Two States Theory Repudiates the 1992 Consensus and ECFAUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 10, 2010
The cross-strait economic framework agreement (ECFA) has been signed. The DPP now faces a new political scenario. On the one hand, cross-Strait relations have progressed beyond the point of no return. Taiwan independence has become increasingly unlikely. On the other hand, it is too late for the DPP to call off its campaign to kill ECFA, and disassociate itself from Taiwan independence. In short, the DPP finds itself swimming against the tide, in diametric opposition to the larger currents of history.
The DPP's defeat in the 2008 presidential election led to Tsai Ing-wen's election as DPP chairman. The public and elements within the DPP, once entertained the illusion that the DPP would take advantage of this opportunity to reinvent itself, and get the Taiwan independence monkey off its back. But ECFA showed that the DPP is incapable of divorcing itself from the Taiwan independence movement. Tsai Ing-wen may be the person who finally dashes all hope that the DPP might remake itself. This is the effect ECFA has had on party politics on Taiwan. ECFA's importance should not be underestimated.
For the past two years, Tsai Ing-wen was the person the public hoped would transform the DPP. But as a result of ECFA, Tsai has backslid. She has adopted a scorched earth policy, and a hardline Taiwan independence posture. Any hope that the DPP might transform itself has been completely shattered. Actually, we should not be surprised. In fact, Tsai Ing-wen was the instigator of the "two states theory" during the Lee Teng-hui era, and the person responsible for the repudiation the 1992 Consensus during the Chen Shui-bian era. She was the main reason the cross-Strait policies of both the Lee and Chen regimes ran smack into a brick wall. But because Tsai Ing-wen was merely a staffer at the time, many believed that once she became party chairman she would change. She would help the DPP undergo a transformation. Tsai Ing-wen once said "The DPP is an opposition party with experience in governing." Some concluded that meant she could see the bigger picture, and would not revert to self-destructive policies of the Taiwan independence movement. ECFA however, has inspired the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen to revert to form. Tsai has totally blanked out the disastrous consequences her "two states theory" and her refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus had on cross-Strait relations. If anything, the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen have intensified their opposition to ECFA.
During the Lee and Chen era, not one day passed without Taiwan independence political maneuveurs leading to confrontation. For example, in 2000, Lee Teng-hui stumped for the Lien-Siew ticket. In order to appeal to supporters of "softcore Taiwan independence," he introduced his "two states theory." A few days later however, he publicly stated that "the two states theory would not be incorporated into the Constitution." In 2004, Chen Shui-bian launched his "anti-missile referendum," which later morphed into a half-baked "missile purchase referendum." In 2006, Chen Shui-bian launched his "end reunification" drive. As a result, Washington demoted his status during transit, and Ah-Bian enacted his "Journey to Nowhere" farce. In 2008, Ah-Bian launched his "referendum to join the UN," only to be publicly condemned by George W. Bush, and labeled a "Taiwan independence element" by the US State Department. Eventually the DPP lost power. The DPP's Taiwan independence tactics exhibit a common pattern. First, they experience a power crisis. Then they escalate their Taiwan independence rhetoric, digging themselves in deeper and deeper, to where they can no longer to turn back, can no longer brake, and wind up driving headlong into a wall.
The DPP's current tactics have followed the same pattern. At first they are unsure about how they should express opposition to ECFA. Tsai Ying-wen loses the debate over ECFA. Now she faces a power crisis. So she escalates her anti-ECFA rhetoric. She refers to the Republic of China as a "government in exile." She characterizes ECFA as a "duet between the KMT and the CCP," and a "class struggle between the rich and poor." She demonizes ECFA. But ECFA is signed, and when its contents are announced, the DPP's demonization campaign backfires. By now however, it is too late to turn back, it is too late to apply the brakes. Therefore they insist that ECFA is "not a treaty," they demand a "line item review," and begin scorched earth resistance tactics. They simultaneously launch a referendum campaign, sinking deeper and deeper in their own quagmire. They find themselves riding a tiger, and unable to get off. They find themselves swimming against the tide, unable to repudiate their anti-ECFA stance in order to win the five cities elections. They may not even be able to reverse their anti-ECFA stance for the 2012 presidential election. They may even find themselves forced to invoke Article XVI and proclaim that ECFA is invalid. The DPP and Tsai Ing-wen are now stuck to their own anti-ECFA tar baby. Under the circumstances, how can the DPP possibility undergo transformation?
Tsai Ing-wen takes a back seat to no one in the DPP when it comes to cross-Strait policy. After all, during her two terms in the Lee and Chen regimes, she racked up considerable hands-on experience in cross-Strait policy. Some people concluded that the tragic consequences of her two states theory" and repudiation of the 1992 Consensus gave Tsai Ing-wen all the more reason to transform the DPP. After all, she clearly knew Taiwan independence was a dead end. Her hands-on experience was painful and unforgettable. When Tsai Ing-wen was first elected party chairman, some of her words and deeds seemed to suggest a desire to transform the party. Who knew the ECFA controversy, followed by a power struggle within the DPP over the party's future, would persuade in Tsai Ing-wen to revert to the DPP's Taiwan independence, scorched earth path?
Within a single lifetime, Tsai Ying-wen led Taiwan to ruin three times. This may end up being Tsai Ing-wen's epitaph. Her "two states theory" spelled the end of the Lee Teng-hui regime. Her repudiation of the 1992 Consensus spelled the end of the Chen Shui-bian regime. Tsai Ing-wen is now holding high the anti-ECFA banner. She may enable the DPP to win the five cities elections. She may even enable the DPP to win the 2012 presidential election. But she cannot prevent Taiwan from running head on into a brick wall. Moreover, the consequences will be far more serious than the consequences of her "two-states theory" and her repudiation of the 1992 Consensus.
Tsai Ying-wen has erred, once, twice, thrice. Why is she unable to learn from her mistakes?
兩國論‧否認九二共識‧反ECFA
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.10
兩岸經濟協議（ＥＣＦＡ）簽訂後，民進黨面對新的政治局勢：一方面，兩岸關係已經超越了返折點，台獨已愈不可能；另一方面，民進黨追殺ＥＣＦＡ的政治操作，卻已煞不住車，無法從獨派路線上自我超脫。一句話說明：民進黨已與大局大勢南轅北轍，背道而馳。
二○○八年民進黨的慘敗，與蔡英文當選民進黨主席，曾經在社會上及民進黨內普遍引發一種幻想，認為那是民進黨跳脫台獨路線、轉型蛻變的契機。但是，經由ＥＣＦＡ的考驗，證明了民進黨已無可能從台獨路線跳脫，而蔡英文可能成為民進黨轉型領航者的想像亦告正式幻滅。這是ＥＣＦＡ對台灣政黨政治的重大影響，不容輕估。
無人可以否認，蔡英文是過去兩年民進黨可能轉型蛻變的寄託；如今卻證實她也因ＥＣＦＡ而走回焦土鬥爭的獨派路線，則民進黨轉型蛻變的想像亦告完全破滅。其實，蔡英文在李登輝時代倡議「兩國論」，在陳水扁時代堅持「否認九二共識」，皆是造成李扁二任兩岸政策推車撞壁的主要原因；但當時蔡英文只是幕僚身分，許多人覺得她在成為黨主席後，應當有所調整，引領民進黨轉型蛻變。蔡英文原本說：「民進黨是一個有執政經驗的反對黨。」這句話被解讀成，能識大體，不會回到玉石俱焚的台獨鬥爭。但是，ＥＣＦＡ卻使民進黨及蔡英文回復原形，她儼然完全忘記「兩國論」及「否認九二共識」對兩岸關係造成的慘重創傷；民進黨及蔡英文此時操作ＥＣＦＡ的手法，實已變本加厲。
在李扁二任，台獨操作沒有一次不是推車撞壁。例如：二 ○○○年，李登輝為「連蕭配」輔選，想拉攏「輕獨」選民，推出「兩國論」，後來在幾天之內就公開表示「兩國論不入憲」；二○○四年，陳水扁發動「反飛彈公投」，結果卻成了虎頭蛇尾的「買飛彈公投」；二○○六年，陳水扁發動「終統」，結果美國降低過境禮遇，扁演出「迷航」的鬧劇；二○○八年，扁又發動「入聯公投」，被小布希公開譴責，國務院則逕指其為「台獨分子」，最後民進黨輸掉了政權。這些台獨操作皆呈現一種共同程序：發生權力危機→升高台獨操作→愈陷愈深，不能回頭，煞不住車→推車撞壁。
現在，民進黨對ＥＣＦＡ的操作又進入同一程序：一開始，對如何對抗ＥＣＦＡ，有些猶豫→蔡英文辯論落敗，出現權力危機→升高反ＥＣＦＡ操作→指中華民國是流亡政府→指ＥＣＦＡ是「國共唱和／貧富鬥爭」，將之妖魔化→ＥＣＦＡ簽成，公布內容，民進黨的「妖魔化」操作失敗→不能回頭，煞不住車→主張「不是條約」，堅持「逐條審查」，焦土抗爭→另一路又發動公投，愈陷愈深→騎虎難下，逆向操作，五都反ＥＣＦＡ煞不住車，未來二○一二大選反ＥＣＦＡ也下不了車，甚至可能被迫主張動用第十六條宣布廢約→民進黨及蔡英文被自己的「反ＥＣＦＡ」路線綑綁住→民進黨豈再有轉型蛻變的可能性？
蔡英文對於兩岸政策的鑽研，在民進黨中不作第二人想，畢竟她在李扁二任兩岸政策上皆真正具有第一線的「執政經驗」。有些人曾認為，「兩國論」的失敗，與「否認九二共識」的悲劇後果，皆是蔡英文較有可能引領民進黨轉型蛻變的理由；畢竟，明明已知此路不通，這種「執政經驗」自是創鉅痛深且刻骨銘心。蔡英文任黨主席之初，有些言行也顯得不無轉型蛻變的用心；詎料，一場ＥＣＦＡ爭議，伴隨著民進黨內的權力與路線鬥爭，蔡英文又將民進黨帶向愈陷愈深的台獨焦土路線上。
以一身而竟將台灣連續三次帶上絕路，這或許將成為蔡英文的人生碑記。兩國論，結束了李登輝政權；否認九二共識，結束了陳水扁政權；現在蔡英文又高舉反ＥＣＦＡ的大旗，或許她能因而使民進黨贏得五都選舉，及二○一二總統大選，但她恐怕終究避免不了再將台灣推車撞壁的下場。而且，屆時的後果，必較兩國論及否認九二共識更嚴重萬倍。
一而再，再而三，寧有此理？
Saturday, July 10, 2010
The DPP's Desire for Conflict has Wounded the ROC's Democracy
The DPP's Desire for Conflict has Wounded the ROC's Democracy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 10, 2010
Sure enough, physical violence erupted over the cross-strait economic framework agreement (ECFA) during an emergency session of the legislature. KMT Legislator Wu Yu-Sheng was hit in the head by an electric timer and left bleeding. After DPP Legislator Huang Wei-che, who threw the timer, offered an apology, the DPP delegation withdrew from the emergency session. But it continued making impossible demands, and prattled on about the "death of democracy" and "the biggest blot on the reputation of the legislature." The DPP refuses to admit that it undermined the dignity of the legislature, trampled on democratic values, and has been habitually unable to control its violent impulses.
Is the DPP truly unaware that violent behavior undermines its party image just as much as it undermined the dignity of the legislature? Julian Kuo is the spokesman for the DPP Legislative Caucus on ECFA. He said the DPP cannot win the current battle over ECFA, and should begin thinking about how it can establish an image of itself as a "tragic, heroic, but rational" political party. It should not persist in initiating physical violence. Instead, he said, "The DPP must think long and hard about how to deal with its imminent defeat."
Has the DPP thought long and hard? DPP Legislator Pan Meng-an revealed that those within the legislative caucus who oppose violence outnumber those who favor it. When interviewed, Ker Chien-ming, Executive Director of the DPP Policy Committee, said, "The ECFA controversy will not be allowed to persist until the five cities elections." In other words, the DPP knows full well that overdoing its protests will be extremely damaging to the party's image and to the party's effort to win over moderate voters.
The DPP should consider the potential impact on the upcoming elections. It should also consider the opinions of its own local level officials. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu recently visited Kaohsiung County. Spokesmen for the fish farming industry in Yung-an Township affirmed that ECFA was beneficial to fishermen and the fish farming industry. Tainan County Chief Su Huan-chih and Yunlin County Chief Su Chih-fen went to the Mainland to promote sales of agricultural products. Su Huan-chih declined to participate in the DPP's anti-ECFA protest march. He preferred to stay in Tainan and discuss the establishment of a Mainland base for the sale of Taiwan agricultural products. Even Ker Chien-ming spoke openly to the machinery industry. He said the DPP's protests helped Taiwan negotiate more benefits. But he added that the DPP had no objections to the 539 items on the early harvest list. It merely lamented the failure to win another 200 items. These views, expressed by DPP officials, show that the DPP cannot stubbornly insist that ECFA is harmful to Taiwan. If anything, the DPP must acknowledge that ECFA is more or less beneficial. That being the case, must the DPP persist in bloody violence before it is satisfied?
During ruling KMT and opposition DPP consultations, the DPP delegation demanded that President Ma report to the Legislative Yuan. But ECFA was not a treaty ratified by the president. Therefore there is no reason why he should be compelled to report to the legislature. Should the premier report to the legislature? That depends upon the Legislative Yuan, and whether it passes a resolution to that effect. But ever since the proceedings began, total chaos has prevailed. There has been no chance to discuss ECFA, let alone to listen to reports. How can one talk about any "early loss list?"
To be fair, it takes two to tango. During the recent violence in the legislature, Wu Yu-sheng was hit in the head and required eight stitches. But he was not the only one injured. Several DPP legislators fell from the podium. They may not have bled, but their contusions were just as painful. The opposition DPP's scorched earth tactics have proven effective in the past. They often brought the legislature to a standstill. KMT legislators had no choice but to respond in earnest, to prevent DPP legislators from approaching the podium and disrupting the proceedings. TV footage shows ruling party legislators on the podium and opposition party legislators below with stern expressions on their faces. But others had smiles on theirs. Were it not for the thrown timer, the entire altercation might well be dismissed as a vast charade.
After Wu Yu-Sheng was hospitalized, DPP legislators sneered, and accused him of "faking it." Huang Wei-che even denied that he was the one who injured Wu. Huang said he threw a book. But when the closed circuit video footage was made public, Huang Wei-che was forced to admit his guilt and apologize. Other DPP officials however, dug in their heels and continued protesting, accusing the KMT and President Ma of being "tyrannical behavior." But just exactly who was guilty of "tyrannical behavior?" Suppose a KMT legislator had thrown an electric timer and struck a DPP legislator? Would the DPP say the bleeding victim was "faking it?"
A nation's legislature is the benchmark of its democracy. The business of the legislature is to organize, discuss, and reach accomodations between differing views. People who hold differing views may not be able to persuade each other. But submitting to the majority decision is an unchanging principle of democracy. Besides, the DPP must not forget that although some industries on Taiwan may be negatively impacted by ECFA, most industries will benefit. And since the government has promised to compensate vulnerable industries, why can't the DPP view the matter from the perspective of maximizing the good, while minimizing the bad? Why can't it decide to oversee the government's measures, and do what it can on behalf of vulnerable industries?
