Sungshan Airport Indicates a New Political Climate on Taiwan
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 2, 2010
The Songshan Airport is already 60 years old. It is about to become an important part of the Northeast Asian transportation ring. It will link to Shanghai's Hongqiao, Tokyo's Haneda, and Seoul's Gimpo. It will become a "small is beautiful" commercial airport for the nation's capital. This will significantly increase Songshan Airport's commercial viability. It will integrate Taipei with the three most important cities of Northeast Asia, and provide it with opportunities for development. The prospects are worth looking forward to.
The plan is for Songshan Airport to begin flights to and from Hongqiao Airport on the 14th of this month. Each side will schedule 14 flights per week. Flights to and from Haneda Airport will begin on October 31. Each side will schedule 28 flights per week. Negotiations with South Korea are still in progress. The government hopes to open up new direct flights to Gimpo Airport. Therefore In addition to current domestic and cross-Strait flights, Songshan Airport will offer flights to the capitals of Japan and Korea, linking Taipei to the Northeast Asian Transportion Ring's Golden Triangle. Shanghai, Tokyo, and Seoul are Asia's most important, prosperous, and vibrant metropolises. If Taipei can seize the opportunity to reinforce its air links to these cities, it will help promote mutual exchanges. It will make Taipei more attractive to international business and tourism.
As President Ma Ying-jeou has noted, Taiwan is geographically situated at the heart of East Asia. Average distances to the major countries in the region and their capitals are very short -- less than four hours flying time. Taipei enjoys such favorable geographic advantages. Yet in the past, due to various factors, it could not make best use of its advantages, it could not maximize the benefits of economic exchange. That truly is a pity.
Songshan Airport has a glorious history. But in 1979, when the Taoyuan International Airport went into operation, Songshan Airport was demoted to the status of a domestic airport. It never underwent significant expansion or renovation, but instead gradually went into decline. Once the High Speed Rail went into operations, domestic flights were grounded. Songshan Airport looked even more forlorn. Only after President Ma took office did the two sides reconcile and resume cross-Strait exchanges, open up cross-Strait direct flights, and include Songshan Airport as a destination. This, plus a significant increase in the number of mainland tourists arriving on Taiwan, began to revive Songshan Airport. Weekend charter flights turned into regular flights. Last year passenger traffic experienced a significant 3,130,000 increase. Now that international flights are being restored, its facilities and services must be significantly increased. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications is about to spend billions of dollars on a three-phase renovation, completely converting it into a terminal for international flights. Terminal II will be reserved for domestic flights. Essential services and facilities will be added, providing the greater Taipei area with express freight and commercial aviation services.
Therefore, one can expect that within the year, Taipei, Shanghai, and Tokyo, three major cities in Northeast Asia, will be linked. Songshan Airport, Hongqiao Airport, and Haneda Airport are all located in urban areas. If they are linked to these cities' subway systems, travel times can be greatly reduced. Travel between these three cities could be reduced to "day trips." From Taipei, one could take the subway to Songshan Airport in the morning, lunch on crabs in Shanghai at noon, and sip tea in Tokyo in the afternoon. If an agreement can be reached with South Korea on Kimpo Airport, dining on ginseng chicken in Myeong-dong will be easy as pie. Tourists from Taiwan to Japan and South Korea do not require visas. Civil sector exchanges and tourism to Taiwan would be even more convenient.
Such convenient transportation flows will directly benefit affected businesses. But before traffic to Songshan Airport is significantly increased, we must be fully prepared. We must review the existing hardware and software for shortcomings, and make timely improvements.
Frankly, although Songshan Airport was once in the spotlight, its interior space, its design, and its facilities had already fallen short of the prevailing requirements for international airports. The runways were not long enough for Boeing 747s. With the influx of mainland tourists, it has attempted to cope. But if we hope to further increase passenger and aircraft throughput, we must significantly increase the capacity of the facilities and services. We will also need the cooperation of other departments. For example, we must set up a business aviation zone to facilitate exchanges between international business executives. The ROC Air Force must be willing to allow the use of its land. This will require high-level government coordination.
The expanded role of Songshan Airport runs directly counter to Green Camp wishes. The Democratic Progressive Party has long advocated that Songshan Airport be relocated, and the site be turned into a park. But if the role of Songshan Airport becomes larger and larger, if its operations are expanded day by day, if the public experiences the benefits of using Songshan Airport, the DPP will be forced to take into account public preferences. This may be the reason Su Tseng-chang, the DPP candidate for Taipei Mayor, no longer raises the issue of Songshan Airport relocation. If Su Tseng-chang can adopt a pragmatic attitude, Songshan Airport need not become a political battlefield. Policy can be formulated on the basis of merit. Policies can be formulated on the basis of what is most consistent with the interests of the public, including the city of Taipei. This would be the most mature and rational approach.
Additional air routes can bring about an increase in tourist traffic. But the operation of an airport requires multifaceted support. Only then can one achieve shining results that will impress the public. Now that Songshan Airport is about to undergo further transformation, we would like to applaud the opening of this small but beautiful gateway to the nation, an opening that indicates the advent of a new political climate on Taiwan.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.06.02
社論－期待松山機場 展現台灣新氣象
本報訊
已經高齡六十的松山機場，即將變身成為東北亞黃金航圈之重要據點，陸續與中國上海虹橋、日本東京羽田及南韓首爾金浦機場對飛，並打造「小而美」的首都商務機場。這不僅將明顯提高松山機場的營運，更將讓台北市與東北亞三大重要都會緊密結合，帶動的發展契機，非常令人期待。
依據規畫，松山機場將在本月十四日先與虹橋機場通航，每周雙方各飛十四班；今年十月卅一日則與羽田機場對飛，每周雙方各飛廿八班；目前正與南韓方面洽談修約，希望進一步開闢直飛金浦機場的新航線。如此一來，除了目前的國內與兩岸航班之外，松山機場又增加了與日、韓首都圈機場的航班，串連起一個東北亞的黃金三角航圈。上海、東京、首爾是亞洲最重要、商務最蓬勃的大都會，台北市能藉此加強與這幾個城市的航空交通，對促進彼此的交流大有助益，也能對國際商務與觀光客源產生更大的吸引力。
正如馬英九總統所言，台灣的地理位置在東亞中心，和此區主要國家城市與首都的平均距離都很短，飛行時間不到四小時，如此優越的地理優勢，過去礙於種種因素而沒有辦法好好利用，使其發揮最大經濟交流效益，確實非常可惜。
松山機場曾經有一段輝煌的歷史，但在民國六十八年桃園國際機場啟用、松山機場改為國內線機場後，一直未作重大整修擴建的松山機場漸顯衰退。而高鐵通車之後，國內航班紛紛停飛，松山機場更是愈來愈冷清。直到馬總統上任後，兩岸關係和解，開放兩岸直航並納入松山機場，加上大陸觀光客來台數量大增，松山機場才又熙來攘往熱鬧起來，從周末包機發展成定期航班，去年旅客量大幅增加至三一三萬。如今要再增加國際航班，相關設備及服務勢必大幅加強不可。交通部現正斥資十億台幣進行三階段整建，將一航廈完全改作國際線之用，第二航廈則供國內線使用，同時補強相關服務設備，提供大台北地區快遞貨運及商務航空服務。
因此，可以預見在今年之內，台北、上海、東京，這三座東北亞重要城市將串連起來。由於松山機場、虹橋機場與羽田機場都位於市區，在地鐵的配合下，大大縮短了旅行時間。換句話說，這三座城市可以成為一個「一日生活圈」。在台北，早上出門搭捷運到松山機場，午餐就可以在上海吃大閘蟹，或在東京六本木喝下午茶。而如果能再與南韓金浦機場談好對飛協議，到明洞吃人蔘雞也是小事一椿。尤其台灣觀光客赴日本、南韓都享有免簽證待遇，將來民眾的來往、觀光客來台旅遊，都將更加方便順暢。
如此方便的流通，直接將對相關商圈的營運帶來助益，然而，在松山機場業務大增之前，我們必須作好充分的準備，檢討目前軟硬體不足之處，及早改善補強。
坦白說，松山機場當年可能很風光，但其空間、設計與設備，早已不敷當前一個國際機場之所需，甚至因為跑道不夠長而不能起降波音七四七。在大陸觀光客湧入後雖然勉強還能應付，可是如果想再增加旅客與飛機的吞吐量，就非要大幅強化設備與服務能量不可。有些環節還需要動員其他部門的配合，例如設置商務航空專區，以便利國際商務高層人士往來，就牽涉到空軍是否願意釋出土地來，這也有待政府高層的協調。
松山機場機能日益擴大，其實是與綠營的一貫主張相反的。過去民進黨長期主張將松山機場遷移至他處，原址則改造成公園，但如果松山機場的功能愈來愈蓬勃，營運日益成長，民眾感受到善用松山機場的好處時，民進黨恐怕就不得不考慮到民意的好惡了，這可能也是民進黨台北市長參選人蘇貞昌現在不提松山機場遷移案的原因。如果蘇貞昌能採取務實態度，松山機場可以不必成為政黨角力的戰場，而回歸就事論事，讓這項政策朝最符合民眾希望及台北市利益的方向走，這應該是最成熟理性的作法。
航線的增加可以帶來客源，但一個機場的營運，需要許多環節的支持，才能有令人耳目一新的成績。在松山機場即將進一步轉型的同時，我們期勉這個小而美的國家大門，也能展現出台灣的新氣象。
Wednesday, June 2, 2010
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
From Export Processing Zone to Free Trade Zone
From Export Processing Zone to Free Trade Zone
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 1, 2010
Half century ago Taiwan adopted an "export processing zone" development strategy. It lept ahead of most developing countries and seized the international market. Approximately 30 years ago, under intense pressure from the US, a major trading partner, it underwent economic liberalization at an unprecedented scale. But realistically speaking, Taiwan as it is currently cannot be considered a genuinely free and open economy.
During the past two decades, former presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian saddled the nation with an isolationist Closed Door Policy. Too many industries, too many products, and too many occupations are protected to greater or lesser degree by the government. A huge bloc of employers and employees, unable to compete directly with foreign producers, seek out government protection. They are fearful of the day they must confront ECFA. They have become the primary force behind opposition DPP and TSU efforts to obstruct ECFA.
They include agriculture, towel manufacturers, furniture manufacturers, and other vulnerable industries. The heads of these industries may not realize it. But although the government has signed bilateral arrangments to minimize the impact on their production once ECFA is signed, they cannot sit back and relax. That is because ECFA is a key. When Taiwan uses it to open its doors, it will gradually enter an increasingly free economic realm. In the future, by means of free trade agreements (FTA) with its major trading partners, Taiwan will be fully opened. Besides agriculture, there is almost nowhere one can escape powerful competitive pressures. In short, Taiwan will join the mainstream global economy and become a bona fide free economy.
Yet the opposition DPP and TSU cavalierly encourage vulnerable groups to obstruct ECFA. Nearly half of the public on Taiwan still harbors doubts about it. This means too many people still do not realize that Taiwan must eventually undergo full liberalization. They fear the free market economy, and refuse to embrace it with open arms.
Half a century ago, Taiwan led the way toward a new era of export-orientated economic policy. The Export Processing Zone was the pioneer. In a closed area, we gave full play to our strengths. We allowed the public on Taiwan to first make contact in this unfamiliar area, immersing themselves in the experience. Then, after experiencing the infinite opportunities, transform all of Taiwan into an Export Processing Zone. Thirty years ago the Hsinchu Science Park replicated this process, and led Taiwan into the high-tech era.
Today Taiwan is moving toward a new and inevitable era of free markets. We can welcome it, or we can resist it. But during the coming years we will find ourselves smack dab in the middle of it. It would appear we need something akin to export processing zones or science parks to act as trailblazers. This would allow the public on Taiwan to get an advance taste in a closed environment.
The special economic and trade zone, which has been promoted for over two years, is set to perform this role. From south to north several regions with good harbors and airports, surrounded by broad hinterlands, will be designated special zones. They will experiment with and simulate a free economy for no less than one or two years, but no more than ten. By then the whole of Taiwan should have the courage required to enter the free economy.
Within this closed test area, commodities, aside from safety and health concerns, will enjoy unobstructed free access. The movement of funds and personnel will be kept as free as possible, comparable to Singapore's, which has the freest economy in the world. Tariff and non tariff barriers will be kept to a minimum. As much as possible, corporate and personal income taxes will be kept in line with Singapore's. Infrastructure and administrative efficiency will compare favorably. Labor policies for foreign workers will follow suit. As long as we are seeking to be both free and open, we will of course seek to excel.
When it comes to administrative efficiency, Taiwan as a whole may find it difficult to match Singapore. But specific regions, such as the Hsinchu Science Park, operating under special laws, through a single window, will enjoy far greater flexibility. Business taxes can also match Singapore's. If we grant special privileges, income taxes will not constitute a significant barrier. Labor policy for foreign workers will be tested within the zones. It depends only on the determination of those in power. For any relevant infrastructure construction. the government need merely hand down the order. Businesses and funds can quickly be made available without drawing on any public funds.
Minister of Economic Affairs Shi Yen-hsiang declared the intention of building "free economic zones" as pilot projects 20 or 30 years from now. We would like to solemnly remind Minister Shih that our circumstances will be critical two or three years from now. If we fail to step up construction, our circumstances will outpace our pilot programs.
Before conducting any experiments, try first to imagine a Singapore-like region close to prime areas on the mainland. How can one begin to calculate the benefits?
