Fukushima Year Three: Global Anti-Nuke Sentiment
United Daily News editorial
(Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
March 11, 2014
Summary: Over the past three years, nations relying on nuclear power have thoroughly reviewed the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Contrast this with Taiwan. The nuclear vs. non-nuclear debate resulted in scorched earth confrontations. No thorough, practical review or reform has been implemented. This is a far more serious man-made disaster.
Full text below:
Three years have elapsed since the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Over the past year, Japan has made little progress reconstructing the stricken areas. Meanwhile, domestic anti-nuclear sentiment has undergone surprising changes. Conditional acceptance of nuclear power plant development has increased. Germany once vowed that it would be a nuclear free nation by 2022. But the high cost of renewable energy and over-reliance on natural gas from Russia have engendered unprecedented skepticism. After evaluating the Fukushima disaster, most nuclear nations have decided to continue using of nuclear power.
Fukushima disaster victims have returned home. But reconstruction is apparently far more difficult than expected. The obstacles are insurmountable. Nearly 25 million tons of radioactive contaminants must be removed. So far there has been no progress. The government says they are "in temporary storage." But the public thinks the current storage site will be the final storage site. Radiation-contaminated soil must be replaced with new soil. But new soil cannot be found, and no place on earth is willing to accept the contaminated soil. Many intractable problems remain.
Anti-nuclear sentiment is changing with the times. Sign Number One. Pro-nuclear Prime Minister Shinzo Abe supported Masuzoe's election as Governor of Tokyo. Masuzoe defeated former Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa and Junichiro Koizumi, who advocated a nuclear-free homeland. Sign Number Two. The Abe Cabinet recently conducted an opinion poll. It asked 157 local governments within 30 km of nuclear power plants "Do you wish to restart the nuclear power plants?" Thirty percent answered "yes" or "conditionally yes." This matched the number who answered "no." Immediately following the disaster hardly any local government answered "yes" to restarting nuclear power plants. Clearly there has been a significant change.
The atmosphere has gradually changed, for several reasons. One. The complete shutdown of nuclear power plants on Japan harmed the economy and the peoples livelihood. The burden was greater than the public could bear. Nuclear power plant shut down meant natural gas had to be imported to fill the energy gap. Three years later, total expenditures have amounted to 220 billion USD. This approximates Japan's trade deficit over the same period. Energy shortages forced many companies to cut production. This led to incalculable losses in their overseas markets.
Two. Japan's Diet formed an independent commission to investigate the accident and to publish a report. It determined that the cause of the Fukushima disaster was not an earthquake, a tsunami, or any other natural disaster, but rather human error. Tokyo Electric Power Company, to which Fukushima belongs, ignored the recommendations of nuclear regulatory authorities for 30 years. It failed to respond to international recommendations to make nuclear security updates. It allowed the problem to fester. "The Tohoku Electric Power Company's Onagawa nuclear power plant was closer to the epicenter. Why was it perfectly safe? Because it updated its nuclear safety measures." The commission will classify the nuclear disaster not as a natural disaster, but as a man-made one. It has convinced people there is room for improvement.
In Germany, three years of promoting a "nuclear free homeland" has led to considerable progress. But now it appears to have run into a brick wall. Domestically, renewable energy has met only one quarter of its target. The price, meanwhile, has steadily increased. It is now about four times the price in Taiwan. Every kilowatt hour costs $12NT. This year it will increase 20 percent. Rising electricity prices are a public burden. Motivated by election considerations, the Bundestag has censured the Merkel government.
Now take external factors. The main concern is sources of natural gas. These have made the problem much more difficult. Nearly 40 percent of Germany's natural gas comes from Russia. The two countries have signed a cooperation agreement to construct a pipeline. But heavy dependence on Russia is highly controversial. Recently the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has intensified. Unfortunately the gas pipeline to Germany goes through Ukrainian territory. If the Russian gas supply is reduced or even halted as a result of war, Germany will mpt be able to cope.
The United States nuclear power industry has advanced nuclear safety measures. It has long been a major users of nuclear power. It is second only to France in the percentage of nuclear power generation. The Fukushima disaster forced a review of the design of nuclear power plants and nuclear safety control measures. Intensive public opinion polls have accurately gauged public sentiment. The public supports the continued development of nuclear power. The U.S. has five new plants under construction. Fourteen more plant applications are under review. Meanwhile, the number of power generation plants being built has increased. These are proceeding concurrently. The US is not hesitating to seek a "nuclear power windfall."