The legislature must not be an ideological battleground. We may have Blue political parties and Green political parties. We may have pro-reunification parties and pro-independence parties. But public policy affects a nation's progress and the public interest. Cross-Strait policy is no exception. If every cross-Strait policy sent to the Legislative Yuan must be fought over, again and again, to where fists must fly and accusations that the other side is pro-reunification or pro-independence must be hurled back and forth, what hope is there for the nation? ECFA is a cross-Strait agreement. It is also a step Taipei must take during the globalization process in order to arrive at a level playing field. The DPP must put the interests and well-being of the majority of the people ahead of its party ideology. Only then can it win the public trust. No political party should seek victory by initiating physical violence.
民進黨的衝突欲望 撞傷台灣民主價值
2010-07-10
中國時報
果不其然，為了兩岸經濟架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ），立法院臨時會又大打一架，打到國民黨立委吳育昇流血，擲出記時器的民進黨立委黃偉哲道歉後，民進黨團決定退出臨時會，不過，還是強硬聲稱，「民主死亡，國會最大汙點。」民進黨依舊不願面對毀損國會尊嚴、踐踏民主價值的，其實正是他們永遠控制不了的衝突欲望。
民進黨難道不知：肢體衝突損害的除了國會議事的莊嚴性，還有他們的政黨形象嗎？民進黨ＥＣＦＡ因應小組發言人郭正亮直言，ＥＣＦＡ這場仗， 民進黨已經贏不了，該思考如何形塑「悲壯而理智」的形象，不該再製造爆衝，「要怎麼設定輸的場面，民進黨必須深思面對！」
民進黨沒有深思嗎？民進黨立委潘孟安透露，黨團內部「不打」的聲浪大過「打」。民進黨政策會執行長柯建銘受訪時也說，「不會讓ＥＣＦＡ議題燒這麼久，燒到五都選舉去。」換言之，民進黨太清楚，比例失衡的過度抗爭，對黨的形象、對爭取中間選民是大不利。
除選舉利害考量，更直接看看民進黨基層首長反應，高雄市長陳菊日前訪視高雄縣永安鄉石斑魚，肯定ＥＣＦＡ有利於漁民及養殖業；台南縣長蘇煥智和雲林縣長蘇治芬直接登陸推銷農產品，蘇煥智婉拒參與民進黨的反ＥＣＦＡ大遊行，寧可留在台南和業者商討如何建立台灣農產品行銷大陸的據點。包括柯建銘對機械等業界直言無隱，民進黨抗爭可為台灣爭取更多利益，而且民進黨對五百卅九項早收清單沒意見，只會對二百多項早損清單提出看法。從這些民進黨人的觀點和作為看來，民進黨其實無法硬生生地套說ＥＣＦＡ對台灣有害，甚至只能承認多少是有利的，既是如此，有什麼必要非打到頭破血流才罷手？
朝野協商時，民進黨團要求馬總統赴立院報告，但ＥＣＦＡ並非總統批准的條約案，沒道理強求總統赴國會報告。至於是否邀請行政院長報告，那得看立院全體議決，然議事程序一開始，場面立刻混亂，連討論空間都沒有，還聽取什麼報告？還談什麼關切早損清單？
持平而論，一個巴掌拍不響，這場國會衝突，受傷的不只是額頭流血縫八針的吳育昇，還有從議事台上摔落的民進黨立委，即使沒流血，皮肉之痛也夠嗆的了，但是，若非民進黨過去焦土抗爭策略頻頻奏效，讓國會議事嚴重遲滯，國民黨立委不可能採取全面防堵的戰術，不讓民進黨立委接近主席台。從電視畫面上看，主席台前後圍攏的朝野立委，有人神色慘烈，卻也不乏眉眼盡是笑意者，如果不是那個砸傷人的計時器，這場肢體衝突還有可能成為朝野累積相罵本的「消暑大秀」。
吳育昇送醫後，民進黨立委的反應是「嘜假了」，黃偉哲在第一時間甚至否認砸傷人的是他，說他砸出去的是書。當國會錄影帶公布後，黃偉哲倒不失正派地承認且道歉，但民進黨人依舊抗議，指國民黨和馬總統鴨霸，鴨霸的到底是誰？如今天砸出計時器的是國民黨立委，而受傷的是民進黨立委，民進黨做何反應？會說「嘜假了」嗎？
國會是民主政治的指標，國會議事就是整合、討論、協調不同意見的場域，不同見解有可能無法完全彼此說服，但服從多數決是基本不變的道理，更何況，民進黨不要忘記，即使台灣社會有部分產業會受到ＥＣＦＡ衝擊，但是，多數產業會因此得利，且政府已允諾會有配套措施輔助弱勢產業。民進黨為什麼不能從趨利避凶的角度，監督政府落實配套措施，也可為弱勢產業爭取到最大保障？
國會不該是意識形態的戰場，政黨容或有藍綠、統獨的分野，公共政策卻攸關國家社會發展和人民利益，包括兩岸政策亦然，如果任何兩岸政策送進立法院，都要一打再打，打到用拳頭標籤對方是統是獨，台灣還有何希望？ＥＣＦＡ是兩岸協議，也是台灣邁向全球化過程中，取得公平競爭利基必須走得一步，民進黨必須把台灣的利益、台灣多數民眾的福祉，擺在政黨意識形態之前，才能再取得民眾的信賴。打架，絕對不該是政黨爭勝的手段。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 10, 2010
Sure enough, physical violence erupted over the cross-strait economic framework agreement (ECFA) during an emergency session of the legislature. KMT Legislator Wu Yu-Sheng was hit in the head by an electric timer and left bleeding. After DPP Legislator Huang Wei-che, who threw the timer, offered an apology, the DPP delegation withdrew from the emergency session. But it continued making impossible demands, and prattled on about the "death of democracy" and "the biggest blot on the reputation of the legislature." The DPP refuses to admit that it undermined the dignity of the legislature, trampled on democratic values, and has been habitually unable to control its violent impulses.
Is the DPP truly unaware that violent behavior undermines its party image just as much as it undermined the dignity of the legislature? Julian Kuo is the spokesman for the DPP Legislative Caucus on ECFA. He said the DPP cannot win the current battle over ECFA, and should begin thinking about how it can establish an image of itself as a "tragic, heroic, but rational" political party. It should not persist in initiating physical violence. Instead, he said, "The DPP must think long and hard about how to deal with its imminent defeat."
Has the DPP thought long and hard? DPP Legislator Pan Meng-an revealed that those within the legislative caucus who oppose violence outnumber those who favor it. When interviewed, Ker Chien-ming, Executive Director of the DPP Policy Committee, said, "The ECFA controversy will not be allowed to persist until the five cities elections." In other words, the DPP knows full well that overdoing its protests will be extremely damaging to the party's image and to the party's effort to win over moderate voters.
The DPP should consider the potential impact on the upcoming elections. It should also consider the opinions of its own local level officials. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu recently visited Kaohsiung County. Spokesmen for the fish farming industry in Yung-an Township affirmed that ECFA was beneficial to fishermen and the fish farming industry. Tainan County Chief Su Huan-chih and Yunlin County Chief Su Chih-fen went to the Mainland to promote sales of agricultural products. Su Huan-chih declined to participate in the DPP's anti-ECFA protest march. He preferred to stay in Tainan and discuss the establishment of a Mainland base for the sale of Taiwan agricultural products. Even Ker Chien-ming spoke openly to the machinery industry. He said the DPP's protests helped Taiwan negotiate more benefits. But he added that the DPP had no objections to the 539 items on the early harvest list. It merely lamented the failure to win another 200 items. These views, expressed by DPP officials, show that the DPP cannot stubbornly insist that ECFA is harmful to Taiwan. If anything, the DPP must acknowledge that ECFA is more or less beneficial. That being the case, must the DPP persist in bloody violence before it is satisfied?
During ruling KMT and opposition DPP consultations, the DPP delegation demanded that President Ma report to the Legislative Yuan. But ECFA was not a treaty ratified by the president. Therefore there is no reason why he should be compelled to report to the legislature. Should the premier report to the legislature? That depends upon the Legislative Yuan, and whether it passes a resolution to that effect. But ever since the proceedings began, total chaos has prevailed. There has been no chance to discuss ECFA, let alone to listen to reports. How can one talk about any "early loss list?"
To be fair, it takes two to tango. During the recent violence in the legislature, Wu Yu-sheng was hit in the head and required eight stitches. But he was not the only one injured. Several DPP legislators fell from the podium. They may not have bled, but their contusions were just as painful. The opposition DPP's scorched earth tactics have proven effective in the past. They often brought the legislature to a standstill. KMT legislators had no choice but to respond in earnest, to prevent DPP legislators from approaching the podium and disrupting the proceedings. TV footage shows ruling party legislators on the podium and opposition party legislators below with stern expressions on their faces. But others had smiles on theirs. Were it not for the thrown timer, the entire altercation might well be dismissed as a vast charade.
After Wu Yu-Sheng was hospitalized, DPP legislators sneered, and accused him of "faking it." Huang Wei-che even denied that he was the one who injured Wu. Huang said he threw a book. But when the closed circuit video footage was made public, Huang Wei-che was forced to admit his guilt and apologize. Other DPP officials however, dug in their heels and continued protesting, accusing the KMT and President Ma of being "tyrannical behavior." But just exactly who was guilty of "tyrannical behavior?" Suppose a KMT legislator had thrown an electric timer and struck a DPP legislator? Would the DPP say the bleeding victim was "faking it?"
A nation's legislature is the benchmark of its democracy. The business of the legislature is to organize, discuss, and reach accomodations between differing views. People who hold differing views may not be able to persuade each other. But submitting to the majority decision is an unchanging principle of democracy. Besides, the DPP must not forget that although some industries on Taiwan may be negatively impacted by ECFA, most industries will benefit. And since the government has promised to compensate vulnerable industries, why can't the DPP view the matter from the perspective of maximizing the good, while minimizing the bad? Why can't it decide to oversee the government's measures, and do what it can on behalf of vulnerable industries?
The legislature must not be an ideological battleground. We may have Blue political parties and Green political parties. We may have pro-reunification parties and pro-independence parties. But public policy affects a nation's progress and the public interest. Cross-Strait policy is no exception. If every cross-Strait policy sent to the Legislative Yuan must be fought over, again and again, to where fists must fly and accusations that the other side is pro-reunification or pro-independence must be hurled back and forth, what hope is there for the nation? ECFA is a cross-Strait agreement. It is also a step Taipei must take during the globalization process in order to arrive at a level playing field. The DPP must put the interests and well-being of the majority of the people ahead of its party ideology. Only then can it win the public trust. No political party should seek victory by initiating physical violence.
民進黨的衝突欲望 撞傷台灣民主價值
2010-07-10
中國時報
果不其然，為了兩岸經濟架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ），立法院臨時會又大打一架，打到國民黨立委吳育昇流血，擲出記時器的民進黨立委黃偉哲道歉後，民進黨團決定退出臨時會，不過，還是強硬聲稱，「民主死亡，國會最大汙點。」民進黨依舊不願面對毀損國會尊嚴、踐踏民主價值的，其實正是他們永遠控制不了的衝突欲望。
民進黨難道不知：肢體衝突損害的除了國會議事的莊嚴性，還有他們的政黨形象嗎？民進黨ＥＣＦＡ因應小組發言人郭正亮直言，ＥＣＦＡ這場仗， 民進黨已經贏不了，該思考如何形塑「悲壯而理智」的形象，不該再製造爆衝，「要怎麼設定輸的場面，民進黨必須深思面對！」
民進黨沒有深思嗎？民進黨立委潘孟安透露，黨團內部「不打」的聲浪大過「打」。民進黨政策會執行長柯建銘受訪時也說，「不會讓ＥＣＦＡ議題燒這麼久，燒到五都選舉去。」換言之，民進黨太清楚，比例失衡的過度抗爭，對黨的形象、對爭取中間選民是大不利。
除選舉利害考量，更直接看看民進黨基層首長反應，高雄市長陳菊日前訪視高雄縣永安鄉石斑魚，肯定ＥＣＦＡ有利於漁民及養殖業；台南縣長蘇煥智和雲林縣長蘇治芬直接登陸推銷農產品，蘇煥智婉拒參與民進黨的反ＥＣＦＡ大遊行，寧可留在台南和業者商討如何建立台灣農產品行銷大陸的據點。包括柯建銘對機械等業界直言無隱，民進黨抗爭可為台灣爭取更多利益，而且民進黨對五百卅九項早收清單沒意見，只會對二百多項早損清單提出看法。從這些民進黨人的觀點和作為看來，民進黨其實無法硬生生地套說ＥＣＦＡ對台灣有害，甚至只能承認多少是有利的，既是如此，有什麼必要非打到頭破血流才罷手？
朝野協商時，民進黨團要求馬總統赴立院報告，但ＥＣＦＡ並非總統批准的條約案，沒道理強求總統赴國會報告。至於是否邀請行政院長報告，那得看立院全體議決，然議事程序一開始，場面立刻混亂，連討論空間都沒有，還聽取什麼報告？還談什麼關切早損清單？
持平而論，一個巴掌拍不響，這場國會衝突，受傷的不只是額頭流血縫八針的吳育昇，還有從議事台上摔落的民進黨立委，即使沒流血，皮肉之痛也夠嗆的了，但是，若非民進黨過去焦土抗爭策略頻頻奏效，讓國會議事嚴重遲滯，國民黨立委不可能採取全面防堵的戰術，不讓民進黨立委接近主席台。從電視畫面上看，主席台前後圍攏的朝野立委，有人神色慘烈，卻也不乏眉眼盡是笑意者，如果不是那個砸傷人的計時器，這場肢體衝突還有可能成為朝野累積相罵本的「消暑大秀」。
吳育昇送醫後，民進黨立委的反應是「嘜假了」，黃偉哲在第一時間甚至否認砸傷人的是他，說他砸出去的是書。當國會錄影帶公布後，黃偉哲倒不失正派地承認且道歉，但民進黨人依舊抗議，指國民黨和馬總統鴨霸，鴨霸的到底是誰？如今天砸出計時器的是國民黨立委，而受傷的是民進黨立委，民進黨做何反應？會說「嘜假了」嗎？
國會是民主政治的指標，國會議事就是整合、討論、協調不同意見的場域，不同見解有可能無法完全彼此說服，但服從多數決是基本不變的道理，更何況，民進黨不要忘記，即使台灣社會有部分產業會受到ＥＣＦＡ衝擊，但是，多數產業會因此得利，且政府已允諾會有配套措施輔助弱勢產業。民進黨為什麼不能從趨利避凶的角度，監督政府落實配套措施，也可為弱勢產業爭取到最大保障？
國會不該是意識形態的戰場，政黨容或有藍綠、統獨的分野，公共政策卻攸關國家社會發展和人民利益，包括兩岸政策亦然，如果任何兩岸政策送進立法院，都要一打再打，打到用拳頭標籤對方是統是獨，台灣還有何希望？ＥＣＦＡ是兩岸協議，也是台灣邁向全球化過程中，取得公平競爭利基必須走得一步，民進黨必須把台灣的利益、台灣多數民眾的福祉，擺在政黨意識形態之前，才能再取得民眾的信賴。打架，絕對不該是政黨爭勝的手段。
Friday, July 9, 2010
Is the DPP helping Taiwan, or the CCP?