從加工出口區到自由經濟區
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.01 02:19 am
台灣從半世紀前就採取「加工出口區」的發展策略，領先絕大多數開發中國家走向國際市場；約莫三十年前，又在主要貿易對手美國的強大壓力下，展開了規模空前的經濟自由化行動；但實事求是而言，台灣現在卻還不能算是高度自由開放的經濟。
近二十年來，在李、陳兩位前總統主導的鎖國政策下，我們還有太多產業、太多商品、太多行業，受到政府或多或少的保護。也正是這一大塊躲在政府公權力庇蔭之下無法與國外生產者直接抗衡的雇主與從業人員，面對ＥＣＦＡ日近一日的簽署時程，心生惶惑，成為在野黨藉以杯葛、抗拒ＥＣＦＡ的主力。
包括農業、毛巾、寢具等弱勢產業的從業人士或許不知道，即使透過兩岸雙方政府的用心安排，在簽署ＥＣＦＡ之後的一段時期雖不致對他們產生難以抵擋的衝擊，但他們也不能高枕無憂；因為ＥＣＦＡ只是一把鑰匙，當台灣用它打開了大門，漸將進入一個逐次體現的自由經濟天地。未來，透過與主要貿易對手簽定自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ），整個台灣會日漸全面開放；除了農業之外，幾乎不會有任何角落可以逃避從四面八方而來的強勁競爭壓力，簡言之：台灣會加入全球經濟的主流，成為一個不折不扣的自由經濟體。
然而，當在野黨可以輕易鼓動弱勢群體杯葛ＥＣＦＡ，而且將近半數台灣人民心中仍有深重疑慮，就表示有太多國人不但昧於台灣即將漸次全面開放的事實，而且不敢張開雙臂迎對開放、擁抱自由經濟。
半世紀前，當台灣一馬當先邁入出口導向的新紀元，加工出口區就是開路先鋒；在一個封閉的區域內，將我們的優勢充分發揮，讓台灣人民對這個陌生的領域從事初次的接觸、深入的體驗；然後，在體會其中蘊藏的無限機會後，進而將整個台灣都變成加工出口區。三十年前的「新竹科學園區」複製了這個過程，引領台灣進入高科技時代。
如今，當台灣將邁步踏入一個全新的，卻無從逃避的自由經濟新時代，而且不論我們歡迎還是抗拒，未來數年之間即將置身其中；我們似乎也需要一個像加工出口區或科學園區一樣的開路先鋒，讓台灣人民可以在一個封閉的區域內，先體驗及因應一下個中滋味。
鼓吹逾兩年的經貿特區，正要扮演這個角色；從南到北，選擇幾個具備優良的海港、空港條件，周邊有足夠腹地的寬廣區域，闢為專區，進行自由經濟的實驗，模擬快則一、二年，慢不過十年，整個台灣應可勇敢地進入的自由經濟時代。
在這個封閉的試區內，商品貨物除了安全與健康的顧慮，可以全無阻礙地自由進出；資金、人員也比照全世界最自由的新加坡，最大限度地開放；關稅與非關稅障礙降至最低；企業與個人所得稅儘可能向新加坡看齊；基本設施及行政效能毫不遜色，外勞政策也一概效法。既要自由開放，當然要取法乎上。
行政效能，整個台灣或許還難及新加坡，但在特定區域之內，透過單一窗口與特別法的運作，如新竹科學園區，其靈活性已較前者不遑多讓。營所稅亦足堪與星比擬，若給予特別優惠，所得稅也不致構成重大障礙；外勞政策在區內試行，只繫乎當政者的決心；而基礎設施等相關建設，只要政府一聲號令，企業、資金一擁而至，無需任何公帑，即可快速齊備。
經濟部長施顏祥宣示，要建設若干「自由經濟區」做為模擬二、三十年後台灣現狀的試點；我們要鄭重提醒施部長，二、三年後的現狀可能已將如是，再不加緊建設，現狀就要跑在試點的前面。
在進行實驗之前，先設想一下：一個近在大陸精華地區咫尺之地的「新加坡」，其利豈可勝計？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 1, 2010
Half century ago Taiwan adopted an "export processing zone" development strategy. It lept ahead of most developing countries and seized the international market. Approximately 30 years ago, under intense pressure from the US, a major trading partner, it underwent economic liberalization at an unprecedented scale. But realistically speaking, Taiwan as it is currently cannot be considered a genuinely free and open economy.
During the past two decades, former presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian saddled the nation with an isolationist Closed Door Policy. Too many industries, too many products, and too many occupations are protected to greater or lesser degree by the government. A huge bloc of employers and employees, unable to compete directly with foreign producers, seek out government protection. They are fearful of the day they must confront ECFA. They have become the primary force behind opposition DPP and TSU efforts to obstruct ECFA.
They include agriculture, towel manufacturers, furniture manufacturers, and other vulnerable industries. The heads of these industries may not realize it. But although the government has signed bilateral arrangments to minimize the impact on their production once ECFA is signed, they cannot sit back and relax. That is because ECFA is a key. When Taiwan uses it to open its doors, it will gradually enter an increasingly free economic realm. In the future, by means of free trade agreements (FTA) with its major trading partners, Taiwan will be fully opened. Besides agriculture, there is almost nowhere one can escape powerful competitive pressures. In short, Taiwan will join the mainstream global economy and become a bona fide free economy.
Yet the opposition DPP and TSU cavalierly encourage vulnerable groups to obstruct ECFA. Nearly half of the public on Taiwan still harbors doubts about it. This means too many people still do not realize that Taiwan must eventually undergo full liberalization. They fear the free market economy, and refuse to embrace it with open arms.
Half a century ago, Taiwan led the way toward a new era of export-orientated economic policy. The Export Processing Zone was the pioneer. In a closed area, we gave full play to our strengths. We allowed the public on Taiwan to first make contact in this unfamiliar area, immersing themselves in the experience. Then, after experiencing the infinite opportunities, transform all of Taiwan into an Export Processing Zone. Thirty years ago the Hsinchu Science Park replicated this process, and led Taiwan into the high-tech era.
Today Taiwan is moving toward a new and inevitable era of free markets. We can welcome it, or we can resist it. But during the coming years we will find ourselves smack dab in the middle of it. It would appear we need something akin to export processing zones or science parks to act as trailblazers. This would allow the public on Taiwan to get an advance taste in a closed environment.
The special economic and trade zone, which has been promoted for over two years, is set to perform this role. From south to north several regions with good harbors and airports, surrounded by broad hinterlands, will be designated special zones. They will experiment with and simulate a free economy for no less than one or two years, but no more than ten. By then the whole of Taiwan should have the courage required to enter the free economy.
Within this closed test area, commodities, aside from safety and health concerns, will enjoy unobstructed free access. The movement of funds and personnel will be kept as free as possible, comparable to Singapore's, which has the freest economy in the world. Tariff and non tariff barriers will be kept to a minimum. As much as possible, corporate and personal income taxes will be kept in line with Singapore's. Infrastructure and administrative efficiency will compare favorably. Labor policies for foreign workers will follow suit. As long as we are seeking to be both free and open, we will of course seek to excel.
When it comes to administrative efficiency, Taiwan as a whole may find it difficult to match Singapore. But specific regions, such as the Hsinchu Science Park, operating under special laws, through a single window, will enjoy far greater flexibility. Business taxes can also match Singapore's. If we grant special privileges, income taxes will not constitute a significant barrier. Labor policy for foreign workers will be tested within the zones. It depends only on the determination of those in power. For any relevant infrastructure construction. the government need merely hand down the order. Businesses and funds can quickly be made available without drawing on any public funds.
Minister of Economic Affairs Shi Yen-hsiang declared the intention of building "free economic zones" as pilot projects 20 or 30 years from now. We would like to solemnly remind Minister Shih that our circumstances will be critical two or three years from now. If we fail to step up construction, our circumstances will outpace our pilot programs.
Before conducting any experiments, try first to imagine a Singapore-like region close to prime areas on the mainland. How can one begin to calculate the benefits?
從加工出口區到自由經濟區
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.01 02:19 am
台灣從半世紀前就採取「加工出口區」的發展策略，領先絕大多數開發中國家走向國際市場；約莫三十年前，又在主要貿易對手美國的強大壓力下，展開了規模空前的經濟自由化行動；但實事求是而言，台灣現在卻還不能算是高度自由開放的經濟。
近二十年來，在李、陳兩位前總統主導的鎖國政策下，我們還有太多產業、太多商品、太多行業，受到政府或多或少的保護。也正是這一大塊躲在政府公權力庇蔭之下無法與國外生產者直接抗衡的雇主與從業人員，面對ＥＣＦＡ日近一日的簽署時程，心生惶惑，成為在野黨藉以杯葛、抗拒ＥＣＦＡ的主力。
包括農業、毛巾、寢具等弱勢產業的從業人士或許不知道，即使透過兩岸雙方政府的用心安排，在簽署ＥＣＦＡ之後的一段時期雖不致對他們產生難以抵擋的衝擊，但他們也不能高枕無憂；因為ＥＣＦＡ只是一把鑰匙，當台灣用它打開了大門，漸將進入一個逐次體現的自由經濟天地。未來，透過與主要貿易對手簽定自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ），整個台灣會日漸全面開放；除了農業之外，幾乎不會有任何角落可以逃避從四面八方而來的強勁競爭壓力，簡言之：台灣會加入全球經濟的主流，成為一個不折不扣的自由經濟體。
然而，當在野黨可以輕易鼓動弱勢群體杯葛ＥＣＦＡ，而且將近半數台灣人民心中仍有深重疑慮，就表示有太多國人不但昧於台灣即將漸次全面開放的事實，而且不敢張開雙臂迎對開放、擁抱自由經濟。
半世紀前，當台灣一馬當先邁入出口導向的新紀元，加工出口區就是開路先鋒；在一個封閉的區域內，將我們的優勢充分發揮，讓台灣人民對這個陌生的領域從事初次的接觸、深入的體驗；然後，在體會其中蘊藏的無限機會後，進而將整個台灣都變成加工出口區。三十年前的「新竹科學園區」複製了這個過程，引領台灣進入高科技時代。
如今，當台灣將邁步踏入一個全新的，卻無從逃避的自由經濟新時代，而且不論我們歡迎還是抗拒，未來數年之間即將置身其中；我們似乎也需要一個像加工出口區或科學園區一樣的開路先鋒，讓台灣人民可以在一個封閉的區域內，先體驗及因應一下個中滋味。
鼓吹逾兩年的經貿特區，正要扮演這個角色；從南到北，選擇幾個具備優良的海港、空港條件，周邊有足夠腹地的寬廣區域，闢為專區，進行自由經濟的實驗，模擬快則一、二年，慢不過十年，整個台灣應可勇敢地進入的自由經濟時代。
在這個封閉的試區內，商品貨物除了安全與健康的顧慮，可以全無阻礙地自由進出；資金、人員也比照全世界最自由的新加坡，最大限度地開放；關稅與非關稅障礙降至最低；企業與個人所得稅儘可能向新加坡看齊；基本設施及行政效能毫不遜色，外勞政策也一概效法。既要自由開放，當然要取法乎上。
行政效能，整個台灣或許還難及新加坡，但在特定區域之內，透過單一窗口與特別法的運作，如新竹科學園區，其靈活性已較前者不遑多讓。營所稅亦足堪與星比擬，若給予特別優惠，所得稅也不致構成重大障礙；外勞政策在區內試行，只繫乎當政者的決心；而基礎設施等相關建設，只要政府一聲號令，企業、資金一擁而至，無需任何公帑，即可快速齊備。
經濟部長施顏祥宣示，要建設若干「自由經濟區」做為模擬二、三十年後台灣現狀的試點；我們要鄭重提醒施部長，二、三年後的現狀可能已將如是，再不加緊建設，現狀就要跑在試點的前面。
在進行實驗之前，先設想一下：一個近在大陸精華地區咫尺之地的「新加坡」，其利豈可勝計？
Monday, May 31, 2010
Tsai Ing-wen: More Taiwan Independence-minded than Chen Shui-bian?
Tsai Ing-wen: More Taiwan Independence-minded than Chen Shui-bian?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 31, 2010
Tsai Ing-wen has left many people in shock. Many people assumed Tsai Ing-wen had adopted a more rational perspective on national identity and the status of the Republic of China Constitution in her "Political Platform for the Coming Decade." They assumed she was struggling to transform the DPP. But according to the latest news reports, she has openly asserted that "the Republic of China is a government in exile."
Tsai Ing-wen is Chairman of the DPP. These views are the most irrational views on Taiwan independence that any chairman of the DPP has expressed since the 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." Tsai Ing-wen is a potential candidate for President of the Republic of China in 2012. These views are the most irrational views on Taiwan independence any presidential candidate has expressed, ever. Such extraordinary comments, issuing from the lips of the ostensibly rational Tsai Ing-wen, could only leave listeners in shocked disbelief.
The "Government in Exile" theory is the most irrational Taiwan independence theory one is likely to encounter in cross-Straits debate. For example: 1. The DPP's "Taiwan Independence Party Constitution" does not repudiate the Republic of China per se. It merely asserts that the political structure of the ROC "leads to an impasse for constitutional reform." Therefore it advocates the authoring of a new constitution and the "founding of a sovereign and independent Republic of Taiwan" via public referendum. 2. The DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" also recognizes the "constitutionally-defined Republic of China" as a "backdoor listing" strategy, as a means of maintaining a framework by which "all residents of Taiwan can participate in a referendum." 3. The "two states theory" has never maintained that the ROC is a government in exile. 4. The "one country on each side" theory still allows room for the "two states" theory. 5. The "rectification of names" movement calls for the abolition of the Republic of China, but does not repudiate the Republic of China prior to its abolition. 6. The "Taiwan's undetermined status" theory merely asserts that Taiwan "does not necessarily" belong to the Republic of China. 7. The "Resolution for a Normal Nation" advocates the "swift rectification of names." 8. The "foreign government" theory still recognizes the Republic of China as a de facto "authority." 9. The "second republic" is merely an "extension" of the ROC.
As we can see, among the various "hard line Taiwan independence," "soft line Taiwan independence" and "quasi-Taiwan independence" theories, the "government in exile" theory is the most extreme. It asserts that the "Republic of China is on the mainland" and "not on Taiwan." Therefore it is arguably the most irrational form of Taiwan independence. 1. If the Republic of China is actually a government in exile, then the DPP's years of participation in the democratic and constitutional processes of the Republic of China are utterly meaningless. 2. It effectively contradicts the DPP's own calls for a "public referendum," and instead resorts to political rhetoric to repudiate the Republic of China, denying the public the right to its own opinions. 3. Strategically, it inevitably plays into Beijing's "united front" strategy. In their rush to repudiate the Republic of China, its advocates effectively end up as "Communist fellow travelers."
Tsai Ing-wen is both DPP party chairman and a potential ROC presidential candidate. Given her position of responsibility, her "government in exile" stance is even more irrationally independence-minded than those of Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui. The 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" paved the way for Chen Shui-bian's bid for the presidency. The "Five Noes" eased cross-Strait tensions. Chen Shui-bian cozied up to Taiwan independence only after he found himself in hot water over corruption, and after leaving office. As for Lee Teng-hui, during the 1996 direct elections, his political platform included the "National Unification Guidelines." Even his "two states theory," launched in 1999, merely attempted to attract Pale Green voters in order to boost Lien Chan's election prospects in 2000. He did not assert that "the Republic of China no longer exists." He said that only after leaving office. But Tsai Ing-wen was perceived as a party chairman committed to transforming the DPP, and a likely 2012 ROC presidential candidate. Yet at the same point in her career, she has adopted an even more irrationally independence-minded stance than either Lee Teng-hui or Chen Shui-bian. What in the world inspired her to openly assert that the "Republic of China is a government in exile?"
