DPP: Why Not Renounce TIFA Outright?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 12 2012
Summary: Today the Legislative Yuan will vote on whether to allow U.S. beef imports. The Green Camp has threatened a bloody struggle. It is engaging in all out obstructionism. Blue Camp legislators are of two minds. Some are ready to run for cover and vote Green. The Legislative Yuan is about to witness yet another ruling vs. opposition party melee. This is hardly surprising. But TIFA has been delayed for seven years. Do the opposition Green Camp parties really not care?
Full Text below:
Today the Legislative Yuan will vote on whether to allow U.S. beef imports. The Green Camp has threatened a bloody struggle. It is engaging in all out obstructionism. Blue Camp legislators are of two minds. Some are ready to run for cover and vote Green. The Legislative Yuan is about to witness yet another ruling vs. opposition party melee. This is hardly surprising. But TIFA has been delayed for seven years. Do the opposition Green Camp parties really not care?
The U.S. beef imports bill must pass. It must pass not because it is a major Ma administration policy initiative. It must pass because it is the final obstacle in the way of restarting talks over the Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). The government must ensure the quality of U.S. beef imports. It must fight for international economic and trade advantages. It can do both. Ensuring economic prosperity does not require sacrificing the health of the people. The Green Camp has declared war. It intends to prevent the import of U.S. beef products. But is it "defending Taiwan's interests?" Or is it standing in the way of Taiwan's economic development?
Some Blue Camp legislators are wobbling. They say they are unsure what they are fighting for. But this is exactly the question we should be asking the DPP. When you insist on preventing U.S. beef imports, just exactly what are you fighting for? Are you fighting for pig farmers? The Ma administration has already persuaded Washington to distinguish between beef and pork. Are you fighting for public health? Japan and South Korea have established strict quality control standards. Haven't these achieved that very goal? Are you "fighting for Taiwan?" Then shouldn't Taiwan's trade relations and economic growth take priority over US beef imports with Clenbuterol and Ractopamine? Is the DPP fighting for any of these ostensible goals? Or is the DPP waging this demagogic battle, and engaging in this populist rabble-rousing merely for its own selfish political advantage?
As the political opposition, Green Camp political parties feel a compulsion to engage in political obstructionism, in order to accumulate political capital. This is the essence of the game of democracy. But lest we forget, beneath the offensive and defensive maneuvers, beneath all the checks and balances, democracy requires rationality -- if it is to survive. Besides jockeying for position against their rivals, political parties must also show us what they stand for. U.S. beef imports and TIFA are both policies the Democratic Progressive Party championed when it was in office. Now that the DPP has been relegated to the status of an opposition party, it has reverted to obstructionism. The DPP's opportunistic behavior tells us it has no core values. If the DPP insists on forcefully preventing U.S. beef imports, it might as well come right out and renounce TIFA. It should openly proclaim that if the DPP ever returns to power, it will refuse to sign TIFA. Only this will absolve it from the charge of flip-flopping, and chronic and habitual deceit.
The DPP boasts that it intends to use the anti-ECFA methods it adopted two years ago to prevent U.S. beef imports. Such intimidation tactics may appear tough, but they are actually confessions of impotence. The Democratic Progressive Party demonized ECFA. It said ECFA would bring disaster upon the nation. It said ECFA was a sugar-coated poison pill that would forfeit sovereignty and humilate the nation. The DPP boasted that it would obstruct US beef imports in the Legislative Yuan. The DPP even threatened a referendum to nullify the US beef imports bill in the event it passed. But ECFA soon proved its effectiveness. During last year's election campaign Tsai Ing-wen suddenly declared that she would not nullify ECFA in the event she was elected president. She was so arrogant before, and so deferential afterwards. Does the DPP really want U.S. beef imports to be a replay of the ECFA fiasco?
Given the current make up of the Legislative Yuan, the DPP's threat of blanket obstructionism is not terribly worrisome. More worrisome is the ruling and opposition parties' zero-sum game. This will result in the coarsening of the legislative process. Take U.S. beef imports. We expect the opposition parties to put forth a more detailed plan for the control of Clenbuterol and Ractopamine. Instead, they are indiscriminately calling for a halt to everything. Take TIFA. We hope the DPP can offer constructive alternatives once the talks resume. They could help ensure a more level playing field during Taipei/Washington negotiations. They could help maximize Taiwan's interests. But so far the Green Camp's only response has been "No!" It has no desire to seek more complex answers. It has no desire to rationally assess the pros and cons. Suppose the Green Camp's sneak attack succeeds. Suppose it brings the legislative process to a standstill. At most it will delay the vote by a few days. But will it win the respect of the public on Taiwan?
Five years ago, the DPP used a U-lock and superglue to lock the Speaker of the Legislature out of the Legislative Chambers. Wang Jin-pyng was unable to preside over the ongoing session. The DPP did this merely to prevent passage of the Central Election Commission Organization Act. Its conduct left an ugly record of coarseness, without the slightest trace of respect for the spirit of democracy. Meanwhile some Blue Camp legislators are whining "We don't know what we're fighting for." They are even more pathetic. They are members of the ruling party. They cannot walk away from questions of right and wrong. They are standing on the battlefield. Yet they have the gall to claim that they cannot tell friend from foe? Are they waiting for acknowledgement and approval? Are they waiting for the party to give them a wake-up call?
In recent years democracy on Taiwan has remained deadlocked. The main reason is that partisan political interests are presented to the public as national interests. Politicians have learned how to play the political game faster than the public has been able to learn how democracy works. But if the DPP thinks it makes no difference whether we sign TIFA, then it should say so, openly. It should not hide behind the shield of US beef imports, in order to hoodwink the public.
民進黨何不直接宣布放棄TIFA？
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.06.12
立法院今天將就「美牛案」進行表決，綠營揚言將流血抗爭，全力杯葛；藍營則有立委首鼠兩端，準備抽腿跑票。立院要加演一場朝野混戰大戲，不足為奇；但對於延宕七年的TIFA，在野黨真的一點都無動於衷嗎？
美牛案之所以必須過關，並非因為它是馬政府力推的重大政策，而是因為它是重啟「台美貿易及投資架構協定」（TIFA）的最後一道關卡。進一步說，一邊做好美牛的把關，一邊爭取台灣國際經貿談判空間，是可以達到「雙贏」的選項，完全不必以犧牲國民健康為代價。在這種情況下，綠營宣稱要浴血抗戰杯葛美牛案，到底是在維護台灣利益，還是在打擊台灣的發展？
就在某些藍營搖擺立委傳出不知「為何而戰」之際，這個問題，恰好也可以拿來反問民進黨：杯葛美牛是為誰而戰？如果是為了豬農，馬政府不是已作出「牛豬分離」的決策嗎？若說是為了國民健康，比照韓日訂出嚴格的管制標準，不是可以達到同樣的效果嗎？若說是為了台灣，那麼台灣經貿發展的問題不會比美牛瘦肉精更迫切嗎？排除這些之後，民進黨會不會只是為了一己的民粹利益而戰？
作為反對黨，綠營當然需要盡其所能地杯葛，以累積自己的政治資本，這是民主遊戲的本質。但別忘了，撇開浮面的政治攻防，民主政治除了反對及制衡，還有理性的一面需要維持；那就是，如何在攻防之間展現自己的精神和價值。美牛和TIFA都是民進黨執政時推動未遂的政策，如今民進黨淪為在野，便又移至杯葛立場，這種投機作法有何核心理念可言？若民進黨今天要強力阻擋美牛案，何不乾脆直接宣布放棄TIFA，聲明將來自己即使執政也絕不推動；唯有如此，才能免去其反反覆覆、欺世盜名之譏。
民進黨近日揚言，要比照兩年前反ECFA的規格，來對付美牛案。這種威嚇手法，外表狠勁十足，內裡卻相當荏弱。試想，民進黨當時大肆妖魔化ECFA，指為禍國殃民、喪權辱國的糖衣毒藥，除在立院大打一場，還揚言重返執政後要舉辦公投決定其存廢。然而，俟ECFA的效用逐漸彰顯，去年底大選前蔡英文便公開聲明當選後不會廢掉ECFA。如此前倨後恭的表現，難道要在美牛案重演一回？
以目前立法院的結構，民進黨的凡事杯葛並不值得太過憂慮；比較令人擔心的，是朝野耽溺於這種「有你無我」的零和遊戲，將造成國會立法的粗糙化與偏頗化。以美牛案為例，我們其實期待在野黨對瘦肉精的管理提出更細緻的主張，而不只是一味在那裡喊「卡」；以TIFA為例，我們也希望民進黨能在復談過程中拿出相對意見，使美台談判能更趨均衡，可以極大化台灣的利益。但現在，綠營提供的答案卻只有一個「不」字，不想用心去思考更複雜的解答，也無意以理性評估大局的利弊得失。那麼，就算綠營今天奇襲成功，使議事根本無法進行，充其量也不過是使表決大戰多拖幾天，這能贏得台灣民眾的尊重嗎？
五年前，民進黨以機車大鎖及三秒膠封住議長進出之門，使王金平無法主持議事，不過是為了阻擋中選會組織法的法制化。那樣的行動，除留下一個狼藉、粗暴的杯葛紀錄，有彰顯任何一絲民主精神嗎？相形之下，藍營中那些喊著不知「為何而戰」的立委，則更可悲。身為執政黨國會議員，不能從大局分斷是非利害也就罷了；身處戰場，竟還敢聲稱不知敵我之分。他們是在期待被摸頭，還是等著黨紀的當頭棒喝？
台灣民主近年膠著不前，主要癥結，便在黨派利益往往假藉民意之名來冒充是國家利益；而攻防戰術的改良，又遠快於民主理性素養的提升。民進黨若覺得TIFA簽不簽無所謂，那就請公開宣示放棄，不要躲在美牛的擋箭牌下欺弄人民。
Tuesday, June 12, 2012
Monday, June 11, 2012
Pardon for Chen Shui-bian: Only with Admission of Guilt and Expression of Remorse
Pardon for Chen Shui-bian: Only with Admission of Guilt and Expression of Remorse
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9 2012
Summary: There has been much discussion about how Chen Shui-bian should serve out his prison term. One possible solution is for the president to grant Chen a pardon after all his cases have been adjudicated. But Chen Shui-bian must first admit guilt, express remorse, and offer the public a good faith apology.
Full Text below:
There has been much discussion about how Chen Shui-bian should serve out his prison term. One possible solution is for the president to grant Chen a pardon after all his cases have been adjudicated. But Chen Shui-bian must first admit guilt, express remorse, and offer the public a good faith apology.
Granting pardons is a presidential prerogative. But the president may not behave like a "Great Dictator" or "His Imperial Highness." The President may grant a pardon. But he must consider the principle of justice. He must heed the feelings of the nation. He may not do whatever he pleases.
Former South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan was originally sentenced to death for corruption. His sentenced was commuted to life imprisonment. Roh Tae-woo was originally sentenced to 22 years and six months for corruption. His sentence was commuted to 17 years. Chun and Roh both admitted guilt, apologized, and expressed remorse to their political parties and to the Korean people. Only then did President Kim Dae-jung grant them pardons. Chun and Roh expressed their gratitude to the Korean people. Chun Doo Hwan retreated to a monastery. Question: If Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae-woo refused to admit guilt, express remorse, and offer apologies, would Kim Dae-jung have granted them pardons? Would the Korean people have agreed to granting them pardons?
"I refuse to admit guilt. But I demand a pardon." This has been the mistaken strategy adopted by Chen and his supporters. This epitomizes the attitude, "Better that I should be indebted to the world, than the world should be indebted to me." Ironically by clinging to this position, Chen Shui-bian has painted himself into a corner. Clinging to this position has led to a stalemate which has made a pardon impossible. To expect President Ma to pardon Chen Shui-bian when Chen refuses to admit guilt, express remorse, and offer an apology, is expecting too much. A majority of the public would ever consent.
Character determines destiny. Chen Shui-bian obstinately refuses to admit guilt and express remorse. This has led to an impasse that makes a pardon impossible. The more Chen Shui-bian refuses to admit guilt and offer an apology, the longer the case drags on, and the harder it is for him to reverse himself. Chen Shui-bian has already decided never to reverse himself, never to admit guilt or offer an apology. How can anyone offer him a pardon? This is a vicious circle that persists even now.
Chen Shui-bian and his supporters have discovered that refusal to admit guilt while demanding a pardon is self-contradictory. As a result they are now demanding medical parole. Others, such as Buddhist Master Hsing Yun, have humanitarian concerns. Hhe has proposed the "Chang Hsueh-lang model" of house arrest. These calls already violate existing legal provisions.
Two views have emerged. One side argues that Chen Shui-bian "after all, served as president for eight years." Therefore he should receive special treatment. Two. Another side argues that the president commiting a crime is more serious than an ordinary person committing a crime. In fact, since Chen Shui-bian entered prison, the public and judicial authorities have been divided between these two views. Most people think the Chen Shui-bian case is a chance to improve conditions for all inmates. If conditions for Chen Shui-bian are improved, then conditions for all inmates should be improved. If Chen Shui-bian is allowed to have hot baths, then other inmates should also be allowed to have hot baths. If Chen Shui-bian is allowed to appear in court without handcuffs, then other inmates should also be allowed to appear in court without handcuffs. These two views can be implemented simultaneously. In a democratic society under the rule of law, this is the right way to deal with such problems.
Some argue that Chen Shui-bian "after all, served as president for eight years." In fact, the prison system, as one might imagine, has bent over backwards to accomodate this "super inmate." Chen Shui-bian has been provided with every nicety the law allows. Demands that he be provided with reasonable and humanitarian accommodations have ensured that Chen Shui-bian, as "former president," is treated better than other inmates. His cell is 1.3 Pings in size. Approximately 4.3 SM. This is standard. But whether he wishes to live alone, and whether he wishes to work in the prison workshop, have all been left up to Chen Shui-bian himself. Chen Shui-bian's medical problems have been attended to four times. His medical care was overseen by Doctor Ko Wen-Je of National Taiwan University Hospital. Ko confirmed that Chen had blood clots, not tumors, within his prostate. Should Chen be allowed medical parole? That is specified by law. Both "former presidents" and "ordinary people" should receive the same treatment, under the same set of rules. One may not operate outside the law.
We have always believed that the crux of the matter in the Chen corruption case has been the crime rather than the punishment. Chen Shui-bian owes the nation and society so much, and not just for his corruption, He owes them even more for his refusal to admit guilt, express remorse, and offer an apology. The public feels Chen Shui-bian admitting guilt, expressing remorse, and offering an apology is more important than increasing his punishment. The public feels that if he does not admit guilt, express remorse, and offer an apology, then it has no reason to pardon him.
A presidential pardon, medical parole, and improved prison conditions all pertain to the rule of law. But they also pertain to peoples differing concepts of justice. But the decision to admit guilt, express remorse, and offer an apology is Chen Shui-bian's alone. Why doesn't Chen Shui-bian admit guilt and express remorse to the nation and society, in order to win public forgiveness? Why doesn't Chen Shui-bian demonstrate his sincerity though his own efforts, and fight for a pardon? Why has he refused to admit guilt and express remorse for his attempts destroy the nation's laws for his own sake?
The Chen corruption case is the most significant case of its kind in the history of the Republic of China. A president who violated the law has been forced to suffer punishment alongside ordinary people. Chen Shui-bian made all sorts of demands on the nation's laws. But he should also reflect on his own responsibility and apologize to society. Once the cases have been adjudicated, a pardon is an option. After all, the person who created the problem should solve the problem.