Is the DPP helping Taiwan, or the CCP?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2010
The Democratic Progressive Party's cross-Strait policy contains a glaring paradox. It shrilly proclaims that the Chinese Communist Party is its main enemy, but in practice it confines its battles to the island of Taiwan. It has never demonstrated any intention of confronting its ostensible opponent on the opposite shore of the Taiwan Strait.
The DPP has obstructed cross-Strait exchanges, the recognition of Mainland academic credentials, and the exchange of personnel. On the surface, its goal is to safeguard Taiwan's interests. In practice however, it has merely bound Taiwan hand and foot, without touching a hair on the CCP's head. In fact the target of the DPP's attacks has always been the KMT. Long ago, it locked onto this "surrogate enemy." This spares it from the necessity of direct clashes with the CCP. No longer content to lash out at its "pseudo enemy," the Green Camp is now advancing the absurd argument that "to strike a blow against the KMT is to strike a blow against the CCP."
The DPP's obstruction of ECFA has brought the problem into clear relief. The DPP opposes the expansion of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. It speaks of a "One China Market," and characterizes it as an evil transaction harmful to Taiwan. But the question is, if one jettisons ECFA, will that help Taiwan, or harm Taiwan? The answer is clear. Without the Mainland as its hinterland, Taiwan will have a hard time finding alternative financing and markets. Without Taiwan however, the impact on the Mainland will be extremely limited. In other words, the DPP's obstruction of ECFA will only harm Taiwan. It will not harm Mainland China. The DPP has engaged in endless obstructionism. First they say they are doing it to help vulnerable industries. Then they say they are doing it to oppose a "One China Market." Just exactly why are they doing it?
The DPP knows perfectly well what it is doing it. As far as the DPP is concerned, ECFA is an island-based battle, unrelated to cross-Strait competition and confrontation. It is merely a struggle over short-term political interests, unrelated to Taiwan's survival or long term interests. The DPP waves a borrowed "anti-China" banner, to add a little excitement, to make the DPP's political charade appear high-minded. But with a little thought, the public should have little difficulty discerning the glaring contradiction between the DPP's words and deeds. The DPP is systematically weakening and hobbling Taiwan, while aiding its ostensible "evil enemy." As it hides behind its deceptive mask, the DPP fills the air with shrill proclamations about how much it "loves Taiwan."
The DPP may argue that as an opposition party it is merely providing checks and balances against the ruling party. But the DPP ruled for eight years, during which it imprisoned Taiwan behind locked doors. It played an endless string of games involving the "rectification of names," the "changing of names," and the removal and destruction of road signs. All of these were part of a hollow charade for internal consumption. None of these games ever struck a blow against the opposite shore. None of these games ever harmed a hair on Beijing's head. Instead, the DPP relentlessly attempted to instill fear in people's hearts. It insisted that an giant boogeyman lived on the other side of the strait. But it never crossed the sea to challenge this monster. It merely sat at home shouting "Oh how frightening!" The DPP never kicked the football toward the opponent's goal. It merely kicked the ball back and forth in front of its own goal. It never scored a goal. What's worse, it frequently mistook its own goal for the opponent's goal, and gave the opponent extra points.
The DPP's obstructionism undeniably provided the government with a little additional leverage during negotiations with the other side. It lent the government a few more bargaining chips. But when the DPP equates obstructionism with a philosophy of life, and a reason for living, then the results can only be counterproductive. The DPP's obstructionism will not help contain the CCP. It can only bind Taiwan, hand and foot. Therefore the DPP must redefine is cross-Strait policy. Its strategy and tactics are full of flaws, and require major changes.
The DPP behaves belligerently with the KMT. But when confronted with the CCP, it is "fierce of mien but faint of heart." Furthermore, its empty expressions of "love for Taiwan" contradict its rhetoric about bolstering Taiwan's economy. The DPP is about to unveil its "Platform for the Coming Decade." The DPP should think long and hard about what it intends to say and do. It should acknowledge its self-contradictory, bigoted attitudes. It should find within itself the wisdom and courage to confront its real opponent on the opposite shore.
The DPP has long pretended that by "striking a blow against the Blue Camp," it was "striking a blow against the Red Camp." But that game is getting old. The DPP needs to find a new game.
Su Chih-fen made has just returned from a trip to the mainland. She confessed that the more she saw how skillfully Mainland businesses were being managed, the more depressed she became. Chen Chu admitted that ECFA would be help Kaohsiung's fish farming industry. Su Huan-chih cast doubt on his own party's ambiguous stand on ECFA. He said "We should enter any market in which we can make a profit." The DPP opposes cross-Strait trade. Actually, that's fine. What matters is to be clear about Taiwan's future direction. The DPP can no longer point to the opposite shore and prattle on about boogeymen. It can no longer hide at home and demonstrate its bravado by engaging in internecine warfare. The DPP's behavior has reached the height of absurdity.
The DPP must find a way to bridge the yawning chasm between its "nativist" rhetoric and a sensible cross-Strait policy. At the very least, it must offer a convincing argument. The DPP lacks a strategy for Taiwan's economic growth. The DPP lacks the courage to confront the CCP directly. Unless the DPP can overcome these deficiencies, it will never be anything more than a gang of political refugees and thugs, whose only trick is to surround the podium in the Legislative Yuan.
民進黨在幫台灣，還是在幫中共？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.09 03:26 am
民進黨的兩岸政策，存在一個極大的悖論是：它聲稱中共是主要敵人，但在操作上卻把戰場完全侷限在台灣島內，根本無意也無法碰觸到彼岸的敵手。
亦即，民進黨杯葛兩岸經貿流通、學歷承認、人員交流等，表面上說是為了維護台灣的利益，實際上只是限制了台灣手腳的伸展，卻絲毫傷不了對岸的中共。以民進黨的打法，其纏鬥對象一向只是國民黨，鎖定這個「替代敵人」，即可不必親身和中共交手過招。諷刺的是，不僅綠營以打擊「假敵」為滿足；連藍營對其「打國民黨就等於打中共」的邏輯似也逐漸習以為常，這真是嚴重的錯亂。
看民進黨對ＥＣＦＡ的杯葛，此一問題便格外清楚。民進黨反對兩岸經貿擴大交流，指控「一中市場」是危害台灣的邪惡貿易；問題是，如果推翻ＥＣＦＡ，那是在幫台灣，還是在害台灣？答案很清楚：少掉大陸這個腹地，台灣很難找到可資替代的經貿市場；但大陸少掉台灣這一隅，影響卻極其有限。換句話說，民進黨力阻ＥＣＦＡ只會傷害台灣，卻傷不到中國。那麼，民進黨在台灣對此進行無休無止的杯葛，忽而說為了弱勢產業，忽而說為了反一中市場，到底目的何在？
民進黨其實心知肚明，對它而言，ＥＣＦＡ徹頭徹尾只是一場島內戰役，與兩岸的競爭或對峙無關。本質上，這也只是政治利益的短期爭奪，而無關台灣生存發展的長程思考。這樣的政治盤算，藉著「反中」大旗的助興，好像也唱出了一番高調；但民眾只要稍微認真思考，不難發現其言行間的偌大矛盾：民進黨正一步步在削弱、阻滯台灣，而助長他口中的「邪惡敵人」。掩蓋此一矛盾假象的，正是喊得漫天價響的「愛台灣」口號。
民進黨可能會辯稱：作為在野黨，當然只能對執政黨進行制衡。問題是，民進黨執政的八年，緊閉台灣大門，不斷玩弄正名、改名、拆銜牌等的花招，完全皆是供內部消費用的「假動作」，而從未真正出手觸及對岸，何曾動到北京一根汗毛？矛盾的是，民進黨不斷恐嚇台灣人民，說海峽對岸住著一個大妖魔；自己卻從來不跨海去挑戰怪物，只會坐在家裡高喊「恐怖喔」！這就好像足球比賽，不把球帶向對方的半場進攻，只在自己的球門前踢來踢去，不僅未曾得分，且常常誤進烏龍球給對手加分。這道理不是很明顯嗎？
不可否認，民進黨的政治杯葛，對馬政府與對岸的談判確能產生若干槓桿作用，可使我方爭取到更多籌碼。然而，當民進黨誤將杯葛當成自己全部的生命哲學及存在樂趣，其結果必然適得其反，不僅無助於牽制中共，反而只是羈絆了台灣自己的腳步。從這點看，民進黨不僅兩岸政策需要重新定位，其戰略及戰術運用也已破綻百出，有待大幅調整。
簡言之，民進黨對付國民黨，表現得好勇鬥狠；但面對中共，卻是色厲內荏。而且，它對落實建設台灣的力氣，也和它喊愛台灣的虛假熱情背道而馳。在即將公布「十年政綱」之際，民進黨必須先思考如何平衡所言與所行，誠實面對自己的矛盾和褊狹，並運用智慧和勇敢去面對彼岸真正的對手。
至少，民進黨以「打藍軍」偽裝成「打紅軍」的手法，已經招式用老，必須另起爐灶了。
蘇治芬去了一趟大陸，對於大陸企業經營手法的精幹自承「愈看愈沉重」；陳菊則承認，簽ＥＣＦＡ對高雄石斑魚業者很有幫助；蘇煥智則質疑黨的ＥＣＦＡ政策模糊，並說「賺得到錢的市場都要去」。民進黨反對兩岸貿易，其實無所謂；重要的是，它要想清楚台灣的出路何在，不能指著對岸說外頭有惡魔，卻又一味躲在家裡以打自己人顯威風。荒唐離譜，莫此為甚。
民進黨必須在本土論述和兩岸政策的偌大鴻溝間搭起跨度夠強的橋梁，至少要說出自己能信服的道理。否則，發展台灣無謀，對付中共又無勇，民進黨永遠只是一群包圍立法院主席台的政治遊民與暴徒而已。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2010
The Democratic Progressive Party's cross-Strait policy contains a glaring paradox. It shrilly proclaims that the Chinese Communist Party is its main enemy, but in practice it confines its battles to the island of Taiwan. It has never demonstrated any intention of confronting its ostensible opponent on the opposite shore of the Taiwan Strait.
The DPP has obstructed cross-Strait exchanges, the recognition of Mainland academic credentials, and the exchange of personnel. On the surface, its goal is to safeguard Taiwan's interests. In practice however, it has merely bound Taiwan hand and foot, without touching a hair on the CCP's head. In fact the target of the DPP's attacks has always been the KMT. Long ago, it locked onto this "surrogate enemy." This spares it from the necessity of direct clashes with the CCP. No longer content to lash out at its "pseudo enemy," the Green Camp is now advancing the absurd argument that "to strike a blow against the KMT is to strike a blow against the CCP."
The DPP's obstruction of ECFA has brought the problem into clear relief. The DPP opposes the expansion of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. It speaks of a "One China Market," and characterizes it as an evil transaction harmful to Taiwan. But the question is, if one jettisons ECFA, will that help Taiwan, or harm Taiwan? The answer is clear. Without the Mainland as its hinterland, Taiwan will have a hard time finding alternative financing and markets. Without Taiwan however, the impact on the Mainland will be extremely limited. In other words, the DPP's obstruction of ECFA will only harm Taiwan. It will not harm Mainland China. The DPP has engaged in endless obstructionism. First they say they are doing it to help vulnerable industries. Then they say they are doing it to oppose a "One China Market." Just exactly why are they doing it?
The DPP knows perfectly well what it is doing it. As far as the DPP is concerned, ECFA is an island-based battle, unrelated to cross-Strait competition and confrontation. It is merely a struggle over short-term political interests, unrelated to Taiwan's survival or long term interests. The DPP waves a borrowed "anti-China" banner, to add a little excitement, to make the DPP's political charade appear high-minded. But with a little thought, the public should have little difficulty discerning the glaring contradiction between the DPP's words and deeds. The DPP is systematically weakening and hobbling Taiwan, while aiding its ostensible "evil enemy." As it hides behind its deceptive mask, the DPP fills the air with shrill proclamations about how much it "loves Taiwan."
The DPP may argue that as an opposition party it is merely providing checks and balances against the ruling party. But the DPP ruled for eight years, during which it imprisoned Taiwan behind locked doors. It played an endless string of games involving the "rectification of names," the "changing of names," and the removal and destruction of road signs. All of these were part of a hollow charade for internal consumption. None of these games ever struck a blow against the opposite shore. None of these games ever harmed a hair on Beijing's head. Instead, the DPP relentlessly attempted to instill fear in people's hearts. It insisted that an giant boogeyman lived on the other side of the strait. But it never crossed the sea to challenge this monster. It merely sat at home shouting "Oh how frightening!" The DPP never kicked the football toward the opponent's goal. It merely kicked the ball back and forth in front of its own goal. It never scored a goal. What's worse, it frequently mistook its own goal for the opponent's goal, and gave the opponent extra points.
The DPP's obstructionism undeniably provided the government with a little additional leverage during negotiations with the other side. It lent the government a few more bargaining chips. But when the DPP equates obstructionism with a philosophy of life, and a reason for living, then the results can only be counterproductive. The DPP's obstructionism will not help contain the CCP. It can only bind Taiwan, hand and foot. Therefore the DPP must redefine is cross-Strait policy. Its strategy and tactics are full of flaws, and require major changes.
The DPP behaves belligerently with the KMT. But when confronted with the CCP, it is "fierce of mien but faint of heart." Furthermore, its empty expressions of "love for Taiwan" contradict its rhetoric about bolstering Taiwan's economy. The DPP is about to unveil its "Platform for the Coming Decade." The DPP should think long and hard about what it intends to say and do. It should acknowledge its self-contradictory, bigoted attitudes. It should find within itself the wisdom and courage to confront its real opponent on the opposite shore.
The DPP has long pretended that by "striking a blow against the Blue Camp," it was "striking a blow against the Red Camp." But that game is getting old. The DPP needs to find a new game.
Su Chih-fen made has just returned from a trip to the mainland. She confessed that the more she saw how skillfully Mainland businesses were being managed, the more depressed she became. Chen Chu admitted that ECFA would be help Kaohsiung's fish farming industry. Su Huan-chih cast doubt on his own party's ambiguous stand on ECFA. He said "We should enter any market in which we can make a profit." The DPP opposes cross-Strait trade. Actually, that's fine. What matters is to be clear about Taiwan's future direction. The DPP can no longer point to the opposite shore and prattle on about boogeymen. It can no longer hide at home and demonstrate its bravado by engaging in internecine warfare. The DPP's behavior has reached the height of absurdity.
The DPP must find a way to bridge the yawning chasm between its "nativist" rhetoric and a sensible cross-Strait policy. At the very least, it must offer a convincing argument. The DPP lacks a strategy for Taiwan's economic growth. The DPP lacks the courage to confront the CCP directly. Unless the DPP can overcome these deficiencies, it will never be anything more than a gang of political refugees and thugs, whose only trick is to surround the podium in the Legislative Yuan.
