菲薄的利益而漸漸翻過身來，血汗工廠的勞工階層成為崛起的動力與首波受益者。這是歷史上第一次自血汗工廠「由下而上」的大國崛起，甚至也是唯一的一次「大國和平崛起」。十九世紀列強崛起，逼迫中國割地賠款；如今中國翻身，竟成了美國最大的債權人。北京政權應當珍惜這個以血汗工廠起步所創造的「和平崛起」的典範，不要保持不住。
這個「和平崛起」的大情勢，是兩岸得以「和平發展」的條件，也是兩岸不能不「和平發展」的理由。如今的中國大陸，在經濟上已與世界密切交織，所以在政治上也已禁受不起世界對其「崛起」的質疑。兩岸倘不能「和平發展」，北京若欲以武力吞滅台灣，將給世界找到不容中國「崛起」的理由；屆時，中國的處境必較美國侵略伊拉克狼狽萬倍，那絕對是一場大災難。
其實，兩岸的「和平發展」，亦已有了基本框架，那就是「九二共識／一中各表」。北京當局應該修正兩岸關係的路徑圖，不要迫使自己以「誰吃掉誰」為兩岸的終極目標。因為，那可能使北京掉入「承諾的陷阱」（commitment trap），無以轉圜，不能自拔。
長期以來，北京以大陸社會上狂熱的民族主義為對台政策的憑藉，這其實已使北京當局自陷於不由自主的危機中；何況，現實大陸輿情或許主張對台灣強硬，看似民氣可用；然一旦以武力吞滅了自由民主的中華民國，其對世界文明及中國人感情上的重創，絕非北京當局所能承受。若能改弦易轍，從積極面，改以為世界文明作出貢獻為大陸社會的共識，兩岸關係朝正面發展的空間其實非常寬闊。所以，北京當局應當修正兩岸關係的路徑圖，不要用危險的「自我承諾」，將自己逼到牆角；而應為兩岸關係預留較為寬裕的空間。兩岸若不能「和平發展」，其所牽動的內外效應，將使中國無以「和平崛起」。
其實，中國的「和平崛起」與兩岸的「和平發展」，皆已有了可以正面期待的開端；兩岸的競合關係，不是沒有為世界文明及人類文化作出重大貢獻的契機，切勿辜負這萬古不遇的珍貴機遇。朝向「一中各表」，是可以思考的路徑圖。
必須正視的是：目前以馬英九及與胡錦濤所形成的架構，大陸與台灣皆已交互到達停利點與停損點，可視為此一機遇的顛峰；若錯過此一顛峰，北京未修正路徑圖，兩岸「和平發展」的機遇難測，中國「和平崛起」的風險亦必將暴升。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2010
Yesterday former premier Liu Chao-hsuan spoke at Tsinghua University in Beijing. He pointed out that cross-strait relations should contribute to human civilization. For example, England's Industrial Revolution introduced the rule of law and human rights. America's independence and founding brought about popular rule.
The last time the two sides of the Taiwan Strait clashed then merged, was during the Ming dynasty, when Koxinga and the Qing court clashed. In the end, Shi Lang resolved the issue by means of military force. The Qing dynasty, a large absolute monarchy, swallowed up the Ming dynasty Koxinga regime, a small absolute monarchy. That cross-Strait merger expanded the Qing empire's territory. But otherwise it contributed nothing to human civilization. Subsequently, in 1894, the Qing court ceded Taiwan to Japan.
Since 1949, the separation of the two sides has made a significant contribution to world civilization. On Taiwan, the Republic of China government became a model for the political and economic development of emerging nations. On the mainland meanwhile, the People's Republic of China government rose to its feet following a "Thirty Year Long Catastrophe." The world's attention is focused on the miracle of "China's Rise." Today the two sides have moved from life or death struggle to "peaceful development." This remarkable cross-Strait interaction no longer poses the question of "who will swallow up whom" faced by the Ming dynasty Koxinga regime and the Qing Court. Instead, it has the potential to make a significant contribution human civilization.
The mainland has a responsibility toward Taiwan. The mainland is big. Taiwan is small. Taiwan has a liberal democratic society. It occupies the moral and civilizational high ground. The mainland has no reason to drag Taiwan down. If in the end the matter is settled by means of military force, on the basis of "who swallows up whom," that would be intolerable to human civilization.
Fortunately, there is reason for optimism amidst pessimism. [Mainland] China's "peaceful rise" is already contributing to world civilization. Historically the "rise of great nations" has always been based on military invasions and economic exploitation. The Industrial Revolution was followed by eighteenth and nineteenth-century imperialism. The major powers used their powerful navies to aid and abet greedy and bloodthirsty capitalists in their plunder. The working classes within these major powers however, did not benefit. They too were exploited. But this time, the rise of [mainland] China is based on the exchange of meager profits between cheap labor and powerful capitalists. Sweatshop laborers have become the prime movers and first wave of beneficiaries in this rise. This is the first time in history that sweatshops instigated the rise of a great power from the bottom-up. In fact, it is the only time in history that a great nation has ever risen peacefully. During the nineteenth century, the great powers rose, then forced China to cede territory and pay reparations. Today, China has been reborn. It has become the US's largest creditor. The Beijing authorities must take pride in this example of a "peaceful rise" created by sweatshops. It must not relinquish this honor lightly.
At the macro level, this "peaceful rise" is beneficial to cross-Strait "peaceful development." It is also why the two sides have no choice but to engage in "peaceful development." Today mainland China is closely intertwined with the global economy. That is why politically it cannot afford to have its rise called into question. If the two sides of the Taiwan Strait cannot engage in "peaceful development," if Beijing hopes to swallow up Taipei by force, that would offer grounds to reject [mainland] China's rise. Beijing's situation would be far more embarrassing than Washington's during the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It would surely be a disaster.
In fact, the two sides already have a basic framework for "peaceful development." That framework is the "1992 Consensus" and "One China, Different Interpretations." The Beijing authorities should rethink their cross-Strait relations road map. They must not make "who swallows up whom" the ultimate goal in cross-Strait relations. Such a goal could turn into a trap for Beijing, one from which it could not extricate itself.
Beijing has long relied on fanatical nationalism to justify its Taiwan policy. In fact this has mired the Beijing authorities in an unwanted quagmire. The public on the mainland may favor getting tough with Taipei, and this sentiment can be exploited. But if Beijing swallows up the liberal democratic Republic of China by force, it would constitute a blow to world civilization and the Chinese people that the Beijing authorities could not withstand. But if we can change course, in a positive direction, we can arrive at a consensus with the mainland that contributes to world civilization. Cross-Strait relations has enormous opportunities for positive development. Therefore, the Beijing authorities should rethink their map for cross-Strait relations. It should not paint itself into a corner with self-imposed commitments. Cross-Strait relations must be allowed greater leeway. If the two sides cannot engage in "peaceful development," then the internal and external repercussions will make it impossible for [mainland] China to continue its "peaceful rise."
In fact, [mainland] China's "peaceful rise" and cross-Strait "peaceful development" are already off to a positive start. Cross-Strait coopetition offers an opportunity to make a significant contribution to world civilization. Do not forsake this precious opportunity. Moving towards "One China, Different Interpretations" is a path Beijing should consider.
The current framework, established by Ma Ying-jeou and Hu Jintao, has already reached its profit-taking and stop-loss points. This is a one time opportunity. If we miss the peak, if Beijing fails to rethink its road map, the impact on cross-Strait "peaceful development" will be difficult to predict. The risk to [mainland] China's "peaceful rise" is sure to increase.
北京必須修正兩岸關係路徑圖
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.21 02:21 am
行政院前院長劉兆玄日前在北京清華大學演說指出，兩岸關係的發展，應對人類文化有所貢獻；例如，英國在工業革命外帶來法治、人權，美國獨立建國則帶來平民政治等。
上一次兩岸關係的衝突與整合，發生在明鄭與清廷的對抗；最後是以施琅武力犯台收場，清朝那個大的君主專制政體，併吞了明鄭這個小的君主專制朝廷。那一次兩岸整合，除了為滿清帝國擴增疆域外，難謂對世界文明或人類文化作出任何貢獻。嗣後，在一八九四年，清廷甲午戰敗，將台灣割給日本。
此次自一九四九年以來的兩岸分離，已為世界文明創造了重大的貢獻。在台灣的中華民國，成為新興國家自由民主政經發展的典範；在大陸的中華人民共和國，則從「三十年浩劫」後重新站起，舉世皆在注目「中國崛起」的奇蹟。如今，兩岸從不共戴天的殊死惡鬥中，走向「和平發展」，這場舉世矚目的兩岸競合互動，應當不再是如明鄭清廷那一般「誰吃掉誰」的問題，而是很有可能為世界文明及人類文化作出重大貢獻。
大陸的責任大於台灣。因為大陸大，台灣小；而且台灣已是自由民主社會，在文明及道德上占了高度及優勢，大陸沒有道理將台灣往下拖。倘若最後只是以「誰吃掉誰」的武力吞滅收場，必為世界文明及人類文化所不容。
情勢在悲觀中存有樂觀的理由。中國大陸的「和平崛起」其實已為世界文明作出貢獻。歷史上的「大國崛起」，從來皆是軍事進犯與經濟侵略。以十八、十九世紀的帝國主義論，工業革命後，列強以艦炮為貪婪嗜血的資本家護航，四出掠奪；與此同時，這些強國在國內的勞工階級並未受惠，同樣飽受剝削。然而，此際的中國崛起，卻是以廉價勞工與列強資本家交換菲薄的利益而漸漸翻過身來，血汗工廠的勞工階層成為崛起的動力與首波受益者。這是歷史上第一次自血汗工廠「由下而上」的大國崛起，甚至也是唯一的一次「大國和平崛起」。十九世紀列強崛起，逼迫中國割地賠款；如今中國翻身，竟成了美國最大的債權人。北京政權應當珍惜這個以血汗工廠起步所創造的「和平崛起」的典範，不要保持不住。
這個「和平崛起」的大情勢，是兩岸得以「和平發展」的條件，也是兩岸不能不「和平發展」的理由。如今的中國大陸，在經濟上已與世界密切交織，所以在政治上也已禁受不起世界對其「崛起」的質疑。兩岸倘不能「和平發展」，北京若欲以武力吞滅台灣，將給世界找到不容中國「崛起」的理由；屆時，中國的處境必較美國侵略伊拉克狼狽萬倍，那絕對是一場大災難。
其實，兩岸的「和平發展」，亦已有了基本框架，那就是「九二共識／一中各表」。北京當局應該修正兩岸關係的路徑圖，不要迫使自己以「誰吃掉誰」為兩岸的終極目標。因為，那可能使北京掉入「承諾的陷阱」（commitment trap），無以轉圜，不能自拔。
長期以來，北京以大陸社會上狂熱的民族主義為對台政策的憑藉，這其實已使北京當局自陷於不由自主的危機中；何況，現實大陸輿情或許主張對台灣強硬，看似民氣可用；然一旦以武力吞滅了自由民主的中華民國，其對世界文明及中國人感情上的重創，絕非北京當局所能承受。若能改弦易轍，從積極面，改以為世界文明作出貢獻為大陸社會的共識，兩岸關係朝正面發展的空間其實非常寬闊。所以，北京當局應當修正兩岸關係的路徑圖，不要用危險的「自我承諾」，將自己逼到牆角；而應為兩岸關係預留較為寬裕的空間。兩岸若不能「和平發展」，其所牽動的內外效應，將使中國無以「和平崛起」。
其實，中國的「和平崛起」與兩岸的「和平發展」，皆已有了可以正面期待的開端；兩岸的競合關係，不是沒有為世界文明及人類文化作出重大貢獻的契機，切勿辜負這萬古不遇的珍貴機遇。朝向「一中各表」，是可以思考的路徑圖。
必須正視的是：目前以馬英九及與胡錦濤所形成的架構，大陸與台灣皆已交互到達停利點與停損點，可視為此一機遇的顛峰；若錯過此一顛峰，北京未修正路徑圖，兩岸「和平發展」的機遇難測，中國「和平崛起」的風險亦必將暴升。
Thursday, May 20, 2010
President Ma's Second Anniversary: Unfulfilled Expectations and Their Remedies
President Ma's Second Anniversary: Unfulfilled Expectations and Their Remedies
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 20, 2010
President Ma Ying-jeou has been in office for two years. He has passed the middle of his term of office. The past two years could be considered a collision between the type of president Ma Ying-jeou wanted to be, and the type of president the public wanted him to be. The next two years will require that he bridge the gap between his expectations and those of the public. This will determine the success or failure of his four-year presidential term.
Two years ago, on May 28, the Executive Yuan made a surprise announcement. Gasoline prices would be raised. On April 25 this year, the Two Yings Debate took place. These two events can be seen as bookends. They bracket Ma Ying-jeou's two years in office. They reflect the gap in expectations, and the remedies that must be applied.
On May 20, 2008, President Ma took office. The Chen administration had frozen gasoline prices for six months. The public waited to see if the new administration would fulfill its "one time only increase" election promise. Sure enough on June 2 the Liu cabinet announced a price increase. Alas this provoked gasoline hoarding, putting the public at risk from hazard of fire. With lightning speed the Liu cabinet announced a price increase on the 29th. People responded by lining up to fill their tanks. Gas lines stretched for miles. Public discontent came to a boil. The public concluded that the Ma administration had flunked its very first test.
The Ma administration has now changed its policy to "floating prices" adjusted every week. This was the very first test for the Ma administration. For the next two years the Ma administration would repeat this same defective decision making procedure, again and again. It would find itself on the receiving end of public wrath, again and again. In terms of oil prices, the decision to "respect the market mechanism" and adopt "floating prices" is strategically correct. But to announce price increases on June 2, provoking hoarding, then making another surprise announcement, provoking gas lines, was a tactical blunder that stirred up a political storm. Public disillusionment and skepticism regarding the Ma administration's "rule of law" and "meat and potatoes economics" began to grow.
Examples such as this are too numerous to list. For example, President Ma declared that typhoon disaster relief was mainly Premier Liu Chao-hsuan's responsibility, and that the president ought to retreat to the second line. Disaster victims were both angry and suspicious. They puzzled over the reasoning behind his declaration. The 8/8 Flood was a major disaster. Yet Ma Ying-jeou failed to declare an emergency. He was characterized as "legally correct" but "politically incorrect." Another example was the recent arbitration victory in the Lafayette frigate kickback scandal. The Chen administration attempted to settle the case privately, on the pretext that "arms compensation" is not merely a means of engaging in corruption, it also impacts international and cross-Strait politics. Ma Ying-jeou however risked the uncertain outcome of arbitration, refused reconciliation, and forsook the opportunity to use "arms compensation" to manipulate international politics.
