What Exactly Does James Soong Want?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 9, 2011
Summary: Many people are asking what exactly is James Soong thinking? What exactly does he want? What James Soong must do now, is settle down. He must re-evaluate his own legacy, and seek a lasting place for himself in history. One Green Camp talking head has already characterized him as a "Blue Camp Wang Ching-wei, and a Green Camp Wu San-gui." Is James Soong deluded enough to imagine that Tsai Ing-wen will work some sort of political miracle on his behalf?
Full Text Below:
Many people are asking what exactly is James Soong thinking? What exactly does he want?
Consider some possibilities. One. He wants to be president. Two. He wants to form a People First Party caucus in the Legislative Yuan. Three. He wants to be appointed Premier or SEF Chairman. Four. He wants to bring down Ma Ying-jeou and help Tsai Ing-wen get elected.
One. James Soong cannot possibly be elected president. Consider current election sentiment. Tsai Ing-wen commands at least 45% of the vote. Therefore if James Soong wants to be elected, it is not enough that he win more votes than Ma Ying-jeou. Ma Ying-jeou cannot win more than 10% of the votes. Only then can Soong surpass the 45% of the vote commanded by Tsai Ing-wen. Soong knows this is impossible, Therefore his goal is not be be elected president.
The Soong Camp began mobilizing in June. Its stated goal was to win three seats in the legislature in order to form a PFP legislative caucus. But if this is James Soong's real goal, why did he adopt such extreme rhetoric as "Reject Ma, Defend Taiwan?" After all, most of the Soong Camp's support comes from the Blue Camp. In single candidate voting districts, the "Reject Ma, Defend Taiwan" battle cry adopted by the "Orange Army" (PFP) is unlikely to win any votes. What's worse, the Soong Camp is deliberately fielding PFP candidates in voting districts where the Blue Camp is under threat from the Green Camp. The PFP is obviously not attempting to get its own candidates elected. It is merely attempting to undermine KMT candidates in order to help DPP candidates. it is merely attempting to reduce the number of seats held by the KMT in the legislature. It is merely attempting to create an election upset. Will James Soong's "Reject Ma, Defend Taiwan" strategy have a coat tails effect? Or will those riding Soong's coat tails get trampled to death? That remains to be seen. Fairminded observers have concluded that if Soong merely wanted to form a PFP party caucus, he could have used any number of other means. He had no need to march in lockstep with the Green Camp and shout "Reject Ma, Defend Taiwan." By adopting this strategy, PFP legislative candidates will probably run headlong into a brick wall.
Is Soong seeking an appointment to SEF Chairman or Premier following the election? The odds against any such appointment are astronomical. Even assuming such an appointment was in the offing initially, Soong's actions over the past few months have scotched any possibility of such an appointment today. Whether the Kuomintang wins or the Democratic Progressive Party wins makes no difference. Soong has so thoroughly discredited himself no one is going to appoint him to any position. Even if they were to appoint him to an important position, Soong is so far gone he would not be able to hold on to it. There is no need to conduct a poll to determine whether the public supports James Soong as Premier. The public will not tolerate James Soong as Premier. If the KMT prevails, it cannot possibly appoint Soong as Premier. By the same token, the "Bian/Soong Meeting" was unacceptable to the Green Camp in 2005. Soong has since discredited himself even further. How can the Green Camp possibly accept him now? Besides, given James Soong's character and image, how can Beijing possibly tolerate someone of Soong's ilk as "SEF Chairman?"
In sum, James Soong cannot possibly be elected president. If he merely wants to establish a PFP legislative caucus, he does not need to adopt such a radical stance. Over recent months he has thoroughly discredited himself. He has ruled out the possibility of anyone appointing him to a position of importance in the wake of the election. Therefore if James Soong persists in running for president to the bitter end, his only possible motive would be to "Topple Ma, and prop up Tsai Ing-wen." Given current election sentiment, as long as James Soong wins three to five percent of the vote, he may be able to ensure a Tsai Ing-wen victory.
James Soong truly has overplayed his hand. On the one hand, by shouting "Reject Ma, Defend Taiwan," he persuaded the DPP to help his petition drive. On the other hand, he draped himself in the flag in order to win votes from the Blue Camp. His was a stunning display of deceit and viciousness. Soong probably thinks he outsmarted everyone. But most Blue Camp and Green Camp supporters will merely view him with contempt. He has forfeited any role on Taiwan or in cross-Strait relations. He has shredded any vestige of credibility he might once have commanded. Rumors have emerged about possible KMT/PFP "consultations." But given James Soong's habit of deceit, who would dare risk "consulting" with him? Who would dare risk negotiating with him in good faith, only to be stabbed in the back?
Wu Poh-hsiung put it succinctly. The only possible outcome of the current election is the election of Ma Ying-jeou or Tsai Ing-wen. There is no third possible outcome. Most people understand this. James Soong understands this as well. If Soong remains in the running to the bitter end, it could lead to a Tsai Ing-wen victory. If that happens, what will he say to all those young people wearing shirts emblazoned with the ROC flag? If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, how can she possibly form a coalition government with James Soong, who said that "If Beijing's missiles attack Taiwan, it will be in defense of China's territory?" He has resorted to every trick in the book. Let us hope he has not put all our lives at risk.
What James Soong must do now, is settle down. He must re-evaluate his own legacy, and seek a lasting place for himself in history. One Green Camp talking head has already characterized him as a "Blue Camp Wang Ching-wei, and a Green Camp Wu San-gui." Is James Soong deluded enough to imagine that Tsai Ing-wen will work some sort of political miracle on his behalf?
宋楚瑜意欲何為
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.11.09
許多人都在問：宋楚瑜到底在想什麼？他到底要什麼？
能夠想像的選項是：一、他想當總統。二、想在立法院成立親民黨黨團。三、想當行政院長或海基會董事長。四、想拉下馬英九，助蔡英文當選。
首先，宋楚瑜絕無可能當選總統。以目前選情來看，蔡英文至少應有超越四十五％選票的實力；因此，宋楚瑜若要當選，非但要超越馬英九，且要將馬的得票壓低至十％以下，他始有可能超越蔡英文的至少四十五％而當選。這是宋楚瑜亦自知絕無可能之事，所以他的目標絕非當選總統。
六月間宋營開始動作之初，是以「當選三席立委／組成立院黨團」為目標；如果這就是宋楚瑜要的，則他當不必採「棄馬保台」如此偏激的路線。因為，宋營的主要票源畢竟是在泛藍，而在單一選區中，橘軍欲在「棄馬保台」的旗幟下勝出，恐非易事。再者，宋營特意挑幾處藍綠緊繃的選區提名，其意顯然不在自己人當選，而是要拉下國民黨的候選人，助民進黨候選人當選，以降低國民黨在立院的席次，便利選後操作。因而，宋的「棄馬保台」路線，究竟是「母雞帶小雞」或「母雞踩死小雞」，恐怕亦是尚待觀察。平允的評論是：如果宋要的只是「成立黨團」而已，他其實有其他許多路可走，不必非要與綠營同走「棄馬保台」之路；如今走上這條路，反而使立委參選人四處碰壁。
那麼，宋要的是在選後出掌海基會或任行政院長嗎？即使這種想像原本或有萬分之一成真的可能性，如今亦已因宋幾個月來的操作而化作泡影。因為，不論國民黨或民進黨勝選執政，皆不可能任用人格形象扭曲至此地步的宋楚瑜；而即使任用，人格扭曲至此的宋楚瑜也難安其位，不要看今日民調或有支持他出任閣揆者，但屆時民意絕不可能容他。莫說國民黨若勝選，已不可能任用宋；綠營在二○○五年不能接受「扁宋會」，難道如今能接受人格形象更加扭曲的宋楚瑜？再者，以宋楚瑜如此人格形象，北京又豈能以平常心面對這位「海基會董事長」？
綜上所論，宋楚瑜絕無可能當選總統；他若只是想組成立院黨團，則不必採如此偏激的路線；而他在這段期間將自己的人格形象扭曲至此地步，實可謂已經自我否定了選後主政者受其挾制而任用他出掌要職的可能；那麼，宋楚瑜如果執意參選到底，他唯一最可能實現之目的，就是「拉下馬英九／扶上蔡英文」。因為，照目前緊繃的選情來看，宋楚瑜只要獲得三至五％的選票，即可能保送蔡英文勝選。
宋楚瑜確實玩得太過頭了。他一手用「棄馬保台」拉民進黨為他連署；另一手想用背後兩排國旗裝去挖藍營的選票。這或許是令人瞠目結舌的權謀演示，卻也是一個猙獰人格的公開展演；宋也許自以為得計，卻必被藍綠雙方多數民眾所輕蔑，亦失去了未來在台灣及兩岸扮演任何重要角色的信任度。至於傳出國親兩黨仍待「協商」，但以宋楚瑜的詭詐反覆，誰敢冒著被他反噬的風險與他「協商」？
吳伯雄說得對，這次大選只有馬英九當選或蔡英文當選兩種可能，不會有第三種結果；這應是多數國人的共同見解，亦當是宋楚瑜所心知肚明。宋如果參選到底而造成蔡英文當選，他如何面對那些穿國旗裝的年輕人？而蔡英文若當選，她又如何能與曾經主張「北京飛彈襲台／是為捍衛中國領土」的宋楚瑜組「聯合政府」？這真是機關算盡，莫要誤了卿卿的性命！
宋楚瑜現在應當做的是好好沉澱下來，重新為自己的歷史評價找尋可大可久的定位。且聽綠營名嘴已將他稱作「藍營的汪精衛／綠營的吳三桂」，宋楚瑜還能妄想蔡英文若當選能為他帶來什麼政治奇蹟？
Wednesday, November 9, 2011
Tuesday, November 8, 2011
Why Con Artists were Ecstatic About Being Extradited to Taiwan
Why Con Artists were Ecstatic About Being Extradited to Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 8, 2011
Summary: A few months ago Republic of China police escorted hundreds of con artists who committed fraud in Southeast Asia back to Taiwan. When the suspects saw the chartered EVA airliner that was to take them back to Taiwan land, they were ecstatic. They cheered out loud. Authorities on the Mainland mete out far harsher punishment to con artists than authorities on Taiwan. The suspects were confident that being extradited to Taiwan was a "get out of jail free card." Sure enough, the Taichung District Court recently handed down its judgment on the first group of defendants. One of the 26 suspects was given a one year sentence. The rest were given suspended sentences or light fines. Taiwan truly is the "con artist's paradise."
Full Text Below:
A few months ago Republic of China police escorted hundreds of con artists who committed fraud in Southeast Asia back to Taiwan. When the suspects saw the chartered EVA airliner that was to take them back to Taiwan land, they were ecstatic. They cheered out loud. Authorities on the Mainland mete out far harsher punishment to con artists than authorities on Taiwan. The suspects were confident that being extradited to Taiwan was a "get out of jail free card." Sure enough, the Taichung District Court recently handed down its judgment on the first group of defendants. One of the 26 suspects was given a one year sentence. The rest were given suspended sentences or light fines. Taiwan truly is the "con artist's paradise."
Early this year, authorities from Taiwan and the Mainland fought over the right to prosecute a dozen or so con artists. Invoking high-minded concepts such as "sovereignty" and "national dignity," our side precipitated an embarrassing diplomatic crisis with the Philippines. We haggled for months with the Mainland authorities. Only then did we gain custody of the prisoners, who had been extradited to the Mainland. Only then were they transferred to Taiwan. Contrast the controversy then, with the outcome today. Fierce arguments were advanced in a jurisdictional dispute. The only issue appeared to be the lenient treatment of criminals on Taiwan. What kind of impression has our "judicial sovereignty" left on the world?
Fraud on Taiwan is rampant. This fact is well known, both at home and abroad. The justice system on Taiwan condones fraud. This is common knowledge to every member in a confidence ring. Our government applied diplomatic pressure to gain custody over a large number of suspected con artists. The impression we left however, was that we had distorted values. The ruling and opposition parties turned the tug of war into a matter of national dignity. Had they not done this, authorities on the two sides could have used the opportunity to increase cross-Strait cooperation on crime fighting. They could have made sure that con artists would be frightened hence deterred by the harsh penalties meted out by the Mainland authorities. But ideological concerns prevailed. Taiwan remained mired in arguments about sovereignty. The result was a travesty of justice, utterly unacceptable to the citizens of the nation.
To ensure justice, the legal system must keep pace with the times. Con artists do not use physical violence. But they use deceit to deprive people of their life savings. Their victims lose hope. Families are destroyed. Some of their victims may even commit suicide. Can we really dismiss their physical and emotional suffering as trivial? Take the confidence ring uncovered recently for example. It was an organized crime ring. Many of its members were chronic and habitual offenders, with long criminal records. Most of the victims were from the Mainland. But they took their victims for hundreds of millions of RMB. The judges were unable to question the victims. Therefore the perpetrators got off with a slap on the wrist. What sort of narrow-minded, absurd notion of justice is this?
Punishments meted out by the authorities on the Mainland are draconian. By contrast, authorities on Taiwan have greater respect for the rule of law. Human rights are better protected. But in recent years, many trial judges on Taiwan have become corrupt. Their judgments have left the public aghast. They feel the legal system on Taiwan is moving backwards. It is obstructing justice and impeding progress. On Mainland China, acts of fraud involving 200,000 RMB or more are considered felonies, punishable by sentences ranging from 10 years to life imprisonment. Actually on Taiwan, fraud is also punishable by sentences up to five years. But judges usually hand down suspended sentences or impose light fines. No wonder even con artists with PRC status attempt to pass themselves off as Taiwanese. No wonder they want to be tried on Taiwan. The chasm between the justice systems on the two sides is simply too wide.
Con artists tried on Taiwan were let off with a slap on the wrist. Meanwhile several children of Taiwan businessmen who committed robberies in Kunshan, received stiff ten year sentences. These children of Taiwan businessmen were still in school. But on weekends they would arm themselves with knives and rob passers-by. The amount they robbed was only a few hundred RMB. But they were repeat offenders. Therefore their offenses are classified as felonies. The Taiwanese students who committed these robberies did not appear to lack money. What they lacked was respect for the law. They thought of themselves as "Taiwanese students,' superior to local residents. They got drunk and "asked for money" from passersby, "just for kicks." On Taiwan students guilty of similar crimes would probably not be sent to prison. On Mainland China Taiwanese students are accorded special treatment. But because three of the students were 18 years old, they received heavy sentences.
Con artists from Taiwan who defraud their victims of hundreds of millions of RMB received a slap on the wrist. Reckless Taiwanese youths who committed robberies on the Mainland received heavy sentences. This illustrates the chasm between the legal systems on the two sides of the Strait. This illustrates the chasm in their perception of what constutites justice. This chasm should be bridged by means of exchanges, and by learning from each others' strengths. This will enable the two sides to arrive at a happy medium. This will prevent differences in their legal systems from creating a haven for criminals. It will prevent demagogues from using politics to disguise our social problems.
Several hundred con artists cheered when they learned they were being extradited to Taiwan. This shows that the legal system on Taiwan is a toothless tiger. The government may strive for diplomatic face. But it cannot provide people with the justice they demand. So-called "dinosaur judges" cavalierly invoke "judicial sovereignty." They leave people appalled and speechless. Does our justice system have nothing to say about the Taiwanese students who received heavy sentences on the Mainland?
