ECFA Referendum: More Rationality, Less Politics
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 7, 2010
Last week members of the the Executive Yuan Referendum Commission met for several hours. They voted 12 to four against the Taiwan Solidarity Union's proposed referendum, which asked "Do you agree or disagree with the government's intention to sign the Economic Framework Cooperation Agreement (ECFA)?" Green Camp members have expressed a great deal of dissatisfaction, leading to a high degree of controversy, and contributing to continued add more fuel to the political fires.
The Referendum Commission had two reasons for rejecting the Taiwan Solidarity Union's referendum proposal. One was that the wording of the referendum proposal contradicted its intent. The second reason was that the wording of the referendum proposal adopted an affirmative position by posing a question, when it was in fact taking a stand against ECFA. Even if the referendum were to pass, it would not change the status quo. Therefore it failed to qualify as a referendum on a major policy issue, and could not be approved.
In arriving at this decision, the Referendum Commission was 100% correct. We said so before. Now that the referendum proposal has been rejected, its sponsors are clearly not going to let the matter rest. They are certain to try again. In this connection we would like to offer several observations.
The sponsors of the referendum are saying that by rejecting its referendum proposal, the Referendum Commission is obstructing the referendum process. In fact anyone with any iota of political sense knows that is not the issue. Actually the Referendum Commission's decision has clarified a fuzzy aspect of the Referendum Law. The wording of the Taiwan Solidarity Union's referendum proposal may have been intentional or unintentional. Either way, if it had passed, it would have resulted in a self-contradiction. The sponsors were clearly opposed to the signing of an ECFA agreement. Yet they reversed their wording. They worded their referendum proposal to make it look like a question and an affirmation. The result would have been voter confusion over the content of the proposal. The result would have been a bizarre paradox. Even assuming a majority of the public expressed opposition to ECFA, they would be unable to stop ECFA. If this was political calculation, it was a carefully calculated. If this was merely an unintentional blunder, then its sponsors need only reword it. That should not be easy enough. Two issues should be considered. The first is the right way to word a referendum proposal. The other is the right time to make a referendum proposal.
The norm in a democracy is representative politics. The role of a public referendum is merely to address inadequacies in respresentative politics. If those who are asking for a referendum on ECFA are asking the government to promote ECFA, they should be asking for an initiative, not a referendum. Since the government is already promoting ECFA, there is no need to demand an initiative on this major policy issue. If those who are asking for a referendum on ECFA are asking the government to stop promoting ECFA, then it can be classified as a referendum on a major policy issue. In which case, the referendum should simply ask whether the voter "opposes" or "disapproves of" ECFA. There is no reason to mislead the voters or to use contradictory wording in the referendum. Otherwise, to accuse the Referendum Commission of obstructing the referendum process is unfounded hyperbole.
The key to referenda on major policy issues is timing. Since the referendum concerns major policy, any referendum proposal should of course be made only after the major policy has actually been formulated. Take ECFA for example. No agreement has yet to be reached on its content. That means the target of the proposed referendum does not exist. Any referendum proposal would be premature. At best it would be political demagoguery.
In fact the two sides have many procedural problems to consider before they sign ECFA. One is that the draft of the agreement will go into effect only after approval by the Legislative Yuan. for Beijing, it must be approved by the NPC. How cross-Strait official government documents should be signed, and what formal procedures should be implemented, warrant careful consideration. If the process includes public referenda, one must find a more rational approach. Should a public referendum be considered when the Executive Yuan asks the Legislative Yuan to consider a draft? Or should it be considered only after the Legislative Yuan has given its approval? The Referendum Law leaves much room for interpretation. The referendum process is the final step in the democratic process. It must abide by the rule of law. One must not approach every issue by resorting to electoral politics and political mobilization. If one fails to determine what sort of referendum procedure is what the rule of law and democracy on Taiwan require, then one has betrayed the hopes and dreams of the public on Taiwan regarding democratic politics.
We of course have our own view on whether ECFA really requires a public referendum. But if some voters insist that the issue requires a referendum, they have the right to demand one, in accordance with legal procedures. Those who oppose a referendum cannot stop them. Therefore we are not addressing the political legitimacy or political wisdom of demanding an ECFA referendum. We are merely reminding the government and the Pan Green opposition that if a referendum on ECFA cannot be avoided, then we must proceed in a proper and logical manner. Selfish political calculations must not be allowed to bedevil the Republic of China's referendum process.
ECFA公投多些理性 少些政黨算計
2010-06-07
中國時報
行政院公投審議委員會上周經數小時反覆討論，依投票方式做成決定，結果票數十二比四，否決了台聯所提的「你是否同意政府與中國簽訂兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）」公投案。綠營人士對此表達高度不滿，醞釀昇高抗爭態勢，持續為相關議題添加政治柴火升溫。
公投審議委員會駁回台聯提案的理由有二：一是提案的主文與理由矛盾；二是以正面表述的疑問式命題主張反對ＥＣＦＡ的立場，即使公投通過，也不能改變現狀，因此並不屬於重大政策的複決，故無法通過。
公投審議委員會做此決定，十分正確，我們前已提出類似的看法。現在此案不能成立，提案者顯然不會就此罷休，捲土重來可想而知，就此我們想提出若干看法。
指控公投審議委員會否決此案是阻擋公投，其實稍具政治常識者，都知道問題並不在此。公投審議委員會的決定其實釐清了公投法上一個模糊不明的地帶，台聯提出的ＥＣＦＡ公投案，不論是無心插柳還是有意栽花，如果通過，就會形成一種吊詭，因為提案者明明反對兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ協議，卻反轉其辭，用一個看起來像是問句的肯定語法提案，其結果不但會形成選民對於提案內容的混淆，也會使得即使多數民眾表達反對ＥＣＦＡ也不能阻擋ＥＣＦＡ的怪異現象。如果這是一個有心的政治算計，那是一種用心甚深的政治算計；如果只是無心之失，用心加以調整，其實並不困難。此中應該思考的問題有二，一是公投提案的內容如何表述，一是公投提案的時機。
民主國家代議政治是常態，公民投票只具有補充代議政治不足的功能。將ＥＣＦＡ議題交付公投的人士，如果是要求政府推動ＥＣＦＡ，即是創制案的性質，政府既然要推動ＥＣＦＡ，就沒有提出重大政策創制的必要。如果是否決政府推動的ＥＣＦＡ，那是要複決這項重大政策；所提出的公投案只要以「反對」或「不同意」ＥＣＦＡ協議的形式提出，就不會有誤導選民或是主文與理由相互矛盾的顧慮。捨此不為，卻要指責公投審議委員會阻擋公投，不是欲加之罪，就是言過其辭。
複決重大政策的公投提案，時機也是重點。既然是複決重大政策，當然應該要等到重大政策形成之後提出才有意義。以ＥＣＦＡ協議的簽署而言，還未談定任何協議的內容，等於是複決案的複決標的尚不存在，提出任何複決案都是過早或不成熟的提案，充其量只是政治口水的操作而已。
兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ協議的程序本來還有許多應該思考的問題，其中一個題目就是協議的草案應經立法院通過始能生效，在對岸而言，則涉及是否需要人大通過的對應程序。兩岸未來要簽署正式的官方文件應經雙方怎樣的正式程序始能生效，其實很值得仔細斟酌。如果此中還要夾雜著公民投票的程序，就更該找出一種合理的辦法。是在行政院向立法院提出草簽版本請求審議時就可提出公民投票複決案，還是要等到立法院通過後才可複決，依照公民投票法，也有再討論的空間。公民投票是一種民主政治的終極程序，不能不伴隨著應有的法治理性，凡事皆以選舉政治社會動員的態度來對待，而不去設想怎樣的公民投票程序才是台灣需要的法治民主安排，其實對不起台灣人民對於民主政治的堅持與追求。
對於兩岸ＥＣＦＡ協議是否需要交付公投，我們當然不是沒有任何看法。不過，如果有的選民堅持這是一種需要交由公民投票的議題，其實本有權利依照法定程序加以提出，不是旁人反對就能阻攔得了的。因此我們今天不去討論追求ＥＣＦＡ公投的政治正當性或是政治智慧，而要在此提醒朝野，ＥＣＦＡ公投如果是台灣不能迴避的問題，就該找到正當而合理的程序讓它可以理性進行，政黨的私心算計，不該是台灣公民投票制度始終揮之不去的幽靈。
Monday, June 7, 2010
Sunday, June 6, 2010
If the Legislative Yuan Amends ECFA Line by Line, It Can Forget About Signing FTAsChina Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 6, 2010
Taipei and Beijing have signed the cross-strait economic cooperation framework (ECFA), and two agreements to protect intellectual property rights. Is the Legislative Yuan permitted to consider these on a line by line basis? Much fuss has been made over grudges between Ma Ying-jeou and Wang JIng-pyn. But suppose relations between the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan and the President were chummy? Would that mean ECFA could pass without a legislative review? During the Two Yings Debate Ma Ying-jeou declared that he would submit ECFA to the legislature for review. The only issue was sort of review it should be subjected to. To be fair, it is not the president's place to micro-manage the workings of the legislature. But Ma is also the ruling party chairman. Therefore the real question is how large a role should the ruling party play in the legislature.
Are the many agreements between Taipei and Beijing accords, treaties, or international agreements? Must they be sent to the Legislative Yuan for review? Seventeen years ago the signing of four agreements following the Koo-Wang talks provoked controversy. The ruling and opposition parties were of one mind then. They upheld the authority of the legislature. Several prominent legislators have petitioned for a constitutional interpretation. They include KMT heavyweights, Kuan Chung, the President of the Examination Yuan, New Party legislators, Jaw Shau-kong, a KMT consultant for the five cities mayoral campaigns, and Ker Chien-ming, the DPP's highest-ranking cadre. The Grand Justices' Interpretation Number 329 was laughable. It stated that treaties and agreements must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review, but that whether ECFA must be sent to the Legislative Yuan for review was "not within the scope of this particular interpretation." In other words, they left the problem unresolved.
But is the problem really insoluble? The Grand Justices said that ECFA was not within the scope of Interpretation Number 329. Their reasons were simple. First, the Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area is clearly defined. The Legislative Yuan must either "review" it, or "be kept informed." Either way, it must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan. Even if it is merely "being kept informed," the legislature can decide that it must be reviewed. Secondly, the Grand Justices implied that whether ECFA is an international treaty or agreement is a hot button issue, and that it wants nothing to do with it.
In fact, the same time the Grand Justices' interpretation emerged, others opined that the Judicial Yuan should not have accepted a petition to begin with. The Republic of China's international plight is unique and difficult. Foreign agreements are supposed to be the purview of the executive branch. Foreign agreements should not be submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review. To do so would be inconsistent with the intent of the constitution. If they must be sent to the legislature for review before they are signed, the national interest may at risk. That said, the Grand Justice believe the executive and legislative branches have legal means by which they can settle disputes. In short, if the Legislative Yuan really does not approve of the agreement or treaty the executive branch has negotiated, it can simply veto it. The Executive Yuan must either accept or reject within 10 days. If this fails, the premier simply resigns.
ECFA has been submitted to the Legislative Yuan for "review." The executive branch can hardly ask the Legislative Yuan not to review the bill line by line. But this is different from domestic legislation or the budget. Those can be changed or deleted by legislators at will. Treaties, agreements, or cross-Strait agreements are the prerogative of sovereign and independent nations. Only after long and difficult negotiations, and both sides make gains and concessions, can one arrive at a final decision. Unilaterally modifying one or two items may undermine the two parties' best interests. That is why for years, the Legislative Yuan has never violated precedent, why it has never made line by line changes. At most it has resolved that the executive should improve the agreement on its own initiative. This shows respect for the larger interests of the nation as a whole.
DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has attempted to refute President Ma Ying-jeou. She cited an FTA signed by the ROC with El Salvador, which was subjected to line by line review. She took unfair advantage of the KMT. When the Chen regime was in office, KMT legislators may have had a majority. But they could hardly refuse to approve a bill involving international agreements. The precedent of not refusing to approve bills involving international agreements was shattered with US beef imports. Screaming Democratic Progressive Party legislators were not the only ones resposible for violating established precedents. Many Blue Camp legislators were party to it as well. In the end, the Executive Yuan could not accept the Legislative Yuan's resolution. It re-negotiated the agreement with Washington, reducing the number of U.S. beef parts that could be imported.
Wang Jing-pyn is an experienced speaker of the legislator. He understands what the Legislative Yuan can and cannot do. The Legislative Yuan may insist on reviewing ECFA on a line by line basis. But it should not attempt to rewrite it line by line. Legislators may attempt to change the contents merely to gratify their own whims. But they will not be able to implement it on a piecemeal basis. At best, talks will have to be restarted. At worst, the consequences are unthinkable. One can forget about signing any FTAs with other nations. Given the U.S. beef fiasco, no nation one cares to mention is going to tolerate having the legislature overturn its agreements. Not Japan, not South Korea, and not Singapore.
