New Superpower or New Superparty?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 11, 2013
Summary: Obama gave Xi Jinping a present, a California Redwood setee. The two men sat side by side on it for a photo op. The image showed the two on an equal footing. The relationship may be a "new superpower relationship." It may be a "new partnership." Either way, it suggests wide acceptance of the notion of a "G2."
Full Text below:
Obama gave Xi Jinping a present, a California Redwood setee. The two men sat side by side on it for a photo op. The image showed the two on an equal footing. The relationship may be a "new superpower relationship." It may be a "new partnership." Either way, it suggests wide acceptance of the notion of a "G2."
Xi Jinping and Obama discussed a "new superpower relationship." Let us begin by addressing the notion of Mainland China as a "new style superpower."
Mainland China may well become a "new superpower." Compare Mainland China with the 19th century British Empire. The British Empire held high the banner of capitalism. Through aggression, colonization, and exploitation of other countries, it became a great nation. But Mainland China used a century of globalization to become a superpower. It used high volume, low-wage labor to become the "world's factory." This made it a "new style superpower."
Compare Mainland China with 20th century Soviet Communism. The Soviet Union led the Cold War. It led North-South confrontation. Shock therapy failed to save this single party dictatorship. Eventually it imploded. By contrast, Mainland China, under Deng Xiaoping's "reform and liberalization," became a model for the transformation of communist regimes. This too made it a "new style superpower."
Now compare Mainland China with the United States. The U.S. was established by emigrants who objected to home rule by Great Britain. From the very beginning it had a free and democratic political system. Mainland China by contrast, experienced the three red flags, the Cultural Revolution, the June 4 Incident, and other such governance nightmares. It owes its people a political debt not easily paid off. This too makes it a "new style superpower."
These comparisons show that Mainland China will not become an aggressor like the British Empire. It will not implement an "Iron Curtain" like the Soviet Union. It has already successfully negotiated its internal crisis. It will not implode the way the Soviet Union did. Therefore Mainland China is a new style superpower that has the wherewithal to maintain peaceful foreign relations.
Mainland China's problems are internal. The United States was founded on freedom and democracy. It upholds these universal values. It may be guilty of hypocrisy and double standards. But it has not deviated from liberal democracy. This important pillar provides support for this superpower. What sort of value system will Mainland China use to maintain harmony internally, and define itself externally? This will be the ultimate test of this new style superpower.
Xi Jinping said, [Mainland] China will not export revolution, will not export hunger and poverty, and will not attempt to sow chaos among others. What else is there to say? These are things that the new style superpower will not do internationally. But a more fundamental question is, what moral high ground will this new style superpower seek internally? Will it merely flaunt its status as a "new superparty?"
The Chinese Communist Party has become a "new superparty." It is the world's largest political party. For 60 years it has no opposition political parties to speak against it. It has practiced Communist one-party dictatorship. But it has not imploded the way the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries did. It still uses the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to assert one party control over the land and resources. It still uses a wide range of political tools to impose "capitalism with Chinese characteristics." These have enabled the Chinese Communist Party to become a "new superparty." For now and for the foreseeable short term future, it remains a successful model. But is it a sustainable model? That is a major question.
The CCP cannot use "Chinese characteristics" to maintain its "new superparty" rule, in perpetuity. It cannot avoid universal values such as freedom and democracy in perpetuity. These have already been made part of the "seven unmentionables." The Mainland government wants China to be a superpower. But the constitutional rights of the people remain unfulfilled. The human quest for freedom and democracy remains frustrated. The only law is "one-party communist dictatorship, forever." What civilized human values can the Mainland government invoke? How can it be a true superpower?
Actually, the CCP could use the Sudong Po dominoes turmoil to transform itself into a new superparty, and to create a political miracle. Its next step should be to invoke its "new superparty" status. It should take a different path than "old country" superpowers such as Great Britain, America, and the Soviet Union. Mainland China can become a model for the universal values of freedom and democracy. It can indeed achieve "new style superpower" status. The rejuvenation of the Chinese nation cannot ensure that the Communist Party will forever remain a "great" one-party dictatorship. It is impossible. A genuine renaissance must be founded on freedom and democracy for every member of the Chinese nation.
For Mainland China to be a "superpower," it must be "internally a saint, externally a king." In today's language, "internally a saint" means democracy, whereas "externally a king" means peace with other nations. The Chinese Communist Party cannot alter these requirements by imposing its will as a one-party dictatorship. Mainland China must become a new style superpower. Only then can it establish a "new relationship among superpowers." Only then can it establish a new model for human civilization. Only then, can it speak of a great renaissance of the Chinese nation.
How cross-strait relations should bear on external relations presents a major challenge to this new style superpower. Can cross-strait relations be reconciled with "peace externally" and "democracy internally?" Can reasonable arrangements be made? The new style superpower framework may not support these. That means that externally "new superpower relationships" may be difficult to maintain as well.
新型大國或新型大黨？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.11 02:14 am
歐巴馬贈與習近平一張加州紅杉二人座的長椅，兩人並肩坐在椅上合影；此一平起平坐的圖像顯示，不論是「新型大國關係」或「新合作關係」，皆透露著一股「Ｇ２」的飛揚意態。
習近平與歐巴馬談「新型大國關係」，其實，可先從把中國大陸建構為「新型的大國」作起。
中國不無可能成為「新型的大國」。若以中國與十九世紀的大英帝國相比，英帝國高舉資本主義的大纛，經由侵略、殖民及剝削他國，成為大國；但中國則是趁上世紀末的全球化風潮，以大量低工資的勞動階級成為「世界工廠」而崛起。這是「新型」。
再將中國與二十世紀的共產主義蘇聯相比，蘇聯以領導東西冷戰與南北對抗為能事，最後是因「休克療法」未能挽救一黨專政而致大國崩解；中國則在鄧小平的「改革開放」下，成為共產政權的轉型典範。這也是「新型」。
再以中國與美國比，美國原就是由抗議英國母國統治的出走者所建，自始即有自由民主的立國價值體系；而中國卻經歷了三面紅旗、文革、六四等統治夢魘，對其人民尚有不易償贖的政治債務。這亦是「新型」。
由以上簡略的比較可知，中國不會變成英帝國那樣的侵略國，亦不會變成蘇聯那樣的「鐵幕連線」，也已暫度過蘇聯那樣自內部瓦解的危機；因此，中國在對外關係上，確具備主張「外部和平」的新型大國條件。
但是，中國的問題在內部。像美國以自由民主立國，站在普世價值的同一邊，雖亦有其偽善及兩重標準的行徑，畢竟不曾背離自由民主，這是支撐其為大國的重要支柱；而中國將以何種價值體系來維持其「內部和諧」及「外部號召」，這才是新型大國的終極考驗。
習近平曾說：中國一不輸出革命，二不輸出饑餓和貧困，三不折騰你們，還有什麼好說的？這些，皆是新型大國的對外條件。但根本的問題卻在於：其內部的統治究竟是具有「新型大國」的道德高度，抑或只是以標榜一個「新型大黨」而自豪？
中共已經成為一個「新型大黨」。它是舉世最大的政黨，且是一個六十餘年來沒有反對黨的政黨；它實行共產黨的一黨專政，卻未像蘇聯及東歐諸國一樣崩解；它仍以「無產階級專政」為名，卻以一黨控制之土地、資源及各種統治工具來推進「有中國特色的資本主義」……。這些，皆使中共成為一個「新型大黨」，而且迄今及在可見的短期未來，它皆是一個成功的模式。然而，這會不會是一個永續的模式，卻是個大問號。
因為，中共不可能永遠以「中國特色」來維持這種「新型大黨」的統治正當性。亦即，它不可能永遠不面對必然趨向自由民主的公民社會與普世價值（皆已列入「七不講」）。中國若想作為一個「大國」，若連人民的憲法權利皆不能兌現，若連自由民主的人性追求都不能實現，而認為「共產黨永遠一黨專政」是唯一的政治鐵律，其對於全人類文明價值之號召何在？又如何成為名副其實的大國？
其實，中共能在「蘇東波」的骨牌風潮中，轉型成為一個新型大黨，誠為一個政經奇蹟。下一步，即應運用此一「新型大黨」的特殊條件，設法使中國能經由與英、美、蘇聯那些「老牌大國」不同的路徑，而也能成為實現自由民主普世價值典範的「新型大國」。因為，中華民族的偉大復興，不會因確保共產黨永世一黨專政而「偉大」（其實，也不可能永遠保住）；真正的「復興」，應是建立在中華民族每一人民皆能享有自由民主之上。
中國的「大國」形象，是「內聖／外王」。以今日語言說，「內聖」即是「民主」，「外王」即是「和平」。此一至理，不可能隨中共一黨專政的意志為轉移。中國必須成為如此的新型大國，始有可能建立並引領真正的「新型大國關係」，亦始有可能作為人類文明的典範；如此，始有可能言中華民族的偉大與復興。
再者，兩岸關係處於「內外介面」之間，如何處理，亦是對新型大國的考驗。若兩岸關係不能經由「外和平」與「內民主」的途徑合理的安排，新型大國的架構必難支撐，對外的「新型大國關係」恐怕也就難以維繫。
Monday, June 10, 2013
Sunday, June 9, 2013
Sunnylands Summit: Historic Meeting between Obama and Xi
Sunnylands Summit: Historic Meeting between Obama and Xi
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 10, 2013
Summary: Barack Obama and Xi Jinping held a summit at the Sunnylands estate in Rancho Mirage, California. They spoke, face to face, for over eight hours. The first day's working dinner continued late into the evening, concluding at 10:45. Such close interaction between the two nations' officials is unprecedented. The Sunnylands estate summit will not be the last. As the summit concluded, Xi Jinping invited President Obama to visit Beijing. The two would hold a similar, informal summit. There were few substantive results this time. But the importance of the summit for Sino-US relations should be clear.
Full Text below:
Barack Obama and Xi Jinping held a summit at the Sunnylands estate in Rancho Mirage, California. They spoke, face to face, for over eight hours. The first day's working dinner continued late into the evening, concluding at 10:45. Such close interaction between the two nations' officials is unprecedented.
The White House announced this informal summit less than three weeks ago. Obama and Xi were originally expected to meet at APEC and the G20 summit three months from now. But Washington concluded that Xi Jinping had already consolidated his power. Therefore there was no need to "wait and see." Washington concluded that it was better to meet sooner than later. Otherwise, once Beijing's diplomatic strategy was set, it would be too late. Beijing also felt that Xi Jinping's top priority upon taking office should be to consolidate U.S. policy. No state banquet. No 21 gun salute. The important thing was a candid face to face discussion with Obama himself. Therefore following Xi's scheduled visit to the Caribbean, he went from Washington's backyard to its front yard.
Beijing and Washington have never before held such an informal summit. This was not because Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao has any particular attachment to diplomatic protocol. This was because in the past Beijing leaders' diplomatic speeches were subject to the approval of the Politburo. Its leaders did not have the self-confidence and authority to conduct direct talks with foreign heads of state. But Xi Jinping's status is different. He possesses the necessary eloquence to set aside the script and communicate face to face with foreign heads of state.
US National Security Adviser Tom Donilon and Beijing State Councilor Yang Jiechi issued a summary of the proceedings. Obama and Xi agreed on very few issues, and disagreed on many. The two sides reached a consensus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. They agreed not to recognize North Korea as a nuclear power. But they differed on Internet hacker attacks, sovereignty in the South China Sea, RMB exchange rates, and arms sales to Taipei.
Having differences is normal. For the two sides to see things in exactly the same way would be abnormal. After all, Mainland China and the US have very different cultures. More importantly, one is the dominant power. The other is an emerging power. The two sides are well aware of their differences. The two leaders' clash symbolizes the significance of this summit.
Throughout history, large-scale wars have taken place when an emerging power challenges a dominant hegemonic power. Greek historian Thucydides noted how when Sparta attempted to prevent the rise of Athens, it precipitated 30 years of war. Harvard professor Graham Allison termed this the "Thucydides Trap." He felt this applied to Germany just before the war in Europe. He thinks it may apply to today's Chinese mainland as well.
The United States wants to remain the primary force in Asia. It wants to "maintain long-term stability in Asia." But Mainland China wants to reassert its historical status as the superpower in Asia. As Mainland China sees it, even if the United States does not leave Asia, it should at least stand to one side. Therefore it advocates the development of a "new relationship among the major powers." The two sides' thinking on regional leadership differ. Friction, therefore, is guaranteed. If the two governments want peaceful coexistence, the summit is a good starting point.
Some U.S. officials have concluded that this "New Power Relation" implies that Washington should not interfere with Mainland China's "core interests." These "core interests" are national interests about which Mainland China cannot compromise. They include Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. During the summit, Xi Jinping said he hoped Obama understands and respects Mainland China's "core interests." In other words, Beijing wants to define its "sphere of influence." The question is, will Washington acquiesce?
Obama spoke of "a new power relationship between the United States and China." This does not mean the United States accepts Mainland China's formulation. East Asia has become the global economic center. Therefore the U.S. is extremely reluctant to accept Mainland China's regional dominance. U.S. Navy and Air Force presence in the Asian Pacific region has increased 60%. This suggests that Washington's Asian rebalancing strategy remains in place, and that it is refusing to withdraw.
During the summit, Xi Jinping referred to the Taiwan issue. He reiterated Beijing's principles and stance on Taiwan. He stressed that this issue concerns the patriotic sentiments of 1.3 billion people. He urged the United States to abide by the three Sino-US joint communiques, to adhere to the "one China" policy, to take concrete action to support the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, and to cease its arms sales to Taipei.
This may sound like an old tune. But the fact that it was raised at all, means it warrants close attention. The Taiwan issue is not longer what it was during past Washington-Beijing tensions, If Washington and Beijing establish a new power relationship, Washington-Taipei relations are bound to be affected. Cross-strait relations are bound to be affected as well. Responsible ministries in our government must understand Obama's response, and formulate follow-up responses.
The Sunnylands estate summit will not be the last. As the summit concluded, Xi Jinping invited President Obama to visit Beijing. The two would hold a similar, informal summit. There were few substantive results this time. But the importance of the summit for Sino-US relations should be clear.
