Even the Best Policies Must be Properly Implemented
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 9, 2011
Summary: Vision Magazine has just published the results of its latest county chiefs and city mayors job satisfaction survey. Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin's ranking fell since the previous survey. He now ranks third from last. The mayors of Xinbei City and Keelung City are also bringing up the rear. The Green Camp has blasted Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City, calling them Taiwan's underachievers. But paradoxically the same survey shows Taipei City in first place in "economics and employment, environmental protection, transportation, health care, and government fiscal resources." Xinbei City is in second place. Competition between cities is intense, Public satisfaction however, is extremely low. What's going on here? The Taipei City government's own take is that the opinion polls were conducted while the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination controversy was raging. The negative public reaction led to these poll results.
Full Text below:
Vision Magazine has just published the results of its latest county chiefs and city mayors job satisfaction survey. Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin's ranking fell since the previous survey. He now ranks third from last. The mayors of Xinbei City and Keelung City are also bringing up the rear. The Green Camp has blasted Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City, calling them Taiwan's underachievers. But paradoxically the same survey shows Taipei City in first place in "economics and employment, environmental protection, transportation, health care, and government fiscal resources." Xinbei City is in second place. Competition between cities is intense, Public satisfaction however, is extremely low. What's going on here? The Taipei City government's own take is that the opinion polls were conducted while the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination controversy was raging. The negative public reaction led to these poll results.
The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination has become an insoluble nighmare for Taipei City and Xinbei City. But closer examination reveals that this Single Guideline, Single Text educational policy was well-intended. It tried to alleviate the burden on students and parents imposed by the Single Guideline, Multiple Texts policy. The Single Guideline, Single Text policy was supported by most county and municipal leaders. The Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination adopted the Single Guideline, Single Text approach. It conserved Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City educational resources. Past joint examinations on Taiwan used a regionally based joint examination approach. When Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City adopted something other than the nationally based Basic Competency Tests approach, it was nothing new, Candidates and parents accepted it without complaint.
But in 2011 the first Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination was held. Controversy erupted over "high scores, low achievement" and "increased admissions." Students and parents complained. A backlash developed. When the controversy first erupted, Taipei City insisted it would continue using the Single Guideline, Single Text approach during the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination. But the opposition was too intense, The Ministry of Education explicity called for a halt to the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination, and a return to the nationally based Basic Competency Tests.
But problems have arisen. Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City have nearly 100,000 students under the Single Guideline, Single Text policy. Other cities and counties have students under the Single Guideline, Multiple Texts policy. Many Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keeling City students and their parents are worried. Next year's Basic Competency Tests are only a few months away. Students in Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City have read only one text. How will they compete against students who have read multiple texts, and who are taking the nationally based Basic Competency Tests? In order to reassure concerned parents, Taipei City held briefings. Mayor Hau Lung-bin and educational authorities personally briefed junior high school teachers and parents. Other counties and municipalities talk about the Single Guideline, Multiple Texts approach. But in reality most of them have settled on a single text. Students in Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City need not worry that other students are reading multiple texts, while they are reading only one text. The nationally based Basic Competency Tests have been held for many years. In principle, they test the guidelines, not the texts. In other words, regardless of which version candidates are using, they can participate in the Basic Competency Tests.
Taipei City and educational authorities have issued repeated assurances. They hope students and parents will not worry excessively. But Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City did exceed their brief. Officials may issue assurances. But the results remain to be seen. Taipei City took the lead in adopting the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examination. Sad to say, Taipei City is already a casualty, The examination and distribution system experienced technical difficulties. It is now uncertain whether they will continue using the Single Guideline, Single Text approach. Apparently everything is up for grabs. Suppose one day, even the Single Guideline, Single Text policy is set aside. Everything returns to where it was years ago, Local government leaders' political prestige will not be the only thing to take a hit. The hard-won educational policies achieved over the years will collapse, Each year hundreds of thousands of students in Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City will be affected. Their educational system will face dramatic change. Educational policy has a significant long term impact on students, parents, and educational institutions that must not be overlooked. Before any policy is implemented, it must be carefully tested for leaks. Clearly Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City failed to do so on behalf of the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examinations.
Let this experience be a reminder to those in power. One's policies may be well-intentioned, But if they are not implemented properly, the public will not understand or support them. Once the government loses the public trust, remedial measures will be perceived as ad-libbing, as evidence of insufficient long-term planning, The government will naturally find it hard to regain the public trust .
Parents of students taking examinations have concerns and sensitivities that exceed many politician's expectations. This incident proves they must not be ignored. It matters not whether we are talking about Taipei City, Xinbei City, and Keelung City. Twelve year national compulsory education will be officially implemented in 2012 and December 2013. How will examinations be held in 2014? How will school admissions be administered? How will Basic Competency Tests, school performance, Educational Examinations, written tests and skill tests be administered? Who will be exempt from testing? How will applications be processed? How will special talents be determined? Many parents and students are still confused. Central and local government educational authorities must take time to explain. They must not allow a replay of the Taipei Xinbei Keelung Senior High School Joint Entrance Examinations fiasco.
政策立意再好也必須妥善執行
2011-09-09 中國時報
《遠見雜誌》最新發布的縣市長滿意度調查顯示，台北市市長郝龍斌排名較前次調查退步，落居倒數第三，而新北市和基隆市的滿意度也殿後，綠營批評「北北基生活圈」已成為台灣後段班。然而，弔詭的卻是，在同一份調查中，台北市卻又拿下「經濟與就業、環保、交通、醫療衛生、政府財源」這五項指標的第一名，新北市也高居第二名；城市競爭力高，民眾滿意度奇低，這到底是怎麼一回事？北市自己的解釋是因為民調的時間點剛好是在「北北基聯測爭議期」，民眾觀感不佳，造成民調大跌。
北北基聯測似乎已成了雙北揮之難去的夢魘，但細究起來，這項從「一綱一本」開始的教育政策其實是本於善念出發的。當初之所以這麼做，為的是減輕學生「一綱多本」的壓力和家長的負擔，推動「一綱一本」教學，此舉並得到多個縣市的認同，之後進一步推動基於一綱一本的北北基聯測，從某個角度來說，這麼做也是保護和保障北北基學生的教學資源。過往台灣舉行聯考之初，曾經歷過分區聯招的做法，因此北北基舉行有別於全國基測的區域聯測，並非創舉，考生和家長也都還能接受。
然而，二○一一年北北基第一次聯測後，卻發生諸如「高分低就」、「增額錄取」等爭議，引起考生與家長的抱怨、甚至反彈。儘管事件剛發生時，台北市仍堅持明年會繼續就一綱一本舉辦北北基的聯測，然因反對聲浪過大，教育部已於日前明確要求北北基聯測停辦，回歸全國基測。
但是，問題來了，北北基近十萬名學生讀的是一綱中的「一本」，其他縣市的學生讀的是一綱「多本」，許多北北基的考生和家長不禁擔心，距離明年基測就只有幾個月的時間了，只讀一本的北北基學生要怎麼拚讀多本的全國考生？為了讓關心教育和考試的家長安心，台北市舉辦了說明會，市長郝龍斌和教育主管機關親自跟國中老師和家長解釋，其實其他縣市雖然講是講一綱多本，但大部分也都是選擇一本；而北北基學生不用擔心「別人多本、自己卻只有一本」的另一個理由是，全國基測考試已經實施了多年，命題原則是考綱不考本，也就是說，不論考生用的是哪一個版本，都可以參加基測考試。
然而，即使台北市和教育主管一再保證，希望家長及考生不用太擔心，不過，畢竟今年的北北基的確就是出了包，官方保證效果如何，實在有待觀察。令人唏噓的是，不但由台北市帶頭的北北基聯測已經陣亡，由於考試與分發技術出了問題，現在甚至於連要不要繼續實施一綱一本，似乎都已經出現了很大的討論空間，如果有一天，連一綱一本也作廢了，一切又回到多年前的原點，那就不只是地方首長的政治聲望受到打擊、堅持多年爭取的新教育政策瓦解，每年北北基的十萬考生的學習方式和教育生態也將面臨改變。教育政策有長期效果，對學生與家長、教育機構的權益會造成重大影響，輕忽不得，任何政策在實施之前都必須詳考再三，務必做到「滴水不漏」，但顯然這次北北基聯測做的還不夠到位。
這個經驗也提醒了執政者，即使在基本面上立意良善的政策，若在技術面上出現疏失，可能也就得不到民眾的體諒與支持，一旦政府失去人民的信任，而後不論提出什麼樣的補救措施，往往被認為是臨時起意，缺乏長遠規畫，當然也就不容易贏得信任。
這個事件顯示，台灣家長對學生考試、入學的關注與敏感程度可能超過許多為政者的預期，實在不可輕忽。不論是北北基還是非北北基，一○一年和一○二年十二年國教正式實施前和一○三年實施後要怎麼考，有什麼入學方式，「基測」和「在校成績」、「教育會考」和「學科、術科測驗」到底如何進行，「免試」、「申請」和「特色」招生，等等，錯綜複雜，很多家長和學生仍一頭霧水─拜託中央及地方教育主管當局務必不厭其煩，說清楚、講明白，不要讓「北北基大亂鬥」再出現了。
Thursday, September 8, 2011
Tsai: We Want Taiwan Independence, Therefore We Refuse to Recognize the 1992 Consensus
Tsai: We Want Taiwan Independence, Therefore We Refuse to Recognize the 1992 Consensus
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 8, 2011
Summary: Beijing considers refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus equivalent to advocating Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence advocates say that acceptance of the 1992 Consensus is treason against Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen must chose one or the other. She cannot say that the two do not exist.
Full Text below:
Yesterday we asked, why does Ma Ying-jeou support the 1992 Consensus. Today we ask, why does Tsai Ing-wen oppose the 1992 Consensus?
Beijing has declared that refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus is the same as advocating Taiwan independence. Beijing considers the 1992 Consensus the cornerstone of cross-Strait relations. If it is removed, then the superstructure of cross-Strait relations will collapse. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She has in effect refused to recognize One China, Different Interpretations. She has not expressed opposition to Taiwan independence. Nevertheless she wants to maintain ECFA. She wants to maintain economic and trade relations with the Chinese mainland. Most of all. she wants to maintain peaceful development with the Chinese mainland.
Now, just before the presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen is pumping up the volume. She is full of bluff and bluster. But if she is elected president, Beijing will demand to know whether she still refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. President Tsai will be in absolutely no position to thumb her nose at Beijing. At least not if she still wants peaceful development. So the question is, will President Tsai blink? If she does, the result will not just be a personal and political disaster for President Tsai. It will be a major political and economic disaster for everyone on Taiwan.
But Tsai Ing-wen has left herself an escape clause. So far, she has only said "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." But she has yet to touch upon the meaning of One China, Different Interpretations, and no immediate reunification, no independence, and no use of force. If she can stonewall until after the election, she can then say that what she meant was that the actual term "The 1992 Consensus" did not exist. She can qualify her position, and say that the "Spirit of '92" does exist, or that the "Tacit Agreement Reached during the 1992 Talks in Hong Kong" does exist. She can change her colors like a chameleon, without missing a beat. Chen Shui-bian used this gimmick as well. But if Tsai Ing-wen harbors such intentions, then she is too shallow and frightening for words. If she fails in her attempt to deceive voters, she will destroy whatever legitimacy her presidential term might have had.
If Tsai is elected president, Beijing is sure to hold peaceful development over her head. It will demand that she accept the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen cannot afford to lose peaceful development with the Chinese mainland. In the end, she will have no choice. She will have to recognize the 1992 Consensus, or at least a variant. She will have to recognize One China, Different Interpretations. She will have to express opposition to Taiwan independence. This is inevitable. This is common sense.
Tsai Ing-wen's campaign committee has relentlessly floated rumors, alleging that after the election she will hold talks with Beijing. Years ago, Chen Shui-bian wanted Washington to dismiss his pronouncements as nothing more than election rhetoric. Years later, Tsai Ing-wen is hoping Beijing will do the same. But Tsai Ing-wen may have difficulty stonewalling until after the election. The focus of the debate is no longer whether the 1992 Consensus exists. Instead, Tsai is being asked directly whether she supports One China, Different Interpretations, and no immediate reunification, no independence, and no use of force. She is being asked directly whether she believes the Republic of China is a government in exile. She is being asked directly whether she supports Taiwan independence. She cannot revert to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. But neither can she declare that the Taiwan Independence Party Platform and the Resolution for a Normal Nation are null and void. If she intends to fall back on the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, she may as well affirm the Constitution of the Republic of China, and its provision for One China, Different Interpretations.
Ultimately, Tsai will be forced to make a public declaration. Is she attempting to advance Taiwan independence by means of "backdoor listing?" Or does she truly intend to act as a President of the Republic of China? Does she truly intend to assume the privileges and responsibilities provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of China?
Tsai Ing-wen has a dilemma. She cannot say that she opposes Taiwan independence. But neither can she say that she advocates Taiwan independence. No matter what Tsai Ing-wen says, she cannot divest herself of the spectre of Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian and other Taiwan independence elements. She cannot change a simple fact. The DPP is political party whose gatherings include hundreds of thousands of people, but never a single Republic of China flag.
Tsai Ing-wen can say, "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." But she can not say, "The Constitution of the Republic of China does not exist." She cannot say that "The Republic of China Constitution and the welfare of the Republic of China do not exist." She cannot reject backdoor listing. Nor can she say that "Taiwan independence does not exist."
Set aside whether the 1992 Consensus exists. Ask instead whether Taiwan independence exists. Tsai Ing-wen can no longer evade the question. Does Taiwan independence exist? Shouldn't the question of whether Taiwan independence exists be taken seriously? Taiwan had two decades of bitter experience with Taiwan independence. Does Taiwan independence really "love Taiwan," or does it harm Taiwan?
Consider two statements quoted in the papers over the past few days. First, the Chairman of the Taiwan Solidarity Union called the Republic of China a ficttion, a "phantom." He called the Republic of China a walking zombie that lives off the flesh and blood of the Taiwanese people. Second, during a campaign speech on Saturday, Yu Shyi-kun, Chairman of Tsai Ing-wen's Campaign Committee, called the Republic of China a fiction. Tsai Ing-wen cannot say these statements do not represent her position. She cannot deny that her most important supporters are advocates of Taiwan independence. She cannot say that the "spirit" of Taiwan independence "does not exist.
Beijing considers refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus as equivalent to advocating Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence advocates say that acceptance of the 1992 Consensus is treason against Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen must chose one or the other. She cannot say that the two do not exist.
The answer has emerged. Why does Tsai Ing-wen insist that the 1992 Consensus does not exist? Because she knows that Taiwan independence exists, and that she cannot escape the clutches of this "phantom."