When the Legislative Yuan tried to overturn the U.S. beef agreement, 30 DPP legislators were not enough. And so it is with ECFA. ECFA cannot be overturned unless KMT legislators share DPP objections. If this is the case, the Kuomintang would not be out of line to impose party discipline. As speaker Wang Jing-pyn must remain strictly neutral. But as a legislator without portfolio Wang represents the KMT and must fulfill his duties as legislator. The legislature will soon hold an emergency session. If the relationship between the ruling party and the ruling administration has not been clarified, one need not wait for the results of the five cities mayoral elections, and Ma Ying-jeou might as well resign as party chairman.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.06
社論－立院若逐條修改ECFA 也不必簽FTA了
本報訊
為了兩岸簽署經濟合作架構（ＥＣＦＡ）、及智財權保護兩項協議，送立法院到底能不能逐條審議，政壇又不斷在馬、王心結上做文章，難道國會議長與總統關係深厚，兩岸協議就能迴避審查嗎？馬英九早在ＥＣＦＡ雙英辯論時就宣告，一定送立法院審議，差別僅在於如何審查的議事程序。持平而論，總統對國會議事沒有指三道四的空間，但若是執政黨主席的身分，那就得看黨政運作平台到底能發揮多少功能。
兩岸之間的各種協議，到底是否比照條約或國際協定，交付立法院議決？早在十七年前，辜汪會談簽署四項協議時即引發爭議，當時，立法院朝野有志一同，伸張國會職權，數得出名字的立委都連署此一聲請釋憲案，包括國民黨重量級立委、現任考試院長關中，新黨立委、現任國民黨五都選戰顧問趙少康，還有民進黨最資深的幹事長柯建銘，大法官做成第三二九號解釋文，好笑的是，大法官解釋諸種型態與樣貌的條約、協定，當然要送立法院審議後，對於兩岸間協議是否該送立法院審議，竟以「不在本解釋範圍之內」帶過，讓這個老問題依舊無解。
但真的無解嗎？大法官之認定兩岸協議不在三二九號解釋範圍之內，理由很簡單：第一，兩岸人民關係條例已有明確規範，不是「審議」就是「查照」，但都得送立法院，即使是備查案，立委若獲多數共識經院會決議還是可改為審查案；第二，大法官隱而不宣的是，兩岸協議到底是不是國與國之間的條約或協定？屬高度政治性問題，不碰可也。
事實上，這號解釋出爐同時，還有不同意見書，認為司法院根本不該接受聲請釋憲案，因為台灣國際處境特殊且困難，涉外事務全部交由行政授權，不經立法院審議，於憲法意旨不符，但若全部送國會審議後才能簽定，又恐有危及國家利益之虞。但即使如此，大法官認為，行政、立法兩院還是有依法解決爭端的途徑。簡言之，立法院若真的不同意談判所簽署的協定或條約，可議決否決之，行政院收到否決案之後，十日內必須選擇接受或覆議，若覆議不成，很簡單，閣揆請辭走人！
ＥＣＦＡ既送立法院「審議」，行政部門很難要求立法院不可以逐條審查，但是，與國內法律案或預算案不同，立委改了就改了，刪了就刪了，條約、協定或兩岸之間的協議，都是主權獨立國家間的合意行為，經過一番漫長、甚至艱鉅的談判，彼此互有斬獲和退讓，才得以拍板定案，單方面修改其中一、二內容，都可能影響彼此考量的利益。因此，過去多少年來，立法院審查條約案或協定案，從來沒有破壞前例，進行個別條文或內容的更動，頂多附帶決議要求行政機關改善，這也是對國家整體利益的尊重。
民進黨主席蔡英文反駁馬英九總統，並舉出實例指台、薩簽定ＦＴＡ就是逐條審查，可謂大吃國民黨豆腐，因為扁政府執政時代，國民黨立委即使多數，也不會在國會杯葛涉外議案。但是，國會審查涉外議案的慣例，卻在審查美牛進口議定書時破壞了，破壞慣例的不只是罵聲衝天的民進黨立委，還有為數甚眾的藍營立委，最後讓行政院不能不接受立法院的議決，重新與美方磋商，減少了美牛進口的品項。
王金平是資歷深厚的國會議長，他不會不了解立法院可做與不宜做的事。立法院或許可以堅持選擇逐條審查ＥＣＦＡ，卻不宜逐條修改其內容，因為立委為了自己爽而增刪的內容，都不可能片面落實，最好的情況就是重啟談判，一個弄不好，就是甭談了，接下來與他國間的ＦＴＡ也不必奢想了，有美牛的前例，日本、南韓、新加坡…，隨便數吧，沒有哪一個國家能忍受與台灣談好的事，到了立法院翻盤。
就像美牛協定，立法院真要翻盤，靠區區卅席不到的民進黨立委是不可能的，除非國民黨立委對ＥＣＦＡ內容別有想法，果若如此，國民黨祭出黨紀也不為過。王金平是必須嚴守議事中立的國會議長，但也是政黨不分區立委，是代表國民黨的政黨角色執行立委職務，立法院臨時會召開在即，黨政運作若還不能把話講清楚，不必等到五都選後，馬英九這個黨主席不兼也罷。
A Translation
July 6, 2010
Taipei and Beijing have signed the cross-strait economic cooperation framework (ECFA), and two agreements to protect intellectual property rights. Is the Legislative Yuan permitted to consider these on a line by line basis? Much fuss has been made over grudges between Ma Ying-jeou and Wang JIng-pyn. But suppose relations between the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan and the President were chummy? Would that mean ECFA could pass without a legislative review? During the Two Yings Debate Ma Ying-jeou declared that he would submit ECFA to the legislature for review. The only issue was sort of review it should be subjected to. To be fair, it is not the president's place to micro-manage the workings of the legislature. But Ma is also the ruling party chairman. Therefore the real question is how large a role should the ruling party play in the legislature.
Are the many agreements between Taipei and Beijing accords, treaties, or international agreements? Must they be sent to the Legislative Yuan for review? Seventeen years ago the signing of four agreements following the Koo-Wang talks provoked controversy. The ruling and opposition parties were of one mind then. They upheld the authority of the legislature. Several prominent legislators have petitioned for a constitutional interpretation. They include KMT heavyweights, Kuan Chung, the President of the Examination Yuan, New Party legislators, Jaw Shau-kong, a KMT consultant for the five cities mayoral campaigns, and Ker Chien-ming, the DPP's highest-ranking cadre. The Grand Justices' Interpretation Number 329 was laughable. It stated that treaties and agreements must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review, but that whether ECFA must be sent to the Legislative Yuan for review was "not within the scope of this particular interpretation." In other words, they left the problem unresolved.
But is the problem really insoluble? The Grand Justices said that ECFA was not within the scope of Interpretation Number 329. Their reasons were simple. First, the Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area is clearly defined. The Legislative Yuan must either "review" it, or "be kept informed." Either way, it must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan. Even if it is merely "being kept informed," the legislature can decide that it must be reviewed. Secondly, the Grand Justices implied that whether ECFA is an international treaty or agreement is a hot button issue, and that it wants nothing to do with it.
In fact, the same time the Grand Justices' interpretation emerged, others opined that the Judicial Yuan should not have accepted a petition to begin with. The Republic of China's international plight is unique and difficult. Foreign agreements are supposed to be the purview of the executive branch. Foreign agreements should not be submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review. To do so would be inconsistent with the intent of the constitution. If they must be sent to the legislature for review before they are signed, the national interest may at risk. That said, the Grand Justice believe the executive and legislative branches have legal means by which they can settle disputes. In short, if the Legislative Yuan really does not approve of the agreement or treaty the executive branch has negotiated, it can simply veto it. The Executive Yuan must either accept or reject within 10 days. If this fails, the premier simply resigns.
ECFA has been submitted to the Legislative Yuan for "review." The executive branch can hardly ask the Legislative Yuan not to review the bill line by line. But this is different from domestic legislation or the budget. Those can be changed or deleted by legislators at will. Treaties, agreements, or cross-Strait agreements are the prerogative of sovereign and independent nations. Only after long and difficult negotiations, and both sides make gains and concessions, can one arrive at a final decision. Unilaterally modifying one or two items may undermine the two parties' best interests. That is why for years, the Legislative Yuan has never violated precedent, why it has never made line by line changes. At most it has resolved that the executive should improve the agreement on its own initiative. This shows respect for the larger interests of the nation as a whole.
DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has attempted to refute President Ma Ying-jeou. She cited an FTA signed by the ROC with El Salvador, which was subjected to line by line review. She took unfair advantage of the KMT. When the Chen regime was in office, KMT legislators may have had a majority. But they could hardly refuse to approve a bill involving international agreements. The precedent of not refusing to approve bills involving international agreements was shattered with US beef imports. Screaming Democratic Progressive Party legislators were not the only ones resposible for violating established precedents. Many Blue Camp legislators were party to it as well. In the end, the Executive Yuan could not accept the Legislative Yuan's resolution. It re-negotiated the agreement with Washington, reducing the number of U.S. beef parts that could be imported.
Wang Jing-pyn is an experienced speaker of the legislator. He understands what the Legislative Yuan can and cannot do. The Legislative Yuan may insist on reviewing ECFA on a line by line basis. But it should not attempt to rewrite it line by line. Legislators may attempt to change the contents merely to gratify their own whims. But they will not be able to implement it on a piecemeal basis. At best, talks will have to be restarted. At worst, the consequences are unthinkable. One can forget about signing any FTAs with other nations. Given the U.S. beef fiasco, no nation one cares to mention is going to tolerate having the legislature overturn its agreements. Not Japan, not South Korea, and not Singapore.
When the Legislative Yuan tried to overturn the U.S. beef agreement, 30 DPP legislators were not enough. And so it is with ECFA. ECFA cannot be overturned unless KMT legislators share DPP objections. If this is the case, the Kuomintang would not be out of line to impose party discipline. As speaker Wang Jing-pyn must remain strictly neutral. But as a legislator without portfolio Wang represents the KMT and must fulfill his duties as legislator. The legislature will soon hold an emergency session. If the relationship between the ruling party and the ruling administration has not been clarified, one need not wait for the results of the five cities mayoral elections, and Ma Ying-jeou might as well resign as party chairman.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.06
社論－立院若逐條修改ECFA 也不必簽FTA了
本報訊
為了兩岸簽署經濟合作架構（ＥＣＦＡ）、及智財權保護兩項協議，送立法院到底能不能逐條審議，政壇又不斷在馬、王心結上做文章，難道國會議長與總統關係深厚，兩岸協議就能迴避審查嗎？馬英九早在ＥＣＦＡ雙英辯論時就宣告，一定送立法院審議，差別僅在於如何審查的議事程序。持平而論，總統對國會議事沒有指三道四的空間，但若是執政黨主席的身分，那就得看黨政運作平台到底能發揮多少功能。
兩岸之間的各種協議，到底是否比照條約或國際協定，交付立法院議決？早在十七年前，辜汪會談簽署四項協議時即引發爭議，當時，立法院朝野有志一同，伸張國會職權，數得出名字的立委都連署此一聲請釋憲案，包括國民黨重量級立委、現任考試院長關中，新黨立委、現任國民黨五都選戰顧問趙少康，還有民進黨最資深的幹事長柯建銘，大法官做成第三二九號解釋文，好笑的是，大法官解釋諸種型態與樣貌的條約、協定，當然要送立法院審議後，對於兩岸間協議是否該送立法院審議，竟以「不在本解釋範圍之內」帶過，讓這個老問題依舊無解。
但真的無解嗎？大法官之認定兩岸協議不在三二九號解釋範圍之內，理由很簡單：第一，兩岸人民關係條例已有明確規範，不是「審議」就是「查照」，但都得送立法院，即使是備查案，立委若獲多數共識經院會決議還是可改為審查案；第二，大法官隱而不宣的是，兩岸協議到底是不是國與國之間的條約或協定？屬高度政治性問題，不碰可也。
事實上，這號解釋出爐同時，還有不同意見書，認為司法院根本不該接受聲請釋憲案，因為台灣國際處境特殊且困難，涉外事務全部交由行政授權，不經立法院審議，於憲法意旨不符，但若全部送國會審議後才能簽定，又恐有危及國家利益之虞。但即使如此，大法官認為，行政、立法兩院還是有依法解決爭端的途徑。簡言之，立法院若真的不同意談判所簽署的協定或條約，可議決否決之，行政院收到否決案之後，十日內必須選擇接受或覆議，若覆議不成，很簡單，閣揆請辭走人！
ＥＣＦＡ既送立法院「審議」，行政部門很難要求立法院不可以逐條審查，但是，與國內法律案或預算案不同，立委改了就改了，刪了就刪了，條約、協定或兩岸之間的協議，都是主權獨立國家間的合意行為，經過一番漫長、甚至艱鉅的談判，彼此互有斬獲和退讓，才得以拍板定案，單方面修改其中一、二內容，都可能影響彼此考量的利益。因此，過去多少年來，立法院審查條約案或協定案，從來沒有破壞前例，進行個別條文或內容的更動，頂多附帶決議要求行政機關改善，這也是對國家整體利益的尊重。
民進黨主席蔡英文反駁馬英九總統，並舉出實例指台、薩簽定ＦＴＡ就是逐條審查，可謂大吃國民黨豆腐，因為扁政府執政時代，國民黨立委即使多數，也不會在國會杯葛涉外議案。但是，國會審查涉外議案的慣例，卻在審查美牛進口議定書時破壞了，破壞慣例的不只是罵聲衝天的民進黨立委，還有為數甚眾的藍營立委，最後讓行政院不能不接受立法院的議決，重新與美方磋商，減少了美牛進口的品項。
王金平是資歷深厚的國會議長，他不會不了解立法院可做與不宜做的事。立法院或許可以堅持選擇逐條審查ＥＣＦＡ，卻不宜逐條修改其內容，因為立委為了自己爽而增刪的內容，都不可能片面落實，最好的情況就是重啟談判，一個弄不好，就是甭談了，接下來與他國間的ＦＴＡ也不必奢想了，有美牛的前例，日本、南韓、新加坡…，隨便數吧，沒有哪一個國家能忍受與台灣談好的事，到了立法院翻盤。
就像美牛協定，立法院真要翻盤，靠區區卅席不到的民進黨立委是不可能的，除非國民黨立委對ＥＣＦＡ內容別有想法，果若如此，國民黨祭出黨紀也不為過。王金平是必須嚴守議事中立的國會議長，但也是政黨不分區立委，是代表國民黨的政黨角色執行立委職務，立法院臨時會召開在即，黨政運作若還不能把話講清楚，不必等到五都選後，馬英九這個黨主席不兼也罷。
Friday, June 4, 2010
Beijing Must Not Oppose Taipei Signing FTAs with Other Countries
Beijing Must Not Oppose Taipei Signing FTAs with Other Countries
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 4, 2010
Beijing must not stand in the way of Taipei signing free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries. Doing so would run counter to the goal of improved cross-Strait relations that the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is attempting to establish. Doing so would seriously undermine the meaning and achievements of ECFA.
During a Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference, a reporter from Taiwan asked how Beijing felt about Taipei's desire to sign FTAs with other nations with the help of ECFA. Spokesperson Jiang Yu replied, "[mainland] China has no objection to Taiwan having non-official economic and trade exchanges with other countries. But for agreements of an official nature, we are opposed."
Some have concluded this means Beijing is opposed to Taipei signing FTAs with other countries. Others have concluded that "opposition to Taiwan signing official agreements" is not the same as "opposition to Taiwan signing FTAs."
For verification, a reporter from this paper, the United Daily News, asked a follow-up question. The Beijing official said that once ECFA is signed, if Taipei wants to sign FTAs with other countries, Beijing will be delighted. It would not stand in Taipei's way, as long as they are "purely economic agreements" that do not involve sovereignty, and are beneficial to the development of Taiwan's economy. We believe that given Beijing's concerns about Taipei, this is a reasonable and predictable response. Unless one is obtuse beyond belief, no other response is possible.
Beijing cannot possibly oppose Taipei signing FTAs with other countries. That's because ECFA is not merely a "cross-Strait economic agreement." It is also an important framework for cross-Strait "peaceful development." Was ECFA negotiated with sincerity and goodwill? The public on Taiwan has a single criterion. Will Taipei be allowed to sign FTAs with other countries. As this newspaper asked, is ECFA an "Invitation to a Funeral," or an "Invitation to a Dance?" The answer will depend on whether Taipei is allowed to sign FTAs with other countries. This affects not merely the hearts and minds of the public on Taiwan. It is also the key to the cross-Strait struggle between the two largest political parties on Taiwan. Beijing cannot possibly be unaware of this.
