KMT and PFP Supporters Oppose Confrontation
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 10, 2011
The candidates for the presidential and the legislative elections have gradually emerged. A split within the Blue Camp appears inevitable. People First Party Chairman James Soong publicly announced that the PFP would be seeking at least 10 seats in the legislature. Would he himself lead the party by taking a run at the legislature? Or would he hold a petition drive then decide whether to run for president? Both possibilities are under consideration. From the KMT's perspective, the Blue Camp has returned to its divided state in 2000. That division led to a nightmare. The Blue Camp lost of power, and the nation experienced a change in ruling parties. The pressure on the Blue Camp was enormous.
During the 2000 change in ruling parties, the Democratic Progressive Party failed to win an absolute majority. In other words, had the Blue Camp not split, the DPP would never have come to power so soon. But as we revisit history, the Blue Camp must face one fact. The Kuomintang may have developed and diversified. But unless it can implement effective internal mechanisms and procedures, it will repeatedly experience internal division and discord.
The problem began when Lee Teng-hui became president. A split arose between traditional KMT members and proponents of "localization." The New KMT Connection and the Thoughts-Gathering Alliance fought tooth and nail, Several years later they developed into the New Party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union. Looking back, "localization" within the KMT is no longer an issue. It has already taken root. Its roots are already deep within the soil. But localization is not Taiwan independence. To some extent localization helped Lee Teng-hui remain in power for 12 years.
As for the bad blood between Lee Teng-hui and James Soong, it was merely a naked power struggle. Soong perceived the "freezing" of the Taiwan Provincial Government as an attempt to deprive him of power. It also suggested that the ROC might eliminate the Taiwan Provincial Government altogether, and move toward Taiwan independence, But the freezing of the Taiwan Provincial Government over a decade ago proved one thing. Although the Taiwan Provincial Government's administrative efficiency had already been called into question, the Republic of China did not move toward Taiwan independence. Its administration was upgraded and improved.according to the law. Even if James Soong had been elected president in 2000, he would not have restored the Taiwan Provincial Government.
After the first change in ruling parties in 2000, the People First Party enjoyed considerable public approval. But following two attempts by the PFP to collaborate with the Chen regime, Blue Camp supporters began to wonder about the People First Party's political priorities. Even more troubling, word emerged that the PFP and the DPP were making quid pro quo power deals. When James Soong proclaimed that the People First Party would go its own way, his troops had already participated in the KMT's party primaries, and were running as KMT candidates. Lo Shu-lei is running for the legislature under the KMT banner. Lo said that James Soong is not making trouble for no reason. She said President Ma should publicly promise that if he wins a second term, he will appoint James Soong premier. This surely grated on the ears of Blue Camp supporters, It surely grated on James Soong's ears as well.
From the People First Party's perspective, "dissent should not be equated with disunity." If the Kuomintang refuses to extend its hand in friendship, how can there be any unity? But the KMT may still feel aggrieved. Just what is that James Soong wants? Suppose that in 2008, the nation experiences yet another change in ruling parties? Suppose the KMT invites James Soong back to the KMT as a vice chairman, but gets turned down? Suppose People First Party candidates who promised to return to the KMT, renege on their promises, but instead run for office, either as legislators without portfolio, or as district representatives? Most People First Party officials have already been granted positions within the Ma administration. They have gradually risen within the hierarchy. Must James Soong be appointed premier before the Ma administration's governance can be affirmed? James Soong has blasted the Ma administration full force. Premier Wu Den-yih has been on good terms with James Soong. How must he feel hearing Soong say these things?
Regrets however, cannot solve problems. Lee Teng-hui and Lien Chan have withdrawn from the political arena. But the old Chung Hsing case remains unresolved, despite Ma Ying-jeou's return as KMT Chairman. It remains an ulit fuse that could touch off conflict. Lawyers for Ma and Soong clash constantly. How can they meet each other earnestly? How can they engage in an exchange of views?
Ma and Song may not be able to unite. But that does not mean that the KMT and the PFP must split. At one time Lee and Soong split, Lien and Soong fell out, Today Soong may be a guest of honor at Lee Teng-hui's birthday. Lien and Soong are even closer. On the Mainland and on Taiwan, James Soong never ceases praising Lien Chan for making cross-Strait peace possible. Having suffered the consequences of disunity, Lien and Soong have become brothers in arms. Politically, they are not really enemies. The KMT and the PFP were never enemies.
How much support does the People First Party still enjoy? That remains to be seen. But from the KMT's perspective, the People First Party must not become box office poison. Honorary Chairman Lien Chan should act as a buffer. He should wine and dine James Soong, Legislative Yuan President Wang Jin-pyng, former Examination Yuan President Hsu Shui-teh, Vice Premier Wu Yung-ming, and Secretary-General Liao Liao-yi. He should help ensure KMT and PFP unity.
Does KMT/PFP cooperation require that the People First Party disappear? That is something the KMT must consider. After all, the People First Party is no longer the party it was in 2000. After Lien and Soong united, the People First Party spontaneously dissolved within four or five years. It is definitely not as strong as it was back then. James Soong wants the People First Party to once again raise its banners. But he wants to nominate only ten candidates to the legislature. If the KMT and the PFP apportion their seats appropriately, they may be able to maximize their advantage. They may be able to complement each other. The biggest fear is that the two sides may begin trading potshots and insults, Blue Camp supporters would be dismayed. Their enthusiasm would be dampened -- to the point where they could not be bothered to vote. That would truly be a case of hurting the ones you love. That would truly be a case of penny wise and pound foolish.
國親如果交鋒 支持者不樂見
2011-06-10 中國時報
隨著總統與立委大選布局漸次明朗，藍營分途似乎已然不可避免。親民黨主席宋楚瑜公開宣布至少要提名十席立委參選，至於他本人要領軍搶進國會，或者自行連署參選總統仍在考慮中，對國民黨而言，彷彿又要重回二千年藍營分裂，造成政黨輪替失去政權的噩夢，其壓力不可謂不重。
二千年政黨輪替，民進黨勝選卻未過半，質言之，只要藍軍不分裂，民進黨就不可能這麼早嘗到執政的滋味，然而，即使重回歷史現場，藍營不能不面對一個事實：以國民黨的多元化和發展歷程，若不能透過有效的黨內機制和程序，分裂或齟齬將會是國民黨反覆遭遇的難題。
這個難題，從前總統李登輝繼任總統就開始了。當年的分裂起因於傳統國民黨對本土化路線的質疑，新連線與集思會鬥爭不斷，幾年發展先後有了新黨和台聯；回首從前，本土化在國民黨內已經不再是爭議，因為本土化是在地生根、在地深耕，而非台獨。這個路線某種程度確保了李登輝爾後繼續執政十二年。
至於李登輝與宋楚瑜的交惡，則是活脫脫的權力鬥爭，凍省之舉在宋楚瑜看來既是削權，也是中華民國廢省走台獨的象徵，但凍省十數年印證一件事：雖然行政效能的問題始終遭到詬病，但中華民國沒因此走向台獨。行政效能從用人和法制上的調整，是可以改善提昇的，就算宋楚瑜二千年能選上總統，想必他也不會再幹一次修憲恢復省政府的事。
親民黨在二千年政黨輪替後，挾高民意造成相當程度的氣候，然而，二度企圖與扁政府合作，卻讓藍營內部對親民黨到底要走什麼路線備感質疑，更麻煩的是，中間總是傳出親民黨欲與民進黨交換權力的政治耳語；此次當宋楚瑜表明親民黨要走自己的路時，其子弟兵、已經通過國民黨初選、確定會披國民黨戰旗競選區域立委的羅淑蕾又說，宋楚瑜不是無理取鬧的人，國民黨應該公開宣示馬總統連任後要請宋出任行政院長，聽在藍營支持者耳裡想必刺耳，聽在宋楚瑜耳裡，又何嘗不刺耳。
對親民黨而言，「不能因為不聽話就叫做不團結。」國民黨不釋出善意如何團結？但對國民黨而言，或許心中有一個永遠打不開的結：宋楚瑜到底要什麼？二○○八年政黨再輪替，國民黨想請宋回任國民黨副主席遭婉拒，但親民黨該吸納者無不進入不分區或改參選區域，很大部分親民黨黨職人士亦在馬政府安排下，陸續出任周邊事業單位高職，是不是非要宋楚瑜出任閣揆，政府效能才受其肯定呢？當宋楚瑜用盡力氣批評馬政府能力時，與宋交情不差的行政院長吳敦義心中想必感慨萬千。
然而，感慨解決不了問題，即使李登輝和連戰相繼放手，但興票案這個陳年老案，在馬總統回任國民黨主席後，仍未妥善快速解決，讓衝突的引線始終未摘掉，當馬、宋老是透過律師交手，又如何能坦誠相見、交換意見？
馬、宋不合，不代表國親非分裂不可，當年李、宋分裂，連、宋翻臉，如今宋楚瑜可成為李登輝過壽的座上賓，連宋更是情投意合，宋楚瑜不論在大陸在台灣，對連戰開啟兩岸和平契機從不吝於讚美，經過分裂之痛，連宋倒成為真心相交的兄弟。政治上，沒有真正的敵人，更何況國、親本來就不是敵人。
親民黨到底在民意市場上還有多少票房，還是得經過民意的檢驗，但對國民黨而言，親民黨的票房不能成為自己的毒藥才是最重要的。這一回，還是請出榮譽主席連戰居間緩衝，連戰夜宴宋楚瑜，立法院長王金平、前考試院長許水德和副院長吳容明、與黨秘書長廖了以等都到場，塑造國親仍和的味道不言可喻。
國親合，是否一定要親民黨消失？這也是國民黨必須思考的問題，因為親民黨終究不再是二千年時的親民黨，連宋合之後，親民黨在這四、五年中自動繳械，戰鬥力確實不若當年，這次宋楚瑜要讓親民黨重張旗幟，也不過提出十席區域立委，若國親布局得當，未必不能截長補短，相輔相成，就怕兩方始終隔空交火，出言傷人，傷了藍營支持者的心，看到兩方就心寒，鬧到支持者懶得投票，那就真是親痛仇快，為小利而損大義了。
Friday, June 10, 2011
Thursday, June 9, 2011
Cross-Strait Negotiations: Easy Things First, Hard Things Later
Cross-Strait Negotiations: Easy Things First, Hard Things Later
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9, 2011
ARATS Vice Chairman Zheng Lizhong is coming to Taiwan. He will discuss the Free and Independent Travel Policy and direct cross-Strait airline flights. He will also meet with SEF Vice Chairman Kao Koong-lian, to review the effectiveness of past cross-Strait agreements.
The Ma administration took office in 2008. Since then, the two sides have signed a total of 16 agreements or memoranda of understanding. The medical and health cooperation agreement has been signed, but is not yet in force. Not counting this year, the two sides have signed an average of 5.3 protocols a year. But this year is already half over, and the two sides have yet to sign a single agreement. It would appear that the easy things have already been done, and that cross-Strait consultations have entered the "hard things stage." When the two sides review the effectiveness of existing agreements, they must consider obstacles to future negotiations, and seek constructive solutions.
Cross-Strait exchanges were once non-existent. The Ma administration institutionalized cross-Strait agreements within an economic cooperation framework. It liberalized and expanded long term trade and economic relations. It brought about systemic changes. Even more significantly, it reduced personnel costs, capital costs, and transaction costs. It reaped real economic benefits. Early harvest provisions for goods, finance, transport, tourism, and medicine yielded "cross-Strait dividends" and business opportunities. These were the immediate benefits of the agreements. But food safety, agricultural product inspection and quarantine, product inspection and safety, and intellectual property protection require closer cooperation on technical matters. Obvious results are not as easy to achieve. Efforts to seek common ground and establish mutual trust must continue. Consider cross-Strait cooperation on consumer product safety, implemented last year. Since then Taipei has issued reports on hundreds of defective products. Beijing has also conducted investigations, and achieved real results.
Late last year, the sixth Chiang/Chen meeting was convened. Cross-strait economic and trade agreements reached a nadir. The momentum from highly effective past consultations seemed to have petered out. ECFA included agreements over goods, services, investment protection, and dispute settlement, none of which saw real progress. The direction and structure of economic cooperation remained indeterminate. Consider the investment protection negotiations held during the second half of last year, Consultations went on for nearly a year. But they stalled over investment liberalization, personal safety, dispute resolution, and arbitration. Many of these had implications for the legal system, legal standards, and technical issues. Many had cross-Strait repercussions. They are understandably time-consuming. But ten months have passed, and no solution are in sight, The problem is probably not technical or legal in nature. After all, if one is flexible and determined to reach an accord, one can break any deadlock. In other words, the current predicament may involve sensitive political issues. Absent a clear political mandate, cross-Strait negotiations may remain stalled over technicalities.
It is better to get cross-Strait agreements right, than to arrive at cross-Strait agreements quickly. But wheel-spinning is a bad sign. The solution to our current plight is not difficult. As far as Taipei is concerned, we must forsake our "demand more, give less" attitude. Negotiations must strike a balance. It is true that the two sides are unequal in size. Political problems persist. Taipei's demand for full equality and reciprocity in negotiations ignores political reality. Blindly delaying normalization, and demanding concessions in return, represents unrealistic thinking. The key is lifting restrictions on the import and export of Mainland capital, in order to create favorable condidtions for consultation. As far as Beijing is concerned, it must look at the Big Picture. It must not be so politically sensitive. It must avoid interpreting everything in a political light. It must adopt a more pragmatic approach when dealing with simple technical issues. It must establish a more favorable basis for future consultations. More importantly, the two sides must solemnly confront the current deadlock. They need a push from those at the top of the political ladder. They must resolve problems relating to investment protection and disputes settlement. They must find solutions applicable to all subsequent negotiations. Apparently officials charged with cross-Strait negotiations have yet to receive such instructions and authorizations.
The two sides have reached an impasse. Are they deliberately slowing their footsteps in anticipation of political changes that may occur within the coming year? Will slowed progress in cross-Strait trade be a political blessing or a political curse? No one can say for sure. If slowed progress is the result of underestimating the problem's importance, then the two sides must allow more time for adjustment and reform. The two sides will convene their second regular meeting in September. Authorities on both sides look forward to breaking the deadlock. They are using the occasion of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Council to break the deadlock.