因為台獨存在，所以九二共識不存在
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.09.08 01:24 am
昨天談馬英九為何主張「九二共識」；今天談蔡英文為何否認「九二共識」。
北京將否定九二共識指為主張台獨，並稱九二共識的屋基若毀，一切兩岸交流的樓層即失憑藉；蔡英文則一方面否定「九二共識」，亦即否定「一中各表」，更未表態「不獨」，另一方面卻欲維持ECFA，且欲維持與中國的經貿交流，更欲維持與中國的「和平發展」。
此刻，在總統大選揭曉以前，蔡英文儘可催盡油門，虛張聲勢；但在她若當選總統後，一方面北京必然要她交代究竟是否仍然否定「九二共識」，而「蔡總統」又絕無與北京決裂的本錢，即仍欲維持兩岸「和平發展」，試問：屆時「蔡總統」仍能撐持得住嗎？若是撐不住，那將不只是「蔡總統」個人的政治大禍，台灣亦必將墜入一場不堪設想的政經大災難之中。
蔡英文其實留有一個一廂情願的伏筆。她迄今只說「九二共識不存在」，但幾乎未觸碰及否定「一中各表」或「不統／不獨／不武」的內涵問題。如果此一策略可以讓她拖到當選後，則屆時她或許可宣稱，「九二共識這四個字當年不存在」，但並不是不能用「九二精神」或「九二香港會談默契」等變體及化身加以銜接（陳水扁用過此法）。然而，大位不以詐取，蔡英文若心存此種僥倖，未免太淺薄也太可怕，更必將全盤解構「蔡總統」的統治正當性。
蔡若當選總統，北京必然會以是否維持「和平發展」，來挾持她，要她接受「九二共識」；而蔡英文由於絕對承當不起失去「和平發展」的後果，以致最後必然會回過頭來接受「一中各表／反台獨」的「九二共識」內涵（或許出以變體及化身）。這是必然的結果，也是常識的結論。
蔡英文方面不斷放話，謂選後可與北京談；這就好像陳水扁當年要美國將他的話視為「選舉語言」，蔡英文此刻亦如此寄望於北京當局。但是，蔡英文似乎很難把問題拖到選後。因為，辯論的焦點已不在「九二共識存不存在」，而是直接問蔡英文：是否支持「一中各表」及「不統／不獨／不武」？中華民國是否流亡政府？是否支持「不獨」？她雖又回到《台灣前途決議文》，但能否宣示《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》失效？且若回到《台灣前途決議文》，為何不支持中華民國憲法「一中各表」的兩岸憲政戰略？
這些問題歸結到底，就是要蔡表態：究竟是主張「台獨」、欲「借殼上市」？或是要當真正的中華民國總統，而將中華民國憲法的利益與責任一律概括承受？
蔡英文的問題在於：她不敢說、不能說「反對台獨」，但又不敢說、不能說「主張台獨」。且不論蔡英文怎麼說，她皆不可能擺脫她的「背後靈」李登輝與陳水扁等台獨勢力，也絕對改變不了民進黨是一個數十萬人集會看不到一面國旗的另類政黨。
蔡英文可以說「九二共識不存在」，但她不能說「中華民國憲法不存在」，或「承當中華民國憲法利益及責任的中華民國不存在」（不是借殼上市）；另一方面，她更不能說「台獨不存在」！
因而，當大家放下「九二共識存不存在」的問題，改問「台獨存不存在」時，蔡英文已無可迴避。台獨不存在嗎？台獨不應「嚴肅面對」嗎？台灣二十年來的沉痛經歷，台獨究竟是愛台灣或害台灣？
且看這兩段幾天前才見報的言論：一、中華民國是一個虛構的「幽靈」，中華民國根本是為吸食台灣人民血肉而存在的「活殭屍」……。這是台聯主席的最新見解。二、中華民國是虛構的……。這是蔡英文競選總督導游錫?上周六的發言。蔡英文不能說這些皆不代表她的立場，她不能否認台獨是她最主要的支持者，她也不能說台獨這個「背後靈」不存在。
北京指否認「九二共識」就是台獨；台獨則說接受「九二共識」就是背叛台獨。蔡英文必須接受二者之一，不能說二者皆「不存在」。
答案出來了。蔡英文為何說「九二共識不存在」？因為她知道「台獨是存在的」，而她根本擺脫不了這個「背後靈」。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 8, 2011
Summary: Beijing considers refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus equivalent to advocating Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence advocates say that acceptance of the 1992 Consensus is treason against Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen must chose one or the other. She cannot say that the two do not exist.
Full Text below:
Yesterday we asked, why does Ma Ying-jeou support the 1992 Consensus. Today we ask, why does Tsai Ing-wen oppose the 1992 Consensus?
Beijing has declared that refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus is the same as advocating Taiwan independence. Beijing considers the 1992 Consensus the cornerstone of cross-Strait relations. If it is removed, then the superstructure of cross-Strait relations will collapse. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She has in effect refused to recognize One China, Different Interpretations. She has not expressed opposition to Taiwan independence. Nevertheless she wants to maintain ECFA. She wants to maintain economic and trade relations with the Chinese mainland. Most of all. she wants to maintain peaceful development with the Chinese mainland.
Now, just before the presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen is pumping up the volume. She is full of bluff and bluster. But if she is elected president, Beijing will demand to know whether she still refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. President Tsai will be in absolutely no position to thumb her nose at Beijing. At least not if she still wants peaceful development. So the question is, will President Tsai blink? If she does, the result will not just be a personal and political disaster for President Tsai. It will be a major political and economic disaster for everyone on Taiwan.
But Tsai Ing-wen has left herself an escape clause. So far, she has only said "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." But she has yet to touch upon the meaning of One China, Different Interpretations, and no immediate reunification, no independence, and no use of force. If she can stonewall until after the election, she can then say that what she meant was that the actual term "The 1992 Consensus" did not exist. She can qualify her position, and say that the "Spirit of '92" does exist, or that the "Tacit Agreement Reached during the 1992 Talks in Hong Kong" does exist. She can change her colors like a chameleon, without missing a beat. Chen Shui-bian used this gimmick as well. But if Tsai Ing-wen harbors such intentions, then she is too shallow and frightening for words. If she fails in her attempt to deceive voters, she will destroy whatever legitimacy her presidential term might have had.
If Tsai is elected president, Beijing is sure to hold peaceful development over her head. It will demand that she accept the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen cannot afford to lose peaceful development with the Chinese mainland. In the end, she will have no choice. She will have to recognize the 1992 Consensus, or at least a variant. She will have to recognize One China, Different Interpretations. She will have to express opposition to Taiwan independence. This is inevitable. This is common sense.
Tsai Ing-wen's campaign committee has relentlessly floated rumors, alleging that after the election she will hold talks with Beijing. Years ago, Chen Shui-bian wanted Washington to dismiss his pronouncements as nothing more than election rhetoric. Years later, Tsai Ing-wen is hoping Beijing will do the same. But Tsai Ing-wen may have difficulty stonewalling until after the election. The focus of the debate is no longer whether the 1992 Consensus exists. Instead, Tsai is being asked directly whether she supports One China, Different Interpretations, and no immediate reunification, no independence, and no use of force. She is being asked directly whether she believes the Republic of China is a government in exile. She is being asked directly whether she supports Taiwan independence. She cannot revert to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future. But neither can she declare that the Taiwan Independence Party Platform and the Resolution for a Normal Nation are null and void. If she intends to fall back on the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, she may as well affirm the Constitution of the Republic of China, and its provision for One China, Different Interpretations.
Ultimately, Tsai will be forced to make a public declaration. Is she attempting to advance Taiwan independence by means of "backdoor listing?" Or does she truly intend to act as a President of the Republic of China? Does she truly intend to assume the privileges and responsibilities provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of China?
Tsai Ing-wen has a dilemma. She cannot say that she opposes Taiwan independence. But neither can she say that she advocates Taiwan independence. No matter what Tsai Ing-wen says, she cannot divest herself of the spectre of Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian and other Taiwan independence elements. She cannot change a simple fact. The DPP is political party whose gatherings include hundreds of thousands of people, but never a single Republic of China flag.
Tsai Ing-wen can say, "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." But she can not say, "The Constitution of the Republic of China does not exist." She cannot say that "The Republic of China Constitution and the welfare of the Republic of China do not exist." She cannot reject backdoor listing. Nor can she say that "Taiwan independence does not exist."
Set aside whether the 1992 Consensus exists. Ask instead whether Taiwan independence exists. Tsai Ing-wen can no longer evade the question. Does Taiwan independence exist? Shouldn't the question of whether Taiwan independence exists be taken seriously? Taiwan had two decades of bitter experience with Taiwan independence. Does Taiwan independence really "love Taiwan," or does it harm Taiwan?
Consider two statements quoted in the papers over the past few days. First, the Chairman of the Taiwan Solidarity Union called the Republic of China a ficttion, a "phantom." He called the Republic of China a walking zombie that lives off the flesh and blood of the Taiwanese people. Second, during a campaign speech on Saturday, Yu Shyi-kun, Chairman of Tsai Ing-wen's Campaign Committee, called the Republic of China a fiction. Tsai Ing-wen cannot say these statements do not represent her position. She cannot deny that her most important supporters are advocates of Taiwan independence. She cannot say that the "spirit" of Taiwan independence "does not exist.
Beijing considers refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus as equivalent to advocating Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence advocates say that acceptance of the 1992 Consensus is treason against Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen must chose one or the other. She cannot say that the two do not exist.
The answer has emerged. Why does Tsai Ing-wen insist that the 1992 Consensus does not exist? Because she knows that Taiwan independence exists, and that she cannot escape the clutches of this "phantom."
因為台獨存在，所以九二共識不存在
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.09.08 01:24 am
昨天談馬英九為何主張「九二共識」；今天談蔡英文為何否認「九二共識」。
北京將否定九二共識指為主張台獨，並稱九二共識的屋基若毀，一切兩岸交流的樓層即失憑藉；蔡英文則一方面否定「九二共識」，亦即否定「一中各表」，更未表態「不獨」，另一方面卻欲維持ECFA，且欲維持與中國的經貿交流，更欲維持與中國的「和平發展」。
此刻，在總統大選揭曉以前，蔡英文儘可催盡油門，虛張聲勢；但在她若當選總統後，一方面北京必然要她交代究竟是否仍然否定「九二共識」，而「蔡總統」又絕無與北京決裂的本錢，即仍欲維持兩岸「和平發展」，試問：屆時「蔡總統」仍能撐持得住嗎？若是撐不住，那將不只是「蔡總統」個人的政治大禍，台灣亦必將墜入一場不堪設想的政經大災難之中。
蔡英文其實留有一個一廂情願的伏筆。她迄今只說「九二共識不存在」，但幾乎未觸碰及否定「一中各表」或「不統／不獨／不武」的內涵問題。如果此一策略可以讓她拖到當選後，則屆時她或許可宣稱，「九二共識這四個字當年不存在」，但並不是不能用「九二精神」或「九二香港會談默契」等變體及化身加以銜接（陳水扁用過此法）。然而，大位不以詐取，蔡英文若心存此種僥倖，未免太淺薄也太可怕，更必將全盤解構「蔡總統」的統治正當性。
蔡若當選總統，北京必然會以是否維持「和平發展」，來挾持她，要她接受「九二共識」；而蔡英文由於絕對承當不起失去「和平發展」的後果，以致最後必然會回過頭來接受「一中各表／反台獨」的「九二共識」內涵（或許出以變體及化身）。這是必然的結果，也是常識的結論。
蔡英文方面不斷放話，謂選後可與北京談；這就好像陳水扁當年要美國將他的話視為「選舉語言」，蔡英文此刻亦如此寄望於北京當局。但是，蔡英文似乎很難把問題拖到選後。因為，辯論的焦點已不在「九二共識存不存在」，而是直接問蔡英文：是否支持「一中各表」及「不統／不獨／不武」？中華民國是否流亡政府？是否支持「不獨」？她雖又回到《台灣前途決議文》，但能否宣示《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》失效？且若回到《台灣前途決議文》，為何不支持中華民國憲法「一中各表」的兩岸憲政戰略？
這些問題歸結到底，就是要蔡表態：究竟是主張「台獨」、欲「借殼上市」？或是要當真正的中華民國總統，而將中華民國憲法的利益與責任一律概括承受？
蔡英文的問題在於：她不敢說、不能說「反對台獨」，但又不敢說、不能說「主張台獨」。且不論蔡英文怎麼說，她皆不可能擺脫她的「背後靈」李登輝與陳水扁等台獨勢力，也絕對改變不了民進黨是一個數十萬人集會看不到一面國旗的另類政黨。
蔡英文可以說「九二共識不存在」，但她不能說「中華民國憲法不存在」，或「承當中華民國憲法利益及責任的中華民國不存在」（不是借殼上市）；另一方面，她更不能說「台獨不存在」！
因而，當大家放下「九二共識存不存在」的問題，改問「台獨存不存在」時，蔡英文已無可迴避。台獨不存在嗎？台獨不應「嚴肅面對」嗎？台灣二十年來的沉痛經歷，台獨究竟是愛台灣或害台灣？
且看這兩段幾天前才見報的言論：一、中華民國是一個虛構的「幽靈」，中華民國根本是為吸食台灣人民血肉而存在的「活殭屍」……。這是台聯主席的最新見解。二、中華民國是虛構的……。這是蔡英文競選總督導游錫?上周六的發言。蔡英文不能說這些皆不代表她的立場，她不能否認台獨是她最主要的支持者，她也不能說台獨這個「背後靈」不存在。
北京指否認「九二共識」就是台獨；台獨則說接受「九二共識」就是背叛台獨。蔡英文必須接受二者之一，不能說二者皆「不存在」。
答案出來了。蔡英文為何說「九二共識不存在」？因為她知道「台獨是存在的」，而她根本擺脫不了這個「背後靈」。
Wednesday, September 7, 2011
One China, Different Interpretations Means No Immediate Reunification, No Independence, and No Use of Force
One China, Different Interpretations Means No Immediate Reunification, No Independence, and No Use of Force
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 7, 2011
Summary: The 1992 Consensus is the capsule that contains One China, Different Interpretations. Asking whether the 1992 Consensus exists, is asking whether the capsule exists. The capsule is has nothing to do with the medicine within the capsule. It has nothing to do with the medicine's potency or efficacy. The real question is what sort of medicine is inside the capsule. In other words, how do Ma's Blue Camp, and Tsai's Green Camp propose to approach the cross-Strait strategic struggle? Do they intend to affirm or deny One China, Different Interpretations?
Full Text below:
Today's editorial asks why Ma Ying-jeou supports the 1992 Consensus. Tomorrow's editorial asks why Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus.
In fact, the 1992 Consensus is the capsule that contains One China, Different Interpretations. Asking whether the 1992 Consensus exists, is asking whether the capsule exists. The capsule is has nothing to do with the medicine within the capsule. It has nothing to do with the medicine's potency or efficacy. The real question is what sort of medicine is inside the capsule. In other words, how do Ma's Blue Camp, and Tsai's Green Camp propose to approach the cross-Strait strategic struggle? Do they intend to affirm or deny One China, Different Interpretations?
The capsule is not important. The medicine inside is. The 1992 Consensus is merely the wrapping paper. Inside the wrapping paper is One China, Different Interpretations. The recent debate between Ma and Tsai has gradually moved away from the wrapping paper, and towards the contents.
Consider the cross-Strait status quo, One China means "no independence." Different Interpretations means "no [immediate] reunification." Therefore, One China, Different Interpretations is the practical manifestation of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It means maintaining the status quo.
Consider the Ma administration's position. Upholding One China, Different Interpretations safeguards the Republic of China. It adheres to the Constitution of the Republic of China. The One China stipulated within the Republic of China Constitution means "no independence." It also means maintaining the status quo, wherein the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are temporarily divided and separately administered. It means no [immediate] reunification. That is why President Ma says "Supporting the 1992 Consensus means supporting the Republic of China." By implication One China, Different Interpretations means "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." This is the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy.
Consider Beijing's position. Originally Beijing took the 1992 Consensus to mean "Different Interpretations of One China." It opposed "One China, Different Interpretations." But in 2008 a new opportunity arose. Beijing warmed up to "One China, Different Interpretations." March 26 was the third anniversary of the Bush-Hu "One China, Different Interpretations" hotline conversation. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said "Cross-Strait relations are good. The two sides have different understandings of One China. But we can seek common ground while setting aside differences. That is the essence of the 1992 Consensus." Wang Yi's "seeking common ground and setting aside differences," is One China, Different Interpretations.
For Beijing, the most important aspect of the 1992 Consensus is its opposition to Taiwan independence. Therefore it must be mentioned in the same breath as opposition to Taiwan independence and commitment to the 1992 Consensus, When Beijing speaks out against Taiwan independence, it speaks out against the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." It speaks out against de jure Taiwan independence. The Republic of China is clearly not de jure Taiwan independence. The Republic of China seeks common ground and sets aside differences, under the premise of One China. The Beijing authorities, ironically, are doing their utmost to maintain the status quo. Beijing knows that the Republic of China's policy of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" Is a manifestation of the cross-Strait status quo -- one that has no substitute.
Consider the 1992 Consensus. To the Ma administration, the ROC is a sovereign and independent nation. Therefore it does not advocate Taiwan independence. It opposes Taiwan independence. It upholds the status quo, wherein the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are temporarily divided and separately administered. It opposes [immediate] reunification. To Bejing, the important point about the 1992 Consensus is that it opposes Taiwan independence. Beijing accepts the status quo, in which the Republic of China opposes [immediate] reunification. The 1992 Consensus implies One China, Different Interpretations.It implies seeking common ground and setting aside differences under the aegis of One China. It implies no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force. It may not be the ultimate solution. It may not be the perfect solution. But it is the best solution in 60 years. It is the only way, because it enables the two sides to adopt a rational process leading to clearer solutions.
Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus. But talk is cheap. She can say "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." But if she goes further, and repudiates One China, Different Interpretations, she will be repudiating the Republic of China and its Constitution. The Constitution of the Republic of China, including its amendments, acknowledges that the two sides are temporarily divided and separately administered. This has resulted in a constitution that accommodates One China, Different Interpretations. This is the same constitution former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman and Vice Premier Tsai Ing-wen swore an oath to uphold when she assumed office. Tsai Ing-wen now argues that "The Republic of China is a government in exile." She wants to play word games. She wants to exploit the name "Republic of China." She want to use it as a backdoor listing for a would-be "Nation of Taiwan." Of course she has to repudiate the One China, Different Interpretations elements in the Republic of China Constitution. But if she repudiates the Republic of China Constitution, how can she possibly run for Republic of China President? Furthermore, if Tsai Ing-wen repudiates One China, Different Interpretations, how can she advocate "no reunification?" Does she intend to openly advocate Taiwan independence, even while she demands "no use of force?"
The 1992 Consensus was merely a way to put One China, Different Interpretations into a gel capsule. Now however, controversy has arisen over whether the 1992 Consensus exists. The controversy has drowned out rational discussion of One China, Different Interpretations. People should be asking themselves what will happen if there is no One China, Different Interpretations Constitution? What will happen if the "no independence" principle is nullified? What will happen, internally and externally? What will happen if the "temporarily divided, separately administered" elements within the Constitution no longer apply? What will happen to the framework for cross-Strait peaceful development? What will happen to "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force?"
一中各表就是不統不獨不武
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.07
今天社論談馬英九為何主張「九二共識」；明天社論談蔡英文為何否認「九二共識」。
其實，使用「九二共識」這個概念，只是要使「一個中國／各自表述」這八個字進一步「膠囊化」，以便流通使用。所以，辯論九二共識是否存在，形同只是辯論那個膠囊存不存在；但膠囊無關藥理、藥性及藥效，問題的實質在於膠囊裡面的藥粉，亦即：馬蔡藍綠各自是否主張以「一個中國，各自表述」為兩岸角力的基本戰略？
膠囊不重要，重要的是裡面的藥粉。因此，馬蔡雙方近日的辯論焦點，其實已漸漸脫離「九二共識」這張包裝紙，而進入了「一個中國，各自表述」的內容物，亦即「一中各表」。
就兩岸現狀言，「一中」就是「不獨」，「各表」就是「不統」。因此，一中各表，就是不統、不獨、不武的憑藉與實踐，亦即通稱的「維持現狀」。
就馬政府言，「一中各表」就是維護中華民國，堅持中華民國憲法。因為，中華民國憲法主張「憲法一中」，就是「不獨」；並維持兩岸分裂分治的現狀，即是「不統」。因此，馬總統說「支持九二共識，就是支持中華民國」，其潛台詞則是：「支持一中各表，就是支持不統不獨不武的兩岸政策。」
就北京言，原本對九二共識的認定，傾向於「各表一中」，而諱言「一中各表」；但在二○○八年出現「新機遇」後，已向「一中各表」靠攏。北京國台辦主任王毅今年三月二十六日（布胡「一中各表」熱線三周年）指出：「兩岸目前的良好關係，是體現一個中國的九二共識；儘管對於一個中國的涵義，雙方認知不同，但我們可以求同存異，這是九二共識的精髓所在。」王毅所稱「一個中國，求同存異」，就是「一個中國，各自表述」。
對北京來說，「九二共識」的重中之重是「反對台獨」，因此必以「反對台獨」與「堅持九二共識」並稱；而北京今日言反對台獨，是反對「正名制憲」的「法理台獨」，至於中華民國顯非「法理台獨」，而是「一個中國，求同存異」，反而是北京當局全力維持的「現狀」。因為，北京亦知，中華民國的「不統／不獨／不武」，是維持兩岸「現狀」的無可取代的憑藉與實踐。
九二共識，對馬政府言，在主張「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家」，因此「不主張台獨」（不獨），而維持兩岸分裂分治的「不統」；就北京言，則九二共識的重點在「反對台獨」，但也因而接受了中華民國「不統」的現狀。所以說，「九二共識」無論是指「一個中國／各自表述」，或指「一個中國／求同存異」，皆是「不統／不獨／不武」的憑藉與實踐。這雖未必是終極方案，亦容非完美的方案，卻是六十年來相對最佳的方案，更是可使兩岸關係「由合理的過程到改善之目的」的唯一途徑。
因此，蔡英文反對「九二共識」雖言之輕易，只消一句「九二共識不存在」即可；但她若進一步要否定「一中各表」，即形同也否定了中華民國與中華民國憲法；因為，中華民國憲法（從增修條文看）即是一部承認兩岸現狀分裂分治的「一中各表」的憲法，這也是曾任陸委會主委及行政院副院長的蔡英文當年宣誓就職的基礎。蔡英文現今若主張「中華民國是流亡政府」，要玩「借殼上市」，自然就要否定「一中各表」的中華民國憲法；但她若否定中華民國憲法，何以參選中華民國總統？進一步言，蔡英文若否定「一中各表」，將如何主張「不統」？更難道要公開主張「台獨」？卻又如何主張「不武」？
當年是為了包裝「一中各表」，而採用「九二共識」這個膠囊；現在，由於對「九二共識」存不存在的爭議，反而掩蓋了對「一中各表」的理性探討。如今國人應思考的是：如果沒有「一中各表」，憲法「不獨」的原則若遭毀棄，將如何因應內外？而憲法「分裂分治」（不統）的憑藉若告失據，又將如何因應內外？更將如何維持「不統／不獨／不武」的兩岸「和平發展」架構？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 7, 2011
Summary: The 1992 Consensus is the capsule that contains One China, Different Interpretations. Asking whether the 1992 Consensus exists, is asking whether the capsule exists. The capsule is has nothing to do with the medicine within the capsule. It has nothing to do with the medicine's potency or efficacy. The real question is what sort of medicine is inside the capsule. In other words, how do Ma's Blue Camp, and Tsai's Green Camp propose to approach the cross-Strait strategic struggle? Do they intend to affirm or deny One China, Different Interpretations?
Full Text below:
Today's editorial asks why Ma Ying-jeou supports the 1992 Consensus. Tomorrow's editorial asks why Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus.
In fact, the 1992 Consensus is the capsule that contains One China, Different Interpretations. Asking whether the 1992 Consensus exists, is asking whether the capsule exists. The capsule is has nothing to do with the medicine within the capsule. It has nothing to do with the medicine's potency or efficacy. The real question is what sort of medicine is inside the capsule. In other words, how do Ma's Blue Camp, and Tsai's Green Camp propose to approach the cross-Strait strategic struggle? Do they intend to affirm or deny One China, Different Interpretations?
The capsule is not important. The medicine inside is. The 1992 Consensus is merely the wrapping paper. Inside the wrapping paper is One China, Different Interpretations. The recent debate between Ma and Tsai has gradually moved away from the wrapping paper, and towards the contents.
Consider the cross-Strait status quo, One China means "no independence." Different Interpretations means "no [immediate] reunification." Therefore, One China, Different Interpretations is the practical manifestation of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It means maintaining the status quo.
Consider the Ma administration's position. Upholding One China, Different Interpretations safeguards the Republic of China. It adheres to the Constitution of the Republic of China. The One China stipulated within the Republic of China Constitution means "no independence." It also means maintaining the status quo, wherein the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are temporarily divided and separately administered. It means no [immediate] reunification. That is why President Ma says "Supporting the 1992 Consensus means supporting the Republic of China." By implication One China, Different Interpretations means "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." This is the Ma administration's cross-Strait policy.
Consider Beijing's position. Originally Beijing took the 1992 Consensus to mean "Different Interpretations of One China." It opposed "One China, Different Interpretations." But in 2008 a new opportunity arose. Beijing warmed up to "One China, Different Interpretations." March 26 was the third anniversary of the Bush-Hu "One China, Different Interpretations" hotline conversation. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi said "Cross-Strait relations are good. The two sides have different understandings of One China. But we can seek common ground while setting aside differences. That is the essence of the 1992 Consensus." Wang Yi's "seeking common ground and setting aside differences," is One China, Different Interpretations.
For Beijing, the most important aspect of the 1992 Consensus is its opposition to Taiwan independence. Therefore it must be mentioned in the same breath as opposition to Taiwan independence and commitment to the 1992 Consensus, When Beijing speaks out against Taiwan independence, it speaks out against the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." It speaks out against de jure Taiwan independence. The Republic of China is clearly not de jure Taiwan independence. The Republic of China seeks common ground and sets aside differences, under the premise of One China. The Beijing authorities, ironically, are doing their utmost to maintain the status quo. Beijing knows that the Republic of China's policy of "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" Is a manifestation of the cross-Strait status quo -- one that has no substitute.
Consider the 1992 Consensus. To the Ma administration, the ROC is a sovereign and independent nation. Therefore it does not advocate Taiwan independence. It opposes Taiwan independence. It upholds the status quo, wherein the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are temporarily divided and separately administered. It opposes [immediate] reunification. To Bejing, the important point about the 1992 Consensus is that it opposes Taiwan independence. Beijing accepts the status quo, in which the Republic of China opposes [immediate] reunification. The 1992 Consensus implies One China, Different Interpretations.It implies seeking common ground and setting aside differences under the aegis of One China. It implies no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force. It may not be the ultimate solution. It may not be the perfect solution. But it is the best solution in 60 years. It is the only way, because it enables the two sides to adopt a rational process leading to clearer solutions.
Tsai Ing-wen opposes the 1992 Consensus. But talk is cheap. She can say "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." But if she goes further, and repudiates One China, Different Interpretations, she will be repudiating the Republic of China and its Constitution. The Constitution of the Republic of China, including its amendments, acknowledges that the two sides are temporarily divided and separately administered. This has resulted in a constitution that accommodates One China, Different Interpretations. This is the same constitution former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman and Vice Premier Tsai Ing-wen swore an oath to uphold when she assumed office. Tsai Ing-wen now argues that "The Republic of China is a government in exile." She wants to play word games. She wants to exploit the name "Republic of China." She want to use it as a backdoor listing for a would-be "Nation of Taiwan." Of course she has to repudiate the One China, Different Interpretations elements in the Republic of China Constitution. But if she repudiates the Republic of China Constitution, how can she possibly run for Republic of China President? Furthermore, if Tsai Ing-wen repudiates One China, Different Interpretations, how can she advocate "no reunification?" Does she intend to openly advocate Taiwan independence, even while she demands "no use of force?"
The 1992 Consensus was merely a way to put One China, Different Interpretations into a gel capsule. Now however, controversy has arisen over whether the 1992 Consensus exists. The controversy has drowned out rational discussion of One China, Different Interpretations. People should be asking themselves what will happen if there is no One China, Different Interpretations Constitution? What will happen if the "no independence" principle is nullified? What will happen, internally and externally? What will happen if the "temporarily divided, separately administered" elements within the Constitution no longer apply? What will happen to the framework for cross-Strait peaceful development? What will happen to "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force?"
一中各表就是不統不獨不武
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.07
今天社論談馬英九為何主張「九二共識」；明天社論談蔡英文為何否認「九二共識」。
其實，使用「九二共識」這個概念，只是要使「一個中國／各自表述」這八個字進一步「膠囊化」，以便流通使用。所以，辯論九二共識是否存在，形同只是辯論那個膠囊存不存在；但膠囊無關藥理、藥性及藥效，問題的實質在於膠囊裡面的藥粉，亦即：馬蔡藍綠各自是否主張以「一個中國，各自表述」為兩岸角力的基本戰略？
膠囊不重要，重要的是裡面的藥粉。因此，馬蔡雙方近日的辯論焦點，其實已漸漸脫離「九二共識」這張包裝紙，而進入了「一個中國，各自表述」的內容物，亦即「一中各表」。
就兩岸現狀言，「一中」就是「不獨」，「各表」就是「不統」。因此，一中各表，就是不統、不獨、不武的憑藉與實踐，亦即通稱的「維持現狀」。
就馬政府言，「一中各表」就是維護中華民國，堅持中華民國憲法。因為，中華民國憲法主張「憲法一中」，就是「不獨」；並維持兩岸分裂分治的現狀，即是「不統」。因此，馬總統說「支持九二共識，就是支持中華民國」，其潛台詞則是：「支持一中各表，就是支持不統不獨不武的兩岸政策。」
就北京言，原本對九二共識的認定，傾向於「各表一中」，而諱言「一中各表」；但在二○○八年出現「新機遇」後，已向「一中各表」靠攏。北京國台辦主任王毅今年三月二十六日（布胡「一中各表」熱線三周年）指出：「兩岸目前的良好關係，是體現一個中國的九二共識；儘管對於一個中國的涵義，雙方認知不同，但我們可以求同存異，這是九二共識的精髓所在。」王毅所稱「一個中國，求同存異」，就是「一個中國，各自表述」。
對北京來說，「九二共識」的重中之重是「反對台獨」，因此必以「反對台獨」與「堅持九二共識」並稱；而北京今日言反對台獨，是反對「正名制憲」的「法理台獨」，至於中華民國顯非「法理台獨」，而是「一個中國，求同存異」，反而是北京當局全力維持的「現狀」。因為，北京亦知，中華民國的「不統／不獨／不武」，是維持兩岸「現狀」的無可取代的憑藉與實踐。
九二共識，對馬政府言，在主張「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家」，因此「不主張台獨」（不獨），而維持兩岸分裂分治的「不統」；就北京言，則九二共識的重點在「反對台獨」，但也因而接受了中華民國「不統」的現狀。所以說，「九二共識」無論是指「一個中國／各自表述」，或指「一個中國／求同存異」，皆是「不統／不獨／不武」的憑藉與實踐。這雖未必是終極方案，亦容非完美的方案，卻是六十年來相對最佳的方案，更是可使兩岸關係「由合理的過程到改善之目的」的唯一途徑。
因此，蔡英文反對「九二共識」雖言之輕易，只消一句「九二共識不存在」即可；但她若進一步要否定「一中各表」，即形同也否定了中華民國與中華民國憲法；因為，中華民國憲法（從增修條文看）即是一部承認兩岸現狀分裂分治的「一中各表」的憲法，這也是曾任陸委會主委及行政院副院長的蔡英文當年宣誓就職的基礎。蔡英文現今若主張「中華民國是流亡政府」，要玩「借殼上市」，自然就要否定「一中各表」的中華民國憲法；但她若否定中華民國憲法，何以參選中華民國總統？進一步言，蔡英文若否定「一中各表」，將如何主張「不統」？更難道要公開主張「台獨」？卻又如何主張「不武」？
當年是為了包裝「一中各表」，而採用「九二共識」這個膠囊；現在，由於對「九二共識」存不存在的爭議，反而掩蓋了對「一中各表」的理性探討。如今國人應思考的是：如果沒有「一中各表」，憲法「不獨」的原則若遭毀棄，將如何因應內外？而憲法「分裂分治」（不統）的憑藉若告失據，又將如何因應內外？更將如何維持「不統／不獨／不武」的兩岸「和平發展」架構？
Tuesday, September 6, 2011
Candidates Return to Policy Debate
Candidates Return to Policy Debate
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 6, 2011
Summary: The general election is four and a half months away. The current policy struggle between the Two Yings is considered an essential part of the presidential race. Partisan mobilization is the factor most likely to influence the outcome of the election. The closer we come to election day, the more likely partisan mobilization, even ideological confrontation is likely to begin. But given the Two Yings personal and political character, we remain optimistic. The Two Yings have the ability to adhere to policy debate, in which case politics on Taiwan may enter a new phase.
Full Text below:
In the media age, visual and auditory impact is everything. Straightforward policy debate attracts scant attention. But political leaders are not show people or talking heads. It is not their job to entertain the public by staging media events or by slinging mud.
Pressures are mounting in the presidential election. The KMT presidential candidate is Ma Ying-jeou. The DPP candidate is Tsai Ing-wen. Ma refers to his platform as the "Golden Decade." Tsai calls hers the "Platform for the Coming Decade." When referring to rival platforms, supporters use virtually identical language. They say the rival candidate's platform is "full of flowery words and empty rhetoric." Conversely, when referring to their own candidate's platform, they say he or she has "the ability to implement his or her vision for the nation." To their credit, the Two Yings have published their platforms, leaving them open to public scrutiny.
Ma Ying-jeou's "Golden Decade" and Tsai Ing-wen's "Platform for the Coming Decade" have ensured a comparatively normal presidential campaign. The upcoming presidential debate already has substantive issues to take on. Past election campaigns were "saliva wars." Candidates slung mud indiscriminately. They were lively affairs. But the public soon wearied. At the very least, the Two Yings have set a commendable precedent for future campaigns.