Taiwan has a "shallow dish economy." If Taipei hopes to sign FTAs with any other countries, they will have to "cut Taipei some slack." Otherwise the FTAs will exert dangerous pressure on Taiwan society. But once Taipei signs ECFA, it must demonstrate its autonomy by signing FTAs. Otherwise given internal struggles between the two largest parties on Taiwan, the ruling administration's policies would not pass muster. Failure to sign FTAs would cast a pall of skepticism over cross-Strait "peaceful development." It would seriously undermine the significance and achievements of ECFA. This why Taipei must attempt to sign FTAs. This is the reason Beijing is not opposed to Taipei signing FTAs.
Therefore one possibile future development is that Taipei will sign a number of FTAs with its major trading partners, such as the United States, as well as with certain nations such as Singapore, which poses no agricultural threat. On the one hand, this will help make Taiwan's economy more liberal and open. On the other hand, and more importantly, it will help win the hearts and minds of the public vis a vis cross-Strait exchanges. If the ROC can maintain diplomatic ties with a certain number of allies, that will be beneficial to cross-Strait relations. The same is true for FTAs. Surely Beijing sees how FTAs will stabilize and improve cross-Strait relations. What reason does it have to oppose them?
Let us review the comments made by Beijing's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They opposed Taipei signing "agreements of an official nature" with other countries. In fact, this was their "three standard comments," namely that "The People's Republic of China is the sole legal government and represents all of China." Have cross-Strait relations evolved no further than this? What is ECFA? Is it an "economic and trade exchange of a non-official nature?" Or is it an "agreement of a non-official nature?" Did Beijing sign an ECFA with Fujian Province? Will Fujian Province sign FTAs with other countries? We do not think Beijing can break through such contradictions and psychological barriers in the short term. But if cross-Strait relations are to "develop peacefully," why invoke such terms as "sovereignty?" when they merely muddy the waters?
Cross-Strait relations have transitioned from hostility and conflict to "peaceful development." Governments on both sides must respond in a timely manner to this rare historical opportunity. They must lay down important cornerstones for cross-Strait relations. ECFA is one of the most important. But ECFA alone is not enough. Most importantly, the two sides must understand the hearts and minds of the public. One might say that the reason for ECFA is to win the hearts and minds of the people. But if one loses the hearts and minds of the people, what good is ECFA?
The hearts and minds of the public on Taiwan have two main pillars -- self-esteem and trust. If we have ECFA but no FTAs, where is that self-esteem? Where is that trust? How can the meaning and achievements of ECFA remain intact?
北京不可反對台灣與他國簽FTA
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.04 03:05 am
北京不可反對台灣與其他國家簽定自由貿易協定（FTA）。因為，這不啻與兩岸經濟協議（ECFA）所欲追求的兩岸關係之氛圍與境界是背道而馳的，反而將嚴重摧毀ECFA的意義與成就。
在北京外交部記者會上，台灣記者問，大陸對台灣希望ECFA有助於與其他國家簽定FTA持何態度？發言人馬朝旭答稱：「……中方對於台灣同其他國家開展非官方經貿往來不持異議，但對官方性質的協議，我們是反對的。」
有人認為，此說表示北京反對台灣與他國簽FTA；也有人認為，在「反對台灣簽官方協議」與「反對台灣簽FTA」之間，不能劃上等號。
本報記者後續的查證指出，北京涉台官員表示：在簽定ECFA後，台灣若要與其他國家洽簽FTA，只要是「純經濟協議」，不涉及主權，對發展台灣經濟有利，北京樂觀其成，不會阻撓。我們認為，面對台灣方面的疑慮，這是北京方面一個合理且可以預期的解釋，倘非至愚至昏，不可能有第二種答案。
北京不可能反對台灣與他國簽定FTA。因為ECFA不止是一個「兩岸經濟協議」，更是兩岸奠定「和平發展」的氛圍與境界的重要架構；而ECFA是否存有誠意與善意，對台灣主流社會而言，能否與他國簽定FTA，已成為主要的指標。若用本報的兩岸語彙來說，ECFA究竟是「請君入甕」或「與卿共舞」，就看能否與他國簽FTA；這非僅影響台灣主流社會的民心向背，更是台灣兩黨兩岸政策鬥爭的勝敗關鍵。凡此種種，北京豈會不知？
其實，以台灣的淺碟經濟，欲簽定任何FTA，對方若不「讓利」，對台灣社會皆會造成壓力與風險。但在簽定ECFA後，台灣若不能展現可以簽定FTA的自主權，這不但在內部兩黨鬥爭上過不了關，且必為兩岸關係抹上一層有害「和平發展」的不信任陰影，因而勢將嚴重摧毀了簽定ECFA的意義與成就。這是台灣必須設法簽ＦＴＡ的原因，也是北京不可反對的原因。
因而，未來的可能發展是：台灣與主要貿易夥伴如美國，及選擇性的對象如新加坡（無農業威脅）簽定幾個FTA；一方面固然可藉以錘煉台灣經濟體質的更趨自由開放，另一方面更重要的則是藉以印證兩岸關係的更符民心。此與中華民國能夠維持若干邦交國之對兩岸關係有利，是同一道理。北京方面不會看不到FTA對穩固及改善兩岸關係的種種重大利益，豈有反對之理？
現在回頭看北京外交部的相關談話。宣稱反對其他國家與台灣簽定「官方性質的協議」，其實仍是「老三句」（中華人民共和國是代表中國的唯一合法政府）的思維。如果在兩岸關係演化至今日地步仍持此說，則莫非ECFA也是「非官方的經貿往來」，或「非官方性質的協議」？難道北京會與福建省簽ECFA？或福建省會與他國簽FTA？我們不認為北京能夠在短期內破解此種矛盾與心障；但若欲使兩岸關係「和平發展」，豈宜動輒即用「主權」這類言詞來攪渾一池好不容易才沉澱下來的春水？
兩岸關係正從衝突敵對朝往「和平發展」的轉型階段。兩岸政府適時回應了此一珍貴的歷史機遇，為兩岸關係奠定了諸多重要的基石，ECFA即其中大者；但徒有 ECFA尚不足以自行，重要的是，必須因勢利導民心的趨向。也可以說，為了民心而有ECFA；若失民心，ECFA有何用？
台灣民心的二大支柱是自尊心及信任感。但倘若只可有ECFA而不可有FTA，自尊心何在？信任感何在？而ECFA的意義及成就，更將如何維繫？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 4, 2010
Beijing must not stand in the way of Taipei signing free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries. Doing so would run counter to the goal of improved cross-Strait relations that the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is attempting to establish. Doing so would seriously undermine the meaning and achievements of ECFA.
During a Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference, a reporter from Taiwan asked how Beijing felt about Taipei's desire to sign FTAs with other nations with the help of ECFA. Spokesperson Jiang Yu replied, "[mainland] China has no objection to Taiwan having non-official economic and trade exchanges with other countries. But for agreements of an official nature, we are opposed."
Some have concluded this means Beijing is opposed to Taipei signing FTAs with other countries. Others have concluded that "opposition to Taiwan signing official agreements" is not the same as "opposition to Taiwan signing FTAs."
For verification, a reporter from this paper, the United Daily News, asked a follow-up question. The Beijing official said that once ECFA is signed, if Taipei wants to sign FTAs with other countries, Beijing will be delighted. It would not stand in Taipei's way, as long as they are "purely economic agreements" that do not involve sovereignty, and are beneficial to the development of Taiwan's economy. We believe that given Beijing's concerns about Taipei, this is a reasonable and predictable response. Unless one is obtuse beyond belief, no other response is possible.
Beijing cannot possibly oppose Taipei signing FTAs with other countries. That's because ECFA is not merely a "cross-Strait economic agreement." It is also an important framework for cross-Strait "peaceful development." Was ECFA negotiated with sincerity and goodwill? The public on Taiwan has a single criterion. Will Taipei be allowed to sign FTAs with other countries. As this newspaper asked, is ECFA an "Invitation to a Funeral," or an "Invitation to a Dance?" The answer will depend on whether Taipei is allowed to sign FTAs with other countries. This affects not merely the hearts and minds of the public on Taiwan. It is also the key to the cross-Strait struggle between the two largest political parties on Taiwan. Beijing cannot possibly be unaware of this.
Taiwan has a "shallow dish economy." If Taipei hopes to sign FTAs with any other countries, they will have to "cut Taipei some slack." Otherwise the FTAs will exert dangerous pressure on Taiwan society. But once Taipei signs ECFA, it must demonstrate its autonomy by signing FTAs. Otherwise given internal struggles between the two largest parties on Taiwan, the ruling administration's policies would not pass muster. Failure to sign FTAs would cast a pall of skepticism over cross-Strait "peaceful development." It would seriously undermine the significance and achievements of ECFA. This why Taipei must attempt to sign FTAs. This is the reason Beijing is not opposed to Taipei signing FTAs.
Therefore one possibile future development is that Taipei will sign a number of FTAs with its major trading partners, such as the United States, as well as with certain nations such as Singapore, which poses no agricultural threat. On the one hand, this will help make Taiwan's economy more liberal and open. On the other hand, and more importantly, it will help win the hearts and minds of the public vis a vis cross-Strait exchanges. If the ROC can maintain diplomatic ties with a certain number of allies, that will be beneficial to cross-Strait relations. The same is true for FTAs. Surely Beijing sees how FTAs will stabilize and improve cross-Strait relations. What reason does it have to oppose them?
Let us review the comments made by Beijing's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They opposed Taipei signing "agreements of an official nature" with other countries. In fact, this was their "three standard comments," namely that "The People's Republic of China is the sole legal government and represents all of China." Have cross-Strait relations evolved no further than this? What is ECFA? Is it an "economic and trade exchange of a non-official nature?" Or is it an "agreement of a non-official nature?" Did Beijing sign an ECFA with Fujian Province? Will Fujian Province sign FTAs with other countries? We do not think Beijing can break through such contradictions and psychological barriers in the short term. But if cross-Strait relations are to "develop peacefully," why invoke such terms as "sovereignty?" when they merely muddy the waters?
Cross-Strait relations have transitioned from hostility and conflict to "peaceful development." Governments on both sides must respond in a timely manner to this rare historical opportunity. They must lay down important cornerstones for cross-Strait relations. ECFA is one of the most important. But ECFA alone is not enough. Most importantly, the two sides must understand the hearts and minds of the public. One might say that the reason for ECFA is to win the hearts and minds of the people. But if one loses the hearts and minds of the people, what good is ECFA?
The hearts and minds of the public on Taiwan have two main pillars -- self-esteem and trust. If we have ECFA but no FTAs, where is that self-esteem? Where is that trust? How can the meaning and achievements of ECFA remain intact?
北京不可反對台灣與他國簽FTA
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.04 03:05 am
北京不可反對台灣與其他國家簽定自由貿易協定（FTA）。因為，這不啻與兩岸經濟協議（ECFA）所欲追求的兩岸關係之氛圍與境界是背道而馳的，反而將嚴重摧毀ECFA的意義與成就。
在北京外交部記者會上，台灣記者問，大陸對台灣希望ECFA有助於與其他國家簽定FTA持何態度？發言人馬朝旭答稱：「……中方對於台灣同其他國家開展非官方經貿往來不持異議，但對官方性質的協議，我們是反對的。」
有人認為，此說表示北京反對台灣與他國簽FTA；也有人認為，在「反對台灣簽官方協議」與「反對台灣簽FTA」之間，不能劃上等號。
本報記者後續的查證指出，北京涉台官員表示：在簽定ECFA後，台灣若要與其他國家洽簽FTA，只要是「純經濟協議」，不涉及主權，對發展台灣經濟有利，北京樂觀其成，不會阻撓。我們認為，面對台灣方面的疑慮，這是北京方面一個合理且可以預期的解釋，倘非至愚至昏，不可能有第二種答案。
北京不可能反對台灣與他國簽定FTA。因為ECFA不止是一個「兩岸經濟協議」，更是兩岸奠定「和平發展」的氛圍與境界的重要架構；而ECFA是否存有誠意與善意，對台灣主流社會而言，能否與他國簽定FTA，已成為主要的指標。若用本報的兩岸語彙來說，ECFA究竟是「請君入甕」或「與卿共舞」，就看能否與他國簽FTA；這非僅影響台灣主流社會的民心向背，更是台灣兩黨兩岸政策鬥爭的勝敗關鍵。凡此種種，北京豈會不知？
其實，以台灣的淺碟經濟，欲簽定任何FTA，對方若不「讓利」，對台灣社會皆會造成壓力與風險。但在簽定ECFA後，台灣若不能展現可以簽定FTA的自主權，這不但在內部兩黨鬥爭上過不了關，且必為兩岸關係抹上一層有害「和平發展」的不信任陰影，因而勢將嚴重摧毀了簽定ECFA的意義與成就。這是台灣必須設法簽ＦＴＡ的原因，也是北京不可反對的原因。
因而，未來的可能發展是：台灣與主要貿易夥伴如美國，及選擇性的對象如新加坡（無農業威脅）簽定幾個FTA；一方面固然可藉以錘煉台灣經濟體質的更趨自由開放，另一方面更重要的則是藉以印證兩岸關係的更符民心。此與中華民國能夠維持若干邦交國之對兩岸關係有利，是同一道理。北京方面不會看不到FTA對穩固及改善兩岸關係的種種重大利益，豈有反對之理？
現在回頭看北京外交部的相關談話。宣稱反對其他國家與台灣簽定「官方性質的協議」，其實仍是「老三句」（中華人民共和國是代表中國的唯一合法政府）的思維。如果在兩岸關係演化至今日地步仍持此說，則莫非ECFA也是「非官方的經貿往來」，或「非官方性質的協議」？難道北京會與福建省簽ECFA？或福建省會與他國簽FTA？我們不認為北京能夠在短期內破解此種矛盾與心障；但若欲使兩岸關係「和平發展」，豈宜動輒即用「主權」這類言詞來攪渾一池好不容易才沉澱下來的春水？
兩岸關係正從衝突敵對朝往「和平發展」的轉型階段。兩岸政府適時回應了此一珍貴的歷史機遇，為兩岸關係奠定了諸多重要的基石，ECFA即其中大者；但徒有 ECFA尚不足以自行，重要的是，必須因勢利導民心的趨向。也可以說，為了民心而有ECFA；若失民心，ECFA有何用？
台灣民心的二大支柱是自尊心及信任感。但倘若只可有ECFA而不可有FTA，自尊心何在？信任感何在？而ECFA的意義及成就，更將如何維繫？
Thursday, June 3, 2010
Songshan, Hongqiao and Haneda: Su Tseng-chang and the Capital Airport
Songshan, Hongqiao and Haneda: Su Tseng-chang and the Capital Airport
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 3, 2010
The Democratic Progressive Party once demanded that the Songshan Airport, once in decline, be decommissioned and turned into a public park. Now however, Songshan Airport has been revitalized by direct cross-Strait flights. It will soon connect directly with Shanghai's Hongqiao, Tokyo's Haneda, and Seoul's Gimpo airports. It has been transformed into the business airport for a national capital in the East Asian economic circle. Su Tseng-chang's opposition to the DPP's "anti-Songshan Airport" line has reportedly mired him in a major showdown. His election campaign asks the question: Can Songshan Airport really be wiped off the map?
