A Worthy and Substantive Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 10, 2012
Summary: Yesterday the SEF and ARATS held its latest Chiang-Chen Meeting. The two sides signed the Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement and Customs Agreement. These consultations took two years. The Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement attracted the attention not just of Taiwan businessmen, but of the general public. It is a substantive legal document deserving of recognition. It is worth taking the time to analyze its significance.
Full Text below:
Yesterday the SEF and ARATS held its latest Chiang-Chen Meeting. The two sides signed the Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement and Customs Agreement. These consultations took two years. The Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement attracted the attention not just of Taiwan businessmen, but of the general public. It is a substantive legal document deserving of recognition. It is worth taking the time to analyze its significance.
Compare the Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement to international bilateral investment protection agreements. This agreement may be the most important fruit of ECFA, the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement. Many points are worth noting. First of all, the agreement covers investments, investors, investment income, and relevant government provisions. The agreement is comprehensive. The wording is precise, and consistent with international standards. It establishes basic principles for investment protection. It emphasizes due process and non-discrimination. Besides protecting the security of investments, it specifies that investors must enjoy the same rights as local citizens, and calls for MFN treatment. The two sides pledged to improve treatment for investors, and a halt to new restrictive provisions.
One issue that delayed agreement concerned personal liberty and personal safety. The requirement that family members of detained businessmen be notified within 24 hours was not reflected in the text of the agreement. The agreement merely stated that the two sides must provide notice within the specified period of time, in accordance with existing notification requirements. This results were less than hoped for. But they should not be regarded as a failure. Negotiators for our side stressed the provisions of Article VIII of the Constitution, which require notification within 24-hours to protect personal freedom. They attempted to establish standards for the protection of cross-Strait investors. Their efforts should be applauded.
This set the bar quite high for the the other side. It was difficult to incorporate into their criminal procedure system. But it was also a lesson in constitutionalism. Article VIII of the Constitution provides strict protections for personal freedom. But even on Taiwan the government does not always fully comply with the relevant requirements. Our side stressed the Constitution. Our side called on the Mainland to respect the personal rights and interests of Taiwan businessmen. We called for treatment beyond that afforded local citizens. Such demands were not excessive. They were not incorporated into the agreement. But the government must engage in self-introspection. It must adhere more strictly to Article VIII of the Constitution on Taiwan. It must do so for the sake of foreign investments as well as its own citizens. These principles should apply to everyone. This should become the basis for future reciprocity.
The most praise-worthy aspect of the agreement concerns norms for investment levies. The agreement clearly defines levies to include direct expropriation and indirect expropriation. For Taiwan businessmen, this is highly significant. Taiwan businessmen encounter few cases of direct expropriation. But they encounter many cases of indirect expropriation. Indirect expropriation may not expropriation in name, but it is expropriation just the same. Examples include plant closings, deportations, forfeitures of equity, the repossession of land legally obtained, and so on. These all constitute indirect expropriation. These are expressly included in the agreement. The other side, especially local governments, often makes ever-increasing demands on Taiwan investors. The agreement will impose restraints. Detailed provisions allow investment transfers. This too was a plus.
The agreement calls for the timely payment of compensation. It calls for compliance with international standards. This too deserves praise. It clearly specifies that compensation must be calculated on the basis of fair market value. This constitutes a landmark provision for expropriation compensation, even for Taiwan.
The Cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement is a rare reminder for investors on both sides of the Strait, especially on Taiwan. International investment protection agreements seldom include provisions for commercial disputes between private investors. This agreement does. Investors may include arbitration clauses in business contracts as an alternative to litigation. Arbitration institutions from either side are eligible, and either side may serve as the arbitration locale. This allows arbitration institutions on either side to handle arbitration on the other side. Taiwan businessmen will have many more options during investment negotiations.
Taiwan businessmen must of course understand the rule of law. They must understand beforehand the arbitration clause in the contract, if they wish to avoid litigation. Consider disputes between investors and local governments. The agreement includes multiple means of conflict resolution. The current agreement includes mediating institutions. It was a compromise arrangement. Critics wanted the inclusion of international arbitration mechanisms. But as one can imagine, this was not something the other side could accept. This is not an option for dispute arbitration between investors and the government even on Taiwan. Such a demand amounts to super-national treatment. One can only hope that attitudes may change in the future. The current agreement is a giant step forward from what we had before. That is no exaggeration.
In sum, two years of concerted effort were not wasted. We expect the two governments to earnestly implement this hard-won agreement, and ensure the two sides' precious cross-Strait investments.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2012.08.10
社論－兩岸投保協議 內容豐富值得肯定
本報訊
兩岸兩會日昨舉行江陳會，會中簽署了《兩岸投資保障協議》與《海關協議》。其中費時兩年協商，深受台商乃至全社會注意的投資保障協議，是一份內容豐富值得肯定的法律文件，也因此值得分析其具有的含義。
兩岸投資保障協議，比照國際上雙邊投資保障協定的規格而書立，堪稱是兩岸經濟合作架構協議之後的一項重要協商成果，有許多值得注意之處。首先，其所涵蓋的投資、投資人、投資收益及受到規範的政府措施，相當周延，遣詞用字謹嚴，均符合國際投資保障協議的水準。其中樹立了投資待遇的基本保障原則，除了強調正當程序，不得歧視，並且保障投資安全之後，也納入了國民待遇及最惠國待遇的實質要求，雙方亦承諾改善待遇及不增加不利限制的規定。
此中曾經一度拖延協議進度的議題，是關於人身自由與安全保障的通知義務。關於廿四小時內進行通報的規定，並未見諸協議文字，而只寫到了雙方應依各自規定的時限履行相關通知的義務，完善既有通報機制。此一成果雖不如預期，畢竟不應視為失敗。我方談判人員能夠記得憲法第八條關於廿四小時通知以保障人身自由的規定，企圖引為兩岸保障投資人的標準，立意極佳，值得稱許。
對於對岸而言，此一要求雖然標準極高且尚難納為刑事訴訟制度的當然內容，但是也不妨視為一種憲法教育的過程，話說回來，憲法第八條關於人身自由的嚴格保障，即使在台灣，政府是否已然完全遵照做到，也非無可資檢討之處。我們不忘記憲法的規定，要求海峽彼岸尊重台商的人身權益，給予超國民待遇，倒也不算陳義過高。雖然並未如願載入協議；但政府同時應該自我督促，更切實地在台灣境內嚴格依照憲法第八條的規定辦事，對於外資以及本國人民，皆應一體適用，做為日後基於互惠原則要求對方的張本。
最可稱道的約定，應數徵收投資的規範，本項協議明白定義徵收包括直接徵收與間接徵收，對於台商而言，甚有意義。因為台商遇到直接徵收的情形少，遇到間接徵收的情形多。所謂間接徵收，就是政府對於投資採取了不以徵收為名，而其實質效果等同於直接徵收的措施。例如封廠、驅逐出境、沒收股權、逕行收回合法審批的土地等等，都可能構成間接徵收。此項明文納入協議範圍，對於對岸特別是地方政府，處理台商投資事宜，許多予取予求的作風，應該具有收斂節制的作用，詳細規定容許投資轉移的細節，也具有正面的價值。
協議中規定徵收補償應該符合即時、有效及充分等項符合國際要求的原則，也可按讚。尤其是明白寫下應以公平市場價值做為計算徵收補償的基準，即使是在台灣既有的徵收補償法制上，也是一項新穎而具有指標意義的規定。
兩岸投資保障協議對於兩岸的投資者，特別是台商，還有一項罕見的提醒。一般的國際投資保障協定，少見明文載入私人間投資商務糾紛的規定，此次則也有著墨，而且仔細交代投資者可於商務契約中納入仲裁條款，作為替代訴訟的選擇。又強調兩岸的仲裁機構可以選擇兩岸各地做為仲裁地點，開放了兩岸仲裁機構至對岸辦理仲裁的可能性，對於台商是項可於投資談判中要求採納的利多選擇。
當然此中的關鍵，仍然是台商要有足夠的法治認識，懂得事前在契約中納入仲裁條款，避免訴訟，就投資人與投資地政府的爭端，協議中也有多重的解決途徑。此次納入了機構調解的選擇，應該是折衷的安排。論者或許期待能有所謂的國際仲裁機制，此點不是對岸可以接受的選擇，可以想見。即使就台灣現行法制而言，提供投資者與政府間發生公法性質的爭執循仲裁方式解決，也不是既有的選項。如此要求，不啻是超國民待遇，只能期諸來日觀念的改變。現在協議的安排，比起簽署之前，是一大進步，則非過言。
整體而言，兩年的協商努力，可謂功不唐捐，接下來，我們應該期待的是兩岸政府均能誠心落實執行這項來之不易的協議，保障兩岸彌足珍貴的投資活動。
Thursday, August 9, 2012
Wednesday, August 8, 2012
Shortage of Talent on Taiwan Serious
Shortage of Talent on Taiwan Serious
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 9, 2012
Summary: The National Science Council recently held a Science and Technology Development Advisory Conference. It invited officials and experts to discuss industry-university cooperation, national planning projects, and the talent shortage. Chu Ching-yi, Chairman of the National Science Council told reporters Taiwan now has a serious shortage of talent. If nothing is done, Taiwan's former advantage will be lost. International competition will result in our tragic demise. His comments were shocking. Industry, government, and academia each issued warnings. Everyone sees the problem. But no one sees any solutions.
Full Text below:
The National Science Council recently held a Science and Technology Development Advisory Conference. It invited officials and experts to discuss industry-university cooperation, national planning projects, and the talent shortage. Chu Ching-yi, Chairman of the National Science Council told reporters Taiwan now has a serious shortage of talent. If nothing is done, Taiwan's former advantage will be lost. International competition will result in our tragic demise. His comments were shocking. Industry, government, and academia each issued warnings. Everyone sees the problem. But no one sees any solutions.
The shortage of talent on Taiwan did not begin today. Two or three years ago Chu Ching-yi was chairman of the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. As an ordinary scholar he repeatedly issued warnings, including a number of concrete facts. For example, A Ph.D returning from the U.S. to work as an assistant researcher at the Academia Sinica, would be paid a monthly salary of 190,000 NT. The same individual working at Tsinghua University in Beijing, would receive an annual salary, moving expenses, and three years of housing subsidies. His or her average monthly salary would be 436,000 NT, two to three times the Academia Sinica salary. As one can imagine, given such differences in treatment, Beijing is clearly preferable to Taipei.
Three years later, the situation has not improved. Salaries for high-level talen on Taiwan lag far behind Hong Kong and Singapore, by as much as five times. Back then Chu Ching-yi estimated that if nothing was done, the talent shortage would reach crisis proportions within ten years. Even Chu did not realize the crisis would materialize so soon. Less than three years later, the situation has already deteriorated. High-level salaries are constrained by rigid laws. Mid and low-level salaries are constrained by economic hardship. When the pie cannot be made any larger, each piece of the pie will remain small. We lack the economic wherewithal to attract talent. In turn, the lack of talent in a knowledge-based economy will make economic growth impossible. In short, Taiwan may fall victim to more than a lack of talent. The lack of talent could lead to a vicious cycle of economic decline.
This is true for native talent. But how is it for foreign scientific and technological talent? Chu Ching-yi cites his own experience with foreign professors. Before the professor can receive a letter of appointment, he must undergo the same "foreign labor screening" as ordinary foreign workers. Screening for foreign professionals includes bewildering and humiliating screening for syphilis. They may be granted permanent residence, but their families and loved ones will not. Family members can be reunited only by obtaining a 30 day tourist visa. When it expires, family members must leave the country. Even driver's licenses are valid only for the duration of their residence. If their work permit has expired, income earned on Taiwan cannot be withdrawn overseas. Even dividends from unlisted shares require mountains of red tape. Personal information concerning the companies and the individuals must be submitted to the Ministry of Economic Affairs Investment Commission. Myriad restrictions make foreign professionals feel demeaned and subjected to unreasonable and unfair treatment. Why would they want to come to Taiwan?
Native talent has become harder to keep. Foreign talent has become even harder to attract. In recent years many people on Taiwan have evinced an intensely isolationist mentality. Mainland and foreign students have encountered the same obstacles, both in education and in employment. To ensure educational and employment opportunities for Taiwan students, students from the Mainland are not even allowed to marry someone from Taiwan. Allowing in foreign workers involves a variety of political considerations. On the surface such restrictions protect Taiwan. In fact they restrict the entry of high-level talent into Taiwan. They undermine national competitiveness. As a result, more talent leaves. In the global talent market, Taiwan has already lost its attraction. If talent cannot gather, how can industry upgrade? By contrast Singapore is encouraging professionals to move there in droves. The US is the world's most powerful nation. It has never changed its open invitation to professional talent. It spares no expense to train students. Is Taiwan really in any position to talk about global competitiveness?
People on Taiwan underwent years of hardship. They survived the "Come, come, come to National Taiwan University; Go, go, go to the United States" era. Eventually those who went to the United States returned home to create Taiwan's economic miracle. But once Taiwan took off, students had less incentive to study abroad. They stayed home and stood guard over a pool of stagnant water. As iD SoftCapital Group Chairman Stan Shih observed, "The new generation is talented. But we can no longer offer them a stage on which to perform." When asked how this came about, he said "under the influence of politic demagoguery, our society shrank the stage. We only looked inward. Industries lost their competitiveness. Young people no longer have a stage on which to perform."
Industry and academia see the problem. They have proposed solutions. The key is to free up the policies and the laws. The way must be cleared, all the way from the legislature to the executive. For example, the Legislative Yuan oversees public shares and public foundations. It fights fat cats. This enabled the Executive Yuan to invoke the "anti-fat cat articles" to attack research institutes willy nilly. Eventually they realized their error and proposed a "flexible salary program." They managed to retain research institute talent, barely. But the damage was already done.
Politics and economics on Taiwan is brims over with lip service to "the common man." Populist sentiment can easily lead to coercive egalitarianism. This is hardly conducive to the cultivation of cutting-edge talent. The political realm has reduced the stage for the economic realm and the social realm. As a result, far-sighted policies are no longer an option. Even assuming they could be implemented immediately, the government should give them careful consideration.
