DPP: An Abundance of Rage, A Dearth of Proposals
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 10, 2012
Summary: The DPP will hold its "Raging Citizens Protest March" this Sunday. Party insiders had reservations about the march. They said "All we see is rage. Where are the policy proposals?" Some are even predicting that once the march is over, the DPP will resume spinning its wheels.
Full Text below:
The DPP will hold its "Raging Citizens Protest March" this Sunday. Party insiders had reservations about the march. They said "All we see is rage. Where are the policy proposals?" Some are even predicting that once the march is over, the DPP will resume spinning its wheels.
The DPP has been spinning its wheels, hobbled by internal conflict. Take three examples. One. The Chen family corruption scandal. Two. ECFA. Three. U.S. beef imports. The DPP remains a hostage of the Chen family corruption scandal. Even today it lacks the courage to condemn Chen family corruption. Just the opposite, the entire party, in stubborn defiance of justice, is aiding and abetting Chen Shui-bian in his quest for "medical parole." It is twisting the meaning of the laws pertaining to parole. As a result the party's "Transitional Justice" has gone nowhere, and continues to spin its wheels. In 2008, the DPP demagogued ECFA, alleging that it "forfeited sovereignty, humiliated the nation" and "pandered to [Mainland] China and sold out Taiwan." It persisted until 2012, when it suddenly sang a different tune. It announced that "If the DPP returns to power, it will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." This major about face was another example of DPP wheel-spinning. It happened because the DPP's cross-strait policy "reform" remains stillborn. The U.S. beef imports controversy raged for several months. DPP legislators even held an multi-night "slumber party" on the legislature floor. In the end however, they closed up shop and agreed to "abide by international standards." Their temper tantrum was for naught.
The Chen family corruption scandal shows that the DPP has forfeited the moral high ground. The DPP's cross-strait policy shows that its anti-ECFA crusade was a debacle. The U.S. beef imports controversy shows that the DPP's "Raging Citizens" card is the demagoguing of phony issues. These are all examples of how the DPP is spinning its wheels. These have forced caused the nation and society to spin their wheels as well. Little wonder that when contemplating Sunday's "Raging Citizens Protest March" some are saying, "All we see is rage. Where are the policy proposals?"
The DPP has become a Machiavellian political party. Political trickery reigns supreme. It has abandoned its principles. It lacks a compass. It even lacks a goal. It aided and abetted Chen Shui-bian. It is deft at political trickery but lacking in moral principles. It opposed ECFA. It is deft at political trickery, but lacking in policy direction. During the U.S. beef imports controversy, it was adept at political protests, but lacking in policy goals. Being adept at political trickery but lacking in moral principles, has led it to equate ideology with "policy," political struggle with "reform," and incitement of social divisions with "love for Taiwan." This is a political party that pretends to take action. But its only real action is wheel-spinning. It holds countless protest marches. But its protests are mere internal bickering.
The DPP could have chosen not be such a political party. But its Machiavellianism has led to a transformation in character. This transformation includes three aspects. One. Before and after the lifting of martial law, the DPP's principles and goals were clear. Overthrow the "Ten Thousand Year Assembly," and return to constitutional rule. But then it colluded with Lee Teng-hui to "amend," i.e., shred the Constitution. It treated the Constitution is a sacrifice it its political struggle. Its Machiavellianism led to the shredding of the Constitution. Its "Taiwan independence party platform" called for the "Rectification of Names." This has been exposed for what it is, a phony issue. But it forced the nation and society to pay a heavy price -- two decades of wheel-spinning.
Two. Before and after the 1990s it proposed "subsidies for farmers," "allowances for the elderly," and "allowances for fishermen." It was originally a legitimate advocate of social welfare. But then it began competing with the KMT to see who could engage in the most political patronage. It underwent a transformation in character. Since then, the DPP's policies for social welfare, environmental protection, nuclear energy, annuities, health insurance, capital gains tax, have all been recut a la Machiavelli. The DPP neglects the Big Picture. It considers only tactical advantage in its ongoing political struggle.
Three. After 2008, the DPP's cross-Strait policy became opposition to ECFA and the 1992 consensus. It said it "opposed the forfeiting of sovereignty and the humiliation the nation," it said it opposed "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." It has yet to clean up the mess left by its Machievellianism. The DPP finds itself on the horns of a dilemma. Its plight is clear to see.
As we can see, the DPP thinks it can demagogue national and constitutional allegiance by means of Machievillian trickery. Suddenly it trots out its "Taiwan independence party platform." Suddenly it trots out its "five noes." Suddenly it trots out its "rectification of names." It resorts to Machievellian trickery in nuclear energy policy. Suddenly it halts construction of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. Suddenly it orders an accelerated construction schedule for the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. Suddenly it demands a nuclear-free homeland. It resorts to Machievellian trickery in cross-Strait policy. Suddenly it opposes ECFA. Suddenly it "unconditionally accepts" ECFA. We have a suggestion. Before the DPP takes to the streets on Sunday it should first ask itself this question. One protest march after another has arrived on Ketagalan Boulevard, then scattered. But what does the DPP want? What is its policy? What are its goals? Just where does the DPP want to go?
Today's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), cannot even form an intraparty "China Affairs Committee." Yet it shrilly demands a National Policy Conference. But convening a National Policy Conference is merely another Machievellian tactic in its ongoing political struggle. It is not a policy direction. What is it, but another "Raging Citizens Protest March?" One that ends up on the ash heap, spinning its wheels?
"All we saw was rage. Where were the policy proposals?" The DPP has a body, but it has no soul. The DPP acts, but it has no principles. The DPP moves, but it has no direction. Perhaps Su Tseng-chang hopes the march will injecdt life into the DPP. But he must first rebuild tge DPP's policy framework on a secure moral foundation. There is no such thing as a free lunch.
The "Raging Citizens Protest March" is an example of Machievellian tactics trumping policy direction. Once the march has ended, will the DPP resume spinning its wheels?
空有火大 不見主張
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.10
民進黨的「火大遊行」周日上路，黨內中生代質疑「空有火大，不見主張」；並有人鐵口預言，遊行過後，民進黨仍將陷於目前這種空轉的困境。
民進黨已經久陷於嚴重的空轉內耗。僅舉三例：一、扁案。二、ＥＣＦＡ。三、美牛案。民進黨已完全被扁案挾持，迄今不敢對扁案做出道德譴責，反而整個黨正在協助陳水扁以「保外就醫」對抗司法，扭曲了監獄行刑法，已使黨內的轉型正義陷於無止境的空轉。ＥＣＦＡ則從二○○八年的「喪權辱國／傾中賣台」，一路鬧到二○一二，竟突然改口說「民進黨若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」；這個大轉彎迄今仍在「空轉」之中，因為民進黨的兩岸政策「轉型」尚在「空轉」。美牛案則吵了幾個月，甚至鬧到夜宿議場，結果卻以「遵照國際標準」收攤，白白「火大」了一場。
扁案顯示民進黨已喪失道德立場，反ＥＣＦＡ則反映民進黨的兩岸政策徹底失敗，美牛案則證明民進黨的「火大」有時根本是無的放矢的「假議題」。這些都是民進黨的內耗空轉，並也轉嫁成了國家社會的內耗空轉。也就難怪，面對周日的「火大遊行」，有人質疑：「空有火大，主張何在？」
民進黨已經成為一個「技術主義」或「權謀主義」掛帥的政黨；由於技術及權謀掛帥，因此失去原則，沒有方向，甚至無的放矢。挺扁，重權謀而無原則；反ＥＣＦＡ，重權謀而無方向；美牛案，更是只重抗爭技術，卻根本是無的放矢。由於重技術而無原則，因此遂將意識形態視為「政策」，將政治鬥爭視為「改革」，將撕裂視為「愛台灣」。這樣的政黨，動作很大，卻皆是空轉；遊行很多，卻只是內耗。
民進黨原本可以不是這樣的政黨，卻因權謀主義及技術主義而量變導致質變。其變化過程大致可分三個面向：一、解嚴前後，民進黨的政策原則與運動方向十分清楚，推翻萬年國會，回歸憲政；但自與李登輝聯手修憲而導致毀憲後，不啻將憲法視為政爭的供品，以權謀主義造成憲法敗毀；至於楬櫫《台獨黨綱》，倡議正名制憲，如今皆成假議題，卻使國家社會付出了近二十年空轉的代價。
二、一九九○年代前後，提出「老農津貼」、「老人津貼」、「漁民津貼」等，原是社會福利的正當主張，卻是以「與國民黨比賽利益綁樁」的「技術主義」為著眼，遂致變質。此後，民進黨的社福、環保、核能、年金、健保、證所稅等政策，皆以權謀主義見長；並無關照全局的政策理念，而是以政爭的技術觀點為依違。
三、二○○八年以後，民進黨以反ＥＣＦＡ及反九二共識為其「兩岸政策」的主軸，打著「反喪權辱國，反傾中賣台」的口號；這個出自「技術主義」的爛攤子迄今尚不知如何收拾，民進黨進退維谷、左支右絀的窘態可謂有目共睹。
由上述討論可見，在民進黨的「技術主義」操作下，國憲認同可以權謀化，一下子《台獨黨綱》，一下子「四不一沒有」，一下子正名制憲；核能政策可以權謀化，一下子停建核四，一下子命核四趕工，一下子非核家園；兩岸政策也可權謀化，一下子反ＥＣＦＡ，一下子「概括承受」。我們建議，民進黨人在周日上街以前，先自己問問自己：場場遊行皆可走到凱達格蘭大道就散場，但民進黨的主張究竟是什麼？政策究竟是什麼？方向究竟是什麼？民進黨究竟要往何處去？
今天的民進黨，連黨內的「中國事務委員會」都拼湊不起來，卻只是吼叫要開國是會議。然若召開國是會議仍只是政治鬥爭的「技術主義」，而非「政策取向」，豈不又是一場「火大」燒出了一堆「空轉」的灰燼？
「空有火大，不見主張」，這使民進黨陷於「無魂有體」、「有動作／無原則」、「有運動／無方向」的危境；蘇貞昌或許寄望這場遊行能使民進黨動起來，但若不能重建民進黨的道德立場與政策架構，天下豈有無薪自燃的道理？
這場「火大遊行」仍是「技術主義」超越「政策取向」。遊行過後，民進黨仍將空轉嗎？
Thursday, January 10, 2013
Tuesday, January 8, 2013
Government Reform Must Not Create a No Man's Land
Government Reform Must Not Create a No Man's Land
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 9, 2012
Summary: The government is undergoing its second stage structural reform. It began on New Year's Day. In recent days chaos has prevailed. Rival ministries are fighting over the most desirable agencies. Undesirable agencies have become orphans. Even more seriously, some agencies are seizing the opportunity to expand their scope and increase their staff. As a result, the greater the transformation, the greater the bloat. These phenomenon are undermining the original intention of improving government efficiency.
Full Text below:
The government is undergoing its second stage structural reform. It began on New Year's Day. In recent days chaos has prevailed. Rival ministries are fighting over the most desirable agencies. Undesirable agencies have become orphans. Even more seriously, some agencies are seizing the opportunity to expand their scope and increase their staff. As a result, the greater the transformation, the greater the bloat. These phenomenon are undermining the original intention of improving government efficiency.
The chaos is mind-boggling. For example, the Construction and Planning Agency was supposed to be incorporated into the Ministry of Communications. In the end however, only a handful of personnel were transferred. The Ministry of Communications was supposed to be upgraded. It was supposed to become the figurehead for the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Directorate General of Highways. The Central Weather Bureau was supposed to be subsumed under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. But that decision was reversed long ago. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Environmental Resources and Ministry of Science and Technology did not want it. As a result, it became an orphan. No one wants the Central Weather Bureau. The Forestry Bureau, on the other hand, has a vast forest resources. As a result it has become a bone of contention between the Council of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environmental Resources. So far no one knows where it will end up.
The reason for this chaos is not hard to understand. First of all, the scale of the government's restructuring is much too great. It is attempting to dissolve the boundaries between all the ministries, then re-assemble them. This is not something that can be done overnight. Secondly, the Executive Yuan Organization Law was hurriedly amended three years ago. Many problems have yet to be ironed out. Failure to do so led to today's result: cutting and grafting and total gridlock. The current batch of legislators also have their own ideas. They want to do some cutting and grafting of their own. Thirdly, the various ministries cannot rise above their parochialism. They are unwilling to relinquish their current resources. They are unwilling to take over thorny sectors. They are engrossed in expanding their spheres of influence. These all add to the difficulty of restructuring.
One factor however, is the most puzzling. Government reform is the cornerstone of the government's long-term plans. Yet the Executive Yuan has not treated this as a high priority. It entrusted the responsibility solely to the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission (RDEC), an agency which commands little prestige. Therefore, many ministries will attempt to haggle during the coordination process, and even subvert the administration's agenda. The final round of restructuring will be difficult. Yet the Executive Yuan has not sought consensus through internal negotiations. Instead, it has allowed cadres to lobby individual legislators and attempt to directly amend the law. This has provided the ruling and opposition parties the opportunity to engage in confrontation and back room deals.
Consider the root of the problem. The restructuring of the government is meaningful and necessary, The government should make reasonable changes to its organizational structure in response to changing times. The government should urge government agencies to reevaluate their function and their performance. But it must never forget that restructuring is merely the means, not the end. The end is to create a government that better serves the people, and more effectively uses government and social resources. Will restructuring result merely in the hanging of new signs everywhere? Will policy implementation remain hobbled by outdated thinking? Will the governments' problem-solving ability remain as weak as before? If so, then the restructuring can hardly be termed a success.
Furthermore, restructuring is not simply the dismantling of various agencies and reassembling them elsewhere. It is evolution that enables the new organization to function more effectively. Otherwise, the government is merely rearranging the blocks in a game of Lego. In other words, reinventing government requires internal software integration, not external hardware reorganization. The former is the key. Alas, a number of problems have appeared. Executive branch agencies apparently cannot even solve the hardware problems. Solving the software problems is going to be a case of "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak."
The Central Weather Bureau has been reduced to an orphan. The Forestry Bureau has become a bone of contention. These are passing phenomenon that will eventually be resolved. But unmanned service windows reveal the failure of upper echelon government official thinking. Restructuring has exposed their lack of direction. The greatest irony is in the existing government structure. The Forestry Bureau sits on valuable resources. Yet it was a neglected agency. Now, during restructuring, it has become a bone of contention between rival ministries. This is truly a paradox. Just what role do the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Environmental Resources want the Forestry Bureau to fulfill?
What is the most worrisome aspect of the governmental restructuring? Some organizational functions were omitted during agency consolidation. They were relegated to a no man's land. But no one noticed. This is the most common pitfall during reform. The scale of the current restructuring is especially great. It was allowed too little time and given too little promotion. The public is accustomed to the current government structure. They no longer know where to seek solutions to many problems, old and new. Moreover, restructured agency personnel must be transferred hither, thither, and yon. New personnel must settle in and adapt to their new environment. If they are not properly settled, they will inevitably feel resentment. The public may not realize how much harm reinventing the government has already done.
Reinventing government requires time to iron out the kinks. But the process must be accelerated. Otherwise it will lead to social discontent. Premier Chen must pay more attention. He must resolve inter-ministerial differences. He must not allow rival ministries to treat restructuring as an opportunity for haggling. He must not allow the current administration to become the object of opposition party and public ridicule.