That Su Tseng-chang is mired in a major showdown means he realizes that circumstances have changed, and are not something he or the DPP can resist. After all, the Songshan Airport's current resurrection is a living reality to people traveling to and from the airport daily. Even assuming Su Tseng-chang had superhuman abilities, he could not take a bouncing baby and stuff it back into its mother's womb.
For DPP leaders, the Songshan Airport project, like so many other controversial construction projects, has been nothing more than a sword to attack their political enemies, rather than a plowshare to till the earth. When Huang Ta-chou was Taipei Mayor, the Democratic Progressive Party called for Songshan Airport's relocation. It pressured the Civil Aviation Authority to commit to relocating it within five years. When Chen Shui-bian was Taipei Mayor, he avoided the issue altogether. When Lee Ying-yuan and Frank Hsieh were running against each other for Taipei Mayor, they again campaigned for the elimination of Sung Shan Airport. They argued that since the MRT system would soon link Taoyuan Airport, Songshan Airport was no longer necessary.
Ironically, by that time, the DPP was already in power. But the Chen administration never made plans to either eliminate or preserve Songshan Airport. Instead, as the Green Camp shouted "Eliminate Songshan" at deafening volume, Chen Shui-bian embarked on a major campaign to build local airports across the island in the name of "Love for Taiwan." Today "mosquito airports" (unused airports infested with mosquitoes) can be found all over the island, the product of the "politics of wishful thinking." No trace of an MRT link to CKS Airport could be found during Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office. Chen renamed the CKS International Airport the "Taoyuan International Airport." But that did nothing to change its fortune. It merely became eight years older and shabbier. Over the years, the airport's decline has ironically become a clear reflection of our national decline.
Songshan Airport has now gotten a new lease on life. It has been the beneficiary of warming cross-Strait relations. It has also benefitted from recent changes in international airport operations. Take mainland China, South Korea, and Japan, for example. Many years ago airport noise pollution and traffic congestion forced major metropolises to build new international airports and transform existing airports into domestic airports. But more recently this rigid pattern of "one domestic airport, one international airport" for major metropolises has been shattered. Take Shanghai's Hongqiao Airport for example. In March of this year, following runway expansions and the construction of a new terminal building, it was redefined as a "regional airport." It now allows flights to select Asian cities. For one thing, it helps reduce congestion at Pudong Airport. For another it takes advantage of its proximity to the city, increasing its convenience for business travelers.
This is not the only example. The roles of Tokyo's Narita Airport and Haneda Airport have changed. For years "Narita was primarily international, Haneda was primarily domestic." But the Japanese government was shocked to discover that Incheon International Airport in Seoul, South Korea had replaced Tokyo as Japan's major international hub. The crux of the matter is that Incheon Airport not only has a greater take off and landing capacity, it also allows direct flights to 28 cities in Japan. By contrast, Narita Airport allows direct flights to only eight cities in Japan. Travelers in Japan who wish to go abroad must first fly to Haneda. From there they must travel over an hour by car to Narita, dragging along their luggage, in order to make their connecting flight. Under the circumstances, many Japanese prefer to fly directly from their hometowns to Incheon, where they can board an international flight to any destination in the world, saving considerable waiting and transit time.
In other words, Incheon Airport's openness and dense network of international connections greatly enhance its competitiveness. For passengers in neighboring countries, Incheon Airport can provide services even more convenient than those in their home countries. Japan is not the only one threatened. So is mainland China. Tourists from Shandong traveling to the West Coast of the US can save 17 full hours by transiting through Inchon instead of through Pudong. As we can see, in order to become a competitive airport, one must establish the right conditions, and not hide behind closed doors shouting angry slogans.
Songshan will connect with Hongqiao by the middle of this month. Not only does this symbolize a closer relationship between the two sides, it also suggests Taipei may soon be upgraded to the status of an East Asian transportation hub. In retrospect, we have gotten off to a late start. In fact, we squandered over a decade of valuable time. We would like to remind the Ma administration to maintain a balance between Songshan Airport and Taoyuan Airport, We would like to remind Su Tseng-chang that he must properly define the role of Songshan Airport in his campaign appeals, since this will have a bearing on his cross-Strait and regional appeals.
松山、虹橋、羽田：蘇貞昌與首都機場
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.03 02:08 am
一度沒落的松山機場，曾遭民進黨要求廢掉改建公園，如今卻因兩岸直航重振活力，更將進一步與上海虹橋、東京羽田、首爾金浦等機場直接對飛，蛻變為東亞經濟圈的首都商務機場。據說，蘇貞昌正為要不要延續黨內的「反松山機場」戰線而陷入天人交戰，他的首都選戰論述，真的能把松山機場從地圖上塗銷嗎？
蘇貞昌陷入天人交戰，顯示他知道大形勢已然改變，絕非他個人或民進黨可以抵擋。畢竟，松山機場今天的「復活」，已是每天人來機往的活生生現實。蘇貞昌縱使有天大的本事，也無法把一個活潑亂跳的孩子，再塞回母親的子宮裡吧？
像許多建設爭議一樣，對民進黨而言，松山機場的議題始終是一支用來攻擊的矛，而不是拿來耕耘的鋤頭。黃大洲時代，民進黨即曾提出遷移松山機場的主張，並迫使民航局承諾五年內提出遷建計畫；隨後陳水扁出任市長，卻絕口不提此事。直到李應元和謝長廷角逐台北市長，再度發動廢松山機場的攻擊，認為桃園機場捷運即將通車，松山機場已無存在必要。
諷刺的是，當時民進黨已經執政，扁政府並未就松山機場的去留提出任何相應計畫，反而就在綠營高喊「廢松山」最喧天價響之際，陳水扁以「愛台」之名在島內大肆興建地方機場。今天全台「蚊子機場」林立，正是這種「空想政治」的產物。何況，扁任內八年，不僅中正機場捷運無影無蹤，甚至改名為「桃園國際機場」，但並未使機場改運，只是愈發顯得老態龍鍾罷了。過去多年，機場的沒落，竟然成為綜合國力衰退的明顯指標。
松山機場得以重燃生機，除了拜兩岸關係融冰之賜，其實也與近年國際間經營機場理念的轉變有關。以中韓日等國為例，幾個大都會早年都因市區機場噪音及運量不勝負荷，而覓地另建國際機場，舊機場則皆轉為國內線之用。最近幾年，這種雙機場「一主內、一主外」的呆板分工，已逐漸被打破。以上海虹橋機場為例，今年三月擴建跑道和航廈後重新定位為「區域機場」，選擇對亞洲城市定點對飛，一則疏散浦東機場的壅塞，二則利用其接近市區的優越條件，為商務旅客創造便利。
更有對比價值的例子，則是東京成田機場與羽田機場的角色變化。在「成田主國際、羽田主國內」模式運作多年後，日本政府赫然發現，南韓首爾的仁川機場已取代東京，變成了日本最主要的國際樞紐機場。其中癥結在：仁川機場不僅起降容量更大，更開放對廿八個日本城市直飛；相對的，日本僅有八個城市能直飛成田機場，旅客若要出國，需先飛到羽田，再拖著行李花一個多小時搭車到成田去轉機。在這種情況下，許多日本人寧可選擇從居住地直接飛往仁川，再從那裡轉搭國際班機前往世界各地，以省下可觀的轉乘及等待時間。
換句話說，仁川機場的開放性以及它綿密的國際連接網絡，大大提升了它的競爭能力；對鄰國旅客而言，仁川甚至比自己的國家機場還更能提供便利的服務。受到威脅的不僅是日本，中國亦然，山東旅客要前往美國西岸，從仁川轉機要比經浦東轉機足足省下十七個小時。可見，要成為有競爭力的機場，必須要先創造條件，而不是關起門在家中吶喊即可成事。
松山與虹橋月中即將對飛，不僅象徵兩地的關係更形密切，更意味著台北在東亞交通樞紐的展望也更上層樓。驀然回首，遲至今日始走出這一步，其實已耗掉了十多年的寶貴時光。此際，我們除提醒馬政府要注意松山與桃園機場的平衡，也要提醒蘇貞昌：在他的選戰論述上，必須對松山機場妥適定位；而松山機場的定位，也必將牽動其兩岸論述及區域論述。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 3, 2010
The Democratic Progressive Party once demanded that the Songshan Airport, once in decline, be decommissioned and turned into a public park. Now however, Songshan Airport has been revitalized by direct cross-Strait flights. It will soon connect directly with Shanghai's Hongqiao, Tokyo's Haneda, and Seoul's Gimpo airports. It has been transformed into the business airport for a national capital in the East Asian economic circle. Su Tseng-chang's opposition to the DPP's "anti-Songshan Airport" line has reportedly mired him in a major showdown. His election campaign asks the question: Can Songshan Airport really be wiped off the map?
That Su Tseng-chang is mired in a major showdown means he realizes that circumstances have changed, and are not something he or the DPP can resist. After all, the Songshan Airport's current resurrection is a living reality to people traveling to and from the airport daily. Even assuming Su Tseng-chang had superhuman abilities, he could not take a bouncing baby and stuff it back into its mother's womb.
For DPP leaders, the Songshan Airport project, like so many other controversial construction projects, has been nothing more than a sword to attack their political enemies, rather than a plowshare to till the earth. When Huang Ta-chou was Taipei Mayor, the Democratic Progressive Party called for Songshan Airport's relocation. It pressured the Civil Aviation Authority to commit to relocating it within five years. When Chen Shui-bian was Taipei Mayor, he avoided the issue altogether. When Lee Ying-yuan and Frank Hsieh were running against each other for Taipei Mayor, they again campaigned for the elimination of Sung Shan Airport. They argued that since the MRT system would soon link Taoyuan Airport, Songshan Airport was no longer necessary.
Ironically, by that time, the DPP was already in power. But the Chen administration never made plans to either eliminate or preserve Songshan Airport. Instead, as the Green Camp shouted "Eliminate Songshan" at deafening volume, Chen Shui-bian embarked on a major campaign to build local airports across the island in the name of "Love for Taiwan." Today "mosquito airports" (unused airports infested with mosquitoes) can be found all over the island, the product of the "politics of wishful thinking." No trace of an MRT link to CKS Airport could be found during Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office. Chen renamed the CKS International Airport the "Taoyuan International Airport." But that did nothing to change its fortune. It merely became eight years older and shabbier. Over the years, the airport's decline has ironically become a clear reflection of our national decline.
Songshan Airport has now gotten a new lease on life. It has been the beneficiary of warming cross-Strait relations. It has also benefitted from recent changes in international airport operations. Take mainland China, South Korea, and Japan, for example. Many years ago airport noise pollution and traffic congestion forced major metropolises to build new international airports and transform existing airports into domestic airports. But more recently this rigid pattern of "one domestic airport, one international airport" for major metropolises has been shattered. Take Shanghai's Hongqiao Airport for example. In March of this year, following runway expansions and the construction of a new terminal building, it was redefined as a "regional airport." It now allows flights to select Asian cities. For one thing, it helps reduce congestion at Pudong Airport. For another it takes advantage of its proximity to the city, increasing its convenience for business travelers.
This is not the only example. The roles of Tokyo's Narita Airport and Haneda Airport have changed. For years "Narita was primarily international, Haneda was primarily domestic." But the Japanese government was shocked to discover that Incheon International Airport in Seoul, South Korea had replaced Tokyo as Japan's major international hub. The crux of the matter is that Incheon Airport not only has a greater take off and landing capacity, it also allows direct flights to 28 cities in Japan. By contrast, Narita Airport allows direct flights to only eight cities in Japan. Travelers in Japan who wish to go abroad must first fly to Haneda. From there they must travel over an hour by car to Narita, dragging along their luggage, in order to make their connecting flight. Under the circumstances, many Japanese prefer to fly directly from their hometowns to Incheon, where they can board an international flight to any destination in the world, saving considerable waiting and transit time.
In other words, Incheon Airport's openness and dense network of international connections greatly enhance its competitiveness. For passengers in neighboring countries, Incheon Airport can provide services even more convenient than those in their home countries. Japan is not the only one threatened. So is mainland China. Tourists from Shandong traveling to the West Coast of the US can save 17 full hours by transiting through Inchon instead of through Pudong. As we can see, in order to become a competitive airport, one must establish the right conditions, and not hide behind closed doors shouting angry slogans.
Songshan will connect with Hongqiao by the middle of this month. Not only does this symbolize a closer relationship between the two sides, it also suggests Taipei may soon be upgraded to the status of an East Asian transportation hub. In retrospect, we have gotten off to a late start. In fact, we squandered over a decade of valuable time. We would like to remind the Ma administration to maintain a balance between Songshan Airport and Taoyuan Airport, We would like to remind Su Tseng-chang that he must properly define the role of Songshan Airport in his campaign appeals, since this will have a bearing on his cross-Strait and regional appeals.