兩岸協商先易後難的困局與解套
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.09
大陸海協會副會長鄭立中來台，除討論陸客自由行與航班之事外，並與海基會副董事長高孔廉共同檢視、總結過去兩岸協議的執行成效。
自二○○八年馬政府上任至今，兩岸已經簽署總計十六個協議或備忘錄（醫藥衛生合作協議已簽尚未生效）；今年不算，平均每年洽簽五點三個協議。但今年至今已過一半，卻尚無將可簽成任何協議的音訊，顯現在「先易後難」的方向下，兩岸協商已經逐漸進入困難階段。雙方當局在回顧既有協議的執行成效之際，更有必要認真檢視未來的協商障礙，並積極構思解決之道。
相較於過去的一片空白，兩岸各項協議除了建立制度化的經濟合作架構，並加深自由化經貿關係等長期性、制度面的機制外，更顯著地降低了人員、貨品及資金互動的交易成本。在實質經濟利益上，早收貨品、金融、運輸、觀光，甚至於醫療等行業所享有的「兩岸紅利」與商機也開始浮現。但不可諱言，除了這些立即見效的協議外，諸如食品安全、農產品檢驗檢疫、商品檢驗與安全及智財權保護等，因為涉及更為深層、隱性的技術性合作議題，其表層效果不易呈現，還有持續化異求同與建立互信的空間。例如，以兩岸消費品安全合作為例，自去年實施以來，台灣方面已經進行了數百件檢驗瑕疵商品的通報，而大陸主管機關也積極的在源頭協查處理，亦達成相當的具體成果。
但是，自從去年底第六次江陳會開始，兩岸經貿協議似乎進入了一個低潮期。過去高效率的協商動能，已經出現疲乏現象，迄今ECF A所列的貨品、服務、投保與爭端解決四大後續協議，都尚未見到實質進展；而經濟合作更是連方向、架構都還沒確定。以去年下半年便展開協商的投資保障協議為例，在經過接近一年的協商後，還環繞在投資開放、人身安全保障、糾紛調解與仲裁等老議題原地打轉。這些議題固然涉及許多法律制度接軌等技術配套問題，還有很多具有兩岸特色的規定，其耗時費神是可以理解的，但十個月過去，難題還是無解，就恐怕不是法律技術問題造成的障礙。畢竟若是立場底線有彈性，完成協商的意志堅定，則總會在山窮水盡之際突破僵局；換言之，目前的困局，可能已經涉及敏感的政治問題，在欠缺明確政治授權的情況下，兩岸技術談判階層只能繼續堅持己見，讓協商空轉。
確實，兩岸協議應該秉持著「簽得快不如簽得好」的原則，但原地空轉絕非健康的發展。解決目前困境的方向其實不難。對台灣來說，必須調整「要的多、給的少」的心態，求取一個更為平衡的協商起點。固然兩岸大小懸殊，政治問題仍存，完全的對等互惠談判，是漠視台灣政治現實的想法；但一味抵拒延滯正常化，及要求更為優惠的回報，也是不切實際的思維。於此同時，加速陸資的開放及進出口限制的解除，也是創造良好協商環境的關鍵。而中國大陸的解答，則在於以大局為視野，調低對政治議題的敏感度，避免凡事政治解釋的取向，以更務實的態度處理可以是很單純看待的技術問題，創造未來更為有利的協商基礎。更重要的是，若是兩岸嚴肅正視目前停滯不前的問題，以政治高度提供動力，則不僅能夠解決投保與爭端解決協議的問題，且能一體適用在所有的後續協商中。遺憾的是，兩岸雙方談判官員，似乎都還沒得到這樣的指示與授權。
目前的僵局，若是起因於一年內兩岸都須面對政治變局下，刻意放慢腳步的結果，則兩岸經貿進展遲緩在政治上是利是弊，恐怕沒人說得準；但若是因為輕視問題的重要性所致，就有需要調整改革的空間。兩岸經合會將在九月召開第二次例會，期待雙方當局能夠重視停滯空轉問題，利用經合例會的機會以突破僵局。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9, 2011
ARATS Vice Chairman Zheng Lizhong is coming to Taiwan. He will discuss the Free and Independent Travel Policy and direct cross-Strait airline flights. He will also meet with SEF Vice Chairman Kao Koong-lian, to review the effectiveness of past cross-Strait agreements.
The Ma administration took office in 2008. Since then, the two sides have signed a total of 16 agreements or memoranda of understanding. The medical and health cooperation agreement has been signed, but is not yet in force. Not counting this year, the two sides have signed an average of 5.3 protocols a year. But this year is already half over, and the two sides have yet to sign a single agreement. It would appear that the easy things have already been done, and that cross-Strait consultations have entered the "hard things stage." When the two sides review the effectiveness of existing agreements, they must consider obstacles to future negotiations, and seek constructive solutions.
Cross-Strait exchanges were once non-existent. The Ma administration institutionalized cross-Strait agreements within an economic cooperation framework. It liberalized and expanded long term trade and economic relations. It brought about systemic changes. Even more significantly, it reduced personnel costs, capital costs, and transaction costs. It reaped real economic benefits. Early harvest provisions for goods, finance, transport, tourism, and medicine yielded "cross-Strait dividends" and business opportunities. These were the immediate benefits of the agreements. But food safety, agricultural product inspection and quarantine, product inspection and safety, and intellectual property protection require closer cooperation on technical matters. Obvious results are not as easy to achieve. Efforts to seek common ground and establish mutual trust must continue. Consider cross-Strait cooperation on consumer product safety, implemented last year. Since then Taipei has issued reports on hundreds of defective products. Beijing has also conducted investigations, and achieved real results.
Late last year, the sixth Chiang/Chen meeting was convened. Cross-strait economic and trade agreements reached a nadir. The momentum from highly effective past consultations seemed to have petered out. ECFA included agreements over goods, services, investment protection, and dispute settlement, none of which saw real progress. The direction and structure of economic cooperation remained indeterminate. Consider the investment protection negotiations held during the second half of last year, Consultations went on for nearly a year. But they stalled over investment liberalization, personal safety, dispute resolution, and arbitration. Many of these had implications for the legal system, legal standards, and technical issues. Many had cross-Strait repercussions. They are understandably time-consuming. But ten months have passed, and no solution are in sight, The problem is probably not technical or legal in nature. After all, if one is flexible and determined to reach an accord, one can break any deadlock. In other words, the current predicament may involve sensitive political issues. Absent a clear political mandate, cross-Strait negotiations may remain stalled over technicalities.
It is better to get cross-Strait agreements right, than to arrive at cross-Strait agreements quickly. But wheel-spinning is a bad sign. The solution to our current plight is not difficult. As far as Taipei is concerned, we must forsake our "demand more, give less" attitude. Negotiations must strike a balance. It is true that the two sides are unequal in size. Political problems persist. Taipei's demand for full equality and reciprocity in negotiations ignores political reality. Blindly delaying normalization, and demanding concessions in return, represents unrealistic thinking. The key is lifting restrictions on the import and export of Mainland capital, in order to create favorable condidtions for consultation. As far as Beijing is concerned, it must look at the Big Picture. It must not be so politically sensitive. It must avoid interpreting everything in a political light. It must adopt a more pragmatic approach when dealing with simple technical issues. It must establish a more favorable basis for future consultations. More importantly, the two sides must solemnly confront the current deadlock. They need a push from those at the top of the political ladder. They must resolve problems relating to investment protection and disputes settlement. They must find solutions applicable to all subsequent negotiations. Apparently officials charged with cross-Strait negotiations have yet to receive such instructions and authorizations.
The two sides have reached an impasse. Are they deliberately slowing their footsteps in anticipation of political changes that may occur within the coming year? Will slowed progress in cross-Strait trade be a political blessing or a political curse? No one can say for sure. If slowed progress is the result of underestimating the problem's importance, then the two sides must allow more time for adjustment and reform. The two sides will convene their second regular meeting in September. Authorities on both sides look forward to breaking the deadlock. They are using the occasion of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Council to break the deadlock.
兩岸協商先易後難的困局與解套
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.09
大陸海協會副會長鄭立中來台，除討論陸客自由行與航班之事外，並與海基會副董事長高孔廉共同檢視、總結過去兩岸協議的執行成效。
自二○○八年馬政府上任至今，兩岸已經簽署總計十六個協議或備忘錄（醫藥衛生合作協議已簽尚未生效）；今年不算，平均每年洽簽五點三個協議。但今年至今已過一半，卻尚無將可簽成任何協議的音訊，顯現在「先易後難」的方向下，兩岸協商已經逐漸進入困難階段。雙方當局在回顧既有協議的執行成效之際，更有必要認真檢視未來的協商障礙，並積極構思解決之道。
相較於過去的一片空白，兩岸各項協議除了建立制度化的經濟合作架構，並加深自由化經貿關係等長期性、制度面的機制外，更顯著地降低了人員、貨品及資金互動的交易成本。在實質經濟利益上，早收貨品、金融、運輸、觀光，甚至於醫療等行業所享有的「兩岸紅利」與商機也開始浮現。但不可諱言，除了這些立即見效的協議外，諸如食品安全、農產品檢驗檢疫、商品檢驗與安全及智財權保護等，因為涉及更為深層、隱性的技術性合作議題，其表層效果不易呈現，還有持續化異求同與建立互信的空間。例如，以兩岸消費品安全合作為例，自去年實施以來，台灣方面已經進行了數百件檢驗瑕疵商品的通報，而大陸主管機關也積極的在源頭協查處理，亦達成相當的具體成果。
但是，自從去年底第六次江陳會開始，兩岸經貿協議似乎進入了一個低潮期。過去高效率的協商動能，已經出現疲乏現象，迄今ECF A所列的貨品、服務、投保與爭端解決四大後續協議，都尚未見到實質進展；而經濟合作更是連方向、架構都還沒確定。以去年下半年便展開協商的投資保障協議為例，在經過接近一年的協商後，還環繞在投資開放、人身安全保障、糾紛調解與仲裁等老議題原地打轉。這些議題固然涉及許多法律制度接軌等技術配套問題，還有很多具有兩岸特色的規定，其耗時費神是可以理解的，但十個月過去，難題還是無解，就恐怕不是法律技術問題造成的障礙。畢竟若是立場底線有彈性，完成協商的意志堅定，則總會在山窮水盡之際突破僵局；換言之，目前的困局，可能已經涉及敏感的政治問題，在欠缺明確政治授權的情況下，兩岸技術談判階層只能繼續堅持己見，讓協商空轉。
確實，兩岸協議應該秉持著「簽得快不如簽得好」的原則，但原地空轉絕非健康的發展。解決目前困境的方向其實不難。對台灣來說，必須調整「要的多、給的少」的心態，求取一個更為平衡的協商起點。固然兩岸大小懸殊，政治問題仍存，完全的對等互惠談判，是漠視台灣政治現實的想法；但一味抵拒延滯正常化，及要求更為優惠的回報，也是不切實際的思維。於此同時，加速陸資的開放及進出口限制的解除，也是創造良好協商環境的關鍵。而中國大陸的解答，則在於以大局為視野，調低對政治議題的敏感度，避免凡事政治解釋的取向，以更務實的態度處理可以是很單純看待的技術問題，創造未來更為有利的協商基礎。更重要的是，若是兩岸嚴肅正視目前停滯不前的問題，以政治高度提供動力，則不僅能夠解決投保與爭端解決協議的問題，且能一體適用在所有的後續協商中。遺憾的是，兩岸雙方談判官員，似乎都還沒得到這樣的指示與授權。
目前的僵局，若是起因於一年內兩岸都須面對政治變局下，刻意放慢腳步的結果，則兩岸經貿進展遲緩在政治上是利是弊，恐怕沒人說得準；但若是因為輕視問題的重要性所致，就有需要調整改革的空間。兩岸經合會將在九月召開第二次例會，期待雙方當局能夠重視停滯空轉問題，利用經合例會的機會以突破僵局。
Wednesday, June 8, 2011
By What Right Does the DPP Demand Ruling Party Change?
By What Right Does the DPP Demand Ruling Party Change?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 8, 2011
Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu wrote a letter to Zhao Xing, a young girl from Beijing, inviting her to visit Kaohsiung and to travel about the city at will. Pingtung County Chief Tsao Chi-hung meanwhile, just returned from Beijing on a trip to sell pineapples.
As the presidential election looms, these two moves were visible indicators of DPP political calculation. Just before the 2009 World Games in Kaohsiung, Chen Chu flew to the Mainland and put on a show. The idea was to show the Beijing authorities and the public on Taiwan that "If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policies."
These two moves suggest that cross-Strait relations, as suggested by the Free and Independent Travel Policy and ECFA, have passed the point of no return. The DPP can no longer overturn them. It too must hop on the bandwagon. But two years ago, the Free and Independent Travel Policy and ECFA were part of the DPP's scorched earth policy. The DPP denounced them as "Trojan horses." It said they "forfeited our sovereignty and demeaned our nation." Compare the behavior of Chen and Cao then, with their behavior now. The contrast reveals how short-sighted the DPP was back then. A mere two years later, they have been forced to do an about face. The contrast also reveals the absurd degree to which DPP policy has flip-flopped repeatedly.
Are these two moves enough to show the Beijing authorities and the public on Taiwan that "If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policies?" Hardly. Chen Chu and Tsao Chi-hung are local government heads. Their cross-Strait movements, dependence upon on the Free and Independent Travel Policy, and trips to Beijing to sell pineapples, are possible only due to the KMT/Ma administration's stand on the 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, and No [immediate] Reunification, No Independence, and No Use of Force. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, then abandons the KMT's stand on the 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, and No [immediate] Reunification, No Independence, and No Use of Force, will there still be an ECFA? Will there still be a Free and Independent Travel Policy?
The key remains the 1992 Consensus, and One China, Different Interpretations. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, but repudiates the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. how can it possibly "continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policies?" Suppose the Democratic Progressive Party finds itself held hostage by Beijing, under pressure to give in? The two sides would have a falling out. Beijing would return to the era of "listening to what they say and watching what they do." Knowing this, ruling party change would clearly lead to a deadly cross-Strait crisis.
Consider the DPP's cross-Strait policy plank in its presidential campaign platform: "With the exception of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations, all other cross-Strait policies of the previous administration will be continued." The DPP can of course repudiate the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations if it wishes. But it must offer an alternative. Without the 1992 Consensus, it simply cannot ensure the "continuation of the former administration's cross-Strait policies." Beijing will not allow itself to be hijacked. Quite the contrary. The DPP would find itself snared on the Beijing authorities' hook. Knowing this, why should voters go along with the DPP's calls for ruling party change?
Suppose the DPP returns to power but retains ECFA and other allegedly "humiliating" mechanisms? Suppose it upholds the Free and Independent Travel Policy and other "Trojan Horse" mechanisms? Suppose it does an about face and recognizes the KMT's stand on the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations? Suppose it reverses itself on all these positions, which it not long ago denounced as "pandering to [Mainland] China, and selling out Taiwan?" Suppose it "continues the former administration's cross-Strait policies," across the board? If so, the KMT/Ma administration was the initiator of these policies. Since "change has begun, and reform must not be interrupted," where is the need for a change in ruling parties? Do we really need the DPP to replace the KMT, only "continue the KMT's cross-Strait policies?"
These moves by Chen and Tsao, reflect the DPP's dilemma. They can no longer oppose the Ma administration's cross-Strait policies, which have passed the point of no return. On the other hand, if they hop on the bandwagon, they must swallow their words. They must take back their myopic, ignorant, and vicious charges about "Trojan Horses," about "pandering to [Mainland] China, about "selling out Taiwan," and about "forfeiting our sovereignty and humiliating the nation." The public is watching. Can the DPP formulate a better cross-Strait policy than the Ma administration?