民進黨在幫台灣，還是在幫中共？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.09 03:26 am
民進黨的兩岸政策，存在一個極大的悖論是：它聲稱中共是主要敵人，但在操作上卻把戰場完全侷限在台灣島內，根本無意也無法碰觸到彼岸的敵手。
亦即，民進黨杯葛兩岸經貿流通、學歷承認、人員交流等，表面上說是為了維護台灣的利益，實際上只是限制了台灣手腳的伸展，卻絲毫傷不了對岸的中共。以民進黨的打法，其纏鬥對象一向只是國民黨，鎖定這個「替代敵人」，即可不必親身和中共交手過招。諷刺的是，不僅綠營以打擊「假敵」為滿足；連藍營對其「打國民黨就等於打中共」的邏輯似也逐漸習以為常，這真是嚴重的錯亂。
看民進黨對ＥＣＦＡ的杯葛，此一問題便格外清楚。民進黨反對兩岸經貿擴大交流，指控「一中市場」是危害台灣的邪惡貿易；問題是，如果推翻ＥＣＦＡ，那是在幫台灣，還是在害台灣？答案很清楚：少掉大陸這個腹地，台灣很難找到可資替代的經貿市場；但大陸少掉台灣這一隅，影響卻極其有限。換句話說，民進黨力阻ＥＣＦＡ只會傷害台灣，卻傷不到中國。那麼，民進黨在台灣對此進行無休無止的杯葛，忽而說為了弱勢產業，忽而說為了反一中市場，到底目的何在？
民進黨其實心知肚明，對它而言，ＥＣＦＡ徹頭徹尾只是一場島內戰役，與兩岸的競爭或對峙無關。本質上，這也只是政治利益的短期爭奪，而無關台灣生存發展的長程思考。這樣的政治盤算，藉著「反中」大旗的助興，好像也唱出了一番高調；但民眾只要稍微認真思考，不難發現其言行間的偌大矛盾：民進黨正一步步在削弱、阻滯台灣，而助長他口中的「邪惡敵人」。掩蓋此一矛盾假象的，正是喊得漫天價響的「愛台灣」口號。
民進黨可能會辯稱：作為在野黨，當然只能對執政黨進行制衡。問題是，民進黨執政的八年，緊閉台灣大門，不斷玩弄正名、改名、拆銜牌等的花招，完全皆是供內部消費用的「假動作」，而從未真正出手觸及對岸，何曾動到北京一根汗毛？矛盾的是，民進黨不斷恐嚇台灣人民，說海峽對岸住著一個大妖魔；自己卻從來不跨海去挑戰怪物，只會坐在家裡高喊「恐怖喔」！這就好像足球比賽，不把球帶向對方的半場進攻，只在自己的球門前踢來踢去，不僅未曾得分，且常常誤進烏龍球給對手加分。這道理不是很明顯嗎？
不可否認，民進黨的政治杯葛，對馬政府與對岸的談判確能產生若干槓桿作用，可使我方爭取到更多籌碼。然而，當民進黨誤將杯葛當成自己全部的生命哲學及存在樂趣，其結果必然適得其反，不僅無助於牽制中共，反而只是羈絆了台灣自己的腳步。從這點看，民進黨不僅兩岸政策需要重新定位，其戰略及戰術運用也已破綻百出，有待大幅調整。
簡言之，民進黨對付國民黨，表現得好勇鬥狠；但面對中共，卻是色厲內荏。而且，它對落實建設台灣的力氣，也和它喊愛台灣的虛假熱情背道而馳。在即將公布「十年政綱」之際，民進黨必須先思考如何平衡所言與所行，誠實面對自己的矛盾和褊狹，並運用智慧和勇敢去面對彼岸真正的對手。
至少，民進黨以「打藍軍」偽裝成「打紅軍」的手法，已經招式用老，必須另起爐灶了。
蘇治芬去了一趟大陸，對於大陸企業經營手法的精幹自承「愈看愈沉重」；陳菊則承認，簽ＥＣＦＡ對高雄石斑魚業者很有幫助；蘇煥智則質疑黨的ＥＣＦＡ政策模糊，並說「賺得到錢的市場都要去」。民進黨反對兩岸貿易，其實無所謂；重要的是，它要想清楚台灣的出路何在，不能指著對岸說外頭有惡魔，卻又一味躲在家裡以打自己人顯威風。荒唐離譜，莫此為甚。
民進黨必須在本土論述和兩岸政策的偌大鴻溝間搭起跨度夠強的橋梁，至少要說出自己能信服的道理。否則，發展台灣無謀，對付中共又無勇，民進黨永遠只是一群包圍立法院主席台的政治遊民與暴徒而已。
Thursday, July 8, 2010
ECFA: Ruling and Opposition Parties Should Return to Reason
ECFA: Ruling and Opposition Parties Should Return to Reason
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 8, 2010
Taipei and Beijing have signed the cross-strait economic framework agreement (ECFA). Once ECFA has been reviewed by the Legislative Yuan, the DPP should cease its obdurate opposition, and adopt a new and more rational attitude, by helping oversee ECFA.
Ever since ECFA negotiations began, the DPP has been obstinately opposed to it. It opposed it upon completion of negotiations. It opposed it when the early harvest list was announced. It opposed it even though the government negotiated favorable terms for our side. It opposed it even though Beijing made generous concessions. It opposed it even after internationally renowned financial experts affirmed its value. On this point at least, the DPP can claim the dubious distinction of "being consistent from beginning to end." Having mired itself in this "opposition to the bitter end" quagmire however, the DPP now finds it even more harder to fulfill its proper role as the loyal opposition providing legislative oversight.
In retrospect, the Democratic Progressive Party's justifications for opposing ECFA can be divided into the political and the economic. The political justifications it cited include concern for sovereignty. But if one pores over the text of ECFA, one cannot find a single word touching on politics or sovereignty. What can one say except that the DPP has scared itself and its supporters to death, for no reason.
The DPP cited many more economic justifications, but every one of them equally absurd. They failed to withstand careful scrutiny, and even contradicted one other. Early during negotiations, the DPP said ECFA would allow Mainland workers to flood the island, putting Taiwanese out of work. Even though the government repeatedly made clear that Mainland workers would not be permitted to work on Taiwan, the DPP continued to make this claim in their propaganda. Free trade agreements (FTAs) the world over direct themselves at goods and services. Services involve small numbers of high-end white-collar service positions. No FTA has ever opened up a nation's borders to unrestricted immigration. If the DPP is actually wringing its hands over such concerns, then it is ignorant beyond belief. If the DPP knows the truth but is deliberately deceiving the public, then it is unethical beyond belief.
The DPP says it is afraid that more vulnerable industries and workers will be harmed. That was why it opposes ECFA. But the DPP has simultaneously demanded that the government sign FTAs with European nations, the United States, Japan, ASEAN nations, and other major nations. It has even suggested that the government first sign FTAs with the United States and Europe, then sign ECFA with the Mainland. Clearly, the DPP is guilty of a gross contradiction.
All FTAs involve the two parties opening their markets to each other. Most FTAs make over ninety percent of their goods tariff free. Every economy will negatively impact some weaker, less competitive industries. But country A's comparatively weaker industry may be country B's comparatively stronger industry. During the bargaining process, some industries will be winners, and others will be losers. FTAs will eventually force weaker industries to face competitive pressures from abroad. Therefore, if the DPP's justification for opposing ECFA is to protect weaker industries, it ought to oppose FTAs. After all, the industries vulnerable to ECFA are the industries vulnerable to FTAs. If the DPP is urging the government to swiftly sign FTAs with other major nations, then the DPP's rhetoric is utterly incoherent and flatly self-contradictory.
During the Two Yings Debate, DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen issued a dire warning. She said that Hong Kong was experiencing a widening gap between rich and poor because of CEPA, and that ECFA would exacerbate the wealth gap on Taiwan. In fact during the past decade, the gap between rich and poor in all nations has continued to increase. The main reason is that with globalization the "winners circle" has gotten smaller. Governments have yet to compensate for changes in the domestic distribution of wealth. Taipei has yet to sign an FTA with any major nation, yet the gap between rich and poor has widened steadily over the past ten years. On the other hand, Japan has signed FTAs with many other nations, yet its domestic gap between rich and poor has not gotten worse. Obviously allegations that ECFA will lead to a widening gap between rich and poor is utterly beside the point. FTAs are merely one facet of globalization. Refusing to become part of the larger circle of globalization leads to greater losses, and makes economic growth even more difficult.
When ECFA was submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review, the DPP demanded a line by line review instead of a package review. Even then its justifications were utterly unconvincing. In 2007 the United States and South Korea signed an FTA. The U.S. Congress objected to the articles pertaining to U.S. beef and automobiles. As of today, the bill has yet to pass. But neither nation's legislators demanded a line by line review. If the FTA was unacceptable, they would simply have rejected it in toto. In fact ECFA is an FTA. If the DPP considers it a poorly drafted FTA, it can simply urge its rejection. Should an FTA be subjected to line by line review by members of the legislature? Should it be custom tailored according to the whims of individual legilslators? Should even the early harvest list be subjected to a vote? In one's dreams maybe, but not the real world. If one is willing only to approve what is to one's benefit, and unwilling to approve anything that is not, who is going to be willing to negotiate with you?
When addressing ECFA, the DPP should not blindly play the role of naysayer. Instead, it should adopt a more active and constructive role. For example, once ECFA comes into force, it will inevitably harm some domestic industries. When the government comes up with a budget providing relief for victimized industries, the DPP should to play a more professional role. It should help determine the appropriate compensation, instead of indulging in demogogic obstructionism. Such antics do a disservice to society and the public, to the vulnerable industries and workers the DPP purports to care so much about, and even to the DPP itself.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.08
看待ECFA 在野黨應回歸理性專業
本報訊
在兩岸正式簽署兩岸經濟架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ），同時ＥＣＦＡ也在立法院審議後，民進黨是應該改變過去全力反對的立場，而是以新的態度面對，理性的監督ＥＣＦＡ。
民進黨從洽商ＥＣＦＡ開始，就一路反對；在完成洽商、早收清單公布，台灣有攻有守，大陸也實現了「讓利」，還是反對。甚至，在國際諸多財經大師肯定ＥＣＦＡ後，仍堅持反對態度。這點，倒算是「一路走來，始終如一」。但在陷入這種「誓死反對」的漩渦後，民進黨更難以在野黨的立場，扮演好監督角色。
回頭看，民進黨反對ＥＣＦＡ的理由可分政治與經濟面；政治面是擔心主權問題，但看看ＥＣＦＡ內文，從頭到尾無一字涉及政治與主權，只能說，這是自己嚇自己兼嚇唬人民。
而經濟方面的理由更多，但都荒腔走板，沒有一個禁得起分析，甚至彼此自相矛盾。在洽談初，民進黨說ＥＣＦＡ會開放大陸勞工來台工作，台灣人都沒工作；即使政府再三澄清強調，絕對不會開放大陸勞工來台，民進黨還是拿此項目作宣傳。更何況，全世界的自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ），談的貿易是貨品與服務，而服務則是少數高階白領的服務業，從來就沒有一個ＦＴＡ，是開放讓另一國的勞工無限制的入境工作。民進黨如果真有此擔心，是無知了。如果知道實情卻仍蓄意以此欺騙社會大眾，那就是不道德了。
民進黨也說擔心弱勢產業與勞工受傷，因此要反對ＥＣＦＡ。但我們也同時聽到民進黨要求政府儘快與其它歐、美、日、東協等主要國家簽ＦＴＡ，甚至提出該先與美、歐先簽ＦＴＡ，再來與大陸簽ＥＣＦＡ的看法。但這兩者間存在著本質上嚴重的矛盾。
所有ＦＴＡ都是雙方彼此開放市場給對方，多數是把九成以上的貨品降到零關稅。每個經濟體必然有較弱勢、較不具競爭力的產業。但Ａ國的相對弱勢產業，很可能就是Ｂ國相對強勢產業，談判過程必然有得有失，ＦＴＡ最後必定造成部分弱勢產業必須面對更國外更大競爭壓力。因此，如果民進黨反對ＥＣＦＡ的重要理由是為國內弱勢產業發聲，坦白說，就該反對所有的ＦＴＡ─因為弱勢產業就是那些產業，但民進黨卻又催促政府趕快與其它主要國家簽ＦＴＡ。民進黨的主張，可說前言不對後語，夠矛盾的。
此外，雙英辯論中，民進黨主席蔡英文提出警語，說香港因為ＣＥＰＡ而拉大貧富差距，ＥＣＦＡ也會加劇台灣的貧富差距。但事實上近十多年來，全球各國貧富差距不斷擴大，其主要成因在全球化帶來的「贏者圈」變小，各國政府又未在國內分配上作調整所致。台灣未與任何主要國家簽署ＦＴＡ，這十多年來，貧富差距還是一路拉大；反倒是日本與許多國家簽署ＦＴＡ，但國內貧富差距狀況未惡化。顯然，說ＥＣＦＡ會導致國內貧富差距擴大，是未抓住問題焦點。ＦＴＡ只是全球化中的一個面相，但問題是不加入全球化的大圈圈，損失更大、經濟更難發展。
甚至到立法院審議時，對到底要包裹表決還是逐條表決，民進黨堅持的逐條表決，都毫無說服力。看看美國與南韓在二○○七年簽署ＦＴＡ後，因美國國會對美國牛肉與汽車的條件有意見，延擱至今未通過。可沒有那個國會議員說要逐條表決審議美韓ＦＴＡ；真是內容簽得不好，就完全不讓它通過。ＥＣＦＡ其實就是ＦＴＡ，民進黨認為簽得差，就主張不讓它通過即可。如果ＦＴＡ是靠國會議員逐條表決─或甚至如有些立委要求的，連早收清單都表決，那世界就太美了，如果大家只要通過對自己有利、否決對自己有害的項目，那以後誰還敢跟你談？
在ＥＣＦＡ的議題中，民進黨其實不該只扮演一味反對的角色，而是應選擇更積極而有建設性的角色。例如，ＥＣＦＡ生效後，國內必然有受損的產業，在政府編列損害救濟預算，及如何評估、發放損害救濟金上，民進黨應該能扮演更專業的監督角色。一味陷於民粹的反對，對社會、對民眾，對民進黨「念茲在茲」關切的弱勢產業與勞工，甚至對民進黨本身，都毫無益處。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 8, 2010
Taipei and Beijing have signed the cross-strait economic framework agreement (ECFA). Once ECFA has been reviewed by the Legislative Yuan, the DPP should cease its obdurate opposition, and adopt a new and more rational attitude, by helping oversee ECFA.
Ever since ECFA negotiations began, the DPP has been obstinately opposed to it. It opposed it upon completion of negotiations. It opposed it when the early harvest list was announced. It opposed it even though the government negotiated favorable terms for our side. It opposed it even though Beijing made generous concessions. It opposed it even after internationally renowned financial experts affirmed its value. On this point at least, the DPP can claim the dubious distinction of "being consistent from beginning to end." Having mired itself in this "opposition to the bitter end" quagmire however, the DPP now finds it even more harder to fulfill its proper role as the loyal opposition providing legislative oversight.
In retrospect, the Democratic Progressive Party's justifications for opposing ECFA can be divided into the political and the economic. The political justifications it cited include concern for sovereignty. But if one pores over the text of ECFA, one cannot find a single word touching on politics or sovereignty. What can one say except that the DPP has scared itself and its supporters to death, for no reason.