松山、虹橋、羽田：蘇貞昌與首都機場
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.03 02:08 am
一度沒落的松山機場，曾遭民進黨要求廢掉改建公園，如今卻因兩岸直航重振活力，更將進一步與上海虹橋、東京羽田、首爾金浦等機場直接對飛，蛻變為東亞經濟圈的首都商務機場。據說，蘇貞昌正為要不要延續黨內的「反松山機場」戰線而陷入天人交戰，他的首都選戰論述，真的能把松山機場從地圖上塗銷嗎？
蘇貞昌陷入天人交戰，顯示他知道大形勢已然改變，絕非他個人或民進黨可以抵擋。畢竟，松山機場今天的「復活」，已是每天人來機往的活生生現實。蘇貞昌縱使有天大的本事，也無法把一個活潑亂跳的孩子，再塞回母親的子宮裡吧？
像許多建設爭議一樣，對民進黨而言，松山機場的議題始終是一支用來攻擊的矛，而不是拿來耕耘的鋤頭。黃大洲時代，民進黨即曾提出遷移松山機場的主張，並迫使民航局承諾五年內提出遷建計畫；隨後陳水扁出任市長，卻絕口不提此事。直到李應元和謝長廷角逐台北市長，再度發動廢松山機場的攻擊，認為桃園機場捷運即將通車，松山機場已無存在必要。
諷刺的是，當時民進黨已經執政，扁政府並未就松山機場的去留提出任何相應計畫，反而就在綠營高喊「廢松山」最喧天價響之際，陳水扁以「愛台」之名在島內大肆興建地方機場。今天全台「蚊子機場」林立，正是這種「空想政治」的產物。何況，扁任內八年，不僅中正機場捷運無影無蹤，甚至改名為「桃園國際機場」，但並未使機場改運，只是愈發顯得老態龍鍾罷了。過去多年，機場的沒落，竟然成為綜合國力衰退的明顯指標。
松山機場得以重燃生機，除了拜兩岸關係融冰之賜，其實也與近年國際間經營機場理念的轉變有關。以中韓日等國為例，幾個大都會早年都因市區機場噪音及運量不勝負荷，而覓地另建國際機場，舊機場則皆轉為國內線之用。最近幾年，這種雙機場「一主內、一主外」的呆板分工，已逐漸被打破。以上海虹橋機場為例，今年三月擴建跑道和航廈後重新定位為「區域機場」，選擇對亞洲城市定點對飛，一則疏散浦東機場的壅塞，二則利用其接近市區的優越條件，為商務旅客創造便利。
更有對比價值的例子，則是東京成田機場與羽田機場的角色變化。在「成田主國際、羽田主國內」模式運作多年後，日本政府赫然發現，南韓首爾的仁川機場已取代東京，變成了日本最主要的國際樞紐機場。其中癥結在：仁川機場不僅起降容量更大，更開放對廿八個日本城市直飛；相對的，日本僅有八個城市能直飛成田機場，旅客若要出國，需先飛到羽田，再拖著行李花一個多小時搭車到成田去轉機。在這種情況下，許多日本人寧可選擇從居住地直接飛往仁川，再從那裡轉搭國際班機前往世界各地，以省下可觀的轉乘及等待時間。
換句話說，仁川機場的開放性以及它綿密的國際連接網絡，大大提升了它的競爭能力；對鄰國旅客而言，仁川甚至比自己的國家機場還更能提供便利的服務。受到威脅的不僅是日本，中國亦然，山東旅客要前往美國西岸，從仁川轉機要比經浦東轉機足足省下十七個小時。可見，要成為有競爭力的機場，必須要先創造條件，而不是關起門在家中吶喊即可成事。
松山與虹橋月中即將對飛，不僅象徵兩地的關係更形密切，更意味著台北在東亞交通樞紐的展望也更上層樓。驀然回首，遲至今日始走出這一步，其實已耗掉了十多年的寶貴時光。此際，我們除提醒馬政府要注意松山與桃園機場的平衡，也要提醒蘇貞昌：在他的選戰論述上，必須對松山機場妥適定位；而松山機場的定位，也必將牽動其兩岸論述及區域論述。
Wednesday, June 2, 2010
Political Support for the DPP Not in QuestionUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 2, 2010
Summary: Last Saturday the DPP held an anti-ECFA protest march. It boasted that over 150,000 people joined in. According to police estimates however, only 32,000 people started out, and by the time they reached Ketegelan Boulevard only about 16,000 remained due to the heavy rains. No one questions the political strength of the Democratic Progressive Party. Suppose that 150,000 people actually participated in the anti-ECFA protest march. How was that any different from past protest marches? When the marchers arrived at Ketagalan Boulevard, the DPP also reached "the end of the road." The DPP also reached a "dead end."
Full Text below:
Last Saturday the DPP held an anti-ECFA protest march. It boasted that over 150,000 people joined in. According to police estimates however, only 32,000 people started out, and by the time they reached Ketegelan Boulevard only about 16,000 remained due to the heavy rains.
Each time a protest march is held, the organizers' estimates differ from the police estimates. This is true for the Blue and Green camps alike. Actually, the DPP should not be terribly concerned about the number of people participating in any particular protest march. Nor should outsiders jump to conclusions about the DPP's political support based solely on the number of people who participated in a given DPP protest march.
After all, the DPP is a political party that still commanded 5.4 million votes during the 2008 presidential election, i.e., 41.55% of the total votes. During the 2008 presidential election, the DPP hit a low due to the Chen Corruption and Money Laundering Scandals. The Referendum on Joining the UN and other political moves made it impossible for Taipei to talk to Beijing and Washington. Presidential candidate Frank Hsieh was also a highly controversial figure. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou's political momentum was unstoppable. Pan Blue voters' morale was sky high. But even admidst such dire circumstances the DPP still commanded 5.4 million votes. Such political support is as solid as the Rock of Gilbraltar. Who dares to underestimate it?
During the 2008 presidential election ballot counting stage, we pointed out that although Ma Ying-jeou's KMT won with approximately 58% of the vote, the Democratic Progressive Party remained the key factor determining the rise or fall of Taiwan. If the DPP is unwilling to allow the Republic of China to survive, then it will not survive.
Twenty years of party politics on Taiwan has shown that the DPP's political support is growing. During the 2000 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian received 39% of the vote. In 2004, that number increased by 5%. The DPP's political support is rock solid. Even in 2008, when the party was in crisis, support for the DPP held at 42%. Several by-elections over the past two years show that support for the DPP has stabilized. Admittedly one reason is Pan Blue voters have boycotted recent elections. But even more interestingly, after 2008 it was widely assumed that the Democratic Progressive Party would draw a line in the sand between itself and Chen Shui-bian's corruption, and that it would change its stand on Taiwan independence. But these predictions turned out to be grossly mistaken. Today the "Chen Shui-bian connection" has become one wing of the DPP. Furthermore, the Democratic Progressive Party has mobilized in opposition to ECFA, and reverted to shouting "The KMT and CCP are singing a duet, the rich and the poor are locked in a class struggle."
These phenomena show that although the DPP has refused to disown Ah-Bian, and persists in supporting Taiwan independence, it nevertheless commands solid support. One might even say that in order to maintain its political base, the DPP cannot afford to disown Ah-Bian, and cannot afford to amend its Taiwan independence stance. This is why the DPP is able to ensure that its political support never falls below a certain level. But it is also the reason the DPP is unable to transform itself.
In the wake of ECFA, one can safely draw the following conclusion. The Democratic Progressive Party will not undergo any transformation prior to 2012.
From the very beginning, the Democratic Progressive Party chose to demonize ECFA. Now it is too late to change its tune. If the DPP were to change its tune, how could it continue its mayoral campaigns for the five directly administered municipalities? The primary plank in the five municipalities mayoral elections is "opposition to [mainland] China." If the DPP wins in 2012 on the basis of an "opposition to [mainland] China" platform, does it really intend to abolish ECFA. Does it really intend to force everyone to start over from scratch?
There is no possibility of the DPP undergoing transformation. At the same time, the DPP has a solid base of political support. This gives the DPP enough power to divide the nation. It also encourages the DPP to divide the nation to ensure its own political survival and political growth. But if the DPP wins the five mayoral elections, or even the 2013 presidential election, won't it lead Taiwan down a dead end?
Compare the current Democratic Progressive Party with the "DPP" of 2000, which proclaimed its support for "Five Noes." Compare it with the DPP of 2004, which demanded a referendum to purchase missiles. Compare it with the DPP of 2008, which demanded a referendum to join the UN. The DPP of 2010 has adopted an even harder line on Taiwan independence. Its party chairman refers to the ROC as "a government in exile." It is trying even harder to divide the nation. It has equated opposition to ECFA with hatred for [mainland] China and hatred for the rich. It is less likely to undergo transformation, and less willing to undergo transformation. It believes that if it changes, it will collapse, and be unable to justify its former rhetoric. It feels no need to undergo transformation. After all, it still retains a 42% level of political support from 2008.
DPP supporters are diehards who stubbornly persist in supporting the party despite Chen Shui-bian's flagrant corruption. They are diehards whose support cannot be shaken even by globalization and Taiwan's marginalization. This is why the Democratic Progressive Party feels no need to undergo transformation prior to 2012. This is why the DPP does not dare undergo transformation, and will not undergo transformation prior to 2012.
On the one hand, such stubbornly unwavering political support provides the DPP with skeletal support. On the other hand, it is also consumes the DPP's marrow. Therefore, pay no attention to how many people attend the DPP's protest marches. After all, the DPP once held an island wide demonstration involving one million people. No one questions the political strength of the Democratic Progressive Party. Suppose that 150,000 people actually participated in the anti-ECFA protest march. How was that any different from past protest marches? When the marchers arrived at Ketagalan Boulevard, the DPP also reached "the end of the road." The DPP also reached a "dead end."
不用質疑民進黨的社會實力
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.02 03:22 am
上周六民進黨發動反ＥＣＦＡ大遊行，宣稱參加者達十五萬人；但據警方統計，出發時約三萬兩千人，到達凱道時下起大雨，剩下約一萬六千人。
每次遊行，主辦單位宣稱的人數，與警方的估計皆有出入；此種情況，藍綠皆然。其實，民進黨不必太過在意一次遊行人數的多寡，而外界也不能只因一次遊行人數多寡而論斷民進黨的社會實力。
畢竟，民進黨是一個在二○○八年總統大選中「仍能」保有五四○餘萬選票的政黨（得票率四十一‧五五）。二○○八年總統大選之際，民進黨因扁案幾已陷於谷底，入聯公投等操作又與北京及華府鬧得不可開交，總統候選人謝長廷也是高度爭議性人物；相對而言，其競選對手馬英九的聲勢銳不可當，藍營選民更是士氣如虹；但即使在那般艱困的情勢中，民進黨在二○○八年「仍能」保有五四○餘萬選票，這樣的社會實力簡直已是鐵板一塊，豈容輕估？
二○○八總統大選開票時，我們即曾指出，馬英九的國民黨雖以約五十八％贏得政權，但相對而言，民進黨卻仍是決定台灣興衰存亡的關鍵因素，如果民進黨不願意中華民國活下去，中華民國仍是活不成。
台灣經歷二十餘年政黨政治的激盪已可證明，民進黨的社會支持是在成長（二○○○年總統大選，陳水扁三十九％，二○○四年升至五○％），而且十分堅實（即使在二○○八的艱困情勢下，仍維持四十二％）。近二年的幾次補選，亦顯示民進黨的社會支持已告盤穩（雖然主要原因是藍營選民不投票）。更值得注意的是，二 ○○八後一般想像民進黨會與陳水扁的貪腐切割，及修正其台獨路線，但這些預測卻竟皆是大謬不然；如今非僅「陳水扁連線」已寄身民進黨內，且民進黨更因操作反ＥＣＦＡ，又走回「國共唱和／貧富鬥爭」的獨派路線。
這些現象皆在顯示：即使民進黨不與扁切割，或仍然維持台獨路線，民進黨依然會保有堅實的社會支持；甚至可反過來說，民進黨為保有其社會支持，所以不能與扁切割，也不能修正其台獨路線。這是民進黨所以維持不墜的原因，但這也是民進黨不可能轉型蛻變的原因。
經歷ＥＣＦＡ的激盪，台灣的政治又可獲得一個階段性的論斷，那就是：民進黨在二○一二年以前，已完全沒有轉型蛻變的可能性。
民進黨一開始就把ＥＣＦＡ妖魔化，現在已無改口的可能性；倘若改口，民進黨的五都選舉還能選得下去嗎？而五都選舉既以「反中」為主軸，到了二○一二總統大選恐怕也只有硬撐到底（連蘇貞昌也已正面反ＥＣＦＡ）；接著，倘若在二○一二年民進黨又以「反中」路線贏得了選舉，到了執政後難道真要廢止ＥＣＦＡ而教台灣一切重新來過嗎？
民進黨已不可能轉型蛻變，而民進黨又有十分堅實的社會支持；這使民進黨有撕裂國家的實力，且亦使民進黨必須藉撕裂國家始能生存發展。但是，這樣的民進黨即使贏得了五都選舉，甚或即使贏得了二○一二總統大選，難道不會將台灣帶上死路一條？
現在的民進黨，比二○○○年的「民進黨」（四不一沒有），比二○○四年的民進黨（買飛彈公投），亦比二○○八年的民進黨（入聯公投），路線上更獨（黨主席說中華民國是「流亡政府」），也更撕裂台灣（反ＥＣＦＡ將「仇中／仇富」聯結）。民進黨已不可能轉型蛻變，更不敢轉型蛻變（變了就垮了，如何自圓其說），亦更不必轉型蛻變（畢竟也許有從二○○八年四十二％起跳的社會支持）。
民進黨的支持者，是連陳水扁貪腐也不離不棄的支持者，亦是連國際全球化及台灣邊緣化也不能動搖的支持者。這是民進黨在二○一二年前不必轉型蛻變之所寄，也是民進黨在二○一二年前絕不敢且絕不可能轉型蛻變的原因。
如此堅實頑強的社會支持，一方面支撐著民進黨的骨架，另一方面亦在噬食民進黨的骨髓。因而，不必計較民進黨遊行人數多寡，畢竟民進黨也曾發動過號稱百萬人的環島示威，誰能質疑民進黨的社會實力？但是，即使反ＥＣＦＡ遊行真有十五萬人，一如過去每次遊行，走到凱達格蘭大道，也就已是民進黨「登峰造極」的終點與盡頭了。
A Translation
July 2, 2010
Summary: Last Saturday the DPP held an anti-ECFA protest march. It boasted that over 150,000 people joined in. According to police estimates however, only 32,000 people started out, and by the time they reached Ketegelan Boulevard only about 16,000 remained due to the heavy rains. No one questions the political strength of the Democratic Progressive Party. Suppose that 150,000 people actually participated in the anti-ECFA protest march. How was that any different from past protest marches? When the marchers arrived at Ketagalan Boulevard, the DPP also reached "the end of the road." The DPP also reached a "dead end."
Full Text below:
Last Saturday the DPP held an anti-ECFA protest march. It boasted that over 150,000 people joined in. According to police estimates however, only 32,000 people started out, and by the time they reached Ketegelan Boulevard only about 16,000 remained due to the heavy rains.
Each time a protest march is held, the organizers' estimates differ from the police estimates. This is true for the Blue and Green camps alike. Actually, the DPP should not be terribly concerned about the number of people participating in any particular protest march. Nor should outsiders jump to conclusions about the DPP's political support based solely on the number of people who participated in a given DPP protest march.
