Su Chia-chuan's 400 Dollars and Su Tseng-chang's 400 Million DollarsUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 11, 2010
Election season has arrived. The candidates are issuing blank checks left and right. In Taichung, Su Chia-chuan promised that if he was elected, he would increase old age benefits from 1600 dollars to 2000 dollars. Other old age benefits would also be increased proportionately. Su Tseng-chang blasted Taipei City's garbage collection policy. He called for a stop to the sale of prepaid garbage bags, and vowed to distribute garbage bags for free.
DPP politicians have a penchant for issuing blank checks. It is among their nastiest habits. They have engaged in bidding wars over annual pensions and farm subsidies, and raised the ante on a whole range of benefits targeting selected voters. These will undoubtedly liven up the elections. But they will also turn democratic elections into a populist vote-buying contest. Over the past decade, the public has gradually begun to see through the "vote-buying via policy" racket. But the practice continues, unabated.
When Chang Wen-ying was in office, Taichung City issued old age benefits amounting to 2000 dollars. When Jason Hu came into office, as part of a larger effort to balance the budget, he reduced it to 1600 dollars. He reduced the amount by 400 dollars, but it was still 600 dollars more than the 1000 dollar amount for Taichung County. The amount was still high, but not without reason. Su Chia-chuan refuses to address the overall budget. Instead, he insists on increasing the ante. What is this, if not a calculated attempt to buy the senior vote, at 400 dollars per vote? The problem is, suppose he is elected and actually begins fufilling his campaign promises? Out of whose hide does he intend to extract his pound of flesh?
Su Chia-chuan has raised the ante for old age benefits. For Su, "cash is king." Whether his strategy will work, depends on the wisdom of Taichung citizens. Su Tseng-chang's proposal to eliminate prepaid trash bags in Taipei also reeks of short-sighted opportunism. From a policy perspective, it is a grave mistake, and reveals his superficial understanding of real life garbage collection methods.
Taipei City charges for garbage collection on a per bag basis. The city earns less than 400 million dollars a year from the sale of garbage bags. Su Tseng-chang argues that if one day the reduction of garbage volume reaches a point where the cost of garbage collection exceeds the income derived from the sale of garbage bags, the system will no longer be able to pay for itself. Therefore, Su reasons, garbage bags should be issued to the public free of charge! Su Tseng-chang's mistake is seeing only the city government's 400 million dollar income from the sale of garbage bags. He fails to see how the per bag charge mechanism provides a powerful incentive for citizens to engage in the proactive separation of garbage and reduction of garbage volume.
Ten years ago, before the implementation of prepaid garbage bags, Taipei City produced more than 3,000 tonnes of garbage per day. Ten years later, the amount of garbage produced per day is less than 1,000 tonnes, a 67 percent reduction. Such a huge change is almost magical. This is what the prepaid garbage bag regime can achieve. In order to reduce their own garbage collection expenses, each household makes an effort to separate their garbage and reduce the volume of their garbage. They do everthing they can to get the most use from each of their garbage bags. In other words, a simple price mechanism motivated individual citizens to work toward the greater good of the city as a whole. That is something the government can never accomplish with state power, no matter how much it might spend.
Taipei City's garbage collection regime is a model worthy of universal emulation, Not only has it succeeded in reducing the volume of garbage, even more importantly it has inspired the public to exercise discipline and restraint as it eagerly cooperates with government policy. Without prepaid trash bags, how could one possibly achieve such results? The separation of garbage and the reduction of garbage volume has made our nation's capital cleaner. It has increased environmental awareness among the public. That is why Taipei County and other counties and cities ought to adopt the very same policy.
When Su Tseng-chang was Taipei County Chief, he refused to coordinate with Taipei City by simultaneously implementing its progressive garbage collection regime. Su held Taipei County back in a major way. Now he is running for Taipei City Mayor. Lacking a proper understanding of how the garbage collection process works, he is promising to distribute garbage bags to the public free of charge. Does he really not understand that distributing garbage bags free of charge will undermine the financial incentive to do the right thing? That it will undermine public willingness to separate garbage and reduce garbage volume? That it would turn the clock back to the past? Su Tseng-chang considers 400 million dollars chump change. But he has overlooked the collateral benefits generated by the policy. They may well exceed 400 billion dollars. This is the blind spot in his logic.
A political candidate must explain his vision to the public. But targeting specific demographics, attempting to buy their votes by issuing blank checks, is base political opportunism and demeans the value of elections. Su Chia-chuan has raised the ante by 400 dollars. Su Tseng-change has raisd the ante by 400 million dollars. Their proposals may glitter like gold, but up close they are the same old base metal. One can only hope that most citizens in the 21st century have the eyes to see.
蘇嘉全的四百與蘇貞昌的四億
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.08.11 10:27 am
選季來臨，候選人的支票漫天飛舞。蘇嘉全在台中宣布，他如果當選，將把重陽敬老金從一千六百元提高為兩千元，其他老人福利也要比照北、高發放。蘇貞昌則批評台北市的垃圾處理政策，並主張未來停止垃圾「隨袋徵收」政策，改為免費發放垃圾袋。
喜歡開現金支票，似乎是民進黨政治人物的專長和癖好。從當年的老人年金，到老農津貼及各種名目的加碼比賽，對吸引特定選民、炒熱選情極有助益，卻也將民主選舉扭曲為可以「現金收買」的民粹操作。十年來，民眾已逐漸認清這類「政策賄選」的手法，但政治人物卻似仍樂此不疲。
張溫鷹時代曾發放兩千元的重陽敬老金，到胡志強時代減為一千六百元，是衡度台中市整體財政而作的調整。雖比過去少了四百，但比起台中縣的一千元，則多了六百，顯示這個金額並不低，也有其合理性。蘇嘉全不談整體預算，一味主張加碼，誰說這不是「四百元買一張老人票」的政治算計？問題是，如果他當選要落實承諾，增加的預算要從誰身上去拔毛？
蘇嘉全加碼敬老金，是一項「現金才是王道」的戰術；能否奏效，要看大台中市民的智慧。相形之下，蘇貞昌主張台北市取消垃圾隨袋徵收的政見，同樣充滿投機氣味，且從政策角度看，更犯了極嚴重的邏輯謬誤，暴露了他對垃圾處理機制的實際認識太過淺薄。
蘇貞昌的說法是：台北市垃圾處理費用是隨袋徵收，市府每年出售垃圾袋所得不過四億多元；一旦垃圾減量達到一個地步，光是賣垃圾袋的行政處理費用就將超過隨袋徵收的所得，形成「費不及費」的問題。所以，屆時，垃圾袋應改為免費發送。蘇貞昌的謬誤在：他眼中只看到市府出售垃圾袋的四億元年收入，卻沒有看到「隨袋徵收」機制如何激勵了市民積極投入分類、減量的無限潛力。
十年前，在實施垃圾隨袋徵收前，台北市每日要製造三千多公噸的垃圾量；如今，一天垃圾量僅剩一千多公噸，較當年減少了百分之六十七。如此偌大的變化，最神奇的按鈕，就是採取了垃圾隨袋徵收的制度。每家每戶為了撙節自己的垃圾費用，都主動進行垃圾分類、減量，讓自家每一個垃圾袋都達到最高效用。亦即，一個簡單的價格機制，觸發了個別市民的積極動機，終而達到了整體城市的「善」的目標，這是政府用公權力花再多代價都做不到的事。
今天，台北市的垃圾處理能成為世界各國仿效的典範，不僅在於它成功地減少了都會的垃圾量，更在於市民展現了高度的節制紀律與自我要求，對政策的樂於配合。若非垃圾隨袋收費，這樣的成績如何達成？而隨著分類減量，首都變得更清潔，市民培養出更強烈的環保意識，也因此才有台北縣等其他縣市跟進取法。
蘇貞昌當年擔任台北縣長，拒絕和北市同步實施具有進步意識的垃圾政策，讓台北縣起步慢了一大截；現在他為了選市長，又不明就裡地宣稱垃圾袋要免費發送。難道不知道：垃圾袋一旦變成免費，勢將破壞其「以費制量」的心理機制，削弱市民主動分類、減量的積極性，把故事又推回從前。蘇貞昌覺得四億元不過是個小錢，他卻輕忽了整個政策透過這四億產生的槓桿效益，可能四千億都不止，這是他的邏輯盲點。
向市民說明自己的執政願景，是候選人必須做的事；但用針對性的金錢支票來賄買特定選民，卻屬於惡質、投機的一類，把選舉廉價化了。蘇嘉全嘴裡四百元的加碼，或蘇貞昌眼中四億元的免費，金光閃閃，卻都是「老梗」，不知能否獲得廿一世紀多數市民的喝采認同？
Wednesday, August 11, 2010
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Yang Chiu-hsing: Forcing the DPP to Engage in Soul-Searching
Yang Chiu-hsing: Forcing the DPP to Engage in Soul-SearchingUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 10, 2010
Yang Chiu-hsing has resigned from the Democratic Progressive Party and is running for Kaohsiung Mayor as an independent. His move has forced the DPP to engage in soul-searching. It has led to changes in the DPP's party style and party line. He said, "We have chosen the way of the majority," and "We are taking the path of moderation." What he meant was that the DPP has turned its back on the majority and gone down the wrong path. The current round of self-reflection and debate will intensify as election fever increases. These developments can be evaluated from three different perspectives.
One. Election fairness. Yang Chiu-hsing felt the party primary process was unfair. He felt wronged and unable to get fair treatment. Two. Governing ability. He said he watched as Kaohsiung declined, and that left him deeply concerned. Three. The nation's future. He expressed conditional support for ECFA. He declared that he would take the middle path.
Consider the issue of election fairness. The major dispute between Yang Chiu-hsing and Chen Chu during the party primaries was billboards. Chen Chu was unhappy with billboards criticizing high unemployment in Kaohsiung. Yang Chiu-hsing said Chen Chu blamed him for billboards attacking her posted by Li Cheng-hsien. A review of the 2006 Kaohsiung Mayoral Election may be instructive. Chen Chu's campaign committee held a "per diem press conference," which led to a narrow 1114 vote victory over Huang Chun-ying. A first instance court ruled Chen Chu's election invalid. A second instance court ruled that Chen Chu's tactics were "controversial, but not coercive" and ruled in her favor. The ruling was controversial. Many observers considered Chen Chu's campaign tactics underhanded trickery. One has to ask, was Chen Chu "fair" to Huang Chun-ying? Was Chen Chu's victory "legitimate?"
The fact is, incidents of DPP dirty tricks during election season are too numerous to list. The DPP has been a major contributor to corrupt election practices on Taiwan. The 3/19 Shooting Incident in 2004 was so outrageous it shocked the world. Had Yang Chiu-hsing not lashed back so vehemently at such "trivia," who would have known the DPP primary process had become so unfair as to be intolerable?
Consider governing ability. Compare Yang Chiu and Chen Chu. Yang is more reliable. Chen is more agile. Yang's political achievements have been lauded repeatedly. They are not a matter of luck. He has been honored as a "five star" county chief four times. That is the result of dedication. It is especially noteworthy given that Kaohsiung County has far fewer resources than Kaohsiung City. Yang's governing ability is superior to Chen Chu's in many ways. But Chen Chu hitched a ride on the World Games. She demagogued visits by the Dalai Lama and Rebiyah Kadeer. As a result, her momentum surged. Yang Chiu-hsing kept his nose to the grindstone for nine long years. How do you think he felt? Those who sponsor fireworks displays and engage in populist demagoguery win greater public approval than those who keep their noses to the grindstone. Maybe this is why Yang Chiu-hsing was so indignant. Yang Chiu-hsing served as county chief for nine years. Is he really oblivious to the distinction between governing ability and rabble-rousing? By the same token, former blacklistee Hsu Tien-tsai served nine years as Tainan City Mayor. He had to sit tightlipped while Lai Ching-teh was catapulted into the Legislative Yuan. How do you think he felt?
The DPP ruled the central government for eight years via populist demagoguery. Its ability to engage in demagoguery far exceeds its ability to govern. Yang Chiu-hsing quit the party in protest. Do voters understand the difference between holding fireworks displays and demagoguing Rebiyah Kadeer on the one hand, versus governing ability on the other?
Finally, consider the nation's future. One cannot discuss infrastructure construction in Kaohsiung without discussing the nation's future. Kaohsiung was once the engine of the Republic of China economy. But the DPP now insists that Kaohsiung is a victim of policies that "favor the north at the expense of the south." The DPP seems intent on blaming all of Kaohsiung's ills on central government indifference, rather than on catastrophically mistaken local government conceptions about the nation's future. (One has to wonder whether the DPP's blame game includes the Chen administration, which after all, was in power for eight years?) According to international rating organizations, Kaohsiung City is a city in free fall. Its ranking among the top 500 cities of the world has plummeted from 77th place to 227th place. Among cities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, its ranking has fallen from 7th place to 10th place. Kaohsiung Harbor was once the world's third largest port. It is now the 13th. Yet Chen Chu has the chutzpah to speak to Kaohsiung voters about "a sense of joy and a sense of honor." Perhaps Yang Chiu-hsing find it incomprehensible. Perhaps he would like voters to awaken from their dream. He said Kaohsiung's potential is great, and can surely become a second Singapore. He has expressed conditional support for ECFA. He has declared his intention to take the middle road, and the path of moderation. The debate over the nation's future has long been a debate between Blue and Green. Perhaps Yang Chiu-hsing's moves will inspire deep soul-searching within the Green Camp. If so, voters who take part in the five cities elections may just get their money's worth.
As the DPP considers the issue of election fairness, it should reflect on the 3/19 Shooting Incident. As the DPP considers the issue of governing ability, it should reflect on its "eight wasted years." As the DPP considers the issue of the nation's future, it should reflect on how it careened down the road from the "Five Noes" to the "Rectification of Names and the Authoring of a New Constitution," and finally smashed into a brick wall. When the DPP points the finger at Yang Chiu-hsing, it should remember four fingers are pointing at itself.