政府改造不可改出三不管地帶
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.09
政府第二階段組織改造，已於元旦上路，連日來亂象頻傳；各部會爭相搶奪熱門單位，冷門機構則因部會推拒而淪為孤兒。更嚴重的，是有些部會趁機大伺擴張架構，膨脹員額；如此一來，越改造越臃腫，勢將失去提升政府效能的初衷。
檢視最近發生的亂象，令人感到匪夷所思。諸如：原預訂納入交通部的營建署，最後只移撥了一小撮人，使得交通部提升為「交通及建設部」淪為有名無實。而原隸交通部的氣象局則因早早被劃出，卻又不為「環境資源部」及「科技部」接納，成了部會棄兒。相對於氣象局的無人關愛，林務局則因擁有龐大的台灣山林資源，成為農委會及環境資源部爭奪的對象，至今尚不知歸屬何方。
之所以出現這些亂象，原因不難想見。第一，政府組織改造的規模太大，要打破所有的部會疆界，再重新組裝，絕非一朝一夕之事。第二，行政院組織法的修法工作三年前在倉促間完成，許多問題未及細思，留下了今天左支右絀的扞格難題；而本屆立委又有不同看法，希望再修枝鋸幹。第三，各部會不脫本位主義思維，或不願割捨既有資源，或不願接手棘手部門，或汲汲於擴大勢力範圍，更增加整併與再造的困難。
除了上述因素，最讓人不解的是，政府組織改造是國家長期布局的奠基工程，但行政院卻將此重擔交由層級不高、威望不重的研考會一肩承擔。因此，許多部會在協調中擺出討價還價的姿態，乃至要推翻前議。而對於最後整併上的疑難，行政院竟不透過院內討論尋求共識，卻放任若干部會逕自向個別立法委員遊說，企圖直接訴諸修法，這又為朝野對峙及密室協商提供了翻雲覆雨的機會。
正本清源，政府的組織改造當然是有意義、也有必要的工作，不僅可使整個政府架構因應時代及社會的變化而作出合理的調整，也可敦促政府部門重新檢視自己的功能和績效。但絕不能忘記的是，改造只是「手段」，而不是「目的」；其最後目的，是要實現政府對人民的更佳服務，以及對國家、社會資源的更有效整合運用。若組織改造的結果，只是許多部門掛起新招牌，但在行政作業上使用的卻仍是老套思維，解決問題的能力也依然疲弱如故；那麼，這次改造絕對難稱為成功。
進一步說，組織改造並不是把各單位拆解、再進行組裝這麼簡單的事，而是要讓新的組織在功能上產生「進化」，效能變得更強；否則，這就只是一場政府級的「樂高」遊戲而已。換言之，政府再造所追求的，不是外表的「硬體重組」，而是內部的「軟件整合」，後者才是核心重點。但從目前浮現的問題看，行政部門顯然連硬體的組合都無法解決，對軟體的進化恐怕更是心餘力絀。
從這個角度看，氣象局淪為部會孤兒，以及林務局變成爭奪對象，其實都尚只是暫時現象，最終會獲得解決。但此一空窗現象，實實在在地反映出政府改造「上層思維」的貧乏，才會在整併時面臨找不到方向的困境。最諷刺的是，在現有的政府架構中，坐擁珍貴資源的林務局原是一個受冷落的部門，如今它卻在改造時變成部會間爭奪的搶手貨，真是咄咄怪事。試問，農業部或環境資源部都想好要林務局扮演什麼角色了嗎？
不可諱言，政府改造最令人擔憂的是，既有的組織功能在部門整併中遭到遺漏或疏忽，而被推到三不管地帶，乏人聞問。這也是改革中最常見的陷阱。一則因為這次組織變動極大，二則是時間短促而宣導不足，而一般民眾早已習慣原有的政府架構，許多新舊問題不知要由什麼部門提供解決。更何況，各單位人員隨組織異動而遷徙，必然產生新的人事安頓及環境變動的適應問題，若缺乏妥適的安頓，必生怨懟；在這種情形下，民眾恐怕未享政府再造之利即先蒙其大害。
政府再造需要時間來磨合各部門的接縫，但這個過程必須加快，才不會導致社會怨聲載道。陳揆也必須對此付出更多關注，解決部會間的歧見，不能任由各方把整併工程當成買賣在那裡討價還價，讓在野黨和民眾看笑話。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 9, 2012
Summary: The government is undergoing its second stage structural reform. It began on New Year's Day. In recent days chaos has prevailed. Rival ministries are fighting over the most desirable agencies. Undesirable agencies have become orphans. Even more seriously, some agencies are seizing the opportunity to expand their scope and increase their staff. As a result, the greater the transformation, the greater the bloat. These phenomenon are undermining the original intention of improving government efficiency.
Full Text below:
The government is undergoing its second stage structural reform. It began on New Year's Day. In recent days chaos has prevailed. Rival ministries are fighting over the most desirable agencies. Undesirable agencies have become orphans. Even more seriously, some agencies are seizing the opportunity to expand their scope and increase their staff. As a result, the greater the transformation, the greater the bloat. These phenomenon are undermining the original intention of improving government efficiency.
The chaos is mind-boggling. For example, the Construction and Planning Agency was supposed to be incorporated into the Ministry of Communications. In the end however, only a handful of personnel were transferred. The Ministry of Communications was supposed to be upgraded. It was supposed to become the figurehead for the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Directorate General of Highways. The Central Weather Bureau was supposed to be subsumed under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. But that decision was reversed long ago. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Environmental Resources and Ministry of Science and Technology did not want it. As a result, it became an orphan. No one wants the Central Weather Bureau. The Forestry Bureau, on the other hand, has a vast forest resources. As a result it has become a bone of contention between the Council of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environmental Resources. So far no one knows where it will end up.
The reason for this chaos is not hard to understand. First of all, the scale of the government's restructuring is much too great. It is attempting to dissolve the boundaries between all the ministries, then re-assemble them. This is not something that can be done overnight. Secondly, the Executive Yuan Organization Law was hurriedly amended three years ago. Many problems have yet to be ironed out. Failure to do so led to today's result: cutting and grafting and total gridlock. The current batch of legislators also have their own ideas. They want to do some cutting and grafting of their own. Thirdly, the various ministries cannot rise above their parochialism. They are unwilling to relinquish their current resources. They are unwilling to take over thorny sectors. They are engrossed in expanding their spheres of influence. These all add to the difficulty of restructuring.
One factor however, is the most puzzling. Government reform is the cornerstone of the government's long-term plans. Yet the Executive Yuan has not treated this as a high priority. It entrusted the responsibility solely to the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission (RDEC), an agency which commands little prestige. Therefore, many ministries will attempt to haggle during the coordination process, and even subvert the administration's agenda. The final round of restructuring will be difficult. Yet the Executive Yuan has not sought consensus through internal negotiations. Instead, it has allowed cadres to lobby individual legislators and attempt to directly amend the law. This has provided the ruling and opposition parties the opportunity to engage in confrontation and back room deals.
Consider the root of the problem. The restructuring of the government is meaningful and necessary, The government should make reasonable changes to its organizational structure in response to changing times. The government should urge government agencies to reevaluate their function and their performance. But it must never forget that restructuring is merely the means, not the end. The end is to create a government that better serves the people, and more effectively uses government and social resources. Will restructuring result merely in the hanging of new signs everywhere? Will policy implementation remain hobbled by outdated thinking? Will the governments' problem-solving ability remain as weak as before? If so, then the restructuring can hardly be termed a success.
Furthermore, restructuring is not simply the dismantling of various agencies and reassembling them elsewhere. It is evolution that enables the new organization to function more effectively. Otherwise, the government is merely rearranging the blocks in a game of Lego. In other words, reinventing government requires internal software integration, not external hardware reorganization. The former is the key. Alas, a number of problems have appeared. Executive branch agencies apparently cannot even solve the hardware problems. Solving the software problems is going to be a case of "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak."
The Central Weather Bureau has been reduced to an orphan. The Forestry Bureau has become a bone of contention. These are passing phenomenon that will eventually be resolved. But unmanned service windows reveal the failure of upper echelon government official thinking. Restructuring has exposed their lack of direction. The greatest irony is in the existing government structure. The Forestry Bureau sits on valuable resources. Yet it was a neglected agency. Now, during restructuring, it has become a bone of contention between rival ministries. This is truly a paradox. Just what role do the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Environmental Resources want the Forestry Bureau to fulfill?
What is the most worrisome aspect of the governmental restructuring? Some organizational functions were omitted during agency consolidation. They were relegated to a no man's land. But no one noticed. This is the most common pitfall during reform. The scale of the current restructuring is especially great. It was allowed too little time and given too little promotion. The public is accustomed to the current government structure. They no longer know where to seek solutions to many problems, old and new. Moreover, restructured agency personnel must be transferred hither, thither, and yon. New personnel must settle in and adapt to their new environment. If they are not properly settled, they will inevitably feel resentment. The public may not realize how much harm reinventing the government has already done.
Reinventing government requires time to iron out the kinks. But the process must be accelerated. Otherwise it will lead to social discontent. Premier Chen must pay more attention. He must resolve inter-ministerial differences. He must not allow rival ministries to treat restructuring as an opportunity for haggling. He must not allow the current administration to become the object of opposition party and public ridicule.
政府改造不可改出三不管地帶
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.09
政府第二階段組織改造，已於元旦上路，連日來亂象頻傳；各部會爭相搶奪熱門單位，冷門機構則因部會推拒而淪為孤兒。更嚴重的，是有些部會趁機大伺擴張架構，膨脹員額；如此一來，越改造越臃腫，勢將失去提升政府效能的初衷。
檢視最近發生的亂象，令人感到匪夷所思。諸如：原預訂納入交通部的營建署，最後只移撥了一小撮人，使得交通部提升為「交通及建設部」淪為有名無實。而原隸交通部的氣象局則因早早被劃出，卻又不為「環境資源部」及「科技部」接納，成了部會棄兒。相對於氣象局的無人關愛，林務局則因擁有龐大的台灣山林資源，成為農委會及環境資源部爭奪的對象，至今尚不知歸屬何方。
之所以出現這些亂象，原因不難想見。第一，政府組織改造的規模太大，要打破所有的部會疆界，再重新組裝，絕非一朝一夕之事。第二，行政院組織法的修法工作三年前在倉促間完成，許多問題未及細思，留下了今天左支右絀的扞格難題；而本屆立委又有不同看法，希望再修枝鋸幹。第三，各部會不脫本位主義思維，或不願割捨既有資源，或不願接手棘手部門，或汲汲於擴大勢力範圍，更增加整併與再造的困難。
除了上述因素，最讓人不解的是，政府組織改造是國家長期布局的奠基工程，但行政院卻將此重擔交由層級不高、威望不重的研考會一肩承擔。因此，許多部會在協調中擺出討價還價的姿態，乃至要推翻前議。而對於最後整併上的疑難，行政院竟不透過院內討論尋求共識，卻放任若干部會逕自向個別立法委員遊說，企圖直接訴諸修法，這又為朝野對峙及密室協商提供了翻雲覆雨的機會。
正本清源，政府的組織改造當然是有意義、也有必要的工作，不僅可使整個政府架構因應時代及社會的變化而作出合理的調整，也可敦促政府部門重新檢視自己的功能和績效。但絕不能忘記的是，改造只是「手段」，而不是「目的」；其最後目的，是要實現政府對人民的更佳服務，以及對國家、社會資源的更有效整合運用。若組織改造的結果，只是許多部門掛起新招牌，但在行政作業上使用的卻仍是老套思維，解決問題的能力也依然疲弱如故；那麼，這次改造絕對難稱為成功。
進一步說，組織改造並不是把各單位拆解、再進行組裝這麼簡單的事，而是要讓新的組織在功能上產生「進化」，效能變得更強；否則，這就只是一場政府級的「樂高」遊戲而已。換言之，政府再造所追求的，不是外表的「硬體重組」，而是內部的「軟件整合」，後者才是核心重點。但從目前浮現的問題看，行政部門顯然連硬體的組合都無法解決，對軟體的進化恐怕更是心餘力絀。
從這個角度看，氣象局淪為部會孤兒，以及林務局變成爭奪對象，其實都尚只是暫時現象，最終會獲得解決。但此一空窗現象，實實在在地反映出政府改造「上層思維」的貧乏，才會在整併時面臨找不到方向的困境。最諷刺的是，在現有的政府架構中，坐擁珍貴資源的林務局原是一個受冷落的部門，如今它卻在改造時變成部會間爭奪的搶手貨，真是咄咄怪事。試問，農業部或環境資源部都想好要林務局扮演什麼角色了嗎？
不可諱言，政府改造最令人擔憂的是，既有的組織功能在部門整併中遭到遺漏或疏忽，而被推到三不管地帶，乏人聞問。這也是改革中最常見的陷阱。一則因為這次組織變動極大，二則是時間短促而宣導不足，而一般民眾早已習慣原有的政府架構，許多新舊問題不知要由什麼部門提供解決。更何況，各單位人員隨組織異動而遷徙，必然產生新的人事安頓及環境變動的適應問題，若缺乏妥適的安頓，必生怨懟；在這種情形下，民眾恐怕未享政府再造之利即先蒙其大害。
政府再造需要時間來磨合各部門的接縫，但這個過程必須加快，才不會導致社會怨聲載道。陳揆也必須對此付出更多關注，解決部會間的歧見，不能任由各方把整併工程當成買賣在那裡討價還價，讓在野黨和民眾看笑話。
Neither Prosecute the Innocent, Nor Abet the Guilty
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 8, 2012
Summary: A dozen or so professors are suspected of falsely reporting expenses. Prosecutors have indicted them on charges of corruption. National Science Council President Chu Ching-yi, Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey, and Education Minister Jiang Wei-ning have issued a joint declaration, expressing concern and making an appeal. The two sides appear to be diametrically opposed and at a standoff.
Full Text below:
A dozen or so professors are suspected of falsely reporting expenses. Prosecutors have indicted them on charges of corruption. National Science Council President Chu Ching-yi, Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey, and Education Minister Jiang Wei-ning have issued a joint declaration, expressing concern and making an appeal. The two sides appear to be diametrically opposed and at a standoff.
But we see no fundamental difference between the two sides. Zhu, Weng, and Chiang have long advocated cracking down on corruption while avoiding malicious prosecution. The Ministry of Justice says that it is making distinctions between minor and major offenses. It says it is letting smaller fish go while going after corruption. The public has a very different perception. As they see it, the three elders from academia are merely covering up their own mistakes. As they see it, the prosecutors are merely persecuting the innocent. These impressions however, do not necessarily reflect the truth or the whole picture.
The three elders from academia began by comparing two categories of false reporting, which they termed Category A and Category B. Under Category A, "A professor use false invoices and pockets the money, or else uses the money to purchase personal items having nothing to do with research. Examples include designer bags and refrigerators for their homes. Such cases must be turned over to the authorities, who should exercise no leniency."
Under Category B, "A professor uses false invoices to purchase other kinds of research equipment. One example would be using an invoice for three toner cartridges to purchase a computer screen. Not one dime went into private pockets. The Corruption Offences Ordinance is not aimed at cases such as this."
The three elders from academia said "Different categories of false invoices call for different attitudes."
Actually the prosecution took this into account when leveling their indictments. They apparently subscribe to the same policy. If public funds have not entered private pockets, depending on the seriousness of the offense, they may choose not to prosecute. They may charge them with forgery, a Category B offense. Other categories, such as purchasing one thing while reporting another, will also be dealt with leniently. But if the accused colluded with the vendor to pad the invoice and pocketed the difference, that will be treated harshly. That would be a Category C offense. Abusing the power of one's office to embezzle and pocket public funds is an even worse form of corruption. That would be a Category A offense. The vast majority of offenses are Category D offenses. These the prosecution chose to overlook from the very outset. It either chose not to prosecute, or dropped the cases midstream. The prosecution does have a "different cases, different attitudes" policy.
The dispute between the three elders from academia and the Ministry of Justice is merely over the wording of "Neither prosecute the innocent, nor abet the guilty." Each side has its own job description. Each side has its own perspective. The three elders from academia may stress "not prosecuting the innocent." The Ministry of Justice may stress "not abetting the guilty." Each side has its own take on the matter. This is hardly surprising.
But the controversy involves an unshakeable core principle. Under existing laws, a public university professor is a civil servant. If he pockets public funds, he can be prosecuted for corruption. That is why the three elders from academia agree that offending public university professors would fall under Category A offenders. They "should unquestionably be handed over to the authorities for prosecution according to the letter of the law. They must not be treated leniently." This is what the Ministry of Justice refers to as "no room for ambiguity." Both parties agree about the core principle. Therefore the controversy over right and wrong is already half-solved.
What concerns the public is that the prosecution may have difficulty successfully prosecuting Category B and Category D offenses as embezzlement because they involve a grey area. The three elders from academia may have difficulty interceding on behalf of those accused of Category A and Category C offenses. .
Many individuals have been indicted for these offenses. But each case is an individual case. These are not indictments of educators, academicians, and professors, per se.
Prosecuting illegal activities has nothing to with the educators as such. Nor is it right to associate Category A suspects with "distinguished researchers." After all, even a distinguished president was involved in corruption. He was prosecuted according to the law. How can professors be exempt?
There already appears to be a consensus. At first academicians said the offenses were Category B and Category D offenses. But later on they said they were Category A offenses involving embezzlement. Some even said they were Category C offenses involving collusion. One reason for this guilt by association, is that suspects often get away scot free due to dumb luck. Another reason is a systemic lack of accountability. The prosecution is merely restoring long term accountability to the system. This could be seen as a belated attempt to restore accountability to academia as a whole.
The three elders from academia have addressed Category B and Category D offenses. They do not want the public thinking they are condoning Category A and Category C offenses. By contrast, if the prosecution cites Category B and Category D offenses when prosecuting corruption, it will generate chaos. It will undermine its credibility. Therefore the three elders from academia, the prosecution, and the public, must reach a clear consensus, namely, "different cases, different attitudes."
We believe the differences between the four types of offenses must be made clear. This will not "undermine morale in academia." It will clear the air. It will exonerate academicians. It will enhance their dignity and honor.