Otherwise, Ma Ying-jeou or any other president, cannot grant a pardon to a criminal who refuses to admit guilt and express remorse.
特赦是辦法，但陳水扁應認罪悔過
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.06.09
對在監服刑的陳水扁應當如何處遇，一直議論紛紜。我們認為：或許可行的辦法，是在諸案定讞後，由總統給予特赦。但必要的前提是：陳水扁必須真誠地向國人認罪悔罪並道歉。
特赦是總統的特權，但總統不可做「大獨裁者」或「寡人」；總統在行使特赦時，仍必須衡量正義原則，及照應國民感情，不可一意孤行。
韓國前總統全斗煥因涉貪被處死刑後改判無期徒刑而入監，盧泰愚亦因涉貪被處二十二年六月徒刑後改判十七年而入監，全盧二人最後非但認罪，且向所屬政黨及全體韓國人民悔罪道歉；因而，金大中出任總統乃給予特赦，全盧二人向韓國人民謝恩，全斗煥且自此隱居廟中。試問：倘若全斗煥、盧泰愚皆不認罪悔罪道歉，金大中能給予特赦嗎？韓國人又能同意特赦嗎？
「我不認罪，我要特赦」，這是陳水扁及其支持者一開始就誤採的戰略；但這種「寧可我負天下人，不容天下人負我」的姿態，卻使陳水扁將自己陷入牆角。這樣的僵持，使得特赦失去空間；因為，要馬總統特赦堅不認罪悔過道歉的陳水扁，這無疑是強人之所難，也必不能獲得多數民眾的同意。
性格決定命運。陳水扁堅不認罪悔過，造成了特赦的僵局。陳水扁愈不認錯道歉，拖得愈久，自己就愈加回不去了；而陳水扁既已決定不回頭道歉認錯，又如何出現特赦的空間？此一惡性循環，已然存在。
等到陳水扁方面發現「不認罪」與「要特赦」之間有矛盾牴觸，於是又改圖「保外就醫」等路徑；另如星雲大師的人道關懷者主張，可改採「張學良模式」的軟禁，則已超出了現行法律的規制。
於是，出現了兩種觀點。一種認為，陳水扁「畢竟曾任八年總統」，應當優遇；另一種則主張「總統犯法與庶民同刑」。其實，自陳水扁入所入監以來，國人及司法監所當局一直就在尋找上述兩種觀點的平衡；而在大方向上，是朝向如果改善了受刑人陳水扁的處遇，即應一體改善全體受刑人的處遇。例如，回應陳水扁的要求，提供靠背分離式桌椅，其他受刑人一體適用；又為回應陳水扁，放寬提供熱水浴的標準，其他受刑人也一體適用；陳水扁出庭不上銬，也研議調整上銬的規範。我們認為，這是對兩種觀點的兼籌並顧，且是在民主法治社會具有向上及正面意義的應對方式。
陳水扁「畢竟曾任八年總統」，監所為了容置這位「超級受刑人」，其戒慎恐懼、唯恐不周之心情可以想見。法律規定的受刑人權益，陳水扁一樣不會少；而情理可容通的人道處置，陳水扁以「前總統」的身分也只會比別人多。囚房一點三坪，其實是一律的規格；是否獨居，是否下工場，悉聽阿扁之意願。關於陳水扁之健康，則已戒護就醫四次，並在台大醫師柯文哲見證下，證實攝護腺內為血塊，非腫瘤；至於是否「保外就醫」，亦是法律上設置的機制，唯「前總統」與「一般庶民」，亦應在同一標準下一體適用，不宜脫法違法而行。
我們始終認為，扁案的主體是在「罪」，而不在「刑」。同理，陳水扁對國家社會的虧欠，也不只是他的貪腐罪行，而更在他的堅不認罪悔罪道歉。我們相信：一般民眾認為，陳水扁的認罪悔過道歉，比加以刑罰重要；而若不認罪悔過道歉，即沒有理由寬免其刑罰。
關於特赦、保外就醫、改善處遇等，除了關係到法制規定，亦涉及不同的國人各具不同的正義感情；但是，要不要認罪悔過道歉，則只是決定於陳水扁一人的方寸之間而已。然則，陳水扁為何不能為自己的行為，誠心向國家社會認錯懺悔，以取得國人的原諒寬恕，並表現出自己爭取特赦的努力與誠意？卻偏偏要倒行逆施，堅不認錯悔罪，兀自妄圖國法為他一個人曲枉破壞？
扁案對中華民國最大的意義，就是「總統犯法與庶民同罪同刑」。因而，當陳水扁向國法提出種種要求之時，也應反省自己確有無可遁逃的向社會認錯道歉的責任。有了這個領悟，待諸案定讞，或許即有特赦的空間；畢竟，解鈴還須繫鈴人。
否則，不說馬英九，哪一個總統能特赦一
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9 2012
Summary: There has been much discussion about how Chen Shui-bian should serve out his prison term. One possible solution is for the president to grant Chen a pardon after all his cases have been adjudicated. But Chen Shui-bian must first admit guilt, express remorse, and offer the public a good faith apology.
Full Text below:
There has been much discussion about how Chen Shui-bian should serve out his prison term. One possible solution is for the president to grant Chen a pardon after all his cases have been adjudicated. But Chen Shui-bian must first admit guilt, express remorse, and offer the public a good faith apology.
Granting pardons is a presidential prerogative. But the president may not behave like a "Great Dictator" or "His Imperial Highness." The President may grant a pardon. But he must consider the principle of justice. He must heed the feelings of the nation. He may not do whatever he pleases.
Former South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan was originally sentenced to death for corruption. His sentenced was commuted to life imprisonment. Roh Tae-woo was originally sentenced to 22 years and six months for corruption. His sentence was commuted to 17 years. Chun and Roh both admitted guilt, apologized, and expressed remorse to their political parties and to the Korean people. Only then did President Kim Dae-jung grant them pardons. Chun and Roh expressed their gratitude to the Korean people. Chun Doo Hwan retreated to a monastery. Question: If Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae-woo refused to admit guilt, express remorse, and offer apologies, would Kim Dae-jung have granted them pardons? Would the Korean people have agreed to granting them pardons?
"I refuse to admit guilt. But I demand a pardon." This has been the mistaken strategy adopted by Chen and his supporters. This epitomizes the attitude, "Better that I should be indebted to the world, than the world should be indebted to me." Ironically by clinging to this position, Chen Shui-bian has painted himself into a corner. Clinging to this position has led to a stalemate which has made a pardon impossible. To expect President Ma to pardon Chen Shui-bian when Chen refuses to admit guilt, express remorse, and offer an apology, is expecting too much. A majority of the public would ever consent.
Character determines destiny. Chen Shui-bian obstinately refuses to admit guilt and express remorse. This has led to an impasse that makes a pardon impossible. The more Chen Shui-bian refuses to admit guilt and offer an apology, the longer the case drags on, and the harder it is for him to reverse himself. Chen Shui-bian has already decided never to reverse himself, never to admit guilt or offer an apology. How can anyone offer him a pardon? This is a vicious circle that persists even now.
Chen Shui-bian and his supporters have discovered that refusal to admit guilt while demanding a pardon is self-contradictory. As a result they are now demanding medical parole. Others, such as Buddhist Master Hsing Yun, have humanitarian concerns. Hhe has proposed the "Chang Hsueh-lang model" of house arrest. These calls already violate existing legal provisions.
Two views have emerged. One side argues that Chen Shui-bian "after all, served as president for eight years." Therefore he should receive special treatment. Two. Another side argues that the president commiting a crime is more serious than an ordinary person committing a crime. In fact, since Chen Shui-bian entered prison, the public and judicial authorities have been divided between these two views. Most people think the Chen Shui-bian case is a chance to improve conditions for all inmates. If conditions for Chen Shui-bian are improved, then conditions for all inmates should be improved. If Chen Shui-bian is allowed to have hot baths, then other inmates should also be allowed to have hot baths. If Chen Shui-bian is allowed to appear in court without handcuffs, then other inmates should also be allowed to appear in court without handcuffs. These two views can be implemented simultaneously. In a democratic society under the rule of law, this is the right way to deal with such problems.
Some argue that Chen Shui-bian "after all, served as president for eight years." In fact, the prison system, as one might imagine, has bent over backwards to accomodate this "super inmate." Chen Shui-bian has been provided with every nicety the law allows. Demands that he be provided with reasonable and humanitarian accommodations have ensured that Chen Shui-bian, as "former president," is treated better than other inmates. His cell is 1.3 Pings in size. Approximately 4.3 SM. This is standard. But whether he wishes to live alone, and whether he wishes to work in the prison workshop, have all been left up to Chen Shui-bian himself. Chen Shui-bian's medical problems have been attended to four times. His medical care was overseen by Doctor Ko Wen-Je of National Taiwan University Hospital. Ko confirmed that Chen had blood clots, not tumors, within his prostate. Should Chen be allowed medical parole? That is specified by law. Both "former presidents" and "ordinary people" should receive the same treatment, under the same set of rules. One may not operate outside the law.
We have always believed that the crux of the matter in the Chen corruption case has been the crime rather than the punishment. Chen Shui-bian owes the nation and society so much, and not just for his corruption, He owes them even more for his refusal to admit guilt, express remorse, and offer an apology. The public feels Chen Shui-bian admitting guilt, expressing remorse, and offering an apology is more important than increasing his punishment. The public feels that if he does not admit guilt, express remorse, and offer an apology, then it has no reason to pardon him.
A presidential pardon, medical parole, and improved prison conditions all pertain to the rule of law. But they also pertain to peoples differing concepts of justice. But the decision to admit guilt, express remorse, and offer an apology is Chen Shui-bian's alone. Why doesn't Chen Shui-bian admit guilt and express remorse to the nation and society, in order to win public forgiveness? Why doesn't Chen Shui-bian demonstrate his sincerity though his own efforts, and fight for a pardon? Why has he refused to admit guilt and express remorse for his attempts destroy the nation's laws for his own sake?
The Chen corruption case is the most significant case of its kind in the history of the Republic of China. A president who violated the law has been forced to suffer punishment alongside ordinary people. Chen Shui-bian made all sorts of demands on the nation's laws. But he should also reflect on his own responsibility and apologize to society. Once the cases have been adjudicated, a pardon is an option. After all, the person who created the problem should solve the problem.
Otherwise, Ma Ying-jeou or any other president, cannot grant a pardon to a criminal who refuses to admit guilt and express remorse.
特赦是辦法，但陳水扁應認罪悔過
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.06.09
對在監服刑的陳水扁應當如何處遇，一直議論紛紜。我們認為：或許可行的辦法，是在諸案定讞後，由總統給予特赦。但必要的前提是：陳水扁必須真誠地向國人認罪悔罪並道歉。
特赦是總統的特權，但總統不可做「大獨裁者」或「寡人」；總統在行使特赦時，仍必須衡量正義原則，及照應國民感情，不可一意孤行。
韓國前總統全斗煥因涉貪被處死刑後改判無期徒刑而入監，盧泰愚亦因涉貪被處二十二年六月徒刑後改判十七年而入監，全盧二人最後非但認罪，且向所屬政黨及全體韓國人民悔罪道歉；因而，金大中出任總統乃給予特赦，全盧二人向韓國人民謝恩，全斗煥且自此隱居廟中。試問：倘若全斗煥、盧泰愚皆不認罪悔罪道歉，金大中能給予特赦嗎？韓國人又能同意特赦嗎？
「我不認罪，我要特赦」，這是陳水扁及其支持者一開始就誤採的戰略；但這種「寧可我負天下人，不容天下人負我」的姿態，卻使陳水扁將自己陷入牆角。這樣的僵持，使得特赦失去空間；因為，要馬總統特赦堅不認罪悔過道歉的陳水扁，這無疑是強人之所難，也必不能獲得多數民眾的同意。
性格決定命運。陳水扁堅不認罪悔過，造成了特赦的僵局。陳水扁愈不認錯道歉，拖得愈久，自己就愈加回不去了；而陳水扁既已決定不回頭道歉認錯，又如何出現特赦的空間？此一惡性循環，已然存在。
等到陳水扁方面發現「不認罪」與「要特赦」之間有矛盾牴觸，於是又改圖「保外就醫」等路徑；另如星雲大師的人道關懷者主張，可改採「張學良模式」的軟禁，則已超出了現行法律的規制。
於是，出現了兩種觀點。一種認為，陳水扁「畢竟曾任八年總統」，應當優遇；另一種則主張「總統犯法與庶民同刑」。其實，自陳水扁入所入監以來，國人及司法監所當局一直就在尋找上述兩種觀點的平衡；而在大方向上，是朝向如果改善了受刑人陳水扁的處遇，即應一體改善全體受刑人的處遇。例如，回應陳水扁的要求，提供靠背分離式桌椅，其他受刑人一體適用；又為回應陳水扁，放寬提供熱水浴的標準，其他受刑人也一體適用；陳水扁出庭不上銬，也研議調整上銬的規範。我們認為，這是對兩種觀點的兼籌並顧，且是在民主法治社會具有向上及正面意義的應對方式。
陳水扁「畢竟曾任八年總統」，監所為了容置這位「超級受刑人」，其戒慎恐懼、唯恐不周之心情可以想見。法律規定的受刑人權益，陳水扁一樣不會少；而情理可容通的人道處置，陳水扁以「前總統」的身分也只會比別人多。囚房一點三坪，其實是一律的規格；是否獨居，是否下工場，悉聽阿扁之意願。關於陳水扁之健康，則已戒護就醫四次，並在台大醫師柯文哲見證下，證實攝護腺內為血塊，非腫瘤；至於是否「保外就醫」，亦是法律上設置的機制，唯「前總統」與「一般庶民」，亦應在同一標準下一體適用，不宜脫法違法而行。
我們始終認為，扁案的主體是在「罪」，而不在「刑」。同理，陳水扁對國家社會的虧欠，也不只是他的貪腐罪行，而更在他的堅不認罪悔罪道歉。我們相信：一般民眾認為，陳水扁的認罪悔過道歉，比加以刑罰重要；而若不認罪悔過道歉，即沒有理由寬免其刑罰。
關於特赦、保外就醫、改善處遇等，除了關係到法制規定，亦涉及不同的國人各具不同的正義感情；但是，要不要認罪悔過道歉，則只是決定於陳水扁一人的方寸之間而已。然則，陳水扁為何不能為自己的行為，誠心向國家社會認錯懺悔，以取得國人的原諒寬恕，並表現出自己爭取特赦的努力與誠意？卻偏偏要倒行逆施，堅不認錯悔罪，兀自妄圖國法為他一個人曲枉破壞？
扁案對中華民國最大的意義，就是「總統犯法與庶民同罪同刑」。因而，當陳水扁向國法提出種種要求之時，也應反省自己確有無可遁逃的向社會認錯道歉的責任。有了這個領悟，待諸案定讞，或許即有特赦的空間；畢竟，解鈴還須繫鈴人。
否則，不說馬英九，哪一個總統能特赦一
Thursday, June 7, 2012
Ma/Su Meeting Will Birth a Dialogue Mechanism
Ma/Su Meeting Will Birth a Dialogue Mechanism
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 8, 2012
Summary: A poll conducted by this newspaper recently revealed that 66% of the public wants a Ma/Su meeting. The public feels that years of Blue vs. Green partisan bickering has exhausted the nation's strength and undermined its international competitiveness. Political parties must of course compete for political power. People want healthy competition. But they do not want endless infighting. The ruling and opposition party leaders must respond to these expectations.