當詐騙犯歡呼遣返的謎底揭曉
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.11.08
我國警方數月前從東南亞押解數百名詐欺犯回台，許多嫌犯看到長榮專機來接都喜出望外，大聲歡呼。他們料定：以兩岸司法對待詐欺犯的差異，回台形同「減刑」的保證。果然，台中地院最近審結一批人犯，廿六人之中僅一人判刑一年，其餘不是緩刑就是易科罰金。台灣果然是「詐欺犯的天堂」。
回顧年初，我國為了和大陸爭奪十幾名詐欺犯，在「主權」和「國格」的高調下，與菲律賓鬧出一場難堪的外交風波；後來和中共交涉數月，才將一干遭遣送大陸人犯全數接回。對比今天的結局，爭得面紅耳赤的管轄權風波，似乎只是追求台灣司法對罪犯輕縱而已，這樣的「司法主權」給社會留下何種觀感？
台灣詐欺犯行徑囂張惡劣，是國內外皆知的事實；而台灣司法寬縱詐欺犯，則是詐欺集團無人不曉的「常識」。正因如此，政府不惜用外交爭議來換取大批詐欺犯的輕縱，恐怕只留下「價值錯亂」的印象。當時，若不是在野黨將此事上綱成國格問題，兩岸可能有機會在合作「打擊犯罪」上取得更多進展，讓詐欺犯懾於大陸的嚴刑重罰，而知所收斂。但由於意識形態作祟，台灣陷入主權的口水爭議，結果卻得到了國民情感上難以接受的司法表現，讓人扼腕。
我們必須嚴肅面對的是，司法應當如何與時俱進以維護社會正義的問題。詐欺犯雖非使用暴力，卻以詐術騙得對方的畢生積蓄，使受害者灰心喪志甚至家破人亡；如此，對人們的身心戕害能說不嚴重嗎？以這次破獲的詐欺集團為例，不僅是集團犯罪，許多人更是前科累累的慣犯；雖然受害者多為大陸民眾，但金額高達數億。法官若因無法訊問被害人，即輕率對嫌犯網開一面，這體現的又是什麼樣狹隘且荒謬的正義呢？
與嚴刑峻罰的大陸比較，台灣法治相對健全，對人權的保護也更周密。然而，近年台灣不少法官在審判中體現的錯亂價值，卻一再讓人覺得荒謬與倒退，已成了扭曲社會公義、阻滯社會進步的因素。在中國大陸，只要詐騙之不法所得超過廿萬人民幣，就屬十年以上重罪，甚至可高達無期徒刑；其實，在台灣詐欺亦可判至五年徒刑，但法官卻選擇了緩刑或易科罰金。難怪連詐欺集團內的大陸公民都想冒充台灣人，希望來台受審，因為兩岸司法天平太過傾斜、太不成比例。
值得注意的是，正當台灣詐欺犯全獲輕判之際，大陸傳出數名台商子弟在昆山犯下搶劫罪而遭求處十年重刑的消息，令人震驚。這些台商子弟都還是在校學生，卻在周末出外遊樂時持刀行搶路人，得款不過數百人民幣，卻因連續犯罪被當成重案辦理。這些台生集體行搶，看來並非缺錢，而不過是缺乏法治觀念；或者平日仗恃著「台生」的身分，自以為高當地居民一等，因而在酒後為了「好玩」向路人「要錢」。若在台灣，學生犯了類似的罪行，或許不致送進監牢；但在大陸，就算台生特別受到禮遇，因其中三人已滿十八歲，和解後仍遭公訴重判。
從詐騙了數億元的罪犯在台僅受輕判，對比台商子弟輕率行搶而遭大陸司法機關重懲，凸顯的不僅是兩岸司法體制的巨大傾斜，也是兩岸人民對法治認知的巨大差異。這樣的差異，應當透過交流互相截長補短，找尋自己社會最佳的平衡點，而不是利用身分把司法變成罪犯的避風港，或用政治來迴避、扭曲真實的社會問題。
數百名詐欺犯歡呼遣台的謎底揭曉，證實台灣司法是無牙的老虎，也顯示政府拚命爭取的外交顏面，結果卻無法維護民眾期待的正義。恐龍法官們如此漫不經心地行使「司法主權」，豈不令人瞠目結舌？試問：相對於那些被判重刑的台商子弟，我們的司法有什麼話要說嗎？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 8, 2011
Summary: A few months ago Republic of China police escorted hundreds of con artists who committed fraud in Southeast Asia back to Taiwan. When the suspects saw the chartered EVA airliner that was to take them back to Taiwan land, they were ecstatic. They cheered out loud. Authorities on the Mainland mete out far harsher punishment to con artists than authorities on Taiwan. The suspects were confident that being extradited to Taiwan was a "get out of jail free card." Sure enough, the Taichung District Court recently handed down its judgment on the first group of defendants. One of the 26 suspects was given a one year sentence. The rest were given suspended sentences or light fines. Taiwan truly is the "con artist's paradise."
Full Text Below:
A few months ago Republic of China police escorted hundreds of con artists who committed fraud in Southeast Asia back to Taiwan. When the suspects saw the chartered EVA airliner that was to take them back to Taiwan land, they were ecstatic. They cheered out loud. Authorities on the Mainland mete out far harsher punishment to con artists than authorities on Taiwan. The suspects were confident that being extradited to Taiwan was a "get out of jail free card." Sure enough, the Taichung District Court recently handed down its judgment on the first group of defendants. One of the 26 suspects was given a one year sentence. The rest were given suspended sentences or light fines. Taiwan truly is the "con artist's paradise."
Early this year, authorities from Taiwan and the Mainland fought over the right to prosecute a dozen or so con artists. Invoking high-minded concepts such as "sovereignty" and "national dignity," our side precipitated an embarrassing diplomatic crisis with the Philippines. We haggled for months with the Mainland authorities. Only then did we gain custody of the prisoners, who had been extradited to the Mainland. Only then were they transferred to Taiwan. Contrast the controversy then, with the outcome today. Fierce arguments were advanced in a jurisdictional dispute. The only issue appeared to be the lenient treatment of criminals on Taiwan. What kind of impression has our "judicial sovereignty" left on the world?
Fraud on Taiwan is rampant. This fact is well known, both at home and abroad. The justice system on Taiwan condones fraud. This is common knowledge to every member in a confidence ring. Our government applied diplomatic pressure to gain custody over a large number of suspected con artists. The impression we left however, was that we had distorted values. The ruling and opposition parties turned the tug of war into a matter of national dignity. Had they not done this, authorities on the two sides could have used the opportunity to increase cross-Strait cooperation on crime fighting. They could have made sure that con artists would be frightened hence deterred by the harsh penalties meted out by the Mainland authorities. But ideological concerns prevailed. Taiwan remained mired in arguments about sovereignty. The result was a travesty of justice, utterly unacceptable to the citizens of the nation.
To ensure justice, the legal system must keep pace with the times. Con artists do not use physical violence. But they use deceit to deprive people of their life savings. Their victims lose hope. Families are destroyed. Some of their victims may even commit suicide. Can we really dismiss their physical and emotional suffering as trivial? Take the confidence ring uncovered recently for example. It was an organized crime ring. Many of its members were chronic and habitual offenders, with long criminal records. Most of the victims were from the Mainland. But they took their victims for hundreds of millions of RMB. The judges were unable to question the victims. Therefore the perpetrators got off with a slap on the wrist. What sort of narrow-minded, absurd notion of justice is this?
Punishments meted out by the authorities on the Mainland are draconian. By contrast, authorities on Taiwan have greater respect for the rule of law. Human rights are better protected. But in recent years, many trial judges on Taiwan have become corrupt. Their judgments have left the public aghast. They feel the legal system on Taiwan is moving backwards. It is obstructing justice and impeding progress. On Mainland China, acts of fraud involving 200,000 RMB or more are considered felonies, punishable by sentences ranging from 10 years to life imprisonment. Actually on Taiwan, fraud is also punishable by sentences up to five years. But judges usually hand down suspended sentences or impose light fines. No wonder even con artists with PRC status attempt to pass themselves off as Taiwanese. No wonder they want to be tried on Taiwan. The chasm between the justice systems on the two sides is simply too wide.
Con artists tried on Taiwan were let off with a slap on the wrist. Meanwhile several children of Taiwan businessmen who committed robberies in Kunshan, received stiff ten year sentences. These children of Taiwan businessmen were still in school. But on weekends they would arm themselves with knives and rob passers-by. The amount they robbed was only a few hundred RMB. But they were repeat offenders. Therefore their offenses are classified as felonies. The Taiwanese students who committed these robberies did not appear to lack money. What they lacked was respect for the law. They thought of themselves as "Taiwanese students,' superior to local residents. They got drunk and "asked for money" from passersby, "just for kicks." On Taiwan students guilty of similar crimes would probably not be sent to prison. On Mainland China Taiwanese students are accorded special treatment. But because three of the students were 18 years old, they received heavy sentences.
Con artists from Taiwan who defraud their victims of hundreds of millions of RMB received a slap on the wrist. Reckless Taiwanese youths who committed robberies on the Mainland received heavy sentences. This illustrates the chasm between the legal systems on the two sides of the Strait. This illustrates the chasm in their perception of what constutites justice. This chasm should be bridged by means of exchanges, and by learning from each others' strengths. This will enable the two sides to arrive at a happy medium. This will prevent differences in their legal systems from creating a haven for criminals. It will prevent demagogues from using politics to disguise our social problems.
Several hundred con artists cheered when they learned they were being extradited to Taiwan. This shows that the legal system on Taiwan is a toothless tiger. The government may strive for diplomatic face. But it cannot provide people with the justice they demand. So-called "dinosaur judges" cavalierly invoke "judicial sovereignty." They leave people appalled and speechless. Does our justice system have nothing to say about the Taiwanese students who received heavy sentences on the Mainland?
當詐騙犯歡呼遣返的謎底揭曉
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.11.08
我國警方數月前從東南亞押解數百名詐欺犯回台，許多嫌犯看到長榮專機來接都喜出望外，大聲歡呼。他們料定：以兩岸司法對待詐欺犯的差異，回台形同「減刑」的保證。果然，台中地院最近審結一批人犯，廿六人之中僅一人判刑一年，其餘不是緩刑就是易科罰金。台灣果然是「詐欺犯的天堂」。
回顧年初，我國為了和大陸爭奪十幾名詐欺犯，在「主權」和「國格」的高調下，與菲律賓鬧出一場難堪的外交風波；後來和中共交涉數月，才將一干遭遣送大陸人犯全數接回。對比今天的結局，爭得面紅耳赤的管轄權風波，似乎只是追求台灣司法對罪犯輕縱而已，這樣的「司法主權」給社會留下何種觀感？
台灣詐欺犯行徑囂張惡劣，是國內外皆知的事實；而台灣司法寬縱詐欺犯，則是詐欺集團無人不曉的「常識」。正因如此，政府不惜用外交爭議來換取大批詐欺犯的輕縱，恐怕只留下「價值錯亂」的印象。當時，若不是在野黨將此事上綱成國格問題，兩岸可能有機會在合作「打擊犯罪」上取得更多進展，讓詐欺犯懾於大陸的嚴刑重罰，而知所收斂。但由於意識形態作祟，台灣陷入主權的口水爭議，結果卻得到了國民情感上難以接受的司法表現，讓人扼腕。
我們必須嚴肅面對的是，司法應當如何與時俱進以維護社會正義的問題。詐欺犯雖非使用暴力，卻以詐術騙得對方的畢生積蓄，使受害者灰心喪志甚至家破人亡；如此，對人們的身心戕害能說不嚴重嗎？以這次破獲的詐欺集團為例，不僅是集團犯罪，許多人更是前科累累的慣犯；雖然受害者多為大陸民眾，但金額高達數億。法官若因無法訊問被害人，即輕率對嫌犯網開一面，這體現的又是什麼樣狹隘且荒謬的正義呢？
與嚴刑峻罰的大陸比較，台灣法治相對健全，對人權的保護也更周密。然而，近年台灣不少法官在審判中體現的錯亂價值，卻一再讓人覺得荒謬與倒退，已成了扭曲社會公義、阻滯社會進步的因素。在中國大陸，只要詐騙之不法所得超過廿萬人民幣，就屬十年以上重罪，甚至可高達無期徒刑；其實，在台灣詐欺亦可判至五年徒刑，但法官卻選擇了緩刑或易科罰金。難怪連詐欺集團內的大陸公民都想冒充台灣人，希望來台受審，因為兩岸司法天平太過傾斜、太不成比例。
值得注意的是，正當台灣詐欺犯全獲輕判之際，大陸傳出數名台商子弟在昆山犯下搶劫罪而遭求處十年重刑的消息，令人震驚。這些台商子弟都還是在校學生，卻在周末出外遊樂時持刀行搶路人，得款不過數百人民幣，卻因連續犯罪被當成重案辦理。這些台生集體行搶，看來並非缺錢，而不過是缺乏法治觀念；或者平日仗恃著「台生」的身分，自以為高當地居民一等，因而在酒後為了「好玩」向路人「要錢」。若在台灣，學生犯了類似的罪行，或許不致送進監牢；但在大陸，就算台生特別受到禮遇，因其中三人已滿十八歲，和解後仍遭公訴重判。
從詐騙了數億元的罪犯在台僅受輕判，對比台商子弟輕率行搶而遭大陸司法機關重懲，凸顯的不僅是兩岸司法體制的巨大傾斜，也是兩岸人民對法治認知的巨大差異。這樣的差異，應當透過交流互相截長補短，找尋自己社會最佳的平衡點，而不是利用身分把司法變成罪犯的避風港，或用政治來迴避、扭曲真實的社會問題。
數百名詐欺犯歡呼遣台的謎底揭曉，證實台灣司法是無牙的老虎，也顯示政府拚命爭取的外交顏面，結果卻無法維護民眾期待的正義。恐龍法官們如此漫不經心地行使「司法主權」，豈不令人瞠目結舌？試問：相對於那些被判重刑的台商子弟，我們的司法有什麼話要說嗎？
Monday, November 7, 2011
Balancing Corporate Reality and Labor Protection
Balancing Corporate Reality and Labor Protection
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 5, 2011
Summary: Huga Optotech and Everlight Electronics fired the first shot, Over mere days, the tech industry suffered an unexpected economic downturn, The Council of Labor Affairs finally admitted that "unpaid leaves are on the rise." President Ma participated in a business forum at the Hsinchu Science Park. The downturn affects both labor rights and corporate survival, The government must balance business reality and labor rights. Being biased towards either party could lead to a lose/lose/lose scenario in which labor, business, and society are all losers.
Full Text Below:
Huga Optotech and Everlight Electronics fired the first shot, Over mere days, the tech industry suffered an unexpected economic downturn, The Council of Labor Affairs finally admitted that "unpaid leaves are on the rise." President Ma participated in a business forum at the Hsinchu Science Park. The downturn affects both labor rights and corporate survival, The government must balance business reality and labor rights. Being biased towards either party could lead to a lose/lose/lose scenario in which labor, business, and society are all losers.
Unpaid leaves are a response to reduced orders. When utilization falls below capacity, businesses give unpaid leave to reduce costs and reduce losses. For businesses more flexible manpower usage enables companies to immediately lower costs. Immediately giving employees unpaid leave reduces capital costs. Businesses do not have to bear huge severance costs. The immediate reduction in income often impacts the lives of workers whose salaries were not high to begin with. But on the other hand, the alternative to unpaid leave may well be lay offs. Unpaid leave means workers still have some work, They still have some income. They are at least not completely unemployed.
During the financial tsunami, over 800 domestic companies gave over 200,000 unpaid leaves. The government had a laissez-faire policy. It imposed no legal standards. Once the economic recovery gradually reduced the number of workers on unpaid leave, no one gave it any more thought. But the recent wave of economic decline was unexpectedly rapid. We experience a new downturn even before we experienced a recovery. Unpaid leaves returned, with a vengeance. The government hardly wants to see an increase in the number of unpaid leaves, especially before a general election. Officials resorted to moral suasion. They also imposed legal constraints. Everlight Electronics announced the cancellation of unpaid leaves. It even added that it was "cooperating with government policy." Its statement had unspoken implications.
But based on their statements, government officials have yet to get the point. They remain out of touch with reality. For example, CLA Chairman Jennifer Wang told the Legislative Yuan that the Council of Labor Affairs will draft amendments "enabling employers and employees to reduce working hours." The labor agreement would include provisions for a "corporate commitment to profit sharing." Workers meanwhile would agree to unpaid leave. Employers might "be required to use future profits to make up for lost salaries."
This policy is riddled with problems. Should corporations issue dividends? Different industries have different business practices. They are internal standards. Most companies include them in their articles of incorporation. They are established by the shareholders, They have no relationship to whether employees are given unpaid leave, Businesses which show a profit may issue bonuses to employees. They may offer stock dividends. But these benefits need to be based on long-term growth. Corporations may need to re-invest their profits rather than issue dividends. On the other hand, even businesses which have not turned a profit may wish to encourage employees and boost morale by issuing year-end bonuses or dividends. The circumstances are often different. For the Council of Labor Affairs to artificially link unpaid leave to dividends and profit sharing is unreasonable and difficult to implement. It interferes with sound corporate governance.