毋枉毋縱：三長與法部的共識
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.08 02:52 am
十多名教授涉嫌不實報銷案，被檢方以貪汙等罪名起訴；國科會主委朱敬一、中研院院長翁啟惠及教育部長蔣偉寧為此聯名聲明，表達憂慮與呼籲。雙方看似針鋒相對，壁壘分明。
然而，迄至目前，我們卻看不出雙方有何根本差異。朱翁蔣三長亦主張法辦貪汙，但不可造成冤錯；法務部則稱已經區別輕重，網開一面，但貪汙仍應法辦。然而，如今形成的社會印象卻是：三長只知護短，檢方則濫訴無辜，這些恐皆未必是如今事態的真相與全貌。
三長的公開聲明，開宗明義即舉出「兩種類型」的比較，茲稱之為甲類型與乙類型。甲類型：「如果教授以假發票報領經費拿進口袋，或是用此經費購買與研究無關的私人物品（如名牌包、家用電冰箱等），我們認為絕對要依法究辦，不應寬貸。」
乙類型：「但是，假如以假發票報帳購買另一項研究器材（例如用三個碳粉匣的發票實購一個電腦螢幕），也沒有一毛錢進私人口袋，那麼畢竟不是貪汙治罪條例所該適用的對象。」
準此，三長表示：「假發票案的類型不同，我們對不同案件的態度也不同。」
其實，檢方在過濾相關案件時，似乎亦持同一立場：倘公款未入私囊，視情節輕重，或不起訴，或訴以偽造文書（乙類型）；另對類如買Ａ報Ｂ的情節，亦從輕處理；但若與廠商勾串以低價高報，而將「預放款」（回扣）留為私用者，即不寬貸（此可謂為丙類型）；至於利用職務詐取公款納入私囊就是貪汙，沒有模糊空間（甲類型）；另外，還有居絕對多數的「丁類型」，早經檢方過濾掉了，以不起訴或請回結案。倘若此即檢方的辦案準則，豈不也是「案件類型不同，我們對不同案件的態度也不同」？
因此，就我們看來，三長及法部之間若有爭執，亦僅在「毋枉毋縱」四字而已。只是，各自站在職司不同的立場，三長可能較重「毋枉」，但法部可能較重「毋縱」。此皆人情事理之自然，不足為怪。
這場爭論，有一個不可移變的中心準則，即是在現行法律下，倘將公立大學教授視為公務職位，則其人若將公款納入私囊，即可能被以貪汙罪訴究；因此，三長也認為在公立大學教授的法律責任中，亦有「甲類型」存在，「絕對要依法究辦，不應寬貸」。此或即是法務部所稱的「沒有模糊空間」。只要雙方皆站在這個中心準則上，這場辯論的核心是非已可解決大半。
國人關切的是：檢方不宜將灰色地帶的「乙類型」、「丁類型」，辦成貪汙罪；三長亦不宜為「甲類型」、「丙類型」說項。
接下來可以一談的是，此事雖牽涉人數不少，但畢竟仍屬個案，不宜將之與「教育界／學術界／教授界」的全稱命題相提並論；畢竟，糾辦不法，不能視為與全體「教育界」為難。再者，亦不宜將涉案者的案情（如果是甲類型），與其是否為「研究傑出卓越者」混為一談；畢竟，即使是「傑出卓越的總統」，若涉貪汙，亦當法辦，教授又豈能免責？
然而，若說事態發展迄今，已有「制度共業」的意味，亦非全無道理。一開始，校園漸漸出現了便宜行事的「乙類型」、「丁類型」，然後就慢慢演變出監守自盜的「甲類型」，甚至惡化成教商勾結的「丙類型」。此種「制度共業」的形成，一方面是因涉案者的僥倖心理，另一方面亦因問責規範的失能；因而，這次檢方的動作，其實只是還原了原本早已應當運行的問責體制，可視為挽救「校園共業」的一個遲到的契機。
如今，三長要為「乙類型」、「丁類型」發言，亦不願社會誤解其是在為「甲類型」或「丙類型」撐腰。相對而言，倘若檢方真將「乙類型」、「丁類型」辦了貪汙案，即是亂了分寸，自失立場。所以，三長及檢方，與全體國人，已可在本案找到一個明確的共識，那就是：「案件的類型不同，我們對案件的態度也不同。」
我們相信，若能把四種類型區別清楚，非但不會「重挫學術界士氣」，反更將激濁揚清，清新校園，提升學術界的尊嚴與榮譽。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 8, 2012
Summary: A dozen or so professors are suspected of falsely reporting expenses. Prosecutors have indicted them on charges of corruption. National Science Council President Chu Ching-yi, Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey, and Education Minister Jiang Wei-ning have issued a joint declaration, expressing concern and making an appeal. The two sides appear to be diametrically opposed and at a standoff.
Full Text below:
A dozen or so professors are suspected of falsely reporting expenses. Prosecutors have indicted them on charges of corruption. National Science Council President Chu Ching-yi, Academia Sinica President Wong Chi-huey, and Education Minister Jiang Wei-ning have issued a joint declaration, expressing concern and making an appeal. The two sides appear to be diametrically opposed and at a standoff.
But we see no fundamental difference between the two sides. Zhu, Weng, and Chiang have long advocated cracking down on corruption while avoiding malicious prosecution. The Ministry of Justice says that it is making distinctions between minor and major offenses. It says it is letting smaller fish go while going after corruption. The public has a very different perception. As they see it, the three elders from academia are merely covering up their own mistakes. As they see it, the prosecutors are merely persecuting the innocent. These impressions however, do not necessarily reflect the truth or the whole picture.
The three elders from academia began by comparing two categories of false reporting, which they termed Category A and Category B. Under Category A, "A professor use false invoices and pockets the money, or else uses the money to purchase personal items having nothing to do with research. Examples include designer bags and refrigerators for their homes. Such cases must be turned over to the authorities, who should exercise no leniency."
Under Category B, "A professor uses false invoices to purchase other kinds of research equipment. One example would be using an invoice for three toner cartridges to purchase a computer screen. Not one dime went into private pockets. The Corruption Offences Ordinance is not aimed at cases such as this."
The three elders from academia said "Different categories of false invoices call for different attitudes."
Actually the prosecution took this into account when leveling their indictments. They apparently subscribe to the same policy. If public funds have not entered private pockets, depending on the seriousness of the offense, they may choose not to prosecute. They may charge them with forgery, a Category B offense. Other categories, such as purchasing one thing while reporting another, will also be dealt with leniently. But if the accused colluded with the vendor to pad the invoice and pocketed the difference, that will be treated harshly. That would be a Category C offense. Abusing the power of one's office to embezzle and pocket public funds is an even worse form of corruption. That would be a Category A offense. The vast majority of offenses are Category D offenses. These the prosecution chose to overlook from the very outset. It either chose not to prosecute, or dropped the cases midstream. The prosecution does have a "different cases, different attitudes" policy.
The dispute between the three elders from academia and the Ministry of Justice is merely over the wording of "Neither prosecute the innocent, nor abet the guilty." Each side has its own job description. Each side has its own perspective. The three elders from academia may stress "not prosecuting the innocent." The Ministry of Justice may stress "not abetting the guilty." Each side has its own take on the matter. This is hardly surprising.
But the controversy involves an unshakeable core principle. Under existing laws, a public university professor is a civil servant. If he pockets public funds, he can be prosecuted for corruption. That is why the three elders from academia agree that offending public university professors would fall under Category A offenders. They "should unquestionably be handed over to the authorities for prosecution according to the letter of the law. They must not be treated leniently." This is what the Ministry of Justice refers to as "no room for ambiguity." Both parties agree about the core principle. Therefore the controversy over right and wrong is already half-solved.
What concerns the public is that the prosecution may have difficulty successfully prosecuting Category B and Category D offenses as embezzlement because they involve a grey area. The three elders from academia may have difficulty interceding on behalf of those accused of Category A and Category C offenses. .
Many individuals have been indicted for these offenses. But each case is an individual case. These are not indictments of educators, academicians, and professors, per se.
Prosecuting illegal activities has nothing to with the educators as such. Nor is it right to associate Category A suspects with "distinguished researchers." After all, even a distinguished president was involved in corruption. He was prosecuted according to the law. How can professors be exempt?
There already appears to be a consensus. At first academicians said the offenses were Category B and Category D offenses. But later on they said they were Category A offenses involving embezzlement. Some even said they were Category C offenses involving collusion. One reason for this guilt by association, is that suspects often get away scot free due to dumb luck. Another reason is a systemic lack of accountability. The prosecution is merely restoring long term accountability to the system. This could be seen as a belated attempt to restore accountability to academia as a whole.
The three elders from academia have addressed Category B and Category D offenses. They do not want the public thinking they are condoning Category A and Category C offenses. By contrast, if the prosecution cites Category B and Category D offenses when prosecuting corruption, it will generate chaos. It will undermine its credibility. Therefore the three elders from academia, the prosecution, and the public, must reach a clear consensus, namely, "different cases, different attitudes."
We believe the differences between the four types of offenses must be made clear. This will not "undermine morale in academia." It will clear the air. It will exonerate academicians. It will enhance their dignity and honor.
毋枉毋縱：三長與法部的共識
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.08 02:52 am
十多名教授涉嫌不實報銷案，被檢方以貪汙等罪名起訴；國科會主委朱敬一、中研院院長翁啟惠及教育部長蔣偉寧為此聯名聲明，表達憂慮與呼籲。雙方看似針鋒相對，壁壘分明。
然而，迄至目前，我們卻看不出雙方有何根本差異。朱翁蔣三長亦主張法辦貪汙，但不可造成冤錯；法務部則稱已經區別輕重，網開一面，但貪汙仍應法辦。然而，如今形成的社會印象卻是：三長只知護短，檢方則濫訴無辜，這些恐皆未必是如今事態的真相與全貌。
三長的公開聲明，開宗明義即舉出「兩種類型」的比較，茲稱之為甲類型與乙類型。甲類型：「如果教授以假發票報領經費拿進口袋，或是用此經費購買與研究無關的私人物品（如名牌包、家用電冰箱等），我們認為絕對要依法究辦，不應寬貸。」
乙類型：「但是，假如以假發票報帳購買另一項研究器材（例如用三個碳粉匣的發票實購一個電腦螢幕），也沒有一毛錢進私人口袋，那麼畢竟不是貪汙治罪條例所該適用的對象。」
準此，三長表示：「假發票案的類型不同，我們對不同案件的態度也不同。」
其實，檢方在過濾相關案件時，似乎亦持同一立場：倘公款未入私囊，視情節輕重，或不起訴，或訴以偽造文書（乙類型）；另對類如買Ａ報Ｂ的情節，亦從輕處理；但若與廠商勾串以低價高報，而將「預放款」（回扣）留為私用者，即不寬貸（此可謂為丙類型）；至於利用職務詐取公款納入私囊就是貪汙，沒有模糊空間（甲類型）；另外，還有居絕對多數的「丁類型」，早經檢方過濾掉了，以不起訴或請回結案。倘若此即檢方的辦案準則，豈不也是「案件類型不同，我們對不同案件的態度也不同」？
因此，就我們看來，三長及法部之間若有爭執，亦僅在「毋枉毋縱」四字而已。只是，各自站在職司不同的立場，三長可能較重「毋枉」，但法部可能較重「毋縱」。此皆人情事理之自然，不足為怪。
這場爭論，有一個不可移變的中心準則，即是在現行法律下，倘將公立大學教授視為公務職位，則其人若將公款納入私囊，即可能被以貪汙罪訴究；因此，三長也認為在公立大學教授的法律責任中，亦有「甲類型」存在，「絕對要依法究辦，不應寬貸」。此或即是法務部所稱的「沒有模糊空間」。只要雙方皆站在這個中心準則上，這場辯論的核心是非已可解決大半。
國人關切的是：檢方不宜將灰色地帶的「乙類型」、「丁類型」，辦成貪汙罪；三長亦不宜為「甲類型」、「丙類型」說項。
接下來可以一談的是，此事雖牽涉人數不少，但畢竟仍屬個案，不宜將之與「教育界／學術界／教授界」的全稱命題相提並論；畢竟，糾辦不法，不能視為與全體「教育界」為難。再者，亦不宜將涉案者的案情（如果是甲類型），與其是否為「研究傑出卓越者」混為一談；畢竟，即使是「傑出卓越的總統」，若涉貪汙，亦當法辦，教授又豈能免責？
然而，若說事態發展迄今，已有「制度共業」的意味，亦非全無道理。一開始，校園漸漸出現了便宜行事的「乙類型」、「丁類型」，然後就慢慢演變出監守自盜的「甲類型」，甚至惡化成教商勾結的「丙類型」。此種「制度共業」的形成，一方面是因涉案者的僥倖心理，另一方面亦因問責規範的失能；因而，這次檢方的動作，其實只是還原了原本早已應當運行的問責體制，可視為挽救「校園共業」的一個遲到的契機。
如今，三長要為「乙類型」、「丁類型」發言，亦不願社會誤解其是在為「甲類型」或「丙類型」撐腰。相對而言，倘若檢方真將「乙類型」、「丁類型」辦了貪汙案，即是亂了分寸，自失立場。所以，三長及檢方，與全體國人，已可在本案找到一個明確的共識，那就是：「案件的類型不同，我們對案件的態度也不同。」
我們相信，若能把四種類型區別清楚，非但不會「重挫學術界士氣」，反更將激濁揚清，清新校園，提升學術界的尊嚴與榮譽。
Monday, January 7, 2013
Fiscal Cliff Sequel: Taiwan Must Not Cross the Line
Fiscal Cliff Sequel: Taiwan Must Not Cross the Line
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 5, 2012
Summary: The White House and Congress reached a last minute agreement. They prevented the fiscal cliff from becoming a reality. Stock markets around the world rose in response. But the celebration will not last long. The sequel to the fiscal cliff will soon debut. Add this year's global economic risks, and turbulence in the financial markets will be difficult to avoid.
Full Text below:
The White House and Congress reached a last minute agreement. They prevented the fiscal cliff from becoming a reality. Stock markets around the world rose in response. But the celebration will not last long. The sequel to the fiscal cliff will soon debut. Add this year's global economic risks, and turbulence in the financial markets will be difficult to avoid.
During in the second half of last year, analysts constantly reminded the US government about the risks of the fiscal cliff. The so-called fiscal cliff refers to the 2013 expiration of the Bush administration's preferential tax rates. This will automatically restore higher tax rates. Also, in order to balance the budget, the government will begin "automatic deficit reduction." The government will raise taxes. The public will reduce consumption. Government deficit reductions and spending cuts will work in combination. According to Federal Reserve (FED) Chairman Ben Bernanke, together these will withdraw a great deal of income from the economy. It will affect spending and short-term economic recovery. According to Congressional Budget Office estimates, once the economy falls off the fiscal cliff, the United States will enter a recession. This year it will experience a negative growth rate of 0.5%, and an unemployment rate of 9%.
No one is willing to leap off this cliff. Republicans may have been unwilling. But they were forced to compromise. U.S. President Barack Obama smirked with satisfaction during a press conference. But this situation will not last. The two parties will immediately begin another round of struggles. The agreement addresses only the tax increase portion and the deficit reduction portion. The U.S. Treasury Department used cash scheduling and other methods to postpone the U.S. debt ceiling by two months. But they will eventually have to confront the problem. The White House wants to increase the debt limit. Republicans want to cut welfare spending. The two parties are locked in combat. Financial market turmoil is difficult to avoid. The view from the market is that the agreement is merely an expedient. It is not a fundamental solution. Further negotiations will lead to market volatility.
The paradox is that if the two parties cannot reach an agreement, in two months the United States will go over the fiscal cliff. The global market economy will plumb new lows. Under normal circumstances, the two parties would wrestle for a while, then each take a step back. The White House would reduce some of its expenditures. Congress would raise the debt ceiling. Unfortunately reaching an agreement is not necessarily a good thing. It means America's fiscal problems will become increasingly severe, and step by step advance toward the red zone.
No wonder the three major credit rating companies said that going over the fiscal cliff might be better than reaching an agreement. The credit rating companies feel that the United States government must come up with a way to reduce debt as a percentage of GDP (gross domestic product). At the same time, it must achieve revenue growth and make spending cuts. Otherwise, the U.S. national debt rating could be downgraded. Given the reality of the political and economic situation in the United States, the possibility of achieving this goal is low. Especially given that the process of American political compromise could undermine outsider confidence in the United States' ability to solve its fiscal and economic problems. Lest we forget, Standard & Poor's cut the U.S. sovereign credit rating the previous year. One of the reasons was American political battles. Congress can not afford to compromise.
Any country, especially an elective democracy, will find itself bogged down once their fiscal affairs enter the red zone. It will find itself sinking deeper and deeper, unable to extricate itself. This is true of the United States, Japan, and the PIIGS. Ultimately, the nation's fiscal affairs will lead to collapse. The social and economic adjustments will be great and painful. When nations find themselves in these circumstances, the government lacks the financial resources and ability to cope.
During the Clinton administration, the United States enjoyed a budget surplus. But once Bush took office he made massive tax cuts. He made significant increases in expenditures in the War on Terror. As a result the US once again experienced financial difficulties. After the financial tsunami of a century, the U.S. government no longer has the ability to expand its fiscal policy. All it can do is promote the massive printing of money, i.e., Quantitative Easing. By contrast, Germany and the Nordic countries, normally practice fiscal discipline. During a crisis the country is able to ride out the storm. The government has the ability to adapt to changes. Therefore, normally adhering to fiscal discipline is key.