Full Text below:
A poll conducted by this newspaper recently revealed that 66% of the public wants a Ma/Su meeting. The public feels that years of Blue vs. Green partisan bickering has exhausted the nation's strength and undermined its international competitiveness. Political parties must of course compete for political power. People want healthy competition. But they do not want endless infighting. The ruling and opposition party leaders must respond to these expectations.
Party politics is one of the foundations of a democratic society. Checks and balances between political parties are a safety mechanism to avoid excessive concentrations of power, and deviations from national policy. But the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China is different from other countries. The Blue and Green political parties on Taiwan clash over national identity. Their conflicts revolve around the definition of the nation and whether people are "loyal to Taiwan." The conflicts are too fierce and the stakes are too high. Compromise is nearly impossible. This leads to deeper social divisions and undermines national unity.
Over the years, arguments have raged over "who loves Taiwan," "who is selling out Taiwan," "who is defending Taiwan," and "who is harming Taiwan." This unnecessary and pointless infighting has made progress on Taiwan impossible. By contrast, look at the other Asian Tigers, at South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Every one of them is progressing by leaps and bounds. They have all left Taiwan in the dust. International competition is fierce. The global economic outlook is bleak. Can Taiwan really afford to engage in such internal squabbling?
Political struggle is often a zero-sum game. No wonder politicians are often reluctant to set the ball and allow someone else to spike it. Ruling and opposition party interactions are inevitably the result of careful political calculation about whether they will win points for their side. Which party is putting the public good ahead of the party's good? Which party is worrying only about its own interests? Which party is ignoring whether the nation survives or perishes? The people are watching. They will decide. The Blue and Green political parties on Taiwan stand in fierce opposition to each other. They lack dialogue. They ignore right and wrong. They oppose each other blindly. They remain locked in a vicious and mutually destructive struggle. Whoever wins office will have a hard time getting anything done.
In fact, the ruling and opposition parties do not really need to oppose each other so fiercely. We are all in the same boat. There is no need to sink it out of mutual spite. The leaders of the two major parties should sit down and exchange views. This would help ease ruling vs opposition party tensions.
When Chen Shui-bian was president, he and Ma Ying-jeou held two Chen/Ma meetings. The first time was on April 3, 2006. KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou visited the United States, returned, then requested a meeting with Chen Shui-bian, to offer him some suggestions on cross-Strait policy. The second time was on April 1, 2008. Ma Ying-jeou was then president-elect. During these two meetings, Chen and Ma clashed over whether or not there was a 1992 consensus. Sparks flew. But after the first Chen/Ma meeting, then Premier Su Tseng-chang expressed his approval. He encouraged the ruling and opposition parties to dialogue often, "because we all want the best for Taiwan."
When Ma Ying-jeou became president, the dialogue between the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties stopped. The Presidential Office repeatedly expressed its willingness to talk with DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. But Tsai repeatedly refused. The Two Yings finally met during the presidential campaign, when they debated ECFA. But the debate was televised. It came across as a warm-up match to the presidential election. Each side spoke its peace. Each side appealed to its own constituents. Neither side listened to what the other had to say or sought common ground.
During the presidential campaign Ma Ying-jeou promised that if re-elected, he would issue an invitation to opposition party leaders every six months, to discuss the affairs of state. When Su Tseng-chang was elected DPP Chairman, President Ma phoned him, congratulating him on his victory. President Ma invited Su to meet with him to talk. Su Tseng-chang did not turn him down. Su even said "The KMT and DPP should talk about how to increase the general welfare. If a Ma/Su meeting can achieve this goal, there is no reason to refuse." He apparently favored a Ma/Su meeting. The public would welcome a face to face meeting between the ruling and opposition party leaders
No one is naive enough to think that the chairmen of the KMT and DPP can meet and melt away their differences with a smile. No one is naive enough to think that the opposition party will no longer denounce the ruling party in the Legislative Yuan. But the ruling and opposition parties are important assets to the politics of democracy. Each has considerable public support. If the leaders are willing to meet and communicate, that expresses respect for their rivals. It also expresses respect for the public. They will not be able to reach a consensus on many issues. But it will not hurt to listen to each others thoughts, and to admit that we all share a common goal - Taiwan's survival, growth, and dignity. Our goals are the same. Therefore we should communicate more about policy. The administration wants to promote reforms. It should speak to the opposition parties. It should listen to what they have to say.
Taiwan is our common destiny. We have no internal enemies. Political parties must compete. But they must not engage in vicious infighting. Ruling and opposition party leaders should consider the expectations of the public. They should consider the future of the nation. They should seek mechanisms that enable political parties to move forward, together.
催生馬蘇會 建立對話互動機制
2012-06-08
中國時報
本報日前所做民調顯示，有高達六六％的民眾期待馬蘇對話。在相當程度上，這反映出民意對藍綠長期惡鬥，以致國家元氣虛耗、在國際競爭中節節落後的憂心。政黨之間固然必須爭奪政治版圖，但民眾要的是良性競爭，而不是惡鬥不斷，朝野政黨領袖應該積極回應民意的期待。
政黨政治是民主社會的基礎之一，政黨之間的監督制衡，也是避免權力過度集中及政策偏失的安全機制。不過，和其他國家不同的是，台灣藍綠政黨的最大對立點是國家定位，環繞著國家定義及對台灣忠誠度的爭論，因為上綱層次太高，衝突太過重大，難有妥協空間，帶動的社會分裂也更為深化，對國家團結的傷害至為嚴重。
多年來，為了誰愛台、誰賣台、誰衛台、誰害台，台灣的前進腳步被這些無謂又無意義的內鬥綁得寸步難行。反觀昔日亞洲四小龍的南韓、香港、新加坡，哪一個不是早已飛奔向前，把台灣遠遠甩到後方？在國際競爭如此激烈、未來全球經濟前景堪憂下，台灣還有本錢耽於內耗嗎？
政治之爭常常是零和遊戲，也難怪政治人物往往不願替對手做球，朝野政黨的任何互動，都要先在政治算盤上打個仔細，看能替自己加分多少。但究竟誰真的把全民福祉置於優先，誰只顧自己利益不管國家死活，老百姓終究也會有個評價。台灣藍綠政黨激烈對立、缺乏對話、不問是非一味反對的做法，已經讓政局鎖死在惡性互動中，在這種相互糾纏乃至相互毀滅下，坦白說，誰當家都很難做事。
其實，朝野兩黨實在不必如此仇恨不共載天，我們都在同一條船上，不必鬥到不讓任何人開船。兩黨領導人如果能坐下來交換意見溝通看法，對緩和朝野對立應會有相當幫助。
過去在陳水扁擔任總統時，曾經舉行過兩次「扁馬會」。第一次是在二○○六年四月三日，國民黨主席的馬英九訪美歸來，主動要求與陳水扁會晤，希望就兩岸政策提出建言。第二次是在二○○八年四月一日，馬英九已經成了總統當選人。這兩次會晤，扁馬都對究竟有無「九二共識」針鋒相對，激辯得火花四射。不過，第一次「扁馬會」後，當時的行政院長蘇貞昌曾經表示肯定，並表示非常歡迎、鼓勵朝野常常對話，「因為大家都是為了台灣好」。
到了馬英九就任總統後，朝野政黨領導人的對話始終停擺。總統府方面曾多次表達願意與民進黨主席蔡英文會談，不過一直未獲首肯，直到雙英針對ＥＣＦＡ舉行辯論，這才算是有碰到面談上了話。不過當時採取電視辯論會的形式，宛如一場大選熱身賽，各自陳述立場爭取支持，多過於傾聽對方尋找交集。
馬英九這次大選前曾經宣示，連任後每半年將邀在野領袖共商國是。蘇貞昌當選民進黨主席當晚，就接了馬總統的道賀電話，而且對於馬總統的對話邀約，蘇貞昌在第一時間並未回絕，稍後還表示「當前國、民兩黨應該為增加社會福祉對話，馬蘇會若能達到這個目標，就不必迴避。」感覺對「馬蘇會」的態度似乎比較正面，如果能夠因此促成朝野領導人的面對面溝通，應該為民眾所樂見。
沒有人會天真到以為國、民兩黨主席碰個面就能一笑泯恩仇，從此立法院不再吵架在野黨不再罵政府。但朝野政黨都是民主政治的重要資產，也各自代表了相當的民意基礎，領導人願意見面溝通，不只是對於對手政黨的尊重，更是對對方背後的民意表示敬意。雖然必定會有許多問題無法取得共識，但也不妨聽聽對方的想法，並且承認大家都有共同的目標─台灣的生存、發展與尊嚴。既然方向一致，對於政策的溝通，其實可以做得更多。政府想推動的改革方案，也不妨先與在野黨對話，聽取對方的意見做為參考。
台灣是我們共同的命運，我們的內部沒有敵人，政黨必須競爭，但不能流於惡鬥。朝野政黨領袖應該慎重思考民意的期待，為國家發展著想，尋找一個能讓大家一起向前邁進的政黨互動機制。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 8, 2012
Summary: A poll conducted by this newspaper recently revealed that 66% of the public wants a Ma/Su meeting. The public feels that years of Blue vs. Green partisan bickering has exhausted the nation's strength and undermined its international competitiveness. Political parties must of course compete for political power. People want healthy competition. But they do not want endless infighting. The ruling and opposition party leaders must respond to these expectations.
Full Text below:
A poll conducted by this newspaper recently revealed that 66% of the public wants a Ma/Su meeting. The public feels that years of Blue vs. Green partisan bickering has exhausted the nation's strength and undermined its international competitiveness. Political parties must of course compete for political power. People want healthy competition. But they do not want endless infighting. The ruling and opposition party leaders must respond to these expectations.
Party politics is one of the foundations of a democratic society. Checks and balances between political parties are a safety mechanism to avoid excessive concentrations of power, and deviations from national policy. But the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China is different from other countries. The Blue and Green political parties on Taiwan clash over national identity. Their conflicts revolve around the definition of the nation and whether people are "loyal to Taiwan." The conflicts are too fierce and the stakes are too high. Compromise is nearly impossible. This leads to deeper social divisions and undermines national unity.
Over the years, arguments have raged over "who loves Taiwan," "who is selling out Taiwan," "who is defending Taiwan," and "who is harming Taiwan." This unnecessary and pointless infighting has made progress on Taiwan impossible. By contrast, look at the other Asian Tigers, at South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Every one of them is progressing by leaps and bounds. They have all left Taiwan in the dust. International competition is fierce. The global economic outlook is bleak. Can Taiwan really afford to engage in such internal squabbling?
Political struggle is often a zero-sum game. No wonder politicians are often reluctant to set the ball and allow someone else to spike it. Ruling and opposition party interactions are inevitably the result of careful political calculation about whether they will win points for their side. Which party is putting the public good ahead of the party's good? Which party is worrying only about its own interests? Which party is ignoring whether the nation survives or perishes? The people are watching. They will decide. The Blue and Green political parties on Taiwan stand in fierce opposition to each other. They lack dialogue. They ignore right and wrong. They oppose each other blindly. They remain locked in a vicious and mutually destructive struggle. Whoever wins office will have a hard time getting anything done.
In fact, the ruling and opposition parties do not really need to oppose each other so fiercely. We are all in the same boat. There is no need to sink it out of mutual spite. The leaders of the two major parties should sit down and exchange views. This would help ease ruling vs opposition party tensions.
When Chen Shui-bian was president, he and Ma Ying-jeou held two Chen/Ma meetings. The first time was on April 3, 2006. KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou visited the United States, returned, then requested a meeting with Chen Shui-bian, to offer him some suggestions on cross-Strait policy. The second time was on April 1, 2008. Ma Ying-jeou was then president-elect. During these two meetings, Chen and Ma clashed over whether or not there was a 1992 consensus. Sparks flew. But after the first Chen/Ma meeting, then Premier Su Tseng-chang expressed his approval. He encouraged the ruling and opposition parties to dialogue often, "because we all want the best for Taiwan."
When Ma Ying-jeou became president, the dialogue between the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties stopped. The Presidential Office repeatedly expressed its willingness to talk with DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen. But Tsai repeatedly refused. The Two Yings finally met during the presidential campaign, when they debated ECFA. But the debate was televised. It came across as a warm-up match to the presidential election. Each side spoke its peace. Each side appealed to its own constituents. Neither side listened to what the other had to say or sought common ground.
During the presidential campaign Ma Ying-jeou promised that if re-elected, he would issue an invitation to opposition party leaders every six months, to discuss the affairs of state. When Su Tseng-chang was elected DPP Chairman, President Ma phoned him, congratulating him on his victory. President Ma invited Su to meet with him to talk. Su Tseng-chang did not turn him down. Su even said "The KMT and DPP should talk about how to increase the general welfare. If a Ma/Su meeting can achieve this goal, there is no reason to refuse." He apparently favored a Ma/Su meeting. The public would welcome a face to face meeting between the ruling and opposition party leaders
No one is naive enough to think that the chairmen of the KMT and DPP can meet and melt away their differences with a smile. No one is naive enough to think that the opposition party will no longer denounce the ruling party in the Legislative Yuan. But the ruling and opposition parties are important assets to the politics of democracy. Each has considerable public support. If the leaders are willing to meet and communicate, that expresses respect for their rivals. It also expresses respect for the public. They will not be able to reach a consensus on many issues. But it will not hurt to listen to each others thoughts, and to admit that we all share a common goal - Taiwan's survival, growth, and dignity. Our goals are the same. Therefore we should communicate more about policy. The administration wants to promote reforms. It should speak to the opposition parties. It should listen to what they have to say.
Taiwan is our common destiny. We have no internal enemies. Political parties must compete. But they must not engage in vicious infighting. Ruling and opposition party leaders should consider the expectations of the public. They should consider the future of the nation. They should seek mechanisms that enable political parties to move forward, together.