Using future profits to "make up" income lost during unpaid leave is obviously infeasible. Unpaid leave represents time the employee did not work. One should not be paid for it in the first place, The Council of Labor Affairs argument about "making up" lost income attempts to look after labor. But it is obviously unreasonable. Businesses would find it unacceptable.
The solutions proposed by the recent forum in Hsinchu Science Park is probably more reasonable and more acceptable to both parties. Business leaders proposed greater flexibility in working hours. But employers and employees disagreed on how. Current law stipulates 48 standard working hours every two weeks. The business community proposed capping standard working hours on a yearly basis. Labor groups voiced strong opposition, They said it had too negative an impact on labor rights. But the standards could be capped on a monthly or bimonthly basis. They could take into consideration the general economic slowdown and reduced orders. More often than not one or two months is enough for a company to recover. This slight relaxation is probably acceptable to business leaders.
Corporations want employees to take unpaid leave only because they have no choice. If the economy is not in decline, if orders are not greatly reduced, businesses will naturally want to run at full capacity. When businesses give unpaid leave instead of laying workers off, it means the expected reduced orders is merely cyclical. But if orders fail to increase, if the long term remains negative, then businesses will lay people off without hesitation. To wit, Quanta and Inventec. If companies cannot survive the transition period via unpaid leave, or if the legal requirements for unpaid leave are too harsh, they will be forced to lay people off immediately. For workers, this is not necessarily a good thing.
On the othe hand, if conditions for unpaid leave are too lenient, workers will become even more vulnerable. If unpaid leave is made a legal requirement, but the conditions are too lenient, the result will be "moral hazard." In the past, when the number of orders fell, companies were still willing to give employees the same salary. But after the unpaid leave system is implemented, and the number of orders fall, businesses may force employees to take unpaid leave in order to save on costs. Labor rights may be even less secure. Therefore one must balance three factors: the protection of labor rights, the maintenance of labor market flexibility, and the requirements of business. One must seek a balance. This will test the government's wisdom and ability.
在企業現實與保障勞工間尋找平衡
2011-11-05 中國時報
從廣鎵、億光開第一槍開始，幾天內驀然發現科技業景氣下滑程度超乎意外，勞委會也終於承認「無薪假有增加趨勢」。馬總統並前往竹科園區與企業座談。面對此一關係著勞工權益與企業生計的大事，在企業現實與勞工權益間，政府宜審慎尋找平衡點，太偏向任何一方，最後都可能造成「三輸」─勞工、企業、社會全成輸家。
無薪假是企業在訂單減少、產能利用率低檔時，為了節省成本、減少虧損，讓勞工休不支薪的假。這種方式，對企業而言，人力更彈性的運用，能讓企業成本立即降低；與立即資遣員工相較，也不必在經營困難之時，猶要支付龐大的資遣費用。對勞工而言，收入立即減少，對許多原本薪資就不高的勞工而言，生活可能馬上受影響；但換個觀點看，如果不是無薪假，企業可能就要裁員；休無薪假，勞工至少仍有工作、也有一定的收入，不至於落入失業困境中。
金融海嘯期間，國內有八百多家企業、共廿多萬人休無薪假；當時，政府採「放任制」，並未訂定辦法規範，待景氣復甦、無薪假逐漸減少後，就更沒人提、沒人想了。只是沒想到這波景氣下滑得如此快速，尚未看到頂峰就已下行，無薪假重出江湖。特別是在大選前，政府當然不樂見無薪假擴大成風潮。官員道德勸說也有、祭出規範限制也有。億光在宣布取消無薪假時，特別說了一句「配合政府政策」，可說是意在言外。
不過，從官員發言來看，官員仍未抓住重點，更未能切合現實。例如，勞委會主委王如玄在立法院說，勞委會將草擬修正「勞雇雙方減少工時協議書範例」，在勞資協議時納入「企業承諾獲利時讓員工可分紅」條文；同時勞工在同意放無薪假時，也可以「將來獲利後資方應回補薪資」作為條件。
這個政策方向，問題不少。企業獲利是否分紅，不同產業、不同企業的作法都不一樣，屬於企業內部規範事宜，一般企業都訂在組織章程中，再由股東會決定，這與員工是否有休過無薪假，實在很難扯上關係。企業有獲利，可能會增發年終獎金給員工，也可能以股票分紅，但也可能基於企業長期發展，需要再投資而完全不分紅。但如企業無獲利，也可能為了鼓勵員工、提振士氣，仍會發出年終獎金或分紅。種種情況、不一而足，勞委會以休過無薪假，作為公司有獲利要分紅的條件，既不合理，亦難執行，更干預原本屬於企業治理的範疇。
至於說有獲利後要「回補」放無薪假時的薪資，更是明顯不通。因為，放無薪假代表的就是正常休假外有沒有上班的天數，原本就不該有薪資，勞委會的「回補」說法，雖然可說顧及勞工收入，但也明顯不合理，企業也難以接受。
較合理而能為勞資雙方接受者，應是日前竹科座談會中，企業提出的擴大工時制度彈性。不過，應該如何擴大彈性，勞資雙方又有得爭了。目前法令的規範是兩周四十八小時工時，對企業界所建議放寬為以「一年計」，勞工團體已表達強力反對立場，認為對勞工權益影響太大；但如僅放寬到一、兩個月，考量到一般景氣低迷、訂單減少，往往不是一、兩個月就能回春，這種小幅放寬，對企業而言，大概也是雞肋。
坦白說，企業要員工放無薪假，基本上是很無奈─要不是景氣下滑、訂單大減，企業當然希望是產能全開。而企業以無薪假而非裁員因應，代表預期現階段的訂單減少只是景氣循環。如果是訂單不再回來、長期看壞，企業大概是二話不說就裁員（如廣達、英業達）。如果這種過度期企業不能以無薪假因應，或是無薪假條件過於嚴苛，反而逼使企業在第一時間就以裁員手段因應，對勞工而言，未必是好事。
但問題是無薪假條件寬鬆，將使勞工更形弱勢；而且把無薪假「法制化」再加上條件寬鬆，更可能引發「道德風險」─過去訂單減少，企業企業還是願意給員工同樣薪資，但有無薪假的制度後，訂單稍減，企業就動輒要員工休無薪假以節省成本，勞工權益更無保障。因此，如何拿捏分寸，在保障勞工權益、保持勞工場彈性、及考量企業實際運作需求等三大面向上，尋求一個最佳的平衡點，將考驗政府的智慧與能力。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 5, 2011
Summary: Huga Optotech and Everlight Electronics fired the first shot, Over mere days, the tech industry suffered an unexpected economic downturn, The Council of Labor Affairs finally admitted that "unpaid leaves are on the rise." President Ma participated in a business forum at the Hsinchu Science Park. The downturn affects both labor rights and corporate survival, The government must balance business reality and labor rights. Being biased towards either party could lead to a lose/lose/lose scenario in which labor, business, and society are all losers.
Full Text Below:
Huga Optotech and Everlight Electronics fired the first shot, Over mere days, the tech industry suffered an unexpected economic downturn, The Council of Labor Affairs finally admitted that "unpaid leaves are on the rise." President Ma participated in a business forum at the Hsinchu Science Park. The downturn affects both labor rights and corporate survival, The government must balance business reality and labor rights. Being biased towards either party could lead to a lose/lose/lose scenario in which labor, business, and society are all losers.
Unpaid leaves are a response to reduced orders. When utilization falls below capacity, businesses give unpaid leave to reduce costs and reduce losses. For businesses more flexible manpower usage enables companies to immediately lower costs. Immediately giving employees unpaid leave reduces capital costs. Businesses do not have to bear huge severance costs. The immediate reduction in income often impacts the lives of workers whose salaries were not high to begin with. But on the other hand, the alternative to unpaid leave may well be lay offs. Unpaid leave means workers still have some work, They still have some income. They are at least not completely unemployed.
During the financial tsunami, over 800 domestic companies gave over 200,000 unpaid leaves. The government had a laissez-faire policy. It imposed no legal standards. Once the economic recovery gradually reduced the number of workers on unpaid leave, no one gave it any more thought. But the recent wave of economic decline was unexpectedly rapid. We experience a new downturn even before we experienced a recovery. Unpaid leaves returned, with a vengeance. The government hardly wants to see an increase in the number of unpaid leaves, especially before a general election. Officials resorted to moral suasion. They also imposed legal constraints. Everlight Electronics announced the cancellation of unpaid leaves. It even added that it was "cooperating with government policy." Its statement had unspoken implications.
But based on their statements, government officials have yet to get the point. They remain out of touch with reality. For example, CLA Chairman Jennifer Wang told the Legislative Yuan that the Council of Labor Affairs will draft amendments "enabling employers and employees to reduce working hours." The labor agreement would include provisions for a "corporate commitment to profit sharing." Workers meanwhile would agree to unpaid leave. Employers might "be required to use future profits to make up for lost salaries."
This policy is riddled with problems. Should corporations issue dividends? Different industries have different business practices. They are internal standards. Most companies include them in their articles of incorporation. They are established by the shareholders, They have no relationship to whether employees are given unpaid leave, Businesses which show a profit may issue bonuses to employees. They may offer stock dividends. But these benefits need to be based on long-term growth. Corporations may need to re-invest their profits rather than issue dividends. On the other hand, even businesses which have not turned a profit may wish to encourage employees and boost morale by issuing year-end bonuses or dividends. The circumstances are often different. For the Council of Labor Affairs to artificially link unpaid leave to dividends and profit sharing is unreasonable and difficult to implement. It interferes with sound corporate governance.
Using future profits to "make up" income lost during unpaid leave is obviously infeasible. Unpaid leave represents time the employee did not work. One should not be paid for it in the first place, The Council of Labor Affairs argument about "making up" lost income attempts to look after labor. But it is obviously unreasonable. Businesses would find it unacceptable.
The solutions proposed by the recent forum in Hsinchu Science Park is probably more reasonable and more acceptable to both parties. Business leaders proposed greater flexibility in working hours. But employers and employees disagreed on how. Current law stipulates 48 standard working hours every two weeks. The business community proposed capping standard working hours on a yearly basis. Labor groups voiced strong opposition, They said it had too negative an impact on labor rights. But the standards could be capped on a monthly or bimonthly basis. They could take into consideration the general economic slowdown and reduced orders. More often than not one or two months is enough for a company to recover. This slight relaxation is probably acceptable to business leaders.
Corporations want employees to take unpaid leave only because they have no choice. If the economy is not in decline, if orders are not greatly reduced, businesses will naturally want to run at full capacity. When businesses give unpaid leave instead of laying workers off, it means the expected reduced orders is merely cyclical. But if orders fail to increase, if the long term remains negative, then businesses will lay people off without hesitation. To wit, Quanta and Inventec. If companies cannot survive the transition period via unpaid leave, or if the legal requirements for unpaid leave are too harsh, they will be forced to lay people off immediately. For workers, this is not necessarily a good thing.
On the othe hand, if conditions for unpaid leave are too lenient, workers will become even more vulnerable. If unpaid leave is made a legal requirement, but the conditions are too lenient, the result will be "moral hazard." In the past, when the number of orders fell, companies were still willing to give employees the same salary. But after the unpaid leave system is implemented, and the number of orders fall, businesses may force employees to take unpaid leave in order to save on costs. Labor rights may be even less secure. Therefore one must balance three factors: the protection of labor rights, the maintenance of labor market flexibility, and the requirements of business. One must seek a balance. This will test the government's wisdom and ability.
在企業現實與保障勞工間尋找平衡
2011-11-05 中國時報
從廣鎵、億光開第一槍開始，幾天內驀然發現科技業景氣下滑程度超乎意外，勞委會也終於承認「無薪假有增加趨勢」。馬總統並前往竹科園區與企業座談。面對此一關係著勞工權益與企業生計的大事，在企業現實與勞工權益間，政府宜審慎尋找平衡點，太偏向任何一方，最後都可能造成「三輸」─勞工、企業、社會全成輸家。
無薪假是企業在訂單減少、產能利用率低檔時，為了節省成本、減少虧損，讓勞工休不支薪的假。這種方式，對企業而言，人力更彈性的運用，能讓企業成本立即降低；與立即資遣員工相較，也不必在經營困難之時，猶要支付龐大的資遣費用。對勞工而言，收入立即減少，對許多原本薪資就不高的勞工而言，生活可能馬上受影響；但換個觀點看，如果不是無薪假，企業可能就要裁員；休無薪假，勞工至少仍有工作、也有一定的收入，不至於落入失業困境中。
金融海嘯期間，國內有八百多家企業、共廿多萬人休無薪假；當時，政府採「放任制」，並未訂定辦法規範，待景氣復甦、無薪假逐漸減少後，就更沒人提、沒人想了。只是沒想到這波景氣下滑得如此快速，尚未看到頂峰就已下行，無薪假重出江湖。特別是在大選前，政府當然不樂見無薪假擴大成風潮。官員道德勸說也有、祭出規範限制也有。億光在宣布取消無薪假時，特別說了一句「配合政府政策」，可說是意在言外。
不過，從官員發言來看，官員仍未抓住重點，更未能切合現實。例如，勞委會主委王如玄在立法院說，勞委會將草擬修正「勞雇雙方減少工時協議書範例」，在勞資協議時納入「企業承諾獲利時讓員工可分紅」條文；同時勞工在同意放無薪假時，也可以「將來獲利後資方應回補薪資」作為條件。
這個政策方向，問題不少。企業獲利是否分紅，不同產業、不同企業的作法都不一樣，屬於企業內部規範事宜，一般企業都訂在組織章程中，再由股東會決定，這與員工是否有休過無薪假，實在很難扯上關係。企業有獲利，可能會增發年終獎金給員工，也可能以股票分紅，但也可能基於企業長期發展，需要再投資而完全不分紅。但如企業無獲利，也可能為了鼓勵員工、提振士氣，仍會發出年終獎金或分紅。種種情況、不一而足，勞委會以休過無薪假，作為公司有獲利要分紅的條件，既不合理，亦難執行，更干預原本屬於企業治理的範疇。
至於說有獲利後要「回補」放無薪假時的薪資，更是明顯不通。因為，放無薪假代表的就是正常休假外有沒有上班的天數，原本就不該有薪資，勞委會的「回補」說法，雖然可說顧及勞工收入，但也明顯不合理，企業也難以接受。
較合理而能為勞資雙方接受者，應是日前竹科座談會中，企業提出的擴大工時制度彈性。不過，應該如何擴大彈性，勞資雙方又有得爭了。目前法令的規範是兩周四十八小時工時，對企業界所建議放寬為以「一年計」，勞工團體已表達強力反對立場，認為對勞工權益影響太大；但如僅放寬到一、兩個月，考量到一般景氣低迷、訂單減少，往往不是一、兩個月就能回春，這種小幅放寬，對企業而言，大概也是雞肋。
坦白說，企業要員工放無薪假，基本上是很無奈─要不是景氣下滑、訂單大減，企業當然希望是產能全開。而企業以無薪假而非裁員因應，代表預期現階段的訂單減少只是景氣循環。如果是訂單不再回來、長期看壞，企業大概是二話不說就裁員（如廣達、英業達）。如果這種過度期企業不能以無薪假因應，或是無薪假條件過於嚴苛，反而逼使企業在第一時間就以裁員手段因應，對勞工而言，未必是好事。
但問題是無薪假條件寬鬆，將使勞工更形弱勢；而且把無薪假「法制化」再加上條件寬鬆，更可能引發「道德風險」─過去訂單減少，企業企業還是願意給員工同樣薪資，但有無薪假的制度後，訂單稍減，企業就動輒要員工休無薪假以節省成本，勞工權益更無保障。因此，如何拿捏分寸，在保障勞工權益、保持勞工場彈性、及考量企業實際運作需求等三大面向上，尋求一個最佳的平衡點，將考驗政府的智慧與能力。
Thursday, November 3, 2011
Voters Must Not Allow Politicians to Repeatedly Manipulate Them
Voters Must Not Allow Politicians to Repeatedly Manipulate Them
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 4, 2011
Summary: People First Party Chairman James Soong has handed a petition signed by 355,819 petitioners to the Taipei City Election Commission. It's official. James Soong is an independent presidential candidate in the 2012 election. For the KMT, James Soong has become a nightmare from which it cannot awake. Everyone must pay close attention to him, even though he is utterly unelectable. He has become the decisive factor in the presidential election, Once again, this is a test of the maturity of the island's democracy.