ROC debt at all levels of government is only about 4% of GDP. It is much lower than in other countries. But add hidden liabilities, and the figure soars to over 100%. The economy is in recession. The government should increase spending. Instead, government public works spending has been reduced. Endless arguments over whether the pension system is bankrupt have triggered social unrest. Government finances have already entered the red zone. The United States is the world's number one power. It has the advantage of being able to print dollars, the global reserve currency, If its fiscal policy is poor, it can expand its money supply. Other countries do not have this privilege. Therefore they face the same dilemma as the PIIGS. The ROC must learn from the United States and Europe. It must put its fiscal house in order. It must increase fiscal discipline, cut costs, and prevent its fiscal affairs from becoming bogged down. Otherwise it will reach a point of no return. If it attempts to make changes too far down the road, society will pay a painful price.
財政懸崖還有續集 台灣借鏡別踩紅線
2013-01-05
中國時報
雖然，美國白宮與國會終究在最後關頭達成協議，避免「財政懸崖」成真，全球股市以大漲慶賀。不過，這個慶祝行情不會持續太久，因為，財政懸崖續集馬上就會上演，加上今年全球經濟風險仍多，金融市場顛波震盪仍難避免。
從去年下半年開始，各界就不斷在提醒美國「財政懸崖」的風險。所謂財政懸崖，指的是到二○一三年開始，布希政府任內給予的稅率優惠到期，將自動恢復較高的稅率；還有為了平衡財政，政府進入「自動減赤」。民眾會因增稅而減少消費，政府因減赤而降低支出，一來一往之間，根據聯準會（ＦＥＤ）主席柏南克的說法：「把這些綜合起來，會有大量收入從經濟體系中被抽走；這會影響到支出，並影響短期經濟復甦能力。」依照美國國會預算辦公室的估計，「墜崖」後，美國將進入衰退，今年經濟負成長○．五％，失業率回升到九％。
這個懸崖，終究沒人敢跳，共和黨再不甘願，也只能妥協，讓美國總統歐巴馬在記者會中得意的笑。但這個光景不會太久，兩黨馬上進入另一回的鬥爭。這次的協議只解決增稅部分，減赤方面，美國財政部雖然運用現金調度等方式，讓美國的債務上限延後兩個月，但問題終究要面對；白宮要的是調高債務上限，共和黨要的是砍社福等支出，兩黨對決過程，金融市場震盪仍難避免。市場的看法是：這次的協議只是權宜之計，非根本解決之道，未來進一步談判時，就會導致市場波動。
更弔詭的是，如果兩黨無法達成協議，兩個月後美國「墜崖」，全球市場與經濟必然再下探深淵。正常情況下，應該是兩黨吵鬧、角力一陣後各自退讓一步，白宮刪減一些支出、國會調高債務上限。問題是達成協議，也未必是好事，因為這意味著美國財政問題將日益嚴重、一步步走向紅線區。
難怪三大信評公司，甚至發出「墜崖」可能比達成協議好的說法。信評公司都認為美國必須拿出降低債務占ＧＤＰ（國內生產毛額）的方法，同時實現財政收入增長與削減開支，否則美國國債評等有可能被降等。衡諸美國現實的政治與經濟情勢，達到此目標的可能性低；特別是美國政治折衝的過程，就可能削弱外界對美國是否有能力解決財政與經濟問題的信心。別忘了標準普爾前年下調美國主權信用評等的理由之一，就是美國政治惡鬥、國會沒有能力達成妥協。
任何國家─特別是選舉制的民主國家，一旦財政踏入紅線區後，都會陷入泥沼，愈陷愈深、難以抽身是常態，包括美、日、歐豬五國，情況都是如此。最終，財政接近崩潰，整個社會與經濟的調整將非常龐大而痛苦；在國家碰上特殊情況時，政府可說是完全缺乏應變的財源與能力。
美國在柯林頓任期內，己實現財政盈餘的美景；但布希上任後的大減稅、反恐戰爭的支出大增，讓美國再陷財政困境。之後碰上百年僅見的金融海嘯，美國政府已無擴張財政政策的能力，只好推動大印鈔票的ＱＥ（量化寬鬆）政策。反觀德國與北歐國家，平日注重財政紀律，危機時國家仍能平穩度過，政府也有能力因應變局。因此，平日即遵守財政紀律是非常重要的。
台灣的各級政府債務餘額雖然號稱只占ＧＤＰ的四成左右，遠低於其它國家，但如加上隱藏性負債，則這個數字會飆上百分之百。我們看到在景氣低迷、政府應該擴大財政支出時，政府的公共建設支出反而減少，還有近月各界議論不斷的退休金是否會破產因而引發社會不安等問題，其實就是政府財政已踏入紅線區所致。美國是全球第一強權，擁有印製全球準備貨幣美元的特權，即使財政政策不靈光，還可不斷擴大其貨幣政策的影響力，但其它國家都沒有這個特權，因此才會有歐豬五國的窘境。台灣必須以歐美國家為借鏡，好好整頓財政、加強財政紀律、開源節流，別讓台灣的財政陷入泥沼，因為這將會是一條不歸路─若想在路的盡頭才做調整，那社會將付出極其龐大且痛苦的代價。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 5, 2012
Summary: The White House and Congress reached a last minute agreement. They prevented the fiscal cliff from becoming a reality. Stock markets around the world rose in response. But the celebration will not last long. The sequel to the fiscal cliff will soon debut. Add this year's global economic risks, and turbulence in the financial markets will be difficult to avoid.
Full Text below:
The White House and Congress reached a last minute agreement. They prevented the fiscal cliff from becoming a reality. Stock markets around the world rose in response. But the celebration will not last long. The sequel to the fiscal cliff will soon debut. Add this year's global economic risks, and turbulence in the financial markets will be difficult to avoid.
During in the second half of last year, analysts constantly reminded the US government about the risks of the fiscal cliff. The so-called fiscal cliff refers to the 2013 expiration of the Bush administration's preferential tax rates. This will automatically restore higher tax rates. Also, in order to balance the budget, the government will begin "automatic deficit reduction." The government will raise taxes. The public will reduce consumption. Government deficit reductions and spending cuts will work in combination. According to Federal Reserve (FED) Chairman Ben Bernanke, together these will withdraw a great deal of income from the economy. It will affect spending and short-term economic recovery. According to Congressional Budget Office estimates, once the economy falls off the fiscal cliff, the United States will enter a recession. This year it will experience a negative growth rate of 0.5%, and an unemployment rate of 9%.
No one is willing to leap off this cliff. Republicans may have been unwilling. But they were forced to compromise. U.S. President Barack Obama smirked with satisfaction during a press conference. But this situation will not last. The two parties will immediately begin another round of struggles. The agreement addresses only the tax increase portion and the deficit reduction portion. The U.S. Treasury Department used cash scheduling and other methods to postpone the U.S. debt ceiling by two months. But they will eventually have to confront the problem. The White House wants to increase the debt limit. Republicans want to cut welfare spending. The two parties are locked in combat. Financial market turmoil is difficult to avoid. The view from the market is that the agreement is merely an expedient. It is not a fundamental solution. Further negotiations will lead to market volatility.
The paradox is that if the two parties cannot reach an agreement, in two months the United States will go over the fiscal cliff. The global market economy will plumb new lows. Under normal circumstances, the two parties would wrestle for a while, then each take a step back. The White House would reduce some of its expenditures. Congress would raise the debt ceiling. Unfortunately reaching an agreement is not necessarily a good thing. It means America's fiscal problems will become increasingly severe, and step by step advance toward the red zone.
No wonder the three major credit rating companies said that going over the fiscal cliff might be better than reaching an agreement. The credit rating companies feel that the United States government must come up with a way to reduce debt as a percentage of GDP (gross domestic product). At the same time, it must achieve revenue growth and make spending cuts. Otherwise, the U.S. national debt rating could be downgraded. Given the reality of the political and economic situation in the United States, the possibility of achieving this goal is low. Especially given that the process of American political compromise could undermine outsider confidence in the United States' ability to solve its fiscal and economic problems. Lest we forget, Standard & Poor's cut the U.S. sovereign credit rating the previous year. One of the reasons was American political battles. Congress can not afford to compromise.
Any country, especially an elective democracy, will find itself bogged down once their fiscal affairs enter the red zone. It will find itself sinking deeper and deeper, unable to extricate itself. This is true of the United States, Japan, and the PIIGS. Ultimately, the nation's fiscal affairs will lead to collapse. The social and economic adjustments will be great and painful. When nations find themselves in these circumstances, the government lacks the financial resources and ability to cope.
During the Clinton administration, the United States enjoyed a budget surplus. But once Bush took office he made massive tax cuts. He made significant increases in expenditures in the War on Terror. As a result the US once again experienced financial difficulties. After the financial tsunami of a century, the U.S. government no longer has the ability to expand its fiscal policy. All it can do is promote the massive printing of money, i.e., Quantitative Easing. By contrast, Germany and the Nordic countries, normally practice fiscal discipline. During a crisis the country is able to ride out the storm. The government has the ability to adapt to changes. Therefore, normally adhering to fiscal discipline is key.
ROC debt at all levels of government is only about 4% of GDP. It is much lower than in other countries. But add hidden liabilities, and the figure soars to over 100%. The economy is in recession. The government should increase spending. Instead, government public works spending has been reduced. Endless arguments over whether the pension system is bankrupt have triggered social unrest. Government finances have already entered the red zone. The United States is the world's number one power. It has the advantage of being able to print dollars, the global reserve currency, If its fiscal policy is poor, it can expand its money supply. Other countries do not have this privilege. Therefore they face the same dilemma as the PIIGS. The ROC must learn from the United States and Europe. It must put its fiscal house in order. It must increase fiscal discipline, cut costs, and prevent its fiscal affairs from becoming bogged down. Otherwise it will reach a point of no return. If it attempts to make changes too far down the road, society will pay a painful price.
財政懸崖還有續集 台灣借鏡別踩紅線
2013-01-05
中國時報
雖然，美國白宮與國會終究在最後關頭達成協議，避免「財政懸崖」成真，全球股市以大漲慶賀。不過，這個慶祝行情不會持續太久，因為，財政懸崖續集馬上就會上演，加上今年全球經濟風險仍多，金融市場顛波震盪仍難避免。
從去年下半年開始，各界就不斷在提醒美國「財政懸崖」的風險。所謂財政懸崖，指的是到二○一三年開始，布希政府任內給予的稅率優惠到期，將自動恢復較高的稅率；還有為了平衡財政，政府進入「自動減赤」。民眾會因增稅而減少消費，政府因減赤而降低支出，一來一往之間，根據聯準會（ＦＥＤ）主席柏南克的說法：「把這些綜合起來，會有大量收入從經濟體系中被抽走；這會影響到支出，並影響短期經濟復甦能力。」依照美國國會預算辦公室的估計，「墜崖」後，美國將進入衰退，今年經濟負成長○．五％，失業率回升到九％。
這個懸崖，終究沒人敢跳，共和黨再不甘願，也只能妥協，讓美國總統歐巴馬在記者會中得意的笑。但這個光景不會太久，兩黨馬上進入另一回的鬥爭。這次的協議只解決增稅部分，減赤方面，美國財政部雖然運用現金調度等方式，讓美國的債務上限延後兩個月，但問題終究要面對；白宮要的是調高債務上限，共和黨要的是砍社福等支出，兩黨對決過程，金融市場震盪仍難避免。市場的看法是：這次的協議只是權宜之計，非根本解決之道，未來進一步談判時，就會導致市場波動。
更弔詭的是，如果兩黨無法達成協議，兩個月後美國「墜崖」，全球市場與經濟必然再下探深淵。正常情況下，應該是兩黨吵鬧、角力一陣後各自退讓一步，白宮刪減一些支出、國會調高債務上限。問題是達成協議，也未必是好事，因為這意味著美國財政問題將日益嚴重、一步步走向紅線區。
難怪三大信評公司，甚至發出「墜崖」可能比達成協議好的說法。信評公司都認為美國必須拿出降低債務占ＧＤＰ（國內生產毛額）的方法，同時實現財政收入增長與削減開支，否則美國國債評等有可能被降等。衡諸美國現實的政治與經濟情勢，達到此目標的可能性低；特別是美國政治折衝的過程，就可能削弱外界對美國是否有能力解決財政與經濟問題的信心。別忘了標準普爾前年下調美國主權信用評等的理由之一，就是美國政治惡鬥、國會沒有能力達成妥協。
任何國家─特別是選舉制的民主國家，一旦財政踏入紅線區後，都會陷入泥沼，愈陷愈深、難以抽身是常態，包括美、日、歐豬五國，情況都是如此。最終，財政接近崩潰，整個社會與經濟的調整將非常龐大而痛苦；在國家碰上特殊情況時，政府可說是完全缺乏應變的財源與能力。
美國在柯林頓任期內，己實現財政盈餘的美景；但布希上任後的大減稅、反恐戰爭的支出大增，讓美國再陷財政困境。之後碰上百年僅見的金融海嘯，美國政府已無擴張財政政策的能力，只好推動大印鈔票的ＱＥ（量化寬鬆）政策。反觀德國與北歐國家，平日注重財政紀律，危機時國家仍能平穩度過，政府也有能力因應變局。因此，平日即遵守財政紀律是非常重要的。
台灣的各級政府債務餘額雖然號稱只占ＧＤＰ的四成左右，遠低於其它國家，但如加上隱藏性負債，則這個數字會飆上百分之百。我們看到在景氣低迷、政府應該擴大財政支出時，政府的公共建設支出反而減少，還有近月各界議論不斷的退休金是否會破產因而引發社會不安等問題，其實就是政府財政已踏入紅線區所致。美國是全球第一強權，擁有印製全球準備貨幣美元的特權，即使財政政策不靈光，還可不斷擴大其貨幣政策的影響力，但其它國家都沒有這個特權，因此才會有歐豬五國的窘境。台灣必須以歐美國家為借鏡，好好整頓財政、加強財政紀律、開源節流，別讓台灣的財政陷入泥沼，因為這將會是一條不歸路─若想在路的盡頭才做調整，那社會將付出極其龐大且痛苦的代價。
Thursday, January 3, 2013
Inaugural Protest Marches Compared: Su Tseng-chang vs. Tsai Ing-wen
Inaugural Protest Marches Compared:
Su Tseng-chang vs. Tsai Ing-wen
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 4, 2012
Summary: Su Tseng-chang announced that the DPP will hold a "Raging Citizens Protest March" on January 13. This symbolic act, made upon assuming the party chairmanship, attempts to build consensus. It also suggests the path Su intends to take. Contrast this with several "inaugural protest marches" that Tsai Ing-wen led upon her own inauguration as party chairman. The differences underscore the changes that have taken place within the DPP over the past four years, and the DPP's current dilemma.
Full Text below:
Su Tseng-chang announced that the DPP will hold a "Raging Citizens Protest March" on January 13. This symbolic act, made upon assuming the party chairmanship, attempts to build consensus. It also suggests the path Su intends to take. Contrast this with several "inaugural protest marches" that Tsai Ing-wen led upon her own inauguration as party chairman. The differences underscore the changes that have taken place within the DPP over the past four years, and the DPP's current dilemma.
When Tsai Ing-wen became party chairman on May 20, 2008, she faced two major problems. One. The Ma administration's new cross-Strait policy was about to go into effect. Two. The Chen family corruption case was about to be tried in the courts.
Amidst this atmosphere, several "inaugural protest marches" took place in swift succession. On August 30, 2008, Taiwan independence hardliners launched a "Prevent hunger, Defend sovereignty, Seek sunshine" protest march. Tsai Ing-wen initially expressed reservations about participating. Later, under duress, she and the DPP participated. But she made clear that the DPP was "merely a participating organization and not the initiating organization." The DPP agreed to join the protest march, but a proviso was added. No Taiwan independence banners would be displayed, and no pro Ah-Bian slogans would be shouted. On October 25, Taiwan independence organizations came forward yet again. They held an "Oppose blackhearts, Defend Taiwan" protest march. This time the DPP was unable to block Chen Shui-bian. Chen Shui-bian held forth from atop a sound truck, causing a sensation. Then, between November 3rd and November 7th, Chen Yunlin arrived on Taiwan for the second Chiang-Chen Meeting. The DPP launched a string of protests. They held high banners reading, "Chen bandit Yunlin get out!" and" Commies get out!" In June their "Surround Chen" protests continued into the night, leaving the streets of Taipei in shambles. Later, Tsai Ing-wen made clear that the Democratic Progressive Party's participation ended at dusk.
Contrast Tsai Ing-wen's string of "inaugural protest marches" with Su Tseng-chang's "Raging Citizens Protest March."