Chen Chu and Tsao Chi-hung can do what they do, only because they are local government heads. They are under the protection of the central government, which recognizes the 1992 Consensus. In fact, the greatest benefit conferred upon the two sides by the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations, is not free and independent travel or the sale of pineapples, but a peaceful, win/win political atmosphere. If the Democratic Progressive Party cannot offer the public such assurances in the event it returns to power, why should voters go along with the DPP's calls for ruling party change?
As we all know, cross-Strait policy is the backbone of Republic of China national policy. Can Taiwan independence leaders "do ECFA?" Can Taiwan independence leaders "do the Free and Independent Travel Policy?" Take Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min, for example. Not one of them recognizes the 1992 Consensus. This is even more true of Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen may try to weasel her way through. She may try to get elected, then await the outcome of a life and death struggle between Taiwan independence leaders Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min, the Beijing authorities, and the public on Taiwan. We repeatedly suffered the consequences of such outrageous political gambles under Chen Shui-bian. Does Tsai Ing-wen really intend to bet the nation on the outcome of the presidential election? Knowing this, why should voters go along with the DPP's calls for ruling party change?
Without the 1992 Consensus, there can be no ECFA. There can be no One China, Different Interpretations. There can be no Free and Independent Travel Policy. The DPP, Tsai Ing-wen, Chen Chu, Tsao Chi-hung, Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, Koo Kwan-min and the Taiwan independence leadership can refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. But they cannot refuse to assume responsibility. They must tell the people their alternative. Otherwise, why should voters go along with DPP calls for ruling party change?
民進黨憑什麼政黨輪替？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.08
高雄市長陳菊函邀北京女孩趙星赴高雄自由行，屏東縣長曹啟鴻則剛從北京賣鳳梨回來。
在總統大選前，這兩個動作可視為民進黨的設計事件，猶如二○○九高雄世界運動會前，陳菊親赴大陸示好，用意在向北京當局及台灣民眾演示「民進黨若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」。
這兩個動作亦顯示，兩岸的交流情勢，不論是自由行或ＥＣＦＡ，皆已跨過了不可折返點；民進黨非但不可能推翻，且反而必須回頭搶搭巴士。但自由行與ＥＣＦＡ卻是民進黨兩年多前焦土反對的議題，斥為「木馬屠城」、「喪權辱國」；對比於陳曹二人今日的動作，一方面顯示民進黨的政策眼光竟短視至看不到兩年後，另一方面更顯示民進黨政策的反覆已至莫名其妙的地步。
然而，只憑這兩個動作就能向北京當局及台灣民眾演示「民進黨若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」嗎？問題沒有那麼簡單。如今，陳菊及曹啟鴻皆是地方政府首長，二人的兩岸動作，歡迎自由行及赴北京賣鳳梨，皆是在國民黨馬政府「九二共識，一中各表」及「不統、不獨、不武」的兩岸政策支撐下始能成立。倘若民進黨再執政而否棄了「九二共識」、「不統、不獨、不武」，則還會有ＥＣＦＡ嗎？還會有自由行嗎？
關鍵仍在「九二共識，一中各表」。如果民進黨再執政，則既否認「九二共識，一中各表」，卻將如何「延續前朝兩岸政策」？屆時，若不是民進黨受北京挾持而在壓力下讓步，就是兩岸翻臉，再度回到「聽其言，觀其行」的年代。倘係如此，政黨輪替即成兩岸的致命危機。
民進黨現今的總統大選兩岸政策似乎是：「除了九二共識、一中各表之外，其他一切都可延續前朝兩岸政策。」民進黨當然可以否認「九二共識，一中各表」，但必須拿出一個替代方案，要在「沒有九二共識」下，也保證能夠「延續前朝兩岸政策」。不可屆時竟被北京挾持，反而成為北京當局的俎上魚肉；倘係如此，豈可政黨輪替？
反過來說，民進黨若再執政，倘仍維護ＥＣＦＡ等所謂「喪權辱國」的機制，且仍招徠所謂「木馬屠城」的自由行，更居然回頭承認了所謂「傾中賣台」的「九二共識，一中各表」，一概皆「延續前朝兩岸政策」；那麼，國民黨馬政府既是這套政策的開創者，「改變已經開始，改革不能中斷」，又何必政黨輪替，讓民進黨來「延續國民黨的兩岸政策」？
陳曹二人的動作，充分反映了民進黨的進退維谷。若要繼續反對馬政府的兩岸政策，卻已過了不可折返點；但若要拿香跟拜，則要如何收回「木馬屠城」、「傾中賣台」、「喪權辱國」那些無知無遠見的惡毒詛咒？國人皆在注目：且看民進黨能否提出一個超越馬政府的兩岸政策。
陳菊與曹啟鴻今日可以有此演出，皆因都是地方政府首長，也皆在「九二共識」的中央政府庇護下行事；何況，在「九二共識，一中各表」下，兩岸的最大利益，其實不在自由行與賣鳳梨，而在維繫了和平雙贏的大氛圍。如果民進黨再執政而不能對此一利益作出保證，何必政黨輪替？
眾所皆知，兩岸政策是國政的脊樑。台獨能ＥＣＦＡ嗎？台獨能自由行嗎？「扁李謝辜獨」，沒有一個人承認「九二共識」，蔡英文尤然。蔡英文心中若想先打個馬虎眼，待選上總統再在「扁李謝辜獨」、北京當局與台灣民眾之間決一生死勝負，這種荒唐的政治賭博在陳水扁時已一再發生，難道蔡英文還想把國家放上她的大選賭桌上？倘係如此，豈可政黨輪替？
沒有「九二共識」就沒有ＥＣＦＡ；沒有「一中各表」，就沒有自由行。民進黨、蔡英文、陳菊、曹啟鴻、扁李謝辜獨，皆可反對「九二共識，一中各表」；但是，也應當負責地告訴國人，什麼是替代方案？否則，豈可政黨輪替？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 8, 2011
Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu wrote a letter to Zhao Xing, a young girl from Beijing, inviting her to visit Kaohsiung and to travel about the city at will. Pingtung County Chief Tsao Chi-hung meanwhile, just returned from Beijing on a trip to sell pineapples.
As the presidential election looms, these two moves were visible indicators of DPP political calculation. Just before the 2009 World Games in Kaohsiung, Chen Chu flew to the Mainland and put on a show. The idea was to show the Beijing authorities and the public on Taiwan that "If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policies."
These two moves suggest that cross-Strait relations, as suggested by the Free and Independent Travel Policy and ECFA, have passed the point of no return. The DPP can no longer overturn them. It too must hop on the bandwagon. But two years ago, the Free and Independent Travel Policy and ECFA were part of the DPP's scorched earth policy. The DPP denounced them as "Trojan horses." It said they "forfeited our sovereignty and demeaned our nation." Compare the behavior of Chen and Cao then, with their behavior now. The contrast reveals how short-sighted the DPP was back then. A mere two years later, they have been forced to do an about face. The contrast also reveals the absurd degree to which DPP policy has flip-flopped repeatedly.
Are these two moves enough to show the Beijing authorities and the public on Taiwan that "If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policies?" Hardly. Chen Chu and Tsao Chi-hung are local government heads. Their cross-Strait movements, dependence upon on the Free and Independent Travel Policy, and trips to Beijing to sell pineapples, are possible only due to the KMT/Ma administration's stand on the 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, and No [immediate] Reunification, No Independence, and No Use of Force. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, then abandons the KMT's stand on the 1992 Consensus, One China, Different Interpretations, and No [immediate] Reunification, No Independence, and No Use of Force, will there still be an ECFA? Will there still be a Free and Independent Travel Policy?
The key remains the 1992 Consensus, and One China, Different Interpretations. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, but repudiates the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. how can it possibly "continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policies?" Suppose the Democratic Progressive Party finds itself held hostage by Beijing, under pressure to give in? The two sides would have a falling out. Beijing would return to the era of "listening to what they say and watching what they do." Knowing this, ruling party change would clearly lead to a deadly cross-Strait crisis.
Consider the DPP's cross-Strait policy plank in its presidential campaign platform: "With the exception of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations, all other cross-Strait policies of the previous administration will be continued." The DPP can of course repudiate the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations if it wishes. But it must offer an alternative. Without the 1992 Consensus, it simply cannot ensure the "continuation of the former administration's cross-Strait policies." Beijing will not allow itself to be hijacked. Quite the contrary. The DPP would find itself snared on the Beijing authorities' hook. Knowing this, why should voters go along with the DPP's calls for ruling party change?
Suppose the DPP returns to power but retains ECFA and other allegedly "humiliating" mechanisms? Suppose it upholds the Free and Independent Travel Policy and other "Trojan Horse" mechanisms? Suppose it does an about face and recognizes the KMT's stand on the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations? Suppose it reverses itself on all these positions, which it not long ago denounced as "pandering to [Mainland] China, and selling out Taiwan?" Suppose it "continues the former administration's cross-Strait policies," across the board? If so, the KMT/Ma administration was the initiator of these policies. Since "change has begun, and reform must not be interrupted," where is the need for a change in ruling parties? Do we really need the DPP to replace the KMT, only "continue the KMT's cross-Strait policies?"
These moves by Chen and Tsao, reflect the DPP's dilemma. They can no longer oppose the Ma administration's cross-Strait policies, which have passed the point of no return. On the other hand, if they hop on the bandwagon, they must swallow their words. They must take back their myopic, ignorant, and vicious charges about "Trojan Horses," about "pandering to [Mainland] China, about "selling out Taiwan," and about "forfeiting our sovereignty and humiliating the nation." The public is watching. Can the DPP formulate a better cross-Strait policy than the Ma administration?
Chen Chu and Tsao Chi-hung can do what they do, only because they are local government heads. They are under the protection of the central government, which recognizes the 1992 Consensus. In fact, the greatest benefit conferred upon the two sides by the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations, is not free and independent travel or the sale of pineapples, but a peaceful, win/win political atmosphere. If the Democratic Progressive Party cannot offer the public such assurances in the event it returns to power, why should voters go along with the DPP's calls for ruling party change?
As we all know, cross-Strait policy is the backbone of Republic of China national policy. Can Taiwan independence leaders "do ECFA?" Can Taiwan independence leaders "do the Free and Independent Travel Policy?" Take Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min, for example. Not one of them recognizes the 1992 Consensus. This is even more true of Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen may try to weasel her way through. She may try to get elected, then await the outcome of a life and death struggle between Taiwan independence leaders Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min, the Beijing authorities, and the public on Taiwan. We repeatedly suffered the consequences of such outrageous political gambles under Chen Shui-bian. Does Tsai Ing-wen really intend to bet the nation on the outcome of the presidential election? Knowing this, why should voters go along with the DPP's calls for ruling party change?
Without the 1992 Consensus, there can be no ECFA. There can be no One China, Different Interpretations. There can be no Free and Independent Travel Policy. The DPP, Tsai Ing-wen, Chen Chu, Tsao Chi-hung, Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, Koo Kwan-min and the Taiwan independence leadership can refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. But they cannot refuse to assume responsibility. They must tell the people their alternative. Otherwise, why should voters go along with DPP calls for ruling party change?
民進黨憑什麼政黨輪替？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.08
高雄市長陳菊函邀北京女孩趙星赴高雄自由行，屏東縣長曹啟鴻則剛從北京賣鳳梨回來。
在總統大選前，這兩個動作可視為民進黨的設計事件，猶如二○○九高雄世界運動會前，陳菊親赴大陸示好，用意在向北京當局及台灣民眾演示「民進黨若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」。
這兩個動作亦顯示，兩岸的交流情勢，不論是自由行或ＥＣＦＡ，皆已跨過了不可折返點；民進黨非但不可能推翻，且反而必須回頭搶搭巴士。但自由行與ＥＣＦＡ卻是民進黨兩年多前焦土反對的議題，斥為「木馬屠城」、「喪權辱國」；對比於陳曹二人今日的動作，一方面顯示民進黨的政策眼光竟短視至看不到兩年後，另一方面更顯示民進黨政策的反覆已至莫名其妙的地步。
然而，只憑這兩個動作就能向北京當局及台灣民眾演示「民進黨若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」嗎？問題沒有那麼簡單。如今，陳菊及曹啟鴻皆是地方政府首長，二人的兩岸動作，歡迎自由行及赴北京賣鳳梨，皆是在國民黨馬政府「九二共識，一中各表」及「不統、不獨、不武」的兩岸政策支撐下始能成立。倘若民進黨再執政而否棄了「九二共識」、「不統、不獨、不武」，則還會有ＥＣＦＡ嗎？還會有自由行嗎？
關鍵仍在「九二共識，一中各表」。如果民進黨再執政，則既否認「九二共識，一中各表」，卻將如何「延續前朝兩岸政策」？屆時，若不是民進黨受北京挾持而在壓力下讓步，就是兩岸翻臉，再度回到「聽其言，觀其行」的年代。倘係如此，政黨輪替即成兩岸的致命危機。
民進黨現今的總統大選兩岸政策似乎是：「除了九二共識、一中各表之外，其他一切都可延續前朝兩岸政策。」民進黨當然可以否認「九二共識，一中各表」，但必須拿出一個替代方案，要在「沒有九二共識」下，也保證能夠「延續前朝兩岸政策」。不可屆時竟被北京挾持，反而成為北京當局的俎上魚肉；倘係如此，豈可政黨輪替？
反過來說，民進黨若再執政，倘仍維護ＥＣＦＡ等所謂「喪權辱國」的機制，且仍招徠所謂「木馬屠城」的自由行，更居然回頭承認了所謂「傾中賣台」的「九二共識，一中各表」，一概皆「延續前朝兩岸政策」；那麼，國民黨馬政府既是這套政策的開創者，「改變已經開始，改革不能中斷」，又何必政黨輪替，讓民進黨來「延續國民黨的兩岸政策」？
陳曹二人的動作，充分反映了民進黨的進退維谷。若要繼續反對馬政府的兩岸政策，卻已過了不可折返點；但若要拿香跟拜，則要如何收回「木馬屠城」、「傾中賣台」、「喪權辱國」那些無知無遠見的惡毒詛咒？國人皆在注目：且看民進黨能否提出一個超越馬政府的兩岸政策。
陳菊與曹啟鴻今日可以有此演出，皆因都是地方政府首長，也皆在「九二共識」的中央政府庇護下行事；何況，在「九二共識，一中各表」下，兩岸的最大利益，其實不在自由行與賣鳳梨，而在維繫了和平雙贏的大氛圍。如果民進黨再執政而不能對此一利益作出保證，何必政黨輪替？
眾所皆知，兩岸政策是國政的脊樑。台獨能ＥＣＦＡ嗎？台獨能自由行嗎？「扁李謝辜獨」，沒有一個人承認「九二共識」，蔡英文尤然。蔡英文心中若想先打個馬虎眼，待選上總統再在「扁李謝辜獨」、北京當局與台灣民眾之間決一生死勝負，這種荒唐的政治賭博在陳水扁時已一再發生，難道蔡英文還想把國家放上她的大選賭桌上？倘係如此，豈可政黨輪替？
沒有「九二共識」就沒有ＥＣＦＡ；沒有「一中各表」，就沒有自由行。民進黨、蔡英文、陳菊、曹啟鴻、扁李謝辜獨，皆可反對「九二共識，一中各表」；但是，也應當負責地告訴國人，什麼是替代方案？否則，豈可政黨輪替？
Tuesday, June 7, 2011
Can the DPP Dissociate Itself from the Chen Corruption Case?