催生馬蘇會 建立對話互動機制
2012-06-08
中國時報
本報日前所做民調顯示，有高達六六％的民眾期待馬蘇對話。在相當程度上，這反映出民意對藍綠長期惡鬥，以致國家元氣虛耗、在國際競爭中節節落後的憂心。政黨之間固然必須爭奪政治版圖，但民眾要的是良性競爭，而不是惡鬥不斷，朝野政黨領袖應該積極回應民意的期待。
政黨政治是民主社會的基礎之一，政黨之間的監督制衡，也是避免權力過度集中及政策偏失的安全機制。不過，和其他國家不同的是，台灣藍綠政黨的最大對立點是國家定位，環繞著國家定義及對台灣忠誠度的爭論，因為上綱層次太高，衝突太過重大，難有妥協空間，帶動的社會分裂也更為深化，對國家團結的傷害至為嚴重。
多年來，為了誰愛台、誰賣台、誰衛台、誰害台，台灣的前進腳步被這些無謂又無意義的內鬥綁得寸步難行。反觀昔日亞洲四小龍的南韓、香港、新加坡，哪一個不是早已飛奔向前，把台灣遠遠甩到後方？在國際競爭如此激烈、未來全球經濟前景堪憂下，台灣還有本錢耽於內耗嗎？
政治之爭常常是零和遊戲，也難怪政治人物往往不願替對手做球，朝野政黨的任何互動，都要先在政治算盤上打個仔細，看能替自己加分多少。但究竟誰真的把全民福祉置於優先，誰只顧自己利益不管國家死活，老百姓終究也會有個評價。台灣藍綠政黨激烈對立、缺乏對話、不問是非一味反對的做法，已經讓政局鎖死在惡性互動中，在這種相互糾纏乃至相互毀滅下，坦白說，誰當家都很難做事。
其實，朝野兩黨實在不必如此仇恨不共載天，我們都在同一條船上，不必鬥到不讓任何人開船。兩黨領導人如果能坐下來交換意見溝通看法，對緩和朝野對立應會有相當幫助。
過去在陳水扁擔任總統時，曾經舉行過兩次「扁馬會」。第一次是在二○○六年四月三日，國民黨主席的馬英九訪美歸來，主動要求與陳水扁會晤，希望就兩岸政策提出建言。第二次是在二○○八年四月一日，馬英九已經成了總統當選人。這兩次會晤，扁馬都對究竟有無「九二共識」針鋒相對，激辯得火花四射。不過，第一次「扁馬會」後，當時的行政院長蘇貞昌曾經表示肯定，並表示非常歡迎、鼓勵朝野常常對話，「因為大家都是為了台灣好」。
到了馬英九就任總統後，朝野政黨領導人的對話始終停擺。總統府方面曾多次表達願意與民進黨主席蔡英文會談，不過一直未獲首肯，直到雙英針對ＥＣＦＡ舉行辯論，這才算是有碰到面談上了話。不過當時採取電視辯論會的形式，宛如一場大選熱身賽，各自陳述立場爭取支持，多過於傾聽對方尋找交集。
馬英九這次大選前曾經宣示，連任後每半年將邀在野領袖共商國是。蘇貞昌當選民進黨主席當晚，就接了馬總統的道賀電話，而且對於馬總統的對話邀約，蘇貞昌在第一時間並未回絕，稍後還表示「當前國、民兩黨應該為增加社會福祉對話，馬蘇會若能達到這個目標，就不必迴避。」感覺對「馬蘇會」的態度似乎比較正面，如果能夠因此促成朝野領導人的面對面溝通，應該為民眾所樂見。
沒有人會天真到以為國、民兩黨主席碰個面就能一笑泯恩仇，從此立法院不再吵架在野黨不再罵政府。但朝野政黨都是民主政治的重要資產，也各自代表了相當的民意基礎，領導人願意見面溝通，不只是對於對手政黨的尊重，更是對對方背後的民意表示敬意。雖然必定會有許多問題無法取得共識，但也不妨聽聽對方的想法，並且承認大家都有共同的目標─台灣的生存、發展與尊嚴。既然方向一致，對於政策的溝通，其實可以做得更多。政府想推動的改革方案，也不妨先與在野黨對話，聽取對方的意見做為參考。
台灣是我們共同的命運，我們的內部沒有敵人，政黨必須競爭，但不能流於惡鬥。朝野政黨領袖應該慎重思考民意的期待，為國家發展著想，尋找一個能讓大家一起向前邁進的政黨互動機制。
Wednesday, June 6, 2012
President Ma Ying-jeou: Teflon or Tyrant?
President Ma Ying-jeou: Teflon or Tyrant?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 7 2012
Summary: Some people say President Ma Ying-jeou is a Teflon president. They hope he will not "hang back from the front lines." Others accuse him of being a tyrant. They say he "sweats the small stuff." They say he cannot see the forest for the trees, and has all the vision of a section chief. These are two extreme characterizations. But are they really referring to the same person, to Ma Ying-jeou?
Full Text below:
Some people say President Ma Ying-jeou is a Teflon president. They hope he will not "hang back from the front lines." Others accuse him of being a tyrant. They say he "sweats the small stuff." They say he cannot see the forest for the trees, and has all the vision of a section chief. These are two extreme characterizations. But are they really referring to the same person, to Ma Ying-jeou?
President Ma first entered office in 2008. Not long afterwards, the "position himself on the front lines vs. retreat from the front lines" controversy erupted. The Legislative Yuan went its own way on Control Yuan, Examination Yuan appointments, and on the Sunshine Laws. Subsequent developments forced President Ma to return to the front lines. They forced him to assume the role of party chairman, and build bridges between the party and the administration. This four year long process can be evaluated from at least two perspectives.
One. The most fundamental issue is our constitutional framework. The current constitution stipulates that the Premier is the chief executive, and is answerable to the Legislative Yuan. The President must "retreat from the front lines." Otherwise he will usurp the authority of the Premier and the cabinet. But the voters elected the president through a direct vote. They expect him to assume full responsibility. The opposition parties set their sights on the presidency as their chief campaign goal. This process endlessly pushes all power and responsibility onto the presidency, leaving the President no room to "retreat from the front lines." President Ma wants to abide by dual-leadership system, but can't.
Two. The real problem is with the culture of democracy. To be fair, President Ma has demonstrated enormous restraint in the exercise of power. He hopes major decisions will be made through "democratic dialogue." But the democratic process is confrontational. It often leads to internal rebellion within the KMT. It often leads to opposition DPP incitement of social divisions. The real world consequence a ruling administration that in the eyes of the public has lost control. The US beef imports controversy is one example. The Ma administration's strategy is to "ensure a public forum." He hopes a public forum will enable experts to convince the people that US beef imports are harmless. He hopes this will affirm the legitimacy of his decision-making. But the public forum is already occupied by his opponents, inside and outside the party. They have already labeled the Ma administration "incompetent" and "a traitor to Taiwan." But this is democracy. Such developments are inevitable. Those in office must have the wisdom and ability avoid these pitfalls. They must not repeat the same mistakes. over and over again.
Allow us to summarize. One. A directly elected president cannot "retreat from the front lines." Never mind that the role of the president has departed from what is stipulated in the constitution. Two. Policies must be formulated and implement through the democratic process. But one must realize that confrontations will inevitably lead to chaos and to charges of "incompetence."
But if the President "must take a position on the front lines," how can we maintain the form and substance of the dual-leadership system? How can we uphold democracy while avoiding the chaos resulting from the democratic process, not to mention charges of "incompetence?"
The Ma administration says that peace begins at home. Electricity price hikes were actually imposed the day before they were announced. The five-member group reversed its decision and adopted a three-stage incremental rate hike. KMT legislators blasted the capital gains tax from day one. When time came to review the tax bill, they concocted their own version. The process revealed the fragmentation and chaos within the party. Some even took advantage of the occasion to engage in shameless self-promotion. The internal chaos encouraged and legitimized the opposition DPP's obstructionism. This chaos was not "intra-party democracy." It was merely incompetence.
Given the situation, some people want President Ma to "man up." In other words, to behave more tyrannically. But we believe he should instead increase democratic cooperation between the Presidential Office, the cabinet, the party, and the Legislative Yuan. For example, the five-member group must find a way to reach consensus. It must not air the party's dirty laundry in public. By the same token, the cabinet and the Legislative Yuan must consult with each other. They must ensure party/administration cooperation. The Secretary-General of the cabinet must not accuse ministers of ducking him. The administration and the ruling party must establish a democratic mechanism that does not air its laundry in public. Dissenting views must be thoroughly dealt with inhouse. Only then can they speak with one voice without.
In fact, the term "political policy" can be broken into two words, "political" and "policy." The term "political" may refer to a program. The term "policy" may refer to a method. The program should be conceived by a capable think-tank. It should subject the program to detailed evaluation. It should not flip-flop repeatedly. Only then can it offer a sound and convincing program. It must have a method or a technique. Only tnen can it sail through the democratic process, reduce resistance, and reach fruition. Take the gasoline and electricity price hikes and the capital gains tax. The programs were controversial. The methods to promote them were inept. Internal and external opposition and a hostile environment were coupled with a leader who flip-flopped repeatedly. The political policy failed, both as politics and as policy. The result was a mess.
This is practical politics. President Ma cannot be a Teflon president. And being a Teflon tyrant is not his style. He must promote a policy of democratic conflict management. He must prevent political turmoil from exacting an exorbitant social cost. Some accuse the administration of being incompetent. But they must acknowledge that democracy requires cooperation between the presdential office, the cabinet, the legislature, and the ruling party. This is what is meant by the expression, "peace begins at home."
馬總統是不沾鍋或獨裁者
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.06.07
有人指馬英九總統是不沾鍋，希望他不要「退居第二線」；有人則稱他是獨裁者，說他巨細躬親，不啻形同科長。這兩個極端，難道是指同一個馬英九嗎？
馬總統在二○○八年首任上台，不久即發生「第一線／第二線」的爭議；且立法院在監察院、考試院人事案及陽光法案等議事上也自有主張。後來的發展，如所共見的是，將馬總統逼回了「第一線」，且自兼黨主席以彌縫黨政脫節。四年多來，此一演化過程，至少可從兩方面評析：
一、最根本的問題在憲政體制。現行憲法以行政院長為最高行政首長，且對立法院負責；總統若不留有「退居第二線」的空間，則閣揆對內閣的領導統御即可能出現「架空」的問題。但是，選民概以直選總統為問責主體，反對黨又以直選總統為政爭對象，在這個過程中，不斷地將憲法上明明沒有的無所不包的權力及責任加諸總統身上，使總統全無「退居第二線」的餘地。馬總統想要遵行「雙首長制」，自無可能。
二、最實質的問題則在民主文化。持平而論，馬總統在權力操持上比較自制，亦希望重大決策能出自「民主討論」的過程；但是，民主程序的折衝過程，卻往往成為國民黨內「窩裡反」的戲台，及反對黨撕裂社會的槓桿，以致在實際政治效應上及社會認知上皆演成了主政者的失能失控。例如美牛案，馬政府所採的策略是「不毀鄉校」，希望在公共論壇上由專家帶領社會作出「巴劑牛肉無害」的共識，以建立決策的正當性；但是，這一舞台全被黨內外的反對者所佔據，馬政府則被貼上「無能」「賣台」的標籤。然而，既是民主政治，在過程中這些效應皆是難以避免，只是操持者須有趨吉避凶的智慧與能力，不能自蹈覆轍。
歸納上述評析，可得一綜合印象：一、直選總統沒有退居「第二線」的可能性，儘管此種變質的總統角色已經逾出憲法的規範；二、在政策的制定及推行上，必須通過民主程序，但也應知道，民主折衝的失序，會換來「無能」的罵名。
然而，倘若總統必須站上「第一線」，如何維持「雙首長制」的形式與實質？再者，如何一方面維持民主程序，另一方面又能避免民主程序顯露的混亂，以至被罵「無能」？
就馬政府言，根本之道在「攘外必先安內」。電費漲價，竟於執行日宣布後，在「五人小組」中翻案改採「三階段緩漲」；證所稅案，一路下來以黨籍立委罵得最兇最狠，到了審查當日還在拼湊黨內的版本。在這過程中，黨內的支離混亂暴露無遺，且有人尚以對中樞持異議來自我標榜；而內部的混亂，又助長並正當化了反對黨的挑戰，此種亂局不會被解讀為「黨內民主」，只會又回到那兩個字：「無能」。
在這樣的情勢中，有人希望馬總統「硬起來」，也就是希望他「獨裁」一些；但我們認為，反而應當強化「府／閣／黨／院」四者之間的民主協作。例如，必須設法落實「五人小組」的共議機制，而不要把其中的矛盾搬到外面去演給社會看；同理，內閣及立院之間的黨政協商也須有個深入的互動過程，而不應出現內閣秘書長指部長「不是路過就是來過」。亦即，政府及執政黨的內部必須建立一套有效且對外靜默的民主協作，透過內在機制使得相對意見充分折衝，然後就以一致的口徑對外。
其實，若將「政策」一詞，拆成「政」、「策」二字；「政」可指「方案」，「策」則指折衝的「方法」。「方案」應由強有力的智囊機制來產生，考量周延，端出去後不致搖擺反覆，即可較具說服力；而好的「方案」，亦須有好的折衝「方法」或「技巧」，始能在民主程序中增加助力、減少阻力，獲得實現。以此看油電雙漲及證所稅案，「方案」內容有爭議，折衝「方法」又拙劣，一旦陷於內憂外患、腹背受敵之境，再加上主帥態度搖擺反覆，「政」與「策」即告雙雙失敗，遂致難以收拾。
在現實政治中，馬總統不可能做「不沾鍋」，而「獨裁者」也不是馬總統的風格；他必須在推動政策的民主折衝中，讓人民不致因政局混亂及付出過大社會代價，而認為主政者「無能」，所以他至少必須先做好「府／閣／院／黨」內的民主協作。所謂「攘外必先安內」，斯之謂也。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 7 2012
Summary: Some people say President Ma Ying-jeou is a Teflon president. They hope he will not "hang back from the front lines." Others accuse him of being a tyrant. They say he "sweats the small stuff." They say he cannot see the forest for the trees, and has all the vision of a section chief. These are two extreme characterizations. But are they really referring to the same person, to Ma Ying-jeou?
Full Text below:
Some people say President Ma Ying-jeou is a Teflon president. They hope he will not "hang back from the front lines." Others accuse him of being a tyrant. They say he "sweats the small stuff." They say he cannot see the forest for the trees, and has all the vision of a section chief. These are two extreme characterizations. But are they really referring to the same person, to Ma Ying-jeou?
President Ma first entered office in 2008. Not long afterwards, the "position himself on the front lines vs. retreat from the front lines" controversy erupted. The Legislative Yuan went its own way on Control Yuan, Examination Yuan appointments, and on the Sunshine Laws. Subsequent developments forced President Ma to return to the front lines. They forced him to assume the role of party chairman, and build bridges between the party and the administration. This four year long process can be evaluated from at least two perspectives.
One. The most fundamental issue is our constitutional framework. The current constitution stipulates that the Premier is the chief executive, and is answerable to the Legislative Yuan. The President must "retreat from the front lines." Otherwise he will usurp the authority of the Premier and the cabinet. But the voters elected the president through a direct vote. They expect him to assume full responsibility. The opposition parties set their sights on the presidency as their chief campaign goal. This process endlessly pushes all power and responsibility onto the presidency, leaving the President no room to "retreat from the front lines." President Ma wants to abide by dual-leadership system, but can't.
Two. The real problem is with the culture of democracy. To be fair, President Ma has demonstrated enormous restraint in the exercise of power. He hopes major decisions will be made through "democratic dialogue." But the democratic process is confrontational. It often leads to internal rebellion within the KMT. It often leads to opposition DPP incitement of social divisions. The real world consequence a ruling administration that in the eyes of the public has lost control. The US beef imports controversy is one example. The Ma administration's strategy is to "ensure a public forum." He hopes a public forum will enable experts to convince the people that US beef imports are harmless. He hopes this will affirm the legitimacy of his decision-making. But the public forum is already occupied by his opponents, inside and outside the party. They have already labeled the Ma administration "incompetent" and "a traitor to Taiwan." But this is democracy. Such developments are inevitable. Those in office must have the wisdom and ability avoid these pitfalls. They must not repeat the same mistakes. over and over again.
Allow us to summarize. One. A directly elected president cannot "retreat from the front lines." Never mind that the role of the president has departed from what is stipulated in the constitution. Two. Policies must be formulated and implement through the democratic process. But one must realize that confrontations will inevitably lead to chaos and to charges of "incompetence."
But if the President "must take a position on the front lines," how can we maintain the form and substance of the dual-leadership system? How can we uphold democracy while avoiding the chaos resulting from the democratic process, not to mention charges of "incompetence?"