First of all, the protest marches Tsai took participated in had some purpose. They expressed opposition to the Ma government's new cross-Strait policy. They expressed the concerns of Chen Shui-bian supporters. By contrast, Su Tseng-chang's "Raging Citizens Protest March," which demandds "Survival, Democracy, and Reform" feels like a case of clutching at straws.
Secondly, in 2008, following the defeat of the Democratic Progressive Party in the presidential election, the Green Camp experienced a sense of crisis and solidarity. The protest marches Tsai Ing-wen took part in felt like bottom-up, outside-in affairs. Tsai Ing-wen hastened to add that she and the DPP were merely participating in, not initiating the protest marches. By contrast, Su Tseng-chang's "Raging Citizens Protest March" cannot paper over the schism that has developed within the Green Camp. On the one hand Frank Hsieh's "trail-blazing journey" has a sequel. On the other hand, the Taiwan independence hardliners are even more arrogant than they were in 2008. Su Tseng-chang could not even get his "China Affairs Committee" started. No wonder his top-down protest march is meeting with increased skepticism, even from his own camp.
Such comparisons however, merely skim the surface. Far more profound changes have taken place over the past four years. Tsai Ing-wen's "inaugural protest marches" attempted to distance themselves from Chen Shui-bian. They attempted to block the Ma government's new cross-Strait policy. The next development was opposition to ECFA and the 1992 consensus. These became Tsai Ing-wen's trademark. These became part of her 2012 presidential campaign. But this is not the ultimate answer. Tsai Ing-wen initially had reservations about supporting Ah-Bian. Today however, she has become Chen Shui-bian's champion for "medical parole." She initially denounced ECFA as a "forfeiture of sovereignty and an insult to the nation." She said it "pandered to [Mainland] China, and sold out Taiwan." Later however, she reversed herself. She said "If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." She said she "unconditionally accepts ECFA." Such are the paradoxes of political calculation.
Tsai Ing-wen participated in several high profile "inauguration protest marches." She attempted to distance herself and the DPP from Ah-Bian. She led crowds who shouted "Chen bandit Yunlin get out!" She denounced ECFA as "pandering to [Mainland] China, and selling out Taiwan." Today, four years later, people are asking questions. Will they get any answers?
Now no one in the DPP utters a peep about ECFA "pandering to [Mainland] China, and selling out Taiwan." Instead, DPP members mutter about "reform." This shows that the DPP is unwilling to reform its cross-strait policy. No one dares to utter a peep about distancing the DPP from Ah-Bian. Instead, DPP members mutter about "medical parole." This shows that Taiwan independence hardliners have taken over the DPP, the way cancer cells take over a body. In fact, Su Tseng-chang is dealing with the mess left behind by Tsai Ing-wen.
Taiwan society has never lacked "Raging Citizens." The DPP has never failed to exploit raging public anger and grievances. Tsai Ing-wen's "Inaugural Protest March" was dominated by "Raging Citizens." When these citizens surrounded Chen Yunlin that night, they threw rocks, human feces, and Molotov cocktails. They proved they were raging alright. But what has happened to her leadership and the DPP since then? What has happened to the rage incited by the "Oppose ECFA" and "Oppose the 1992 consensus" protest marches? It has become dead political ashes from which no smoke emerges. Yesterday's fearsome rage has become today's ridiculous tantrum.
When we contrast Su Tseng with Tsai Ing-wen, we must look at more than Tsai's high profile "inauguration protest marches." We must also look at the rage felt during the "Oppose the 1992 consensus" and "Oppose ECFA" protest marches. Today those flames have burned out. So-called "distancing the DPP from Ah-Bian" has become a joke. Today Su Tseng-chang is desperately attempting to reignite the raging fires that burned when Tsai Ing-wen was chairman. Naturally he feels impotent, and plagued by doubt.
Actually, the history of the DPP is a history of rage. During the early years of martial law and the "ten thousand year assembly," the DPP raged. When the DPP promoted liberal democracy on Taiwan, it raged. But when it came time for Tsai Ing-wen to "Oppose the 1992 consensus" and "Oppose ECFA," the DPP's rage burned out. Now it is Su Tseng-chang's turn. The DPP raged over gasoline price hikes, electricity rate hikes, the capital gains tax, and U.S. beef imports. They raged so intensely they held a five day/four nights sleepover on the legislature floor. This too will become a footnote in history.
Su Tseng-chang's "Raging Citizens Protest March" has clearly not received the same applause as Tsai Ing-wen's numerous "inaugural protest marches." Tsai Ing-wen has long ceased opposing ECFA. She has long since ceased shouting "Chen bandit Yunlin get out!" But her past rage makes her by far the most popular politician on Taiwan. Is Su Tseng-chang jealous of her successful exploitation of rage?
But Su Tseng-chang should not complain. How can he rekindle a raging fire from the dead ashes left by Tsai Ing-wen? Besides, after he finishes raging, what will he be left with? Other than the bitter ashes from some meaningless memories?
比較蘇貞昌與蔡英文的「就職遊行」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.04 01:52 am
蘇貞昌宣布，民進黨將於一月十三日發動「火大遊行」，這是他就任黨主席後標舉路線及凝聚民氣的指標性動作；若與二○○八年蔡英文就任黨主席後的幾次「就職遊行」相較，非但可以看出蘇蔡二人處境之迥異，尤可反映民進黨四年多來路線的轉變與困境。
蔡英文在二○○八年五月二十日就任黨主席，面臨了兩大情勢：一、馬政府推動的兩岸交流新政即將上路；二、陳水扁家族貪汙案的司法程序正要啟動。
在這種氛圍下，幾場「就職遊行」相繼登場。二○○八年八月三十日，獨派發動「顧腹肚／護主權／要陽光」大遊行，蔡英文原持保留立場，後來在情勢所迫下，民進黨以「只是參加的團體／不是發起的單位」，加入遊行；背後的條件是，不可有台獨旗幟，不可有挺扁口號。十月二十五日，又以獨派團體出面，舉行「反黑心／顧台灣」大遊行；這次未能擋住陳水扁，阿扁在宣傳車上開講，造成轟動。接著，十一月三至七日，陳雲林來台出席第二次江陳會，民進黨發動連續抗爭，高舉「陳匪雲林滾蛋！」「共匪滾蛋！」的大旗，六日的「圍陳」行動更一直進行到深夜，弄得台北街頭一片狼藉。事後，蔡英文說：民進黨的活動已在傍晚宣布結束。
蔡英文的這幾場「就職遊行」，可與蘇貞昌的「火大遊行」相較：
一、蔡的幾場遊行較有針對性，一在反對馬政府的兩岸新政上路，二在宣洩挺扁者的憂慮；蘇貞昌的「火大遊行」，則標舉「要生活／要民主／要改革」，不著邊際。
二、二○○八年，民進黨在總統大選慘敗之後，綠營內部的危機感與凝聚力較強；蔡英文的幾場遊行，可以感覺到一種由下而上、由外而內的動員力量，蔡英文則反而採取「只參加／不發起」的姿態。相對而言，蘇貞昌舉行「火大遊行」的此時，綠營的撕裂已難掩飾；一方面謝長廷的「開展之旅」將有續集，另一方面獨派的氣焰已高過二○○八年，而蘇貞昌則連「中國事務委員會」也無法開張；難怪面對這場由上而下發動的遊行，內部的質疑聲浪此起彼落。
不過，這樣的比較，仍只是浮面而已，四年多來最深層的變化是：蔡英文當年的幾場「就職遊行」，一方面嘗試與陳水扁切割，另一方面則表態欲阻擋馬政府的兩岸新政上路；接下來的發展是，反對ＥＣＦＡ與反對九二共識成了蔡英文的品牌路線，一路殺到二○一二總統大選。然而，這卻不是終極的答案；原本對挺扁持保留立場的蔡英文，如今已成了陳水扁「保外就醫」的號召者；而原本指ＥＣＦＡ「喪權辱國」、「傾中賣台」的蔡英文，後來竟改口稱「民進黨若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」、「概括承受ＥＣＦＡ」。政治操作之弔詭，一至於此。
在四年後的今日，國人可問的是：蔡英文在其幾場轟轟烈烈的「就職遊行」中，不論是為切割陳水扁所作的嘗試，或為「陳匪雲林滾蛋」及其後「反對ＥＣＦＡ傾中賣台」所作的努力，今日究竟得到什麼答案？
此時民進黨中，早已不聞「ＥＣＦＡ傾中賣台」，卻是「轉型」之聲不絕於耳，這顯示了民進黨的兩岸政策仍無出路；更已不聞「切割阿扁」之聲，「保外就醫」竟成顯學，這又顯示了獨派已成民進黨的附骨之疽。其實，蘇貞昌正在面對蔡英文留下的爛攤子。
台灣社會從來不缺「火大」，民進黨更從來不虞沒有可以操作「火大」的民憤及民怨。回想蔡英文當年「就職遊行」的「火大」之「大」，「圍陳」當夜的石塊、糞便及汽油彈，皆可證明「火大」得不得了；但她領導民進黨四年且競選總統以來，以「反對ＥＣＦＡ」及「反對九二共識」所掀起的「火大」，如今卻已成為一片連煙都不冒的政治灰燼。當年的火大，變成了今日的可笑。
因而，在將蘇貞昌與蔡英文作對比之時，不能只看到蔡當年「就職遊行」的轟轟烈烈，也要看到當年「反對九二共識／反對ＥＣＦＡ」的「火大」，如今已完全熄火，「切割阿扁」也成了一場自欺欺人；蘇貞昌如今欲在蔡英文留下的這一片「灰燼」中，重新燃燒起什麼轟轟烈烈的「大火」，自不免有些力不從心，且質疑四起。
其實，民進黨的發展史，可謂就是一部「火大發展史」。早年對戒嚴體制與萬年國會的「火大」，促進了台灣的自由民主體制。但是，到了蔡英文「反對九二共識／反對ＥＣＦＡ」的「火大」，四年已燒成灰燼；現在輪到了蘇貞昌，他在油電雙漲、證所稅及美牛案強調的「火大」，甚至「火大」到民進黨在立法院打了五天四夜的地鋪，亦將留待歷史評說。
蘇貞昌的這一場「火大遊行」顯然未得到如當年蔡英文幾場「就職遊行」所獲的掌聲。今天，蔡英文早已不反ＥＣＦＡ了，也早已不主張「陳匪雲林滾蛋」了，但當年的「火大」，卻使她迄今仍是台灣人氣最高的政治人物，這樣的「火大」，蘇貞昌不忌妒嗎？
但蘇貞昌也不必怨艾，他是在蔡英文留下的灰燼上生火，如何「火大」得起來？何況，「火大」之後，會不會又只是留下一堆無意義的灰燼而已？
Su Tseng-chang vs. Tsai Ing-wen
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 4, 2012
Summary: Su Tseng-chang announced that the DPP will hold a "Raging Citizens Protest March" on January 13. This symbolic act, made upon assuming the party chairmanship, attempts to build consensus. It also suggests the path Su intends to take. Contrast this with several "inaugural protest marches" that Tsai Ing-wen led upon her own inauguration as party chairman. The differences underscore the changes that have taken place within the DPP over the past four years, and the DPP's current dilemma.
Full Text below:
Su Tseng-chang announced that the DPP will hold a "Raging Citizens Protest March" on January 13. This symbolic act, made upon assuming the party chairmanship, attempts to build consensus. It also suggests the path Su intends to take. Contrast this with several "inaugural protest marches" that Tsai Ing-wen led upon her own inauguration as party chairman. The differences underscore the changes that have taken place within the DPP over the past four years, and the DPP's current dilemma.
When Tsai Ing-wen became party chairman on May 20, 2008, she faced two major problems. One. The Ma administration's new cross-Strait policy was about to go into effect. Two. The Chen family corruption case was about to be tried in the courts.
Amidst this atmosphere, several "inaugural protest marches" took place in swift succession. On August 30, 2008, Taiwan independence hardliners launched a "Prevent hunger, Defend sovereignty, Seek sunshine" protest march. Tsai Ing-wen initially expressed reservations about participating. Later, under duress, she and the DPP participated. But she made clear that the DPP was "merely a participating organization and not the initiating organization." The DPP agreed to join the protest march, but a proviso was added. No Taiwan independence banners would be displayed, and no pro Ah-Bian slogans would be shouted. On October 25, Taiwan independence organizations came forward yet again. They held an "Oppose blackhearts, Defend Taiwan" protest march. This time the DPP was unable to block Chen Shui-bian. Chen Shui-bian held forth from atop a sound truck, causing a sensation. Then, between November 3rd and November 7th, Chen Yunlin arrived on Taiwan for the second Chiang-Chen Meeting. The DPP launched a string of protests. They held high banners reading, "Chen bandit Yunlin get out!" and" Commies get out!" In June their "Surround Chen" protests continued into the night, leaving the streets of Taipei in shambles. Later, Tsai Ing-wen made clear that the Democratic Progressive Party's participation ended at dusk.
Contrast Tsai Ing-wen's string of "inaugural protest marches" with Su Tseng-chang's "Raging Citizens Protest March."
First of all, the protest marches Tsai took participated in had some purpose. They expressed opposition to the Ma government's new cross-Strait policy. They expressed the concerns of Chen Shui-bian supporters. By contrast, Su Tseng-chang's "Raging Citizens Protest March," which demandds "Survival, Democracy, and Reform" feels like a case of clutching at straws.
Secondly, in 2008, following the defeat of the Democratic Progressive Party in the presidential election, the Green Camp experienced a sense of crisis and solidarity. The protest marches Tsai Ing-wen took part in felt like bottom-up, outside-in affairs. Tsai Ing-wen hastened to add that she and the DPP were merely participating in, not initiating the protest marches. By contrast, Su Tseng-chang's "Raging Citizens Protest March" cannot paper over the schism that has developed within the Green Camp. On the one hand Frank Hsieh's "trail-blazing journey" has a sequel. On the other hand, the Taiwan independence hardliners are even more arrogant than they were in 2008. Su Tseng-chang could not even get his "China Affairs Committee" started. No wonder his top-down protest march is meeting with increased skepticism, even from his own camp.
Such comparisons however, merely skim the surface. Far more profound changes have taken place over the past four years. Tsai Ing-wen's "inaugural protest marches" attempted to distance themselves from Chen Shui-bian. They attempted to block the Ma government's new cross-Strait policy. The next development was opposition to ECFA and the 1992 consensus. These became Tsai Ing-wen's trademark. These became part of her 2012 presidential campaign. But this is not the ultimate answer. Tsai Ing-wen initially had reservations about supporting Ah-Bian. Today however, she has become Chen Shui-bian's champion for "medical parole." She initially denounced ECFA as a "forfeiture of sovereignty and an insult to the nation." She said it "pandered to [Mainland] China, and sold out Taiwan." Later however, she reversed herself. She said "If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." She said she "unconditionally accepts ECFA." Such are the paradoxes of political calculation.
Tsai Ing-wen participated in several high profile "inauguration protest marches." She attempted to distance herself and the DPP from Ah-Bian. She led crowds who shouted "Chen bandit Yunlin get out!" She denounced ECFA as "pandering to [Mainland] China, and selling out Taiwan." Today, four years later, people are asking questions. Will they get any answers?
Now no one in the DPP utters a peep about ECFA "pandering to [Mainland] China, and selling out Taiwan." Instead, DPP members mutter about "reform." This shows that the DPP is unwilling to reform its cross-strait policy. No one dares to utter a peep about distancing the DPP from Ah-Bian. Instead, DPP members mutter about "medical parole." This shows that Taiwan independence hardliners have taken over the DPP, the way cancer cells take over a body. In fact, Su Tseng-chang is dealing with the mess left behind by Tsai Ing-wen.
Taiwan society has never lacked "Raging Citizens." The DPP has never failed to exploit raging public anger and grievances. Tsai Ing-wen's "Inaugural Protest March" was dominated by "Raging Citizens." When these citizens surrounded Chen Yunlin that night, they threw rocks, human feces, and Molotov cocktails. They proved they were raging alright. But what has happened to her leadership and the DPP since then? What has happened to the rage incited by the "Oppose ECFA" and "Oppose the 1992 consensus" protest marches? It has become dead political ashes from which no smoke emerges. Yesterday's fearsome rage has become today's ridiculous tantrum.
When we contrast Su Tseng with Tsai Ing-wen, we must look at more than Tsai's high profile "inauguration protest marches." We must also look at the rage felt during the "Oppose the 1992 consensus" and "Oppose ECFA" protest marches. Today those flames have burned out. So-called "distancing the DPP from Ah-Bian" has become a joke. Today Su Tseng-chang is desperately attempting to reignite the raging fires that burned when Tsai Ing-wen was chairman. Naturally he feels impotent, and plagued by doubt.