陽光莊園高峰會 歐習歷史性會晤
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.10
歐巴馬與習近平在加州陽光莊園的高峰會，兩人晤面時間超過八小時，首日工作晚餐後的討論更延續到深夜十點四十四分。這樣的密切互動，在兩國歷史上是空前的。
從白宮宣布這次不拘形式的高峰會到真正召開，時間不到三周。本來三個月後的ＡＰＥＣ會議及Ｇ２０高峰會，歐習兩人都將見面，但美方認為習近平權力已經鞏固，沒有必要觀望，晚見不如早見；否則，待北京外交戰略形成，就來不及了。而中方也認為，習近平上任之初，最重要的就是將對美政策確定下來，沒有國宴、沒有廿一響禮炮皆無所謂，重要的是與歐巴馬本人坦誠面談。因此，習在預定的加勒比海訪問後，從美國的「後院」來到美國的「前院」停留會晤。
如此隨興的峰會形式，中美之間未曾有過。倒不是因為過去江澤民與胡錦濤特別拘泥高峰外交禮儀，而是過去中國領導人的外交致詞都須經政治局批准，領導人沒有足夠的自信與授權直接與外國元首會談。而習近平的外交格局不同，他可以拋開講稿，與外國元首面對面溝通，侃侃而談。
綜合會後美國國安顧問唐尼倫及中共國務委員楊潔篪的簡報，歐習兩人在會中同意的事少，不同意的事多。就減少溫室氣體排放及不承認北韓為核武國家，雙方有共識；但在網路駭客攻擊、南海的主權糾紛、人民幣匯率操縱和對台軍售議題上，則有歧見。
有歧見是正常的，雙方看法完全一致，才不正常。畢竟，中美兩國文化背景大不相同，更重要的是，一個是目前稱霸的強權，另一個是崛起的新興強權，雙方的認知各自不同。兩國領導人象徵式的碰撞，才是此次高峰會的意義。
縱觀歷史，世界上的大規模戰爭總發生在一個新興國家挑戰既有霸權的時候。希臘歷史學家修昔底德觀察到，斯巴達為阻止雅典的崛起，釀成卅年的戰爭；哈佛大學教授格雷厄姆‧阿利森（Graham Allison）稱之為「修昔底德陷阱」（Thucydides’s trap），認為這適用於歐戰前的德國，也可能適用今天的中國大陸。
美國希望自己仍是主導亞洲秩序的最主要力量，以維持亞洲的長期穩定；但中國則希望恢復自己亞洲第一大國的歷史地位，美國即使不退出亞洲，至少也要站邊去，因而主張發展「新型大國關係」。雙方不同的區域領導思維，勢必發生摩擦；兩國想要在競爭中保持和平共處之姿，這次峰會至少是一個起點。
某些美國官員認為，「新型大國關係」實即暗指美國不應干預中國的「核心利益」。所謂「核心利益」，是指中國絕對不能讓步的國家利益，如西藏、新疆和台灣等問題。習近平在高峰會中希望歐巴馬理解並尊重中國的「核心利益」，換句話說，北京想要在其周邊地區劃出「勢力範圍」。問題是，美國會不會退讓？
歐巴馬雖在致詞中談到「推動建設美中新型大國關係」，但這未必意味美國接受此一提法。事實上，隨著東亞逐漸成為全球經濟中心，美國極不願意將區域主導權讓給中國。美國海空軍在亞太地區的比例，正持續往六成增加，意味著其亞洲再平衡策略仍堅不退讓。
值得注意的是，習近平在高峰會上提出了台灣問題，重申了中方對台灣的原則和立場，並強調此議題涉及十三億人民的民族感情，要求美方恪守中美三個聯合公報，堅持「一個中國」政策，以實際行動支持兩岸關係的和平發展，停止售台武器。
看似舊調重彈，但僅僅提出議題本身，即值得我方密切注意。尤其，目前台灣問題的性質已不同於過去美中緊張時期，若美中發展新型大國關係，勢必衝擊美台關係，也將影響兩岸關係的進展。我相關部門應盡快了解歐巴馬的回應，以擬定後續的因應政策。
這次陽光莊園高峰會，不會是最後一次。在會晤的尾聲，習近平邀請歐巴馬總統訪中，兩人再做一次類似不拘形式的高峰會。也許這次沒有太多實質成果，但它在中美關係史上的重要性已經確立。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 10, 2013
Summary: Barack Obama and Xi Jinping held a summit at the Sunnylands estate in Rancho Mirage, California. They spoke, face to face, for over eight hours. The first day's working dinner continued late into the evening, concluding at 10:45. Such close interaction between the two nations' officials is unprecedented. The Sunnylands estate summit will not be the last. As the summit concluded, Xi Jinping invited President Obama to visit Beijing. The two would hold a similar, informal summit. There were few substantive results this time. But the importance of the summit for Sino-US relations should be clear.
Full Text below:
Barack Obama and Xi Jinping held a summit at the Sunnylands estate in Rancho Mirage, California. They spoke, face to face, for over eight hours. The first day's working dinner continued late into the evening, concluding at 10:45. Such close interaction between the two nations' officials is unprecedented.
The White House announced this informal summit less than three weeks ago. Obama and Xi were originally expected to meet at APEC and the G20 summit three months from now. But Washington concluded that Xi Jinping had already consolidated his power. Therefore there was no need to "wait and see." Washington concluded that it was better to meet sooner than later. Otherwise, once Beijing's diplomatic strategy was set, it would be too late. Beijing also felt that Xi Jinping's top priority upon taking office should be to consolidate U.S. policy. No state banquet. No 21 gun salute. The important thing was a candid face to face discussion with Obama himself. Therefore following Xi's scheduled visit to the Caribbean, he went from Washington's backyard to its front yard.
Beijing and Washington have never before held such an informal summit. This was not because Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao has any particular attachment to diplomatic protocol. This was because in the past Beijing leaders' diplomatic speeches were subject to the approval of the Politburo. Its leaders did not have the self-confidence and authority to conduct direct talks with foreign heads of state. But Xi Jinping's status is different. He possesses the necessary eloquence to set aside the script and communicate face to face with foreign heads of state.
US National Security Adviser Tom Donilon and Beijing State Councilor Yang Jiechi issued a summary of the proceedings. Obama and Xi agreed on very few issues, and disagreed on many. The two sides reached a consensus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. They agreed not to recognize North Korea as a nuclear power. But they differed on Internet hacker attacks, sovereignty in the South China Sea, RMB exchange rates, and arms sales to Taipei.
Having differences is normal. For the two sides to see things in exactly the same way would be abnormal. After all, Mainland China and the US have very different cultures. More importantly, one is the dominant power. The other is an emerging power. The two sides are well aware of their differences. The two leaders' clash symbolizes the significance of this summit.
Throughout history, large-scale wars have taken place when an emerging power challenges a dominant hegemonic power. Greek historian Thucydides noted how when Sparta attempted to prevent the rise of Athens, it precipitated 30 years of war. Harvard professor Graham Allison termed this the "Thucydides Trap." He felt this applied to Germany just before the war in Europe. He thinks it may apply to today's Chinese mainland as well.
The United States wants to remain the primary force in Asia. It wants to "maintain long-term stability in Asia." But Mainland China wants to reassert its historical status as the superpower in Asia. As Mainland China sees it, even if the United States does not leave Asia, it should at least stand to one side. Therefore it advocates the development of a "new relationship among the major powers." The two sides' thinking on regional leadership differ. Friction, therefore, is guaranteed. If the two governments want peaceful coexistence, the summit is a good starting point.
Some U.S. officials have concluded that this "New Power Relation" implies that Washington should not interfere with Mainland China's "core interests." These "core interests" are national interests about which Mainland China cannot compromise. They include Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. During the summit, Xi Jinping said he hoped Obama understands and respects Mainland China's "core interests." In other words, Beijing wants to define its "sphere of influence." The question is, will Washington acquiesce?
Obama spoke of "a new power relationship between the United States and China." This does not mean the United States accepts Mainland China's formulation. East Asia has become the global economic center. Therefore the U.S. is extremely reluctant to accept Mainland China's regional dominance. U.S. Navy and Air Force presence in the Asian Pacific region has increased 60%. This suggests that Washington's Asian rebalancing strategy remains in place, and that it is refusing to withdraw.
During the summit, Xi Jinping referred to the Taiwan issue. He reiterated Beijing's principles and stance on Taiwan. He stressed that this issue concerns the patriotic sentiments of 1.3 billion people. He urged the United States to abide by the three Sino-US joint communiques, to adhere to the "one China" policy, to take concrete action to support the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, and to cease its arms sales to Taipei.
This may sound like an old tune. But the fact that it was raised at all, means it warrants close attention. The Taiwan issue is not longer what it was during past Washington-Beijing tensions, If Washington and Beijing establish a new power relationship, Washington-Taipei relations are bound to be affected. Cross-strait relations are bound to be affected as well. Responsible ministries in our government must understand Obama's response, and formulate follow-up responses.
The Sunnylands estate summit will not be the last. As the summit concluded, Xi Jinping invited President Obama to visit Beijing. The two would hold a similar, informal summit. There were few substantive results this time. But the importance of the summit for Sino-US relations should be clear.
陽光莊園高峰會 歐習歷史性會晤
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.10
歐巴馬與習近平在加州陽光莊園的高峰會，兩人晤面時間超過八小時，首日工作晚餐後的討論更延續到深夜十點四十四分。這樣的密切互動，在兩國歷史上是空前的。
從白宮宣布這次不拘形式的高峰會到真正召開，時間不到三周。本來三個月後的ＡＰＥＣ會議及Ｇ２０高峰會，歐習兩人都將見面，但美方認為習近平權力已經鞏固，沒有必要觀望，晚見不如早見；否則，待北京外交戰略形成，就來不及了。而中方也認為，習近平上任之初，最重要的就是將對美政策確定下來，沒有國宴、沒有廿一響禮炮皆無所謂，重要的是與歐巴馬本人坦誠面談。因此，習在預定的加勒比海訪問後，從美國的「後院」來到美國的「前院」停留會晤。
如此隨興的峰會形式，中美之間未曾有過。倒不是因為過去江澤民與胡錦濤特別拘泥高峰外交禮儀，而是過去中國領導人的外交致詞都須經政治局批准，領導人沒有足夠的自信與授權直接與外國元首會談。而習近平的外交格局不同，他可以拋開講稿，與外國元首面對面溝通，侃侃而談。
綜合會後美國國安顧問唐尼倫及中共國務委員楊潔篪的簡報，歐習兩人在會中同意的事少，不同意的事多。就減少溫室氣體排放及不承認北韓為核武國家，雙方有共識；但在網路駭客攻擊、南海的主權糾紛、人民幣匯率操縱和對台軍售議題上，則有歧見。
有歧見是正常的，雙方看法完全一致，才不正常。畢竟，中美兩國文化背景大不相同，更重要的是，一個是目前稱霸的強權，另一個是崛起的新興強權，雙方的認知各自不同。兩國領導人象徵式的碰撞，才是此次高峰會的意義。
縱觀歷史，世界上的大規模戰爭總發生在一個新興國家挑戰既有霸權的時候。希臘歷史學家修昔底德觀察到，斯巴達為阻止雅典的崛起，釀成卅年的戰爭；哈佛大學教授格雷厄姆‧阿利森（Graham Allison）稱之為「修昔底德陷阱」（Thucydides’s trap），認為這適用於歐戰前的德國，也可能適用今天的中國大陸。
美國希望自己仍是主導亞洲秩序的最主要力量，以維持亞洲的長期穩定；但中國則希望恢復自己亞洲第一大國的歷史地位，美國即使不退出亞洲，至少也要站邊去，因而主張發展「新型大國關係」。雙方不同的區域領導思維，勢必發生摩擦；兩國想要在競爭中保持和平共處之姿，這次峰會至少是一個起點。
某些美國官員認為，「新型大國關係」實即暗指美國不應干預中國的「核心利益」。所謂「核心利益」，是指中國絕對不能讓步的國家利益，如西藏、新疆和台灣等問題。習近平在高峰會中希望歐巴馬理解並尊重中國的「核心利益」，換句話說，北京想要在其周邊地區劃出「勢力範圍」。問題是，美國會不會退讓？
歐巴馬雖在致詞中談到「推動建設美中新型大國關係」，但這未必意味美國接受此一提法。事實上，隨著東亞逐漸成為全球經濟中心，美國極不願意將區域主導權讓給中國。美國海空軍在亞太地區的比例，正持續往六成增加，意味著其亞洲再平衡策略仍堅不退讓。
值得注意的是，習近平在高峰會上提出了台灣問題，重申了中方對台灣的原則和立場，並強調此議題涉及十三億人民的民族感情，要求美方恪守中美三個聯合公報，堅持「一個中國」政策，以實際行動支持兩岸關係的和平發展，停止售台武器。
看似舊調重彈，但僅僅提出議題本身，即值得我方密切注意。尤其，目前台灣問題的性質已不同於過去美中緊張時期，若美中發展新型大國關係，勢必衝擊美台關係，也將影響兩岸關係的進展。我相關部門應盡快了解歐巴馬的回應，以擬定後續的因應政策。
這次陽光莊園高峰會，不會是最後一次。在會晤的尾聲，習近平邀請歐巴馬總統訪中，兩人再做一次類似不拘形式的高峰會。也許這次沒有太多實質成果，但它在中美關係史上的重要性已經確立。
Thursday, June 6, 2013
Competition Necessitates Structural Reform
Competition Necessitates Structural Reform
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 5, 2013
Summary: The Swiss School of Management in Lausanne has announced its 2013 global competitiveness rankings for 60 economies. Taiwan fell from 7th place last year to 11th place this year. Hong Kong fell to 3rd place and Singapore fell to 5th place. South Korea remained unchanged in 22nd place. But Taiwan's declining competitiveness has attracted the greatest attention and concern. What factors contributed to Taiwan's decline? What was the role of economic crisis?
Full Text below:
The Swiss School of Management in Lausanne has announced its 2013 global competitiveness rankings for 60 economies. Taiwan fell from 7th place last year to 11th place this year. Hong Kong fell to 3rd place and Singapore fell to 5th place. South Korea remained unchanged in 22nd place. But Taiwan's declining competitiveness has attracted the greatest attention and concern. What factors contributed to Taiwan's decline? What was the role of economic crisis? These are all questions that warrant our attention.
First consider the upside. Taiwan remains competitive in international investment, fiscal management, and international trade. This proves that the government succeed in attracting foreign investment over the past year. Taiwan businesses have also returned to Taiwan, This has improved the fiscal picture. The elimination of trade barriers and the signing of free trade agreements also contributed. This is all enormously gratifying.
But in overall economic performance, Taiwan fell to 16th place. The slow recovery of the international economy impacted exports. This was not under our control. The domestic economy and employment rate fell to 24th place. This was due mainly to insufficient domestic demand. This made businesses reluctant to hire new employees. Salary increases remained small. Overall government effectiveness fell from 5th place to 8th place. This was probably due to long term ruling vs. opposition party deadlocks, inadequate coordination between ministries, and legislative inefficiency. Infrastructure, health, and environmental rankings also fell. These reflect insufficient investment in scientific infrastructure, and insufficient cooperation with industry.
Taiwan has long been proud of its corporate performance. But this plummeted from 4th place to 10th place. Production capacity and efficiency also declined, to 20th place. This is a warning sign that warrants concern. It means Taiwan's industrial upgrading and transformation is too slow. We have failed to jettison the OEM manufacturing-based model. Profit margins have narrowed. We have failed to create added value. We have remained trapped in a vicious cycle of price competition. We lack brand names. We lack competitive human talent. The service sector now accounts for a larger percentage of the total, but has shrunk in absolute terms. Industry is developing unevenly. Monetary easing and low interest rates have attracted funds to real estate. But this is an isolated case, and overly dependent upon government tax breaks, financial deals, and gasoline, water, and electricity subsidies These all constitute structural problems.
In short, Taiwan's competitiveness has declined. Public sector performance has improved slightly. But private sector performance has remained poor. The next question we must ask is: How can the government help the private sector improve its competitiveness? The answer is: Improve enhanced national competitiveness.
The US has regained its supremacy, due mainly to improvements in the financial industry. Numerous technical innovations and successful enterprises have reduced unemployment and gradually stabilized the housing market. Progress on the Chinese mainland is the result of its policy of phasing out low margin manufacturing industries and replacing them with high-tech, high value industries. It has replaced export-oriented industries with re-export industries. It has increased domestic demand, promoted industrial restructuring and upgrading, thereby stabilizing its economy. Japan's "Abenomics" has begun to impact its economic vitality. In the Eurozone, 2nd ranked Switzerland, 4th ranked Sweden, and 9th ranked Germany have all retained their previous rankings. They rely on export-oriented manufacturing, diversification, and SMEs with strong fiscal discipline. No wonder the IMD World Competitiveness Center said, "Structural reform is unavoidable. Development is a prerequisite to competitiveness... competitiveness has a simple golden rule: emphasize production, diversification, exports, investment in infrastructure, education, support for the development of SMEs, increased fiscal discipline, and most importantly, maintaining social cohesion."
This shows us the steps necessary to maintain social cohesion. The executive branch must implement open door policies and make resolute reforms. The ruling and opposition parties in the Legislative Yuan must break the current deadlock and reach a consensus on economic priorities and the people's livelihood. They must overcome their dread of the downside that prevents them from profiting from the upside. They must accelerate the process of deregulation. They must restore public confidence in economic development.
