DPP Alternatives: Pursue Progress or Blindly Oppose Ma
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 10, 2013
Summary: Wang Jin-pyng has caused an uproar by peddling influence in the Ker Chien-ming corruption case. Perhaps the most incomprehensible aspect of the current controversy is the DPP's self-contradictory rhetoric. One minute the Green Camp dismisses the prosecution as "political persecution." The next minute it accuses the Special Investigation Unit of "illegal wiretapping." The one aspect of the case it completely ignores is political interference in the judicial process. Does the DPP consider legislators peddling influence in court cases a matter unworthy of concern?
Full text below:
Wang Jin-pyng has caused an uproar by peddling influence in the Ker Chien-ming corruption case. Perhaps the most incomprehensible aspect of the current controversy is the DPP's self-contradictory rhetoric. One minute the Green Camp dismisses the prosecution as "political persecution." The next minute it accuses the Special Investigation Unit of "illegal wiretapping." The one aspect of the case it completely ignores is political interference in the judicial process. Does the DPP consider legislators peddling influence in court cases a matter unworthy of concern?
President Ma spoke out on the case. He said "If this is not influence peddling, what is?" "This is the most shameful day in the history of Taiwan's democracy and its rule of law." DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang ridiculed the president's statement. He said "If this is not a political power struggle, what is?" He said "This is the darkest day in the history of Taiwan's system of justice and human rights." Su's posturing reveals the DPP's lack of creativity and inability to engage in independent thought. Even worse, it reveals Su's utter befuddlement regarding his role in the matter.
President Ma's condemnation was directed primarily at Wang Jin-pying, the President of the Legislative Yuan. Ma did not even mention DPP party whip Ker Chien-ming's role in the scandal. Therefore, what precisely as Su's role when he responded? Was he speaking on behalf of Wang Jin-pying, or was he speaking on behalf of Ker Chien-ming? An opposition party chairman painted himself into a tiny corner on such an isolated issue. His rush to retort and counterattack merely made him appear confused. It made his behavior appear inappropriate. Worse still, he dragged the entire DPP down with him.
When the case first broke, the DPP flatly contradicted itself. On the one hand, it demanded that the Ma government immediately investigate Tseng Yung-fu. On the other hand, it dismissed the case as a mere "political power struggle." It accused President Ma of using the Special Investigation Unit to purge dissidents. But if DPP allegations were true, then Tseng Yung-fu would have been just another tool in the alleged "political power struggle." The DPP insists that Wang Jin-pying never peddled influence on behalf of Ker Chien-ming. But it simultaneously demands that Tseng Yung-fu resign because he allegedly succumbed to influence peddling. What is this, other than a flagrant contradiction? The DPP even argued that the executive and judicial branches cannot tolerate influence peddling, but the legislative branch must permit open and flagrant influence peddling, and that it must be immune from wiretapping. What manner of logic is this?
Even more ironically, the DPP pointed the finger at the Special Investigation Unit for "illegal wiretapping." It pointed the finger at President Ma for "unconstitutional" theft of the President of the Legislature's phone records. But from beginning to end, it never said one word about fellow comrade Ker Chien-ming or his role in the influence peddling case. Su expressed no desire to investigate the facts. Party comrades expressed no desire to ascertain whether Ker Chien-ming was in violation of party disciplinary rules. None of them questioned the seriousness of DPP legislative caucus whip Ker Chien-ming's role in influence peddling. The DPP has long been "tough on others, and easy on itself." Therefore this hypocrisy was hardly surprising. But the rationalization of Ker Chien-ming's wrongdoing reached absurd levels. Support for Ker and opposition to Ma have extended to blind favoritism toward Wang Jin-pying, and complete indifference to right and wrong. The DPP even appears indifferent to public condemnation.
The DPP is an opposition party. Its seeks to gain political advantage from each and every political incident that arises. It seizes the opportunity to bring the ruling KMT down a notch, whenever it can. These are of course, instinctive political moves. But all political moves involve costs. Even assuming one achieves one's purpose, one must never forget the price paid. Therefore even if certain individuals profit handsomely, the party as a whole may end up paying in the end.
Consider the current influence peddling case. The gist of the story is not hard to grasp. The public sees politicians interfering with the justice system on their own behalf. They see ministers and prosecutors at the politicians' beck and call. Many feel outrage at the injustice. They feel these gray areas distort democracy and the rule of law, and must be reformed. But the DPP sees things differently. It thinks that political smokescreens will allow them to muddy the waters. It thinks that lashing out at Ma will provide them with a cost effective windfall profit. As we all know, the toxic smoke of conspiracy theories can obscure the government's pursuit of justice and progress, until all that remains is unrelenting political struggle. If the DPP persists in its present course of action, what will the public make of the DPP as a party? Will it continue to perceive it as "progressive?"
We would like to remind the DPP that the current influence peddling scandal may be a major blow to the KMT. But if it uses the opportunity to address its bad habits, it can emerge as a beacon for constitutional rule and political progress. Conversely, the DPP must be wary of opposing Ma at every opportunity, of standing on the sidelines poisoning the political atmosphere, and of invoking conspiracy theories that blur the focus and obstruct justice. Doing so will only reveal its corruption, favoritism, and hypocrisy. The DPP is likely to pay a heavy price in lost ideals and eroded grassroots support. The current campaign against influence peddling may perish at the hands of the DPP. The party as a whole may be sacrificed to shield Ker Chien-ming from his wrongdoing. If so, the DPP will have pitted itself against the public.
Years ago, the DPP obstinately aided and abetted the hopelessly corrupt Chen Shui-bian. As a result, the public withdrew its support. Today the Kuomintang is willing to prosecute Wang Jin-pyng for influence peddling. Yet the DPP is obstinately aiding and abetting Ker Chien-ming. Our concern is not that the DPP is "swallowing poison to quench its thirst." Our concern is that rampant conspiracy theories and opposition party political moves will obliterate public awareness of right and wrong. They will bring the public to the brink of oblivion. We call on the DPP to consider social values and democratic progress. We call on the DPP to exercise moral courage, to call a spade a spade, and to help Taiwan in its pursuit of progress.
民進黨要追求進步或只能逢馬必反
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.09.10 03:17 am
王金平為柯建銘關說案，在一片沸沸揚揚之中，最令人難以理解的，是民進黨左歪右倒的言論。綠營忽而指控此事為「政治鬥爭」，忽而指控特偵組「非法監聽」，卻對此案「政治干預司法」的本質完全略而不談。難道，民進黨認為立委關說司法個案，沒有任何正當性的問題需要質疑？
就在馬總統就此案發表了：「如果這不是關說，那什麼才是關說」、「這是台灣民主法治最可恥的一天」之聲明後，民進黨主席蘇貞昌一五一十模仿了總統的句法，回應說：「如果這不是鬥爭，什麼才是鬥爭」、「這是台灣司法人權最黑暗的一天」。這種態度，不僅顯示民進黨缺乏創意與獨立思考，更暴露蘇貞昌完全站錯位置。
試想，馬總統的譴責聲明，主要是針對立法院長王金平而發，甚至無意暗示民進黨大黨鞭柯建銘難脫干係；那麼，觀察蘇貞昌的發言，他究竟是站在誰的立場回應？是代表王金平，還是柯建銘？一個在野黨主席把自己放進這樣有特定指涉的位置上，越俎代庖回擊、反嗆，不僅顯得失格與錯亂，也把民進黨一起拖進了渾水。
此案一開始，民進黨的態度就顯得自相矛盾：一方面要求馬政府要立即查辦曾勇夫，另一方面又將案件上綱為「政治鬥爭」，說這是馬總統借特偵組之手整肅異己。然而，如果「政治鬥爭」之說成立，曾勇夫亦不過是間接再間接的工具，何以民進黨為「關說」的主角王金平、柯建銘大聲喊冤，卻認定「被關說」的曾勇夫應該去職，這豈不矛盾？再說，行政和司法部門不容被關說，而立法部門的關說卻能理直氣壯、不容監聽，這又是什麼邏輯？
更諷刺的是，在民進黨把十指指向特偵組「違法監聽」、馬總統「違憲」竊取國會議長通聯內容之時，對引發此一關說案的自家人柯建銘，卻始終未置一詞。蘇貞昌既未表態要調查真相，黨內亦無任何同志質疑柯建銘的行為違反黨紀，更沒有人反省身為立院黨團大黨鞭的柯建銘關說的嚴重性。民進黨向來「嚴以律人，寬以待己」，這並不奇怪；但對柯建銘寬縱到這種地步，又因「挺柯」及「反馬」延伸出對王金平的莫名偏袒，到了顛倒是非的地步，對民眾的指指點點似乎亦無所戒懼。
從在野黨的立場，要從每一場政治事件中找到自己的利基，並趁機倒打執政黨一耙，當然是最直覺的盤算。但別忘了，任何的政治盤算，如果打到連自己從政的初衷都忘了計算成本；那麼，就算有人能從中海撈一票，對整個政黨而言，加總起來卻可能是慘賠收場。
以這次的關說案為例，整個故事的脈絡並不難懂，民眾看到的是政治人物如何為自己的案件插手司法，並任意使喚部長及檢察長；許多人除感到不公，也認為這類扭曲民主法治的灰色地帶應該清理。但在民進黨眼中，卻似乎以為用政治煙幕、烏賊戰術來模糊問題焦點，可以「打馬」兼收鬥爭漁利，似乎更為划算。殊不知，在陰謀論的毒煙中，政府追求司法進步的意義即被抹煞，剩下的只有政治的死纏爛打。如此一來，民眾會覺得民進黨的黨格和進步性在哪裡呢？
我們要提醒的是，這次的關說事件，對國民黨而言固然難免是一場大傷，但若能利用機會好好清理政治關說的陋習劣風，未始不能立下一個憲政進步的界碑。相對的，民進黨如果抱著「逢馬必反」的態度，只是一味從旁叫囂、下毒，想要用政治陰謀論來模糊焦點或阻擋處理，不僅將暴露自己的藏汙納垢和徇私矯情，更可能因喪失理想而失去基層支持。而如果這次反關說的改革契機竟葬送在民進黨手裡，只因為全黨要袒護一個柯建銘，那民進黨無異站到了人民的對立面。
當年民進黨誓死也要挺貪腐的陳水扁，結果遭人民唾棄；今天當國民黨願意處理王金平的關說，民進黨難道無論如何還要護著柯建銘？我們關心的，其實不是民進黨如何在政治上飲鴆止渴；我們關心的是，政治上過度的陰謀論和對立操作，將淹沒社會的是非黑白，會把人民帶向虛無。從關注社會價值及民主發展出發，我們呼籲民進黨拿出道德勇氣就事論事，幫助台灣追求進步。
Monday, September 9, 2013
What Should Wang Jin-pyng Do Next?
What Should Wang Jin-pyng Do Next?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 9, 2013
Summary: Wang Jin-pyng will be returning from abroad. Charges that he exerted undue influence on the legal system are growing louder. How will Wang Jin-pyng account for his actions? What will he do next? The answers to these questions wil determine how the case against him unfolds. This case has already inflicted considerable damage to Wang Jin-pyng himself and to the nation's constitutional framework. Let us hope that what Wang Jin-pyng does next, minimizes the damage to himself and to the nation.
Full text below:
Wang Jin-pyng will be returning from abroad. Charges that he exerted undue influence on the legal system are growing louder. How will Wang Jin-pyng account for his actions? What will he do next? The answers to these questions wil determine how the case against him unfolds.
Two possibiliities come to mind. One, Wang Jin-pyng-pying can admit to those wrongdoings that have come to light so far. He can express remorse and apologize for his actions. He can chastise himself. He can help make peace between the ruling and opposition parties. He can help the various parties find closure.
Two. Indications are Wang Jin-pyng has chosen a different path. He apparently intends to repudiate the wrongdoings that have come to light so far. He apparently intends to argue that his phone call "merely offered a few words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming." In other words, Wang Jin-pyng intends to spin his story a different way. He apparently has no intention of assuming political responsibility for the case. If he persists, Wang Jin-pyng could alienate the public and diminish understanding and compassion for him. He could incite Blue vs. Green partisan bickering. He could paint the Ma administration, himself, and the public into a corner. The result could be Mutually Assured Destruction.
The first question one must ask is, what are the facts of the case? Parts of the conversation between himself and Ker Chien-ming made public so far prove that "Wang Jin-pyng admitted exerting undue influence on the Ker case, and was later repaid by Ker Chien-ming for what he did." Wang Jin-pyng does not deny making the statements over the phone. But he insists they were "merely words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming." He denied having exerted an undue influence upon Tseng Yung-fu and others. He said he "merely offered a few empty words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming." Tseng Yung-fu and Chen Shou-huang however, said that Wang Jin-pyng never personally talked to them about Ker's case. Tseng Yung-fu said Wang mentioned the fact that the Ministry of Justice budget was stalled in the legislature. Wang Jin-pyng cannot deny that he exerted undue influence on the Ker case. The facts make it impossible for Wang to claim that he was merely offering words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming. His "words of comfort" spin control cannot change the fact that he exerted undue pressure.
Wang Jin-pyng insists he was "merely offering words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming." Wang's crisis management approach is a textbook case of "squid ink tactics." It is not a wise approach. The Special Investigation Unit has recording of three phone calls between Wang Jin-pyng, Tseng Yung-fu, and Chen Shou-huang. It has yet to publish the transcripts. But that does not mean it is unaware of what was said. If Wang Jin-pyng is determined to turn the controversy into a debate about whether he "actually exerted undue influence," he could force the SIU to release those telephone transcripts. That would paint the parties involved into an even smaller corner.
At this point, how should Wang Jin-pyng deal with the matter? The President of the Legislative Yuan is also the Chief Convener of the ruling party legislative caucus. He personally exerted undue influence on the Minister of Justice and the Chief Prosecutor's Office. This is a major incident with constitutional implications. Wang Jin-pyng has four political responsibilities. First, the Legislative Yuan has undermined the constitution's "tripartite separation of powers." Secondly, the President of the Legislative Yuan and the Chief Convener of the DPP legislative caucus have undermined the Legislative Yuan's constitutional ethics and public honor. Thirdly, Wang Jin-pyng is a ruling party legislator without portfolio who is also President of the Legislative Yuan. If he is found guilty of significant constitutional violations, he must answer to the ruling party. Fourthly, judicial independence is the supreme goal of constitutional governance. The public demands it. Wang Jin-pyng must answer to the public in an appropriate manner. Given the situation, Wang Jin-pyng must address his own political responsibility. He cannot dismiss the entire affair with a single, "I merely offered a few words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming." Wang Jin-pyng has no room for denials. He cannot make the same mistakes over again.
Some are already saying that Wang Jin-pyng should resign. In fact, this is precisely what Wang Jin-pyng should do, for the nation, for the constitution, for the dignity of the Legislative Yuan, and for the independence of the judiciary. This is what he owes them, and this is what the public expects. Unfortunately, this may be too much to expect of him. Instead, Wang Jin-pyng may do one of two things.
One. He can boldly face the facts. He can offer an acceptable explanation. He can admit wrongdoing and apologize. The various parties can then cease stonewalling and obfuscating. He can seek public understanding and compassion. He can seize the initiative. As a party member, he can ask the KMT Central Committee to mete out the proper punishment. This would put the ball in Ma Ying-jeou's court. How would Ma deal with it? That may depend on how convincing Wang is before the public. If this happens, the various parties may be able to resolve the matter quickly and avoid digging themselves in even deeper.
Two. Wang Jin-pyng can evade the facts. He can cling to his "I was merely offering a few words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming" spin control. He can encourage the various parties to continue stonewalling and obfuscating. Wang's public image could become even more tarnished. The various parties could find themselves in even tighter quarters. Wang Jin-pyng could turn his personal political crisis into a vicious Blue vs. Green political struggle, one leading to Mutually Assured Destruction.