台灣人才斷層危機 不容低估
2012-08-09 01:02
中國時報
國科會舉行「科學技術發展諮議會」，邀集產官學界人士討論產學合作、國家型計畫及人才問題，國科會主委朱敬一會前受訪直指，台灣進入「人才斷層期」，如果再無作為，早年累積的優勢也會流失，與他國競爭的結果會是「死狀甚慘」，一語驚雷，讓產官學各界紛紛提出警語，然而，危機大家都看到了，解決辦法卻似乎還沒個譜。
台灣人才危機非始於今日，早在二、三年前，朱敬一猶是中華經濟研究院董事長，以一介學者的身分，已多次撰文警示，當年他提出的幾項具體事實，隨便舉例，一位留美博士要返台出任中研院助研究員，依現行俸給規定月薪約台幣十九萬；相同的人才若赴北京清華大學，年薪加上安家費、三年助房補貼等等平均月薪四十三萬六千，是中研院薪給的二點三倍，可想而知，如果以待遇做選擇，北京會是台北之前的優選。
三年過去，情況並未改善，而台灣高階人才的薪資待遇，甚至已經遠遠落後於香港、新加坡達五倍之多。當時，朱敬一預估，如果不加防範則人才斷層危機會在十年內呈現，他大概沒想到，危機來得既猛又快，三年不到已然惡化。高階人才薪給受困於僵化法令制度，中低階人員待遇則受限於實際的經濟發展，當餅做不大的時候，可分食的資源必然有限，經濟實力不夠缺乏足以吸引人才的誘因，人才不足則在知識經濟的時代更不可能翻轉提升經濟實力，質言之，台灣可能不只陷入人才斷層危機，而是已經陷入人才斷層與經濟頹軟的惡化循環。
本國人才如此，外籍科研人才又如何？朱敬一以自己身邊外籍教授的經驗為例，即使是教授拿到聘書前，還是要和一般外勞相同先行「外勞篩檢」，檢驗項目包括讓外籍專業人士不解也感到羞辱的「梅毒」；他們即使因為工作而取得永久居留證，但其家屬親人卻始終無法取得居留證，家人想團聚只能以觀光簽證卅天居留，期滿就得出境，連駕照換照都只給到其居留期限；他們在台灣工作所得，因為在銀行的居留證資料過期而不能在國外提款；連購買未上市股票配發股票股利，還得搜集包括公司與個人的一大疊資料赴經濟部投審會「申請」；林林總總的限制，只讓外籍專業人士自覺低人一等，且受到不合理、不公平的待遇。誰還想到台灣？
本國人才難留、外籍人才不來，更嚴重的，台灣近幾年有強烈的鎖國心態，不論是陸生或者外籍學生，從教育到就業都要碰到相同的爭議話題：保障台生就讀與就業權益，陸生甚至不能在台結婚，即使開放外勞都有各種牽牽絆絆的政治考量，表面上彷彿保障了台灣人，實情卻是限制了高階優秀人才移入台灣，國家整體競爭力因此衰退，更多人才因此出走，在全球化的人才市場上，台灣已經失去了磁吸作用，人才無法群聚，產業如何升級？相對於新加坡大量鼓勵專業人士移入，世界最大強國美國從未改變向全球張開雙臂歡迎專業人士，不惜重金培養留學生，台灣還有什麼條件談全球競爭力？
台灣走過困頓的歲月，有過「來來來，來台大；去去去，去美國」的日子，然而，那些赴美人才陸續回鄉，開創台灣的經濟奇蹟，騰昇之後的台灣，學生出國留學意願漸低，留著守住一攤難以攪動的死水。智融集團董事長施振榮說得好，「新生代都是人才，但是我們沒有提供下一代可以發揮的舞台。」何以致此？「因為整個社會在政治運作下，把舞台做小了，都是往內看，產業沒有競爭力，年輕人也失去發揮的舞台。」
產學界看到問題，提出可能的解決方案，重點還是卡在政策法令制度的鬆綁，得一路通關從行政部門打到立法機關。隨便舉例，因為立法院監督公股事業與財團法人，重打肥貓，讓行政院祭出「打肥貓條款」，打到工研院幾乎崩盤，才亟思挽救推出「彈薪方案」，勉強有利於研究機關延攬人才，但已打成重傷。
而在舉國從政治、經濟甚至語言俱談「庶民」之際，民粹情緒很容易塑造齊頭式的平等，卻絕對無益於形塑尖端人才，政治壓縮了經濟與社會的舞台空間，致使有遠見的政策方案無法有效推出、即時落實執行，都值得執政者深思。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 9, 2012
Summary: The National Science Council recently held a Science and Technology Development Advisory Conference. It invited officials and experts to discuss industry-university cooperation, national planning projects, and the talent shortage. Chu Ching-yi, Chairman of the National Science Council told reporters Taiwan now has a serious shortage of talent. If nothing is done, Taiwan's former advantage will be lost. International competition will result in our tragic demise. His comments were shocking. Industry, government, and academia each issued warnings. Everyone sees the problem. But no one sees any solutions.
Full Text below:
The National Science Council recently held a Science and Technology Development Advisory Conference. It invited officials and experts to discuss industry-university cooperation, national planning projects, and the talent shortage. Chu Ching-yi, Chairman of the National Science Council told reporters Taiwan now has a serious shortage of talent. If nothing is done, Taiwan's former advantage will be lost. International competition will result in our tragic demise. His comments were shocking. Industry, government, and academia each issued warnings. Everyone sees the problem. But no one sees any solutions.
The shortage of talent on Taiwan did not begin today. Two or three years ago Chu Ching-yi was chairman of the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. As an ordinary scholar he repeatedly issued warnings, including a number of concrete facts. For example, A Ph.D returning from the U.S. to work as an assistant researcher at the Academia Sinica, would be paid a monthly salary of 190,000 NT. The same individual working at Tsinghua University in Beijing, would receive an annual salary, moving expenses, and three years of housing subsidies. His or her average monthly salary would be 436,000 NT, two to three times the Academia Sinica salary. As one can imagine, given such differences in treatment, Beijing is clearly preferable to Taipei.
Three years later, the situation has not improved. Salaries for high-level talen on Taiwan lag far behind Hong Kong and Singapore, by as much as five times. Back then Chu Ching-yi estimated that if nothing was done, the talent shortage would reach crisis proportions within ten years. Even Chu did not realize the crisis would materialize so soon. Less than three years later, the situation has already deteriorated. High-level salaries are constrained by rigid laws. Mid and low-level salaries are constrained by economic hardship. When the pie cannot be made any larger, each piece of the pie will remain small. We lack the economic wherewithal to attract talent. In turn, the lack of talent in a knowledge-based economy will make economic growth impossible. In short, Taiwan may fall victim to more than a lack of talent. The lack of talent could lead to a vicious cycle of economic decline.
This is true for native talent. But how is it for foreign scientific and technological talent? Chu Ching-yi cites his own experience with foreign professors. Before the professor can receive a letter of appointment, he must undergo the same "foreign labor screening" as ordinary foreign workers. Screening for foreign professionals includes bewildering and humiliating screening for syphilis. They may be granted permanent residence, but their families and loved ones will not. Family members can be reunited only by obtaining a 30 day tourist visa. When it expires, family members must leave the country. Even driver's licenses are valid only for the duration of their residence. If their work permit has expired, income earned on Taiwan cannot be withdrawn overseas. Even dividends from unlisted shares require mountains of red tape. Personal information concerning the companies and the individuals must be submitted to the Ministry of Economic Affairs Investment Commission. Myriad restrictions make foreign professionals feel demeaned and subjected to unreasonable and unfair treatment. Why would they want to come to Taiwan?
Native talent has become harder to keep. Foreign talent has become even harder to attract. In recent years many people on Taiwan have evinced an intensely isolationist mentality. Mainland and foreign students have encountered the same obstacles, both in education and in employment. To ensure educational and employment opportunities for Taiwan students, students from the Mainland are not even allowed to marry someone from Taiwan. Allowing in foreign workers involves a variety of political considerations. On the surface such restrictions protect Taiwan. In fact they restrict the entry of high-level talent into Taiwan. They undermine national competitiveness. As a result, more talent leaves. In the global talent market, Taiwan has already lost its attraction. If talent cannot gather, how can industry upgrade? By contrast Singapore is encouraging professionals to move there in droves. The US is the world's most powerful nation. It has never changed its open invitation to professional talent. It spares no expense to train students. Is Taiwan really in any position to talk about global competitiveness?
People on Taiwan underwent years of hardship. They survived the "Come, come, come to National Taiwan University; Go, go, go to the United States" era. Eventually those who went to the United States returned home to create Taiwan's economic miracle. But once Taiwan took off, students had less incentive to study abroad. They stayed home and stood guard over a pool of stagnant water. As iD SoftCapital Group Chairman Stan Shih observed, "The new generation is talented. But we can no longer offer them a stage on which to perform." When asked how this came about, he said "under the influence of politic demagoguery, our society shrank the stage. We only looked inward. Industries lost their competitiveness. Young people no longer have a stage on which to perform."
Industry and academia see the problem. They have proposed solutions. The key is to free up the policies and the laws. The way must be cleared, all the way from the legislature to the executive. For example, the Legislative Yuan oversees public shares and public foundations. It fights fat cats. This enabled the Executive Yuan to invoke the "anti-fat cat articles" to attack research institutes willy nilly. Eventually they realized their error and proposed a "flexible salary program." They managed to retain research institute talent, barely. But the damage was already done.
Politics and economics on Taiwan is brims over with lip service to "the common man." Populist sentiment can easily lead to coercive egalitarianism. This is hardly conducive to the cultivation of cutting-edge talent. The political realm has reduced the stage for the economic realm and the social realm. As a result, far-sighted policies are no longer an option. Even assuming they could be implemented immediately, the government should give them careful consideration.
台灣人才斷層危機 不容低估
2012-08-09 01:02
中國時報
國科會舉行「科學技術發展諮議會」，邀集產官學界人士討論產學合作、國家型計畫及人才問題，國科會主委朱敬一會前受訪直指，台灣進入「人才斷層期」，如果再無作為，早年累積的優勢也會流失，與他國競爭的結果會是「死狀甚慘」，一語驚雷，讓產官學各界紛紛提出警語，然而，危機大家都看到了，解決辦法卻似乎還沒個譜。
台灣人才危機非始於今日，早在二、三年前，朱敬一猶是中華經濟研究院董事長，以一介學者的身分，已多次撰文警示，當年他提出的幾項具體事實，隨便舉例，一位留美博士要返台出任中研院助研究員，依現行俸給規定月薪約台幣十九萬；相同的人才若赴北京清華大學，年薪加上安家費、三年助房補貼等等平均月薪四十三萬六千，是中研院薪給的二點三倍，可想而知，如果以待遇做選擇，北京會是台北之前的優選。
三年過去，情況並未改善，而台灣高階人才的薪資待遇，甚至已經遠遠落後於香港、新加坡達五倍之多。當時，朱敬一預估，如果不加防範則人才斷層危機會在十年內呈現，他大概沒想到，危機來得既猛又快，三年不到已然惡化。高階人才薪給受困於僵化法令制度，中低階人員待遇則受限於實際的經濟發展，當餅做不大的時候，可分食的資源必然有限，經濟實力不夠缺乏足以吸引人才的誘因，人才不足則在知識經濟的時代更不可能翻轉提升經濟實力，質言之，台灣可能不只陷入人才斷層危機，而是已經陷入人才斷層與經濟頹軟的惡化循環。
本國人才如此，外籍科研人才又如何？朱敬一以自己身邊外籍教授的經驗為例，即使是教授拿到聘書前，還是要和一般外勞相同先行「外勞篩檢」，檢驗項目包括讓外籍專業人士不解也感到羞辱的「梅毒」；他們即使因為工作而取得永久居留證，但其家屬親人卻始終無法取得居留證，家人想團聚只能以觀光簽證卅天居留，期滿就得出境，連駕照換照都只給到其居留期限；他們在台灣工作所得，因為在銀行的居留證資料過期而不能在國外提款；連購買未上市股票配發股票股利，還得搜集包括公司與個人的一大疊資料赴經濟部投審會「申請」；林林總總的限制，只讓外籍專業人士自覺低人一等，且受到不合理、不公平的待遇。誰還想到台灣？
本國人才難留、外籍人才不來，更嚴重的，台灣近幾年有強烈的鎖國心態，不論是陸生或者外籍學生，從教育到就業都要碰到相同的爭議話題：保障台生就讀與就業權益，陸生甚至不能在台結婚，即使開放外勞都有各種牽牽絆絆的政治考量，表面上彷彿保障了台灣人，實情卻是限制了高階優秀人才移入台灣，國家整體競爭力因此衰退，更多人才因此出走，在全球化的人才市場上，台灣已經失去了磁吸作用，人才無法群聚，產業如何升級？相對於新加坡大量鼓勵專業人士移入，世界最大強國美國從未改變向全球張開雙臂歡迎專業人士，不惜重金培養留學生，台灣還有什麼條件談全球競爭力？
台灣走過困頓的歲月，有過「來來來，來台大；去去去，去美國」的日子，然而，那些赴美人才陸續回鄉，開創台灣的經濟奇蹟，騰昇之後的台灣，學生出國留學意願漸低，留著守住一攤難以攪動的死水。智融集團董事長施振榮說得好，「新生代都是人才，但是我們沒有提供下一代可以發揮的舞台。」何以致此？「因為整個社會在政治運作下，把舞台做小了，都是往內看，產業沒有競爭力，年輕人也失去發揮的舞台。」
產學界看到問題，提出可能的解決方案，重點還是卡在政策法令制度的鬆綁，得一路通關從行政部門打到立法機關。隨便舉例，因為立法院監督公股事業與財團法人，重打肥貓，讓行政院祭出「打肥貓條款」，打到工研院幾乎崩盤，才亟思挽救推出「彈薪方案」，勉強有利於研究機關延攬人才，但已打成重傷。
而在舉國從政治、經濟甚至語言俱談「庶民」之際，民粹情緒很容易塑造齊頭式的平等，卻絕對無益於形塑尖端人才，政治壓縮了經濟與社會的舞台空間，致使有遠見的政策方案無法有效推出、即時落實執行，都值得執政者深思。
Tuesday, August 7, 2012
Asian-Pacific Territorial Disputes Escalate
Asian-Pacific Territorial Disputes Escalate
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 8, 2012
Summary: Long-standing sovereignty disputes continue to bedevil the Asian-Pacific region. Several nations are at loggerheads over the four Northern Islands, Dokdo/Takeshima, Diaoyutai, and the Nansha Islands. In recent years these disputes have further intensified. They have even led to direct clashes. They threaten peace in the Asian-Pacific region. The Republic of China asserts sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands and Nansha Islands. Needless to say, it cannot remain aloof. It must be deeply concerned about the situation.
Full Text below:
Long-standing sovereignty disputes continue to bedevil the Asian-Pacific region. Several nations are at loggerheads over the four Northern Islands, Dokdo/Takeshima, Diaoyutai, and the Nansha Islands. In recent years these disputes have further intensified. They have even led to direct clashes. They threaten peace in the Asian-Pacific region. The Republic of China asserts sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands and Nansha Islands. Needless to say, it cannot remain aloof. It must be deeply concerned about the situation.
Basically these sovereignty disputes are intensifying. A major cause is the rapid growth of Mainland China's military might. It is projecting its power into to the Pacific. It is attempting to breakthrough the Japanese-US island chain currently containing Mainland China. It is colliding with the powers currently occupying the region. The flashpoint will be disputes concerning territory or territorial waters. The United States is responding. It has begun its return to the Asian-Pacific region. This has emboldened other nations. This has encouraged them to thumb their noses at Mainland China. The US, they now assume, now has their back. A few days ago the U.S. State Department harshly criticized Mainland China for establishing Sansha City, a municipality to preside over three South China Sea islands. This provoked a vehement response from Mainland China. Mainland China and the US were clearly exchanging blows.
Meanwhile the global recession has discredited the governments of many nations. The influence of right-wing populist elements has been enhanced. Sovereignty disputes are often tools for domestic political struggles. They often force governments to draw lines in the sand. They often enable ultranationalist organizations to hijack their governments. They sometimes lead to foreign military quagmires.