Secondly, the private sector must increase productivity and create added value. It must accelerate industrial upgrading and restructuring. It must shift capital investment from the electronics and technology industries of the past, to real estate. Imbalances must be addressed. Balanced development of industry and diversification is the correct path. How will funds be directed to SMEs, manufacturing, research and development and infrastructure? How can the government encourage job creation, and better educate the technical personnel required by industry? All of these are prerequisites to enhancing industrial efficiency.
The business community must change its policy of cutting salaries whenever the economy is depressed. It must realize that low salaries will not attract talent and cannot retain talent. Conversely, increased wages will improve employee morale. Employees will be more willing to make an effort. This will enhance productivity, benefitting business owners. Financial incentives should be replaced by the allocation of resources in branding, marketing channels, manufacturing, and services. We should encourage industry-university cooperation. This will significantly improve corporate competitiveness.
In conclusion, we hope the government and the public will remain vigilant and work together. We hope that that next year Taiwan's competitiveness will increase, and its economy emerge from under its dark cloud.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.05
社論－衝競爭力 結構性改革已無可避免
本報訊
瑞士洛桑管理學院日前公布涉及六十個經濟體的二○一三年全球競爭力排名，台灣由去年的第七名降至十一名，雖然香港、新加坡也分別降至第三名和第五名，南韓則維持不變（廿二名），但台灣競爭力下降確實引起國人的緊張和重視。台灣競爭力衰退是什麼因素造成，以及背後反映經濟的危機為何，都是值得警惕和探究的問題。
先看正面的部分，台灣競爭力表現較佳的是「國際投資」、「財政」和「國際貿易」，顯示政府一年來在吸引外資（包括台商回流）、改善財政，以及鬆綁貿易障礙與洽簽自由貿易協定的表現有了成果，值得欣慰。
但是，「整體經濟」表現退到十六名，應是國際經濟復甦緩慢，使我國出口受創，這部分比較難以操之在我。國內經濟及就業都後退到第廿四名，主要是內需不足，而使企業雇用人力保守，調薪幅度微小。「政府效能」整體從第五名降到第八名，應和長期以來朝野對立，部會協調不足，立法效率不佳等原因有關。基礎建設及健康及環境等指標也都退步，顯示科學基礎建設的投資不足及產業合作有待加強。
比較特別的是，台灣一向引以為傲的「企業效能」則從第四驟降到第十，產能及效率也衰退到第廿名。這是非常值得重視關注的警訊，代表台灣的產業升級轉型速度太慢，包括無法擺脫代工、製造為主的模式，淪入利潤微薄，無法提升附加價值，只知壓低成本的惡性循環；缺乏品牌通路，軟體競爭力差，服務業占比大卻規模縮小，產業不均衡發展（例如不動產業在貨幣寬鬆、利率偏低的情勢下吸引資金競相投入而一枝獨秀），以及太過依賴政府的許多租稅減免和金融優惠和油水電低價補貼等措施這些結構性的困境和問題。
換言之，台灣這次競爭力下降，主要是政府部門表現略有進步，但民間部門表現欠佳所致。接下來要問的是，政府該如何協助民間部門改進，以提升競爭力，這可以從競爭力提升的國家找到一些答案。
重登榜首的美國，主要是由於金融業好轉，大量技術創新和成功企業，因而失業率下降，房市逐漸回穩；中國大陸進步則和騰籠換鳥政策（揚棄低階製造，轉為高科技、高值發展；出口導向轉出口、內需並重）促使產業轉型升級，經濟持穩有關；日本則主要是安倍經濟學對經濟活力產生了初步影響。歐元區的瑞士（第二）、瑞典（第四）和德國（第九）維持競爭力不墜，是靠出口導向型的製造業、多元化經濟體制、中小企業強大與遵守財政紀律。難怪洛桑競爭力中心負責人表示：「結構性改革已經不可避免，發展仍應是獲得競爭力的前提」，「競爭力的黃金定律其實簡單：重視生產、多元化、出口、基礎設施投資、教育、支持中小企業發展、加強財政紀律，以及最重要的事情─維持社會凝聚力。」
由此可見，政府行政部門大開大闔的政策，有魄力的改革，以及立法院朝野政黨以民生經濟優先的共識，打破現在對立的僵局，打破防弊重於興利的心態，加速法規鬆綁的立法進度，全力發展經濟是建立民眾信心，維持社會凝聚力的第一步。
其次，民間更要提高生產力和附加價值，加速產業升級和結構調整的速度，從過去的電子科技產業一枝獨秀到現在的不動產業吸引龐大資金投資，此種偏頗失衡的狀態都要突破，走向多元化的產業均衡發展才是正途。如何將資金導向到中小企業、生產事業、研究發展和基礎建設，以及以創造就業為主要內涵的獎勵政策，和改善產業需要的技術人才的教育體制等等，也都是提升產業效能的必備條件。
企業界也應調整「景氣低迷時吝於調升薪資」的心態。要知道，低薪無法吸引人才，更無法留住人才；反過來說，調高薪資，不但可以提高員工士氣，更使員工更願投入，發揮潛力而提升生產力，進而使得企業主受惠。金融優惠政策應轉至品牌、通路及製造、服務並重的資源投入，鼓勵加強產學合作，對廠商的競爭力將有重大的激勵效果。
總之，希望政府和民間引以為戒，一起努力，讓明年台灣的競爭力不但提升，經濟也走出沉悶的陰霾！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 5, 2013
Summary: The Swiss School of Management in Lausanne has announced its 2013 global competitiveness rankings for 60 economies. Taiwan fell from 7th place last year to 11th place this year. Hong Kong fell to 3rd place and Singapore fell to 5th place. South Korea remained unchanged in 22nd place. But Taiwan's declining competitiveness has attracted the greatest attention and concern. What factors contributed to Taiwan's decline? What was the role of economic crisis?
Full Text below:
The Swiss School of Management in Lausanne has announced its 2013 global competitiveness rankings for 60 economies. Taiwan fell from 7th place last year to 11th place this year. Hong Kong fell to 3rd place and Singapore fell to 5th place. South Korea remained unchanged in 22nd place. But Taiwan's declining competitiveness has attracted the greatest attention and concern. What factors contributed to Taiwan's decline? What was the role of economic crisis? These are all questions that warrant our attention.
First consider the upside. Taiwan remains competitive in international investment, fiscal management, and international trade. This proves that the government succeed in attracting foreign investment over the past year. Taiwan businesses have also returned to Taiwan, This has improved the fiscal picture. The elimination of trade barriers and the signing of free trade agreements also contributed. This is all enormously gratifying.
But in overall economic performance, Taiwan fell to 16th place. The slow recovery of the international economy impacted exports. This was not under our control. The domestic economy and employment rate fell to 24th place. This was due mainly to insufficient domestic demand. This made businesses reluctant to hire new employees. Salary increases remained small. Overall government effectiveness fell from 5th place to 8th place. This was probably due to long term ruling vs. opposition party deadlocks, inadequate coordination between ministries, and legislative inefficiency. Infrastructure, health, and environmental rankings also fell. These reflect insufficient investment in scientific infrastructure, and insufficient cooperation with industry.
Taiwan has long been proud of its corporate performance. But this plummeted from 4th place to 10th place. Production capacity and efficiency also declined, to 20th place. This is a warning sign that warrants concern. It means Taiwan's industrial upgrading and transformation is too slow. We have failed to jettison the OEM manufacturing-based model. Profit margins have narrowed. We have failed to create added value. We have remained trapped in a vicious cycle of price competition. We lack brand names. We lack competitive human talent. The service sector now accounts for a larger percentage of the total, but has shrunk in absolute terms. Industry is developing unevenly. Monetary easing and low interest rates have attracted funds to real estate. But this is an isolated case, and overly dependent upon government tax breaks, financial deals, and gasoline, water, and electricity subsidies These all constitute structural problems.
In short, Taiwan's competitiveness has declined. Public sector performance has improved slightly. But private sector performance has remained poor. The next question we must ask is: How can the government help the private sector improve its competitiveness? The answer is: Improve enhanced national competitiveness.
The US has regained its supremacy, due mainly to improvements in the financial industry. Numerous technical innovations and successful enterprises have reduced unemployment and gradually stabilized the housing market. Progress on the Chinese mainland is the result of its policy of phasing out low margin manufacturing industries and replacing them with high-tech, high value industries. It has replaced export-oriented industries with re-export industries. It has increased domestic demand, promoted industrial restructuring and upgrading, thereby stabilizing its economy. Japan's "Abenomics" has begun to impact its economic vitality. In the Eurozone, 2nd ranked Switzerland, 4th ranked Sweden, and 9th ranked Germany have all retained their previous rankings. They rely on export-oriented manufacturing, diversification, and SMEs with strong fiscal discipline. No wonder the IMD World Competitiveness Center said, "Structural reform is unavoidable. Development is a prerequisite to competitiveness... competitiveness has a simple golden rule: emphasize production, diversification, exports, investment in infrastructure, education, support for the development of SMEs, increased fiscal discipline, and most importantly, maintaining social cohesion."
This shows us the steps necessary to maintain social cohesion. The executive branch must implement open door policies and make resolute reforms. The ruling and opposition parties in the Legislative Yuan must break the current deadlock and reach a consensus on economic priorities and the people's livelihood. They must overcome their dread of the downside that prevents them from profiting from the upside. They must accelerate the process of deregulation. They must restore public confidence in economic development.
Secondly, the private sector must increase productivity and create added value. It must accelerate industrial upgrading and restructuring. It must shift capital investment from the electronics and technology industries of the past, to real estate. Imbalances must be addressed. Balanced development of industry and diversification is the correct path. How will funds be directed to SMEs, manufacturing, research and development and infrastructure? How can the government encourage job creation, and better educate the technical personnel required by industry? All of these are prerequisites to enhancing industrial efficiency.
The business community must change its policy of cutting salaries whenever the economy is depressed. It must realize that low salaries will not attract talent and cannot retain talent. Conversely, increased wages will improve employee morale. Employees will be more willing to make an effort. This will enhance productivity, benefitting business owners. Financial incentives should be replaced by the allocation of resources in branding, marketing channels, manufacturing, and services. We should encourage industry-university cooperation. This will significantly improve corporate competitiveness.
In conclusion, we hope the government and the public will remain vigilant and work together. We hope that that next year Taiwan's competitiveness will increase, and its economy emerge from under its dark cloud.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.05
社論－衝競爭力 結構性改革已無可避免
本報訊
瑞士洛桑管理學院日前公布涉及六十個經濟體的二○一三年全球競爭力排名，台灣由去年的第七名降至十一名，雖然香港、新加坡也分別降至第三名和第五名，南韓則維持不變（廿二名），但台灣競爭力下降確實引起國人的緊張和重視。台灣競爭力衰退是什麼因素造成，以及背後反映經濟的危機為何，都是值得警惕和探究的問題。
先看正面的部分，台灣競爭力表現較佳的是「國際投資」、「財政」和「國際貿易」，顯示政府一年來在吸引外資（包括台商回流）、改善財政，以及鬆綁貿易障礙與洽簽自由貿易協定的表現有了成果，值得欣慰。
但是，「整體經濟」表現退到十六名，應是國際經濟復甦緩慢，使我國出口受創，這部分比較難以操之在我。國內經濟及就業都後退到第廿四名，主要是內需不足，而使企業雇用人力保守，調薪幅度微小。「政府效能」整體從第五名降到第八名，應和長期以來朝野對立，部會協調不足，立法效率不佳等原因有關。基礎建設及健康及環境等指標也都退步，顯示科學基礎建設的投資不足及產業合作有待加強。
比較特別的是，台灣一向引以為傲的「企業效能」則從第四驟降到第十，產能及效率也衰退到第廿名。這是非常值得重視關注的警訊，代表台灣的產業升級轉型速度太慢，包括無法擺脫代工、製造為主的模式，淪入利潤微薄，無法提升附加價值，只知壓低成本的惡性循環；缺乏品牌通路，軟體競爭力差，服務業占比大卻規模縮小，產業不均衡發展（例如不動產業在貨幣寬鬆、利率偏低的情勢下吸引資金競相投入而一枝獨秀），以及太過依賴政府的許多租稅減免和金融優惠和油水電低價補貼等措施這些結構性的困境和問題。
換言之，台灣這次競爭力下降，主要是政府部門表現略有進步，但民間部門表現欠佳所致。接下來要問的是，政府該如何協助民間部門改進，以提升競爭力，這可以從競爭力提升的國家找到一些答案。
重登榜首的美國，主要是由於金融業好轉，大量技術創新和成功企業，因而失業率下降，房市逐漸回穩；中國大陸進步則和騰籠換鳥政策（揚棄低階製造，轉為高科技、高值發展；出口導向轉出口、內需並重）促使產業轉型升級，經濟持穩有關；日本則主要是安倍經濟學對經濟活力產生了初步影響。歐元區的瑞士（第二）、瑞典（第四）和德國（第九）維持競爭力不墜，是靠出口導向型的製造業、多元化經濟體制、中小企業強大與遵守財政紀律。難怪洛桑競爭力中心負責人表示：「結構性改革已經不可避免，發展仍應是獲得競爭力的前提」，「競爭力的黃金定律其實簡單：重視生產、多元化、出口、基礎設施投資、教育、支持中小企業發展、加強財政紀律，以及最重要的事情─維持社會凝聚力。」
由此可見，政府行政部門大開大闔的政策，有魄力的改革，以及立法院朝野政黨以民生經濟優先的共識，打破現在對立的僵局，打破防弊重於興利的心態，加速法規鬆綁的立法進度，全力發展經濟是建立民眾信心，維持社會凝聚力的第一步。
其次，民間更要提高生產力和附加價值，加速產業升級和結構調整的速度，從過去的電子科技產業一枝獨秀到現在的不動產業吸引龐大資金投資，此種偏頗失衡的狀態都要突破，走向多元化的產業均衡發展才是正途。如何將資金導向到中小企業、生產事業、研究發展和基礎建設，以及以創造就業為主要內涵的獎勵政策，和改善產業需要的技術人才的教育體制等等，也都是提升產業效能的必備條件。
企業界也應調整「景氣低迷時吝於調升薪資」的心態。要知道，低薪無法吸引人才，更無法留住人才；反過來說，調高薪資，不但可以提高員工士氣，更使員工更願投入，發揮潛力而提升生產力，進而使得企業主受惠。金融優惠政策應轉至品牌、通路及製造、服務並重的資源投入，鼓勵加強產學合作，對廠商的競爭力將有重大的激勵效果。
總之，希望政府和民間引以為戒，一起努力，讓明年台灣的競爭力不但提升，經濟也走出沉悶的陰霾！
Wednesday, June 5, 2013
President Ma Must Lead Public Opinion and Offer the Nation a Clear Direction
President Ma Must Lead Public Opinion and Offer the Nation a Clear Direction
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 6, 2013
Summary: On Taiwan, for government leaders and the man in the street, "Democracy is all about public opinion." At least, that is the mantra. But for many, the reality is "Public opinion is as changeable as running water." If public policy is erected on a foundation of running water, how firm can the edifice of state possibly be?
Full Text below:
On Taiwan, for government leaders and the man in the street, "Democracy is all about public opinion." At least, that is the mantra. But for many, the reality is "Public opinion is like running water." If public policy is erected on a foundation of running water, how firm can the edifice of state possibly be?