This case has already inflicted considerable damage to Wang Jin-pyng himself and to the nation's constitutional framework. Let us hope that what Wang Jin-pyng does next, minimizes the damage to himself and to the nation.
王金平應當如何自處
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.09.09 01:56 am
王金平將回國，司法關說案亦進入升高放大的情勢。接下來，王金平如何解釋此案，及他之如何自處，將決定此案如何發展下去。
有兩種可能。一、王金平承認了本案迄今呈現的事實，並對自己的行為表達認錯及歉意；然後，或者自行引咎而有所表示，或者藉此營造出一個朝野可能形成的寬容情勢，再與各方在其中尋找轉圜的空間。
二、以目前之端倪，王金平卻好像做了第二種選擇；他似想否認此案迄今呈現的事實，辯稱電話中所說「只是安慰柯建銘的話語」。也就是說，王金平似擬就本案情節提出另一版本，並不準備為本案負起任何政治責任。若循此發展下去，一方面可能會減低王金平獲得的社會諒解與同情，另一方面更可能會添增藍綠鬥爭的火藥，逼得馬政府與王金平及整個社會皆困入牆角，最後甚至可能落得玉石俱焚。
首先要問：本案的事實是什麼？僅就公布的對柯建銘的幾通監聽譯文來看，已經呈現「王金平自承為柯案向曾勇夫關說，後來並回報柯建銘謂曾已處理」的始末。現在，王金平未否認這些電話內容，但辯稱「只是安慰柯建銘的話語」，似意謂他並未向曾勇夫等人關說，只是「哄騙安慰」柯建銘而已。然而，曾勇夫及陳守煌皆未否認王金平親自與他們談到柯案，曾勇夫甚至說，王也同時提及法務部的預算在立法院被凍結事。因此，王金平似乎無法完全否認他為柯案關說的事實；然而，只要有此一事實，就不是辯稱「只是安慰柯建銘的話語」所能推卸。畢竟，「安慰」的說法，不能改變「關說」的事實。
所以，在王金平的危機處理而言，如果想要採取「只是安慰柯建銘的話語」之類的烏賊戰術，恐非明智之舉。比如說，特偵組至少已掌握王金平主動與曾勇夫及陳守煌的三次通聯紀錄，未公布譯文不代表不知其詳；如果王金平欲將情勢導向「究竟有無關說」的事實辯論，即可能又引出了那幾通電話譯文，這必使各方的轉圜空間更形緊縮。
處此情勢，王金平應當如何自處？立法院長為黨團總召的刑案直接向法務部長及高檢署檢察長關說，這是一個憲法層次的重大事件。此時，王金平面對四方面的政治責任：一、立法院長破壞了「三權分立」的重大憲政界際；二、立法院長與民進黨黨團總召，共同破壞了立法院及立委的憲政倫理與社會榮譽；三、王金平以執政黨不分區立委的身分出任立法院長，若有重大的違憲過失，他必須對執政黨有所交代；四、司法獨立為憲政發展的至高目標，亦為國人的共同期待，王金平對國人必須有符合情理的回應。面對這樣的情勢，王金平恐怕只能斟酌自己應當如何負起這些政治責任，而絕無可能用「只是安慰柯建銘的話語」一句話，就將此案輕描淡寫地一筆勾銷。也就是說，王金平應當已無不認錯的餘地，而且，切勿一錯再錯。
已經聽聞王金平應引咎辭職之說；其實，這也應是王金平對國家、憲法、立院尊嚴、司法獨立，及國人期待的合乎比例的回應。然而，這可能是一種奢望。於是，處此情勢，王金平也許有兩種選擇：
一、坦蕩面對，就案情提出一個在情理上可以接受的解釋，並表達認錯與道歉之意，使各方不再陷入硬拗強辯的烏賊大戰，以爭取社會的諒解與同情，然後主動以從政黨員的身分向黨中央自請處分。這是將球發到馬英九的場中，馬之如何處理，則可就王的說法是否對國人有說服力來斟酌。如此，各方或許可以迅速面對善後，避免越陷越深。
二、王金平若想避重就輕，從「只是安慰柯建銘的話語」入手，將各方拉入硬拗強辯的漩渦，則王的社會形象可能更形扭曲，各方的轉圜空間也更形侷促，甚至王金平若將自己的政治危機轉化成挾持政局、藍綠惡鬥的局面，那就可能造成玉石俱焚的苦果。
此案對王金平自己及對國家憲政，皆已造成重大的傷害；希望王金平接下來對此案效應的處理，能夠減少對自己的再傷害，也減少對國家的再傷害。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 9, 2013
Summary: Wang Jin-pyng will be returning from abroad. Charges that he exerted undue influence on the legal system are growing louder. How will Wang Jin-pyng account for his actions? What will he do next? The answers to these questions wil determine how the case against him unfolds. This case has already inflicted considerable damage to Wang Jin-pyng himself and to the nation's constitutional framework. Let us hope that what Wang Jin-pyng does next, minimizes the damage to himself and to the nation.
Full text below:
Wang Jin-pyng will be returning from abroad. Charges that he exerted undue influence on the legal system are growing louder. How will Wang Jin-pyng account for his actions? What will he do next? The answers to these questions wil determine how the case against him unfolds.
Two possibiliities come to mind. One, Wang Jin-pyng-pying can admit to those wrongdoings that have come to light so far. He can express remorse and apologize for his actions. He can chastise himself. He can help make peace between the ruling and opposition parties. He can help the various parties find closure.
Two. Indications are Wang Jin-pyng has chosen a different path. He apparently intends to repudiate the wrongdoings that have come to light so far. He apparently intends to argue that his phone call "merely offered a few words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming." In other words, Wang Jin-pyng intends to spin his story a different way. He apparently has no intention of assuming political responsibility for the case. If he persists, Wang Jin-pyng could alienate the public and diminish understanding and compassion for him. He could incite Blue vs. Green partisan bickering. He could paint the Ma administration, himself, and the public into a corner. The result could be Mutually Assured Destruction.
The first question one must ask is, what are the facts of the case? Parts of the conversation between himself and Ker Chien-ming made public so far prove that "Wang Jin-pyng admitted exerting undue influence on the Ker case, and was later repaid by Ker Chien-ming for what he did." Wang Jin-pyng does not deny making the statements over the phone. But he insists they were "merely words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming." He denied having exerted an undue influence upon Tseng Yung-fu and others. He said he "merely offered a few empty words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming." Tseng Yung-fu and Chen Shou-huang however, said that Wang Jin-pyng never personally talked to them about Ker's case. Tseng Yung-fu said Wang mentioned the fact that the Ministry of Justice budget was stalled in the legislature. Wang Jin-pyng cannot deny that he exerted undue influence on the Ker case. The facts make it impossible for Wang to claim that he was merely offering words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming. His "words of comfort" spin control cannot change the fact that he exerted undue pressure.
Wang Jin-pyng insists he was "merely offering words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming." Wang's crisis management approach is a textbook case of "squid ink tactics." It is not a wise approach. The Special Investigation Unit has recording of three phone calls between Wang Jin-pyng, Tseng Yung-fu, and Chen Shou-huang. It has yet to publish the transcripts. But that does not mean it is unaware of what was said. If Wang Jin-pyng is determined to turn the controversy into a debate about whether he "actually exerted undue influence," he could force the SIU to release those telephone transcripts. That would paint the parties involved into an even smaller corner.
At this point, how should Wang Jin-pyng deal with the matter? The President of the Legislative Yuan is also the Chief Convener of the ruling party legislative caucus. He personally exerted undue influence on the Minister of Justice and the Chief Prosecutor's Office. This is a major incident with constitutional implications. Wang Jin-pyng has four political responsibilities. First, the Legislative Yuan has undermined the constitution's "tripartite separation of powers." Secondly, the President of the Legislative Yuan and the Chief Convener of the DPP legislative caucus have undermined the Legislative Yuan's constitutional ethics and public honor. Thirdly, Wang Jin-pyng is a ruling party legislator without portfolio who is also President of the Legislative Yuan. If he is found guilty of significant constitutional violations, he must answer to the ruling party. Fourthly, judicial independence is the supreme goal of constitutional governance. The public demands it. Wang Jin-pyng must answer to the public in an appropriate manner. Given the situation, Wang Jin-pyng must address his own political responsibility. He cannot dismiss the entire affair with a single, "I merely offered a few words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming." Wang Jin-pyng has no room for denials. He cannot make the same mistakes over again.
Some are already saying that Wang Jin-pyng should resign. In fact, this is precisely what Wang Jin-pyng should do, for the nation, for the constitution, for the dignity of the Legislative Yuan, and for the independence of the judiciary. This is what he owes them, and this is what the public expects. Unfortunately, this may be too much to expect of him. Instead, Wang Jin-pyng may do one of two things.
One. He can boldly face the facts. He can offer an acceptable explanation. He can admit wrongdoing and apologize. The various parties can then cease stonewalling and obfuscating. He can seek public understanding and compassion. He can seize the initiative. As a party member, he can ask the KMT Central Committee to mete out the proper punishment. This would put the ball in Ma Ying-jeou's court. How would Ma deal with it? That may depend on how convincing Wang is before the public. If this happens, the various parties may be able to resolve the matter quickly and avoid digging themselves in even deeper.
Two. Wang Jin-pyng can evade the facts. He can cling to his "I was merely offering a few words of comfort to Ker Chien-ming" spin control. He can encourage the various parties to continue stonewalling and obfuscating. Wang's public image could become even more tarnished. The various parties could find themselves in even tighter quarters. Wang Jin-pyng could turn his personal political crisis into a vicious Blue vs. Green political struggle, one leading to Mutually Assured Destruction.
This case has already inflicted considerable damage to Wang Jin-pyng himself and to the nation's constitutional framework. Let us hope that what Wang Jin-pyng does next, minimizes the damage to himself and to the nation.
王金平應當如何自處
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.09.09 01:56 am
王金平將回國，司法關說案亦進入升高放大的情勢。接下來，王金平如何解釋此案，及他之如何自處，將決定此案如何發展下去。
有兩種可能。一、王金平承認了本案迄今呈現的事實，並對自己的行為表達認錯及歉意；然後，或者自行引咎而有所表示，或者藉此營造出一個朝野可能形成的寬容情勢，再與各方在其中尋找轉圜的空間。
二、以目前之端倪，王金平卻好像做了第二種選擇；他似想否認此案迄今呈現的事實，辯稱電話中所說「只是安慰柯建銘的話語」。也就是說，王金平似擬就本案情節提出另一版本，並不準備為本案負起任何政治責任。若循此發展下去，一方面可能會減低王金平獲得的社會諒解與同情，另一方面更可能會添增藍綠鬥爭的火藥，逼得馬政府與王金平及整個社會皆困入牆角，最後甚至可能落得玉石俱焚。
首先要問：本案的事實是什麼？僅就公布的對柯建銘的幾通監聽譯文來看，已經呈現「王金平自承為柯案向曾勇夫關說，後來並回報柯建銘謂曾已處理」的始末。現在，王金平未否認這些電話內容，但辯稱「只是安慰柯建銘的話語」，似意謂他並未向曾勇夫等人關說，只是「哄騙安慰」柯建銘而已。然而，曾勇夫及陳守煌皆未否認王金平親自與他們談到柯案，曾勇夫甚至說，王也同時提及法務部的預算在立法院被凍結事。因此，王金平似乎無法完全否認他為柯案關說的事實；然而，只要有此一事實，就不是辯稱「只是安慰柯建銘的話語」所能推卸。畢竟，「安慰」的說法，不能改變「關說」的事實。
所以，在王金平的危機處理而言，如果想要採取「只是安慰柯建銘的話語」之類的烏賊戰術，恐非明智之舉。比如說，特偵組至少已掌握王金平主動與曾勇夫及陳守煌的三次通聯紀錄，未公布譯文不代表不知其詳；如果王金平欲將情勢導向「究竟有無關說」的事實辯論，即可能又引出了那幾通電話譯文，這必使各方的轉圜空間更形緊縮。
處此情勢，王金平應當如何自處？立法院長為黨團總召的刑案直接向法務部長及高檢署檢察長關說，這是一個憲法層次的重大事件。此時，王金平面對四方面的政治責任：一、立法院長破壞了「三權分立」的重大憲政界際；二、立法院長與民進黨黨團總召，共同破壞了立法院及立委的憲政倫理與社會榮譽；三、王金平以執政黨不分區立委的身分出任立法院長，若有重大的違憲過失，他必須對執政黨有所交代；四、司法獨立為憲政發展的至高目標，亦為國人的共同期待，王金平對國人必須有符合情理的回應。面對這樣的情勢，王金平恐怕只能斟酌自己應當如何負起這些政治責任，而絕無可能用「只是安慰柯建銘的話語」一句話，就將此案輕描淡寫地一筆勾銷。也就是說，王金平應當已無不認錯的餘地，而且，切勿一錯再錯。
已經聽聞王金平應引咎辭職之說；其實，這也應是王金平對國家、憲法、立院尊嚴、司法獨立，及國人期待的合乎比例的回應。然而，這可能是一種奢望。於是，處此情勢，王金平也許有兩種選擇：
一、坦蕩面對，就案情提出一個在情理上可以接受的解釋，並表達認錯與道歉之意，使各方不再陷入硬拗強辯的烏賊大戰，以爭取社會的諒解與同情，然後主動以從政黨員的身分向黨中央自請處分。這是將球發到馬英九的場中，馬之如何處理，則可就王的說法是否對國人有說服力來斟酌。如此，各方或許可以迅速面對善後，避免越陷越深。
二、王金平若想避重就輕，從「只是安慰柯建銘的話語」入手，將各方拉入硬拗強辯的漩渦，則王的社會形象可能更形扭曲，各方的轉圜空間也更形侷促，甚至王金平若將自己的政治危機轉化成挾持政局、藍綠惡鬥的局面，那就可能造成玉石俱焚的苦果。
此案對王金平自己及對國家憲政，皆已造成重大的傷害；希望王金平接下來對此案效應的處理，能夠減少對自己的再傷害，也減少對國家的再傷害。
Thursday, September 5, 2013
Flood Control Requires Understanding: Using Our Heads Beats Spending Our Money
Flood Control Requires Understanding:
Using Our Heads Beats Spending Our Money
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 6, 2013
Summary: Recently the central government blasted local governments. It said per capita local government funding for flood control was "not even enough to buy a hard-boiled egg" and that the inadequate flood control budget left people deeply alarmed. The central government's gesture exposed local government emphasis on public works at the expense of flood control. But it also muddied the issue of flood control.
Full text below:
Recently the central government blasted local governments. It said per capita local government funding for flood control was "not even enough to buy a hard-boiled egg" and that the inadequate flood control budget left people deeply alarmed. The central government's gesture exposed local government emphasis on public works at the expense of flood control. But it also muddied the issue of flood control.
Politics distinguishes between Blue and Green. Politicians demagogue the issues. But Mother Nature is utterly indifferent to all of this. Rain falls wherever it wants. The only immutable truth is "Water seeks its own level." If it cannot find a way out, flooding follows. It makes no distinctions whatseover between Blue and Green. In this it is ruthlessly fair.
Central government fiscal constraints make it impossible to continue past flood control budget practices. Otherwise it would not have declared this all out war of words on local governments. In the past, Taiwan adopted a "man must conquer nature" approach to flood control. But change is long overdue.
Global warming and extreme climates mean more fequent and prolonged droughts followed by heavy rains. Traditional 20 to 50 year flood control remediation standards are no longer adequate. Maximum rainfall in Tainan recently reached 100 mm . This far exceed the system's design specifications. Few drainage systems in the world can handle such loads. In the future, there may be rainfall that does not cause flooding. But there will no longer be flood control systems immune to flooding.