楊秋興催動民進黨三個層次的自省
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.08.10 01:55 am
楊秋興退黨參選大高雄市長最重要的意義，是從民進黨內部觸動了自我反省的契機，帶動了黨內風格與路線的辯證。他說，「我們，選擇了人群最多的那一條路」，「要走一條中道之路」；應是喻指民進黨背離了人群，走在一條偏斜的路上。這場反省與辯證，將隨選情升高而深化，並可循三個層次觀察其發展。
一、選舉公平層次：楊秋興認為初選不公，使他「委屈卻不能求全」。二、治理能力層次：他說「眼看大高雄沒落，令人憂心忡忡」。三、國家路線層次：有條件支持ＥＣＦＡ，宣示將走「中間路線」。
先談選舉公平層次。楊秋興與陳菊初選，主要爭議是在陳菊不悅楊秋興設看板指高雄市失業率高，而楊秋興則認為陳菊誣指他唆使李政憲刊廣告攻擊她。那麼，不妨回顧二○○六年高雄市長選舉，陳菊陣營設計一場「走路工記者會」，而以一一一四票的絲毫差距險勝了黃俊英；一審判陳菊當選無效，二審則認為陳菊的手法「固有可議」，但不屬「強暴、脅迫」，因此判陳菊勝訴。司法審判留下議論空間，而輿論多認為陳菊陣營用的是極不入流的「奧步」。試問：陳菊對黃俊英「公平」嗎？陳菊的勝選又有「正當性」嗎？
其實，民進黨在選舉中的惡劣操作手法可謂罄竹難書，敗壞台灣選舉風氣甚巨；到了二○○四年的三一九槍擊案，則已至震驚世界的地步。若非楊秋興因「細故」而反彈如此強烈，誰知道「選舉不公」在民進黨內竟也是如此令人忍無可忍？
再論治理能力層次。楊秋興與陳菊對比，楊較篤實，陳較靈活。楊的政績評比屢占鰲頭，應非倖致；連獲四次「五星級」縣長的殊榮，可謂亦是辛苦耕耘所致。何況，高雄縣的條件不如高雄市，對照起來，楊的「治理能力」不能謂沒有優於陳菊之處。不料，陳菊藉一場世運會及操作達賴與熱比婭，陡然聲勢暴漲；這使得苦幹實幹九年於茲的楊秋興如何能夠甘服？放煙火的、操作民粹政治的，比苦幹實幹的更能擄獲人心，這或許正是楊秋興忿忿難平的原因。楊秋興幹了九年縣長，他難道不能分辨「治理能力」與「操弄民粹政治」的區別？同理，「黑名單」出身、在台南市撐持九年的許添財，看著跳上立法院主席台的賴清德出線，心中作何滋味？
然而，民進黨在中央執政八年，「操弄民粹政治」的技巧，遠遠勝過其「治理能力」。若非楊秋興退黨抗議，誰能領悟煙火秀及操作熱比婭與治理能力的差別何在？
最後談國家路線層次。談大高雄的建設，不可諱談國家路線。高雄市曾是台灣經濟的火車頭，如今卻一直將自己浸溺在「重北輕南」的酸言酸語中。似乎一切過失皆在中央的冷漠（包括扁政府八年執政？），而不是地方政府對國家路線的思考與操作出了致命性的錯誤。高雄港市所有的世界評比皆呈「自由落體」狀下墜。全球五百城市競爭力評比，高雄市自七十七名暴跌至二二七名；兩岸城市競爭力評比，高雄市亦由第七跌至第十。高雄港則從世界第三大港，掉到了第十三。然而，陳菊卻仍有本事召喚起大高雄選民的「幸福感／光榮感」；這或許使楊秋興大惑不解，而想要喚醒選民於迷夢之中。他說「高雄市條件這麼好，一定能變成第二個新加坡」，又稱「有條件贊成ＥＣＦＡ」，更宣示「中間路線／中道之路」……。楊秋興的動作，若能使得「國家路線」由藍綠爭論，轉變成一場綠營內部的全面深刻自省，那麼全民參與這場五都大選，必可值回「票」價！
論及選舉公平，民進黨應反省三一九槍擊案。論及治理能力，民進黨應反省「失落的八年」。論及國家路線，民進黨應反省從「四不一沒有」到「正名制憲」的躓踣踉蹌、推車撞壁。當民進黨準備指著楊秋興開罵，勿忘有四根手指正指著自己。
A Translation
August 10, 2010
Yang Chiu-hsing has resigned from the Democratic Progressive Party and is running for Kaohsiung Mayor as an independent. His move has forced the DPP to engage in soul-searching. It has led to changes in the DPP's party style and party line. He said, "We have chosen the way of the majority," and "We are taking the path of moderation." What he meant was that the DPP has turned its back on the majority and gone down the wrong path. The current round of self-reflection and debate will intensify as election fever increases. These developments can be evaluated from three different perspectives.
One. Election fairness. Yang Chiu-hsing felt the party primary process was unfair. He felt wronged and unable to get fair treatment. Two. Governing ability. He said he watched as Kaohsiung declined, and that left him deeply concerned. Three. The nation's future. He expressed conditional support for ECFA. He declared that he would take the middle path.
Consider the issue of election fairness. The major dispute between Yang Chiu-hsing and Chen Chu during the party primaries was billboards. Chen Chu was unhappy with billboards criticizing high unemployment in Kaohsiung. Yang Chiu-hsing said Chen Chu blamed him for billboards attacking her posted by Li Cheng-hsien. A review of the 2006 Kaohsiung Mayoral Election may be instructive. Chen Chu's campaign committee held a "per diem press conference," which led to a narrow 1114 vote victory over Huang Chun-ying. A first instance court ruled Chen Chu's election invalid. A second instance court ruled that Chen Chu's tactics were "controversial, but not coercive" and ruled in her favor. The ruling was controversial. Many observers considered Chen Chu's campaign tactics underhanded trickery. One has to ask, was Chen Chu "fair" to Huang Chun-ying? Was Chen Chu's victory "legitimate?"
The fact is, incidents of DPP dirty tricks during election season are too numerous to list. The DPP has been a major contributor to corrupt election practices on Taiwan. The 3/19 Shooting Incident in 2004 was so outrageous it shocked the world. Had Yang Chiu-hsing not lashed back so vehemently at such "trivia," who would have known the DPP primary process had become so unfair as to be intolerable?
Consider governing ability. Compare Yang Chiu and Chen Chu. Yang is more reliable. Chen is more agile. Yang's political achievements have been lauded repeatedly. They are not a matter of luck. He has been honored as a "five star" county chief four times. That is the result of dedication. It is especially noteworthy given that Kaohsiung County has far fewer resources than Kaohsiung City. Yang's governing ability is superior to Chen Chu's in many ways. But Chen Chu hitched a ride on the World Games. She demagogued visits by the Dalai Lama and Rebiyah Kadeer. As a result, her momentum surged. Yang Chiu-hsing kept his nose to the grindstone for nine long years. How do you think he felt? Those who sponsor fireworks displays and engage in populist demagoguery win greater public approval than those who keep their noses to the grindstone. Maybe this is why Yang Chiu-hsing was so indignant. Yang Chiu-hsing served as county chief for nine years. Is he really oblivious to the distinction between governing ability and rabble-rousing? By the same token, former blacklistee Hsu Tien-tsai served nine years as Tainan City Mayor. He had to sit tightlipped while Lai Ching-teh was catapulted into the Legislative Yuan. How do you think he felt?
The DPP ruled the central government for eight years via populist demagoguery. Its ability to engage in demagoguery far exceeds its ability to govern. Yang Chiu-hsing quit the party in protest. Do voters understand the difference between holding fireworks displays and demagoguing Rebiyah Kadeer on the one hand, versus governing ability on the other?
Finally, consider the nation's future. One cannot discuss infrastructure construction in Kaohsiung without discussing the nation's future. Kaohsiung was once the engine of the Republic of China economy. But the DPP now insists that Kaohsiung is a victim of policies that "favor the north at the expense of the south." The DPP seems intent on blaming all of Kaohsiung's ills on central government indifference, rather than on catastrophically mistaken local government conceptions about the nation's future. (One has to wonder whether the DPP's blame game includes the Chen administration, which after all, was in power for eight years?) According to international rating organizations, Kaohsiung City is a city in free fall. Its ranking among the top 500 cities of the world has plummeted from 77th place to 227th place. Among cities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, its ranking has fallen from 7th place to 10th place. Kaohsiung Harbor was once the world's third largest port. It is now the 13th. Yet Chen Chu has the chutzpah to speak to Kaohsiung voters about "a sense of joy and a sense of honor." Perhaps Yang Chiu-hsing find it incomprehensible. Perhaps he would like voters to awaken from their dream. He said Kaohsiung's potential is great, and can surely become a second Singapore. He has expressed conditional support for ECFA. He has declared his intention to take the middle road, and the path of moderation. The debate over the nation's future has long been a debate between Blue and Green. Perhaps Yang Chiu-hsing's moves will inspire deep soul-searching within the Green Camp. If so, voters who take part in the five cities elections may just get their money's worth.
As the DPP considers the issue of election fairness, it should reflect on the 3/19 Shooting Incident. As the DPP considers the issue of governing ability, it should reflect on its "eight wasted years." As the DPP considers the issue of the nation's future, it should reflect on how it careened down the road from the "Five Noes" to the "Rectification of Names and the Authoring of a New Constitution," and finally smashed into a brick wall. When the DPP points the finger at Yang Chiu-hsing, it should remember four fingers are pointing at itself.
楊秋興催動民進黨三個層次的自省
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.08.10 01:55 am
楊秋興退黨參選大高雄市長最重要的意義，是從民進黨內部觸動了自我反省的契機，帶動了黨內風格與路線的辯證。他說，「我們，選擇了人群最多的那一條路」，「要走一條中道之路」；應是喻指民進黨背離了人群，走在一條偏斜的路上。這場反省與辯證，將隨選情升高而深化，並可循三個層次觀察其發展。
一、選舉公平層次：楊秋興認為初選不公，使他「委屈卻不能求全」。二、治理能力層次：他說「眼看大高雄沒落，令人憂心忡忡」。三、國家路線層次：有條件支持ＥＣＦＡ，宣示將走「中間路線」。
先談選舉公平層次。楊秋興與陳菊初選，主要爭議是在陳菊不悅楊秋興設看板指高雄市失業率高，而楊秋興則認為陳菊誣指他唆使李政憲刊廣告攻擊她。那麼，不妨回顧二○○六年高雄市長選舉，陳菊陣營設計一場「走路工記者會」，而以一一一四票的絲毫差距險勝了黃俊英；一審判陳菊當選無效，二審則認為陳菊的手法「固有可議」，但不屬「強暴、脅迫」，因此判陳菊勝訴。司法審判留下議論空間，而輿論多認為陳菊陣營用的是極不入流的「奧步」。試問：陳菊對黃俊英「公平」嗎？陳菊的勝選又有「正當性」嗎？
其實，民進黨在選舉中的惡劣操作手法可謂罄竹難書，敗壞台灣選舉風氣甚巨；到了二○○四年的三一九槍擊案，則已至震驚世界的地步。若非楊秋興因「細故」而反彈如此強烈，誰知道「選舉不公」在民進黨內竟也是如此令人忍無可忍？
再論治理能力層次。楊秋興與陳菊對比，楊較篤實，陳較靈活。楊的政績評比屢占鰲頭，應非倖致；連獲四次「五星級」縣長的殊榮，可謂亦是辛苦耕耘所致。何況，高雄縣的條件不如高雄市，對照起來，楊的「治理能力」不能謂沒有優於陳菊之處。不料，陳菊藉一場世運會及操作達賴與熱比婭，陡然聲勢暴漲；這使得苦幹實幹九年於茲的楊秋興如何能夠甘服？放煙火的、操作民粹政治的，比苦幹實幹的更能擄獲人心，這或許正是楊秋興忿忿難平的原因。楊秋興幹了九年縣長，他難道不能分辨「治理能力」與「操弄民粹政治」的區別？同理，「黑名單」出身、在台南市撐持九年的許添財，看著跳上立法院主席台的賴清德出線，心中作何滋味？
然而，民進黨在中央執政八年，「操弄民粹政治」的技巧，遠遠勝過其「治理能力」。若非楊秋興退黨抗議，誰能領悟煙火秀及操作熱比婭與治理能力的差別何在？
最後談國家路線層次。談大高雄的建設，不可諱談國家路線。高雄市曾是台灣經濟的火車頭，如今卻一直將自己浸溺在「重北輕南」的酸言酸語中。似乎一切過失皆在中央的冷漠（包括扁政府八年執政？），而不是地方政府對國家路線的思考與操作出了致命性的錯誤。高雄港市所有的世界評比皆呈「自由落體」狀下墜。全球五百城市競爭力評比，高雄市自七十七名暴跌至二二七名；兩岸城市競爭力評比，高雄市亦由第七跌至第十。高雄港則從世界第三大港，掉到了第十三。然而，陳菊卻仍有本事召喚起大高雄選民的「幸福感／光榮感」；這或許使楊秋興大惑不解，而想要喚醒選民於迷夢之中。他說「高雄市條件這麼好，一定能變成第二個新加坡」，又稱「有條件贊成ＥＣＦＡ」，更宣示「中間路線／中道之路」……。楊秋興的動作，若能使得「國家路線」由藍綠爭論，轉變成一場綠營內部的全面深刻自省，那麼全民參與這場五都大選，必可值回「票」價！
論及選舉公平，民進黨應反省三一九槍擊案。論及治理能力，民進黨應反省「失落的八年」。論及國家路線，民進黨應反省從「四不一沒有」到「正名制憲」的躓踣踉蹌、推車撞壁。當民進黨準備指著楊秋興開罵，勿忘有四根手指正指著自己。
Monday, August 9, 2010
Do Not Poke Holes in the 1992 Consensus
Do Not Poke Holes in the 1992 ConsensusUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 9, 2010
A disagreement may be brewing between Taipei and Beijing. Mainland Affairs Council Chairperson Lai Hsing-yuan made a number of remarks on cross-Strait relations during her recent visit to Washington, that according to reports, raised grave concerns in Beijing. A stern response reflecting Beijing's views on the matter cannot be ruled out. Lai Hsing-yuan's "flight to Los Angeles was cancelled" ostensibly "due to mechanical problems," and she is returning to Taipei ahead of schedule.
We would like say a few words before Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office holds its weekly press conference. We hope this incident will not damage relations between the two sides.
A second disagreement has also been brewing. Mainland China Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng said that as long as the two sides abide by the One China Principle, issues such as the withdrawal of missiles and the redeployment of troops are all open to discussion. ROC Presidential Office Spokesman Luo Chi-chiang responded. He said that of Mainaland China is willing to abide by the 1992 Consensus, and relocates its missiles on its own initiative, the public on Taiwan would surely express approval. KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou wrote a draft of his speech for the provisional plenary session. It too including mention of the 1992 Consensus, and called on Beijing to take the initiative to withdraw its missiles. But during his oral presentation, he skipped over them.
Over the past few days, comments issued by Hong Kong's Phoenix Satellite TV have pointed out that Taipei refers only to the "1992 Consensus" and avoids reference to "One China." Phoenix TV said that is why Ma Ying-jeou's conception of the 1992 Consensus "is probably not our conception of One China." The day before yesterday, ARATS President Chen Yunlin noted during a Xinhua News interview that cross-Strait relations are currently good, and "must be cherished and treated with care." The same remark has been repeated a number of times by different individuals. Chen added that some degree of instability and uncertainty still plagues cross-Strait relations. "Taiwan independence secessionist forces" continue to obstruct and undermine cross-Strait peace. It is generally believed that the Taiwan Affairs Office weekly press conference will deal with this topic.