Full Text Below:
People First Party Chairman James Soong has handed a petition signed by 355,819 petitioners to the Taipei City Election Commission. It's official. James Soong is an independent presidential candidate in the 2012 election. For the KMT, James Soong has become a nightmare from which it cannot awake. Everyone must pay close attention to him, even though he is utterly unelectable. He has become the decisive factor in the presidential election, Once again, this is a test of the maturity of the island's democracy.
Just exactly what does James Soong want? Why is he determined to stay in the race to the bitter end? The KMT has never understood this mystery. But the answer is actually quite simple. James Soong is motivated entirely by power, Power is his only motivation. Years ago, before he became Governor of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui gave Soong a choice of appointments, including ROC Representative to Washington and Minister of Defense. He unhesitatingly chose Governor of Taiwan. James Soong said that a "Mainlander" is currently unelectable. But if I serve as governor now, it will be easier to nominate a Mainlander candidate when elections are eventually held. Therefore he fought hard for the KMT nomination, Wu Poh-hsiung was assumed to be a shoo-in. Wu was determined to run even, if he won only in Alishan. But in the end Wu was forced to quietly withdraw.
After the Taiwan Provincial Government was frozen, James Soong and Lee Teng-hui had a falling out. Reconciliation was possible, But James Soong rejected attempts at reconciliation, and went his own way. The reason was simple. He was a popularly elected governor. He had strong public backing. Other than premier, what position was worthy of him? But Lee Teng-hui had no intention of letting him run for president. For Lee, pushing out Vincent Siew to placate James Soong was not an option. Just before Lien Chan was officially nominated, Lee sent Soong a hand-written letter, inviting Soong to be Lien's vice presidential running mate. Soong did not even bother to read the letter, but sent it back unopened.
The 2004 Lien-Soong ticket was a major turning point. The KMT tasted the bitter fruit of losing power. More importantly, Chen Shui-bian cheated both Lien Chan and James Soong, They dissolved their ticket and did not return to power. Lien and Soong were once at odds with each other. During this period however, they development a reasonably good, highly cooperative relationship. Chen Shui-bian's "Two Bullets" miracle even nurtured a degree of "side by side in the trenches" camaraderie. Yet less than a year later, James Soong arranged a "Bian/Soong Meeting," leaving the KMT stunned and betrayed. KMT Chairman Lien Chan was about to embark on his historic ice-breaking trip to the Mainland. James Soong hope to preempt Lien by visiting the Mainland as "President Chen Shui-bian official envoy."
Soong used to insist that he was not someone who yearned for a position of power. He said he was not someone who made political deals. People motivated by power can do without a position of power. But they cannot do without public attention, The "Bian/Soong Meeting" was a good example. Soong merely wanted a role in cross-Strait relations. But this is not always the case, According to a China Times Weekly WikiLeaks report, in 2006 James Soong insisted on running for Mayor of Taipei. Soong told then AIT Taipei Office Chief Stephen M. Young that Ma Ying-jeou's consultant was considering asking Hau Lung-bin to withdraw from the race. In return, Ma would promise not to run for president in 2008. Soong said that running for mayor was the same as telling the KMT he was not running for president and would not serve as the DPP government's premier. The report said union organizer Liao Feng-teh told them Ma Ying-jeou had already denied this allegation.
After his defeat in the Taipei mayoral race, James Soong announced his withdrawal from the political arena. But the Ma Ying-jeou discretionary fund controversy handed the PFP a number of bargaining chips. WikiLeaks described the 2007 KMT/PFP joint nominations for the Legislative Yuan as something the PFP accepted "only because it had no choice." People First Party Legislator Huang Yi-chiao told Stephen M. Young that the People First Party met with the DPP in advance. The PFP told the DPP that the PFP would be absent from the Legislative Yuan Ways and Means Committee session, The "Exclude Ma Clause" would make anyone found guilty in a first instance trial ineligible as a candidate. The PFP's absence enabled the DPP to make the "Exclude Ma Clause" part of the agenda. This forced the KMT to yield seats to the PFP in the legislative election.
The KMT and the PFP have often been at odds with each other. But this joint nomination strategy enabled the KMT and PFP to achieve an unprecedented victory in the 2008 legislative elections. Ma Ying-jeou also won by a landslide in the presidential election. But the KMT was barely back in power before the People First Party began demanding even more political appointments. This included appointments to the Control Yuan, which calls for the independent exercise of power, and for which appointments of a partisan political character are inappropriate. James Soong complained that Wu Po-hsiung was forced to consent, and that Ma Ying-jeou was unwilling to nominate PFP candidates to the Control Yuan.
After meeting with James Soong, Stephen M. Young remarked, "James Soong is a wily, unprincipled politician. He controls a tiny faction within the legislature (21 seats out of 221 total). Yet on major issues he is able to exercise a decisive influence. Everyone is afraid of offending Soong. Probably because he knows many of the KMT's dirty secrets. But the question is, why should Ma Ying-jeou and other Blue Camp leaders allow "this old Blue Camp tail to wag the dog?"
Stephen M. Young wonders why. The Kuomintang probably wonders why as well. Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan provided a pertinent answer to this question. "We have no choice. We must ally with the PFP in order to achieve a majority in the legislature." This was true back then. It appears to be true now, But who is to blame? Is Soong too adept at political manipulation? Or is the KMT simply too inept? More importantly, how long will voters on Taiwan allow politicians to lead them around by the nose?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.11.04
選民不應容忍政客一再操弄
本報訊
親民黨主席宋楚瑜向台北市選委會交出三十五萬五千五百八十九份連署書之後，宋楚瑜成為二○一二年總統獨立參選人已勢所必然。對國民黨而言，宋楚瑜已成為揮之不去的夢魘，這位眾人皆曰當選不了的參選人，卻成為總統選局的關鍵變數，再一次考驗台灣民主的成熟度。
宋楚瑜到底要什麼？為什麼非選到底不可？國民黨始終解不開這個謎，其實很簡單，宋楚瑜是一個徹底的權力人物，權力是他唯一的動力。當年出任省主席之前，李登輝給了他包括駐美代表、國防部長等選擇，他獨挑省主席，宋楚瑜曾說，一個外省人當省主席不可能選省長，有利於未來開放省長民選後的提名布局。結果，他強力爭取國民黨的提名，讓原以為十拿九穩，台灣只剩下阿里山也要選省長的吳伯雄黯然退讓。
凍省之後，宋楚瑜與李登輝翻臉，不是沒有機會和解，宋楚瑜拒絕安排決意走自己的路，原因也很簡單，在那個時候擁有強大民意後盾的民選省長，除行政院長還有什麼職務可以匹配？李登輝既無意讓他選總統，當時更不可能換掉蕭萬長以安撫宋楚瑜。即使如此，連戰在國民黨正式提名前，還是親筆手書信函，力邀宋楚瑜搭檔，這封信連拆都沒拆，就被宋楚瑜退回了。
二○○四年「連宋配」是一個重大轉機，國民黨痛嘗失去政權的苦果，更重要的，連戰、宋楚瑜都吃了陳水扁的虧，不合無以重返執政。在這段期間，曾經對立的連宋建立相當不錯的合作關係，甚至在兩顆子彈衝擊選情後，還有一定程度的革命感情。即使如此，一年不到宋楚瑜一場「扁宋會」，又讓國民黨錯愕不已，當時正是國民黨主席連戰準備赴大陸展開破冰之旅前夕，宋楚瑜要以「陳水扁總統授權」的身分搶得先機登陸。
宋楚瑜常說，他不是爭取職務的人，更不是談政治交易的人。權力人物可以不要位子，不能沒有角色，「扁宋會」可做如是觀，他要在兩岸關係中扮演角色。但是，也不全然如此，根據《時報周刊》報導，維基解密電文紀錄，二○○六年宋楚瑜堅持參選台北市長，他告訴時任ＡＩＴ台北辦事處長楊甦棣，馬英九的顧問不排除勸退郝龍斌，以換取他保證二○○八年不會競選總統，宋楚瑜說參選市長就是告訴國民黨他既不會選總統，也不會出任民進黨政府的行政院長。ＡＩＴ電文加註指出，組工會主任廖風德告訴他們馬英九已斷然否認這個可能。
台北市長敗選之後，宋楚瑜宣布退出政壇，但是，馬英九特別費案爆發，又讓親民黨掌握與國民黨談判的籌碼。維基解密電文用「只因不得不然」形容二○○七年五月國親立委聯合提名協議，親民黨立委黃義交坦白告訴楊甦棣，親民黨事前知會民進黨，他們會在立法院程序委員會缺席，讓一審有罪不得參選的「排馬條款」排入議程，逼迫國民黨最後同意讓出立委席次。
不論國親之間到底在多大的矛盾衝突下達成協議，這個聯合提名策略確實讓國親在二○○八年取得空前勝利，馬英九也在總統大選中高票當選。然而，國民黨才重返執政，親民黨在人事安排上又多所要求，包括獨立行使職權未必適合由政黨推薦的監委，宋楚瑜都抱怨使吳伯雄同意，馬英九都不肯提名親民黨人出任監委。
與宋楚瑜會談後的楊甦棣在電文中特別加了一段評論：「宋楚瑜是狡詐（wily）、沒有原則的政治人物，他操作小小的立院派系（總數二百二十一席中的二十一席），在重大議題中，取得關鍵影響力。人們似乎都很怕得罪宋，可能因為他懷抱著國民黨過去許多難堪的祕密。問題在於，馬英九和其他藍營領導人，到底要容許「這樣的藍營老尾巴搖狗」（this aging blue tail to wag the dog）到什麼時候？」
楊甦棣的疑問，或許也是國民黨人的疑問，這個問題國民黨榮譽主席連戰倒是很中肯的給了答案：「沒辦法，我們需要親民黨的結盟，以取得國會多數。」這個答案當年如此，此刻看來還是如此，該怪宋楚瑜太擅於權力操作？還是國民黨太拙於政治操作？更重要的，台灣選民會容忍政治人物權力操作到幾時？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 4, 2011
Summary: People First Party Chairman James Soong has handed a petition signed by 355,819 petitioners to the Taipei City Election Commission. It's official. James Soong is an independent presidential candidate in the 2012 election. For the KMT, James Soong has become a nightmare from which it cannot awake. Everyone must pay close attention to him, even though he is utterly unelectable. He has become the decisive factor in the presidential election, Once again, this is a test of the maturity of the island's democracy.
Full Text Below:
People First Party Chairman James Soong has handed a petition signed by 355,819 petitioners to the Taipei City Election Commission. It's official. James Soong is an independent presidential candidate in the 2012 election. For the KMT, James Soong has become a nightmare from which it cannot awake. Everyone must pay close attention to him, even though he is utterly unelectable. He has become the decisive factor in the presidential election, Once again, this is a test of the maturity of the island's democracy.
Just exactly what does James Soong want? Why is he determined to stay in the race to the bitter end? The KMT has never understood this mystery. But the answer is actually quite simple. James Soong is motivated entirely by power, Power is his only motivation. Years ago, before he became Governor of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui gave Soong a choice of appointments, including ROC Representative to Washington and Minister of Defense. He unhesitatingly chose Governor of Taiwan. James Soong said that a "Mainlander" is currently unelectable. But if I serve as governor now, it will be easier to nominate a Mainlander candidate when elections are eventually held. Therefore he fought hard for the KMT nomination, Wu Poh-hsiung was assumed to be a shoo-in. Wu was determined to run even, if he won only in Alishan. But in the end Wu was forced to quietly withdraw.
After the Taiwan Provincial Government was frozen, James Soong and Lee Teng-hui had a falling out. Reconciliation was possible, But James Soong rejected attempts at reconciliation, and went his own way. The reason was simple. He was a popularly elected governor. He had strong public backing. Other than premier, what position was worthy of him? But Lee Teng-hui had no intention of letting him run for president. For Lee, pushing out Vincent Siew to placate James Soong was not an option. Just before Lien Chan was officially nominated, Lee sent Soong a hand-written letter, inviting Soong to be Lien's vice presidential running mate. Soong did not even bother to read the letter, but sent it back unopened.
The 2004 Lien-Soong ticket was a major turning point. The KMT tasted the bitter fruit of losing power. More importantly, Chen Shui-bian cheated both Lien Chan and James Soong, They dissolved their ticket and did not return to power. Lien and Soong were once at odds with each other. During this period however, they development a reasonably good, highly cooperative relationship. Chen Shui-bian's "Two Bullets" miracle even nurtured a degree of "side by side in the trenches" camaraderie. Yet less than a year later, James Soong arranged a "Bian/Soong Meeting," leaving the KMT stunned and betrayed. KMT Chairman Lien Chan was about to embark on his historic ice-breaking trip to the Mainland. James Soong hope to preempt Lien by visiting the Mainland as "President Chen Shui-bian official envoy."
Soong used to insist that he was not someone who yearned for a position of power. He said he was not someone who made political deals. People motivated by power can do without a position of power. But they cannot do without public attention, The "Bian/Soong Meeting" was a good example. Soong merely wanted a role in cross-Strait relations. But this is not always the case, According to a China Times Weekly WikiLeaks report, in 2006 James Soong insisted on running for Mayor of Taipei. Soong told then AIT Taipei Office Chief Stephen M. Young that Ma Ying-jeou's consultant was considering asking Hau Lung-bin to withdraw from the race. In return, Ma would promise not to run for president in 2008. Soong said that running for mayor was the same as telling the KMT he was not running for president and would not serve as the DPP government's premier. The report said union organizer Liao Feng-teh told them Ma Ying-jeou had already denied this allegation.
After his defeat in the Taipei mayoral race, James Soong announced his withdrawal from the political arena. But the Ma Ying-jeou discretionary fund controversy handed the PFP a number of bargaining chips. WikiLeaks described the 2007 KMT/PFP joint nominations for the Legislative Yuan as something the PFP accepted "only because it had no choice." People First Party Legislator Huang Yi-chiao told Stephen M. Young that the People First Party met with the DPP in advance. The PFP told the DPP that the PFP would be absent from the Legislative Yuan Ways and Means Committee session, The "Exclude Ma Clause" would make anyone found guilty in a first instance trial ineligible as a candidate. The PFP's absence enabled the DPP to make the "Exclude Ma Clause" part of the agenda. This forced the KMT to yield seats to the PFP in the legislative election.
The KMT and the PFP have often been at odds with each other. But this joint nomination strategy enabled the KMT and PFP to achieve an unprecedented victory in the 2008 legislative elections. Ma Ying-jeou also won by a landslide in the presidential election. But the KMT was barely back in power before the People First Party began demanding even more political appointments. This included appointments to the Control Yuan, which calls for the independent exercise of power, and for which appointments of a partisan political character are inappropriate. James Soong complained that Wu Po-hsiung was forced to consent, and that Ma Ying-jeou was unwilling to nominate PFP candidates to the Control Yuan.
After meeting with James Soong, Stephen M. Young remarked, "James Soong is a wily, unprincipled politician. He controls a tiny faction within the legislature (21 seats out of 221 total). Yet on major issues he is able to exercise a decisive influence. Everyone is afraid of offending Soong. Probably because he knows many of the KMT's dirty secrets. But the question is, why should Ma Ying-jeou and other Blue Camp leaders allow "this old Blue Camp tail to wag the dog?"