Everyone is familiar with the legend of Da Yu. Flood control practice is complex. But flood control principles are simple. If one occupies the hight ground, one can rely on gravity for drainage. As long as one provides proper channels, water will take advantage of the opportunity to flow downward. If one occupies low-lying areas below sea level however, one must rely on dikes, pumps, and other means to eliminate the water.
The Nantou storm drain system is poorly designed. But Nantou occupies the high ground. During the recent typhoon, and inadequate and overburdened storm drain system turned the streets into defacto storm drains. The streets enabled the flood waters to flow to low-lying areas. Although the streets were temporarily flooded, it did not result in disaster. For Nantou flooding is not the worst problem. Preventing landslides in the mountain regions is more urgent and more difficult. Low-lying areas have the opposite problem. The entire area is below sea level. More storm drain construction would do nothing to solve their problem. As long as water volume exceeds pumping capacity, flooding is inevitable.
The situation differs for urban and rural areas. Over the past decade , scholars have been promoting the "sponge city" concept. This would increase the city's permeability. This would allow water to flow, not just through the storm drain system, but through parks, greenbelts, rainwater wells, high coefficient of permeability pavements, and even soil through vertical absorption, enabling it to become groundwater .
Low-lying coastal village remediation requires a comprehensive upstream, midstream, and downstream solution. This includes upstream watershed management and forest conservation to ensure more natural water retention. It also includes midstream and downstream retention, reducing peaks downstream water. It includes ensuring that water downstream has more than one place to flow.
The most difficult problem is changing low-lying area land use patterns, to prevent the situation from further deteriorating. But this often affects people's property, livelihoods, and their emotional attachment to the land. One must also create new economic conditions in the region. Given electoral pressures, almost no local leader or elected representative will be willing to take on this thankless task. Therefore the WRA will allocate huge sums of taxpayer dollars to build breakwaters and protect coastal fish farms. But meanwhile the Council of Agriculture will ignore the paradoxical scenario of fish farms pumping out groundwater. As Minister of the Interior Li Hong-yuan noted, this manner of flood control means that even another 600 billion would be inadequate.
Rivers on Taiwan are short. Water flow is swift. Water supplies are inadequate. Yet public awareness of the need for water conservation is almost non-existent. Sewage treatment produces reusable "gray water." But it is dumped into the sea. No one considers recycling rainwater. The public does not value water. It does not think about water. It does not treat water resources as something precious. It has no concept of water. Naturally water has become a problem.
When the MRT Taipei Main Station flooded, President Ma noted how it "unwittingly functioned as a detention pond." He was met with strong criticism. But his remark highlighted a problem. President Ma had only a superficial knowledge of flood control. A good detention facility must function when flood waters threaten. But they must also benefit the public in normal times. . The government should amend the relevant laws and regulations. It can then establish new water permeability standards for new developments. It can modify the building codes. It can require new materials, additional rainwater storage towers, and stormwater pipelines. The water can be used to flush toilets or water plants, reducing the load on the system during floods. These measures would be far more effective than simply increasing government budgets.
Low-lying area remediation must begin with national land planning, changes in urban planning, land readjustment, and zone expropriation. It requires changes in land use, and the creation of new values and lifestyles. Central and local governments must ensure a clear division of labor on individual projects. They must overcome difficulties in communication. They must determine who is responsible for implementation. They must establish detailed timetables.
The public views zone expropriation as a scourge, Therefore this is sure to be a long, hard road. But it is the only viable approach. The traditional practice of throwing money at the problem is entirely beside the point.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.09.06
社論－治水要先知水 花大錢不如換腦袋
本報訊
近日，中央政府火力全開批評地方，編列的人均治水經費甚至「買不到一顆茶葉蛋」，治水預算低得讓人「毛骨悚然」。中央此舉固然揭開了地方要工程、輕治水的部分面紗，卻也模糊了治水的全貌。
政治分藍綠、政治人物噴口水，老天爺可不管這一套，雨要下哪、就下哪，「水往低處流」才是唯一不變的真理，流不出去就淹水，絕對不分藍綠，公平得很。
如果不是中央財政拮据，實在沒有辦法再按照過去的手段編列治水預算，恐怕未必會大張旗鼓地和地方打這場口水戰。但實際上，台灣過去完全從工程出發，力求「人定勝天」的治水思維，也早就到了不能不改的地步。
面對全球暖化、極端氣候的大環境，久旱、暴雨出現的頻率一定會越來越高，過去傳統以20年或50年洪水頻率為基礎的整治設計，也將越來越不足恃。這次台南新營最大時雨量達到100毫米，不僅遠超過系統的設計，全球大概也沒有幾個排水系統能夠承受。幾可斷言，未來只有不淹水的雨量，不會有不淹水的系統。
大禹治水的故事，每個人都耳熟能詳。治水問題複雜，原理卻很簡單。地勢高的地方，靠重力排水，只要有適當的渠道，水就會順勢往低的地方走；至於地勢低於海面的地方，就只能靠堤防、抽水機等外力，把水抽掉。
以這次地方點名雨水下水道建設最不力的南投為例，因為地勢高，雨水下水道不足或是不堪負荷時，水自然就會把馬路當水道，往地勢低的地方走，雖然會淹水，卻不等同於會造成災情。對南投而言，相較於淹水問題，土石流、治山防洪可能更急迫、棘手。至於低窪地區，問題則剛好相反，整個地區都在海平面以下，再多下水道建設也解決不了問題，只要水量超過抽水機的負荷，就非淹不可。
都市與鄉村的情況則又不同。近十幾年來，學界不斷提倡「海綿都市」的概念，要增加城市的透水率，讓水除了經過排水系統水平流出之外，還能經公園、綠地、雨水井、透水係數高的鋪面，垂直的被土地吸收，甚至挹注地下水。
而沿海低窪的鄉村的整治，就必須要上中下游整體解決，上游治山、森林保育，讓更多的水能夠被大自然留住；中下游的滯洪規畫，降低瞬間到下游的水量，也讓到下游的水多一個去處。
最困難的是，如何改變低窪地區的土地利用方式，讓問題不再繼續惡化，但這方面往往涉及人民的財產、生計、土地情感等因素，還必須要有建立當地新經濟型態等多方條件的配合，在選票壓力下，幾乎沒有任何地方首長、民代願意做這種吃力不討好的工作。於是就會出現水利署拿納稅人大筆的錢蓋離岸堤，保護沿海的魚塭，而農委會卻繼續漠視魚塭抽地下水，維繫養殖戶生計的荒謬景象。正如內政部長李鴻源所說，如果還是這樣治水，再編6000億都不夠。
台灣的河川短而急，水資源其實相當缺乏，但國人節水的觀念卻相當薄弱，汙水處理後可利用的「灰水」全部放流出海，國人生活中也從來沒有「利用雨水」這回事。不親水、不知水、不珍惜水資源、沒有與水共生的概念，自然就不可能治好水。
馬總統以捷運和台北車站淹水，「不知不覺扮演了滯洪池的角色」，遭到強烈的批評。背後凸顯的，馬總統自己對治水的一知半解。一個好的滯洪設施，不能僅在洪水來時發生效用，更必須在平時對民眾有益。其實只要政府修改相關法規，就可以要求新開發區域的透水率；也一樣可以修改建築法規，要求新建物必須增設雨水儲存池（塔）及雨水管線，用作沖馬桶、澆花之用，同時也減少洪水時系統的負荷，這遠比政府編列預算更能立竿見影。
至於低窪地區的整治，則必須要從國土規畫出發，以都市計畫變更、土地重劃、區段徵收等手段，改變土地的利用，創造新的價值和生活型態。中央與地方必須要就個別計畫清楚的分工，哪些困難的業務與溝通各該誰負責執行，並訂定詳細的時間表。
雖然以目前民眾視區段徵收如洪水猛獸的社會氛圍，這勢必是一條漫長崎嶇的道路，但恐怕也是唯一可行的道路。至於傳統花大錢做工程的作法，就大可不必了。
Using Our Heads Beats Spending Our Money
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 6, 2013
Summary: Recently the central government blasted local governments. It said per capita local government funding for flood control was "not even enough to buy a hard-boiled egg" and that the inadequate flood control budget left people deeply alarmed. The central government's gesture exposed local government emphasis on public works at the expense of flood control. But it also muddied the issue of flood control.
Full text below:
Recently the central government blasted local governments. It said per capita local government funding for flood control was "not even enough to buy a hard-boiled egg" and that the inadequate flood control budget left people deeply alarmed. The central government's gesture exposed local government emphasis on public works at the expense of flood control. But it also muddied the issue of flood control.
Politics distinguishes between Blue and Green. Politicians demagogue the issues. But Mother Nature is utterly indifferent to all of this. Rain falls wherever it wants. The only immutable truth is "Water seeks its own level." If it cannot find a way out, flooding follows. It makes no distinctions whatseover between Blue and Green. In this it is ruthlessly fair.
Central government fiscal constraints make it impossible to continue past flood control budget practices. Otherwise it would not have declared this all out war of words on local governments. In the past, Taiwan adopted a "man must conquer nature" approach to flood control. But change is long overdue.
Global warming and extreme climates mean more fequent and prolonged droughts followed by heavy rains. Traditional 20 to 50 year flood control remediation standards are no longer adequate. Maximum rainfall in Tainan recently reached 100 mm . This far exceed the system's design specifications. Few drainage systems in the world can handle such loads. In the future, there may be rainfall that does not cause flooding. But there will no longer be flood control systems immune to flooding.
Everyone is familiar with the legend of Da Yu. Flood control practice is complex. But flood control principles are simple. If one occupies the hight ground, one can rely on gravity for drainage. As long as one provides proper channels, water will take advantage of the opportunity to flow downward. If one occupies low-lying areas below sea level however, one must rely on dikes, pumps, and other means to eliminate the water.
The Nantou storm drain system is poorly designed. But Nantou occupies the high ground. During the recent typhoon, and inadequate and overburdened storm drain system turned the streets into defacto storm drains. The streets enabled the flood waters to flow to low-lying areas. Although the streets were temporarily flooded, it did not result in disaster. For Nantou flooding is not the worst problem. Preventing landslides in the mountain regions is more urgent and more difficult. Low-lying areas have the opposite problem. The entire area is below sea level. More storm drain construction would do nothing to solve their problem. As long as water volume exceeds pumping capacity, flooding is inevitable.
The situation differs for urban and rural areas. Over the past decade , scholars have been promoting the "sponge city" concept. This would increase the city's permeability. This would allow water to flow, not just through the storm drain system, but through parks, greenbelts, rainwater wells, high coefficient of permeability pavements, and even soil through vertical absorption, enabling it to become groundwater .
Low-lying coastal village remediation requires a comprehensive upstream, midstream, and downstream solution. This includes upstream watershed management and forest conservation to ensure more natural water retention. It also includes midstream and downstream retention, reducing peaks downstream water. It includes ensuring that water downstream has more than one place to flow.
The most difficult problem is changing low-lying area land use patterns, to prevent the situation from further deteriorating. But this often affects people's property, livelihoods, and their emotional attachment to the land. One must also create new economic conditions in the region. Given electoral pressures, almost no local leader or elected representative will be willing to take on this thankless task. Therefore the WRA will allocate huge sums of taxpayer dollars to build breakwaters and protect coastal fish farms. But meanwhile the Council of Agriculture will ignore the paradoxical scenario of fish farms pumping out groundwater. As Minister of the Interior Li Hong-yuan noted, this manner of flood control means that even another 600 billion would be inadequate.
Rivers on Taiwan are short. Water flow is swift. Water supplies are inadequate. Yet public awareness of the need for water conservation is almost non-existent. Sewage treatment produces reusable "gray water." But it is dumped into the sea. No one considers recycling rainwater. The public does not value water. It does not think about water. It does not treat water resources as something precious. It has no concept of water. Naturally water has become a problem.
When the MRT Taipei Main Station flooded, President Ma noted how it "unwittingly functioned as a detention pond." He was met with strong criticism. But his remark highlighted a problem. President Ma had only a superficial knowledge of flood control. A good detention facility must function when flood waters threaten. But they must also benefit the public in normal times. . The government should amend the relevant laws and regulations. It can then establish new water permeability standards for new developments. It can modify the building codes. It can require new materials, additional rainwater storage towers, and stormwater pipelines. The water can be used to flush toilets or water plants, reducing the load on the system during floods. These measures would be far more effective than simply increasing government budgets.
Low-lying area remediation must begin with national land planning, changes in urban planning, land readjustment, and zone expropriation. It requires changes in land use, and the creation of new values and lifestyles. Central and local governments must ensure a clear division of labor on individual projects. They must overcome difficulties in communication. They must determine who is responsible for implementation. They must establish detailed timetables.
The public views zone expropriation as a scourge, Therefore this is sure to be a long, hard road. But it is the only viable approach. The traditional practice of throwing money at the problem is entirely beside the point.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.09.06
社論－治水要先知水 花大錢不如換腦袋
本報訊
近日，中央政府火力全開批評地方，編列的人均治水經費甚至「買不到一顆茶葉蛋」，治水預算低得讓人「毛骨悚然」。中央此舉固然揭開了地方要工程、輕治水的部分面紗，卻也模糊了治水的全貌。
政治分藍綠、政治人物噴口水，老天爺可不管這一套，雨要下哪、就下哪，「水往低處流」才是唯一不變的真理，流不出去就淹水，絕對不分藍綠，公平得很。
如果不是中央財政拮据，實在沒有辦法再按照過去的手段編列治水預算，恐怕未必會大張旗鼓地和地方打這場口水戰。但實際上，台灣過去完全從工程出發，力求「人定勝天」的治水思維，也早就到了不能不改的地步。
面對全球暖化、極端氣候的大環境，久旱、暴雨出現的頻率一定會越來越高，過去傳統以20年或50年洪水頻率為基礎的整治設計，也將越來越不足恃。這次台南新營最大時雨量達到100毫米，不僅遠超過系統的設計，全球大概也沒有幾個排水系統能夠承受。幾可斷言，未來只有不淹水的雨量，不會有不淹水的系統。
大禹治水的故事，每個人都耳熟能詳。治水問題複雜，原理卻很簡單。地勢高的地方，靠重力排水，只要有適當的渠道，水就會順勢往低的地方走；至於地勢低於海面的地方，就只能靠堤防、抽水機等外力，把水抽掉。
以這次地方點名雨水下水道建設最不力的南投為例，因為地勢高，雨水下水道不足或是不堪負荷時，水自然就會把馬路當水道，往地勢低的地方走，雖然會淹水，卻不等同於會造成災情。對南投而言，相較於淹水問題，土石流、治山防洪可能更急迫、棘手。至於低窪地區，問題則剛好相反，整個地區都在海平面以下，再多下水道建設也解決不了問題，只要水量超過抽水機的負荷，就非淹不可。
都市與鄉村的情況則又不同。近十幾年來，學界不斷提倡「海綿都市」的概念，要增加城市的透水率，讓水除了經過排水系統水平流出之外，還能經公園、綠地、雨水井、透水係數高的鋪面，垂直的被土地吸收，甚至挹注地下水。
而沿海低窪的鄉村的整治，就必須要上中下游整體解決，上游治山、森林保育，讓更多的水能夠被大自然留住；中下游的滯洪規畫，降低瞬間到下游的水量，也讓到下游的水多一個去處。
最困難的是，如何改變低窪地區的土地利用方式，讓問題不再繼續惡化，但這方面往往涉及人民的財產、生計、土地情感等因素，還必須要有建立當地新經濟型態等多方條件的配合，在選票壓力下，幾乎沒有任何地方首長、民代願意做這種吃力不討好的工作。於是就會出現水利署拿納稅人大筆的錢蓋離岸堤，保護沿海的魚塭，而農委會卻繼續漠視魚塭抽地下水，維繫養殖戶生計的荒謬景象。正如內政部長李鴻源所說，如果還是這樣治水，再編6000億都不夠。
台灣的河川短而急，水資源其實相當缺乏，但國人節水的觀念卻相當薄弱，汙水處理後可利用的「灰水」全部放流出海，國人生活中也從來沒有「利用雨水」這回事。不親水、不知水、不珍惜水資源、沒有與水共生的概念，自然就不可能治好水。
馬總統以捷運和台北車站淹水，「不知不覺扮演了滯洪池的角色」，遭到強烈的批評。背後凸顯的，馬總統自己對治水的一知半解。一個好的滯洪設施，不能僅在洪水來時發生效用，更必須在平時對民眾有益。其實只要政府修改相關法規，就可以要求新開發區域的透水率；也一樣可以修改建築法規，要求新建物必須增設雨水儲存池（塔）及雨水管線，用作沖馬桶、澆花之用，同時也減少洪水時系統的負荷，這遠比政府編列預算更能立竿見影。
至於低窪地區的整治，則必須要從國土規畫出發，以都市計畫變更、土地重劃、區段徵收等手段，改變土地的利用，創造新的價值和生活型態。中央與地方必須要就個別計畫清楚的分工，哪些困難的業務與溝通各該誰負責執行，並訂定詳細的時間表。
雖然以目前民眾視區段徵收如洪水猛獸的社會氛圍，這勢必是一條漫長崎嶇的道路，但恐怕也是唯一可行的道路。至於傳統花大錢做工程的作法，就大可不必了。
Wednesday, September 4, 2013
Politically-Motivated Flood Control Would Defeat Even Da Yu
Politically-Motivated Flood Control Would Defeat Even Da Yu
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 5, 2013
Summary: Moderate Typhoon Kong-Rey inflicted heavy damage on central and southern Taiwan. The tail end of the typhoon moved northward and dumped heavy rains on Keelung, at Taiwan's northern tip. Flood waters visited disaster upon both Keelung City and Keelung County. They also led to mutual recriminations between local and central government. Bickering over flood control budgets and flood control effectiveness raged endlessly, confusing everyone looking on.