Actually, the history of the DPP is a history of rage. During the early years of martial law and the "ten thousand year assembly," the DPP raged. When the DPP promoted liberal democracy on Taiwan, it raged. But when it came time for Tsai Ing-wen to "Oppose the 1992 consensus" and "Oppose ECFA," the DPP's rage burned out. Now it is Su Tseng-chang's turn. The DPP raged over gasoline price hikes, electricity rate hikes, the capital gains tax, and U.S. beef imports. They raged so intensely they held a five day/four nights sleepover on the legislature floor. This too will become a footnote in history.
Su Tseng-chang's "Raging Citizens Protest March" has clearly not received the same applause as Tsai Ing-wen's numerous "inaugural protest marches." Tsai Ing-wen has long ceased opposing ECFA. She has long since ceased shouting "Chen bandit Yunlin get out!" But her past rage makes her by far the most popular politician on Taiwan. Is Su Tseng-chang jealous of her successful exploitation of rage?
But Su Tseng-chang should not complain. How can he rekindle a raging fire from the dead ashes left by Tsai Ing-wen? Besides, after he finishes raging, what will he be left with? Other than the bitter ashes from some meaningless memories?
比較蘇貞昌與蔡英文的「就職遊行」
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.04 01:52 am
蘇貞昌宣布，民進黨將於一月十三日發動「火大遊行」，這是他就任黨主席後標舉路線及凝聚民氣的指標性動作；若與二○○八年蔡英文就任黨主席後的幾次「就職遊行」相較，非但可以看出蘇蔡二人處境之迥異，尤可反映民進黨四年多來路線的轉變與困境。
蔡英文在二○○八年五月二十日就任黨主席，面臨了兩大情勢：一、馬政府推動的兩岸交流新政即將上路；二、陳水扁家族貪汙案的司法程序正要啟動。
在這種氛圍下，幾場「就職遊行」相繼登場。二○○八年八月三十日，獨派發動「顧腹肚／護主權／要陽光」大遊行，蔡英文原持保留立場，後來在情勢所迫下，民進黨以「只是參加的團體／不是發起的單位」，加入遊行；背後的條件是，不可有台獨旗幟，不可有挺扁口號。十月二十五日，又以獨派團體出面，舉行「反黑心／顧台灣」大遊行；這次未能擋住陳水扁，阿扁在宣傳車上開講，造成轟動。接著，十一月三至七日，陳雲林來台出席第二次江陳會，民進黨發動連續抗爭，高舉「陳匪雲林滾蛋！」「共匪滾蛋！」的大旗，六日的「圍陳」行動更一直進行到深夜，弄得台北街頭一片狼藉。事後，蔡英文說：民進黨的活動已在傍晚宣布結束。
蔡英文的這幾場「就職遊行」，可與蘇貞昌的「火大遊行」相較：
一、蔡的幾場遊行較有針對性，一在反對馬政府的兩岸新政上路，二在宣洩挺扁者的憂慮；蘇貞昌的「火大遊行」，則標舉「要生活／要民主／要改革」，不著邊際。
二、二○○八年，民進黨在總統大選慘敗之後，綠營內部的危機感與凝聚力較強；蔡英文的幾場遊行，可以感覺到一種由下而上、由外而內的動員力量，蔡英文則反而採取「只參加／不發起」的姿態。相對而言，蘇貞昌舉行「火大遊行」的此時，綠營的撕裂已難掩飾；一方面謝長廷的「開展之旅」將有續集，另一方面獨派的氣焰已高過二○○八年，而蘇貞昌則連「中國事務委員會」也無法開張；難怪面對這場由上而下發動的遊行，內部的質疑聲浪此起彼落。
不過，這樣的比較，仍只是浮面而已，四年多來最深層的變化是：蔡英文當年的幾場「就職遊行」，一方面嘗試與陳水扁切割，另一方面則表態欲阻擋馬政府的兩岸新政上路；接下來的發展是，反對ＥＣＦＡ與反對九二共識成了蔡英文的品牌路線，一路殺到二○一二總統大選。然而，這卻不是終極的答案；原本對挺扁持保留立場的蔡英文，如今已成了陳水扁「保外就醫」的號召者；而原本指ＥＣＦＡ「喪權辱國」、「傾中賣台」的蔡英文，後來竟改口稱「民進黨若執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」、「概括承受ＥＣＦＡ」。政治操作之弔詭，一至於此。
在四年後的今日，國人可問的是：蔡英文在其幾場轟轟烈烈的「就職遊行」中，不論是為切割陳水扁所作的嘗試，或為「陳匪雲林滾蛋」及其後「反對ＥＣＦＡ傾中賣台」所作的努力，今日究竟得到什麼答案？
此時民進黨中，早已不聞「ＥＣＦＡ傾中賣台」，卻是「轉型」之聲不絕於耳，這顯示了民進黨的兩岸政策仍無出路；更已不聞「切割阿扁」之聲，「保外就醫」竟成顯學，這又顯示了獨派已成民進黨的附骨之疽。其實，蘇貞昌正在面對蔡英文留下的爛攤子。
台灣社會從來不缺「火大」，民進黨更從來不虞沒有可以操作「火大」的民憤及民怨。回想蔡英文當年「就職遊行」的「火大」之「大」，「圍陳」當夜的石塊、糞便及汽油彈，皆可證明「火大」得不得了；但她領導民進黨四年且競選總統以來，以「反對ＥＣＦＡ」及「反對九二共識」所掀起的「火大」，如今卻已成為一片連煙都不冒的政治灰燼。當年的火大，變成了今日的可笑。
因而，在將蘇貞昌與蔡英文作對比之時，不能只看到蔡當年「就職遊行」的轟轟烈烈，也要看到當年「反對九二共識／反對ＥＣＦＡ」的「火大」，如今已完全熄火，「切割阿扁」也成了一場自欺欺人；蘇貞昌如今欲在蔡英文留下的這一片「灰燼」中，重新燃燒起什麼轟轟烈烈的「大火」，自不免有些力不從心，且質疑四起。
其實，民進黨的發展史，可謂就是一部「火大發展史」。早年對戒嚴體制與萬年國會的「火大」，促進了台灣的自由民主體制。但是，到了蔡英文「反對九二共識／反對ＥＣＦＡ」的「火大」，四年已燒成灰燼；現在輪到了蘇貞昌，他在油電雙漲、證所稅及美牛案強調的「火大」，甚至「火大」到民進黨在立法院打了五天四夜的地鋪，亦將留待歷史評說。
蘇貞昌的這一場「火大遊行」顯然未得到如當年蔡英文幾場「就職遊行」所獲的掌聲。今天，蔡英文早已不反ＥＣＦＡ了，也早已不主張「陳匪雲林滾蛋」了，但當年的「火大」，卻使她迄今仍是台灣人氣最高的政治人物，這樣的「火大」，蘇貞昌不忌妒嗎？
但蘇貞昌也不必怨艾，他是在蔡英文留下的灰燼上生火，如何「火大」得起來？何況，「火大」之後，會不會又只是留下一堆無意義的灰燼而已？
Wednesday, January 2, 2013
Challenge 2013: Enhance Competitiveness at Structural Level
Challenge 2013: Enhance Competitiveness at Structural Level
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 3, 2012
Summary: This year's forecast is for over 3% growth. This is much higher than last year's 1.13%. Although better than last year, it is nowhere near a "perceptible improvement." The most serious challenge for our industries and government is not the growth rate. It is the need to revamp our industrial structure and to upgrade our economic competitiveness. This is the real problem industry and government must tackle this year.
Full Text below:
Taiwan's economy over the past year has been a roller coaster ride. Sudden peaks were followed by equally sudden valleys. It was a thrill a minute. We were optimistic at the beginning of the year. Predictions were that our economic growth rate would lead the Four Asian Tigers. But the numbers suddenly plummeted. setting off ten blue warning lights in a row. We could no longer be sure even of maintaining a 1% growth rate. Newly re-elected President Ma and the public had high hopes for the new cabinet's economic advisors. But public approval plummeted along with the growth rate. The good news is that the economy is on the mend and expected to climb back out of its hole. The bad news is that risks remain. Especially the problem of Taiwan's economic structure, which remains unsolved.
Last year the global economy was turbulent. One disaster followed another. The initial forecasts from all quarters were that the economy would bottom out in the first quarter, then bounce back. The global economy would recover in the second half of the year. But the European debt crisis intensified. Europe fell into recession. The UK and italy experienced negative growth. France experienced zero growth. Even Germany experienced less than one percent growth. Over the last two to three quarters, the European Union experienced negative growth. This is the definition of a recession. The United States threw money at the problem with quantitative easing. But the unemployment rate hovered at about 9%. It dropped to under 8% toward the end of the year. The recovery however, remained weak.
Even more surprising was the Chinese mainland's economic slowdown. The U.S. and European economies slowed. This led to fewer exports than expected. This in turn led to small and medium enterprises on the Chinese mainland closing down. They closed down to avoid becoming part of the asset bubble. For many years this emerging economy maintained double-digit growth rates. During the first quarter of last year however, this growth slowed. During the second-quarter economic growth fell below 8%, to a mere 7.6%. It fell to record lows in the aftermath of the financial tsunami. The Mainland government was compelled to put "steady growth" economic policy first. Several other prosperous emerging economies, including India and Brazil, experienced minimal growth following the financial tsunami.
The environment is hostile. The economic performance of the Four Asian Tigers, including Taiwan, is far from ideal. Export growth rates were negative in the second half of the year. The economic growth rate was supposed to be 4% to 5%, It has been gradually revised down to between 1% and 2%. Taiwan's export growth rate fell first, before the other Asian Tigers. That is undeniable. The amount of Its decline was also greater than for the other Asian Tigers'. These cold, hard facts tell us something. Taiwan's economic decline last year was attributable partly to macro conditions. But it was also the result of internal problems. These include a decline in industrial competitiveness.
This year the global economy is expected to bounce back. The U.S. unemployment rate has fallen to 7.7%, the lowest over the past four years. Economic growth was also better than expected. Mainland China's Purchasing Managers Index has rebounded. Export figures increased. The major think tanks' economic forecasts for this year are higher than they were for last year. This shows that a rebound has begun. But we cannot ignore potential risks. Crises are still ongoing. The first hurdle is the U.S. fiscal cliff. The Democratic and Republican parties have reached an agreement. They will tax the rich. But the deficit reduction mechanism will not kick in for two months. The wrangling between the two parties is expected to continue. Economic and financial markets will remain shakey.
The second hurdle is the European debt crisis. It remains insoluble. Greece is no longer the problem. But the Spanish economy has yet to improve. Italy is finally out of intensive care. But Prime Minister Mario Monti, responsible for rescuing the economy, has resigned. The leadership will be replaced. Much risk remains. The third hurdle is international political risk. The Middle East has long been a powderkeg. Changes in the Mid East situation could impact the price of oil. This could impact the economy. A Japanese rightist regime has come to power. How will it interact with Japan's neighbors, especially the Chinese Mainland? Will another unpredictable conflict such as last year's Diaoyutai incident erupt? Will the conflict impact the two nations' economy, trade, and investments? These are external economic risks we must face this year.
But these risks beyond our control. We on Taiwan should attempt to reverse the decline in our competitiveness. Last year data showed that Taiwan's economic and industrial structure has three problems. The first is exports highly dependent upon the technology industry. The economy is in bad shape. People have been forced to tighten their belts. The first thing they cut back on is luxury technology products. When last year's global recession ended, South Korea's exports were doing better than Taiwan's. One important reason was its automobile exports, petrochemical, shipbuilding, and diversified technological structure.
The second problem is that even in technology products, Taiwan's competitiveness has declined. HTC's market share has fallen. Exports have decreased. This immediately affected Taiwan's export figures. Domestic DRAM is dead. LCD, LED, solar energy, and other industries all face fierce competition. If the economy improves this year, manufacturers can breathe a sigh of relief. But they must address their technology, branding, and competitiveness issues. Otherwise when the boom ends, they will find themselves eliminated. The third problem is that Taiwan has yet to enter the "post-PC era." Taiwan's technology industry and its industry as a whole, have yet to reposition themselves. This problem has plagued domestic industry for the past several years. It will continue to haunt Taiwan during the coming year.
This year's forecast is for over 3% growth. This is much higher than last year's 1.13%. But the number is based on last year's lower baseline. Therefore, this year's economic recovery remains moderate. Although better than last year, it is nowhere near a "perceptible improvement." The most serious challenge for our industries and government is not the growth rate. It is the need to revamp our industrial structure and to upgrade our economic competitiveness. This is the real problem industry and government must tackle this year.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.01.03
社論－展望2013系列之二/經濟篇 調整結構拚競爭力 才是最嚴峻挑戰
本報訊
過去一年的台灣經濟，有如乘坐雲霄飛車，忽高忽低、驚險萬分。從年初的樂觀、經濟成長率可居四小龍之首的預測值，直線下墜到景氣燈號連十藍、「保一」能否的驚恐；甫連任的馬總統與社會寄望極高的財經內閣，民意支持度正如成長率一樣的直落低點。展望今年，喜的是景氣終究是否極泰來，可望由谷底攀升；憂的是風險仍在，特別是台灣經濟結構的問題仍無法解決。
去年全球經濟可謂亂流不斷、衰事層出，原本各界預測都是景氣在第一季落底、反轉向上，下半年全球經濟就可嘗到甜頭；但歐債危機白熱化，讓歐洲墜入衰退，英、義經濟出現負成長，法國零成長，德國也只有不到一％的微幅成長，歐盟去年二、三季經濟都是負成長，這已是定義上的進入衰退。美國雖然以量化寬鬆不斷撒錢，但失業率一直在九％左右，到年底前才降到八％以下，復甦火苗微弱。
更大的意外是大陸經濟也走緩。受到歐美經濟遲緩、導致出口不如預期下，大陸內部中小企業的倒閉問題，打房以避免資產泡沫化的緊縮力道，讓這個連續多年維持二位數成長率的新興經濟體，去年第一季就開始放緩腳步，第二季經濟成長跌破八％，只有七．六％，創海嘯之後的低點。大陸政府不得不把「穩增長」再提到經濟政策之首。其它幾個在海嘯後虎虎生威的新興經濟體─包括印度、巴西等，都落入海嘯後最低成長的窘境。
在如此惡劣的大環境下，包括台灣在內的四小龍，經濟表現當然不甚理想，下半年各經濟體的出口成長率紛紛跌入負值，經濟成長率也由原先預估的四到五％，逐步下修到一到二％。但不能否認的是，台灣出口成長率的下跌，先於其它小龍，跌幅也高於它國。這個殘酷的數據告訴我們，台灣去年經濟走低，除了大環境因素外，更有著本身產業、企業競爭力下滑的成分在內。
因此，縱然展望今年，全球經濟可望走出谷底，如美國失業率降到七．七％，是近四年最低數值，經濟成長亦優於預期；大陸採購經理人指數回升、出口數值上揚；各大智庫對今年的經濟預測值都較去年高，這些都顯示景氣春意已現。但也不能忽略潛藏的風險與危機仍不少，第一道關卡就是美國的財政懸崖風險，儘管民主、共和兩黨及時達成富人加稅協議，但減赤機制將晚兩個月啟動，可以預期，兩黨之間的角力仍將繼續，經濟與金融市場依然存在變數。
第二道關卡則是歐債危機仍是難解、無解；希臘固然已不是問題核心，但西班牙經濟仍未見好轉，好不容易才從加護病房搶救回來的義大利，則因負責整頓經濟的總理蒙蒂去職，政局將更替，未來仍有不少的風險。第三道關卡則是國際政治的風險，除了「傳統」地緣政治風險所在的中東局勢，如出現變局即可能衝擊油價、進而打擊經濟外，日本右派政權上台，與鄰國─特別是大陸之間的互動如何、是否引發如去年釣魚台事件般不可預知的衝突？是否又因此衝擊彼此的經濟、貿易、投資？這些都是今年我們必須面對的外在經濟風險。
但撇開這些非操之在我的風險，台灣更應力求掌握、控管者，當屬本身競爭力下滑的問題。去年的數據看出，台灣經濟與產業結構有三大問題，第一是出口高度依賴科技產業，景氣差、民眾要節衣縮食者，第一個砍的就是有奢侈品性質的科技產品；去年全球衰退聲中，南韓出口表現較台灣佳，重要原因就是其出口是由汽車、石化、造船加上科技等多元結構組成。
第二個問題是即使以科技產品看，競爭力也衰退，宏達電的市占率腰斬、出口變少，立刻反映在台灣出口數字的下降上；更別提國內DRAM已死，LCD、LED、太陽能等產業紛陷苦戰。今年景氣好轉，固然廠商可喘一口氣，但如不能在技術、品牌及競爭力下功夫，景氣再反轉時，又將陷入淘汰行列中。第三個問題則是台灣尚未在「後PC時代」，為台灣的科技產業，乃至整個國家的產業，找到一個因應與定位。這個問題，過去幾年困擾著國內業者，看來，未來一年仍將持續困擾著台灣。
今年經濟成長預測應在三％以上，遠高於去年的一．一三％；但這個數字是建立在去年較低的基礎上，因此今年的景氣復甦仍屬和緩，雖較去年佳，但距離「明顯有感」恐怕仍有些距離。而對台灣產業及政府而言，最嚴峻的挑戰，恐怕不在於計較成長率多少，而是產業結構的調整與競爭力的提升，這才是業者與政府今年更該投注心力解決的問題。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 3, 2012
Summary: This year's forecast is for over 3% growth. This is much higher than last year's 1.13%. Although better than last year, it is nowhere near a "perceptible improvement." The most serious challenge for our industries and government is not the growth rate. It is the need to revamp our industrial structure and to upgrade our economic competitiveness. This is the real problem industry and government must tackle this year.