In fact, most international disputes over sovereignty cannot be resolved through negotiations. If one cannot use force, then all one can do is protest. As a result, the sovereignty remains in dispute. This has long been the case for the Diaoyutai Islands dispute and South China Sea dispute. In recent years confrontations have intensified. Military intervention has become more frequent. For example, PRC fleets and Mainland Chinese fishing boats have repeatedly entered Diaoyutai Island waters. ROC Coast Guard ships have escorted Diaoyutai Islands Defense Movement activists to the Diaoyutai Islands to proclaim sovereignty. Warships belonging to Mainland China and the Philippines have clashed in the Huangyan Islands.
All nations claim they want dialogue and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The international community agrees. In fact this is hypocritical lip service. Few people ever want dialogue during territorial sovereignty disputes. The reason is simple. Possession is nine-tenths of the law. Nations in actual possession of the disputed territories do not want to talk to others. Doing so merely undermines their ownership claims. Other nations gain nothing from talks. For them, there is nothing to talk about. The recent ASEAN meeting originally wanted the South China Sea Code of Conduct included in the joint declaration, But they were unable to reach an agreement, so they gave up on the idea. As one can see, sovereignty disputes are not easy resolved by diplomatic means. Therefore they will only drag on.
President Ma Ying-jeou recently attended the 60th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. He reiterated the Republic of China's sovereignty over the islands. He also offered a five-point peace initiative for the East China Sea. One. Self-restraint. Do not escalate the antagonisms. Two. Shelve disputes. Do not give up on dialogue and communications. Three. Comply with international law. Settle disputes through peaceful means. Four. Seek consensus. Establish an East China Sea Code of Conduct. Five. Establish a mechanism for the development of East China Sea resources.
Ma Ying-jeou is an expert on international and maritime law. In particular, he has conducted in-depth research on the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute. According to reports, the proposed peace initiative for the East China Sea was drawn up by the ROC National Security Council. The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified Japan and other nations through unofficial channels. But so far none of the the parties have responded. This is not surprising. Other nations have no intention of engaging in more active diplomatic consultations. Moreover, Beijing does not want the ROC to take part in this territorial dispute in the name of a sovereign state. Japan is worried that Taipei and Beijing will join hands to defend the nation's territory against annexation by Japan. As for the cooperative development of resources, that is hardly a pressing issue. At this time any concrete move to develop regional resources would be regarded as serious provocation.
The ROC government has issued a five-point proposal for the Diaoyutai Islands. Diplomatically, this keeps our hand in the game. This reaffirms our sovereignty. This is a necessary political gesture. Otherwise, if we stand by without saying anything, our role in the controversy will gradually shrink.
The most concrete and specific of these five points is "Self-restraint. Do not escalate the antagonism." This clearly refers to Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, with their declared intention of "purchasing" the three Diaoyutai Islands. The two men are engaged in domestic political struggle. They are ignoring the diplomatic consequences of raising tensions with Mainland China. Diaoyutai for them may be a tool for domesic political struggle. But it is one that could lead to Sino-Japanese conflict. It is sure to impact the strategic picture and economic development in the Asian-Pacific region. It is not something anyone would be happy to see. It is not even something that the US, which longs to "contain" Mainland China, would be happy to see.
Territorial disputes may be intractable. But national policy must not allow disputes to undermine the national interest. This includes the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute in the Asian-Pacific region. Problems should be resolved peacefully and pragmatically. President Ma's clarion call merits the nation's attention.
對立尖銳化 亞太版圖之爭日趨緊繃
2012-08-08 01:17
中國時報
亞太地區沿著太平洋岸，從北方四島、獨島/竹島、釣魚台到南沙群島，都長期存在著主權爭議，相關各國也經常針鋒相對。但近幾年來，這些爭執漸趨尖銳，甚至出現對峙行動，已經為亞太和平投下變數。主張擁有釣魚台和南沙群島主權且實際統轄太平島的台灣，當然不能置身事外，必須慎重關切局勢發展。
就基本格局而言，這些主權之爭之所以日益升高，一大原因是中國勢力迅速增長，軍事力量開始往太平洋投射，力圖突破昔日美國圍堵中國的島鏈時，開始與原有勢力發生撞擊，直接的引爆點便在領土或領海問題上。而美國面對此一局勢，也開始「重返亞太」，使得相關國家在對中國嗆聲時，背後有更多依恃。日前美國國務院對中國設三沙市發出嚴厲批判，引發中共強力批駁，明顯地，中美過招意味濃厚。
此外，在另一方面，國際經濟衰退導致許多國家政府人氣低落，右派民粹勢力影響力增強，主權之爭常成為內部政治鬥爭工具，甚至逼得政府必須跟進表態，甚至被民族主權激進團體拖著跑，有時也導致對外衝突難以下台。
事實上，國際間的主權爭議所在多有，能夠經由談判解決的並不多，一般來說，如果不能動武，那麼就只能三不五時動動口，讓主權歸屬保持在爭議狀態。釣魚台與南海爭議多年來均是如此，但最近幾年的對立愈來愈尖銳，軍事介入也更為頻繁。例如中國大陸的艦隊及漁政船多次進入釣魚台海域、台灣海巡艦護送保釣船去釣魚台宣示主權、中國和菲律賓的艦艇與船隻在黃岩島對峙等等。
雖然相關各國都聲稱希望對話和平解決糾紛，而國際社會也如此呼籲，但事實上，這些都只是虛偽的場面話，領土主權之爭很少有人真心想對話。原因很簡單：占者最大。實際占有的國家根本不想和別人談，否則就是把自己的擁有權打了折扣，其他國家既撈不著好處，那又何必多此一談？不久前的東協會議原本想把南海行為準則納入共同宣言，最後喬不攏而作罷，可見主權之爭不容易靠外交手段解決，只能繼續拖下去。
馬英九總統在出席《中日和約》生效六十周年紀念活動時，除了重申中華民國擁有釣魚台主權外，也主動提出五點「東海和平倡議」：第一、自我克制，不升高對立行動；第二、擱置爭議，不放棄對話溝通；第三、遵守國際法，以和平方式處理爭端；第四、尋求共識，研訂「東海行為準則」；第五、建立機制，合作開發東海資源。
馬英九本人其實是國際海洋法專家，對釣魚台的主權爭議尤其有深入研究。據報導，這次提出的「東海和平倡議」是由國安會主導規畫，外交部事前曾透過管道告知日本等國，但各方迄今未作回應。這並不讓人意外，因為其他國家目前無意於更積極的外交磋商。何況，中國大陸不希望台灣以主權國家地位參與這樁領土之爭，而日本則十分介意兩岸是否聯手護土抗日。至於合作開發資源，更不是迫切議題，此時任何具體的開發動作，反而會被視為更嚴重的挑釁。
我國針對釣魚台問題提出五點倡議，在外交層次上，是一種保持話語權、重申主權地位的政治動作，而這是維護主權所必須做的。否則老是站在旁邊一語不發，參與爭議的地位會漸形薄弱。
這五點裡最具體、也最有針對性的，是第一點「自我克制，不升高對立行動」。很明顯的，這是指近來相關國家的動作。尤其日本首相野田佳彥與東京都知事石原慎太郎爭相搶購釣魚台三小島，在內部政治角力下，不顧外交後果激化與中國的緊張。釣魚台如果成為內鬥工具，甚至引發日中衝突，勢必衝擊亞太整體局勢與經濟發展，並非任何國家之福，即使是想壓抑中國勢力的美國，也不樂見。
領土之爭固然難解，但政策至少不能讓局勢朝損及國家利益的方向走；而包括釣魚台在內的亞太主權之爭，也應該在維護整體和平發展的前提下務實處理。馬總統提出的呼籲，值得相關國家思考。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 8, 2012
Summary: Long-standing sovereignty disputes continue to bedevil the Asian-Pacific region. Several nations are at loggerheads over the four Northern Islands, Dokdo/Takeshima, Diaoyutai, and the Nansha Islands. In recent years these disputes have further intensified. They have even led to direct clashes. They threaten peace in the Asian-Pacific region. The Republic of China asserts sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands and Nansha Islands. Needless to say, it cannot remain aloof. It must be deeply concerned about the situation.
Full Text below:
Long-standing sovereignty disputes continue to bedevil the Asian-Pacific region. Several nations are at loggerheads over the four Northern Islands, Dokdo/Takeshima, Diaoyutai, and the Nansha Islands. In recent years these disputes have further intensified. They have even led to direct clashes. They threaten peace in the Asian-Pacific region. The Republic of China asserts sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands and Nansha Islands. Needless to say, it cannot remain aloof. It must be deeply concerned about the situation.
Basically these sovereignty disputes are intensifying. A major cause is the rapid growth of Mainland China's military might. It is projecting its power into to the Pacific. It is attempting to breakthrough the Japanese-US island chain currently containing Mainland China. It is colliding with the powers currently occupying the region. The flashpoint will be disputes concerning territory or territorial waters. The United States is responding. It has begun its return to the Asian-Pacific region. This has emboldened other nations. This has encouraged them to thumb their noses at Mainland China. The US, they now assume, now has their back. A few days ago the U.S. State Department harshly criticized Mainland China for establishing Sansha City, a municipality to preside over three South China Sea islands. This provoked a vehement response from Mainland China. Mainland China and the US were clearly exchanging blows.
Meanwhile the global recession has discredited the governments of many nations. The influence of right-wing populist elements has been enhanced. Sovereignty disputes are often tools for domestic political struggles. They often force governments to draw lines in the sand. They often enable ultranationalist organizations to hijack their governments. They sometimes lead to foreign military quagmires.
In fact, most international disputes over sovereignty cannot be resolved through negotiations. If one cannot use force, then all one can do is protest. As a result, the sovereignty remains in dispute. This has long been the case for the Diaoyutai Islands dispute and South China Sea dispute. In recent years confrontations have intensified. Military intervention has become more frequent. For example, PRC fleets and Mainland Chinese fishing boats have repeatedly entered Diaoyutai Island waters. ROC Coast Guard ships have escorted Diaoyutai Islands Defense Movement activists to the Diaoyutai Islands to proclaim sovereignty. Warships belonging to Mainland China and the Philippines have clashed in the Huangyan Islands.
All nations claim they want dialogue and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The international community agrees. In fact this is hypocritical lip service. Few people ever want dialogue during territorial sovereignty disputes. The reason is simple. Possession is nine-tenths of the law. Nations in actual possession of the disputed territories do not want to talk to others. Doing so merely undermines their ownership claims. Other nations gain nothing from talks. For them, there is nothing to talk about. The recent ASEAN meeting originally wanted the South China Sea Code of Conduct included in the joint declaration, But they were unable to reach an agreement, so they gave up on the idea. As one can see, sovereignty disputes are not easy resolved by diplomatic means. Therefore they will only drag on.
President Ma Ying-jeou recently attended the 60th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. He reiterated the Republic of China's sovereignty over the islands. He also offered a five-point peace initiative for the East China Sea. One. Self-restraint. Do not escalate the antagonisms. Two. Shelve disputes. Do not give up on dialogue and communications. Three. Comply with international law. Settle disputes through peaceful means. Four. Seek consensus. Establish an East China Sea Code of Conduct. Five. Establish a mechanism for the development of East China Sea resources.
Ma Ying-jeou is an expert on international and maritime law. In particular, he has conducted in-depth research on the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute. According to reports, the proposed peace initiative for the East China Sea was drawn up by the ROC National Security Council. The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified Japan and other nations through unofficial channels. But so far none of the the parties have responded. This is not surprising. Other nations have no intention of engaging in more active diplomatic consultations. Moreover, Beijing does not want the ROC to take part in this territorial dispute in the name of a sovereign state. Japan is worried that Taipei and Beijing will join hands to defend the nation's territory against annexation by Japan. As for the cooperative development of resources, that is hardly a pressing issue. At this time any concrete move to develop regional resources would be regarded as serious provocation.
The ROC government has issued a five-point proposal for the Diaoyutai Islands. Diplomatically, this keeps our hand in the game. This reaffirms our sovereignty. This is a necessary political gesture. Otherwise, if we stand by without saying anything, our role in the controversy will gradually shrink.
The most concrete and specific of these five points is "Self-restraint. Do not escalate the antagonism." This clearly refers to Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, with their declared intention of "purchasing" the three Diaoyutai Islands. The two men are engaged in domestic political struggle. They are ignoring the diplomatic consequences of raising tensions with Mainland China. Diaoyutai for them may be a tool for domesic political struggle. But it is one that could lead to Sino-Japanese conflict. It is sure to impact the strategic picture and economic development in the Asian-Pacific region. It is not something anyone would be happy to see. It is not even something that the US, which longs to "contain" Mainland China, would be happy to see.
Territorial disputes may be intractable. But national policy must not allow disputes to undermine the national interest. This includes the Diaoyutai Islands sovereignty dispute in the Asian-Pacific region. Problems should be resolved peacefully and pragmatically. President Ma's clarion call merits the nation's attention.
對立尖銳化 亞太版圖之爭日趨緊繃
2012-08-08 01:17
中國時報
亞太地區沿著太平洋岸，從北方四島、獨島/竹島、釣魚台到南沙群島，都長期存在著主權爭議，相關各國也經常針鋒相對。但近幾年來，這些爭執漸趨尖銳，甚至出現對峙行動，已經為亞太和平投下變數。主張擁有釣魚台和南沙群島主權且實際統轄太平島的台灣，當然不能置身事外，必須慎重關切局勢發展。
就基本格局而言，這些主權之爭之所以日益升高，一大原因是中國勢力迅速增長，軍事力量開始往太平洋投射，力圖突破昔日美國圍堵中國的島鏈時，開始與原有勢力發生撞擊，直接的引爆點便在領土或領海問題上。而美國面對此一局勢，也開始「重返亞太」，使得相關國家在對中國嗆聲時，背後有更多依恃。日前美國國務院對中國設三沙市發出嚴厲批判，引發中共強力批駁，明顯地，中美過招意味濃厚。
此外，在另一方面，國際經濟衰退導致許多國家政府人氣低落，右派民粹勢力影響力增強，主權之爭常成為內部政治鬥爭工具，甚至逼得政府必須跟進表態，甚至被民族主權激進團體拖著跑，有時也導致對外衝突難以下台。
事實上，國際間的主權爭議所在多有，能夠經由談判解決的並不多，一般來說，如果不能動武，那麼就只能三不五時動動口，讓主權歸屬保持在爭議狀態。釣魚台與南海爭議多年來均是如此，但最近幾年的對立愈來愈尖銳，軍事介入也更為頻繁。例如中國大陸的艦隊及漁政船多次進入釣魚台海域、台灣海巡艦護送保釣船去釣魚台宣示主權、中國和菲律賓的艦艇與船隻在黃岩島對峙等等。
雖然相關各國都聲稱希望對話和平解決糾紛，而國際社會也如此呼籲，但事實上，這些都只是虛偽的場面話，領土主權之爭很少有人真心想對話。原因很簡單：占者最大。實際占有的國家根本不想和別人談，否則就是把自己的擁有權打了折扣，其他國家既撈不著好處，那又何必多此一談？不久前的東協會議原本想把南海行為準則納入共同宣言，最後喬不攏而作罷，可見主權之爭不容易靠外交手段解決，只能繼續拖下去。
馬英九總統在出席《中日和約》生效六十周年紀念活動時，除了重申中華民國擁有釣魚台主權外，也主動提出五點「東海和平倡議」：第一、自我克制，不升高對立行動；第二、擱置爭議，不放棄對話溝通；第三、遵守國際法，以和平方式處理爭端；第四、尋求共識，研訂「東海行為準則」；第五、建立機制，合作開發東海資源。
馬英九本人其實是國際海洋法專家，對釣魚台的主權爭議尤其有深入研究。據報導，這次提出的「東海和平倡議」是由國安會主導規畫，外交部事前曾透過管道告知日本等國，但各方迄今未作回應。這並不讓人意外，因為其他國家目前無意於更積極的外交磋商。何況，中國大陸不希望台灣以主權國家地位參與這樁領土之爭，而日本則十分介意兩岸是否聯手護土抗日。至於合作開發資源，更不是迫切議題，此時任何具體的開發動作，反而會被視為更嚴重的挑釁。
我國針對釣魚台問題提出五點倡議，在外交層次上，是一種保持話語權、重申主權地位的政治動作，而這是維護主權所必須做的。否則老是站在旁邊一語不發，參與爭議的地位會漸形薄弱。
這五點裡最具體、也最有針對性的，是第一點「自我克制，不升高對立行動」。很明顯的，這是指近來相關國家的動作。尤其日本首相野田佳彥與東京都知事石原慎太郎爭相搶購釣魚台三小島，在內部政治角力下，不顧外交後果激化與中國的緊張。釣魚台如果成為內鬥工具，甚至引發日中衝突，勢必衝擊亞太整體局勢與經濟發展，並非任何國家之福，即使是想壓抑中國勢力的美國，也不樂見。
領土之爭固然難解，但政策至少不能讓局勢朝損及國家利益的方向走；而包括釣魚台在內的亞太主權之爭，也應該在維護整體和平發展的前提下務實處理。馬總統提出的呼籲，值得相關國家思考。
Political Barriers Not Crossed by Eight Chiang-Chen Meetings
Political Barriers Not Crossed by Eight Chiang-Chen Meetings
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 7, 2012
Summary: Beijing's bottom line erected insurmountable political barriers for all eight Chiang-Chen Meetings. Cross-strait negotiations are based on the 1992 consensus, on the basis of "one China, different interpretations." Economic consultations need not dance to the tune of politics. Can Beijing transcend ideological barriers? Can it allow economics to remain economics? Can it allow cross-Strait relations to ascend to the next level? If the eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting can do so, then its achievements will transcend those of the past.