The DPP cited many more economic justifications, but every one of them equally absurd. They failed to withstand careful scrutiny, and even contradicted one other. Early during negotiations, the DPP said ECFA would allow Mainland workers to flood the island, putting Taiwanese out of work. Even though the government repeatedly made clear that Mainland workers would not be permitted to work on Taiwan, the DPP continued to make this claim in their propaganda. Free trade agreements (FTAs) the world over direct themselves at goods and services. Services involve small numbers of high-end white-collar service positions. No FTA has ever opened up a nation's borders to unrestricted immigration. If the DPP is actually wringing its hands over such concerns, then it is ignorant beyond belief. If the DPP knows the truth but is deliberately deceiving the public, then it is unethical beyond belief.
The DPP says it is afraid that more vulnerable industries and workers will be harmed. That was why it opposes ECFA. But the DPP has simultaneously demanded that the government sign FTAs with European nations, the United States, Japan, ASEAN nations, and other major nations. It has even suggested that the government first sign FTAs with the United States and Europe, then sign ECFA with the Mainland. Clearly, the DPP is guilty of a gross contradiction.
All FTAs involve the two parties opening their markets to each other. Most FTAs make over ninety percent of their goods tariff free. Every economy will negatively impact some weaker, less competitive industries. But country A's comparatively weaker industry may be country B's comparatively stronger industry. During the bargaining process, some industries will be winners, and others will be losers. FTAs will eventually force weaker industries to face competitive pressures from abroad. Therefore, if the DPP's justification for opposing ECFA is to protect weaker industries, it ought to oppose FTAs. After all, the industries vulnerable to ECFA are the industries vulnerable to FTAs. If the DPP is urging the government to swiftly sign FTAs with other major nations, then the DPP's rhetoric is utterly incoherent and flatly self-contradictory.
During the Two Yings Debate, DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen issued a dire warning. She said that Hong Kong was experiencing a widening gap between rich and poor because of CEPA, and that ECFA would exacerbate the wealth gap on Taiwan. In fact during the past decade, the gap between rich and poor in all nations has continued to increase. The main reason is that with globalization the "winners circle" has gotten smaller. Governments have yet to compensate for changes in the domestic distribution of wealth. Taipei has yet to sign an FTA with any major nation, yet the gap between rich and poor has widened steadily over the past ten years. On the other hand, Japan has signed FTAs with many other nations, yet its domestic gap between rich and poor has not gotten worse. Obviously allegations that ECFA will lead to a widening gap between rich and poor is utterly beside the point. FTAs are merely one facet of globalization. Refusing to become part of the larger circle of globalization leads to greater losses, and makes economic growth even more difficult.
When ECFA was submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review, the DPP demanded a line by line review instead of a package review. Even then its justifications were utterly unconvincing. In 2007 the United States and South Korea signed an FTA. The U.S. Congress objected to the articles pertaining to U.S. beef and automobiles. As of today, the bill has yet to pass. But neither nation's legislators demanded a line by line review. If the FTA was unacceptable, they would simply have rejected it in toto. In fact ECFA is an FTA. If the DPP considers it a poorly drafted FTA, it can simply urge its rejection. Should an FTA be subjected to line by line review by members of the legislature? Should it be custom tailored according to the whims of individual legilslators? Should even the early harvest list be subjected to a vote? In one's dreams maybe, but not the real world. If one is willing only to approve what is to one's benefit, and unwilling to approve anything that is not, who is going to be willing to negotiate with you?
When addressing ECFA, the DPP should not blindly play the role of naysayer. Instead, it should adopt a more active and constructive role. For example, once ECFA comes into force, it will inevitably harm some domestic industries. When the government comes up with a budget providing relief for victimized industries, the DPP should to play a more professional role. It should help determine the appropriate compensation, instead of indulging in demogogic obstructionism. Such antics do a disservice to society and the public, to the vulnerable industries and workers the DPP purports to care so much about, and even to the DPP itself.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.08
看待ECFA 在野黨應回歸理性專業
本報訊
在兩岸正式簽署兩岸經濟架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ），同時ＥＣＦＡ也在立法院審議後，民進黨是應該改變過去全力反對的立場，而是以新的態度面對，理性的監督ＥＣＦＡ。
民進黨從洽商ＥＣＦＡ開始，就一路反對；在完成洽商、早收清單公布，台灣有攻有守，大陸也實現了「讓利」，還是反對。甚至，在國際諸多財經大師肯定ＥＣＦＡ後，仍堅持反對態度。這點，倒算是「一路走來，始終如一」。但在陷入這種「誓死反對」的漩渦後，民進黨更難以在野黨的立場，扮演好監督角色。
回頭看，民進黨反對ＥＣＦＡ的理由可分政治與經濟面；政治面是擔心主權問題，但看看ＥＣＦＡ內文，從頭到尾無一字涉及政治與主權，只能說，這是自己嚇自己兼嚇唬人民。
而經濟方面的理由更多，但都荒腔走板，沒有一個禁得起分析，甚至彼此自相矛盾。在洽談初，民進黨說ＥＣＦＡ會開放大陸勞工來台工作，台灣人都沒工作；即使政府再三澄清強調，絕對不會開放大陸勞工來台，民進黨還是拿此項目作宣傳。更何況，全世界的自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ），談的貿易是貨品與服務，而服務則是少數高階白領的服務業，從來就沒有一個ＦＴＡ，是開放讓另一國的勞工無限制的入境工作。民進黨如果真有此擔心，是無知了。如果知道實情卻仍蓄意以此欺騙社會大眾，那就是不道德了。
民進黨也說擔心弱勢產業與勞工受傷，因此要反對ＥＣＦＡ。但我們也同時聽到民進黨要求政府儘快與其它歐、美、日、東協等主要國家簽ＦＴＡ，甚至提出該先與美、歐先簽ＦＴＡ，再來與大陸簽ＥＣＦＡ的看法。但這兩者間存在著本質上嚴重的矛盾。
所有ＦＴＡ都是雙方彼此開放市場給對方，多數是把九成以上的貨品降到零關稅。每個經濟體必然有較弱勢、較不具競爭力的產業。但Ａ國的相對弱勢產業，很可能就是Ｂ國相對強勢產業，談判過程必然有得有失，ＦＴＡ最後必定造成部分弱勢產業必須面對更國外更大競爭壓力。因此，如果民進黨反對ＥＣＦＡ的重要理由是為國內弱勢產業發聲，坦白說，就該反對所有的ＦＴＡ─因為弱勢產業就是那些產業，但民進黨卻又催促政府趕快與其它主要國家簽ＦＴＡ。民進黨的主張，可說前言不對後語，夠矛盾的。
此外，雙英辯論中，民進黨主席蔡英文提出警語，說香港因為ＣＥＰＡ而拉大貧富差距，ＥＣＦＡ也會加劇台灣的貧富差距。但事實上近十多年來，全球各國貧富差距不斷擴大，其主要成因在全球化帶來的「贏者圈」變小，各國政府又未在國內分配上作調整所致。台灣未與任何主要國家簽署ＦＴＡ，這十多年來，貧富差距還是一路拉大；反倒是日本與許多國家簽署ＦＴＡ，但國內貧富差距狀況未惡化。顯然，說ＥＣＦＡ會導致國內貧富差距擴大，是未抓住問題焦點。ＦＴＡ只是全球化中的一個面相，但問題是不加入全球化的大圈圈，損失更大、經濟更難發展。
甚至到立法院審議時，對到底要包裹表決還是逐條表決，民進黨堅持的逐條表決，都毫無說服力。看看美國與南韓在二○○七年簽署ＦＴＡ後，因美國國會對美國牛肉與汽車的條件有意見，延擱至今未通過。可沒有那個國會議員說要逐條表決審議美韓ＦＴＡ；真是內容簽得不好，就完全不讓它通過。ＥＣＦＡ其實就是ＦＴＡ，民進黨認為簽得差，就主張不讓它通過即可。如果ＦＴＡ是靠國會議員逐條表決─或甚至如有些立委要求的，連早收清單都表決，那世界就太美了，如果大家只要通過對自己有利、否決對自己有害的項目，那以後誰還敢跟你談？
在ＥＣＦＡ的議題中，民進黨其實不該只扮演一味反對的角色，而是應選擇更積極而有建設性的角色。例如，ＥＣＦＡ生效後，國內必然有受損的產業，在政府編列損害救濟預算，及如何評估、發放損害救濟金上，民進黨應該能扮演更專業的監督角色。一味陷於民粹的反對，對社會、對民眾，對民進黨「念茲在茲」關切的弱勢產業與勞工，甚至對民進黨本身，都毫無益處。
Wednesday, July 7, 2010
Even More Important is Keeping Our Roots on Taiwan
Even More Important is Keeping Our Roots on Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2010
ECFA has been signed. Taiwan's economic situation has now entered a new phase. This does not mean immediate tariff reductions on the 539 goods and 11 services our side negotiated. The other side's 267 products will soon run their course. Everything must wait until January 1 next year before taking effect. Tariffs will not be fully eliminated until late 2012. How will this transitional period differ from the previous one or two years?
Only one thing will be different. Before ECFA was signed, the Ma administration and the opposition DPP were engaged in a tug of war. To promote their agendas, one side painted an overly rosy picture. The other side resorted to political intrigue, electioneering sleight of hand, and ideological demagoguery in an all-out campaign to demonize ECFA.
That is all in the past. The two parties must immediately end their war of words. They must work on behalf of the nation and the people. The ruling and opposition parties must pursue the same goal. They must ensure that ECFA works to our full advantage, and reduce any ill effects to the minimum.
Green Camp politicians allege that ECFA will merely enrich the wealthy, widen the gap between rich and poor, and strengthen the strong while weakening the weak. Lee Teng-hui is screaming that ECFA will hollow out Taiwan's industrial base, and that people will starve. Such scenarios are alarmist and exaggerated. But they are scenarios those in authority must be prepared to deal with. The new economic situation may lead to inequities, and the government must ensure a smooth transition.
The gap between rich and poor may increase for three reasons. The first is the dumping of low cost products produced by cheap labor on Taiwan. Manufacturers on Taiwan may be forced to engage in desperate price-cutting. The second is changes in industrial structure. Capital-intensive and technology-intensive companies will profit handsomely. Traditional production-based SMEs will shrink endlessly. The former will hire fewer workers at higher wages, leading to the polarization of rich and poor. The third is tariff reductions, large scale liberalization, and industry-wide corporate relocations. These will lead to capital outflows, a brain drain, and the hollowing out of industry.
Of the three, the third is the most frightening, but also the least likely. For two decades, we have watched companies pick up stakes on Taiwan to relocate on the Mainland. The most critical factors are the lack of direct links, which increase transportation costs; too high tariffs, which reduce the competitiveness of exports when compared to Mainland products; and cheap and abundant Mainland labor, against which Taiwan simply cannot compete. Now, given direct links and ECFA, the first two reasons have ceased to exist. For upstream industries not reliant on cheap labor, the reason for relocation has also disappeared. The industrial chain on Taiwan is more complete. The service sector is stronger. The basic infrastructure is better. The rule of law is more deeply rooted. Upstream vendors who relocated earlier may well return. Cheap Mainland labor may tempt manufacturers. But the wave of Foxconn pay raises is rapidly diminishing this temptation. If the ROC government can plan a "special economic zone" as soon as possible, and establish an attractive economic and trade environment, what reason does it have to fear the hollowing out of Taiwan's economy?
Low cost Mainland products may force wage cuts in weaker Taiwan industries -- if the government does nothing. But low cost Mainland products are of notoriously poor quality. Taiwan manufacturers offer far better quality, creativity, and design. Given a level playing field, at home and abroad, we have a comparative advantage. The problem is that in the past the government did nothing. It allowed inferior quality brands, counterfeit brands, deceptive business practices, and "big box stores" to run amok. It allowed local goods to be squeezed out by inferior quality goods, leaving Taiwan manufacturers nowhere to go. Only recently has it responded properly.
In terms of industrial structure, those most likely to benefit from tax cuts and liberalization are highly competitive big businesses. Those most likely to be harmed are small and medium enterprises unable to engage in multinational operations. This is the biggest detriment to the equitable distribution of jobs and income. But the true strength of Taiwan lies in this group of SMEs. The Ma administration should make timely use of its 95 billion in capital. It should support and promote tens of thousands of promising small and medium enterprises. If the scale of these businesses can be doubled, hundreds of thousands of new jobs can be created. Creating job opportunities is the best way to solve economic problems. It is the most important goal of economic development.
In short, ECFA does far more than solve problems for Taiwan companies. More importantly, it improves Taiwan's economic health. In other words, it benefits us not merely by "advancing into [Mainland] China." Even more importantly, it helps us keep our roots on Taiwan.
更重要的是根留台灣
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.07 02:34 am
ＥＣＦＡ完成簽署，台灣經濟情勢進入新階段。這並不意味我方的五三九項商品及十一項服務業立刻即可享受減免關稅，對方的二六七項產品也會馬上長驅直入；因為一切都要等到明年一月一日才開始發動，而且要遲至後年年底關稅方可降至零。然則，在這個過渡期間，與過去一、兩年有何不同？
真正的不同，只在一件事上：ＥＣＦＡ簽署之前，是馬政府與在野黨的拉鋸戰；一邊為了促其成功，將種種好處說得天花亂墜；另一邊則基於政治權謀、選戰操作，或是意識形態作祟，極盡可能地將ＥＣＦＡ妖魔化。
俱往矣。如今兩黨應當立刻結束口水戰，為台灣計、為台灣人民計，朝野只能追求同一個目標：讓ＥＣＦＡ創造的效益達到最大，而將一切衝擊、傷害，都可藉完善的對策未雨綢繆，降至最小。
綠營政治人物認為，ＥＣＦＡ將造成財富重分配、擴大貧富差距，使強者更強、弱者更弱；李登輝更高喊，ＥＣＦＡ將使台灣產業空洞化，許多台灣人民將會沒有飯吃。這些訴求或許危言聳聽，或許過度渲染，卻仍是主政當局必須面對的問題；務須做到縱然經濟新局會出現損益不平均的情勢，仍然能在政府的掌握下平順轉型。
其實，損益差距之可能擴大，不外三個原因：其一是對方廉價勞工的低價產品傾銷台灣，逼迫台灣產品走投無路削價以應。其二是產業結構改變，資本與技術密集的大型企業大獲利市，傳產型的中小企業則相形見絀，不斷萎縮；前者用人少而薪酬高，貧富乃朝向兩極發展。其三則為隨著關稅減免、大幅開放，企業群起外移，導致資金、人才大失血，產業空洞化。
三者之中，第三個原因最可怕，但也最不可能。因為二十年來，我們眼見大批台灣企業出走對岸，最關鍵的理由，無非是無法直航、運輸成本高昂；關稅太高、出口產品在對岸競爭力受挫；以及大陸勞工低廉而充沛，遠非台灣可及。但透過直航與ＥＣＦＡ，前兩個原因皆已不復存在，對那些不仰賴廉價勞工的中上游產業而言，外移理由已消失。相反地，由於台灣產業鍊完整而周密、周邊服務業強大、基礎設施優良，以及民主法治環境遠勝對岸，已經外移的中上游廠商還有可能回流。至於大陸廉價勞工對廠商的誘惑，隨富士康掀起加薪潮之後，正在快速降溫。倘若台灣能從速規畫「經貿特區」，建構近悅遠來的經貿環境，豈會空洞化？
至於台灣弱勢產業受低價大陸產品衝擊，迫使工資調降；若政府對此一無作為，的確可能發生。但大陸產品價低質差的名聲遠颺；台灣廠商的品質、創意、設計能力，都遠過於彼；只要放在同樣通路上公平競爭，在國內外，我們都有相對優勢。問題出在，長久以來政府的確一無作為，任由劣質品剪標、偽標，魚目混珠，而大賣場又唯利是圖，捨本土貨而就劣質品，使台灣廠商行銷無門。直到最近，才見到若干正確行動。
再就產業結構而言，減稅開放，最易獲利者當然是競爭力大增的大企業，最可能受創者多為無力跨國經營、自守一隅的中小企業，這對就業及所得分配最為不利。但台灣真正的實力，卻多潛藏在這一群中小企業之中。藉此時機，馬政府若能善用其九五○億資金，在中小企業中挑選數萬可造之才，全力扶持、提升，若其規模可因而倍增，新增的就業機會即可達數十萬。創造就業機會，是解決經濟問題的標本兼治之術，也是最重要的經濟發展目標。
總之，ＥＣＦＡ不止要解決「台商」的經營問題，更重要的是要改善整個「台灣」的經貿體質。也就是說，不只要從「前進中國」獲利，更要有利於「根留台灣」。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2010
ECFA has been signed. Taiwan's economic situation has now entered a new phase. This does not mean immediate tariff reductions on the 539 goods and 11 services our side negotiated. The other side's 267 products will soon run their course. Everything must wait until January 1 next year before taking effect. Tariffs will not be fully eliminated until late 2012. How will this transitional period differ from the previous one or two years?