We believe authorities on both sides should return to the 1992 Consensus . For Beijing, the original intent of the 1992 Consensus is "Uphold the One China Principle, but refrain from politically defining "One China." For Taipei, the original intent of the 1992 Consensus is "Both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist on "One China," but the two sides differ in their definition of "One China." In other words, Beijing says "Different Interpretations of One China." Taipei says "One China with Different Interpretations."
Su Chi, the creator of the "1992 Consensus" said 'When [I] invented the term "1992 Consensus," I was attempting to avoid the words "One China."' In other words the 1992 Consensus was a synonym for "One China." The only difference is that the two sides have different definitions of One China. When Beijing uses the 1992 Consensus as a synonym for One China, Taipei does not object. When Taipei uses the 1992 Consensus as a synonym for One China, Different Interpretations, Beijing has yet to make on open objection. Because the 1992 Consensus has so many different meanings, the two sides have been able to ensure "peaceful development" and a "favorable overall picture."
Assuming the above understanding is correct, Lo Chi-chang and Geng Yansheng may have misunderstood each other. Geng Yansheng spoke of the One China Principle. Lo Chi-chiang responded with the 1992 Consensus. This implies that the 1992 Consensus and One China are mutually exclusive, mutually hostile concepts. This was Phoenix TV's understanding. But the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations does not repudiate the principle of One China. It merely allows for Different Interpretations. Because the Ma government is not on the path to Taiwan independence, it must uphold One China, Different Interpretations. Ma's "no unification / no independence / no war" policies all fall within the framework of One China, Different Interpretations. Absent this strategic framework, one has no ground to stand on.
Let us return to Lai Hsing-yuan's remarks. Lai provoked two controversies. First, she called for the Mainland "to forsake the use of force against Taiwan, both in terms of thinking and in terms of law." Second, she said "the world needs Taiwan as a key... by which to influence the Chinese Mainland." Actually, as Mainland Affairs Council Chairman, Lai Hsing-yuan's second remark was redundant. In fact, if Taipei can contribute to the maintainance of "peaceful development" between Taiwan and Mainland China, that would be its greatest contribution to the world. Lai Hsing-yuan's first remark was an unintentional blunder. Beijing directed its Anti-Secession Law against "de jure Taiwan independence." When the Mainland Affairs Council makes such a comment, it is likely to make Beijing extremely suspicious.
The public has probably noticed that with the five cities elections approaching, the Ma administration's public remarks have also become increasingly pointed. For example, it denounced the Democratic Progressive Party for deceiving and harming the nation. It said that the DPP's "opposition to ECFA amounted to opposition to the people." Similarly, Lo Chi-chiang's response to Geng Yansheng, as well as Lai Hsing-yuan's remarks during her visit to the US, may have been efforts to shrug off the label of "cozying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." But Lo and Lai must not unwittingly sacrifice one thing for another. They must not stretch matters beyond the breaking point.
The authorities on both sides should return to the 1992 Consensus. Beijing likes to refer to it as the 1992 Consensus / One China Principle. Taipei likes to refer to it as the 1992 Consensus / One China, Different Interpretations. It is precisely this ambiguity that has allowed "peaceful development," a major achievement.
The 1992 Consensus is a concept still in development, and still amenable to development. It is a paper window that lets in light but also separates. Neither side should poke holes in this translucent paper window.
不要捅破「九二共識」這扇紙窗
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.08.09
兩岸當局的一場齟齬可能正在發展之中。據報導，陸委會主委賴幸媛訪美對兩岸關係的公開談話，引起中共方面的嚴重關切，不排除在近日藉適當時機嚴肅回應，表達大陸方面的看法。賴幸媛因「飛洛杉磯班機故障」，已提前返國。
我們願在北京國台辦本周記者會之前，先說幾句話，希望雙方不要擦槍走火，壞了大局。
另一個同時發展的事件是：中國大陸國防部發言人耿雁生稱，只要堅持「一個中國原則」，撤飛彈、軍事部署等皆可進行討論；我總統府發言人羅智強回應：如果中國大陸願意在「九二共識」的基礎上，主動撤除飛彈，將會得到台灣人民的肯定。原本，馬英九主席接著在國民黨臨全會的書面講稿中，也有「九二共識下，對岸主動撤飛彈」等語，但在口頭演說時，卻略過未說。
也就在前幾天，香港鳳凰衛視的兩岸評論指出：台灣方面只談「九二共識」，卻迴避「一個中國」；所以，馬英九主張的「九二共識」，「很可能不是我們想像的一個中國」。前天，大陸海協會會長陳雲林又接受新華社專訪說：兩岸目前關係，值得「倍加珍惜、善加呵護」（這類用語，最近數日在不同的人口中頻見）；又稱：兩岸關係仍存在一些不穩定、不確定的因素，「台獨分裂勢力」不斷阻撓和破壞兩岸和平發展的大好局面。一般認為，本周國台辦記者會仍會處理此一話題。
我們認為，兩岸當局仍應回到「九二共識」的架構下。「九二共識」的原始意義，對北京來說是：「堅持一個中國原則，不討論『一個中國』的政治涵意。」對台北而言則是：「海峽兩岸均堅持『一個中國』之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵意有所不同。」換句話說，就是北京「各表一中」，台北「一中各表」。
「九二共識」的創製者蘇起說：「（我）創造『九二共識』這個新名詞，企圖避免『一個中國』四個字。」也就是說，「九二共識」對兩岸而言，其實皆是「一個中國」的替代語，只是雙方對「一個中國」的意涵有不同的認知。一方面，北京以「九二共識」主張「一個中國原則」，台北可以理解；另一方面，台北藉「九二共識」表達「一中各表」，北京也迄未正面否定。正因「九二共識」四字有這種「求同存異」的包羅涵泳的功能，兩岸始能維持目前這個「和平發展」的「大好局面」。
倘若以上的理解無誤，我們認為羅智強與耿雁生的對話也許稍有閃失。耿雁生說「一個中國原則」，羅智強回以「九二共識」；如此一來，「九二共識」彷彿是「一個中國」的排斥詞或敵對詞（這正是鳳凰衛視的觀點）。但是，「九二共識／一中各表」並未否定「一中」，只是爭取「各表」的空間。馬政府若不走台獨路線，即必須持守「一中各表」；不論是「不統／不獨／不武」，皆是建構在「一中各表」的架構上。這是一種戰略的選擇，失此即無以立足。
再論賴幸媛的發言。引起議論者有二：一是呼籲大陸「放棄對台用武的思維及法律」，一是談到「世界各國需要台灣此一關鍵樞紐……以便發揮對中國大陸的影響力」。身為陸委會主委，賴幸媛的後一段話說得有一點贅餘，其實只消點出台灣若能維持與中國大陸的「和平發展」，就是對世界最大的貢獻即可；前一段話則說得有一點凸槌，北京自認「反分裂國家法」是針對「法理台獨」而發，陸委會主委作此評論，會使北京作出猜疑的解讀。
國人應已感覺到，隨著五都選舉迫近，馬政府的發言也越來越趨麻辣。例如，痛斥民進黨誤國害國，又稱「反對ＥＣＦＡ，就是與人民為敵」；同理，羅智強回應耿雁生，與賴幸媛的訪美發言，也可能是想摘掉「親中賣台」的帽子。但是，萬勿顧此失彼，捉襟見肘。
我們認為，兩岸當局仍應回到「九二共識」的架構下。北京傾向「九二共識／一中原則」，台北傾向「九二共識／一中各表」；正因此種「求同存異」的架構，推進了「和平發展」的重大成就。
「九二共識」是仍在發展及仍可發展的概念，這扇紙窗既有透光之效又有隔離之功，雙方都不要捅破了這一層朦朧的窗戶紙。
A Translation
August 9, 2010
A disagreement may be brewing between Taipei and Beijing. Mainland Affairs Council Chairperson Lai Hsing-yuan made a number of remarks on cross-Strait relations during her recent visit to Washington, that according to reports, raised grave concerns in Beijing. A stern response reflecting Beijing's views on the matter cannot be ruled out. Lai Hsing-yuan's "flight to Los Angeles was cancelled" ostensibly "due to mechanical problems," and she is returning to Taipei ahead of schedule.
We would like say a few words before Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office holds its weekly press conference. We hope this incident will not damage relations between the two sides.
A second disagreement has also been brewing. Mainland China Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng said that as long as the two sides abide by the One China Principle, issues such as the withdrawal of missiles and the redeployment of troops are all open to discussion. ROC Presidential Office Spokesman Luo Chi-chiang responded. He said that of Mainaland China is willing to abide by the 1992 Consensus, and relocates its missiles on its own initiative, the public on Taiwan would surely express approval. KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou wrote a draft of his speech for the provisional plenary session. It too including mention of the 1992 Consensus, and called on Beijing to take the initiative to withdraw its missiles. But during his oral presentation, he skipped over them.
Over the past few days, comments issued by Hong Kong's Phoenix Satellite TV have pointed out that Taipei refers only to the "1992 Consensus" and avoids reference to "One China." Phoenix TV said that is why Ma Ying-jeou's conception of the 1992 Consensus "is probably not our conception of One China." The day before yesterday, ARATS President Chen Yunlin noted during a Xinhua News interview that cross-Strait relations are currently good, and "must be cherished and treated with care." The same remark has been repeated a number of times by different individuals. Chen added that some degree of instability and uncertainty still plagues cross-Strait relations. "Taiwan independence secessionist forces" continue to obstruct and undermine cross-Strait peace. It is generally believed that the Taiwan Affairs Office weekly press conference will deal with this topic.
We believe authorities on both sides should return to the 1992 Consensus . For Beijing, the original intent of the 1992 Consensus is "Uphold the One China Principle, but refrain from politically defining "One China." For Taipei, the original intent of the 1992 Consensus is "Both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist on "One China," but the two sides differ in their definition of "One China." In other words, Beijing says "Different Interpretations of One China." Taipei says "One China with Different Interpretations."
Su Chi, the creator of the "1992 Consensus" said 'When [I] invented the term "1992 Consensus," I was attempting to avoid the words "One China."' In other words the 1992 Consensus was a synonym for "One China." The only difference is that the two sides have different definitions of One China. When Beijing uses the 1992 Consensus as a synonym for One China, Taipei does not object. When Taipei uses the 1992 Consensus as a synonym for One China, Different Interpretations, Beijing has yet to make on open objection. Because the 1992 Consensus has so many different meanings, the two sides have been able to ensure "peaceful development" and a "favorable overall picture."
Assuming the above understanding is correct, Lo Chi-chang and Geng Yansheng may have misunderstood each other. Geng Yansheng spoke of the One China Principle. Lo Chi-chiang responded with the 1992 Consensus. This implies that the 1992 Consensus and One China are mutually exclusive, mutually hostile concepts. This was Phoenix TV's understanding. But the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations does not repudiate the principle of One China. It merely allows for Different Interpretations. Because the Ma government is not on the path to Taiwan independence, it must uphold One China, Different Interpretations. Ma's "no unification / no independence / no war" policies all fall within the framework of One China, Different Interpretations. Absent this strategic framework, one has no ground to stand on.
Let us return to Lai Hsing-yuan's remarks. Lai provoked two controversies. First, she called for the Mainland "to forsake the use of force against Taiwan, both in terms of thinking and in terms of law." Second, she said "the world needs Taiwan as a key... by which to influence the Chinese Mainland." Actually, as Mainland Affairs Council Chairman, Lai Hsing-yuan's second remark was redundant. In fact, if Taipei can contribute to the maintainance of "peaceful development" between Taiwan and Mainland China, that would be its greatest contribution to the world. Lai Hsing-yuan's first remark was an unintentional blunder. Beijing directed its Anti-Secession Law against "de jure Taiwan independence." When the Mainland Affairs Council makes such a comment, it is likely to make Beijing extremely suspicious.
The public has probably noticed that with the five cities elections approaching, the Ma administration's public remarks have also become increasingly pointed. For example, it denounced the Democratic Progressive Party for deceiving and harming the nation. It said that the DPP's "opposition to ECFA amounted to opposition to the people." Similarly, Lo Chi-chiang's response to Geng Yansheng, as well as Lai Hsing-yuan's remarks during her visit to the US, may have been efforts to shrug off the label of "cozying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." But Lo and Lai must not unwittingly sacrifice one thing for another. They must not stretch matters beyond the breaking point.
The authorities on both sides should return to the 1992 Consensus. Beijing likes to refer to it as the 1992 Consensus / One China Principle. Taipei likes to refer to it as the 1992 Consensus / One China, Different Interpretations. It is precisely this ambiguity that has allowed "peaceful development," a major achievement.
The 1992 Consensus is a concept still in development, and still amenable to development. It is a paper window that lets in light but also separates. Neither side should poke holes in this translucent paper window.