Full Text below:
The eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting will convene tomorrowin Taipei. The two sides will sign a Cross-Strait Customs Cooperation Agreement and a Cross-Strait Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement. The seventh Chiang-Chen Meeting took place during President Ma's first term. The two sides signed 16 agreements. Altogether the two sides have signed 18 agreements. They have established a solid record of cross-Strait interaction. They have heralded a new stage of mutually beneficial cross-strait relations.
The current Chiang-Chen Meeting will be different from previous meetings. President Ma recently began his second term. The leadership has changed. The CCP will hold its 18th Party Congress in October. Its leadership is also about to change. The current Chiang-Chen Meeting represents a farewell to the past. The eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting is a period. The ARATS-SEF consultations were a semicolon. They clearly connected the two.
The highlight of the eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting will be the signing of the Investment Protection Agreement. Consultations lasted nearly two years. The process was complex. The agreement was supposed to be signed during the sixth and seventh Chiang-Chen Meetings. But both times the meetings concluded without results. As we can see, the agreement was hard won.
During the final stages of consultation, BYD filed an infringement suit against the Hon Hai Group's Foxconn Company. The suit was not actually relevant to the Investment Protection Agreement. The landlord for the Pacific SOGO Dalian Store increased rents an unreasonable amount and cut power to the store. These have become test cases for the effectiveness of the Investment Protection Agreement. Taiwan businessman Chung Ting-pang, who attended Falun Gong events, was detained by Mainland authorities. This is why some oppose the Investment Protection Agreement. The Investment Protection Agreement was originally confined to protecting investments. As we can see, some people expect too much from it.
Nevertheless, the significance of the agreement cannot be denied. One. Taiwan investments on the Mainland were once protected unilaterally by the Taiwan Compatriots Investment Protection Act. Now they are protected bilaterally by the Investment Protection Agreement. ROC authorities can now intervene in any investment disputes. This has dramatically increased the degree of protection afforded Taiwan business people on the Mainland. Two. Mainland companies and individuals have investments on Taiwan. Ruling party changes on Taiwan could jeopardize their interests. The Investment Protection Agreement may help dispel their fears and facilitate the normalization of Mainland investments on Taiwan. Three. The Investment Protection Agreement is one of four follow-up agreements to ECFA. It constitutes a cross-strait economic and trade success. It will facilitate follow-up ECFA negotiations and accelerate cross-Strait free trade.
The Investment Protection Agreement has led to major breakthroughs. But more hurdles must be overcome. Our side was concerned about the personal safety of Taiwan business people. These concerns were addressed in the Investment Protection Agreement. We fought for Taiwan business peoples' personal freedom, and won. If Mainland authorities detain Taiwan business people, they must notify their families within 24 hours, in accordance with "citizen status." Our side sought exemption from the Mainland's newly amended Code of Criminal Law. Our calls for "extra-citizen status" and "unconditional notification" were rejected.
Consider the settlement of disputes between investors (P2P). Our side wanted immunity from Mainland regulations. We were able to secure only arbitration on Taiwan and third party arbitration under Mainland arbitration institutions and arbitration rules. Our side wanted international arbitration for disputes between investors and local governments (P2G). The Mainland side refused. Multilateral mediation with fewer teeth was substituted.
In the final analysis, the cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement was dogged by political factors. The Mainland side objected to the internationalization of cross-Strait issues blurring the "one China principle." Turning cross-strait P2G disputes over to international arbitration bodies for arbitration violated the political bottom line. The Mainland agreed to notify the family members of those detained by Mainland authorities within 24 hours, based on "citizen status." But to avoid the misintrepretation of cross-strait relations, it substituted the concept of consensus for the concept of sovereignty in the standardized protocol.
Think back to protocols signed during the past seven Chiang-Chen Meetings. Whenever our demands touched upon sovereignty and jurisdiction, Beijing refused to budge. Consider the cross-Strait Maritime Transport Agreement. We have been fighting to get Mainland exports to other countries shipped to Taiwan ports for transit. But the Mainland sees re-exports as relations between sovereign states. It has balked. Our side wants cross-Strait air transport agreements merged into "beyond rights" Fifth Freedom of air travel. Our side wants Mainland visitors to transit Taiwan, then proceed to other countries. But this too is impossible due to political considerations. As a result our side's vision of a cross-Strait direct sea and air operations center has been set back.
Beijing's bottom line erected insurmountable political barriers for all eight Chiang-Chen Meetings. Cross-strait negotiations are based on the 1992 consensus, on the basis of "one China, different interpretations." Economic consultations need not dance to the tune of politics. Can Beijing transcend ideological barriers? Can it allow economics to remain economics? Can it allow cross-Strait relations to ascend to the next level? If the eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting can do so, then its achievements will transcend those of the past.
八次江陳會尚未跨越的政治藩籬
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.08.07
第八次江陳會明起在台北舉行，將簽署「兩岸海關合作協議」及「兩岸投資保障和促進協議」，連同馬總統第一任內七次江陳會所簽署十六項協議，總計十八項協議，寫下兩岸互動的豐盛紀錄，也標幟兩岸關係互利雙贏的新階段。
這次江陳會意義不同於以往，一方面，舉行時間在馬總統第二任開始不久，有「展布新局」的意義；另方面，攸關中共人事換屆的「十八大」即將於十月召開，此時江陳會又是「總結過去」的象徵。喻以標點符號，「江陳會」名稱在第八次會議後可能劃下「句點」，但在兩岸兩會協商則是「分號」，承上啟下的意義至為明顯。
簽署投資保障協議是第八次江陳會的重頭戲，但協商歷時近兩年，過程一波三折，第六次及第七次江陳會兩次事前預告即將簽署，但最後皆告落空；可見該協議難度甚高。
在協商進入最後階段，和投保協議關聯不大的鴻海集團旗下富士康公司遭比亞迪侵權纏訟案，以及太平洋SOGO大陸大連店遭房東無理調漲租金及斷電案，先後浮上檯面，成為測試投保協議有效性的指標案件。修習法輪功的台商鍾鼎邦遭大陸羈押事件，更成為部分人士反對簽署投保協議的重要理由。可見原本侷限於保障投資相關權益的一紙協議，承載了多少過度期待。
儘管如此，投保協議簽署仍有不容抹殺的重要意義：第一，對台商大陸投資的保障，從大陸以單方面制定「台灣同胞投資保護法」作規範依據，轉變為依雙方協議加以規範，我方公權力可直接介入投資爭端協處，對大陸台商保護程度大幅提升；第二，對大陸企業或個人來台投資，投保協議可祛除投資人擔心台灣政黨輪替可能影響投資權益的心理障礙，有助促進陸資來台正常化；第三，對兩岸經貿布局而言，投保協議是ECFA後續四大協議之一，其成功達陣，有利推進ECFA後續談判，加速邁向兩岸自由貿易的既定目標。
從投保協議實質內容來看，我方爭取到若干重大突破，但也有難以克服的障礙。如我方將台商關心的人身安全保障納入投保協議，並爭取到台商人身自由受限制時，須在二十四小時內通知家屬的「國民待遇」，但在訴求排除大陸新修正「刑事訴訟法」國安條款適用、「超國民待遇」的「無例外通知」，則鎩羽而歸。
在投資爭端方面，關於投資人間（P2P）爭端，我方為排除大陸法規只能在大陸仲裁機構仲裁的規定，爭取到可在台灣及第三地仲裁的待遇，但關於投資人與在地政府間（P2G）爭端，我方訴求援引國際仲裁機制遭大陸拒絕，而代以強制力較低的「調解」、「協處」等多元方式處理。
追根究柢，兩岸投保協議很多限制都是政治因素作祟，大陸強力排斥兩岸問題國際化及兩岸關係定位模糊「一中原則」。因此，訴求兩岸P2G爭端交由國際仲裁機構仲裁，自是違反北京政治底線。大陸同意限制人身自由須二十四小時內通知家屬的「國民待遇」，但似為避免兩岸關係被錯誤解讀，據知將不在協議本文規範，而改以無主權意義的共識文件代之。
事實上，回溯過去七次江陳會簽署的各項協議，我方訴求只要碰觸到主權及管轄權問題，都很難突破北京的底線。如兩岸海運協議，我方一直爭取大陸輸往其他國家貨品能運到台灣港口中轉，但大陸視轉口為主權國間運輸關係，一直不願放行。我方訴求在兩岸空運協議納入延遠權，並爭取大陸來台旅客能從台灣轉往其他國家，也因北京同樣的政治考量而卡住。台灣藉由兩岸直航發展海空運轉中心的願景因之重挫。
總結過去經驗，北京設下的底線，就是八次江陳會難以跨越的政治藩籬。兩岸協商是建立在「九二共識」、「一中各表」的基礎上，經濟事務協商大可不必再箍上政治的條條框框。北京如能跨越意識形態的障礙，讓經濟的歸經濟，兩岸關係發展始可能再上層樓。第八次江陳會若能有所調整，成就必可超越過去。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 7, 2012
Summary: Beijing's bottom line erected insurmountable political barriers for all eight Chiang-Chen Meetings. Cross-strait negotiations are based on the 1992 consensus, on the basis of "one China, different interpretations." Economic consultations need not dance to the tune of politics. Can Beijing transcend ideological barriers? Can it allow economics to remain economics? Can it allow cross-Strait relations to ascend to the next level? If the eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting can do so, then its achievements will transcend those of the past.
Full Text below:
The eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting will convene tomorrowin Taipei. The two sides will sign a Cross-Strait Customs Cooperation Agreement and a Cross-Strait Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement. The seventh Chiang-Chen Meeting took place during President Ma's first term. The two sides signed 16 agreements. Altogether the two sides have signed 18 agreements. They have established a solid record of cross-Strait interaction. They have heralded a new stage of mutually beneficial cross-strait relations.
The current Chiang-Chen Meeting will be different from previous meetings. President Ma recently began his second term. The leadership has changed. The CCP will hold its 18th Party Congress in October. Its leadership is also about to change. The current Chiang-Chen Meeting represents a farewell to the past. The eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting is a period. The ARATS-SEF consultations were a semicolon. They clearly connected the two.
The highlight of the eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting will be the signing of the Investment Protection Agreement. Consultations lasted nearly two years. The process was complex. The agreement was supposed to be signed during the sixth and seventh Chiang-Chen Meetings. But both times the meetings concluded without results. As we can see, the agreement was hard won.
During the final stages of consultation, BYD filed an infringement suit against the Hon Hai Group's Foxconn Company. The suit was not actually relevant to the Investment Protection Agreement. The landlord for the Pacific SOGO Dalian Store increased rents an unreasonable amount and cut power to the store. These have become test cases for the effectiveness of the Investment Protection Agreement. Taiwan businessman Chung Ting-pang, who attended Falun Gong events, was detained by Mainland authorities. This is why some oppose the Investment Protection Agreement. The Investment Protection Agreement was originally confined to protecting investments. As we can see, some people expect too much from it.
Nevertheless, the significance of the agreement cannot be denied. One. Taiwan investments on the Mainland were once protected unilaterally by the Taiwan Compatriots Investment Protection Act. Now they are protected bilaterally by the Investment Protection Agreement. ROC authorities can now intervene in any investment disputes. This has dramatically increased the degree of protection afforded Taiwan business people on the Mainland. Two. Mainland companies and individuals have investments on Taiwan. Ruling party changes on Taiwan could jeopardize their interests. The Investment Protection Agreement may help dispel their fears and facilitate the normalization of Mainland investments on Taiwan. Three. The Investment Protection Agreement is one of four follow-up agreements to ECFA. It constitutes a cross-strait economic and trade success. It will facilitate follow-up ECFA negotiations and accelerate cross-Strait free trade.
The Investment Protection Agreement has led to major breakthroughs. But more hurdles must be overcome. Our side was concerned about the personal safety of Taiwan business people. These concerns were addressed in the Investment Protection Agreement. We fought for Taiwan business peoples' personal freedom, and won. If Mainland authorities detain Taiwan business people, they must notify their families within 24 hours, in accordance with "citizen status." Our side sought exemption from the Mainland's newly amended Code of Criminal Law. Our calls for "extra-citizen status" and "unconditional notification" were rejected.
Consider the settlement of disputes between investors (P2P). Our side wanted immunity from Mainland regulations. We were able to secure only arbitration on Taiwan and third party arbitration under Mainland arbitration institutions and arbitration rules. Our side wanted international arbitration for disputes between investors and local governments (P2G). The Mainland side refused. Multilateral mediation with fewer teeth was substituted.
In the final analysis, the cross-Strait Investment Protection Agreement was dogged by political factors. The Mainland side objected to the internationalization of cross-Strait issues blurring the "one China principle." Turning cross-strait P2G disputes over to international arbitration bodies for arbitration violated the political bottom line. The Mainland agreed to notify the family members of those detained by Mainland authorities within 24 hours, based on "citizen status." But to avoid the misintrepretation of cross-strait relations, it substituted the concept of consensus for the concept of sovereignty in the standardized protocol.