The Ma administration says that peace begins at home. Electricity price hikes were actually imposed the day before they were announced. The five-member group reversed its decision and adopted a three-stage incremental rate hike. KMT legislators blasted the capital gains tax from day one. When time came to review the tax bill, they concocted their own version. The process revealed the fragmentation and chaos within the party. Some even took advantage of the occasion to engage in shameless self-promotion. The internal chaos encouraged and legitimized the opposition DPP's obstructionism. This chaos was not "intra-party democracy." It was merely incompetence.
Given the situation, some people want President Ma to "man up." In other words, to behave more tyrannically. But we believe he should instead increase democratic cooperation between the Presidential Office, the cabinet, the party, and the Legislative Yuan. For example, the five-member group must find a way to reach consensus. It must not air the party's dirty laundry in public. By the same token, the cabinet and the Legislative Yuan must consult with each other. They must ensure party/administration cooperation. The Secretary-General of the cabinet must not accuse ministers of ducking him. The administration and the ruling party must establish a democratic mechanism that does not air its laundry in public. Dissenting views must be thoroughly dealt with inhouse. Only then can they speak with one voice without.
In fact, the term "political policy" can be broken into two words, "political" and "policy." The term "political" may refer to a program. The term "policy" may refer to a method. The program should be conceived by a capable think-tank. It should subject the program to detailed evaluation. It should not flip-flop repeatedly. Only then can it offer a sound and convincing program. It must have a method or a technique. Only tnen can it sail through the democratic process, reduce resistance, and reach fruition. Take the gasoline and electricity price hikes and the capital gains tax. The programs were controversial. The methods to promote them were inept. Internal and external opposition and a hostile environment were coupled with a leader who flip-flopped repeatedly. The political policy failed, both as politics and as policy. The result was a mess.
This is practical politics. President Ma cannot be a Teflon president. And being a Teflon tyrant is not his style. He must promote a policy of democratic conflict management. He must prevent political turmoil from exacting an exorbitant social cost. Some accuse the administration of being incompetent. But they must acknowledge that democracy requires cooperation between the presdential office, the cabinet, the legislature, and the ruling party. This is what is meant by the expression, "peace begins at home."
馬總統是不沾鍋或獨裁者
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.06.07
有人指馬英九總統是不沾鍋，希望他不要「退居第二線」；有人則稱他是獨裁者，說他巨細躬親，不啻形同科長。這兩個極端，難道是指同一個馬英九嗎？
馬總統在二○○八年首任上台，不久即發生「第一線／第二線」的爭議；且立法院在監察院、考試院人事案及陽光法案等議事上也自有主張。後來的發展，如所共見的是，將馬總統逼回了「第一線」，且自兼黨主席以彌縫黨政脫節。四年多來，此一演化過程，至少可從兩方面評析：
一、最根本的問題在憲政體制。現行憲法以行政院長為最高行政首長，且對立法院負責；總統若不留有「退居第二線」的空間，則閣揆對內閣的領導統御即可能出現「架空」的問題。但是，選民概以直選總統為問責主體，反對黨又以直選總統為政爭對象，在這個過程中，不斷地將憲法上明明沒有的無所不包的權力及責任加諸總統身上，使總統全無「退居第二線」的餘地。馬總統想要遵行「雙首長制」，自無可能。
二、最實質的問題則在民主文化。持平而論，馬總統在權力操持上比較自制，亦希望重大決策能出自「民主討論」的過程；但是，民主程序的折衝過程，卻往往成為國民黨內「窩裡反」的戲台，及反對黨撕裂社會的槓桿，以致在實際政治效應上及社會認知上皆演成了主政者的失能失控。例如美牛案，馬政府所採的策略是「不毀鄉校」，希望在公共論壇上由專家帶領社會作出「巴劑牛肉無害」的共識，以建立決策的正當性；但是，這一舞台全被黨內外的反對者所佔據，馬政府則被貼上「無能」「賣台」的標籤。然而，既是民主政治，在過程中這些效應皆是難以避免，只是操持者須有趨吉避凶的智慧與能力，不能自蹈覆轍。
歸納上述評析，可得一綜合印象：一、直選總統沒有退居「第二線」的可能性，儘管此種變質的總統角色已經逾出憲法的規範；二、在政策的制定及推行上，必須通過民主程序，但也應知道，民主折衝的失序，會換來「無能」的罵名。
然而，倘若總統必須站上「第一線」，如何維持「雙首長制」的形式與實質？再者，如何一方面維持民主程序，另一方面又能避免民主程序顯露的混亂，以至被罵「無能」？
就馬政府言，根本之道在「攘外必先安內」。電費漲價，竟於執行日宣布後，在「五人小組」中翻案改採「三階段緩漲」；證所稅案，一路下來以黨籍立委罵得最兇最狠，到了審查當日還在拼湊黨內的版本。在這過程中，黨內的支離混亂暴露無遺，且有人尚以對中樞持異議來自我標榜；而內部的混亂，又助長並正當化了反對黨的挑戰，此種亂局不會被解讀為「黨內民主」，只會又回到那兩個字：「無能」。
在這樣的情勢中，有人希望馬總統「硬起來」，也就是希望他「獨裁」一些；但我們認為，反而應當強化「府／閣／黨／院」四者之間的民主協作。例如，必須設法落實「五人小組」的共議機制，而不要把其中的矛盾搬到外面去演給社會看；同理，內閣及立院之間的黨政協商也須有個深入的互動過程，而不應出現內閣秘書長指部長「不是路過就是來過」。亦即，政府及執政黨的內部必須建立一套有效且對外靜默的民主協作，透過內在機制使得相對意見充分折衝，然後就以一致的口徑對外。
其實，若將「政策」一詞，拆成「政」、「策」二字；「政」可指「方案」，「策」則指折衝的「方法」。「方案」應由強有力的智囊機制來產生，考量周延，端出去後不致搖擺反覆，即可較具說服力；而好的「方案」，亦須有好的折衝「方法」或「技巧」，始能在民主程序中增加助力、減少阻力，獲得實現。以此看油電雙漲及證所稅案，「方案」內容有爭議，折衝「方法」又拙劣，一旦陷於內憂外患、腹背受敵之境，再加上主帥態度搖擺反覆，「政」與「策」即告雙雙失敗，遂致難以收拾。
在現實政治中，馬總統不可能做「不沾鍋」，而「獨裁者」也不是馬總統的風格；他必須在推動政策的民主折衝中，讓人民不致因政局混亂及付出過大社會代價，而認為主政者「無能」，所以他至少必須先做好「府／閣／院／黨」內的民主協作。所謂「攘外必先安內」，斯之謂也。
ECFA and FTAs: What are We Missing?
ECFA and FTAs: What are We Missing?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 6, 2012
Summary: Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul are about to begin negotiations on a tripartite free trade agreement (FTA). Beijing and Seoul have also begun negotiations on a bilateral FTA. An agreement is expected within two years. Meanwhile Taipei is moving at a snail's pace. Government officials top to bottom have promised to pick up the pace of talks. But Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) Chairman Yin Chi-ming has criticized the government for moving too slowly. South Korea is well ahead in its FTA signing campaign. We have good reason to be worried.
Full Text below:
Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul are about to begin negotiations on a tripartite free trade agreement (FTA). Beijing and Seoul have also begun negotiations on a bilateral FTA. An agreement is expected within two years. Meanwhile Taipei is moving at a snail's pace on the cross-Strait economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA), on FTAs with other countries, and on the Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Government officials top to bottom have promised to pick up the pace of talks. But Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) Chairman Yin Chi-ming has criticized the government for moving too slowly. South Korea is well ahead in its FTA signing campaign. We have good reason to be worried. We must pick up the pace. We must consider the depth and breadth of our FTA policy. That is the key.
FTAs are agreements that signatories promote voluntarily. Only signatories to FTAs benefit from the liberalized conditions FTAs provide. There is no free rider problem. Therefore they are more open than most. For example, South Korea, the EU, and the United States have signed FTAs. Roughly 99% of all products are tariff free. Restrictions on foreign participation in the service sector have basically been eliminated. These FTAs also provide for simplified customs clearance, inspections, and quarantine procedures. They make regulations more transparent, and more consistent with international standards. State-owned enterprises compete on an equal footing. Government procurement is conducted in the open marketplace. Even health insurance and pharmaceutical products are market priced.
Over the past decade FTAs have included "goods, capital, and personnel." All three elements move across borders at all levels. Such an undertaking is daunting. International economic and trade interests often conflict. The difficulties encountered during negotiations can be imagined. Taiwan's economic structure is similar to South Korea's. Yet South Korea was able to sign an FTA with the EU and the US within two years. Mainland China and South Korea believe they will be able to sign an FTA, on schedule, within two years. That is not an empty boast. Once the FTA between Mainland China and South Korea is in place, the edge ECFA provides us will be lost. Chairman Yin's concerns are not alarmism.
What are we missing? Real world implementation of ECFA in both goods and services has been slow. Other FTAs have also gone nowhere. On the surface, we have no shortage of political resolve. Every time a South Korean FTA goes into effect, the President, the Premier, and sundry Ministers reaffirm their determination to accelerate the pace of liberalization. But as Chairman Yin noted, many of them still cling to protectionism. They still do not understand the industries they are dealing with. They are overly conservative. They are reluctant to play ball. One possibility is that high officials are merely going through the motions. They may be paying mere lip service to liberalization. They lack determination. They lack the desire to follow through. The higher the rank, the stronger the determination. The lower the rank, the weaker the determination. This is the first problem that must be solved.
Another reason for the snail's pace of FTA negotiations is the lack of negotiation resources. FTA negotiations involve complex issues. They require expertise in diverse fields. They require a division of labor. Only then can negotiations be conducted swiftly and thoroughly. South Korea's FTA negotiations involved over 100 officials. Government think tanks backed them 100%. By contrast, our own government has only 10 officials assigned to cross-Strait negotiations. Few officials have been assigned to other FTA negotiations. Think tank budgets have been cut or reallocated year after year. Innate deficiencies have led to inevitable problems. Speed has not been easy to achieve. Haste may also make for waste. This is the second bottleneck that must be eliminated.
A lack of industry understanding is another problem. Take the service sector. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is responsible for negotiations and coordination. It has little to do with the service sector. Telecommunications, finance, education, tourism, construction, transportation and other key services each have their own overseers. Each agency is responsible only for oversight. They lack industry understanding. They lacke international perspective. In the past industrial development was the responsibility of the CEPD. But since our accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the CEPD no longer participates in economic and trade negotiations. It has no role in cross-Strait negotiations. Over the past decade, it has played no part in negotiations.
In the long term, the government must re-position the CEPD as an economic and trade negotiator. The CEPD should promote liberalization. It need not sit at the negotiating table. Using external pressure from FTA negotiations to promote domestic reforms is also a worthwhile goal. FTAs are now about regulatory reform and structural change. These are matters the CEPD was adept at. These are matters it can promote. The CEPD Finance Legal Co-ordination Centre was responsible for regulatory reform when we joined the WTO. It has been quiet since. But if the need arises, it could once again play a role.
Finally, we offer this reminder to the government. The key with ECFA or FTAs is to negotiate well. South Korea seeks short-term advantages. But we should attempt to secure more favorable entry conditions. That would consitute a real victory.
ECFA與FTA，台灣缺了什麼？
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.06.06
中國大陸與日本和南韓即將啟動三方自由貿易協定（FTA）談判，而中、韓也同步開啟了雙邊FTA的談判，並預計在二年內完成。反觀台灣，無論是兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ECFA），還是與各國的FTA，包括台美貿易及投資架構協議（TIFA），都還在牛步慢行，非但政府上下紛紛誓言加速，經建會尹啟銘主委更專文痛批「談太慢」。眼見韓國在FTA的布局上迅速超前，我們當然要急，也必須急，但除了速度，亦要兼顧深度及廣度，才是達成FTA政策的關鍵。
FTA是簽約各方自願推動，加上其自由化優惠僅限締約國之間才能享有，沒有「搭便車」的顧慮，因此開放程度一般都很高。以韓國與歐盟、美國簽訂的FTA為例，雙方零關稅產品比率都接近甚至超過百分之九十九，服務業部門對外資參與的限制，也都基本解除。除此之外，這些FTA中還包括通關、檢驗及檢疫措施的簡化、強化法規透明並向國際標準接軌、國營企業公平競爭、政府採購市場開放，甚至健保藥品核價等自由化項目。
簡單地說，近十年來新興FTA所涵蓋的自由化內容，幾乎包含了國際貿易中「貨品、資金及人員」三個要素在跨國移動時所可能涉及的所有層面。如此複雜的工程，加上各國經貿利益各不相同，談判的艱鉅可想而知。但是，經濟結構與台灣接近的韓國，卻能分別在二年內先後完成與歐盟、美國的FTA，所以中韓FTA預估的二年完成時程，不能視為隨便說說。一旦中韓FTA到位，我方連兩岸協議ECFA的先機也將喪失；所以尹主委的擔憂，絕非危言聳聽。
我們到底缺了什麼，非但具體實現ECFA效益的兩岸貨品及服務貿易協議進展緩慢，其他FTA也無下文？表面上看來，缺的不是政治決心；因為每次韓國的某個FTA生效，總統、院長、部長們都會堅決宣示加速加大推動的自由化決心。但尹主委文中也提到，很多部會還是抱持保護主義，而且對產業不夠瞭解、心態保守、配合度低。一個可能的原因，就是認為高層的決心是玩假的，說說就算。這個決心欠缺貫徹，「越上越強，越下越弱」的現象，是第一個要解決的問題。
欠缺談判資源，也是FTA牛步化的原因之一。FTA的談判議題複雜，所需專業領域很廣，分工必須細化，才能兼顧速度與深度。韓國FTA談判，不只投入百人以上參與，政府智庫也充分支援；反觀我國，非但負責兩岸協商者不過十人出頭，其他FTA談判人力也很吃緊，而智庫預算更是年年減少或被移為他用。先天不足，後天失調，要快不易，且求快就無法兼顧品質，這正是第二個要解決的瓶頸。
回到欠缺產業觀的問題上。以服務業為例，目前負責談判協調的經濟部，本身主管的服務業極少，電信、金融、教育、觀光、營建、運輸等重點服務業，各有所主；再者，各機關原本功能即以監管為主，欠缺產業觀及國際觀，已是老問題。過去各產業發展事項，是由經建會扮演主要推手，但經建會自從我國加入世貿組織（WTO）後，就不再參與經貿談判，在兩岸協商中也沒有角色，十年下來，早無談判能量。
長期而言，政府必須重新定位經建會在經貿談判中的角色。但是，要推動自由化，不一定要上桌談判；事實上，引FTA協商的外部壓力，推動國內改革，也是重要的目標。當代FTA的重心移轉到法規革新、結構調整，而這些都是經建會所拿手的業務，未來更可大力發揮。例如經建會財經法律協調中心在加入WTO時曾扮演過法規革新的樞紐，如今沈寂多時；但事態所需，應有再發揮的空間。
最後必須提醒政府的是，無論是ECFA還是FTA，談得好還是最重要的關鍵。與其要取得在時間上先於韓國這種短期利益，不如能夠爭取到更為優惠的進入條件，才是真正的勝利。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 6, 2012
Summary: Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul are about to begin negotiations on a tripartite free trade agreement (FTA). Beijing and Seoul have also begun negotiations on a bilateral FTA. An agreement is expected within two years. Meanwhile Taipei is moving at a snail's pace. Government officials top to bottom have promised to pick up the pace of talks. But Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) Chairman Yin Chi-ming has criticized the government for moving too slowly. South Korea is well ahead in its FTA signing campaign. We have good reason to be worried.