Many people are waiting to see what positions Tsai Ing-wen will adopt on national identity and the status of the ROC Constitution in her "Political Platform for the Coming Decade." But over the past month, she has spoken repeatedly of "abolishing ECFA upon assuming power." She has spoken of having "no intention of abolishing the Taiwan Independence Party Constitution," and she has characterized the ROC as a "government in exile." She has even said we must "repudiate our economics above all priorities, and export-oriented tendencies." She has no qualms about ruling out her own transformation or the transformation of the DPP. Her behavior is incomprehensible. Since she asserts that the "Republic of China is a government in exile," how can she possibly lead the DPP to a victory in 2012?
What's even more remarkable, is that Tsai Ing-wen's assertions were hardly a slip of the tongue. The words "government in exile" appeared in black ink on white paper. Since Tsai Ing-wen is advocating Taiwan independence, why is she behaving in such a superficial manner? If Tsai Ing-wen is merely indulging in political power plays, why is she behaving in such a ridiculous manner?
Tsai Ing-wen's "two states theory" brought down the Lee Teng-hui regime. Her stubborn opposition to the 1992 Consensus brought down the Chen Shui-bian regime. Now she is apparently using "government in exile" rhetoric to prevent the DPP from undergoing transformation and taking the high road. Is this still the rational Tsai Ing-wen moderate voters believed her to be?
The phrase "government in exile," printed in black ink on white paper, is a serious matter. Can Tsai Ing-wen cavalierly dismiss public concerns merely by saying that she "has no time for political mudslinging?"
蔡英文比陳水扁還獨？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.31 01:30 am
蔡英文讓許多人跌破眼鏡。不少人曾有幻想，認為蔡英文在她的《十年政綱》中，將對國家認同及憲法定位提出較為理性中道的論述，引領民進黨轉型。詎料，她竟然白紙黑字地公開宣示「中華民國是流亡政府」。
蔡英文是民進黨主席，這樣的言論，是一九九九年《台灣前途決議文》以來，歷任民進黨主席所發表的最獨與最不理性的兩岸論述；同時，由於蔡英文也可能是二○ 一二中華民國總統候選人，這樣的言論，亦是歷來總統候選人所宣示的最獨且最不理性的兩岸政策。這般奇異的論述，出自被視為理性清新的蔡英文之口，豈能不跌破許多人的眼鏡？
《流亡政府論》可謂是最獨且最不理性的兩岸論述。例如：一、《台獨黨綱》並未否定中華民國，只是認為中華民國體制「造成憲政改造的僵局」，而主張由公民投票另制新憲，「建立主權獨立自主的台灣共和國」。二、《台灣前途決議文》更承認「依目前憲法稱為中華民國」，亦即採「借殼上市」的策略，且維持「台灣全體住民公民投票」的架構。三、《兩國論》亦未稱中華民國是流亡政府。四、《一邊一國》則仍有《兩國論》的想像空間。五、《正名制憲》則雖是主張廢中華民國，卻非在未廢前即否定中華民國。六、《台灣地位未定論》也只是說，台灣「不一定」屬於中華民國。七、《正常國家決議文》則主張「及早正名制憲」。八、《外來政權》尚承認中華民國是一事實「政權」。九、《第二共和》亦只是強調中華民國的「成長」……。
由以上例舉可知，在各種「重台獨」、「輕台獨」或「類台獨」理論中，《流亡政府論》是最「獨」的主張，認為「中華民國在大陸」，而「不在台灣」。因而亦是「最不理性」的台獨主張：一、中華民國既是流亡政府，使民進黨參與中華民國的民主憲政運作，完全失去了正當性；二、形同否棄了「公民投票」的理論，只憑政治語言即片面否定中華民國，劫奪民意。三、在戰略上，這必然掉入「中共同路人」的統一戰線，不啻搶在北京前頭否定了中華民國。
再說，以蔡英文兼具黨主席及可能總統參選者的身分言，若持《流亡政府論》，其立場亦較陳水扁及李登輝更獨且更不理性。一九九九年的《台灣前途決議文》，是為陳水扁參選總統預作鋪墊；更不用說還有他就任後的「四不一沒有」，緩和兩岸情勢。陳水扁是在貪腐失政危機出現及卸任後，才愈走愈獨。至於李登輝，一九九六年直選時，他的政治看板仍是《國統綱領》；甚至在一九九九年推出《兩國論》，企圖拉住淺綠，挽救二○○○年連戰的選情，也未說「中華民國已不存在」（那是卸任後的語言）。然而，蔡英文被想像是引領民進黨轉型的黨主席，且極可能是二○一二中華民國的總統候選人，竟然在與李扁對等的生涯時點上，發表比陳水扁及李登輝更獨且更不理性的《流亡政府論》，她究竟是少了哪一根筋？
蔡英文在《十年政綱》中將端出什麼樣的國家認同與憲政定位論述，許多人都在等著看。但是，近一個月來，她陸續發表「執政後，公投廢ＥＣＦＡ」、「沒有廢止《台獨黨綱》的問題」及《流亡政府論》，甚至又「否定經濟掛帥／質疑出口導向」；不啻已然封殺了她自己及民進黨的轉型空間，令人不解。她主張「中華民國是流亡政府」，將如何引領民進黨贏得二○一二？
更令人驚異的是，蔡英文此次絕非信口失言所致，而是用白紙黑字印出《流亡政府論》。蔡英文即使是台獨，何以膚淺至此？蔡英文即使只是想政治操作，何以荒謬至此？
蔡英文曾因《兩國論》，搞垮了李登輝政權；又因堅持否定《九二共識》，搞垮了陳水扁政權。如今，儼然又要以《流亡政府論》，來杜絕民進黨轉型提升的路徑；這樣的蔡英文，仍是中間選民想像中的那個理性清新的蔡英文嗎？
白紙黑字的《流亡政府論》，性質何其嚴肅，更何其沉重，蔡英文豈能如此輕佻地說：「沒時間理會這些政治口水！」
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 31, 2010
Tsai Ing-wen has left many people in shock. Many people assumed Tsai Ing-wen had adopted a more rational perspective on national identity and the status of the Republic of China Constitution in her "Political Platform for the Coming Decade." They assumed she was struggling to transform the DPP. But according to the latest news reports, she has openly asserted that "the Republic of China is a government in exile."
Tsai Ing-wen is Chairman of the DPP. These views are the most irrational views on Taiwan independence that any chairman of the DPP has expressed since the 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." Tsai Ing-wen is a potential candidate for President of the Republic of China in 2012. These views are the most irrational views on Taiwan independence any presidential candidate has expressed, ever. Such extraordinary comments, issuing from the lips of the ostensibly rational Tsai Ing-wen, could only leave listeners in shocked disbelief.
The "Government in Exile" theory is the most irrational Taiwan independence theory one is likely to encounter in cross-Straits debate. For example: 1. The DPP's "Taiwan Independence Party Constitution" does not repudiate the Republic of China per se. It merely asserts that the political structure of the ROC "leads to an impasse for constitutional reform." Therefore it advocates the authoring of a new constitution and the "founding of a sovereign and independent Republic of Taiwan" via public referendum. 2. The DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" also recognizes the "constitutionally-defined Republic of China" as a "backdoor listing" strategy, as a means of maintaining a framework by which "all residents of Taiwan can participate in a referendum." 3. The "two states theory" has never maintained that the ROC is a government in exile. 4. The "one country on each side" theory still allows room for the "two states" theory. 5. The "rectification of names" movement calls for the abolition of the Republic of China, but does not repudiate the Republic of China prior to its abolition. 6. The "Taiwan's undetermined status" theory merely asserts that Taiwan "does not necessarily" belong to the Republic of China. 7. The "Resolution for a Normal Nation" advocates the "swift rectification of names." 8. The "foreign government" theory still recognizes the Republic of China as a de facto "authority." 9. The "second republic" is merely an "extension" of the ROC.
As we can see, among the various "hard line Taiwan independence," "soft line Taiwan independence" and "quasi-Taiwan independence" theories, the "government in exile" theory is the most extreme. It asserts that the "Republic of China is on the mainland" and "not on Taiwan." Therefore it is arguably the most irrational form of Taiwan independence. 1. If the Republic of China is actually a government in exile, then the DPP's years of participation in the democratic and constitutional processes of the Republic of China are utterly meaningless. 2. It effectively contradicts the DPP's own calls for a "public referendum," and instead resorts to political rhetoric to repudiate the Republic of China, denying the public the right to its own opinions. 3. Strategically, it inevitably plays into Beijing's "united front" strategy. In their rush to repudiate the Republic of China, its advocates effectively end up as "Communist fellow travelers."
Tsai Ing-wen is both DPP party chairman and a potential ROC presidential candidate. Given her position of responsibility, her "government in exile" stance is even more irrationally independence-minded than those of Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui. The 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" paved the way for Chen Shui-bian's bid for the presidency. The "Five Noes" eased cross-Strait tensions. Chen Shui-bian cozied up to Taiwan independence only after he found himself in hot water over corruption, and after leaving office. As for Lee Teng-hui, during the 1996 direct elections, his political platform included the "National Unification Guidelines." Even his "two states theory," launched in 1999, merely attempted to attract Pale Green voters in order to boost Lien Chan's election prospects in 2000. He did not assert that "the Republic of China no longer exists." He said that only after leaving office. But Tsai Ing-wen was perceived as a party chairman committed to transforming the DPP, and a likely 2012 ROC presidential candidate. Yet at the same point in her career, she has adopted an even more irrationally independence-minded stance than either Lee Teng-hui or Chen Shui-bian. What in the world inspired her to openly assert that the "Republic of China is a government in exile?"
Many people are waiting to see what positions Tsai Ing-wen will adopt on national identity and the status of the ROC Constitution in her "Political Platform for the Coming Decade." But over the past month, she has spoken repeatedly of "abolishing ECFA upon assuming power." She has spoken of having "no intention of abolishing the Taiwan Independence Party Constitution," and she has characterized the ROC as a "government in exile." She has even said we must "repudiate our economics above all priorities, and export-oriented tendencies." She has no qualms about ruling out her own transformation or the transformation of the DPP. Her behavior is incomprehensible. Since she asserts that the "Republic of China is a government in exile," how can she possibly lead the DPP to a victory in 2012?
What's even more remarkable, is that Tsai Ing-wen's assertions were hardly a slip of the tongue. The words "government in exile" appeared in black ink on white paper. Since Tsai Ing-wen is advocating Taiwan independence, why is she behaving in such a superficial manner? If Tsai Ing-wen is merely indulging in political power plays, why is she behaving in such a ridiculous manner?
Tsai Ing-wen's "two states theory" brought down the Lee Teng-hui regime. Her stubborn opposition to the 1992 Consensus brought down the Chen Shui-bian regime. Now she is apparently using "government in exile" rhetoric to prevent the DPP from undergoing transformation and taking the high road. Is this still the rational Tsai Ing-wen moderate voters believed her to be?
The phrase "government in exile," printed in black ink on white paper, is a serious matter. Can Tsai Ing-wen cavalierly dismiss public concerns merely by saying that she "has no time for political mudslinging?"
蔡英文比陳水扁還獨？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.31 01:30 am
蔡英文讓許多人跌破眼鏡。不少人曾有幻想，認為蔡英文在她的《十年政綱》中，將對國家認同及憲法定位提出較為理性中道的論述，引領民進黨轉型。詎料，她竟然白紙黑字地公開宣示「中華民國是流亡政府」。
蔡英文是民進黨主席，這樣的言論，是一九九九年《台灣前途決議文》以來，歷任民進黨主席所發表的最獨與最不理性的兩岸論述；同時，由於蔡英文也可能是二○ 一二中華民國總統候選人，這樣的言論，亦是歷來總統候選人所宣示的最獨且最不理性的兩岸政策。這般奇異的論述，出自被視為理性清新的蔡英文之口，豈能不跌破許多人的眼鏡？
《流亡政府論》可謂是最獨且最不理性的兩岸論述。例如：一、《台獨黨綱》並未否定中華民國，只是認為中華民國體制「造成憲政改造的僵局」，而主張由公民投票另制新憲，「建立主權獨立自主的台灣共和國」。二、《台灣前途決議文》更承認「依目前憲法稱為中華民國」，亦即採「借殼上市」的策略，且維持「台灣全體住民公民投票」的架構。三、《兩國論》亦未稱中華民國是流亡政府。四、《一邊一國》則仍有《兩國論》的想像空間。五、《正名制憲》則雖是主張廢中華民國，卻非在未廢前即否定中華民國。六、《台灣地位未定論》也只是說，台灣「不一定」屬於中華民國。七、《正常國家決議文》則主張「及早正名制憲」。八、《外來政權》尚承認中華民國是一事實「政權」。九、《第二共和》亦只是強調中華民國的「成長」……。
由以上例舉可知，在各種「重台獨」、「輕台獨」或「類台獨」理論中，《流亡政府論》是最「獨」的主張，認為「中華民國在大陸」，而「不在台灣」。因而亦是「最不理性」的台獨主張：一、中華民國既是流亡政府，使民進黨參與中華民國的民主憲政運作，完全失去了正當性；二、形同否棄了「公民投票」的理論，只憑政治語言即片面否定中華民國，劫奪民意。三、在戰略上，這必然掉入「中共同路人」的統一戰線，不啻搶在北京前頭否定了中華民國。
再說，以蔡英文兼具黨主席及可能總統參選者的身分言，若持《流亡政府論》，其立場亦較陳水扁及李登輝更獨且更不理性。一九九九年的《台灣前途決議文》，是為陳水扁參選總統預作鋪墊；更不用說還有他就任後的「四不一沒有」，緩和兩岸情勢。陳水扁是在貪腐失政危機出現及卸任後，才愈走愈獨。至於李登輝，一九九六年直選時，他的政治看板仍是《國統綱領》；甚至在一九九九年推出《兩國論》，企圖拉住淺綠，挽救二○○○年連戰的選情，也未說「中華民國已不存在」（那是卸任後的語言）。然而，蔡英文被想像是引領民進黨轉型的黨主席，且極可能是二○一二中華民國的總統候選人，竟然在與李扁對等的生涯時點上，發表比陳水扁及李登輝更獨且更不理性的《流亡政府論》，她究竟是少了哪一根筋？
蔡英文在《十年政綱》中將端出什麼樣的國家認同與憲政定位論述，許多人都在等著看。但是，近一個月來，她陸續發表「執政後，公投廢ＥＣＦＡ」、「沒有廢止《台獨黨綱》的問題」及《流亡政府論》，甚至又「否定經濟掛帥／質疑出口導向」；不啻已然封殺了她自己及民進黨的轉型空間，令人不解。她主張「中華民國是流亡政府」，將如何引領民進黨贏得二○一二？
更令人驚異的是，蔡英文此次絕非信口失言所致，而是用白紙黑字印出《流亡政府論》。蔡英文即使是台獨，何以膚淺至此？蔡英文即使只是想政治操作，何以荒謬至此？
蔡英文曾因《兩國論》，搞垮了李登輝政權；又因堅持否定《九二共識》，搞垮了陳水扁政權。如今，儼然又要以《流亡政府論》，來杜絕民進黨轉型提升的路徑；這樣的蔡英文，仍是中間選民想像中的那個理性清新的蔡英文嗎？
白紙黑字的《流亡政府論》，性質何其嚴肅，更何其沉重，蔡英文豈能如此輕佻地說：「沒時間理會這些政治口水！」
Thursday, May 27, 2010
TSU Referendum on ECFA Seriously Flawed
TSU Referendum on ECFA Seriously Flawed
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2010
Perhaps no one has noticed. But the Taiwan Solidarity Union has proposed a referendum on ECFA that is currently under review by the Referendum Commission. The referendum asks "Do you agree with the government's plan to sign a "Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement" with the mainland? The sponsor of the referendum has characterized it as a major policy issue. The Referendum Commission meanwhile, must review this referendum proposal to determine whether it meets the requirements of the law, and therefore whether it should be approved or struck down.