Many have blasted Ma Ying-jeou, calling him stupid. In fact they are merely saying they don't think he is sufficiently calculating, sufficiently devious, sufficiently tuned in, sufficiently Machievellian, sufficiently ruthless. For example, the public feels that Chen Tsung-ming refuses to step down because Ma Ying-jeou is "impotent" and "gutless." But one of Ma's important political convictions is non-interference in judicial affairs. Unfortunately this has led to a "gap in expectations."
The Two Yings Debate held in April of this year can be viewed as the beginning of an attempt to bridge the gap in expectations. Given Ma Ying-jeou's personality, he may have been looking forward to a calm and rational dialogue. Been circumstances forced him into a head to head debate. Ma probably knew he was at a disadvantage vis a vis debating skills. But he respects the opposition's watchdog role. He ran a major political risk. He put himself on an equal footing with Tsai Ing-wen and accepted the challenge. Fortunately Ma Ying-jeou gained the upper hand. Otherwise who knows how much worse the "gap in expectations" would have gotten?
During the Two Yings Debate public attention was focused on which of the two Yings was turning in a better public performance. But Ma Ying-jeou was probably merely hoping to gain public understanding and trust. The way Ma Ying-jeou handled himself during the debate showed he was serious, diligent, and sincere. He knew the risks. Nothing ventured, nothing gained. He knew the economy had to be revived. Tsai Ing-wen refrained from accusing Ma Ying-jeou of "pandering to [mainland] China and selling out Taiwan" because it was merely a Green Camp street slogan. There is no assurance it would have done the trick during the debate. In fact one of Ma Ying-jeou's most important personality traits is his loyalty to the Republic of China. That may be why his cross-Strait policy has gained the support and trust of a majority of the public. Which political leader on Taiwan besides Ma Ying-jeou exhibits these personality traits?
What kind of president does Ma Ying-jeou want to be? He probably does not want to be a media star. Instead, he wants the nation and its government to operate in accordance with the principles of justice and the rule of law. In cross-Strait affairs, he wants to be pragmatic. He is unwilling to see cross-Strait issues exploited for populist leverage during political struggles. His political style has led to a shortfall in public expectations. How can the President stand on the "second line?" Why doesn't Chen Tsung-ming feel compelled to step down? Why is the Chen Shui-bian corruption case on hold? Why is the majority party in the Legislative Yuan doing nothing? Why doesn't he meet with the Dalai Lama? Why the string of lost elections? Why the tax cuts for the wealthy? Why will ECFA harm weak industries? Why do we all feel so ill at ease?
Ma Ying-jeou has been president for two years. The Republic of China inhabits a world in which the mainland is rising, the U.S. is declining, the Republic of China is wracked by internal divisions, government personnel are either veterans or rookies, with no one in between, justice no longer prevails, the Chen corruption case is going nowhere, the global economic crisis has slowed economic growth, the threat of ASEAN plus N has surfaced, and the threat of economic marginalization looms. This would seem to be the time for a Man on Horseback, a "Father of Democracy," or a "Son of Taiwan" to come riding to the rescue. Instead, to lead us out of our predicament, we have a political leader who studiously maintains a low political profile, who eschews populist demagoguery, but who has won the trust of leaders abroad, across the Taiwan Strait, and on Taiwan. Ma Ying-jeou apparently regard this as his historical role. Taiwan must no longer be a political stage for charismatic demagogues. Taiwan needs self-effacing political leaders who can heal cross-Strait wounds, and allow us to return to peace and reason.
But a two year "gap in expectations" has left Ma Ying-jeou scarred. The public is disappointed in him. Ma Ying-jeou now stands on the front line, and is moving closer and closer to the "politics of the man in the street." The Two Yings Debate will be viewed as an attempt to address the "gap in expectations." Ma Ying-jeou hopes to win public understanding and trust for his policies. But populism may prevail. The public may care more about who turned in a better performance during the debate.
The Republic of China is in dire straits, internally and externally. President Ma's performance will be held up to a microscope, a magnifying glass. It will even be held up before a funhouse mirror. He must watch what he says. A single remark about having "creepy feelings" can provoke public attacks. He must be careful to maintain his trusted and irreplaceable role in cross-Strait affairs. Ma Ying-jeou admittedly has many things he can be criticized for. His policy bungles have left his administration in crisis. But as we review the record of the past two years, he remains the right choice to lead the Republic of China over the next few years,
馬總統二周年：角色期望落差的衝撞與修補
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.20 01:57 am
馬英九總統就職滿二年，任期已經過半。這兩年來，可謂是「馬英九自己想作一個怎樣的總統」，與「國人期望他作一個怎樣的總統」的強烈衝撞過程；未來兩年，則將是這種「角色期望落差」的修補工程，並將由此決定他四年總統任期的成敗得失。
兩年前，五月二十八日，行政院以奇襲方式宣布油價上漲，與今年四月二十五日的雙英辯論，這兩個事件，一頭一尾，跨越馬英九的兩年任期，正好反映了上述「角色期望落差」的衝撞與修補。
2008年五月二十日，馬總統上台，油價已被扁政府凍漲了六個月，國人皆在觀望新政府何時實施「一次漲足」的競選政見；果然，劉兆玄內閣宣布將在六月二日漲價，但立即引發囤油居奇，公共安全危機四伏，劉內閣遂閃電宣布於二十九日漲價，爆發了排隊搶購的風潮，車隊綿延數公里。於是，民怨沸騰，指馬政府「第一堂課就不及格」。
如今，已然改採「浮動油價」，每周調整一次。這個「馬政府的第一堂課」，其決策模式及所引致的批評，幾乎是兩年來馬政府多數政策的「原型」。以言油價，決定「尊重市場機制」，採行「浮動油價」，其實皆是「戰略正確」的主張；但居然預先宣布將在六月二日漲價以致引發囤積，再又突襲漲價引爆搶購，則分明是在戰術面及溝通面造成了政治風暴。在這當中，就出現了「依法行政」及「庶民政治」的期望落差。
此類事例，不勝枚舉。例如，馬總統一度認為，颱風勘災慰問，應讓閣揆劉兆玄先去，總統則退居第二線；此說惹得災民又怒又疑，質問這是什麼道理？甚至發生八八水災那麼大的災難，馬英九堅不宣布緊急命令，亦被指為即使「法制正確」，卻是「政治不正確」。再如最近拉法葉艦佣金案仲裁獲勝，扁政府曾欲私下和解，藉「武器代償」，一方面操作國際及兩岸政治，另一方面作為貪墨器具；但是，馬英九卻冒著仲裁勝負未定的風險，堅拒和解，也無意藉「武器代償」操弄國際政治。
許多人批評馬英九笨，其實不少批評的真意是指他不夠權謀，不夠奸巧，不夠通達，不會弄權，不夠壞；例如，強烈的民意認為，陳聰明久不下台是因馬英九「無能」、「沒有魄力」，但不干涉司法卻是他的重要政治信仰與堅持之一。然而，「期望的落差」卻因此而生。
今年四月的雙英辯論，似可視為這種「期望落差」修補工程的開端。若依馬英九的真性情，他可能更期待一場平和理性的「對話」；卻被情勢推上針鋒相對的辯論。其實，馬應自知在口才上未必占有優勢；但他卻尊重在野黨作為監督者的角色，冒著重大政治風險，接受蔡英文平起平坐的挑戰。所幸馬英九在那場辯論中略占上風，否則這種「期望的落差」更不知將惡化至何種田地？
那場辯論會，社會視聽關注的是雙英臨場表現的高下，但馬英九自己所期望者，卻應在能否取得國人的理解與信任。馬英九在這場辯論會中的表現顯示，他是認真的，用功的，誠懇的，他也知道其中必有「不入虎穴」的風險，但他更知道他所面對的是必須將台灣「起死回生」的工程。蔡英文在辯論會中未以「傾中賣台」指責馬英九，由於那只是綠營的街頭運動語言，在辯論會中未必站得住腳；其實，馬英九最重要的人格特質，也許正是對中華民國的忠愛，這是他的兩岸政策之所以能獲得多數國人支持與信任的重要理由。尤其，若非馬英九，其他台灣政治領袖在兩岸間不可能有此種人格資產。
馬英九自己想作一個怎樣的總統？他也許不想成為視聽的明星，希望國家及政府的一切皆能按公義及法制運作；在兩岸政務上，他也希望能務實進行，不願見將兩岸議題當作台灣內部政治鬥爭的民粹槓桿。這樣的風格，與國人的期待是有落差的。總統豈能站在「第二線」？陳聰明豈能不下台？扁案為何遲未定讞？立法院的多數黨是幹什麼的？為何不會見達賴？為什麼一連輸掉幾場選舉？為何對富人減稅？為何ECFA傷害了弱勢產業？為什麼說心裡毛毛的？
馬英九就任總統兩年來，台灣所處的大環境是：中國崛起、美國式微、台灣內部撕裂、政府人才斷層、公義沉淪、扁案翻騰、國際經濟風暴迭生、東協加Ｎ浮現、台灣經濟地位面臨邊緣化危機……。這似乎已非「民主之父」、「台灣之子」之類政治梟雄興風作浪的時際，而應當有一位降低政治姿態，不玩弄民粹手段，可以在國際間、兩岸間及台灣內部取得信任的政治領袖，帶領台灣走出困局。馬英九似乎視此為他的歷史角色，台灣目前這個局面，不能再成為任何政治明星的民粹舞台，也唯有壓低個人角色的政治領袖，始有可能給兩岸帶來療傷止痛、回歸和平與理智的機會。
然而，經過兩年來「角色期望落差」的衝撞，馬英九可謂傷痕累累，民眾亦對他失望已甚；如今，馬英九幾乎已完全站在「第一線」上，且也愈來愈向「庶民政治」趨近。而雙英辯論在未來也許可視為「角色期望落差」的修補模式：馬英九期待的是政策思維取得理解與信任，但國人可能更在乎辯論演出高下的民粹效果。
台灣的內外處境極度嚴峻，馬總統的表現亦繼續要在尖銳的顯微鏡、放大鏡及哈哈鏡下接受考驗。他須留意一句「毛毛的」受到質疑，更須慎審維持他在兩岸之間無可取代的受到信任的角色。馬英九誠然有諸多可受批評之處，施政表現更是捉襟見肘，但回顧過去這兩年，及瞻望未來幾年，他仍應是在當前時際出任中華民國總統的正確人選。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 20, 2010
President Ma Ying-jeou has been in office for two years. He has passed the middle of his term of office. The past two years could be considered a collision between the type of president Ma Ying-jeou wanted to be, and the type of president the public wanted him to be. The next two years will require that he bridge the gap between his expectations and those of the public. This will determine the success or failure of his four-year presidential term.
Two years ago, on May 28, the Executive Yuan made a surprise announcement. Gasoline prices would be raised. On April 25 this year, the Two Yings Debate took place. These two events can be seen as bookends. They bracket Ma Ying-jeou's two years in office. They reflect the gap in expectations, and the remedies that must be applied.
On May 20, 2008, President Ma took office. The Chen administration had frozen gasoline prices for six months. The public waited to see if the new administration would fulfill its "one time only increase" election promise. Sure enough on June 2 the Liu cabinet announced a price increase. Alas this provoked gasoline hoarding, putting the public at risk from hazard of fire. With lightning speed the Liu cabinet announced a price increase on the 29th. People responded by lining up to fill their tanks. Gas lines stretched for miles. Public discontent came to a boil. The public concluded that the Ma administration had flunked its very first test.
The Ma administration has now changed its policy to "floating prices" adjusted every week. This was the very first test for the Ma administration. For the next two years the Ma administration would repeat this same defective decision making procedure, again and again. It would find itself on the receiving end of public wrath, again and again. In terms of oil prices, the decision to "respect the market mechanism" and adopt "floating prices" is strategically correct. But to announce price increases on June 2, provoking hoarding, then making another surprise announcement, provoking gas lines, was a tactical blunder that stirred up a political storm. Public disillusionment and skepticism regarding the Ma administration's "rule of law" and "meat and potatoes economics" began to grow.
Examples such as this are too numerous to list. For example, President Ma declared that typhoon disaster relief was mainly Premier Liu Chao-hsuan's responsibility, and that the president ought to retreat to the second line. Disaster victims were both angry and suspicious. They puzzled over the reasoning behind his declaration. The 8/8 Flood was a major disaster. Yet Ma Ying-jeou failed to declare an emergency. He was characterized as "legally correct" but "politically incorrect." Another example was the recent arbitration victory in the Lafayette frigate kickback scandal. The Chen administration attempted to settle the case privately, on the pretext that "arms compensation" is not merely a means of engaging in corruption, it also impacts international and cross-Strait politics. Ma Ying-jeou however risked the uncertain outcome of arbitration, refused reconciliation, and forsook the opportunity to use "arms compensation" to manipulate international politics.
Many have blasted Ma Ying-jeou, calling him stupid. In fact they are merely saying they don't think he is sufficiently calculating, sufficiently devious, sufficiently tuned in, sufficiently Machievellian, sufficiently ruthless. For example, the public feels that Chen Tsung-ming refuses to step down because Ma Ying-jeou is "impotent" and "gutless." But one of Ma's important political convictions is non-interference in judicial affairs. Unfortunately this has led to a "gap in expectations."
The Two Yings Debate held in April of this year can be viewed as the beginning of an attempt to bridge the gap in expectations. Given Ma Ying-jeou's personality, he may have been looking forward to a calm and rational dialogue. Been circumstances forced him into a head to head debate. Ma probably knew he was at a disadvantage vis a vis debating skills. But he respects the opposition's watchdog role. He ran a major political risk. He put himself on an equal footing with Tsai Ing-wen and accepted the challenge. Fortunately Ma Ying-jeou gained the upper hand. Otherwise who knows how much worse the "gap in expectations" would have gotten?
During the Two Yings Debate public attention was focused on which of the two Yings was turning in a better public performance. But Ma Ying-jeou was probably merely hoping to gain public understanding and trust. The way Ma Ying-jeou handled himself during the debate showed he was serious, diligent, and sincere. He knew the risks. Nothing ventured, nothing gained. He knew the economy had to be revived. Tsai Ing-wen refrained from accusing Ma Ying-jeou of "pandering to [mainland] China and selling out Taiwan" because it was merely a Green Camp street slogan. There is no assurance it would have done the trick during the debate. In fact one of Ma Ying-jeou's most important personality traits is his loyalty to the Republic of China. That may be why his cross-Strait policy has gained the support and trust of a majority of the public. Which political leader on Taiwan besides Ma Ying-jeou exhibits these personality traits?