Full Text below:
Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul are about to begin negotiations on a tripartite free trade agreement (FTA). Beijing and Seoul have also begun negotiations on a bilateral FTA. An agreement is expected within two years. Meanwhile Taipei is moving at a snail's pace on the cross-Strait economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA), on FTAs with other countries, and on the Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Government officials top to bottom have promised to pick up the pace of talks. But Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) Chairman Yin Chi-ming has criticized the government for moving too slowly. South Korea is well ahead in its FTA signing campaign. We have good reason to be worried. We must pick up the pace. We must consider the depth and breadth of our FTA policy. That is the key.
FTAs are agreements that signatories promote voluntarily. Only signatories to FTAs benefit from the liberalized conditions FTAs provide. There is no free rider problem. Therefore they are more open than most. For example, South Korea, the EU, and the United States have signed FTAs. Roughly 99% of all products are tariff free. Restrictions on foreign participation in the service sector have basically been eliminated. These FTAs also provide for simplified customs clearance, inspections, and quarantine procedures. They make regulations more transparent, and more consistent with international standards. State-owned enterprises compete on an equal footing. Government procurement is conducted in the open marketplace. Even health insurance and pharmaceutical products are market priced.
Over the past decade FTAs have included "goods, capital, and personnel." All three elements move across borders at all levels. Such an undertaking is daunting. International economic and trade interests often conflict. The difficulties encountered during negotiations can be imagined. Taiwan's economic structure is similar to South Korea's. Yet South Korea was able to sign an FTA with the EU and the US within two years. Mainland China and South Korea believe they will be able to sign an FTA, on schedule, within two years. That is not an empty boast. Once the FTA between Mainland China and South Korea is in place, the edge ECFA provides us will be lost. Chairman Yin's concerns are not alarmism.
What are we missing? Real world implementation of ECFA in both goods and services has been slow. Other FTAs have also gone nowhere. On the surface, we have no shortage of political resolve. Every time a South Korean FTA goes into effect, the President, the Premier, and sundry Ministers reaffirm their determination to accelerate the pace of liberalization. But as Chairman Yin noted, many of them still cling to protectionism. They still do not understand the industries they are dealing with. They are overly conservative. They are reluctant to play ball. One possibility is that high officials are merely going through the motions. They may be paying mere lip service to liberalization. They lack determination. They lack the desire to follow through. The higher the rank, the stronger the determination. The lower the rank, the weaker the determination. This is the first problem that must be solved.
Another reason for the snail's pace of FTA negotiations is the lack of negotiation resources. FTA negotiations involve complex issues. They require expertise in diverse fields. They require a division of labor. Only then can negotiations be conducted swiftly and thoroughly. South Korea's FTA negotiations involved over 100 officials. Government think tanks backed them 100%. By contrast, our own government has only 10 officials assigned to cross-Strait negotiations. Few officials have been assigned to other FTA negotiations. Think tank budgets have been cut or reallocated year after year. Innate deficiencies have led to inevitable problems. Speed has not been easy to achieve. Haste may also make for waste. This is the second bottleneck that must be eliminated.
A lack of industry understanding is another problem. Take the service sector. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is responsible for negotiations and coordination. It has little to do with the service sector. Telecommunications, finance, education, tourism, construction, transportation and other key services each have their own overseers. Each agency is responsible only for oversight. They lack industry understanding. They lacke international perspective. In the past industrial development was the responsibility of the CEPD. But since our accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the CEPD no longer participates in economic and trade negotiations. It has no role in cross-Strait negotiations. Over the past decade, it has played no part in negotiations.
In the long term, the government must re-position the CEPD as an economic and trade negotiator. The CEPD should promote liberalization. It need not sit at the negotiating table. Using external pressure from FTA negotiations to promote domestic reforms is also a worthwhile goal. FTAs are now about regulatory reform and structural change. These are matters the CEPD was adept at. These are matters it can promote. The CEPD Finance Legal Co-ordination Centre was responsible for regulatory reform when we joined the WTO. It has been quiet since. But if the need arises, it could once again play a role.
Finally, we offer this reminder to the government. The key with ECFA or FTAs is to negotiate well. South Korea seeks short-term advantages. But we should attempt to secure more favorable entry conditions. That would consitute a real victory.
ECFA與FTA，台灣缺了什麼？
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.06.06
中國大陸與日本和南韓即將啟動三方自由貿易協定（FTA）談判，而中、韓也同步開啟了雙邊FTA的談判，並預計在二年內完成。反觀台灣，無論是兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ECFA），還是與各國的FTA，包括台美貿易及投資架構協議（TIFA），都還在牛步慢行，非但政府上下紛紛誓言加速，經建會尹啟銘主委更專文痛批「談太慢」。眼見韓國在FTA的布局上迅速超前，我們當然要急，也必須急，但除了速度，亦要兼顧深度及廣度，才是達成FTA政策的關鍵。
FTA是簽約各方自願推動，加上其自由化優惠僅限締約國之間才能享有，沒有「搭便車」的顧慮，因此開放程度一般都很高。以韓國與歐盟、美國簽訂的FTA為例，雙方零關稅產品比率都接近甚至超過百分之九十九，服務業部門對外資參與的限制，也都基本解除。除此之外，這些FTA中還包括通關、檢驗及檢疫措施的簡化、強化法規透明並向國際標準接軌、國營企業公平競爭、政府採購市場開放，甚至健保藥品核價等自由化項目。
簡單地說，近十年來新興FTA所涵蓋的自由化內容，幾乎包含了國際貿易中「貨品、資金及人員」三個要素在跨國移動時所可能涉及的所有層面。如此複雜的工程，加上各國經貿利益各不相同，談判的艱鉅可想而知。但是，經濟結構與台灣接近的韓國，卻能分別在二年內先後完成與歐盟、美國的FTA，所以中韓FTA預估的二年完成時程，不能視為隨便說說。一旦中韓FTA到位，我方連兩岸協議ECFA的先機也將喪失；所以尹主委的擔憂，絕非危言聳聽。
我們到底缺了什麼，非但具體實現ECFA效益的兩岸貨品及服務貿易協議進展緩慢，其他FTA也無下文？表面上看來，缺的不是政治決心；因為每次韓國的某個FTA生效，總統、院長、部長們都會堅決宣示加速加大推動的自由化決心。但尹主委文中也提到，很多部會還是抱持保護主義，而且對產業不夠瞭解、心態保守、配合度低。一個可能的原因，就是認為高層的決心是玩假的，說說就算。這個決心欠缺貫徹，「越上越強，越下越弱」的現象，是第一個要解決的問題。
欠缺談判資源，也是FTA牛步化的原因之一。FTA的談判議題複雜，所需專業領域很廣，分工必須細化，才能兼顧速度與深度。韓國FTA談判，不只投入百人以上參與，政府智庫也充分支援；反觀我國，非但負責兩岸協商者不過十人出頭，其他FTA談判人力也很吃緊，而智庫預算更是年年減少或被移為他用。先天不足，後天失調，要快不易，且求快就無法兼顧品質，這正是第二個要解決的瓶頸。
回到欠缺產業觀的問題上。以服務業為例，目前負責談判協調的經濟部，本身主管的服務業極少，電信、金融、教育、觀光、營建、運輸等重點服務業，各有所主；再者，各機關原本功能即以監管為主，欠缺產業觀及國際觀，已是老問題。過去各產業發展事項，是由經建會扮演主要推手，但經建會自從我國加入世貿組織（WTO）後，就不再參與經貿談判，在兩岸協商中也沒有角色，十年下來，早無談判能量。
長期而言，政府必須重新定位經建會在經貿談判中的角色。但是，要推動自由化，不一定要上桌談判；事實上，引FTA協商的外部壓力，推動國內改革，也是重要的目標。當代FTA的重心移轉到法規革新、結構調整，而這些都是經建會所拿手的業務，未來更可大力發揮。例如經建會財經法律協調中心在加入WTO時曾扮演過法規革新的樞紐，如今沈寂多時；但事態所需，應有再發揮的空間。
最後必須提醒政府的是，無論是ECFA還是FTA，談得好還是最重要的關鍵。與其要取得在時間上先於韓國這種短期利益，不如能夠爭取到更為優惠的進入條件，才是真正的勝利。
Tuesday, June 5, 2012
South Korea Joins the 20-50 Club: Taiwan Taken Down a Notch
South Korea Joins the 20-50 Club: Taiwan Taken Down a Notch
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 5, 2012
Summary: After World War II, a dozen or so economies, including the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China, experienced over 20 years of rapid growth. On average they experienced a 7% annual GDP growth rate. But recently South Korea has left everyone else behind. This month it will join the "20-50 Club." It will become one of the seven countries in the world with a population exceeding 50 million, and a per capita income exceeding $20,000 USD. This news was hard for both the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan to swallow.
Full Text below:
After World War II, a dozen or so economies, including the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China, experienced over 20 years of rapid growth. On average they experienced a 7% annual GDP growth rate. But recently South Korea has left everyone else behind. This month it will join the "20-50 Club." It will become one of the seven countries in the world with a population exceeding 50 million, and a per capita income exceeding $20,000 USD.
Currently only six countries are members of the 20-50 Club. These six major developed countries became members before Korea. They include Japan (1987), the United States (1988) France and Italy (1990), Germany (1991), and Great Britain (1996).
This news was hard for both the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan to swallow. Taiwan and South Korea have long competed in every field, from academics to athletics. The 20-50 Club however, is an objective standard, one established by the major powers. Given the numbers, the gap between Taiwan and South Korea is hardly surprising. In 2004 South Korea's per capita income was $15,037 USD, ahead of Taiwan's at $15,012 USD. The gap in per capita income is increasing. Taiwan exceeded $20,000 USD in 2011. But South Korea led by $3,000 USD. In recent years South Korea's international competitiveness has steadily risen. The lifeblood of Taiwan's electronics industry has been diverted to South Korea, to Samsung and other large enterprises. Taiwan has been under the gun. It has lost market share to South Korea even on the Chinese Mainland. In 2005, South Korea commanded an 11.64% share of the Mainland market, exceeding Taiwan's 11.31% share. It has continued to lead Taiwan since.
Many commentators have suggested that South Korea's achievements are a result of its internal solidarity. They say it channels the entire nation's resources into economic development. But the fact is South Korea is free and open. The government and Big Business join to suppress domestic trade unions and farmers. Allowing U.S. beef imports created quite a stir in South Korea. When South Korea signed an FTA with the United States, opposition party legislators occupied the legislature. Only ruling party force enabled the legislature to vote. In other words, once the Korean government set its goals, it did not hesitate to pay any political price to achieve its goal, This is something we have been unable to accomplish on Taiwan.
Secondly, Taiwan must reallze that South Korea has always been a larger economy than Taiwan. It has twice the population. It has vastly greater land area. Taiwan may set higher goals. It may compare itself to South Korea. Just like South Korea often compares itself to Japan, out of national pride. But such comparisons are unrealistic.
What Taiwan really needs to emulate, is the South Korean government's determination to open itself to the outside world. South Korea has signed more free trade agreements than any other country in the world. It has signed FTAs with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), India, the European Union, and the United States. Currently 36.22% of South Korea's exports are duty-free. If it signs FTAs with Mainland China, including Hong Kong, with Japan and other countries, then 72.73% of South Korea's exports will be duty free. This will create ideal conditions for Korean products in the international markets.
South Korea's FTA strategy was devised by foreign service personnel and trade-oriented think tanks established by the government. They formulated its economic and trade strategy. Major companies also have research units. Together they have cultivated the talent necessary to open up global markets and negotiate FTAs. These talented individuals are experts in foreign languages and laws, international industry, finance, politics, and diplomacy. Hundreds of them have post-doctoral research experience. But the South Korean government's real achievements lie in its exploration of the future of industry. According to Nobel Prize winning economist Michael Spence, South Korea was like Taiwan. It too experienced a period of rapid growth. It too transitioned into a middle income economy. South Korean ruling and opposition parties also worried that their economy would lose momentum. High quality, labor-intensive manufacturing moved to lower cost countries. But the South Korean government vigorously promoted structural transformation. This may have been a response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997. South Korea hit rock bottom. This was a signal that reform could no longer be avoided. Public sector investment shifted from the labor-intensive export sector to education and applied research. The government actively recruited overseas Korean talent, and persuaded them to return. It canceled many of its plans to support industry. It transferred the resources to the private sector.
As Quanta Chairman Barry Lam observed, South Korea channeled its resources into the integration of technology. It actively developed information technology. First-class talent joined the Samsung Group. When Samsung announced its intention to develop and manufacture semiconductor memory chips, western countries thought it was being foolish. But a decade later, Samsung has created the world's first 256 GB memory chip. This was an important milestone for the semiconductor industry, The doubters are now silent.
If one really wants to understand the difference between South Korea and Taiwan, one must avoid the myth of "large consortia vs SMEs." The real difference lies elsewhere. The real question, whether for industrial policy or for FTA strategy, is whether the government took the lead and offered a vision. Did the ruling and opposition parties persist in infighting? Did they change the direction in which the country developed?