Great Britain's constitutional framework is rooted in John Locke's concept of the right of resistance. If the government does not conform to the public will, the people can replace it at their discretion. That is why a no confidence vote grants parliament the right to dissolve the parliament and the cabinet. Its purpose is to keep public policy in step with public opinion. This accords with the ideals of democracy. But it also facilitates majoritarian tyranny within the national legislature, Nations within the Anglosphere are aware of this danger. That is why they separated the executive and legislative powers. Their national founders had a vision. Presidential power would be concentrated in a single person. This would enable him or her to respond more swiftly while leading the nation. Legislative power would be dispersed among many individuals, and between two houses. This would make them more responsive to public opinion. Judicial power would be conferred upon judges for life. This would enable them to transcend political pressures. Therefore, even though the president and members of the legislature are both elected. Their elections have very different meanings. The former is an election for "the best and the brightest." The hope is that those elected will have both the wisdom and the determination to lead the nation. That is why they are given a fixed term of four years. This enables them to avoid the pressure of public opinion. The latter is an election for "vox populi," for a "voice of the people." That is why they are given mere two-year terms. This prevents them from becoming out of touch with public opinion. The British system is different. The parliament lacks the right to hold a no confidence vote to facilitate and defend the president's leadership.
Our constitutional framework stipulates a five part separation of powers. But at its core, the separation of powers is between the executive and the legislative. In spirit, it clearly resembles the American model. In other words, we elect a president to provide us with a clear sense of direction. We want someone with the courage to lead public opinion. We want a wise leader able to defy legislative pressure. We do not want someone who is constantly holding up his finger to see which way the wind is blowing. We do not want a "jellyfish head of state" unable to stick to his principles. Unfortunately, President Ma's record over the past five years, shows a surfeit of supplication and a dearth of determination. Last year's U.S. beef imports controversy, and this year's Number Four Nuclear Power Plant controversy persist. During both of these controversies, he exhibited the same character deficiencies.
After last year's Lunar New Year, rumors emerged that the United States was pressuring him to allow the importation of U.S. beef products. Then newly re-elected President Ma repeatedly stipulated, "no promises, no timetable, no predetermined position." As we all know, the resumption of TIFA talks was necessary to join the TPP. This was hard reality. Taipei has very little bargaining power. But the president's announcement that he had "no predetermined position" opened Pandora's Box. Pandemonium erupted among various special interests and between the ruling and opposition parties. Only in April did the president belatedly put his foot down and say, "US beef imports must be allowed in. This is a matter of national credibility." He confessed that Taipei and Washington already had an agreement. The U.S. beef imports controversy dragged on until the last day of the June legislative session. Only then was the bill finally passed. The entire country wasted five months arguing over a decision that had already been made. President Ma's approval rating tested new lows.
Sadly, last year's U.S. beef imports fiasco failed to teach President Ma a lesson. Ma is now betting his credibility as a leader on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. In February, President Ma met with KMT legislators to discuss nuclear power plant issues. According to Ma, he had "no predetermined position." He appeared to be open to the legislators' recommendations. To prove that Ma had no predetermined position, Premier Chiang suggested a public referendum. This would allow the public to decide whether to continue construction. President Ma expressed stauch support for such a referendum. But the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant is a multi-trillion dollar infrastructure project. How can the nation's highest ranking political leader not have any opinion about whether to finish construction? Can a public referendum resolve the multitude of complex public financing and technological problems involved? If it can, then why go to the trouble of electing a president and granting him these decision-making powers? Is President Ma using a public referendum as political cover for his decision to continue construction on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant? When such suspicions arise, the referendum no longer serves to legitimize the president's decisions. In other words, just as in the U.S. beef imports fiasco, such a referendum will only waste the nation's time and energy.
This week, Ma invited media executives and reporters on a grand tour of power generation facilities. He took them on an overnight visit of the Number Three Nuclear Power Plant. During a walking tour, Ma declared, "In the short-term alternative energy sources cannot replace nuclear energy. The Immediate impact of abolishing nuclear energy would be great. Nuclear energy is essential during any transition period." The implication was clear. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant must be finished. Ma clearly believes this is the case. He is the nation's highest leader. People across the nation are looking for a clear direction and for leadership. So why did Ma not speak up and state his position at the beginning of the year? Why mire people across the nation in a "public referendum?" Why flip-flop between this and solemn reassurances that "Without nuclear safety, there can be no nuclear power?" As some in the media have noted, If Ma already had a position, he should have attempted to set forth a convincing "National Energy Discourse." He should not waste time and energy on a public referendum.
The design of our political framework posits the president as the nation's helmsman. It matters not whether he or she belongs to the same party or the same faction. The public wants a president who exudes conviction and evinces consistency, who provides individuals and the nation with opportunities for growth. People need to plan their careers and their lives. But on one issue after another, from U.S. beef imports to the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant, President Ma has nothing to say except "I have no predetermined position." He puts on a show of openness and tolerance. He seldom bears any resemblance to other national leaders, who solemnly take to the podium to officially proclaim national policy, and to reassure the public. If the media and the public can only learn what the president is thinking from from his intraparty statements, his public interviews, personal visits, and facebook posts, can we blame the public when it calls him a spineless jellyfish?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.06
社論－給百業明確方向感 總統要敢領導民意
本報訊
在台灣，無論是政府領袖或一般販夫走卒，常把「民主政治就是民意政治」琅琅上口的掛在嘴邊。但「民意如流水」也是許多人的體會，如果施政總是建立在流水的基礎上，國家的城堡又如何維持堅固？
英國的憲政體制承襲了洛克的抵抗權觀念，主張政府施政如果不符民意，人民可以隨時撤換政府，故而賦予國會倒閣權及內閣的解散國會權，希望讓施政與民意能夠亦步亦趨，以符民主的理想。但此一設計卻使得多數暴力壟罩國會，使得傳承英國文化的美國殖民地有所警惕，因而創造了行政與立法分立的三權體制。開國先賢的理想是，總統權集中於一人身上，使其得以明確迅速的領導國家；立法權分散於眾多議員與兩院手中，使得民意反映更為周延；司法權由終生職法官掌控，得以超然就理論法。故而，儘管總統與國會議員都是透過選舉產生，但兩者的意義卻大不相同。前者乃為「選賢與能」，希望當選者賢能明智具有果斷的意志，能領導國家穩定的發展，故設計出固定的四年任期，以避免承受經常性的民意壓力；後者則為「選民喉舌」，故任期僅有兩年防止民意脫節，但與英國制度不同的是，國會不具倒閣權以利總統維護施政的領導空間。
我國憲政雖然號稱五權，但核心設計採行政與立法分立，精神上明顯傾向美國的體制。換言之，我們選總統為的是要一個具明確方向感，敢於領導民意，不畏國會壓力的賢明領袖，而不是處處以民意為依歸，不敢堅持個人理念與原則的水母型首長。遺憾的是，馬總統過去五年的表現，便讓人感覺謙沖客氣有餘，領袖魄力略嫌不足，去年的美牛進口事件與今年的核四續建問題，便在在浮現他的這些人格特質。
去年農曆年後，已有傳聞美國開始施壓台灣要求開放美牛進口，但當時甫當選連任的馬總統，卻一再對外宣稱「沒有承諾、沒有時間表、沒有預設立場。」眾人皆知，在TIFA復談與參加TPP的客觀情勢下，台灣沒有喊價的空間，但總統這句「沒有預設立場」，無異打開潘朵拉的盒蓋，各方利益與朝野政黨因此吵得不可開交。直到四月初，總統才說「美牛非過不可，因為事關國家信用」，抖出了台美原來早有承諾的事實。就這樣美牛案拖到六月立院會期的最後一天才完成立法，全國上下竟為一個不存在的議題，虛耗了五個月，馬總統的支持度也因此跌到了低點。
令人痛心的是，去年的美牛事件並沒有讓馬總統記取教訓，馬似乎以核四續建之名準備再將領袖信譽豪賭一次。二月，馬總統邀請黨籍立委討論核四議題，據轉述馬表示「沒有預設立場」，面對立委的建議也採取開放的態度。或為了證明果真沒有立場，行政院江院長便隨即在月底拋出核四公投的主張，要讓民意決定是否續建，馬總統對此表示力挺。但核四這個上兆經費的計畫，身為國家最高領導人怎能沒有立場？如果公投民意能夠解決諸多財政與技術上的複雜問題，我們又何必辛苦選個總統並賦予他決策大權？故而當「以公投之名，行捍衛核四續建之實」的質疑此起彼落時，公投便已無法再賦予總統決策的合法性基礎。換言之，如同美牛事件，這場公投玩到底也依然只是虛耗空轉。
本周以來，馬大陣仗的帶領媒體主管與記者展開能源之旅，在夜宿核三後繼續走訪核四。行走間，馬明白的表示「替代能源短期無法取代核能，立即廢核衝擊大，核能為過渡時期的必要選擇。」言下之意，核四是非蓋不可了。果真如此，身為國家最高領袖，當全國民眾都仰望明確的方向與領導時，為何年初以來不能大聲表達立場，反陷全國民眾於「公投」與「沒有核安就沒有核電」間惶然遊走？正如部分媒體所指出的，馬若早有定見，便應及早提出一套具說服力的「國家能源論述」，而非環繞著公投議題虛耗。
體制的設計既將總統塑造成國家的舵手，無論是否屬於同一黨派，人民無不企盼由總統堅定的態度與言談，尋得個人與國家發展的方向，以做為事業與生活的規畫依據。但從美牛事件到核四議題，馬總統除了喜歡重複「沒有預設立場」，以矯飾廓然大度外，也鮮少如同國外領導人，嚴肅的站在講壇上正式宣示國家政策，扮演安定民心的中流砥柱角色。如果媒體與民眾都只能由總統的黨內發言、專訪、巡視、臉書等，捕捉總統的思維，又如何能責怪人民譏評政府宛如沒有背脊的水母？
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 6, 2013
Summary: On Taiwan, for government leaders and the man in the street, "Democracy is all about public opinion." At least, that is the mantra. But for many, the reality is "Public opinion is as changeable as running water." If public policy is erected on a foundation of running water, how firm can the edifice of state possibly be?
Full Text below:
On Taiwan, for government leaders and the man in the street, "Democracy is all about public opinion." At least, that is the mantra. But for many, the reality is "Public opinion is like running water." If public policy is erected on a foundation of running water, how firm can the edifice of state possibly be?
Great Britain's constitutional framework is rooted in John Locke's concept of the right of resistance. If the government does not conform to the public will, the people can replace it at their discretion. That is why a no confidence vote grants parliament the right to dissolve the parliament and the cabinet. Its purpose is to keep public policy in step with public opinion. This accords with the ideals of democracy. But it also facilitates majoritarian tyranny within the national legislature, Nations within the Anglosphere are aware of this danger. That is why they separated the executive and legislative powers. Their national founders had a vision. Presidential power would be concentrated in a single person. This would enable him or her to respond more swiftly while leading the nation. Legislative power would be dispersed among many individuals, and between two houses. This would make them more responsive to public opinion. Judicial power would be conferred upon judges for life. This would enable them to transcend political pressures. Therefore, even though the president and members of the legislature are both elected. Their elections have very different meanings. The former is an election for "the best and the brightest." The hope is that those elected will have both the wisdom and the determination to lead the nation. That is why they are given a fixed term of four years. This enables them to avoid the pressure of public opinion. The latter is an election for "vox populi," for a "voice of the people." That is why they are given mere two-year terms. This prevents them from becoming out of touch with public opinion. The British system is different. The parliament lacks the right to hold a no confidence vote to facilitate and defend the president's leadership.
Our constitutional framework stipulates a five part separation of powers. But at its core, the separation of powers is between the executive and the legislative. In spirit, it clearly resembles the American model. In other words, we elect a president to provide us with a clear sense of direction. We want someone with the courage to lead public opinion. We want a wise leader able to defy legislative pressure. We do not want someone who is constantly holding up his finger to see which way the wind is blowing. We do not want a "jellyfish head of state" unable to stick to his principles. Unfortunately, President Ma's record over the past five years, shows a surfeit of supplication and a dearth of determination. Last year's U.S. beef imports controversy, and this year's Number Four Nuclear Power Plant controversy persist. During both of these controversies, he exhibited the same character deficiencies.
After last year's Lunar New Year, rumors emerged that the United States was pressuring him to allow the importation of U.S. beef products. Then newly re-elected President Ma repeatedly stipulated, "no promises, no timetable, no predetermined position." As we all know, the resumption of TIFA talks was necessary to join the TPP. This was hard reality. Taipei has very little bargaining power. But the president's announcement that he had "no predetermined position" opened Pandora's Box. Pandemonium erupted among various special interests and between the ruling and opposition parties. Only in April did the president belatedly put his foot down and say, "US beef imports must be allowed in. This is a matter of national credibility." He confessed that Taipei and Washington already had an agreement. The U.S. beef imports controversy dragged on until the last day of the June legislative session. Only then was the bill finally passed. The entire country wasted five months arguing over a decision that had already been made. President Ma's approval rating tested new lows.
Sadly, last year's U.S. beef imports fiasco failed to teach President Ma a lesson. Ma is now betting his credibility as a leader on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. In February, President Ma met with KMT legislators to discuss nuclear power plant issues. According to Ma, he had "no predetermined position." He appeared to be open to the legislators' recommendations. To prove that Ma had no predetermined position, Premier Chiang suggested a public referendum. This would allow the public to decide whether to continue construction. President Ma expressed stauch support for such a referendum. But the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant is a multi-trillion dollar infrastructure project. How can the nation's highest ranking political leader not have any opinion about whether to finish construction? Can a public referendum resolve the multitude of complex public financing and technological problems involved? If it can, then why go to the trouble of electing a president and granting him these decision-making powers? Is President Ma using a public referendum as political cover for his decision to continue construction on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant? When such suspicions arise, the referendum no longer serves to legitimize the president's decisions. In other words, just as in the U.S. beef imports fiasco, such a referendum will only waste the nation's time and energy.
This week, Ma invited media executives and reporters on a grand tour of power generation facilities. He took them on an overnight visit of the Number Three Nuclear Power Plant. During a walking tour, Ma declared, "In the short-term alternative energy sources cannot replace nuclear energy. The Immediate impact of abolishing nuclear energy would be great. Nuclear energy is essential during any transition period." The implication was clear. The Number Four Nuclear Power Plant must be finished. Ma clearly believes this is the case. He is the nation's highest leader. People across the nation are looking for a clear direction and for leadership. So why did Ma not speak up and state his position at the beginning of the year? Why mire people across the nation in a "public referendum?" Why flip-flop between this and solemn reassurances that "Without nuclear safety, there can be no nuclear power?" As some in the media have noted, If Ma already had a position, he should have attempted to set forth a convincing "National Energy Discourse." He should not waste time and energy on a public referendum.