What kind of president does Ma Ying-jeou want to be? He probably does not want to be a media star. Instead, he wants the nation and its government to operate in accordance with the principles of justice and the rule of law. In cross-Strait affairs, he wants to be pragmatic. He is unwilling to see cross-Strait issues exploited for populist leverage during political struggles. His political style has led to a shortfall in public expectations. How can the President stand on the "second line?" Why doesn't Chen Tsung-ming feel compelled to step down? Why is the Chen Shui-bian corruption case on hold? Why is the majority party in the Legislative Yuan doing nothing? Why doesn't he meet with the Dalai Lama? Why the string of lost elections? Why the tax cuts for the wealthy? Why will ECFA harm weak industries? Why do we all feel so ill at ease?
Ma Ying-jeou has been president for two years. The Republic of China inhabits a world in which the mainland is rising, the U.S. is declining, the Republic of China is wracked by internal divisions, government personnel are either veterans or rookies, with no one in between, justice no longer prevails, the Chen corruption case is going nowhere, the global economic crisis has slowed economic growth, the threat of ASEAN plus N has surfaced, and the threat of economic marginalization looms. This would seem to be the time for a Man on Horseback, a "Father of Democracy," or a "Son of Taiwan" to come riding to the rescue. Instead, to lead us out of our predicament, we have a political leader who studiously maintains a low political profile, who eschews populist demagoguery, but who has won the trust of leaders abroad, across the Taiwan Strait, and on Taiwan. Ma Ying-jeou apparently regard this as his historical role. Taiwan must no longer be a political stage for charismatic demagogues. Taiwan needs self-effacing political leaders who can heal cross-Strait wounds, and allow us to return to peace and reason.
But a two year "gap in expectations" has left Ma Ying-jeou scarred. The public is disappointed in him. Ma Ying-jeou now stands on the front line, and is moving closer and closer to the "politics of the man in the street." The Two Yings Debate will be viewed as an attempt to address the "gap in expectations." Ma Ying-jeou hopes to win public understanding and trust for his policies. But populism may prevail. The public may care more about who turned in a better performance during the debate.
The Republic of China is in dire straits, internally and externally. President Ma's performance will be held up to a microscope, a magnifying glass. It will even be held up before a funhouse mirror. He must watch what he says. A single remark about having "creepy feelings" can provoke public attacks. He must be careful to maintain his trusted and irreplaceable role in cross-Strait affairs. Ma Ying-jeou admittedly has many things he can be criticized for. His policy bungles have left his administration in crisis. But as we review the record of the past two years, he remains the right choice to lead the Republic of China over the next few years,
馬總統二周年：角色期望落差的衝撞與修補
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.20 01:57 am
馬英九總統就職滿二年，任期已經過半。這兩年來，可謂是「馬英九自己想作一個怎樣的總統」，與「國人期望他作一個怎樣的總統」的強烈衝撞過程；未來兩年，則將是這種「角色期望落差」的修補工程，並將由此決定他四年總統任期的成敗得失。
兩年前，五月二十八日，行政院以奇襲方式宣布油價上漲，與今年四月二十五日的雙英辯論，這兩個事件，一頭一尾，跨越馬英九的兩年任期，正好反映了上述「角色期望落差」的衝撞與修補。
2008年五月二十日，馬總統上台，油價已被扁政府凍漲了六個月，國人皆在觀望新政府何時實施「一次漲足」的競選政見；果然，劉兆玄內閣宣布將在六月二日漲價，但立即引發囤油居奇，公共安全危機四伏，劉內閣遂閃電宣布於二十九日漲價，爆發了排隊搶購的風潮，車隊綿延數公里。於是，民怨沸騰，指馬政府「第一堂課就不及格」。
如今，已然改採「浮動油價」，每周調整一次。這個「馬政府的第一堂課」，其決策模式及所引致的批評，幾乎是兩年來馬政府多數政策的「原型」。以言油價，決定「尊重市場機制」，採行「浮動油價」，其實皆是「戰略正確」的主張；但居然預先宣布將在六月二日漲價以致引發囤積，再又突襲漲價引爆搶購，則分明是在戰術面及溝通面造成了政治風暴。在這當中，就出現了「依法行政」及「庶民政治」的期望落差。
此類事例，不勝枚舉。例如，馬總統一度認為，颱風勘災慰問，應讓閣揆劉兆玄先去，總統則退居第二線；此說惹得災民又怒又疑，質問這是什麼道理？甚至發生八八水災那麼大的災難，馬英九堅不宣布緊急命令，亦被指為即使「法制正確」，卻是「政治不正確」。再如最近拉法葉艦佣金案仲裁獲勝，扁政府曾欲私下和解，藉「武器代償」，一方面操作國際及兩岸政治，另一方面作為貪墨器具；但是，馬英九卻冒著仲裁勝負未定的風險，堅拒和解，也無意藉「武器代償」操弄國際政治。
許多人批評馬英九笨，其實不少批評的真意是指他不夠權謀，不夠奸巧，不夠通達，不會弄權，不夠壞；例如，強烈的民意認為，陳聰明久不下台是因馬英九「無能」、「沒有魄力」，但不干涉司法卻是他的重要政治信仰與堅持之一。然而，「期望的落差」卻因此而生。
今年四月的雙英辯論，似可視為這種「期望落差」修補工程的開端。若依馬英九的真性情，他可能更期待一場平和理性的「對話」；卻被情勢推上針鋒相對的辯論。其實，馬應自知在口才上未必占有優勢；但他卻尊重在野黨作為監督者的角色，冒著重大政治風險，接受蔡英文平起平坐的挑戰。所幸馬英九在那場辯論中略占上風，否則這種「期望的落差」更不知將惡化至何種田地？
那場辯論會，社會視聽關注的是雙英臨場表現的高下，但馬英九自己所期望者，卻應在能否取得國人的理解與信任。馬英九在這場辯論會中的表現顯示，他是認真的，用功的，誠懇的，他也知道其中必有「不入虎穴」的風險，但他更知道他所面對的是必須將台灣「起死回生」的工程。蔡英文在辯論會中未以「傾中賣台」指責馬英九，由於那只是綠營的街頭運動語言，在辯論會中未必站得住腳；其實，馬英九最重要的人格特質，也許正是對中華民國的忠愛，這是他的兩岸政策之所以能獲得多數國人支持與信任的重要理由。尤其，若非馬英九，其他台灣政治領袖在兩岸間不可能有此種人格資產。
馬英九自己想作一個怎樣的總統？他也許不想成為視聽的明星，希望國家及政府的一切皆能按公義及法制運作；在兩岸政務上，他也希望能務實進行，不願見將兩岸議題當作台灣內部政治鬥爭的民粹槓桿。這樣的風格，與國人的期待是有落差的。總統豈能站在「第二線」？陳聰明豈能不下台？扁案為何遲未定讞？立法院的多數黨是幹什麼的？為何不會見達賴？為什麼一連輸掉幾場選舉？為何對富人減稅？為何ECFA傷害了弱勢產業？為什麼說心裡毛毛的？
馬英九就任總統兩年來，台灣所處的大環境是：中國崛起、美國式微、台灣內部撕裂、政府人才斷層、公義沉淪、扁案翻騰、國際經濟風暴迭生、東協加Ｎ浮現、台灣經濟地位面臨邊緣化危機……。這似乎已非「民主之父」、「台灣之子」之類政治梟雄興風作浪的時際，而應當有一位降低政治姿態，不玩弄民粹手段，可以在國際間、兩岸間及台灣內部取得信任的政治領袖，帶領台灣走出困局。馬英九似乎視此為他的歷史角色，台灣目前這個局面，不能再成為任何政治明星的民粹舞台，也唯有壓低個人角色的政治領袖，始有可能給兩岸帶來療傷止痛、回歸和平與理智的機會。
然而，經過兩年來「角色期望落差」的衝撞，馬英九可謂傷痕累累，民眾亦對他失望已甚；如今，馬英九幾乎已完全站在「第一線」上，且也愈來愈向「庶民政治」趨近。而雙英辯論在未來也許可視為「角色期望落差」的修補模式：馬英九期待的是政策思維取得理解與信任，但國人可能更在乎辯論演出高下的民粹效果。
台灣的內外處境極度嚴峻，馬總統的表現亦繼續要在尖銳的顯微鏡、放大鏡及哈哈鏡下接受考驗。他須留意一句「毛毛的」受到質疑，更須慎審維持他在兩岸之間無可取代的受到信任的角色。馬英九誠然有諸多可受批評之處，施政表現更是捉襟見肘，但回顧過去這兩年，及瞻望未來幾年，他仍應是在當前時際出任中華民國總統的正確人選。
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
The New Cabinet Heralds a Post-ECFA Era
The New Cabinet Heralds a Post-ECFA Era
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 19, 2010
It is the eve of the second anniversary of President Ma's inauguration. The cabinet is being reshuffled because Vice Premier Chu Li-lun is running for Xinbei City Mayor. So far only the chairmen of the CEPD and the FSC have been redeployed. The overall structure of the cabinet will remain the same. Three new cabinet members who were promoted however have financial and economic backgrounds. This includes Sean Chen, incoming Vice Premier. This is obviously related to ECFA, the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement that will be signed in June.
When Sean Chen was at the FSC, he was the prime mover behind the Cross-Strait Financial Supervision Memorandum of Understanding. He is familiar with cross-Strait affairs. He has now been kicked upstairs, charged with integrating and coordinating the financial and economic subcabinet. He has deft management skills and a cool head. He is bold in the face of challenges, and does not get bogged down in technicalities. The opposition DPP is boycotting ECFA with all its might, attempting to incite panic. Meanwhile Beijing is watching Taipei like a hawk. Every step is riddled with danger. If a traditional paint by the numbers bureaucrat were in charge, he would be overwhelmed. But this is precisely the kind of battlefield on which Sean Chen shines. Expect the unfavorable currents before us to subside.
The Chairman of the CEPD has been changed. The nominee announced her appointment "on her own initiative." Former Chairman Tsai Hsun-hsung is modest and austere. A sudden unprovoked "war between two women" erupted, making waves and raising eyebrows. The public knows that for the past several decades the CEPD has been responsible for planning, communications, and coordination. It truly is the heart of a financial subcabinet. If it receives recognition and full support from higher ups, its effectiveness will be unparalled. Its effectiveness however, can create problems as well as solve them. For example, when Hau Pei-tsun was premier, President Lee Teng-hui and Premier Hau trusted CEPD Chairman Kuo Wan-jung implicitly. In response to the new administration's expectations, she established a "Six-Year Economic Reconstruction Plan." The most concrete example was her heroic mobilization of national resources and use of large public construction loans. Thousands of large and small projects remain uncompleted. Her achievements cannot compare with the small scale "Ten Major Construction Projects." Squandering hard-earned tax dollars and misusing national resources left behind a bottomless well of red ink that still haunts us.
Therefore when Chairman Kuo's protege Christina Liu took over the same position 20 years later, it made for a great story. We must learn lessons from these events, and avoid making the same mistakes. Liu Yi-ju is unofficially slated to take over as Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development. She has a doctorate in economics from the University of Chicago. Her professionalism is probably not at issue. She has long believed in a free economy. She respects the market mechanism. She has been sharply critical of improper government intervention in the marketplace. Under her guidance the Council for Economic Planning and Development will probably have a very different face.
This does not mean that the CEPD can rule by doing nothing, allowing the market to go its own way completely. During normal times, the CEPD must anticipate economic trends, remedy market failures in a timely manner, improve the economic environment, and allow the individual full opportunity for development. Our economy is moving away from a long term Closed Door Policy and towards openness and freedom. Cross-Strait trade and economic relations, once bound hand and foot, have now had the doors thrown open. At this critical juncture, the CEPD is seeking the best way to open up our economy. It is attempting to eliminate obstacles in our way, and help the negotiating team obtain the most favorable conditions. It must seize the initiative. The two sides have yet to eliminate tariffs. Many SMEs have potential advantages. With money and talent, their core competitiveness can be given leg up, helping them to thrive and grow. By opening up in advance, the ordinary citizen can avoid being made obsolete. He can get a jump on the vast mainland hinterlands and marketplace, transforming it into a solid foundation for Taiwan's economic development. Meanwhile, by building "special economic zones" he can obtain an advance peace dividend. This will bring people from afar, accelerating the pace of economic growth, and herald the arrival of a new Post-ECFA Era.
In fact during DPP Chairman Tsai's current term, the CEPD took upon itself to formulate a strategy for a "Golden Decade." Now dynamic new advocates of such a strategy are in office. Among them is a Vice Premier even more familiar with cross-Strait affairs. Planning for a Golden Decade should be even more feasible and meet with even less resistance. This may make up for the Ma administration's failure to offer a vision when first assuming office.
The crux of the problem behind the Ma administration's disappointing performance over the past two years was not the premier. Nor was it members of the cabinet. It was President Ma's own stumbling about as he learned from his mistakes. Now it appears that considerable progress has been made. The quality of his administration's decision-making has improved. He is more professional and mature in his use of talent. As long as he shows greater respect for professionalism, delegates authority, speaks and acts with caution, we anticipate better from him.