韓國邁進20—50俱樂部 台灣矮一截
2012-06-05
中國時報
【本報訊】
在二次世界大戰後，有十幾個國家（包括台灣在內）持續廿幾年高速成長，平均超過ＧＤＰ七％以上，但目前在這場賽跑中領先的韓國已經把大家拋在後面，即將於這個月進入「二○｜五○俱樂部」，成為全球第七個平均國民所得超過兩萬美元、總人口超過五千萬的國家。
目前全球僅有六國是「二○｜五○俱樂部」的成員，比韓國更早加入的國家，只有日本（一九八七年）、美國（一九八八年）、法國和義大利（一九九○年）、德國（一九九一年）與英國（一九九六年）六個主要發達國家。
這個新聞讓台灣朝野很不好過。過去台灣與南韓兩國處處競爭，從學術水準到體育競賽無一不在做對比。但「二○｜五○俱樂部」畢竟是個客觀標準，也是個強國的標準。從數據看，台韓差距並不是突如其來的，自從二○○四年韓國的平均國民所得（一五○三七美元）超過台灣（一五○一二美元）後，雙方平均國民所得的差距愈來愈大，台灣雖然在二○一一年超過兩萬美金，但是南韓卻又超前領先台灣三千元美金。尤其近幾年，韓國國際競爭力節節提升，台灣電子業的命脈被韓國三星等大企業掌握，更讓台灣備感威脅。即使連在中國大陸市場占有率方面，韓國亦於二○○五年以十一．六四％的占有率超越台灣的十一．三一％，並且持續領先台灣至今。
不少論者認為韓國的成就，是因為內部團結一致，用整體國家的力量在發展經濟。但事實上韓國的自由開放，卻是經由政府與大企業聯合，壓制國內工會與農民所導致的結果。美牛開放在韓國曾掀起軒然大波，與美國洽簽ＦＴＡ之際，更面臨反對黨議員佔據議事堂，執政黨是不惜動用強制表決才讓其生效。換句話說，韓國政府一旦認定了方向，就不惜付出任何政治代價，只求達到目標，這不是台灣所可以比擬的。
其次，台灣也必須認清，韓國本來就是一個比台灣更大的經濟體，不只人口是兩倍，土地面積也大得多，台灣可以設定更高的目標，自比南韓，但是就像南韓要自比日本一樣，有時出自民族情緒，並不實際。
台灣真正需要學習的，是韓國政府對外自由開放的決心。韓國是全世界簽署自由貿易協定最多的國家，目前已與東南亞國協、印度、歐盟、美國等國簽署ＦＴＡ，總計韓國已經有三六．二二％的出口產品享受免關稅與通關便利。倘若韓國再與中國大陸（含香港）、日本等國完成ＦＴＡ協商，則比例高達七二．七三％，此舉勢必將為韓國產品在國際市場上創造良好的競爭條件。
韓國的ＦＴＡ戰略，是由政府成立外交與貿易智囊，研究國家總體的經貿戰略，各大企業也設研究單位，一起進行全球市場開拓與ＦＴＡ簽署談判人才的培養，這些人才領域遍及外語與法律、國際企業、國際金融、政治與外交，屬博士後研究人才有數百人。但韓國政府真正的作為，還是在於開拓未來的產業方向。據諾貝爾獎經濟學家史賓塞的研究，就像台灣一樣，韓國經過一段快速成長階段後，邁入中階所得轉型期，韓國朝野也曾憂心經濟會失去成長動能，優質、勞力密集的製造業移往成本較低國家。但不尋常的是，韓國政府大力進行結構性轉型，也許是因一九九七年亞洲金融危機，韓國幾乎跌到谷底，讓它知道改革無可避免，將公部門投資焦點從勞力密集的出口部門轉移至教育、應用研究，積極吸引海外人才回流，並取消許多早期對產業的計畫與支持，移轉給民間部門去負責。
誠如廣達董事長林百里的觀察：韓國在國家整體力量主導下，正進行科技整合計畫，積極發展資訊科技產業，一流人才全部進入三星集團。早先當三星宣布打算發展與製造半導體記憶晶片時，西方國家認為這是愚蠢之舉。但是在宣布的十年後，三星製造出世界第一個二五六ＧＢ記憶體，那是半導體產業的重要里程碑，外界的質疑頓時鴉雀無聲。
如果要真正檢討韓國與台灣的不同，千萬要避免所謂「大財團v.s.中小企業」的迷思，真正的差別還是在於，不論是產業政策方向，亦或是ＦＴＡ戰略，政府有沒有帶頭提出願景，再加上朝野的循環惡鬥，有沒有扭曲了國家發展的大方向。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 5, 2012
Summary: After World War II, a dozen or so economies, including the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China, experienced over 20 years of rapid growth. On average they experienced a 7% annual GDP growth rate. But recently South Korea has left everyone else behind. This month it will join the "20-50 Club." It will become one of the seven countries in the world with a population exceeding 50 million, and a per capita income exceeding $20,000 USD. This news was hard for both the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan to swallow.
Full Text below:
After World War II, a dozen or so economies, including the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China, experienced over 20 years of rapid growth. On average they experienced a 7% annual GDP growth rate. But recently South Korea has left everyone else behind. This month it will join the "20-50 Club." It will become one of the seven countries in the world with a population exceeding 50 million, and a per capita income exceeding $20,000 USD.
Currently only six countries are members of the 20-50 Club. These six major developed countries became members before Korea. They include Japan (1987), the United States (1988) France and Italy (1990), Germany (1991), and Great Britain (1996).
This news was hard for both the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan to swallow. Taiwan and South Korea have long competed in every field, from academics to athletics. The 20-50 Club however, is an objective standard, one established by the major powers. Given the numbers, the gap between Taiwan and South Korea is hardly surprising. In 2004 South Korea's per capita income was $15,037 USD, ahead of Taiwan's at $15,012 USD. The gap in per capita income is increasing. Taiwan exceeded $20,000 USD in 2011. But South Korea led by $3,000 USD. In recent years South Korea's international competitiveness has steadily risen. The lifeblood of Taiwan's electronics industry has been diverted to South Korea, to Samsung and other large enterprises. Taiwan has been under the gun. It has lost market share to South Korea even on the Chinese Mainland. In 2005, South Korea commanded an 11.64% share of the Mainland market, exceeding Taiwan's 11.31% share. It has continued to lead Taiwan since.
Many commentators have suggested that South Korea's achievements are a result of its internal solidarity. They say it channels the entire nation's resources into economic development. But the fact is South Korea is free and open. The government and Big Business join to suppress domestic trade unions and farmers. Allowing U.S. beef imports created quite a stir in South Korea. When South Korea signed an FTA with the United States, opposition party legislators occupied the legislature. Only ruling party force enabled the legislature to vote. In other words, once the Korean government set its goals, it did not hesitate to pay any political price to achieve its goal, This is something we have been unable to accomplish on Taiwan.
Secondly, Taiwan must reallze that South Korea has always been a larger economy than Taiwan. It has twice the population. It has vastly greater land area. Taiwan may set higher goals. It may compare itself to South Korea. Just like South Korea often compares itself to Japan, out of national pride. But such comparisons are unrealistic.
What Taiwan really needs to emulate, is the South Korean government's determination to open itself to the outside world. South Korea has signed more free trade agreements than any other country in the world. It has signed FTAs with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), India, the European Union, and the United States. Currently 36.22% of South Korea's exports are duty-free. If it signs FTAs with Mainland China, including Hong Kong, with Japan and other countries, then 72.73% of South Korea's exports will be duty free. This will create ideal conditions for Korean products in the international markets.
South Korea's FTA strategy was devised by foreign service personnel and trade-oriented think tanks established by the government. They formulated its economic and trade strategy. Major companies also have research units. Together they have cultivated the talent necessary to open up global markets and negotiate FTAs. These talented individuals are experts in foreign languages and laws, international industry, finance, politics, and diplomacy. Hundreds of them have post-doctoral research experience. But the South Korean government's real achievements lie in its exploration of the future of industry. According to Nobel Prize winning economist Michael Spence, South Korea was like Taiwan. It too experienced a period of rapid growth. It too transitioned into a middle income economy. South Korean ruling and opposition parties also worried that their economy would lose momentum. High quality, labor-intensive manufacturing moved to lower cost countries. But the South Korean government vigorously promoted structural transformation. This may have been a response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997. South Korea hit rock bottom. This was a signal that reform could no longer be avoided. Public sector investment shifted from the labor-intensive export sector to education and applied research. The government actively recruited overseas Korean talent, and persuaded them to return. It canceled many of its plans to support industry. It transferred the resources to the private sector.
As Quanta Chairman Barry Lam observed, South Korea channeled its resources into the integration of technology. It actively developed information technology. First-class talent joined the Samsung Group. When Samsung announced its intention to develop and manufacture semiconductor memory chips, western countries thought it was being foolish. But a decade later, Samsung has created the world's first 256 GB memory chip. This was an important milestone for the semiconductor industry, The doubters are now silent.
If one really wants to understand the difference between South Korea and Taiwan, one must avoid the myth of "large consortia vs SMEs." The real difference lies elsewhere. The real question, whether for industrial policy or for FTA strategy, is whether the government took the lead and offered a vision. Did the ruling and opposition parties persist in infighting? Did they change the direction in which the country developed?
韓國邁進20—50俱樂部 台灣矮一截
2012-06-05
中國時報
【本報訊】
在二次世界大戰後，有十幾個國家（包括台灣在內）持續廿幾年高速成長，平均超過ＧＤＰ七％以上，但目前在這場賽跑中領先的韓國已經把大家拋在後面，即將於這個月進入「二○｜五○俱樂部」，成為全球第七個平均國民所得超過兩萬美元、總人口超過五千萬的國家。
目前全球僅有六國是「二○｜五○俱樂部」的成員，比韓國更早加入的國家，只有日本（一九八七年）、美國（一九八八年）、法國和義大利（一九九○年）、德國（一九九一年）與英國（一九九六年）六個主要發達國家。
這個新聞讓台灣朝野很不好過。過去台灣與南韓兩國處處競爭，從學術水準到體育競賽無一不在做對比。但「二○｜五○俱樂部」畢竟是個客觀標準，也是個強國的標準。從數據看，台韓差距並不是突如其來的，自從二○○四年韓國的平均國民所得（一五○三七美元）超過台灣（一五○一二美元）後，雙方平均國民所得的差距愈來愈大，台灣雖然在二○一一年超過兩萬美金，但是南韓卻又超前領先台灣三千元美金。尤其近幾年，韓國國際競爭力節節提升，台灣電子業的命脈被韓國三星等大企業掌握，更讓台灣備感威脅。即使連在中國大陸市場占有率方面，韓國亦於二○○五年以十一．六四％的占有率超越台灣的十一．三一％，並且持續領先台灣至今。
不少論者認為韓國的成就，是因為內部團結一致，用整體國家的力量在發展經濟。但事實上韓國的自由開放，卻是經由政府與大企業聯合，壓制國內工會與農民所導致的結果。美牛開放在韓國曾掀起軒然大波，與美國洽簽ＦＴＡ之際，更面臨反對黨議員佔據議事堂，執政黨是不惜動用強制表決才讓其生效。換句話說，韓國政府一旦認定了方向，就不惜付出任何政治代價，只求達到目標，這不是台灣所可以比擬的。
其次，台灣也必須認清，韓國本來就是一個比台灣更大的經濟體，不只人口是兩倍，土地面積也大得多，台灣可以設定更高的目標，自比南韓，但是就像南韓要自比日本一樣，有時出自民族情緒，並不實際。
台灣真正需要學習的，是韓國政府對外自由開放的決心。韓國是全世界簽署自由貿易協定最多的國家，目前已與東南亞國協、印度、歐盟、美國等國簽署ＦＴＡ，總計韓國已經有三六．二二％的出口產品享受免關稅與通關便利。倘若韓國再與中國大陸（含香港）、日本等國完成ＦＴＡ協商，則比例高達七二．七三％，此舉勢必將為韓國產品在國際市場上創造良好的競爭條件。
韓國的ＦＴＡ戰略，是由政府成立外交與貿易智囊，研究國家總體的經貿戰略，各大企業也設研究單位，一起進行全球市場開拓與ＦＴＡ簽署談判人才的培養，這些人才領域遍及外語與法律、國際企業、國際金融、政治與外交，屬博士後研究人才有數百人。但韓國政府真正的作為，還是在於開拓未來的產業方向。據諾貝爾獎經濟學家史賓塞的研究，就像台灣一樣，韓國經過一段快速成長階段後，邁入中階所得轉型期，韓國朝野也曾憂心經濟會失去成長動能，優質、勞力密集的製造業移往成本較低國家。但不尋常的是，韓國政府大力進行結構性轉型，也許是因一九九七年亞洲金融危機，韓國幾乎跌到谷底，讓它知道改革無可避免，將公部門投資焦點從勞力密集的出口部門轉移至教育、應用研究，積極吸引海外人才回流，並取消許多早期對產業的計畫與支持，移轉給民間部門去負責。
誠如廣達董事長林百里的觀察：韓國在國家整體力量主導下，正進行科技整合計畫，積極發展資訊科技產業，一流人才全部進入三星集團。早先當三星宣布打算發展與製造半導體記憶晶片時，西方國家認為這是愚蠢之舉。但是在宣布的十年後，三星製造出世界第一個二五六ＧＢ記憶體，那是半導體產業的重要里程碑，外界的質疑頓時鴉雀無聲。
如果要真正檢討韓國與台灣的不同，千萬要避免所謂「大財團v.s.中小企業」的迷思，真正的差別還是在於，不論是產業政策方向，亦或是ＦＴＡ戰略，政府有沒有帶頭提出願景，再加上朝野的循環惡鬥，有沒有扭曲了國家發展的大方向。
Monday, June 4, 2012
Su Tseng-chang's Semantic Dilemma
Su Tseng-chang's Semantic Dilemma
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 2, 2012
Summary: The DPP has announced its intention to to reinstate its "Department of China Affairs." It has also declared that referring to the Mainland as "China" is a neutral gesture without political implications. As a result, one reporter asked State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi whether he considered the DPP's move a gesture of goodwill toward the Mainland.
Full Text below:
The DPP has announced its intention to to reinstate its "Department of China Affairs." It has also declared that referring to the Mainland as "China" is a neutral gesture without political implications. As a result, one reporter asked State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi whether he considered the DPP's move a gesture of goodwill toward the Mainland.
Yang Yi was blunt. He said the Mainland resolutely opposes any Taiwan independence assertions that the cross-Strait relationship involves "one country on each side."
The Democratic Progressive Party is one of the major political parties on Taiwan. Yet it actually dissolved its Department of China Affairs. This was truly incomprehensible. Now it is considering reinstating it. But opinion is divided on what to name it. Some DPP leaders think it should be called the "Mainland Affairs Committee." Others think it should be called the "Cross-Strait Policy Committee."
The debate reflects a struggle within the Democratic Progressive Party over the party line. Democratic Progressive Party ideology dictates the name "Department of China Affairs." It reflects the DPP's "one country on each side" thinking. Names such as the "Department of Mainland Affairs" or "Cross-Strait Policy Committee" imply "one country, two regions" or "one China, different interpretations." That is why Taiwan independence hardliners lean toward "Department of Chinese Affairs" and revisionists lean toward terms such as "Mainland" or "cross-Strait."
The media asked Su Tseng-chang why the reinstated Department of China Affairs is not being referred to as the "Department of Mainland Affairs." He said "Because China is a neutral term." He said the entire world uses the term "China." He said even [Mainland] China refers to itself as "China."
When Chen Shui-bian was party chairman, he dissolved the "Department of China Affairs" as part of the "one country on each side" premise. He merged it into the "Department for International Affairs." This was a deliberate attempt to cast Mainland China as a foreign nation. Su Tseng-chang now wants to extract cross-Strait affairs from the "Department of International Affairs." Yet he remains trapped within "Department of China Affairs" thinking. So has he really "transcended" anything?
The DPP says the whole world says "China means the People's Republic of China." Therefore adopting this stance represents the adoption of an "international perspective." But Taiwan and the Mainland are engaged in coopetition. Taiwan must not accept the notion that "China is the People's Republic of China." Taiwan must not accept the notion that "one China means the People's Republic of China." Taiwan must take into account the cross-Strait situation, the strategic situation, and the constitutional framework.
By contrast, the Ma administration's 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. rejects the notion that "one China means the People's Republic of China." Instead, it champions "one China, different interpretations." These strategic and constitutional considerations are why President Ma insisted that official documents must never use the term "China" but instead "Mainland China" or "the Mainland."
The DPP's traditional view is that "one China means the People's Republic of China," or "one country on each side." But the Ma administration's view is that one China has different interpretations, based on constitutional and strategic considerations.
So how will the DPP name the new body? Naturally it will involve strategic concerns about national and constitutional allegiance. . Will the DPP support the view that "one China means the People's Republic of China?" Will it argue that this is the "international perspective?" Will it leave the definition of "China" in the hands of Beijing? Or will it adopt a "one China, different interpretations" cross-Strait perspective, one that takes into account constitutional and strategic concerns? Will it engage in a dialogue with the Republic of China's democracy, with 1.3 billion people on the Mainland, and with supporters of democratic institutions the world over?
Su Tseng-chang said that referring to the Mainland as "China" is neutral, and has no political implications. Beijing replied that the Mainland resolutely opposes Taiwan independence assertions that the cross-Strait relationship is "one country on each side." Earlier, Tsai Ing-wen expressed opposition to "one country, two regions." Beijing cited this as an example of "one country on each side," and "mulish Taiwan independence." Beijing has clearly laid out its position in its upcoming struggle with the DPP. The naming of the new DPP body may seem insignificant. Will the DPP use the term "China," or "the Mainland," or "cross-Strait?" This will become a problem for Su Tseng-chang and the DPP as they attempt to arrive policy positions that involve strategic and constitutional implications.