The design of our political framework posits the president as the nation's helmsman. It matters not whether he or she belongs to the same party or the same faction. The public wants a president who exudes conviction and evinces consistency, who provides individuals and the nation with opportunities for growth. People need to plan their careers and their lives. But on one issue after another, from U.S. beef imports to the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant, President Ma has nothing to say except "I have no predetermined position." He puts on a show of openness and tolerance. He seldom bears any resemblance to other national leaders, who solemnly take to the podium to officially proclaim national policy, and to reassure the public. If the media and the public can only learn what the president is thinking from from his intraparty statements, his public interviews, personal visits, and facebook posts, can we blame the public when it calls him a spineless jellyfish?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.06
社論－給百業明確方向感 總統要敢領導民意
本報訊
在台灣，無論是政府領袖或一般販夫走卒，常把「民主政治就是民意政治」琅琅上口的掛在嘴邊。但「民意如流水」也是許多人的體會，如果施政總是建立在流水的基礎上，國家的城堡又如何維持堅固？
英國的憲政體制承襲了洛克的抵抗權觀念，主張政府施政如果不符民意，人民可以隨時撤換政府，故而賦予國會倒閣權及內閣的解散國會權，希望讓施政與民意能夠亦步亦趨，以符民主的理想。但此一設計卻使得多數暴力壟罩國會，使得傳承英國文化的美國殖民地有所警惕，因而創造了行政與立法分立的三權體制。開國先賢的理想是，總統權集中於一人身上，使其得以明確迅速的領導國家；立法權分散於眾多議員與兩院手中，使得民意反映更為周延；司法權由終生職法官掌控，得以超然就理論法。故而，儘管總統與國會議員都是透過選舉產生，但兩者的意義卻大不相同。前者乃為「選賢與能」，希望當選者賢能明智具有果斷的意志，能領導國家穩定的發展，故設計出固定的四年任期，以避免承受經常性的民意壓力；後者則為「選民喉舌」，故任期僅有兩年防止民意脫節，但與英國制度不同的是，國會不具倒閣權以利總統維護施政的領導空間。
我國憲政雖然號稱五權，但核心設計採行政與立法分立，精神上明顯傾向美國的體制。換言之，我們選總統為的是要一個具明確方向感，敢於領導民意，不畏國會壓力的賢明領袖，而不是處處以民意為依歸，不敢堅持個人理念與原則的水母型首長。遺憾的是，馬總統過去五年的表現，便讓人感覺謙沖客氣有餘，領袖魄力略嫌不足，去年的美牛進口事件與今年的核四續建問題，便在在浮現他的這些人格特質。
去年農曆年後，已有傳聞美國開始施壓台灣要求開放美牛進口，但當時甫當選連任的馬總統，卻一再對外宣稱「沒有承諾、沒有時間表、沒有預設立場。」眾人皆知，在TIFA復談與參加TPP的客觀情勢下，台灣沒有喊價的空間，但總統這句「沒有預設立場」，無異打開潘朵拉的盒蓋，各方利益與朝野政黨因此吵得不可開交。直到四月初，總統才說「美牛非過不可，因為事關國家信用」，抖出了台美原來早有承諾的事實。就這樣美牛案拖到六月立院會期的最後一天才完成立法，全國上下竟為一個不存在的議題，虛耗了五個月，馬總統的支持度也因此跌到了低點。
令人痛心的是，去年的美牛事件並沒有讓馬總統記取教訓，馬似乎以核四續建之名準備再將領袖信譽豪賭一次。二月，馬總統邀請黨籍立委討論核四議題，據轉述馬表示「沒有預設立場」，面對立委的建議也採取開放的態度。或為了證明果真沒有立場，行政院江院長便隨即在月底拋出核四公投的主張，要讓民意決定是否續建，馬總統對此表示力挺。但核四這個上兆經費的計畫，身為國家最高領導人怎能沒有立場？如果公投民意能夠解決諸多財政與技術上的複雜問題，我們又何必辛苦選個總統並賦予他決策大權？故而當「以公投之名，行捍衛核四續建之實」的質疑此起彼落時，公投便已無法再賦予總統決策的合法性基礎。換言之，如同美牛事件，這場公投玩到底也依然只是虛耗空轉。
本周以來，馬大陣仗的帶領媒體主管與記者展開能源之旅，在夜宿核三後繼續走訪核四。行走間，馬明白的表示「替代能源短期無法取代核能，立即廢核衝擊大，核能為過渡時期的必要選擇。」言下之意，核四是非蓋不可了。果真如此，身為國家最高領袖，當全國民眾都仰望明確的方向與領導時，為何年初以來不能大聲表達立場，反陷全國民眾於「公投」與「沒有核安就沒有核電」間惶然遊走？正如部分媒體所指出的，馬若早有定見，便應及早提出一套具說服力的「國家能源論述」，而非環繞著公投議題虛耗。
體制的設計既將總統塑造成國家的舵手，無論是否屬於同一黨派，人民無不企盼由總統堅定的態度與言談，尋得個人與國家發展的方向，以做為事業與生活的規畫依據。但從美牛事件到核四議題，馬總統除了喜歡重複「沒有預設立場」，以矯飾廓然大度外，也鮮少如同國外領導人，嚴肅的站在講壇上正式宣示國家政策，扮演安定民心的中流砥柱角色。如果媒體與民眾都只能由總統的黨內發言、專訪、巡視、臉書等，捕捉總統的思維，又如何能責怪人民譏評政府宛如沒有背脊的水母？
Tuesday, June 4, 2013
"Taiwan" is Not a Sovereign and Independent Nation
"Taiwan" is Not a Sovereign and Independent Nation
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 5, 2013
Summary: Beijing is publicly urging the Democratic Progressive Party to forsake Taiwan independence. It is saying that if the DPP can change its position on Taiwan independence, then it can have contacts with the Mainland. Su Tseng-chang recently declared that "Taiwan is a sovereign nation, one that has long been independent. Our first priority now is to strengthen the nation, not turn the clock back and advocate Taiwan independence."
Full Text below:
Beijing is publicly urging the Democratic Progressive Party to forsake Taiwan independence. It is saying that if the DPP can change its position on Taiwan independence, then it can have contacts with the Mainland. Su Tseng-chang recently declared that "Taiwan is a sovereign nation, one that has long been independent. Our first priority now is to strengthen the nation, not turn the clock back and advocate Taiwan independence."
Su Tseng-chang's media spin was nothing new. The assertion that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation" has long been the DPP's position on national identity and constitutional allegiance. Unfortunately, it is bogus. Why? One. There is no nation in the world named "Taiwan." After all, if "Taiwan" is the "name of the nation," when why must the DPP demand the "rectification of names?" Two. If "Taiwan" is a "sovereign and independent nation," where is its constitution? Nowhere in the world can one find a "Taiwan Constitution." Therefore how can "Taiwan" be a "nation?" Why does the DPP continue calling for the "authoring of a new constitution?"
Su Tseng-chang said, "there is no need to turn the clock back and advocate Taiwan independence." How should this be interpreted? Is he advocating a moratorium on the promotion of Taiwan independence, or has he changed his position on Taiwan independence? In this regard there is room for doubt. On the other hand this might merely be Su's personal view. After all, the DPP has yet to pass a "Resolution not to Turn the Clock Back and Advocate Taiwan Independence."
Su Tseng-chang declared, "Taiwan is a sovereign nation." As we noted earlier, this assertion is flat-out false. He said his cross-Strait posture is the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," approved by the DPP All Peoples Conference in 1999. The Resolution proclaims that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation... even though it is referred to as the Republic of China under the current constitution... " This is the source of this bogus claim.
The Resolution asserts that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. It asserts that "Taiwan" is a "nation." It asserts that according to the "current (Republic of China) constitution, the "Nation of Taiwan" is known as the "Republic of China." This amounts to an admission that the "Nation of Taiwan" is "currently" borrowing the Constitution of the Republic of China, and the name of the Republic of China. Therefore, the assertion that "Taiwan" is a "sovereign and independent nation" is nothing more than a game of "constitutional switch and bait." It is nothing more than the same old "backdoor listing" approach to Taiwan independence.
The "Resolution" is "backdoor listing" Taiwan independence. If it is not, then the DPP should accept in toto the Constitution of the Republic of China, which calls for "one China, different interpretations." Alas, Frank Hsieh's "different constitutional interpretations of one China" was violently attacked by others in the party. Clearly the DPP is only interested in borrowing the name "Republic of China," and nothing else. Yao Chia-wen freely admitted that apart from its electoral system, the DPP does not recognize the ROC Constitution. Chiu Yi-jen recently told Frank Hsieh that the DPP does not completely accept the ROC Constitution.
The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" asserts that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation." It piggybacks on the Constitution of the Republic of China. Yet the DPP opposes "different constitutional interpretations of one China." It refuses to "completely accept the ROC Constitution." Meanwhile, it remains incapable of completing the "rectification of names." Therefore, the obvious question is, where can one find the logical basis for the proposition that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation?"
The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," was announced in 1999. In 2000, upon taking office, Chen Shui-bian announced his "Five Noes." This evolution is logical. But the Ah-Bian regime ruled for eight years. It engaged in the "rectification of names." It demanded a "referendum on UN membership." It asserted that there was "one country on each side," touching off a firestorm. It long ago shredded the "Resolution." But at the time, Su Tseng-chang was both the Premier and a former party chairman. Can he really wipe all that away today with an airy "My cross-Strait posture is the Resolution on Taiwan's Future?"
In 1993, Shih Ming-teh argued that Taiwan, under the name Republic of China, need not and should not declare independence. He argued that the Republic of China was already a sovereign and independent nation, one that has been independent since 1912. This argument is a very different animal from "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation." The difference is that Shih argues that the "Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation."
Su Tseng-chang says he has no intention of "turning back the clock and advocating Taiwan independence." If he means it, he cannot turn the clock back and hide behind the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." The "Resolution" falsely asserts that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation." Su has never "completely accepted this [one China, different interpretations] constitution." Besides, the DPP's "Taiwan Independence Party Platform" remains in force. Does the DPP intend to invoke the "Taiwan independence platform" in order to implement the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future?"
Su Tseng-chang says he has no intention of "turning back the clock and advocating Taiwan independence." If so, he should wean the DPP from the false assertion that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation." He should lead them toward the reality that the "Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation." The sovereignty of the Republic of China may have been weakened. But there is no nation anywhere in the world known as "Taiwan." The Constitution of the Republic of China may have been weakened. But unless the DPP turns the clock back and engages in the "rectification of names," the world will never see a "Taiwan Constitution."
Mainland China's CPPCC Chairman Yu Zhengsheng challenged the DPP to promise "not to engage in de jure Taiwan independence." What he meant was, "Is the DPP willing to once again reaffirm the Republic of China?" What he meant was that the DPP should first reaffirm that the "Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation."
假議題：台灣是主權獨立的國家
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.05 03:57 am
北京聲聲催迫：民進黨若不搞台獨，若能改變台獨的立場，大陸即可與其交往。蘇貞昌日前表態：「台灣是主權國家，早已獨立；現在最重要的是建設國家，不是走回頭路搞台獨。」
蘇貞昌的說法並不新。「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家」，這是民進黨的國憲認同主軸論述；然而，這卻是個假議題。因為：一、世界上並沒有一個以「台灣」為國號的國家；若「台灣」是「國號」，民進黨何必主張「正名」？二、「台灣」若是一個「主權獨立的國家」，請問其憲法何在？世上並無一部「台灣憲法」，則「台灣」如何會是一個「國家」？民進黨又何必主張「制憲」？
蘇貞昌說「不走回頭路搞台獨」，能不能一比一地解讀成：「不搞台獨」或「改變其台獨的立場」？這一方面還有仁智論證的餘地，另一方面這也仍僅是蘇貞昌個人的看法，畢竟民進黨尚未作成《不走回頭路搞台獨決議文》。
蘇貞昌說「台灣是主權國家」，如前文所論，這句話根本是個假議題。他說，他的兩岸立場，就是民進黨全代會在一九九九年通過的《台灣前途決議文》；此決議文說：「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家……固然依目前憲法稱為中華民國……」這正是此一假議題的原始出處。
《決議文》說：台灣是一個主權獨立的國家，但「台灣」這個「國家」，依「目前的（中華民國）憲法」，「台灣這個國家」被稱作「中華民國」。此說不啻是指：台灣這個「國家」，「目前」借用「中華民國憲法」，也借用「中華民國」這個國號，因此「台灣」成了一個「主權獨立的國家」。這是扭曲的憲政法理，其實仍是「借殼上市」的台獨。
《決議文》若非「借殼上市」的台獨，民進黨至少應當完整接受這部「一中各表」的《中華民國憲法》；但是，從謝長廷的「憲法各表」在黨內遭到狂暴的攻擊，即知民進黨只是要借「中華民國」這個「殼」而已。姚嘉文說：除了選舉制度，民進黨不承認中華民國憲法；最近邱義仁亦對謝長廷說：民進黨並未全盤接受這部憲法。
《台灣前途決議文》是將「台灣是主權獨立的國家」這個命題，建立或寄居在《中華民國憲法》之上；但民進黨卻反對「憲法各表」，反對「全盤接受中華民國憲法」，而自己又不能實現「正名制憲」；如此，試問「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家」這個命題何以立足？
《台灣前途決議文》頒布於一九九九年，二○○○年陳水扁執政後又宣布「四不一沒有」，此一演化尚合邏輯；但扁政府執政八年，正名制憲、入聯公投、一邊一國鬧得沸沸揚揚，早將《決議文》撕得粉碎。而蘇貞昌當時曾任民進黨主席及行政院長，如今難道只憑一句「我的兩岸立場就是《台灣前途決議文》」即可交代？
施明德在一九九三年曾主張：台灣在中華民國這個名號下不必、也不會宣布獨立，因為中華民國原本是一個主權獨立的國家，且自一九一二年就已獨立。此一論述，與「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家」大異其趣，差異在於他主張的是「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家」。
因此，蘇貞昌若「不走回頭路搞台獨」，就也不能回頭拿《台灣前途決議文》當防火牆。因為，《決議文》在理念上是主張「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」的假議題，在操作上則一路以來皆未「全盤接受這部（一中各表的）憲法」。何況，《台獨黨綱》迄仍有效，民進黨難道要在《台獨黨綱》下操作《台灣前途決議文》？
蘇貞昌若「不走回頭路搞台獨」，就應引領民進黨從「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」之假議題，走向「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家」的現實課題。儘管中華民國在主權上是受傷的國家，但世界上卻沒有以「台灣」為國號的國家；中華民國憲法雖是部受傷的憲法，但除非民進黨走回頭路搞「正名制憲」，世界上永遠不會有一部「台灣憲法」。
中國大陸政協主席俞正聲說：民進黨敢不敢說「不搞法理台獨」？其意應指：民進黨先回到「中華民國」再說，亦即先回到「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家」再說。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 5, 2013
Summary: Beijing is publicly urging the Democratic Progressive Party to forsake Taiwan independence. It is saying that if the DPP can change its position on Taiwan independence, then it can have contacts with the Mainland. Su Tseng-chang recently declared that "Taiwan is a sovereign nation, one that has long been independent. Our first priority now is to strengthen the nation, not turn the clock back and advocate Taiwan independence."
Full Text below:
Beijing is publicly urging the Democratic Progressive Party to forsake Taiwan independence. It is saying that if the DPP can change its position on Taiwan independence, then it can have contacts with the Mainland. Su Tseng-chang recently declared that "Taiwan is a sovereign nation, one that has long been independent. Our first priority now is to strengthen the nation, not turn the clock back and advocate Taiwan independence."
Su Tseng-chang's media spin was nothing new. The assertion that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation" has long been the DPP's position on national identity and constitutional allegiance. Unfortunately, it is bogus. Why? One. There is no nation in the world named "Taiwan." After all, if "Taiwan" is the "name of the nation," when why must the DPP demand the "rectification of names?" Two. If "Taiwan" is a "sovereign and independent nation," where is its constitution? Nowhere in the world can one find a "Taiwan Constitution." Therefore how can "Taiwan" be a "nation?" Why does the DPP continue calling for the "authoring of a new constitution?"
Su Tseng-chang said, "there is no need to turn the clock back and advocate Taiwan independence." How should this be interpreted? Is he advocating a moratorium on the promotion of Taiwan independence, or has he changed his position on Taiwan independence? In this regard there is room for doubt. On the other hand this might merely be Su's personal view. After all, the DPP has yet to pass a "Resolution not to Turn the Clock Back and Advocate Taiwan Independence."
Su Tseng-chang declared, "Taiwan is a sovereign nation." As we noted earlier, this assertion is flat-out false. He said his cross-Strait posture is the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," approved by the DPP All Peoples Conference in 1999. The Resolution proclaims that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation... even though it is referred to as the Republic of China under the current constitution... " This is the source of this bogus claim.
The Resolution asserts that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. It asserts that "Taiwan" is a "nation." It asserts that according to the "current (Republic of China) constitution, the "Nation of Taiwan" is known as the "Republic of China." This amounts to an admission that the "Nation of Taiwan" is "currently" borrowing the Constitution of the Republic of China, and the name of the Republic of China. Therefore, the assertion that "Taiwan" is a "sovereign and independent nation" is nothing more than a game of "constitutional switch and bait." It is nothing more than the same old "backdoor listing" approach to Taiwan independence.