新內閣引領「後ECFA 時代」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.19 02:40 am
馬總統就職兩周年前夕，內閣由於副院長朱立倫參選新北市長而局部改組。到目前為止，牽動的主要是經建會與金管會兩會主委，內閣整體架構基本上維持舊觀。但包括新任陳?副院長在內，三位受到拔擢的新閣員皆以財經見長，顯然與六月可望簽署的ＥＣＦＡ（兩岸經濟合作架構協議）有直接關聯。
陳?在金管會主委任內就是推動兩岸金融監理備忘錄（ＭＯＵ）的主將，對兩岸事務甚為熟稔。如今更上層樓，負責整合協調財經小內閣；以其手腕的靈活、心思的冷靜細膩，加上勇於任事、不拘泥於形式，面對ＥＣＦＡ這個在內部反對黨全力杯葛、煽動恐慌情緒，對岸則虎視眈眈、步步為營的艱困形勢，傳統的技術官僚按部就班、等因奉此的作法恐將窮於應付，這正是陳?重簷最佳的用武之地，眼前的逆流可望化解。
經建會主委的更迭，由於當事人「主動」宣布，原任的蔡勳雄主委又謙沖樸實，加上無端鬧出一場「兩個女人的戰爭」，因而搞得波濤洶湧，眾人側目。眾所周知，數十年來，經建會負責規畫布局、溝通協調，才真正是財經小內閣的核心，如果得到高層的肯定與全力支持，其戰鬥力量無與倫比。但這種戰鬥力，可以興利，卻亦可以為禍。例如，在郝柏村任行政院長時，深獲李登輝總統與郝院長信賴的經建會主委郭婉容，迎合新掌權者好大喜功的心態，搞出一個「六年國建」，動用全國資源還大事舉債從事公共建設，就是最具體的例證。數千項六年還完成不了的大小建設，其成就遠不能與規模極小的「十大建設」相提並論，但虛擲人民血汗、濫用全國資源，留下一個深不可測的赤字黑洞，迄今遺禍未已。
因此，當郭主委的令嬡劉憶如二十年後接掌相同職位，固是一段佳話，但千萬要從其中汲取教訓，莫再重蹈覆轍。內定接任經建會主委的劉憶如，具芝加哥大學經濟學博士學位，其專業素養應可信賴，而且素來推崇自由經濟、尊重市場機制，對公權力不當干預市場運作的作為痛加撻伐，相信在她主導之下的經建會，應可表現出完全不同的面貌。
這卻不表示經建會可以垂拱而治，完全放任市場自行其是。在平常時刻，經建會即有前瞻經濟走向而預作綢繆、化解市場失靈適時加以補救，以及改善經濟大環境任個體充分發展的基本使命。此際正值台灣經濟由長期鎖國邁向自由開放、兩岸經貿互動自百般掣肘到四門大開的關鍵時刻，經建會不僅要為加緊腳步走向開放的台灣經濟指出最妥善的前進道路、事前盡力消除橫亙道中的坎坷崎嶇、協助談判團隊爭取最有利的條件，更要掌握機先，在兩岸尚未互免關稅之前，一方面選擇有潛力、具優勢的大量中小企業，針對其核心競爭力，出錢、出人，拉他們一把，幫助他們茁壯長大，搶先站在開放的起跑點上，庶可不虞慘遭衝擊淘汰，還可能領先掌握廣大的大陸腹地與市場，成為台灣經濟堅實的依靠；另一方面則藉建設「經貿特區」提前兌現和平紅利，使近悅遠來，加速經濟成長的腳步，迎對一個嶄新的「後ＥＣＦＡ時代」。
其實在現任的蔡主委任內，經建會正銜命規畫「黃金十年」的發展戰略；如今有充滿活力的新推動者就位，其上更有熟諳兩岸事務的副院長督軍，黃金十年的規畫應可臻善美，更具可行性與說服力，彌補馬政府上任以來始終未能提出亮麗遠景的遺憾。
歸根究柢，馬政府過去兩年令人失望的表現，其癥結不在閣揆、更不在內閣成員，而在馬總統自身跌跌撞撞，從錯誤中學習。如今，似乎已可見到相當進步，決策品質已有改善，用人格局也比較專業、成熟，只要更尊重專業、分工授權、謹言慎行，應可寄望漸入佳境。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 19, 2010
It is the eve of the second anniversary of President Ma's inauguration. The cabinet is being reshuffled because Vice Premier Chu Li-lun is running for Xinbei City Mayor. So far only the chairmen of the CEPD and the FSC have been redeployed. The overall structure of the cabinet will remain the same. Three new cabinet members who were promoted however have financial and economic backgrounds. This includes Sean Chen, incoming Vice Premier. This is obviously related to ECFA, the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement that will be signed in June.
When Sean Chen was at the FSC, he was the prime mover behind the Cross-Strait Financial Supervision Memorandum of Understanding. He is familiar with cross-Strait affairs. He has now been kicked upstairs, charged with integrating and coordinating the financial and economic subcabinet. He has deft management skills and a cool head. He is bold in the face of challenges, and does not get bogged down in technicalities. The opposition DPP is boycotting ECFA with all its might, attempting to incite panic. Meanwhile Beijing is watching Taipei like a hawk. Every step is riddled with danger. If a traditional paint by the numbers bureaucrat were in charge, he would be overwhelmed. But this is precisely the kind of battlefield on which Sean Chen shines. Expect the unfavorable currents before us to subside.
The Chairman of the CEPD has been changed. The nominee announced her appointment "on her own initiative." Former Chairman Tsai Hsun-hsung is modest and austere. A sudden unprovoked "war between two women" erupted, making waves and raising eyebrows. The public knows that for the past several decades the CEPD has been responsible for planning, communications, and coordination. It truly is the heart of a financial subcabinet. If it receives recognition and full support from higher ups, its effectiveness will be unparalled. Its effectiveness however, can create problems as well as solve them. For example, when Hau Pei-tsun was premier, President Lee Teng-hui and Premier Hau trusted CEPD Chairman Kuo Wan-jung implicitly. In response to the new administration's expectations, she established a "Six-Year Economic Reconstruction Plan." The most concrete example was her heroic mobilization of national resources and use of large public construction loans. Thousands of large and small projects remain uncompleted. Her achievements cannot compare with the small scale "Ten Major Construction Projects." Squandering hard-earned tax dollars and misusing national resources left behind a bottomless well of red ink that still haunts us.
Therefore when Chairman Kuo's protege Christina Liu took over the same position 20 years later, it made for a great story. We must learn lessons from these events, and avoid making the same mistakes. Liu Yi-ju is unofficially slated to take over as Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development. She has a doctorate in economics from the University of Chicago. Her professionalism is probably not at issue. She has long believed in a free economy. She respects the market mechanism. She has been sharply critical of improper government intervention in the marketplace. Under her guidance the Council for Economic Planning and Development will probably have a very different face.
This does not mean that the CEPD can rule by doing nothing, allowing the market to go its own way completely. During normal times, the CEPD must anticipate economic trends, remedy market failures in a timely manner, improve the economic environment, and allow the individual full opportunity for development. Our economy is moving away from a long term Closed Door Policy and towards openness and freedom. Cross-Strait trade and economic relations, once bound hand and foot, have now had the doors thrown open. At this critical juncture, the CEPD is seeking the best way to open up our economy. It is attempting to eliminate obstacles in our way, and help the negotiating team obtain the most favorable conditions. It must seize the initiative. The two sides have yet to eliminate tariffs. Many SMEs have potential advantages. With money and talent, their core competitiveness can be given leg up, helping them to thrive and grow. By opening up in advance, the ordinary citizen can avoid being made obsolete. He can get a jump on the vast mainland hinterlands and marketplace, transforming it into a solid foundation for Taiwan's economic development. Meanwhile, by building "special economic zones" he can obtain an advance peace dividend. This will bring people from afar, accelerating the pace of economic growth, and herald the arrival of a new Post-ECFA Era.
In fact during DPP Chairman Tsai's current term, the CEPD took upon itself to formulate a strategy for a "Golden Decade." Now dynamic new advocates of such a strategy are in office. Among them is a Vice Premier even more familiar with cross-Strait affairs. Planning for a Golden Decade should be even more feasible and meet with even less resistance. This may make up for the Ma administration's failure to offer a vision when first assuming office.
The crux of the problem behind the Ma administration's disappointing performance over the past two years was not the premier. Nor was it members of the cabinet. It was President Ma's own stumbling about as he learned from his mistakes. Now it appears that considerable progress has been made. The quality of his administration's decision-making has improved. He is more professional and mature in his use of talent. As long as he shows greater respect for professionalism, delegates authority, speaks and acts with caution, we anticipate better from him.
新內閣引領「後ECFA 時代」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.19 02:40 am
馬總統就職兩周年前夕，內閣由於副院長朱立倫參選新北市長而局部改組。到目前為止，牽動的主要是經建會與金管會兩會主委，內閣整體架構基本上維持舊觀。但包括新任陳?副院長在內，三位受到拔擢的新閣員皆以財經見長，顯然與六月可望簽署的ＥＣＦＡ（兩岸經濟合作架構協議）有直接關聯。
陳?在金管會主委任內就是推動兩岸金融監理備忘錄（ＭＯＵ）的主將，對兩岸事務甚為熟稔。如今更上層樓，負責整合協調財經小內閣；以其手腕的靈活、心思的冷靜細膩，加上勇於任事、不拘泥於形式，面對ＥＣＦＡ這個在內部反對黨全力杯葛、煽動恐慌情緒，對岸則虎視眈眈、步步為營的艱困形勢，傳統的技術官僚按部就班、等因奉此的作法恐將窮於應付，這正是陳?重簷最佳的用武之地，眼前的逆流可望化解。
經建會主委的更迭，由於當事人「主動」宣布，原任的蔡勳雄主委又謙沖樸實，加上無端鬧出一場「兩個女人的戰爭」，因而搞得波濤洶湧，眾人側目。眾所周知，數十年來，經建會負責規畫布局、溝通協調，才真正是財經小內閣的核心，如果得到高層的肯定與全力支持，其戰鬥力量無與倫比。但這種戰鬥力，可以興利，卻亦可以為禍。例如，在郝柏村任行政院長時，深獲李登輝總統與郝院長信賴的經建會主委郭婉容，迎合新掌權者好大喜功的心態，搞出一個「六年國建」，動用全國資源還大事舉債從事公共建設，就是最具體的例證。數千項六年還完成不了的大小建設，其成就遠不能與規模極小的「十大建設」相提並論，但虛擲人民血汗、濫用全國資源，留下一個深不可測的赤字黑洞，迄今遺禍未已。
因此，當郭主委的令嬡劉憶如二十年後接掌相同職位，固是一段佳話，但千萬要從其中汲取教訓，莫再重蹈覆轍。內定接任經建會主委的劉憶如，具芝加哥大學經濟學博士學位，其專業素養應可信賴，而且素來推崇自由經濟、尊重市場機制，對公權力不當干預市場運作的作為痛加撻伐，相信在她主導之下的經建會，應可表現出完全不同的面貌。
這卻不表示經建會可以垂拱而治，完全放任市場自行其是。在平常時刻，經建會即有前瞻經濟走向而預作綢繆、化解市場失靈適時加以補救，以及改善經濟大環境任個體充分發展的基本使命。此際正值台灣經濟由長期鎖國邁向自由開放、兩岸經貿互動自百般掣肘到四門大開的關鍵時刻，經建會不僅要為加緊腳步走向開放的台灣經濟指出最妥善的前進道路、事前盡力消除橫亙道中的坎坷崎嶇、協助談判團隊爭取最有利的條件，更要掌握機先，在兩岸尚未互免關稅之前，一方面選擇有潛力、具優勢的大量中小企業，針對其核心競爭力，出錢、出人，拉他們一把，幫助他們茁壯長大，搶先站在開放的起跑點上，庶可不虞慘遭衝擊淘汰，還可能領先掌握廣大的大陸腹地與市場，成為台灣經濟堅實的依靠；另一方面則藉建設「經貿特區」提前兌現和平紅利，使近悅遠來，加速經濟成長的腳步，迎對一個嶄新的「後ＥＣＦＡ時代」。
其實在現任的蔡主委任內，經建會正銜命規畫「黃金十年」的發展戰略；如今有充滿活力的新推動者就位，其上更有熟諳兩岸事務的副院長督軍，黃金十年的規畫應可臻善美，更具可行性與說服力，彌補馬政府上任以來始終未能提出亮麗遠景的遺憾。
歸根究柢，馬政府過去兩年令人失望的表現，其癥結不在閣揆、更不在內閣成員，而在馬總統自身跌跌撞撞，從錯誤中學習。如今，似乎已可見到相當進步，決策品質已有改善，用人格局也比較專業、成熟，只要更尊重專業、分工授權、謹言慎行，應可寄望漸入佳境。
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
Beheading the Republic of China: Beijing Should Reconsider
Beheading the Republic of China: Beijing Should Reconsider
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 18, 2010
Zhang Nianchi of the East Asia Institute in Shanghai has posted a special article in the May edition of the China Review. The title of the webpage is: "Establish the Preconditions Necessary to Resolve the Republic of China Conundrum."
We do not know whether this article reflects the thinking of decision-making circles within the CCP. But if Beijing wants a key that can unlock cross-Strait problems, the above article should be considered a valuable draft.
Zhang Nianchi wrote that he spoke with a "member of the public on Taiwan." That member of the public told Zhang that "[Beijing's] refusal to recognize the Republic of China, is akin to chopping off our head. What good does it do to leave the four limbs and the five organs intact?" Zhang Nianchi said people who think like this do not necessarily support Taiwan independence.
Actually "members of the public on Taiwan" who think like this could never be supporters of Taiwan independence. The goal of Taiwan independence is to replace the Republic of China's head. The goal of Taiwan independence is to use the Republic of China as a shell company, in order to engage in backdoor listing. The goal of Taiwan independence is to exploit the Republic of China, to assert that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country. Its current name is the Republic of China." The implication being that "Its future name will be the Republic of Taiwan." Such political sleight of hand is another matter than can be discussed some other time. The Beijing authorities must realize that the fundamental reason Taiwan independence has been able to grow is that Beijing refuses to recognize the Republic of China, and wants to chop off the Republic of China head. Beijing's desire to chop off the Republic of China head inspired the Taiwan independence movement to "replace the Republic of China head."
Beijing understands of course that preserving the Republic of China head is the best way to shrink the Taiwan independence movement's maneuvering room. But this is merely a passive means of addressing cross-Strait problems. As for active means, regardless of whether we are looking at
The future may involve the maintenance of the status quo. It may involve signing ECFA or a peace agreement. It may involve the establishment of an EU model or a confederation. It may even involve reunification. But no matter what, Taiwan must be entrusted to the Republic of China. If the Republic of China head is chopped off, what is there left to talk about?
Actually the Beijing authorities know this. They know that without the Republic of China, there can be no "peaceful development" of cross-Strait relations. But in practice Beijing remains mired in serious self-contradictions. For example, CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao said that "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, the mainland and Taiwan have always belonged to one China. This is not merely our position. It also appears in existing regulations and documents on Taiwan." The "regulations and documents" Hu Jintao was referring to was of course the Republic of China Constitution. President Hu Jintao made these remarks following the passage of the Anti-Secession Law. He meant to say that the Republic of China Constitution is also a "One China Constitution." He asked how Taiwan independence can be tolerated, given that it is "unconstitutional?" But such an argument contains an obvious and serious contradiction. Since Beijing refuses to recognize the Republic of China, and wants to cut off the Republic of China's head, how can it demand that the public on Taiwan abide by the Republic of China Constitution and support the Republic of China?