不要捅破「九二共識」這扇紙窗
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.08.09
兩岸當局的一場齟齬可能正在發展之中。據報導，陸委會主委賴幸媛訪美對兩岸關係的公開談話，引起中共方面的嚴重關切，不排除在近日藉適當時機嚴肅回應，表達大陸方面的看法。賴幸媛因「飛洛杉磯班機故障」，已提前返國。
我們願在北京國台辦本周記者會之前，先說幾句話，希望雙方不要擦槍走火，壞了大局。
另一個同時發展的事件是：中國大陸國防部發言人耿雁生稱，只要堅持「一個中國原則」，撤飛彈、軍事部署等皆可進行討論；我總統府發言人羅智強回應：如果中國大陸願意在「九二共識」的基礎上，主動撤除飛彈，將會得到台灣人民的肯定。原本，馬英九主席接著在國民黨臨全會的書面講稿中，也有「九二共識下，對岸主動撤飛彈」等語，但在口頭演說時，卻略過未說。
也就在前幾天，香港鳳凰衛視的兩岸評論指出：台灣方面只談「九二共識」，卻迴避「一個中國」；所以，馬英九主張的「九二共識」，「很可能不是我們想像的一個中國」。前天，大陸海協會會長陳雲林又接受新華社專訪說：兩岸目前關係，值得「倍加珍惜、善加呵護」（這類用語，最近數日在不同的人口中頻見）；又稱：兩岸關係仍存在一些不穩定、不確定的因素，「台獨分裂勢力」不斷阻撓和破壞兩岸和平發展的大好局面。一般認為，本周國台辦記者會仍會處理此一話題。
我們認為，兩岸當局仍應回到「九二共識」的架構下。「九二共識」的原始意義，對北京來說是：「堅持一個中國原則，不討論『一個中國』的政治涵意。」對台北而言則是：「海峽兩岸均堅持『一個中國』之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵意有所不同。」換句話說，就是北京「各表一中」，台北「一中各表」。
「九二共識」的創製者蘇起說：「（我）創造『九二共識』這個新名詞，企圖避免『一個中國』四個字。」也就是說，「九二共識」對兩岸而言，其實皆是「一個中國」的替代語，只是雙方對「一個中國」的意涵有不同的認知。一方面，北京以「九二共識」主張「一個中國原則」，台北可以理解；另一方面，台北藉「九二共識」表達「一中各表」，北京也迄未正面否定。正因「九二共識」四字有這種「求同存異」的包羅涵泳的功能，兩岸始能維持目前這個「和平發展」的「大好局面」。
倘若以上的理解無誤，我們認為羅智強與耿雁生的對話也許稍有閃失。耿雁生說「一個中國原則」，羅智強回以「九二共識」；如此一來，「九二共識」彷彿是「一個中國」的排斥詞或敵對詞（這正是鳳凰衛視的觀點）。但是，「九二共識／一中各表」並未否定「一中」，只是爭取「各表」的空間。馬政府若不走台獨路線，即必須持守「一中各表」；不論是「不統／不獨／不武」，皆是建構在「一中各表」的架構上。這是一種戰略的選擇，失此即無以立足。
再論賴幸媛的發言。引起議論者有二：一是呼籲大陸「放棄對台用武的思維及法律」，一是談到「世界各國需要台灣此一關鍵樞紐……以便發揮對中國大陸的影響力」。身為陸委會主委，賴幸媛的後一段話說得有一點贅餘，其實只消點出台灣若能維持與中國大陸的「和平發展」，就是對世界最大的貢獻即可；前一段話則說得有一點凸槌，北京自認「反分裂國家法」是針對「法理台獨」而發，陸委會主委作此評論，會使北京作出猜疑的解讀。
國人應已感覺到，隨著五都選舉迫近，馬政府的發言也越來越趨麻辣。例如，痛斥民進黨誤國害國，又稱「反對ＥＣＦＡ，就是與人民為敵」；同理，羅智強回應耿雁生，與賴幸媛的訪美發言，也可能是想摘掉「親中賣台」的帽子。但是，萬勿顧此失彼，捉襟見肘。
我們認為，兩岸當局仍應回到「九二共識」的架構下。北京傾向「九二共識／一中原則」，台北傾向「九二共識／一中各表」；正因此種「求同存異」的架構，推進了「和平發展」的重大成就。
「九二共識」是仍在發展及仍可發展的概念，這扇紙窗既有透光之效又有隔離之功，雙方都不要捅破了這一層朦朧的窗戶紙。
Friday, August 6, 2010
We Applaud the Taipei Singapore FTA
We Applaud the Taipei Singapore FTAChina Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 6, 2010
On August 5, Taipei and Singapore announced the commencement of economic cooperation negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. The move underscored a strong desire for such an agreement by both sides, and officially kicked off the negotiation process. Soon after Taipei and Beijing signed ECFA, President Ma personally led a campaign to sign free trade agreements (FTAs). That such good news would arrive so soon, has left the public surprised and excited.
According to the press release, Taipei will be known by the name, "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu," in accordance with WTO conventions. The name will be abbreviated as "Chinese Taipei." Taipei and Singapore will sign an agreement promoting economic cooperation. In fact WTO expressly requires members to permit other members to sign trade agreements consistent with WTO norms. Taipei and Singapore are both WTO members. As a WTO member, Taipei already had a basis by which it could expand bilateral interaction with Singapore. This includes signing economic cooperation agreements. Because we already had an existing framework, the expansion of relations was merely a matter of form, and obstacles were kept to a minimum.
Following this formal declaration of intent, government agencies in Taipei and Singapore will hold step by step discussions, and eventually arrive at specific agreements regarding cooperation. The agreement may not use the term "FTA." But it will lower trade barriers and promote economic exchanges. This is entirely consistent with the purpose of an FTA. An FTA can go by many names, and include many different provisions. Substantively speaking, the economic partnership agreement between Taipei and Singapore will be an FTA.
This development is highly encouraging. It will benefit Taipei in many ways. First of all, Taipei has signed FTAs with only a handeful of governments -- those with which it maintains diplomatic relations. But the volume of trade is too small. The political symbolism is more important than the economic benefits. This is not the case with Singapore. It is one of Asia's Four Little Dragons. Its economic success is the envy of the world. It is a member of ASEAN. It has close economic and trade ties with India. Singapore's industries and Taiwan's industries are not in direct competition with each other, but instead complement each other. An economic cooperation agreement between Taipei and Singapore can create more trade opportunities on Taiwan. It can create opportunities for Taiwan businesses in India and ASEAN, by way of Singapore.
In addition to significant economic and trade benefits, the Taipei Singapore FTA will establish a model to be emulated. Many governments would like to sign FTAs with Taipei. But in the past, although these governments were under the aegis of the WTO, they gave up on the idea because they feared opposition from Beijing. Now however, Taipei and Beijing have been reconciled. Taipei and Beijing have themselves signed ECFA. Singapore may be small, but it is an economically important trading nation. It has always been extremely careful and thorough in its decision-making. It has never acted recklessly or in haste. Its willingness to formally negotiate an economic cooperation agreement with Taipei means that it has already given the matter much thought and communicated with Taipei at great length. This will of course positively influence other governments. For Taipei, which longs to break out of its isolation and to avoid marginalization, this is significant indeed.
This breakthrough may have positive implications for cross-Strait relations and internal politics on Taiwan. Cross-Strait relations have recovered rapidly since President Ma took office. But some on Taiwan have always doubted Beijing's sincerity. The Green Camp has long alleged that Beijing's accomodations were merely ploys to make Taiwan increasingly dependent on the Mainland. Beijing's willingnes to allow Taipei to sign FTAs with other governments will be a concrete indicator of its sincerity. President Ma has personally led the way on signing FTAs. Therefore Beijing will have to issue some sort of statement in response.
Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi Jun said Beijing understands Taipei's need to establish economic relations with other governments. Under the general framework of peaceful development, the two sides should be able to find a solution. Beijing should offer Taipei "fair and reasonable treatment, pragmatic and appropriate handling." Such open goodwill is unprecedented. But will words be followed by deeds? Taipei must "listen to his words, and look at his deeds." Taipei and Singapore have begun negotiating an economic cooperation agreement. They have confirmed indirectly that Beijing's bottom line has changed.
When Taipei has sufficient room to survive in the international community, it will no longer feel such a powerful sense of insecurity. It will have fewer doubts and fears when dealing with Beijing. An FTA with Singapore is the first positive result. This will discredit obstinate opponents of ECFA. It will encourage the public on Taiwan to adopt a more pragmatic attitude towards the Mainland, and to improve relations with the Mainland. It will generate increased public support for cross-Strait reconciliation.
In the past, when Singapore expressed a desire to sign an FTA with Taipei, the Chen Shui-bian regime insisted on the name "Taiwan." This, plus firm opposition from Beijing, forced Singapore to give up on the idea. Now Taipei and Singapore have resumed negotiations. One reason is that the Ma administration adopted a pragmatic strategy, a viable model able to overcome the dispute over names. It is creating new forms of cross-Strait interaction, enabling Taipei more room for survival and growth. Which is the right way to defend one's national interests, and to care for the people? The answer is clear. President Ma has achieved a previously unimagineable breakthrough. For this he deserves public acclaim, We hope the government will persist in its efforts, and continue to achieve positive results.
台星洽簽FTA 值得掌聲肯定
中國時報
2010-08-06
台灣與新加坡五日同步宣布，雙方同意在世界貿易組織（ＷＴＯ）的架構下，展開洽簽經濟合作協議之磋商。這項動作，不僅揭示雙方對簽署協議之積極意願，也宣告談判程序正式啟動。兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ之後，馬總統親自領軍推動簽署自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ），在這麼快的時間內就傳來好消息，實在令國人深感驚喜與振奮。
根據雙方的新聞稿，台灣將以在ＷＴＯ的名稱「台澎金馬個別關稅領域」（簡稱中華台北，Chinese Taipei），與新加坡推動經濟合作協議之簽署。事實上，ＷＴＯ明文規定其會員享有與其他會員簽署符合ＷＴＯ規範貿易協定之權利，我國與新加坡同為ＷＴＯ會員，以我國參與ＷＴＯ的模式為雙方進一步互動的基礎，包括洽簽經濟合作協議。因為已經有了一個現成的操作共識架構，據以進一步發展關係可謂水到渠成，可以把困難降到最低。
在正式宣布意向之後，台星相關部門將按部就班展開磋商，最後落實為具體合作協議，雖然名稱未必是ＦＴＡ，但降低貿易壁壘、促進交流的宗旨卻是一致的。ＦＴＡ的名稱與內容可以非常多樣，實質上，台星要展開磋商的經濟合作協議，便是一種ＦＴＡ。
這項發展之所以令人振奮，是因為它將為台灣帶來許多正面利益。首先，台灣現在只和少數邦交國簽署ＦＴＡ，但彼此的貿易額太小，政治的象徵意義還大於實際經濟效益。而新加坡不然，它是亞洲四小龍之一，經貿成就傲視全球，既是東協的成員國，與印度也有相當緊密的經貿關係。加上新加坡的產業與台灣互補性強，沒有非常強烈的直接競爭，台星若能簽署經濟合作協議，不僅讓台灣增加更多貿易商機，也能經由新加坡尋找進入東協與印度市場的機會。
除了實質的經貿利益外，台星洽簽ＦＴＡ也將帶來示範效益。許多國家原本有意和我國簽署ＦＴＡ，但過去即使是依據ＷＴＯ的架構，也因為忌憚中國的反對而作罷。現在兩岸關係趨於和解，中國本身都和台灣簽署了ＥＣＦＡ，新加坡雖然幅員小，在經貿方面卻是重要國家，而且決策向來慎重周延，從不魯莽草率，它願意採取積極態度，正式展開與台灣洽簽經濟合作協議，必然已經作好評估與溝通，這對其他國家當然會產生示範效果。對一直渴望打破孤立處境以免被邊緣化的台灣，意義格外重大。
此外，對於兩岸關係及台灣內部，這項突破也可以帶來正面意義。雖說在馬總統上台後，兩岸關係迅速從谷底回升，但中國的善意裡有多少誠意，台灣內部始終存有疑慮，綠營也不斷質疑各種籠絡手段只是為了讓台灣更依賴中國。因此，是否在外交休兵之後，中國願意進一步改變過去堅決反對台灣與其他國家簽署ＦＴＡ的立場，就是一個具體的評估指標。而馬總統也以親自推動洽簽ＦＴＡ，讓中國必須對這個議題有所表態。
國台辦主任王毅六月時表示，大陸對台灣出於經濟發展需要，與其他國家建立經濟關係，是可以理解的；在和平發展大方向下，應可找到解決之道，大陸方面應會「合情合理對待，務實妥善處理」，這種開放的善意態度前所未見，但口惠是否能實至，台灣仍然要「聽其言，觀其行」。現在台星展開經濟合作協議磋商，間接證實了中國的思維及政策底線確實有所調整。
當台灣能夠在國際社會找到更多生存空間時，就不會有那麼強的不安全感，也更能降低與中國交往時的疑懼。如今洽簽ＦＴＡ有了第一個好成果，這不僅將讓抵死反對ＥＣＦＡ的聲音失去正當性，也能鼓勵台灣內部主張與中國改善關係的務實路線，為兩岸和解營造更多社會支持。
過去新加坡表達有意與我國簽署ＦＴＡ時，扁政府堅持要以「台灣」為名，加上中國又堅決反對，星方於是作罷。如今雙方能夠重啟協商，一方面是因為馬政府採取務實策略，以可行的模式克服了名稱爭議，一方面是藉由開創新的兩岸互動，為台灣找到新的生存發展空間。那種方式才是真正在捍衛國家利益、照顧民眾福祉，答案顯然很清楚了。馬總統達到了過去不敢想像的對外突破，值得全國民眾的掌聲肯定，也希望政府能再接再厲，繼續交出好成績。
A Translation
August 6, 2010
On August 5, Taipei and Singapore announced the commencement of economic cooperation negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. The move underscored a strong desire for such an agreement by both sides, and officially kicked off the negotiation process. Soon after Taipei and Beijing signed ECFA, President Ma personally led a campaign to sign free trade agreements (FTAs). That such good news would arrive so soon, has left the public surprised and excited.
According to the press release, Taipei will be known by the name, "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu," in accordance with WTO conventions. The name will be abbreviated as "Chinese Taipei." Taipei and Singapore will sign an agreement promoting economic cooperation. In fact WTO expressly requires members to permit other members to sign trade agreements consistent with WTO norms. Taipei and Singapore are both WTO members. As a WTO member, Taipei already had a basis by which it could expand bilateral interaction with Singapore. This includes signing economic cooperation agreements. Because we already had an existing framework, the expansion of relations was merely a matter of form, and obstacles were kept to a minimum.
Following this formal declaration of intent, government agencies in Taipei and Singapore will hold step by step discussions, and eventually arrive at specific agreements regarding cooperation. The agreement may not use the term "FTA." But it will lower trade barriers and promote economic exchanges. This is entirely consistent with the purpose of an FTA. An FTA can go by many names, and include many different provisions. Substantively speaking, the economic partnership agreement between Taipei and Singapore will be an FTA.
This development is highly encouraging. It will benefit Taipei in many ways. First of all, Taipei has signed FTAs with only a handeful of governments -- those with which it maintains diplomatic relations. But the volume of trade is too small. The political symbolism is more important than the economic benefits. This is not the case with Singapore. It is one of Asia's Four Little Dragons. Its economic success is the envy of the world. It is a member of ASEAN. It has close economic and trade ties with India. Singapore's industries and Taiwan's industries are not in direct competition with each other, but instead complement each other. An economic cooperation agreement between Taipei and Singapore can create more trade opportunities on Taiwan. It can create opportunities for Taiwan businesses in India and ASEAN, by way of Singapore.
In addition to significant economic and trade benefits, the Taipei Singapore FTA will establish a model to be emulated. Many governments would like to sign FTAs with Taipei. But in the past, although these governments were under the aegis of the WTO, they gave up on the idea because they feared opposition from Beijing. Now however, Taipei and Beijing have been reconciled. Taipei and Beijing have themselves signed ECFA. Singapore may be small, but it is an economically important trading nation. It has always been extremely careful and thorough in its decision-making. It has never acted recklessly or in haste. Its willingness to formally negotiate an economic cooperation agreement with Taipei means that it has already given the matter much thought and communicated with Taipei at great length. This will of course positively influence other governments. For Taipei, which longs to break out of its isolation and to avoid marginalization, this is significant indeed.