Think back to protocols signed during the past seven Chiang-Chen Meetings. Whenever our demands touched upon sovereignty and jurisdiction, Beijing refused to budge. Consider the cross-Strait Maritime Transport Agreement. We have been fighting to get Mainland exports to other countries shipped to Taiwan ports for transit. But the Mainland sees re-exports as relations between sovereign states. It has balked. Our side wants cross-Strait air transport agreements merged into "beyond rights" Fifth Freedom of air travel. Our side wants Mainland visitors to transit Taiwan, then proceed to other countries. But this too is impossible due to political considerations. As a result our side's vision of a cross-Strait direct sea and air operations center has been set back.
Beijing's bottom line erected insurmountable political barriers for all eight Chiang-Chen Meetings. Cross-strait negotiations are based on the 1992 consensus, on the basis of "one China, different interpretations." Economic consultations need not dance to the tune of politics. Can Beijing transcend ideological barriers? Can it allow economics to remain economics? Can it allow cross-Strait relations to ascend to the next level? If the eighth Chiang-Chen Meeting can do so, then its achievements will transcend those of the past.
八次江陳會尚未跨越的政治藩籬
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.08.07
第八次江陳會明起在台北舉行，將簽署「兩岸海關合作協議」及「兩岸投資保障和促進協議」，連同馬總統第一任內七次江陳會所簽署十六項協議，總計十八項協議，寫下兩岸互動的豐盛紀錄，也標幟兩岸關係互利雙贏的新階段。
這次江陳會意義不同於以往，一方面，舉行時間在馬總統第二任開始不久，有「展布新局」的意義；另方面，攸關中共人事換屆的「十八大」即將於十月召開，此時江陳會又是「總結過去」的象徵。喻以標點符號，「江陳會」名稱在第八次會議後可能劃下「句點」，但在兩岸兩會協商則是「分號」，承上啟下的意義至為明顯。
簽署投資保障協議是第八次江陳會的重頭戲，但協商歷時近兩年，過程一波三折，第六次及第七次江陳會兩次事前預告即將簽署，但最後皆告落空；可見該協議難度甚高。
在協商進入最後階段，和投保協議關聯不大的鴻海集團旗下富士康公司遭比亞迪侵權纏訟案，以及太平洋SOGO大陸大連店遭房東無理調漲租金及斷電案，先後浮上檯面，成為測試投保協議有效性的指標案件。修習法輪功的台商鍾鼎邦遭大陸羈押事件，更成為部分人士反對簽署投保協議的重要理由。可見原本侷限於保障投資相關權益的一紙協議，承載了多少過度期待。
儘管如此，投保協議簽署仍有不容抹殺的重要意義：第一，對台商大陸投資的保障，從大陸以單方面制定「台灣同胞投資保護法」作規範依據，轉變為依雙方協議加以規範，我方公權力可直接介入投資爭端協處，對大陸台商保護程度大幅提升；第二，對大陸企業或個人來台投資，投保協議可祛除投資人擔心台灣政黨輪替可能影響投資權益的心理障礙，有助促進陸資來台正常化；第三，對兩岸經貿布局而言，投保協議是ECFA後續四大協議之一，其成功達陣，有利推進ECFA後續談判，加速邁向兩岸自由貿易的既定目標。
從投保協議實質內容來看，我方爭取到若干重大突破，但也有難以克服的障礙。如我方將台商關心的人身安全保障納入投保協議，並爭取到台商人身自由受限制時，須在二十四小時內通知家屬的「國民待遇」，但在訴求排除大陸新修正「刑事訴訟法」國安條款適用、「超國民待遇」的「無例外通知」，則鎩羽而歸。
在投資爭端方面，關於投資人間（P2P）爭端，我方為排除大陸法規只能在大陸仲裁機構仲裁的規定，爭取到可在台灣及第三地仲裁的待遇，但關於投資人與在地政府間（P2G）爭端，我方訴求援引國際仲裁機制遭大陸拒絕，而代以強制力較低的「調解」、「協處」等多元方式處理。
追根究柢，兩岸投保協議很多限制都是政治因素作祟，大陸強力排斥兩岸問題國際化及兩岸關係定位模糊「一中原則」。因此，訴求兩岸P2G爭端交由國際仲裁機構仲裁，自是違反北京政治底線。大陸同意限制人身自由須二十四小時內通知家屬的「國民待遇」，但似為避免兩岸關係被錯誤解讀，據知將不在協議本文規範，而改以無主權意義的共識文件代之。
事實上，回溯過去七次江陳會簽署的各項協議，我方訴求只要碰觸到主權及管轄權問題，都很難突破北京的底線。如兩岸海運協議，我方一直爭取大陸輸往其他國家貨品能運到台灣港口中轉，但大陸視轉口為主權國間運輸關係，一直不願放行。我方訴求在兩岸空運協議納入延遠權，並爭取大陸來台旅客能從台灣轉往其他國家，也因北京同樣的政治考量而卡住。台灣藉由兩岸直航發展海空運轉中心的願景因之重挫。
總結過去經驗，北京設下的底線，就是八次江陳會難以跨越的政治藩籬。兩岸協商是建立在「九二共識」、「一中各表」的基礎上，經濟事務協商大可不必再箍上政治的條條框框。北京如能跨越意識形態的障礙，讓經濟的歸經濟，兩岸關係發展始可能再上層樓。第八次江陳會若能有所調整，成就必可超越過去。
Monday, August 6, 2012
DPP Cross-Strait Policy Must Overcome Two Hurdles
DPP Cross-Strait Policy Must Overcome Two Hurdles
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 4, 2012
Summary: Su Tseng-chang said "People may differ about the national flag at home, but in the international arena, the flag represents Taiwan. We must defend the ROC national flag." This was a surprising and risible comment. What it really meant was that even though the DPP advocates Taiwan independence and refuses to fly the ROC national flag at home, the Ma administration is nevertheless obligated to wave the ROC national flag in Beijing's face.
Full Text below:
The DPP's attempt to transform its cross-Strait policy has clearly run aground.
First of all, it has named its restored cross-Strait institution the "China Affairs Department" instead of the "Cross-Strait Affairs Department." A "Cross-Strait Affairs Department" implies "one China, different interpretations." A "China Affairs Department" implies "one country on each side." The hand of Taiwan independence is clearly visible. Furthermore, it is redundant. It overlaps the "China Affairs Committee" custom tailored for Chairman Frank Hsieh. Dissent within the party has forced Frank Hsieh to adopt a "neither opposing nor demanding" stance on the new "China Affairs Department."
Su Tseng-chang's strategic understanding and tactical skills were apparently unable to ensure transformation. Take Su Tseng-chang's response to the removal of the ROC national flag on Regent Street, London. He was transparently insincere. Su Tseng-chang has clearly returned to the 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." He is clearly saying that according to the current constitution, Taiwan is referred to as the Republic of China, and uses the ROC national flag. This is "amputated history." Su Tseng-chang utterly fails to address the DPP's "Taiwan Independence Party Platform," the DPP's calls for the "Rectification of Names," and the DPP's still alive and kicking "one country on each side" rhetoric. If Su Tseng-chang was really that broken up about the ROC national flag being taken down on Regent Street, why did he not vow that he would obtain this flag and make it the centerpiece of DPP political rallies? If this is what Su Tseng-chang's cross-Strait rhetoric boils down to, isn't it just a wee bit superficial? Isn't it just a wee bit deceitful?
The KMT is in trouble. The DPP may be able to win back the presidency in 2016. It may be able to return to power. But first DPP cross-Strait policy must be successfully transformed. In 2016, the DPP will encounter two hurdles. Hurdle One would be that voters on Taiwan will refuse to vote for the DPP because they don't think the DPP can win. If the DPP does win, it will encounter Hurdle Two. The ruling DPP will be held hostage by Beijing. For Taiwan, this would be a catastrophe. Judging by Su Tseng-chang's cross-Strait transformation so far, even if he helps the DPP over the Hurdle One, the DPP will not be able to negotiate Hurdle Two.
The DPP can no longer play "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" type "backdoor listing" word games. It can no longer pass off "Taiwan" as the Republic of China. It can no longer pass off the Constitution of the Republic of China as "Taiwan's Constitution," It can no longer pass off the Republic of China national flag as "Taiwan's flag." Cross-Strait coopetition is now deep rooted. Does the DPP actually imagine it can continue to skate by on such glib sophistries?
One can be certain that Beijing's bottom line in 2016 will remain "opposition to Taiwan independence" and "adherence to the 1992 consensus." This is not something the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" can resist. The DPP must offer a response before the election. In the event it wins, it must offer a response after the election. If it responds before the election, the DPP will at least have exercised some initiative. In the event it wins but responds only after the election, the result will be political and economic catastrophe.
Blue vs. Green politics on Taiwan has led to political instability. As a result, Beijing is taking a harder line. To "opposing Taiwan independence and upholding the 1992 consensus," it has added "consolidating the one China framework." It has begun criticizing the Ma administration's "no reunification, no independence, no use of force" policy. This reflects Beijing's concern about political instability on Taiwan. It also reflects Beijing's reservations about attacking the Ma administration. Its words are heavy with subtext. It is giving the DPP advance warning. It is saying that if the DPP returns to power, the political and economic pressure Beijing applies to the DPP administration will far exceed the pressure applied to the Ma administration. When the time comes, the DPP will be able to adopt Chen Shui-bian's suicidal Taiwan independence policy. Just the opposite,it will be hostage to Beijing. It will be compelled to knuckle under. Therefore the DPP must seize the initiative and transform itself before the election. This is a far wiser strategy than waiting passively and knuckling under to pressure after the election. This is Su Tseng-chang's responsibility as party chairman. Does Su Tseng-chang understand the strategic picture well enough to pull it off?
The DPP's transformation has run aground. It has struck a reef, the struggle between Su and Tsai for the presidency in 2016. This has dealt Taiwan independence elements a stronger hand. Any transformation will be hobbled by these Taiwan independence elements. Under the circumstances, Frank Hsieh's sudden prominence could take a surprising turn. Frank Hsieh is the only DPP leader still promoting the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. Su and Tsai may reach a tacit understanding. They may exploit Frank Hsieh's self-sacrifice to facilitate the party's transformation. Su and Tsai may not be able to reach an understanding. They may not wish to offend Taiwan independence elements as they jockey for position. Frank Hsieh may be rendered impotent. The DPP may revert to the backdoor listing of its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." It may continue to engage in self-deception.
Su Tseng-chang said "People may differ about the national flag at home, but in the international arena, the flag represents Taiwan. We must defend the ROC national flag." This was a surprising and risible comment. What it really meant was that even though the DPP advocates Taiwan independence and refuses to fly the ROC national flag at home, the Ma administration is nevertheless obligated to wave the ROC national flag in Beijing's face.
What it really means is that the DPP must be allowed to promote Taiwan independence. But defending the Republic of China is Ma Ying-jeou's responsibility. As chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party, isn't Su Tseng-chang ashamed about indulging in such superficial and deceitful sophistry?
民進黨兩岸政策轉型工程的兩大關口
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.08.04
原本甚囂塵上的民進黨兩岸政策轉型工程，顯然已告擱淺。
首先，恢復的機構，仍名為「中國事務部」，卻不是「兩岸事務部」；而「兩岸事務部」意味「一中各表」，「中國事務部」則意味「一邊一國」，可見獨派的掣肘。再者，原本疊床架屋、為謝長廷量身裁製的「中國事務委員會」主任委員一職，由於「黨內意見很多」，謝長廷的態度已由當仁不讓，轉為「不排斥，也不強求」。
最值得注意的是，蘇貞昌在思維的高度與操作的手法上，似乎皆不具帶領轉型的能力。從蘇貞昌對此次倫敦攝政街撤旗事件的回應，可以看出他的膚淺與不真誠。蘇貞昌又回到了一九九九年的《台灣前途決議文》，謂台灣依現行憲法稱為中華民國，就是用這一面國旗；這卻是將歷史掐頭去尾的手法，蘇貞昌完全未交代民進黨此前的《台獨黨綱》，及此後的「正名制憲」，與現在仍然活蹦亂跳的「一邊一國」；何況，蘇貞昌既如此心痛在攝政街被撤去的那一幅國旗，為何不承諾將這面國旗插回民進黨的群眾集會中？倘若這就是蘇貞昌的兩岸論述水準，豈非太膚淺？又豈非太不真誠？
由於國民黨的形勢式微，出現了民進黨可能在二○一六贏回大選、重返執政的可能性。但是，倘若民進黨在兩岸政策上不能轉型成功，則在二○一六年，必將遭遇兩大關口；不是在第一關被台灣選民所拒以致不能勝選，就是倘若勝選，亦將在第二關被北京挾持而釀成台灣的浩劫。若以蘇貞昌如今在兩岸轉型工程上的表現，他即使帶領民進黨過了第一關，也絕無可能過得了第二關。
民進黨不能再玩《台灣前途決議文》那種「借殼上市」的把戲；把「台灣」說成「中華民國」，把「中華民國憲法」說成「台灣的憲法」，把「中華民國國旗」說成「台灣的國旗」。兩岸競合關係的重重關口，盤根錯節，豈能以如此移花接木的淺薄手法就想僥倖過關？
可以預言，北京在二○一六年的政策底線，仍將是「反對台獨」與「堅持九二共識」二大元素，這絕非《台灣前途決議文》所能抵擋的題目。民進黨若不在選前回答這個題目，必將在若勝選後被迫回答；倘在選前回應，則民進黨尚不致全然淪於被動，但若至勝選執政才被北京逼迫回應，則必將釀成台灣政經的巨災浩劫。
由於台灣藍綠政局出現不穩，如今北京的底線已然更見限縮；由「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」，又加上了「鞏固一中框架」，並開始對馬政府的「不統／不獨／不武」展開批判，這反映了北京對台灣政局不穩的憂慮。這一方面是北京在攻擊馬政府的保守，另一方面更是「項莊舞劍，意在沛公」，不啻也是預先為民進黨點眼藥。民進黨若執政，在北京的政經壓力下，其抗壓能力可以斷言絕對不如現在的馬政府；屆時，民進黨勢必不能、不敢再採行陳水扁式的台獨自殺政策，反而必將被北京所挾持並對北京屈服。所以，民進黨若在大選前主動轉型，自遠較若勝選後的被動屈服為得計；這正是蘇貞昌作為黨主席的責任，但蘇貞昌有這樣的思維高度與操作能力嗎？
民進黨轉型的擱淺，主因之一是撞上了「蘇蔡二○一六」的礁岩。蘇蔡相爭，使獨派籌碼的分量上升，因此轉型受到獨派的掣肘。在這樣的情勢下，謝長廷的角色由奇峰突起轉至可能驚鴻一瞥，就尤令人玩味。其實，如今謝長廷已成了整個民進黨想要在兩岸政策大轉型的唯一槓桿，蘇蔡若有默契，即可能藉謝長廷的「自我犧牲」來帶動轉型；倘若蘇蔡不能一致，而皆不想在相互「卡位」中開罪獨派，則非但謝長廷無用武之地，民進黨也只能回到借殼上市的《台灣前途決議文》，繼續玩弄自欺欺人的把戲。
蘇貞昌說：「雖然國旗在國內仍有不同看法，但在國際上，國旗代表台灣，當然要維護國旗的權益。」這真是一段令人驚詫不置的荒謬言論，其意是指，即使民進黨主張台獨，在國內也不掛青天白日滿地紅國旗，但馬政府仍有責任在北京的面前展開國旗。
民進黨可以搞台獨，但捍衛中華民國是馬英九的責任。作為民進黨主席，說出如此膚淺與不真誠的言語，蘇貞昌，你不覺得難為情嗎？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 4, 2012
Summary: Su Tseng-chang said "People may differ about the national flag at home, but in the international arena, the flag represents Taiwan. We must defend the ROC national flag." This was a surprising and risible comment. What it really meant was that even though the DPP advocates Taiwan independence and refuses to fly the ROC national flag at home, the Ma administration is nevertheless obligated to wave the ROC national flag in Beijing's face.