The United States is also developing small modular reactors (SMR). These are estimated to go online in 2024. Small modular reactors enable flexible power supply. They also distribute the risk. The choice of power plant depends entirely on cost, U.S. shale gas mining technology breakthroughs, coupled with high density inland gas pipelines, and lower natural gas prices. The closing of the old coal-fired plants is inevitable. For new plants, the choice of nuclear energy or gas is optional.
On the European continent, nations besides Germany, Italy, and Switzerland have decided to go the non-nuclear route. France, Britain and even Sweden, which announced the phasing out of nuclear power generation, nevertheless continue to develop nuclear power. Economics is a factor. So is carbon reduction. Mainland China, India, South Africa, Brazil, and other emerging industrial countries have never slowed the development of nuclear power. In fact, they are increasing the number of nuclear power plants.
The Fukushima nuclear disaster was unprecedented. It was certain to provoke a global nuclear vs. non-nuclear debate. But an even more critical issue is how to move forward. Over the past three years, nations relying on nuclear power have thoroughly reviewed the Fukushima nuclear disaster. They have examined the water shortages, electricity shortages, and blackouts. They have thoroughly reformed their software and hardware disaster prevention measures. Contrast this with Taiwan. The nuclear vs. non-nuclear debate resulted in scorched earth confrontations. No thorough, practical review or reform has been implemented. This is a far more serious man-made disaster.
福島三周年 全球非核風怎麼吹
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.03.11 02:24 am
福島核災屆滿三年。過去一年，日本在災區的重建進度有限，但其國內非核、反核的氛圍已微妙變化，朝有條件重啟核電廠的方向發展。當時率先宣布二○二二無核家園的德國，也因再生能源代價極高，替代的天然氣又過度依賴俄國，質疑聲浪空前。其他核電國家經過「福島省思」後，多半亦繼續發展核電。
福島災區雖已同意若干災民返回家園，但重建難度顯然遠超過預期，無法克服。近兩千五百萬噸輻射汙染垃圾的移除，至今毫無進度，政府說「現地暫時儲存」，但民眾普遍認為現地是「終極儲存場」。遭輻射汙染的土壤需客土替代，但既找不到新土，汙染土方也沒地方願意收容。類似難解的問題一大堆，棘手之極。
儘管如此，隨著時間變化，非核氣氛卻逐漸發生變化。跡象一，擁核派首相安倍晉三支持的舛添要一當選東京都知事，擊敗鼓吹無核家園的前首相細川護熙及小泉純一郎聯盟；跡象二，安倍內閣最近針對核電廠周圍卅公里內的一五七個地方政府進行「是否同意重啟核電廠」的問卷調查，結果近三成「同意」或「有條件同意」，與「不同意重啟」旗鼓相當。這與災後幾乎沒有任何地方政府同意重啟核電廠，已有顯著變化。
氛圍之所以逐漸變化，原因包括：其一，核電廠全面關閉對日本經濟和民生的傷害，超出了人民的承受力。關閉核電廠後，能源缺口以進口天然氣填補，災後三年總計支出達兩千兩百億美元；這個數字，和近三年日本的貿易逆差值相當。此外，因能源短缺而導致若干企業縮小生產規模，也造成海外市場流失；這部分尚無法量化計算。
其二，日本眾議院組織獨立調查委員會提出事故報告，定位福島災變不是地震、海嘯等天災，而是人禍。福島所屬的東電公司，三十多年不理會核管部門的建議，長時間忽視國際核安應對更新，因而釀禍；「離震央更近，東北電力公司的女川核電廠為什麼安然無恙？因為他們同步更新核安措施。」委員會將核災定位為人禍、不是天災，說服民眾有改善餘地。
德國方面，三年來全力推動「非核」雖有相當進展，但似乎進入「撞牆期」。其內部因素是，目前再生能源的生產僅達目標的四分之一，但電價已連續調高，約為台灣的四倍、每度電合台幣十二元，今年還要再調高二十％。電價連漲使得民眾負擔沉重，基於選票考量，國會議員對梅克爾政府已多所責難。
外部因素方面，主要是天然氣來源成為隱憂，使問題更棘手。德國天然氣近四成來自俄羅斯，雖然兩國簽有合作埋管供氣的協定，但對俄羅斯依賴太深一直深受爭議。最近俄國與烏克蘭衝突加劇，不巧的是輸德的供氣管線穿越烏克蘭境內，萬一俄國因戰爭減壓供氣甚或停供，德國將措手不及。
美國以其核電工業及核安前瞻地位，一直是核電大國，核電比重僅次於法國。福島災後，重新檢討核電廠設計及核安管制措施，並以密集民調精準掌握民眾想法後，繼續發展核電。目前美國有五座新廠興建中、十四個機組申請建廠；另方面，增加發電功率的電廠升載、延役同步進行，毫不猶疑地繼續領取「核電紅利」。
美國也同步開發小容量核電機組，預計二○二四即可併聯商轉。小機組讓電力調度靈活，也可分散風險。值得注意的是，電廠種類選擇完全取決於成本，由於美國頁岩氣開採技術突破，加上內陸輸氣管線密度極高，天然氣價格走低，關老燃煤電廠是必然走向。至於新建電廠，核能或燃氣的選擇彈性很大。
歐陸諸國除了德、義、瑞士確定非核路線，法、英乃至曾宣布廢核的瑞典等國都繼續發展核電；其中，除了經濟因素外，減碳的壓力也是重要考慮。至於中國、印度、南非、巴西等新興工業國，則從未減緩發展核電，還進一步擴充核電廠。
福島核災確屬空前，引發全球「核電／非核」論辯也屬必然，但論辯之外，更關鍵的是如何向前走。三年下來，全球核電國家對福島成災的無水、無電、應對延宕的「電廠全黑」危機徹底檢討，做了從軟、硬體，到防災決策觀念的徹底改革。對照台灣，「核電／非核」仍處於焦土對峙，卻無任何徹底務實的檢討與改革，這毋寧是更大的人禍。
Monday, March 10, 2014
Anti-Intellectualism: Harbinger of a Nation's Decline
Anti-Intellectualism: Harbinger of a Nation's Decline