After all, the DPP is a political party that still commanded 5.4 million votes during the 2008 presidential election, i.e., 41.55% of the total votes. During the 2008 presidential election, the DPP hit a low due to the Chen Corruption and Money Laundering Scandals. The Referendum on Joining the UN and other political moves made it impossible for Taipei to talk to Beijing and Washington. Presidential candidate Frank Hsieh was also a highly controversial figure. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou's political momentum was unstoppable. Pan Blue voters' morale was sky high. But even admidst such dire circumstances the DPP still commanded 5.4 million votes. Such political support is as solid as the Rock of Gilbraltar. Who dares to underestimate it?
During the 2008 presidential election ballot counting stage, we pointed out that although Ma Ying-jeou's KMT won with approximately 58% of the vote, the Democratic Progressive Party remained the key factor determining the rise or fall of Taiwan. If the DPP is unwilling to allow the Republic of China to survive, then it will not survive.
Twenty years of party politics on Taiwan has shown that the DPP's political support is growing. During the 2000 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian received 39% of the vote. In 2004, that number increased by 5%. The DPP's political support is rock solid. Even in 2008, when the party was in crisis, support for the DPP held at 42%. Several by-elections over the past two years show that support for the DPP has stabilized. Admittedly one reason is Pan Blue voters have boycotted recent elections. But even more interestingly, after 2008 it was widely assumed that the Democratic Progressive Party would draw a line in the sand between itself and Chen Shui-bian's corruption, and that it would change its stand on Taiwan independence. But these predictions turned out to be grossly mistaken. Today the "Chen Shui-bian connection" has become one wing of the DPP. Furthermore, the Democratic Progressive Party has mobilized in opposition to ECFA, and reverted to shouting "The KMT and CCP are singing a duet, the rich and the poor are locked in a class struggle."
These phenomena show that although the DPP has refused to disown Ah-Bian, and persists in supporting Taiwan independence, it nevertheless commands solid support. One might even say that in order to maintain its political base, the DPP cannot afford to disown Ah-Bian, and cannot afford to amend its Taiwan independence stance. This is why the DPP is able to ensure that its political support never falls below a certain level. But it is also the reason the DPP is unable to transform itself.
In the wake of ECFA, one can safely draw the following conclusion. The Democratic Progressive Party will not undergo any transformation prior to 2012.
From the very beginning, the Democratic Progressive Party chose to demonize ECFA. Now it is too late to change its tune. If the DPP were to change its tune, how could it continue its mayoral campaigns for the five directly administered municipalities? The primary plank in the five municipalities mayoral elections is "opposition to [mainland] China." If the DPP wins in 2012 on the basis of an "opposition to [mainland] China" platform, does it really intend to abolish ECFA. Does it really intend to force everyone to start over from scratch?
There is no possibility of the DPP undergoing transformation. At the same time, the DPP has a solid base of political support. This gives the DPP enough power to divide the nation. It also encourages the DPP to divide the nation to ensure its own political survival and political growth. But if the DPP wins the five mayoral elections, or even the 2013 presidential election, won't it lead Taiwan down a dead end?
Compare the current Democratic Progressive Party with the "DPP" of 2000, which proclaimed its support for "Five Noes." Compare it with the DPP of 2004, which demanded a referendum to purchase missiles. Compare it with the DPP of 2008, which demanded a referendum to join the UN. The DPP of 2010 has adopted an even harder line on Taiwan independence. Its party chairman refers to the ROC as "a government in exile." It is trying even harder to divide the nation. It has equated opposition to ECFA with hatred for [mainland] China and hatred for the rich. It is less likely to undergo transformation, and less willing to undergo transformation. It believes that if it changes, it will collapse, and be unable to justify its former rhetoric. It feels no need to undergo transformation. After all, it still retains a 42% level of political support from 2008.
DPP supporters are diehards who stubbornly persist in supporting the party despite Chen Shui-bian's flagrant corruption. They are diehards whose support cannot be shaken even by globalization and Taiwan's marginalization. This is why the Democratic Progressive Party feels no need to undergo transformation prior to 2012. This is why the DPP does not dare undergo transformation, and will not undergo transformation prior to 2012.
On the one hand, such stubbornly unwavering political support provides the DPP with skeletal support. On the other hand, it is also consumes the DPP's marrow. Therefore, pay no attention to how many people attend the DPP's protest marches. After all, the DPP once held an island wide demonstration involving one million people. No one questions the political strength of the Democratic Progressive Party. Suppose that 150,000 people actually participated in the anti-ECFA protest march. How was that any different from past protest marches? When the marchers arrived at Ketagalan Boulevard, the DPP also reached "the end of the road." The DPP also reached a "dead end."
不用質疑民進黨的社會實力
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.02 03:22 am
上周六民進黨發動反ＥＣＦＡ大遊行，宣稱參加者達十五萬人；但據警方統計，出發時約三萬兩千人，到達凱道時下起大雨，剩下約一萬六千人。
每次遊行，主辦單位宣稱的人數，與警方的估計皆有出入；此種情況，藍綠皆然。其實，民進黨不必太過在意一次遊行人數的多寡，而外界也不能只因一次遊行人數多寡而論斷民進黨的社會實力。
畢竟，民進黨是一個在二○○八年總統大選中「仍能」保有五四○餘萬選票的政黨（得票率四十一‧五五）。二○○八年總統大選之際，民進黨因扁案幾已陷於谷底，入聯公投等操作又與北京及華府鬧得不可開交，總統候選人謝長廷也是高度爭議性人物；相對而言，其競選對手馬英九的聲勢銳不可當，藍營選民更是士氣如虹；但即使在那般艱困的情勢中，民進黨在二○○八年「仍能」保有五四○餘萬選票，這樣的社會實力簡直已是鐵板一塊，豈容輕估？
二○○八總統大選開票時，我們即曾指出，馬英九的國民黨雖以約五十八％贏得政權，但相對而言，民進黨卻仍是決定台灣興衰存亡的關鍵因素，如果民進黨不願意中華民國活下去，中華民國仍是活不成。
台灣經歷二十餘年政黨政治的激盪已可證明，民進黨的社會支持是在成長（二○○○年總統大選，陳水扁三十九％，二○○四年升至五○％），而且十分堅實（即使在二○○八的艱困情勢下，仍維持四十二％）。近二年的幾次補選，亦顯示民進黨的社會支持已告盤穩（雖然主要原因是藍營選民不投票）。更值得注意的是，二 ○○八後一般想像民進黨會與陳水扁的貪腐切割，及修正其台獨路線，但這些預測卻竟皆是大謬不然；如今非僅「陳水扁連線」已寄身民進黨內，且民進黨更因操作反ＥＣＦＡ，又走回「國共唱和／貧富鬥爭」的獨派路線。
這些現象皆在顯示：即使民進黨不與扁切割，或仍然維持台獨路線，民進黨依然會保有堅實的社會支持；甚至可反過來說，民進黨為保有其社會支持，所以不能與扁切割，也不能修正其台獨路線。這是民進黨所以維持不墜的原因，但這也是民進黨不可能轉型蛻變的原因。
經歷ＥＣＦＡ的激盪，台灣的政治又可獲得一個階段性的論斷，那就是：民進黨在二○一二年以前，已完全沒有轉型蛻變的可能性。
民進黨一開始就把ＥＣＦＡ妖魔化，現在已無改口的可能性；倘若改口，民進黨的五都選舉還能選得下去嗎？而五都選舉既以「反中」為主軸，到了二○一二總統大選恐怕也只有硬撐到底（連蘇貞昌也已正面反ＥＣＦＡ）；接著，倘若在二○一二年民進黨又以「反中」路線贏得了選舉，到了執政後難道真要廢止ＥＣＦＡ而教台灣一切重新來過嗎？
民進黨已不可能轉型蛻變，而民進黨又有十分堅實的社會支持；這使民進黨有撕裂國家的實力，且亦使民進黨必須藉撕裂國家始能生存發展。但是，這樣的民進黨即使贏得了五都選舉，甚或即使贏得了二○一二總統大選，難道不會將台灣帶上死路一條？
現在的民進黨，比二○○○年的「民進黨」（四不一沒有），比二○○四年的民進黨（買飛彈公投），亦比二○○八年的民進黨（入聯公投），路線上更獨（黨主席說中華民國是「流亡政府」），也更撕裂台灣（反ＥＣＦＡ將「仇中／仇富」聯結）。民進黨已不可能轉型蛻變，更不敢轉型蛻變（變了就垮了，如何自圓其說），亦更不必轉型蛻變（畢竟也許有從二○○八年四十二％起跳的社會支持）。
民進黨的支持者，是連陳水扁貪腐也不離不棄的支持者，亦是連國際全球化及台灣邊緣化也不能動搖的支持者。這是民進黨在二○一二年前不必轉型蛻變之所寄，也是民進黨在二○一二年前絕不敢且絕不可能轉型蛻變的原因。
如此堅實頑強的社會支持，一方面支撐著民進黨的骨架，另一方面亦在噬食民進黨的骨髓。因而，不必計較民進黨遊行人數多寡，畢竟民進黨也曾發動過號稱百萬人的環島示威，誰能質疑民進黨的社會實力？但是，即使反ＥＣＦＡ遊行真有十五萬人，一如過去每次遊行，走到凱達格蘭大道，也就已是民進黨「登峰造極」的終點與盡頭了。
Sungshan Airport Indicates a New Political Climate on Taiwan
Sungshan Airport Indicates a New Political Climate on Taiwan
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 2, 2010
The Songshan Airport is already 60 years old. It is about to become an important part of the Northeast Asian transportation ring. It will link to Shanghai's Hongqiao, Tokyo's Haneda, and Seoul's Gimpo. It will become a "small is beautiful" commercial airport for the nation's capital. This will significantly increase Songshan Airport's commercial viability. It will integrate Taipei with the three most important cities of Northeast Asia, and provide it with opportunities for development. The prospects are worth looking forward to.
The plan is for Songshan Airport to begin flights to and from Hongqiao Airport on the 14th of this month. Each side will schedule 14 flights per week. Flights to and from Haneda Airport will begin on October 31. Each side will schedule 28 flights per week. Negotiations with South Korea are still in progress. The government hopes to open up new direct flights to Gimpo Airport. Therefore In addition to current domestic and cross-Strait flights, Songshan Airport will offer flights to the capitals of Japan and Korea, linking Taipei to the Northeast Asian Transportion Ring's Golden Triangle. Shanghai, Tokyo, and Seoul are Asia's most important, prosperous, and vibrant metropolises. If Taipei can seize the opportunity to reinforce its air links to these cities, it will help promote mutual exchanges. It will make Taipei more attractive to international business and tourism.
As President Ma Ying-jeou has noted, Taiwan is geographically situated at the heart of East Asia. Average distances to the major countries in the region and their capitals are very short -- less than four hours flying time. Taipei enjoys such favorable geographic advantages. Yet in the past, due to various factors, it could not make best use of its advantages, it could not maximize the benefits of economic exchange. That truly is a pity.
Songshan Airport has a glorious history. But in 1979, when the Taoyuan International Airport went into operation, Songshan Airport was demoted to the status of a domestic airport. It never underwent significant expansion or renovation, but instead gradually went into decline. Once the High Speed Rail went into operations, domestic flights were grounded. Songshan Airport looked even more forlorn. Only after President Ma took office did the two sides reconcile and resume cross-Strait exchanges, open up cross-Strait direct flights, and include Songshan Airport as a destination. This, plus a significant increase in the number of mainland tourists arriving on Taiwan, began to revive Songshan Airport. Weekend charter flights turned into regular flights. Last year passenger traffic experienced a significant 3,130,000 increase. Now that international flights are being restored, its facilities and services must be significantly increased. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications is about to spend billions of dollars on a three-phase renovation, completely converting it into a terminal for international flights. Terminal II will be reserved for domestic flights. Essential services and facilities will be added, providing the greater Taipei area with express freight and commercial aviation services.
Therefore, one can expect that within the year, Taipei, Shanghai, and Tokyo, three major cities in Northeast Asia, will be linked. Songshan Airport, Hongqiao Airport, and Haneda Airport are all located in urban areas. If they are linked to these cities' subway systems, travel times can be greatly reduced. Travel between these three cities could be reduced to "day trips." From Taipei, one could take the subway to Songshan Airport in the morning, lunch on crabs in Shanghai at noon, and sip tea in Tokyo in the afternoon. If an agreement can be reached with South Korea on Kimpo Airport, dining on ginseng chicken in Myeong-dong will be easy as pie. Tourists from Taiwan to Japan and South Korea do not require visas. Civil sector exchanges and tourism to Taiwan would be even more convenient.
Such convenient transportation flows will directly benefit affected businesses. But before traffic to Songshan Airport is significantly increased, we must be fully prepared. We must review the existing hardware and software for shortcomings, and make timely improvements.
Frankly, although Songshan Airport was once in the spotlight, its interior space, its design, and its facilities had already fallen short of the prevailing requirements for international airports. The runways were not long enough for Boeing 747s. With the influx of mainland tourists, it has attempted to cope. But if we hope to further increase passenger and aircraft throughput, we must significantly increase the capacity of the facilities and services. We will also need the cooperation of other departments. For example, we must set up a business aviation zone to facilitate exchanges between international business executives. The ROC Air Force must be willing to allow the use of its land. This will require high-level government coordination.
The expanded role of Songshan Airport runs directly counter to Green Camp wishes. The Democratic Progressive Party has long advocated that Songshan Airport be relocated, and the site be turned into a park. But if the role of Songshan Airport becomes larger and larger, if its operations are expanded day by day, if the public experiences the benefits of using Songshan Airport, the DPP will be forced to take into account public preferences. This may be the reason Su Tseng-chang, the DPP candidate for Taipei Mayor, no longer raises the issue of Songshan Airport relocation. If Su Tseng-chang can adopt a pragmatic attitude, Songshan Airport need not become a political battlefield. Policy can be formulated on the basis of merit. Policies can be formulated on the basis of what is most consistent with the interests of the public, including the city of Taipei. This would be the most mature and rational approach.