In his article Zhang Nianchi discussed a variety of theories on cross-Strait relations. Among them was the "glass theory" proposed by the UDN News. The "glass theory" compares the Republic of China to a glass. Republic of China citizens on Taiwan are akin to the water in the glass. If cross-Strait relations dispenses with the glass, what happens to the water? Zhang Nianchi's said "the public on Taiwan is the water in the glass." This differs slightly from the UDN News understanding. As we see it, Taiwan refers not merely to the public, but also to a free and democratic politico-economic system. Given the "glass theory" metaphor, how can the Beijing authorities refuse to recognize the Republic of China Constitution on the one hand, and expect the public on Taiwan to respect its "One China Constitution?" Is this not the same reasoning as "the existence of the glass ensures the existence of the water / the breaking of the glass means the loss of the water?"
Consider the issue at a deeper level. The Republic of China is a liberal democracy that elects its own president. Unless Beijing resorts to military force, how can it avoid dealing with the Republic of China? If Beijing uses non-peaceful means to swallow up this liberal democracy, one that belongs to China and is opposed to Taiwan independence, it will be committing a grievous sin against human civilization and against Chinese culture. Today's cross-Strait conflict is no longer merely a civil war between the KMT and the CCP. It concerns global civilization and the Republic of China's liberal democracy. It concerns China's sons and daughters down through the ages, and how we should deal with this liberal democracy that belongs to China and is opposed to Taiwan independence. Isn't "chopping of its head" or "smashing the glass" incompatible with "peaceful development?"
Zhang Nianchi is political consultant to the Beijing authorities. He embraces Chinese civilization and understands Taiwan. The UDN News has advocated "process orientation" instead of "goal orientation." Zhang can be considered "process oriented." If we have correctly understood his arguments, he advocates "establishing the preconditions necessary to resolve the Republic of China Conundrum." Zhang Nianchi's article identifies the real cross-Strait "conundrum." Beijing must deal with the Republic of China. His is an innovative and practical cross-Strait policy proposal.
The Beijing authorities must recognize that Taiwan independence is largely the result of pressure from Beijing. Even Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian's moves toward independence were primarily the result of Beijing preventing them from taking the "Republic of China" path. Beijing now understands that the "One China Constitution" is the legal umbilical cord that connects the two sides. Therefore it ought to view the Republic of China from the perspective of the "glass theory." It may wish eventually to discuss the "roof theory," or a peace agreement, or a confederation, or even reunification. But if Beijing does not allow the public on Taiwan to feel that the Republic of China is part of China, then it cannot make them think of themselves as Chinese. Nor can it elevate cross-Strait relations to the level of "peaceful development." In short, in order to prevent Taiwan independence, Beijing must not chop off the Republic of China head. In order to harmonize the two sides, Beijing must not shatter the Republic of China glass. The UDN News began expressing these views on cross-Strait relations beginning with "Six New Years Day Editorials."
Zhang Nian Wang Chi was the late Wang Daohan's right hand man. In 1997 Wang Daohan proposed an "In Progress Style One China." The UDN News has made a major revision to his thinking. It has changed a "One China in which the Republic of China has been eliminated" to a "One China in which the Republic of China has been preserved." Zhang Nianchi advocates "establishing the preconditions necessary to resolve the Republic of China Conundrum." This may be seen as a variant of the "In Progress Style One China." He voices many caveats in his article. But he maintains that "issues of sovereignty are all matters of perception." His vision is bold, his courage commendable, and his words admirable.
How should we deal with the Republic of China? Our "Six New Years Day Editorials" suggest that the more we move toward the 1992 Consensus and "One China, Different Interpretations," the more cross-Strait relations will undergo "peaceful development." The more rational the cross-Strait process will become, and the clearer cross-Strait goals will be.
"Chopping off the Republic of China head" and "peaceful development" are mutually contradictory. If we uphold "One China, Different Interpretations," we already have "One China." We can already ensure against backsliding. Conditions can only improve. Why subject "One China" to the vagaries of the future?
面對中華民國 北京應檢討「砍頭論」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.18 02:39 am
上海的東亞研究所所長章念馳，在五月號《中國評論》發表專文，該文在網站上的標題是：〈創條件解「中華民國」難題〉。
我們不知這篇文字是否反映了中共決策圈的思考，但北京方面若想打造一把解開兩岸難題的鑰匙，該文所述可謂即是一張珍貴的草圖。
章念馳在文中引述他與一名「台灣民眾」的談話。那位台灣民眾對章說：「（北京）不承認『中華民國』，好比砍了我們的頭，那麼留下四肢五臟還有什麼用？」章念馳說，具有這樣想法的人未必是支持「台獨」。
其實，具有這樣想法的「台灣民眾」本就不會支持「台獨」。因為，台獨的目標就是要否定中華民國，要「換」掉中華民國的「頭」；至於「借殼上市」，謂「現在的名字叫中華民國」云云，那則是政治操作的手法，另當別論。中共當局應知：台獨得以滋長的根本原因，就是北京不承認中華民國，要砍掉中華民國這一顆「頭」；正因北京的「砍頭論」，所以造成了台獨的「換頭論」。
北京當然知道：有了「中華民國」這顆「頭」，是使台獨縮小操作空間的最佳對策。但是，就解決兩岸難題言，這猶只是消極的目標；至於積極的目標，未來無論是維持現狀、簽訂ＥＣＦＡ、簽訂和平協議、走向歐盟模式、建構邦聯，甚或統一，台灣皆須以中華民國為憑託，若砍掉了這顆「頭」，還有什麼可談？
其實，中共當局深知此理，亦即，沒有中華民國就沒有兩岸關係的「和平發展」可言；但是，北京方面在實際操作上，卻一直陷於嚴重的自我矛盾。例如，中共總書記胡錦濤也說過：「儘管兩岸尚未統一，大陸和台灣同屬一個中國的事實從未改變。這不僅是我們的立場，也見之於台灣現有的規定和文件。」此處所指的「規定和文件」，其實主要是指「中華民國憲法」。胡錦濤發表這段談話，是在《反分裂國家法》立法時際；其意是說，中華民國憲法也是「一中憲法」，台獨豈可「違憲」？但此說的嚴重矛盾顯而易見：北京既否認中華民國，要「砍」中華民國的「頭」，如何又要台灣民眾遵奉信守中華民國憲法？支持中華民國？
章念馳在文中論及多種關於兩岸關係的學說理論，其中亦提到本報主張的「杯子理論」。章對「杯子理論」的引述是：把「中華民國」比作杯子，台灣人民比作杯子裡面的水；兩岸關係如果不要杯子，水焉能存？章念馳的引述說「台灣人民是杯子裡面的水」，與本報主張「台灣是杯子裡面的水」，稍有出入，因為「台灣」不止有人民，還包括了自由民主的政經體制及其他。而以「杯子理論」為喻，北京當局豈能一方面不承認中華民國憲法，又另一方面竟要台灣遵行「一中憲法」？這豈不亦與「杯在水在／杯破水覆」是同一道理？
更深層次的思考是：中華民國已然是一直選總統的自由民主政體，北京除非採取軍事暴力手段處理台灣問題，將如何可能迴避中華民國？而若北京以非和平手段吞滅了中華民國這個「中國的／非台獨的」自由民主政體，在人類文明及中國文化上又將是何等罪孽？兩岸問題的層次，如今絕非只是「國共內戰」的層次，而是世界文明應當如何面對中華民國這個自由民主政體的問題；亦是中國的永世子孫，應當如何面對這個「中國的／非台獨」的自由民主的中華民國的問題？試問：「砍頭論」或「砸杯論」，如何能與「和平發展」相容不悖？
章念馳是一位對中國文明深具懷抱，且對台灣底蘊感觸敏銳的北京智囊。若以本報所舉「過程論／目的論」的光譜言，他應是偏向「過程論」；倘若對他的文章解讀無誤，他如今主張〈創條件解「中華民國」難題〉，似乎也能從「杯子理論」來看待中華民國。章念馳的文章點出了兩岸真正的「難題」，在於北京必須面對中華民國，這堪謂是極具創意及實際功能意義的兩岸方案。
中共當局必須承認，台獨大半是北京逼出來的。即使李登輝、陳水扁走向台獨，也主要是因北京不容他們走「中華民國」這一條路。北京如今既知「一中憲法」是兩岸的「法理維繫」，即應從「杯子理論」來理解中華民國；縱使未來要談「屋頂理論」，或和平協議或邦聯或統一，如果不使台灣人民感受到「中華民國是一部分的中國」，即無可能使台灣人民認同自己是「中國人」，也就無可能使兩岸關係有更高層次的「和平發展」。總之，要抵拒「台獨」，不可砍掉中華民國這顆「頭」；要「融和」兩岸，更不能砸破中華民國這只「杯子」。這也是本報自〈元旦六論〉以來，對兩岸議題所表達的基本觀點。
章念馳是汪道涵的左右手。汪道涵在一九九七年就提出了「現在進行式的一個中國」；本報曾將此種思維解讀為「一個中國」的大改版，亦即從「中華民國消滅的一個中國」，改版為「中華民國存在的一個中國」。章念馳如今倡議〈創條件解「中華民國」難題〉，應可視為仍屬「現在進行式的一個中國」的折射。他在文中的論述雖諸多保留，但仍見「什麼主權觀念等等問題，都是取決於我們的意識」之類的大膽創見，其勇可嘉，其言可佩。
如何面對中華民國？依據我們自〈元旦六論〉以來的建議：只要愈向「九二共識／一中各表」靠攏，就愈能使兩岸關係「和平發展」，亦即愈能從「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」。
「砍頭論」與「和平發展」是相互矛盾的。若能盡量體現「一中各表」，現在就是「一個中國」；就可使現狀不致倒退，而只會提升，只會改善，何必將「一個中國」推拒於變幻莫測的未來？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 18, 2010
Zhang Nianchi of the East Asia Institute in Shanghai has posted a special article in the May edition of the China Review. The title of the webpage is: "Establish the Preconditions Necessary to Resolve the Republic of China Conundrum."
We do not know whether this article reflects the thinking of decision-making circles within the CCP. But if Beijing wants a key that can unlock cross-Strait problems, the above article should be considered a valuable draft.
Zhang Nianchi wrote that he spoke with a "member of the public on Taiwan." That member of the public told Zhang that "[Beijing's] refusal to recognize the Republic of China, is akin to chopping off our head. What good does it do to leave the four limbs and the five organs intact?" Zhang Nianchi said people who think like this do not necessarily support Taiwan independence.
Actually "members of the public on Taiwan" who think like this could never be supporters of Taiwan independence. The goal of Taiwan independence is to replace the Republic of China's head. The goal of Taiwan independence is to use the Republic of China as a shell company, in order to engage in backdoor listing. The goal of Taiwan independence is to exploit the Republic of China, to assert that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country. Its current name is the Republic of China." The implication being that "Its future name will be the Republic of Taiwan." Such political sleight of hand is another matter than can be discussed some other time. The Beijing authorities must realize that the fundamental reason Taiwan independence has been able to grow is that Beijing refuses to recognize the Republic of China, and wants to chop off the Republic of China head. Beijing's desire to chop off the Republic of China head inspired the Taiwan independence movement to "replace the Republic of China head."
Beijing understands of course that preserving the Republic of China head is the best way to shrink the Taiwan independence movement's maneuvering room. But this is merely a passive means of addressing cross-Strait problems. As for active means, regardless of whether we are looking at
The future may involve the maintenance of the status quo. It may involve signing ECFA or a peace agreement. It may involve the establishment of an EU model or a confederation. It may even involve reunification. But no matter what, Taiwan must be entrusted to the Republic of China. If the Republic of China head is chopped off, what is there left to talk about?
Actually the Beijing authorities know this. They know that without the Republic of China, there can be no "peaceful development" of cross-Strait relations. But in practice Beijing remains mired in serious self-contradictions. For example, CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao said that "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, the mainland and Taiwan have always belonged to one China. This is not merely our position. It also appears in existing regulations and documents on Taiwan." The "regulations and documents" Hu Jintao was referring to was of course the Republic of China Constitution. President Hu Jintao made these remarks following the passage of the Anti-Secession Law. He meant to say that the Republic of China Constitution is also a "One China Constitution." He asked how Taiwan independence can be tolerated, given that it is "unconstitutional?" But such an argument contains an obvious and serious contradiction. Since Beijing refuses to recognize the Republic of China, and wants to cut off the Republic of China's head, how can it demand that the public on Taiwan abide by the Republic of China Constitution and support the Republic of China?
In his article Zhang Nianchi discussed a variety of theories on cross-Strait relations. Among them was the "glass theory" proposed by the UDN News. The "glass theory" compares the Republic of China to a glass. Republic of China citizens on Taiwan are akin to the water in the glass. If cross-Strait relations dispenses with the glass, what happens to the water? Zhang Nianchi's said "the public on Taiwan is the water in the glass." This differs slightly from the UDN News understanding. As we see it, Taiwan refers not merely to the public, but also to a free and democratic politico-economic system. Given the "glass theory" metaphor, how can the Beijing authorities refuse to recognize the Republic of China Constitution on the one hand, and expect the public on Taiwan to respect its "One China Constitution?" Is this not the same reasoning as "the existence of the glass ensures the existence of the water / the breaking of the glass means the loss of the water?"
Consider the issue at a deeper level. The Republic of China is a liberal democracy that elects its own president. Unless Beijing resorts to military force, how can it avoid dealing with the Republic of China? If Beijing uses non-peaceful means to swallow up this liberal democracy, one that belongs to China and is opposed to Taiwan independence, it will be committing a grievous sin against human civilization and against Chinese culture. Today's cross-Strait conflict is no longer merely a civil war between the KMT and the CCP. It concerns global civilization and the Republic of China's liberal democracy. It concerns China's sons and daughters down through the ages, and how we should deal with this liberal democracy that belongs to China and is opposed to Taiwan independence. Isn't "chopping of its head" or "smashing the glass" incompatible with "peaceful development?"
Zhang Nianchi is political consultant to the Beijing authorities. He embraces Chinese civilization and understands Taiwan. The UDN News has advocated "process orientation" instead of "goal orientation." Zhang can be considered "process oriented." If we have correctly understood his arguments, he advocates "establishing the preconditions necessary to resolve the Republic of China Conundrum." Zhang Nianchi's article identifies the real cross-Strait "conundrum." Beijing must deal with the Republic of China. His is an innovative and practical cross-Strait policy proposal.