This breakthrough may have positive implications for cross-Strait relations and internal politics on Taiwan. Cross-Strait relations have recovered rapidly since President Ma took office. But some on Taiwan have always doubted Beijing's sincerity. The Green Camp has long alleged that Beijing's accomodations were merely ploys to make Taiwan increasingly dependent on the Mainland. Beijing's willingnes to allow Taipei to sign FTAs with other governments will be a concrete indicator of its sincerity. President Ma has personally led the way on signing FTAs. Therefore Beijing will have to issue some sort of statement in response.
Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi Jun said Beijing understands Taipei's need to establish economic relations with other governments. Under the general framework of peaceful development, the two sides should be able to find a solution. Beijing should offer Taipei "fair and reasonable treatment, pragmatic and appropriate handling." Such open goodwill is unprecedented. But will words be followed by deeds? Taipei must "listen to his words, and look at his deeds." Taipei and Singapore have begun negotiating an economic cooperation agreement. They have confirmed indirectly that Beijing's bottom line has changed.
When Taipei has sufficient room to survive in the international community, it will no longer feel such a powerful sense of insecurity. It will have fewer doubts and fears when dealing with Beijing. An FTA with Singapore is the first positive result. This will discredit obstinate opponents of ECFA. It will encourage the public on Taiwan to adopt a more pragmatic attitude towards the Mainland, and to improve relations with the Mainland. It will generate increased public support for cross-Strait reconciliation.
In the past, when Singapore expressed a desire to sign an FTA with Taipei, the Chen Shui-bian regime insisted on the name "Taiwan." This, plus firm opposition from Beijing, forced Singapore to give up on the idea. Now Taipei and Singapore have resumed negotiations. One reason is that the Ma administration adopted a pragmatic strategy, a viable model able to overcome the dispute over names. It is creating new forms of cross-Strait interaction, enabling Taipei more room for survival and growth. Which is the right way to defend one's national interests, and to care for the people? The answer is clear. President Ma has achieved a previously unimagineable breakthrough. For this he deserves public acclaim, We hope the government will persist in its efforts, and continue to achieve positive results.
台星洽簽FTA 值得掌聲肯定
中國時報
2010-08-06
台灣與新加坡五日同步宣布，雙方同意在世界貿易組織（ＷＴＯ）的架構下，展開洽簽經濟合作協議之磋商。這項動作，不僅揭示雙方對簽署協議之積極意願，也宣告談判程序正式啟動。兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ之後，馬總統親自領軍推動簽署自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ），在這麼快的時間內就傳來好消息，實在令國人深感驚喜與振奮。
根據雙方的新聞稿，台灣將以在ＷＴＯ的名稱「台澎金馬個別關稅領域」（簡稱中華台北，Chinese Taipei），與新加坡推動經濟合作協議之簽署。事實上，ＷＴＯ明文規定其會員享有與其他會員簽署符合ＷＴＯ規範貿易協定之權利，我國與新加坡同為ＷＴＯ會員，以我國參與ＷＴＯ的模式為雙方進一步互動的基礎，包括洽簽經濟合作協議。因為已經有了一個現成的操作共識架構，據以進一步發展關係可謂水到渠成，可以把困難降到最低。
在正式宣布意向之後，台星相關部門將按部就班展開磋商，最後落實為具體合作協議，雖然名稱未必是ＦＴＡ，但降低貿易壁壘、促進交流的宗旨卻是一致的。ＦＴＡ的名稱與內容可以非常多樣，實質上，台星要展開磋商的經濟合作協議，便是一種ＦＴＡ。
這項發展之所以令人振奮，是因為它將為台灣帶來許多正面利益。首先，台灣現在只和少數邦交國簽署ＦＴＡ，但彼此的貿易額太小，政治的象徵意義還大於實際經濟效益。而新加坡不然，它是亞洲四小龍之一，經貿成就傲視全球，既是東協的成員國，與印度也有相當緊密的經貿關係。加上新加坡的產業與台灣互補性強，沒有非常強烈的直接競爭，台星若能簽署經濟合作協議，不僅讓台灣增加更多貿易商機，也能經由新加坡尋找進入東協與印度市場的機會。
除了實質的經貿利益外，台星洽簽ＦＴＡ也將帶來示範效益。許多國家原本有意和我國簽署ＦＴＡ，但過去即使是依據ＷＴＯ的架構，也因為忌憚中國的反對而作罷。現在兩岸關係趨於和解，中國本身都和台灣簽署了ＥＣＦＡ，新加坡雖然幅員小，在經貿方面卻是重要國家，而且決策向來慎重周延，從不魯莽草率，它願意採取積極態度，正式展開與台灣洽簽經濟合作協議，必然已經作好評估與溝通，這對其他國家當然會產生示範效果。對一直渴望打破孤立處境以免被邊緣化的台灣，意義格外重大。
此外，對於兩岸關係及台灣內部，這項突破也可以帶來正面意義。雖說在馬總統上台後，兩岸關係迅速從谷底回升，但中國的善意裡有多少誠意，台灣內部始終存有疑慮，綠營也不斷質疑各種籠絡手段只是為了讓台灣更依賴中國。因此，是否在外交休兵之後，中國願意進一步改變過去堅決反對台灣與其他國家簽署ＦＴＡ的立場，就是一個具體的評估指標。而馬總統也以親自推動洽簽ＦＴＡ，讓中國必須對這個議題有所表態。
國台辦主任王毅六月時表示，大陸對台灣出於經濟發展需要，與其他國家建立經濟關係，是可以理解的；在和平發展大方向下，應可找到解決之道，大陸方面應會「合情合理對待，務實妥善處理」，這種開放的善意態度前所未見，但口惠是否能實至，台灣仍然要「聽其言，觀其行」。現在台星展開經濟合作協議磋商，間接證實了中國的思維及政策底線確實有所調整。
當台灣能夠在國際社會找到更多生存空間時，就不會有那麼強的不安全感，也更能降低與中國交往時的疑懼。如今洽簽ＦＴＡ有了第一個好成果，這不僅將讓抵死反對ＥＣＦＡ的聲音失去正當性，也能鼓勵台灣內部主張與中國改善關係的務實路線，為兩岸和解營造更多社會支持。
過去新加坡表達有意與我國簽署ＦＴＡ時，扁政府堅持要以「台灣」為名，加上中國又堅決反對，星方於是作罷。如今雙方能夠重啟協商，一方面是因為馬政府採取務實策略，以可行的模式克服了名稱爭議，一方面是藉由開創新的兩岸互動，為台灣找到新的生存發展空間。那種方式才是真正在捍衛國家利益、照顧民眾福祉，答案顯然很清楚了。馬總統達到了過去不敢想像的對外突破，值得全國民眾的掌聲肯定，也希望政府能再接再厲，繼續交出好成績。
Thursday, August 5, 2010
Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen: How Do You Intend to Clean Up the Central Taiwan Science Park Mess?
Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen:How Do You Intend to Clean Up the Central Taiwan Science Park Mess?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 5, 2010
Construction has been halted on Phase 3 of the Central Taiwan Science Park. What do Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen have to say for themselves? This is not a hypothetical question. The reason we are demanding answers from them, is their role in the Seven Stars Farm Environmental Impact Assessment dispute. Afer all, forceful intervention by these two during their terms as premier and deputy premier created this mess in the first place. The Administrative Court has ordered the project halted. The industries impacted face hundreds of billions in losses. Clearly those responsible for creating this mess have an oblgation to explain themselves and help clean it up.
Back then the Chen administration was promoting its "Two Trillion, Three Stars" plan, and promoted the Central Taiwan Science Park full force. It allow AUO to move in after only 10 months. Su Tseng-chang single-handedly masterminded Phase 3. The EPA Bureau Chief at the time was environmental activist Chang Kuo-lung. Tsai Ing-wen personally telephoned Environmental Impact Assessment Commission members to "express concern for the project." The project was rammed through amidst intense controversy, leading to continued litigation. Two and a half years ago, the High Administrative Court squelched an Environmental Impact Assessment for the first time in history. The government refused to halt construction on the project, and rejected further appeals. The party in power at the time was the DPP. The record is clear to see. Yet the Green Camp and the DPP are now attempting to use the controversy to accuse the Blue Camp of indifference to environmental protection and contempt for the law, in flagrant defiance of the truth.
Governmental decision-making must of course have consistency and continuity. If the KMT were to characterize its plight as "being forced to wipe the DPP's ass," we would not approve. But when the government's plans for industrial development conflict with environmental protection, the successor administration and the ruling and opposition parties must face facts and seek solutions. They must not use the opportunity to engage in muck-raking or complicate issues by politicizing them. They certainly must not mire the public in a debate over "economic growth vs. environmental protection." They must insist on environmental sustainability while protecting the rights and interests of business. The government must not default on its responsibilities, and the opposition party must not attempt to fish in troubled waters.
A string of events seem to suggest an increase in environmental awareness on Taiwan. These include protests by farmers from DaPu, protests by farmers from Hsiang Shi Liao and the Seven Star Farm over the Central Taiwan Science Park, protests over the fire at the Formosa Plastics Sixth Naphtha Cracking Plant, and protests over the Kuo Kuang Eighth Naphtha Cracking Plant. Closer examination however reveals that the motivations in each case were not the same. The backlash from farmers in Dapu and Hsiang Shi Liao was a reaction to the heavy-handed application of eminent domain. Public suspicions concerning Phase 3 of the Central Taiwan Science Park and the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant were the result of a sloppy Environmental Impact Assessment. Concerns about the Formosa Plastics Sixth Naphtha Cracking Plant arose in response to poor internal management practices and gaps in industrial safety measures.
As we can see, the current wave of environmental protests was the result of inept administrative practices by the previous two administrations. These left the public with the impression that the government "favors industry at the expense of agriculture." Secondly, a number of industries failed to fulfill their commitments, and left the public feeling betrayed. There was no wave of "anti-business" sentiment. The question that must be asked is whether past or present administrations abused their authority and failed to follow procedure. These administrations must pay closer attention, and respect the rights of minorities. Industry must set higher standards for itself. It must not blindly pursue profits and ignore public expectations.
Heightened environmental awareness is a sign of social progress. But current protests include political ploys masquerading as environmental protection. They involve environmental double standards. Their instigators are environmental con artists. Take the construction halt on Phase 3 of the Central Taiwan Science Park for example. DPP legislators are demanding that Sheng Shi-hung step down. They are feigning ignorance that this was a decision made by Su Tseng-chang while he was in office, They are deliberately inverting cause and effect. When academicians petitioned against the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant, Lee Yuan-tse described the construction of the Eighth Naphtha Cracking Plant as "extremely unfortunate for Taiwan." The only problem is, the Chen Shui-bian administration had been promoting the project for years. Then EPA Bureau Chief Chang Kuo-long was accused of "obstructing" both this project and the Formosa Plastics Steel Mill, and summarily replaced. Then Academia Sinica President Lee Yuan-tse, and then National Science Council Chairperson Chen Chien-jen voiced no opposition whatsoever. Given their flagrant double standards, aren't they afraid of the damage to their reputations as scientists?
Economic growth and environmental protection are not necessarily rivals in a zero-sum game. Only 2 percent of the residents in Miaoli Dapu opposed government acquisition of the land. Only two dozen or so farmers refused to vacate their ancestral homes in Hsiang Shi Liao. Only seven farming families commissioned environmental groups to file suit in the Seven Stars Farm dispute. The will of the minority must be taken seriously. But the hopes of the majority for economic development and employment cannot be ignored. Phase 3 and 4 of the Central Taiwan Science Park have been halted. This has raised concerns among residents of Er Ling about the impact on their local economy. They are threatening protests of their own. The government must have sound reasons for whatever it does. It must balance economic growth with environmental protection. It must consider the will of both the majority and the minority.
The five cities elections are fast arriving. The KMT is afraid that the environmental issue may continue to burn. Therefore it has adopted a soft strategy. It has called a halt to Phase 3 and 4 of the Central Taiwan Science Park. It has become an election issue. Therefore the fate of the Central Taiwan Science Park must not be determined solely by Wu Den-yih or Jason Hu. Nor should the industrial firms involved be the only ones to suffer the consequences. Current political candidates Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen have an obligation to contemplate the mess they have left behind, and tell us how they think it should be cleaned up. This is an historical responsibilty that both the Blue and Green camps must share. During the Democratic Progressive Party's time in office, it ignored the law in order to help industry. They proved that this approach cannot work. Now that the DPP is in the opposition, it has the temerity to turn around and accuse industry of doing nothing but polluting. That simply does not fly.
問蘇貞昌蔡英文中科如何善後
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.08.05 02:18 am
這不是一個假設性問題。之所以要問蘇貞昌和蔡英文對中科三期喊卡有何看法，因為三期七星農場的環評爭議，正是兩人在擔任正副閣揆時強勢介入所留下的後果。如今，行政法院裁定停止開發、廠商數千億投資面臨無所適從，原始決策者當然有義務說明立場及如何善後。
扁政府當年為了推動「兩兆三星」計畫，全力開發中科，僅花了十個月就讓友達進駐。中科三期由蘇內閣一手主導，當時環保署長是出身環運的張國龍，蔡英文且打電話向環評委員關切；此案在爭議中強渡關山，導致居民不斷爭訟。兩年半前，高等行政法院首度判決撤銷環評，拒絕停工並提出上訴的仍是民進黨政府。從這些前因後果看，今天綠營或民進黨趁機反咬藍營蔑視環保、漠視法令，都是有昧於事實的說法。
當然，政府行政決策應有其一貫性及連續性，國民黨若要將此事形容為替民進黨政府「擦屁股」，我們也不贊同。問題在，當國家延續性重大工業開發計劃與環境保護發生衝突時，前後任政府及朝野政黨必須就事論事，設法尋求解決；而不是趁機相互潑糞，或將之複雜化為政治事件，甚至讓整個社會再陷入「經濟與環保孰重」的交戰之中。重要的是，維護環境永續的立場要堅持，企業的合法權益要保障，政府公權力則不可廢弛自己的責任，在野黨也不應趁火打劫。
近期的一連串事件，從大埔農民走上街頭，到中科相思寮、七星農場的抗爭，包括台塑六輕火災到反國光八輕的事件，都說明台灣保育意識的再度抬頭。但仔細觀察，其中問題並不全然相同：大埔與相思寮是出在徵收手段粗魯，導致農民反彈；中科三期和國光石化是環評程序不夠完備，引發社會疑慮；台塑六輕則是內部管理不良，出現工安漏洞。
由此可見，這一波環保事件，更大的癥結在於前後兩任政府的行政處理手段欠佳，留給人們「重工輕農」的印象；其次，是少數企業的管理和承諾未能徹底落實，失卻民眾的信任；而並非社會突然湧現了「反商情結」。要檢討的，是前後任政府公權力的運用為何偏離軌道，如何能更細緻化，不要忽視少數的權益。企業則應提升自我要求，不要一味追求營收，而疏忽了社會期待。
環保意識的提高，是社會進步的象徵；但在這波事件中，我們卻看到了一些假環保之名而為的政治操作，用兩套標準談環保，實可謂環保之賊。以中科三期遭裁定停工為例，民進黨立委要求沈世宏下台負責；他們假裝不知道這是蘇貞昌任內的決策，故意倒果為因。在學者反對「國光石化」的連署中，李遠哲形容建八輕是「台灣非常不幸的事」；問題是，此案在陳水扁執政時已經成立多年，當時環保署長張國龍還被扣上「阻擋」此案及台塑大鋼廠案之名而遭撤換；李遠哲和陳建仁當時分居中研院長及國科會主委，為何從未表示反對意見？如此兩套標準，不怕引起反科學之譏嗎？
經濟和環保，並不完全是零和遊戲。苗栗大埔僅百分之二居民反對徵收，相思寮抗爭是廿多戶農民不願離開祖厝，七星農場則是七戶農民委託環保團體代打行政訴訟。小蝦米的心願必須重視，但多數人對開發及就業的期待也不能不顧。中科三四期喊卡，一批憂心地方發展的二林民眾也表示要抗爭；政府該做的就是要進退有據，兼籌經濟和環境，並顧多數和少數。
五都選舉在即，國民黨深恐環保議題延燒，因此採取柔勢策略；中科三四期喊卡，應是出於這樣的盤計。這既是一個選舉議題，那麼中科何去何從，就不該只是吳敦義或胡志強的責任，也不只是廠商該自認倒楣；正在參選的蘇貞昌和蔡英文，也有義務想想自己留下的爛攤要如何收拾，這才是藍綠真正的歷史「共業」。民進黨執政時，罔顧法令也要幫助企業設廠，證明是行不通；如今在野，若竟然翻臉指控廠商只會「放雞屎」，一樣是說不通的！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 5, 2010
Construction has been halted on Phase 3 of the Central Taiwan Science Park. What do Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen have to say for themselves? This is not a hypothetical question. The reason we are demanding answers from them, is their role in the Seven Stars Farm Environmental Impact Assessment dispute. Afer all, forceful intervention by these two during their terms as premier and deputy premier created this mess in the first place. The Administrative Court has ordered the project halted. The industries impacted face hundreds of billions in losses. Clearly those responsible for creating this mess have an oblgation to explain themselves and help clean it up.