Full Text below:
The DPP's attempt to transform its cross-Strait policy has clearly run aground.
First of all, it has named its restored cross-Strait institution the "China Affairs Department" instead of the "Cross-Strait Affairs Department." A "Cross-Strait Affairs Department" implies "one China, different interpretations." A "China Affairs Department" implies "one country on each side." The hand of Taiwan independence is clearly visible. Furthermore, it is redundant. It overlaps the "China Affairs Committee" custom tailored for Chairman Frank Hsieh. Dissent within the party has forced Frank Hsieh to adopt a "neither opposing nor demanding" stance on the new "China Affairs Department."
Su Tseng-chang's strategic understanding and tactical skills were apparently unable to ensure transformation. Take Su Tseng-chang's response to the removal of the ROC national flag on Regent Street, London. He was transparently insincere. Su Tseng-chang has clearly returned to the 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." He is clearly saying that according to the current constitution, Taiwan is referred to as the Republic of China, and uses the ROC national flag. This is "amputated history." Su Tseng-chang utterly fails to address the DPP's "Taiwan Independence Party Platform," the DPP's calls for the "Rectification of Names," and the DPP's still alive and kicking "one country on each side" rhetoric. If Su Tseng-chang was really that broken up about the ROC national flag being taken down on Regent Street, why did he not vow that he would obtain this flag and make it the centerpiece of DPP political rallies? If this is what Su Tseng-chang's cross-Strait rhetoric boils down to, isn't it just a wee bit superficial? Isn't it just a wee bit deceitful?
The KMT is in trouble. The DPP may be able to win back the presidency in 2016. It may be able to return to power. But first DPP cross-Strait policy must be successfully transformed. In 2016, the DPP will encounter two hurdles. Hurdle One would be that voters on Taiwan will refuse to vote for the DPP because they don't think the DPP can win. If the DPP does win, it will encounter Hurdle Two. The ruling DPP will be held hostage by Beijing. For Taiwan, this would be a catastrophe. Judging by Su Tseng-chang's cross-Strait transformation so far, even if he helps the DPP over the Hurdle One, the DPP will not be able to negotiate Hurdle Two.
The DPP can no longer play "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" type "backdoor listing" word games. It can no longer pass off "Taiwan" as the Republic of China. It can no longer pass off the Constitution of the Republic of China as "Taiwan's Constitution," It can no longer pass off the Republic of China national flag as "Taiwan's flag." Cross-Strait coopetition is now deep rooted. Does the DPP actually imagine it can continue to skate by on such glib sophistries?
One can be certain that Beijing's bottom line in 2016 will remain "opposition to Taiwan independence" and "adherence to the 1992 consensus." This is not something the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" can resist. The DPP must offer a response before the election. In the event it wins, it must offer a response after the election. If it responds before the election, the DPP will at least have exercised some initiative. In the event it wins but responds only after the election, the result will be political and economic catastrophe.
Blue vs. Green politics on Taiwan has led to political instability. As a result, Beijing is taking a harder line. To "opposing Taiwan independence and upholding the 1992 consensus," it has added "consolidating the one China framework." It has begun criticizing the Ma administration's "no reunification, no independence, no use of force" policy. This reflects Beijing's concern about political instability on Taiwan. It also reflects Beijing's reservations about attacking the Ma administration. Its words are heavy with subtext. It is giving the DPP advance warning. It is saying that if the DPP returns to power, the political and economic pressure Beijing applies to the DPP administration will far exceed the pressure applied to the Ma administration. When the time comes, the DPP will be able to adopt Chen Shui-bian's suicidal Taiwan independence policy. Just the opposite,it will be hostage to Beijing. It will be compelled to knuckle under. Therefore the DPP must seize the initiative and transform itself before the election. This is a far wiser strategy than waiting passively and knuckling under to pressure after the election. This is Su Tseng-chang's responsibility as party chairman. Does Su Tseng-chang understand the strategic picture well enough to pull it off?
The DPP's transformation has run aground. It has struck a reef, the struggle between Su and Tsai for the presidency in 2016. This has dealt Taiwan independence elements a stronger hand. Any transformation will be hobbled by these Taiwan independence elements. Under the circumstances, Frank Hsieh's sudden prominence could take a surprising turn. Frank Hsieh is the only DPP leader still promoting the transformation of DPP cross-Strait policy. Su and Tsai may reach a tacit understanding. They may exploit Frank Hsieh's self-sacrifice to facilitate the party's transformation. Su and Tsai may not be able to reach an understanding. They may not wish to offend Taiwan independence elements as they jockey for position. Frank Hsieh may be rendered impotent. The DPP may revert to the backdoor listing of its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." It may continue to engage in self-deception.
Su Tseng-chang said "People may differ about the national flag at home, but in the international arena, the flag represents Taiwan. We must defend the ROC national flag." This was a surprising and risible comment. What it really meant was that even though the DPP advocates Taiwan independence and refuses to fly the ROC national flag at home, the Ma administration is nevertheless obligated to wave the ROC national flag in Beijing's face.
What it really means is that the DPP must be allowed to promote Taiwan independence. But defending the Republic of China is Ma Ying-jeou's responsibility. As chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party, isn't Su Tseng-chang ashamed about indulging in such superficial and deceitful sophistry?
民進黨兩岸政策轉型工程的兩大關口
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.08.04
原本甚囂塵上的民進黨兩岸政策轉型工程，顯然已告擱淺。
首先，恢復的機構，仍名為「中國事務部」，卻不是「兩岸事務部」；而「兩岸事務部」意味「一中各表」，「中國事務部」則意味「一邊一國」，可見獨派的掣肘。再者，原本疊床架屋、為謝長廷量身裁製的「中國事務委員會」主任委員一職，由於「黨內意見很多」，謝長廷的態度已由當仁不讓，轉為「不排斥，也不強求」。
最值得注意的是，蘇貞昌在思維的高度與操作的手法上，似乎皆不具帶領轉型的能力。從蘇貞昌對此次倫敦攝政街撤旗事件的回應，可以看出他的膚淺與不真誠。蘇貞昌又回到了一九九九年的《台灣前途決議文》，謂台灣依現行憲法稱為中華民國，就是用這一面國旗；這卻是將歷史掐頭去尾的手法，蘇貞昌完全未交代民進黨此前的《台獨黨綱》，及此後的「正名制憲」，與現在仍然活蹦亂跳的「一邊一國」；何況，蘇貞昌既如此心痛在攝政街被撤去的那一幅國旗，為何不承諾將這面國旗插回民進黨的群眾集會中？倘若這就是蘇貞昌的兩岸論述水準，豈非太膚淺？又豈非太不真誠？
由於國民黨的形勢式微，出現了民進黨可能在二○一六贏回大選、重返執政的可能性。但是，倘若民進黨在兩岸政策上不能轉型成功，則在二○一六年，必將遭遇兩大關口；不是在第一關被台灣選民所拒以致不能勝選，就是倘若勝選，亦將在第二關被北京挾持而釀成台灣的浩劫。若以蘇貞昌如今在兩岸轉型工程上的表現，他即使帶領民進黨過了第一關，也絕無可能過得了第二關。
民進黨不能再玩《台灣前途決議文》那種「借殼上市」的把戲；把「台灣」說成「中華民國」，把「中華民國憲法」說成「台灣的憲法」，把「中華民國國旗」說成「台灣的國旗」。兩岸競合關係的重重關口，盤根錯節，豈能以如此移花接木的淺薄手法就想僥倖過關？
可以預言，北京在二○一六年的政策底線，仍將是「反對台獨」與「堅持九二共識」二大元素，這絕非《台灣前途決議文》所能抵擋的題目。民進黨若不在選前回答這個題目，必將在若勝選後被迫回答；倘在選前回應，則民進黨尚不致全然淪於被動，但若至勝選執政才被北京逼迫回應，則必將釀成台灣政經的巨災浩劫。
由於台灣藍綠政局出現不穩，如今北京的底線已然更見限縮；由「反對台獨／堅持九二共識」，又加上了「鞏固一中框架」，並開始對馬政府的「不統／不獨／不武」展開批判，這反映了北京對台灣政局不穩的憂慮。這一方面是北京在攻擊馬政府的保守，另一方面更是「項莊舞劍，意在沛公」，不啻也是預先為民進黨點眼藥。民進黨若執政，在北京的政經壓力下，其抗壓能力可以斷言絕對不如現在的馬政府；屆時，民進黨勢必不能、不敢再採行陳水扁式的台獨自殺政策，反而必將被北京所挾持並對北京屈服。所以，民進黨若在大選前主動轉型，自遠較若勝選後的被動屈服為得計；這正是蘇貞昌作為黨主席的責任，但蘇貞昌有這樣的思維高度與操作能力嗎？
民進黨轉型的擱淺，主因之一是撞上了「蘇蔡二○一六」的礁岩。蘇蔡相爭，使獨派籌碼的分量上升，因此轉型受到獨派的掣肘。在這樣的情勢下，謝長廷的角色由奇峰突起轉至可能驚鴻一瞥，就尤令人玩味。其實，如今謝長廷已成了整個民進黨想要在兩岸政策大轉型的唯一槓桿，蘇蔡若有默契，即可能藉謝長廷的「自我犧牲」來帶動轉型；倘若蘇蔡不能一致，而皆不想在相互「卡位」中開罪獨派，則非但謝長廷無用武之地，民進黨也只能回到借殼上市的《台灣前途決議文》，繼續玩弄自欺欺人的把戲。
蘇貞昌說：「雖然國旗在國內仍有不同看法，但在國際上，國旗代表台灣，當然要維護國旗的權益。」這真是一段令人驚詫不置的荒謬言論，其意是指，即使民進黨主張台獨，在國內也不掛青天白日滿地紅國旗，但馬政府仍有責任在北京的面前展開國旗。
民進黨可以搞台獨，但捍衛中華民國是馬英九的責任。作為民進黨主席，說出如此膚淺與不真誠的言語，蘇貞昌，你不覺得難為情嗎？
Thursday, August 2, 2012
Olympic Spirit cannot tolerate Throwing Matches
Olympic Spirit cannot tolerate Throwing Matches
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 3, 2012
Summary: On the fifth day of the London Olympics, one of the ugliest scandals in Olympic history took place. Eight women badminton players from Mainland China, South Korea, and Indonesia, deliberately threw matches to avoid more powerful competitors. The World Badminton Federation disqualified the players for violating player guidelines. These players have lost face for themselves, their countries, and the Olympics.
Full Text below:
On the fifth day of the London Olympics, one of the ugliest scandals in Olympic history took place. Eight women badminton players from Mainland China, South Korea, and Indonesia, deliberately threw matches to avoid more powerful competitors. The World Badminton Federation disqualified the players for violating player guidelines. These players have lost face for themselves, their countries, and the Olympics.
Throwing these matches was an outrage, These players threw these matches right in front of 6000 spectators. They pretended they could not return serves, or deliberately returned them out of bounds. They deliberately gave away points to their opponents. Seeing this, many fans booed. Twice, the referee issued black cards. He warned players that they must actively attack and defend. The quadrennial Olympic Games represents the pinnacle of world sports. How can it tolerate players manipulating the audience and the judges, and trampling over the sport?
Let us carefully study the events surrounding these incidents. The most blameworthy is the Mainland China team, which initiated this tactic. Yu Yang and Wang Li are the world's best women's doubles players. They should have shown their fans their best game. Instead, they deliberately lost to rival South Korea in the preliminaries to avoid a premature encounter with another group of Mainland players. Their hoped the Mainland team would eventually win both the gold and the silver. They wanted to keep it "all in the family." This Mainland team strategy received a warning from the referee. The South Korean team also expressed disapproval. Predictably, the South Korean team soon began copying the Mainland strategy. It soon began throwing its match against the weaker Indonesian team. Its outrageous behavior was more than the audience could bear.
Once the dispute arose, these teams defended their actions. They claimed they were making "reasonable use of the rules of the game." They claimed that "throwing matches" was a commonly used strategy, and that it was not illegal. Their attitude evinced a lack of introspection, and worse, opportunism. It unconsciously introduced bad practices into the Olympic Games. The Olympic Badminton Federation adopted a new round robin elimination format. Its purpose was to avoid eliminating strong competitors prematurely as a result of bad luck. Who knew that the Mainland Chinese and South Korean teams would abuse the goodwill of the Olympics Committee, and use this foreknowledge of their opponents to throw matches? Especially regrettable was that the first to throw matches were the world's top two players. Confronted with such naked fraud, the Olympic Badminton Federation dealt with the matter harshly. Otherwise how could it uphold the reputation of the sport and the spirit of competition?
Looking further ahead individual gold medal competitors must not throw matches based on their own discretion. Such decisions must be left to coaches. They must be tactical decisions by the coaching staff as a whole. Yu Yang and Wang Li lost their bids for gold. But they have only themselves to blame. These Asian nations' victory at any price values call for deep introspection. There is no shame in losing the gold as long as one competes with all one's might. But these shameful losses were the result of certain coaches' calcuations. The damage done to the reputation of the players and the sport is irreparable. Actually, the players are the victims rather than the culprits. The accusing finger of public opinion must not be misdirected.
The Olympic Games are the arena for the world's top players. It is the temple to the pursuit of the highest ideals of sports. The ideals people champion are "faster, higher, farther," not "gold, silver and bronze." During the current Olympic Games many competitors from Mainland China were proud winners of Olympic medals. But the badminton match throwing incident has exposed the dark side of sports. The horse may already have been stolen. But the barn door must be repaired regardless.
The Olympic Committee disqualified players who threw matches. The soul-searching on the Chinese Mainland appears louder than in South Korea. The public and the government have been critical of the match throwing. They say dignity and integrity are more important than gold medals. This at least is a welcome phenomenon. Since the opening of the London Olympics, Mainland society has engaged in two waves of soul-searching. One. The opening ceremonies demonstrated the power of culture. This impressed the world more than the power of the state. Two. The players' behavior led to the recognition that sportsmanship is more important than gold medals.
A silver medal weight lifter who failed to win the gold wept apologetically. He said "I apologize to my country. I apologize to everyone." Many netizens responded, "You need not apologize. The nation should apologize to you." The myth of the gold medal must be shattered. Only then will the true spirit of the Olympics return. Only then will players cease to be mindless robots programmed to win medals.
The Badminton Federation's actions did not jointly and severally punish coaches or players. Player disqualifications were limited to the current Olympic Games. The iron fist showed mercy. But it was sufficient to teach the various nations' players a lesson. Bring back the spirit of the Olympics. Do not introduce various nations' bad habits into the Olympic Games.