Full text below:
Moderate Typhoon Kong-Rey inflicted heavy damage on central and southern Taiwan. The tail end of the typhoon moved northward and dumped heavy rains on Keelung, at Taiwan's northern tip. Flood waters visited disaster upon both Keelung City and Keelung County. They also led to mutual recriminations between local and central government. Bickering over flood control budgets and flood control effectiveness raged endlessly, confusing everyone looking on.
Typhoons batter Taiwan every year. The government and the public have engaged in soil and water conservation. They have invested heavily in river remediation. Nevertheless each time a typhoon arrives, flooding follows. Each time rain falls, disaster follows. This is true every time, everywhere, in the north or in the south. Typhoon Kong-Rey showed that local flooding does not discriminate between Blue and Green, and that landslides are indifferent to the time and date.
Floods and landslides have nothing to do with Blue or Green political affiliation. Green Camp city mayors and county chiefs gathered in one place to demand flood control money and plead with the central government. Interior Minister Li Hong-yuan even spoke up, telling Premier Jiang Yi-hua how to control floods. An public policy issue that should transcend partisanship, has become a political issue.
If one concentrated exclusively on the technical aspects of flood control, the problems would be so much simpler. But flood control is side-tracked by political considerations. Political posture and electoral considerations get dragged in. Add personal political calculations, and the issue becomes increasingly complex, and the focus increasingly blurred.
Sadly, as long as torrential rains batter Taiwan, we will be subjected to "politically-motivated flood control." Central Emergency Operations Center Commander Li Hong-yuan said that some counties were lax in disaster prevention. This provoked immediate opposition party counterattacks. Some got down on their knees and pleaded. Others shrilly denounced him, The interaction between central and local governments, the bickering over flood control money, left everyone red in the face with anger.
Li Hong-yuan said "If we talk only about money, then flood control is impossible. The central government may allocate 60 billion or 600 billion to flood control. But if local governments continue pumping out too much groundwater, it will be to no avail." Tainan City Mayor Lai Ching-teh, in league with the five city mayors and county chiefs, lashed out. "If Li Hong-yuan personally took a trip to the region, examined the reasons for the flooding, and the results of flood control, he would realize that we are not merely asking the central government for money."
In fact, when city mayors and county chiefs fight for central government money, the lines are not necessarily drawn along Blue and Green political lines. Sometimes it is actually about who is in need. Take Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin. Lai Ching-teh blasted him for tardiness in declaring a typhoon emergency. Hau bluntly averred that government heads could do little, and that hoped people would understand.
Later however, Hau phoned four city mayors and county chiefs in Yunling, Chiayi, and Tainan, asking them if they required assistance. But he never received a clear answer. Premier Chiang went south to survey the affected regions. But county chiefs and city mayors confronted him with demands for funds. Observers cannot help concluding that their presumption was a prelude to demands for handouts. As a result, Hau, who ventured forth on his own initiative, was more than a little embarrassed .
Local heads in the stricken regions were ambivalent toward Taipei City. They presented two faces to the central government. This reveals how serious the problem of "politically motivated flood control" is. On the one hand, local county chiefs and city mayors have not rid themselves of partisanship. Even a goodwill gesture from the capital city provoked political discomfort among the different parties. On the other hand, it is always about the money. Local government heads' petitions, in the final analysis, were always about money.
A closer look shows that during the DPP's eight years in power, it handed out 80 billion in flood control money. Now its time has run out. Five Green Camp county chiefs and city mayors in the south are demanding 60 billion over 6 years. Special budgets or public budgets are no different. Ten billion a year in flood control money is bound to become a political issue. Local governments have no intention of quitting until they get what they want. But the central government must worry about the money being spent where it will do the most good.
Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan, and Pingtung have announced the result of their flood control efforts. They are swearing up and down that every penny is being used where it does the most good. The Ministry of the Interior was silent for several days. It then released fund allocation lists and re-released county and city rankings for adminstrative efficiency. They blasted Yunlin and Chiayi. A single declaration that "The per capita storm sewer construction funds for each county could not buy a hard-boiled egg" intensified the rhetoric between central and local governments.
Political struggles have resulted in political rhetoric trumping flood control. Local and central governments each have their own political calculations. Who cares about the legislature's latest report about which local government's flood control is the least effective? Who cares about Ma Ying-jeou's declaration that "central and local governments share a common concern for flood control?"
Flood control is a long term project. It requires multi-generational continuity. It requires ongoing struggle that transcends partisanship and sectarianism. It requires concern for the public weal. Yunlin County Chief Su Chih-fen posted a message on Facebook. "Eight years ago the comprehensive governance program failed to simultaneously promote comprehensive water management. This was most unfortunate." In fact, this was Li Hong-yuan's "comprehensive flood control" concept. Su added, "Watershed Management" and long-term land planning reform can be implemented simultaneously. This was something Li Hong-yuan consistently advocated with his "watershed management partnership."
The ruling and opposition parties are not necessarily talking about parallel flood control plans. Su Chih-fen and Li Hong-yuan spoke over the phone. They had a good talk. This shows that in the absence of political considerations and calculations of self-interest, the two sides can reach a consensus. Otherwise, even if the legendary Da Yu were reincarnateded, he would not be able to control today's flood waters.
社論－政治治水，大禹再世也沒用
中國時報 本報訊
2013年09月05日 04:10
一場康芮輕颱造成中南部慘重災情，隨後臨去秋波甩尾北上的豪大雨，又重創台灣頭的基隆。由於水淹成災，使得受創縣市叫苦連天，也掀起地方與中央的相互叫陣，為治水預算的編列與成效吵翻天，令人看得眼花撩亂。
台灣每年都有颱風，儘管政府、民間相繼在水土保持、河川整治的工作上投入龐大心力，然而，逢颱必淹、遇雨成災，依舊是台灣不分南北普遍存在的現象。這次康芮颱風來襲，即說明地區淹水豈會分藍綠，土石崩裂更不會挑時看日。
正因為淹大水和土石流都無關政黨或藍綠，所以當綠營執政的5縣市長齊聚一堂，為爭取治水預算向中央請命，甚至要內政部長李鴻源站出來，教行政院長江宜樺怎麼治水時，一個原本應該超越黨派、地域的公共政策議題，卻成了政治問題。
談治水，若只是論技術問題，那會單純許多，但要是扯到政治問題，不僅牽涉政黨立場，也有選舉考量，再加上個人政治利益的算計，既錯綜複雜，也模糊焦點。
悲哀的是，在台灣政壇只要碰到暴雨成災，總是難逃「水災政治學」的積習。比方說，身為中央災害應變中心指揮官的李鴻源，點名部分縣市的防災非常消極，隨即引來在野黨的反擊，又是下跪，又是嗆聲，中央與地方互槓，為了治水的錢爭得面紅耳赤。
譬如，當李鴻源直指，「治水若只談錢就沒解，中央再編600億或6000億，地方若繼續超抽地下水，一樣沒有用。」串聯5縣市首長的台南市長賴清德則回應，「如果李鴻源親自到地方走一趟，看看淹水原因，再檢視治水成果，他會明瞭，我們不是只會向中央要錢。」
其實，在縣市長聯手向中央力爭預算的過程裡，藍綠並非必然的對立，甚至還有那麼一點雪中送炭的味道。以台北市長郝龍斌為例，在賴清德因颱風假放太慢而挨罵之際，他出面緩頰，直言首長難為，盼民眾體諒。
不過，郝龍斌後來致電雲嘉南4縣市長，詢問是否需要支援，卻未獲得明確回應。等到江揆南下勘災，縣市長們卻又跳出來陳情，讓外界不免有「前倨後恭」的質疑，也使得主動探詢的郝龍斌有些尷尬。
坦白說，受災地區地方首長對北市曖昧、向中央喊話所呈現的兩樣情，顯示「治水問題政治化」的嚴重性。一方面，地方縣市長之間未能真正擺脫黨派思維，即便是來自首善之區的善意，不同黨派也會瞻前顧後；另一方面，則是一切向錢看，地方父母官的集體陳情說到底還是為了錢。
深入地看，因為民進黨執政時編列8年800億治水預算，現在執行時限即將到來，綠營南部5縣市長要求再加碼6年600億，不管是要以特別預算續編，還是回歸公務預算，讓一年百億的治水經費隱然成為一種政治標的。地方有不達目的絕不終止的盤算，而中央則有錢應花在刀口上的考量。
因此，雲嘉南與高屏紛紛公布治水成效，藉以佐證每分錢是用在刀口上，沉寂數日的內政部，則除了列出經費的分配排名之外，索性再公布各縣市執行不力的排名，把雲嘉又痛批了一番。一句「每個縣民雨水下水道建設經費不到一個茶葉蛋」，讓中央和地方的政治口水戰越演越烈。
政治攻防至此，已是口水多過治水，在地方與中央皆各自算計之下，誰還會在乎那份立法院批評政府治水成效不彰的最新報告，或者馬英九總統所言，拚治水「中央地方一條心」。
治水是百年大事，需要世世代代的接力、前仆後繼的奮鬥，以及超越黨派門戶之見、以眾生為念的胸襟。雲林縣長蘇治芬在臉書提及「8年前的總合治理方案，沒有與綜合治水方案一起推，最為可惜。」其實，這正是李鴻源倡議的「總合治水」概念；蘇又說，「流域治理」與長期的國土規畫、空間倫理改造是可並行的，恰巧李鴻源始終主張「建立流域治理的夥伴關係」。
顯然，朝野談治水未必是兩條平行線。蘇治芬與李鴻源一通電話，相談甚歡，說明只要不是政治掛帥，沒有利害算計，雙方應不難找到交集與共識，否則就算是大禹再世，也沒轍！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 5, 2013
Summary: Moderate Typhoon Kong-Rey inflicted heavy damage on central and southern Taiwan. The tail end of the typhoon moved northward and dumped heavy rains on Keelung, at Taiwan's northern tip. Flood waters visited disaster upon both Keelung City and Keelung County. They also led to mutual recriminations between local and central government. Bickering over flood control budgets and flood control effectiveness raged endlessly, confusing everyone looking on.
Full text below:
Moderate Typhoon Kong-Rey inflicted heavy damage on central and southern Taiwan. The tail end of the typhoon moved northward and dumped heavy rains on Keelung, at Taiwan's northern tip. Flood waters visited disaster upon both Keelung City and Keelung County. They also led to mutual recriminations between local and central government. Bickering over flood control budgets and flood control effectiveness raged endlessly, confusing everyone looking on.
Typhoons batter Taiwan every year. The government and the public have engaged in soil and water conservation. They have invested heavily in river remediation. Nevertheless each time a typhoon arrives, flooding follows. Each time rain falls, disaster follows. This is true every time, everywhere, in the north or in the south. Typhoon Kong-Rey showed that local flooding does not discriminate between Blue and Green, and that landslides are indifferent to the time and date.
Floods and landslides have nothing to do with Blue or Green political affiliation. Green Camp city mayors and county chiefs gathered in one place to demand flood control money and plead with the central government. Interior Minister Li Hong-yuan even spoke up, telling Premier Jiang Yi-hua how to control floods. An public policy issue that should transcend partisanship, has become a political issue.
If one concentrated exclusively on the technical aspects of flood control, the problems would be so much simpler. But flood control is side-tracked by political considerations. Political posture and electoral considerations get dragged in. Add personal political calculations, and the issue becomes increasingly complex, and the focus increasingly blurred.
Sadly, as long as torrential rains batter Taiwan, we will be subjected to "politically-motivated flood control." Central Emergency Operations Center Commander Li Hong-yuan said that some counties were lax in disaster prevention. This provoked immediate opposition party counterattacks. Some got down on their knees and pleaded. Others shrilly denounced him, The interaction between central and local governments, the bickering over flood control money, left everyone red in the face with anger.
Li Hong-yuan said "If we talk only about money, then flood control is impossible. The central government may allocate 60 billion or 600 billion to flood control. But if local governments continue pumping out too much groundwater, it will be to no avail." Tainan City Mayor Lai Ching-teh, in league with the five city mayors and county chiefs, lashed out. "If Li Hong-yuan personally took a trip to the region, examined the reasons for the flooding, and the results of flood control, he would realize that we are not merely asking the central government for money."
In fact, when city mayors and county chiefs fight for central government money, the lines are not necessarily drawn along Blue and Green political lines. Sometimes it is actually about who is in need. Take Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin. Lai Ching-teh blasted him for tardiness in declaring a typhoon emergency. Hau bluntly averred that government heads could do little, and that hoped people would understand.
Later however, Hau phoned four city mayors and county chiefs in Yunling, Chiayi, and Tainan, asking them if they required assistance. But he never received a clear answer. Premier Chiang went south to survey the affected regions. But county chiefs and city mayors confronted him with demands for funds. Observers cannot help concluding that their presumption was a prelude to demands for handouts. As a result, Hau, who ventured forth on his own initiative, was more than a little embarrassed .
Local heads in the stricken regions were ambivalent toward Taipei City. They presented two faces to the central government. This reveals how serious the problem of "politically motivated flood control" is. On the one hand, local county chiefs and city mayors have not rid themselves of partisanship. Even a goodwill gesture from the capital city provoked political discomfort among the different parties. On the other hand, it is always about the money. Local government heads' petitions, in the final analysis, were always about money.
A closer look shows that during the DPP's eight years in power, it handed out 80 billion in flood control money. Now its time has run out. Five Green Camp county chiefs and city mayors in the south are demanding 60 billion over 6 years. Special budgets or public budgets are no different. Ten billion a year in flood control money is bound to become a political issue. Local governments have no intention of quitting until they get what they want. But the central government must worry about the money being spent where it will do the most good.
Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan, and Pingtung have announced the result of their flood control efforts. They are swearing up and down that every penny is being used where it does the most good. The Ministry of the Interior was silent for several days. It then released fund allocation lists and re-released county and city rankings for adminstrative efficiency. They blasted Yunlin and Chiayi. A single declaration that "The per capita storm sewer construction funds for each county could not buy a hard-boiled egg" intensified the rhetoric between central and local governments.