Stephen M. Young wonders why. The Kuomintang probably wonders why as well. Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan provided a pertinent answer to this question. "We have no choice. We must ally with the PFP in order to achieve a majority in the legislature." This was true back then. It appears to be true now, But who is to blame? Is Soong too adept at political manipulation? Or is the KMT simply too inept? More importantly, how long will voters on Taiwan allow politicians to lead them around by the nose?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2011.11.04
選民不應容忍政客一再操弄
本報訊
親民黨主席宋楚瑜向台北市選委會交出三十五萬五千五百八十九份連署書之後，宋楚瑜成為二○一二年總統獨立參選人已勢所必然。對國民黨而言，宋楚瑜已成為揮之不去的夢魘，這位眾人皆曰當選不了的參選人，卻成為總統選局的關鍵變數，再一次考驗台灣民主的成熟度。
宋楚瑜到底要什麼？為什麼非選到底不可？國民黨始終解不開這個謎，其實很簡單，宋楚瑜是一個徹底的權力人物，權力是他唯一的動力。當年出任省主席之前，李登輝給了他包括駐美代表、國防部長等選擇，他獨挑省主席，宋楚瑜曾說，一個外省人當省主席不可能選省長，有利於未來開放省長民選後的提名布局。結果，他強力爭取國民黨的提名，讓原以為十拿九穩，台灣只剩下阿里山也要選省長的吳伯雄黯然退讓。
凍省之後，宋楚瑜與李登輝翻臉，不是沒有機會和解，宋楚瑜拒絕安排決意走自己的路，原因也很簡單，在那個時候擁有強大民意後盾的民選省長，除行政院長還有什麼職務可以匹配？李登輝既無意讓他選總統，當時更不可能換掉蕭萬長以安撫宋楚瑜。即使如此，連戰在國民黨正式提名前，還是親筆手書信函，力邀宋楚瑜搭檔，這封信連拆都沒拆，就被宋楚瑜退回了。
二○○四年「連宋配」是一個重大轉機，國民黨痛嘗失去政權的苦果，更重要的，連戰、宋楚瑜都吃了陳水扁的虧，不合無以重返執政。在這段期間，曾經對立的連宋建立相當不錯的合作關係，甚至在兩顆子彈衝擊選情後，還有一定程度的革命感情。即使如此，一年不到宋楚瑜一場「扁宋會」，又讓國民黨錯愕不已，當時正是國民黨主席連戰準備赴大陸展開破冰之旅前夕，宋楚瑜要以「陳水扁總統授權」的身分搶得先機登陸。
宋楚瑜常說，他不是爭取職務的人，更不是談政治交易的人。權力人物可以不要位子，不能沒有角色，「扁宋會」可做如是觀，他要在兩岸關係中扮演角色。但是，也不全然如此，根據《時報周刊》報導，維基解密電文紀錄，二○○六年宋楚瑜堅持參選台北市長，他告訴時任ＡＩＴ台北辦事處長楊甦棣，馬英九的顧問不排除勸退郝龍斌，以換取他保證二○○八年不會競選總統，宋楚瑜說參選市長就是告訴國民黨他既不會選總統，也不會出任民進黨政府的行政院長。ＡＩＴ電文加註指出，組工會主任廖風德告訴他們馬英九已斷然否認這個可能。
台北市長敗選之後，宋楚瑜宣布退出政壇，但是，馬英九特別費案爆發，又讓親民黨掌握與國民黨談判的籌碼。維基解密電文用「只因不得不然」形容二○○七年五月國親立委聯合提名協議，親民黨立委黃義交坦白告訴楊甦棣，親民黨事前知會民進黨，他們會在立法院程序委員會缺席，讓一審有罪不得參選的「排馬條款」排入議程，逼迫國民黨最後同意讓出立委席次。
不論國親之間到底在多大的矛盾衝突下達成協議，這個聯合提名策略確實讓國親在二○○八年取得空前勝利，馬英九也在總統大選中高票當選。然而，國民黨才重返執政，親民黨在人事安排上又多所要求，包括獨立行使職權未必適合由政黨推薦的監委，宋楚瑜都抱怨使吳伯雄同意，馬英九都不肯提名親民黨人出任監委。
與宋楚瑜會談後的楊甦棣在電文中特別加了一段評論：「宋楚瑜是狡詐（wily）、沒有原則的政治人物，他操作小小的立院派系（總數二百二十一席中的二十一席），在重大議題中，取得關鍵影響力。人們似乎都很怕得罪宋，可能因為他懷抱著國民黨過去許多難堪的祕密。問題在於，馬英九和其他藍營領導人，到底要容許「這樣的藍營老尾巴搖狗」（this aging blue tail to wag the dog）到什麼時候？」
楊甦棣的疑問，或許也是國民黨人的疑問，這個問題國民黨榮譽主席連戰倒是很中肯的給了答案：「沒辦法，我們需要親民黨的結盟，以取得國會多數。」這個答案當年如此，此刻看來還是如此，該怪宋楚瑜太擅於權力操作？還是國民黨太拙於政治操作？更重要的，台灣選民會容忍政治人物權力操作到幾時？
Cross-Strait Industrial Cooperation Requires Vision
Cross-Strait Industrial Cooperation Requires Vision
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 3, 2011
Summary: Recently cross-Strait industrial cooperation has attracted considerable attention. On October 20th, the Seventh Chiang/Chen Summit announced "increased agreement on cross-Strait industrial cooperation." On October 28th and 29th, the First Cross-Strait Industry Forum reached a consensus on numerous issues. Yesterday, the Second Economic Cooperation Conference announced a preliminary agreement on industrial cooperation, and on plans for the future. Currently industries on both sides of the Strait face challenges such as recession, restructuring, and export competition, Industrial cooperation requires overall review and planning. Only this will meet everyone's needs.
Full Text Below:
Recently cross-Strait industrial cooperation has attracted considerable attention. On October 20th, the Seventh Chiang/Chen Summit announced "increased agreement on cross-Strait industrial cooperation." On October 28th and 29th, the First Cross-Strait Industry Forum reached a consensus on numerous issues. Yesterday, the Second Economic Cooperation Conference announced a preliminary agreement on industrial cooperation, and on plans for the future. Currently industries on both sides of the Strait face challenges such as recession, restructuring, and export competition, Industrial cooperation requires overall review and planning. Only this will meet everyone's needs.
In the short term, the debt crisis in Europe and high unemployment in the US have increased the risk of a second global economic recession. The United States and Europe face sharply reduced market demand. Imports from emerging market countries continue to slow. This affects these country's exports and economic growth. Mainland China's exports and economic growth have slowed significantly in recent months. Taiwan's main exports are susceptible to economic fluctuations. These exports include information technology and communications technology products. These products have borne the brunt of the recession. In the past, the government provided strong support for memory (DRAM) manufacturers and panel manufacturers despite countless losses. These manufacturers now totter on the brink of death. The two sides of the Strait have established a large-scale division of labor within the computer industry. The mobile phone industry and LED industry face serious problems with overcapacity and insufficient orders. Following the financial tsunami, both sides of the Strait vigorously supported green energy industries such as solar energy generation and electric cars. All these are in trouble. If they cannot survive these short-term difficulties, how can we talk about cross-Strait industrial cooperation?
In the mid term and long term, industries on both sides of the Strait face severe challenges. South Korea is Taiwan's main competitor in the international market. South Korea is aggressively signing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with other countries. FTAs between Europe and Korea, and the US and Korea, have been signed and are about to take effect. The impact on Taiwan's exports will be severe. Taiwan's most advantageous export market is the Chinese mainland. Korean products are a growing threat. The Chinese mainland is also undergoing rapid industrial upgrading. It is rapidly replacing Taiwan in the manufacture of components, intermediate raw materials, machinery, and equipment. The market share of Taiwan exports in the Mainland market continues to drop. Experts estimate that within five to ten years, over half of Taiwan's exports to the Mainland will be replaced by products from foreign countries, Taiwan faces an imminent industrial crisis.
Industries on the Mainland also face a number of factors, such as rapidly rising wage rates, real estate prices, raw material prices, and an appreciating RMB. Low value-added processing and export industries face intense pressure to upgrade, move inland, or move abroad. The Mainland's 125 Plan is a response to internal and external changes. It vigorously promotes industrial restructuring and modernization. It strongly supports the development of new strategic industries. This industrial policy is clearly in coopetition with industries on Taiwan, and adds to the complexity of cross-Strait industrial cooperation.
The environment for industrial development is harsh, Cross-strait cooperation requires a sense of direction and a need for prioritization. In the short term, cooperation should focus on helping industry respond to the recession. The two governments should help them cope with excess manufacturing capacity, reduce duplication of investments, and ensure the survival of the fittest. This will enhance the competitiveness of the economy and establish a foundation for the future. Flat panels, LEDs, and solar energy face a recession. These industries should be our top priority as cooperation projects, If cooperation on these industries yield concrete results, it will increase confidence in cross-Strait industrial cooperation.
In the mid term to long term, the two sides must fully understand that the only way to improve industrial competitiveness is to compete globally and follow the rules of the market. Therefore, the two sides should accelerate their move in the direction of free trade. The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) attempts to establish a cross-Strait free trade zone, The long-term cross-Strait division of labor will enhance industrial competitiveness. Its impact will be critical. We have repeatedly called for follow up talks on ECFA. We must clear away the obstacles. We must draw up plans for a cross-Strait free trade zone. This is the main reason the Ma administration must not delay.
Accelerated signing of free trade agreements (FTAs) with major trading partners, and regional economic integration, are keys to industrial development. The Ma administration has announced its goal of joining the "Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement" (TPP) within 10 years. Taipei is actively seeking to sign FTAs with Singapore, New Zealand, India, the ASEAN countries, and even the U.S. and EU. But the key to success in these efforts, is Beijing's political concerns. Cross-Strait cooperation will endure only with cross-Strait integration and international economic support
We are moving toward global competition. South Korea and Japan are Taiwan's major rivals. Strategic cross-Strait industrial cooperation is an important market niche that can spell victory in the international market. The authorities on both sides of the Strait must approach the matter from the perspective of international industrial competition. They must identify the niche common to both sides of the Strait. They must encourage business owners on both sides of the Strait to form strategic alliances, to break through bottlenecks, and together build globally competitive, high-value industries.
In short, the successful elements of cross-Strait industrial cooperation, must be based on free trade and market rules. Only through global competition in the marketplace, can industries on both sides of the Strait create a win-win situation that offers hope for the future.
兩岸產業合作應有宏觀思維
2011-11-03 中國時報
近來兩岸產業合作問題受到很大關注，上月20日第7次江陳會發表《加強兩岸產業合作的共同意見》，28、29日首屆兩岸產業論壇達成多項共識，昨日經合會第2次例會亦總結產業合作階段性成果，並策勵將來。鑑於當前兩岸產業皆面臨景氣衰退衝擊、結構調整及出口競爭等多重挑戰，產業合作須從總體面進行整合檢討及規畫，才能切中需要，事半功倍。
從短期來看，歐債危機及美國失業率居高不下，導致全球經濟二次衰退風險升高，美、歐市場需求大幅減弱，自新興市場國家進口持續減緩，從而影響該等國家的出口及經濟成長。近月大陸出口及經濟成長均明顯減緩，台灣主力出口產品為易受景氣波動影響的資、通訊等高科技產品，因而更是首當其衝，過去政府極力扶持的記憶體（DRAM）及面板產業虧損累累，正面臨存亡絕續的關頭；在兩岸建立大規模產業內分工的電腦、手機、LED等產業也都面臨產能過剩、訂單不足的嚴重問題；金融海嘯後兩岸大力扶持的綠能產業如太陽能、電動車等亦淪為艱困產業。若短期難關都無法度過，豈有能力奢談兩岸產業合作？
從中長期來看，兩岸產業發展亦面臨至為嚴峻的挑戰。在國際市場上，台灣主要競爭對手南韓積極對外洽簽《自由貿易協定》（FTA），歐韓及美韓FTA完成簽署及陸續生效，對台灣出口的衝擊尤深。而台灣出口最具優勢的大陸市場，不僅受南韓產品與日俱增的威脅，而且因為大陸本土產業快速升級，在零組件、中間原料及機器設備供應方面，大量取代台灣製造產品，從而導致台灣出口產品在大陸市占率不斷下降。有專家估計5至10年內，台灣對大陸的出口超過一半將被大陸及其他國家產品所取代，台灣產業的危機正日益逼近。
大陸產業本身也面臨到工資大幅上漲、房地價及原材料價格不斷攀升、人民幣升值等多重因素衝擊，低附加價值的加工出口產業面臨強大的轉型升級壓力或被迫移往內陸或境外。大陸十二五規畫亦因應內外情勢變化，加大力道推動產業轉型換代，並大力扶植戰略性新興產業發展。此等產業政策方向明顯和台灣產業出現競合關係，從而也增添兩岸產業合作的複雜度。
面對嚴苛的產業發展環境，兩岸合作必須抓對方向並有優先緩急的順序。在短期，合作重點應在協助產業因應景氣衰退，兩岸政府的角色當在協助整合產能過剩的產業，減少重複投資，汰弱留強，以為景氣好轉後競爭力提升，打下基礎。如面板、LED、太陽能等面臨衰退產業可列為最優先合作的項目，若能見到具體成效，必能增強兩岸產業合作的信心。
在中長期，兩岸都須深刻體認：面向全球競爭，遵循市場法則，是提高產業競爭力的不二法門，因此，兩岸皆應加速朝自由貿易方向發展。《兩岸經濟合作架構協議》（ECFA）旨在建立兩岸自由貿易區，對兩岸產業分工及長期競爭力提升，具有關鍵的影響。我們已多次呼籲應加速ECFA後續4大協議的諮商，排除阻力，及早完成兩岸自由貿易區的路徑圖。這也是馬政府不能再繼續拖延的關鍵作為。
另一方面，加速和主要貿易對手洽簽自由貿易協定（FTA），融入區域經濟整合，亦是產業發展的關鍵。馬政府宣示台灣將以10年內加入《跨太平洋經濟夥伴協定》（TPP）為目標；台灣也正積極推動和新加坡、紐西蘭、印度、東協各國乃至美國、歐盟等洽簽FTA；但這些努力成功與否關鍵，繫於北京的政治考量。我們相信，唯有兩岸在參與國際經濟整合上相互扶持，兩岸合作才能可長可久。
在邁向全球競爭過程中，兩岸產業的策略性合作，是和南韓、日本等主要對手決勝國際市場的重要利基。兩岸當局須從國際產業競爭戰略切入，找出兩岸共同的利基，進而引導或鼓勵兩岸業者進行策略性聯盟，才能突破瓶頸，共同打造具全球競爭力的高值產業。
總之，兩岸產業合作的成功要件，必須建立在自由貿易及市場法則之上，唯有通過全球市場競爭的檢驗，兩岸產業才能共創雙贏，締造令人期待的發展願景。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 3, 2011
Summary: Recently cross-Strait industrial cooperation has attracted considerable attention. On October 20th, the Seventh Chiang/Chen Summit announced "increased agreement on cross-Strait industrial cooperation." On October 28th and 29th, the First Cross-Strait Industry Forum reached a consensus on numerous issues. Yesterday, the Second Economic Cooperation Conference announced a preliminary agreement on industrial cooperation, and on plans for the future. Currently industries on both sides of the Strait face challenges such as recession, restructuring, and export competition, Industrial cooperation requires overall review and planning. Only this will meet everyone's needs.
Full Text Below:
Recently cross-Strait industrial cooperation has attracted considerable attention. On October 20th, the Seventh Chiang/Chen Summit announced "increased agreement on cross-Strait industrial cooperation." On October 28th and 29th, the First Cross-Strait Industry Forum reached a consensus on numerous issues. Yesterday, the Second Economic Cooperation Conference announced a preliminary agreement on industrial cooperation, and on plans for the future. Currently industries on both sides of the Strait face challenges such as recession, restructuring, and export competition, Industrial cooperation requires overall review and planning. Only this will meet everyone's needs.