Only one thing will be different. Before ECFA was signed, the Ma administration and the opposition DPP were engaged in a tug of war. To promote their agendas, one side painted an overly rosy picture. The other side resorted to political intrigue, electioneering sleight of hand, and ideological demagoguery in an all-out campaign to demonize ECFA.
That is all in the past. The two parties must immediately end their war of words. They must work on behalf of the nation and the people. The ruling and opposition parties must pursue the same goal. They must ensure that ECFA works to our full advantage, and reduce any ill effects to the minimum.
Green Camp politicians allege that ECFA will merely enrich the wealthy, widen the gap between rich and poor, and strengthen the strong while weakening the weak. Lee Teng-hui is screaming that ECFA will hollow out Taiwan's industrial base, and that people will starve. Such scenarios are alarmist and exaggerated. But they are scenarios those in authority must be prepared to deal with. The new economic situation may lead to inequities, and the government must ensure a smooth transition.
The gap between rich and poor may increase for three reasons. The first is the dumping of low cost products produced by cheap labor on Taiwan. Manufacturers on Taiwan may be forced to engage in desperate price-cutting. The second is changes in industrial structure. Capital-intensive and technology-intensive companies will profit handsomely. Traditional production-based SMEs will shrink endlessly. The former will hire fewer workers at higher wages, leading to the polarization of rich and poor. The third is tariff reductions, large scale liberalization, and industry-wide corporate relocations. These will lead to capital outflows, a brain drain, and the hollowing out of industry.
Of the three, the third is the most frightening, but also the least likely. For two decades, we have watched companies pick up stakes on Taiwan to relocate on the Mainland. The most critical factors are the lack of direct links, which increase transportation costs; too high tariffs, which reduce the competitiveness of exports when compared to Mainland products; and cheap and abundant Mainland labor, against which Taiwan simply cannot compete. Now, given direct links and ECFA, the first two reasons have ceased to exist. For upstream industries not reliant on cheap labor, the reason for relocation has also disappeared. The industrial chain on Taiwan is more complete. The service sector is stronger. The basic infrastructure is better. The rule of law is more deeply rooted. Upstream vendors who relocated earlier may well return. Cheap Mainland labor may tempt manufacturers. But the wave of Foxconn pay raises is rapidly diminishing this temptation. If the ROC government can plan a "special economic zone" as soon as possible, and establish an attractive economic and trade environment, what reason does it have to fear the hollowing out of Taiwan's economy?
Low cost Mainland products may force wage cuts in weaker Taiwan industries -- if the government does nothing. But low cost Mainland products are of notoriously poor quality. Taiwan manufacturers offer far better quality, creativity, and design. Given a level playing field, at home and abroad, we have a comparative advantage. The problem is that in the past the government did nothing. It allowed inferior quality brands, counterfeit brands, deceptive business practices, and "big box stores" to run amok. It allowed local goods to be squeezed out by inferior quality goods, leaving Taiwan manufacturers nowhere to go. Only recently has it responded properly.
In terms of industrial structure, those most likely to benefit from tax cuts and liberalization are highly competitive big businesses. Those most likely to be harmed are small and medium enterprises unable to engage in multinational operations. This is the biggest detriment to the equitable distribution of jobs and income. But the true strength of Taiwan lies in this group of SMEs. The Ma administration should make timely use of its 95 billion in capital. It should support and promote tens of thousands of promising small and medium enterprises. If the scale of these businesses can be doubled, hundreds of thousands of new jobs can be created. Creating job opportunities is the best way to solve economic problems. It is the most important goal of economic development.
In short, ECFA does far more than solve problems for Taiwan companies. More importantly, it improves Taiwan's economic health. In other words, it benefits us not merely by "advancing into [Mainland] China." Even more importantly, it helps us keep our roots on Taiwan.
更重要的是根留台灣
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.07 02:34 am
ＥＣＦＡ完成簽署，台灣經濟情勢進入新階段。這並不意味我方的五三九項商品及十一項服務業立刻即可享受減免關稅，對方的二六七項產品也會馬上長驅直入；因為一切都要等到明年一月一日才開始發動，而且要遲至後年年底關稅方可降至零。然則，在這個過渡期間，與過去一、兩年有何不同？
真正的不同，只在一件事上：ＥＣＦＡ簽署之前，是馬政府與在野黨的拉鋸戰；一邊為了促其成功，將種種好處說得天花亂墜；另一邊則基於政治權謀、選戰操作，或是意識形態作祟，極盡可能地將ＥＣＦＡ妖魔化。
俱往矣。如今兩黨應當立刻結束口水戰，為台灣計、為台灣人民計，朝野只能追求同一個目標：讓ＥＣＦＡ創造的效益達到最大，而將一切衝擊、傷害，都可藉完善的對策未雨綢繆，降至最小。
綠營政治人物認為，ＥＣＦＡ將造成財富重分配、擴大貧富差距，使強者更強、弱者更弱；李登輝更高喊，ＥＣＦＡ將使台灣產業空洞化，許多台灣人民將會沒有飯吃。這些訴求或許危言聳聽，或許過度渲染，卻仍是主政當局必須面對的問題；務須做到縱然經濟新局會出現損益不平均的情勢，仍然能在政府的掌握下平順轉型。
其實，損益差距之可能擴大，不外三個原因：其一是對方廉價勞工的低價產品傾銷台灣，逼迫台灣產品走投無路削價以應。其二是產業結構改變，資本與技術密集的大型企業大獲利市，傳產型的中小企業則相形見絀，不斷萎縮；前者用人少而薪酬高，貧富乃朝向兩極發展。其三則為隨著關稅減免、大幅開放，企業群起外移，導致資金、人才大失血，產業空洞化。
三者之中，第三個原因最可怕，但也最不可能。因為二十年來，我們眼見大批台灣企業出走對岸，最關鍵的理由，無非是無法直航、運輸成本高昂；關稅太高、出口產品在對岸競爭力受挫；以及大陸勞工低廉而充沛，遠非台灣可及。但透過直航與ＥＣＦＡ，前兩個原因皆已不復存在，對那些不仰賴廉價勞工的中上游產業而言，外移理由已消失。相反地，由於台灣產業鍊完整而周密、周邊服務業強大、基礎設施優良，以及民主法治環境遠勝對岸，已經外移的中上游廠商還有可能回流。至於大陸廉價勞工對廠商的誘惑，隨富士康掀起加薪潮之後，正在快速降溫。倘若台灣能從速規畫「經貿特區」，建構近悅遠來的經貿環境，豈會空洞化？
至於台灣弱勢產業受低價大陸產品衝擊，迫使工資調降；若政府對此一無作為，的確可能發生。但大陸產品價低質差的名聲遠颺；台灣廠商的品質、創意、設計能力，都遠過於彼；只要放在同樣通路上公平競爭，在國內外，我們都有相對優勢。問題出在，長久以來政府的確一無作為，任由劣質品剪標、偽標，魚目混珠，而大賣場又唯利是圖，捨本土貨而就劣質品，使台灣廠商行銷無門。直到最近，才見到若干正確行動。
再就產業結構而言，減稅開放，最易獲利者當然是競爭力大增的大企業，最可能受創者多為無力跨國經營、自守一隅的中小企業，這對就業及所得分配最為不利。但台灣真正的實力，卻多潛藏在這一群中小企業之中。藉此時機，馬政府若能善用其九五○億資金，在中小企業中挑選數萬可造之才，全力扶持、提升，若其規模可因而倍增，新增的就業機會即可達數十萬。創造就業機會，是解決經濟問題的標本兼治之術，也是最重要的經濟發展目標。
總之，ＥＣＦＡ不止要解決「台商」的經營問題，更重要的是要改善整個「台灣」的經貿體質。也就是說，不只要從「前進中國」獲利，更要有利於「根留台灣」。
Monday, July 5, 2010
Three Concepts Explaining the ROC and PRC: The Roof, the Glass, and Chopsticks
Three Concepts Explaining the ROC and PRC:
The Roof, the Glass, and Chopsticks
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 5, 2010
Some time ago, this newspaper devised a theoretical framework to explain the relationship between the Republic of China government in Taipei (ROC) and the Peoples Republic of China government in Beijing (PRC). We called it the Roof Theory, the Glass Theory, and the Chopsticks Theory. Now that ECFA has been signed, cross-Strait relations have taken another step toward this framework, which could be summed up as "A Glass and a Pair of Chopsticks under a Roof."
Let's start with the Chopsticks Theory. This is one of the suggestions we put forth over ten years ago, while the Lee Teng-hui administration was flip-flopping back and forth on cross-Strait policy. The Chopsticks Theory likens the Mainland and Taiwan to a pair of chopsticks. They cannot be bound together, i.e., reunified (in the near term), nor can they be separated, i.e., made independent. They need to be like a pair of chopsticks, as they are normally used. They must touch at certain points, but not at others. Only then they pick up food and scoop up rice. Only then can they fulfill their normal function as chopsticks. Back then, Beijing's main theme was "peaceful reunification" and "One Country, Two Systems." But it added "verbal attacks and military intimidation." On the Taipei side the mantra was "Avoid Haste, Be Patient." Taipei gradually entered the post-Lee Teng-hui era. The Chen Shui-bian regime gradually adopted a Taiwan independence line. Beijing would like to bind this pair of chopsticks together. Lee and Chen would like to separate them entirely. Both approaches prevent the chopsticks from functioning normally. Now however, we have entered the post-ECFA era. The main theme now is "peaceful development." Economically speaking, cross-Strait legal agreements enable this pair of chopsticks to function better. Politically speaking, the "1992 Consensus" and "One China, Two Interpretations" also enable this pair of chopsticks to function better. Cross-Strait relations are able to function like a pair of chopsticks. Some parts touch, others parts remain separate and are allowed to move about freely.
The Chopsticks Theory is premised upon the Glass Theory. The general thrust of the Glass Theory is that Taiwan is the water. while the Republic of China is the glass. As long as glass remains, the water remains. As soon as the glass is shattered, the water is scattered. Beijing once tried to eliminate the Republic of China. Meanwhile, the primary justification cited by the Taiwan independence movement for overthrowing the Republic of China was that Beijing would not tolerate the Republic of China's continued existence. Its argument was that since the Republic of China glass was no longer viable, it must be replaced with a "Nation of Taiwan" glass. We have now entered the post-ECFA era. The biggest change in cross-Strait relations is that Beijing has gradually changed its policy from "destroy the Republic of China" to "do not repudiate the Republic of China." Obviously it has realized that without the Republic of China glass it will not be able to hang on to Taiwan, and the cross-Strait situation will spiral out of control. Beijing has gone from denying the 1992 Consensus to accepting it. It has also refrained from publicly denying Taipei's "One China, Different Interpretations" argument. This can be considered progress toward the Glass Theory. With the Glass Theory, the Republic of China's primacy has been upheld. We can talk about the Chopsticks Theory later.
Finally, we have the Big Roof Theory. The Chopsticks Theory encompasses both integration and separation. The Glass Theory tends toward separation. By preserving the primacy of the Republic of China. the Roof Theory tends toward integration. While proposing cross-Strait integration, we spoke of three kinds of roofs. The first is a hard roof. This is a political roof, and encompasses such terms as "reunification" and proposals for a "Chinese confederation." The second is a soft roof. This encompasses such terms as "the Chinese people" and "the two sides of the Strait are one family." The third is a resilient roof. It is not as hard as the hard roof. Nor is it as soft as the soft roof. It is neither hard nor soft, but somewhere in the middle. This resilient roof is ECFA. ECFA has legally reinforced the hard links between the two sides. But the primacy of the Republic of China is unlikely to be harmed. The glass remains. Also, we have significantly improved soft interaction between the two sides. The chopsticks work more efficiently. This resilient roof is better than both the hard roof and the soft roof.
The primary theme of the post-ECFA era is "peaceful development." This was the theme of the 2005 Lien Hu Summit. Permit us to quote this newspaper's comments on what cross-Strait relations ought to be in the post-ECFa era. We should de-emphasize goal orientation, which stresses reunification or independence. We should emphasize instead process orientation, which stresses synergy and a win/win scenario. The common goal of both sides should be to improve our mutually-shared goal through of a rational process.
ECFA is a resilient roof. It reduces the urgency of political solutions to cross-Strait problems. The key factor is that the Glass Theory has become an implicit cross-Strait understanding. Beijing has already changed its rhetoric from "The Republic of China is already defunct" to "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are still party of one China." This is another way of saying "One China, Different Interpretations." Cross-Strait interaction has been successfully institutionalized. Therefore it may become a nimble and responsive pair of synergistic, win/win chopsticks.
The Glass Theory is the core concept. The glass is a room under the roof of the Roof Theory. It is a single chopstick in the Chopstick Theory. Without the Glass Theory there can be no Roof Theory or Chopsticks Theory to speak of.
Cross-Strait relations today are like the glass or the chopsticks under the resilient roof. The authorities and public on both sides must cherish the new opportunities the post-ECFA era offers. For the sake of world civilization, human history, and cross-Strait relations, they must develop a model for "peaceful development." They must use a rational process to discover a better goal.