Full Text below:
Taiwan's economy over the past year has been a roller coaster ride. Sudden peaks were followed by equally sudden valleys. It was a thrill a minute. We were optimistic at the beginning of the year. Predictions were that our economic growth rate would lead the Four Asian Tigers. But the numbers suddenly plummeted. setting off ten blue warning lights in a row. We could no longer be sure even of maintaining a 1% growth rate. Newly re-elected President Ma and the public had high hopes for the new cabinet's economic advisors. But public approval plummeted along with the growth rate. The good news is that the economy is on the mend and expected to climb back out of its hole. The bad news is that risks remain. Especially the problem of Taiwan's economic structure, which remains unsolved.
Last year the global economy was turbulent. One disaster followed another. The initial forecasts from all quarters were that the economy would bottom out in the first quarter, then bounce back. The global economy would recover in the second half of the year. But the European debt crisis intensified. Europe fell into recession. The UK and italy experienced negative growth. France experienced zero growth. Even Germany experienced less than one percent growth. Over the last two to three quarters, the European Union experienced negative growth. This is the definition of a recession. The United States threw money at the problem with quantitative easing. But the unemployment rate hovered at about 9%. It dropped to under 8% toward the end of the year. The recovery however, remained weak.
Even more surprising was the Chinese mainland's economic slowdown. The U.S. and European economies slowed. This led to fewer exports than expected. This in turn led to small and medium enterprises on the Chinese mainland closing down. They closed down to avoid becoming part of the asset bubble. For many years this emerging economy maintained double-digit growth rates. During the first quarter of last year however, this growth slowed. During the second-quarter economic growth fell below 8%, to a mere 7.6%. It fell to record lows in the aftermath of the financial tsunami. The Mainland government was compelled to put "steady growth" economic policy first. Several other prosperous emerging economies, including India and Brazil, experienced minimal growth following the financial tsunami.
The environment is hostile. The economic performance of the Four Asian Tigers, including Taiwan, is far from ideal. Export growth rates were negative in the second half of the year. The economic growth rate was supposed to be 4% to 5%, It has been gradually revised down to between 1% and 2%. Taiwan's export growth rate fell first, before the other Asian Tigers. That is undeniable. The amount of Its decline was also greater than for the other Asian Tigers'. These cold, hard facts tell us something. Taiwan's economic decline last year was attributable partly to macro conditions. But it was also the result of internal problems. These include a decline in industrial competitiveness.
This year the global economy is expected to bounce back. The U.S. unemployment rate has fallen to 7.7%, the lowest over the past four years. Economic growth was also better than expected. Mainland China's Purchasing Managers Index has rebounded. Export figures increased. The major think tanks' economic forecasts for this year are higher than they were for last year. This shows that a rebound has begun. But we cannot ignore potential risks. Crises are still ongoing. The first hurdle is the U.S. fiscal cliff. The Democratic and Republican parties have reached an agreement. They will tax the rich. But the deficit reduction mechanism will not kick in for two months. The wrangling between the two parties is expected to continue. Economic and financial markets will remain shakey.
The second hurdle is the European debt crisis. It remains insoluble. Greece is no longer the problem. But the Spanish economy has yet to improve. Italy is finally out of intensive care. But Prime Minister Mario Monti, responsible for rescuing the economy, has resigned. The leadership will be replaced. Much risk remains. The third hurdle is international political risk. The Middle East has long been a powderkeg. Changes in the Mid East situation could impact the price of oil. This could impact the economy. A Japanese rightist regime has come to power. How will it interact with Japan's neighbors, especially the Chinese Mainland? Will another unpredictable conflict such as last year's Diaoyutai incident erupt? Will the conflict impact the two nations' economy, trade, and investments? These are external economic risks we must face this year.
But these risks beyond our control. We on Taiwan should attempt to reverse the decline in our competitiveness. Last year data showed that Taiwan's economic and industrial structure has three problems. The first is exports highly dependent upon the technology industry. The economy is in bad shape. People have been forced to tighten their belts. The first thing they cut back on is luxury technology products. When last year's global recession ended, South Korea's exports were doing better than Taiwan's. One important reason was its automobile exports, petrochemical, shipbuilding, and diversified technological structure.
The second problem is that even in technology products, Taiwan's competitiveness has declined. HTC's market share has fallen. Exports have decreased. This immediately affected Taiwan's export figures. Domestic DRAM is dead. LCD, LED, solar energy, and other industries all face fierce competition. If the economy improves this year, manufacturers can breathe a sigh of relief. But they must address their technology, branding, and competitiveness issues. Otherwise when the boom ends, they will find themselves eliminated. The third problem is that Taiwan has yet to enter the "post-PC era." Taiwan's technology industry and its industry as a whole, have yet to reposition themselves. This problem has plagued domestic industry for the past several years. It will continue to haunt Taiwan during the coming year.
This year's forecast is for over 3% growth. This is much higher than last year's 1.13%. But the number is based on last year's lower baseline. Therefore, this year's economic recovery remains moderate. Although better than last year, it is nowhere near a "perceptible improvement." The most serious challenge for our industries and government is not the growth rate. It is the need to revamp our industrial structure and to upgrade our economic competitiveness. This is the real problem industry and government must tackle this year.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.01.03
社論－展望2013系列之二/經濟篇 調整結構拚競爭力 才是最嚴峻挑戰
本報訊
過去一年的台灣經濟，有如乘坐雲霄飛車，忽高忽低、驚險萬分。從年初的樂觀、經濟成長率可居四小龍之首的預測值，直線下墜到景氣燈號連十藍、「保一」能否的驚恐；甫連任的馬總統與社會寄望極高的財經內閣，民意支持度正如成長率一樣的直落低點。展望今年，喜的是景氣終究是否極泰來，可望由谷底攀升；憂的是風險仍在，特別是台灣經濟結構的問題仍無法解決。
去年全球經濟可謂亂流不斷、衰事層出，原本各界預測都是景氣在第一季落底、反轉向上，下半年全球經濟就可嘗到甜頭；但歐債危機白熱化，讓歐洲墜入衰退，英、義經濟出現負成長，法國零成長，德國也只有不到一％的微幅成長，歐盟去年二、三季經濟都是負成長，這已是定義上的進入衰退。美國雖然以量化寬鬆不斷撒錢，但失業率一直在九％左右，到年底前才降到八％以下，復甦火苗微弱。
更大的意外是大陸經濟也走緩。受到歐美經濟遲緩、導致出口不如預期下，大陸內部中小企業的倒閉問題，打房以避免資產泡沫化的緊縮力道，讓這個連續多年維持二位數成長率的新興經濟體，去年第一季就開始放緩腳步，第二季經濟成長跌破八％，只有七．六％，創海嘯之後的低點。大陸政府不得不把「穩增長」再提到經濟政策之首。其它幾個在海嘯後虎虎生威的新興經濟體─包括印度、巴西等，都落入海嘯後最低成長的窘境。
在如此惡劣的大環境下，包括台灣在內的四小龍，經濟表現當然不甚理想，下半年各經濟體的出口成長率紛紛跌入負值，經濟成長率也由原先預估的四到五％，逐步下修到一到二％。但不能否認的是，台灣出口成長率的下跌，先於其它小龍，跌幅也高於它國。這個殘酷的數據告訴我們，台灣去年經濟走低，除了大環境因素外，更有著本身產業、企業競爭力下滑的成分在內。
因此，縱然展望今年，全球經濟可望走出谷底，如美國失業率降到七．七％，是近四年最低數值，經濟成長亦優於預期；大陸採購經理人指數回升、出口數值上揚；各大智庫對今年的經濟預測值都較去年高，這些都顯示景氣春意已現。但也不能忽略潛藏的風險與危機仍不少，第一道關卡就是美國的財政懸崖風險，儘管民主、共和兩黨及時達成富人加稅協議，但減赤機制將晚兩個月啟動，可以預期，兩黨之間的角力仍將繼續，經濟與金融市場依然存在變數。
第二道關卡則是歐債危機仍是難解、無解；希臘固然已不是問題核心，但西班牙經濟仍未見好轉，好不容易才從加護病房搶救回來的義大利，則因負責整頓經濟的總理蒙蒂去職，政局將更替，未來仍有不少的風險。第三道關卡則是國際政治的風險，除了「傳統」地緣政治風險所在的中東局勢，如出現變局即可能衝擊油價、進而打擊經濟外，日本右派政權上台，與鄰國─特別是大陸之間的互動如何、是否引發如去年釣魚台事件般不可預知的衝突？是否又因此衝擊彼此的經濟、貿易、投資？這些都是今年我們必須面對的外在經濟風險。
但撇開這些非操之在我的風險，台灣更應力求掌握、控管者，當屬本身競爭力下滑的問題。去年的數據看出，台灣經濟與產業結構有三大問題，第一是出口高度依賴科技產業，景氣差、民眾要節衣縮食者，第一個砍的就是有奢侈品性質的科技產品；去年全球衰退聲中，南韓出口表現較台灣佳，重要原因就是其出口是由汽車、石化、造船加上科技等多元結構組成。
第二個問題是即使以科技產品看，競爭力也衰退，宏達電的市占率腰斬、出口變少，立刻反映在台灣出口數字的下降上；更別提國內DRAM已死，LCD、LED、太陽能等產業紛陷苦戰。今年景氣好轉，固然廠商可喘一口氣，但如不能在技術、品牌及競爭力下功夫，景氣再反轉時，又將陷入淘汰行列中。第三個問題則是台灣尚未在「後PC時代」，為台灣的科技產業，乃至整個國家的產業，找到一個因應與定位。這個問題，過去幾年困擾著國內業者，看來，未來一年仍將持續困擾著台灣。
今年經濟成長預測應在三％以上，遠高於去年的一．一三％；但這個數字是建立在去年較低的基礎上，因此今年的景氣復甦仍屬和緩，雖較去年佳，但距離「明顯有感」恐怕仍有些距離。而對台灣產業及政府而言，最嚴峻的挑戰，恐怕不在於計較成長率多少，而是產業結構的調整與競爭力的提升，這才是業者與政府今年更該投注心力解決的問題。
New Year's Wishes: Consolidate Our Constitutional Rule, Bolster Our International Standing
New Year's Wishes: Consolidate Our Constitutional Rule, Bolster Our International Standing
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 1, 2012
Summary: If President Ma is seeking an historical legacy, he must establish it during the next three years. He must lay the foundation for the consolidation of our nation's constitutional rule and the bolstering of our nation's international standing. If the DPP wishes to return to power, it must assume the heavy responsibility of consolidating our constitutional rule and bolstering our international standing.
Full Text below:
Today is New Year's Day, in the 102nd Year of the Republic of China. Today is the 102nd anniversary of our nation's founding. Our wishes for the New Year are to consolidate our nation's constitutional rule, and to bolster our nation's international standing.
Dramatic changes are taking place around the world, in the Taiwan Straits, and on Taiwan. We must consolidate our nation's constitutional rule, and bolster our nation's international standing. We must do this to ensure the survival of the Republic of China. To consolidate our nation's constitutional rule means more than increasing allegiance towards the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. It also means raising the quality of our democracy and its constitutional rule. An effort must be made within the one China framework. We must find a place for the Republic of China within the cross-Strait framework. To bolster our international standing, we must transform Taiwan into a free and open Asian-Pacific economic and trade platform. We must use multilateral world trade and economic ties to bolster the Republic of China's international standing.
The two goals are complementary. If the Republic of China consolidates its system of constitutional rule, both internally and within the cross-Strait framework, it will also bolster its international economic and trade relations. Conversely, free and open international trade and economic relations will help consolidate the Republic of China's system of constitutional rule, both on Taiwan and within the cross-Strait framework.
Let us first address the consolidation of constitutional rule. Constitutional rule in the Republic of China has undergone many shocks over the years, both on Taiwan and within the cross-Strait framework. On Taiwan, DPP leader Frank Hsieh has set forth his "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutional interpretations." On the Mainland, CCP leaders are talking about "using the two sides' existing legal provisions, (i.e., constitutions), as a point of departure." Hu Jintao even said, "We affirm (that both the Mainland and Taiwan are part of one China). This reality is consistent with both sides' existing legal provisions. It is something both sides can accept." This thinking shows that people on Taiwan are not the only ones who realize that "Without the Republic of China, Taiwan's survival cannot be assured." Even Beijing realizes that the "Republic of China's existing legal provisions," i.e., its one China Constitution, is the pillar that supports one China and cross-Strait peaceful development. That is also this newspaper's glass theory. "The Republic of China is a glass, Taiwan is the water. As long as the glass remains intact, the water remains in the glass. Once the glass is shattered, the water runs off everywhere."
In other words, consolidation of constitutional rule for the Republic of China accords not just with the interests of the public on Taiwan. It also ensures that constitutional rule for the Republic of China survives. As Beijing puts it, "using the two sides' existing legal provisions (i.e., constitutions), as a point of departure." It is also the only way to champion "one China." Therefore it also accords with both sides' interests. Consider the facts. In recent years, Beijing has invested a great deal of effort into Taiwan. Beijing has undeniably been upholding the Republic of China's one China constitution. It has been preventing Taiwan from embarking on the "rectification of names" and undermining the constitution. Put simply, the two sides have a common interest in consolidating the Republic of China's constitutional rule. .
How should these common interests be maintained? Beijing's cross-Strait policy used to be a rigid "Only reunification will do." Now however, its policy has morphed into "exploring cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." The two sides should "take existing legal provisions (their constitutions) as a point of departure" in order to sign a peace agreement. This would stabilize "political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." The aforementioned common interests would be protected. This is what this newspaper proposed, the signing of a peace agreement under the big roof theory of China.
For the public on Taiwan, consolidating the Republic of China's constitutional rule is not merely something people on Taiwan must strive for. It is also something that both sides of the Taiwan Strait should strive for. For Beijing, this requires an even broader vision. It requires incorporating the big roof theory of China into the one China principle.
Now consider the issue of bolstering our nation's international standing. Consider the global picture, cross-Strait trends, and Taiwan's dilemma. Taiwan's development will probably proceed from ECFA to a free trade zone pilot program, to TIFA, to FTAs, to TPP or RCEP, and finally to a Free Trade Island. But this is no easy path. One. This path will be a major test of Taiwan's internal perseverance and external competitiveness. Two. This path requires adequate cross-Strait goodwill and mutual trust. Beijing must not hobble Taiwan. It must be eager to see it succeed.
This is the path the public on Taiwan must take. It is the only way out for the public on Taiwan. It is not merely the way out for Taiwan's economy. It is also the way to bring cross-strait relations into balance, and to establish international political and economic links.
For Taiwan international trade is inextricably linked with cross-Strait relations. Taiwan independence is no longer possible. The Republic of China must seek a foothold for itself within the one China framework. Taiwan's international trade and economic relations must be conducted within the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. On Taiwan, the public must agree on a national identity and swear allegiance to the same constitution. Otherwise it will be impossible to establish enough cross-Strait goodwill and mutual trust. It will not be easy to fling Taiwan's doors open to international markets. Even if we manage to do so, it may be difficult to keep them open. Beijing's focus is on "political relations under special conditions in which the two sides of the Strait have yet to be reunified." Beijing must consider Taiwan's international political and economic breathing space. Politically Beijing must allow the Republic of China to be accepted as part of China. Taiwanese must be willing to define themselves as Chinese. Interfering with Taiwan's integration into the international economic and trade framework would be counterproductive.
The Republic of China's blueprint for international trade and economic relations requires Mainland support. The Republic of China must insist that it is a "Republic," of "China." Since it is China, therefore it must not pursue independence as Taiwan. Since it is a "republic," therefore it must implement freedom and democracy. Beijing will have no reason to forcibly occupy Taiwan. In other words, reunification will not be easy. Instead, the two sides must behave pragmatically and "maintain political relations under special conditions in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." So-called political relations requires a peace agreement under the big roof theory of China. This would reduce internal friction from Taiwan independence. This would reduce pressure on Beijing to reunify. This would reduce pressures towards reunification and independence. Each side would concentrate on its own internal and external governance. If this can be achieved, the Republic of China can engage in international trade within the framework of cross-Strait political relations.
If President Ma is seeking an historical legacy, he must establish it during the next three years. He must lay the foundation for the consolidation of our nation's constitutional rule and the bolstering of our nation's international standing. If the DPP wishes to return to power, it must assume the heavy responsibility of consolidating our constitutional rule and bolstering our international standing. Citizens of the Republic of China must make the ruling and opposition parties return to these two issues: consolidating our constitutional rule, and bolstering our international standing. This is the only way out for the Republic of China.