Ever since the Republic of China introduced its "Referendum Law," referenda that could serve as case studies have been rare. There are many reasons for this, including at least two major problems. One problem is that the provisions of the Referendum Law are not sufficiently stringent. On the one hand, the law includes difficult to surmount ballot proposition thresholds and procedural red tape. On the other hand, the classification scheme for referendum proposals is inadequate, and can easily lead to voter confusion. Voters often find it impossible to understand the content of referendum proposals. As a result interest is not high. Voters are also likely to misunderstand the content and potential impact of the referendum proposals, leaving them adrift.
Another problem is that past referendum proposals often showed clear markings of electioneering strategy. The taint of political manipulation overwhelmed the possibility that its sponsors were promoting deliberative democracy. This made it impossible for the public to resolve public policy disputes by engaging in rational debate. The result was a decline in the credibility of the referendum process. Although referendum proposals are not uncommon, it is increasingly difficult to rally public attention or interest. The TSU proposal for a referendum on ECFA is no exception.
Leave aside the question of whether the current proposal for a referendum on ECFA advances democracy. The proposal itself is riddled with flaws. This is enough to conclude that the positive impact of the current referendum proposal will be limited. It will not help resolve the social divisions that have arisen over whether to sign ECFA.
The Referendum Law basically divides ballot proposals on major national policy issues into two categories: initiatives and referenda. Initiatives set forth important policy proposals that do not already exist. If an initiative passes a public vote, the government must attempt to incorporate it into government policy. A referendum addresses an existing government policy. The purpose of a referendum is to repudiate an existing government policy. If the referendum passes, the government must abandon its policy. The current proposal for a referendum on ECFA can be considered a major policy issue. Its sponsor hopes to prevent the government from signing an ECFA agreement. But this apparently simple proposal contains a number of serious flaws.
First of all, initiatives create new policy. The language of an initiative should read: "approve of the policy." Those who approve of the policy, cast votes in favor of the initiative. Those who disapprove of the policy, cast votes opposing the initiative. A referendum, on the other hand, expresses disapproval of the government's existing policy. The language of a referendum should read: "disapprove of the policy." Those who support the referendum cast votes opposing the government's policy. Those who oppose the referendum cast votes supporting the government's policy. The TSU says it opposes an ECFA agreement. Yet the wording of its proposal is a question. It asks voters "Do you approve of or disapprove of" an ECFA agreement? It is impossible to tell from the language alone whether the sponsors of the referendum approve of or disapprove of an ECFA agreement. Such language could deceive supporters of ECFA into unwittingly casting votes against an ECFA agreement. It could easily create voter confusion. Superficially the sponsors of the referendum could look more like supporters of ECFA, rather than opponents of ECFA. Clearly the sponsor's language for the referendum is at odds with the sponsor's intentions. The language of the referendum is more like the language of an initiative, and not a referendum. It is seriously flawed.
Another problem is that the referendum process applies only to policies whose content is already clear, and not to policies whose content have yet to be determined. ECFA is an agreement whose contents are still uncertain. Before the contents of ECFA have been agreed upon, it is not considered settled. Therefore it does not even warrant a referendum. To propose a referendum over a policy whose content has yet to be settled, is pointless. A majority of voters support referenda. But because the content of ECFA remains undetermined, the government could sign an agreement under a different name, and would no longer be constrained by the result of the referendum. If the purpose of the referendum is to pass final judgment on ECFA, it must be conducted after it is signed, not before. If it is, then the government will be constrained by the results, and must comply. If it is, then the referendum will not be in vain and meaningless.
The Taiwan Solidarity Union has proposed a referendum on ECFA. This is something that should have been subjected to rational debate by a deliberative democracy. Now however, it is merely a proposal whose language is unclear, whose justifications are self-contradictory, and which has been trotted out too early. The results of a referendum whose meaning is unclear will be meaningless. Referendum Commission Members should rule the proposed referendum in violation of the Referendum Law, and strike it down. Only this is consistent with the essence of the referendum law.
台聯ECFA公投提案 存在嚴重瑕疵
2010-05-27
中國時報
也許乏人注意，但目前有一項由台聯提出的ＥＣＦＡ公投案，正由公投審議委員會進入審查程度。這項公投提案的主文是：「你是否同意政府與中國簽訂『兩岸經濟合作架構協議』？」提案者將此項提案定性為重大政策之複決。公投審議委員會，則要審查此一提案是否符合法定要件，以決定應予駁回或是進行後續程序。
台灣自有《公民投票法》以來，少有足以作為公民投票教材的正面案例，此中原因不一，至少存在兩個主要的問題。一個問題是現行《公民投票法》的立法不夠嚴謹，一方面給公民投票加設了許多不易通過的人數門檻以及程序機制；另一方面又對公投提案內容的分類界定不足，極易引起選民的混淆，不但常常使得選民無法瞭解提案的內容以致興趣不高，也容易造成選民誤會提案的內容與效果，以致無所適從。
另一個問題，則是以往公投案的提出，總是選舉策略斧鑿痕跡明顯，政治操弄的意味遠大過推動審議民主的目標，導致全民無從透過理性思辯解決公共政策爭議。其結果就是公民投票制度的公信力愈來愈薄弱。公投提案雖然並不鮮見，卻很難引起社會一般民眾的重視或共鳴。這次台聯提出的ＥＣＦＡ公投提案，同樣也不例外。
先不必研究此次ＥＣＦＡ公投提案，是否具有促進民主政治發展的價值，單從提案主文所呈現出來的瑕疵，就幾可斷言此一公投提案的正面意義有限，根本無從幫助台灣社會有效解決因為簽署ＥＣＦＡ協議政策所面臨的社會歧見。
《公民投票法》基本上將重大政策之全國性公民投票區分為創制與複決兩種。創制案是提出還不存在的重要政策，如果經過公民投票通過，政府即應設法將之納為政府施政的政策；複決案則是針對已經形成的重要政府政策，推動公民投票加以否定，如果經過公民投票通過，政府即應廢止既定的政府政策。此次所提出的ＥＣＦＡ公投案在定位上應算是重大政策的複決案，主文似是要阻止政府簽署兩岸ＥＣＦＡ協議。可是，看來簡單的提案，卻有著幾項嚴重的瑕疵。
首先，創制案是創造一項新的政策，提案主文應該以「同意……案」為投票內容，贊成者投同意票，反對者投不同意票。複決案則是反對一項既定的政策，提案主文應該是「反對……政策案」，支持提案者投票支持反對案，反對提案者投票否定反對票。台聯提案說是反對簽署ＥＣＦＡ協議，提案內容則是疑問句，詢問投票者「是否同意」簽署ＥＣＦＡ，根本看不出來提案者究竟是贊成還是反對ＥＣＦＡ；而且此種文句安排會使得投票支持者變成是同意簽署ＥＣＦＡ而不是反對簽署ＥＣＦＡ，極易形成選民的混洧。外觀上，提案者反而更像是支持簽署ＥＣＦＡ而非反對簽署ＥＣＦＡ，不但提案主文與理由顯然相互矛盾，提案主文也更像是創制提案而非複決提案，具有嚴重的瑕疵。
更進一步的問題，在於複決案必須是針對內容已經確定的政策，而不能是針對內容尚未確定的政策。簽署ＥＣＦＡ協議，現在正是一項內容不確定的政策，ＥＣＦＡ協議的內容在未加簽署之前，都不算定案，根本不具有可複決性。對於內容不確定的政策提出複決案，並無實質意義。即令多數選民支持複決，但是由於ＥＣＦＡ的內容未經簽署確定，政府改簽一項換個名稱的協議，也就完全不受拘束了。如果提案的內容是去複決一項政府「所」簽署的ＥＣＦＡ，也就是在ＥＣＦＡ簽署之後再進行複決，那麼政府所已簽署而內容確定的ＥＣＦＡ就要受到複決案的拘束而不得加以執行。公民投票也就不會徒勞無功而毫無價值。
台聯針對ＥＣＦＡ協議提出公共政策複決案進行公民投票，本來應該是個可以透過審議民主進行公共理性辯論的題目，現在卻只是一項主文不明；主文與理由相互矛盾，提出時機過早，而又複決客體不明確以致不具實質意義的提案，公投審議委員應該以之為違反公民投票法而加以否決，才能符合公民投票法制的真諦。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2010
Perhaps no one has noticed. But the Taiwan Solidarity Union has proposed a referendum on ECFA that is currently under review by the Referendum Commission. The referendum asks "Do you agree with the government's plan to sign a "Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement" with the mainland? The sponsor of the referendum has characterized it as a major policy issue. The Referendum Commission meanwhile, must review this referendum proposal to determine whether it meets the requirements of the law, and therefore whether it should be approved or struck down.
Ever since the Republic of China introduced its "Referendum Law," referenda that could serve as case studies have been rare. There are many reasons for this, including at least two major problems. One problem is that the provisions of the Referendum Law are not sufficiently stringent. On the one hand, the law includes difficult to surmount ballot proposition thresholds and procedural red tape. On the other hand, the classification scheme for referendum proposals is inadequate, and can easily lead to voter confusion. Voters often find it impossible to understand the content of referendum proposals. As a result interest is not high. Voters are also likely to misunderstand the content and potential impact of the referendum proposals, leaving them adrift.
Another problem is that past referendum proposals often showed clear markings of electioneering strategy. The taint of political manipulation overwhelmed the possibility that its sponsors were promoting deliberative democracy. This made it impossible for the public to resolve public policy disputes by engaging in rational debate. The result was a decline in the credibility of the referendum process. Although referendum proposals are not uncommon, it is increasingly difficult to rally public attention or interest. The TSU proposal for a referendum on ECFA is no exception.
Leave aside the question of whether the current proposal for a referendum on ECFA advances democracy. The proposal itself is riddled with flaws. This is enough to conclude that the positive impact of the current referendum proposal will be limited. It will not help resolve the social divisions that have arisen over whether to sign ECFA.
The Referendum Law basically divides ballot proposals on major national policy issues into two categories: initiatives and referenda. Initiatives set forth important policy proposals that do not already exist. If an initiative passes a public vote, the government must attempt to incorporate it into government policy. A referendum addresses an existing government policy. The purpose of a referendum is to repudiate an existing government policy. If the referendum passes, the government must abandon its policy. The current proposal for a referendum on ECFA can be considered a major policy issue. Its sponsor hopes to prevent the government from signing an ECFA agreement. But this apparently simple proposal contains a number of serious flaws.
First of all, initiatives create new policy. The language of an initiative should read: "approve of the policy." Those who approve of the policy, cast votes in favor of the initiative. Those who disapprove of the policy, cast votes opposing the initiative. A referendum, on the other hand, expresses disapproval of the government's existing policy. The language of a referendum should read: "disapprove of the policy." Those who support the referendum cast votes opposing the government's policy. Those who oppose the referendum cast votes supporting the government's policy. The TSU says it opposes an ECFA agreement. Yet the wording of its proposal is a question. It asks voters "Do you approve of or disapprove of" an ECFA agreement? It is impossible to tell from the language alone whether the sponsors of the referendum approve of or disapprove of an ECFA agreement. Such language could deceive supporters of ECFA into unwittingly casting votes against an ECFA agreement. It could easily create voter confusion. Superficially the sponsors of the referendum could look more like supporters of ECFA, rather than opponents of ECFA. Clearly the sponsor's language for the referendum is at odds with the sponsor's intentions. The language of the referendum is more like the language of an initiative, and not a referendum. It is seriously flawed.
Another problem is that the referendum process applies only to policies whose content is already clear, and not to policies whose content have yet to be determined. ECFA is an agreement whose contents are still uncertain. Before the contents of ECFA have been agreed upon, it is not considered settled. Therefore it does not even warrant a referendum. To propose a referendum over a policy whose content has yet to be settled, is pointless. A majority of voters support referenda. But because the content of ECFA remains undetermined, the government could sign an agreement under a different name, and would no longer be constrained by the result of the referendum. If the purpose of the referendum is to pass final judgment on ECFA, it must be conducted after it is signed, not before. If it is, then the government will be constrained by the results, and must comply. If it is, then the referendum will not be in vain and meaningless.
The Taiwan Solidarity Union has proposed a referendum on ECFA. This is something that should have been subjected to rational debate by a deliberative democracy. Now however, it is merely a proposal whose language is unclear, whose justifications are self-contradictory, and which has been trotted out too early. The results of a referendum whose meaning is unclear will be meaningless. Referendum Commission Members should rule the proposed referendum in violation of the Referendum Law, and strike it down. Only this is consistent with the essence of the referendum law.