Ma Ying-jeou is the incumbent. Tsai Ing-wen is the challenger. Their positions are different. But both are political leaders. Both must offer a direction for the nation's future. Tsai Ing-wen has launched her "Platform for the Decade." It has been criticized for being full of "pretty but empty rhetoric." But she is at least making an effort to persuade people who do not support her. So far, her platform is no more than an outline. It will be followed by a more detailed White Paper, which will be subject to even closer scrutiny. Contrast this with 2008. Ma Ying-jeou published his White Paper. But DPP candidate Frank Hsieh assiduously ignored it, Instead, Hsieh harped on the Green Card non-issue. He resorted to all manner of negative campaigning. No substantive policy debate took place. Tsai Ing-wen deserves credit for insisting on a campaign rooted in rational debate.
The DPP is the opposition party. Not surprisingly, its "Platform for the Decade" is deliberately vague. After all, if one is in the opposition, one need assume no responsibility for day to day governance. But the DPP was in office for eight years. Excessive policy vagueness inevitably invites criticism. Does the DPP really not understand this? Have three years in the political wilderness induced amnesia? Has the DPP become so emotionally removed from policy implementation?
The KMT is the ruling party. Ma Ying-jeou has published his "Golden Decade" platform. He faces even harsher scrutiny than Tsai. Critics may not bother to characterize his platform as "full of pretty rhetoric." The reason is simple. Ma is already in a position of power. His policies must be implemented here and now. He must demonstrate a capacity for real world governance. From a management perspective the easiest way to make one's case is to cite numbers. Alas, numbers are the least effective way to win voters' hearts and minds.
The "Golden Decade" platform implies that administration policies have already been implemented, or about to be implemented. It implies that the ruling administration is capable of implementing its vision for the nation over the coming decade. Unnamed senior officials in the Ma administration have revealed that "There will be no earth-shattering announcements. Merely the continuation of existing policies." The Ma administration is confident its platform is more worthwhile and substantive than the DPP's.
Does the "Golden Decade" platform contain anything of substance? The public will decide. Public opinion is rooted more in perception than in numbers. The Ma administration's performance may be interpreted very differently by different parties. The Ma administration's record on taxation, fiscal policy, 12-year national education, and industrial policy may be perceived as either good or bad, depending upon whom one asks. At best, the "Golden Decade" will win the approval of a majority.
The "Golden Decade," and the "Platform for the Coming Decade" each have their own appeal. Regardless, the Two Yings are serious about their bid for high office. They have returned to the issues. People First Party Chairman James Soong has recently been the focus of public attention. Soong, by contrast, has yet to make his case. He is still waffling about whether to run. He is maintaining campaign momentum by raising hot button issues and staging photo ops. He clearly suspects he will lose. His glory days as provincial governor are hardly a topic for policy debate. After all, the public has far higher expectations from a national leader than a local leader.
Blue vs. Green polarization on Taiwan remains intense. Will policy debate be the deciding factor in the presidential race? That remains to be seen, The public is concerned about the direction politics has taken. Most people know what they love and hate, They evaluate the candidate's words and deeds based on it. But mob passions and partisan confrontation eventually lead to burnout. More and more people are indifferent to Blue vs. Green political confrontation. This is especially true among so-called "swing voters." More and more they demand practical, rational, policy debate. Only when the candidates return to debating policy, will democracy on Taiwan truly mature.
The general election is four and a half months away. The current policy struggle between the Two Yings is considered an essential part of the presidential race. Partisan mobilization is the factor most likely to influence the outcome of the election. The closer we come to election day, the more likely partisan mobilization, even ideological confrontation is likely to begin. But given the Two Yings personal and political character, we remain optimistic. The Two Yings have the ability to adhere to policy debate, in which case politics on Taiwan may enter a new phase.
大選回歸政策辯論 值得肯定
2011-09-06 中國時報
在現今講究聲光效果的媒體時代，單純的訴求「政策」議題確實很難吸引民眾關注，但身為政治領袖，終究不是藝人或名嘴，不能只以花稍的身段，辛辣的攻擊言詞取悅民意。
面對壓力愈來愈大的總統大選，國、民兩黨總統參選人馬英九與蔡英文，同步推出「黃金十年」與「十年政綱」，儘管支持者與反對者，幾乎用相同的語言批評對手「充斥美麗而空洞的詞藻」，肯定自己的主帥「有能力落實國家願景」，至少雙英還能不媚俗地推出政策牛肉，供各界檢視。
馬英九的「黃金十年」和蔡英文的「十年政綱」，已經為總統大選開啟一個相對正常的序幕，可預期未來的總統大選辯論，也已經有了一個可供實質辯論的題材。相對於過去大選政治口水亂射，熱鬧固然有餘，卻搞到全民精神疲勞，雙英至少創造了一個值得稱許的競選模式。
馬英九與蔡英文即使所處的朝野位置不一，但都是必須為國家前景提出方向的政治領袖。蔡英文推出「十年政綱」後，儘管被批評為「美麗而空泛」，但她至少願意用美麗的詞藻說服可能不支持她的人；此外，既為「政綱」即屬提綱挈領，因此，後續她將進一步以「政綱」為本，提出具體的政策白皮書，必然會遭到更嚴格的檢驗。但不論如何，對比二○○八年，馬英九提出競選政策白皮書後，民進黨參選人謝長廷相應不理，持續主打綠卡議題等負面選戰，讓實質的政策討論付諸闕如，蔡英文堅持理性論述的選舉風格，確實應予肯定。
做為在野政黨，民進黨的「十年政綱」難免空泛，畢竟在野者不負執行之責，但是因為民進黨有過八年執政經驗，過度空泛難免遭致非議，為什麼執政八年還不了解實務到這個地步？或者為什麼才在野三年多，對政府已經執行的政策卻疏離至此？
同樣的，做為執政者，馬英九推出的「黃金十年」可能遭遇的檢驗不會比「十年政綱」更少，可以預期「黃金十年」或許連「美麗的詞藻」都沒有。原因很簡單，既已處執政的位置，所有的政策都得是目前已經落實執行，而且，還得具體提出執行的績效，從管理的角度，呈現績效最簡單的方法就是數據，然而，數字偏偏是最難打動人心的。
此外，既為「黃金十年」就表示這些已經執行或準備執行的政策，可以有效落實至少十年的國家願景，馬政府不具名的高層人士透露，「不會有驚天動地的宣示，都是現有政策成果的延續。」但也信心滿滿表示，一定比「十年政綱」更有看頭、更扎實。
「黃金十年」是否更扎實？還是得由民意認可，民意很大部分倚賴的是「感覺」而非數字。換言之，所有馬政府推出的政績成果，都可能引發仁智之見的爭論，從稅制到國家財政，從十二年國教到產業規畫，其實都沒有一個必然好或不好的定論，「黃金十年」最多只能做到爭取多數人的認可。
「黃金十年」與「十年政綱」各有其市場定位的優劣勢，但不論如何，雙英皆嚴肅面對自己即將競逐的大位，已經成功將他們拉回主戰場，相對之下，最近同樣掀起民意關注的親民黨主席宋楚瑜迄未提出其主張，依舊擺盪在選與不選總統之間，企圖以懸疑的話題和動作維繫熱度，很明顯地又略輸一著，畢竟曾任省長的往日輝煌不可能成為政策內涵的辯論主題，國家領導人的高度，就是必須不同於地方父母官。
無可諱言，台灣當前藍綠對立的氛圍未解，政策戰到底能否成為決勝關鍵，不無疑問，關心政治趨勢和走向的民眾，多數心中或許早有好惡，也依據其好惡檢視候選人的政策內涵與言行表現，但是，激情的民意對峙終究也有疲乏的時刻，愈來愈多的民眾對藍綠惡鬥抱持冷漠的態度，特別是所謂的「中間選民」，愈來愈重視實際、理性的政策論述，只有當選舉回歸政策基本面，台灣民主才有真正成熟的可能。
距離大選投票還有四個半月，此刻的雙英政策牛肉戰或許可視為選戰過程中必要的戲碼，愈接近投票日影響選戰最大的可能還是政黨動員，甚至意識形態的對決，但觀諸雙英的人格特質和政治性格，我們還是樂觀期待，雙英有能力一以貫之地堅持以政策論述決勝，那麼台灣的選舉格調、政治文化即可再臻新境。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 6, 2011
Summary: The general election is four and a half months away. The current policy struggle between the Two Yings is considered an essential part of the presidential race. Partisan mobilization is the factor most likely to influence the outcome of the election. The closer we come to election day, the more likely partisan mobilization, even ideological confrontation is likely to begin. But given the Two Yings personal and political character, we remain optimistic. The Two Yings have the ability to adhere to policy debate, in which case politics on Taiwan may enter a new phase.
Full Text below:
In the media age, visual and auditory impact is everything. Straightforward policy debate attracts scant attention. But political leaders are not show people or talking heads. It is not their job to entertain the public by staging media events or by slinging mud.
Pressures are mounting in the presidential election. The KMT presidential candidate is Ma Ying-jeou. The DPP candidate is Tsai Ing-wen. Ma refers to his platform as the "Golden Decade." Tsai calls hers the "Platform for the Coming Decade." When referring to rival platforms, supporters use virtually identical language. They say the rival candidate's platform is "full of flowery words and empty rhetoric." Conversely, when referring to their own candidate's platform, they say he or she has "the ability to implement his or her vision for the nation." To their credit, the Two Yings have published their platforms, leaving them open to public scrutiny.
Ma Ying-jeou's "Golden Decade" and Tsai Ing-wen's "Platform for the Coming Decade" have ensured a comparatively normal presidential campaign. The upcoming presidential debate already has substantive issues to take on. Past election campaigns were "saliva wars." Candidates slung mud indiscriminately. They were lively affairs. But the public soon wearied. At the very least, the Two Yings have set a commendable precedent for future campaigns.
Ma Ying-jeou is the incumbent. Tsai Ing-wen is the challenger. Their positions are different. But both are political leaders. Both must offer a direction for the nation's future. Tsai Ing-wen has launched her "Platform for the Decade." It has been criticized for being full of "pretty but empty rhetoric." But she is at least making an effort to persuade people who do not support her. So far, her platform is no more than an outline. It will be followed by a more detailed White Paper, which will be subject to even closer scrutiny. Contrast this with 2008. Ma Ying-jeou published his White Paper. But DPP candidate Frank Hsieh assiduously ignored it, Instead, Hsieh harped on the Green Card non-issue. He resorted to all manner of negative campaigning. No substantive policy debate took place. Tsai Ing-wen deserves credit for insisting on a campaign rooted in rational debate.
The DPP is the opposition party. Not surprisingly, its "Platform for the Decade" is deliberately vague. After all, if one is in the opposition, one need assume no responsibility for day to day governance. But the DPP was in office for eight years. Excessive policy vagueness inevitably invites criticism. Does the DPP really not understand this? Have three years in the political wilderness induced amnesia? Has the DPP become so emotionally removed from policy implementation?
The KMT is the ruling party. Ma Ying-jeou has published his "Golden Decade" platform. He faces even harsher scrutiny than Tsai. Critics may not bother to characterize his platform as "full of pretty rhetoric." The reason is simple. Ma is already in a position of power. His policies must be implemented here and now. He must demonstrate a capacity for real world governance. From a management perspective the easiest way to make one's case is to cite numbers. Alas, numbers are the least effective way to win voters' hearts and minds.
The "Golden Decade" platform implies that administration policies have already been implemented, or about to be implemented. It implies that the ruling administration is capable of implementing its vision for the nation over the coming decade. Unnamed senior officials in the Ma administration have revealed that "There will be no earth-shattering announcements. Merely the continuation of existing policies." The Ma administration is confident its platform is more worthwhile and substantive than the DPP's.
Does the "Golden Decade" platform contain anything of substance? The public will decide. Public opinion is rooted more in perception than in numbers. The Ma administration's performance may be interpreted very differently by different parties. The Ma administration's record on taxation, fiscal policy, 12-year national education, and industrial policy may be perceived as either good or bad, depending upon whom one asks. At best, the "Golden Decade" will win the approval of a majority.
The "Golden Decade," and the "Platform for the Coming Decade" each have their own appeal. Regardless, the Two Yings are serious about their bid for high office. They have returned to the issues. People First Party Chairman James Soong has recently been the focus of public attention. Soong, by contrast, has yet to make his case. He is still waffling about whether to run. He is maintaining campaign momentum by raising hot button issues and staging photo ops. He clearly suspects he will lose. His glory days as provincial governor are hardly a topic for policy debate. After all, the public has far higher expectations from a national leader than a local leader.
Blue vs. Green polarization on Taiwan remains intense. Will policy debate be the deciding factor in the presidential race? That remains to be seen, The public is concerned about the direction politics has taken. Most people know what they love and hate, They evaluate the candidate's words and deeds based on it. But mob passions and partisan confrontation eventually lead to burnout. More and more people are indifferent to Blue vs. Green political confrontation. This is especially true among so-called "swing voters." More and more they demand practical, rational, policy debate. Only when the candidates return to debating policy, will democracy on Taiwan truly mature.
The general election is four and a half months away. The current policy struggle between the Two Yings is considered an essential part of the presidential race. Partisan mobilization is the factor most likely to influence the outcome of the election. The closer we come to election day, the more likely partisan mobilization, even ideological confrontation is likely to begin. But given the Two Yings personal and political character, we remain optimistic. The Two Yings have the ability to adhere to policy debate, in which case politics on Taiwan may enter a new phase.
大選回歸政策辯論 值得肯定
2011-09-06 中國時報
在現今講究聲光效果的媒體時代，單純的訴求「政策」議題確實很難吸引民眾關注，但身為政治領袖，終究不是藝人或名嘴，不能只以花稍的身段，辛辣的攻擊言詞取悅民意。
面對壓力愈來愈大的總統大選，國、民兩黨總統參選人馬英九與蔡英文，同步推出「黃金十年」與「十年政綱」，儘管支持者與反對者，幾乎用相同的語言批評對手「充斥美麗而空洞的詞藻」，肯定自己的主帥「有能力落實國家願景」，至少雙英還能不媚俗地推出政策牛肉，供各界檢視。
馬英九的「黃金十年」和蔡英文的「十年政綱」，已經為總統大選開啟一個相對正常的序幕，可預期未來的總統大選辯論，也已經有了一個可供實質辯論的題材。相對於過去大選政治口水亂射，熱鬧固然有餘，卻搞到全民精神疲勞，雙英至少創造了一個值得稱許的競選模式。
馬英九與蔡英文即使所處的朝野位置不一，但都是必須為國家前景提出方向的政治領袖。蔡英文推出「十年政綱」後，儘管被批評為「美麗而空泛」，但她至少願意用美麗的詞藻說服可能不支持她的人；此外，既為「政綱」即屬提綱挈領，因此，後續她將進一步以「政綱」為本，提出具體的政策白皮書，必然會遭到更嚴格的檢驗。但不論如何，對比二○○八年，馬英九提出競選政策白皮書後，民進黨參選人謝長廷相應不理，持續主打綠卡議題等負面選戰，讓實質的政策討論付諸闕如，蔡英文堅持理性論述的選舉風格，確實應予肯定。
做為在野政黨，民進黨的「十年政綱」難免空泛，畢竟在野者不負執行之責，但是因為民進黨有過八年執政經驗，過度空泛難免遭致非議，為什麼執政八年還不了解實務到這個地步？或者為什麼才在野三年多，對政府已經執行的政策卻疏離至此？
同樣的，做為執政者，馬英九推出的「黃金十年」可能遭遇的檢驗不會比「十年政綱」更少，可以預期「黃金十年」或許連「美麗的詞藻」都沒有。原因很簡單，既已處執政的位置，所有的政策都得是目前已經落實執行，而且，還得具體提出執行的績效，從管理的角度，呈現績效最簡單的方法就是數據，然而，數字偏偏是最難打動人心的。
此外，既為「黃金十年」就表示這些已經執行或準備執行的政策，可以有效落實至少十年的國家願景，馬政府不具名的高層人士透露，「不會有驚天動地的宣示，都是現有政策成果的延續。」但也信心滿滿表示，一定比「十年政綱」更有看頭、更扎實。
「黃金十年」是否更扎實？還是得由民意認可，民意很大部分倚賴的是「感覺」而非數字。換言之，所有馬政府推出的政績成果，都可能引發仁智之見的爭論，從稅制到國家財政，從十二年國教到產業規畫，其實都沒有一個必然好或不好的定論，「黃金十年」最多只能做到爭取多數人的認可。
「黃金十年」與「十年政綱」各有其市場定位的優劣勢，但不論如何，雙英皆嚴肅面對自己即將競逐的大位，已經成功將他們拉回主戰場，相對之下，最近同樣掀起民意關注的親民黨主席宋楚瑜迄未提出其主張，依舊擺盪在選與不選總統之間，企圖以懸疑的話題和動作維繫熱度，很明顯地又略輸一著，畢竟曾任省長的往日輝煌不可能成為政策內涵的辯論主題，國家領導人的高度，就是必須不同於地方父母官。
無可諱言，台灣當前藍綠對立的氛圍未解，政策戰到底能否成為決勝關鍵，不無疑問，關心政治趨勢和走向的民眾，多數心中或許早有好惡，也依據其好惡檢視候選人的政策內涵與言行表現，但是，激情的民意對峙終究也有疲乏的時刻，愈來愈多的民眾對藍綠惡鬥抱持冷漠的態度，特別是所謂的「中間選民」，愈來愈重視實際、理性的政策論述，只有當選舉回歸政策基本面，台灣民主才有真正成熟的可能。
距離大選投票還有四個半月，此刻的雙英政策牛肉戰或許可視為選戰過程中必要的戲碼，愈接近投票日影響選戰最大的可能還是政黨動員，甚至意識形態的對決，但觀諸雙英的人格特質和政治性格，我們還是樂觀期待，雙英有能力一以貫之地堅持以政策論述決勝，那麼台灣的選舉格調、政治文化即可再臻新境。
Monday, September 5, 2011
Taipei and Bejing Must Value Each Other's Goodwill
Taipei and Bejing Must Value Each Other's Goodwill
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 5, 2011
Summary: The DPP argues that cross-Strait relations are overly dependent upon Beijing's goodwill. Therefore, it argues, this makes the relationship too fragile and unreliable. But one might well turn around and ask, if cross-Strait relations must not be based on Beijing's goodwill, what should they be based upon? Mutual ill will? The presidential election in January next year will be a severe test of the two sides' ability to maintain good cross-Strait relations. Even goodwill may not be enough. But goodwill is not something that should be casually tossed aside.