兩岸三論：巧屋頂下的杯子與筷子
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.05 01:53 am
後ECFA的兩岸新情勢，若用本報長期對兩岸關係的評論體系來說，可謂是又向「屋頂理論」、「杯子理論」與「筷子理論」更加趨近一大步。若作成口訣，可以說成：巧屋頂下的一只杯子與一雙筷子。
先談筷子理論。這是十餘年前在李登輝政府對兩岸政策擺盪不定之際，我們所提出的建言。大陸與台灣像一雙筷子，不能綁在一起（統一），也不能切分兩處（獨立）；應當像我們平常使用的一雙筷子那般，有些地方「合」，有些地方「分」，才能挾菜扒飯，發揮筷子正常操作的功效。在那個時候，北京方面的主調是「和平統一／一國兩制」，加上「文攻武嚇」；台灣方面則是「戒急用忍」，且逐漸進入李登輝政府後期及陳水扁政府的台獨路線。北京想把這雙筷子綁在一起，李扁則欲將之拆成兩邊；這兩種辦法，皆使這雙筷子無法正常操作。如今，進入後ECFA時代，改以「和平發展」為主調；這雙筷子，因法制化的兩岸協議，在經濟互動上更密切（合），又因「九二共識／一中各表」亦在政治區隔上更穩定（分）；也就使得兩岸關係更像我們平常使用的一雙筷子，有分有合，靈動自如。
筷子理論需以杯子理論為前提。杯子理論的大意是：「台灣」是水，「中華民國」是杯子；杯在水在，杯破水覆。過去，北京欲消滅中華民國，台獨也要顛覆中華民國；而台獨主張顛覆中華民國的主要理由，是因為北京不容中華民國存在。台獨的說法是，中華民國這只杯子既然保不住，就另換一只「台灣國」的杯子。如今，進入後ECFA時代，兩岸關係的最大變化，就是北京的政策從「消滅中華民國」，逐漸轉變成「不否認中華民國」；顯已認知，沒有「中華民國」這只杯子，就保不住「台灣」，兩岸情勢也必失控。北京從否認到接受「九二共識」，且未公開否定台北宣示的「一中各表」；這些皆可視為「杯子理論」的重要進展。有了杯子理論，台灣的主體性得以維護，然後始可言筷子理論。
最後談屋頂理論。就筷子理論的「有分／有合」而言，杯子理論傾向「分」，在維護中華民國的主體性；屋頂理論則傾向「合」，在主張兩岸的聯結性。我們曾說，「屋頂」有三種：一、硬屋頂，是政治性的屋頂，如「統一」或「中華邦聯」。二、軟屋頂，如「中華民族」、「兩岸都是一家人」。三、巧屋頂，不像硬屋頂那麼硬，也不像軟屋頂那麼軟，而是不硬不軟、軟硬適中；這個巧屋頂，就是ECFA。亦即，ECFA在法制上加強了兩岸的「硬聯結」，但台灣的主體性不因此受傷（杯子仍在），且又大幅提升了兩岸的「軟互動」（筷子的功效更佳）；這誠然是比硬屋頂、軟屋頂都好的巧屋頂。
後ECFA時代的兩岸主題是「和平發展」，這是2005年「連胡會」定的調。若再用本報對兩岸關係的評論體系來說，後ECFA時代，也應當是一個「目的論」（強調統獨）下降，「過程論」（強調互動雙贏）上升的時代；兩岸共同努力的目標應當是：經由「合理的過程」，邁向「改善之目的」。
ECFA是一座「巧屋頂」，使兩岸的「政治解決」降低了緊迫性；其關鍵因素，則是因「杯子理論」成為兩岸默契，北京已從「中華民國已經滅亡」的論調，轉向「雖然尚未統一，仍是一個中國」，亦即以另一種修辭表達「一中各表」；亦因此，兩岸互動得以在法制化上順利邁進，有可能自此變成一雙靈動自如、共生雙贏的筷子。
相對而言，「杯子理論」是核心概念。「杯子」在「屋頂理論」中，就是有主體性的「一間房間」，在「筷子理論」中就是具主體性的「一隻筷子」。沒有「杯子理論」，也就沒有「屋頂理論」或「筷子理論」可言。
現今的兩岸關係，猶如在「巧屋頂」下的一只「杯子」與一雙「筷子」。兩岸當局及兩岸人民皆當珍惜這個後ECFA時代的兩岸新機遇，為世界文明、人類歷史及兩岸關係創造「和平發展」的典範，由「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」。
The Roof, the Glass, and Chopsticks
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 5, 2010
Some time ago, this newspaper devised a theoretical framework to explain the relationship between the Republic of China government in Taipei (ROC) and the Peoples Republic of China government in Beijing (PRC). We called it the Roof Theory, the Glass Theory, and the Chopsticks Theory. Now that ECFA has been signed, cross-Strait relations have taken another step toward this framework, which could be summed up as "A Glass and a Pair of Chopsticks under a Roof."
Let's start with the Chopsticks Theory. This is one of the suggestions we put forth over ten years ago, while the Lee Teng-hui administration was flip-flopping back and forth on cross-Strait policy. The Chopsticks Theory likens the Mainland and Taiwan to a pair of chopsticks. They cannot be bound together, i.e., reunified (in the near term), nor can they be separated, i.e., made independent. They need to be like a pair of chopsticks, as they are normally used. They must touch at certain points, but not at others. Only then they pick up food and scoop up rice. Only then can they fulfill their normal function as chopsticks. Back then, Beijing's main theme was "peaceful reunification" and "One Country, Two Systems." But it added "verbal attacks and military intimidation." On the Taipei side the mantra was "Avoid Haste, Be Patient." Taipei gradually entered the post-Lee Teng-hui era. The Chen Shui-bian regime gradually adopted a Taiwan independence line. Beijing would like to bind this pair of chopsticks together. Lee and Chen would like to separate them entirely. Both approaches prevent the chopsticks from functioning normally. Now however, we have entered the post-ECFA era. The main theme now is "peaceful development." Economically speaking, cross-Strait legal agreements enable this pair of chopsticks to function better. Politically speaking, the "1992 Consensus" and "One China, Two Interpretations" also enable this pair of chopsticks to function better. Cross-Strait relations are able to function like a pair of chopsticks. Some parts touch, others parts remain separate and are allowed to move about freely.
The Chopsticks Theory is premised upon the Glass Theory. The general thrust of the Glass Theory is that Taiwan is the water. while the Republic of China is the glass. As long as glass remains, the water remains. As soon as the glass is shattered, the water is scattered. Beijing once tried to eliminate the Republic of China. Meanwhile, the primary justification cited by the Taiwan independence movement for overthrowing the Republic of China was that Beijing would not tolerate the Republic of China's continued existence. Its argument was that since the Republic of China glass was no longer viable, it must be replaced with a "Nation of Taiwan" glass. We have now entered the post-ECFA era. The biggest change in cross-Strait relations is that Beijing has gradually changed its policy from "destroy the Republic of China" to "do not repudiate the Republic of China." Obviously it has realized that without the Republic of China glass it will not be able to hang on to Taiwan, and the cross-Strait situation will spiral out of control. Beijing has gone from denying the 1992 Consensus to accepting it. It has also refrained from publicly denying Taipei's "One China, Different Interpretations" argument. This can be considered progress toward the Glass Theory. With the Glass Theory, the Republic of China's primacy has been upheld. We can talk about the Chopsticks Theory later.
Finally, we have the Big Roof Theory. The Chopsticks Theory encompasses both integration and separation. The Glass Theory tends toward separation. By preserving the primacy of the Republic of China. the Roof Theory tends toward integration. While proposing cross-Strait integration, we spoke of three kinds of roofs. The first is a hard roof. This is a political roof, and encompasses such terms as "reunification" and proposals for a "Chinese confederation." The second is a soft roof. This encompasses such terms as "the Chinese people" and "the two sides of the Strait are one family." The third is a resilient roof. It is not as hard as the hard roof. Nor is it as soft as the soft roof. It is neither hard nor soft, but somewhere in the middle. This resilient roof is ECFA. ECFA has legally reinforced the hard links between the two sides. But the primacy of the Republic of China is unlikely to be harmed. The glass remains. Also, we have significantly improved soft interaction between the two sides. The chopsticks work more efficiently. This resilient roof is better than both the hard roof and the soft roof.
The primary theme of the post-ECFA era is "peaceful development." This was the theme of the 2005 Lien Hu Summit. Permit us to quote this newspaper's comments on what cross-Strait relations ought to be in the post-ECFa era. We should de-emphasize goal orientation, which stresses reunification or independence. We should emphasize instead process orientation, which stresses synergy and a win/win scenario. The common goal of both sides should be to improve our mutually-shared goal through of a rational process.
ECFA is a resilient roof. It reduces the urgency of political solutions to cross-Strait problems. The key factor is that the Glass Theory has become an implicit cross-Strait understanding. Beijing has already changed its rhetoric from "The Republic of China is already defunct" to "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are still party of one China." This is another way of saying "One China, Different Interpretations." Cross-Strait interaction has been successfully institutionalized. Therefore it may become a nimble and responsive pair of synergistic, win/win chopsticks.
The Glass Theory is the core concept. The glass is a room under the roof of the Roof Theory. It is a single chopstick in the Chopstick Theory. Without the Glass Theory there can be no Roof Theory or Chopsticks Theory to speak of.
Cross-Strait relations today are like the glass or the chopsticks under the resilient roof. The authorities and public on both sides must cherish the new opportunities the post-ECFA era offers. For the sake of world civilization, human history, and cross-Strait relations, they must develop a model for "peaceful development." They must use a rational process to discover a better goal.
兩岸三論：巧屋頂下的杯子與筷子
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.05 01:53 am
後ECFA的兩岸新情勢，若用本報長期對兩岸關係的評論體系來說，可謂是又向「屋頂理論」、「杯子理論」與「筷子理論」更加趨近一大步。若作成口訣，可以說成：巧屋頂下的一只杯子與一雙筷子。
先談筷子理論。這是十餘年前在李登輝政府對兩岸政策擺盪不定之際，我們所提出的建言。大陸與台灣像一雙筷子，不能綁在一起（統一），也不能切分兩處（獨立）；應當像我們平常使用的一雙筷子那般，有些地方「合」，有些地方「分」，才能挾菜扒飯，發揮筷子正常操作的功效。在那個時候，北京方面的主調是「和平統一／一國兩制」，加上「文攻武嚇」；台灣方面則是「戒急用忍」，且逐漸進入李登輝政府後期及陳水扁政府的台獨路線。北京想把這雙筷子綁在一起，李扁則欲將之拆成兩邊；這兩種辦法，皆使這雙筷子無法正常操作。如今，進入後ECFA時代，改以「和平發展」為主調；這雙筷子，因法制化的兩岸協議，在經濟互動上更密切（合），又因「九二共識／一中各表」亦在政治區隔上更穩定（分）；也就使得兩岸關係更像我們平常使用的一雙筷子，有分有合，靈動自如。
筷子理論需以杯子理論為前提。杯子理論的大意是：「台灣」是水，「中華民國」是杯子；杯在水在，杯破水覆。過去，北京欲消滅中華民國，台獨也要顛覆中華民國；而台獨主張顛覆中華民國的主要理由，是因為北京不容中華民國存在。台獨的說法是，中華民國這只杯子既然保不住，就另換一只「台灣國」的杯子。如今，進入後ECFA時代，兩岸關係的最大變化，就是北京的政策從「消滅中華民國」，逐漸轉變成「不否認中華民國」；顯已認知，沒有「中華民國」這只杯子，就保不住「台灣」，兩岸情勢也必失控。北京從否認到接受「九二共識」，且未公開否定台北宣示的「一中各表」；這些皆可視為「杯子理論」的重要進展。有了杯子理論，台灣的主體性得以維護，然後始可言筷子理論。
最後談屋頂理論。就筷子理論的「有分／有合」而言，杯子理論傾向「分」，在維護中華民國的主體性；屋頂理論則傾向「合」，在主張兩岸的聯結性。我們曾說，「屋頂」有三種：一、硬屋頂，是政治性的屋頂，如「統一」或「中華邦聯」。二、軟屋頂，如「中華民族」、「兩岸都是一家人」。三、巧屋頂，不像硬屋頂那麼硬，也不像軟屋頂那麼軟，而是不硬不軟、軟硬適中；這個巧屋頂，就是ECFA。亦即，ECFA在法制上加強了兩岸的「硬聯結」，但台灣的主體性不因此受傷（杯子仍在），且又大幅提升了兩岸的「軟互動」（筷子的功效更佳）；這誠然是比硬屋頂、軟屋頂都好的巧屋頂。
後ECFA時代的兩岸主題是「和平發展」，這是2005年「連胡會」定的調。若再用本報對兩岸關係的評論體系來說，後ECFA時代，也應當是一個「目的論」（強調統獨）下降，「過程論」（強調互動雙贏）上升的時代；兩岸共同努力的目標應當是：經由「合理的過程」，邁向「改善之目的」。
ECFA是一座「巧屋頂」，使兩岸的「政治解決」降低了緊迫性；其關鍵因素，則是因「杯子理論」成為兩岸默契，北京已從「中華民國已經滅亡」的論調，轉向「雖然尚未統一，仍是一個中國」，亦即以另一種修辭表達「一中各表」；亦因此，兩岸互動得以在法制化上順利邁進，有可能自此變成一雙靈動自如、共生雙贏的筷子。
相對而言，「杯子理論」是核心概念。「杯子」在「屋頂理論」中，就是有主體性的「一間房間」，在「筷子理論」中就是具主體性的「一隻筷子」。沒有「杯子理論」，也就沒有「屋頂理論」或「筷子理論」可言。
現今的兩岸關係，猶如在「巧屋頂」下的一只「杯子」與一雙「筷子」。兩岸當局及兩岸人民皆當珍惜這個後ECFA時代的兩岸新機遇，為世界文明、人類歷史及兩岸關係創造「和平發展」的典範，由「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」。
Thursday, July 1, 2010
Scandal Must Not Halt Biotech Development
Scandal Must Not Halt Biotech Development
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 1, 2010
Next week the Academia Sinica will hold its biennial members meeting. Veteran academics from home and abroad will gather. It will be a major event within the academic community. The Academia Sinica however has been dogged by misfortune for the past six months. A series of controversies have left it struggling to cope. Two months ago, the Academia Sinica attempted to develop a small plot of land belonging to Arsenal Number 202. Some environmentalists have accused it of encroaching on wetlands. It was eventually shown that the Academia Sinica Biotech Park was far removed from any wetlands. But by then an unfavorable atmosphere had already formed. putting future plans for a National Health Technology Park in doubt.
Then, last week, the director of the Academia Sinica Biomedical Institute became a suspect in a procurement scandal. He was interrogated, searched, and released on bail. This is probably the first time a member of the Academia Sinica has ever been a defendant in a criminal case. The incident has harmed the reputation of the institution. The case pertains to biotechnology and technology transfers. Therefore it has affected the prospects for Taiwan's biotechnology industry. This incident, along with the controversy over the aforementioned Arsenal Number 202 Biotechnology Park, may make the road ahead a bumpy one. This newspaper has commented on the Park environmental dispute. We now have some comments on the procurement scandal.
We have no desire to comment on the case per se. We merely wish to comment on the manner in which prosecutors and investigators have handled the case. The Academia Sinica is the Republic of China's foremost research institute. Being made a member of the Academia Sinica is considered the highest possible honor. Prosecutors and investigators made a great show of searching the institution, including members' laboratories. They seized evidence and leaked information to the press. This constitutes a violation of the prohibition against publicizing an ongoing investigation. It can also be considered prosecutorial excess. Consider the evidence seized. Couldn't the court have subpoenaed the Academia Sinica, asking it to provide information pertaining to technology transfers and industrial cooperation? Would the Academia Sinica really have dared to defy a court order? Would it really have refused to provide the information? Instead, prosecutors seized evidence. This implies that the suspect might destroy evidence. Why did prosecutors assume that an Academia Sinica scholar would stoop so low? Was there really no civilized way of dealing with the nation's foremost academic institution and its esteemed scholars? Were prosecutors eager to throw their weight around, to convey the thuggish message that "We are unafraid to prosecute anyone." Prosecutors have searched the media. They have searched the nation's foremost academic institute. They have leaked information to outsiders. When will we outgrow such Neanderthal handling of cases?