Political struggles have resulted in political rhetoric trumping flood control. Local and central governments each have their own political calculations. Who cares about the legislature's latest report about which local government's flood control is the least effective? Who cares about Ma Ying-jeou's declaration that "central and local governments share a common concern for flood control?"
Flood control is a long term project. It requires multi-generational continuity. It requires ongoing struggle that transcends partisanship and sectarianism. It requires concern for the public weal. Yunlin County Chief Su Chih-fen posted a message on Facebook. "Eight years ago the comprehensive governance program failed to simultaneously promote comprehensive water management. This was most unfortunate." In fact, this was Li Hong-yuan's "comprehensive flood control" concept. Su added, "Watershed Management" and long-term land planning reform can be implemented simultaneously. This was something Li Hong-yuan consistently advocated with his "watershed management partnership."
The ruling and opposition parties are not necessarily talking about parallel flood control plans. Su Chih-fen and Li Hong-yuan spoke over the phone. They had a good talk. This shows that in the absence of political considerations and calculations of self-interest, the two sides can reach a consensus. Otherwise, even if the legendary Da Yu were reincarnateded, he would not be able to control today's flood waters.
社論－政治治水，大禹再世也沒用
中國時報 本報訊
2013年09月05日 04:10
一場康芮輕颱造成中南部慘重災情，隨後臨去秋波甩尾北上的豪大雨，又重創台灣頭的基隆。由於水淹成災，使得受創縣市叫苦連天，也掀起地方與中央的相互叫陣，為治水預算的編列與成效吵翻天，令人看得眼花撩亂。
台灣每年都有颱風，儘管政府、民間相繼在水土保持、河川整治的工作上投入龐大心力，然而，逢颱必淹、遇雨成災，依舊是台灣不分南北普遍存在的現象。這次康芮颱風來襲，即說明地區淹水豈會分藍綠，土石崩裂更不會挑時看日。
正因為淹大水和土石流都無關政黨或藍綠，所以當綠營執政的5縣市長齊聚一堂，為爭取治水預算向中央請命，甚至要內政部長李鴻源站出來，教行政院長江宜樺怎麼治水時，一個原本應該超越黨派、地域的公共政策議題，卻成了政治問題。
談治水，若只是論技術問題，那會單純許多，但要是扯到政治問題，不僅牽涉政黨立場，也有選舉考量，再加上個人政治利益的算計，既錯綜複雜，也模糊焦點。
悲哀的是，在台灣政壇只要碰到暴雨成災，總是難逃「水災政治學」的積習。比方說，身為中央災害應變中心指揮官的李鴻源，點名部分縣市的防災非常消極，隨即引來在野黨的反擊，又是下跪，又是嗆聲，中央與地方互槓，為了治水的錢爭得面紅耳赤。
譬如，當李鴻源直指，「治水若只談錢就沒解，中央再編600億或6000億，地方若繼續超抽地下水，一樣沒有用。」串聯5縣市首長的台南市長賴清德則回應，「如果李鴻源親自到地方走一趟，看看淹水原因，再檢視治水成果，他會明瞭，我們不是只會向中央要錢。」
其實，在縣市長聯手向中央力爭預算的過程裡，藍綠並非必然的對立，甚至還有那麼一點雪中送炭的味道。以台北市長郝龍斌為例，在賴清德因颱風假放太慢而挨罵之際，他出面緩頰，直言首長難為，盼民眾體諒。
不過，郝龍斌後來致電雲嘉南4縣市長，詢問是否需要支援，卻未獲得明確回應。等到江揆南下勘災，縣市長們卻又跳出來陳情，讓外界不免有「前倨後恭」的質疑，也使得主動探詢的郝龍斌有些尷尬。
坦白說，受災地區地方首長對北市曖昧、向中央喊話所呈現的兩樣情，顯示「治水問題政治化」的嚴重性。一方面，地方縣市長之間未能真正擺脫黨派思維，即便是來自首善之區的善意，不同黨派也會瞻前顧後；另一方面，則是一切向錢看，地方父母官的集體陳情說到底還是為了錢。
深入地看，因為民進黨執政時編列8年800億治水預算，現在執行時限即將到來，綠營南部5縣市長要求再加碼6年600億，不管是要以特別預算續編，還是回歸公務預算，讓一年百億的治水經費隱然成為一種政治標的。地方有不達目的絕不終止的盤算，而中央則有錢應花在刀口上的考量。
因此，雲嘉南與高屏紛紛公布治水成效，藉以佐證每分錢是用在刀口上，沉寂數日的內政部，則除了列出經費的分配排名之外，索性再公布各縣市執行不力的排名，把雲嘉又痛批了一番。一句「每個縣民雨水下水道建設經費不到一個茶葉蛋」，讓中央和地方的政治口水戰越演越烈。
政治攻防至此，已是口水多過治水，在地方與中央皆各自算計之下，誰還會在乎那份立法院批評政府治水成效不彰的最新報告，或者馬英九總統所言，拚治水「中央地方一條心」。
治水是百年大事，需要世世代代的接力、前仆後繼的奮鬥，以及超越黨派門戶之見、以眾生為念的胸襟。雲林縣長蘇治芬在臉書提及「8年前的總合治理方案，沒有與綜合治水方案一起推，最為可惜。」其實，這正是李鴻源倡議的「總合治水」概念；蘇又說，「流域治理」與長期的國土規畫、空間倫理改造是可並行的，恰巧李鴻源始終主張「建立流域治理的夥伴關係」。
顯然，朝野談治水未必是兩條平行線。蘇治芬與李鴻源一通電話，相談甚歡，說明只要不是政治掛帥，沒有利害算計，雙方應不難找到交集與共識，否則就算是大禹再世，也沒轍！
Tuesday, September 3, 2013
The Syrian Dilemma: Uncle Sammy "Can Do" No More
The Syrian Dilemma: Uncle Sammy "Can Do" No More
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 4, 2013
Summary: Chemical weapons in Syria have killed over 1000 people. The U.S. began banging the war drums against Syria but suddenly stopped. Now the decision to go to war or not has been turned over to Congress. US power has gradually declined. Uncle Sammy still covets the role of world policeman. But it is increasingly a case of "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak."
Full text below:
Chemical weapons in Syria have killed over 1000 people. The U.S. began banging the war drums against Syria but suddenly stopped. Now the decision to go to war or not has been turned over to Congress. US power has gradually declined. Uncle Sammy still covets the role of world policeman. But it is increasingly a case of "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak."
The incident inflicted heavy casualties. The corpses of innocent children shocked the world. The U.S. began by referring to the Syrian government as murderous. President Obama initially vowed that the United States would take action. But then surprisingly his rhetoric began winding down. The U.S. President clearly does not need Congressional approval to launch an attack. Obama nevertheless sought approval from Congress, which will probably vote on the matter by the middle of this month.
There are many reasons for Obama's about face. First, domestic opinion was vehemently opposed to war. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were decade-long quagmires for the United States. The loss of life and financial burden was immense. They exacted a heavy toll on the U.S. military, physically and psychologically. Death by suicides have exceeded deaths in combat. Now, finally, the US has managed to extricate itself. It is no longer willing to immerse itself in that cesspool. The U.S. media feels that a declaration of war will have a difficult time passing in Congress. Obama's Democrats constitute a minority in the House of Representatives. On top of which, the public is weary of war.
Secondly, the international community is singing a very different tune. Russia and Mainland China have vetoed the use of force in the UN, making any such resolution impossible. NATO is unwilling to participate in an attack. Even the United Kingdom, which has long been faithful, which has always backed the United States, is opposed. The British Parliament flatly rejected Prime Minister David Cameron's proposed use of force. Most EU countries do not support war. Only French President Francois Hollande was willing to lend a hand. But rumors are the French public may demand parliamentary approval.
Thirdly, the United States does not want to send in ground troops. It fears another nightmarish war. Therefore it will probably only fire missiles as part of a limited attack. In that case, toppling the Assad regime will be difficult. The US is more concerned about its status as the world's policeman than in upholding justice. As soon as Obama took office he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. He withdrew troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. These were important achievements. But now he wants to use force and begin shooting. He needs endorsements and support.
In fact, the domestic situation in Syria is complex. The ruling and opposition parties belong to different religious sects, Shia and Sunni. Outside meddling, especially by the U.S., could make the situation worse. Assad is militarily strong. That is why he has been able to fight the rebels for two years without falling. The rebel camp has too many chiefs and not enough Indians. Al-Qaeda forces dominate. The U.S. fears that if it rides to the rescue, it may help its sworn enemy.
Since the Cold War, the United States has been playing the role of world policeman, even as it expanded its sphere of influence. But such "Captain America" style actions in the Arab world have often resulted in humiliation. How much have they actually helped the local population? That is hard to say.
After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. supported Afghan guerrillas fighting the USSR. Among those who received CIA funding and military training, were members of Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization, which later launched the 9/11 attacks of 2001. The United States found and killed bin Laden in May 2011. But it the terrorist threat from Al Qaeda remains.
After 911, U.S. troops in Afghanistan overthrew the Taliban regime that had been harboring bin Laden. In March 2003, the US claimed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and destroyed the regime of Saddam Hussein. Great Britain and other countries waged war on Iraq. Saddam Hussein was captured in December 2003. He was hanged in December 2006. But no weapons of mass destruction whatsoever were ever found. The U.S. has a record of such blunders. Now people are questioning the legitimacy of the use of force against Syria.
The United States paid a high price for these two wars. The Iraq war cost 662 billion US. The United States has been battered by the financial crisis. Its economy is in a prolonged downturn. The ruling and opposition parties are both afraid of war. They are in no mood to set foot on another Middle Eastern battlefield.
The Arab world is very different from the Western world in its religious and cultural beliefs. Each country has its own tribal, sectarian, and political factions, Add to this widespread anti-American sentiment. Even if the United States is sincere, any help it can provide will be limited. If it insists on intervening, it may make matters worse. It may intensify any grievances the local inhabitants might already have against the United States.
Over 100,000 people have been killed in Syria. Over 200,000 people have been uprooted. This is a man-made disaster. Is the United Nations is willing to become more actively involved? Is it willing to impose a cease fire? First freeze the situation, then stop the killing. Put pressure on Assad to negotiate a peace. At least protect people from poison gas. But given the current international situation, the United States can no longer lay down the law. Uncle Sammy has gotten decrepit. It must must now spend more time communicating and negotiating with other countries .
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.09.04
社論－老大哥不行了 美難解敘利亞困局
本報訊
敘利亞發生千餘人死亡的化武攻擊事件，但美國對敘利亞擂起的戰鼓卻再衰三竭，現在要交給國會定奪，開火與否還要再往後拖。氣力漸衰的美國，想扮演世界警察的老大哥角色，已經愈來愈力不從心了。
這起事件傷亡慘重，無辜稚兒屍體橫陳的畫面更是震撼全球。美國一開始即指敘利亞政府下的毒手，歐巴馬總統矢言美國必須採取行動。但之後卻放緩了動作，明明美國總統可以不經國會同意即決定發動攻擊，但歐巴馬還是轉而尋求國會同意，大概到本月中旬才會進行表決。
歐巴馬的決策轉折有其背景，第一，國內民意非常不挺再捲入一場戰爭，阿富汗和伊拉克之戰讓美國陷入10年泥淖，人命損失及財政負擔都極大，對美軍身心造成沉重壓力，自殺死亡人數已經超過了死於戰火的人數。好不容易現在快抽身了，實在不願再淌一趟渾水。美國媒體認為動武案可能不容易在國會過關，不只是歐巴馬的民主黨在眾院居少數，也因為民意強烈厭戰。
其次是國際社會也唱反調，聯合國在俄羅斯、中國反對下無法通過動武決議，北約不願共同發動攻擊，向來忠實力挺美國的英國，國會斷然否決了首相卡麥隆的動武提案。其他歐盟國家大多不支持，只有法國總統奧朗德願意助拳，但如今法國內部也傳出要求交付國會的聲音。
第三，美國既然不想派地面部隊，免得陷入另一場戰爭惡夢，於是大概只能發射幾枚飛彈，作「有限」的攻擊，那麼勢將難以扳倒阿塞德政權，對自己世界警察的地位作點交代的成分還大於維護正義。歐巴馬一上任就得了諾貝爾和平獎，又把從伊、阿撤軍作為重要政績，如今若要動武開火，總要多拉些背書支持。
其實敘利亞內部情勢複雜，執政與反抗分屬什葉與遜尼不同教派，外力─尤其是美國─的介入，未必會讓局面好轉。阿塞德的軍力堅強，因此能和反抗軍鏖戰兩年而不倒。反抗陣營內部多頭馬車，基地組織勢力又在其中坐大，美國忌憚出手相救，也是擔心幫到了死對頭。
從冷戰以來，美國一直在扮演世界警察的同時擴張勢力版圖，不過這個「美國隊長」在阿拉伯世界的行動，有時卻灰頭土臉，對當地民眾有多大幫助也很難說。
1979年蘇聯入侵阿富汗之後，美國支援阿富汗游擊隊抗俄，而當時曾經接受資助與中央情報局武力訓練的，就包括了後來在2001年發動911恐怖攻擊的「基地」組織首腦賓拉登。即使美國在2011年5月找到並擊斃賓拉登，仍然無法徹底清除「基地」的恐怖威脅。
911事件後，美國出兵阿富汗，推翻窩藏賓拉登的塔里班政權。2003年3月以伊拉克哈珊政權擁有大規模毀滅性武器為由，與英國等國家發動伊拉克戰爭。哈珊在2003年12月被捕獲，2006年12月死在絞刑台上，但結果根本找不到任何大規模毀滅性武器。美國既有搞烏龍的前科，現在對敘動武的正當性也受到質疑。
不過美國也為這兩場戰爭付出了高昂代價，伊戰花費甚至達6620億美元，在美國因金融海嘯重創經濟、景氣陷入長期低迷後，朝野都已聞戰色變，無心也無力再踏入另一個中東戰場。
何況，阿拉伯世界由於宗教、文化、思維模式與西方有相當差距，每個國家內部又各有其部族、教派、政治派系等因素，加上普遍有反美情緒，美國就算有誠意，能幫上的忙也非常有限。硬要插手的話，反而可能使局勢益發複雜，讓當地民眾對美國的怨氣更深。
敘利亞之局，到現在已經超過10萬人喪生，200萬人流離失所，堪稱人間浩劫。如果聯合國願意更積極介入，強制兩造停火，先凍結現狀停止殺戮，施壓阿塞德進行和平談判，至少能保護老百姓免受荼毒。不過目前的國際態勢，已經不是美國可以一呼百諾了。大哥已老，現在必須花更多心力時間與各國溝通協商。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 4, 2013
Summary: Chemical weapons in Syria have killed over 1000 people. The U.S. began banging the war drums against Syria but suddenly stopped. Now the decision to go to war or not has been turned over to Congress. US power has gradually declined. Uncle Sammy still covets the role of world policeman. But it is increasingly a case of "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak."
Full text below:
Chemical weapons in Syria have killed over 1000 people. The U.S. began banging the war drums against Syria but suddenly stopped. Now the decision to go to war or not has been turned over to Congress. US power has gradually declined. Uncle Sammy still covets the role of world policeman. But it is increasingly a case of "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak."
The incident inflicted heavy casualties. The corpses of innocent children shocked the world. The U.S. began by referring to the Syrian government as murderous. President Obama initially vowed that the United States would take action. But then surprisingly his rhetoric began winding down. The U.S. President clearly does not need Congressional approval to launch an attack. Obama nevertheless sought approval from Congress, which will probably vote on the matter by the middle of this month.