台聯ECFA公投提案 存在嚴重瑕疵
2010-05-27
中國時報
也許乏人注意，但目前有一項由台聯提出的ＥＣＦＡ公投案，正由公投審議委員會進入審查程度。這項公投提案的主文是：「你是否同意政府與中國簽訂『兩岸經濟合作架構協議』？」提案者將此項提案定性為重大政策之複決。公投審議委員會，則要審查此一提案是否符合法定要件，以決定應予駁回或是進行後續程序。
台灣自有《公民投票法》以來，少有足以作為公民投票教材的正面案例，此中原因不一，至少存在兩個主要的問題。一個問題是現行《公民投票法》的立法不夠嚴謹，一方面給公民投票加設了許多不易通過的人數門檻以及程序機制；另一方面又對公投提案內容的分類界定不足，極易引起選民的混淆，不但常常使得選民無法瞭解提案的內容以致興趣不高，也容易造成選民誤會提案的內容與效果，以致無所適從。
另一個問題，則是以往公投案的提出，總是選舉策略斧鑿痕跡明顯，政治操弄的意味遠大過推動審議民主的目標，導致全民無從透過理性思辯解決公共政策爭議。其結果就是公民投票制度的公信力愈來愈薄弱。公投提案雖然並不鮮見，卻很難引起社會一般民眾的重視或共鳴。這次台聯提出的ＥＣＦＡ公投提案，同樣也不例外。
先不必研究此次ＥＣＦＡ公投提案，是否具有促進民主政治發展的價值，單從提案主文所呈現出來的瑕疵，就幾可斷言此一公投提案的正面意義有限，根本無從幫助台灣社會有效解決因為簽署ＥＣＦＡ協議政策所面臨的社會歧見。
《公民投票法》基本上將重大政策之全國性公民投票區分為創制與複決兩種。創制案是提出還不存在的重要政策，如果經過公民投票通過，政府即應設法將之納為政府施政的政策；複決案則是針對已經形成的重要政府政策，推動公民投票加以否定，如果經過公民投票通過，政府即應廢止既定的政府政策。此次所提出的ＥＣＦＡ公投案在定位上應算是重大政策的複決案，主文似是要阻止政府簽署兩岸ＥＣＦＡ協議。可是，看來簡單的提案，卻有著幾項嚴重的瑕疵。
首先，創制案是創造一項新的政策，提案主文應該以「同意……案」為投票內容，贊成者投同意票，反對者投不同意票。複決案則是反對一項既定的政策，提案主文應該是「反對……政策案」，支持提案者投票支持反對案，反對提案者投票否定反對票。台聯提案說是反對簽署ＥＣＦＡ協議，提案內容則是疑問句，詢問投票者「是否同意」簽署ＥＣＦＡ，根本看不出來提案者究竟是贊成還是反對ＥＣＦＡ；而且此種文句安排會使得投票支持者變成是同意簽署ＥＣＦＡ而不是反對簽署ＥＣＦＡ，極易形成選民的混洧。外觀上，提案者反而更像是支持簽署ＥＣＦＡ而非反對簽署ＥＣＦＡ，不但提案主文與理由顯然相互矛盾，提案主文也更像是創制提案而非複決提案，具有嚴重的瑕疵。
更進一步的問題，在於複決案必須是針對內容已經確定的政策，而不能是針對內容尚未確定的政策。簽署ＥＣＦＡ協議，現在正是一項內容不確定的政策，ＥＣＦＡ協議的內容在未加簽署之前，都不算定案，根本不具有可複決性。對於內容不確定的政策提出複決案，並無實質意義。即令多數選民支持複決，但是由於ＥＣＦＡ的內容未經簽署確定，政府改簽一項換個名稱的協議，也就完全不受拘束了。如果提案的內容是去複決一項政府「所」簽署的ＥＣＦＡ，也就是在ＥＣＦＡ簽署之後再進行複決，那麼政府所已簽署而內容確定的ＥＣＦＡ就要受到複決案的拘束而不得加以執行。公民投票也就不會徒勞無功而毫無價值。
台聯針對ＥＣＦＡ協議提出公共政策複決案進行公民投票，本來應該是個可以透過審議民主進行公共理性辯論的題目，現在卻只是一項主文不明；主文與理由相互矛盾，提出時機過早，而又複決客體不明確以致不具實質意義的提案，公投審議委員應該以之為違反公民投票法而加以否決，才能符合公民投票法制的真諦。
Just What is Tsai Ing-wen's "Alternative?"
Just What is Tsai Ing-wen's "Alternative?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2010
Party politics means that the opposition party opposes the ruling party and proposes "alternatives." Tsai Ing-wen opposes ECFA, and has proposed an "alternative." Her "alternative" is her "Political Platform for the Decade," currently under construction, which may be regarded as a sweeping alternative for the nation's political and economic future.
The alternative Tsai has proposed for ECFA is "move closer to the world before moving closer to [mainland] China." She proposes "allowing industries with particularly high tariffs to invest on the mainland." But if one wishes to "move closer to the world before moving closer to [mainland] China," one must first "enable the world to move closer to Taiwan." Without signing ECFA, how can one provide the world an incentive to move closer to Taiwan? What about her proposal "allowing industries with particularly high tariffs to invest on the mainland?" What is this path but "moving closer to [mainland] China before moving closer to the world," which Tsai Ing-wen herself firmly opposes? Or worse, "forcing Taiwan businesses to flee to [mainland] China?" Such an "alternative" is not merely self-contradictory, it is suicidal.
Leave ECFA aside for the moment. Tsai Ing-wen's "Political Platform for the Decade" also seeks a political and economic "alternative" for the nation's future. She said that Taipei must rethink its "economics above all else path." She said that "Economic development has led to 'generational injustice,"' and asked "Is economic growth our only goal?"
She mentioned this during the Two Yings Debate. She said that "Over the past several decades Taiwan's economy had exports as its priority. The public on Taiwan paid a heavy price. For example, the destruction of national lands, the destruction of the local landscape, a growing gap between the cities and the countryside, and alternating floods and droughts."
Tsai Ing-wen's claim is questionable. Economic growth may not be one's only goal. But for the people of any nation it is invariably their most important goal. Therefore political rhetoric denouncing "economics above all else" hardly negates the necessity and importance of economic growth. Economic development can damage the environment. It can lead to calls for the "redistribution of wealth." But the resources generated by economic development can also heal the environment. Tax policies can also equalize inequities in wealth. Tsai Ing-wen said the public on Taiwan paid a "very heavy price" for an export-oriented economy. But her assertion hardly negates the fact that 70% of our GDP comes from exports. Exports have long been the bedrock of Taiwan's economic survival and prosperity. Given Taiwan's current economic difficulties, is Tsai Ing-wen's "alternative," the repudiation of economic growth and the questioning of export-orientation the least bit convincing?
Tsai Ing-wen's "Political Platform for the Decade" has yet to offer an "alternative" for the status of our constitution and our national identity. But her current obsession with "economic alternatives" is clearly politically-motivated. It is obviously a Procrustean Bed into which economics must be force-fitted into a preconceived political framework. For example, the main reason she opposes ECFA is her desire to avoid "East Asia becoming a Sinocentric East Asia." She also wants to avoid "weakening and marginalizing the United States." Perhaps her politically-motivated thinking has convinced her to question our "economics above all path" and our "export-orientation." Perhaps it has convinced her to reduce our cross-Strait economic and trade dependency, in order to avoid mainland China's political threat.
Such a policy proposal is even more bizarre than Marie Antoinette's "Let them eat cake!" It is precisely concerns about cross-Strait political crises that necessitate strengthening Taiwan's economic structure and export trade. Otherwise, if Taiwan's economy becomes increasingly depressed, the magnetic attraction mainland China exerts on Taiwan's economy will be even more serious. The political threat will be even more difficult to control, leading to a vicious circle. Is Tsai Ing-wen's "alternative" to "rethink our economics above all else path and export-orientation" in order to "reduce cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges?" If so, she needs to realize that such an "alternative" cannot possibly "cool down the economy" and "resolve political problems." It can only lead to an irreparable economic chill and political disaster. Is Tsai Chi really this obtuse, or is she merely feigning ignorance?
The world has changed radically. Whether we are talking about short term or long term benefits, Taipei must base its political strategy on its economic strategy. Over the past decade or so, the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian regimes were utterly incapable of suppressing booming cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. Instead they seriously undermined our chances of becoming an Asian-Pacific Operations Center. Whether we are talking about short term or long term profits, whether we are talking about economics or politics, the harm inflicted upon Taiwan will be difficult to remedy.
The Democratic Progressive Party's path is to force economic strategy into the Procrustean Bed of political strategy. The result is bizarre "alternatives" such as "rethinking our economics above all path and our export-orientation in order to reduce cross-Strait exchanges." We would like to ask Tsai Ing-wen what are the short term and long term benefits of her "economic cool down" and "questioning of exports?"
Tsai Ing-wen's "Political Platform for the Decade" is still tinkering at the margins. The public still does not understand what her "alternative" is for the status of our constitution and our national identity. Does she intend to "jettison our economics above all path and question our export-orientation?" Does she intend to propose an "alternative" to what she dismisses as the "Republic of China government in exile?"
看不懂蔡英文的「替代方案」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.27 03:24 am
政黨政治就是「在野黨」反對執政黨，並提出「替代方案」。蔡英文反對ＥＣＦＡ，提出「替代方案」；她正在研議的「十年政綱」，則更可視為國家政經路線全套足本的「替代方案」。
蔡英文為ＥＣＦＡ提出的替代方案是，「由世界走向中國」，並主張「讓關稅特別高的產業到大陸投資」等。不過，若要「由世界走向中國」，首先要「讓世界走進台灣」；倘不簽ＥＣＦＡ，如何增加「世界走進台灣」的誘因？至於主張「讓關稅特別高的產業到大陸投資」，此一路徑更十足是蔡英文自己所反對的「由中國走向世界」，甚至是「逼台商奔赴中國」。這樣的「替代方案」，非僅自相矛盾，而且不啻是自尋死路。
跳開ＥＣＦＡ的個案，蔡英文的「十年政綱」也嘗試為整體經濟政策路線提出「替代方案」。她說，台灣必須重新檢驗「經濟掛帥路線」；並質疑：「經濟發展造成了『世代不正義』。」「經濟成長還是不是我們唯一的發展目標？」
此一觀點，她在雙英辯論時即已提出。她說：「過去幾十年台灣經濟以出口為優先，台灣社會付出了很慘重的代價；例如國土破碎、鄉土景觀破壞、城鄉差距過大、水旱災交織等代價。」
蔡英文的主張可待商榷。經濟成長雖然未必是唯一目標，卻是任何國家社會最重要的目標。因而，「經濟掛帥」這類政治語言，並不足以推翻「經濟成長」的必要性與重要性。何況，經濟發展可能破壞生態，也可能形成「財富重分配」的問題；但經濟發展所產生的資源，卻也是用以改善生態，與利用租稅政策以平均財富的重要憑藉。再者，蔡英文只說，出口導向的經濟使台灣社會付出了「很慘重的代價」；但是，憑她這一句話，卻抹煞不了幾佔ＧＤＰ七十％的出口經貿，長期以來皆是台灣安身立命的重要磐石。面對台灣當前經濟困境，倘若蔡英文提出的「替代方案」，竟是「否定經濟掛帥／質疑出口導向」，這種論調豈有說服力？
蔡英文的「十年政綱」，尚未端出在憲政定位及國家認同上的「替代方案」；但她迄至目前所提的「經濟替代方案」，顯然皆是以政治思考為主，亦即欲削足適履，以「經濟方案」配合「政治方案」。例如，她反對ＥＣＦＡ的主要理由，是欲避免「東亞成為以中國為中心的東亞」，也欲避免「使美國弱化與邊緣化」。也許正因這樣的政治思考邏輯，使她認為「檢驗經濟掛帥路線／質疑出口導向經濟」，應當即可降低兩岸經貿依賴，進而擺脫中國的政治威脅。
這是比「何不食肉糜」還要離奇的國策主張。因為，正是由於有兩岸政治危機的顧慮，所以要強化台灣的經濟體質及出口貿易；否則，台灣的經濟倘若愈趨低迷，中國大陸在經濟上的磁吸效應必會愈嚴重，在政治關係上的威脅也會更難節制，且必將形成一個惡性循環。也就是說，若以「為了降低兩岸經貿關係／所以要檢討經濟掛帥與出口導向」作為「替代方案」，非但不能以「經濟降溫」來解決政治問題，反而必將因「經濟失溫」而造成萬劫不復的政治災難。蔡英文真是智不及此，還是故作天真？
世局丕變，無論就「近利」及「遠利」言，台灣皆應「以經濟戰略支撐政治戰略」。過去十餘年，李扁二任政府，完全無法抑制兩岸經貿關係的紅火發展，卻又嚴重挫傷了實現「亞太營運中心」的機遇；這無論就「近利」或「遠利」言，就「經濟」或「政治」言，對台灣皆是難以彌償的損傷。
民進黨的路線是「以政治戰略扭曲經濟戰略」，因而才會出現這種「為降低兩岸關係／應檢驗經濟掛帥／質疑出口導向」的「替代方案」，離奇至極。試問：蔡英文的「經濟降溫／質疑出口」，有何「近利」，又有何「遠利」？
蔡英文的「十年政綱」，迄今仍在「外圍地帶」繞圈子；國人不知她對憲法定位及國家認同的主軸路線，將提出什麼「替代方案」？莫非要用「廢棄經濟掛帥／質疑出口導向」，來支撐其「中華民國是流亡政府」的「替代方案」？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 27, 2010
Party politics means that the opposition party opposes the ruling party and proposes "alternatives." Tsai Ing-wen opposes ECFA, and has proposed an "alternative." Her "alternative" is her "Political Platform for the Decade," currently under construction, which may be regarded as a sweeping alternative for the nation's political and economic future.
The alternative Tsai has proposed for ECFA is "move closer to the world before moving closer to [mainland] China." She proposes "allowing industries with particularly high tariffs to invest on the mainland." But if one wishes to "move closer to the world before moving closer to [mainland] China," one must first "enable the world to move closer to Taiwan." Without signing ECFA, how can one provide the world an incentive to move closer to Taiwan? What about her proposal "allowing industries with particularly high tariffs to invest on the mainland?" What is this path but "moving closer to [mainland] China before moving closer to the world," which Tsai Ing-wen herself firmly opposes? Or worse, "forcing Taiwan businesses to flee to [mainland] China?" Such an "alternative" is not merely self-contradictory, it is suicidal.
Leave ECFA aside for the moment. Tsai Ing-wen's "Political Platform for the Decade" also seeks a political and economic "alternative" for the nation's future. She said that Taipei must rethink its "economics above all else path." She said that "Economic development has led to 'generational injustice,"' and asked "Is economic growth our only goal?"
She mentioned this during the Two Yings Debate. She said that "Over the past several decades Taiwan's economy had exports as its priority. The public on Taiwan paid a heavy price. For example, the destruction of national lands, the destruction of the local landscape, a growing gap between the cities and the countryside, and alternating floods and droughts."