「奧運精神」不容「消極比賽」
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.08.03 02:50 am
倫敦奧運第五天，發生了奧運史上最醜陋的「打假球」事件。包括中國、南韓及印尼的八名女子羽球選手為迴避強敵而故意「消極比賽」，遭到世界羽球總會以「違反球員準則」取消資格，這些選手讓自己及自己的國家丟臉，也讓奧運蒙羞。
這次的假球事件之所以令人憤怒，是因為這些選手當著六千觀眾公然放水，或者假裝接不到球，或者故意把球打出界外，平白送分給對手。許多觀眾都看出端倪，發出滿場噓聲；裁判甚至兩度出示「黑牌」，進場警告雙方選手要積極攻防。四年一度的奧林匹克運動會，代表的是全球運動員競技的頂峰，豈容心懷鬼胎的球員在那裡戲弄觀眾及裁判、踐踏運動精神？
細究事件原委，最該譴責的，是始作俑者的中國大陸隊。于洋及王曉理是排名世界第一的女雙好手，原應在場上一展絕技以饗球迷，她們卻為了避免與另一組大陸選手過早遭遇，故意在預賽放水敗給對手南韓。其主要盤算，是希望大陸隊的兩組最後能同時包辦金銀牌，肥水不入外人田。大陸隊的作法，遭到了裁判警告，南韓隊也頗表不以為然；孰料，南韓旋即東施效顰，另一組隨後上場的選手也向較弱的印尼隊打起假球。倨傲、離譜的表現，讓現場觀眾忍無可忍。
爭議發生後，這些隊伍還振振有詞，自稱是「合理利用比賽規則」，更狡辯說「消極比賽」是一般常用的戰略，並無不法。這種態度，不僅缺乏反省，更把投機、造假惡習帶進奧運而不自知。事實上，這次奧運羽球採取「分組單循環、決賽淘汰」的新制，目的是為避免好手因些微意外遭到淘汰；想不到，中、韓等隊伍卻誤用大會的善意，利用預知對手的機會打起假球。尤令人遺憾的，是率先上場放水的，竟是名列世界第一的兩名好手。面對如此赤裸裸的運動詐騙術，奧會及羽球總會若不痛下鐵腕處置，如何維繫羽球的聲譽和運動員的奮戰精神？
進一步看，金牌選手在場上打假球，應該不是球員個人的一時興起，而是教練授意，甚至是教練團的集體戰術指導。亦即，于洋及王曉理喪失奪金資格固係咎由自取，但這些亞洲國家體育界為了爭取名次而不擇手段的矯詐文化，恐怕更該深刻反省。如果是全力拚搏而輸球，丟金並不可恥；但由於教練團爭牌的算計，而造成輸球又丟人，這對球員的聲譽及運動生命的傷害是無可彌補的，她們其實是犧牲品而非罪魁，輿論指責矛頭不能失焦。
奧運不僅是全球頂尖好手的競技場，也是人類追逐極致運動精神的聖殿。人們崇尚的是「更快、更高、更遠」的理想，而不僅是金、銀、銅牌的名次。這次奧運，中國大陸獲得的獎牌數傲居世界首位，可堪自豪；但羽球放水事件，卻也暴露其運動精神及體育文化貧瘠的一面，必須亡羊補牢。
值得注意的是，大會宣布放水球員失格後，中國大陸內部的反省聲音似乎比南韓清晰，輿論及官方媒體都對打假球事件發出批評，要求尊嚴和品格比金牌更重要，這至少是個可喜的現象。事實上，倫敦奧運開幕後，中國民間社會有兩股正面的反思浪潮：一是從開幕式看到「文化的力量」比「國家的力量」更能打動世界；二是從選手背後的種種故事認知「運動精神」比「金牌數目」重要。
也因此，當一位銀牌舉重選手為未能奪金而痛哭致歉說「我對不起祖國，對不起大家」時，不少網民回應他：「你不必道歉，是國家對不起你。」只有當「金牌迷思」打破，真正的運動精神才能回到人的身上，球員才不會被當成操練機器及奪牌工具。
羽球總會這次的處分，並未連帶處分教練或球團，球員失格也僅限此次奧運，鐵腕下依然留情，但已足供各國球員引為殷鑑：請把奧運的美好精神帶回國內，勿將各國的陋習帶進奧運。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 3, 2012
Summary: On the fifth day of the London Olympics, one of the ugliest scandals in Olympic history took place. Eight women badminton players from Mainland China, South Korea, and Indonesia, deliberately threw matches to avoid more powerful competitors. The World Badminton Federation disqualified the players for violating player guidelines. These players have lost face for themselves, their countries, and the Olympics.
Full Text below:
On the fifth day of the London Olympics, one of the ugliest scandals in Olympic history took place. Eight women badminton players from Mainland China, South Korea, and Indonesia, deliberately threw matches to avoid more powerful competitors. The World Badminton Federation disqualified the players for violating player guidelines. These players have lost face for themselves, their countries, and the Olympics.
Throwing these matches was an outrage, These players threw these matches right in front of 6000 spectators. They pretended they could not return serves, or deliberately returned them out of bounds. They deliberately gave away points to their opponents. Seeing this, many fans booed. Twice, the referee issued black cards. He warned players that they must actively attack and defend. The quadrennial Olympic Games represents the pinnacle of world sports. How can it tolerate players manipulating the audience and the judges, and trampling over the sport?
Let us carefully study the events surrounding these incidents. The most blameworthy is the Mainland China team, which initiated this tactic. Yu Yang and Wang Li are the world's best women's doubles players. They should have shown their fans their best game. Instead, they deliberately lost to rival South Korea in the preliminaries to avoid a premature encounter with another group of Mainland players. Their hoped the Mainland team would eventually win both the gold and the silver. They wanted to keep it "all in the family." This Mainland team strategy received a warning from the referee. The South Korean team also expressed disapproval. Predictably, the South Korean team soon began copying the Mainland strategy. It soon began throwing its match against the weaker Indonesian team. Its outrageous behavior was more than the audience could bear.
Once the dispute arose, these teams defended their actions. They claimed they were making "reasonable use of the rules of the game." They claimed that "throwing matches" was a commonly used strategy, and that it was not illegal. Their attitude evinced a lack of introspection, and worse, opportunism. It unconsciously introduced bad practices into the Olympic Games. The Olympic Badminton Federation adopted a new round robin elimination format. Its purpose was to avoid eliminating strong competitors prematurely as a result of bad luck. Who knew that the Mainland Chinese and South Korean teams would abuse the goodwill of the Olympics Committee, and use this foreknowledge of their opponents to throw matches? Especially regrettable was that the first to throw matches were the world's top two players. Confronted with such naked fraud, the Olympic Badminton Federation dealt with the matter harshly. Otherwise how could it uphold the reputation of the sport and the spirit of competition?
Looking further ahead individual gold medal competitors must not throw matches based on their own discretion. Such decisions must be left to coaches. They must be tactical decisions by the coaching staff as a whole. Yu Yang and Wang Li lost their bids for gold. But they have only themselves to blame. These Asian nations' victory at any price values call for deep introspection. There is no shame in losing the gold as long as one competes with all one's might. But these shameful losses were the result of certain coaches' calcuations. The damage done to the reputation of the players and the sport is irreparable. Actually, the players are the victims rather than the culprits. The accusing finger of public opinion must not be misdirected.
The Olympic Games are the arena for the world's top players. It is the temple to the pursuit of the highest ideals of sports. The ideals people champion are "faster, higher, farther," not "gold, silver and bronze." During the current Olympic Games many competitors from Mainland China were proud winners of Olympic medals. But the badminton match throwing incident has exposed the dark side of sports. The horse may already have been stolen. But the barn door must be repaired regardless.
The Olympic Committee disqualified players who threw matches. The soul-searching on the Chinese Mainland appears louder than in South Korea. The public and the government have been critical of the match throwing. They say dignity and integrity are more important than gold medals. This at least is a welcome phenomenon. Since the opening of the London Olympics, Mainland society has engaged in two waves of soul-searching. One. The opening ceremonies demonstrated the power of culture. This impressed the world more than the power of the state. Two. The players' behavior led to the recognition that sportsmanship is more important than gold medals.
A silver medal weight lifter who failed to win the gold wept apologetically. He said "I apologize to my country. I apologize to everyone." Many netizens responded, "You need not apologize. The nation should apologize to you." The myth of the gold medal must be shattered. Only then will the true spirit of the Olympics return. Only then will players cease to be mindless robots programmed to win medals.
The Badminton Federation's actions did not jointly and severally punish coaches or players. Player disqualifications were limited to the current Olympic Games. The iron fist showed mercy. But it was sufficient to teach the various nations' players a lesson. Bring back the spirit of the Olympics. Do not introduce various nations' bad habits into the Olympic Games.
「奧運精神」不容「消極比賽」
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.08.03 02:50 am
倫敦奧運第五天，發生了奧運史上最醜陋的「打假球」事件。包括中國、南韓及印尼的八名女子羽球選手為迴避強敵而故意「消極比賽」，遭到世界羽球總會以「違反球員準則」取消資格，這些選手讓自己及自己的國家丟臉，也讓奧運蒙羞。
這次的假球事件之所以令人憤怒，是因為這些選手當著六千觀眾公然放水，或者假裝接不到球，或者故意把球打出界外，平白送分給對手。許多觀眾都看出端倪，發出滿場噓聲；裁判甚至兩度出示「黑牌」，進場警告雙方選手要積極攻防。四年一度的奧林匹克運動會，代表的是全球運動員競技的頂峰，豈容心懷鬼胎的球員在那裡戲弄觀眾及裁判、踐踏運動精神？
細究事件原委，最該譴責的，是始作俑者的中國大陸隊。于洋及王曉理是排名世界第一的女雙好手，原應在場上一展絕技以饗球迷，她們卻為了避免與另一組大陸選手過早遭遇，故意在預賽放水敗給對手南韓。其主要盤算，是希望大陸隊的兩組最後能同時包辦金銀牌，肥水不入外人田。大陸隊的作法，遭到了裁判警告，南韓隊也頗表不以為然；孰料，南韓旋即東施效顰，另一組隨後上場的選手也向較弱的印尼隊打起假球。倨傲、離譜的表現，讓現場觀眾忍無可忍。
爭議發生後，這些隊伍還振振有詞，自稱是「合理利用比賽規則」，更狡辯說「消極比賽」是一般常用的戰略，並無不法。這種態度，不僅缺乏反省，更把投機、造假惡習帶進奧運而不自知。事實上，這次奧運羽球採取「分組單循環、決賽淘汰」的新制，目的是為避免好手因些微意外遭到淘汰；想不到，中、韓等隊伍卻誤用大會的善意，利用預知對手的機會打起假球。尤令人遺憾的，是率先上場放水的，竟是名列世界第一的兩名好手。面對如此赤裸裸的運動詐騙術，奧會及羽球總會若不痛下鐵腕處置，如何維繫羽球的聲譽和運動員的奮戰精神？
進一步看，金牌選手在場上打假球，應該不是球員個人的一時興起，而是教練授意，甚至是教練團的集體戰術指導。亦即，于洋及王曉理喪失奪金資格固係咎由自取，但這些亞洲國家體育界為了爭取名次而不擇手段的矯詐文化，恐怕更該深刻反省。如果是全力拚搏而輸球，丟金並不可恥；但由於教練團爭牌的算計，而造成輸球又丟人，這對球員的聲譽及運動生命的傷害是無可彌補的，她們其實是犧牲品而非罪魁，輿論指責矛頭不能失焦。
奧運不僅是全球頂尖好手的競技場，也是人類追逐極致運動精神的聖殿。人們崇尚的是「更快、更高、更遠」的理想，而不僅是金、銀、銅牌的名次。這次奧運，中國大陸獲得的獎牌數傲居世界首位，可堪自豪；但羽球放水事件，卻也暴露其運動精神及體育文化貧瘠的一面，必須亡羊補牢。
值得注意的是，大會宣布放水球員失格後，中國大陸內部的反省聲音似乎比南韓清晰，輿論及官方媒體都對打假球事件發出批評，要求尊嚴和品格比金牌更重要，這至少是個可喜的現象。事實上，倫敦奧運開幕後，中國民間社會有兩股正面的反思浪潮：一是從開幕式看到「文化的力量」比「國家的力量」更能打動世界；二是從選手背後的種種故事認知「運動精神」比「金牌數目」重要。
也因此，當一位銀牌舉重選手為未能奪金而痛哭致歉說「我對不起祖國，對不起大家」時，不少網民回應他：「你不必道歉，是國家對不起你。」只有當「金牌迷思」打破，真正的運動精神才能回到人的身上，球員才不會被當成操練機器及奪牌工具。
羽球總會這次的處分，並未連帶處分教練或球團，球員失格也僅限此次奧運，鐵腕下依然留情，但已足供各國球員引為殷鑑：請把奧運的美好精神帶回國內，勿將各國的陋習帶進奧運。
Wednesday, August 1, 2012
We Look Forward to the DPP Actually Defending the ROC National Flag
We Look Forward to the DPP Actually Defending the ROC National Flag
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 1, 2012
Summary: The London Olympics has opened to much fanfare. At such a moment the ruling and opposition parties ought to demonstrate unity. But politicians on Taiwan are nothing if not quarrelsome. The Republic of China national flag was unexpectedly taken down on London's Regent Street. This touched off a ruling vs. opposition party war of words. Saliva flew. But if this flag can make the DPP examine its own position, maybe it was a good thing.
Full Text below:
The London Olympics has opened to much fanfare. At such a moment the ruling and opposition parties ought to demonstrate unity. But politicians on Taiwan are nothing if not quarrelsome. The Republic of China national flag was unexpectedly taken down on London's Regent Street. This touched off a ruling vs. opposition party war of words. Saliva flew. But if this flag can make the DPP examine its own position, maybe it was a good thing.
Ideally in politics, political parties will argue among themselves at home, but will maintain a united front in international diplomatic venues. Hopefully they will pull together, or at least avoid badmouthing each other in public. Recently Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney visited Israel. His purpose was to highlight his qualifications as a national leader. But while in Israel. he challenged the policies of U.S. President Barack Obama. He unwittingly touched a raw nerve in Middle East politics. He violated the rule that American politicians must not criticize their own government's policies while abroad. If his trip is deemed "international politics for domestic consumption," it may hurt Romney's election prospects.
Unfortunately, Taiwan has a long tradition of running off and crying to foreigners. This was perhaps understandable under martial law. But it has actually worsened since democratization. Our diplomatic plight has not unified the ruling and opposition parties. On the contrary, it has become a bone of contention. It has become a weapon to attack one's opponent. Su Tseng-chang blasted the KMT. He accused the KMT of failing to defend the ROC national flag. Although he was sounding off at home, he was touching on Taiwan's complex international plight.
Su Tseng-chang's "defend the flag" rhetoric is nothing new. Whenever the ROC national flag is forcibly taken down in an international venue. the pro-Taiwan independence Democratic Progressive Party inevitably opens fire. In fact, the DPP's behavior is a classic case of "waving the national flag to oppose the national flag." The DPP remains mired in the martial law era. It still equates the ROC national flag with the KMT party flag. It contemptuously refers to it as the "automotive wheel brand flag." In recent years, the ROC national flag has become the common denominator in Taiwan society. The Green Camp puts on a show of "defending the flag." But in its heart of hearts, it is actually attempting to undermine the Republic of China. What it really means is that "Your automotive wheel brand flag has been rejected by the international community!"