Back then the Chen administration was promoting its "Two Trillion, Three Stars" plan, and promoted the Central Taiwan Science Park full force. It allow AUO to move in after only 10 months. Su Tseng-chang single-handedly masterminded Phase 3. The EPA Bureau Chief at the time was environmental activist Chang Kuo-lung. Tsai Ing-wen personally telephoned Environmental Impact Assessment Commission members to "express concern for the project." The project was rammed through amidst intense controversy, leading to continued litigation. Two and a half years ago, the High Administrative Court squelched an Environmental Impact Assessment for the first time in history. The government refused to halt construction on the project, and rejected further appeals. The party in power at the time was the DPP. The record is clear to see. Yet the Green Camp and the DPP are now attempting to use the controversy to accuse the Blue Camp of indifference to environmental protection and contempt for the law, in flagrant defiance of the truth.
Governmental decision-making must of course have consistency and continuity. If the KMT were to characterize its plight as "being forced to wipe the DPP's ass," we would not approve. But when the government's plans for industrial development conflict with environmental protection, the successor administration and the ruling and opposition parties must face facts and seek solutions. They must not use the opportunity to engage in muck-raking or complicate issues by politicizing them. They certainly must not mire the public in a debate over "economic growth vs. environmental protection." They must insist on environmental sustainability while protecting the rights and interests of business. The government must not default on its responsibilities, and the opposition party must not attempt to fish in troubled waters.
A string of events seem to suggest an increase in environmental awareness on Taiwan. These include protests by farmers from DaPu, protests by farmers from Hsiang Shi Liao and the Seven Star Farm over the Central Taiwan Science Park, protests over the fire at the Formosa Plastics Sixth Naphtha Cracking Plant, and protests over the Kuo Kuang Eighth Naphtha Cracking Plant. Closer examination however reveals that the motivations in each case were not the same. The backlash from farmers in Dapu and Hsiang Shi Liao was a reaction to the heavy-handed application of eminent domain. Public suspicions concerning Phase 3 of the Central Taiwan Science Park and the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant were the result of a sloppy Environmental Impact Assessment. Concerns about the Formosa Plastics Sixth Naphtha Cracking Plant arose in response to poor internal management practices and gaps in industrial safety measures.
As we can see, the current wave of environmental protests was the result of inept administrative practices by the previous two administrations. These left the public with the impression that the government "favors industry at the expense of agriculture." Secondly, a number of industries failed to fulfill their commitments, and left the public feeling betrayed. There was no wave of "anti-business" sentiment. The question that must be asked is whether past or present administrations abused their authority and failed to follow procedure. These administrations must pay closer attention, and respect the rights of minorities. Industry must set higher standards for itself. It must not blindly pursue profits and ignore public expectations.
Heightened environmental awareness is a sign of social progress. But current protests include political ploys masquerading as environmental protection. They involve environmental double standards. Their instigators are environmental con artists. Take the construction halt on Phase 3 of the Central Taiwan Science Park for example. DPP legislators are demanding that Sheng Shi-hung step down. They are feigning ignorance that this was a decision made by Su Tseng-chang while he was in office, They are deliberately inverting cause and effect. When academicians petitioned against the Kuo Kuang Petrochemical Plant, Lee Yuan-tse described the construction of the Eighth Naphtha Cracking Plant as "extremely unfortunate for Taiwan." The only problem is, the Chen Shui-bian administration had been promoting the project for years. Then EPA Bureau Chief Chang Kuo-long was accused of "obstructing" both this project and the Formosa Plastics Steel Mill, and summarily replaced. Then Academia Sinica President Lee Yuan-tse, and then National Science Council Chairperson Chen Chien-jen voiced no opposition whatsoever. Given their flagrant double standards, aren't they afraid of the damage to their reputations as scientists?
Economic growth and environmental protection are not necessarily rivals in a zero-sum game. Only 2 percent of the residents in Miaoli Dapu opposed government acquisition of the land. Only two dozen or so farmers refused to vacate their ancestral homes in Hsiang Shi Liao. Only seven farming families commissioned environmental groups to file suit in the Seven Stars Farm dispute. The will of the minority must be taken seriously. But the hopes of the majority for economic development and employment cannot be ignored. Phase 3 and 4 of the Central Taiwan Science Park have been halted. This has raised concerns among residents of Er Ling about the impact on their local economy. They are threatening protests of their own. The government must have sound reasons for whatever it does. It must balance economic growth with environmental protection. It must consider the will of both the majority and the minority.
The five cities elections are fast arriving. The KMT is afraid that the environmental issue may continue to burn. Therefore it has adopted a soft strategy. It has called a halt to Phase 3 and 4 of the Central Taiwan Science Park. It has become an election issue. Therefore the fate of the Central Taiwan Science Park must not be determined solely by Wu Den-yih or Jason Hu. Nor should the industrial firms involved be the only ones to suffer the consequences. Current political candidates Su Tseng-chang and Tsai Ing-wen have an obligation to contemplate the mess they have left behind, and tell us how they think it should be cleaned up. This is an historical responsibilty that both the Blue and Green camps must share. During the Democratic Progressive Party's time in office, it ignored the law in order to help industry. They proved that this approach cannot work. Now that the DPP is in the opposition, it has the temerity to turn around and accuse industry of doing nothing but polluting. That simply does not fly.
問蘇貞昌蔡英文中科如何善後
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.08.05 02:18 am
這不是一個假設性問題。之所以要問蘇貞昌和蔡英文對中科三期喊卡有何看法，因為三期七星農場的環評爭議，正是兩人在擔任正副閣揆時強勢介入所留下的後果。如今，行政法院裁定停止開發、廠商數千億投資面臨無所適從，原始決策者當然有義務說明立場及如何善後。
扁政府當年為了推動「兩兆三星」計畫，全力開發中科，僅花了十個月就讓友達進駐。中科三期由蘇內閣一手主導，當時環保署長是出身環運的張國龍，蔡英文且打電話向環評委員關切；此案在爭議中強渡關山，導致居民不斷爭訟。兩年半前，高等行政法院首度判決撤銷環評，拒絕停工並提出上訴的仍是民進黨政府。從這些前因後果看，今天綠營或民進黨趁機反咬藍營蔑視環保、漠視法令，都是有昧於事實的說法。
當然，政府行政決策應有其一貫性及連續性，國民黨若要將此事形容為替民進黨政府「擦屁股」，我們也不贊同。問題在，當國家延續性重大工業開發計劃與環境保護發生衝突時，前後任政府及朝野政黨必須就事論事，設法尋求解決；而不是趁機相互潑糞，或將之複雜化為政治事件，甚至讓整個社會再陷入「經濟與環保孰重」的交戰之中。重要的是，維護環境永續的立場要堅持，企業的合法權益要保障，政府公權力則不可廢弛自己的責任，在野黨也不應趁火打劫。
近期的一連串事件，從大埔農民走上街頭，到中科相思寮、七星農場的抗爭，包括台塑六輕火災到反國光八輕的事件，都說明台灣保育意識的再度抬頭。但仔細觀察，其中問題並不全然相同：大埔與相思寮是出在徵收手段粗魯，導致農民反彈；中科三期和國光石化是環評程序不夠完備，引發社會疑慮；台塑六輕則是內部管理不良，出現工安漏洞。
由此可見，這一波環保事件，更大的癥結在於前後兩任政府的行政處理手段欠佳，留給人們「重工輕農」的印象；其次，是少數企業的管理和承諾未能徹底落實，失卻民眾的信任；而並非社會突然湧現了「反商情結」。要檢討的，是前後任政府公權力的運用為何偏離軌道，如何能更細緻化，不要忽視少數的權益。企業則應提升自我要求，不要一味追求營收，而疏忽了社會期待。
環保意識的提高，是社會進步的象徵；但在這波事件中，我們卻看到了一些假環保之名而為的政治操作，用兩套標準談環保，實可謂環保之賊。以中科三期遭裁定停工為例，民進黨立委要求沈世宏下台負責；他們假裝不知道這是蘇貞昌任內的決策，故意倒果為因。在學者反對「國光石化」的連署中，李遠哲形容建八輕是「台灣非常不幸的事」；問題是，此案在陳水扁執政時已經成立多年，當時環保署長張國龍還被扣上「阻擋」此案及台塑大鋼廠案之名而遭撤換；李遠哲和陳建仁當時分居中研院長及國科會主委，為何從未表示反對意見？如此兩套標準，不怕引起反科學之譏嗎？
經濟和環保，並不完全是零和遊戲。苗栗大埔僅百分之二居民反對徵收，相思寮抗爭是廿多戶農民不願離開祖厝，七星農場則是七戶農民委託環保團體代打行政訴訟。小蝦米的心願必須重視，但多數人對開發及就業的期待也不能不顧。中科三四期喊卡，一批憂心地方發展的二林民眾也表示要抗爭；政府該做的就是要進退有據，兼籌經濟和環境，並顧多數和少數。
五都選舉在即，國民黨深恐環保議題延燒，因此採取柔勢策略；中科三四期喊卡，應是出於這樣的盤計。這既是一個選舉議題，那麼中科何去何從，就不該只是吳敦義或胡志強的責任，也不只是廠商該自認倒楣；正在參選的蘇貞昌和蔡英文，也有義務想想自己留下的爛攤要如何收拾，這才是藍綠真正的歷史「共業」。民進黨執政時，罔顧法令也要幫助企業設廠，證明是行不通；如今在野，若竟然翻臉指控廠商只會「放雞屎」，一樣是說不通的！
Wednesday, August 4, 2010
Come to National Taiwan University, or Perhaps Beijing University?
Come to National Taiwan University, or Perhaps Beijing University?United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 4, 2010
Recent news reports sent shockwaves through universities on Taiwan. Apparently many outstanding high school graduates are choosing to attend university on Mainland China and in Hong Kong. Sporadic cases have occurred in the past. But this year Mainland authorities made it official. Students from Taiwan who meet required standards may seek admission directly from over 100 universities on the Mainland. In other words, a pipeline for systematically channeling human resources toward the Mainland has been laid.
The number of students who have made such a choice is not yet alarming. But as one can easily imagine, the rate will surely increase rapidly, even geometrically. Subjectively and objectively, this "Come to Beijing University; go to the Mainland" trend is more alarming than the "Come to National Taiwan University; go to the United States" trend 30 or 40 years ago. Back then students from Taiwan were still proud to be recruited by National Taiwan University. They still considered it an honor. Today most of the young people who have chosen to attend university on the Mainland lack the academic credentials required for National Taiwan University. For them, this is a good alternative. Back then "go to the United States" meant a long journey at great expense. Not everyone could afford to make this tough choice. Now students from Taiwan can attend Beijing University, Tsinghua University, Shanghai's Fudan University, National Chiao Tung University and other elite schools. They have the advantage of belonging to the same culture. Their "overseas studies" will not be so costly. They will not be handicapped from the outset. Add to this the earnest effort the Mainland is making to attract them.
How members of the public respond will depend upon their perspective. Those with an "anti-China" perspective will of course pour cold water all over the option. They have issued dire warnings about "being brainwashed into supporting reunification." But many television news or talk shows have invited students to share their experiences, to compare the cost of a university education on the two sides of the Strait, the differences in culture, if any, and the trials and tribulations of daily life. Obviously this is a hot topic, and may even indicate a megatrend. The students surveyed were confident. They spoke of the ways they could increase competitiveness. They brimmed over with ambition. On the one hand, it echoed alarmist fears of "being brainwashed into supporting reunification." On the other hand it reflected the government's habitually tardy and belated response. When Mainland China's Taiwan Affairs Office first announced this policy, Mainland Affairs Council and Ministry of Education officials declared that "the attraction for students from Taiwan will not be great." They expressed confidence that good students would stay on Taiwan. But the trend suggests this is clearly not the case.
Thirty years ago this sort of "spread your wings and fly" attitude was common among students from Taiwan who attended university in the United States. Now high school students on Taiwan have expressed the same attitudes about attending university on the Mainland. Is this not an alarming scenario?
The international flow of talent in an era of globalization is nothing new. Many researchers have stressed how emigrants are driven from their place of birth and drawn to their adopted homes. Today Mainland China is a "Great Nation on the Rise." It is competing for international talent. Its draw is a factor not within our control. All we can do is try to catch up.