The "Resolution" is "backdoor listing" Taiwan independence. If it is not, then the DPP should accept in toto the Constitution of the Republic of China, which calls for "one China, different interpretations." Alas, Frank Hsieh's "different constitutional interpretations of one China" was violently attacked by others in the party. Clearly the DPP is only interested in borrowing the name "Republic of China," and nothing else. Yao Chia-wen freely admitted that apart from its electoral system, the DPP does not recognize the ROC Constitution. Chiu Yi-jen recently told Frank Hsieh that the DPP does not completely accept the ROC Constitution.
The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" asserts that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation." It piggybacks on the Constitution of the Republic of China. Yet the DPP opposes "different constitutional interpretations of one China." It refuses to "completely accept the ROC Constitution." Meanwhile, it remains incapable of completing the "rectification of names." Therefore, the obvious question is, where can one find the logical basis for the proposition that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation?"
The "Resolution on Taiwan's Future," was announced in 1999. In 2000, upon taking office, Chen Shui-bian announced his "Five Noes." This evolution is logical. But the Ah-Bian regime ruled for eight years. It engaged in the "rectification of names." It demanded a "referendum on UN membership." It asserted that there was "one country on each side," touching off a firestorm. It long ago shredded the "Resolution." But at the time, Su Tseng-chang was both the Premier and a former party chairman. Can he really wipe all that away today with an airy "My cross-Strait posture is the Resolution on Taiwan's Future?"
In 1993, Shih Ming-teh argued that Taiwan, under the name Republic of China, need not and should not declare independence. He argued that the Republic of China was already a sovereign and independent nation, one that has been independent since 1912. This argument is a very different animal from "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation." The difference is that Shih argues that the "Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation."
Su Tseng-chang says he has no intention of "turning back the clock and advocating Taiwan independence." If he means it, he cannot turn the clock back and hide behind the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." The "Resolution" falsely asserts that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation." Su has never "completely accepted this [one China, different interpretations] constitution." Besides, the DPP's "Taiwan Independence Party Platform" remains in force. Does the DPP intend to invoke the "Taiwan independence platform" in order to implement the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future?"
Su Tseng-chang says he has no intention of "turning back the clock and advocating Taiwan independence." If so, he should wean the DPP from the false assertion that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation." He should lead them toward the reality that the "Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation." The sovereignty of the Republic of China may have been weakened. But there is no nation anywhere in the world known as "Taiwan." The Constitution of the Republic of China may have been weakened. But unless the DPP turns the clock back and engages in the "rectification of names," the world will never see a "Taiwan Constitution."
Mainland China's CPPCC Chairman Yu Zhengsheng challenged the DPP to promise "not to engage in de jure Taiwan independence." What he meant was, "Is the DPP willing to once again reaffirm the Republic of China?" What he meant was that the DPP should first reaffirm that the "Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation."
假議題：台灣是主權獨立的國家
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.06.05 03:57 am
北京聲聲催迫：民進黨若不搞台獨，若能改變台獨的立場，大陸即可與其交往。蘇貞昌日前表態：「台灣是主權國家，早已獨立；現在最重要的是建設國家，不是走回頭路搞台獨。」
蘇貞昌的說法並不新。「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家」，這是民進黨的國憲認同主軸論述；然而，這卻是個假議題。因為：一、世界上並沒有一個以「台灣」為國號的國家；若「台灣」是「國號」，民進黨何必主張「正名」？二、「台灣」若是一個「主權獨立的國家」，請問其憲法何在？世上並無一部「台灣憲法」，則「台灣」如何會是一個「國家」？民進黨又何必主張「制憲」？
蘇貞昌說「不走回頭路搞台獨」，能不能一比一地解讀成：「不搞台獨」或「改變其台獨的立場」？這一方面還有仁智論證的餘地，另一方面這也仍僅是蘇貞昌個人的看法，畢竟民進黨尚未作成《不走回頭路搞台獨決議文》。
蘇貞昌說「台灣是主權國家」，如前文所論，這句話根本是個假議題。他說，他的兩岸立場，就是民進黨全代會在一九九九年通過的《台灣前途決議文》；此決議文說：「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家……固然依目前憲法稱為中華民國……」這正是此一假議題的原始出處。
《決議文》說：台灣是一個主權獨立的國家，但「台灣」這個「國家」，依「目前的（中華民國）憲法」，「台灣這個國家」被稱作「中華民國」。此說不啻是指：台灣這個「國家」，「目前」借用「中華民國憲法」，也借用「中華民國」這個國號，因此「台灣」成了一個「主權獨立的國家」。這是扭曲的憲政法理，其實仍是「借殼上市」的台獨。
《決議文》若非「借殼上市」的台獨，民進黨至少應當完整接受這部「一中各表」的《中華民國憲法》；但是，從謝長廷的「憲法各表」在黨內遭到狂暴的攻擊，即知民進黨只是要借「中華民國」這個「殼」而已。姚嘉文說：除了選舉制度，民進黨不承認中華民國憲法；最近邱義仁亦對謝長廷說：民進黨並未全盤接受這部憲法。
《台灣前途決議文》是將「台灣是主權獨立的國家」這個命題，建立或寄居在《中華民國憲法》之上；但民進黨卻反對「憲法各表」，反對「全盤接受中華民國憲法」，而自己又不能實現「正名制憲」；如此，試問「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家」這個命題何以立足？
《台灣前途決議文》頒布於一九九九年，二○○○年陳水扁執政後又宣布「四不一沒有」，此一演化尚合邏輯；但扁政府執政八年，正名制憲、入聯公投、一邊一國鬧得沸沸揚揚，早將《決議文》撕得粉碎。而蘇貞昌當時曾任民進黨主席及行政院長，如今難道只憑一句「我的兩岸立場就是《台灣前途決議文》」即可交代？
施明德在一九九三年曾主張：台灣在中華民國這個名號下不必、也不會宣布獨立，因為中華民國原本是一個主權獨立的國家，且自一九一二年就已獨立。此一論述，與「台灣是一個主權獨立的國家」大異其趣，差異在於他主張的是「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家」。
因此，蘇貞昌若「不走回頭路搞台獨」，就也不能回頭拿《台灣前途決議文》當防火牆。因為，《決議文》在理念上是主張「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」的假議題，在操作上則一路以來皆未「全盤接受這部（一中各表的）憲法」。何況，《台獨黨綱》迄仍有效，民進黨難道要在《台獨黨綱》下操作《台灣前途決議文》？
蘇貞昌若「不走回頭路搞台獨」，就應引領民進黨從「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」之假議題，走向「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家」的現實課題。儘管中華民國在主權上是受傷的國家，但世界上卻沒有以「台灣」為國號的國家；中華民國憲法雖是部受傷的憲法，但除非民進黨走回頭路搞「正名制憲」，世界上永遠不會有一部「台灣憲法」。
中國大陸政協主席俞正聲說：民進黨敢不敢說「不搞法理台獨」？其意應指：民進黨先回到「中華民國」再說，亦即先回到「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家」再說。
Monday, June 3, 2013
Green Governance? First Tell Us How You Stand on the Republic of China Constitution
Green Governance? First Tell Us How You Stand on the Republic of China Constitution
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 4, 2013
Summary: In order to wage a successful 2016 election campaign, the DPP is struggling to change its image. It is establishing new provisions against involvement in organized crime. It is rewording its "China [sic] policy." But as we have pointed out, if the party refuses to sever its links to Chen Shui-bian's corruption, or if it persists in defining Taiwan as "not part of China," their efforts will be in vain. If the DPP hopes to become a party the people can trust to rule, it must tell us, in no uncertain terms, how it stands on the Republic of China Constitution.
Full Text below:
In order to wage a successful 2016 election campaign, the DPP is struggling to change its image. It is establishing new provisions against involvement in organized crime. It is rewording its "China [sic] policy." But as we have pointed out, if the party refuses to sever its links to Chen Shui-bian's corruption, or if it persists in defining Taiwan as "not part of China," their efforts will be in vain. If the DPP hopes to become a party the people can trust to rule, it must tell us, in no uncertain terms, how it stands on the Republic of China Constitution.
Ever since the DPP was founded in 1986, it has remained a "dang wai" (outside the party) entity that purports to "struggle for the realization of democracy and constitutional rule." The party's attitude toward the constitution however, is hypocritical. First it expressed public support. Later it shrilly repudiated it. Still later, it stooped to cynically exploiting it even as it angrily denounced it. Eventually, it tried to destroy it. Its flip-flops have left the public unable to trust the DPP's lip service to the Republic of China Constitution, and even to constitutional rule per se.
At first, the DPP relentlessly attacked the way the KMT dealt with the Constitution. In its Party Constitution it proclaimed that, "For the past three or four decades, the Legislative Yuan has never held a comprehensive re-election. Instead, the KMT has imposed long-term martial law. The Temporary Provisions have nullified the constitution, and utterly undermined the principle of constitutional rule." The DPP concluded that "A nation governed by the rule of law must adhere to its constitution." "National emergency powers must not be permitted to undermine the constitutional framework."
But this show of "loyal opposition within the constitutional system" lasted a mere five years. In 1991, the DPP passed its "Taiwan Independence Party Platform." It denounced the "five part constitutional framework of the Republic of China" as a "white elephant." It advocated "the authoring of a new constitution in accordance with Taiwan's sovereignty, in order to establish an independent state." Ever since then its goal has been to overthrow the constitution.
In May 1999, the DPP, facing a presidential election, hoped to soften its Taiwan independence stance. It passed its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." It proclaimed that, "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. Currently it is referred to as the Republic of China, in accordance with the Constitution... Any changes affecting its independent status, must be decided by a popular referendum." This resolution openly proclaimed that Taiwan was an independent nation, and that it held sovereignty only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. It reworded the "proactive Taiwan independence referendum," turning it into a "reactive referendum against reunification." This strategy for Taiwan independence involves "first backdoor list, then stall for time." The party shifted its focus to indoctrinating the public with "cultural Taiwan independence" attitudes internally, while stalling for time with the Mainland authorities on the other side of the Strait. To avoid touching the third rail of de jure independence, the DPP temporarily stopped demanding a new constitution. But the only part of the "Constitution of the Republic of China" the DPP recognized was the name of the nation. The DPP treated the Constitution as temporary scaffolding to be discarded later.
In 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected president. During the next eight years, Ah-Bian exploited constitutional loopholes to expand his personal power and to sow political chaos. He relentlessly demeaned and undermined the constitution. Just before the 1990 "National Conference," Ah-Bian denounced the constitution as a "Rube Goldberg contraption." Ten years later, during his presidential inauguration, he swore to "uphold the Constitution." But he had no intention of upholding this constitution. He exploited the Additional Articles, which granted the president the power to appoint officials and impose regulations. He used them to line his own pockets. He never missed an opportunity to slander the constitution as a "Rube Goldberg contraption."
Finally, in 2007, Chen Shui-bian spearheaded the DPP's "Resolution for a Normal Nation." He maintained that "Taiwan is an independent and sovereign state." He maintained that "Taiwan is still using the unsuitable ROC constitutional framework... resulting in an abnornal constitutional framework." He decided to "promote the rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." He reverted to the "original intent" of the "Taiwan independence Party Platform."
Alas, the Chen Dynasty engaged in monstrous corruption. Public outrage boiled over. The "Rectification of Names Campaign" fell on its face. Ah-Bian strategist Chiu Yi-jen recently publicly declared that, "We were forced to accept this constitution. But we were not sincere in our acceptance of this constitution." He confessed that even when it participated in the amending of the constitution, the DPP "did not completely accept the constitution." "The constitution was something we were forced to accept." No wonder during the "97 constitutional reform," Chiu Yi-jen admitted that there was an "arrangement to switch tracks." But later, when the DPP came to power, apart from the short-lived Tang Fei cabinet, Ah-Bian invariably maintained a minority government. Today, it is clear the DPP's endless promises to uphold the constitution and its amendments were nothing more than strategies to seize power. In their heart of hearts, they feel no loyalty to anything other than Taiwan independence, political power, and personal enrichment.
British philosopher David Hume spoke of "the assumption that every man is a knave." He argued that the design of any system for constitutional rule must assume that every politician is a knave. Chen Shui-bian and his family are living proof that Hume's assumption was not a theoretical proposition, but an ugly reality. During previous constitutional amendment processes, everyone lacked the requisite vigilance. This enabled knaves to exploit loopholes in the constitution, and almost destroy the Republic of China Constitution.
Today, as the Ma administration's prestige hits rock bottom, the DPP rubs its hands and licks its lips. It looks forward to a comeback three years from now. Frank Hsieh acknowledged that "We made many commitments to the constitution, but not one that we fulfilled." Other party princes have yet to make the same admission. Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang has merely reverted to the position stated in the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." In other words, he intends to continue abusing the ROC constitution, using it as a means of "backdoor listing."
We hope Frank Hsieh was speaking the truth. We hope the DPP will choose to do the right thing. We are waiting to see.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.04
社論－民進黨何去何從 系列3 綠色執政？先說清對中華民國憲法態度
本報訊
為了迎戰二○一六年大選，民進黨正努力改變形象，一面制定排黑條款，一面重新表述中國政策。我們已指出：如果該黨無法與陳水扁的貪腐切割，或仍自外於中國，這些努力將難奏效。在此，我們還要進一步指出：民進黨若要成為人民可以放心託付的執政黨，還需要說清楚他們對中華民國憲法的態度。
正如本系列社論首篇所言，民進黨在一九八六年建黨之初，仍延續黨外主流，宣稱「 為實現民主憲政而奮鬥 」。但是，該黨對於憲法的態度前後不一：先公開擁護，後來公然否定，再惡化為一邊利用、一邊羞辱，最後積極毀憲。這種變化，使人民無法信賴其對憲法和憲政的誠意。
一開始，民進黨持續藉憲法攻擊國民黨的作法，在其《黨綱》中明文指出：「這三、四十年來，非但國會未曾全面改選，而且戒嚴長期持續，臨時條款架空憲法，立憲原則完全被扭曲。」於是他們主張：「法治國家應確實遵守憲法」、「國家緊急權不得破壞憲法體制」。
然而，這段扮演「憲政體制內忠實反對黨」的歲月只有五年。一九九一年該黨便通過「台獨黨綱」，將「中華民國五權憲法體制」稱為「大而無當」，主張「依照台灣主權實現獨立建國，制定新憲」，從此便以推翻這部憲法為目標。
一九九九年五月，民進黨面臨總統大選，想軟化其台獨主張，於是通過「台灣前途決議文」，主張「台灣是一主權獨立國家，…依目前憲法稱為中華民國，…任何有關獨立現狀的更動，都必須經由…公民投票的方式決定」。此決議直接主張台灣已是獨立國家，主權領域僅及於台澎金馬，然後把「攻擊性的台獨公投」改為「防禦性的反統公投」。這是把台獨的策略定為「先借殼上市，再以時間換取空間」。於是，該黨把階段性重心轉移到內部文化台獨和兩岸間和平演變。為了不觸及法理台獨，暫不推動制憲。但是，對於「中華民國憲法」，僅承認其所定國號。這是把憲法完全視為階段性的工具來利用。
公元兩千年，陳水扁當選總統。從此八年期間，扁政府一邊利用憲法漏洞擴權亂政，一邊不斷羞辱、破壞這部憲法。扁早在一九九○年「國是會議」前，至少三度表示現行憲政是「烏魯木齊」制。十年後，他宣誓「必遵守憲法」而就職總統。但是，他毫無使這部憲法正常運行的誠意，不但濫用增修條文賦予總統的人事權、調節權以貪贓枉法，也從不放過機會再度汙衊這部憲法是「烏魯木齊」制。
最後，在二○○七年，阿扁主導民進黨通過了「正常國家決議文」，除了繼續堅持「台灣是主權獨立的國家」，並認為「台灣至今仍沿用不當的中華民國憲法架構，…造成『憲政體制不正常』」，決定「積極推動正名、制憲」，回到台獨黨綱的「初衷」。
幸好由於扁朝貪腐滔天，民怨沸騰，「正名制憲」沒有成功。阿扁軍師邱義仁最近即公然承認：「我們是不得不接受，而不是真心接受這部憲法」，甚至在參與修憲的過程中，民進黨也「沒有全盤接受這部憲法」、「憲法是不得不的選擇」。怪不得在「九七憲改」中，邱義仁曾證實有「換軌機制」的共識，但是後來在民進黨當政期間，除了短命的唐飛內閣，阿扁始終堅持任命少數政府。如今回顧民進黨一切憲政的承諾、修憲的共識，都不過是奪權謀略。在他們內心深處，除了台獨、權力、金錢，別無忠誠可言。
英國思想家休謨曾提出「無賴假定」，主張：在為民主憲政設計制度時，必須假定每一個政治人物都是無賴。但是，陳水扁及其家人、近臣卻活生生地告訴世人：休謨所言，絕非假定！正是由於大家在歷次修憲過程中對於「無賴當政」缺乏戒心，才使得這幫無賴得以利用憲法漏洞幾乎摧毀了中華民國憲政！
如今，民進黨面對聲望跌至谷底的馬政府，躍躍欲試，希望三年後捲土重來。但是，除了謝長廷承認：「我們對它（憲法）有很多承諾，我們都沒有做到」外，其他綠營天王們都沒有積極表態。黨主席蘇貞昌也只表示回到「台灣前途決議文」的立場，換言之，就是繼續利用「中華民國憲法」借殼上市。
我們希望謝長廷說的是真心話，我們也希望民進黨擇其善者而從之。我們且拭目以待。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 4, 2013
Summary: In order to wage a successful 2016 election campaign, the DPP is struggling to change its image. It is establishing new provisions against involvement in organized crime. It is rewording its "China [sic] policy." But as we have pointed out, if the party refuses to sever its links to Chen Shui-bian's corruption, or if it persists in defining Taiwan as "not part of China," their efforts will be in vain. If the DPP hopes to become a party the people can trust to rule, it must tell us, in no uncertain terms, how it stands on the Republic of China Constitution.