There are many reasons for Obama's about face. First, domestic opinion was vehemently opposed to war. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were decade-long quagmires for the United States. The loss of life and financial burden was immense. They exacted a heavy toll on the U.S. military, physically and psychologically. Death by suicides have exceeded deaths in combat. Now, finally, the US has managed to extricate itself. It is no longer willing to immerse itself in that cesspool. The U.S. media feels that a declaration of war will have a difficult time passing in Congress. Obama's Democrats constitute a minority in the House of Representatives. On top of which, the public is weary of war.
Secondly, the international community is singing a very different tune. Russia and Mainland China have vetoed the use of force in the UN, making any such resolution impossible. NATO is unwilling to participate in an attack. Even the United Kingdom, which has long been faithful, which has always backed the United States, is opposed. The British Parliament flatly rejected Prime Minister David Cameron's proposed use of force. Most EU countries do not support war. Only French President Francois Hollande was willing to lend a hand. But rumors are the French public may demand parliamentary approval.
Thirdly, the United States does not want to send in ground troops. It fears another nightmarish war. Therefore it will probably only fire missiles as part of a limited attack. In that case, toppling the Assad regime will be difficult. The US is more concerned about its status as the world's policeman than in upholding justice. As soon as Obama took office he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. He withdrew troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. These were important achievements. But now he wants to use force and begin shooting. He needs endorsements and support.
In fact, the domestic situation in Syria is complex. The ruling and opposition parties belong to different religious sects, Shia and Sunni. Outside meddling, especially by the U.S., could make the situation worse. Assad is militarily strong. That is why he has been able to fight the rebels for two years without falling. The rebel camp has too many chiefs and not enough Indians. Al-Qaeda forces dominate. The U.S. fears that if it rides to the rescue, it may help its sworn enemy.
Since the Cold War, the United States has been playing the role of world policeman, even as it expanded its sphere of influence. But such "Captain America" style actions in the Arab world have often resulted in humiliation. How much have they actually helped the local population? That is hard to say.
After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. supported Afghan guerrillas fighting the USSR. Among those who received CIA funding and military training, were members of Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization, which later launched the 9/11 attacks of 2001. The United States found and killed bin Laden in May 2011. But it the terrorist threat from Al Qaeda remains.
After 911, U.S. troops in Afghanistan overthrew the Taliban regime that had been harboring bin Laden. In March 2003, the US claimed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and destroyed the regime of Saddam Hussein. Great Britain and other countries waged war on Iraq. Saddam Hussein was captured in December 2003. He was hanged in December 2006. But no weapons of mass destruction whatsoever were ever found. The U.S. has a record of such blunders. Now people are questioning the legitimacy of the use of force against Syria.
The United States paid a high price for these two wars. The Iraq war cost 662 billion US. The United States has been battered by the financial crisis. Its economy is in a prolonged downturn. The ruling and opposition parties are both afraid of war. They are in no mood to set foot on another Middle Eastern battlefield.
The Arab world is very different from the Western world in its religious and cultural beliefs. Each country has its own tribal, sectarian, and political factions, Add to this widespread anti-American sentiment. Even if the United States is sincere, any help it can provide will be limited. If it insists on intervening, it may make matters worse. It may intensify any grievances the local inhabitants might already have against the United States.
Over 100,000 people have been killed in Syria. Over 200,000 people have been uprooted. This is a man-made disaster. Is the United Nations is willing to become more actively involved? Is it willing to impose a cease fire? First freeze the situation, then stop the killing. Put pressure on Assad to negotiate a peace. At least protect people from poison gas. But given the current international situation, the United States can no longer lay down the law. Uncle Sammy has gotten decrepit. It must must now spend more time communicating and negotiating with other countries .
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.09.04
社論－老大哥不行了 美難解敘利亞困局
本報訊
敘利亞發生千餘人死亡的化武攻擊事件，但美國對敘利亞擂起的戰鼓卻再衰三竭，現在要交給國會定奪，開火與否還要再往後拖。氣力漸衰的美國，想扮演世界警察的老大哥角色，已經愈來愈力不從心了。
這起事件傷亡慘重，無辜稚兒屍體橫陳的畫面更是震撼全球。美國一開始即指敘利亞政府下的毒手，歐巴馬總統矢言美國必須採取行動。但之後卻放緩了動作，明明美國總統可以不經國會同意即決定發動攻擊，但歐巴馬還是轉而尋求國會同意，大概到本月中旬才會進行表決。
歐巴馬的決策轉折有其背景，第一，國內民意非常不挺再捲入一場戰爭，阿富汗和伊拉克之戰讓美國陷入10年泥淖，人命損失及財政負擔都極大，對美軍身心造成沉重壓力，自殺死亡人數已經超過了死於戰火的人數。好不容易現在快抽身了，實在不願再淌一趟渾水。美國媒體認為動武案可能不容易在國會過關，不只是歐巴馬的民主黨在眾院居少數，也因為民意強烈厭戰。
其次是國際社會也唱反調，聯合國在俄羅斯、中國反對下無法通過動武決議，北約不願共同發動攻擊，向來忠實力挺美國的英國，國會斷然否決了首相卡麥隆的動武提案。其他歐盟國家大多不支持，只有法國總統奧朗德願意助拳，但如今法國內部也傳出要求交付國會的聲音。
第三，美國既然不想派地面部隊，免得陷入另一場戰爭惡夢，於是大概只能發射幾枚飛彈，作「有限」的攻擊，那麼勢將難以扳倒阿塞德政權，對自己世界警察的地位作點交代的成分還大於維護正義。歐巴馬一上任就得了諾貝爾和平獎，又把從伊、阿撤軍作為重要政績，如今若要動武開火，總要多拉些背書支持。
其實敘利亞內部情勢複雜，執政與反抗分屬什葉與遜尼不同教派，外力─尤其是美國─的介入，未必會讓局面好轉。阿塞德的軍力堅強，因此能和反抗軍鏖戰兩年而不倒。反抗陣營內部多頭馬車，基地組織勢力又在其中坐大，美國忌憚出手相救，也是擔心幫到了死對頭。
從冷戰以來，美國一直在扮演世界警察的同時擴張勢力版圖，不過這個「美國隊長」在阿拉伯世界的行動，有時卻灰頭土臉，對當地民眾有多大幫助也很難說。
1979年蘇聯入侵阿富汗之後，美國支援阿富汗游擊隊抗俄，而當時曾經接受資助與中央情報局武力訓練的，就包括了後來在2001年發動911恐怖攻擊的「基地」組織首腦賓拉登。即使美國在2011年5月找到並擊斃賓拉登，仍然無法徹底清除「基地」的恐怖威脅。
911事件後，美國出兵阿富汗，推翻窩藏賓拉登的塔里班政權。2003年3月以伊拉克哈珊政權擁有大規模毀滅性武器為由，與英國等國家發動伊拉克戰爭。哈珊在2003年12月被捕獲，2006年12月死在絞刑台上，但結果根本找不到任何大規模毀滅性武器。美國既有搞烏龍的前科，現在對敘動武的正當性也受到質疑。
不過美國也為這兩場戰爭付出了高昂代價，伊戰花費甚至達6620億美元，在美國因金融海嘯重創經濟、景氣陷入長期低迷後，朝野都已聞戰色變，無心也無力再踏入另一個中東戰場。
何況，阿拉伯世界由於宗教、文化、思維模式與西方有相當差距，每個國家內部又各有其部族、教派、政治派系等因素，加上普遍有反美情緒，美國就算有誠意，能幫上的忙也非常有限。硬要插手的話，反而可能使局勢益發複雜，讓當地民眾對美國的怨氣更深。
敘利亞之局，到現在已經超過10萬人喪生，200萬人流離失所，堪稱人間浩劫。如果聯合國願意更積極介入，強制兩造停火，先凍結現狀停止殺戮，施壓阿塞德進行和平談判，至少能保護老百姓免受荼毒。不過目前的國際態勢，已經不是美國可以一呼百諾了。大哥已老，現在必須花更多心力時間與各國溝通協商。
Monday, September 2, 2013
Key to Cross-Strait Development: Seize the Moment, Work Together
Key to Cross-Strait Development: Seize the Moment, Work Together
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 3, 2013
Summary: When officials from Taipei and Beijing discuss cross-Strait relations, they often attempt to seize the moral high ground. They often make carefully worded but undecipherable responses, out of fear that the other side will take advantage of them, or that they will lose face. In fact, opportunities can be created. Our attitudes and perspectives determine the future. We must seize opportunities and ensure cooperation, in order to improve cross-Strait relations. This is the key to the ROC's future. We must give it all we have.
Full text below:
When officials from Taipei and Beijing discuss cross-Strait relations, they often attempt to seize the moral high ground. They often make carefully worded but undecipherable responses, out of fear that the other side will take advantage of them, or that they will lose face. Why? Perhaps this happens because they share the same language and national character. Perhaps it is due to the uniquely ambiguous nature of the Chinese language. Perhaps it can be chalked up to pragmatic political considerations. Everyone is reluctant to put speak plainly. Often they leave things half said. Those outside the loop often assume it is nothing more than political rhetoric, and must not be taken seriously. But sometimes these responses are loaded with subtext. Changing a single word may radically change the meaning. Those in the know often take the hint. But other times the ambiguity leads to misunderstandings, miscalculations, and confusion regarding another's intentions. Experts may need to decipher them.
For example, are relations between Taipei and Beijing international relations, domestic relations, or "cross-Strait relations?" Are delegations from the ROC "Zhongguo Taipei" or "Zhonghua Taipei?" Were the talks Koo-Wang talks or Wang-Koo talks? Were the talks an end point, or a hiatus? Were they political negotiations or political dialogues? Was their consensus "one China, shared interpretation," or "different interpretations?" The two sides quarrel endlessly. Every time Lien and Hu meet, Wu and Hu meet, Siew and Hu meet, or Wu and Xi meet, they issue a 16 word declaration,one that bowls everyone over. Even Hu Jintao joked about these 16 word declarations with visiting VIPs from Taiwan. The two sides rearrange the order of these 16 words constantly. They ponder the meaning of every word. Reporters and officials outside the loop often find their heads spinning. They conclude that the two sides are engaged merely in sophistry or word games, that they are concerned merely with appearances, with saving face, and have forgotten the substance.
Several interesting developments have taken place recently. The first of course, is rumors of a Ma Xi Summit. These are apparently more than mere rumors. Will there be a ground-breaking development in the near future? That would be something worth anticipating. The second is the ongoing interaction between the Red Camp and the Green Camp. Can the DPP successfully restructure? Can it accept the one China Constitution? Can it change its fundamentally anti-China, separatist orientation? This major variable will affect the political situation on Taiwan and in cross-Strait relations. The third is the upcoming cross-Strait peace forum. This will be an important event. Can the two sides' think tanks and academics make a breakthrough, enabling cross-Strait political dialogue? Can they identify the obstacles and a way out of the stalemate?
News reports from Taiwan say that officials from the two sides may meet. These reports have a basis in fact. The officials in question may have domestic elections to consider. They may be attempting to ensure their place in history, or to consolidate long-term cross-Strait relations. President Ma wants to meet with Xi Jinping. At the very least, he does not reject such a meeting. This is widely known. President Ma has repeatedly implied that the only obstacle is current conditions, which must be improved. This of course includes where Ma and Xi would meet, how they would meet, and how they would address each other. The problems are real but not insoluble. The two sides, working together, can overcome any obstacles. Seizing the opportunities and working together is the key.
Ma Ying-jeou does not oppose, and may even want a meeting between himself and Xi Jinping. Beijing is already aware of this. If the rumors are true, it will impact more than Ma Ying-jeou as an individual. It will impact the future of the ROC and cross-Strait relations. It may help Xi Jinping consolidate his power and ensure his legacy. Such a meeting would be the biggest event since the KMT and the CCP shook hands in 2005. It would be the focus of world attention. All research, all officials and academics charged with Taiwan-related business, would have the opportunity to establish their reputations and leave behind legacies. From a strategic perspective, the CCP is likely to see this as a rare and fleeting historical opportunity. It is likely to clear away the tactical obstacles in its way. We can only wait and see.
CCP Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Director Sun Yafu and Foreign Ministry spokesman recently. He addressed officials from both sides during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting. He was clear and specific. Beijing still insists that the two sides cannot meet in an international venue. This accords with customary practice. On the surface, he has already rejected an informal meeting next year at the APEC leadership summit. But as Sun Yafu said, the APEC meeting and any meeting between Ma and Xi would be different things. Outsiders should not conflate the two by talking about them in the same breath. Did his words carry some unknown meaning or subtext? Also, just because the two sides met in Singapore, it did not mean that the Koo Wang Meeting was an international negotiation. If Ma and Xi meet in a third country, that does not mean they are meeting in an international venue. This too should be considered.
Consider Red Camp dialogue with the Green Camp. The CCP is reluctant to use the term "CCP-DPP dialogue." It is reluctant to leave the wrong impression. It remains unwilling to engage in party to party interaction until the DPP forsakes Taiwan independence. Beijing has practical considerations. It is attempting to increase contacts and improve understanding. For the CCP, the purpose of the Peace Forum is to facilitate cross-Strait political dialogue and negotiations, in the search for solutions. Will future developments lead to the formation of a mechanism for this? That remains to be seen. Beijing may have some thoughts on this. But for now it is a case of catch as catch can, feeling the stones while crossing the river. These two things are reflected in the CCP's determination to bring about comprehensive improvements in cross-Strait relations.
In fact, opportunities can be created. Our attitudes and perspectives determine the future. We must seize opportunities and ensure cooperation, in order to improve cross-Strait relations. This is the key to the ROC's future. We must give it all we have.