In the short term, the debt crisis in Europe and high unemployment in the US have increased the risk of a second global economic recession. The United States and Europe face sharply reduced market demand. Imports from emerging market countries continue to slow. This affects these country's exports and economic growth. Mainland China's exports and economic growth have slowed significantly in recent months. Taiwan's main exports are susceptible to economic fluctuations. These exports include information technology and communications technology products. These products have borne the brunt of the recession. In the past, the government provided strong support for memory (DRAM) manufacturers and panel manufacturers despite countless losses. These manufacturers now totter on the brink of death. The two sides of the Strait have established a large-scale division of labor within the computer industry. The mobile phone industry and LED industry face serious problems with overcapacity and insufficient orders. Following the financial tsunami, both sides of the Strait vigorously supported green energy industries such as solar energy generation and electric cars. All these are in trouble. If they cannot survive these short-term difficulties, how can we talk about cross-Strait industrial cooperation?
In the mid term and long term, industries on both sides of the Strait face severe challenges. South Korea is Taiwan's main competitor in the international market. South Korea is aggressively signing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with other countries. FTAs between Europe and Korea, and the US and Korea, have been signed and are about to take effect. The impact on Taiwan's exports will be severe. Taiwan's most advantageous export market is the Chinese mainland. Korean products are a growing threat. The Chinese mainland is also undergoing rapid industrial upgrading. It is rapidly replacing Taiwan in the manufacture of components, intermediate raw materials, machinery, and equipment. The market share of Taiwan exports in the Mainland market continues to drop. Experts estimate that within five to ten years, over half of Taiwan's exports to the Mainland will be replaced by products from foreign countries, Taiwan faces an imminent industrial crisis.
Industries on the Mainland also face a number of factors, such as rapidly rising wage rates, real estate prices, raw material prices, and an appreciating RMB. Low value-added processing and export industries face intense pressure to upgrade, move inland, or move abroad. The Mainland's 125 Plan is a response to internal and external changes. It vigorously promotes industrial restructuring and modernization. It strongly supports the development of new strategic industries. This industrial policy is clearly in coopetition with industries on Taiwan, and adds to the complexity of cross-Strait industrial cooperation.
The environment for industrial development is harsh, Cross-strait cooperation requires a sense of direction and a need for prioritization. In the short term, cooperation should focus on helping industry respond to the recession. The two governments should help them cope with excess manufacturing capacity, reduce duplication of investments, and ensure the survival of the fittest. This will enhance the competitiveness of the economy and establish a foundation for the future. Flat panels, LEDs, and solar energy face a recession. These industries should be our top priority as cooperation projects, If cooperation on these industries yield concrete results, it will increase confidence in cross-Strait industrial cooperation.
In the mid term to long term, the two sides must fully understand that the only way to improve industrial competitiveness is to compete globally and follow the rules of the market. Therefore, the two sides should accelerate their move in the direction of free trade. The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) attempts to establish a cross-Strait free trade zone, The long-term cross-Strait division of labor will enhance industrial competitiveness. Its impact will be critical. We have repeatedly called for follow up talks on ECFA. We must clear away the obstacles. We must draw up plans for a cross-Strait free trade zone. This is the main reason the Ma administration must not delay.
Accelerated signing of free trade agreements (FTAs) with major trading partners, and regional economic integration, are keys to industrial development. The Ma administration has announced its goal of joining the "Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement" (TPP) within 10 years. Taipei is actively seeking to sign FTAs with Singapore, New Zealand, India, the ASEAN countries, and even the U.S. and EU. But the key to success in these efforts, is Beijing's political concerns. Cross-Strait cooperation will endure only with cross-Strait integration and international economic support
We are moving toward global competition. South Korea and Japan are Taiwan's major rivals. Strategic cross-Strait industrial cooperation is an important market niche that can spell victory in the international market. The authorities on both sides of the Strait must approach the matter from the perspective of international industrial competition. They must identify the niche common to both sides of the Strait. They must encourage business owners on both sides of the Strait to form strategic alliances, to break through bottlenecks, and together build globally competitive, high-value industries.
In short, the successful elements of cross-Strait industrial cooperation, must be based on free trade and market rules. Only through global competition in the marketplace, can industries on both sides of the Strait create a win-win situation that offers hope for the future.
兩岸產業合作應有宏觀思維
2011-11-03 中國時報
近來兩岸產業合作問題受到很大關注，上月20日第7次江陳會發表《加強兩岸產業合作的共同意見》，28、29日首屆兩岸產業論壇達成多項共識，昨日經合會第2次例會亦總結產業合作階段性成果，並策勵將來。鑑於當前兩岸產業皆面臨景氣衰退衝擊、結構調整及出口競爭等多重挑戰，產業合作須從總體面進行整合檢討及規畫，才能切中需要，事半功倍。
從短期來看，歐債危機及美國失業率居高不下，導致全球經濟二次衰退風險升高，美、歐市場需求大幅減弱，自新興市場國家進口持續減緩，從而影響該等國家的出口及經濟成長。近月大陸出口及經濟成長均明顯減緩，台灣主力出口產品為易受景氣波動影響的資、通訊等高科技產品，因而更是首當其衝，過去政府極力扶持的記憶體（DRAM）及面板產業虧損累累，正面臨存亡絕續的關頭；在兩岸建立大規模產業內分工的電腦、手機、LED等產業也都面臨產能過剩、訂單不足的嚴重問題；金融海嘯後兩岸大力扶持的綠能產業如太陽能、電動車等亦淪為艱困產業。若短期難關都無法度過，豈有能力奢談兩岸產業合作？
從中長期來看，兩岸產業發展亦面臨至為嚴峻的挑戰。在國際市場上，台灣主要競爭對手南韓積極對外洽簽《自由貿易協定》（FTA），歐韓及美韓FTA完成簽署及陸續生效，對台灣出口的衝擊尤深。而台灣出口最具優勢的大陸市場，不僅受南韓產品與日俱增的威脅，而且因為大陸本土產業快速升級，在零組件、中間原料及機器設備供應方面，大量取代台灣製造產品，從而導致台灣出口產品在大陸市占率不斷下降。有專家估計5至10年內，台灣對大陸的出口超過一半將被大陸及其他國家產品所取代，台灣產業的危機正日益逼近。
大陸產業本身也面臨到工資大幅上漲、房地價及原材料價格不斷攀升、人民幣升值等多重因素衝擊，低附加價值的加工出口產業面臨強大的轉型升級壓力或被迫移往內陸或境外。大陸十二五規畫亦因應內外情勢變化，加大力道推動產業轉型換代，並大力扶植戰略性新興產業發展。此等產業政策方向明顯和台灣產業出現競合關係，從而也增添兩岸產業合作的複雜度。
面對嚴苛的產業發展環境，兩岸合作必須抓對方向並有優先緩急的順序。在短期，合作重點應在協助產業因應景氣衰退，兩岸政府的角色當在協助整合產能過剩的產業，減少重複投資，汰弱留強，以為景氣好轉後競爭力提升，打下基礎。如面板、LED、太陽能等面臨衰退產業可列為最優先合作的項目，若能見到具體成效，必能增強兩岸產業合作的信心。
在中長期，兩岸都須深刻體認：面向全球競爭，遵循市場法則，是提高產業競爭力的不二法門，因此，兩岸皆應加速朝自由貿易方向發展。《兩岸經濟合作架構協議》（ECFA）旨在建立兩岸自由貿易區，對兩岸產業分工及長期競爭力提升，具有關鍵的影響。我們已多次呼籲應加速ECFA後續4大協議的諮商，排除阻力，及早完成兩岸自由貿易區的路徑圖。這也是馬政府不能再繼續拖延的關鍵作為。
另一方面，加速和主要貿易對手洽簽自由貿易協定（FTA），融入區域經濟整合，亦是產業發展的關鍵。馬政府宣示台灣將以10年內加入《跨太平洋經濟夥伴協定》（TPP）為目標；台灣也正積極推動和新加坡、紐西蘭、印度、東協各國乃至美國、歐盟等洽簽FTA；但這些努力成功與否關鍵，繫於北京的政治考量。我們相信，唯有兩岸在參與國際經濟整合上相互扶持，兩岸合作才能可長可久。
在邁向全球競爭過程中，兩岸產業的策略性合作，是和南韓、日本等主要對手決勝國際市場的重要利基。兩岸當局須從國際產業競爭戰略切入，找出兩岸共同的利基，進而引導或鼓勵兩岸業者進行策略性聯盟，才能突破瓶頸，共同打造具全球競爭力的高值產業。
總之，兩岸產業合作的成功要件，必須建立在自由貿易及市場法則之上，唯有通過全球市場競爭的檢驗，兩岸產業才能共創雙贏，締造令人期待的發展願景。
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
Su Jia-chyuan's Next Stop: The Presidential Palace, or the Special Investigation Unit?
Su Jia-chyuan's Next Stop:
The Presidential Palace, or the Special Investigation Unit?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 2, 2011
Summary: Su Jia-chyuan's corruption scandals have erupted in rapid succession, one after another. There seems to be no end to them. During this election, the DPP has a new task. It cannot allow Su Jia-chyuan to be inundated by corruption scandals. Otherwise Tsai Ing-wen and Su Jia-chyuan will be crushed. Therefore the DPP must back Su Jia-chyuan to the hilt, even though corruption scandals have already made him non-viable. If they don't, Su Jia-chyuan will not pass muster, Tsai Ing-wen will not be be elected, and the DPP will not regain power.
Full Text Below:
At election rallies tall, dark Su Jia-chyuan looms over petite Tsai Ing-wen. This contrast applies not just to their bodily appearance. It applies also to their personal character.
Tsai Ing-wen is petite. Obviously she cannot block out Su Jia-chyuan. Tsai Ing-wen has been referred to as "cute." How can she dispel the dark clouds of suspicion surrounding Su Jia-chyuan's personal character?
Su Jia-chyuan's corruption scandals have erupted in rapid succession, one after another. There seems to be no end to them. During this election, the DPP has a new task. It cannot allow Su Jia-chyuan to be inundated by corruption scandals. Otherwise Tsai Ing-wen and Su Jia-chyuan will be crushed. Therefore the DPP must back Su Jia-chyuan to the hilt, even though corruption scandals have already made him non-viable. If they don't, Su Jia-chyuan will not pass muster, Tsai Ing-wen will not be be elected, and the DPP will not regain power.
Does the DPP truly Intend to bury Su Jia-chyuan's crimes under a mountain of ballots? Can it successfully whitewash Su Jia-chyuan's crimes via the ballot box? In short, suppose the DPP wins. Will that prove somehow that Su Jia-chyuan's actions were proper and legal? Does the DPP truly intend to turn Su Jia-chyuan's personal character into the new political and moral standard for politics on Taiwan via the ballot box?
Su Jia-chyuan has turned this election into a tug of war over political and moral standards. The DPP believes that someone of Su Jia-chyuan's character is qualified to be Republic of China Vice President. But critics argue that if someone of Su Jia-chyuan's character is qualified to be Republic of China Vice President, then Taiwan's political arena will have no standards to speak of.
The Su Jia-chyuan family's corruption scandals have already been exposed for the world to see. They include misusing public land for Su family gravesites, misusing agricultural land by building luxury mansions on farmland, allowing his older brother to pave over agricultural land with concrete and turn it into a Night Market for the past 20 years, allowing his maternal cousin to operate an illegal gravel business, allowing his wife to rent space in bootlegged buildings, and allowing his sister in law to build a luxury mansion on farmland. These scandals are currently only a matter of public perception. But any one of them could turn into a criminal case at any time.
When Su Jia-chyuan declared his assets, he touched off an even greater crisis. Auditors discovered that the Su family's insurance policies, investment funds, and mortgages required payments amounting to 750,000 dollars a month, or 9 million dollars a year. His wealth was astounding. But he has no explanation for how and where it was acquired.
An even bigger shocker was to come. No 281 Zhongxiao Road in Pingtung City is three five-story townhouses. They were completed after 1994. Su Jia-chyuan is believed to have used it for social gatherings, including gatherings of the Shui Dang Dang Fan Club. The buildings has no columns or beams. It is believed therefore that it was custom built according to his specifications. These gatherings went on for 14 years, until 2008, when Su Jia-chyuan left office. The builder then "transferred" it to Su Jia-chyuan's two grown daughters. As for the price, Su allegedly paid 6 million dollars, took out a loan for 6 million. He paid half the market price.
This townhouse was also the gathering place for the Coconut Grove Foundation. The foundation is headed by Su Jia-chyuan's wife. All of its directors are former civil servants. They include the Pingtung County Chief, Bureau of Construction Chief, National Tax Administration Chief, and Bureau of Cultural Affairs Chief. Suspicions are unavoidable. Did County Chief Su establish foundations, submit bids to the county government, use public funds in the name of his foundation to sponsor "public" activities? Did he use public funds from the county treasury to bolster his own reputation? The foundation directors were all high ranking officials in the county government. Was the government in bed with business? Did the two have a black gold relationship? Such suspicions are unavoidable. No wonder outsiders have demanded that the Su Jia-chyuan Foundation open its books. Yet Su Jia-chyuan had the chutzpah to stipulate, "subject to board approval." All we need is one look at the fantastic and absurd roster of board members.
Su Jia-chyuan's appalling string of scandals is likely to result in criminal prosecution. Yet the DPP insists on standing behind such an individual. Su Jia-chyuan could become Vice President of the Republic of China. The DPP has no qualms about making someone like Su Jia-chyuan vice president. It has no qualms about subverting the standards political leaders on Taiwan ought to have. After all, if the vice president can do such things, why can't others?
Can you get away with illegally constructing a luxury mansion on agricultural land? The Vice President can. Can your older brother get away with paving over agricultural land with concrete and using it as a night market for 20 years, all the while charging "electric light fees?" The Vice President can. Can you as county chief get away with dismantling other peoples' bootlegged buildings, while allowing your wife to rent out space in her own bootlegged building? The Vice President can. Can you as county chief get away with openly appointing the National Tax Administration Commissioner to the board of your foundation? The Vice President can. Can you get away with purchasing a townhouse completed by the builder 14 years ago, yet "reserved for you," at half price? The Vice President can.
If a majority of the voters oppose this appalling subversion of political and moral standards, then Su Jia-chyuan will not pass muster in this election. Even assuming Tsai and Su emerge victorious, they will not succeed in their political and moral subversion. Tsai Ing-wen and Su Jia-chyuan will not squeak by. Because such a vice president will be incapable of commanding public respect.
Furthermore, the vice president is not exempt from criminal prosecution. Will Su Jia-chyuan's next stop be the Presidential Palace, or the Special Investigation Unit?