Can the DPP Dissociate Itself from the Chen Corruption Case?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 7, 2011
On May 3, the Legislative Yuan amended the law. It decriminalized the Discretionary Fund. The Discretionary Fund case had dragged on for three years. Therefore, this was a red letter day. For high-ranking members of the DPP, it was a emotional watershed. Relevant bills are pending in the Legislative Yuan. If they pass their third reading, the DPP will finally be able to sever its emotional links with Chen Shui-bian, Can the DPP really emerge from under the shadow of Chen Shui-bian?
For government heads, the Discretionary Fund is considered a "skeleton in the closet." It affects a total of 7500 ruling and opposition party officials, including many DPP officials and DPP heavyweights. They will inevitably participate in the upcoming general election. The ruling and opposition parties are making determined efforts to recruit people from the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, and the DPP. Needless to say, none of them want to acknowledge this skeleton in their closet. They are highly motivated to amend the law. But over the past two years, the ruling and opposition parties have been deadlocked over Chen Shui-bian's State Affairs Fund case.
In the past the DPP argued, as Chen Shui-bian argued, that the President's State Affairs Fund was a type of Discretionary Fund for government heads. The DPP argued that Ah-Bian's State Affairs Fund case had to be decriminalized, since it too amounted to a Discretionary Fund case. The ruling and opposition parties have been unable to agree. Chen Shui-bian's State Affairs Fund case has yet to pass its third reading. But the DPP has already retreated. It has come to the realization that if the DPP is to have a future, it can no longer allow itself to be held back by Chen Shui-bian.
But emotional detachment is not the same as earnest soul-searching. Over the past three years, the Democratic Progressive Party has been led by Tsai Ing-wen. It has not engaged in earnest soul-searching over the corruption scandals of the Chen Shui-bian era. Yet it won a string of elections. As a result, the DPP is brimming over with confidence. It is certain that the shadow of the Chen regime's corruption is behind it. It is certain Chen era corruption will no longer hurt the DPP's election prospects. But the Chen corruption case remains a skeleton in the DPP's closet. The Chen corruption case may no longer be the current focus of public attention. But neither is it water under the bridge.
Then Bureau of Investigation Chief Yeh Sheng-mao is finally behind bars for his part in the case. This reminds the public that during his term, Chen Shui-bian abused the investigative powers of the intelligence agencies to liquidate his enemies and whitewash Chen family and DPP corruption. Chen family confidant Huang Fang-yan fled to the US. Graphic images of him thumbing his nose at the law were splashed across the front pages. We can hardly forget how the president abused his officially delegated powers. Worse still, he enabled those who lacked officially delegated powers to summon the wind and rain, to meddle in the affairs of the military, financial conglomerates, even department stores. He turned the Office of the President into a political patronage brokerage house.
The DPP has never engaged in soul-searching about these matters, let alone apologize to the nation. Until it does, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP will never be free from the stigma of Chen Shui-bian. The media characterizes Tsai Ing-wen's campaign as "the Tsai Dynasty, founded by Chen Family Forces." Public perception is negative, but Tsai Ing-wen can say little in her own defense. That is because she has never drawn clear lines of distinction between herself and Chen. The Chen faction remains the equal of other factions within the DPP. It vigorously backed Tsai Ing-wen during the party primaries. It was a major campaign contributor. It has become part of the DPP's general election campaign committee. If in the future it makes any requests, can Tsai Ing-wen really say no?
Of course, Chen Shui-bian is not Tsai Ing-wen's only headache. The DPP is desperately anxious to return to power. Therefore, its current priority is to heal the rift between Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang. This rift arose during the party primaries. If Tsai and Su are unable to reach an accord, the entire election campaign may remain in disarray. President Ma Ying-jeou is the incumbent. He and Premier Wu Den-yih are already at their battle stations, The ranks of the Blue Camp are largely complete. The DPP, on the other hand, may find its own ranks in disarray, unable to repel outside attackers due to internal strife.
The Tsai vs. Su rivalry is hardly the only internal dispute. For years, deep-rooted grievances have divided the DPP. These include factional disputes and non-factional disputes. Personal grudges between Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang may have turned into factional grudges between the Hsieh faction and the Su faction. To some extent, Tsai Ing-wen used these long-standing grudges to give herself a leg up during the party primaries. Once she won, she obviously could not ill-treat Frank Hsieh, who saved the day. On the one hand, Tsai Ing-wen must win over Su Tseng-chang. On the other hand, she must not humiliate Frank Hsieh. Tsai Ing-wen may treat the personal grievances between herself and Su Tseng-chang as bygones. But Su and Hsieh must also reach an accord. None of this is going to be easy.
If Tsai Ing-wen cannot strike an accord between rival factions, the Executive Committee many find it difficult even to approve its nominees for Legislators without Portfolio during the June 25 Executive Committee. Some things are even more difficult than mollifying the factions. This time, the DPP chose not to hold party primaries. The entire roster of nominees was decided by the DPP party leadership. If the Legislators without Portfolio are merely the product of compromises between party factions, and demonstrate no professionalism or ability, Tsai Ing-wen may be hurt.
Next year's presidential election is only six months away. Important issues have been added to the agenda. Matters are already complicated, hence difficult to handle. In the end, this could influence the election and public perception. The Chen corruption case remains a skeleton in the DPP's closet. That is because the DPP has never faced the Chen corruption case squarely. As a result, this period of history will continue to haunt the DPP.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.06.07
社論－民進黨能擺脫扁案糾纏？
本報訊
立法院今年五月三日修法，讓纏訟三年的特別費除罪化。那是一個具象徵意義的日子，對民進黨的高層而言，這是一個精神上的分水嶺，因為，相關法案若在立法院三讀通過，就是民進黨終於在心理上斬斷與陳水扁的牽連，只是，民進黨真的能從此擺脫陳水扁陰影的糾纏嗎？
首長特別費案號稱歷史共業，牽連朝野政黨共七千五百人，其中包括不少黨政要員及民進黨大將，他們在即將到來的總統大選中，不可避免的都要投入選戰。從行政院、立法院到民進黨，朝野厲兵秣馬，準備要打贏這場選戰，當然都不願被這樣的「歷史共業」牽絆住，可以說有充分的修法動機，但是這兩年來，將朝野共識卡住的，就是陳水扁的國務機要費案。
過去，就如陳水扁主張的，民進黨堅持，總統的國務機要費也是一種首長特別費，民進黨因此強調，扁的國務機要費案，也必須和其他的特別費案一起除罪化，朝野一直談不攏。現在，陳水扁的國務費案尚未三審定讞，民進黨卻已經撤守，他們已經認識到，民進黨的大好前程，不能再被陳水扁耽擱了。
只是，心理上的棄守卻不等於深刻的反省。過去三年來，即使蔡英文帶領的民進黨，從未全面反省陳水扁執政時的貪腐弊案，卻仍然連選連勝，讓民進黨信心滿滿的相信，扁案的陰影已經是過去式，不會再對民進黨的選情有殺傷力。只是，扁案其實還是一頁活生生的現代史，扁案也許不再是民眾觀注的焦點，卻不可能船過水無痕。
當前調查局長葉盛茂終於因他案入監服刑，提醒民眾的是，陳水扁任內濫用情治機關的調查權，清算異己、掩護扁家及民進黨要人的貪腐行為；當扁家親信黃芳彥「流亡」在美的逍遙照片曝光，大家不禁回想，當總統非法濫權，可以讓非正式的權力之手翻雲覆雨、毫無顧忌的伸入軍隊、金控集團、百貨集團等等，讓總統府成為喬事情中心。
這些事情，民進黨從來都沒有反省，更別說向人民道歉。結果是，蔡英文與民進黨永遠別想擺脫陳水扁。媒體用「扁家軍打造大英王朝」來形容蔡英文的競選團隊，雖然輿論、民眾觀感不好，但蔡英文無法強力反駁，因為她從未與扁畫清界限，扁系仍是足以與民進黨各大派系平起平坐的關鍵勢力，他們在黨內總統初選時力挺蔡英文，已是助選功臣，大選時進入競選團隊，未來他們有任何要求，蔡英文能說不嗎？
當然，陳水扁不是唯一讓蔡英文頭痛的問題。事實上，民進黨迫切期待重返執政，因此目前優先要處理的，當然是化解蔡英文、蘇貞昌初選黨內裂痕，可以說，蔡蘇談不攏，整個競選總部都跟著搞不定；因此，當執政的總統馬英九、閣揆吳敦義都已就戰鬥位置，藍營競選團隊也大致成軍，民進黨卻忽然火力重挫，就是因為內亂而無法一致對外。
甚而，蔡蘇不合尚不是唯一的內部紛爭。長年以來，民進黨的結構性恩怨，還包括新潮流與非新潮流之爭，或是謝長廷、蘇貞昌的個人恩怨轉化而成的謝系與蘇系之爭，某種程度而言，蔡英文在黨內初選時精妙的將這些長年宿怨轉化為選舉助力，初選勝利後，顯然不能虧待「功臣」謝長廷。一方面，蔡英文必須拉攏蘇貞昌，另一方面又不能委屈謝長廷，即使蔡英文放下個人對蘇貞昌的好惡，但要在蘇謝兩強之間求取平衡，都不是容易之事。
蔡英文若無法在派系之間求取平衡，恐怕連不分區立委名單都通不過六月二十五日舉行的中執會這一關，但是，比讓派系滿意更難的是，這次民進黨放棄黨內初選、全由黨中央決定名單，如果提出的不分區立委都只是派系妥協的產物，看不出專業性或功能性，蔡英文一樣會受傷。
離明年總統大選已經只有半年多時間，排在議程上的重要問題，就已經事事繁雜、不好處理；但是，最後可能影響選情及民眾觀感的，卻是扁案的歷史問題，因為，當民進黨從不正視、反省扁案，這一段歷史就永遠無法成為過去！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 7, 2011
On May 3, the Legislative Yuan amended the law. It decriminalized the Discretionary Fund. The Discretionary Fund case had dragged on for three years. Therefore, this was a red letter day. For high-ranking members of the DPP, it was a emotional watershed. Relevant bills are pending in the Legislative Yuan. If they pass their third reading, the DPP will finally be able to sever its emotional links with Chen Shui-bian, Can the DPP really emerge from under the shadow of Chen Shui-bian?
For government heads, the Discretionary Fund is considered a "skeleton in the closet." It affects a total of 7500 ruling and opposition party officials, including many DPP officials and DPP heavyweights. They will inevitably participate in the upcoming general election. The ruling and opposition parties are making determined efforts to recruit people from the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, and the DPP. Needless to say, none of them want to acknowledge this skeleton in their closet. They are highly motivated to amend the law. But over the past two years, the ruling and opposition parties have been deadlocked over Chen Shui-bian's State Affairs Fund case.
In the past the DPP argued, as Chen Shui-bian argued, that the President's State Affairs Fund was a type of Discretionary Fund for government heads. The DPP argued that Ah-Bian's State Affairs Fund case had to be decriminalized, since it too amounted to a Discretionary Fund case. The ruling and opposition parties have been unable to agree. Chen Shui-bian's State Affairs Fund case has yet to pass its third reading. But the DPP has already retreated. It has come to the realization that if the DPP is to have a future, it can no longer allow itself to be held back by Chen Shui-bian.
But emotional detachment is not the same as earnest soul-searching. Over the past three years, the Democratic Progressive Party has been led by Tsai Ing-wen. It has not engaged in earnest soul-searching over the corruption scandals of the Chen Shui-bian era. Yet it won a string of elections. As a result, the DPP is brimming over with confidence. It is certain that the shadow of the Chen regime's corruption is behind it. It is certain Chen era corruption will no longer hurt the DPP's election prospects. But the Chen corruption case remains a skeleton in the DPP's closet. The Chen corruption case may no longer be the current focus of public attention. But neither is it water under the bridge.
Then Bureau of Investigation Chief Yeh Sheng-mao is finally behind bars for his part in the case. This reminds the public that during his term, Chen Shui-bian abused the investigative powers of the intelligence agencies to liquidate his enemies and whitewash Chen family and DPP corruption. Chen family confidant Huang Fang-yan fled to the US. Graphic images of him thumbing his nose at the law were splashed across the front pages. We can hardly forget how the president abused his officially delegated powers. Worse still, he enabled those who lacked officially delegated powers to summon the wind and rain, to meddle in the affairs of the military, financial conglomerates, even department stores. He turned the Office of the President into a political patronage brokerage house.
The DPP has never engaged in soul-searching about these matters, let alone apologize to the nation. Until it does, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP will never be free from the stigma of Chen Shui-bian. The media characterizes Tsai Ing-wen's campaign as "the Tsai Dynasty, founded by Chen Family Forces." Public perception is negative, but Tsai Ing-wen can say little in her own defense. That is because she has never drawn clear lines of distinction between herself and Chen. The Chen faction remains the equal of other factions within the DPP. It vigorously backed Tsai Ing-wen during the party primaries. It was a major campaign contributor. It has become part of the DPP's general election campaign committee. If in the future it makes any requests, can Tsai Ing-wen really say no?
Of course, Chen Shui-bian is not Tsai Ing-wen's only headache. The DPP is desperately anxious to return to power. Therefore, its current priority is to heal the rift between Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang. This rift arose during the party primaries. If Tsai and Su are unable to reach an accord, the entire election campaign may remain in disarray. President Ma Ying-jeou is the incumbent. He and Premier Wu Den-yih are already at their battle stations, The ranks of the Blue Camp are largely complete. The DPP, on the other hand, may find its own ranks in disarray, unable to repel outside attackers due to internal strife.
The Tsai vs. Su rivalry is hardly the only internal dispute. For years, deep-rooted grievances have divided the DPP. These include factional disputes and non-factional disputes. Personal grudges between Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang may have turned into factional grudges between the Hsieh faction and the Su faction. To some extent, Tsai Ing-wen used these long-standing grudges to give herself a leg up during the party primaries. Once she won, she obviously could not ill-treat Frank Hsieh, who saved the day. On the one hand, Tsai Ing-wen must win over Su Tseng-chang. On the other hand, she must not humiliate Frank Hsieh. Tsai Ing-wen may treat the personal grievances between herself and Su Tseng-chang as bygones. But Su and Hsieh must also reach an accord. None of this is going to be easy.