Additional air routes can bring about an increase in tourist traffic. But the operation of an airport requires multifaceted support. Only then can one achieve shining results that will impress the public. Now that Songshan Airport is about to undergo further transformation, we would like to applaud the opening of this small but beautiful gateway to the nation, an opening that indicates the advent of a new political climate on Taiwan.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.06.02
社論－期待松山機場 展現台灣新氣象
本報訊
已經高齡六十的松山機場，即將變身成為東北亞黃金航圈之重要據點，陸續與中國上海虹橋、日本東京羽田及南韓首爾金浦機場對飛，並打造「小而美」的首都商務機場。這不僅將明顯提高松山機場的營運，更將讓台北市與東北亞三大重要都會緊密結合，帶動的發展契機，非常令人期待。
依據規畫，松山機場將在本月十四日先與虹橋機場通航，每周雙方各飛十四班；今年十月卅一日則與羽田機場對飛，每周雙方各飛廿八班；目前正與南韓方面洽談修約，希望進一步開闢直飛金浦機場的新航線。如此一來，除了目前的國內與兩岸航班之外，松山機場又增加了與日、韓首都圈機場的航班，串連起一個東北亞的黃金三角航圈。上海、東京、首爾是亞洲最重要、商務最蓬勃的大都會，台北市能藉此加強與這幾個城市的航空交通，對促進彼此的交流大有助益，也能對國際商務與觀光客源產生更大的吸引力。
正如馬英九總統所言，台灣的地理位置在東亞中心，和此區主要國家城市與首都的平均距離都很短，飛行時間不到四小時，如此優越的地理優勢，過去礙於種種因素而沒有辦法好好利用，使其發揮最大經濟交流效益，確實非常可惜。
松山機場曾經有一段輝煌的歷史，但在民國六十八年桃園國際機場啟用、松山機場改為國內線機場後，一直未作重大整修擴建的松山機場漸顯衰退。而高鐵通車之後，國內航班紛紛停飛，松山機場更是愈來愈冷清。直到馬總統上任後，兩岸關係和解，開放兩岸直航並納入松山機場，加上大陸觀光客來台數量大增，松山機場才又熙來攘往熱鬧起來，從周末包機發展成定期航班，去年旅客量大幅增加至三一三萬。如今要再增加國際航班，相關設備及服務勢必大幅加強不可。交通部現正斥資十億台幣進行三階段整建，將一航廈完全改作國際線之用，第二航廈則供國內線使用，同時補強相關服務設備，提供大台北地區快遞貨運及商務航空服務。
因此，可以預見在今年之內，台北、上海、東京，這三座東北亞重要城市將串連起來。由於松山機場、虹橋機場與羽田機場都位於市區，在地鐵的配合下，大大縮短了旅行時間。換句話說，這三座城市可以成為一個「一日生活圈」。在台北，早上出門搭捷運到松山機場，午餐就可以在上海吃大閘蟹，或在東京六本木喝下午茶。而如果能再與南韓金浦機場談好對飛協議，到明洞吃人蔘雞也是小事一椿。尤其台灣觀光客赴日本、南韓都享有免簽證待遇，將來民眾的來往、觀光客來台旅遊，都將更加方便順暢。
如此方便的流通，直接將對相關商圈的營運帶來助益，然而，在松山機場業務大增之前，我們必須作好充分的準備，檢討目前軟硬體不足之處，及早改善補強。
坦白說，松山機場當年可能很風光，但其空間、設計與設備，早已不敷當前一個國際機場之所需，甚至因為跑道不夠長而不能起降波音七四七。在大陸觀光客湧入後雖然勉強還能應付，可是如果想再增加旅客與飛機的吞吐量，就非要大幅強化設備與服務能量不可。有些環節還需要動員其他部門的配合，例如設置商務航空專區，以便利國際商務高層人士往來，就牽涉到空軍是否願意釋出土地來，這也有待政府高層的協調。
松山機場機能日益擴大，其實是與綠營的一貫主張相反的。過去民進黨長期主張將松山機場遷移至他處，原址則改造成公園，但如果松山機場的功能愈來愈蓬勃，營運日益成長，民眾感受到善用松山機場的好處時，民進黨恐怕就不得不考慮到民意的好惡了，這可能也是民進黨台北市長參選人蘇貞昌現在不提松山機場遷移案的原因。如果蘇貞昌能採取務實態度，松山機場可以不必成為政黨角力的戰場，而回歸就事論事，讓這項政策朝最符合民眾希望及台北市利益的方向走，這應該是最成熟理性的作法。
航線的增加可以帶來客源，但一個機場的營運，需要許多環節的支持，才能有令人耳目一新的成績。在松山機場即將進一步轉型的同時，我們期勉這個小而美的國家大門，也能展現出台灣的新氣象。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 2, 2010
The Songshan Airport is already 60 years old. It is about to become an important part of the Northeast Asian transportation ring. It will link to Shanghai's Hongqiao, Tokyo's Haneda, and Seoul's Gimpo. It will become a "small is beautiful" commercial airport for the nation's capital. This will significantly increase Songshan Airport's commercial viability. It will integrate Taipei with the three most important cities of Northeast Asia, and provide it with opportunities for development. The prospects are worth looking forward to.
The plan is for Songshan Airport to begin flights to and from Hongqiao Airport on the 14th of this month. Each side will schedule 14 flights per week. Flights to and from Haneda Airport will begin on October 31. Each side will schedule 28 flights per week. Negotiations with South Korea are still in progress. The government hopes to open up new direct flights to Gimpo Airport. Therefore In addition to current domestic and cross-Strait flights, Songshan Airport will offer flights to the capitals of Japan and Korea, linking Taipei to the Northeast Asian Transportion Ring's Golden Triangle. Shanghai, Tokyo, and Seoul are Asia's most important, prosperous, and vibrant metropolises. If Taipei can seize the opportunity to reinforce its air links to these cities, it will help promote mutual exchanges. It will make Taipei more attractive to international business and tourism.
As President Ma Ying-jeou has noted, Taiwan is geographically situated at the heart of East Asia. Average distances to the major countries in the region and their capitals are very short -- less than four hours flying time. Taipei enjoys such favorable geographic advantages. Yet in the past, due to various factors, it could not make best use of its advantages, it could not maximize the benefits of economic exchange. That truly is a pity.
Songshan Airport has a glorious history. But in 1979, when the Taoyuan International Airport went into operation, Songshan Airport was demoted to the status of a domestic airport. It never underwent significant expansion or renovation, but instead gradually went into decline. Once the High Speed Rail went into operations, domestic flights were grounded. Songshan Airport looked even more forlorn. Only after President Ma took office did the two sides reconcile and resume cross-Strait exchanges, open up cross-Strait direct flights, and include Songshan Airport as a destination. This, plus a significant increase in the number of mainland tourists arriving on Taiwan, began to revive Songshan Airport. Weekend charter flights turned into regular flights. Last year passenger traffic experienced a significant 3,130,000 increase. Now that international flights are being restored, its facilities and services must be significantly increased. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications is about to spend billions of dollars on a three-phase renovation, completely converting it into a terminal for international flights. Terminal II will be reserved for domestic flights. Essential services and facilities will be added, providing the greater Taipei area with express freight and commercial aviation services.
Therefore, one can expect that within the year, Taipei, Shanghai, and Tokyo, three major cities in Northeast Asia, will be linked. Songshan Airport, Hongqiao Airport, and Haneda Airport are all located in urban areas. If they are linked to these cities' subway systems, travel times can be greatly reduced. Travel between these three cities could be reduced to "day trips." From Taipei, one could take the subway to Songshan Airport in the morning, lunch on crabs in Shanghai at noon, and sip tea in Tokyo in the afternoon. If an agreement can be reached with South Korea on Kimpo Airport, dining on ginseng chicken in Myeong-dong will be easy as pie. Tourists from Taiwan to Japan and South Korea do not require visas. Civil sector exchanges and tourism to Taiwan would be even more convenient.
Such convenient transportation flows will directly benefit affected businesses. But before traffic to Songshan Airport is significantly increased, we must be fully prepared. We must review the existing hardware and software for shortcomings, and make timely improvements.
Frankly, although Songshan Airport was once in the spotlight, its interior space, its design, and its facilities had already fallen short of the prevailing requirements for international airports. The runways were not long enough for Boeing 747s. With the influx of mainland tourists, it has attempted to cope. But if we hope to further increase passenger and aircraft throughput, we must significantly increase the capacity of the facilities and services. We will also need the cooperation of other departments. For example, we must set up a business aviation zone to facilitate exchanges between international business executives. The ROC Air Force must be willing to allow the use of its land. This will require high-level government coordination.
The expanded role of Songshan Airport runs directly counter to Green Camp wishes. The Democratic Progressive Party has long advocated that Songshan Airport be relocated, and the site be turned into a park. But if the role of Songshan Airport becomes larger and larger, if its operations are expanded day by day, if the public experiences the benefits of using Songshan Airport, the DPP will be forced to take into account public preferences. This may be the reason Su Tseng-chang, the DPP candidate for Taipei Mayor, no longer raises the issue of Songshan Airport relocation. If Su Tseng-chang can adopt a pragmatic attitude, Songshan Airport need not become a political battlefield. Policy can be formulated on the basis of merit. Policies can be formulated on the basis of what is most consistent with the interests of the public, including the city of Taipei. This would be the most mature and rational approach.
Additional air routes can bring about an increase in tourist traffic. But the operation of an airport requires multifaceted support. Only then can one achieve shining results that will impress the public. Now that Songshan Airport is about to undergo further transformation, we would like to applaud the opening of this small but beautiful gateway to the nation, an opening that indicates the advent of a new political climate on Taiwan.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.06.02
社論－期待松山機場 展現台灣新氣象
本報訊
已經高齡六十的松山機場，即將變身成為東北亞黃金航圈之重要據點，陸續與中國上海虹橋、日本東京羽田及南韓首爾金浦機場對飛，並打造「小而美」的首都商務機場。這不僅將明顯提高松山機場的營運，更將讓台北市與東北亞三大重要都會緊密結合，帶動的發展契機，非常令人期待。
依據規畫，松山機場將在本月十四日先與虹橋機場通航，每周雙方各飛十四班；今年十月卅一日則與羽田機場對飛，每周雙方各飛廿八班；目前正與南韓方面洽談修約，希望進一步開闢直飛金浦機場的新航線。如此一來，除了目前的國內與兩岸航班之外，松山機場又增加了與日、韓首都圈機場的航班，串連起一個東北亞的黃金三角航圈。上海、東京、首爾是亞洲最重要、商務最蓬勃的大都會，台北市能藉此加強與這幾個城市的航空交通，對促進彼此的交流大有助益，也能對國際商務與觀光客源產生更大的吸引力。
正如馬英九總統所言，台灣的地理位置在東亞中心，和此區主要國家城市與首都的平均距離都很短，飛行時間不到四小時，如此優越的地理優勢，過去礙於種種因素而沒有辦法好好利用，使其發揮最大經濟交流效益，確實非常可惜。
松山機場曾經有一段輝煌的歷史，但在民國六十八年桃園國際機場啟用、松山機場改為國內線機場後，一直未作重大整修擴建的松山機場漸顯衰退。而高鐵通車之後，國內航班紛紛停飛，松山機場更是愈來愈冷清。直到馬總統上任後，兩岸關係和解，開放兩岸直航並納入松山機場，加上大陸觀光客來台數量大增，松山機場才又熙來攘往熱鬧起來，從周末包機發展成定期航班，去年旅客量大幅增加至三一三萬。如今要再增加國際航班，相關設備及服務勢必大幅加強不可。交通部現正斥資十億台幣進行三階段整建，將一航廈完全改作國際線之用，第二航廈則供國內線使用，同時補強相關服務設備，提供大台北地區快遞貨運及商務航空服務。
因此，可以預見在今年之內，台北、上海、東京，這三座東北亞重要城市將串連起來。由於松山機場、虹橋機場與羽田機場都位於市區，在地鐵的配合下，大大縮短了旅行時間。換句話說，這三座城市可以成為一個「一日生活圈」。在台北，早上出門搭捷運到松山機場，午餐就可以在上海吃大閘蟹，或在東京六本木喝下午茶。而如果能再與南韓金浦機場談好對飛協議，到明洞吃人蔘雞也是小事一椿。尤其台灣觀光客赴日本、南韓都享有免簽證待遇，將來民眾的來往、觀光客來台旅遊，都將更加方便順暢。
如此方便的流通，直接將對相關商圈的營運帶來助益，然而，在松山機場業務大增之前，我們必須作好充分的準備，檢討目前軟硬體不足之處，及早改善補強。
坦白說，松山機場當年可能很風光，但其空間、設計與設備，早已不敷當前一個國際機場之所需，甚至因為跑道不夠長而不能起降波音七四七。在大陸觀光客湧入後雖然勉強還能應付，可是如果想再增加旅客與飛機的吞吐量，就非要大幅強化設備與服務能量不可。有些環節還需要動員其他部門的配合，例如設置商務航空專區，以便利國際商務高層人士往來，就牽涉到空軍是否願意釋出土地來，這也有待政府高層的協調。
松山機場機能日益擴大，其實是與綠營的一貫主張相反的。過去民進黨長期主張將松山機場遷移至他處，原址則改造成公園，但如果松山機場的功能愈來愈蓬勃，營運日益成長，民眾感受到善用松山機場的好處時，民進黨恐怕就不得不考慮到民意的好惡了，這可能也是民進黨台北市長參選人蘇貞昌現在不提松山機場遷移案的原因。如果蘇貞昌能採取務實態度，松山機場可以不必成為政黨角力的戰場，而回歸就事論事，讓這項政策朝最符合民眾希望及台北市利益的方向走，這應該是最成熟理性的作法。
航線的增加可以帶來客源，但一個機場的營運，需要許多環節的支持，才能有令人耳目一新的成績。在松山機場即將進一步轉型的同時，我們期勉這個小而美的國家大門，也能展現出台灣的新氣象。
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
From Export Processing Zone to Free Trade Zone
From Export Processing Zone to Free Trade Zone
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 1, 2010
Half century ago Taiwan adopted an "export processing zone" development strategy. It lept ahead of most developing countries and seized the international market. Approximately 30 years ago, under intense pressure from the US, a major trading partner, it underwent economic liberalization at an unprecedented scale. But realistically speaking, Taiwan as it is currently cannot be considered a genuinely free and open economy.
During the past two decades, former presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian saddled the nation with an isolationist Closed Door Policy. Too many industries, too many products, and too many occupations are protected to greater or lesser degree by the government. A huge bloc of employers and employees, unable to compete directly with foreign producers, seek out government protection. They are fearful of the day they must confront ECFA. They have become the primary force behind opposition DPP and TSU efforts to obstruct ECFA.
They include agriculture, towel manufacturers, furniture manufacturers, and other vulnerable industries. The heads of these industries may not realize it. But although the government has signed bilateral arrangments to minimize the impact on their production once ECFA is signed, they cannot sit back and relax. That is because ECFA is a key. When Taiwan uses it to open its doors, it will gradually enter an increasingly free economic realm. In the future, by means of free trade agreements (FTA) with its major trading partners, Taiwan will be fully opened. Besides agriculture, there is almost nowhere one can escape powerful competitive pressures. In short, Taiwan will join the mainstream global economy and become a bona fide free economy.