Full Text below:
The DPP argues that cross-Strait relations are overly dependent upon Beijing's goodwill. Therefore, it argues, this makes the relationship too fragile and unreliable. But one might well turn around and ask, if cross-Strait relations must not be based on Beijing's goodwill, what should they be based upon? Mutual ill will?
In fact, no matter how cross-Strait relations evolve, mutual goodwill will alway be essential in any relationship. One day the two sides may even sign a peace agreement. Therefore, one must never look askance at another person's goodwill. Good will is essential, and should be assidously cultivated.
The two sides should work toward a number of goals. Abstract expressions of goodwill must become concrete expressions of goodwill. Trust must replace deceit. Momentary expressions of goodwill must become long-term expressions of goodwill. The two sides must allow time for solutions to present themselves. They must adopt a rational process. A rational process will lead to clearer solutions. But the common denominator throughout the process, must be goodwill.
Conversely, Beijing counts upon Taipei's goodwill. The Lee Teng-hui era National Unification Guidelines and the Chen Shui-bian era Five Noes were ostensibly expressions of goodwill. But Beijing failed to express goodwill when it refused to acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China. Lee and Chen failed to express goodwill when it promoted "creeping independence," right under Beijing's nose. In sum, two decades of failed cross-Strait relations can be chalked up to a lack of goodwill on boths sides.
A favorable political development in 2008 allowed cross-Strait goodwill to be based on the 1992 consensus, on One China, Different Interpretations, and on "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force." This allowed peaceful development. Taipei promised no de jure Taiwan independence. In exchange, Beijing lowered the decibel level and "increased the peace." By promising no Taiwan independence, Taipei expressed goodwill. In exchange, Beijing agreed to no [immediate] reunification and no use of force. The 1992 consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. have promoted goodwill, by enabling the two sides to seek common ground under the One China Principle. cross-Strait relations can now evolve on the basis of peace and democracy. A rational process has facilitated the search for clearer solutions.
Today's cross-Strait opportunities were hard-won. The KMT lost the presidential elections in 2000 and 2004. During its eight years in office, the Chen regime exhausted all vestiges of goodwill between Taipei and Beijing. These setbacks however, made possible the 2005 Lien/Hu Summit, and the peaceful development of cross-Stait coopetition. From beginning to end, Lien Chan took the high road. He and Hu Jintao change the course of history with their boldness of vision. They laid the foundation for cross-Strait goodwill. According to Tsai Ing-wen, Ma Ying-jeou has "quiet strength," and Hu Jintao is a "rational person." Beginning In 2008, the two sides implemented peaceful development. Goodwill was no longer empty rhetoric. Fifteen agreements, including ECFA, heralded the advent of explicit and institutionalized goodwill.
Goodwill is not a hollow shell. It is the basis of cross-Strait relations. On the Taipei side, both Lee and Chen promoted creeping independence during their time in office. This showed that not everyone who assumes office will evince goodwill. For Beijing and Washington, Lee and Chen were "troublemakers." For the Republic of China, the two evinced no goodwill whatsoever. Instead, they plotted to "rectify the name of the nation, and author a new constitution." On the Beijing side, not every ruler in Beijing is willing to engage in peaceful development. For Beijing, the cost of peaceful development may be higher than the cost of allowing Taiwan to destroy itself from within. Therefore today's cross-Strait goodwill, is not something we can take for granted, It was won at high cost, after hard lessons and repeated failures. The two sides must realize this and cherish whatever goodwill exists.
Today's cross-Strait goodwill is based on the two sides' overlapping strategic interests. Therefore, the objective must be to maintain these conditions long-term. Beijing's strategic objective is to prevent de jure Taiwan independence and to facilitate reunification. Short of using armed force to swallow up Taipei, Beijing must resort to peaceful and democratic means. It must persuade the public on Taiwan to accept the concept and framework of "China," in their hearts and minds. It must do so by demonstrating genuine goodwill long term. Conversely, unless Taipei is determined to declare independence, to found a "Nation of Taiwan," and to break with the Chinese mainland, its most sensible strategic objective is "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It must defend the Republic of China. It can delay and reduce the pressure for reunification. It can ensure that cross-Strait relations remain peaceful and democratic. It must adopt a rational process in order to facilitate the search for clearer solutions. Therefore, why not maintain this goodwill?
The diplomatic truce was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. Visa-free treatment by 117 countries was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. ECFA was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. Mutual legal assistance was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. The Free and Independent Travel Policy for Mainland tourists was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. cross-Strait goodwill is not assured. But we can hardly negate these achievements merely because cross-Strait goodwill is not assured. On the contrary, we must use these achievements to encourage and strengthen cross-Strait goodwill. The two sides have been separated for 62 years. The first 59 years were a failure, because ill will prevailed over goodwill. The last three years of peace and democracy are the manifestation of goodwill. They are the resut of one's vision transcending one's limitations. They are the result of rational thinking leading to clearer solutions.
The presidential election in January next year will be a severe test of the two sides' ability to maintain good cross-Strait relations. Even goodwill may not be enough. But goodwill is not something that should be casually tossed aside.
兩岸應當珍惜彼此的善意
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.05
民進黨認為，兩岸關係建立在依賴北京當局的「善意」之上，這種關係太脆弱，太無保障。然而，可以反過來問：難道兩岸關係應當建立在彼此的「惡意」之上？若不依賴彼此的「善意」，另將何所憑藉？
其實，兩岸關係不論走到什麼階段，即使有朝一日簽署了「和平協議」，彼此的「善意」仍是維持良性關係最根本的憑靠。因此，不要否定善意，必須建立善意，應當鞏固善意。
兩岸應當努力的目標是：將彼此的善意，從表面變成本質，從權謀變成信仰，從暫時變成長久；以時間換取空間，從「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」，其間貫徹始終者皆賴「善意」。
相對而言，北京其實也依賴台灣方面的「善意」。在李登輝時代的「國統綱領」，及陳水扁時代的「四不一沒有」，皆是「善意」的表示；但是，一方面北京未在「中華民國的存在問題」上回以善意，另一方面李扁操作台獨亦被北京視為不具善意。所以，總結那二十年的兩岸關係之失敗，主因應在雙方皆不知建立及維持善意。
「○八機遇」之後，兩岸關係的「善意」，是建立在「九二共識，一中各表」，及「不統，不獨，不武」之上，因此始有「和平發展」。究其實際，台北是以「不法理台獨」，換取北京的「放低統一分貝，提升和平發展」；亦即以「不獨」的善意，換取「不統，不武」的善意。再者「九二共識，一中各表」，亦使「一中原則」存有「求同存異」的善意。彼此有了此種善意，兩岸關係始有可能在「和平」與「民主」的主軸上，經「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」。
今日兩岸機遇得來不易。若不是國民黨在二○○○年及二○○四年兩次總統大選失敗，若不是扁政府執政八年與大陸朝野喪盡「善意」，即不可能有二○○五年的連胡會，更不可能建立「和平發展」的兩岸競合基調。連戰自始至終「為而不有」的胸襟，與胡錦濤扭轉大局的瞻矚，是建立兩岸善意的基礎。至二○○八後，由於馬英九的「沉默的魄力」與胡錦濤是「理性的人」（蔡英文對胡的評語），兩岸遂得以共同具體落實了「和平發展」的運作架構，使「善意」不再是空言；而ＥＣＦＡ等十五項協議，即成為「明文化的善意」及「法制化的善意」。
「善意」不是虛無空洞之物，而是兩岸關係的根本憑藉。就台灣而言，畢竟經歷過李扁二任政府操作台獨，可見並非每一主政者皆能維持善意；李扁非但屢屢對北京及華府成為「麻煩製造者」，且二人根本對「中華民國」亦無「善意」，而欲「正名制憲」。再就北京而言，我們亦認為，亦非每一北京主政者皆能有「和平發展」的善意；因為，對北京來說，「和平發展」的運作成本，也許高於聽任台灣內耗而自取滅亡的成本。所以，兩岸今日的善意，並非理所當然，而是在獲得教訓及失敗後，以重大代價所建立，雙方皆應知所珍惜維護。
然而，今日兩岸的善意，亦與各自的戰略利益合轍，因此也有得以長久維繫的客觀條件。北京的戰略目標，低標是不容法理台獨，高標是促成統一；而在不採武力併吞的情勢下，必須以「和平」及「民主」的方法，使台灣人民在感情及理智上接受「中國」這個概念及體制，當然要憑藉長久與真誠的善意來經營。相對的，台北的戰略目標，除非是要台獨建國，欲與大陸決裂，則以「不統，不獨，不武」的戰略架構為最明智：一者在捍衛中華民國，另者可放緩降低統一的壓力，再者亦使兩岸關係得以維持「和平」及「民主」的善意基調，爭取「從合理的過程到改善之目的」；那麼，為何不維持這樣的善意？
外交休兵，因兩岸善意；一一七國免簽證，因兩岸善意；ＥＣＦＡ，因兩岸善意；司法互助，因兩岸善意；陸客自由行，因兩岸善意……。不能因兩岸善意未必靠得住，即否定及抵拒這些成就；反而要用這些成就，來鼓勵及鞏固兩岸的善意。兩岸關係六十二年，前五十九年的失敗，正是敗於惡意大於善意，近三年則是和平與民主的善意得以伸張，眼界提升了境界，思路開創了出路。
明年一月的總統大選，將是兩岸善意能否維繫的嚴峻考驗；即使善意不能完全憑靠，但更不能任性推翻。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 5, 2011
Summary: The DPP argues that cross-Strait relations are overly dependent upon Beijing's goodwill. Therefore, it argues, this makes the relationship too fragile and unreliable. But one might well turn around and ask, if cross-Strait relations must not be based on Beijing's goodwill, what should they be based upon? Mutual ill will? The presidential election in January next year will be a severe test of the two sides' ability to maintain good cross-Strait relations. Even goodwill may not be enough. But goodwill is not something that should be casually tossed aside.
Full Text below:
The DPP argues that cross-Strait relations are overly dependent upon Beijing's goodwill. Therefore, it argues, this makes the relationship too fragile and unreliable. But one might well turn around and ask, if cross-Strait relations must not be based on Beijing's goodwill, what should they be based upon? Mutual ill will?
In fact, no matter how cross-Strait relations evolve, mutual goodwill will alway be essential in any relationship. One day the two sides may even sign a peace agreement. Therefore, one must never look askance at another person's goodwill. Good will is essential, and should be assidously cultivated.
The two sides should work toward a number of goals. Abstract expressions of goodwill must become concrete expressions of goodwill. Trust must replace deceit. Momentary expressions of goodwill must become long-term expressions of goodwill. The two sides must allow time for solutions to present themselves. They must adopt a rational process. A rational process will lead to clearer solutions. But the common denominator throughout the process, must be goodwill.
Conversely, Beijing counts upon Taipei's goodwill. The Lee Teng-hui era National Unification Guidelines and the Chen Shui-bian era Five Noes were ostensibly expressions of goodwill. But Beijing failed to express goodwill when it refused to acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China. Lee and Chen failed to express goodwill when it promoted "creeping independence," right under Beijing's nose. In sum, two decades of failed cross-Strait relations can be chalked up to a lack of goodwill on boths sides.
A favorable political development in 2008 allowed cross-Strait goodwill to be based on the 1992 consensus, on One China, Different Interpretations, and on "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force." This allowed peaceful development. Taipei promised no de jure Taiwan independence. In exchange, Beijing lowered the decibel level and "increased the peace." By promising no Taiwan independence, Taipei expressed goodwill. In exchange, Beijing agreed to no [immediate] reunification and no use of force. The 1992 consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. have promoted goodwill, by enabling the two sides to seek common ground under the One China Principle. cross-Strait relations can now evolve on the basis of peace and democracy. A rational process has facilitated the search for clearer solutions.
Today's cross-Strait opportunities were hard-won. The KMT lost the presidential elections in 2000 and 2004. During its eight years in office, the Chen regime exhausted all vestiges of goodwill between Taipei and Beijing. These setbacks however, made possible the 2005 Lien/Hu Summit, and the peaceful development of cross-Stait coopetition. From beginning to end, Lien Chan took the high road. He and Hu Jintao change the course of history with their boldness of vision. They laid the foundation for cross-Strait goodwill. According to Tsai Ing-wen, Ma Ying-jeou has "quiet strength," and Hu Jintao is a "rational person." Beginning In 2008, the two sides implemented peaceful development. Goodwill was no longer empty rhetoric. Fifteen agreements, including ECFA, heralded the advent of explicit and institutionalized goodwill.
Goodwill is not a hollow shell. It is the basis of cross-Strait relations. On the Taipei side, both Lee and Chen promoted creeping independence during their time in office. This showed that not everyone who assumes office will evince goodwill. For Beijing and Washington, Lee and Chen were "troublemakers." For the Republic of China, the two evinced no goodwill whatsoever. Instead, they plotted to "rectify the name of the nation, and author a new constitution." On the Beijing side, not every ruler in Beijing is willing to engage in peaceful development. For Beijing, the cost of peaceful development may be higher than the cost of allowing Taiwan to destroy itself from within. Therefore today's cross-Strait goodwill, is not something we can take for granted, It was won at high cost, after hard lessons and repeated failures. The two sides must realize this and cherish whatever goodwill exists.
Today's cross-Strait goodwill is based on the two sides' overlapping strategic interests. Therefore, the objective must be to maintain these conditions long-term. Beijing's strategic objective is to prevent de jure Taiwan independence and to facilitate reunification. Short of using armed force to swallow up Taipei, Beijing must resort to peaceful and democratic means. It must persuade the public on Taiwan to accept the concept and framework of "China," in their hearts and minds. It must do so by demonstrating genuine goodwill long term. Conversely, unless Taipei is determined to declare independence, to found a "Nation of Taiwan," and to break with the Chinese mainland, its most sensible strategic objective is "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It must defend the Republic of China. It can delay and reduce the pressure for reunification. It can ensure that cross-Strait relations remain peaceful and democratic. It must adopt a rational process in order to facilitate the search for clearer solutions. Therefore, why not maintain this goodwill?