If Tsai Ing-wen cannot strike an accord between rival factions, the Executive Committee many find it difficult even to approve its nominees for Legislators without Portfolio during the June 25 Executive Committee. Some things are even more difficult than mollifying the factions. This time, the DPP chose not to hold party primaries. The entire roster of nominees was decided by the DPP party leadership. If the Legislators without Portfolio are merely the product of compromises between party factions, and demonstrate no professionalism or ability, Tsai Ing-wen may be hurt.
Next year's presidential election is only six months away. Important issues have been added to the agenda. Matters are already complicated, hence difficult to handle. In the end, this could influence the election and public perception. The Chen corruption case remains a skeleton in the DPP's closet. That is because the DPP has never faced the Chen corruption case squarely. As a result, this period of history will continue to haunt the DPP.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.06.07
社論－民進黨能擺脫扁案糾纏？
本報訊
立法院今年五月三日修法，讓纏訟三年的特別費除罪化。那是一個具象徵意義的日子，對民進黨的高層而言，這是一個精神上的分水嶺，因為，相關法案若在立法院三讀通過，就是民進黨終於在心理上斬斷與陳水扁的牽連，只是，民進黨真的能從此擺脫陳水扁陰影的糾纏嗎？
首長特別費案號稱歷史共業，牽連朝野政黨共七千五百人，其中包括不少黨政要員及民進黨大將，他們在即將到來的總統大選中，不可避免的都要投入選戰。從行政院、立法院到民進黨，朝野厲兵秣馬，準備要打贏這場選戰，當然都不願被這樣的「歷史共業」牽絆住，可以說有充分的修法動機，但是這兩年來，將朝野共識卡住的，就是陳水扁的國務機要費案。
過去，就如陳水扁主張的，民進黨堅持，總統的國務機要費也是一種首長特別費，民進黨因此強調，扁的國務機要費案，也必須和其他的特別費案一起除罪化，朝野一直談不攏。現在，陳水扁的國務費案尚未三審定讞，民進黨卻已經撤守，他們已經認識到，民進黨的大好前程，不能再被陳水扁耽擱了。
只是，心理上的棄守卻不等於深刻的反省。過去三年來，即使蔡英文帶領的民進黨，從未全面反省陳水扁執政時的貪腐弊案，卻仍然連選連勝，讓民進黨信心滿滿的相信，扁案的陰影已經是過去式，不會再對民進黨的選情有殺傷力。只是，扁案其實還是一頁活生生的現代史，扁案也許不再是民眾觀注的焦點，卻不可能船過水無痕。
當前調查局長葉盛茂終於因他案入監服刑，提醒民眾的是，陳水扁任內濫用情治機關的調查權，清算異己、掩護扁家及民進黨要人的貪腐行為；當扁家親信黃芳彥「流亡」在美的逍遙照片曝光，大家不禁回想，當總統非法濫權，可以讓非正式的權力之手翻雲覆雨、毫無顧忌的伸入軍隊、金控集團、百貨集團等等，讓總統府成為喬事情中心。
這些事情，民進黨從來都沒有反省，更別說向人民道歉。結果是，蔡英文與民進黨永遠別想擺脫陳水扁。媒體用「扁家軍打造大英王朝」來形容蔡英文的競選團隊，雖然輿論、民眾觀感不好，但蔡英文無法強力反駁，因為她從未與扁畫清界限，扁系仍是足以與民進黨各大派系平起平坐的關鍵勢力，他們在黨內總統初選時力挺蔡英文，已是助選功臣，大選時進入競選團隊，未來他們有任何要求，蔡英文能說不嗎？
當然，陳水扁不是唯一讓蔡英文頭痛的問題。事實上，民進黨迫切期待重返執政，因此目前優先要處理的，當然是化解蔡英文、蘇貞昌初選黨內裂痕，可以說，蔡蘇談不攏，整個競選總部都跟著搞不定；因此，當執政的總統馬英九、閣揆吳敦義都已就戰鬥位置，藍營競選團隊也大致成軍，民進黨卻忽然火力重挫，就是因為內亂而無法一致對外。
甚而，蔡蘇不合尚不是唯一的內部紛爭。長年以來，民進黨的結構性恩怨，還包括新潮流與非新潮流之爭，或是謝長廷、蘇貞昌的個人恩怨轉化而成的謝系與蘇系之爭，某種程度而言，蔡英文在黨內初選時精妙的將這些長年宿怨轉化為選舉助力，初選勝利後，顯然不能虧待「功臣」謝長廷。一方面，蔡英文必須拉攏蘇貞昌，另一方面又不能委屈謝長廷，即使蔡英文放下個人對蘇貞昌的好惡，但要在蘇謝兩強之間求取平衡，都不是容易之事。
蔡英文若無法在派系之間求取平衡，恐怕連不分區立委名單都通不過六月二十五日舉行的中執會這一關，但是，比讓派系滿意更難的是，這次民進黨放棄黨內初選、全由黨中央決定名單，如果提出的不分區立委都只是派系妥協的產物，看不出專業性或功能性，蔡英文一樣會受傷。
離明年總統大選已經只有半年多時間，排在議程上的重要問題，就已經事事繁雜、不好處理；但是，最後可能影響選情及民眾觀感的，卻是扁案的歷史問題，因為，當民進黨從不正視、反省扁案，這一段歷史就永遠無法成為過去！
Friday, June 3, 2011
Free and Independent Travel Policy Promotes Understanding
Free and Independent Travel Policy Promotes Understanding
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 3, 2011
Beginning in July this year, the streets of Taiwan may be filled with Mainland tourists who have chosen not to be part of a tour group. These Mainland tourists want to be free of the restrictions imposed by tour groups. What will they learn about Taiwan after they are allowed to move about freely? Will local people get to know a different kind of Mainland tourist?
The Executive Yuan has announced that by the end of June, Mainland tourists will be permitted to move about Taiwan freely and independently. This is what the tourism related industries expect. This has also been the stated objective of the government since 2008, when it first opened Taiwan to tourists from the Mainland. The Tourism Bureau has already begun preliminary planning. The daily quota will be set at 500 people. Pilot cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, and Xiamen will be opened up first. The Tourism Bureau will make an iniitial assessment. This new policy of openess will enable businesses on Taiwan to do 9 to 15 billion NT a year in business.
Business owners have been quick to react. Many began making investments a long time ago. They welcome the business opportunities brought about by Mainland tourists able to move about freely. According to CEPD statistics, between now and 2013, 34 tourist hotels will invest 75.5 billion NT. Regular hotels will invest 8 billion NT. These measures will create 17,000 jobs. Also, to welcome Mainland tourists, 22 travel related companies are currently building or expanding. Total investments amount to 24 billion NT. An estimated 5,600 new jobs will be created. Why are these companies making such large investments? The answer of course, is that they are optimistic about the business opportunities created by continued opening to Mainland tourists.
The manufacturing industry has declined. Since then, investments and employment opportunities of this scale on Taiwan have been rare. Needless to say, many people have high expectations. In fact, the Taiwan Stock Exchange is already offering "Mainland Tourist Free and Independent Travel Stocks." The ramifications of the Mainland Tourist Free and Independent Travel Policy are becoming more and more obvious. Share prices of these companies have already gone up. When Taiwan was first opened up to tourists from the Mainland, many opponents argued that the baseline target of 3000 people a day could not be reached. They even doubted that Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan would contribute much to the economy. Reality has demonstrated that Mainland tourists are extremely important to Taiwan's economy.
Prior to opening, the Tourism Bureau conservatively estimated that Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan would bring tourism and related industries 200 billion NT in increased revenue per year. But according to estimates by the Tourism Bureau under the Ministry of Transportation and the National Immigration Department, last year (2010) the number of Mainland tourists who visited Taiwan reached 1.63 million. This represents a 68% increase over the same period last year. Among these, Mainland tourists accounted for 1.17 million person-visits. This represents a 98% increase over the same period two years ago. According to DGBAS estimates, last year Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan contributed 650 billion NT to our GDP. Mainland tourists increased our economic growth rate by 0.28%. In 2008, Mainland tourists arrived at the rate of 300 people a day. In 2009 the average was 1686 people a day. The number of Mainland tourists has steadily risen. In response, beginning this year, the number of Mainland tourists permitted to visit Taiwan per day has been increased from 3000 per day to 4000 per day. Businesses say the number is still not high enough. They are asking for an even larger quota.
Permitting Mainland tourists to visit Taiwan offers economic benefits. But over the past three years, a variety of incidents have occurred. For example, some tourists have worn helmets during their visits to Taroko Gorge. The miniature train at Alishan has derailed. Many people on Taiwan routinely feel a sense of superiority relative to Mainland tourists. These incidents shook their self-confidence, and provided them with an opportunity for self-introspection. People on Taiwan and Mainland tourists have a complex feelings about each other. This makes it easy to touch a sensitive nerve. Familiarity and acceptance require time and tolerance. Practically speaking, given large numbers of Mainland tourists, feelings, logic, justice, and profits all play a role. Taiwan will find it difficult to resist.
The Free and Independent Travel Policy liberates the individual tourist from group tour constraints. Mainland tourists enjoy greater freedom. They are better able to gain a genuine understanding of the common man on Taiwan. Many believe the policy will increase business opportunities for the travel industry. It offers a mode of travel that will benefit many more people. Many people on Taiwan are entering the medical tourism, precision farming, and other cultural creative industries. They are attracted by the opportunities presented by Mainland tourists under the Free and Independent Travel Policy.
Various non-traditional travel and tourism industries are entering the field. This demonstrates the influence of Mainland tourists. It also demonstrates Taiwan's strengths. Decades of democracy and freedom, of open and pluralistic development, have created a class of "small is beautiful" professionals. Taiwan may lack great mountains and rivers. But Taiwan offers a wide variety of lifestyles and a rich cultural atmosphere. Tourists enjoy visiting. Much of its beauty and many of its attractions cannot be comprehended by tourists in a hurry. Taiwan is better suited to a different kind of tourism that stresses taste, feel, and atmosphere. Some Mainland tourists will opt for the Free and Independent Travel approach. They are more concerned about experiencing the locale. They hope to immerse themselves in the culture. These travelers are more fully prepared. They will explore the alleys and backstreets of Taiwan. They will stay at B&Bs with local color. They will experience aspects of Taiwan that are not intentionally put on display. Friends from the Mainland may find many charms not listed in the travel brochures.
Allowing Mainland tourists to travel more freely and independently demonstrates our self-confidence and enthusiasm. We hope compatriates on both sides of the Strait will get to know each other better, and learn to respect and cherish each other more.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.06.03
社論－自由行 讓陸客與台灣更認識彼此
本報訊
今年的七月之後，台灣的大街小巷可能會出現一些選擇以「不跟團」的方式來台灣旅行的陸客。這些希望擺脫一般觀光行程的陸客，將會認識到什麼樣的台灣呢？而台灣又會因此認識到什麼樣不同的大陸觀光客呢？
行政院宣布六月底將會開放陸客自由行；這是觀光旅遊相關產業的期盼，也是自二○○八年開放陸客來台觀光後的既定目標。觀光局初步規畫，每天開放人數是五百人，首批開放試點城市有北京、上海、廈門。觀光局評估，這項新開放策，一年可為台灣帶來九○億元到一五○億元的經濟效益。
而反應敏銳的業者早己展開投資行動，迎接陸客與自由行的商機。根據經建會資料顯示，預估從今年到二○一三年，將有三十四家觀光旅館投資七五五億元，合計一般旅館總計投資金額約八百億元，將創造近一.七萬個就業機會；此外，為了迎接陸客，還有二十二家觀光旅遊業者正在進行新建或擴建計畫，總投資金額為二四○億元，預計增加五六○○個就業機會。業者為什麼要進行如此大手筆的投資，當然就是看好陸客旅遊持續開放後的商機。
在製造業式微後，如此的投資規模與所創造的就業機會，就台灣而言，並不多見，自然也為很多人所期待；事實上，股票市場上已有所謂的「陸客自由行概念股」；隨著陸客自由行政策愈來愈明確，這些公司的股價表現也更為走強。開放陸客來台觀光之初，不少反對者認為一天三千人的目標根本無法達成；甚至懷疑陸客來台灣旅遊能給台灣帶來多少經濟活水。不過，事實證明，陸客商機對台灣的確非常重要。
開放之前，觀光局保守估計，大陸觀光客來台，一年約可為觀光及相關行業增加約二○○億元的收入。然而，根據交通部觀光局與內政部移民署的統計，去（二○一○年）全年大陸旅客來台人數達一六三萬人次，較前一年同期成長六十八％，其中觀光客是一一七萬人次，較前一年同期成長九十八％。根據行政院主計處估計，去年陸客來台觀光對GDP（國內生產毛額）貢獻約為六五○億元，因為陸客，台灣經濟成長率向上推了零點二八個百分點。二○○八年，來台陸客每日平均三百人，二○○九年每日平均一六八六人；陸客穩定成長，因應旅遊業者要求，從今年起，大陸旅客來台每天數額已由原先的平均三千人次提高為四千人次；但業者仍表示不敷所需，繼續爭取更高的額度。
當然，開放陸客來台旅遊，除了經濟收益，這三年來也出現了各式各樣的旅遊狀況。像是旅客戴著安全帽走太魯閣的畫面、阿里山小火車出軌的不幸事件，這些多少都對台灣人在面對大陸觀光客時的自信心甚至是某種不自覺的優越感，帶來了衝擊。對外開放，其實是一個向內自省的機會。台灣人與大陸觀光旅客，彼此或有一種幽微複雜的感受，就更容易牽動敏感的神經；熟悉與接納，需要時間與包容的心。無論如何，實際而言，面對中國大陸豐沛的觀光人潮，於情於理、於義於利，台灣都難以抗拒。
而不受制式行程約束的自由行，讓陸客可以用一種更自由、更開放的心情認識台灣比較真實的庶民面向，也被認為可以將旅遊商機擴展給更多行業、讓更多人受惠的旅遊方式。像是醫美健檢、精緻農業和文化創意等領域的業者，有不少人陸續投入了觀光產業，為的就是陸客自由行帶來的機會。
各式各樣非傳統觀光旅遊業者的投入，一方面顯示陸客的魅力，另一方面也顯示台灣的實力。幾十年民主自由、開放多元的發展，造就了台灣在許多領域小而美且專業化的表現，儘管不見得有名山大川，台灣卻有各種豐富的生活場景與動人氛圍，吸引旅客造訪。許多生活美學的確不是跑景點、趕時間的團客可以領會，台灣其實更適合用一種品味與感受的心情旅遊。會選擇自由行的陸客，通常是比較在意「體驗」、期待「融入」、準備比較充分的旅行者。當走入台灣的巷弄街道，住進各具風味的民宿，看見台灣在不經意間流露的文化涵養，來自大陸的朋友們或許會發現很多沒有列在旅遊手冊裡的地方，也很迷人。
開放陸客自由行，我們有這樣的信心，也有這樣的熱情：期盼兩岸人民能夠愈來愈認識彼此、也因此更懂得互相尊重與彼此珍惜。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 3, 2011
Beginning in July this year, the streets of Taiwan may be filled with Mainland tourists who have chosen not to be part of a tour group. These Mainland tourists want to be free of the restrictions imposed by tour groups. What will they learn about Taiwan after they are allowed to move about freely? Will local people get to know a different kind of Mainland tourist?