The Beijing authorities must recognize that Taiwan independence is largely the result of pressure from Beijing. Even Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian's moves toward independence were primarily the result of Beijing preventing them from taking the "Republic of China" path. Beijing now understands that the "One China Constitution" is the legal umbilical cord that connects the two sides. Therefore it ought to view the Republic of China from the perspective of the "glass theory." It may wish eventually to discuss the "roof theory," or a peace agreement, or a confederation, or even reunification. But if Beijing does not allow the public on Taiwan to feel that the Republic of China is part of China, then it cannot make them think of themselves as Chinese. Nor can it elevate cross-Strait relations to the level of "peaceful development." In short, in order to prevent Taiwan independence, Beijing must not chop off the Republic of China head. In order to harmonize the two sides, Beijing must not shatter the Republic of China glass. The UDN News began expressing these views on cross-Strait relations beginning with "Six New Years Day Editorials."
Zhang Nian Wang Chi was the late Wang Daohan's right hand man. In 1997 Wang Daohan proposed an "In Progress Style One China." The UDN News has made a major revision to his thinking. It has changed a "One China in which the Republic of China has been eliminated" to a "One China in which the Republic of China has been preserved." Zhang Nianchi advocates "establishing the preconditions necessary to resolve the Republic of China Conundrum." This may be seen as a variant of the "In Progress Style One China." He voices many caveats in his article. But he maintains that "issues of sovereignty are all matters of perception." His vision is bold, his courage commendable, and his words admirable.
How should we deal with the Republic of China? Our "Six New Years Day Editorials" suggest that the more we move toward the 1992 Consensus and "One China, Different Interpretations," the more cross-Strait relations will undergo "peaceful development." The more rational the cross-Strait process will become, and the clearer cross-Strait goals will be.
"Chopping off the Republic of China head" and "peaceful development" are mutually contradictory. If we uphold "One China, Different Interpretations," we already have "One China." We can already ensure against backsliding. Conditions can only improve. Why subject "One China" to the vagaries of the future?
面對中華民國 北京應檢討「砍頭論」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.18 02:39 am
上海的東亞研究所所長章念馳，在五月號《中國評論》發表專文，該文在網站上的標題是：〈創條件解「中華民國」難題〉。
我們不知這篇文字是否反映了中共決策圈的思考，但北京方面若想打造一把解開兩岸難題的鑰匙，該文所述可謂即是一張珍貴的草圖。
章念馳在文中引述他與一名「台灣民眾」的談話。那位台灣民眾對章說：「（北京）不承認『中華民國』，好比砍了我們的頭，那麼留下四肢五臟還有什麼用？」章念馳說，具有這樣想法的人未必是支持「台獨」。
其實，具有這樣想法的「台灣民眾」本就不會支持「台獨」。因為，台獨的目標就是要否定中華民國，要「換」掉中華民國的「頭」；至於「借殼上市」，謂「現在的名字叫中華民國」云云，那則是政治操作的手法，另當別論。中共當局應知：台獨得以滋長的根本原因，就是北京不承認中華民國，要砍掉中華民國這一顆「頭」；正因北京的「砍頭論」，所以造成了台獨的「換頭論」。
北京當然知道：有了「中華民國」這顆「頭」，是使台獨縮小操作空間的最佳對策。但是，就解決兩岸難題言，這猶只是消極的目標；至於積極的目標，未來無論是維持現狀、簽訂ＥＣＦＡ、簽訂和平協議、走向歐盟模式、建構邦聯，甚或統一，台灣皆須以中華民國為憑託，若砍掉了這顆「頭」，還有什麼可談？
其實，中共當局深知此理，亦即，沒有中華民國就沒有兩岸關係的「和平發展」可言；但是，北京方面在實際操作上，卻一直陷於嚴重的自我矛盾。例如，中共總書記胡錦濤也說過：「儘管兩岸尚未統一，大陸和台灣同屬一個中國的事實從未改變。這不僅是我們的立場，也見之於台灣現有的規定和文件。」此處所指的「規定和文件」，其實主要是指「中華民國憲法」。胡錦濤發表這段談話，是在《反分裂國家法》立法時際；其意是說，中華民國憲法也是「一中憲法」，台獨豈可「違憲」？但此說的嚴重矛盾顯而易見：北京既否認中華民國，要「砍」中華民國的「頭」，如何又要台灣民眾遵奉信守中華民國憲法？支持中華民國？
章念馳在文中論及多種關於兩岸關係的學說理論，其中亦提到本報主張的「杯子理論」。章對「杯子理論」的引述是：把「中華民國」比作杯子，台灣人民比作杯子裡面的水；兩岸關係如果不要杯子，水焉能存？章念馳的引述說「台灣人民是杯子裡面的水」，與本報主張「台灣是杯子裡面的水」，稍有出入，因為「台灣」不止有人民，還包括了自由民主的政經體制及其他。而以「杯子理論」為喻，北京當局豈能一方面不承認中華民國憲法，又另一方面竟要台灣遵行「一中憲法」？這豈不亦與「杯在水在／杯破水覆」是同一道理？
更深層次的思考是：中華民國已然是一直選總統的自由民主政體，北京除非採取軍事暴力手段處理台灣問題，將如何可能迴避中華民國？而若北京以非和平手段吞滅了中華民國這個「中國的／非台獨的」自由民主政體，在人類文明及中國文化上又將是何等罪孽？兩岸問題的層次，如今絕非只是「國共內戰」的層次，而是世界文明應當如何面對中華民國這個自由民主政體的問題；亦是中國的永世子孫，應當如何面對這個「中國的／非台獨」的自由民主的中華民國的問題？試問：「砍頭論」或「砸杯論」，如何能與「和平發展」相容不悖？
章念馳是一位對中國文明深具懷抱，且對台灣底蘊感觸敏銳的北京智囊。若以本報所舉「過程論／目的論」的光譜言，他應是偏向「過程論」；倘若對他的文章解讀無誤，他如今主張〈創條件解「中華民國」難題〉，似乎也能從「杯子理論」來看待中華民國。章念馳的文章點出了兩岸真正的「難題」，在於北京必須面對中華民國，這堪謂是極具創意及實際功能意義的兩岸方案。
中共當局必須承認，台獨大半是北京逼出來的。即使李登輝、陳水扁走向台獨，也主要是因北京不容他們走「中華民國」這一條路。北京如今既知「一中憲法」是兩岸的「法理維繫」，即應從「杯子理論」來理解中華民國；縱使未來要談「屋頂理論」，或和平協議或邦聯或統一，如果不使台灣人民感受到「中華民國是一部分的中國」，即無可能使台灣人民認同自己是「中國人」，也就無可能使兩岸關係有更高層次的「和平發展」。總之，要抵拒「台獨」，不可砍掉中華民國這顆「頭」；要「融和」兩岸，更不能砸破中華民國這只「杯子」。這也是本報自〈元旦六論〉以來，對兩岸議題所表達的基本觀點。
章念馳是汪道涵的左右手。汪道涵在一九九七年就提出了「現在進行式的一個中國」；本報曾將此種思維解讀為「一個中國」的大改版，亦即從「中華民國消滅的一個中國」，改版為「中華民國存在的一個中國」。章念馳如今倡議〈創條件解「中華民國」難題〉，應可視為仍屬「現在進行式的一個中國」的折射。他在文中的論述雖諸多保留，但仍見「什麼主權觀念等等問題，都是取決於我們的意識」之類的大膽創見，其勇可嘉，其言可佩。
如何面對中華民國？依據我們自〈元旦六論〉以來的建議：只要愈向「九二共識／一中各表」靠攏，就愈能使兩岸關係「和平發展」，亦即愈能從「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」。
「砍頭論」與「和平發展」是相互矛盾的。若能盡量體現「一中各表」，現在就是「一個中國」；就可使現狀不致倒退，而只會提升，只會改善，何必將「一個中國」推拒於變幻莫測的未來？
Monday, May 17, 2010
Indonesian Workers Forced to Eat Pork, Mainland Students Not Allowed to Marry
Indonesian Workers Forced to Eat Pork, Mainland Students Not Allowed to Marry
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 17, 2010
A Taiwanese employer who forced Indonesian workers of the Islamic faith to eat pork, has been condemned by the international media. Indonesian labor organizations also denounced him, saying that forcing Indonesian workers to eat eat pork is forcing them to violate their religious consciences, and therefore tantamount to a crime. Yesterday a group of Indonesian workers took to the streets, protesting the brutal and ignorant attitude of Taiwanese employers toward other cultures.
Taiwan has been dependent upon foreign labor for over twenty years. Yet incidents of employers withholding foreign workers' pay, denying them holiday leave, and restricting their movements have not diminished. Many employers see foreign workers as domestic slaves. They see foreign workers as second-class workers. They exploit their bodies, then leave them isolated and without support. They force them to perform endless labor, then ignore their physical and mental fatigue, and demonstrate even less concern for their beliefs and their culture. The reason this incident broke out, was mainly because the employer withheld too much of the foreign workers' wages. In fact, during their training period, many Indonesian workers have been forced to sign consent forms stating, "I am willing to eat pork." Clearly Indonesian workers being forced to eat pork is widespread on Taiwan. It is definitely not limited to this one case.
Taiwan has long taken pride in its prosperity and democracy compared to its Asian neighbors. But as an economy dependent upon foreign workers, discrimination against foreign workers is rash, out of touch with the times, and underscores our shallowness. When discussing foreign workers, many employers think only in terms of "management" and "overhead." But were it not for the abundance of cheap labor from Southeast Asia, twenty years of economic development on Taiwan would probably have a very different face. Therefore, shouldn't we grant these foreign workers, who contributed to Taiwan's development, a little more respect?
Discrimination is a psychological paradox. Often it is a mixture of arrogance, ignorance, and fear. The employer who withheld wages and forced workers to eat pork is a typical example of arrogance and ignorance. Meanwhile, recent DPP attempts to impose layer upon layer of controls on mainland students studying on Taiwan, are the product of another kind of arrogance and fear.
The Democratic Progressive Party initially opposed allowing mainland students to study on Taiwan. The reason they gave was that mainland students would deprive local students of educational resources. But when major universities welcomed mainland students, the Democratic Progressive Party knew that argument would not hold water. Soon they demand a whole new set of barriers, the so-called "Three Limitations and Six Prohibitions." These barriers include limiting the schools mainland students may attend, limiting their numbers, limiting the regions in which they may attend. These barriers include no norm-referenced testing, no reductions in existing enrollment, no scholarships, no moonlighting, no occupational licensure, and no employment allowed. And finally, should a mainland student and a local student happen to fall in love and want to marry, the mainland student will be repatriated.
Consider the matter from an equal rights perspective. Taiwan has established a complicated and onerous threshold for mainland students studying on Taiwan almost as strict as those during martial law. The Democratic Progressive Party is rationalizing its flagrant discrimination with such mantras as "Defending the nation! Defending the people!" The KMT, bafflingly, is dancing to the DPP's tune. At a time when global educational exchanges are increasingly free and open, Taiwan sees mainland students separated by a few miles of water as implacable enemies. It sees mainland students as insidious infiltrators. It sees educational opportunities as deadly threats. Is this not laughable beyond belief?
The Democratic Progressive Party has long boasted of its goal of "founding a nation on human rights." Yet it does everything in its power to treat mainland students and mainland spouses with enmity. The discriminatory restrictions the DPP imposed upon them are utterly devoid of human feeling. They run counter to the concept of universal human rights. The DPP rose to prominence by holding high the banner of democracy and progress, and by safeguarding the interests of the disadvantaged. But somewhere along the way, its ideals of democracy and progress were buried by its "nativist" consciousness. The DPP is able to express its "anti-China" hatred only by demagoguing such low level issues as mainland students studying on Taiwan. One might say that the Green Camp's prejudices against mainland students and mainland spouses reflect a serious step backward for the DPP. Meanwhile the ruling KMT, which is far too eager to compromise, seems to have forgotten that selective discrimination against mainland students is fueling the flames of discrimination on Taiwan.
The general public's oppression of foreign workers, and its contempt for foreign workers has economic and cultural roots. But the Green Camp's antipathy toward [mainland] China and mainland students is politically motivated. Regardless, the targets of both forms of discrimination are part of the Asian community that Taiwan ought to be befriending. This is what we most need to be vigilant about. The Republic of China's diplomatic situation is precarious. Many of our foreign relations depend upon private diplomacy to establish friendship and trust. The visitors ordinary members of the public are most likely to come in contact with are foreign workers, foreign spouses, mainland tourists and mainland students. If the public on Taiwan cannot view others without hostility and prejudice, it may well breed misunderstanding of Taiwan amongst our neighbors, and we may well wind up even more isolated in the Asian community.
強迫印勞吃豬肉與不准陸生結婚
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.17 01:38 am
一位台灣雇主逼迫信仰伊斯蘭的印尼勞工吃豬肉，遭到國際媒體譴責；印尼勞工組織更痛斥，強迫吃豬肉是強迫印勞違背自己的信仰，已是一樁「犯罪行為」。昨天一群印勞更走上街頭，抗議台灣雇主對異文化的粗暴和無知。
我國引進外勞至今已超過廿年，但雇主對外勞動輒剋扣薪資、剝奪假日、限制行動等問題，卻始終未見減少。許多雇主視外傭如家奴，視外勞如同次等勞工，利用他們隻身在外、孤立無援，支使其從事無盡的勞務，罔顧他們身心的疲累，更遑論尊重其信仰和文化。這次事件之所以爆發，主因在雇主對外勞剋扣無度；事實上，許多印勞在接受訓練時，即被迫簽下「我願意吃豬肉」的同意書。足見，印勞被迫吃豬肉的情形在台灣普遍存在，絕非一宗個案而已。
比起一些亞洲鄰邦，台灣向來頗以自己的繁榮和民主自豪。但作為一個倚賴外勞的國家，我們對於外勞的歧視與輕率卻未曾與時俱進，這也凸顯了社會見識淺薄的問題。談到外勞，許多雇主心裡盤算的恐怕只有「管理」和「成本」；但試想，若非有這麼多廉價的東南亞勞工支撐，台灣近廿年的經濟發展恐怕將是另一番面貌。那麼，為何我們不能給這些參與台灣發展的外勞，多一點人道的尊重？
歧視是一種弔詭的心理，經常是自大、無知與恐懼的混合物。雇主剋扣薪資及強迫外勞吃豬肉，這是一種自大與無知的典型；而最近在野黨對陸生來台設下層層管制，則是另外一種傲慢加恐懼的產物。
民進黨最初反對陸生來台，是說他們將搶走本地學生的教育資源；但在各大學院校對陸生表示歡迎之後，民進黨知道情勢抵擋不住，旋即又咬定「三限六不」的重重機關，從限校、限量、限域，到不加分、不佔招生名額、不提供獎學金、不准打工、不可考照、不准就業等。更有甚者，萬一陸生與台生發生戀情進而要結婚，將遭到遣返。
從平權的角度看，台灣專為陸生量身打造一套特殊尺寸的就學門檻，其繁瑣與嚴苛，已直逼戒嚴時代的水準。如此公然的歧視，民進黨竟能把台詞說得像「保國衛民」大戲一樣動聽，而國民黨卻也隨之起舞，令人不解。尤其，當全球的教育交流都在走向自由開放，台灣卻視一水之隔的陸生如同大敵，把陸生想像成社會滲透，把教育機會看成社會威脅，豈不可笑之至？
民進黨自詡「人權立國」，卻千方百計敵視大陸學生和大陸配偶，對他們分級設限歧視，這除了違背社會人情，也已完全悖離人權的普世價值。民進黨當年高舉民主進步的大旗起家，追求維護弱勢者的權益；曾幾何時，民主進步的理想被「本土」思維完全埋葬，民進黨也只能在陸生這類低層次的議題上進行「反中」宣示。可以說，綠營對陸生乃至陸配的歧視，恰好反映了它民主理想的嚴重倒退。而急於妥協的執政黨似乎也忘了，對陸生選擇性的五花大綁，是在助長台灣歧視的火苗。
一般民眾對外勞的壓迫或蔑視，具有經濟及文化的根源；而綠營鼓吹的反中反陸生，則是出自政治性的動機。不論何者，兩種歧視的對象，都是台灣應該友善交好的亞洲社群，這才是最值得警惕之處。台灣的外交處境不易，許多對外關係要靠國民外交所建立的友誼和信任來維繫；至於一般民眾最容易接觸的異鄉客，就是這些來台外勞、外配、陸客及陸生。若台灣民眾不能收起自己的武裝和歧視之眼，一旦這些鄰邦民眾對台灣滋生誤解，我們在亞洲社區的處境恐怕將更形孤立。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 17, 2010
A Taiwanese employer who forced Indonesian workers of the Islamic faith to eat pork, has been condemned by the international media. Indonesian labor organizations also denounced him, saying that forcing Indonesian workers to eat eat pork is forcing them to violate their religious consciences, and therefore tantamount to a crime. Yesterday a group of Indonesian workers took to the streets, protesting the brutal and ignorant attitude of Taiwanese employers toward other cultures.