Tsai Ing-wen's claim is questionable. Economic growth may not be one's only goal. But for the people of any nation it is invariably their most important goal. Therefore political rhetoric denouncing "economics above all else" hardly negates the necessity and importance of economic growth. Economic development can damage the environment. It can lead to calls for the "redistribution of wealth." But the resources generated by economic development can also heal the environment. Tax policies can also equalize inequities in wealth. Tsai Ing-wen said the public on Taiwan paid a "very heavy price" for an export-oriented economy. But her assertion hardly negates the fact that 70% of our GDP comes from exports. Exports have long been the bedrock of Taiwan's economic survival and prosperity. Given Taiwan's current economic difficulties, is Tsai Ing-wen's "alternative," the repudiation of economic growth and the questioning of export-orientation the least bit convincing?
Tsai Ing-wen's "Political Platform for the Decade" has yet to offer an "alternative" for the status of our constitution and our national identity. But her current obsession with "economic alternatives" is clearly politically-motivated. It is obviously a Procrustean Bed into which economics must be force-fitted into a preconceived political framework. For example, the main reason she opposes ECFA is her desire to avoid "East Asia becoming a Sinocentric East Asia." She also wants to avoid "weakening and marginalizing the United States." Perhaps her politically-motivated thinking has convinced her to question our "economics above all path" and our "export-orientation." Perhaps it has convinced her to reduce our cross-Strait economic and trade dependency, in order to avoid mainland China's political threat.
Such a policy proposal is even more bizarre than Marie Antoinette's "Let them eat cake!" It is precisely concerns about cross-Strait political crises that necessitate strengthening Taiwan's economic structure and export trade. Otherwise, if Taiwan's economy becomes increasingly depressed, the magnetic attraction mainland China exerts on Taiwan's economy will be even more serious. The political threat will be even more difficult to control, leading to a vicious circle. Is Tsai Ing-wen's "alternative" to "rethink our economics above all else path and export-orientation" in order to "reduce cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges?" If so, she needs to realize that such an "alternative" cannot possibly "cool down the economy" and "resolve political problems." It can only lead to an irreparable economic chill and political disaster. Is Tsai Chi really this obtuse, or is she merely feigning ignorance?
The world has changed radically. Whether we are talking about short term or long term benefits, Taipei must base its political strategy on its economic strategy. Over the past decade or so, the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian regimes were utterly incapable of suppressing booming cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. Instead they seriously undermined our chances of becoming an Asian-Pacific Operations Center. Whether we are talking about short term or long term profits, whether we are talking about economics or politics, the harm inflicted upon Taiwan will be difficult to remedy.
The Democratic Progressive Party's path is to force economic strategy into the Procrustean Bed of political strategy. The result is bizarre "alternatives" such as "rethinking our economics above all path and our export-orientation in order to reduce cross-Strait exchanges." We would like to ask Tsai Ing-wen what are the short term and long term benefits of her "economic cool down" and "questioning of exports?"
Tsai Ing-wen's "Political Platform for the Decade" is still tinkering at the margins. The public still does not understand what her "alternative" is for the status of our constitution and our national identity. Does she intend to "jettison our economics above all path and question our export-orientation?" Does she intend to propose an "alternative" to what she dismisses as the "Republic of China government in exile?"
看不懂蔡英文的「替代方案」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.27 03:24 am
政黨政治就是「在野黨」反對執政黨，並提出「替代方案」。蔡英文反對ＥＣＦＡ，提出「替代方案」；她正在研議的「十年政綱」，則更可視為國家政經路線全套足本的「替代方案」。
蔡英文為ＥＣＦＡ提出的替代方案是，「由世界走向中國」，並主張「讓關稅特別高的產業到大陸投資」等。不過，若要「由世界走向中國」，首先要「讓世界走進台灣」；倘不簽ＥＣＦＡ，如何增加「世界走進台灣」的誘因？至於主張「讓關稅特別高的產業到大陸投資」，此一路徑更十足是蔡英文自己所反對的「由中國走向世界」，甚至是「逼台商奔赴中國」。這樣的「替代方案」，非僅自相矛盾，而且不啻是自尋死路。
跳開ＥＣＦＡ的個案，蔡英文的「十年政綱」也嘗試為整體經濟政策路線提出「替代方案」。她說，台灣必須重新檢驗「經濟掛帥路線」；並質疑：「經濟發展造成了『世代不正義』。」「經濟成長還是不是我們唯一的發展目標？」
此一觀點，她在雙英辯論時即已提出。她說：「過去幾十年台灣經濟以出口為優先，台灣社會付出了很慘重的代價；例如國土破碎、鄉土景觀破壞、城鄉差距過大、水旱災交織等代價。」
蔡英文的主張可待商榷。經濟成長雖然未必是唯一目標，卻是任何國家社會最重要的目標。因而，「經濟掛帥」這類政治語言，並不足以推翻「經濟成長」的必要性與重要性。何況，經濟發展可能破壞生態，也可能形成「財富重分配」的問題；但經濟發展所產生的資源，卻也是用以改善生態，與利用租稅政策以平均財富的重要憑藉。再者，蔡英文只說，出口導向的經濟使台灣社會付出了「很慘重的代價」；但是，憑她這一句話，卻抹煞不了幾佔ＧＤＰ七十％的出口經貿，長期以來皆是台灣安身立命的重要磐石。面對台灣當前經濟困境，倘若蔡英文提出的「替代方案」，竟是「否定經濟掛帥／質疑出口導向」，這種論調豈有說服力？
蔡英文的「十年政綱」，尚未端出在憲政定位及國家認同上的「替代方案」；但她迄至目前所提的「經濟替代方案」，顯然皆是以政治思考為主，亦即欲削足適履，以「經濟方案」配合「政治方案」。例如，她反對ＥＣＦＡ的主要理由，是欲避免「東亞成為以中國為中心的東亞」，也欲避免「使美國弱化與邊緣化」。也許正因這樣的政治思考邏輯，使她認為「檢驗經濟掛帥路線／質疑出口導向經濟」，應當即可降低兩岸經貿依賴，進而擺脫中國的政治威脅。
這是比「何不食肉糜」還要離奇的國策主張。因為，正是由於有兩岸政治危機的顧慮，所以要強化台灣的經濟體質及出口貿易；否則，台灣的經濟倘若愈趨低迷，中國大陸在經濟上的磁吸效應必會愈嚴重，在政治關係上的威脅也會更難節制，且必將形成一個惡性循環。也就是說，若以「為了降低兩岸經貿關係／所以要檢討經濟掛帥與出口導向」作為「替代方案」，非但不能以「經濟降溫」來解決政治問題，反而必將因「經濟失溫」而造成萬劫不復的政治災難。蔡英文真是智不及此，還是故作天真？
世局丕變，無論就「近利」及「遠利」言，台灣皆應「以經濟戰略支撐政治戰略」。過去十餘年，李扁二任政府，完全無法抑制兩岸經貿關係的紅火發展，卻又嚴重挫傷了實現「亞太營運中心」的機遇；這無論就「近利」或「遠利」言，就「經濟」或「政治」言，對台灣皆是難以彌償的損傷。
民進黨的路線是「以政治戰略扭曲經濟戰略」，因而才會出現這種「為降低兩岸關係／應檢驗經濟掛帥／質疑出口導向」的「替代方案」，離奇至極。試問：蔡英文的「經濟降溫／質疑出口」，有何「近利」，又有何「遠利」？
蔡英文的「十年政綱」，迄今仍在「外圍地帶」繞圈子；國人不知她對憲法定位及國家認同的主軸路線，將提出什麼「替代方案」？莫非要用「廢棄經濟掛帥／質疑出口導向」，來支撐其「中華民國是流亡政府」的「替代方案」？
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
Taiwan: Too Much Sniping, Too Little Joy
Taiwan: Too Much Sniping, Too Little Joy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 26, 2010
Recently the public on Taiwan received a string of positive economic reports. During the first quarter economic growth exceeded 13 %, a 31 year high. Private investment growth this year will reach 37%, a 35 year high. Exports grew at an estimated rate of 24% this year, a 23 year high. Per capita GDP this year will reach an historic high of 18,000 USD.
But the happiness experienced upon receiving this good news lasted less than a day. Soon afterwards, the public was once again neck deep in anxiety. The main reason was the Taiwan stock market was sharply impacted for several days in a row by the European credit crisis and the political clash between North and South Korea. Cries of anguish filled the market. Even non-investors were on tenterhooks. Worse, the good news of first quarter economic growth was dismissed as a calculated effort to release profit reports close to May 20. Private investment growth had cold water splashed on them by reports that "unemployment remains high." The export boom was read as "excessive dependence on mainland China," an even more heinous crime. The increase in GDP meanwhile, became just another cue to mock President Ma Ying-jeou's "633" slogan.
Society on Taiwan has a particularly intense sense of crisis. People worry about their plight as members of a "small nation." They pay close attention to signs of trouble between the ruling and opposition parties. They closely monitor the pulse of the outside world to remain in synch with the international situation. Peoples' sensitivity to their environment and anxiety over change, coupled with an opposition party hovering like vultures, and endless sniping by talking heads, makes it almost impossible for them to experience happy times.
Interestingly enough, when Lausanne Switzerland announced its global competitiveness rankings, the Republic of China's ranking lept from 15th to 8th. Yet apparently no one considered this anything worth celebrating. On the same day, Headlines in South Korea's major media read, "South Korea's competitiveness exceeds Japan's for the first time," and "Korea achieves its best ranking ever." In fact South Korea's "best ranking ever" meant it merely squeezed into 23rd place. Both Korea and the Republic of China are part of East Asia's Confucian cultural sphere. Why the diametrically opposed responses within the two countries?
The collective anxiety felt on Taiwan has three main sources. One. Democracy has brought with it liberation of speech and thought. But it has yet to upgrade the content and quality of political thought. Instead, a social consensus has become even more difficult to reach. This deepens people's feelings of powerlessness and uncertainty. Two. The Republic of China's political development has reached a bottleneck. The mere transfer of power between the two parties has not allowed the ruling and opposition parties to cease hating each other. People in northern and southern Taiwan are unhappy with each other. These factors even intrude upon and oppress the economy, the culture, and other realms. Three. The public has less and less patience with Blue vs. Green political infighting. But society has yet to discover a new force able to break this deadlock. Under the circumstances, the more confrontational the commentaries, the more they nullify each other, and the more confusing they are to the public.
Society on Taiwan has long lacked a sense of joy. It has long been troubled by insoluble domestic uncertainties and foreign threats. Peoples' instinct to express and and enjoy themselves have increasingly been suppressed. When Ma Ying-jeou offered his "Golden Years" proposal, the Green Camp immediately mocked it as a "Golden Turd." Forget the soon to be signed ECFA. The opposition DPP is bad-mouthing it every chance it gets as "selling out Taiwan." It is using the differences in benefits received from the "Early Harvest List" to incite rivalries among different industries. How can the public not be apprehensive about where the country is headed?
The opposition DPP has chosen to equate democratic checks and balances with "endless sniping." That is bad enough. The opposition DPP and opposition pundits seem to be afflicted with "obsessive-compulsive criticism disorder." The ruling party meanwhile, has never outgrown its unrelievedly naive "Peter Pan Syndrome." It seldom responds to issues with maturity, in accordance with public expectations. Take for example the plan for a biotech park on the site of Ordnance Plant Number 202. Had the government stood firm on matters of environmental impact and urban planning, the development of environmentally friendly biotech industries on the site of an old ordnance plant was entirely feasible. What need was there to call a screeching emergency halt to a major national plan merely because of a peition submitted by one writer? The government's reaction to external criticism is passivity and timidity. This merely intensifies public anxiety.
Let us attempt to recall the last time the public on Taiwan experienced even a tiny bit of shared joy. When was it? Was it when Wang Chien-ming pitched a winning game in the Major Leagues? Was it when Ang Lee received an Oscar? Was it when Chen Shu-chu accepted a humanitarian award in New York? Was it "none of the above?" The issue is not whether the government is or is not doing a good job. The issue is not whether the Republic of China has received sufficient international recognition. The issue is not whether critics are malicious and irrational. The issue is whether this society still has confidence in itself and the capacity for joy.
焦慮的台灣：批評過剩與缺乏喜感
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.26 02:21 am
最近台灣經濟接連傳出好消息，包括：首季經濟成長超過百分之十三，創下卅一年來單季新高；今年民間投資成長將達三成七，為卅五年來最高；今年出口成長率預估達百分之廿四，是廿三年來最高。同時，今年平均每人ＧＤＰ可望達到一萬八千美元的歷史紀錄。
然而，這些好消息帶給人們的歡愉，卻維持不到一天，整個社會馬上又被更大的焦慮覆蓋。主要原因是，台股受歐洲債信及南北韓危機牽累連日重挫，市場一片哀鳴，就連非投資人也不得不提心吊膽。尤有甚者，首季經濟成長的喜訊，被認為是刻意配合五二○釋放的利多操作；民間投資成長，被潑上「失業率仍然很高」的冷水；出口暢旺，被解讀成「過度依賴中國」罪加一等。至於國民所得的成長，則只是讓馬英九總統的「六三三」口號再被拿出來嘲弄一次罷了。
台灣是一個危機感特別強的社會，民眾除了擔心自己的小國夾縫處境，嚴密關注朝野之間的風吹草動，也不忘密切追隨著世界的脈動起伏，務求與國際情勢的呼吸同步。由於對環境的敏感和對變動的焦慮，再加上虎視眈眈的反對黨和滔滔不休的名嘴，台灣人民幾乎注定不可能有太多快樂時光。
有趣的是，當瑞士洛桑日前公布全球競爭力評比時，台灣雖前進了十五名而名列第八，大家似乎仍不以為這有什麼值得開心；但同一天，南韓各大媒體登出的標題卻是：「韓國競爭力有史以來首度超越日本」、「韓國取得歷來最佳名次」。事實上，南韓所謂的最佳成績，也不過是擠進第廿三名罷了。同屬亞洲儒家文化區，何以兩國的憂喜反應卻如此背道而馳？
台灣社會的集體焦慮症，主要來源有三：其一，民主政治雖帶來言論和思想的解放，卻未使政治內涵和品質得到相對的提升，反而使社會共識變得難以凝聚，加深了人們的無力感與不確定感。其二，台灣政治發展已進入瓶頸期，徒靠兩黨的輪替執政，仍無法走出朝野相互仇恨、南北彼此不滿的窒鬱，這甚至已對經濟、文化及其他領域造成侵擾和壓迫。其三，社會上能夠抵禦藍綠對峙惡臭侵擾的淨土越來越少，但目前民間社會似又激發不出新的能量，足以衝破這項困境。在這種情況下，對立的評論越多，只是越發互相抵銷，也越是撩亂人心罷了。
台灣本來就是一個比較缺乏喜感的社會，在內憂與外患焦慮難解的情況下，人們發抒及享受愉悅的本能也越發受到了壓抑。當馬英九提出「黃金十年」的說法，馬上遭到綠營反嗆為「黃金一坨」；更遑論ＥＣＦＡ簽署在即，在野黨還在鋪天蓋地的唱衰為賣台，利用早收清單的得失來挑撥不同產業的矛盾。如此，人民怎麼能不惶惑：這個國家到底要走向哪裡？
事實上，民主制衡被在野黨上綱為「無限的批評」，也就罷了；問題在，相對於在野黨和名嘴群的「批評強迫症」，執政黨卻始終不改其「小飛俠症候群」的一派天真，不思對相關議題作出更符合社會期待的成熟因應。例如二○二兵工廠設置生技園區的問題，政府如果自問站穩了環評及都計的立場，要在舊兵工廠上發展兼顧生態和生物科技產業，並非不可能的事；何致因一名作家的請願，一項國家大計畫馬上陷入緊急叫停的茫然無措狀態？相對於外界的批評氾濫，政府的對應消極和畏怯，也是加深社會焦慮的主因。
讓我們回顧一下，台灣社會上次有過一點共同的愉悅，是什麼時候的事了？是王建民在美國職棒大聯盟贏球？是李安獲得奧斯卡獎座？還是陳樹菊到紐約領獎？或者以上沒有一件算得上數？其實，真正讓人擔心的，不是政府做得夠不夠好，不是台灣有沒有得到國際的肯定，也未必是批評者有多麼惡意和不理性，而是這個社會還有沒有保持愉快與自信的能力吧？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 26, 2010
Recently the public on Taiwan received a string of positive economic reports. During the first quarter economic growth exceeded 13 %, a 31 year high. Private investment growth this year will reach 37%, a 35 year high. Exports grew at an estimated rate of 24% this year, a 23 year high. Per capita GDP this year will reach an historic high of 18,000 USD.