The Executive Yuan has announced that by the end of June, Mainland tourists will be permitted to move about Taiwan freely and independently. This is what the tourism related industries expect. This has also been the stated objective of the government since 2008, when it first opened Taiwan to tourists from the Mainland. The Tourism Bureau has already begun preliminary planning. The daily quota will be set at 500 people. Pilot cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, and Xiamen will be opened up first. The Tourism Bureau will make an iniitial assessment. This new policy of openess will enable businesses on Taiwan to do 9 to 15 billion NT a year in business.
Business owners have been quick to react. Many began making investments a long time ago. They welcome the business opportunities brought about by Mainland tourists able to move about freely. According to CEPD statistics, between now and 2013, 34 tourist hotels will invest 75.5 billion NT. Regular hotels will invest 8 billion NT. These measures will create 17,000 jobs. Also, to welcome Mainland tourists, 22 travel related companies are currently building or expanding. Total investments amount to 24 billion NT. An estimated 5,600 new jobs will be created. Why are these companies making such large investments? The answer of course, is that they are optimistic about the business opportunities created by continued opening to Mainland tourists.
The manufacturing industry has declined. Since then, investments and employment opportunities of this scale on Taiwan have been rare. Needless to say, many people have high expectations. In fact, the Taiwan Stock Exchange is already offering "Mainland Tourist Free and Independent Travel Stocks." The ramifications of the Mainland Tourist Free and Independent Travel Policy are becoming more and more obvious. Share prices of these companies have already gone up. When Taiwan was first opened up to tourists from the Mainland, many opponents argued that the baseline target of 3000 people a day could not be reached. They even doubted that Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan would contribute much to the economy. Reality has demonstrated that Mainland tourists are extremely important to Taiwan's economy.
Prior to opening, the Tourism Bureau conservatively estimated that Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan would bring tourism and related industries 200 billion NT in increased revenue per year. But according to estimates by the Tourism Bureau under the Ministry of Transportation and the National Immigration Department, last year (2010) the number of Mainland tourists who visited Taiwan reached 1.63 million. This represents a 68% increase over the same period last year. Among these, Mainland tourists accounted for 1.17 million person-visits. This represents a 98% increase over the same period two years ago. According to DGBAS estimates, last year Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan contributed 650 billion NT to our GDP. Mainland tourists increased our economic growth rate by 0.28%. In 2008, Mainland tourists arrived at the rate of 300 people a day. In 2009 the average was 1686 people a day. The number of Mainland tourists has steadily risen. In response, beginning this year, the number of Mainland tourists permitted to visit Taiwan per day has been increased from 3000 per day to 4000 per day. Businesses say the number is still not high enough. They are asking for an even larger quota.
Permitting Mainland tourists to visit Taiwan offers economic benefits. But over the past three years, a variety of incidents have occurred. For example, some tourists have worn helmets during their visits to Taroko Gorge. The miniature train at Alishan has derailed. Many people on Taiwan routinely feel a sense of superiority relative to Mainland tourists. These incidents shook their self-confidence, and provided them with an opportunity for self-introspection. People on Taiwan and Mainland tourists have a complex feelings about each other. This makes it easy to touch a sensitive nerve. Familiarity and acceptance require time and tolerance. Practically speaking, given large numbers of Mainland tourists, feelings, logic, justice, and profits all play a role. Taiwan will find it difficult to resist.
The Free and Independent Travel Policy liberates the individual tourist from group tour constraints. Mainland tourists enjoy greater freedom. They are better able to gain a genuine understanding of the common man on Taiwan. Many believe the policy will increase business opportunities for the travel industry. It offers a mode of travel that will benefit many more people. Many people on Taiwan are entering the medical tourism, precision farming, and other cultural creative industries. They are attracted by the opportunities presented by Mainland tourists under the Free and Independent Travel Policy.
Various non-traditional travel and tourism industries are entering the field. This demonstrates the influence of Mainland tourists. It also demonstrates Taiwan's strengths. Decades of democracy and freedom, of open and pluralistic development, have created a class of "small is beautiful" professionals. Taiwan may lack great mountains and rivers. But Taiwan offers a wide variety of lifestyles and a rich cultural atmosphere. Tourists enjoy visiting. Much of its beauty and many of its attractions cannot be comprehended by tourists in a hurry. Taiwan is better suited to a different kind of tourism that stresses taste, feel, and atmosphere. Some Mainland tourists will opt for the Free and Independent Travel approach. They are more concerned about experiencing the locale. They hope to immerse themselves in the culture. These travelers are more fully prepared. They will explore the alleys and backstreets of Taiwan. They will stay at B&Bs with local color. They will experience aspects of Taiwan that are not intentionally put on display. Friends from the Mainland may find many charms not listed in the travel brochures.
Allowing Mainland tourists to travel more freely and independently demonstrates our self-confidence and enthusiasm. We hope compatriates on both sides of the Strait will get to know each other better, and learn to respect and cherish each other more.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.06.03
社論－自由行 讓陸客與台灣更認識彼此
本報訊
今年的七月之後，台灣的大街小巷可能會出現一些選擇以「不跟團」的方式來台灣旅行的陸客。這些希望擺脫一般觀光行程的陸客，將會認識到什麼樣的台灣呢？而台灣又會因此認識到什麼樣不同的大陸觀光客呢？
行政院宣布六月底將會開放陸客自由行；這是觀光旅遊相關產業的期盼，也是自二○○八年開放陸客來台觀光後的既定目標。觀光局初步規畫，每天開放人數是五百人，首批開放試點城市有北京、上海、廈門。觀光局評估，這項新開放策，一年可為台灣帶來九○億元到一五○億元的經濟效益。
而反應敏銳的業者早己展開投資行動，迎接陸客與自由行的商機。根據經建會資料顯示，預估從今年到二○一三年，將有三十四家觀光旅館投資七五五億元，合計一般旅館總計投資金額約八百億元，將創造近一.七萬個就業機會；此外，為了迎接陸客，還有二十二家觀光旅遊業者正在進行新建或擴建計畫，總投資金額為二四○億元，預計增加五六○○個就業機會。業者為什麼要進行如此大手筆的投資，當然就是看好陸客旅遊持續開放後的商機。
在製造業式微後，如此的投資規模與所創造的就業機會，就台灣而言，並不多見，自然也為很多人所期待；事實上，股票市場上已有所謂的「陸客自由行概念股」；隨著陸客自由行政策愈來愈明確，這些公司的股價表現也更為走強。開放陸客來台觀光之初，不少反對者認為一天三千人的目標根本無法達成；甚至懷疑陸客來台灣旅遊能給台灣帶來多少經濟活水。不過，事實證明，陸客商機對台灣的確非常重要。
開放之前，觀光局保守估計，大陸觀光客來台，一年約可為觀光及相關行業增加約二○○億元的收入。然而，根據交通部觀光局與內政部移民署的統計，去（二○一○年）全年大陸旅客來台人數達一六三萬人次，較前一年同期成長六十八％，其中觀光客是一一七萬人次，較前一年同期成長九十八％。根據行政院主計處估計，去年陸客來台觀光對GDP（國內生產毛額）貢獻約為六五○億元，因為陸客，台灣經濟成長率向上推了零點二八個百分點。二○○八年，來台陸客每日平均三百人，二○○九年每日平均一六八六人；陸客穩定成長，因應旅遊業者要求，從今年起，大陸旅客來台每天數額已由原先的平均三千人次提高為四千人次；但業者仍表示不敷所需，繼續爭取更高的額度。
當然，開放陸客來台旅遊，除了經濟收益，這三年來也出現了各式各樣的旅遊狀況。像是旅客戴著安全帽走太魯閣的畫面、阿里山小火車出軌的不幸事件，這些多少都對台灣人在面對大陸觀光客時的自信心甚至是某種不自覺的優越感，帶來了衝擊。對外開放，其實是一個向內自省的機會。台灣人與大陸觀光旅客，彼此或有一種幽微複雜的感受，就更容易牽動敏感的神經；熟悉與接納，需要時間與包容的心。無論如何，實際而言，面對中國大陸豐沛的觀光人潮，於情於理、於義於利，台灣都難以抗拒。
而不受制式行程約束的自由行，讓陸客可以用一種更自由、更開放的心情認識台灣比較真實的庶民面向，也被認為可以將旅遊商機擴展給更多行業、讓更多人受惠的旅遊方式。像是醫美健檢、精緻農業和文化創意等領域的業者，有不少人陸續投入了觀光產業，為的就是陸客自由行帶來的機會。
各式各樣非傳統觀光旅遊業者的投入，一方面顯示陸客的魅力，另一方面也顯示台灣的實力。幾十年民主自由、開放多元的發展，造就了台灣在許多領域小而美且專業化的表現，儘管不見得有名山大川，台灣卻有各種豐富的生活場景與動人氛圍，吸引旅客造訪。許多生活美學的確不是跑景點、趕時間的團客可以領會，台灣其實更適合用一種品味與感受的心情旅遊。會選擇自由行的陸客，通常是比較在意「體驗」、期待「融入」、準備比較充分的旅行者。當走入台灣的巷弄街道，住進各具風味的民宿，看見台灣在不經意間流露的文化涵養，來自大陸的朋友們或許會發現很多沒有列在旅遊手冊裡的地方，也很迷人。
開放陸客自由行，我們有這樣的信心，也有這樣的熱情：期盼兩岸人民能夠愈來愈認識彼此、也因此更懂得互相尊重與彼此珍惜。
Thursday, June 2, 2011
Deciphering Tsai Ing-wen's "Generational Change"
Deciphering Tsai Ing-wen's "Generational Change"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 2, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen is trumpeting "generational change." But in fact she is merely six years younger than Ma Ying-jeou. Chronologically speaking, she hardly qualifies as a member of a different generation. Nor would her election victory amount to "change."
Tsai Ing-wen's "generational change" means something else entirely. The term "generational change" denotes the appearance of a new generation distinctly different from the old generation. It implies that this new generation will replace the old. During the eight years it wielded power, the Democratic Progressive Party engaged in rampant corruption. Tsai Ing-wen is now trumpeting generational change. According to her own logic, the DPP must offer voters a new generation of leaders distinctly different from the old. This is the only way generational change can be understood.
But as everyone knows, the only action Tsai Ing-wen has taken in response to the old generation, is to squeeze out Su Tseng-chang. Having done so, she has joined herself at the hip to old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. This represents more than political networking. This represents atavism and regression. This represents a regression to 2000, when Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen jointly repudiated the 1992 Consensus and retreated to old generation thinking.
Therefore from a networking and political policy perspective, Tsai Ing-wen's "generational change" exhibits no signs of progress from old generation to new generation whatsoever. On the contrary, it represents a "harmonic convergence" of the most obdurate elements of the old boy network and the old generation, in over a decade. Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min are all present and accounted for. This confluence of forces is unprecedented. By contrast, during the 2000 general election, the faultline between Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui could be considered generational change of a sort. The Chen era "new centrist path" also conveyed connotations of a new generation. During the 2008 general election, Frank Hsieh and Chen Shui-bian revealed a number of ideological differences. Frank Hsieh's uphill struggle was evident. Yet Tsai Ing-wen aligned herself with old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min.
Tsai Ing-wen is only six years younger than Ma Ying-jeou. One can hardly characterize them as members of different generations. On top of which, she has joined old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. Where, pray tell, is the loudly trumpeted change? Tsai's "generational change" is nothing more than a cutthroat electioneering slogan aimed at first time voters. But as noted above, this slogan contains a fundamental contradiction. Tsai represents the thinking of old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. What is Tsao up to? Does she intend to rally first time voters against obdurate old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min? Or is she merely herding first time voters to the polls to robotically cast their votes for these stale smelling old generation leaders?
We have long wondered how Tsai Ing-wen can appeal to both the "Showa generation" and to first time voters. After all, they have sharply divergent expectations. Tsai Ing-wen is asking the new generation to bear the burden of the future. But Tsai's future has already been hijacked by old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. Does she really want to mire first time voters in that kind of future? Does she really want first time voters to bear the burden for old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min? Just exactly whose future is Tsai Ing-wen protecting? old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min? Or new generation first time voters?
During the 1996 presidential election, the Lee/Lien ticket won 54% of the vote. Polls revealed that some voters believed Lee Teng-hui was a defender of the Republic of China. Others believed a vote for Lee Teng-hui was a vote for Taiwan independence. This newspaper warned that the Lee/Lien ticket might be a ploy.Taiwan independence doctrinarians might be attempting to split KMT supporters by presenting them with a split platform. We said the KMT to consider this a red flag. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian and James Soong split the vote. The Lien/Hsiao ticket received a mere 23.1% of the vote. Our fears came true. Today, Tsai is splitting the DPP's own supporters by preenting a split platform. On the one hand, Tsai is granting real world concessions to old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. On the other hand, Tsai is making hollow emotional appeals to new generation first time voters. It is casting itself as the birth mother of the Deep Greens, and as the wet nurse pf first time voters. These appeals are mutally contradictory, They must lead to a contradictory future. How can Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP assume the burden for such a future?
The situation is clear. In Tsai Ing-wen's future, she and old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min will possess, command, and exploit the resources of the nation together. Tsai Ing-wen is asking a new generation to assume the burden of the future. In essence, she is asking first time voters to assume the burden for old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. Polls indicate that young and middle-aged voters have no desire to assume the burden for old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. Tsai Ing-wen is recruiting first time voters. She expects these new generation voters to assume the burden for the future of the old generation. The deception is obvious. There is no generational change. Tsai's generational change is deception, plain and simple. It is an attempt to trick new generation voters to bear the burden for the old generation's political comeback.
Tsai is asking the new generation to bear the burden for old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min.