蘇嘉全的下一站：總統府或特偵組？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.11.02
在造勢場合，「黑面型男」蘇嘉全高大的身形，站在相對嬌小的蔡英文後方；非但映襯出二人在身貌外觀的對比，如今也成了人格形象的反差對照。
嬌小的蔡英文，顯然在身軀上擋不住高大的蘇嘉全；而被稱為「可愛」的蔡英文，又如何揹得動人格疑竇如此陰沉的蘇嘉全？
自從蘇嘉全的貪腐醜聞接二連三、沒完沒了地曝光，這場大選對民進黨就有了新的任務。亦即：不能讓蘇嘉全被貪腐醜聞壓垮，要不然蔡英文就會被蘇嘉全壓垮。因此，民進黨必須力挺已被貪腐醜聞折騰得不成模樣的蘇嘉全；否則，蘇嘉全過不了關，蔡英文就不能當選，民進黨就不能再執政。
但是，民進黨難道想用選票將蘇嘉全漂白嗎？選票又難道能將蘇嘉全漂白嗎？話說到底，民進黨若勝選，就能證明蘇嘉全的所作所為皆為正當合法嗎？或者，民進黨是想用選票將蘇嘉全的人格標準變成台灣政治道德的新標準嗎？
蘇嘉全使這場大選變成了一場政治道德標準的拉鋸戰。民進黨認為，如此人格可議的蘇嘉全應當出任中華民國副總統；但批評者認為，如果這樣人格可議的蘇嘉全可以出任中華民國副總統，台灣政壇尚有何道德標準可言？
蘇嘉全家族已被揭爆的貪腐醜聞，包括祖墳占公地、豪華農舍非農用、哥哥將農地鋪水泥開了二十年夜市、表兄經營砂石生意、太太有間違章建築收租、太太的姐姐也有一幢豪華農舍……；這些爭議，目前尚只停留在「社會觀瞻」的層次，但其中任何一案皆有可能順藤摸瓜爆出一個攸關官箴的刑案。
蘇嘉全公布了財產，竟掀起更大的風暴。別人代他算帳，發現蘇家的保單、基金及房貸，每月須支出七十五萬元，年支九百萬；如此驚人的財務實力，卻未見他解釋「財產來源不明」的問題。
更勁爆的是屏東市忠孝路二八一號的三連棟五層透天厝，如今被質疑是在民國八十三年落成後，即由蘇嘉全闢作社交場所；由於全棟皆無樑柱，被認為是「量身裁製」，包括曾作為「水噹噹後援會」的聚會處；卻竟延至十四年後的民國九十七年，即蘇嘉全卸任公職的當年，始由建商「過戶」給蘇家剛成年的二女。至於購屋價款，據稱是自備款六百萬，貸款六百萬，僅及當年市價的半數。
再者，此處透天厝又為「椰林文教基金會」的據點，而基金會除由蘇嘉全夫婦領銜，所有董事皆曾具公職身分，包括屏東縣代縣長、建設局長、稅務局長及文化局長等；最起碼的疑點是，蘇縣長自創基金會，向縣政府標案，用公款以基金會名義舉辦「公益」活動，如此豈不是用「縣政府」的公帑去成就了「蘇嘉全」個人的名聲？更何況這些位居縣府要津的一級主管官員具為基金會董事，曾否藉勢藉端操作政商黑金關係，亦屬嫌疑重大；難怪外界要蘇嘉全公布基金會帳目，他竟說「須經董事會同意」，那就且先看看董事會精彩絕倫又荒謬絕倫的名單吧！
蘇嘉全種種駭人聽聞的醜聞，極有可能演成刑事案件。但民進黨卻力挺這樣的蘇嘉全，要這樣的蘇嘉全成為中華民國的副總統，也就是欲以蘇嘉全這樣的副總統，全盤挑戰並顛覆台灣政治人物應有的道德操守標準！因為，副總統能，別人為何不能？
你能蓋那樣的豪華農舍而不農用嗎？副總統能。你的哥哥能將農地水泥化而經營二十年收「電燈費」的夜市嗎？副總統能。你能當縣長去拆別人的違建，但自己的太太竟用違建收租嗎？副總統能。你能當縣長將稅務局長及建設局長納為基金會董事而對外施展嗎？副總統能。你能以市價的半數買到建商十四年前落成的透天厝「保留戶」嗎？副總統能。
如果多數選民反對這場政治道德的大顛覆，蘇嘉全在這場大選就過不了關；反之，倘若蔡蘇勝選，卻也未必就能完成這一場政治道德的大顛覆，蔡英文及蘇嘉全必定是「頭過，身不過」。因為：這樣的副總統，如何教人尊敬？
何況，副總統並無「刑事追訴豁免權」；蘇嘉全的下一站，是總統府，還是特偵組？
The Presidential Palace, or the Special Investigation Unit?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 2, 2011
Summary: Su Jia-chyuan's corruption scandals have erupted in rapid succession, one after another. There seems to be no end to them. During this election, the DPP has a new task. It cannot allow Su Jia-chyuan to be inundated by corruption scandals. Otherwise Tsai Ing-wen and Su Jia-chyuan will be crushed. Therefore the DPP must back Su Jia-chyuan to the hilt, even though corruption scandals have already made him non-viable. If they don't, Su Jia-chyuan will not pass muster, Tsai Ing-wen will not be be elected, and the DPP will not regain power.
Full Text Below:
At election rallies tall, dark Su Jia-chyuan looms over petite Tsai Ing-wen. This contrast applies not just to their bodily appearance. It applies also to their personal character.
Tsai Ing-wen is petite. Obviously she cannot block out Su Jia-chyuan. Tsai Ing-wen has been referred to as "cute." How can she dispel the dark clouds of suspicion surrounding Su Jia-chyuan's personal character?
Su Jia-chyuan's corruption scandals have erupted in rapid succession, one after another. There seems to be no end to them. During this election, the DPP has a new task. It cannot allow Su Jia-chyuan to be inundated by corruption scandals. Otherwise Tsai Ing-wen and Su Jia-chyuan will be crushed. Therefore the DPP must back Su Jia-chyuan to the hilt, even though corruption scandals have already made him non-viable. If they don't, Su Jia-chyuan will not pass muster, Tsai Ing-wen will not be be elected, and the DPP will not regain power.
Does the DPP truly Intend to bury Su Jia-chyuan's crimes under a mountain of ballots? Can it successfully whitewash Su Jia-chyuan's crimes via the ballot box? In short, suppose the DPP wins. Will that prove somehow that Su Jia-chyuan's actions were proper and legal? Does the DPP truly intend to turn Su Jia-chyuan's personal character into the new political and moral standard for politics on Taiwan via the ballot box?
Su Jia-chyuan has turned this election into a tug of war over political and moral standards. The DPP believes that someone of Su Jia-chyuan's character is qualified to be Republic of China Vice President. But critics argue that if someone of Su Jia-chyuan's character is qualified to be Republic of China Vice President, then Taiwan's political arena will have no standards to speak of.
The Su Jia-chyuan family's corruption scandals have already been exposed for the world to see. They include misusing public land for Su family gravesites, misusing agricultural land by building luxury mansions on farmland, allowing his older brother to pave over agricultural land with concrete and turn it into a Night Market for the past 20 years, allowing his maternal cousin to operate an illegal gravel business, allowing his wife to rent space in bootlegged buildings, and allowing his sister in law to build a luxury mansion on farmland. These scandals are currently only a matter of public perception. But any one of them could turn into a criminal case at any time.
When Su Jia-chyuan declared his assets, he touched off an even greater crisis. Auditors discovered that the Su family's insurance policies, investment funds, and mortgages required payments amounting to 750,000 dollars a month, or 9 million dollars a year. His wealth was astounding. But he has no explanation for how and where it was acquired.
An even bigger shocker was to come. No 281 Zhongxiao Road in Pingtung City is three five-story townhouses. They were completed after 1994. Su Jia-chyuan is believed to have used it for social gatherings, including gatherings of the Shui Dang Dang Fan Club. The buildings has no columns or beams. It is believed therefore that it was custom built according to his specifications. These gatherings went on for 14 years, until 2008, when Su Jia-chyuan left office. The builder then "transferred" it to Su Jia-chyuan's two grown daughters. As for the price, Su allegedly paid 6 million dollars, took out a loan for 6 million. He paid half the market price.
This townhouse was also the gathering place for the Coconut Grove Foundation. The foundation is headed by Su Jia-chyuan's wife. All of its directors are former civil servants. They include the Pingtung County Chief, Bureau of Construction Chief, National Tax Administration Chief, and Bureau of Cultural Affairs Chief. Suspicions are unavoidable. Did County Chief Su establish foundations, submit bids to the county government, use public funds in the name of his foundation to sponsor "public" activities? Did he use public funds from the county treasury to bolster his own reputation? The foundation directors were all high ranking officials in the county government. Was the government in bed with business? Did the two have a black gold relationship? Such suspicions are unavoidable. No wonder outsiders have demanded that the Su Jia-chyuan Foundation open its books. Yet Su Jia-chyuan had the chutzpah to stipulate, "subject to board approval." All we need is one look at the fantastic and absurd roster of board members.
Su Jia-chyuan's appalling string of scandals is likely to result in criminal prosecution. Yet the DPP insists on standing behind such an individual. Su Jia-chyuan could become Vice President of the Republic of China. The DPP has no qualms about making someone like Su Jia-chyuan vice president. It has no qualms about subverting the standards political leaders on Taiwan ought to have. After all, if the vice president can do such things, why can't others?
Can you get away with illegally constructing a luxury mansion on agricultural land? The Vice President can. Can your older brother get away with paving over agricultural land with concrete and using it as a night market for 20 years, all the while charging "electric light fees?" The Vice President can. Can you as county chief get away with dismantling other peoples' bootlegged buildings, while allowing your wife to rent out space in her own bootlegged building? The Vice President can. Can you as county chief get away with openly appointing the National Tax Administration Commissioner to the board of your foundation? The Vice President can. Can you get away with purchasing a townhouse completed by the builder 14 years ago, yet "reserved for you," at half price? The Vice President can.
If a majority of the voters oppose this appalling subversion of political and moral standards, then Su Jia-chyuan will not pass muster in this election. Even assuming Tsai and Su emerge victorious, they will not succeed in their political and moral subversion. Tsai Ing-wen and Su Jia-chyuan will not squeak by. Because such a vice president will be incapable of commanding public respect.
Furthermore, the vice president is not exempt from criminal prosecution. Will Su Jia-chyuan's next stop be the Presidential Palace, or the Special Investigation Unit?
蘇嘉全的下一站：總統府或特偵組？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.11.02
在造勢場合，「黑面型男」蘇嘉全高大的身形，站在相對嬌小的蔡英文後方；非但映襯出二人在身貌外觀的對比，如今也成了人格形象的反差對照。
嬌小的蔡英文，顯然在身軀上擋不住高大的蘇嘉全；而被稱為「可愛」的蔡英文，又如何揹得動人格疑竇如此陰沉的蘇嘉全？
自從蘇嘉全的貪腐醜聞接二連三、沒完沒了地曝光，這場大選對民進黨就有了新的任務。亦即：不能讓蘇嘉全被貪腐醜聞壓垮，要不然蔡英文就會被蘇嘉全壓垮。因此，民進黨必須力挺已被貪腐醜聞折騰得不成模樣的蘇嘉全；否則，蘇嘉全過不了關，蔡英文就不能當選，民進黨就不能再執政。
但是，民進黨難道想用選票將蘇嘉全漂白嗎？選票又難道能將蘇嘉全漂白嗎？話說到底，民進黨若勝選，就能證明蘇嘉全的所作所為皆為正當合法嗎？或者，民進黨是想用選票將蘇嘉全的人格標準變成台灣政治道德的新標準嗎？
蘇嘉全使這場大選變成了一場政治道德標準的拉鋸戰。民進黨認為，如此人格可議的蘇嘉全應當出任中華民國副總統；但批評者認為，如果這樣人格可議的蘇嘉全可以出任中華民國副總統，台灣政壇尚有何道德標準可言？
蘇嘉全家族已被揭爆的貪腐醜聞，包括祖墳占公地、豪華農舍非農用、哥哥將農地鋪水泥開了二十年夜市、表兄經營砂石生意、太太有間違章建築收租、太太的姐姐也有一幢豪華農舍……；這些爭議，目前尚只停留在「社會觀瞻」的層次，但其中任何一案皆有可能順藤摸瓜爆出一個攸關官箴的刑案。
蘇嘉全公布了財產，竟掀起更大的風暴。別人代他算帳，發現蘇家的保單、基金及房貸，每月須支出七十五萬元，年支九百萬；如此驚人的財務實力，卻未見他解釋「財產來源不明」的問題。
更勁爆的是屏東市忠孝路二八一號的三連棟五層透天厝，如今被質疑是在民國八十三年落成後，即由蘇嘉全闢作社交場所；由於全棟皆無樑柱，被認為是「量身裁製」，包括曾作為「水噹噹後援會」的聚會處；卻竟延至十四年後的民國九十七年，即蘇嘉全卸任公職的當年，始由建商「過戶」給蘇家剛成年的二女。至於購屋價款，據稱是自備款六百萬，貸款六百萬，僅及當年市價的半數。
再者，此處透天厝又為「椰林文教基金會」的據點，而基金會除由蘇嘉全夫婦領銜，所有董事皆曾具公職身分，包括屏東縣代縣長、建設局長、稅務局長及文化局長等；最起碼的疑點是，蘇縣長自創基金會，向縣政府標案，用公款以基金會名義舉辦「公益」活動，如此豈不是用「縣政府」的公帑去成就了「蘇嘉全」個人的名聲？更何況這些位居縣府要津的一級主管官員具為基金會董事，曾否藉勢藉端操作政商黑金關係，亦屬嫌疑重大；難怪外界要蘇嘉全公布基金會帳目，他竟說「須經董事會同意」，那就且先看看董事會精彩絕倫又荒謬絕倫的名單吧！
蘇嘉全種種駭人聽聞的醜聞，極有可能演成刑事案件。但民進黨卻力挺這樣的蘇嘉全，要這樣的蘇嘉全成為中華民國的副總統，也就是欲以蘇嘉全這樣的副總統，全盤挑戰並顛覆台灣政治人物應有的道德操守標準！因為，副總統能，別人為何不能？
你能蓋那樣的豪華農舍而不農用嗎？副總統能。你的哥哥能將農地水泥化而經營二十年收「電燈費」的夜市嗎？副總統能。你能當縣長去拆別人的違建，但自己的太太竟用違建收租嗎？副總統能。你能當縣長將稅務局長及建設局長納為基金會董事而對外施展嗎？副總統能。你能以市價的半數買到建商十四年前落成的透天厝「保留戶」嗎？副總統能。
如果多數選民反對這場政治道德的大顛覆，蘇嘉全在這場大選就過不了關；反之，倘若蔡蘇勝選，卻也未必就能完成這一場政治道德的大顛覆，蔡英文及蘇嘉全必定是「頭過，身不過」。因為：這樣的副總統，如何教人尊敬？
何況，副總統並無「刑事追訴豁免權」；蘇嘉全的下一站，是總統府，還是特偵組？
Tuesday, November 1, 2011
Delicious Milkfish: Enjoyed on Both Sides of the Strait
Delicious Milkfish: Enjoyed on Both Sides of the Strait
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 1, 2011
Summary: Cross-Strait exchanges must not remain mired in politics. They must be seen in a more pragmatic, economic light. There are many different ways to prepare milkfish. If we dig deeper, we can reach a better understanding. We can get past short term advantage and accusations of "reunification strategy." So many areas of cross-Strait exchanges remain taboo. Milkfish, groupers, pomelos, commercial advertising, financial cooperation, performing artists. In this particular case, a few milkfish exports have led to questions about the fishermen's ideology. Isn't this rather absurd?
Full Text Below:
Milkfish is cheap, nutritious, and delicious proletarian cuisine. It can be fried, "looed," or made into soup, porridge, or fish balls. Mainland buyers have put in order after order for milkfish from Xuejia, Tainan. Nevertheless a recent poll showed no change in the "Blue 30%, Green 70%" voter demographic. This suggests that Beijing's "silver bullet offensive" has been ineffective. But the real question is how Mainland consumers came to like milkfish in the first place. Who if anyone showed Mainland consumers how prepare milkfish?
Milkfish is being sold to the Mainland. This leads us to the fishermen, and their political ideology. The fishermen are indeed problematic. They do indeed exhibit "special Taiwanese characteristics." Their "nativist" attitude is typical for Taiwan. Referring to the problem in such terms however, is also problematic. When one conducts business, does one demand to know how the buyer feels, or how one can increase sales? Isn't demanding that the seller alter his political ideology in response sales just a little bit strange? People on Taiwan habitually reduce cross-Strait relations to politics. This of course, is the result of the two sides' special relationship. But matters have been over-politicized, to the point where they interfere with pragmatic concerns and limit future possibilities. This is a blind spot. We must be aware of it. If milkfish was being exported to Japan, would we make the same demands upon the fishermen?
Taiwan milkfish fishermen have contracts with Mainland buyers. These contracts are naturally going to have political overtones. But they remain matters of commerce. They must remain economic in nature. If the price is unreasonable, if payment is not timely, if delivery is tardy, if quality control is lax, if consumer acceptance is low, then the commercial relationship cannot be sustained. From an economic perspective, the logic is clear. The pros and cons can readily be calculated. Business is business. But suppose we blindly denounce milkfish sales as part of Beijing's "reunification strategy?" Suppose we blindly denounce any loss in milkfish sales as "milkfish sales losing their value in reunification strategy," or as Beijing "exacting punishment?" Aren't we saying that making a sale amounts to victimization? Aren't we saying that conducting commerce amounts to putting our heads on the chopping block?