Full Text below:
In order to wage a successful 2016 election campaign, the DPP is struggling to change its image. It is establishing new provisions against involvement in organized crime. It is rewording its "China [sic] policy." But as we have pointed out, if the party refuses to sever its links to Chen Shui-bian's corruption, or if it persists in defining Taiwan as "not part of China," their efforts will be in vain. If the DPP hopes to become a party the people can trust to rule, it must tell us, in no uncertain terms, how it stands on the Republic of China Constitution.
Ever since the DPP was founded in 1986, it has remained a "dang wai" (outside the party) entity that purports to "struggle for the realization of democracy and constitutional rule." The party's attitude toward the constitution however, is hypocritical. First it expressed public support. Later it shrilly repudiated it. Still later, it stooped to cynically exploiting it even as it angrily denounced it. Eventually, it tried to destroy it. Its flip-flops have left the public unable to trust the DPP's lip service to the Republic of China Constitution, and even to constitutional rule per se.
At first, the DPP relentlessly attacked the way the KMT dealt with the Constitution. In its Party Constitution it proclaimed that, "For the past three or four decades, the Legislative Yuan has never held a comprehensive re-election. Instead, the KMT has imposed long-term martial law. The Temporary Provisions have nullified the constitution, and utterly undermined the principle of constitutional rule." The DPP concluded that "A nation governed by the rule of law must adhere to its constitution." "National emergency powers must not be permitted to undermine the constitutional framework."
But this show of "loyal opposition within the constitutional system" lasted a mere five years. In 1991, the DPP passed its "Taiwan Independence Party Platform." It denounced the "five part constitutional framework of the Republic of China" as a "white elephant." It advocated "the authoring of a new constitution in accordance with Taiwan's sovereignty, in order to establish an independent state." Ever since then its goal has been to overthrow the constitution.
In May 1999, the DPP, facing a presidential election, hoped to soften its Taiwan independence stance. It passed its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." It proclaimed that, "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. Currently it is referred to as the Republic of China, in accordance with the Constitution... Any changes affecting its independent status, must be decided by a popular referendum." This resolution openly proclaimed that Taiwan was an independent nation, and that it held sovereignty only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. It reworded the "proactive Taiwan independence referendum," turning it into a "reactive referendum against reunification." This strategy for Taiwan independence involves "first backdoor list, then stall for time." The party shifted its focus to indoctrinating the public with "cultural Taiwan independence" attitudes internally, while stalling for time with the Mainland authorities on the other side of the Strait. To avoid touching the third rail of de jure independence, the DPP temporarily stopped demanding a new constitution. But the only part of the "Constitution of the Republic of China" the DPP recognized was the name of the nation. The DPP treated the Constitution as temporary scaffolding to be discarded later.
In 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected president. During the next eight years, Ah-Bian exploited constitutional loopholes to expand his personal power and to sow political chaos. He relentlessly demeaned and undermined the constitution. Just before the 1990 "National Conference," Ah-Bian denounced the constitution as a "Rube Goldberg contraption." Ten years later, during his presidential inauguration, he swore to "uphold the Constitution." But he had no intention of upholding this constitution. He exploited the Additional Articles, which granted the president the power to appoint officials and impose regulations. He used them to line his own pockets. He never missed an opportunity to slander the constitution as a "Rube Goldberg contraption."
Finally, in 2007, Chen Shui-bian spearheaded the DPP's "Resolution for a Normal Nation." He maintained that "Taiwan is an independent and sovereign state." He maintained that "Taiwan is still using the unsuitable ROC constitutional framework... resulting in an abnornal constitutional framework." He decided to "promote the rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." He reverted to the "original intent" of the "Taiwan independence Party Platform."
Alas, the Chen Dynasty engaged in monstrous corruption. Public outrage boiled over. The "Rectification of Names Campaign" fell on its face. Ah-Bian strategist Chiu Yi-jen recently publicly declared that, "We were forced to accept this constitution. But we were not sincere in our acceptance of this constitution." He confessed that even when it participated in the amending of the constitution, the DPP "did not completely accept the constitution." "The constitution was something we were forced to accept." No wonder during the "97 constitutional reform," Chiu Yi-jen admitted that there was an "arrangement to switch tracks." But later, when the DPP came to power, apart from the short-lived Tang Fei cabinet, Ah-Bian invariably maintained a minority government. Today, it is clear the DPP's endless promises to uphold the constitution and its amendments were nothing more than strategies to seize power. In their heart of hearts, they feel no loyalty to anything other than Taiwan independence, political power, and personal enrichment.
British philosopher David Hume spoke of "the assumption that every man is a knave." He argued that the design of any system for constitutional rule must assume that every politician is a knave. Chen Shui-bian and his family are living proof that Hume's assumption was not a theoretical proposition, but an ugly reality. During previous constitutional amendment processes, everyone lacked the requisite vigilance. This enabled knaves to exploit loopholes in the constitution, and almost destroy the Republic of China Constitution.
Today, as the Ma administration's prestige hits rock bottom, the DPP rubs its hands and licks its lips. It looks forward to a comeback three years from now. Frank Hsieh acknowledged that "We made many commitments to the constitution, but not one that we fulfilled." Other party princes have yet to make the same admission. Party Chairman Su Tseng-chang has merely reverted to the position stated in the DPP's "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." In other words, he intends to continue abusing the ROC constitution, using it as a means of "backdoor listing."
We hope Frank Hsieh was speaking the truth. We hope the DPP will choose to do the right thing. We are waiting to see.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.04
社論－民進黨何去何從 系列3 綠色執政？先說清對中華民國憲法態度
本報訊
為了迎戰二○一六年大選，民進黨正努力改變形象，一面制定排黑條款，一面重新表述中國政策。我們已指出：如果該黨無法與陳水扁的貪腐切割，或仍自外於中國，這些努力將難奏效。在此，我們還要進一步指出：民進黨若要成為人民可以放心託付的執政黨，還需要說清楚他們對中華民國憲法的態度。
正如本系列社論首篇所言，民進黨在一九八六年建黨之初，仍延續黨外主流，宣稱「 為實現民主憲政而奮鬥 」。但是，該黨對於憲法的態度前後不一：先公開擁護，後來公然否定，再惡化為一邊利用、一邊羞辱，最後積極毀憲。這種變化，使人民無法信賴其對憲法和憲政的誠意。
一開始，民進黨持續藉憲法攻擊國民黨的作法，在其《黨綱》中明文指出：「這三、四十年來，非但國會未曾全面改選，而且戒嚴長期持續，臨時條款架空憲法，立憲原則完全被扭曲。」於是他們主張：「法治國家應確實遵守憲法」、「國家緊急權不得破壞憲法體制」。
然而，這段扮演「憲政體制內忠實反對黨」的歲月只有五年。一九九一年該黨便通過「台獨黨綱」，將「中華民國五權憲法體制」稱為「大而無當」，主張「依照台灣主權實現獨立建國，制定新憲」，從此便以推翻這部憲法為目標。
一九九九年五月，民進黨面臨總統大選，想軟化其台獨主張，於是通過「台灣前途決議文」，主張「台灣是一主權獨立國家，…依目前憲法稱為中華民國，…任何有關獨立現狀的更動，都必須經由…公民投票的方式決定」。此決議直接主張台灣已是獨立國家，主權領域僅及於台澎金馬，然後把「攻擊性的台獨公投」改為「防禦性的反統公投」。這是把台獨的策略定為「先借殼上市，再以時間換取空間」。於是，該黨把階段性重心轉移到內部文化台獨和兩岸間和平演變。為了不觸及法理台獨，暫不推動制憲。但是，對於「中華民國憲法」，僅承認其所定國號。這是把憲法完全視為階段性的工具來利用。
公元兩千年，陳水扁當選總統。從此八年期間，扁政府一邊利用憲法漏洞擴權亂政，一邊不斷羞辱、破壞這部憲法。扁早在一九九○年「國是會議」前，至少三度表示現行憲政是「烏魯木齊」制。十年後，他宣誓「必遵守憲法」而就職總統。但是，他毫無使這部憲法正常運行的誠意，不但濫用增修條文賦予總統的人事權、調節權以貪贓枉法，也從不放過機會再度汙衊這部憲法是「烏魯木齊」制。
最後，在二○○七年，阿扁主導民進黨通過了「正常國家決議文」，除了繼續堅持「台灣是主權獨立的國家」，並認為「台灣至今仍沿用不當的中華民國憲法架構，…造成『憲政體制不正常』」，決定「積極推動正名、制憲」，回到台獨黨綱的「初衷」。
幸好由於扁朝貪腐滔天，民怨沸騰，「正名制憲」沒有成功。阿扁軍師邱義仁最近即公然承認：「我們是不得不接受，而不是真心接受這部憲法」，甚至在參與修憲的過程中，民進黨也「沒有全盤接受這部憲法」、「憲法是不得不的選擇」。怪不得在「九七憲改」中，邱義仁曾證實有「換軌機制」的共識，但是後來在民進黨當政期間，除了短命的唐飛內閣，阿扁始終堅持任命少數政府。如今回顧民進黨一切憲政的承諾、修憲的共識，都不過是奪權謀略。在他們內心深處，除了台獨、權力、金錢，別無忠誠可言。
英國思想家休謨曾提出「無賴假定」，主張：在為民主憲政設計制度時，必須假定每一個政治人物都是無賴。但是，陳水扁及其家人、近臣卻活生生地告訴世人：休謨所言，絕非假定！正是由於大家在歷次修憲過程中對於「無賴當政」缺乏戒心，才使得這幫無賴得以利用憲法漏洞幾乎摧毀了中華民國憲政！
如今，民進黨面對聲望跌至谷底的馬政府，躍躍欲試，希望三年後捲土重來。但是，除了謝長廷承認：「我們對它（憲法）有很多承諾，我們都沒有做到」外，其他綠營天王們都沒有積極表態。黨主席蘇貞昌也只表示回到「台灣前途決議文」的立場，換言之，就是繼續利用「中華民國憲法」借殼上市。
我們希望謝長廷說的是真心話，我們也希望民進黨擇其善者而從之。我們且拭目以待。
Sunday, June 2, 2013
Inter-Party Cooperation, Orderly Development of cross-Strait Relations
Inter-Party Cooperation, Orderly Development of cross-Strait Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 3, 2013
Summary: Beijing is not aggressively demanding talks or forcing reunification upon Taipei. In which case, the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan should make good use of the opportunity. They should take full advantage of the strategic opportunities afforded by current peaceful development. They sould seek a positive response, and adopt an orderly, progressive, and responsible approach to cross-Strait relations.
Full Text below:
Over the past five years, cross-Strait relations have been turned upside down. They have become healthier and more stable. This is beneficial to Taiwan, conducive to regional security, and beneficial to the Chinese mainland. It provides the two sides with a respite, with strategic opportunities for peaceful development. No wonder all parties look favorably upon the situation. They look forward to the healthy development of cross-Strait relations, to further reductions in tensions, and to the resolution of disputes through dialogue. The ruling authorities on both sides have made important and worthwhile contributions. We believe that even if Taiwan undergoes another ruling party change, the new regime will face new circumstances. It will be difficult for them to single-handedly, willfully reverse the macro-level trend for cross-Strait relations. The currents of history are Irresistible.
The DPP has been busy lately. It has established a "China [sic] Affairs Committee." It has invited different factions holding different ideas to participate. It is about to initiate a major "China policy debate." Green-oriented academics say Taiwan independence no longer has a market. They say the party should advocate the establishment of diplomatic relations, rather than the founding of a new nation. They recommend the establishment of a cross-Strait human rights group. They call for the passage of a "Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait Resolution." Su Tseng-chang said the Democratic Progressive Party and the Communist Party can engage in exchanges. Dialogue can take place at any level. But he insists that as party chairman, his China policy stance remains the one adopted by the DPP All Peoples Conference, i.e., "The Resolution on Taiwan's Future." He says he thinks that Taiwan's highest priority is to avoid democratic retrogression, the loss of human rights, and the hollowing out of the nation. His remarks left listeners bewildered.
In the plus column, the DPP held high the banner of democracy and human rights. It highlighted cross-Strait differences. It called on the Mainland authorities to promote political reform, as soon as possible. It encouraged the development of democracy. This was undeniably proactive. After all, future cross-Strait reunification or integration will require narrowing the differences in values between the two sides. In the minus column, we must remain objective, and point out that the DPP's strategic adjustments are motivated by electoral pressures, rather than any fundamental change in core values. For example, the DPP persists in referring to "China" this, and "China" that. It persists in defining Taiwan as "not part of China," as mutually exclusive entities. It may no longer explicitly advocate Taiwan independence. But it persists in referring to "Taiwan, a sovereign independent country," rather than "The Republic of China, a sovereign and independent country." It wants the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two sides predicated upon the assumption that they are separate countries. This shows that the DPP has not forsaken its separatism. The problem persists.
On the surface, DPP and KMT proposals have temporarily converged. Some say this reflects a consensus on Taiwan. For Taiwan, this is not a bad thing. It reflects a gradual qualititative transformation, something to be encouraged. But KMT and DPP proposals only appear similar. They differ fundamentally in substance. For example, for the KMT, maintaining the status quo does not preclude eventual reunification, How matters evolve may not be to everyones' liking. No one can offer any guarantees. But the DPP clings to the illusory goal of independence and the founding of a new nation, while maintaining the status quo. To term it "evil intent" may be a bit strong. But it is not far from the truth. Democratic Progressive Party rhetoric may change. But it will always have trouble winning the trust of the public on Taiwan, the international community, and the Mainland authorities.