In fact, the most distressing development is that even as we drive native talent away, we are simultaneously preventing outside talent from entering. Studies of white collar workers "running away" reveal that at least one million people have left over the past decade. A few years ago they "voted with their feet," leaving primarily for political reasons. In recent years many of them left with their families. They are "going West" to pan for "gold in them thar hills." So-called "Taiwan businessmen" have traditionally been defined as manufacturing sector leaders. Today that definition must be broadened to include leaders of the financial industry and advertising industry, even such service industries as wedding gown makers and beauty salons. These people left partly in response to economic factors on Taiwan, and partly in response to an unstable political environment, a hostile social climate created by militant Taiwan independence groups, and a Closed Door Policy. The government can do nothing about those determined to leave. Meanwhile, the Green Camp persists in doing everything in its power to prevent Mainland students from entering, and Mainland academic credentials from being accepted. Outside talent is not permitted to enter. Inside talent is forced to leave. Over time what will be the consequences for our nation's competitiveness?
Recently our Minister of Education returned from a visit to Vietnam and Indonesia. He spoke of efforts to recruit students from Southeast Asia. The world is undergoing globalization. The population is aging. Birth rates are declining. Governments the world over are fighting over advanced technical personnel and higher education. The government on Taiwan is aggressively recruiting students from Southeast Asia. On the one hand it is unable to retain its own students. On the other hand it is preventing Mainland students from entering. What can one say about such an irrational policy?
During negotiations over ECFA, every issue was placed under the microscope, including the number of trade goods and what sort of "accomodations" would be made. Now however, a huge gap has opened up between the two sides over the departure and entry of talent. To a considerable extent this gap is the result of a tug of war between internal forces on Taiwan. The scenario is incredible. The consequences are unimaginable. How can anyone not be alarmed?
來來來，台大或北大？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.08.04 01:18 am
最近台灣高等教育界的震撼新聞：不少優異的高中畢業生選擇前往中國大陸及香港讀大學。這類個案早就零星發生，但今年由於大陸作成政策，台灣學測達頂標級的學生，可直接向大陸一百多所大學申請就讀，人才流向大陸的「制度性」管道於焉成形！
目前作此選擇的學生數尚非驚人，但可想像將會越來越快、越來越多地倍數增加。從國人的主觀感受和客觀情勢來說，此種「來來來，來北大；去去去，去大陸」的趨勢，比起三、四十年前「來來來，來台大；去去去，去美國」的景象更令人震驚。當年台灣學生尚且懷抱著「來台大」的榮譽感；今天這批登陸的青年學子，多半可能具有進台大的實力，卻寧可捨此就彼。當年的「去美國」，乃路途遙遠、成本浩大、不是人人負擔得起的辛苦選擇；今天赴北大、清大、上海的復旦、交大等名校就讀的台灣學生，享有同文同種的優勢，「留學」的經濟壓力也不大，起跑點毫不輸人，更增添了彼岸對台灣人才招手的吸引力。
輿論對此的反應見仁見智。持「反中」立場者當然努力澆冷水，警告「遭統戰洗腦的危機」。但一般新聞或談話性的電視節目，已見陸續邀請當事人現身說法，討論兩岸讀大學的成本比較、文化差異、生活酸甜苦辣種種，顯然視為熱門話題，甚至不諱言這可能是大勢所趨。受訪學生則多自信滿滿，侃侃而談競爭力提升如何如何，顯得企圖心十足。這一方面襯托出「統戰危機說」之危言聳聽，另方面也對照出政府相關政策的後知後覺。當初中共國台辦作此政策宣布時，我方陸委會和教育部的官員都認為對台生「吸引力不大」，有信心把好學生留在台灣。但趨勢顯然並非如此。
相當程度上，三十多年前顯現在赴美留學的大學畢業生身上，那種「展翅高飛」的憧憬和躍躍欲試之心，如今已提早落實在台灣高中生對大陸發展的想像之中！這豈不是一個令人想起來都會驀然心驚的景象嗎？
國際間人才流動，在此全球化時代本來不足為奇，相關研究多強調移民者母國的「推力」，和移入國的「拉力」因素。今天中國大陸以「大國崛起」之姿，吸引國際人才爭相前往，此一「拉力」因素非操之在我，台灣只能期待急起直追。
其實，最令人為之不安的，是台灣在把本地人才外推的同時，又阻擋外界人才流入。有關白領階級「出走」現象的研究認為，十年來累積至少百萬人，前幾年多是出於「用腳投票」的政治因素使然，這幾年則大量出現「西向淘金」的舉家搬遷熱潮；傳統的製造業相關的「台商」定義，如今已廣泛遍及金融業、廣告業、甚至婚紗、美容等無所不包的服務業。這些人出走的原因，除了台灣內部的景氣因素之外，還有不穩定的政治環境、部分激進團體煽動的不友好社會氣氛、乃至政策閉鎖等等。政府對這些中堅階層的出走無能為力，而綠營對於陸生來台、大陸學歷認證等議題也仍全力阻擋；國外的人才進不來，國內的人才相率出走，這消長之間對我國的競爭力是何等的損失？
最近教育部長訪越南、印尼歸來，談及向東南亞地區招生之事。在全球化競爭及人口老化、少子化等因素之下，各國對於高級技術人才以及高等教育的對象，各自都有「搶人」的策略。台灣目前如果連東南亞地區都列為積極招生的對象，則一方面留不住自己的好學生，另方面還要阻擋陸生來台，實在沒道理可說。
兩岸協商ＥＣＦＡ時，對於貿易互動之間多少項目的商品、如何「讓利」等等，都要斤斤計較；但現在兩岸人才的一出一入卻有如此巨大差異，且相當程度是台灣內部的推力與阻力交互作用所致，這種景象之不可理喻，後果之難以承擔，能不令人思之心驚？
A Translation
August 4, 2010
Recent news reports sent shockwaves through universities on Taiwan. Apparently many outstanding high school graduates are choosing to attend university on Mainland China and in Hong Kong. Sporadic cases have occurred in the past. But this year Mainland authorities made it official. Students from Taiwan who meet required standards may seek admission directly from over 100 universities on the Mainland. In other words, a pipeline for systematically channeling human resources toward the Mainland has been laid.
The number of students who have made such a choice is not yet alarming. But as one can easily imagine, the rate will surely increase rapidly, even geometrically. Subjectively and objectively, this "Come to Beijing University; go to the Mainland" trend is more alarming than the "Come to National Taiwan University; go to the United States" trend 30 or 40 years ago. Back then students from Taiwan were still proud to be recruited by National Taiwan University. They still considered it an honor. Today most of the young people who have chosen to attend university on the Mainland lack the academic credentials required for National Taiwan University. For them, this is a good alternative. Back then "go to the United States" meant a long journey at great expense. Not everyone could afford to make this tough choice. Now students from Taiwan can attend Beijing University, Tsinghua University, Shanghai's Fudan University, National Chiao Tung University and other elite schools. They have the advantage of belonging to the same culture. Their "overseas studies" will not be so costly. They will not be handicapped from the outset. Add to this the earnest effort the Mainland is making to attract them.
How members of the public respond will depend upon their perspective. Those with an "anti-China" perspective will of course pour cold water all over the option. They have issued dire warnings about "being brainwashed into supporting reunification." But many television news or talk shows have invited students to share their experiences, to compare the cost of a university education on the two sides of the Strait, the differences in culture, if any, and the trials and tribulations of daily life. Obviously this is a hot topic, and may even indicate a megatrend. The students surveyed were confident. They spoke of the ways they could increase competitiveness. They brimmed over with ambition. On the one hand, it echoed alarmist fears of "being brainwashed into supporting reunification." On the other hand it reflected the government's habitually tardy and belated response. When Mainland China's Taiwan Affairs Office first announced this policy, Mainland Affairs Council and Ministry of Education officials declared that "the attraction for students from Taiwan will not be great." They expressed confidence that good students would stay on Taiwan. But the trend suggests this is clearly not the case.
Thirty years ago this sort of "spread your wings and fly" attitude was common among students from Taiwan who attended university in the United States. Now high school students on Taiwan have expressed the same attitudes about attending university on the Mainland. Is this not an alarming scenario?
The international flow of talent in an era of globalization is nothing new. Many researchers have stressed how emigrants are driven from their place of birth and drawn to their adopted homes. Today Mainland China is a "Great Nation on the Rise." It is competing for international talent. Its draw is a factor not within our control. All we can do is try to catch up.
In fact, the most distressing development is that even as we drive native talent away, we are simultaneously preventing outside talent from entering. Studies of white collar workers "running away" reveal that at least one million people have left over the past decade. A few years ago they "voted with their feet," leaving primarily for political reasons. In recent years many of them left with their families. They are "going West" to pan for "gold in them thar hills." So-called "Taiwan businessmen" have traditionally been defined as manufacturing sector leaders. Today that definition must be broadened to include leaders of the financial industry and advertising industry, even such service industries as wedding gown makers and beauty salons. These people left partly in response to economic factors on Taiwan, and partly in response to an unstable political environment, a hostile social climate created by militant Taiwan independence groups, and a Closed Door Policy. The government can do nothing about those determined to leave. Meanwhile, the Green Camp persists in doing everything in its power to prevent Mainland students from entering, and Mainland academic credentials from being accepted. Outside talent is not permitted to enter. Inside talent is forced to leave. Over time what will be the consequences for our nation's competitiveness?
Recently our Minister of Education returned from a visit to Vietnam and Indonesia. He spoke of efforts to recruit students from Southeast Asia. The world is undergoing globalization. The population is aging. Birth rates are declining. Governments the world over are fighting over advanced technical personnel and higher education. The government on Taiwan is aggressively recruiting students from Southeast Asia. On the one hand it is unable to retain its own students. On the other hand it is preventing Mainland students from entering. What can one say about such an irrational policy?
During negotiations over ECFA, every issue was placed under the microscope, including the number of trade goods and what sort of "accomodations" would be made. Now however, a huge gap has opened up between the two sides over the departure and entry of talent. To a considerable extent this gap is the result of a tug of war between internal forces on Taiwan. The scenario is incredible. The consequences are unimaginable. How can anyone not be alarmed?
來來來，台大或北大？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.08.04 01:18 am
最近台灣高等教育界的震撼新聞：不少優異的高中畢業生選擇前往中國大陸及香港讀大學。這類個案早就零星發生，但今年由於大陸作成政策，台灣學測達頂標級的學生，可直接向大陸一百多所大學申請就讀，人才流向大陸的「制度性」管道於焉成形！
目前作此選擇的學生數尚非驚人，但可想像將會越來越快、越來越多地倍數增加。從國人的主觀感受和客觀情勢來說，此種「來來來，來北大；去去去，去大陸」的趨勢，比起三、四十年前「來來來，來台大；去去去，去美國」的景象更令人震驚。當年台灣學生尚且懷抱著「來台大」的榮譽感；今天這批登陸的青年學子，多半可能具有進台大的實力，卻寧可捨此就彼。當年的「去美國」，乃路途遙遠、成本浩大、不是人人負擔得起的辛苦選擇；今天赴北大、清大、上海的復旦、交大等名校就讀的台灣學生，享有同文同種的優勢，「留學」的經濟壓力也不大，起跑點毫不輸人，更增添了彼岸對台灣人才招手的吸引力。
輿論對此的反應見仁見智。持「反中」立場者當然努力澆冷水，警告「遭統戰洗腦的危機」。但一般新聞或談話性的電視節目，已見陸續邀請當事人現身說法，討論兩岸讀大學的成本比較、文化差異、生活酸甜苦辣種種，顯然視為熱門話題，甚至不諱言這可能是大勢所趨。受訪學生則多自信滿滿，侃侃而談競爭力提升如何如何，顯得企圖心十足。這一方面襯托出「統戰危機說」之危言聳聽，另方面也對照出政府相關政策的後知後覺。當初中共國台辦作此政策宣布時，我方陸委會和教育部的官員都認為對台生「吸引力不大」，有信心把好學生留在台灣。但趨勢顯然並非如此。
相當程度上，三十多年前顯現在赴美留學的大學畢業生身上，那種「展翅高飛」的憧憬和躍躍欲試之心，如今已提早落實在台灣高中生對大陸發展的想像之中！這豈不是一個令人想起來都會驀然心驚的景象嗎？
國際間人才流動，在此全球化時代本來不足為奇，相關研究多強調移民者母國的「推力」，和移入國的「拉力」因素。今天中國大陸以「大國崛起」之姿，吸引國際人才爭相前往，此一「拉力」因素非操之在我，台灣只能期待急起直追。
其實，最令人為之不安的，是台灣在把本地人才外推的同時，又阻擋外界人才流入。有關白領階級「出走」現象的研究認為，十年來累積至少百萬人，前幾年多是出於「用腳投票」的政治因素使然，這幾年則大量出現「西向淘金」的舉家搬遷熱潮；傳統的製造業相關的「台商」定義，如今已廣泛遍及金融業、廣告業、甚至婚紗、美容等無所不包的服務業。這些人出走的原因，除了台灣內部的景氣因素之外，還有不穩定的政治環境、部分激進團體煽動的不友好社會氣氛、乃至政策閉鎖等等。政府對這些中堅階層的出走無能為力，而綠營對於陸生來台、大陸學歷認證等議題也仍全力阻擋；國外的人才進不來，國內的人才相率出走，這消長之間對我國的競爭力是何等的損失？
最近教育部長訪越南、印尼歸來，談及向東南亞地區招生之事。在全球化競爭及人口老化、少子化等因素之下，各國對於高級技術人才以及高等教育的對象，各自都有「搶人」的策略。台灣目前如果連東南亞地區都列為積極招生的對象，則一方面留不住自己的好學生，另方面還要阻擋陸生來台，實在沒道理可說。
兩岸協商ＥＣＦＡ時，對於貿易互動之間多少項目的商品、如何「讓利」等等，都要斤斤計較；但現在兩岸人才的一出一入卻有如此巨大差異，且相當程度是台灣內部的推力與阻力交互作用所致，這種景象之不可理喻，後果之難以承擔，能不令人思之心驚？
Tuesday, August 3, 2010
Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Negotiations Require More than A Tacit Understanding and Goodwill
Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Negotiations Require More than A Tacit Understanding and GoodwillUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 3, 2010
During recent cross-Strait negotiations, the addition of new airline destinations led to a disagreement over air traffic rights. Air traffic rights have been subjected to intense debate. A single clue tells all. The disagreement reveals the structural nature of Taiwan's cross-Strait economic and trade consultation problems. The government must pay close attention. It must seek appropriate solutions ahead of follow-up negotiations.
One problem is that negotiators for our side have equated "tacit understandings" with "articles of agreement," and given the public the wrong perception. Equating "tacit understandings" with "articles of agreement" is a mistake that rarely occurs when negotiating air traffic rights with other governments. One reason is that prior to negotiations, representatives for our side looked at the two sides' positions and arrived at unrealistic expectations. Statements made by Mainland representatives at the negotiating table were perceived as more generous and accomodating than intended. Even if Mainland China is genuinely inclined to be generous and accomodating, that is merely an inclination, a declaration of principle. It is an approach toward dealing with irreconcilable differences between the two sides. But just as in international economic and trade negotiations, it is not always possible to implement general principles when negotiating specific issues.