解讀蔡英文的世代交替
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.02
蔡英文主張「世代交替」，而馬蔡二人其實只差六歲，若以年齡來說，兩人其實難謂是不同「世代」，也就說不上「交替」。
因此，蔡英文所說的「世代交替」應是另有別解。就正統的觀點而言，所謂「世代交替」，應指「新世代」與「舊世代」在人脈與理念上的差異與輪替；因而，就蔡英文的立場言，由於民進黨執政八年貪腐亂政，則蔡英文既宣示「世代交替」，就應標舉一個民進黨的「新世代」，以與民進黨的「舊世代」有所區隔，這才是「世代交替」的正解。
但是，如所共見，蔡英文如今在綠營之中，除了排擠掉蘇貞昌這個「舊世代」之外，現在她儼然已成為「扁李謝辜獨」一干所有「舊世代」的完全合體；且不止是人脈的整合，亦是理念的返祖與倒退，其中之一是在今日ＥＣＦＡ的「新世代」中，倒退至二○○○年扁蔡合作否認九二共識的「舊世代」思維中。
因此，蔡英文所謂的「世代交替」，在政治人脈及政策思考上，不但完全未見「新世代」與「舊世代」的遞嬗，卻反而可謂是十餘年來綠營「舊人脈」與「舊思維」最為頑強的一次「舊世代」總集結，「扁李謝辜獨」人馬全員到齊，陣容空前壯盛。相對而言，二○○○年大選，陳水扁與李登輝的分道揚鑣或有「世代交替」的意味，而扁當時的「新中間路線」也有「新世代」的色彩；到了二○○八年大選，謝長廷與陳水扁之間亦有路線之歧見，謝長廷當時的掙扎亦有目共睹。但是，如今蔡英文卻儼然是「扁李謝辜獨」這個「舊世代」人脈與理念水乳交融的總集合。
因而，蔡英文既與馬英九只差六歲（難謂不同「世代」），又與「扁李謝辜獨」完全整合（根本沒有「交替」），致使其「世代交替」只剩下了一個意義，那就是以此作為向「首投族」割喉拉票的口號。但如上所述，這個口號卻存在著根本的矛盾，蔡英文既是「扁李謝辜獨」這個「舊世代」人脈與理念的總和，則如今究竟是要帶領「首投族」，將「扁李謝辜獨」這個頑強的舊世代「交替」掉？還是其實只是要「首投族」為這個已經發臭發霉的「舊世代」背書抬轎？
我們曾經質疑，蔡英文如何能同時回應「昭和世代」與「首投族」的不同期待？蔡英文說：召喚新世代，把未來扛起來！但當蔡英文的「未來」，已經被「扁李謝辜獨」這個「舊世代」所挾持，她難道要「首投族」一起陷身那樣的「未來」？又難道要「首投族」與她一起將「扁李謝辜獨」的「未來」扛起來？蔡英文究竟是允諾了「扁李謝辜獨」的「未來」？還是許諾了「首投族」的「未來」？
一九九六年，李連配在總統大選中獲百分之五十四的選票而當選，依當年選情分析，其中有認為李登輝是中華民國維護者的選票，亦有認為李登輝是走台獨路線者的選票；本報當即指出，這是「分裂的政策」所形成的「分裂的支持」，應視為國民黨的警訊；至二○○○年，陳水扁和宋楚瑜分掉了兩頭的票，連蕭配僅得百分之二十三點一的選票而大敗，警訊應驗。如今，蔡英文亦以「分裂的訴求」尋求「分裂的支持」，一方面在實體利益上結合「扁李謝辜獨」的「舊世代」，一方面在虛擬感情上拉攏「首投族」的「新世代」，也就是以深綠為「親娘」，以首投族為「奶媽」，這樣的矛盾操作，必將會面對一個矛盾百出的「未來」，又將如何「扛起」這個未來？
情勢十分明確。蔡英文的「未來」，將是與「扁李謝辜獨」共有、共治、共享的「未來」；蔡英文「號召新世代，把未來扛起來」，不啻就是要「首投族」把「扁李謝辜獨」的「未來」扛起來。因為，民調顯示，中壯年齡層的成熟選民，不願做「扁李謝辜獨」的轎夫，所以蔡英文將徵募的對象聚焦在初出茅廬的首投族身上，有賴這些「新世代」扛起「舊世代」的「未來」。拆穿了說，這絕非世代交替，而是一場要「新世代」幫「舊世代」復辟的政治騙局。
號召新世代，把「扁李謝辜獨舊世代」的「未來」扛起來？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 2, 2011
Tsai Ing-wen is trumpeting "generational change." But in fact she is merely six years younger than Ma Ying-jeou. Chronologically speaking, she hardly qualifies as a member of a different generation. Nor would her election victory amount to "change."
Tsai Ing-wen's "generational change" means something else entirely. The term "generational change" denotes the appearance of a new generation distinctly different from the old generation. It implies that this new generation will replace the old. During the eight years it wielded power, the Democratic Progressive Party engaged in rampant corruption. Tsai Ing-wen is now trumpeting generational change. According to her own logic, the DPP must offer voters a new generation of leaders distinctly different from the old. This is the only way generational change can be understood.
But as everyone knows, the only action Tsai Ing-wen has taken in response to the old generation, is to squeeze out Su Tseng-chang. Having done so, she has joined herself at the hip to old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. This represents more than political networking. This represents atavism and regression. This represents a regression to 2000, when Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen jointly repudiated the 1992 Consensus and retreated to old generation thinking.
Therefore from a networking and political policy perspective, Tsai Ing-wen's "generational change" exhibits no signs of progress from old generation to new generation whatsoever. On the contrary, it represents a "harmonic convergence" of the most obdurate elements of the old boy network and the old generation, in over a decade. Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min are all present and accounted for. This confluence of forces is unprecedented. By contrast, during the 2000 general election, the faultline between Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui could be considered generational change of a sort. The Chen era "new centrist path" also conveyed connotations of a new generation. During the 2008 general election, Frank Hsieh and Chen Shui-bian revealed a number of ideological differences. Frank Hsieh's uphill struggle was evident. Yet Tsai Ing-wen aligned herself with old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min.
Tsai Ing-wen is only six years younger than Ma Ying-jeou. One can hardly characterize them as members of different generations. On top of which, she has joined old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. Where, pray tell, is the loudly trumpeted change? Tsai's "generational change" is nothing more than a cutthroat electioneering slogan aimed at first time voters. But as noted above, this slogan contains a fundamental contradiction. Tsai represents the thinking of old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. What is Tsao up to? Does she intend to rally first time voters against obdurate old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min? Or is she merely herding first time voters to the polls to robotically cast their votes for these stale smelling old generation leaders?
We have long wondered how Tsai Ing-wen can appeal to both the "Showa generation" and to first time voters. After all, they have sharply divergent expectations. Tsai Ing-wen is asking the new generation to bear the burden of the future. But Tsai's future has already been hijacked by old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. Does she really want to mire first time voters in that kind of future? Does she really want first time voters to bear the burden for old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min? Just exactly whose future is Tsai Ing-wen protecting? old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min? Or new generation first time voters?
During the 1996 presidential election, the Lee/Lien ticket won 54% of the vote. Polls revealed that some voters believed Lee Teng-hui was a defender of the Republic of China. Others believed a vote for Lee Teng-hui was a vote for Taiwan independence. This newspaper warned that the Lee/Lien ticket might be a ploy.Taiwan independence doctrinarians might be attempting to split KMT supporters by presenting them with a split platform. We said the KMT to consider this a red flag. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian and James Soong split the vote. The Lien/Hsiao ticket received a mere 23.1% of the vote. Our fears came true. Today, Tsai is splitting the DPP's own supporters by preenting a split platform. On the one hand, Tsai is granting real world concessions to old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. On the other hand, Tsai is making hollow emotional appeals to new generation first time voters. It is casting itself as the birth mother of the Deep Greens, and as the wet nurse pf first time voters. These appeals are mutally contradictory, They must lead to a contradictory future. How can Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP assume the burden for such a future?
The situation is clear. In Tsai Ing-wen's future, she and old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min will possess, command, and exploit the resources of the nation together. Tsai Ing-wen is asking a new generation to assume the burden of the future. In essence, she is asking first time voters to assume the burden for old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. Polls indicate that young and middle-aged voters have no desire to assume the burden for old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min. Tsai Ing-wen is recruiting first time voters. She expects these new generation voters to assume the burden for the future of the old generation. The deception is obvious. There is no generational change. Tsai's generational change is deception, plain and simple. It is an attempt to trick new generation voters to bear the burden for the old generation's political comeback.
Tsai is asking the new generation to bear the burden for old generation Taiwan independence doctrinarians Chen Shui-bian, Lee Teng-hui, Frank Hsieh, and Koo Kwan-min.
解讀蔡英文的世代交替
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.02
蔡英文主張「世代交替」，而馬蔡二人其實只差六歲，若以年齡來說，兩人其實難謂是不同「世代」，也就說不上「交替」。
因此，蔡英文所說的「世代交替」應是另有別解。就正統的觀點而言，所謂「世代交替」，應指「新世代」與「舊世代」在人脈與理念上的差異與輪替；因而，就蔡英文的立場言，由於民進黨執政八年貪腐亂政，則蔡英文既宣示「世代交替」，就應標舉一個民進黨的「新世代」，以與民進黨的「舊世代」有所區隔，這才是「世代交替」的正解。
但是，如所共見，蔡英文如今在綠營之中，除了排擠掉蘇貞昌這個「舊世代」之外，現在她儼然已成為「扁李謝辜獨」一干所有「舊世代」的完全合體；且不止是人脈的整合，亦是理念的返祖與倒退，其中之一是在今日ＥＣＦＡ的「新世代」中，倒退至二○○○年扁蔡合作否認九二共識的「舊世代」思維中。
因此，蔡英文所謂的「世代交替」，在政治人脈及政策思考上，不但完全未見「新世代」與「舊世代」的遞嬗，卻反而可謂是十餘年來綠營「舊人脈」與「舊思維」最為頑強的一次「舊世代」總集結，「扁李謝辜獨」人馬全員到齊，陣容空前壯盛。相對而言，二○○○年大選，陳水扁與李登輝的分道揚鑣或有「世代交替」的意味，而扁當時的「新中間路線」也有「新世代」的色彩；到了二○○八年大選，謝長廷與陳水扁之間亦有路線之歧見，謝長廷當時的掙扎亦有目共睹。但是，如今蔡英文卻儼然是「扁李謝辜獨」這個「舊世代」人脈與理念水乳交融的總集合。
因而，蔡英文既與馬英九只差六歲（難謂不同「世代」），又與「扁李謝辜獨」完全整合（根本沒有「交替」），致使其「世代交替」只剩下了一個意義，那就是以此作為向「首投族」割喉拉票的口號。但如上所述，這個口號卻存在著根本的矛盾，蔡英文既是「扁李謝辜獨」這個「舊世代」人脈與理念的總和，則如今究竟是要帶領「首投族」，將「扁李謝辜獨」這個頑強的舊世代「交替」掉？還是其實只是要「首投族」為這個已經發臭發霉的「舊世代」背書抬轎？
我們曾經質疑，蔡英文如何能同時回應「昭和世代」與「首投族」的不同期待？蔡英文說：召喚新世代，把未來扛起來！但當蔡英文的「未來」，已經被「扁李謝辜獨」這個「舊世代」所挾持，她難道要「首投族」一起陷身那樣的「未來」？又難道要「首投族」與她一起將「扁李謝辜獨」的「未來」扛起來？蔡英文究竟是允諾了「扁李謝辜獨」的「未來」？還是許諾了「首投族」的「未來」？
一九九六年，李連配在總統大選中獲百分之五十四的選票而當選，依當年選情分析，其中有認為李登輝是中華民國維護者的選票，亦有認為李登輝是走台獨路線者的選票；本報當即指出，這是「分裂的政策」所形成的「分裂的支持」，應視為國民黨的警訊；至二○○○年，陳水扁和宋楚瑜分掉了兩頭的票，連蕭配僅得百分之二十三點一的選票而大敗，警訊應驗。如今，蔡英文亦以「分裂的訴求」尋求「分裂的支持」，一方面在實體利益上結合「扁李謝辜獨」的「舊世代」，一方面在虛擬感情上拉攏「首投族」的「新世代」，也就是以深綠為「親娘」，以首投族為「奶媽」，這樣的矛盾操作，必將會面對一個矛盾百出的「未來」，又將如何「扛起」這個未來？
情勢十分明確。蔡英文的「未來」，將是與「扁李謝辜獨」共有、共治、共享的「未來」；蔡英文「號召新世代，把未來扛起來」，不啻就是要「首投族」把「扁李謝辜獨」的「未來」扛起來。因為，民調顯示，中壯年齡層的成熟選民，不願做「扁李謝辜獨」的轎夫，所以蔡英文將徵募的對象聚焦在初出茅廬的首投族身上，有賴這些「新世代」扛起「舊世代」的「未來」。拆穿了說，這絕非世代交替，而是一場要「新世代」幫「舊世代」復辟的政治騙局。
號召新世代，把「扁李謝辜獨舊世代」的「未來」扛起來？
Wednesday, June 1, 2011
Reevaluate Unjust Pseudo-Privatization
Reevaluate Unjust Pseudo-Privatization
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 1, 2011
CEPD Chairman Christina Liu recently raised a hue and cry. She said that in order to enhance government efficiency, the government must redouble its efforts at privatization, Her appeal shone a spotlight on the matter. In recent years, numerous obstacles have stalled privatization. Privatization may not be the best way to improve the quality of government services. But privatization has gone on for over 20 years. It is not meaningless. The government should respond realistically to future needs. It should sort out the issues and find a new direction. One of the issues most in need of review is unjust pseudo-privatization.
Consider the larger framework of economic policy on Taiwan. The privatization of public enterprises began in 1989, as part of economic liberalization and internationalization. Import controls were lifted. Exchange controls were relaxed. Interest rate controls were abolished. The banking and telecommunications industries were also liberalized accordingly. These major policies laid the foundation for the current economic miracle. Ever since policies promoting privatization were instituted, 68 state owned enterprises have been added to the agenda. Thirty-eight state-owned enterprises, including the Bureau of Engineering Services (BES) will be privatized. Seventeen state-owned enterprises, including the Kaohsiung Ammonium Sulfate Company, will go out of business. Five state-owned enterprises, including the Bank of Taiwan will not privatize. Eight state-owned enterprises, including the Taiwan Power Company, the CPC Corporation, the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation, the Taiwan Sugar Corporation, the Taiwan Water Corporation, the Taiwan Tobacco & Liquor Corporation, the Taiwan Railway Administration, and the Chunghwa Post, will work toward privatization. But ever since the Engineering Agency was restructured two years ago, no new steps have been taken toward privatization. The aforementioned eight privatization projects are either in limbo or have been suspended. No one bother to ask about them.
The biggest problem with current privatization policy is not with state-owned enterprises yet to be privatized, but with those already privatized. The government still owns a substantial share in these enterprises. According to the government's definition of privatization, any company in which the government controls less than 50% of the shares, is considered a private company. But the chairmen or managing directors of these companies are government appointees. They control these companies' budgets, personnel appointments, and policies. Thye are subject to no legislative oversight whatsoever. The operational effectiveness of the aforementioned eight enterprises is at least subject to criticism. The persons responsible can at least be identified. By contrast, the quasi-official, quasi-public, "pan-public enterprises" pander to the political needs of those in office. They occupy a no man's land. They are subject to neither public nor private oversight. This leads to confusion in business operations and undermines market competition.
Unclear boundaries between the public and private sectors means increased opportunities for corruption. For example, the chairman or general manager of pan-public enterprises are government appointees. These people may be on the receiving end of political patronage. They may be utterly incompetent. Just exactly whose interests are these officials looking after? Theoretically they represent public shareholders. Theoretically their job is to protect public shareholders. But who decides what is in the interest of public shareholders? Nominally that would be the government. But the actual administrator is a government head appointed by the ruling party. This is precisely how channels in the service of political interests are established. The executive branch is unwilling to relinquish control. The ruling party dominated legislature is only too happy to play along. Worse still, pan public enterprises are public in name only. In practice they merely serve whoever wields political authority. The government heads who control these enterprises are presented with opportunities to maximize their personal interests in the name of public service. The immense resources of pan public enterprises are gradually usurped by personal interests. The abuse of power is rampant. President Ma must open his eyes.