Based on our understanding of the CCP's policy toward Taiwan, Beijing is currently being quite rational and pragmatic. It harbors few illusions. It understands cross-Strait political negotiations. It would like to sign a peace agreement. It knows that achieving the goal of reunification in the short term is unrealistic. It now hopes merely that the Taiwan Region will abide by its own existing regulations, i.e., constitution, and adhere to the one China policy. Under the one China framework, the two sides can begin where they currently stand. They can tackle the easier and more urgent issues first. They can shelve disputes, and step-by-step, through exchanges and cooperation, increase mutual trust, and solidify bilateral relations. The CCP wants to explore the possibility of political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified. It wants to define the two sides' political status, and arrive at a fair and reasonable arrangement. Beijing is merely hoping to create the conditions necessary for the future resolution of problems, rather than attempting to immediately deal with or resolve those problems.
Beijing is not aggressively demanding talks or forcing reunification upon Taipei. In which case, the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan should make good use of the opportunity. They should take full advantage of the strategic opportunities afforded by current peaceful development. They sould seek a positive response, and adopt an orderly, progressive, and responsible approach to cross-Strait relations. In particular, the DPP should change their attitude. They should become more open-minded. They can insist on democracy and human rights. They can help the Mainland move in a more civilized and rational direction. But they should not use it as a pretext to pursue separatism. The KMT on the other hand, should adopt a bolder, more proactive policy toward the Mainland. It should consider signing an interim cross-Strait agreement. Such a cross-Strait agreement would be primarily cultural and educational in nature. The KMT should be less passive and more active. It should make good use of Taiwan's advantages. It should use interparty cooperation to strengthen Taiwan. It should use cross-Strait win/win policies to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. This should be our common goal.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.03
社論－朝野合作 有序、漸進發展兩岸關係
本報訊
過去五年，兩岸關係已有天翻地覆的改變，變的更為健康，更為穩定。這不但對台灣有利，對區域安全有利，也對中國大陸有利，為彼此提供了一個休養生息、和平發展的戰略機遇時期。難怪相關各方都對此持正面鼓勵的態度，樂見兩岸關係的良性發展，緊張的進一步降低，期望雙方能夠透過對話解決紛爭。兩岸執政當局都為此做出了重要的努力與貢獻，值得肯定。我們有理由相信，今後即使台灣再度出現政黨輪替，新的執政當局也將面臨一個嶄新，而且難以憑一己、一黨主觀意志全盤扭轉的兩岸關係。歷史潮流不可抗拒。
爾來，民進黨動作頻仍，一方面成立中國事務委員會，廣邀黨內不同派系與不同主張者與會，一方面又說要進行中國政策大辯論。親綠學者先說台獨主張已無市場，提出兩岸應該建交而非建國的主張，建議成立台海人權交流小組，提案要求通過台海人權決議文。蘇貞昌說，民進黨與共產黨的交流，任何層次的對話軌道都可進行。但他仍然堅持，做為黨主席，他的中國政策立場就是民進黨全代會通過的「台灣前途決議文」。他認為台灣當前最重要的是不要讓民主倒退、人權流失，國家不能虛無化。讓人眼花繚亂。
先從正面來看，民進黨高舉民主人權的大纛，希望用價值來凸顯兩岸的差異，期許中共當局早日推動政治改革，鼓勵北京的民主發展，這不能不說是個比較積極的觀點，畢竟未來兩岸不管是走向統一或融合，總得縮小雙方在價值和生活層面的種種差異。但是若由負面的角度觀察，我們也不得不客觀的指出，民進黨當前的主張恐怕仍然只是迫於選舉壓力的策略性調整而非核心價值的根本轉變。比如說，民進黨仍然口口聲聲中國如何如何，把台灣與中國置於二元對立的局面，雖然它不再主張台獨，但仍然強調台灣（而非中華民國）是個主權獨立的國家，主張兩岸建交，這一切都顯示出民進黨分離主義的本質並未改變。問題仍在。
表面上看來，民進黨當前的某些主張和國民黨似有暫時趨同的現象，有人認為這是反映或爭取台灣整體民意的一種必然結果，對台灣而言並非壞事，至少這總是一個漸進發展、質量互變的過程，應該給予鼓勵，但國、民兩黨的主張即使表面相似，實質上仍有根本的差異。舉例來說，國民黨的維持現狀仍然含有追求或並不排斥國家統一的願景，雖然最後結果可能未必盡如人意，如何發展也沒人敢打包票，但民進黨的主張則基本上仍然是在維持現狀的假象之下，追求最後的獨立建國。用包藏禍心這個字眼或嫌過重，但實情應與此相去不遠。此之所以不論民進黨如何改變說辭，卻總是很難取信於台灣民眾、國際社會與中國大陸的原因。
根據我們對中共對台政策的理解，北京目前已經表現的相當理性務實，幾乎沒有任何幻想，它已了解兩岸政治談判、簽署和平協議，短期內達成統一的目標不切實際，現在只希望台灣能夠依照自己的現行規定（憲法），堅持一個中國的立場，然後在一中的框架之下，雙方都能由實際的情況出發，仍然本著先易後難、先急後緩、擱置爭議、循序漸進的方式，透過交流合作來增加互信、鞏固深化雙邊的關係。具體的說，中共目前只是想要透過雙方共同努力、務實的「探討」在國家尚未統一之前的特殊情況下，如何為雙方的政治定位做出比較合情合理的安排，北京只是卑微的希望為將來解決問題「創造條件」，而非要立刻處理或解決問題。
既然如此，在暫時沒有北京積極促談或逼統的壓力之下，台灣朝野更應該善用這段可以預期，能夠延續一段時間的和平發展戰略機遇時期，好好找出因應之道，以有序、漸進、負責任的方式來發展兩岸關係。對此，我們認為，民進黨尤其應該調整心態、開放思想，既堅持自己對於民主人權價值的主張，主動積極的協助中國大陸往更文明理性的方向發展，但又不是以此做為追求分離主義的藉口，而國民黨則應該考慮採取更為前瞻進取的大陸政策，重新思考簽署兩岸各種中程協議的可能，而這其中又以兩岸文化教育協議應為首要。化被動為主動，善用台灣的優勢，以朝野合作來壯大台灣，用兩岸雙贏來振興中華這才是我們應該共同努力的目標。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 3, 2013
Summary: Beijing is not aggressively demanding talks or forcing reunification upon Taipei. In which case, the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan should make good use of the opportunity. They should take full advantage of the strategic opportunities afforded by current peaceful development. They sould seek a positive response, and adopt an orderly, progressive, and responsible approach to cross-Strait relations.
Full Text below:
Over the past five years, cross-Strait relations have been turned upside down. They have become healthier and more stable. This is beneficial to Taiwan, conducive to regional security, and beneficial to the Chinese mainland. It provides the two sides with a respite, with strategic opportunities for peaceful development. No wonder all parties look favorably upon the situation. They look forward to the healthy development of cross-Strait relations, to further reductions in tensions, and to the resolution of disputes through dialogue. The ruling authorities on both sides have made important and worthwhile contributions. We believe that even if Taiwan undergoes another ruling party change, the new regime will face new circumstances. It will be difficult for them to single-handedly, willfully reverse the macro-level trend for cross-Strait relations. The currents of history are Irresistible.
The DPP has been busy lately. It has established a "China [sic] Affairs Committee." It has invited different factions holding different ideas to participate. It is about to initiate a major "China policy debate." Green-oriented academics say Taiwan independence no longer has a market. They say the party should advocate the establishment of diplomatic relations, rather than the founding of a new nation. They recommend the establishment of a cross-Strait human rights group. They call for the passage of a "Human Rights in the Taiwan Strait Resolution." Su Tseng-chang said the Democratic Progressive Party and the Communist Party can engage in exchanges. Dialogue can take place at any level. But he insists that as party chairman, his China policy stance remains the one adopted by the DPP All Peoples Conference, i.e., "The Resolution on Taiwan's Future." He says he thinks that Taiwan's highest priority is to avoid democratic retrogression, the loss of human rights, and the hollowing out of the nation. His remarks left listeners bewildered.
In the plus column, the DPP held high the banner of democracy and human rights. It highlighted cross-Strait differences. It called on the Mainland authorities to promote political reform, as soon as possible. It encouraged the development of democracy. This was undeniably proactive. After all, future cross-Strait reunification or integration will require narrowing the differences in values between the two sides. In the minus column, we must remain objective, and point out that the DPP's strategic adjustments are motivated by electoral pressures, rather than any fundamental change in core values. For example, the DPP persists in referring to "China" this, and "China" that. It persists in defining Taiwan as "not part of China," as mutually exclusive entities. It may no longer explicitly advocate Taiwan independence. But it persists in referring to "Taiwan, a sovereign independent country," rather than "The Republic of China, a sovereign and independent country." It wants the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two sides predicated upon the assumption that they are separate countries. This shows that the DPP has not forsaken its separatism. The problem persists.
On the surface, DPP and KMT proposals have temporarily converged. Some say this reflects a consensus on Taiwan. For Taiwan, this is not a bad thing. It reflects a gradual qualititative transformation, something to be encouraged. But KMT and DPP proposals only appear similar. They differ fundamentally in substance. For example, for the KMT, maintaining the status quo does not preclude eventual reunification, How matters evolve may not be to everyones' liking. No one can offer any guarantees. But the DPP clings to the illusory goal of independence and the founding of a new nation, while maintaining the status quo. To term it "evil intent" may be a bit strong. But it is not far from the truth. Democratic Progressive Party rhetoric may change. But it will always have trouble winning the trust of the public on Taiwan, the international community, and the Mainland authorities.
Based on our understanding of the CCP's policy toward Taiwan, Beijing is currently being quite rational and pragmatic. It harbors few illusions. It understands cross-Strait political negotiations. It would like to sign a peace agreement. It knows that achieving the goal of reunification in the short term is unrealistic. It now hopes merely that the Taiwan Region will abide by its own existing regulations, i.e., constitution, and adhere to the one China policy. Under the one China framework, the two sides can begin where they currently stand. They can tackle the easier and more urgent issues first. They can shelve disputes, and step-by-step, through exchanges and cooperation, increase mutual trust, and solidify bilateral relations. The CCP wants to explore the possibility of political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified. It wants to define the two sides' political status, and arrive at a fair and reasonable arrangement. Beijing is merely hoping to create the conditions necessary for the future resolution of problems, rather than attempting to immediately deal with or resolve those problems.
Beijing is not aggressively demanding talks or forcing reunification upon Taipei. In which case, the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan should make good use of the opportunity. They should take full advantage of the strategic opportunities afforded by current peaceful development. They sould seek a positive response, and adopt an orderly, progressive, and responsible approach to cross-Strait relations. In particular, the DPP should change their attitude. They should become more open-minded. They can insist on democracy and human rights. They can help the Mainland move in a more civilized and rational direction. But they should not use it as a pretext to pursue separatism. The KMT on the other hand, should adopt a bolder, more proactive policy toward the Mainland. It should consider signing an interim cross-Strait agreement. Such a cross-Strait agreement would be primarily cultural and educational in nature. The KMT should be less passive and more active. It should make good use of Taiwan's advantages. It should use interparty cooperation to strengthen Taiwan. It should use cross-Strait win/win policies to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. This should be our common goal.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.06.03
社論－朝野合作 有序、漸進發展兩岸關係
本報訊
過去五年，兩岸關係已有天翻地覆的改變，變的更為健康，更為穩定。這不但對台灣有利，對區域安全有利，也對中國大陸有利，為彼此提供了一個休養生息、和平發展的戰略機遇時期。難怪相關各方都對此持正面鼓勵的態度，樂見兩岸關係的良性發展，緊張的進一步降低，期望雙方能夠透過對話解決紛爭。兩岸執政當局都為此做出了重要的努力與貢獻，值得肯定。我們有理由相信，今後即使台灣再度出現政黨輪替，新的執政當局也將面臨一個嶄新，而且難以憑一己、一黨主觀意志全盤扭轉的兩岸關係。歷史潮流不可抗拒。
爾來，民進黨動作頻仍，一方面成立中國事務委員會，廣邀黨內不同派系與不同主張者與會，一方面又說要進行中國政策大辯論。親綠學者先說台獨主張已無市場，提出兩岸應該建交而非建國的主張，建議成立台海人權交流小組，提案要求通過台海人權決議文。蘇貞昌說，民進黨與共產黨的交流，任何層次的對話軌道都可進行。但他仍然堅持，做為黨主席，他的中國政策立場就是民進黨全代會通過的「台灣前途決議文」。他認為台灣當前最重要的是不要讓民主倒退、人權流失，國家不能虛無化。讓人眼花繚亂。
先從正面來看，民進黨高舉民主人權的大纛，希望用價值來凸顯兩岸的差異，期許中共當局早日推動政治改革，鼓勵北京的民主發展，這不能不說是個比較積極的觀點，畢竟未來兩岸不管是走向統一或融合，總得縮小雙方在價值和生活層面的種種差異。但是若由負面的角度觀察，我們也不得不客觀的指出，民進黨當前的主張恐怕仍然只是迫於選舉壓力的策略性調整而非核心價值的根本轉變。比如說，民進黨仍然口口聲聲中國如何如何，把台灣與中國置於二元對立的局面，雖然它不再主張台獨，但仍然強調台灣（而非中華民國）是個主權獨立的國家，主張兩岸建交，這一切都顯示出民進黨分離主義的本質並未改變。問題仍在。
表面上看來，民進黨當前的某些主張和國民黨似有暫時趨同的現象，有人認為這是反映或爭取台灣整體民意的一種必然結果，對台灣而言並非壞事，至少這總是一個漸進發展、質量互變的過程，應該給予鼓勵，但國、民兩黨的主張即使表面相似，實質上仍有根本的差異。舉例來說，國民黨的維持現狀仍然含有追求或並不排斥國家統一的願景，雖然最後結果可能未必盡如人意，如何發展也沒人敢打包票，但民進黨的主張則基本上仍然是在維持現狀的假象之下，追求最後的獨立建國。用包藏禍心這個字眼或嫌過重，但實情應與此相去不遠。此之所以不論民進黨如何改變說辭，卻總是很難取信於台灣民眾、國際社會與中國大陸的原因。
根據我們對中共對台政策的理解，北京目前已經表現的相當理性務實，幾乎沒有任何幻想，它已了解兩岸政治談判、簽署和平協議，短期內達成統一的目標不切實際，現在只希望台灣能夠依照自己的現行規定（憲法），堅持一個中國的立場，然後在一中的框架之下，雙方都能由實際的情況出發，仍然本著先易後難、先急後緩、擱置爭議、循序漸進的方式，透過交流合作來增加互信、鞏固深化雙邊的關係。具體的說，中共目前只是想要透過雙方共同努力、務實的「探討」在國家尚未統一之前的特殊情況下，如何為雙方的政治定位做出比較合情合理的安排，北京只是卑微的希望為將來解決問題「創造條件」，而非要立刻處理或解決問題。
既然如此，在暫時沒有北京積極促談或逼統的壓力之下，台灣朝野更應該善用這段可以預期，能夠延續一段時間的和平發展戰略機遇時期，好好找出因應之道，以有序、漸進、負責任的方式來發展兩岸關係。對此，我們認為，民進黨尤其應該調整心態、開放思想，既堅持自己對於民主人權價值的主張，主動積極的協助中國大陸往更文明理性的方向發展，但又不是以此做為追求分離主義的藉口，而國民黨則應該考慮採取更為前瞻進取的大陸政策，重新思考簽署兩岸各種中程協議的可能，而這其中又以兩岸文化教育協議應為首要。化被動為主動，善用台灣的優勢，以朝野合作來壯大台灣，用兩岸雙贏來振興中華這才是我們應該共同努力的目標。
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