The diplomatic truce was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. Visa-free treatment by 117 countries was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. ECFA was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. Mutual legal assistance was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. The Free and Independent Travel Policy for Mainland tourists was made possible by cross-Strait goodwill. cross-Strait goodwill is not assured. But we can hardly negate these achievements merely because cross-Strait goodwill is not assured. On the contrary, we must use these achievements to encourage and strengthen cross-Strait goodwill. The two sides have been separated for 62 years. The first 59 years were a failure, because ill will prevailed over goodwill. The last three years of peace and democracy are the manifestation of goodwill. They are the resut of one's vision transcending one's limitations. They are the result of rational thinking leading to clearer solutions.
The presidential election in January next year will be a severe test of the two sides' ability to maintain good cross-Strait relations. Even goodwill may not be enough. But goodwill is not something that should be casually tossed aside.
兩岸應當珍惜彼此的善意
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.09.05
民進黨認為，兩岸關係建立在依賴北京當局的「善意」之上，這種關係太脆弱，太無保障。然而，可以反過來問：難道兩岸關係應當建立在彼此的「惡意」之上？若不依賴彼此的「善意」，另將何所憑藉？
其實，兩岸關係不論走到什麼階段，即使有朝一日簽署了「和平協議」，彼此的「善意」仍是維持良性關係最根本的憑靠。因此，不要否定善意，必須建立善意，應當鞏固善意。
兩岸應當努力的目標是：將彼此的善意，從表面變成本質，從權謀變成信仰，從暫時變成長久；以時間換取空間，從「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」，其間貫徹始終者皆賴「善意」。
相對而言，北京其實也依賴台灣方面的「善意」。在李登輝時代的「國統綱領」，及陳水扁時代的「四不一沒有」，皆是「善意」的表示；但是，一方面北京未在「中華民國的存在問題」上回以善意，另一方面李扁操作台獨亦被北京視為不具善意。所以，總結那二十年的兩岸關係之失敗，主因應在雙方皆不知建立及維持善意。
「○八機遇」之後，兩岸關係的「善意」，是建立在「九二共識，一中各表」，及「不統，不獨，不武」之上，因此始有「和平發展」。究其實際，台北是以「不法理台獨」，換取北京的「放低統一分貝，提升和平發展」；亦即以「不獨」的善意，換取「不統，不武」的善意。再者「九二共識，一中各表」，亦使「一中原則」存有「求同存異」的善意。彼此有了此種善意，兩岸關係始有可能在「和平」與「民主」的主軸上，經「合理的過程」，通向「改善之目的」。
今日兩岸機遇得來不易。若不是國民黨在二○○○年及二○○四年兩次總統大選失敗，若不是扁政府執政八年與大陸朝野喪盡「善意」，即不可能有二○○五年的連胡會，更不可能建立「和平發展」的兩岸競合基調。連戰自始至終「為而不有」的胸襟，與胡錦濤扭轉大局的瞻矚，是建立兩岸善意的基礎。至二○○八後，由於馬英九的「沉默的魄力」與胡錦濤是「理性的人」（蔡英文對胡的評語），兩岸遂得以共同具體落實了「和平發展」的運作架構，使「善意」不再是空言；而ＥＣＦＡ等十五項協議，即成為「明文化的善意」及「法制化的善意」。
「善意」不是虛無空洞之物，而是兩岸關係的根本憑藉。就台灣而言，畢竟經歷過李扁二任政府操作台獨，可見並非每一主政者皆能維持善意；李扁非但屢屢對北京及華府成為「麻煩製造者」，且二人根本對「中華民國」亦無「善意」，而欲「正名制憲」。再就北京而言，我們亦認為，亦非每一北京主政者皆能有「和平發展」的善意；因為，對北京來說，「和平發展」的運作成本，也許高於聽任台灣內耗而自取滅亡的成本。所以，兩岸今日的善意，並非理所當然，而是在獲得教訓及失敗後，以重大代價所建立，雙方皆應知所珍惜維護。
然而，今日兩岸的善意，亦與各自的戰略利益合轍，因此也有得以長久維繫的客觀條件。北京的戰略目標，低標是不容法理台獨，高標是促成統一；而在不採武力併吞的情勢下，必須以「和平」及「民主」的方法，使台灣人民在感情及理智上接受「中國」這個概念及體制，當然要憑藉長久與真誠的善意來經營。相對的，台北的戰略目標，除非是要台獨建國，欲與大陸決裂，則以「不統，不獨，不武」的戰略架構為最明智：一者在捍衛中華民國，另者可放緩降低統一的壓力，再者亦使兩岸關係得以維持「和平」及「民主」的善意基調，爭取「從合理的過程到改善之目的」；那麼，為何不維持這樣的善意？
外交休兵，因兩岸善意；一一七國免簽證，因兩岸善意；ＥＣＦＡ，因兩岸善意；司法互助，因兩岸善意；陸客自由行，因兩岸善意……。不能因兩岸善意未必靠得住，即否定及抵拒這些成就；反而要用這些成就，來鼓勵及鞏固兩岸的善意。兩岸關係六十二年，前五十九年的失敗，正是敗於惡意大於善意，近三年則是和平與民主的善意得以伸張，眼界提升了境界，思路開創了出路。
明年一月的總統大選，將是兩岸善意能否維繫的嚴峻考驗；即使善意不能完全憑靠，但更不能任性推翻。
Thursday, September 1, 2011
Non-DPP Running Mate a Headache for Tsai Ing-wen
Non-DPP Running Mate a Headache for Tsai Ing-wen
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 2, 2011
Summary: The presidential election is only four months away. DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has not been able to finalize her choice of running mate. This is not just a headache for Tsai Ing-wen. The running mate issue has inadvertently exposed one of the DPP's chronic aliments.
Full Text below:
The presidential election is only four months away. DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has not been able to finalize her choice of running mate. This is not just a headache for Tsai Ing-wen. The running mate issue has inadvertently exposed one of the DPP's chronic aliments.
In theory, the vice president is merely a back up for the president. Unless of course the president is willing to share power. Otherwise, historically speaking, the vice president is usually a person without a voice. Annette Lu even characterized herself as a "neglected concubine hidden away in the imperial harem." The vice presidency is a high office with little authority. But during election season, it takes on inordinate importance, The president's choice of running mate is both art and science.
In nations with vice-presidents, the presidential candidate often picks a vice presidential running mate to make up for what he lacks. U.S. President Barack Obama picked veteran Senator Joe Biden as his running mate, to make up for his own lack of experience, This was considered a brilliant move. By the same token, his opponent, John McCain, sought out Sarah Palin to be his running mate. The idea was to win the women's vote. But Palin surprised everyone with her ineptitude in the political arena. She became a deficit to the McCain presidential campaign.
Similarly, ever since the Republic of China began holding direct presidential elections, the choice of vice presidential running mate has always involved power considerations. Examples include the Lee Teng-hui/Lien Chan ticket and the Lien Chan/Vincent Siew ticket. Back then Lee Teng-hui was masterminding the election campaign, and had certain succession considerations, That was why he ruled out the Lien/Soong ticket. But his decision touched a sensitive nerve within the party, The eventual result was a lose/lose proposition.
Soon afterwards, the balance of power became a key consideration. A running mate was no longer an implicit successor. For example, during Chen Shui-bian's 2004 re-election bid, he stuck with Annette Lu as his running mate. This allowed factional leaders within the party to hold out hope. Only then would they campaign on his behalf during the general election. When President Ma Ying-jeou first ran for president, he chose Vincent Siew. The idea was that Vincent Siew would be the elder statesman, and look after the nation. This would prevent tension within the party. This time, Ma Ying-jeou chose Premier Wu Den-yih as his vice presidential running mate, The two candidates have roughly the same political experience and the same seniority. Ma's choice of running mate did not imply that his vice presidential running mate would also be his successor.
Given such precedents, which model will Tsai Ing-wen adopt in her choice of running mate? She is afraid to even mention her model for succession. Even Chen Shui-bian, at the height of his power, was afraid to designate a successor. Tsai Ing-wen is merely a nominal overlord within the DPP. So far Tsai Ing-wen has reiterated a need to expand the party's base of support within society. The implication is that the ideal running mate would be chosen from outside the party. If so, her primary consideration must be the balance of power within the party.
Currently the "Two Sus" are the most popular candidates within the party. But both lack power. Most DPP supporters want Tsai Ing-wen to choose Su Tseng-chang as her running mate. For them, that would be a dream team. Such a ticket would have more charisma than a Tsai Ing-wen/Peng Hui-nan ticket. But whether Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang can become running mates does not hinge upon whether Tsai and Su can get along. It does not hinge upon whether Su Tseng-chang has committed a breach of faith. The biggest player during the party primaries was Frank Hsieh. The key is whether Hsieh can accept a Tsai/Su ticket, As for Su Chia-chuan, his supporters are enthusiastic. But significant intraparty opposition remains, particularly among the New Tide Faction, the most powerful faction within the party, It does not want to see Su Chia-chuan suddenly emerge as a major player.
Tsai Ing-wen is actively seeking outside talent. To some extent, she is attempting to defuse the power struggle within the party. A running mate from outside the party would have the name but not the game. He would not constitute a threat to party insiders. He could help the DPP party factions reach a consensus. Contrast this with the KMT. Ma Ying-jeou is not as adept at defusing power struggles within the party. For some time grassroots members have been discontent. But the KMT does not have DPP style factional politics. If DPP factions go at each other, Tsai Ing-wen will have her hands full.
Factionalism is not the only hidden malady bedeviling the DPP. Another problem is the party's "monoculture," both ideologically and in the character of its membership. Why is the ideal running mate not from within the party, but instead from without? Why must the runnng mate be Perng Hui-nan? The subtext is clear. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, but lacks Perng Hui-nan's endorsement, voters do not believe the DPP can offer the nation a sound fiscal policy.
DPP talent is drawn almost exclusively from its elected officials, They may be brave and fierce in battle. But after conquering the world, they do not necessarily know how to govern it, The ability to campaign is not the ability to govern. Political rhetoric is no substitue for sound policy. Tsai Ing-wen has published her "Taiwan Next: Platform for the Coming Decade." She is attempting to compensate for this deficiency. But no stack of policy papers can compare with the endorsement of a fiscal policy veteran. No wonder Tsai Ing-wen waited three months for Perng Hui-nan to give the nod.
Without Perng Hui-nan, Tsai Ing-wen would still have found a running mate. But other problems are even more intractable. The balance of terror between DPP factions has infected the party to its very core. The problem has plagued the party from the moment it was founded. The DPP rose to power by taking to the streets. Even though it has been the ruling party, even though many years have gone by, it has never changed its ways. It still knows only how to protest, not how to govern. The public still does not trust DPP leaders to govern, This is the biggest problem the party faces.
副手選黨外 派系讓蔡英文頭痛
2011-09-02 中國時報
距離總統大選只有四個多月，民進黨總統參選人蔡英文的副手卻遲遲未能定案，這不只是蔡英文的頭痛時間，無形中也曝露出民進黨的長年沉痾。
理論上，副手只是備位元首，除非總統願意分享權力，否則從歷史經驗來看，副總統經常是「沒有聲音的人」，呂秀蓮甚至自比深宮怨婦；但這樣位高權輕的角色，大選時卻是舉足輕重，總統候選人挑選副手，確實是一門重要學問。
可以說，有副總統制度的國家，總統候選人挑副手，就是「缺什麼，補什麼」，所以美國總統歐巴馬當年挑了資深參議員拜登擔任副手，可彌補自己生嫩的從政資歷，被視為是高招；相反的，他的對手麥肯雖然找裴琳搭擋、意在爭取婦女選票，但是裴琳當年跌破政壇眼鏡的生疏表現，卻成為麥肯在總統選舉時的一大敗筆。
同樣的，台灣自有總統民選以來，挑選副手背後都有相當的權力考量。例如，李連配、連蕭配，當年主導的李登輝都有一定的接班考量，他排除了連宋配，但也因此牽動黨內敏感的權力神經，最後落得兩敗俱傷的下場。
之後，權力平衡就成為關鍵的考量，副手不再有明顯的接班意味，例如，陳水扁二○○四年角逐總統連任時，繼續選擇居於權力邊緣的呂秀蓮，讓黨內群雄抱持一線希望，大選時才願意為扁效命；總統馬英九首次參選時，挑選蕭萬長則有「老臣謀國」的意味，不致在黨內造成緊張；這一次，馬英九找了閣揆吳敦義搭檔，兩人從政經歷、輩份不相上下，還是看不出有接班意味。
既有前例可循，蔡英文挑選副手，到底會要採取何種模式？接班模式連提都不用提，連陳水扁權力正盛的時刻，他都不敢指定接班人了，更何況蔡英文目前還只是民進黨名義上的共主。到目前為止，蔡英文針對副手人選，一再強調要擴大社會基礎，意在言外的是，她心目中理想的副手人選，仍必須是來自黨外；之所以如此，首要考量還是黨內的權力平衡。
目前黨內人氣最高的雙蘇，在黨內都有權力致命傷。多數民進黨人士認為，蔡英文若找蘇貞昌，這絕對是夢幻組合，比蔡彭（彭淮南）配聲勢還高，但是蔡英文能否和蘇貞昌搭檔，關鍵還不在蔡蘇不和、或是蘇貞昌違反誠信原則而已，黨內初選時最大功臣的謝長廷，能不能接受，也還是關鍵。至於蘇嘉全，雖然同樣呼聲不低，但是黨內的阻力一樣不小，其中尤以黨內新潮流反對最力，該派系實力人士最多，並不樂見蘇嘉全異軍突起。
某種程度而言，蔡英文積極向黨外尋覓人才，其實就是要疏解黨內權鬥的壓力，黨外人士有名無實，不具權力威脅，才可能取得民進黨各派系的共識；相較於國民黨，馬英九同樣不見得能夠嫻熟運用黨內權力，黨內基層有一段時間更是離心離德，但國民黨並未形成如民進黨般的派閥政治，一旦惡鬥起來，蔡英文就要面對相當棘手的處境。
只是，民進黨長年沉痾不只是黨內派系恩怨，黨的屬性及人才過於單一也是問題；為何最佳副手不在黨內、而在黨外？為何非彭淮南不可？背後的潛台詞顯然是，沒有彭淮南背書，民進黨如果再度執政，選民未必相信他們可以有一套穩健的財經政策。
民進黨人才幾乎都是選舉出身，選舉時驍勇善戰，但是馬上得天下，卻還未通過馬上治天下的考驗，選舉畢竟不能代替執政，政見不能取代政策，蔡英文主導十年政綱，正是要補足這塊空缺，但是再多的政策文字，還是比不上一個財經老手的背書，難怪蔡英文要苦等三個月，就是要彭淮南點頭。
等不到彭淮南，蔡英文還是會找到副手，比眼前問題還難解的是，民進黨恐怖平衡的派系結構有如附骨之蛆，從創黨以來就沒有改善過；同樣的，當年以抗爭起家的民進黨，即使經過執政，這麼多年後，還是改不了當年打天下的習性，舉黨人才都無法給予民眾執政信心，這才是最大的問題。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 2, 2011
Summary: The presidential election is only four months away. DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has not been able to finalize her choice of running mate. This is not just a headache for Tsai Ing-wen. The running mate issue has inadvertently exposed one of the DPP's chronic aliments.
Full Text below:
The presidential election is only four months away. DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has not been able to finalize her choice of running mate. This is not just a headache for Tsai Ing-wen. The running mate issue has inadvertently exposed one of the DPP's chronic aliments.
In theory, the vice president is merely a back up for the president. Unless of course the president is willing to share power. Otherwise, historically speaking, the vice president is usually a person without a voice. Annette Lu even characterized herself as a "neglected concubine hidden away in the imperial harem." The vice presidency is a high office with little authority. But during election season, it takes on inordinate importance, The president's choice of running mate is both art and science.
In nations with vice-presidents, the presidential candidate often picks a vice presidential running mate to make up for what he lacks. U.S. President Barack Obama picked veteran Senator Joe Biden as his running mate, to make up for his own lack of experience, This was considered a brilliant move. By the same token, his opponent, John McCain, sought out Sarah Palin to be his running mate. The idea was to win the women's vote. But Palin surprised everyone with her ineptitude in the political arena. She became a deficit to the McCain presidential campaign.