Yet the opposition DPP and TSU cavalierly encourage vulnerable groups to obstruct ECFA. Nearly half of the public on Taiwan still harbors doubts about it. This means too many people still do not realize that Taiwan must eventually undergo full liberalization. They fear the free market economy, and refuse to embrace it with open arms.
Half a century ago, Taiwan led the way toward a new era of export-orientated economic policy. The Export Processing Zone was the pioneer. In a closed area, we gave full play to our strengths. We allowed the public on Taiwan to first make contact in this unfamiliar area, immersing themselves in the experience. Then, after experiencing the infinite opportunities, transform all of Taiwan into an Export Processing Zone. Thirty years ago the Hsinchu Science Park replicated this process, and led Taiwan into the high-tech era.
Today Taiwan is moving toward a new and inevitable era of free markets. We can welcome it, or we can resist it. But during the coming years we will find ourselves smack dab in the middle of it. It would appear we need something akin to export processing zones or science parks to act as trailblazers. This would allow the public on Taiwan to get an advance taste in a closed environment.
The special economic and trade zone, which has been promoted for over two years, is set to perform this role. From south to north several regions with good harbors and airports, surrounded by broad hinterlands, will be designated special zones. They will experiment with and simulate a free economy for no less than one or two years, but no more than ten. By then the whole of Taiwan should have the courage required to enter the free economy.
Within this closed test area, commodities, aside from safety and health concerns, will enjoy unobstructed free access. The movement of funds and personnel will be kept as free as possible, comparable to Singapore's, which has the freest economy in the world. Tariff and non tariff barriers will be kept to a minimum. As much as possible, corporate and personal income taxes will be kept in line with Singapore's. Infrastructure and administrative efficiency will compare favorably. Labor policies for foreign workers will follow suit. As long as we are seeking to be both free and open, we will of course seek to excel.
When it comes to administrative efficiency, Taiwan as a whole may find it difficult to match Singapore. But specific regions, such as the Hsinchu Science Park, operating under special laws, through a single window, will enjoy far greater flexibility. Business taxes can also match Singapore's. If we grant special privileges, income taxes will not constitute a significant barrier. Labor policy for foreign workers will be tested within the zones. It depends only on the determination of those in power. For any relevant infrastructure construction. the government need merely hand down the order. Businesses and funds can quickly be made available without drawing on any public funds.
Minister of Economic Affairs Shi Yen-hsiang declared the intention of building "free economic zones" as pilot projects 20 or 30 years from now. We would like to solemnly remind Minister Shih that our circumstances will be critical two or three years from now. If we fail to step up construction, our circumstances will outpace our pilot programs.
Before conducting any experiments, try first to imagine a Singapore-like region close to prime areas on the mainland. How can one begin to calculate the benefits?
從加工出口區到自由經濟區
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.01 02:19 am
台灣從半世紀前就採取「加工出口區」的發展策略，領先絕大多數開發中國家走向國際市場；約莫三十年前，又在主要貿易對手美國的強大壓力下，展開了規模空前的經濟自由化行動；但實事求是而言，台灣現在卻還不能算是高度自由開放的經濟。
近二十年來，在李、陳兩位前總統主導的鎖國政策下，我們還有太多產業、太多商品、太多行業，受到政府或多或少的保護。也正是這一大塊躲在政府公權力庇蔭之下無法與國外生產者直接抗衡的雇主與從業人員，面對ＥＣＦＡ日近一日的簽署時程，心生惶惑，成為在野黨藉以杯葛、抗拒ＥＣＦＡ的主力。
包括農業、毛巾、寢具等弱勢產業的從業人士或許不知道，即使透過兩岸雙方政府的用心安排，在簽署ＥＣＦＡ之後的一段時期雖不致對他們產生難以抵擋的衝擊，但他們也不能高枕無憂；因為ＥＣＦＡ只是一把鑰匙，當台灣用它打開了大門，漸將進入一個逐次體現的自由經濟天地。未來，透過與主要貿易對手簽定自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ），整個台灣會日漸全面開放；除了農業之外，幾乎不會有任何角落可以逃避從四面八方而來的強勁競爭壓力，簡言之：台灣會加入全球經濟的主流，成為一個不折不扣的自由經濟體。
然而，當在野黨可以輕易鼓動弱勢群體杯葛ＥＣＦＡ，而且將近半數台灣人民心中仍有深重疑慮，就表示有太多國人不但昧於台灣即將漸次全面開放的事實，而且不敢張開雙臂迎對開放、擁抱自由經濟。
半世紀前，當台灣一馬當先邁入出口導向的新紀元，加工出口區就是開路先鋒；在一個封閉的區域內，將我們的優勢充分發揮，讓台灣人民對這個陌生的領域從事初次的接觸、深入的體驗；然後，在體會其中蘊藏的無限機會後，進而將整個台灣都變成加工出口區。三十年前的「新竹科學園區」複製了這個過程，引領台灣進入高科技時代。
如今，當台灣將邁步踏入一個全新的，卻無從逃避的自由經濟新時代，而且不論我們歡迎還是抗拒，未來數年之間即將置身其中；我們似乎也需要一個像加工出口區或科學園區一樣的開路先鋒，讓台灣人民可以在一個封閉的區域內，先體驗及因應一下個中滋味。
鼓吹逾兩年的經貿特區，正要扮演這個角色；從南到北，選擇幾個具備優良的海港、空港條件，周邊有足夠腹地的寬廣區域，闢為專區，進行自由經濟的實驗，模擬快則一、二年，慢不過十年，整個台灣應可勇敢地進入的自由經濟時代。
在這個封閉的試區內，商品貨物除了安全與健康的顧慮，可以全無阻礙地自由進出；資金、人員也比照全世界最自由的新加坡，最大限度地開放；關稅與非關稅障礙降至最低；企業與個人所得稅儘可能向新加坡看齊；基本設施及行政效能毫不遜色，外勞政策也一概效法。既要自由開放，當然要取法乎上。
行政效能，整個台灣或許還難及新加坡，但在特定區域之內，透過單一窗口與特別法的運作，如新竹科學園區，其靈活性已較前者不遑多讓。營所稅亦足堪與星比擬，若給予特別優惠，所得稅也不致構成重大障礙；外勞政策在區內試行，只繫乎當政者的決心；而基礎設施等相關建設，只要政府一聲號令，企業、資金一擁而至，無需任何公帑，即可快速齊備。
經濟部長施顏祥宣示，要建設若干「自由經濟區」做為模擬二、三十年後台灣現狀的試點；我們要鄭重提醒施部長，二、三年後的現狀可能已將如是，再不加緊建設，現狀就要跑在試點的前面。
在進行實驗之前，先設想一下：一個近在大陸精華地區咫尺之地的「新加坡」，其利豈可勝計？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 1, 2010
Half century ago Taiwan adopted an "export processing zone" development strategy. It lept ahead of most developing countries and seized the international market. Approximately 30 years ago, under intense pressure from the US, a major trading partner, it underwent economic liberalization at an unprecedented scale. But realistically speaking, Taiwan as it is currently cannot be considered a genuinely free and open economy.
During the past two decades, former presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian saddled the nation with an isolationist Closed Door Policy. Too many industries, too many products, and too many occupations are protected to greater or lesser degree by the government. A huge bloc of employers and employees, unable to compete directly with foreign producers, seek out government protection. They are fearful of the day they must confront ECFA. They have become the primary force behind opposition DPP and TSU efforts to obstruct ECFA.
They include agriculture, towel manufacturers, furniture manufacturers, and other vulnerable industries. The heads of these industries may not realize it. But although the government has signed bilateral arrangments to minimize the impact on their production once ECFA is signed, they cannot sit back and relax. That is because ECFA is a key. When Taiwan uses it to open its doors, it will gradually enter an increasingly free economic realm. In the future, by means of free trade agreements (FTA) with its major trading partners, Taiwan will be fully opened. Besides agriculture, there is almost nowhere one can escape powerful competitive pressures. In short, Taiwan will join the mainstream global economy and become a bona fide free economy.
Yet the opposition DPP and TSU cavalierly encourage vulnerable groups to obstruct ECFA. Nearly half of the public on Taiwan still harbors doubts about it. This means too many people still do not realize that Taiwan must eventually undergo full liberalization. They fear the free market economy, and refuse to embrace it with open arms.
Half a century ago, Taiwan led the way toward a new era of export-orientated economic policy. The Export Processing Zone was the pioneer. In a closed area, we gave full play to our strengths. We allowed the public on Taiwan to first make contact in this unfamiliar area, immersing themselves in the experience. Then, after experiencing the infinite opportunities, transform all of Taiwan into an Export Processing Zone. Thirty years ago the Hsinchu Science Park replicated this process, and led Taiwan into the high-tech era.
Today Taiwan is moving toward a new and inevitable era of free markets. We can welcome it, or we can resist it. But during the coming years we will find ourselves smack dab in the middle of it. It would appear we need something akin to export processing zones or science parks to act as trailblazers. This would allow the public on Taiwan to get an advance taste in a closed environment.
The special economic and trade zone, which has been promoted for over two years, is set to perform this role. From south to north several regions with good harbors and airports, surrounded by broad hinterlands, will be designated special zones. They will experiment with and simulate a free economy for no less than one or two years, but no more than ten. By then the whole of Taiwan should have the courage required to enter the free economy.
Within this closed test area, commodities, aside from safety and health concerns, will enjoy unobstructed free access. The movement of funds and personnel will be kept as free as possible, comparable to Singapore's, which has the freest economy in the world. Tariff and non tariff barriers will be kept to a minimum. As much as possible, corporate and personal income taxes will be kept in line with Singapore's. Infrastructure and administrative efficiency will compare favorably. Labor policies for foreign workers will follow suit. As long as we are seeking to be both free and open, we will of course seek to excel.
When it comes to administrative efficiency, Taiwan as a whole may find it difficult to match Singapore. But specific regions, such as the Hsinchu Science Park, operating under special laws, through a single window, will enjoy far greater flexibility. Business taxes can also match Singapore's. If we grant special privileges, income taxes will not constitute a significant barrier. Labor policy for foreign workers will be tested within the zones. It depends only on the determination of those in power. For any relevant infrastructure construction. the government need merely hand down the order. Businesses and funds can quickly be made available without drawing on any public funds.
Minister of Economic Affairs Shi Yen-hsiang declared the intention of building "free economic zones" as pilot projects 20 or 30 years from now. We would like to solemnly remind Minister Shih that our circumstances will be critical two or three years from now. If we fail to step up construction, our circumstances will outpace our pilot programs.
Before conducting any experiments, try first to imagine a Singapore-like region close to prime areas on the mainland. How can one begin to calculate the benefits?
從加工出口區到自由經濟區
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.01 02:19 am
台灣從半世紀前就採取「加工出口區」的發展策略，領先絕大多數開發中國家走向國際市場；約莫三十年前，又在主要貿易對手美國的強大壓力下，展開了規模空前的經濟自由化行動；但實事求是而言，台灣現在卻還不能算是高度自由開放的經濟。
近二十年來，在李、陳兩位前總統主導的鎖國政策下，我們還有太多產業、太多商品、太多行業，受到政府或多或少的保護。也正是這一大塊躲在政府公權力庇蔭之下無法與國外生產者直接抗衡的雇主與從業人員，面對ＥＣＦＡ日近一日的簽署時程，心生惶惑，成為在野黨藉以杯葛、抗拒ＥＣＦＡ的主力。
包括農業、毛巾、寢具等弱勢產業的從業人士或許不知道，即使透過兩岸雙方政府的用心安排，在簽署ＥＣＦＡ之後的一段時期雖不致對他們產生難以抵擋的衝擊，但他們也不能高枕無憂；因為ＥＣＦＡ只是一把鑰匙，當台灣用它打開了大門，漸將進入一個逐次體現的自由經濟天地。未來，透過與主要貿易對手簽定自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ），整個台灣會日漸全面開放；除了農業之外，幾乎不會有任何角落可以逃避從四面八方而來的強勁競爭壓力，簡言之：台灣會加入全球經濟的主流，成為一個不折不扣的自由經濟體。
然而，當在野黨可以輕易鼓動弱勢群體杯葛ＥＣＦＡ，而且將近半數台灣人民心中仍有深重疑慮，就表示有太多國人不但昧於台灣即將漸次全面開放的事實，而且不敢張開雙臂迎對開放、擁抱自由經濟。
半世紀前，當台灣一馬當先邁入出口導向的新紀元，加工出口區就是開路先鋒；在一個封閉的區域內，將我們的優勢充分發揮，讓台灣人民對這個陌生的領域從事初次的接觸、深入的體驗；然後，在體會其中蘊藏的無限機會後，進而將整個台灣都變成加工出口區。三十年前的「新竹科學園區」複製了這個過程，引領台灣進入高科技時代。
如今，當台灣將邁步踏入一個全新的，卻無從逃避的自由經濟新時代，而且不論我們歡迎還是抗拒，未來數年之間即將置身其中；我們似乎也需要一個像加工出口區或科學園區一樣的開路先鋒，讓台灣人民可以在一個封閉的區域內，先體驗及因應一下個中滋味。
鼓吹逾兩年的經貿特區，正要扮演這個角色；從南到北，選擇幾個具備優良的海港、空港條件，周邊有足夠腹地的寬廣區域，闢為專區，進行自由經濟的實驗，模擬快則一、二年，慢不過十年，整個台灣應可勇敢地進入的自由經濟時代。
在這個封閉的試區內，商品貨物除了安全與健康的顧慮，可以全無阻礙地自由進出；資金、人員也比照全世界最自由的新加坡，最大限度地開放；關稅與非關稅障礙降至最低；企業與個人所得稅儘可能向新加坡看齊；基本設施及行政效能毫不遜色，外勞政策也一概效法。既要自由開放，當然要取法乎上。
行政效能，整個台灣或許還難及新加坡，但在特定區域之內，透過單一窗口與特別法的運作，如新竹科學園區，其靈活性已較前者不遑多讓。營所稅亦足堪與星比擬，若給予特別優惠，所得稅也不致構成重大障礙；外勞政策在區內試行，只繫乎當政者的決心；而基礎設施等相關建設，只要政府一聲號令，企業、資金一擁而至，無需任何公帑，即可快速齊備。
經濟部長施顏祥宣示，要建設若干「自由經濟區」做為模擬二、三十年後台灣現狀的試點；我們要鄭重提醒施部長，二、三年後的現狀可能已將如是，再不加緊建設，現狀就要跑在試點的前面。
在進行實驗之前，先設想一下：一個近在大陸精華地區咫尺之地的「新加坡」，其利豈可勝計？
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