In recent years, Mainland China's economic system has undergone structural changes. Industry interests and industry viewpoints are given greater consideration during the formulation of economic and trade policy. In recent years, competition among Mainland China airlines has been intense. This is also true for high speed rail routes. Negotiations over air traffic rights involve the interests of airline companies and even airports. The operators are influential members at either the central or local government level. With the end of negotiations, they are having second thoughts. They are backpedaling on the concessions they are willing to make. They are asking themselves what is in the best interest of local governments and Mainland industries. This is not difficult to understand. This is why equating a declaration of general principles with a technical negotiation over a specific issue inevitably leads to dangerous miscalculations.
Secondly, negotiators for our side are deficient in political sensitivity. Another point of controversy concerns airline routes. The Mainland side is artificially directing new airline routes through Fuzhou and Xiamen, cities with lower market demand. These are the cities the Mainland is energetically promoting as the core of the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region. We do not intend to speculate on whether Mainland airline routes for the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region are part of a larger plan for the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region. But our side has always had reservations about making the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region part of cross-Strait economic and trade negotiations. At least we have yet to formulate an overall position on the matter. During negotiations over the cross-Strait economic agreement (ECFA) for example, our side did their utmost to avoid having economic cooperation equated with regional cooperation. But as we know from negotiations over air traffic rights, the Mainland side has made the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region an objective larger than ECFA. Perhaps negotiators for our side fully understood the sensitivity of the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region, and accepted the Mainland's proposals as a show of flexibility. But if they did so out of ignorance, or because the government was unclear about its significance, then it has a systemic problem that requires immediate correction.
The disagreement also highlights the need for increased participation by legal professionals in economic and trade negotiations. Outsiders have no way of knowing whether legal experts were present during recent air traffic rights negotiations. But based on the results, even if legal experts were present, they were ineffectual and their advice went unheeded. Current cross-Strait trade negotiations have proceeded smoothly only because the two sides agreed to tackle the easy issues first. Future negotiations will become increasingly difficult. More special interests and stakeholders will make demands. They will haggle over ever penny. They will dot every i, and cross every t. This is inevitable. The cross-Strait economic and trade agreement is one of the few agreements that can be written in our mother tongue. But just because it can be written in Chinese, that does not mean we can understand its legal implications. Legalese often saves something for a rainy day. Guarding against any downside often takes precedence over ensuring an upside. The atmosphere during negotiations was highly positive, with a high degree of tacit agreement. Insisting on the legal niceties could easily have been perceived as raining on the parade. But the air traffic rights incident highlights the importance of participation by legal professionals.
Over the coming months, negotiations over navigation rights will recommence. Six months after ECFA goes into effect, negotiations over investment protection measures, trade in goods, trade in services, and dispute settlements will begin. The cross-Strait economic cooperation committee must begin operations. But the dispute over air traffic rights betrays a lack of preparedness on the part of various ministries and departments. Therefore the government must quickly internalize its past experiences, publish strategy guides, and correct its structural problems. It must coordinate the various ministries' negotiating positions. Only then can it avoid turning a golden opportunity into a major crisis.
兩岸經貿協商不能只靠默契與善意
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.08.03 01:36 am
兩岸航權協商最近發生新增航點出現認知落差的爭議，各界對航權的計算也有頗多討論；見微知著，我們由此看到一些台灣在兩岸經貿協商中結構性的問題，值得政府重視，並尋求妥善解決的方案，以面對很快就會到來的後續協商。
這次事件的一個關鍵，在於我方談判代表將未條文化的「默契」，當做是協議事項，而讓外界對航班安排產生錯誤的認知。這種將「默契」當「協議」的錯誤也好，失誤也罷，相信在與其他國家洽簽的航權協定中很少出現。究其原因，一是我方代表在事前分析雙方立場時，可能對陸方的讓利說有著不切實際的期待，進而將陸方在談判桌上的討論，一律以善意、讓利的方式解讀。殊不知，即使中國大陸真有所謂讓利的意向，其自始至終都是一種大方向、大原則的宣示，藉為雙方無法化解歧見時的處理方針；但如同國際間的經貿談判，整體原則卻未必能落實在每一個議題的具體協商中。
特別是隨著中國大陸近年的經濟體制與結構改變，產業利益與意見在經貿政策中愈來愈受重視。大陸航空市場近年競爭激烈，各高鐵路段陸續通車後尤然；而航權談判涉及航空公司甚至航空站間的利益分配，其經營者若非中央權貴，也是地方大員，在談判後出現對台讓利說局部退縮，轉而加重考量大陸地方與產業利益的結果，並不難理解。也因此，以讓利這種原則性的宣示做為個別議題技術談判的立場研判基礎，必然存在著一定的誤判風險。
其次，我方談判代表的政治敏感度亦顯不足。這次事件的另一個爭議點，是陸方將新航線以人為方式導引至福州、廈門等市場需求較低的城市；這些城市，正是大陸近年大力推動所謂海西區的核心城市。我們無意猜測陸方的海西專屬航班安排是否屬於海西區整體布局的一部分，但對於海西區議題納入兩岸經貿協商範圍，我方過去基於對等性等考量，一直有所保留，至少整體立場尚未形成。例如在兩岸經濟協議（ECFA）中，我方便極力避免在經濟合作事項上，出現可能被解讀為區域合作的內容。但從航權談判事件可知，陸方將海西區納入協商議題的目標，並不限於ECFA協商。我方談判代表若是在充分認知海西議題的敏感性下，接受陸方提出的承諾，或許意味著政府立場的調整與彈性；但若是因為欠缺此一認知，或因政府本身對海西區的立場不清所致，就是一個結構性問題，需要整頓修正。
另外，這件事也凸顯出強化法律專業人才參與經貿協商的必要性。這次航權協商是否有法律專家參與，外界不得而知；但由結果論斷，法律專家即使有參與，在過程中不是未發揮功能，就是意見未受重視。兩岸經貿協商目前進展固然尚稱順利，但在先易後難的架構下，未來將會愈來愈複雜，牽扯的利益與利害關係人範圍也將加深加大，錙銖必較、字字斟酌的情形，勢將不可避免。確實，兩岸經貿協商是我們少數可以用母語擬訂條文的場合，但即使能以中文書寫，並不意味著瞭解其法律意涵。此外，法律意見往往是採未雨綢繆的觀點，防弊重於興利，因而在協商氣氛良好、默契十足之際，法律意見的堅持，很容易被當成攪局者；但此次航權談判事件，凸顯了強化法律專業的重要性。
未來數月內，除將重開航權談判，ECFA生效後半年內還須啟動投資保障、貨品貿易、服務業貿易及爭端解決等四大協商，兩岸經濟合作委員會也將開始運作；但航權談判爭議凸顯了各部會的準備程度似乎有落差。基此，政府應儘速歸納過去協商經驗，製作教戰手冊，並修正上述的結構性問題，統合各部會的談判立場與協商能量，才不會把好事談成憾事。
A Translation
August 3, 2010
During recent cross-Strait negotiations, the addition of new airline destinations led to a disagreement over air traffic rights. Air traffic rights have been subjected to intense debate. A single clue tells all. The disagreement reveals the structural nature of Taiwan's cross-Strait economic and trade consultation problems. The government must pay close attention. It must seek appropriate solutions ahead of follow-up negotiations.
One problem is that negotiators for our side have equated "tacit understandings" with "articles of agreement," and given the public the wrong perception. Equating "tacit understandings" with "articles of agreement" is a mistake that rarely occurs when negotiating air traffic rights with other governments. One reason is that prior to negotiations, representatives for our side looked at the two sides' positions and arrived at unrealistic expectations. Statements made by Mainland representatives at the negotiating table were perceived as more generous and accomodating than intended. Even if Mainland China is genuinely inclined to be generous and accomodating, that is merely an inclination, a declaration of principle. It is an approach toward dealing with irreconcilable differences between the two sides. But just as in international economic and trade negotiations, it is not always possible to implement general principles when negotiating specific issues.
In recent years, Mainland China's economic system has undergone structural changes. Industry interests and industry viewpoints are given greater consideration during the formulation of economic and trade policy. In recent years, competition among Mainland China airlines has been intense. This is also true for high speed rail routes. Negotiations over air traffic rights involve the interests of airline companies and even airports. The operators are influential members at either the central or local government level. With the end of negotiations, they are having second thoughts. They are backpedaling on the concessions they are willing to make. They are asking themselves what is in the best interest of local governments and Mainland industries. This is not difficult to understand. This is why equating a declaration of general principles with a technical negotiation over a specific issue inevitably leads to dangerous miscalculations.
Secondly, negotiators for our side are deficient in political sensitivity. Another point of controversy concerns airline routes. The Mainland side is artificially directing new airline routes through Fuzhou and Xiamen, cities with lower market demand. These are the cities the Mainland is energetically promoting as the core of the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region. We do not intend to speculate on whether Mainland airline routes for the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region are part of a larger plan for the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region. But our side has always had reservations about making the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region part of cross-Strait economic and trade negotiations. At least we have yet to formulate an overall position on the matter. During negotiations over the cross-Strait economic agreement (ECFA) for example, our side did their utmost to avoid having economic cooperation equated with regional cooperation. But as we know from negotiations over air traffic rights, the Mainland side has made the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region an objective larger than ECFA. Perhaps negotiators for our side fully understood the sensitivity of the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region, and accepted the Mainland's proposals as a show of flexibility. But if they did so out of ignorance, or because the government was unclear about its significance, then it has a systemic problem that requires immediate correction.
The disagreement also highlights the need for increased participation by legal professionals in economic and trade negotiations. Outsiders have no way of knowing whether legal experts were present during recent air traffic rights negotiations. But based on the results, even if legal experts were present, they were ineffectual and their advice went unheeded. Current cross-Strait trade negotiations have proceeded smoothly only because the two sides agreed to tackle the easy issues first. Future negotiations will become increasingly difficult. More special interests and stakeholders will make demands. They will haggle over ever penny. They will dot every i, and cross every t. This is inevitable. The cross-Strait economic and trade agreement is one of the few agreements that can be written in our mother tongue. But just because it can be written in Chinese, that does not mean we can understand its legal implications. Legalese often saves something for a rainy day. Guarding against any downside often takes precedence over ensuring an upside. The atmosphere during negotiations was highly positive, with a high degree of tacit agreement. Insisting on the legal niceties could easily have been perceived as raining on the parade. But the air traffic rights incident highlights the importance of participation by legal professionals.
Over the coming months, negotiations over navigation rights will recommence. Six months after ECFA goes into effect, negotiations over investment protection measures, trade in goods, trade in services, and dispute settlements will begin. The cross-Strait economic cooperation committee must begin operations. But the dispute over air traffic rights betrays a lack of preparedness on the part of various ministries and departments. Therefore the government must quickly internalize its past experiences, publish strategy guides, and correct its structural problems. It must coordinate the various ministries' negotiating positions. Only then can it avoid turning a golden opportunity into a major crisis.
兩岸經貿協商不能只靠默契與善意
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.08.03 01:36 am
兩岸航權協商最近發生新增航點出現認知落差的爭議，各界對航權的計算也有頗多討論；見微知著，我們由此看到一些台灣在兩岸經貿協商中結構性的問題，值得政府重視，並尋求妥善解決的方案，以面對很快就會到來的後續協商。
這次事件的一個關鍵，在於我方談判代表將未條文化的「默契」，當做是協議事項，而讓外界對航班安排產生錯誤的認知。這種將「默契」當「協議」的錯誤也好，失誤也罷，相信在與其他國家洽簽的航權協定中很少出現。究其原因，一是我方代表在事前分析雙方立場時，可能對陸方的讓利說有著不切實際的期待，進而將陸方在談判桌上的討論，一律以善意、讓利的方式解讀。殊不知，即使中國大陸真有所謂讓利的意向，其自始至終都是一種大方向、大原則的宣示，藉為雙方無法化解歧見時的處理方針；但如同國際間的經貿談判，整體原則卻未必能落實在每一個議題的具體協商中。
特別是隨著中國大陸近年的經濟體制與結構改變，產業利益與意見在經貿政策中愈來愈受重視。大陸航空市場近年競爭激烈，各高鐵路段陸續通車後尤然；而航權談判涉及航空公司甚至航空站間的利益分配，其經營者若非中央權貴，也是地方大員，在談判後出現對台讓利說局部退縮，轉而加重考量大陸地方與產業利益的結果，並不難理解。也因此，以讓利這種原則性的宣示做為個別議題技術談判的立場研判基礎，必然存在著一定的誤判風險。
其次，我方談判代表的政治敏感度亦顯不足。這次事件的另一個爭議點，是陸方將新航線以人為方式導引至福州、廈門等市場需求較低的城市；這些城市，正是大陸近年大力推動所謂海西區的核心城市。我們無意猜測陸方的海西專屬航班安排是否屬於海西區整體布局的一部分，但對於海西區議題納入兩岸經貿協商範圍，我方過去基於對等性等考量，一直有所保留，至少整體立場尚未形成。例如在兩岸經濟協議（ECFA）中，我方便極力避免在經濟合作事項上，出現可能被解讀為區域合作的內容。但從航權談判事件可知，陸方將海西區納入協商議題的目標，並不限於ECFA協商。我方談判代表若是在充分認知海西議題的敏感性下，接受陸方提出的承諾，或許意味著政府立場的調整與彈性；但若是因為欠缺此一認知，或因政府本身對海西區的立場不清所致，就是一個結構性問題，需要整頓修正。
另外，這件事也凸顯出強化法律專業人才參與經貿協商的必要性。這次航權協商是否有法律專家參與，外界不得而知；但由結果論斷，法律專家即使有參與，在過程中不是未發揮功能，就是意見未受重視。兩岸經貿協商目前進展固然尚稱順利，但在先易後難的架構下，未來將會愈來愈複雜，牽扯的利益與利害關係人範圍也將加深加大，錙銖必較、字字斟酌的情形，勢將不可避免。確實，兩岸經貿協商是我們少數可以用母語擬訂條文的場合，但即使能以中文書寫，並不意味著瞭解其法律意涵。此外，法律意見往往是採未雨綢繆的觀點，防弊重於興利，因而在協商氣氛良好、默契十足之際，法律意見的堅持，很容易被當成攪局者；但此次航權談判事件，凸顯了強化法律專業的重要性。
未來數月內，除將重開航權談判，ECFA生效後半年內還須啟動投資保障、貨品貿易、服務業貿易及爭端解決等四大協商，兩岸經濟合作委員會也將開始運作；但航權談判爭議凸顯了各部會的準備程度似乎有落差。基此，政府應儘速歸納過去協商經驗，製作教戰手冊，並修正上述的結構性問題，統合各部會的談判立場與協商能量，才不會把好事談成憾事。
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