Similarly, ever since the Republic of China began holding direct presidential elections, the choice of vice presidential running mate has always involved power considerations. Examples include the Lee Teng-hui/Lien Chan ticket and the Lien Chan/Vincent Siew ticket. Back then Lee Teng-hui was masterminding the election campaign, and had certain succession considerations, That was why he ruled out the Lien/Soong ticket. But his decision touched a sensitive nerve within the party, The eventual result was a lose/lose proposition.
Soon afterwards, the balance of power became a key consideration. A running mate was no longer an implicit successor. For example, during Chen Shui-bian's 2004 re-election bid, he stuck with Annette Lu as his running mate. This allowed factional leaders within the party to hold out hope. Only then would they campaign on his behalf during the general election. When President Ma Ying-jeou first ran for president, he chose Vincent Siew. The idea was that Vincent Siew would be the elder statesman, and look after the nation. This would prevent tension within the party. This time, Ma Ying-jeou chose Premier Wu Den-yih as his vice presidential running mate, The two candidates have roughly the same political experience and the same seniority. Ma's choice of running mate did not imply that his vice presidential running mate would also be his successor.
Given such precedents, which model will Tsai Ing-wen adopt in her choice of running mate? She is afraid to even mention her model for succession. Even Chen Shui-bian, at the height of his power, was afraid to designate a successor. Tsai Ing-wen is merely a nominal overlord within the DPP. So far Tsai Ing-wen has reiterated a need to expand the party's base of support within society. The implication is that the ideal running mate would be chosen from outside the party. If so, her primary consideration must be the balance of power within the party.
Currently the "Two Sus" are the most popular candidates within the party. But both lack power. Most DPP supporters want Tsai Ing-wen to choose Su Tseng-chang as her running mate. For them, that would be a dream team. Such a ticket would have more charisma than a Tsai Ing-wen/Peng Hui-nan ticket. But whether Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang can become running mates does not hinge upon whether Tsai and Su can get along. It does not hinge upon whether Su Tseng-chang has committed a breach of faith. The biggest player during the party primaries was Frank Hsieh. The key is whether Hsieh can accept a Tsai/Su ticket, As for Su Chia-chuan, his supporters are enthusiastic. But significant intraparty opposition remains, particularly among the New Tide Faction, the most powerful faction within the party, It does not want to see Su Chia-chuan suddenly emerge as a major player.
Tsai Ing-wen is actively seeking outside talent. To some extent, she is attempting to defuse the power struggle within the party. A running mate from outside the party would have the name but not the game. He would not constitute a threat to party insiders. He could help the DPP party factions reach a consensus. Contrast this with the KMT. Ma Ying-jeou is not as adept at defusing power struggles within the party. For some time grassroots members have been discontent. But the KMT does not have DPP style factional politics. If DPP factions go at each other, Tsai Ing-wen will have her hands full.
Factionalism is not the only hidden malady bedeviling the DPP. Another problem is the party's "monoculture," both ideologically and in the character of its membership. Why is the ideal running mate not from within the party, but instead from without? Why must the runnng mate be Perng Hui-nan? The subtext is clear. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, but lacks Perng Hui-nan's endorsement, voters do not believe the DPP can offer the nation a sound fiscal policy.
DPP talent is drawn almost exclusively from its elected officials, They may be brave and fierce in battle. But after conquering the world, they do not necessarily know how to govern it, The ability to campaign is not the ability to govern. Political rhetoric is no substitue for sound policy. Tsai Ing-wen has published her "Taiwan Next: Platform for the Coming Decade." She is attempting to compensate for this deficiency. But no stack of policy papers can compare with the endorsement of a fiscal policy veteran. No wonder Tsai Ing-wen waited three months for Perng Hui-nan to give the nod.
Without Perng Hui-nan, Tsai Ing-wen would still have found a running mate. But other problems are even more intractable. The balance of terror between DPP factions has infected the party to its very core. The problem has plagued the party from the moment it was founded. The DPP rose to power by taking to the streets. Even though it has been the ruling party, even though many years have gone by, it has never changed its ways. It still knows only how to protest, not how to govern. The public still does not trust DPP leaders to govern, This is the biggest problem the party faces.
副手選黨外 派系讓蔡英文頭痛
2011-09-02 中國時報
距離總統大選只有四個多月，民進黨總統參選人蔡英文的副手卻遲遲未能定案，這不只是蔡英文的頭痛時間，無形中也曝露出民進黨的長年沉痾。
理論上，副手只是備位元首，除非總統願意分享權力，否則從歷史經驗來看，副總統經常是「沒有聲音的人」，呂秀蓮甚至自比深宮怨婦；但這樣位高權輕的角色，大選時卻是舉足輕重，總統候選人挑選副手，確實是一門重要學問。
可以說，有副總統制度的國家，總統候選人挑副手，就是「缺什麼，補什麼」，所以美國總統歐巴馬當年挑了資深參議員拜登擔任副手，可彌補自己生嫩的從政資歷，被視為是高招；相反的，他的對手麥肯雖然找裴琳搭擋、意在爭取婦女選票，但是裴琳當年跌破政壇眼鏡的生疏表現，卻成為麥肯在總統選舉時的一大敗筆。
同樣的，台灣自有總統民選以來，挑選副手背後都有相當的權力考量。例如，李連配、連蕭配，當年主導的李登輝都有一定的接班考量，他排除了連宋配，但也因此牽動黨內敏感的權力神經，最後落得兩敗俱傷的下場。
之後，權力平衡就成為關鍵的考量，副手不再有明顯的接班意味，例如，陳水扁二○○四年角逐總統連任時，繼續選擇居於權力邊緣的呂秀蓮，讓黨內群雄抱持一線希望，大選時才願意為扁效命；總統馬英九首次參選時，挑選蕭萬長則有「老臣謀國」的意味，不致在黨內造成緊張；這一次，馬英九找了閣揆吳敦義搭檔，兩人從政經歷、輩份不相上下，還是看不出有接班意味。
既有前例可循，蔡英文挑選副手，到底會要採取何種模式？接班模式連提都不用提，連陳水扁權力正盛的時刻，他都不敢指定接班人了，更何況蔡英文目前還只是民進黨名義上的共主。到目前為止，蔡英文針對副手人選，一再強調要擴大社會基礎，意在言外的是，她心目中理想的副手人選，仍必須是來自黨外；之所以如此，首要考量還是黨內的權力平衡。
目前黨內人氣最高的雙蘇，在黨內都有權力致命傷。多數民進黨人士認為，蔡英文若找蘇貞昌，這絕對是夢幻組合，比蔡彭（彭淮南）配聲勢還高，但是蔡英文能否和蘇貞昌搭檔，關鍵還不在蔡蘇不和、或是蘇貞昌違反誠信原則而已，黨內初選時最大功臣的謝長廷，能不能接受，也還是關鍵。至於蘇嘉全，雖然同樣呼聲不低，但是黨內的阻力一樣不小，其中尤以黨內新潮流反對最力，該派系實力人士最多，並不樂見蘇嘉全異軍突起。
某種程度而言，蔡英文積極向黨外尋覓人才，其實就是要疏解黨內權鬥的壓力，黨外人士有名無實，不具權力威脅，才可能取得民進黨各派系的共識；相較於國民黨，馬英九同樣不見得能夠嫻熟運用黨內權力，黨內基層有一段時間更是離心離德，但國民黨並未形成如民進黨般的派閥政治，一旦惡鬥起來，蔡英文就要面對相當棘手的處境。
只是，民進黨長年沉痾不只是黨內派系恩怨，黨的屬性及人才過於單一也是問題；為何最佳副手不在黨內、而在黨外？為何非彭淮南不可？背後的潛台詞顯然是，沒有彭淮南背書，民進黨如果再度執政，選民未必相信他們可以有一套穩健的財經政策。
民進黨人才幾乎都是選舉出身，選舉時驍勇善戰，但是馬上得天下，卻還未通過馬上治天下的考驗，選舉畢竟不能代替執政，政見不能取代政策，蔡英文主導十年政綱，正是要補足這塊空缺，但是再多的政策文字，還是比不上一個財經老手的背書，難怪蔡英文要苦等三個月，就是要彭淮南點頭。
等不到彭淮南，蔡英文還是會找到副手，比眼前問題還難解的是，民進黨恐怖平衡的派系結構有如附骨之蛆，從創黨以來就沒有改善過；同樣的，當年以抗爭起家的民進黨，即使經過執政，這麼多年後，還是改不了當年打天下的習性，舉黨人才都無法給予民眾執政信心，這才是最大的問題。
Tsai Ing-wen's Unilateralism
Tsai Ing-wen's Unilateralism
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 1, 2011
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen's recent actions were unmitigated unilateralism. If not wishful thinking, then they were willful unilateralism. If the Democratic Progressive Party is content to remain an opposition party, it can of course persist in wishful thinking. But if Tsai Ing-wen Tsai becomes president, and the DPP becomes the ruling party, willful unilateralism could precipitate the worst political and economic disaster in six decades. Unilateralism. Bush can get away with it. But can Tsai Ing-wen?
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen's recent actions were unmitigated unilateralism. If not wishful thinking, then they were willful unilateralism.
If the Democratic Progressive Party is content to remain an opposition party, it can of course persist in wishful thinking. But if Tsai Ing-wen Tsai becomes president, and the DPP becomes the ruling party, willful unilateralism could precipitate the worst political and economic disaster in six decades.
U.S. President George W. Bush is a textbook case of unilateralism. He fabricated a lie. He said the US discovered weapons of mass destruction. People the world over seriously questioned the invasion of Iraq. Eventually even the mainstream media in the United States doubted the legitimacy of the invasion. By then however, the US was already neck-deep in the Iraqi quagmire, unable to extricate itself; Bush did not consult with other nations. He disregarded domestic opinion. He had all the answers, and assumed an arrogant, high-handed posture. His unilateralism totally ignored other people and their viewpoints.
Tsai Ing-wen bears more than a passing resemblance to George W. Bush. But does Tsai Ing-wen have the wherewithal to be a female George W. Bush? Bush wove a fanciful tale about weapons of mass destruction. He turned nothing into something. Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, insists that "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." She is struggling mightily to turn something into nothing. Bush was dealing with Iraq, a nation far less powerful than the United States. Essentially the strong was bullying the weak. Bush could hurt others without being hurt himself. But Tsai Ing-wen knows perfectly well that she is dealing with the Chinese mainland, which as she herself admits in "Taiwan Next: The Platform for the Coming Decade," is "a great nation on the rise." Yet she appears to have no regard for the Chinese mainland whatsoever. She even presumes to lecture the Chinese mainland. She chides them, reminding them to think twice before acting. She implies that Beijing must bear total responsibility for any and all consequences. But when push comes to shove, who will be hurt the most? Tsai Ing-wen's arrogance exceeds even Bush's. Tsai Ing-wen's recklessness is even more terrifying than Bush's.
What is unilateralism? Unilateralism is how the government of a large and powerful nation conducts itself when implementing its foreign policy. Unilateralism is acting without regard for the interests of other nations, without regard for the opinions of other nations, without regard even for the opinions of its own citizens. Unilateralism is the adoption of an unyielding posture, merely because one has the power to get away with it. Unilateralism is the refusal to negotiate, and the willfully defiance of previously reached commercial or political agreements and understandings. Unilateralism is wanton and destructive behavior.
Bush has engaged in unilateralism. Tsai Ing-wen seems to be engaging in it as well. But Tsai Ing-wen is not George W. Bush. Taipei is not Washington. Beijing is not Baghdad. Compared to Iraq, the United States is a large and powerful nation. But even then, US unilateralism led to US humiliation. Suppose Taipei and Beijing have a showdown? Does Tsai Ing-wen really intend to adopt a condescending, unilateralist posture, in which "I count for everything, and you count for nothing?" Iraq and the United States have long been at loggerheads. During 9/11, Bush Jr. became famous, for good reason. But relations between Taipei and Beijing are more peaceful and mutually beneficial than they have been in 60 years. What does Tsai Ing-wen want? To maintain the peace? Or to start a war? Bush Jr. falsely accused Iraq of having weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein issued denial after denial, to no avail. Both Taipei and Bejing consider the 1992 Consensus the premise and foundation for peaceful development. Does Tsai Ing-wen really intend to engage in unilateralism? Does she really intend to insist that the 1992 consensus does not exist? Her attitude is that no one else counts. Not the Ma administration. Not Beijing. Not Washington. No one else in the world counts.
Consider Taipei/Washington relations. Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly argued that ECFA has strategically weakened and marginalized the U.S. in Southeast Asia. But the U.S. has repeatedly praised ECFA, loudly and publicly, as a crowning achievement of the Ma administration, as a cross-Strait policy victory. The United States knows this is all predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. Does Tsai Ing-wen really think otherwise? Therefore, when Tsai Ing-wen repudiates the 1992 Consensus, she is not butting heads with the Ma administration. She is not butting heads with Beijing. She is butting heads with the United States and the United States' cross-Strait policy. The U.S. government's One China Policy implies "One China, Different Interpretations." When Tsai Ing-wen flaunts her unilateralism, what is saying, but that what the United States says doesn't count?
As we all know, Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy contains fundamental contradictions. On the one hand, it repudiates the 1992 Consensus. On the other hand, it upholds ECFA. Of course, if Tsai Ing-wen is crazy enough, she can repudiate the 1992 Consensus. This is probably the only area where she can cling to her willful unilateralism. But can she repudiate ECFA, cross-Strait peace, and the exchanges that ECFA have made possible? When the time comes, Beijing could preempt Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP, by adopting the very same unilateralism practiced by Tsai and the DPP.
Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP insist that Beijing will not, cannot, and dare not, call a halt to ECFA and other cross-Strait exchanges. But Beijing has repeatedly made clear that if Taipei repudiates the 1992 Consensus, if it ceases to oppose Taiwan independence, the underpinnings for ECFA will no longer exist. In that case, how long can the edifice known as ECFA continue to stand? If Tsai Ing-wen clings to unilateralism, the edifice will collapse. The political and economic disaster that will follow, will be far worse than what occurred in the wake of the 1958 bombardment and the ROC withdrawal from the UN. The situation today is different. Any catastrophe will be both political and economic in nature. Any consequences will be both massive and irreversible.
The repercussions for the Taiwan independence movement will be even more grievous. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, Beijing will immediately insist that she recognize the 1992 Consensus. If she refuses, she will face political and economic disaster. She will deal a lethal blow to the Taiwan independence movement. Taiwan independence will become anathema to the public on Taiwan. On the other hand, suppose Tsai Ing-wen performs an about face and recognizes the 1992 Consensus? There is a 95% chance of this. The Taiwan independence movement will also be done for. In other words, Tsai Ing-wen will either recognize the 1992 Consensus or she will not. Either way, President Tsai's administration will lose all credibility. The Taiwan independence movement will be dealt a mortal blow. Taiwan independence advocates must understand the inevitable consequences.
The 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations are ways to ensure that neither side adopts a unilateralist posture. They are ways to seek common ground. They affirm bilateralism as the basis for cross-Strait interaction. They maintain the "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" status quo. But if Tsai Ing-wen becomes president, and her unilateralism prevails, it will be Beijing's turn to unleash its own unilateralism.
Unilateralism. Bush can get away with it. But can Tsai Ing-wen?