Secondly, we are concerned about the eventual impact of these cases on technology transfers and industrial cooperation. Keen observers note that research on Taiwan has borne considerable fruit. But it is wrong to credit decentralized industry research efforts alone. Chinese society traditionally regards scholarship as a lofty pursuit. It is not accustomed to technical cooperation between academia and industry. As a result, scholars on Taiwan are not accustomed to transferring the fruits of their R & D efforts to industry. Over a decade ago the "Basic Laws Governing Science and Technology" were passed. They finally established intellectual property incentives for technology transfers. But changing the culture of the research community on Taiwan is not easy. The "Basic Law Governing Science and Technology" has still left many technology transfer related concepts undefined.
We hope the outside world will judge the Academia Sinica technology transfers and procurement scandals on a case by case basis. We hope they will deal with systemic defects separately. Biotechnology industry R & D, follow-up industry research, and the eventual development of a marketable product, can take a decade or more. During this long gestation period, research institutes, researchers, manufacturers, and the government must interact with each other. The process involves information disclosure, the avoidance of conflicts of interest, rules for price negotiations, distinctions between new patent rights and old patent rights, investment returns on government subsidies, and other considerations. The more variables, the more complex the potential benefits.
Logically speaking, each step in the process should abide by international precedents, thereby establishing explicit norms which researchers may follow. Unfortunately, many areas remain a blank. Researchers have neglected to disclose information and avoid conflicts of interest. Even the authorities are still feeling their way through the fog. When the rulebook for the transfer of original R & D and technology remains a blank, then logically we must return to the Procurement Act. Once technological research is defined as conventional research, all sorts of legal disputes are inevitable. The good intentions of decentralized industrial R & D will also come to naught.
Taiwan's biotech industry has a rosy future. But the Academia Sinica faces many dangers and obstacles as it attempts to promote the biotech industry on Taiwan. Some, inevitably, will complain. For the sake of Taiwan's industrial future, we hope the Academia Sinica will not be negatively affected by the controversy over the Arsenal Number 202 Biotech Park and the Biomedical Procurement scandal. It must continue promoting biotechnology. It must overcome any and all difficulties. It must solve any and all problems. It must boldly confront any and all scandals. It must never allow repeated blows to forestall the development of the biotech industry.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.01
社論－別讓弊案影響生技產業推動
本報訊
中央研究院下周將召開兩年一度的院士會議，海內外學界大老將齊聚一堂，當然是一場學界盛會。但是，中研院最近半年似乎運氣不佳，先後出現了一些動見觀瞻的紛爭，讓該院疲於應付。兩個月前，中研院試圖開發的一小塊二○二兵工廠用地，被部分環保人士質疑侵犯濕地。雖然最後證實真正的溼地與中研院的園區用地之間相隔甚遠，但壓力氣氛已然形成，對將來國家生技園區計畫是否會有所衝擊，也在未定之天。
接著，則是上周中研院生醫所所長因涉入可能的採購弊案而被約談、搜索、交保；這大概是中研院院士有史以來首次以被告身分捲入刑事案件，對該院聲譽有相當的衝擊。由於這個案件與生技技轉有關，故事件的發展也對台灣生技產業的前景有所影響。此事與先前二○二廠生技園區建設一事合在一起，則不免令人憂心台灣生技產業的坎坷發展前景。對於生技園區的環保爭議，本報先前已做過評論；現在則要對前述採購弊案，提出一些看法。
我們在此不想對於這件個案的內容表示意見，但卻要對檢調辦案的程序做些評論。中央研究院是台灣最高的學術研究機關，中研院院士是華人學術圈最高的學術榮譽；檢調以大動作搜索該院與院士研究室、扣押證據、再洩露消息給媒體，不但違反偵察不公開，也有處置過當的嫌疑。就拿扣押證據來說吧：法院不能去函中研院，請其提供相關技轉或產業合作資料嗎？中研院膽敢違背法院命令，不提供資料嗎？既要「扣押」證據，就表示懷疑當事人會「湮滅」證據。檢察官為什麼會事前就懷疑中研院院士會低劣到湮滅證據呢？難道對於最高學術機關與學界清望人士，就沒有「文明」一點的辦案方式了嗎？還是檢察單位想要藉此立威，傳達「我們誰都敢動」這樣的粗魯訊息呢？檢調單位以前搜索媒體、現在搜索最高學術機構，再對外放話，這樣原始的辦案態度，什麼時候才能改進呢？
其次，我們對於此次案件對於爾後技轉與推廣產業合作的影響，也感到憂心。許多有識之士均指出；台灣的研究成果相當豐碩，但是將研究成果下放到產業的努力，則相對不足。華人社會傳統上將做學問視為清高的行業，不習慣學術界與產業界的技術結合。也因為如此，台灣學者甚少有將其研發成果下放產業的習慣。十數年前《科技基本法》通過之後，總算是對於智財權下放產生了一些誘因。但是，要改變台灣研究社群的風氣並不容易；《科技基本法》推動至今，還有相當多的技轉環節與概念，都還需要釐清。
不論中研院技轉、採購有無弊案，我們都希望外界能夠以「個案歸個案，制度歸制度」的態度，來看待此事。生技產業從研發成果、經後續加工研究、到最終產品上市，鑽研過程動輒超過十年。在這漫長的孕育過程中，研究單位、研究者、廠商、政府之間，必然有一系列的互動過程。這過程裡有資訊揭露的問題、有利益迴避的倫理、有價格協商的程序規範、有新增專利與舊專利之間的權益切割、有政府投資的報酬考量等；變數既多，潛在利益的切割也十分複雜。
照理說，上述這些過程中每個步驟都要參酌國外先例，做成明白清楚的規範原則，以便研究人員遵循。但是遺憾的是，國內在許多環節上都還一片空白，不但研究人員疏於揭露資訊與迴避利益，就連機關本身對許多事也都處於摸索狀態。當原應專屬於研發技轉的規範一片空白時，則所有的法律邏輯就回到處理一般事務的「採購法」。一旦「科研」又回歸「一般」，則不但種種法律爭議難以避免，也將使科技研發下放產業的美意落空。
台灣的生技產業有美麗的前景，但目前中研院推動台灣生技產業卻面對一連串的險阻，難免有些怨歎。為了台灣產業前景計，我們希望該院不要被二○二廠園區興建與生醫所採購疑案的荊棘所干擾，仍然要努力推動生技開發。有困難就排除困難，有問題就解決問題，有弊案質疑就勇敢地面對其質疑，千萬不要在種種打擊下，挫折了台灣生技發展的銳氣。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 1, 2010
Next week the Academia Sinica will hold its biennial members meeting. Veteran academics from home and abroad will gather. It will be a major event within the academic community. The Academia Sinica however has been dogged by misfortune for the past six months. A series of controversies have left it struggling to cope. Two months ago, the Academia Sinica attempted to develop a small plot of land belonging to Arsenal Number 202. Some environmentalists have accused it of encroaching on wetlands. It was eventually shown that the Academia Sinica Biotech Park was far removed from any wetlands. But by then an unfavorable atmosphere had already formed. putting future plans for a National Health Technology Park in doubt.
Then, last week, the director of the Academia Sinica Biomedical Institute became a suspect in a procurement scandal. He was interrogated, searched, and released on bail. This is probably the first time a member of the Academia Sinica has ever been a defendant in a criminal case. The incident has harmed the reputation of the institution. The case pertains to biotechnology and technology transfers. Therefore it has affected the prospects for Taiwan's biotechnology industry. This incident, along with the controversy over the aforementioned Arsenal Number 202 Biotechnology Park, may make the road ahead a bumpy one. This newspaper has commented on the Park environmental dispute. We now have some comments on the procurement scandal.
We have no desire to comment on the case per se. We merely wish to comment on the manner in which prosecutors and investigators have handled the case. The Academia Sinica is the Republic of China's foremost research institute. Being made a member of the Academia Sinica is considered the highest possible honor. Prosecutors and investigators made a great show of searching the institution, including members' laboratories. They seized evidence and leaked information to the press. This constitutes a violation of the prohibition against publicizing an ongoing investigation. It can also be considered prosecutorial excess. Consider the evidence seized. Couldn't the court have subpoenaed the Academia Sinica, asking it to provide information pertaining to technology transfers and industrial cooperation? Would the Academia Sinica really have dared to defy a court order? Would it really have refused to provide the information? Instead, prosecutors seized evidence. This implies that the suspect might destroy evidence. Why did prosecutors assume that an Academia Sinica scholar would stoop so low? Was there really no civilized way of dealing with the nation's foremost academic institution and its esteemed scholars? Were prosecutors eager to throw their weight around, to convey the thuggish message that "We are unafraid to prosecute anyone." Prosecutors have searched the media. They have searched the nation's foremost academic institute. They have leaked information to outsiders. When will we outgrow such Neanderthal handling of cases?
Secondly, we are concerned about the eventual impact of these cases on technology transfers and industrial cooperation. Keen observers note that research on Taiwan has borne considerable fruit. But it is wrong to credit decentralized industry research efforts alone. Chinese society traditionally regards scholarship as a lofty pursuit. It is not accustomed to technical cooperation between academia and industry. As a result, scholars on Taiwan are not accustomed to transferring the fruits of their R & D efforts to industry. Over a decade ago the "Basic Laws Governing Science and Technology" were passed. They finally established intellectual property incentives for technology transfers. But changing the culture of the research community on Taiwan is not easy. The "Basic Law Governing Science and Technology" has still left many technology transfer related concepts undefined.
We hope the outside world will judge the Academia Sinica technology transfers and procurement scandals on a case by case basis. We hope they will deal with systemic defects separately. Biotechnology industry R & D, follow-up industry research, and the eventual development of a marketable product, can take a decade or more. During this long gestation period, research institutes, researchers, manufacturers, and the government must interact with each other. The process involves information disclosure, the avoidance of conflicts of interest, rules for price negotiations, distinctions between new patent rights and old patent rights, investment returns on government subsidies, and other considerations. The more variables, the more complex the potential benefits.
Logically speaking, each step in the process should abide by international precedents, thereby establishing explicit norms which researchers may follow. Unfortunately, many areas remain a blank. Researchers have neglected to disclose information and avoid conflicts of interest. Even the authorities are still feeling their way through the fog. When the rulebook for the transfer of original R & D and technology remains a blank, then logically we must return to the Procurement Act. Once technological research is defined as conventional research, all sorts of legal disputes are inevitable. The good intentions of decentralized industrial R & D will also come to naught.
Taiwan's biotech industry has a rosy future. But the Academia Sinica faces many dangers and obstacles as it attempts to promote the biotech industry on Taiwan. Some, inevitably, will complain. For the sake of Taiwan's industrial future, we hope the Academia Sinica will not be negatively affected by the controversy over the Arsenal Number 202 Biotech Park and the Biomedical Procurement scandal. It must continue promoting biotechnology. It must overcome any and all difficulties. It must solve any and all problems. It must boldly confront any and all scandals. It must never allow repeated blows to forestall the development of the biotech industry.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.01
社論－別讓弊案影響生技產業推動
本報訊
中央研究院下周將召開兩年一度的院士會議，海內外學界大老將齊聚一堂，當然是一場學界盛會。但是，中研院最近半年似乎運氣不佳，先後出現了一些動見觀瞻的紛爭，讓該院疲於應付。兩個月前，中研院試圖開發的一小塊二○二兵工廠用地，被部分環保人士質疑侵犯濕地。雖然最後證實真正的溼地與中研院的園區用地之間相隔甚遠，但壓力氣氛已然形成，對將來國家生技園區計畫是否會有所衝擊，也在未定之天。
接著，則是上周中研院生醫所所長因涉入可能的採購弊案而被約談、搜索、交保；這大概是中研院院士有史以來首次以被告身分捲入刑事案件，對該院聲譽有相當的衝擊。由於這個案件與生技技轉有關，故事件的發展也對台灣生技產業的前景有所影響。此事與先前二○二廠生技園區建設一事合在一起，則不免令人憂心台灣生技產業的坎坷發展前景。對於生技園區的環保爭議，本報先前已做過評論；現在則要對前述採購弊案，提出一些看法。
我們在此不想對於這件個案的內容表示意見，但卻要對檢調辦案的程序做些評論。中央研究院是台灣最高的學術研究機關，中研院院士是華人學術圈最高的學術榮譽；檢調以大動作搜索該院與院士研究室、扣押證據、再洩露消息給媒體，不但違反偵察不公開，也有處置過當的嫌疑。就拿扣押證據來說吧：法院不能去函中研院，請其提供相關技轉或產業合作資料嗎？中研院膽敢違背法院命令，不提供資料嗎？既要「扣押」證據，就表示懷疑當事人會「湮滅」證據。檢察官為什麼會事前就懷疑中研院院士會低劣到湮滅證據呢？難道對於最高學術機關與學界清望人士，就沒有「文明」一點的辦案方式了嗎？還是檢察單位想要藉此立威，傳達「我們誰都敢動」這樣的粗魯訊息呢？檢調單位以前搜索媒體、現在搜索最高學術機構，再對外放話，這樣原始的辦案態度，什麼時候才能改進呢？
其次，我們對於此次案件對於爾後技轉與推廣產業合作的影響，也感到憂心。許多有識之士均指出；台灣的研究成果相當豐碩，但是將研究成果下放到產業的努力，則相對不足。華人社會傳統上將做學問視為清高的行業，不習慣學術界與產業界的技術結合。也因為如此，台灣學者甚少有將其研發成果下放產業的習慣。十數年前《科技基本法》通過之後，總算是對於智財權下放產生了一些誘因。但是，要改變台灣研究社群的風氣並不容易；《科技基本法》推動至今，還有相當多的技轉環節與概念，都還需要釐清。
不論中研院技轉、採購有無弊案，我們都希望外界能夠以「個案歸個案，制度歸制度」的態度，來看待此事。生技產業從研發成果、經後續加工研究、到最終產品上市，鑽研過程動輒超過十年。在這漫長的孕育過程中，研究單位、研究者、廠商、政府之間，必然有一系列的互動過程。這過程裡有資訊揭露的問題、有利益迴避的倫理、有價格協商的程序規範、有新增專利與舊專利之間的權益切割、有政府投資的報酬考量等；變數既多，潛在利益的切割也十分複雜。
照理說，上述這些過程中每個步驟都要參酌國外先例，做成明白清楚的規範原則，以便研究人員遵循。但是遺憾的是，國內在許多環節上都還一片空白，不但研究人員疏於揭露資訊與迴避利益，就連機關本身對許多事也都處於摸索狀態。當原應專屬於研發技轉的規範一片空白時，則所有的法律邏輯就回到處理一般事務的「採購法」。一旦「科研」又回歸「一般」，則不但種種法律爭議難以避免，也將使科技研發下放產業的美意落空。
台灣的生技產業有美麗的前景，但目前中研院推動台灣生技產業卻面對一連串的險阻，難免有些怨歎。為了台灣產業前景計，我們希望該院不要被二○二廠園區興建與生醫所採購疑案的荊棘所干擾，仍然要努力推動生技開發。有困難就排除困難，有問題就解決問題，有弊案質疑就勇敢地面對其質疑，千萬不要在種種打擊下，挫折了台灣生技發展的銳氣。
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