Su Tseng-chang's "defend the flag" rhetoric was a little different from previous Green Camp rhetoric. Writing in FaceBook, he said, "The flag is the symbol of the nation. Those who love this country must defend its dignity." This remark is not wrong. So why has it provoked such widespread controversy?
The answer is obvious, Political parties and politicians should say what they mean, and mean what they say. Su Tseng-chang loudly proclaimed his desire to defend the dignity of the flag. But one never sees a single ROC national flag at DPP mass rallies. One cannot find a single ROC national flag at DPP headquarters. How can Su Tseng-chang convince anyone he is really defending the ROC national flag?
The KMT has criticized him for this. What was Su Tseng-chang's response? He said that at home people may have different views of the national flag. He said this was the natural result of having a democratic and pluralistic society. He said that abroad however, we must defend the national flag. Frankly this rhetoric was highly dubious. The DPP was in office for eight years. Chen Shui-bian was not the "President of Taiwan." He was the President of the Republic of China. The Democratic Progressive Party has already accepted the national flag, the national anthem, and various national symbols. What "different views on the national flag" are there to talk about? If some political parties refuse to grant the ROC national flag the dignity it deserves on Taiwan, how can they demand that others grant it dignity on the international stage?
Most people do not flaunt the symbols of their nation in their daily lives. Most citizens' patriotism is reactive in nature. Someone from the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China may achieve some sort of international recognition. The Republic of China may experience some sort of setback. At times such as these, people are moved when they see the flag. The London Olympics flag removal incident attracted public attention. The reason was that most people consider the ROC flag the symbol of our nation. The Democratic Progressive Party talks about creating a national consensus. Yet it remains blind to this very consensus.
To be fair, Su Tseng-chang's attitude has changed somewhat. He recently attended a Junior Chamber of Commerce meeting. He joined Junior Chamber of Commerce members in bowing before the ROC national flag and Sun Yat-sen's portrait three times. This is still rare among DPP officials. Therefore, we would like to believe that Su Tseng-chang's remarks were not hypocrital or opportunisitic. Can the DPP rid itself of its rigid ideology? Over the past few years the party has become increasingly extremist. Naturally everyone is adopting a wait and see attitude.
The DPP must remember we can only have one national flag, just as we can only have one Republic of China. Our nation must endure hardships in the international arena. But the DPP and the public on Taiwan. have no other choice. We must defend the ROC national flag. We must enable the Republic of China take its place on the international stage, and find its place in the international community.
期待民進黨真心維護國旗
2012-08-01
中國時報
倫敦奧運熱熱鬧鬧展開，這應該是朝野政黨展現團結的最佳時機，但是台灣政客無所不吵，倫敦攝政街上意外掛出的中華民國國旗，也引發一場朝野口水戰。口水如昔，但這一面國旗如果能讓民進黨深刻思考自身的定位，未嘗不是一件好事。
在理想政治中，大家總是期待，政黨在國內吵歸吵，一到國際外交場合，就必須同心一志，至少要避免口出惡言；就以美國共和黨總統參選人羅姆尼此次外交之旅為例，他原有意藉此來凸顯作為國家領導人的條件。但是訪問以色列時，不但挑戰美國總統歐巴馬的政策，又不小心觸動中東政治敏感神經，更破壞了美國政治人物不在國外批評自家政策的慣例。這樣的外交行若被評為「國際政治、國內消費」，只怕對羅姆尼的選情未必有幫助。
很不幸的是，台灣向來有告洋狀的傳統，那也許是戒嚴時期的不得不然，但是民主化以來，情況愈演愈烈。艱難的外交處境，不但沒有使朝野更團結，反而是衝突點，或是拿來攻擊對手的利器。此次蘇貞昌痛批國民黨沒有維護國旗，他雖在國內發言，但他觸及的就是台灣複雜的國際處境了。
坦白說，蘇貞昌這番「護旗論」並不新鮮。過去，只要中華民國國旗在國際場被強制撤下，獨派或民進黨人士必然發言批評；但這其實是「打著國旗反國旗」。他們仍停留在戒嚴時間，將國旗等同國民黨的黨旗，甚至鄙夷的稱之為「車輪牌旗」。近年來，國旗逐漸成為台灣社會的公約數，綠營的「護旗」之舉，骨子裡其實是反對中華民國，真正意在言外的是：「你們這面車輪牌的國旗，在國際社會上還不是走不出去！」
和綠營人士過去的發言比起來，蘇貞昌這次的「護旗論」有些不同。他在臉書上說：「國旗是國家的象徵，愛這個國家就要為這面國旗爭取尊嚴。」此言不差，但為何還是引來各界質疑？
答案很明顯，政黨或政治人物都必須言行一致，當蘇貞昌口口聲聲維護國旗尊嚴時，民進黨的群眾運動中卻從來都看不到一面國旗，甚至在中央黨部也找不到一面國旗時，蘇貞昌如何讓人相信，他是真心護旗？
面對國民黨批評，蘇貞昌的回應是，國內也許對國旗有不同的看法與意見，這是民主多元社會的自然現象，但在國外，當然要維護。坦白說，這段話也是問題百出，試想，民進黨曾經八年執政，陳水扁可不是當台灣國總統，而是中華民國總統；理論上，民進黨對國旗、國歌這些國家象徵都已概括承受，為何還會對國旗有不同意見？如果在台灣的政黨都不願賦予國旗尊嚴，這面國旗在國際場合又怎麼會有尊嚴？
其實，一般人不會在日常生活中時時刻刻展示國家的象徵。國民對國家的愛都是防衛性的，只有當台灣在國際揚名，或是外交受挫的時刻，人民才會深深的受國旗感動。這次倫敦奧運撤旗事件之所以眾所矚目，最關鍵原因在於，多數民眾都認同中華民國國旗正是國家的象徵。口口聲聲要凝聚台灣共識的民進黨，顯然還沒有看清楚這一點。
持平而言，蘇貞昌的態度確實正在微調。他日前出席青商會活動時，公開與青商會員一同向國旗暨國父遺像行三鞠躬禮，這在民進黨要員中仍然極為少見。因此，我們寧願相信，蘇貞昌這番言論並非虛情假意，或是見縫插針。但是，民進黨是否就此擺脫僵固的意識形態，鑑於該黨這幾年極端化的作為，大家理所當然還要長期觀察。
也許，民進黨該記住的是，我們只能有一面國旗，正如同我們只能有一個中華民國。她在國際上走得步履艱辛，但是民進黨和所有台灣人民一樣，已經別無選擇，不但要愛護國旗，也要讓中華民國能夠走下去，在國際社會找到空間！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 1, 2012
Summary: The London Olympics has opened to much fanfare. At such a moment the ruling and opposition parties ought to demonstrate unity. But politicians on Taiwan are nothing if not quarrelsome. The Republic of China national flag was unexpectedly taken down on London's Regent Street. This touched off a ruling vs. opposition party war of words. Saliva flew. But if this flag can make the DPP examine its own position, maybe it was a good thing.
Full Text below:
The London Olympics has opened to much fanfare. At such a moment the ruling and opposition parties ought to demonstrate unity. But politicians on Taiwan are nothing if not quarrelsome. The Republic of China national flag was unexpectedly taken down on London's Regent Street. This touched off a ruling vs. opposition party war of words. Saliva flew. But if this flag can make the DPP examine its own position, maybe it was a good thing.
Ideally in politics, political parties will argue among themselves at home, but will maintain a united front in international diplomatic venues. Hopefully they will pull together, or at least avoid badmouthing each other in public. Recently Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney visited Israel. His purpose was to highlight his qualifications as a national leader. But while in Israel. he challenged the policies of U.S. President Barack Obama. He unwittingly touched a raw nerve in Middle East politics. He violated the rule that American politicians must not criticize their own government's policies while abroad. If his trip is deemed "international politics for domestic consumption," it may hurt Romney's election prospects.
Unfortunately, Taiwan has a long tradition of running off and crying to foreigners. This was perhaps understandable under martial law. But it has actually worsened since democratization. Our diplomatic plight has not unified the ruling and opposition parties. On the contrary, it has become a bone of contention. It has become a weapon to attack one's opponent. Su Tseng-chang blasted the KMT. He accused the KMT of failing to defend the ROC national flag. Although he was sounding off at home, he was touching on Taiwan's complex international plight.
Su Tseng-chang's "defend the flag" rhetoric is nothing new. Whenever the ROC national flag is forcibly taken down in an international venue. the pro-Taiwan independence Democratic Progressive Party inevitably opens fire. In fact, the DPP's behavior is a classic case of "waving the national flag to oppose the national flag." The DPP remains mired in the martial law era. It still equates the ROC national flag with the KMT party flag. It contemptuously refers to it as the "automotive wheel brand flag." In recent years, the ROC national flag has become the common denominator in Taiwan society. The Green Camp puts on a show of "defending the flag." But in its heart of hearts, it is actually attempting to undermine the Republic of China. What it really means is that "Your automotive wheel brand flag has been rejected by the international community!"
Su Tseng-chang's "defend the flag" rhetoric was a little different from previous Green Camp rhetoric. Writing in FaceBook, he said, "The flag is the symbol of the nation. Those who love this country must defend its dignity." This remark is not wrong. So why has it provoked such widespread controversy?
The answer is obvious, Political parties and politicians should say what they mean, and mean what they say. Su Tseng-chang loudly proclaimed his desire to defend the dignity of the flag. But one never sees a single ROC national flag at DPP mass rallies. One cannot find a single ROC national flag at DPP headquarters. How can Su Tseng-chang convince anyone he is really defending the ROC national flag?
The KMT has criticized him for this. What was Su Tseng-chang's response? He said that at home people may have different views of the national flag. He said this was the natural result of having a democratic and pluralistic society. He said that abroad however, we must defend the national flag. Frankly this rhetoric was highly dubious. The DPP was in office for eight years. Chen Shui-bian was not the "President of Taiwan." He was the President of the Republic of China. The Democratic Progressive Party has already accepted the national flag, the national anthem, and various national symbols. What "different views on the national flag" are there to talk about? If some political parties refuse to grant the ROC national flag the dignity it deserves on Taiwan, how can they demand that others grant it dignity on the international stage?
Most people do not flaunt the symbols of their nation in their daily lives. Most citizens' patriotism is reactive in nature. Someone from the Taiwan Region of the Republic of China may achieve some sort of international recognition. The Republic of China may experience some sort of setback. At times such as these, people are moved when they see the flag. The London Olympics flag removal incident attracted public attention. The reason was that most people consider the ROC flag the symbol of our nation. The Democratic Progressive Party talks about creating a national consensus. Yet it remains blind to this very consensus.
To be fair, Su Tseng-chang's attitude has changed somewhat. He recently attended a Junior Chamber of Commerce meeting. He joined Junior Chamber of Commerce members in bowing before the ROC national flag and Sun Yat-sen's portrait three times. This is still rare among DPP officials. Therefore, we would like to believe that Su Tseng-chang's remarks were not hypocrital or opportunisitic. Can the DPP rid itself of its rigid ideology? Over the past few years the party has become increasingly extremist. Naturally everyone is adopting a wait and see attitude.
The DPP must remember we can only have one national flag, just as we can only have one Republic of China. Our nation must endure hardships in the international arena. But the DPP and the public on Taiwan. have no other choice. We must defend the ROC national flag. We must enable the Republic of China take its place on the international stage, and find its place in the international community.
期待民進黨真心維護國旗
2012-08-01
中國時報
倫敦奧運熱熱鬧鬧展開，這應該是朝野政黨展現團結的最佳時機，但是台灣政客無所不吵，倫敦攝政街上意外掛出的中華民國國旗，也引發一場朝野口水戰。口水如昔，但這一面國旗如果能讓民進黨深刻思考自身的定位，未嘗不是一件好事。
在理想政治中，大家總是期待，政黨在國內吵歸吵，一到國際外交場合，就必須同心一志，至少要避免口出惡言；就以美國共和黨總統參選人羅姆尼此次外交之旅為例，他原有意藉此來凸顯作為國家領導人的條件。但是訪問以色列時，不但挑戰美國總統歐巴馬的政策，又不小心觸動中東政治敏感神經，更破壞了美國政治人物不在國外批評自家政策的慣例。這樣的外交行若被評為「國際政治、國內消費」，只怕對羅姆尼的選情未必有幫助。
很不幸的是，台灣向來有告洋狀的傳統，那也許是戒嚴時期的不得不然，但是民主化以來，情況愈演愈烈。艱難的外交處境，不但沒有使朝野更團結，反而是衝突點，或是拿來攻擊對手的利器。此次蘇貞昌痛批國民黨沒有維護國旗，他雖在國內發言，但他觸及的就是台灣複雜的國際處境了。
坦白說，蘇貞昌這番「護旗論」並不新鮮。過去，只要中華民國國旗在國際場被強制撤下，獨派或民進黨人士必然發言批評；但這其實是「打著國旗反國旗」。他們仍停留在戒嚴時間，將國旗等同國民黨的黨旗，甚至鄙夷的稱之為「車輪牌旗」。近年來，國旗逐漸成為台灣社會的公約數，綠營的「護旗」之舉，骨子裡其實是反對中華民國，真正意在言外的是：「你們這面車輪牌的國旗，在國際社會上還不是走不出去！」
和綠營人士過去的發言比起來，蘇貞昌這次的「護旗論」有些不同。他在臉書上說：「國旗是國家的象徵，愛這個國家就要為這面國旗爭取尊嚴。」此言不差，但為何還是引來各界質疑？
答案很明顯，政黨或政治人物都必須言行一致，當蘇貞昌口口聲聲維護國旗尊嚴時，民進黨的群眾運動中卻從來都看不到一面國旗，甚至在中央黨部也找不到一面國旗時，蘇貞昌如何讓人相信，他是真心護旗？
面對國民黨批評，蘇貞昌的回應是，國內也許對國旗有不同的看法與意見，這是民主多元社會的自然現象，但在國外，當然要維護。坦白說，這段話也是問題百出，試想，民進黨曾經八年執政，陳水扁可不是當台灣國總統，而是中華民國總統；理論上，民進黨對國旗、國歌這些國家象徵都已概括承受，為何還會對國旗有不同意見？如果在台灣的政黨都不願賦予國旗尊嚴，這面國旗在國際場合又怎麼會有尊嚴？
其實，一般人不會在日常生活中時時刻刻展示國家的象徵。國民對國家的愛都是防衛性的，只有當台灣在國際揚名，或是外交受挫的時刻，人民才會深深的受國旗感動。這次倫敦奧運撤旗事件之所以眾所矚目，最關鍵原因在於，多數民眾都認同中華民國國旗正是國家的象徵。口口聲聲要凝聚台灣共識的民進黨，顯然還沒有看清楚這一點。
持平而言，蘇貞昌的態度確實正在微調。他日前出席青商會活動時，公開與青商會員一同向國旗暨國父遺像行三鞠躬禮，這在民進黨要員中仍然極為少見。因此，我們寧願相信，蘇貞昌這番言論並非虛情假意，或是見縫插針。但是，民進黨是否就此擺脫僵固的意識形態，鑑於該黨這幾年極端化的作為，大家理所當然還要長期觀察。
也許，民進黨該記住的是，我們只能有一面國旗，正如同我們只能有一個中華民國。她在國際上走得步履艱辛，但是民進黨和所有台灣人民一樣，已經別無選擇，不但要愛護國旗，也要讓中華民國能夠走下去，在國際社會找到空間！
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