Taiwan has been dependent upon foreign labor for over twenty years. Yet incidents of employers withholding foreign workers' pay, denying them holiday leave, and restricting their movements have not diminished. Many employers see foreign workers as domestic slaves. They see foreign workers as second-class workers. They exploit their bodies, then leave them isolated and without support. They force them to perform endless labor, then ignore their physical and mental fatigue, and demonstrate even less concern for their beliefs and their culture. The reason this incident broke out, was mainly because the employer withheld too much of the foreign workers' wages. In fact, during their training period, many Indonesian workers have been forced to sign consent forms stating, "I am willing to eat pork." Clearly Indonesian workers being forced to eat pork is widespread on Taiwan. It is definitely not limited to this one case.
Taiwan has long taken pride in its prosperity and democracy compared to its Asian neighbors. But as an economy dependent upon foreign workers, discrimination against foreign workers is rash, out of touch with the times, and underscores our shallowness. When discussing foreign workers, many employers think only in terms of "management" and "overhead." But were it not for the abundance of cheap labor from Southeast Asia, twenty years of economic development on Taiwan would probably have a very different face. Therefore, shouldn't we grant these foreign workers, who contributed to Taiwan's development, a little more respect?
Discrimination is a psychological paradox. Often it is a mixture of arrogance, ignorance, and fear. The employer who withheld wages and forced workers to eat pork is a typical example of arrogance and ignorance. Meanwhile, recent DPP attempts to impose layer upon layer of controls on mainland students studying on Taiwan, are the product of another kind of arrogance and fear.
The Democratic Progressive Party initially opposed allowing mainland students to study on Taiwan. The reason they gave was that mainland students would deprive local students of educational resources. But when major universities welcomed mainland students, the Democratic Progressive Party knew that argument would not hold water. Soon they demand a whole new set of barriers, the so-called "Three Limitations and Six Prohibitions." These barriers include limiting the schools mainland students may attend, limiting their numbers, limiting the regions in which they may attend. These barriers include no norm-referenced testing, no reductions in existing enrollment, no scholarships, no moonlighting, no occupational licensure, and no employment allowed. And finally, should a mainland student and a local student happen to fall in love and want to marry, the mainland student will be repatriated.
Consider the matter from an equal rights perspective. Taiwan has established a complicated and onerous threshold for mainland students studying on Taiwan almost as strict as those during martial law. The Democratic Progressive Party is rationalizing its flagrant discrimination with such mantras as "Defending the nation! Defending the people!" The KMT, bafflingly, is dancing to the DPP's tune. At a time when global educational exchanges are increasingly free and open, Taiwan sees mainland students separated by a few miles of water as implacable enemies. It sees mainland students as insidious infiltrators. It sees educational opportunities as deadly threats. Is this not laughable beyond belief?
The Democratic Progressive Party has long boasted of its goal of "founding a nation on human rights." Yet it does everything in its power to treat mainland students and mainland spouses with enmity. The discriminatory restrictions the DPP imposed upon them are utterly devoid of human feeling. They run counter to the concept of universal human rights. The DPP rose to prominence by holding high the banner of democracy and progress, and by safeguarding the interests of the disadvantaged. But somewhere along the way, its ideals of democracy and progress were buried by its "nativist" consciousness. The DPP is able to express its "anti-China" hatred only by demagoguing such low level issues as mainland students studying on Taiwan. One might say that the Green Camp's prejudices against mainland students and mainland spouses reflect a serious step backward for the DPP. Meanwhile the ruling KMT, which is far too eager to compromise, seems to have forgotten that selective discrimination against mainland students is fueling the flames of discrimination on Taiwan.
The general public's oppression of foreign workers, and its contempt for foreign workers has economic and cultural roots. But the Green Camp's antipathy toward [mainland] China and mainland students is politically motivated. Regardless, the targets of both forms of discrimination are part of the Asian community that Taiwan ought to be befriending. This is what we most need to be vigilant about. The Republic of China's diplomatic situation is precarious. Many of our foreign relations depend upon private diplomacy to establish friendship and trust. The visitors ordinary members of the public are most likely to come in contact with are foreign workers, foreign spouses, mainland tourists and mainland students. If the public on Taiwan cannot view others without hostility and prejudice, it may well breed misunderstanding of Taiwan amongst our neighbors, and we may well wind up even more isolated in the Asian community.
強迫印勞吃豬肉與不准陸生結婚
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.17 01:38 am
一位台灣雇主逼迫信仰伊斯蘭的印尼勞工吃豬肉，遭到國際媒體譴責；印尼勞工組織更痛斥，強迫吃豬肉是強迫印勞違背自己的信仰，已是一樁「犯罪行為」。昨天一群印勞更走上街頭，抗議台灣雇主對異文化的粗暴和無知。
我國引進外勞至今已超過廿年，但雇主對外勞動輒剋扣薪資、剝奪假日、限制行動等問題，卻始終未見減少。許多雇主視外傭如家奴，視外勞如同次等勞工，利用他們隻身在外、孤立無援，支使其從事無盡的勞務，罔顧他們身心的疲累，更遑論尊重其信仰和文化。這次事件之所以爆發，主因在雇主對外勞剋扣無度；事實上，許多印勞在接受訓練時，即被迫簽下「我願意吃豬肉」的同意書。足見，印勞被迫吃豬肉的情形在台灣普遍存在，絕非一宗個案而已。
比起一些亞洲鄰邦，台灣向來頗以自己的繁榮和民主自豪。但作為一個倚賴外勞的國家，我們對於外勞的歧視與輕率卻未曾與時俱進，這也凸顯了社會見識淺薄的問題。談到外勞，許多雇主心裡盤算的恐怕只有「管理」和「成本」；但試想，若非有這麼多廉價的東南亞勞工支撐，台灣近廿年的經濟發展恐怕將是另一番面貌。那麼，為何我們不能給這些參與台灣發展的外勞，多一點人道的尊重？
歧視是一種弔詭的心理，經常是自大、無知與恐懼的混合物。雇主剋扣薪資及強迫外勞吃豬肉，這是一種自大與無知的典型；而最近在野黨對陸生來台設下層層管制，則是另外一種傲慢加恐懼的產物。
民進黨最初反對陸生來台，是說他們將搶走本地學生的教育資源；但在各大學院校對陸生表示歡迎之後，民進黨知道情勢抵擋不住，旋即又咬定「三限六不」的重重機關，從限校、限量、限域，到不加分、不佔招生名額、不提供獎學金、不准打工、不可考照、不准就業等。更有甚者，萬一陸生與台生發生戀情進而要結婚，將遭到遣返。
從平權的角度看，台灣專為陸生量身打造一套特殊尺寸的就學門檻，其繁瑣與嚴苛，已直逼戒嚴時代的水準。如此公然的歧視，民進黨竟能把台詞說得像「保國衛民」大戲一樣動聽，而國民黨卻也隨之起舞，令人不解。尤其，當全球的教育交流都在走向自由開放，台灣卻視一水之隔的陸生如同大敵，把陸生想像成社會滲透，把教育機會看成社會威脅，豈不可笑之至？
民進黨自詡「人權立國」，卻千方百計敵視大陸學生和大陸配偶，對他們分級設限歧視，這除了違背社會人情，也已完全悖離人權的普世價值。民進黨當年高舉民主進步的大旗起家，追求維護弱勢者的權益；曾幾何時，民主進步的理想被「本土」思維完全埋葬，民進黨也只能在陸生這類低層次的議題上進行「反中」宣示。可以說，綠營對陸生乃至陸配的歧視，恰好反映了它民主理想的嚴重倒退。而急於妥協的執政黨似乎也忘了，對陸生選擇性的五花大綁，是在助長台灣歧視的火苗。
一般民眾對外勞的壓迫或蔑視，具有經濟及文化的根源；而綠營鼓吹的反中反陸生，則是出自政治性的動機。不論何者，兩種歧視的對象，都是台灣應該友善交好的亞洲社群，這才是最值得警惕之處。台灣的外交處境不易，許多對外關係要靠國民外交所建立的友誼和信任來維繫；至於一般民眾最容易接觸的異鄉客，就是這些來台外勞、外配、陸客及陸生。若台灣民眾不能收起自己的武裝和歧視之眼，一旦這些鄰邦民眾對台灣滋生誤解，我們在亞洲社區的處境恐怕將更形孤立。
Friday, May 14, 2010
DPP Forcing Tsai Ing-wen to Swear a Blood Oath
DPP Forcing Tsai Ing-wen to Swear a Blood Oath
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 14, 2010
Tsai Ing-wen's authority within the Democratic Progressive Party is under challenge. The threat to her power may be more serious than outsiders imagine. First, she failed to do as well in the Two Yings Debates as expected. In particular, Deep Green elements found her arguments distasteful. Her authority within the party has been shaken. Secondly, party elders and Taiwan independence fundamentalists are attempting to force her to run for Xinbei City Mayor. The time for a showdown is nigh.
Tsai Ing-wen used the second anniversary of Ma's inauguration to publish an open letter, mainly regarding the Two Yings Debate. This move, plus the numerous TV interviews she held in the wake of the debate, declares that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will hold a referendum to abolish ECFA. It also declares that the DPP is now fully behind the 5/20 protest march. This move can also be seen as a means of ameliorating her current power crisis.
But the grander her gestures, the more apparent the seriousness of her power crisis. Moreover, her remedial measures merely increase the severity of her crisis. For example, she stridently proclaimed that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will hold a referendum to abolish ECFA. For Deep Greens, this amounts to an admission that her arguments during the debate were riddled with holes. For Pale Greens and Pale Blues, this may be seen as a disillusioning revelation of her true face. In particular, this belated addendum will severely narrow the options for the DPP and herself, during the 2012 presidential election as well as for the long term. Crisis management like this amounts to adding fuel to the fire.
Tsai Ing-wen has been party chairman for two years. Yet her current power crisis is the result of her party loyalty being called into question. People are asking why she failed to denounce President Ma for "pandering to [mainland] China and selling out Taiwan?" during the debate? Why she failed to call for a referendum? Some are even saying that Tsai Ing-wen belatedly "defected" to the Democratic Progressive Party and lacks "fighting ability." They are saying that if she refuses to run for Xinbei City Mayor, what right does she have to be re-elected party chairman? Given the current atmosphere, forcing Tsai Ing-wen to run for Xinbei City Mayor amounts to pressuring her to swear a blood oath. For party elders and Taiwan independence fundamentalists, this is an issue of loyalty and not an issue of individual preference.
To what extent must Tsai Ing-wen spill her guts to Deep Green elements before she passes muster? She faces a dilemma. On the one hand she must swear a blood oath to mollify Deep Greens. On the other hand, she must not overdo any such blood oath. Otherwise she will disillusion centrist-oriented Pale Green and Pale Blue voters. Most importantly, she must not overdo any blood oath to the extent that people conclude "Tsai Ing-wen is no longer Tsai Ing-wen." Otherwise Tsai Ing-wen's day will be done.
The open letter Tsai Ing-wen published yesterday reveals her dilemma. Consider this section of her letter. "At this stage the government must ensure that exchanges with [mainland] China" must go hand in hand with "clarifications of Taiwan's image as a nation. If the latter is sacrificed to the former, it will surely have devastating consequences for Taiwan's future." This hesitant argument appears to a defense of national sovereignty in exchanges with mainland China. This of course is a public consensus. But Tsai Ing-wen has invented new jargon, "clarifications of Taiwan's image as a nation," that merely come across as mealy-mouthed. What does "clarifications of Taiwan's image as a nation" mean? Is Tsai Ing-wen advocating the use of "Republic of China" in exchanges with the mainland? The DPP was unable to do so when it was in power. All it can do is one-sidedly cling to "One China, Different Interpretations," and allow Beijing to refrain from voicing any objections. Is Tsai Ing-wen advocating the use of "Republic of Taiwan" in exchanges with the mainland? The DPP was unable to do this either when it was in power. Some in the Democratic Progressive Party have even concluded that the Taiwan independence movement is dead, that it was killed off by Chen Shui-bian during his administration. Is Tsai Ing-wen advocating the invocation of the "two states theory" in exchanges with the mainland? Tsai Ing-wen's namby-pamby formulation may come across as inauthentic to the Deep Greens. It may come across as unintelligible to Pale Greens and Pale Blues. If she herself is unable to offer a clarification of what she means, how can she possibly offer a "clarification of Taiwan's image as a nation?"