The issue is not limited to milkfish. The ECFA early harvest list includes groupers from Pingtung, pomelo from Matou, and bananas from Kaohsiung. They have all been exported to the Mainland this year. The quantities are large. From Taiwan's perspective, this stabilizes prices for locally grown products. It protects farmers' income. It enables them to avoid selling at a loss or allowing their products to rot. From the Mainland's perspective, the Mainland public is afforded an opportunity to enjoy fruits and fish from Taiwan. This enables the Mainland public to feel closer to Taiwan. This enables farmers, fishermen, and officials from both sides to meet each other, understand each other, learn what the other expects, and create a win/win relationship. From a cultural perspective, the impact of such exchanges on society far outweighs any political considerations.
Many cross-Strait transactions cannot be carried out due to political considerations. Endless second-guessing makes progress impossible. Mainland businesses want to run commercial advertisements on Taiwan. But the MAC remains mired in the martial law era. Superficially, it is worried that Beijing will produce partisan political "product placement" ads. But deeper down, it is more worried about the opposition DPP accusing the government of "selling out Taiwan." Hundreds of millions of dollars of milkfish sales a year have not been able to win the hearts and minds of Xuejia fishermen. How can the national allegiance of the Taiwan public possibly be subverted by a few commercial ads? If advertising on both sides can increase commercial opportunities, what does the MAC have to fear from Mainland advertising?
Cross-strait negotiations often involve "concessions." It is time to rethink this as well. During commercial negotiations, securing the most favorable terms is a good thing. But talk of "concessions" is often equated with surrender in the face of "reunification strategy." Initially, one may feel one has gotten a sweet deal. Eventually however, one may find oneself mired in passivity. For example, rumors have emerged that limits will be imposed on performing artists from Taiwan. The reason is that our side imposes too many limitations on performing artists from the Mainland. Also, the two sides must accelerate financial cooperation to bolster Taiwan-funded enterprises and cross-Strait trade. This is a matter of great urgency. But the government is afraid to allow Mainland banks to operate on Taiwan. This has delayed attempts by financial institutions from Taiwan to establish a foothold on the Mainland. Insufficient boldness limits one to eking out petty gains.
Cross-Strait exchanges must not remain mired in politics. They must be seen in a more pragmatic, economic light. This is true even for culture. The two sides' entertainment realms and academic realms are cross-fertilizing each other. There are many different ways to prepare milkfish. If we dig deeper, we can reach a better understanding. We can get past short term advantage and accusations of "reunification strategy." So many areas of cross-Strait exchanges remain taboo. Milkfish, groupers, pomelos, commercial advertising, financial cooperation, performing artists. In this particular case, a few milkfish exports have led to questions about the fishermen's ideology. Isn't this rather absurd?
兩岸餐桌上五味並陳的虱目魚
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.11.01
從任何角度看，虱目魚都是一種便宜、營養、好吃的台灣平民食物。不論是煎、是滷，煮湯、煮粥，或製成魚丸，都風味鮮美。最近台南學甲和大陸的虱目魚契作訂單陸續出貨，有人在當地作了一個民調，得到學甲「藍三綠七」的格局仍未改變的結論；言下之意，北京的「銀彈攻勢」無效。但奇怪的是，沒有人問如何使大陸市場喜歡虱目魚？如何教大陸民眾懂得吃虱目魚？
由虱目魚契作銷陸聯想到漁民的政治立場，誠然是一個有「台灣特色」的問題，也是台灣的慣性思考模式。這樣的提法，其實也反映了它自身的問題：對一樁貿易，大家不關心買方的市場反應和發展條件，反一味去追問賣方的政治態度變化，豈不奇怪？台灣慣常把兩岸事務向政治目的歸結，這當然是彼此特殊關係使然。但過度政治化，可能妨礙我們對事情的務實評估和未來想像；這樣的盲點，人們不能沒有警覺。若是出口虱目魚到日本，我們會問漁民這樣的問題嗎？
大陸和台灣漁民簽訂虱目魚契作合約，當然不可能沒有「政治味」。但無論如何，交易合約本質上仍是一項商業行為，不能完全失去經濟著眼。試想：如果價格不合理，或付款不乾脆，或者交貨拖拖拉拉，或者品質把關不嚴格，乃至消費者接受度不高，雙方的合作都將難以為繼。亦即，從經濟的角度看，商業邏輯才容易清晰，利弊得失才可以計算。如果一味把虱目魚契作說成對岸「統戰」，最後若失去訂單又說成是「失去統戰價值」或「懲罰」，那豈不形同把命脈全交在別人手裡？
不只虱目魚，在ＥＣＦＡ的早收清單中，包括屏東的石斑、麻豆的文旦、高雄的香蕉，今年都已陸續銷往大陸，數量也相當大。對台灣而言，這不僅穩定了本地盛產期的價格，保障了農民的收入，也使「含淚拋售」、「放著爛」的景象不再重演。對大陸而言，其民眾可以就近品嘗台灣風味的水果、魚產，從而擴大對台灣的親近感；雙方官員和業者並透過實際接觸，增進對彼此的了解，知道如何互通有無、創造雙贏。這些文化面、社會面的經驗交換，絕對遠比高層的政治算計更重要。
事實上，兩岸很多事務無法開展，就是由於太過局限在政治考量上打轉；思前想後的結果，就一步也踏不出去。以大陸企業在台刊登廣告的問題為例，陸委會的思維幾乎還停留在「戒嚴」時代，表面上擔心北京夾帶黨政置入性行銷，骨子裡更擔心反對黨指控政府賣台。試想，一年幾億的虱目魚採購，都動搖不了學甲漁民的心；台灣民眾的國家認同，會輕易被幾句廣告文宣所顛覆嗎？在這個年代，互登廣告若有助活絡兩岸商機，陸委會又為何獨怕大陸廣告？
進一步看，兩岸協商中常出現的「讓利」思維，也到了需要修正的時候了。在協商中能爭取到最有利於我的條件固是好事，但「讓利說」卻不啻意味著公開接受「統戰」，初期雖能嚐到甜頭，長期卻使自己陷於被動。舉例來說，最近傳出大陸將對台灣藝人祭出「限娛令」，就是因為我對大陸藝人的演出限制太不對等所致。再如，兩岸如何加速金融合作以壯大台資企業及兩岸貿易，是極迫切的事，但因政府不放心陸銀來台，連帶延宕台灣金融機構登陸時機。缺乏取捨氣魄，就注定只能在小事小利上打轉。
兩岸的來往，不能一直停留在獨沽「政治味」面向，而需進入更務實的經濟味，乃至在文化、娛樂和學術等不同層面相互暈染。就像虱目魚有各種不同吃法，能夠讓五味並陳，才會突破單一皮相，進入更深層、更全面的了解，擺脫近利式的統戰框架。從虱目魚、石斑到文旦，從商業廣告、金融合作到藝人登台演出，兩岸交流還有太多領域未被觸及；在這種情況下，只出口幾趟虱目魚，就強要解讀漁民的政治意向，不嫌太魯莽了點嗎？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 1, 2011
Summary: Cross-Strait exchanges must not remain mired in politics. They must be seen in a more pragmatic, economic light. There are many different ways to prepare milkfish. If we dig deeper, we can reach a better understanding. We can get past short term advantage and accusations of "reunification strategy." So many areas of cross-Strait exchanges remain taboo. Milkfish, groupers, pomelos, commercial advertising, financial cooperation, performing artists. In this particular case, a few milkfish exports have led to questions about the fishermen's ideology. Isn't this rather absurd?
Full Text Below:
Milkfish is cheap, nutritious, and delicious proletarian cuisine. It can be fried, "looed," or made into soup, porridge, or fish balls. Mainland buyers have put in order after order for milkfish from Xuejia, Tainan. Nevertheless a recent poll showed no change in the "Blue 30%, Green 70%" voter demographic. This suggests that Beijing's "silver bullet offensive" has been ineffective. But the real question is how Mainland consumers came to like milkfish in the first place. Who if anyone showed Mainland consumers how prepare milkfish?
Milkfish is being sold to the Mainland. This leads us to the fishermen, and their political ideology. The fishermen are indeed problematic. They do indeed exhibit "special Taiwanese characteristics." Their "nativist" attitude is typical for Taiwan. Referring to the problem in such terms however, is also problematic. When one conducts business, does one demand to know how the buyer feels, or how one can increase sales? Isn't demanding that the seller alter his political ideology in response sales just a little bit strange? People on Taiwan habitually reduce cross-Strait relations to politics. This of course, is the result of the two sides' special relationship. But matters have been over-politicized, to the point where they interfere with pragmatic concerns and limit future possibilities. This is a blind spot. We must be aware of it. If milkfish was being exported to Japan, would we make the same demands upon the fishermen?
Taiwan milkfish fishermen have contracts with Mainland buyers. These contracts are naturally going to have political overtones. But they remain matters of commerce. They must remain economic in nature. If the price is unreasonable, if payment is not timely, if delivery is tardy, if quality control is lax, if consumer acceptance is low, then the commercial relationship cannot be sustained. From an economic perspective, the logic is clear. The pros and cons can readily be calculated. Business is business. But suppose we blindly denounce milkfish sales as part of Beijing's "reunification strategy?" Suppose we blindly denounce any loss in milkfish sales as "milkfish sales losing their value in reunification strategy," or as Beijing "exacting punishment?" Aren't we saying that making a sale amounts to victimization? Aren't we saying that conducting commerce amounts to putting our heads on the chopping block?
The issue is not limited to milkfish. The ECFA early harvest list includes groupers from Pingtung, pomelo from Matou, and bananas from Kaohsiung. They have all been exported to the Mainland this year. The quantities are large. From Taiwan's perspective, this stabilizes prices for locally grown products. It protects farmers' income. It enables them to avoid selling at a loss or allowing their products to rot. From the Mainland's perspective, the Mainland public is afforded an opportunity to enjoy fruits and fish from Taiwan. This enables the Mainland public to feel closer to Taiwan. This enables farmers, fishermen, and officials from both sides to meet each other, understand each other, learn what the other expects, and create a win/win relationship. From a cultural perspective, the impact of such exchanges on society far outweighs any political considerations.
Many cross-Strait transactions cannot be carried out due to political considerations. Endless second-guessing makes progress impossible. Mainland businesses want to run commercial advertisements on Taiwan. But the MAC remains mired in the martial law era. Superficially, it is worried that Beijing will produce partisan political "product placement" ads. But deeper down, it is more worried about the opposition DPP accusing the government of "selling out Taiwan." Hundreds of millions of dollars of milkfish sales a year have not been able to win the hearts and minds of Xuejia fishermen. How can the national allegiance of the Taiwan public possibly be subverted by a few commercial ads? If advertising on both sides can increase commercial opportunities, what does the MAC have to fear from Mainland advertising?
Cross-strait negotiations often involve "concessions." It is time to rethink this as well. During commercial negotiations, securing the most favorable terms is a good thing. But talk of "concessions" is often equated with surrender in the face of "reunification strategy." Initially, one may feel one has gotten a sweet deal. Eventually however, one may find oneself mired in passivity. For example, rumors have emerged that limits will be imposed on performing artists from Taiwan. The reason is that our side imposes too many limitations on performing artists from the Mainland. Also, the two sides must accelerate financial cooperation to bolster Taiwan-funded enterprises and cross-Strait trade. This is a matter of great urgency. But the government is afraid to allow Mainland banks to operate on Taiwan. This has delayed attempts by financial institutions from Taiwan to establish a foothold on the Mainland. Insufficient boldness limits one to eking out petty gains.
Cross-Strait exchanges must not remain mired in politics. They must be seen in a more pragmatic, economic light. This is true even for culture. The two sides' entertainment realms and academic realms are cross-fertilizing each other. There are many different ways to prepare milkfish. If we dig deeper, we can reach a better understanding. We can get past short term advantage and accusations of "reunification strategy." So many areas of cross-Strait exchanges remain taboo. Milkfish, groupers, pomelos, commercial advertising, financial cooperation, performing artists. In this particular case, a few milkfish exports have led to questions about the fishermen's ideology. Isn't this rather absurd?
兩岸餐桌上五味並陳的虱目魚
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.11.01
從任何角度看，虱目魚都是一種便宜、營養、好吃的台灣平民食物。不論是煎、是滷，煮湯、煮粥，或製成魚丸，都風味鮮美。最近台南學甲和大陸的虱目魚契作訂單陸續出貨，有人在當地作了一個民調，得到學甲「藍三綠七」的格局仍未改變的結論；言下之意，北京的「銀彈攻勢」無效。但奇怪的是，沒有人問如何使大陸市場喜歡虱目魚？如何教大陸民眾懂得吃虱目魚？
由虱目魚契作銷陸聯想到漁民的政治立場，誠然是一個有「台灣特色」的問題，也是台灣的慣性思考模式。這樣的提法，其實也反映了它自身的問題：對一樁貿易，大家不關心買方的市場反應和發展條件，反一味去追問賣方的政治態度變化，豈不奇怪？台灣慣常把兩岸事務向政治目的歸結，這當然是彼此特殊關係使然。但過度政治化，可能妨礙我們對事情的務實評估和未來想像；這樣的盲點，人們不能沒有警覺。若是出口虱目魚到日本，我們會問漁民這樣的問題嗎？
大陸和台灣漁民簽訂虱目魚契作合約，當然不可能沒有「政治味」。但無論如何，交易合約本質上仍是一項商業行為，不能完全失去經濟著眼。試想：如果價格不合理，或付款不乾脆，或者交貨拖拖拉拉，或者品質把關不嚴格，乃至消費者接受度不高，雙方的合作都將難以為繼。亦即，從經濟的角度看，商業邏輯才容易清晰，利弊得失才可以計算。如果一味把虱目魚契作說成對岸「統戰」，最後若失去訂單又說成是「失去統戰價值」或「懲罰」，那豈不形同把命脈全交在別人手裡？
不只虱目魚，在ＥＣＦＡ的早收清單中，包括屏東的石斑、麻豆的文旦、高雄的香蕉，今年都已陸續銷往大陸，數量也相當大。對台灣而言，這不僅穩定了本地盛產期的價格，保障了農民的收入，也使「含淚拋售」、「放著爛」的景象不再重演。對大陸而言，其民眾可以就近品嘗台灣風味的水果、魚產，從而擴大對台灣的親近感；雙方官員和業者並透過實際接觸，增進對彼此的了解，知道如何互通有無、創造雙贏。這些文化面、社會面的經驗交換，絕對遠比高層的政治算計更重要。
事實上，兩岸很多事務無法開展，就是由於太過局限在政治考量上打轉；思前想後的結果，就一步也踏不出去。以大陸企業在台刊登廣告的問題為例，陸委會的思維幾乎還停留在「戒嚴」時代，表面上擔心北京夾帶黨政置入性行銷，骨子裡更擔心反對黨指控政府賣台。試想，一年幾億的虱目魚採購，都動搖不了學甲漁民的心；台灣民眾的國家認同，會輕易被幾句廣告文宣所顛覆嗎？在這個年代，互登廣告若有助活絡兩岸商機，陸委會又為何獨怕大陸廣告？
進一步看，兩岸協商中常出現的「讓利」思維，也到了需要修正的時候了。在協商中能爭取到最有利於我的條件固是好事，但「讓利說」卻不啻意味著公開接受「統戰」，初期雖能嚐到甜頭，長期卻使自己陷於被動。舉例來說，最近傳出大陸將對台灣藝人祭出「限娛令」，就是因為我對大陸藝人的演出限制太不對等所致。再如，兩岸如何加速金融合作以壯大台資企業及兩岸貿易，是極迫切的事，但因政府不放心陸銀來台，連帶延宕台灣金融機構登陸時機。缺乏取捨氣魄，就注定只能在小事小利上打轉。
兩岸的來往，不能一直停留在獨沽「政治味」面向，而需進入更務實的經濟味，乃至在文化、娛樂和學術等不同層面相互暈染。就像虱目魚有各種不同吃法，能夠讓五味並陳，才會突破單一皮相，進入更深層、更全面的了解，擺脫近利式的統戰框架。從虱目魚、石斑到文旦，從商業廣告、金融合作到藝人登台演出，兩岸交流還有太多領域未被觸及；在這種情況下，只出口幾趟虱目魚，就強要解讀漁民的政治意向，不嫌太魯莽了點嗎？
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