社論－兩岸發展關鍵：把握機遇、共同合作
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊
2013年09月03日 04:10
或許出於同文同種的民族性格關係，或許由於中國文字特有的朦朧性質，更或許出於現實政治的考量，兩岸領導人在談論雙邊關係的時候常常高來高去，字斟句酌的專講一些摸不著邊際的話；就怕給對方占了便宜或丟了自己的面子，大家都不願意把話講絕，常常是話到嘴邊留半句。不知情的人認為這些都是一些門面的政治語言，當真不得，但有時候卻也真是話中有話，一字之別但卻含有深意；知情的人有時固然能夠心領神會，但有時也還是會誤解、誤判，搞不清對方的真實意圖，還要專人點撥。
比如說兩岸到底是國際、國內或兩岸關係，到底是中國台北或中華台北，到底是辜汪、汪辜會談或會面，到底是句點或逗點，到底是政治談判或政治對話，到底是一中共表或各表，雙方都要吵個半天。連胡、吳胡、蕭胡、吳習會面每次都來個十六字訣，搞得大家人仰馬翻，連胡錦濤後來都要對到訪台灣貴賓笑稱又是十六個字，雙方對這十六個字排列的先後順序字字琢磨，不知情的外國媒体和代表官員常常被搞得暈頭轉向，認為兩岸簡直就是在玩弄玄學或文字藝術，只重表象和面子，有時反而忘了關鍵性的實質問題。
話說最近發生的幾樁引人注意的事情，首先當然是甚囂塵上的所謂馬習會問題，事情看來並非空穴來風，未來是否會有石破天驚的發展，特別值得留意；其次則是進行中的紅綠互動問題，民進黨能否成功轉型，接受憲法一中的主張，調整其反中及分離主義的基本立場，這將是牽動台灣政局及兩岸關係的一大變數；第三則是即將舉行的兩岸和平論壇問題，由於這將是一個極為重要的活動，試看雙方能否透過民間智庫及所謂的重量級學者，先行為兩岸未來政治對話與談判找出問題及破解之道。
就目前看來，台灣媒体報導兩岸領導人可能會面一事可以說是事出有因，不管是出於內政選舉的需要，自己的歷史定位問題或固化兩岸關係的長遠考量，馬總統有意或至少是不排除與習近平見面一事已是眾所皆知的事情。馬總統已多次明示、暗示，當前問題只是會面的條件並不具備，仍然有待加強，而這其中當然涉及馬習見面的地點、方式、稱謂、場合等各種不同的問題。事情當然難解，但也不是無解，端看雙方能否把握機遇，共同合作來克服其中可能存在的障礙。把握機遇和共同合作將是關鍵之所在。
北京對於馬英九不排斥，或希望能夠促成雙方領導人見面的意圖應該早已心領神會。如果此事一旦成真，這將不只是對馬英九個人，台灣的未來發展及兩岸關係產生重大影響，也可進一步鞏固習近平的領導權威，確立他的歷史地位；畢竟這將是繼2005年國共握手言歡後的頭等大事，必然是全世界矚目的焦點，而所有研究、處理涉台業務的官員、學者這都將是建立事功，歷史留名的大好機會。從戰略的高度出發，中共應該會積極把握這種難得、稍縱即逝的歷史機遇，然後在戰術上努力為此創造條件，排除各種障礙，對此我們或可拭目以待。
中共國台辦副主任孫亞夫及外交部發言人日前都對兩岸領導人在亞太經濟合作會議會面一事表達明確而且具體的立場。北京仍然堅持雙方不能在國際場合會面，主張按照慣例辦理，表面上已經拒絕了明年雙方在APEC非正式領袖峰會見面的可能；但就像孫亞夫所說，APEC會議和兩人會面可以是兩件不同的事情，外界不應將其混為一談，他的話中是否有些不為人知的意涵或所謂的潛台詞，值得玩味。另外，就像當年在新加坡舉行的兩岸的辜汪會談並不等於國際談判，馬習兩人若在第三國見面是否也並不意味著國際場合，同樣不無思考的空間。
有關紅綠對話，中共不願直接使用民共對話二字就是不願給外界不當聯想，誤認願意在民進黨並未放棄台獨的主張下與其進行黨際互動，北京只是基於現實的考量，試圖加強彼此的接觸與了解；有關和平論壇一事，中共的目的基本上還是為了破解將來兩岸政治對話與談判難題，預為尋求解決之道，至於未來到底會發展成何種樣貌，最後是否能夠形成一種機制，仍待觀察。北京心中或許有些構想，但目前恐怕也還是在且戰且走，摸著石頭過河的階段。這兩件事情都反映出中共試圖深化發展、全面推動兩關係的決心。
事實上，機會可以是創造的，而態度與視野則會決定未來的結果。把握機遇、共同合作、深化發展、全面推動兩岸關係，這才是影響台灣未來的關鍵，我們必須全力以赴！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 3, 2013
Summary: When officials from Taipei and Beijing discuss cross-Strait relations, they often attempt to seize the moral high ground. They often make carefully worded but undecipherable responses, out of fear that the other side will take advantage of them, or that they will lose face. In fact, opportunities can be created. Our attitudes and perspectives determine the future. We must seize opportunities and ensure cooperation, in order to improve cross-Strait relations. This is the key to the ROC's future. We must give it all we have.
Full text below:
When officials from Taipei and Beijing discuss cross-Strait relations, they often attempt to seize the moral high ground. They often make carefully worded but undecipherable responses, out of fear that the other side will take advantage of them, or that they will lose face. Why? Perhaps this happens because they share the same language and national character. Perhaps it is due to the uniquely ambiguous nature of the Chinese language. Perhaps it can be chalked up to pragmatic political considerations. Everyone is reluctant to put speak plainly. Often they leave things half said. Those outside the loop often assume it is nothing more than political rhetoric, and must not be taken seriously. But sometimes these responses are loaded with subtext. Changing a single word may radically change the meaning. Those in the know often take the hint. But other times the ambiguity leads to misunderstandings, miscalculations, and confusion regarding another's intentions. Experts may need to decipher them.
For example, are relations between Taipei and Beijing international relations, domestic relations, or "cross-Strait relations?" Are delegations from the ROC "Zhongguo Taipei" or "Zhonghua Taipei?" Were the talks Koo-Wang talks or Wang-Koo talks? Were the talks an end point, or a hiatus? Were they political negotiations or political dialogues? Was their consensus "one China, shared interpretation," or "different interpretations?" The two sides quarrel endlessly. Every time Lien and Hu meet, Wu and Hu meet, Siew and Hu meet, or Wu and Xi meet, they issue a 16 word declaration,one that bowls everyone over. Even Hu Jintao joked about these 16 word declarations with visiting VIPs from Taiwan. The two sides rearrange the order of these 16 words constantly. They ponder the meaning of every word. Reporters and officials outside the loop often find their heads spinning. They conclude that the two sides are engaged merely in sophistry or word games, that they are concerned merely with appearances, with saving face, and have forgotten the substance.
Several interesting developments have taken place recently. The first of course, is rumors of a Ma Xi Summit. These are apparently more than mere rumors. Will there be a ground-breaking development in the near future? That would be something worth anticipating. The second is the ongoing interaction between the Red Camp and the Green Camp. Can the DPP successfully restructure? Can it accept the one China Constitution? Can it change its fundamentally anti-China, separatist orientation? This major variable will affect the political situation on Taiwan and in cross-Strait relations. The third is the upcoming cross-Strait peace forum. This will be an important event. Can the two sides' think tanks and academics make a breakthrough, enabling cross-Strait political dialogue? Can they identify the obstacles and a way out of the stalemate?
News reports from Taiwan say that officials from the two sides may meet. These reports have a basis in fact. The officials in question may have domestic elections to consider. They may be attempting to ensure their place in history, or to consolidate long-term cross-Strait relations. President Ma wants to meet with Xi Jinping. At the very least, he does not reject such a meeting. This is widely known. President Ma has repeatedly implied that the only obstacle is current conditions, which must be improved. This of course includes where Ma and Xi would meet, how they would meet, and how they would address each other. The problems are real but not insoluble. The two sides, working together, can overcome any obstacles. Seizing the opportunities and working together is the key.
Ma Ying-jeou does not oppose, and may even want a meeting between himself and Xi Jinping. Beijing is already aware of this. If the rumors are true, it will impact more than Ma Ying-jeou as an individual. It will impact the future of the ROC and cross-Strait relations. It may help Xi Jinping consolidate his power and ensure his legacy. Such a meeting would be the biggest event since the KMT and the CCP shook hands in 2005. It would be the focus of world attention. All research, all officials and academics charged with Taiwan-related business, would have the opportunity to establish their reputations and leave behind legacies. From a strategic perspective, the CCP is likely to see this as a rare and fleeting historical opportunity. It is likely to clear away the tactical obstacles in its way. We can only wait and see.
CCP Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Director Sun Yafu and Foreign Ministry spokesman recently. He addressed officials from both sides during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting. He was clear and specific. Beijing still insists that the two sides cannot meet in an international venue. This accords with customary practice. On the surface, he has already rejected an informal meeting next year at the APEC leadership summit. But as Sun Yafu said, the APEC meeting and any meeting between Ma and Xi would be different things. Outsiders should not conflate the two by talking about them in the same breath. Did his words carry some unknown meaning or subtext? Also, just because the two sides met in Singapore, it did not mean that the Koo Wang Meeting was an international negotiation. If Ma and Xi meet in a third country, that does not mean they are meeting in an international venue. This too should be considered.
Consider Red Camp dialogue with the Green Camp. The CCP is reluctant to use the term "CCP-DPP dialogue." It is reluctant to leave the wrong impression. It remains unwilling to engage in party to party interaction until the DPP forsakes Taiwan independence. Beijing has practical considerations. It is attempting to increase contacts and improve understanding. For the CCP, the purpose of the Peace Forum is to facilitate cross-Strait political dialogue and negotiations, in the search for solutions. Will future developments lead to the formation of a mechanism for this? That remains to be seen. Beijing may have some thoughts on this. But for now it is a case of catch as catch can, feeling the stones while crossing the river. These two things are reflected in the CCP's determination to bring about comprehensive improvements in cross-Strait relations.
In fact, opportunities can be created. Our attitudes and perspectives determine the future. We must seize opportunities and ensure cooperation, in order to improve cross-Strait relations. This is the key to the ROC's future. We must give it all we have.
社論－兩岸發展關鍵：把握機遇、共同合作
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊
2013年09月03日 04:10
或許出於同文同種的民族性格關係，或許由於中國文字特有的朦朧性質，更或許出於現實政治的考量，兩岸領導人在談論雙邊關係的時候常常高來高去，字斟句酌的專講一些摸不著邊際的話；就怕給對方占了便宜或丟了自己的面子，大家都不願意把話講絕，常常是話到嘴邊留半句。不知情的人認為這些都是一些門面的政治語言，當真不得，但有時候卻也真是話中有話，一字之別但卻含有深意；知情的人有時固然能夠心領神會，但有時也還是會誤解、誤判，搞不清對方的真實意圖，還要專人點撥。
比如說兩岸到底是國際、國內或兩岸關係，到底是中國台北或中華台北，到底是辜汪、汪辜會談或會面，到底是句點或逗點，到底是政治談判或政治對話，到底是一中共表或各表，雙方都要吵個半天。連胡、吳胡、蕭胡、吳習會面每次都來個十六字訣，搞得大家人仰馬翻，連胡錦濤後來都要對到訪台灣貴賓笑稱又是十六個字，雙方對這十六個字排列的先後順序字字琢磨，不知情的外國媒体和代表官員常常被搞得暈頭轉向，認為兩岸簡直就是在玩弄玄學或文字藝術，只重表象和面子，有時反而忘了關鍵性的實質問題。
話說最近發生的幾樁引人注意的事情，首先當然是甚囂塵上的所謂馬習會問題，事情看來並非空穴來風，未來是否會有石破天驚的發展，特別值得留意；其次則是進行中的紅綠互動問題，民進黨能否成功轉型，接受憲法一中的主張，調整其反中及分離主義的基本立場，這將是牽動台灣政局及兩岸關係的一大變數；第三則是即將舉行的兩岸和平論壇問題，由於這將是一個極為重要的活動，試看雙方能否透過民間智庫及所謂的重量級學者，先行為兩岸未來政治對話與談判找出問題及破解之道。
就目前看來，台灣媒体報導兩岸領導人可能會面一事可以說是事出有因，不管是出於內政選舉的需要，自己的歷史定位問題或固化兩岸關係的長遠考量，馬總統有意或至少是不排除與習近平見面一事已是眾所皆知的事情。馬總統已多次明示、暗示，當前問題只是會面的條件並不具備，仍然有待加強，而這其中當然涉及馬習見面的地點、方式、稱謂、場合等各種不同的問題。事情當然難解，但也不是無解，端看雙方能否把握機遇，共同合作來克服其中可能存在的障礙。把握機遇和共同合作將是關鍵之所在。
北京對於馬英九不排斥，或希望能夠促成雙方領導人見面的意圖應該早已心領神會。如果此事一旦成真，這將不只是對馬英九個人，台灣的未來發展及兩岸關係產生重大影響，也可進一步鞏固習近平的領導權威，確立他的歷史地位；畢竟這將是繼2005年國共握手言歡後的頭等大事，必然是全世界矚目的焦點，而所有研究、處理涉台業務的官員、學者這都將是建立事功，歷史留名的大好機會。從戰略的高度出發，中共應該會積極把握這種難得、稍縱即逝的歷史機遇，然後在戰術上努力為此創造條件，排除各種障礙，對此我們或可拭目以待。
中共國台辦副主任孫亞夫及外交部發言人日前都對兩岸領導人在亞太經濟合作會議會面一事表達明確而且具體的立場。北京仍然堅持雙方不能在國際場合會面，主張按照慣例辦理，表面上已經拒絕了明年雙方在APEC非正式領袖峰會見面的可能；但就像孫亞夫所說，APEC會議和兩人會面可以是兩件不同的事情，外界不應將其混為一談，他的話中是否有些不為人知的意涵或所謂的潛台詞，值得玩味。另外，就像當年在新加坡舉行的兩岸的辜汪會談並不等於國際談判，馬習兩人若在第三國見面是否也並不意味著國際場合，同樣不無思考的空間。
有關紅綠對話，中共不願直接使用民共對話二字就是不願給外界不當聯想，誤認願意在民進黨並未放棄台獨的主張下與其進行黨際互動，北京只是基於現實的考量，試圖加強彼此的接觸與了解；有關和平論壇一事，中共的目的基本上還是為了破解將來兩岸政治對話與談判難題，預為尋求解決之道，至於未來到底會發展成何種樣貌，最後是否能夠形成一種機制，仍待觀察。北京心中或許有些構想，但目前恐怕也還是在且戰且走，摸著石頭過河的階段。這兩件事情都反映出中共試圖深化發展、全面推動兩關係的決心。
事實上，機會可以是創造的，而態度與視野則會決定未來的結果。把握機遇、共同合作、深化發展、全面推動兩岸關係，這才是影響台灣未來的關鍵，我們必須全力以赴！
Ma Su Debate: On Stage and Off Stage Wrangling
Ma Su Debate: On Stage and Off Stage Wrangling
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 2, 2013
Summary: On the 15th of this month, President Ma Ying-jeou and DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang will hold a public debate on "TISA," or the "Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement." Compare the format to the format of the 2010 Two Yings ECFA Debate. TISA is a follow-up agreement to ECFA. It was signed in June of this year and now awaits approval by the legislature. Debating the issue now is unlikely to change the ruling and opposition parties' entrenched positions. But it is turning the debate into onstage and offstage wrangling.
Full text below:
On the 15th of this month, President Ma Ying-jeou and DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang will hold a public debate on "TISA," or the "Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement." Compare the format to the format of the 2010 Two Yings ECFA Debate. TISA is a follow-up agreement to ECFA. It was signed in June of this year and now awaits approval by the legislature. Debating the issue now is unlikely to change the ruling and opposition parties' entrenched positions. But it is turning the debate into onstage and offstage wrangling.
Consider its substance. TISA can be viewed from several angles.
One. Consider the nation's larger interests. TISA is a key component of ECFA's grand strategy "Today the Chinese mainland, tomorrow the world." It will help Taipei and its trading partners sign FTAs. It will help Taipei become part of TPP, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Partnership Agreement, and RCEP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and other regional integration agreements. The DPP understands its relevance. That is why it eventually endorsed ECFA during the 2012 presidential election.
Two. Consider cross-Strait economic and trade interests. TISA is unequivocally a unilateral Mainland concession to Taiwan. The operative word is "unequivocal." The Mainland has granted Taiwan nearly the same treatment as WTO members. Also, in accordance with FTA principles, it has made Taiwan 80 commitments that go well beyond WTO mandates. By contrast, Taiwan has given the Mainland only half the concessions normally granted WTO members. Taiwan has made the Mainland commitment on only 64 items. More than a third of these were capital investment projects previously approved. These were explicitly termed "stopgaps" in the agreement. Another third fell below WTO standards. A final one-third exceeded WTO standards. But these were granted almost exclusively to Overseas Chinese in recent years. By international standards, TISA was enormously favorable to Taiwan. But the Ma administration dared not underscore this achievement. It was fearful the opposition DPP would cast doubt on the Mainland's motives. As a result, TISA has perversely been spun as detrimental to Taiwan. This is deeply ironic .
Three. Consider the issue of management. Service sector market opening is primarily about investments. In accordance with international practices, nations allow investments to be made on the basis of national security , market order, and other considerations. Foreign investment and the attendant transfer of personnel is permitted. TISA opening commitments are a sensitive issue for the Mainland. Even a handful of national security concerns may be subject to individual examination. The scale of investment and personnel access is controlled. As long as the government manages the opening, it remains quite safe. There is no call for concern.