新年祝願：鞏固憲政 經營國際
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.01
今天是中華民國一○二年元旦，即是開國一○二周年紀念日。我們的新年祝願是：鞏固憲政，經營國際。
在世界、兩岸及台灣內部皆值劇變的今日，鞏固憲政與經營國際，是中華民國生存發展的兩大課題。鞏固憲政，不僅要改善中華民國內部的國憲認同，與提升民主憲政的運作品質；亦須努力在「一個中國」的範圍中，尋找中華民國在兩岸之間的立足點。經營國際，則在將台灣營造為一個自由開放的亞太經貿平台，藉由多元多邊的世界經貿紐帶，以建立並穩固台灣的國際角色與地位。
這二者之間，有相輔相成的關係。中華民國能在內部及兩岸鞏固其憲政體制，應有利於經營其國際經貿關係；而自由開放的國際經貿關係，亦有利於鞏固中華民國在內部及兩岸的憲政地位。
先談鞏固憲政。中華民國憲政經過多年在內部及兩岸的跌宕震盪，在內部出現了如民進黨謝長廷的「憲法共識／憲法各表」；在北京則出現了「從各自現行規定（憲法）出發」的思維，胡錦濤甚至說「確認（大陸和台灣同屬一個中國）這一事實，符合兩岸現行規定，應該是雙方都可以做到的」。這類思考顯示，不但在台灣內部漸已明白「無中華民國則台灣不保」，連北京亦知「台灣的現行規定（一中憲法）」，即是維繫「一個中國」及兩岸和平發展的支柱。此即本報社論所說的杯子理論：「中華民國是杯，台灣是水；杯在水在，杯破水覆。」
也就是說，鞏固中華民國憲政，非但符合台灣的利益；而維繫中華民國的憲政運作於不墜（從各自現行規定出發），亦是維持「一個中國」的唯一路徑，因而也符合兩岸的共同利益。所以，究其實際，北京近幾年來所做的一切努力，亦不啻皆在維護這一部中華民國的一中憲法而已，或皆在防範台灣以正名制憲顛覆了這部憲法而已。說白了，兩岸在鞏固中華民國憲政上，具有共同利益。
如何維繫此種共同利益？北京的兩岸政策重心，已由「唯統一」、「非統一不可」之刻板陳述，轉移到「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。直截了當地說，兩岸若能「從各自現行規定（憲法）出發」，簽定《和平協議》之類的架構，以穩定「尚未統一特殊情況下的政治關係」，前述共同利益即可獲得保證，此即本報所主張的：「在大屋頂中國之下簽訂和平協議。」
準此以論，對台灣而言，鞏固中華民國憲政，不止是要在台灣內部努力，亦須在兩岸之間努力。對北京而言，也須有更超邁開闊的思維，將「大屋頂中國」納入「一個中國原則」。
再談經營國際。不論從世局、兩岸的發展趨勢，及台灣的處境言，台灣未來的發展路徑圖應是：ＥＣＦＡ→自由經濟示範區→ＴＩＦＡ→ＦＴＡ→ＴＰＰ（或／及ＲＣＥＰ）→自由經貿島。但這不是一條容易走的路：一、要走這條路，對台灣的內在承受力及對外競爭力，皆是重大考驗；二、要走這條路，須有足夠的兩岸善意與互信，使北京不致掣肘，並轉為樂觀其成的助力。
這條路是台灣不能不走的路，且是台灣的唯一生路；它不只是台灣經濟的出路，也是台灣用以平衡兩岸關係及與國際建立連結的政經架構。
然而，顯而易見，台灣欲經營其國際經貿角色，亦與兩岸關係糾纏一處。台獨已無可能，中華民國必須在「一個中國」的範圍內尋求立足點，並在此一憲政架構下經營台灣的國際經貿角色。在台灣內部言，若不能建構整合的國憲認同，就不可能建立足夠的兩岸善意與互信，則台灣對國際的自由開放即不易實現，即使實現亦很難維持。在北京言，若將重心置於經營「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，即應對台灣的國際政經空間給予考慮；在政治上，北京必須能使中華民國認同為「一部分的中國」，並使台灣人願認同為「中國人」，則禁堵或干擾台灣融入國際經貿架構的手法，恐皆與此背道而馳。
台灣的國際經貿藍圖必須獲得兩岸關係的支撐。中華民國若能堅持是「中華」的「民國」；「中華」就是不搞台獨，「民國」即是實行自由民主體制；則北京即無理由以武力強取台灣，也就形同宣告「統一」之不易，兩岸即應共同務實經營「尚未統一特殊情況下的政治關係」。我們認為，此一「政治關係」，可以表現於「在大屋頂中國下簽定和平協議」；如此，台灣即可減少「台獨」的內耗，北京也可放緩「統一」的壓力，分別降低統獨的牽絆，致力於各自的內外治理。倘能臻此，台灣亦可在兩岸此種「政治關係」之上，經營其國際經貿角色。
馬總統若欲建立其歷史定位，應在未來三年多任期內，為鞏固憲政及經營國際奠定基礎；民進黨若欲重新執政，亦當以鞏固憲政與經營國際為重責大任；全體國人更應督責朝野政黨回歸到鞏固憲政及經營國際的兩大課題上，因為這是中華民國的唯一生路。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 1, 2012
Summary: If President Ma is seeking an historical legacy, he must establish it during the next three years. He must lay the foundation for the consolidation of our nation's constitutional rule and the bolstering of our nation's international standing. If the DPP wishes to return to power, it must assume the heavy responsibility of consolidating our constitutional rule and bolstering our international standing.
Full Text below:
Today is New Year's Day, in the 102nd Year of the Republic of China. Today is the 102nd anniversary of our nation's founding. Our wishes for the New Year are to consolidate our nation's constitutional rule, and to bolster our nation's international standing.
Dramatic changes are taking place around the world, in the Taiwan Straits, and on Taiwan. We must consolidate our nation's constitutional rule, and bolster our nation's international standing. We must do this to ensure the survival of the Republic of China. To consolidate our nation's constitutional rule means more than increasing allegiance towards the Republic of China and the Republic of China Constitution. It also means raising the quality of our democracy and its constitutional rule. An effort must be made within the one China framework. We must find a place for the Republic of China within the cross-Strait framework. To bolster our international standing, we must transform Taiwan into a free and open Asian-Pacific economic and trade platform. We must use multilateral world trade and economic ties to bolster the Republic of China's international standing.
The two goals are complementary. If the Republic of China consolidates its system of constitutional rule, both internally and within the cross-Strait framework, it will also bolster its international economic and trade relations. Conversely, free and open international trade and economic relations will help consolidate the Republic of China's system of constitutional rule, both on Taiwan and within the cross-Strait framework.
Let us first address the consolidation of constitutional rule. Constitutional rule in the Republic of China has undergone many shocks over the years, both on Taiwan and within the cross-Strait framework. On Taiwan, DPP leader Frank Hsieh has set forth his "constitutional consensus" and "different constitutional interpretations." On the Mainland, CCP leaders are talking about "using the two sides' existing legal provisions, (i.e., constitutions), as a point of departure." Hu Jintao even said, "We affirm (that both the Mainland and Taiwan are part of one China). This reality is consistent with both sides' existing legal provisions. It is something both sides can accept." This thinking shows that people on Taiwan are not the only ones who realize that "Without the Republic of China, Taiwan's survival cannot be assured." Even Beijing realizes that the "Republic of China's existing legal provisions," i.e., its one China Constitution, is the pillar that supports one China and cross-Strait peaceful development. That is also this newspaper's glass theory. "The Republic of China is a glass, Taiwan is the water. As long as the glass remains intact, the water remains in the glass. Once the glass is shattered, the water runs off everywhere."
In other words, consolidation of constitutional rule for the Republic of China accords not just with the interests of the public on Taiwan. It also ensures that constitutional rule for the Republic of China survives. As Beijing puts it, "using the two sides' existing legal provisions (i.e., constitutions), as a point of departure." It is also the only way to champion "one China." Therefore it also accords with both sides' interests. Consider the facts. In recent years, Beijing has invested a great deal of effort into Taiwan. Beijing has undeniably been upholding the Republic of China's one China constitution. It has been preventing Taiwan from embarking on the "rectification of names" and undermining the constitution. Put simply, the two sides have a common interest in consolidating the Republic of China's constitutional rule. .
How should these common interests be maintained? Beijing's cross-Strait policy used to be a rigid "Only reunification will do." Now however, its policy has morphed into "exploring cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." The two sides should "take existing legal provisions (their constitutions) as a point of departure" in order to sign a peace agreement. This would stabilize "political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified." The aforementioned common interests would be protected. This is what this newspaper proposed, the signing of a peace agreement under the big roof theory of China.
For the public on Taiwan, consolidating the Republic of China's constitutional rule is not merely something people on Taiwan must strive for. It is also something that both sides of the Taiwan Strait should strive for. For Beijing, this requires an even broader vision. It requires incorporating the big roof theory of China into the one China principle.
Now consider the issue of bolstering our nation's international standing. Consider the global picture, cross-Strait trends, and Taiwan's dilemma. Taiwan's development will probably proceed from ECFA to a free trade zone pilot program, to TIFA, to FTAs, to TPP or RCEP, and finally to a Free Trade Island. But this is no easy path. One. This path will be a major test of Taiwan's internal perseverance and external competitiveness. Two. This path requires adequate cross-Strait goodwill and mutual trust. Beijing must not hobble Taiwan. It must be eager to see it succeed.
This is the path the public on Taiwan must take. It is the only way out for the public on Taiwan. It is not merely the way out for Taiwan's economy. It is also the way to bring cross-strait relations into balance, and to establish international political and economic links.
For Taiwan international trade is inextricably linked with cross-Strait relations. Taiwan independence is no longer possible. The Republic of China must seek a foothold for itself within the one China framework. Taiwan's international trade and economic relations must be conducted within the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. On Taiwan, the public must agree on a national identity and swear allegiance to the same constitution. Otherwise it will be impossible to establish enough cross-Strait goodwill and mutual trust. It will not be easy to fling Taiwan's doors open to international markets. Even if we manage to do so, it may be difficult to keep them open. Beijing's focus is on "political relations under special conditions in which the two sides of the Strait have yet to be reunified." Beijing must consider Taiwan's international political and economic breathing space. Politically Beijing must allow the Republic of China to be accepted as part of China. Taiwanese must be willing to define themselves as Chinese. Interfering with Taiwan's integration into the international economic and trade framework would be counterproductive.
The Republic of China's blueprint for international trade and economic relations requires Mainland support. The Republic of China must insist that it is a "Republic," of "China." Since it is China, therefore it must not pursue independence as Taiwan. Since it is a "republic," therefore it must implement freedom and democracy. Beijing will have no reason to forcibly occupy Taiwan. In other words, reunification will not be easy. Instead, the two sides must behave pragmatically and "maintain political relations under special conditions in which the two sides have yet to be reunified." So-called political relations requires a peace agreement under the big roof theory of China. This would reduce internal friction from Taiwan independence. This would reduce pressure on Beijing to reunify. This would reduce pressures towards reunification and independence. Each side would concentrate on its own internal and external governance. If this can be achieved, the Republic of China can engage in international trade within the framework of cross-Strait political relations.
If President Ma is seeking an historical legacy, he must establish it during the next three years. He must lay the foundation for the consolidation of our nation's constitutional rule and the bolstering of our nation's international standing. If the DPP wishes to return to power, it must assume the heavy responsibility of consolidating our constitutional rule and bolstering our international standing. Citizens of the Republic of China must make the ruling and opposition parties return to these two issues: consolidating our constitutional rule, and bolstering our international standing. This is the only way out for the Republic of China.
新年祝願：鞏固憲政 經營國際
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.01.01
今天是中華民國一○二年元旦，即是開國一○二周年紀念日。我們的新年祝願是：鞏固憲政，經營國際。
在世界、兩岸及台灣內部皆值劇變的今日，鞏固憲政與經營國際，是中華民國生存發展的兩大課題。鞏固憲政，不僅要改善中華民國內部的國憲認同，與提升民主憲政的運作品質；亦須努力在「一個中國」的範圍中，尋找中華民國在兩岸之間的立足點。經營國際，則在將台灣營造為一個自由開放的亞太經貿平台，藉由多元多邊的世界經貿紐帶，以建立並穩固台灣的國際角色與地位。
這二者之間，有相輔相成的關係。中華民國能在內部及兩岸鞏固其憲政體制，應有利於經營其國際經貿關係；而自由開放的國際經貿關係，亦有利於鞏固中華民國在內部及兩岸的憲政地位。
先談鞏固憲政。中華民國憲政經過多年在內部及兩岸的跌宕震盪，在內部出現了如民進黨謝長廷的「憲法共識／憲法各表」；在北京則出現了「從各自現行規定（憲法）出發」的思維，胡錦濤甚至說「確認（大陸和台灣同屬一個中國）這一事實，符合兩岸現行規定，應該是雙方都可以做到的」。這類思考顯示，不但在台灣內部漸已明白「無中華民國則台灣不保」，連北京亦知「台灣的現行規定（一中憲法）」，即是維繫「一個中國」及兩岸和平發展的支柱。此即本報社論所說的杯子理論：「中華民國是杯，台灣是水；杯在水在，杯破水覆。」
也就是說，鞏固中華民國憲政，非但符合台灣的利益；而維繫中華民國的憲政運作於不墜（從各自現行規定出發），亦是維持「一個中國」的唯一路徑，因而也符合兩岸的共同利益。所以，究其實際，北京近幾年來所做的一切努力，亦不啻皆在維護這一部中華民國的一中憲法而已，或皆在防範台灣以正名制憲顛覆了這部憲法而已。說白了，兩岸在鞏固中華民國憲政上，具有共同利益。
如何維繫此種共同利益？北京的兩岸政策重心，已由「唯統一」、「非統一不可」之刻板陳述，轉移到「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」。直截了當地說，兩岸若能「從各自現行規定（憲法）出發」，簽定《和平協議》之類的架構，以穩定「尚未統一特殊情況下的政治關係」，前述共同利益即可獲得保證，此即本報所主張的：「在大屋頂中國之下簽訂和平協議。」
準此以論，對台灣而言，鞏固中華民國憲政，不止是要在台灣內部努力，亦須在兩岸之間努力。對北京而言，也須有更超邁開闊的思維，將「大屋頂中國」納入「一個中國原則」。
再談經營國際。不論從世局、兩岸的發展趨勢，及台灣的處境言，台灣未來的發展路徑圖應是：ＥＣＦＡ→自由經濟示範區→ＴＩＦＡ→ＦＴＡ→ＴＰＰ（或／及ＲＣＥＰ）→自由經貿島。但這不是一條容易走的路：一、要走這條路，對台灣的內在承受力及對外競爭力，皆是重大考驗；二、要走這條路，須有足夠的兩岸善意與互信，使北京不致掣肘，並轉為樂觀其成的助力。
這條路是台灣不能不走的路，且是台灣的唯一生路；它不只是台灣經濟的出路，也是台灣用以平衡兩岸關係及與國際建立連結的政經架構。
然而，顯而易見，台灣欲經營其國際經貿角色，亦與兩岸關係糾纏一處。台獨已無可能，中華民國必須在「一個中國」的範圍內尋求立足點，並在此一憲政架構下經營台灣的國際經貿角色。在台灣內部言，若不能建構整合的國憲認同，就不可能建立足夠的兩岸善意與互信，則台灣對國際的自由開放即不易實現，即使實現亦很難維持。在北京言，若將重心置於經營「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，即應對台灣的國際政經空間給予考慮；在政治上，北京必須能使中華民國認同為「一部分的中國」，並使台灣人願認同為「中國人」，則禁堵或干擾台灣融入國際經貿架構的手法，恐皆與此背道而馳。
台灣的國際經貿藍圖必須獲得兩岸關係的支撐。中華民國若能堅持是「中華」的「民國」；「中華」就是不搞台獨，「民國」即是實行自由民主體制；則北京即無理由以武力強取台灣，也就形同宣告「統一」之不易，兩岸即應共同務實經營「尚未統一特殊情況下的政治關係」。我們認為，此一「政治關係」，可以表現於「在大屋頂中國下簽定和平協議」；如此，台灣即可減少「台獨」的內耗，北京也可放緩「統一」的壓力，分別降低統獨的牽絆，致力於各自的內外治理。倘能臻此，台灣亦可在兩岸此種「政治關係」之上，經營其國際經貿角色。
馬總統若欲建立其歷史定位，應在未來三年多任期內，為鞏固憲政及經營國際奠定基礎；民進黨若欲重新執政，亦當以鞏固憲政與經營國際為重責大任；全體國人更應督責朝野政黨回歸到鞏固憲政及經營國際的兩大課題上，因為這是中華民國的唯一生路。
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