The relationship between privatization and liberalization is ever closer. The purpose of privatization is to ensure fair competition. It also provides greater room for the private sector to grow, and enhances overall competitiveness. But non public, non private, half-baked privatization is pseudo privatization. It negates privatization. It undercuts the effectiveness of industry liberalization. Consider banking liberalization. The government authorized the establishment of new banks. But the privatization of public banks was incomplete. They constituted unfair competition against private financial institutions. The inefficiency of public financial institutions is also due to half-baked privatization. They may even lack supervision. Unclear lines between the public and private sectors lead to finger-pointing that hinders competition. Consider last year's numbers. The total assets of nine pan-public banks accounted for 52% of all domestic banks. But their pre-tax profits accounted for only 36% of the overall profits. This proves that their performance was inferior to private sector banks. In recent years, the financial and insurance industries have accounted for less and less of the gross domestic product. This shows that the financial industry as whole has grown less than the rest of the economy. The connection is obvious. The scale of Taiwan's economy is small. It is subject to special factors relating to cross-Strait relations. We genuinely need public financial institutions. But must the proportion be so high?
The Annual Competitiveness Report issued by the international Institute for Management Development in Lausanne, Switzerland has received a great deal of attention. The ROC's competitiveness rating this year rose to 6th place. But its "government efficiency" rating fell. Its "public interference in corporate activity" rating also fell. Chairman Liu took advantage of the opportunity to enhance competitiveness. She used the issuance of the Presidential Office monthly fiscal report to restart privatization. Pseudo-privatization has led to more and more problems in recent years. President Ma may not have noticed. But Chairman Liu has said she will invite cross-ministry discussions. We look forward to the restarting of privatization.
不公不民的偽民營化要檢討了
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.01
經建會主委劉憶如近來大聲疾呼，應重新推動民營化政策，以提升政府效能。這項呼籲就像聚光燈一樣，讓人看到近年民營化的停頓以及種種問題。民營化或非提升政府效能的最優先事務，但這項推動超過廿年的政策也不是食之無味的雞肋；政府應依現實及未來需要，重新梳理出政策層次及推動方向；其中，不公不民的偽民營化是最需要檢討的現象。
在台灣經濟政策的大架構裡，公營事業民營化是政府於民國七十八年揭示的經濟自由化、國際化政策的一環，與解除進口管制、放寬外匯管制、取消銀行利率管制、推動產業自由化（如銀行、電信）等並駕齊驅，都是奠定現今台灣經濟發展基礎的重大政策。民營化政策推動以來，共有六十八家事業納入列管目標，並有中華工程等卅八家移轉民營、高硫等十七家結束營業，除台灣銀行等五家決定不民營化外，還有台電、中油、漢翔、台糖、台水、台酒、台鐵及中華郵政等八家繼續推動。不過，自前年榮工處改制之後，民營化再無任何新進展，前述八家事業的民營化計畫不是沒有下文就是暫緩，也無人聞問。
但當前民營化政策最大的問題，並不在這些尚未民營化的事業，而是那些已民營化，但政府依然持有可觀股權的事業。依民營化的定義，政府持股五成以下就視為民營事業；然而，政府指派這些事業的董事長或總經理，也不時委以政策性任務，並掌握其經營主導權，但其預算、人事、經營計畫完全不受國會監督。相對於前述八家事業，其經營績效至少可受批評、也找得到可責之人，這些半官半民的「泛公股事業」卻依著執政者的政治需要，遊走於既公且民、不公不民的不同治理標準之間，導致事業經營的錯亂，也影響市場競爭效率。
官民界線不清的弊端還有更多。舉例來說，泛公股事業的董事長或總經理都由政府指派，且不論這些人是否為酬庸、有無專業能力，僅這些官派負責人監管的究竟是誰的利益，就存有很大的模糊空間。理論上，他們是公股代表人，當然是監管公股的利益，但公股的利益又是誰決定？名義上是政府，但實際執行者是執政黨派任的政府首長，為政治服務的管道正是由此建立，是以行政部門不願放手，由執政黨掌控的國會也樂觀其成。更等而下之的是，泛公股事業不僅得以「假政府之名，行政治服務之實」，領管這些事業的政府首長或負責人更有機會「假政治服務之名，行個人利益最大化之實」；龐大的泛公股事業資源被個人點滴攫取事小、權力濫用事大，馬總統不能不看清這一點。
民營化與產業自由化的關係更是密切，它既是讓各事業得以公平競爭，也是提供民間部門釋放活力的空間，以提升整體的競爭力。可是，不公不民的半吊子民營化，則是「偽民營化」，破壞了這樣的政策設計，影響了產業自由化的效果。就拿銀行自由化來說，政府開放銀行新設，但公營行庫的民營化不徹底，對民營金融機構形成不公平競爭；公營金融機構的低效率也因民營化只做一半而不見改善，甚至因缺乏監督、官民不分而相互諉責、阻礙競爭。以去年統計為例，九家泛公股銀行的合計資產占本國銀行的五成二，但稅前獲利僅有整體的三成六，證明其經營績效不如民間；近年金融保險業占國內生產毛額比率節節下降，顯示金融產業的成長不如總體，亦與此難脫干係。誠然，台灣經濟規模小，又有兩岸關係的特殊因素，確實需要保留一定規模的公營金融機構，但需要這麼高的比重嗎？
廣受國際重視的瑞士洛桑國際管理學院（ＩＭＤ）的年度競爭力報告，今年雖將台灣競爭力提升至第六名，但認為「政府效能」退步，並直指「公股影響企業活動」倒退最多。領軍督導各部會提升競爭力的劉主委打鐵趁熱，在總統府財經月報正式提出重啟民營化，應是有感於近年偽民營化帶來的公股問題愈來愈多而起；儘管尚未引起馬總統的共鳴，但劉主委已表示將邀跨部會討論。我們期望停頓的民營化能因此重拾應有的節奏。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 1, 2011
CEPD Chairman Christina Liu recently raised a hue and cry. She said that in order to enhance government efficiency, the government must redouble its efforts at privatization, Her appeal shone a spotlight on the matter. In recent years, numerous obstacles have stalled privatization. Privatization may not be the best way to improve the quality of government services. But privatization has gone on for over 20 years. It is not meaningless. The government should respond realistically to future needs. It should sort out the issues and find a new direction. One of the issues most in need of review is unjust pseudo-privatization.
Consider the larger framework of economic policy on Taiwan. The privatization of public enterprises began in 1989, as part of economic liberalization and internationalization. Import controls were lifted. Exchange controls were relaxed. Interest rate controls were abolished. The banking and telecommunications industries were also liberalized accordingly. These major policies laid the foundation for the current economic miracle. Ever since policies promoting privatization were instituted, 68 state owned enterprises have been added to the agenda. Thirty-eight state-owned enterprises, including the Bureau of Engineering Services (BES) will be privatized. Seventeen state-owned enterprises, including the Kaohsiung Ammonium Sulfate Company, will go out of business. Five state-owned enterprises, including the Bank of Taiwan will not privatize. Eight state-owned enterprises, including the Taiwan Power Company, the CPC Corporation, the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation, the Taiwan Sugar Corporation, the Taiwan Water Corporation, the Taiwan Tobacco & Liquor Corporation, the Taiwan Railway Administration, and the Chunghwa Post, will work toward privatization. But ever since the Engineering Agency was restructured two years ago, no new steps have been taken toward privatization. The aforementioned eight privatization projects are either in limbo or have been suspended. No one bother to ask about them.
The biggest problem with current privatization policy is not with state-owned enterprises yet to be privatized, but with those already privatized. The government still owns a substantial share in these enterprises. According to the government's definition of privatization, any company in which the government controls less than 50% of the shares, is considered a private company. But the chairmen or managing directors of these companies are government appointees. They control these companies' budgets, personnel appointments, and policies. Thye are subject to no legislative oversight whatsoever. The operational effectiveness of the aforementioned eight enterprises is at least subject to criticism. The persons responsible can at least be identified. By contrast, the quasi-official, quasi-public, "pan-public enterprises" pander to the political needs of those in office. They occupy a no man's land. They are subject to neither public nor private oversight. This leads to confusion in business operations and undermines market competition.
Unclear boundaries between the public and private sectors means increased opportunities for corruption. For example, the chairman or general manager of pan-public enterprises are government appointees. These people may be on the receiving end of political patronage. They may be utterly incompetent. Just exactly whose interests are these officials looking after? Theoretically they represent public shareholders. Theoretically their job is to protect public shareholders. But who decides what is in the interest of public shareholders? Nominally that would be the government. But the actual administrator is a government head appointed by the ruling party. This is precisely how channels in the service of political interests are established. The executive branch is unwilling to relinquish control. The ruling party dominated legislature is only too happy to play along. Worse still, pan public enterprises are public in name only. In practice they merely serve whoever wields political authority. The government heads who control these enterprises are presented with opportunities to maximize their personal interests in the name of public service. The immense resources of pan public enterprises are gradually usurped by personal interests. The abuse of power is rampant. President Ma must open his eyes.
The relationship between privatization and liberalization is ever closer. The purpose of privatization is to ensure fair competition. It also provides greater room for the private sector to grow, and enhances overall competitiveness. But non public, non private, half-baked privatization is pseudo privatization. It negates privatization. It undercuts the effectiveness of industry liberalization. Consider banking liberalization. The government authorized the establishment of new banks. But the privatization of public banks was incomplete. They constituted unfair competition against private financial institutions. The inefficiency of public financial institutions is also due to half-baked privatization. They may even lack supervision. Unclear lines between the public and private sectors lead to finger-pointing that hinders competition. Consider last year's numbers. The total assets of nine pan-public banks accounted for 52% of all domestic banks. But their pre-tax profits accounted for only 36% of the overall profits. This proves that their performance was inferior to private sector banks. In recent years, the financial and insurance industries have accounted for less and less of the gross domestic product. This shows that the financial industry as whole has grown less than the rest of the economy. The connection is obvious. The scale of Taiwan's economy is small. It is subject to special factors relating to cross-Strait relations. We genuinely need public financial institutions. But must the proportion be so high?
The Annual Competitiveness Report issued by the international Institute for Management Development in Lausanne, Switzerland has received a great deal of attention. The ROC's competitiveness rating this year rose to 6th place. But its "government efficiency" rating fell. Its "public interference in corporate activity" rating also fell. Chairman Liu took advantage of the opportunity to enhance competitiveness. She used the issuance of the Presidential Office monthly fiscal report to restart privatization. Pseudo-privatization has led to more and more problems in recent years. President Ma may not have noticed. But Chairman Liu has said she will invite cross-ministry discussions. We look forward to the restarting of privatization.
不公不民的偽民營化要檢討了
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.06.01
經建會主委劉憶如近來大聲疾呼，應重新推動民營化政策，以提升政府效能。這項呼籲就像聚光燈一樣，讓人看到近年民營化的停頓以及種種問題。民營化或非提升政府效能的最優先事務，但這項推動超過廿年的政策也不是食之無味的雞肋；政府應依現實及未來需要，重新梳理出政策層次及推動方向；其中，不公不民的偽民營化是最需要檢討的現象。
在台灣經濟政策的大架構裡，公營事業民營化是政府於民國七十八年揭示的經濟自由化、國際化政策的一環，與解除進口管制、放寬外匯管制、取消銀行利率管制、推動產業自由化（如銀行、電信）等並駕齊驅，都是奠定現今台灣經濟發展基礎的重大政策。民營化政策推動以來，共有六十八家事業納入列管目標，並有中華工程等卅八家移轉民營、高硫等十七家結束營業，除台灣銀行等五家決定不民營化外，還有台電、中油、漢翔、台糖、台水、台酒、台鐵及中華郵政等八家繼續推動。不過，自前年榮工處改制之後，民營化再無任何新進展，前述八家事業的民營化計畫不是沒有下文就是暫緩，也無人聞問。
但當前民營化政策最大的問題，並不在這些尚未民營化的事業，而是那些已民營化，但政府依然持有可觀股權的事業。依民營化的定義，政府持股五成以下就視為民營事業；然而，政府指派這些事業的董事長或總經理，也不時委以政策性任務，並掌握其經營主導權，但其預算、人事、經營計畫完全不受國會監督。相對於前述八家事業，其經營績效至少可受批評、也找得到可責之人，這些半官半民的「泛公股事業」卻依著執政者的政治需要，遊走於既公且民、不公不民的不同治理標準之間，導致事業經營的錯亂，也影響市場競爭效率。
官民界線不清的弊端還有更多。舉例來說，泛公股事業的董事長或總經理都由政府指派，且不論這些人是否為酬庸、有無專業能力，僅這些官派負責人監管的究竟是誰的利益，就存有很大的模糊空間。理論上，他們是公股代表人，當然是監管公股的利益，但公股的利益又是誰決定？名義上是政府，但實際執行者是執政黨派任的政府首長，為政治服務的管道正是由此建立，是以行政部門不願放手，由執政黨掌控的國會也樂觀其成。更等而下之的是，泛公股事業不僅得以「假政府之名，行政治服務之實」，領管這些事業的政府首長或負責人更有機會「假政治服務之名，行個人利益最大化之實」；龐大的泛公股事業資源被個人點滴攫取事小、權力濫用事大，馬總統不能不看清這一點。
民營化與產業自由化的關係更是密切，它既是讓各事業得以公平競爭，也是提供民間部門釋放活力的空間，以提升整體的競爭力。可是，不公不民的半吊子民營化，則是「偽民營化」，破壞了這樣的政策設計，影響了產業自由化的效果。就拿銀行自由化來說，政府開放銀行新設，但公營行庫的民營化不徹底，對民營金融機構形成不公平競爭；公營金融機構的低效率也因民營化只做一半而不見改善，甚至因缺乏監督、官民不分而相互諉責、阻礙競爭。以去年統計為例，九家泛公股銀行的合計資產占本國銀行的五成二，但稅前獲利僅有整體的三成六，證明其經營績效不如民間；近年金融保險業占國內生產毛額比率節節下降，顯示金融產業的成長不如總體，亦與此難脫干係。誠然，台灣經濟規模小，又有兩岸關係的特殊因素，確實需要保留一定規模的公營金融機構，但需要這麼高的比重嗎？
廣受國際重視的瑞士洛桑國際管理學院（ＩＭＤ）的年度競爭力報告，今年雖將台灣競爭力提升至第六名，但認為「政府效能」退步，並直指「公股影響企業活動」倒退最多。領軍督導各部會提升競爭力的劉主委打鐵趁熱，在總統府財經月報正式提出重啟民營化，應是有感於近年偽民營化帶來的公股問題愈來愈多而起；儘管尚未引起馬總統的共鳴，但劉主委已表示將邀跨部會討論。我們期望停頓的民營化能因此重拾應有的節奏。
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