During his party chairman inaugural speech, Su Tseng-chang proposed "three guarantees." Namely, "Taiwan is the Taiwanese people's Taiwan. Taiwan is all Taiwanese people's Taiwan. Taiwan is every generation's Taiwan." This tongue twister may appeal to Taiwan independence hardliners. But it can never serve as cross-Strait or Mainland policy. The DPP's Taiwan independence rhetoric cannot even deliver the votes during election season. The DPP must ask itself how it can win an absolute majority during the presidential election. It must ask itself how it can ensure peace and prosperity on Taiwan, across the Strait, and internationally, in the event it is elected to office, Tsai Ing-wen accumulated enormous momentum during the presidential election. But at the last moment, the voters applied the brakes. Shouldn't Su Tseng-chang consider Tsai Ing-wen an object lesson?
A few days ago this newspaper published an editorial, saying Beijing has changed tack. It is now using the Republic of China Constitution as its bottom line. Beijing's move is directed at the DPP. The DPP opposes "one country, two regions." That is one reason Beijing believes the Ma administration's formulation "one Republic of China, two regions" is no obstacle to cross-Strait peaceful development. Whatever the Democratic Progressive Party opposes, may well become the very thing Beijing accepts. The DPP is now fulfilling the role of "bad cop" in cross-Strait relations.
But is the DPP content to forever be the bad cop? If not, it should think twice about what it intends to call the new body it is forming.
蘇貞昌對新機構命名的困窘
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.06.02
記者問北京國台辦發言人楊毅：民進黨擬恢復設置中國事務部，並視「中國」為中性名詞，大陸是否認為這是民進黨釋出的善意？
楊毅回答：凡是一邊一國的台獨主張，大陸歷來堅決反對。
民進黨做為台灣的主要政黨，居然撤銷了「中國事務部」，誠是不可思議。如今，研議「恢復設置」，但對於如何命名卻是見仁見智；有人認為可名為「大陸事務委員會」，有人則主張稱作「兩岸政策委員會」。
此一議論，見微知著地反映了民進黨內的路線鬥爭。因為，在民進黨的意識形態中，命名為「中國事務部」，基本上是主張「一邊一國」的架構；但「大陸事務委員會」或「兩岸政策委員會」，則是默認「一國兩區」或「一中各表」的架構。因而，獨派傾向「中國事務部」，修正派則主張冠以「大陸」或「兩岸」。
關於恢復「中國事務部」，媒體問蘇貞昌，何以不用「大陸」？他回答：「中國是中性名詞」，因為世界上都用「中國」來指稱，中國方面也用「中國」來稱呼自己。
陳水扁在黨主席任內，撤銷了反映「一邊一國」的「中國事務部」，而將業務併入「國際事務部」，這是刻意再進一步地將「中國」視為「國際概念」。如今，蘇貞昌若想將兩岸業務從「國際事務部」移出，倘仍陷於「中國事務為國際事務」的思維架構中，則豈有「超越」可言？
民進黨說，世界上皆指「中國就是中華人民共和國」，這是支持贊同「國際觀點」；但在台灣與對岸的競合關係中，台灣應不應當也承認及接受「中國就是中華人民共和國」，或「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，這卻必須建立在「兩岸思維」的憲法戰略架構上。
相對而言，馬政府的「九二共識／一中各表」，即是不同意「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，而主張「一個中國／各自表述」。正因此種憲法戰略觀，馬總統曾指示，官文書上不可逕稱「中國」，而應稱「中國大陸」或「大陸」。
換句話說，民進黨的傳統觀點是「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，也就是「一邊一國」；而馬政府的兩岸憲法戰略則是「一中各表」。
正因如此，民進黨將如何為新機構命名，當然會牽涉到基本的國憲認同戰略。究竟是要支持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」的「國際觀點」，將「中國」的定義權交給北京？抑或採行「一中各表」的兩岸憲法戰略，以中華民國的民主體制，與十三億大陸人民，及全世界的民主體制支持者對話？
蘇貞昌說，「中國」是中性名詞；北京方面顧左右而言他地答稱：凡是一邊一國的台獨主張，大陸歷來堅決反對。稍早，蔡英文反對「一國兩區」，亦被北京指為「一邊一國」的「頑固台獨」。北京顯然已經將未來與民進黨的鬥爭架構確立下來；因而，看似無關緊要的民進黨新機構命名，究竟是名以「中國」或「大陸」、「兩岸」，即成為蘇貞昌及民進黨的憲法戰略表態及抉擇問題。
蘇貞昌在黨主席「就職演說」中，雲山霧罩地提出了「三個保證」，即「台灣是台灣人的台灣／台灣是所有台灣人的台灣／台灣是世世代代人的台灣」；這類繞口令的言語，或許可藉以向獨派表態，但絕不是可以操作的「兩岸政策」或「中國政策」。其實，民進黨的台獨語言並非不能帶動選舉激情，而是必須考慮在總統大選中有否獲得過半選票的可能性；及倘若當選而執政，將如何維持台灣內部、兩岸及對外關係的和平發展？蔡英文在總統大選中聲勢如此凌厲，但選民在最後關頭卻踩了煞車。蔡英文是否蘇貞昌的前車之鑒？
本報日前社論說，北京改採「以中華民國憲法為底線」的戰略；其實，北京的動作相當程度地是針對民進黨而來。而民進黨反對「一國兩區」，亦正是北京認為馬政府「一個中華民國，兩個地區」的主張無礙兩岸和平發展的原因之一。由此可見，民進黨所反對的，就可能成為北京不反對的；在此，民進黨似乎又為兩岸「一中各表」的這次推進，扮演了有力的「黑臉」角色。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 2, 2012
Summary: The DPP has announced its intention to to reinstate its "Department of China Affairs." It has also declared that referring to the Mainland as "China" is a neutral gesture without political implications. As a result, one reporter asked State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi whether he considered the DPP's move a gesture of goodwill toward the Mainland.
Full Text below:
The DPP has announced its intention to to reinstate its "Department of China Affairs." It has also declared that referring to the Mainland as "China" is a neutral gesture without political implications. As a result, one reporter asked State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi whether he considered the DPP's move a gesture of goodwill toward the Mainland.
Yang Yi was blunt. He said the Mainland resolutely opposes any Taiwan independence assertions that the cross-Strait relationship involves "one country on each side."
The Democratic Progressive Party is one of the major political parties on Taiwan. Yet it actually dissolved its Department of China Affairs. This was truly incomprehensible. Now it is considering reinstating it. But opinion is divided on what to name it. Some DPP leaders think it should be called the "Mainland Affairs Committee." Others think it should be called the "Cross-Strait Policy Committee."
The debate reflects a struggle within the Democratic Progressive Party over the party line. Democratic Progressive Party ideology dictates the name "Department of China Affairs." It reflects the DPP's "one country on each side" thinking. Names such as the "Department of Mainland Affairs" or "Cross-Strait Policy Committee" imply "one country, two regions" or "one China, different interpretations." That is why Taiwan independence hardliners lean toward "Department of Chinese Affairs" and revisionists lean toward terms such as "Mainland" or "cross-Strait."
The media asked Su Tseng-chang why the reinstated Department of China Affairs is not being referred to as the "Department of Mainland Affairs." He said "Because China is a neutral term." He said the entire world uses the term "China." He said even [Mainland] China refers to itself as "China."
When Chen Shui-bian was party chairman, he dissolved the "Department of China Affairs" as part of the "one country on each side" premise. He merged it into the "Department for International Affairs." This was a deliberate attempt to cast Mainland China as a foreign nation. Su Tseng-chang now wants to extract cross-Strait affairs from the "Department of International Affairs." Yet he remains trapped within "Department of China Affairs" thinking. So has he really "transcended" anything?
The DPP says the whole world says "China means the People's Republic of China." Therefore adopting this stance represents the adoption of an "international perspective." But Taiwan and the Mainland are engaged in coopetition. Taiwan must not accept the notion that "China is the People's Republic of China." Taiwan must not accept the notion that "one China means the People's Republic of China." Taiwan must take into account the cross-Strait situation, the strategic situation, and the constitutional framework.
By contrast, the Ma administration's 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. rejects the notion that "one China means the People's Republic of China." Instead, it champions "one China, different interpretations." These strategic and constitutional considerations are why President Ma insisted that official documents must never use the term "China" but instead "Mainland China" or "the Mainland."
The DPP's traditional view is that "one China means the People's Republic of China," or "one country on each side." But the Ma administration's view is that one China has different interpretations, based on constitutional and strategic considerations.
So how will the DPP name the new body? Naturally it will involve strategic concerns about national and constitutional allegiance. . Will the DPP support the view that "one China means the People's Republic of China?" Will it argue that this is the "international perspective?" Will it leave the definition of "China" in the hands of Beijing? Or will it adopt a "one China, different interpretations" cross-Strait perspective, one that takes into account constitutional and strategic concerns? Will it engage in a dialogue with the Republic of China's democracy, with 1.3 billion people on the Mainland, and with supporters of democratic institutions the world over?
Su Tseng-chang said that referring to the Mainland as "China" is neutral, and has no political implications. Beijing replied that the Mainland resolutely opposes Taiwan independence assertions that the cross-Strait relationship is "one country on each side." Earlier, Tsai Ing-wen expressed opposition to "one country, two regions." Beijing cited this as an example of "one country on each side," and "mulish Taiwan independence." Beijing has clearly laid out its position in its upcoming struggle with the DPP. The naming of the new DPP body may seem insignificant. Will the DPP use the term "China," or "the Mainland," or "cross-Strait?" This will become a problem for Su Tseng-chang and the DPP as they attempt to arrive policy positions that involve strategic and constitutional implications.
During his party chairman inaugural speech, Su Tseng-chang proposed "three guarantees." Namely, "Taiwan is the Taiwanese people's Taiwan. Taiwan is all Taiwanese people's Taiwan. Taiwan is every generation's Taiwan." This tongue twister may appeal to Taiwan independence hardliners. But it can never serve as cross-Strait or Mainland policy. The DPP's Taiwan independence rhetoric cannot even deliver the votes during election season. The DPP must ask itself how it can win an absolute majority during the presidential election. It must ask itself how it can ensure peace and prosperity on Taiwan, across the Strait, and internationally, in the event it is elected to office, Tsai Ing-wen accumulated enormous momentum during the presidential election. But at the last moment, the voters applied the brakes. Shouldn't Su Tseng-chang consider Tsai Ing-wen an object lesson?
A few days ago this newspaper published an editorial, saying Beijing has changed tack. It is now using the Republic of China Constitution as its bottom line. Beijing's move is directed at the DPP. The DPP opposes "one country, two regions." That is one reason Beijing believes the Ma administration's formulation "one Republic of China, two regions" is no obstacle to cross-Strait peaceful development. Whatever the Democratic Progressive Party opposes, may well become the very thing Beijing accepts. The DPP is now fulfilling the role of "bad cop" in cross-Strait relations.
But is the DPP content to forever be the bad cop? If not, it should think twice about what it intends to call the new body it is forming.
蘇貞昌對新機構命名的困窘
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.06.02
記者問北京國台辦發言人楊毅：民進黨擬恢復設置中國事務部，並視「中國」為中性名詞，大陸是否認為這是民進黨釋出的善意？
楊毅回答：凡是一邊一國的台獨主張，大陸歷來堅決反對。
民進黨做為台灣的主要政黨，居然撤銷了「中國事務部」，誠是不可思議。如今，研議「恢復設置」，但對於如何命名卻是見仁見智；有人認為可名為「大陸事務委員會」，有人則主張稱作「兩岸政策委員會」。
此一議論，見微知著地反映了民進黨內的路線鬥爭。因為，在民進黨的意識形態中，命名為「中國事務部」，基本上是主張「一邊一國」的架構；但「大陸事務委員會」或「兩岸政策委員會」，則是默認「一國兩區」或「一中各表」的架構。因而，獨派傾向「中國事務部」，修正派則主張冠以「大陸」或「兩岸」。
關於恢復「中國事務部」，媒體問蘇貞昌，何以不用「大陸」？他回答：「中國是中性名詞」，因為世界上都用「中國」來指稱，中國方面也用「中國」來稱呼自己。
陳水扁在黨主席任內，撤銷了反映「一邊一國」的「中國事務部」，而將業務併入「國際事務部」，這是刻意再進一步地將「中國」視為「國際概念」。如今，蘇貞昌若想將兩岸業務從「國際事務部」移出，倘仍陷於「中國事務為國際事務」的思維架構中，則豈有「超越」可言？
民進黨說，世界上皆指「中國就是中華人民共和國」，這是支持贊同「國際觀點」；但在台灣與對岸的競合關係中，台灣應不應當也承認及接受「中國就是中華人民共和國」，或「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，這卻必須建立在「兩岸思維」的憲法戰略架構上。
相對而言，馬政府的「九二共識／一中各表」，即是不同意「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，而主張「一個中國／各自表述」。正因此種憲法戰略觀，馬總統曾指示，官文書上不可逕稱「中國」，而應稱「中國大陸」或「大陸」。
換句話說，民進黨的傳統觀點是「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，也就是「一邊一國」；而馬政府的兩岸憲法戰略則是「一中各表」。
正因如此，民進黨將如何為新機構命名，當然會牽涉到基本的國憲認同戰略。究竟是要支持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」的「國際觀點」，將「中國」的定義權交給北京？抑或採行「一中各表」的兩岸憲法戰略，以中華民國的民主體制，與十三億大陸人民，及全世界的民主體制支持者對話？
蘇貞昌說，「中國」是中性名詞；北京方面顧左右而言他地答稱：凡是一邊一國的台獨主張，大陸歷來堅決反對。稍早，蔡英文反對「一國兩區」，亦被北京指為「一邊一國」的「頑固台獨」。北京顯然已經將未來與民進黨的鬥爭架構確立下來；因而，看似無關緊要的民進黨新機構命名，究竟是名以「中國」或「大陸」、「兩岸」，即成為蘇貞昌及民進黨的憲法戰略表態及抉擇問題。
蘇貞昌在黨主席「就職演說」中，雲山霧罩地提出了「三個保證」，即「台灣是台灣人的台灣／台灣是所有台灣人的台灣／台灣是世世代代人的台灣」；這類繞口令的言語，或許可藉以向獨派表態，但絕不是可以操作的「兩岸政策」或「中國政策」。其實，民進黨的台獨語言並非不能帶動選舉激情，而是必須考慮在總統大選中有否獲得過半選票的可能性；及倘若當選而執政，將如何維持台灣內部、兩岸及對外關係的和平發展？蔡英文在總統大選中聲勢如此凌厲，但選民在最後關頭卻踩了煞車。蔡英文是否蘇貞昌的前車之鑒？
本報日前社論說，北京改採「以中華民國憲法為底線」的戰略；其實，北京的動作相當程度地是針對民進黨而來。而民進黨反對「一國兩區」，亦正是北京認為馬政府「一個中華民國，兩個地區」的主張無礙兩岸和平發展的原因之一。由此可見，民進黨所反對的，就可能成為北京不反對的；在此，民進黨似乎又為兩岸「一中各表」的這次推進，扮演了有力的「黑臉」角色。
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