But the happiness experienced upon receiving this good news lasted less than a day. Soon afterwards, the public was once again neck deep in anxiety. The main reason was the Taiwan stock market was sharply impacted for several days in a row by the European credit crisis and the political clash between North and South Korea. Cries of anguish filled the market. Even non-investors were on tenterhooks. Worse, the good news of first quarter economic growth was dismissed as a calculated effort to release profit reports close to May 20. Private investment growth had cold water splashed on them by reports that "unemployment remains high." The export boom was read as "excessive dependence on mainland China," an even more heinous crime. The increase in GDP meanwhile, became just another cue to mock President Ma Ying-jeou's "633" slogan.
Society on Taiwan has a particularly intense sense of crisis. People worry about their plight as members of a "small nation." They pay close attention to signs of trouble between the ruling and opposition parties. They closely monitor the pulse of the outside world to remain in synch with the international situation. Peoples' sensitivity to their environment and anxiety over change, coupled with an opposition party hovering like vultures, and endless sniping by talking heads, makes it almost impossible for them to experience happy times.
Interestingly enough, when Lausanne Switzerland announced its global competitiveness rankings, the Republic of China's ranking lept from 15th to 8th. Yet apparently no one considered this anything worth celebrating. On the same day, Headlines in South Korea's major media read, "South Korea's competitiveness exceeds Japan's for the first time," and "Korea achieves its best ranking ever." In fact South Korea's "best ranking ever" meant it merely squeezed into 23rd place. Both Korea and the Republic of China are part of East Asia's Confucian cultural sphere. Why the diametrically opposed responses within the two countries?
The collective anxiety felt on Taiwan has three main sources. One. Democracy has brought with it liberation of speech and thought. But it has yet to upgrade the content and quality of political thought. Instead, a social consensus has become even more difficult to reach. This deepens people's feelings of powerlessness and uncertainty. Two. The Republic of China's political development has reached a bottleneck. The mere transfer of power between the two parties has not allowed the ruling and opposition parties to cease hating each other. People in northern and southern Taiwan are unhappy with each other. These factors even intrude upon and oppress the economy, the culture, and other realms. Three. The public has less and less patience with Blue vs. Green political infighting. But society has yet to discover a new force able to break this deadlock. Under the circumstances, the more confrontational the commentaries, the more they nullify each other, and the more confusing they are to the public.
Society on Taiwan has long lacked a sense of joy. It has long been troubled by insoluble domestic uncertainties and foreign threats. Peoples' instinct to express and and enjoy themselves have increasingly been suppressed. When Ma Ying-jeou offered his "Golden Years" proposal, the Green Camp immediately mocked it as a "Golden Turd." Forget the soon to be signed ECFA. The opposition DPP is bad-mouthing it every chance it gets as "selling out Taiwan." It is using the differences in benefits received from the "Early Harvest List" to incite rivalries among different industries. How can the public not be apprehensive about where the country is headed?
The opposition DPP has chosen to equate democratic checks and balances with "endless sniping." That is bad enough. The opposition DPP and opposition pundits seem to be afflicted with "obsessive-compulsive criticism disorder." The ruling party meanwhile, has never outgrown its unrelievedly naive "Peter Pan Syndrome." It seldom responds to issues with maturity, in accordance with public expectations. Take for example the plan for a biotech park on the site of Ordnance Plant Number 202. Had the government stood firm on matters of environmental impact and urban planning, the development of environmentally friendly biotech industries on the site of an old ordnance plant was entirely feasible. What need was there to call a screeching emergency halt to a major national plan merely because of a peition submitted by one writer? The government's reaction to external criticism is passivity and timidity. This merely intensifies public anxiety.
Let us attempt to recall the last time the public on Taiwan experienced even a tiny bit of shared joy. When was it? Was it when Wang Chien-ming pitched a winning game in the Major Leagues? Was it when Ang Lee received an Oscar? Was it when Chen Shu-chu accepted a humanitarian award in New York? Was it "none of the above?" The issue is not whether the government is or is not doing a good job. The issue is not whether the Republic of China has received sufficient international recognition. The issue is not whether critics are malicious and irrational. The issue is whether this society still has confidence in itself and the capacity for joy.
焦慮的台灣：批評過剩與缺乏喜感
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.26 02:21 am
最近台灣經濟接連傳出好消息，包括：首季經濟成長超過百分之十三，創下卅一年來單季新高；今年民間投資成長將達三成七，為卅五年來最高；今年出口成長率預估達百分之廿四，是廿三年來最高。同時，今年平均每人ＧＤＰ可望達到一萬八千美元的歷史紀錄。
然而，這些好消息帶給人們的歡愉，卻維持不到一天，整個社會馬上又被更大的焦慮覆蓋。主要原因是，台股受歐洲債信及南北韓危機牽累連日重挫，市場一片哀鳴，就連非投資人也不得不提心吊膽。尤有甚者，首季經濟成長的喜訊，被認為是刻意配合五二○釋放的利多操作；民間投資成長，被潑上「失業率仍然很高」的冷水；出口暢旺，被解讀成「過度依賴中國」罪加一等。至於國民所得的成長，則只是讓馬英九總統的「六三三」口號再被拿出來嘲弄一次罷了。
台灣是一個危機感特別強的社會，民眾除了擔心自己的小國夾縫處境，嚴密關注朝野之間的風吹草動，也不忘密切追隨著世界的脈動起伏，務求與國際情勢的呼吸同步。由於對環境的敏感和對變動的焦慮，再加上虎視眈眈的反對黨和滔滔不休的名嘴，台灣人民幾乎注定不可能有太多快樂時光。
有趣的是，當瑞士洛桑日前公布全球競爭力評比時，台灣雖前進了十五名而名列第八，大家似乎仍不以為這有什麼值得開心；但同一天，南韓各大媒體登出的標題卻是：「韓國競爭力有史以來首度超越日本」、「韓國取得歷來最佳名次」。事實上，南韓所謂的最佳成績，也不過是擠進第廿三名罷了。同屬亞洲儒家文化區，何以兩國的憂喜反應卻如此背道而馳？
台灣社會的集體焦慮症，主要來源有三：其一，民主政治雖帶來言論和思想的解放，卻未使政治內涵和品質得到相對的提升，反而使社會共識變得難以凝聚，加深了人們的無力感與不確定感。其二，台灣政治發展已進入瓶頸期，徒靠兩黨的輪替執政，仍無法走出朝野相互仇恨、南北彼此不滿的窒鬱，這甚至已對經濟、文化及其他領域造成侵擾和壓迫。其三，社會上能夠抵禦藍綠對峙惡臭侵擾的淨土越來越少，但目前民間社會似又激發不出新的能量，足以衝破這項困境。在這種情況下，對立的評論越多，只是越發互相抵銷，也越是撩亂人心罷了。
台灣本來就是一個比較缺乏喜感的社會，在內憂與外患焦慮難解的情況下，人們發抒及享受愉悅的本能也越發受到了壓抑。當馬英九提出「黃金十年」的說法，馬上遭到綠營反嗆為「黃金一坨」；更遑論ＥＣＦＡ簽署在即，在野黨還在鋪天蓋地的唱衰為賣台，利用早收清單的得失來挑撥不同產業的矛盾。如此，人民怎麼能不惶惑：這個國家到底要走向哪裡？
事實上，民主制衡被在野黨上綱為「無限的批評」，也就罷了；問題在，相對於在野黨和名嘴群的「批評強迫症」，執政黨卻始終不改其「小飛俠症候群」的一派天真，不思對相關議題作出更符合社會期待的成熟因應。例如二○二兵工廠設置生技園區的問題，政府如果自問站穩了環評及都計的立場，要在舊兵工廠上發展兼顧生態和生物科技產業，並非不可能的事；何致因一名作家的請願，一項國家大計畫馬上陷入緊急叫停的茫然無措狀態？相對於外界的批評氾濫，政府的對應消極和畏怯，也是加深社會焦慮的主因。
讓我們回顧一下，台灣社會上次有過一點共同的愉悅，是什麼時候的事了？是王建民在美國職棒大聯盟贏球？是李安獲得奧斯卡獎座？還是陳樹菊到紐約領獎？或者以上沒有一件算得上數？其實，真正讓人擔心的，不是政府做得夠不夠好，不是台灣有沒有得到國際的肯定，也未必是批評者有多麼惡意和不理性，而是這個社會還有沒有保持愉快與自信的能力吧？
Tuesday, May 25, 2010
Can the DPP Win in 2012?
Can the DPP Win in 2012?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 25, 2010
"Without a victory in the five mayoral elections, there can be no victory in 2012." This is the DPP's strategic perspective. Today Tsai Ing-wen is personally participating in the five mayoral elections, turning it into a showdown. But whether the DPP will win in 2012 is another story.
If the Democratic Progressive Party wants to win the 2012 presidential election, it must pass three tests. It must also deal successfully with Beijing.
Let us first address the three tests it must pass. One. This amounts to a showdown over the nation's political and economic path. Tsai Ing-wen has said that if the Democratic Progressive Party assumes power, it will hold a referendum to abolish ECFA. She also said that "[the DPP] has no intention of removing the Taiwan independence clause from its party constitution." In other words, it has no intention of transforming the party with regards national identity and cross-Strait policy. But the question is, will the public on Taiwan allow a Democratic Progressive Party that holds such views to control the levers of the nation? Two. The DPP may take advantage of the five mayoral elections to revise its political and economic path in accordance with Tsai Ing-wen's "Political Platform for the Coming Decade." But does the public on Taiwan believe a DPP subject to being hijacked from within offer the possibility of genuine reform? Three. Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen are enacting out the "Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers." If Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen win the Taipei City and Xinbei City mayoral elections, they will of course take advantage of the victory to run for president in 2012. If they lose they will have no choice but to enter the presidential race. In other words, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen's entry into the five mayoral races merely confirm that for the Democratic Progressive Party the five mayoral elections are merely a springboard for the presidential election. But will the public on Taiwan condone the Democratic Progressive Party's manipulation of the elections in such a manner?
Now let us talk about how the DPP will tackle Beijing. The DPP has yet to effectively transform itself from within. Now suddenly it wants to participate in a higher level political battle for control of the ROC government. It has already complicated cross-Strait relations. Signs suggest the Democratic Progressive Party may return to power. Will Beijing continue to adopt liberal policies toward Taipei? Or will it adopt more stringent policies? The hour of decision approaches. Opposition to ECFA will be perceived as a "hate [mainland] China" stance. If the DPP persists in its "hate [mainland] China" stance, Beijing will of course retaliate against it. Such pressures will naturally be felt by a large part of the political and economic spectrum on Taiwan. This will land the DPP in a dilemma. If it fails to incite hatred of mainland China, it will forfeit it election theme. If it incites hatred of mainland China, It will find it difficult to deal with the repercussions.
If Tsai Ing-wen had not entered the mayoral race, she might have had a buffering effect. But now that Tsai has entered the race, the Blue and Green camps on Taiwan will have to lay their cards on the table in advance. The DPP will also have to have a showdown with Beijing ahead of schedule. The two years leading up to 2012 will probably be filled with of tension, internally and across the Taiwan Strait. Will the so-called "cross-Strait opportunity" be aborted? Will the "Window of opportunity" be closed? The answer requires close observation.
The DPP has taken a final stand. It has painted itself into a corner. Its back is against the wall. It has also painted everyone else on Taiwan into the same corner. As mentioned earlier, the Democratic Progressive Party has yet to alter its policies regarding national identity and cross-Strait relations. It has adopted an anti-ECFA election theme shot through with hatred for mainland China. It has In effect, decided to have a showdown with both the public on Taiwan and the authorities in Beijing. It has effectively painted itself and the public on Taiwan into a corner. Furthermore, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen have entered the five mayoral races. They stand shoulder to shoulder. They have made clear that win or lose, the two will help each other out in the 2012 presidential race. This too has effectively painted them and the public on Taiwan into the same corner.
For the DPP, the five mayoral elections will be a battle rife with contradictions. On the one hand, it must keep hatred of mainland China and ECFA at a boil. On the other hand it must peddle a credible political and economic vision to the voters. What is this, if not a self-contradiction? What is this, if not flagrant deceit? On the one hand it must attempt to win all five cities. On the other hand, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen intend to run in the 2012 presidential election whether they win or lose. Their political and economic path is self-contradictory. It is flagrantly deceitful. It will grossly distort the five mayoral races and their aftermath. They will subject Taiwan to internal divisions. Upsets in the cross-Strait situation will be unavoidable.