TISA has turned into a major controversy. In fact, it is the demagoguing of a phony issue. Why is it a phony issue? Four reasons. Reason One. If TISA had been signed between Taipei and any other government, the agreement would have been uncontroversial. Reason Two. Beijing sees TISA as an unprecedented concession, and an economic transfusion for Taiwan. If the Democratic Progressive Party were in power, Beijing would probably halt or reduce its investments in Taiwan. The DPP is the party that ought to worry about how to persuade Beijing to change its mind. Reason Three. TISA has raised concerns about Mainland industries affecting land prices. Some media and and special interest groups have exaggerated the impact, but the truth has gradually emerged. Opponents then resortd to questioning the government's committment to market opening and how long the control mechanisms would last. Reason Four. Beijing has maximized its concessions to Taipei. It is almost impossible for the Green Camp to reopen negotiations. Doing so would do Taiwan more harm than good.
Ma and Su agreed to debate TISA. Alas, the debate is more about political considerations than about facts or truth. President Ma faces endless criticism of his administration. Public protests follow one after another. He faces endless ruling vs. opposition controversy and public protests. Agreeing to a ruling vs. opposition debate may help relieve such public pressure. Besides, the Ma administration's cross-strait policy is its shining achievement. The debate may improve communications with the public. It may give it a leg up in the legislature.
The DPP was not originally opposed to TISA. Chairman Su Tseng-chang is obviously using the debate to revive the opposition party's lost status. The DPP hoped its opposition to TISA would pay off big time. It adopted an extremely very tough stance in the legislature. Anti-TISA groups began agitating. They argued that the Ma Su debate was no substitute for "citizen participation." Su Tseng-chang feels pressured to win this debate, or else. If he loses, he will not merely lose points politically. He may even become the target of anti-TISA forces.
Therefore each side has its own political calculus. The Ma Su debate is unlikely to be a focused, rational debate that reveals the truth. It may well degenerate into a manipulative and antagonistic war of words, in which the sole intent is to win whatever the cost. The side that loses may dig in its heels, intensifying the confrontational atmosphere, and undermining the passage of TISA in the legislature.
We urge Ma and Su to set aside the matter of winning or losing, and their personal interests. Instead, they should investigate the facts and to solve the problems that emerge in the wake of TISA. That way maybe both Ma and Su can be winners.
馬蘇辯論：場內和場外的角力
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.09.02 03:50 am
馬英九總統和民進黨主席蘇貞昌本月十五日將就「兩岸服務貿易協議」公開辯論，規格比照二○一○年四月雙英ＥＣＦＡ辯論。服貿協議是ＥＣＦＡ後續協議之一，今年六月已完成簽署並進入立法院審理程序，現在進行辯論顯難改變朝野既定立場，反而成為辯論場內和場外的角力。
從實質面來看，兩岸服貿協議可以從幾個層次加以分析：
第一，在國家總體利益層次，服貿協議是執行ＥＣＦＡ「從中國大陸走向世界」大戰略的環節，有助台灣加速和貿易對手洽簽ＦＴＡ及參加ＴＰＰ（跨太平洋戰略夥伴協定）及ＲＣＥＰ（區域全面經濟夥伴關係）等區域整合。民進黨當然了解其關聯性，也是二○一二年總統大選為ＥＣＦＡ背書的重要原因之一。
第二，在兩岸經貿利益層次，服貿協議可以說是大陸對台灣的「絕對」讓利。這裡用「絕對」兩個字，是指大陸給予台灣近乎完整的世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）成員待遇，並依ＦＴＡ原則，另給予台灣八十項超越ＷＴＯ的開放承諾。但相對上，台灣給予大陸約僅其他ＷＴＯ成員待遇之半數，僅承諾開放六十四個項目；且其中超過三分之一是已開放陸資投資項目，寫入協議顯為「充數」。另近三分之一項目，則低於ＷＴＯ標準；還有近三分之一，雖高於ＷＴＯ標準項目，近年也幾乎完全開放僑外人投資。從國際談判角度看，服貿協議可說對台灣大大有利，但馬政府不敢突出此等成果，顯是擔憂在野黨會質疑大陸讓利動機；弄到現在，卻反被質疑服貿協議不利台灣，實在諷刺。
第三，在管理層次，服務市場開放主要是投資形式，依國際慣例，各國基於安全、市場秩序等理由，對外來投資及衍生的人員移動進行必要管理，乃理所當然。服貿協議對大陸開放承諾，皆非敏感項目；即使涉及到極少數國安顧慮，也可透過個案審查把關。對於投資規模及人員進出，也有足夠管控機制，只要政府落實管理，可以說是相當安全的開放，沒有擔憂的必要。
現兩岸服貿協議演變成社會重大爭議，其實是一個被操弄出來的「假議題」。稱之為「假議題」，原因有四：其一，如果服貿協議是台灣和其他國家間簽署的協議，各種爭議必定大幅降低；其二，北京視服貿協議是前所未有的讓利，也是為台灣經濟輸血；若換成是民進黨執政，北京很可能停止或減少對台投資，民進黨反而要憂慮如何說服北京改變心意；其三，服貿協議引發各行各業擔憂陸企大軍壓境，肇因於部分媒體及有心人士過度渲染、誇大其衝擊，在真實資訊漸次揭露後，反對者又轉而質疑政府未承諾開放的項目及各種管控機制還能維持多久；其四，在北京以最大限度對台讓利的情況下，綠營要求重開談判幾無可能，對台灣更是弊多利少。
馬蘇同意就兩岸服貿協議進行辯論，背後的政治考量顯多於對事實與真理的論辯。對馬總統而言，面對政府施政爭議不斷，社會抗爭事件此起彼落，同意朝野辯論，可適度紓解社會壓力。而且，兩岸政策是最有力的政績，服貿協議在立法院有非過不可的壓力，如果能透過辯論產生社會溝通的效果，對立院闖關自有臨門一腳的助力。
另一方面，民進黨最初並非反服貿協議主角，蘇貞昌主席顯然是想藉辯論重振近來日益失落的在野黨角色及發言地位。但民進黨受到反服貿團體的高度期待，在立法院採取極強硬立場；反服貿團體則放話：馬蘇辯論不能取代「公民參與」。因此，蘇貞昌在這場辯論有非贏不可的壓力，如果落居下風，不僅政治上大為失分，而且可能淪為反服貿勢力抨擊對象。
所以，在各有所圖下，馬蘇辯論很難是一場真理愈辯愈明，聚焦、理性的辯論，甚至可能淪為操弄對立、意圖技術上壓倒對方的唇槍舌劍。落居下風的一方，為扳回一城，在辯論場外立場會更強硬，從而可能激化對立氛圍，反不利服貿協議在立法院順利審查通過。
有鑑於此，我們仍要呼籲馬蘇皆放下辯論輸贏與個人利害，多為探討事實及解決服貿協議後續問題盡一分心力，如此，或許反而能成就馬蘇的雙贏。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
September 2, 2013
Summary: On the 15th of this month, President Ma Ying-jeou and DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang will hold a public debate on "TISA," or the "Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement." Compare the format to the format of the 2010 Two Yings ECFA Debate. TISA is a follow-up agreement to ECFA. It was signed in June of this year and now awaits approval by the legislature. Debating the issue now is unlikely to change the ruling and opposition parties' entrenched positions. But it is turning the debate into onstage and offstage wrangling.
Full text below:
On the 15th of this month, President Ma Ying-jeou and DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang will hold a public debate on "TISA," or the "Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement." Compare the format to the format of the 2010 Two Yings ECFA Debate. TISA is a follow-up agreement to ECFA. It was signed in June of this year and now awaits approval by the legislature. Debating the issue now is unlikely to change the ruling and opposition parties' entrenched positions. But it is turning the debate into onstage and offstage wrangling.
Consider its substance. TISA can be viewed from several angles.
One. Consider the nation's larger interests. TISA is a key component of ECFA's grand strategy "Today the Chinese mainland, tomorrow the world." It will help Taipei and its trading partners sign FTAs. It will help Taipei become part of TPP, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Partnership Agreement, and RCEP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and other regional integration agreements. The DPP understands its relevance. That is why it eventually endorsed ECFA during the 2012 presidential election.
Two. Consider cross-Strait economic and trade interests. TISA is unequivocally a unilateral Mainland concession to Taiwan. The operative word is "unequivocal." The Mainland has granted Taiwan nearly the same treatment as WTO members. Also, in accordance with FTA principles, it has made Taiwan 80 commitments that go well beyond WTO mandates. By contrast, Taiwan has given the Mainland only half the concessions normally granted WTO members. Taiwan has made the Mainland commitment on only 64 items. More than a third of these were capital investment projects previously approved. These were explicitly termed "stopgaps" in the agreement. Another third fell below WTO standards. A final one-third exceeded WTO standards. But these were granted almost exclusively to Overseas Chinese in recent years. By international standards, TISA was enormously favorable to Taiwan. But the Ma administration dared not underscore this achievement. It was fearful the opposition DPP would cast doubt on the Mainland's motives. As a result, TISA has perversely been spun as detrimental to Taiwan. This is deeply ironic .
Three. Consider the issue of management. Service sector market opening is primarily about investments. In accordance with international practices, nations allow investments to be made on the basis of national security , market order, and other considerations. Foreign investment and the attendant transfer of personnel is permitted. TISA opening commitments are a sensitive issue for the Mainland. Even a handful of national security concerns may be subject to individual examination. The scale of investment and personnel access is controlled. As long as the government manages the opening, it remains quite safe. There is no call for concern.
TISA has turned into a major controversy. In fact, it is the demagoguing of a phony issue. Why is it a phony issue? Four reasons. Reason One. If TISA had been signed between Taipei and any other government, the agreement would have been uncontroversial. Reason Two. Beijing sees TISA as an unprecedented concession, and an economic transfusion for Taiwan. If the Democratic Progressive Party were in power, Beijing would probably halt or reduce its investments in Taiwan. The DPP is the party that ought to worry about how to persuade Beijing to change its mind. Reason Three. TISA has raised concerns about Mainland industries affecting land prices. Some media and and special interest groups have exaggerated the impact, but the truth has gradually emerged. Opponents then resortd to questioning the government's committment to market opening and how long the control mechanisms would last. Reason Four. Beijing has maximized its concessions to Taipei. It is almost impossible for the Green Camp to reopen negotiations. Doing so would do Taiwan more harm than good.
Ma and Su agreed to debate TISA. Alas, the debate is more about political considerations than about facts or truth. President Ma faces endless criticism of his administration. Public protests follow one after another. He faces endless ruling vs. opposition controversy and public protests. Agreeing to a ruling vs. opposition debate may help relieve such public pressure. Besides, the Ma administration's cross-strait policy is its shining achievement. The debate may improve communications with the public. It may give it a leg up in the legislature.
The DPP was not originally opposed to TISA. Chairman Su Tseng-chang is obviously using the debate to revive the opposition party's lost status. The DPP hoped its opposition to TISA would pay off big time. It adopted an extremely very tough stance in the legislature. Anti-TISA groups began agitating. They argued that the Ma Su debate was no substitute for "citizen participation." Su Tseng-chang feels pressured to win this debate, or else. If he loses, he will not merely lose points politically. He may even become the target of anti-TISA forces.
Therefore each side has its own political calculus. The Ma Su debate is unlikely to be a focused, rational debate that reveals the truth. It may well degenerate into a manipulative and antagonistic war of words, in which the sole intent is to win whatever the cost. The side that loses may dig in its heels, intensifying the confrontational atmosphere, and undermining the passage of TISA in the legislature.
We urge Ma and Su to set aside the matter of winning or losing, and their personal interests. Instead, they should investigate the facts and to solve the problems that emerge in the wake of TISA. That way maybe both Ma and Su can be winners.
馬蘇辯論：場內和場外的角力
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.09.02 03:50 am
馬英九總統和民進黨主席蘇貞昌本月十五日將就「兩岸服務貿易協議」公開辯論，規格比照二○一○年四月雙英ＥＣＦＡ辯論。服貿協議是ＥＣＦＡ後續協議之一，今年六月已完成簽署並進入立法院審理程序，現在進行辯論顯難改變朝野既定立場，反而成為辯論場內和場外的角力。
從實質面來看，兩岸服貿協議可以從幾個層次加以分析：
第一，在國家總體利益層次，服貿協議是執行ＥＣＦＡ「從中國大陸走向世界」大戰略的環節，有助台灣加速和貿易對手洽簽ＦＴＡ及參加ＴＰＰ（跨太平洋戰略夥伴協定）及ＲＣＥＰ（區域全面經濟夥伴關係）等區域整合。民進黨當然了解其關聯性，也是二○一二年總統大選為ＥＣＦＡ背書的重要原因之一。
第二，在兩岸經貿利益層次，服貿協議可以說是大陸對台灣的「絕對」讓利。這裡用「絕對」兩個字，是指大陸給予台灣近乎完整的世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）成員待遇，並依ＦＴＡ原則，另給予台灣八十項超越ＷＴＯ的開放承諾。但相對上，台灣給予大陸約僅其他ＷＴＯ成員待遇之半數，僅承諾開放六十四個項目；且其中超過三分之一是已開放陸資投資項目，寫入協議顯為「充數」。另近三分之一項目，則低於ＷＴＯ標準；還有近三分之一，雖高於ＷＴＯ標準項目，近年也幾乎完全開放僑外人投資。從國際談判角度看，服貿協議可說對台灣大大有利，但馬政府不敢突出此等成果，顯是擔憂在野黨會質疑大陸讓利動機；弄到現在，卻反被質疑服貿協議不利台灣，實在諷刺。
第三，在管理層次，服務市場開放主要是投資形式，依國際慣例，各國基於安全、市場秩序等理由，對外來投資及衍生的人員移動進行必要管理，乃理所當然。服貿協議對大陸開放承諾，皆非敏感項目；即使涉及到極少數國安顧慮，也可透過個案審查把關。對於投資規模及人員進出，也有足夠管控機制，只要政府落實管理，可以說是相當安全的開放，沒有擔憂的必要。
現兩岸服貿協議演變成社會重大爭議，其實是一個被操弄出來的「假議題」。稱之為「假議題」，原因有四：其一，如果服貿協議是台灣和其他國家間簽署的協議，各種爭議必定大幅降低；其二，北京視服貿協議是前所未有的讓利，也是為台灣經濟輸血；若換成是民進黨執政，北京很可能停止或減少對台投資，民進黨反而要憂慮如何說服北京改變心意；其三，服貿協議引發各行各業擔憂陸企大軍壓境，肇因於部分媒體及有心人士過度渲染、誇大其衝擊，在真實資訊漸次揭露後，反對者又轉而質疑政府未承諾開放的項目及各種管控機制還能維持多久；其四，在北京以最大限度對台讓利的情況下，綠營要求重開談判幾無可能，對台灣更是弊多利少。
馬蘇同意就兩岸服貿協議進行辯論，背後的政治考量顯多於對事實與真理的論辯。對馬總統而言，面對政府施政爭議不斷，社會抗爭事件此起彼落，同意朝野辯論，可適度紓解社會壓力。而且，兩岸政策是最有力的政績，服貿協議在立法院有非過不可的壓力，如果能透過辯論產生社會溝通的效果，對立院闖關自有臨門一腳的助力。
另一方面，民進黨最初並非反服貿協議主角，蘇貞昌主席顯然是想藉辯論重振近來日益失落的在野黨角色及發言地位。但民進黨受到反服貿團體的高度期待，在立法院採取極強硬立場；反服貿團體則放話：馬蘇辯論不能取代「公民參與」。因此，蘇貞昌在這場辯論有非贏不可的壓力，如果落居下風，不僅政治上大為失分，而且可能淪為反服貿勢力抨擊對象。
所以，在各有所圖下，馬蘇辯論很難是一場真理愈辯愈明，聚焦、理性的辯論，甚至可能淪為操弄對立、意圖技術上壓倒對方的唇槍舌劍。落居下風的一方，為扳回一城，在辯論場外立場會更強硬，從而可能激化對立氛圍，反不利服貿協議在立法院順利審查通過。
有鑑於此，我們仍要呼籲馬蘇皆放下辯論輸贏與個人利害，多為探討事實及解決服貿協議後續問題盡一分心力，如此，或許反而能成就馬蘇的雙贏。
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