析論蔡英文的「單邊主義」
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.09.01 01:42 am
蔡英文如今的所作所為，可說是徹頭徹尾的「單邊主義」；倘非一廂情願，即是一意孤行。
如果民進黨繼續作個在野黨，這一切充其量只是「一廂情願」，也就罷了；但如果蔡英文變成蔡總統、民進黨變成執政黨，卻仍要如此「一意孤行」，那恐將引爆台灣六十年來最嚴重的政經災難。
談到單邊主義（Unilateralism），美國小布希總統當然是「典範」。他編造了一個「發現大規模毀滅性武器」的謊言，在世界主流輿論的強烈質疑下揮軍侵略伊拉克，後來又在美國國內主流輿論的強烈質疑下，泥足深陷伊拉克而不能自拔；他這種不問他國意見及不顧民意感受而予智自雄、師心自用的蠻橫霸道態度，即被稱作「單邊主義」；意謂完全無視他人的存在與相對的意見。
此時的蔡英文像不像當年的小布希？但問題是：蔡英文憑什麼作女版的小布希？布希編造「大規模毀滅性武器」，是無中生有；蔡英文謂「九二共識不存在」，則是化有為無。布希面對的是國力遠遜美國的伊拉克，可謂恃強凌弱，至少是傷人不傷己；但蔡英文則明知所面對的是「大國崛起」的中國（見《十年政綱》），卻彷彿視對方如無物，甚至要對方「好好想一想」，大有「一切後果概由北京負責」的味道，到頭來究竟是傷人或自傷？蔡英文這種目中無人的姿態，豈不更勝於小布希？這種不計後果的行徑，又豈不比小布希更可怕？
什麼叫做「單邊主義」？其大意是：一個大國強國的政府，為落實自己的外交政策，不考慮利害相關國家的立場，不考慮國際輿論的主張，甚至不顧國內民意，恃強仗勢，拒絕協商途徑，而任意否棄或挑戰已制定或已商就的國際協議或默契，並恣意做出翻覆局勢的破壞性行為。
這正是小布希曾經幹過的事，也儼然是蔡英文正在做的事；但蔡英文不是小布希，台灣不是美國，中國不是伊拉克。相較於伊拉克，美國是「大國強國」，然而採單邊主義的結果亦落得灰頭土臉；而台灣與中國對峙，難道蔡英文也要採取「居高臨下／有我無你」的單邊主義嗎？且伊拉克與美國始終敵對，小布希在九一一的衝擊中師出有名；但台灣與北京卻正處於六十餘年來最和平互惠的階段，蔡英文到底要維和或求戰？小布希誣指伊拉克備有「大規模毀滅性武器」，海珊百口莫辯；而如今兩岸政府皆稱「九二共識」是「和平發展」的前提與基礎，蔡英文難道只憑自己一句「九二共識不存在」，就玩起她的「單邊主義」？這是目中無人，目中無馬政府，目中無北京，目中無美國，更簡直是目中無世界。
即以台美關係而言，蔡英文始終謂ECFA將使美國在東南亞的戰略地位弱化及邊緣化；但美國卻屢屢公開高聲稱譽ECFA的成就及馬政府兩岸政策的成功，難道美國不知這一切均築基於「九二共識」？因此，蔡英文否定「九二共識」，非但與馬政府對立，亦不見容於北京，其實也與美國華府的兩岸政策扞格不入；因為，美國的「一個中國政策」，亦具「一中各表」的意蘊。蔡英文悍然標榜她的「單邊主義」，豈不是目中無美國？
眾所皆知，蔡英文的兩岸政策有其根本性的矛盾。一方面要「否定九二共識」，另一方面卻又要「維持ECFA」。固然，蔡英文只要夠瘋狂，她就可以否定「九二共識」，這恐怕是她唯一可以堅持「單邊主義」的部分；但是，她能否維持ECFA及現今兩岸和平交流的大走勢，這卻絕無可能片面取決於她與民進黨的「單邊主義」，屆時反而可能使北京取得了主動地位，被北京挾持。
蔡英文與民進黨如今的說法是：北京不會停（ECFA等），不能停，不敢停；但北京卻一再明言，「九二共識」及「反台獨」如果被民進黨否棄，則基礎不存，大廈焉附？蔡英文只要堅持其單邊主義，即必將面對那個樓倒屋塌的局面；而屆時造成的政經災難必將遠逾於八二三炮戰或退出聯合國等，因為，情勢今非昔比，那必將是個「複合式的政經大災難」，創鉅痛深，不可收拾。
而且，已可預言，那也將對台獨運動造成更為致命性的重大衝擊。蔡英文若當選，將會立即被北京以是否接受九二共識所挾持；屆時她倘不接受，勢必引爆政經大災難，那對台獨主張必成致命打擊，台獨勢將成為人民公敵；反之，如若蔡英文竟然回過頭來又接受了「九二共識」（這應有逾九成五的可能性），則台獨也就更是玩完了。也就是說，屆時蔡英文無論接受或不接受，其「蔡總統」的統治正當性皆必全盤解構，台獨亦受重創；台獨人士對此種必然的後果必須有心理警覺。
九二共識，一中各表，其實就是要擺脫兩岸任何一方採行「單邊主義」，俾在「求同存異」中，以「雙邊主義」（Bilateralism）為互動準則，而維持「不統，不獨，不武」的「現狀」。但是，若待蔡英文的「單邊主義」贏得了總統權位後，大概就要輪到北京的「單邊主義」將抬頭及肆虐的時候了。
單邊主義，布希能，蔡英文也能嗎？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 1, 2011
Summary: Tsai Ing-wen's recent actions were unmitigated unilateralism. If not wishful thinking, then they were willful unilateralism. If the Democratic Progressive Party is content to remain an opposition party, it can of course persist in wishful thinking. But if Tsai Ing-wen Tsai becomes president, and the DPP becomes the ruling party, willful unilateralism could precipitate the worst political and economic disaster in six decades. Unilateralism. Bush can get away with it. But can Tsai Ing-wen?
Full Text below:
Tsai Ing-wen's recent actions were unmitigated unilateralism. If not wishful thinking, then they were willful unilateralism.
If the Democratic Progressive Party is content to remain an opposition party, it can of course persist in wishful thinking. But if Tsai Ing-wen Tsai becomes president, and the DPP becomes the ruling party, willful unilateralism could precipitate the worst political and economic disaster in six decades.
U.S. President George W. Bush is a textbook case of unilateralism. He fabricated a lie. He said the US discovered weapons of mass destruction. People the world over seriously questioned the invasion of Iraq. Eventually even the mainstream media in the United States doubted the legitimacy of the invasion. By then however, the US was already neck-deep in the Iraqi quagmire, unable to extricate itself; Bush did not consult with other nations. He disregarded domestic opinion. He had all the answers, and assumed an arrogant, high-handed posture. His unilateralism totally ignored other people and their viewpoints.
Tsai Ing-wen bears more than a passing resemblance to George W. Bush. But does Tsai Ing-wen have the wherewithal to be a female George W. Bush? Bush wove a fanciful tale about weapons of mass destruction. He turned nothing into something. Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, insists that "The 1992 Consensus does not exist." She is struggling mightily to turn something into nothing. Bush was dealing with Iraq, a nation far less powerful than the United States. Essentially the strong was bullying the weak. Bush could hurt others without being hurt himself. But Tsai Ing-wen knows perfectly well that she is dealing with the Chinese mainland, which as she herself admits in "Taiwan Next: The Platform for the Coming Decade," is "a great nation on the rise." Yet she appears to have no regard for the Chinese mainland whatsoever. She even presumes to lecture the Chinese mainland. She chides them, reminding them to think twice before acting. She implies that Beijing must bear total responsibility for any and all consequences. But when push comes to shove, who will be hurt the most? Tsai Ing-wen's arrogance exceeds even Bush's. Tsai Ing-wen's recklessness is even more terrifying than Bush's.
What is unilateralism? Unilateralism is how the government of a large and powerful nation conducts itself when implementing its foreign policy. Unilateralism is acting without regard for the interests of other nations, without regard for the opinions of other nations, without regard even for the opinions of its own citizens. Unilateralism is the adoption of an unyielding posture, merely because one has the power to get away with it. Unilateralism is the refusal to negotiate, and the willfully defiance of previously reached commercial or political agreements and understandings. Unilateralism is wanton and destructive behavior.
Bush has engaged in unilateralism. Tsai Ing-wen seems to be engaging in it as well. But Tsai Ing-wen is not George W. Bush. Taipei is not Washington. Beijing is not Baghdad. Compared to Iraq, the United States is a large and powerful nation. But even then, US unilateralism led to US humiliation. Suppose Taipei and Beijing have a showdown? Does Tsai Ing-wen really intend to adopt a condescending, unilateralist posture, in which "I count for everything, and you count for nothing?" Iraq and the United States have long been at loggerheads. During 9/11, Bush Jr. became famous, for good reason. But relations between Taipei and Beijing are more peaceful and mutually beneficial than they have been in 60 years. What does Tsai Ing-wen want? To maintain the peace? Or to start a war? Bush Jr. falsely accused Iraq of having weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein issued denial after denial, to no avail. Both Taipei and Bejing consider the 1992 Consensus the premise and foundation for peaceful development. Does Tsai Ing-wen really intend to engage in unilateralism? Does she really intend to insist that the 1992 consensus does not exist? Her attitude is that no one else counts. Not the Ma administration. Not Beijing. Not Washington. No one else in the world counts.
Consider Taipei/Washington relations. Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly argued that ECFA has strategically weakened and marginalized the U.S. in Southeast Asia. But the U.S. has repeatedly praised ECFA, loudly and publicly, as a crowning achievement of the Ma administration, as a cross-Strait policy victory. The United States knows this is all predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. Does Tsai Ing-wen really think otherwise? Therefore, when Tsai Ing-wen repudiates the 1992 Consensus, she is not butting heads with the Ma administration. She is not butting heads with Beijing. She is butting heads with the United States and the United States' cross-Strait policy. The U.S. government's One China Policy implies "One China, Different Interpretations." When Tsai Ing-wen flaunts her unilateralism, what is saying, but that what the United States says doesn't count?
As we all know, Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy contains fundamental contradictions. On the one hand, it repudiates the 1992 Consensus. On the other hand, it upholds ECFA. Of course, if Tsai Ing-wen is crazy enough, she can repudiate the 1992 Consensus. This is probably the only area where she can cling to her willful unilateralism. But can she repudiate ECFA, cross-Strait peace, and the exchanges that ECFA have made possible? When the time comes, Beijing could preempt Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP, by adopting the very same unilateralism practiced by Tsai and the DPP.
Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP insist that Beijing will not, cannot, and dare not, call a halt to ECFA and other cross-Strait exchanges. But Beijing has repeatedly made clear that if Taipei repudiates the 1992 Consensus, if it ceases to oppose Taiwan independence, the underpinnings for ECFA will no longer exist. In that case, how long can the edifice known as ECFA continue to stand? If Tsai Ing-wen clings to unilateralism, the edifice will collapse. The political and economic disaster that will follow, will be far worse than what occurred in the wake of the 1958 bombardment and the ROC withdrawal from the UN. The situation today is different. Any catastrophe will be both political and economic in nature. Any consequences will be both massive and irreversible.
The repercussions for the Taiwan independence movement will be even more grievous. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, Beijing will immediately insist that she recognize the 1992 Consensus. If she refuses, she will face political and economic disaster. She will deal a lethal blow to the Taiwan independence movement. Taiwan independence will become anathema to the public on Taiwan. On the other hand, suppose Tsai Ing-wen performs an about face and recognizes the 1992 Consensus? There is a 95% chance of this. The Taiwan independence movement will also be done for. In other words, Tsai Ing-wen will either recognize the 1992 Consensus or she will not. Either way, President Tsai's administration will lose all credibility. The Taiwan independence movement will be dealt a mortal blow. Taiwan independence advocates must understand the inevitable consequences.
The 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations are ways to ensure that neither side adopts a unilateralist posture. They are ways to seek common ground. They affirm bilateralism as the basis for cross-Strait interaction. They maintain the "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" status quo. But if Tsai Ing-wen becomes president, and her unilateralism prevails, it will be Beijing's turn to unleash its own unilateralism.
Unilateralism. Bush can get away with it. But can Tsai Ing-wen?
析論蔡英文的「單邊主義」
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.09.01 01:42 am
蔡英文如今的所作所為，可說是徹頭徹尾的「單邊主義」；倘非一廂情願，即是一意孤行。
如果民進黨繼續作個在野黨，這一切充其量只是「一廂情願」，也就罷了；但如果蔡英文變成蔡總統、民進黨變成執政黨，卻仍要如此「一意孤行」，那恐將引爆台灣六十年來最嚴重的政經災難。
談到單邊主義（Unilateralism），美國小布希總統當然是「典範」。他編造了一個「發現大規模毀滅性武器」的謊言，在世界主流輿論的強烈質疑下揮軍侵略伊拉克，後來又在美國國內主流輿論的強烈質疑下，泥足深陷伊拉克而不能自拔；他這種不問他國意見及不顧民意感受而予智自雄、師心自用的蠻橫霸道態度，即被稱作「單邊主義」；意謂完全無視他人的存在與相對的意見。
此時的蔡英文像不像當年的小布希？但問題是：蔡英文憑什麼作女版的小布希？布希編造「大規模毀滅性武器」，是無中生有；蔡英文謂「九二共識不存在」，則是化有為無。布希面對的是國力遠遜美國的伊拉克，可謂恃強凌弱，至少是傷人不傷己；但蔡英文則明知所面對的是「大國崛起」的中國（見《十年政綱》），卻彷彿視對方如無物，甚至要對方「好好想一想」，大有「一切後果概由北京負責」的味道，到頭來究竟是傷人或自傷？蔡英文這種目中無人的姿態，豈不更勝於小布希？這種不計後果的行徑，又豈不比小布希更可怕？
什麼叫做「單邊主義」？其大意是：一個大國強國的政府，為落實自己的外交政策，不考慮利害相關國家的立場，不考慮國際輿論的主張，甚至不顧國內民意，恃強仗勢，拒絕協商途徑，而任意否棄或挑戰已制定或已商就的國際協議或默契，並恣意做出翻覆局勢的破壞性行為。
這正是小布希曾經幹過的事，也儼然是蔡英文正在做的事；但蔡英文不是小布希，台灣不是美國，中國不是伊拉克。相較於伊拉克，美國是「大國強國」，然而採單邊主義的結果亦落得灰頭土臉；而台灣與中國對峙，難道蔡英文也要採取「居高臨下／有我無你」的單邊主義嗎？且伊拉克與美國始終敵對，小布希在九一一的衝擊中師出有名；但台灣與北京卻正處於六十餘年來最和平互惠的階段，蔡英文到底要維和或求戰？小布希誣指伊拉克備有「大規模毀滅性武器」，海珊百口莫辯；而如今兩岸政府皆稱「九二共識」是「和平發展」的前提與基礎，蔡英文難道只憑自己一句「九二共識不存在」，就玩起她的「單邊主義」？這是目中無人，目中無馬政府，目中無北京，目中無美國，更簡直是目中無世界。
即以台美關係而言，蔡英文始終謂ECFA將使美國在東南亞的戰略地位弱化及邊緣化；但美國卻屢屢公開高聲稱譽ECFA的成就及馬政府兩岸政策的成功，難道美國不知這一切均築基於「九二共識」？因此，蔡英文否定「九二共識」，非但與馬政府對立，亦不見容於北京，其實也與美國華府的兩岸政策扞格不入；因為，美國的「一個中國政策」，亦具「一中各表」的意蘊。蔡英文悍然標榜她的「單邊主義」，豈不是目中無美國？
眾所皆知，蔡英文的兩岸政策有其根本性的矛盾。一方面要「否定九二共識」，另一方面卻又要「維持ECFA」。固然，蔡英文只要夠瘋狂，她就可以否定「九二共識」，這恐怕是她唯一可以堅持「單邊主義」的部分；但是，她能否維持ECFA及現今兩岸和平交流的大走勢，這卻絕無可能片面取決於她與民進黨的「單邊主義」，屆時反而可能使北京取得了主動地位，被北京挾持。
蔡英文與民進黨如今的說法是：北京不會停（ECFA等），不能停，不敢停；但北京卻一再明言，「九二共識」及「反台獨」如果被民進黨否棄，則基礎不存，大廈焉附？蔡英文只要堅持其單邊主義，即必將面對那個樓倒屋塌的局面；而屆時造成的政經災難必將遠逾於八二三炮戰或退出聯合國等，因為，情勢今非昔比，那必將是個「複合式的政經大災難」，創鉅痛深，不可收拾。
而且，已可預言，那也將對台獨運動造成更為致命性的重大衝擊。蔡英文若當選，將會立即被北京以是否接受九二共識所挾持；屆時她倘不接受，勢必引爆政經大災難，那對台獨主張必成致命打擊，台獨勢將成為人民公敵；反之，如若蔡英文竟然回過頭來又接受了「九二共識」（這應有逾九成五的可能性），則台獨也就更是玩完了。也就是說，屆時蔡英文無論接受或不接受，其「蔡總統」的統治正當性皆必全盤解構，台獨亦受重創；台獨人士對此種必然的後果必須有心理警覺。
九二共識，一中各表，其實就是要擺脫兩岸任何一方採行「單邊主義」，俾在「求同存異」中，以「雙邊主義」（Bilateralism）為互動準則，而維持「不統，不獨，不武」的「現狀」。但是，若待蔡英文的「單邊主義」贏得了總統權位後，大概就要輪到北京的「單邊主義」將抬頭及肆虐的時候了。
單邊主義，布希能，蔡英文也能嗎？
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