The KMT must treat the five mayoral races as a battle to retain political power in 2012. One might say the only way the KMT can win is to persuade the public to see ECFA as a symbol of the nation's political and economic path. Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen are reasonably well-respected by the public on Taiwan. If the KMT cannot win the hearts and minds of the public on the basis of its political and economic path, it may well lose the election. Practically speaking, the KMT cannot afford to bungle the ECFA signing in June. It cannot afford to give the DPP any openings.
The DPP has a chance to win the 2012 presidential election. After all, the Democratic Progressive Party is a political party that won in 2000 and 2004. It lost power because it brought disaster upon the nation, and caused the entire nation to turn against it. It has now painted itself into a corner. For the moment it should not ask whether it will win in 2012. Instead, it should ask itself whether a victory for the DPP in 2012 would be a blessing or a curse? Would it be a way out, or a dead end?
民進黨有沒有二○一二？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.25 02:10 am
「沒有五都，就沒有二○一二」這是民進黨的戰略思維。然而，如今民進黨雖因蔡英文親征而將五都之戰推向極致，但有無二○一二，卻又另當別論。
想贏得二○一二總統大選，民進黨在台灣內部仍須通過三項考驗，且尚待通過與北京的角力。
先談在台灣內部的三項考驗。一、這是一場國家政經總路線的對決，蔡英文已稱，民進黨若執政，將公投廢止ＥＣＦＡ，又稱「沒有廢止台獨黨綱的問題」；也就是說，在國家認同及兩岸政策上皆無轉型改革的意向。但問題是：台灣主流社會接不接受這樣的民進黨再掌國柄？二、或許，民進黨亦可能藉五都選舉，以蔡英文的「十年政綱」修正前述路線。但台灣主流社會相不相信內部相互挾持裹脅的民進黨有轉型改革的真誠與可能性？三、蘇蔡演成「雙城奇謀」，在北二都選舉若勝，蘇蔡當然會趁勝直指二○一二總統大選；若敗，也當然會別無選擇地再打總統大選一戰。也就是說，蘇蔡一同投入五都，愈發證實五都選舉只是民進黨總統大選的工具或跳板。但台灣主流社會同不同意民進黨如此操作？
再談與北京的角力。民進黨在內部的轉型改革尚無成效的此際，突然將政局升高至中華民國政權的爭奪戰，已使兩岸關係平添變數。民進黨出現可能重掌政權的跡象，北京對台灣將續採寬鬆政策，或改採緊縮政策，又面臨抉擇時刻。民進黨若繼續採取仇中立場（反ＥＣＦＡ被北京解讀為仇中），北京自會對民進黨以牙還牙，而此種壓力亦自會轉移至台灣社會廣泛的政經領域。這將使民進黨陷於兩難：不煽動仇中，選戰失去主軸；若鼓動仇中，則後效難以收拾。
蔡英文若未投入選戰，應可發揮緩衝效果。但如今蔡一旦投入，非但在台灣內部提早催發了藍綠攤牌的局面，且形同亦造成了民進黨必須與北京提早攤牌的情勢。自今至二○一二的兩年之間，台灣內部及兩岸關係恐將重現高度緊繃及懸疑的情勢，而所謂的「兩岸機遇」是否將會流產，「機會之窗」是否將會關閉，皆待密切觀察。
民進黨背水一戰，已將自己逼到牆角，亦儼然使整個台灣被逼到牆角。如前所述，民進黨在國家認同與兩岸政策尚未轉型的時際，以高度仇中意識的反ＥＣＦＡ為選舉主軸，不啻是與台灣社會及北京當局攤牌，豈不是把自己與台灣一起逼到了牆角？再者，蘇蔡並肩投入五都選戰，且擺明了無論輸贏，二人皆將相互解套，轉戰二 ○一二，這豈不亦是將自己與台灣一起逼到了牆角？
對於民進黨而言，五都選舉將是高度自相矛盾的一戰。一方面必須維持仇中及反ＥＣＦＡ的溫度，另一方面又要向選民推銷可資信賴的政經憧憬。豈不矛盾？再者，亦是高度權謀的一戰。一方面必須在五都全力求勝，另一方面蘇蔡又要盤算不論勝敗皆將過水轉戰二○一二總統大選。路線的矛盾，與過水的權謀，皆將使五都選舉及其後續效應高度扭曲；如此一來，台灣內部的撕裂，與兩岸情勢的震盪，似皆已是難以避免。
面對五都選舉，國民黨勢須將之打成二○一二的政權保衛戰；甚至可以這麼說，國民黨唯一可能贏得選戰的條件，是使全民接受以ＥＣＦＡ為指標象徵的國家政經總路線。其實，蘇蔡個人條件的社會評價都不差；國民黨若不能在國家政經總路線上贏得民心，即有輸掉選戰的可能性。實事求是而言，國民黨至少在六月將簽訂的ＥＣＦＡ，不能有任何差錯，也不能留下任何把柄。
民進黨不是沒有贏得二○一二總統大選的可能性；畢竟，民進黨是曾經贏得二○○○年及二○○四年兩次大選的政黨，只是最後在舉國咒罵中又告失去政權，且對台灣造成大災難。現在，把自己逼到牆角的民進黨，暫不要問能否贏得二○ 一二，且先自問：倘若贏了二○一二大選，將對台灣是福是禍？是活路還是死路？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 25, 2010
"Without a victory in the five mayoral elections, there can be no victory in 2012." This is the DPP's strategic perspective. Today Tsai Ing-wen is personally participating in the five mayoral elections, turning it into a showdown. But whether the DPP will win in 2012 is another story.
If the Democratic Progressive Party wants to win the 2012 presidential election, it must pass three tests. It must also deal successfully with Beijing.
Let us first address the three tests it must pass. One. This amounts to a showdown over the nation's political and economic path. Tsai Ing-wen has said that if the Democratic Progressive Party assumes power, it will hold a referendum to abolish ECFA. She also said that "[the DPP] has no intention of removing the Taiwan independence clause from its party constitution." In other words, it has no intention of transforming the party with regards national identity and cross-Strait policy. But the question is, will the public on Taiwan allow a Democratic Progressive Party that holds such views to control the levers of the nation? Two. The DPP may take advantage of the five mayoral elections to revise its political and economic path in accordance with Tsai Ing-wen's "Political Platform for the Coming Decade." But does the public on Taiwan believe a DPP subject to being hijacked from within offer the possibility of genuine reform? Three. Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen are enacting out the "Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers." If Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen win the Taipei City and Xinbei City mayoral elections, they will of course take advantage of the victory to run for president in 2012. If they lose they will have no choice but to enter the presidential race. In other words, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen's entry into the five mayoral races merely confirm that for the Democratic Progressive Party the five mayoral elections are merely a springboard for the presidential election. But will the public on Taiwan condone the Democratic Progressive Party's manipulation of the elections in such a manner?
Now let us talk about how the DPP will tackle Beijing. The DPP has yet to effectively transform itself from within. Now suddenly it wants to participate in a higher level political battle for control of the ROC government. It has already complicated cross-Strait relations. Signs suggest the Democratic Progressive Party may return to power. Will Beijing continue to adopt liberal policies toward Taipei? Or will it adopt more stringent policies? The hour of decision approaches. Opposition to ECFA will be perceived as a "hate [mainland] China" stance. If the DPP persists in its "hate [mainland] China" stance, Beijing will of course retaliate against it. Such pressures will naturally be felt by a large part of the political and economic spectrum on Taiwan. This will land the DPP in a dilemma. If it fails to incite hatred of mainland China, it will forfeit it election theme. If it incites hatred of mainland China, It will find it difficult to deal with the repercussions.
If Tsai Ing-wen had not entered the mayoral race, she might have had a buffering effect. But now that Tsai has entered the race, the Blue and Green camps on Taiwan will have to lay their cards on the table in advance. The DPP will also have to have a showdown with Beijing ahead of schedule. The two years leading up to 2012 will probably be filled with of tension, internally and across the Taiwan Strait. Will the so-called "cross-Strait opportunity" be aborted? Will the "Window of opportunity" be closed? The answer requires close observation.
The DPP has taken a final stand. It has painted itself into a corner. Its back is against the wall. It has also painted everyone else on Taiwan into the same corner. As mentioned earlier, the Democratic Progressive Party has yet to alter its policies regarding national identity and cross-Strait relations. It has adopted an anti-ECFA election theme shot through with hatred for mainland China. It has In effect, decided to have a showdown with both the public on Taiwan and the authorities in Beijing. It has effectively painted itself and the public on Taiwan into a corner. Furthermore, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen have entered the five mayoral races. They stand shoulder to shoulder. They have made clear that win or lose, the two will help each other out in the 2012 presidential race. This too has effectively painted them and the public on Taiwan into the same corner.
For the DPP, the five mayoral elections will be a battle rife with contradictions. On the one hand, it must keep hatred of mainland China and ECFA at a boil. On the other hand it must peddle a credible political and economic vision to the voters. What is this, if not a self-contradiction? What is this, if not flagrant deceit? On the one hand it must attempt to win all five cities. On the other hand, Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen intend to run in the 2012 presidential election whether they win or lose. Their political and economic path is self-contradictory. It is flagrantly deceitful. It will grossly distort the five mayoral races and their aftermath. They will subject Taiwan to internal divisions. Upsets in the cross-Strait situation will be unavoidable.
The KMT must treat the five mayoral races as a battle to retain political power in 2012. One might say the only way the KMT can win is to persuade the public to see ECFA as a symbol of the nation's political and economic path. Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen are reasonably well-respected by the public on Taiwan. If the KMT cannot win the hearts and minds of the public on the basis of its political and economic path, it may well lose the election. Practically speaking, the KMT cannot afford to bungle the ECFA signing in June. It cannot afford to give the DPP any openings.
The DPP has a chance to win the 2012 presidential election. After all, the Democratic Progressive Party is a political party that won in 2000 and 2004. It lost power because it brought disaster upon the nation, and caused the entire nation to turn against it. It has now painted itself into a corner. For the moment it should not ask whether it will win in 2012. Instead, it should ask itself whether a victory for the DPP in 2012 would be a blessing or a curse? Would it be a way out, or a dead end?
民進黨有沒有二○一二？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.05.25 02:10 am
「沒有五都，就沒有二○一二」這是民進黨的戰略思維。然而，如今民進黨雖因蔡英文親征而將五都之戰推向極致，但有無二○一二，卻又另當別論。
想贏得二○一二總統大選，民進黨在台灣內部仍須通過三項考驗，且尚待通過與北京的角力。
先談在台灣內部的三項考驗。一、這是一場國家政經總路線的對決，蔡英文已稱，民進黨若執政，將公投廢止ＥＣＦＡ，又稱「沒有廢止台獨黨綱的問題」；也就是說，在國家認同及兩岸政策上皆無轉型改革的意向。但問題是：台灣主流社會接不接受這樣的民進黨再掌國柄？二、或許，民進黨亦可能藉五都選舉，以蔡英文的「十年政綱」修正前述路線。但台灣主流社會相不相信內部相互挾持裹脅的民進黨有轉型改革的真誠與可能性？三、蘇蔡演成「雙城奇謀」，在北二都選舉若勝，蘇蔡當然會趁勝直指二○一二總統大選；若敗，也當然會別無選擇地再打總統大選一戰。也就是說，蘇蔡一同投入五都，愈發證實五都選舉只是民進黨總統大選的工具或跳板。但台灣主流社會同不同意民進黨如此操作？
再談與北京的角力。民進黨在內部的轉型改革尚無成效的此際，突然將政局升高至中華民國政權的爭奪戰，已使兩岸關係平添變數。民進黨出現可能重掌政權的跡象，北京對台灣將續採寬鬆政策，或改採緊縮政策，又面臨抉擇時刻。民進黨若繼續採取仇中立場（反ＥＣＦＡ被北京解讀為仇中），北京自會對民進黨以牙還牙，而此種壓力亦自會轉移至台灣社會廣泛的政經領域。這將使民進黨陷於兩難：不煽動仇中，選戰失去主軸；若鼓動仇中，則後效難以收拾。
蔡英文若未投入選戰，應可發揮緩衝效果。但如今蔡一旦投入，非但在台灣內部提早催發了藍綠攤牌的局面，且形同亦造成了民進黨必須與北京提早攤牌的情勢。自今至二○一二的兩年之間，台灣內部及兩岸關係恐將重現高度緊繃及懸疑的情勢，而所謂的「兩岸機遇」是否將會流產，「機會之窗」是否將會關閉，皆待密切觀察。
民進黨背水一戰，已將自己逼到牆角，亦儼然使整個台灣被逼到牆角。如前所述，民進黨在國家認同與兩岸政策尚未轉型的時際，以高度仇中意識的反ＥＣＦＡ為選舉主軸，不啻是與台灣社會及北京當局攤牌，豈不是把自己與台灣一起逼到了牆角？再者，蘇蔡並肩投入五都選戰，且擺明了無論輸贏，二人皆將相互解套，轉戰二 ○一二，這豈不亦是將自己與台灣一起逼到了牆角？
對於民進黨而言，五都選舉將是高度自相矛盾的一戰。一方面必須維持仇中及反ＥＣＦＡ的溫度，另一方面又要向選民推銷可資信賴的政經憧憬。豈不矛盾？再者，亦是高度權謀的一戰。一方面必須在五都全力求勝，另一方面蘇蔡又要盤算不論勝敗皆將過水轉戰二○一二總統大選。路線的矛盾，與過水的權謀，皆將使五都選舉及其後續效應高度扭曲；如此一來，台灣內部的撕裂，與兩岸情勢的震盪，似皆已是難以避免。
面對五都選舉，國民黨勢須將之打成二○一二的政權保衛戰；甚至可以這麼說，國民黨唯一可能贏得選戰的條件，是使全民接受以ＥＣＦＡ為指標象徵的國家政經總路線。其實，蘇蔡個人條件的社會評價都不差；國民黨若不能在國家政經總路線上贏得民心，即有輸掉選戰的可能性。實事求是而言，國民黨至少在六月將簽訂的ＥＣＦＡ，不能有任何差錯，也不能留下任何把柄。
民進黨不是沒有贏得二○一二總統大選的可能性；畢竟，民進黨是曾經贏得二○○○年及二○○四年兩次大選的政黨，只是最後在舉國咒罵中又告失去政權，且對台灣造成大災難。現在，把自己逼到牆角的民進黨，暫不要問能否贏得二○ 一二，且先自問：倘若贏了二○一二大選，將對台灣是福是禍？是活路還是死路？
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