Let's take a closer look at Tsai Ing-wen's power crisis. Party elders and Taiwan independence fundamentalists may feel that Tsai Ing-wen's "interim mission" is over. Since problems have arisen surrounding her loss in the debate and her candidacy for Xinbei City Mayor, it is time for a showdown. If at this point Tsai Ing-wen fails to convince Deep Green elements of her sincerity, and enter the Xinbei City Mayoral campaign, after-effects can be expected. If she is unable to convince them of her sincerity, and refuses to run for Xinbei City Mayor, they may turn against her. Why is she dragging her feet on running for Xinbei City Mayor they ask. Party elders and Taiwan independence fundamentalists want Tsai Ing-wen to swear a blood oath.
Tsai Ing-wen has been party chairman for two years. Who thought her party loyalty would be called into question? Two years ago, Pale Greens and Pale Blues looked to a miracle -- a "DPP reformed by Tsai Ing-wen." Now alas, the reverse has happened -- "Tsai Ing-wen has found herself mired in the DPP morass."
Tsai Ing-wen's rescue awaits a show of support from reformers within the DPP. It also depends on Tsai Ing-wen's efforts on her own behalf.
民進黨逼蔡英文立下投名狀
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.14 04:13 am
蔡英文當下在民進黨內的權力危機，可能較外界想像的更嚴峻。其一、她在雙英辯論中的表現不如預期，尤其論述不符深綠口味，使她在黨內的權威地位動搖。其二、黨內公媽派及獨派欲迫她參選新北市長的壓力有增無已，已瀕攤牌階段。
蔡英文藉馬總統就職二周年，發表了一封公開信；主要是對雙英辯論有所補充。這個動作，與她在辯論會後密集接受電視專訪、宣示在民進黨若執政後將公投廢止ＥＣＦＡ，及對五二○遊行自猶豫轉為支持等等，皆可視為她對當下權力危機所採取的因應及補救手段。
然而，她的動作越大，越暴露了權力危機的嚴重性；而且，她的補救手段，也回過頭來越加重了危機的嚴重性。例如，她加料加碼宣示民進黨若執政後將公投廢止ＥＣＦＡ；對深綠，形同承認了她在辯論會中的論述缺口；對淺綠淺藍，則可能被視為圖窮匕現；尤其，這畫蛇添足的一句話，也將使她自己及民進黨在未來至二○ 一二年的論述架構，喪失了彈性空間。這樣的危機處理，不啻是抱薪救火，火上加油。
蔡英文就任黨主席將屆二年任滿，但當前的權力危機竟然猶如她對黨的忠貞仍受質疑。在辯論會中為何不點明馬總統「傾中賣台」？為何不強調公投？尤有甚者，更謂蔡英文是後來才「投靠」民進黨的，沒有「戰功」，這次若不跳下去參選新北市長，豈有資格再任黨主席？在當下氛圍中，逼蔡英文參選新北市長，就是要逼她立下投名狀。對於公媽派及獨派而言，這是忠貞問題，而不是個人意願問題。
蔡英文要向深綠剖白交心到什麼程度，才能算是過了關？她當前的困境是，不能不加料加碼，以向深綠交代；但也不能加料加碼過了頭，那會使淺綠淺藍及中間選民對她失望。最重要的是，她不能加料加碼到了「蔡英文不再像蔡英文」或「蔡英文不再是蔡英文」的程度，因為那樣的「蔡英文」也就報銷了。
蔡英文前天發表的公開信，顯示了這種進退維谷的情勢。試看其中這一段論述：「現階段的政府應該要確保一個事實，就是『與中國交流』應該要和『台灣國家形象清晰化』結伴出現，攜手並進。……若犧牲後者來成就前者，必然會對台灣的前途帶來災難性的後果。」這段欲語還休的論述，談的好像是與中國交流應當維護國家主權，這當然是全民共識；但是，蔡英文卻創制了「台灣國家形象清晰化」的新語彙，則顯得吞吞吐吐。什麼叫做「台灣國家形象清晰化」？蔡英文是主張用「中華民國」的國號與中國交流嗎？但民進黨執政時也做不到；現階段只能片面持守「一中各表」，並讓北京不表否認。又蔡英文難道是主張用「台灣共和國」的地位與中國交流嗎？同樣民進黨執政時也做不到，何況連民進黨中也有人認為台獨已被陳水扁整死了。再者，蔡英文更難道要再用「兩國論」與中國交流？蔡英文這種囁囁嚅嚅的論調，可能使深綠覺得不夠道地，而讓淺綠淺藍覺得不知所云。如果連自己都不能說得「清晰化」，如何使「台灣國家」形象清晰化？
深一層看蔡英文當下所處權力危機，公媽派及獨派可能認為，蔡英文的「階段性任務」已經完成，既然出現辯論失利及新北市長人選的問題，如今已是借題發揮的攤牌時機。如果蔡英文能在此時向深綠交心輸誠，並投入新北市長選舉，則也許尚有後效可期；但若不能交心輸誠，堅拒參選新北市長，也許就要翻臉了。選不選新北市長？公媽派及獨派要蔡英文立下投名狀。
蔡英文就任黨主席已將二年任滿，詎料竟陷於黨內的忠貞質疑。兩年前，淺綠淺藍皆想像會出現「民進黨蔡英文化」的奇蹟，如今卻已陷「蔡英文民進黨醬缸化」的危機。
搶救蔡英文，有待民進黨內轉型派的聲援搭救，更要看蔡英文自己如何奮力掙扎。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 14, 2010
Tsai Ing-wen's authority within the Democratic Progressive Party is under challenge. The threat to her power may be more serious than outsiders imagine. First, she failed to do as well in the Two Yings Debates as expected. In particular, Deep Green elements found her arguments distasteful. Her authority within the party has been shaken. Secondly, party elders and Taiwan independence fundamentalists are attempting to force her to run for Xinbei City Mayor. The time for a showdown is nigh.
Tsai Ing-wen used the second anniversary of Ma's inauguration to publish an open letter, mainly regarding the Two Yings Debate. This move, plus the numerous TV interviews she held in the wake of the debate, declares that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will hold a referendum to abolish ECFA. It also declares that the DPP is now fully behind the 5/20 protest march. This move can also be seen as a means of ameliorating her current power crisis.
But the grander her gestures, the more apparent the seriousness of her power crisis. Moreover, her remedial measures merely increase the severity of her crisis. For example, she stridently proclaimed that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will hold a referendum to abolish ECFA. For Deep Greens, this amounts to an admission that her arguments during the debate were riddled with holes. For Pale Greens and Pale Blues, this may be seen as a disillusioning revelation of her true face. In particular, this belated addendum will severely narrow the options for the DPP and herself, during the 2012 presidential election as well as for the long term. Crisis management like this amounts to adding fuel to the fire.
Tsai Ing-wen has been party chairman for two years. Yet her current power crisis is the result of her party loyalty being called into question. People are asking why she failed to denounce President Ma for "pandering to [mainland] China and selling out Taiwan?" during the debate? Why she failed to call for a referendum? Some are even saying that Tsai Ing-wen belatedly "defected" to the Democratic Progressive Party and lacks "fighting ability." They are saying that if she refuses to run for Xinbei City Mayor, what right does she have to be re-elected party chairman? Given the current atmosphere, forcing Tsai Ing-wen to run for Xinbei City Mayor amounts to pressuring her to swear a blood oath. For party elders and Taiwan independence fundamentalists, this is an issue of loyalty and not an issue of individual preference.
To what extent must Tsai Ing-wen spill her guts to Deep Green elements before she passes muster? She faces a dilemma. On the one hand she must swear a blood oath to mollify Deep Greens. On the other hand, she must not overdo any such blood oath. Otherwise she will disillusion centrist-oriented Pale Green and Pale Blue voters. Most importantly, she must not overdo any blood oath to the extent that people conclude "Tsai Ing-wen is no longer Tsai Ing-wen." Otherwise Tsai Ing-wen's day will be done.
The open letter Tsai Ing-wen published yesterday reveals her dilemma. Consider this section of her letter. "At this stage the government must ensure that exchanges with [mainland] China" must go hand in hand with "clarifications of Taiwan's image as a nation. If the latter is sacrificed to the former, it will surely have devastating consequences for Taiwan's future." This hesitant argument appears to a defense of national sovereignty in exchanges with mainland China. This of course is a public consensus. But Tsai Ing-wen has invented new jargon, "clarifications of Taiwan's image as a nation," that merely come across as mealy-mouthed. What does "clarifications of Taiwan's image as a nation" mean? Is Tsai Ing-wen advocating the use of "Republic of China" in exchanges with the mainland? The DPP was unable to do so when it was in power. All it can do is one-sidedly cling to "One China, Different Interpretations," and allow Beijing to refrain from voicing any objections. Is Tsai Ing-wen advocating the use of "Republic of Taiwan" in exchanges with the mainland? The DPP was unable to do this either when it was in power. Some in the Democratic Progressive Party have even concluded that the Taiwan independence movement is dead, that it was killed off by Chen Shui-bian during his administration. Is Tsai Ing-wen advocating the invocation of the "two states theory" in exchanges with the mainland? Tsai Ing-wen's namby-pamby formulation may come across as inauthentic to the Deep Greens. It may come across as unintelligible to Pale Greens and Pale Blues. If she herself is unable to offer a clarification of what she means, how can she possibly offer a "clarification of Taiwan's image as a nation?"
Let's take a closer look at Tsai Ing-wen's power crisis. Party elders and Taiwan independence fundamentalists may feel that Tsai Ing-wen's "interim mission" is over. Since problems have arisen surrounding her loss in the debate and her candidacy for Xinbei City Mayor, it is time for a showdown. If at this point Tsai Ing-wen fails to convince Deep Green elements of her sincerity, and enter the Xinbei City Mayoral campaign, after-effects can be expected. If she is unable to convince them of her sincerity, and refuses to run for Xinbei City Mayor, they may turn against her. Why is she dragging her feet on running for Xinbei City Mayor they ask. Party elders and Taiwan independence fundamentalists want Tsai Ing-wen to swear a blood oath.
Tsai Ing-wen has been party chairman for two years. Who thought her party loyalty would be called into question? Two years ago, Pale Greens and Pale Blues looked to a miracle -- a "DPP reformed by Tsai Ing-wen." Now alas, the reverse has happened -- "Tsai Ing-wen has found herself mired in the DPP morass."
Tsai Ing-wen's rescue awaits a show of support from reformers within the DPP. It also depends on Tsai Ing-wen's efforts on her own behalf.
民進黨逼蔡英文立下投名狀
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.14 04:13 am
蔡英文當下在民進黨內的權力危機，可能較外界想像的更嚴峻。其一、她在雙英辯論中的表現不如預期，尤其論述不符深綠口味，使她在黨內的權威地位動搖。其二、黨內公媽派及獨派欲迫她參選新北市長的壓力有增無已，已瀕攤牌階段。
蔡英文藉馬總統就職二周年，發表了一封公開信；主要是對雙英辯論有所補充。這個動作，與她在辯論會後密集接受電視專訪、宣示在民進黨若執政後將公投廢止ＥＣＦＡ，及對五二○遊行自猶豫轉為支持等等，皆可視為她對當下權力危機所採取的因應及補救手段。
然而，她的動作越大，越暴露了權力危機的嚴重性；而且，她的補救手段，也回過頭來越加重了危機的嚴重性。例如，她加料加碼宣示民進黨若執政後將公投廢止ＥＣＦＡ；對深綠，形同承認了她在辯論會中的論述缺口；對淺綠淺藍，則可能被視為圖窮匕現；尤其，這畫蛇添足的一句話，也將使她自己及民進黨在未來至二○ 一二年的論述架構，喪失了彈性空間。這樣的危機處理，不啻是抱薪救火，火上加油。
蔡英文就任黨主席將屆二年任滿，但當前的權力危機竟然猶如她對黨的忠貞仍受質疑。在辯論會中為何不點明馬總統「傾中賣台」？為何不強調公投？尤有甚者，更謂蔡英文是後來才「投靠」民進黨的，沒有「戰功」，這次若不跳下去參選新北市長，豈有資格再任黨主席？在當下氛圍中，逼蔡英文參選新北市長，就是要逼她立下投名狀。對於公媽派及獨派而言，這是忠貞問題，而不是個人意願問題。
蔡英文要向深綠剖白交心到什麼程度，才能算是過了關？她當前的困境是，不能不加料加碼，以向深綠交代；但也不能加料加碼過了頭，那會使淺綠淺藍及中間選民對她失望。最重要的是，她不能加料加碼到了「蔡英文不再像蔡英文」或「蔡英文不再是蔡英文」的程度，因為那樣的「蔡英文」也就報銷了。
蔡英文前天發表的公開信，顯示了這種進退維谷的情勢。試看其中這一段論述：「現階段的政府應該要確保一個事實，就是『與中國交流』應該要和『台灣國家形象清晰化』結伴出現，攜手並進。……若犧牲後者來成就前者，必然會對台灣的前途帶來災難性的後果。」這段欲語還休的論述，談的好像是與中國交流應當維護國家主權，這當然是全民共識；但是，蔡英文卻創制了「台灣國家形象清晰化」的新語彙，則顯得吞吞吐吐。什麼叫做「台灣國家形象清晰化」？蔡英文是主張用「中華民國」的國號與中國交流嗎？但民進黨執政時也做不到；現階段只能片面持守「一中各表」，並讓北京不表否認。又蔡英文難道是主張用「台灣共和國」的地位與中國交流嗎？同樣民進黨執政時也做不到，何況連民進黨中也有人認為台獨已被陳水扁整死了。再者，蔡英文更難道要再用「兩國論」與中國交流？蔡英文這種囁囁嚅嚅的論調，可能使深綠覺得不夠道地，而讓淺綠淺藍覺得不知所云。如果連自己都不能說得「清晰化」，如何使「台灣國家」形象清晰化？
深一層看蔡英文當下所處權力危機，公媽派及獨派可能認為，蔡英文的「階段性任務」已經完成，既然出現辯論失利及新北市長人選的問題，如今已是借題發揮的攤牌時機。如果蔡英文能在此時向深綠交心輸誠，並投入新北市長選舉，則也許尚有後效可期；但若不能交心輸誠，堅拒參選新北市長，也許就要翻臉了。選不選新北市長？公媽派及獨派要蔡英文立下投名狀。
蔡英文就任黨主席已將二年任滿，詎料竟陷於黨內的忠貞質疑。兩年前，淺綠淺藍皆想像會出現「民進黨蔡英文化」的奇蹟，如今卻已陷「蔡英文民進黨醬缸化」的危機。
搶救蔡英文，有待民進黨內轉型派的聲援搭救，更要看蔡英文自己如何奮力掙扎。
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