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
March 10, 2014
Summary: Many academics who become cabinet members give up high-paying jobs. They contribute their professional insights. They could have criticized from the sidelines. But they chose to emerge from academia to practice their professions. They chose to contribute. To level such blanket condemnations of academics is unfair. If anything, we should be more concerned about anti-intellectual political commentary. It has already added fuel to the fire of an increasingly populist society. Anti-intellectualism is the harbinger of social and national decline.
Full text below:
The economy has remained in a long-term slump. Government policies have inspired little public confidence. People are depressed. The public questions the ability of officials to govern. Public fora echo with criticisms of politics and the government. The general impression is that the Ma administration consists mainly of Ph.Ds sequestered in ivory towers, and has little idea how the other half lives. The expressions "bu shi ren jian yan huo" and "tian long guo" have become rote criticisms.
Recently the local media has begun arguing that "Taiwan's worst mistake was allowing intellectuals to lead the nation to disaster." Some even argue that "If a government has too many Ph.Ds, it is not a blessing. It is a tragedy!" These are among the harshest criticisms of "rule by academia."
A number of charges have recently been leveled against academics within the cabinet. They include, "They are leading the nation to disaster," "When in office, they use their positions to engage in plunder," "They lack real dedication," "They are extremely arrogant," "They refuse to admit that they do not understand," and "They refuse to listen to ordinary people." Among the usual criticisms of "rule by academia," these are perhaps the most negative and most hostile. To refer to such criticisms as "anti-intellectual" is no exaggeration. The role of intellectuals has been vilified, even demonized. As a result, it did not require much of a stretch to blame the Ma government's crisis of governance on "Too many Ph.Ds."
But this is an unconvincing argument. Evaluating a nation's governance is not easy. At the macro level, there is the global business cycle and regional geopolitical competition. At the micro level, there are matters of government vs. opposition rivalry, policy orientation, and even leadership style. Any and all of these could be reasons. To offer "Too many Ph.Ds" as the sole reason is probably the most bizzarre reasoning of all.
If this reasoning is correct, then the Ph.Ds and professors in the administration should be herded back to the campus. They should be replaced with less educated candidates with high school diplomas at best. The current governance issues will then magically be solved. Clearly no one with any modicum of common sense would ever make such an argument.
Interestingly enough, former President Lee Teng-hui's cabinet was filled with university professors and Ph.Ds. The percentage was as high as it is in today's Ma cabinet. No one seemed to have any criticisms of them back then. Lee was followed by President Chen Shui-bian. Then Academia Sinica President Lee Yuantse mobilized a large group of academics. He even formed a "National Policy Advisory Group" in support of Chen's election campaign. Chen Shui-bian remained in power for eight years. During that time his cabinet had no shortage of professors and Ph.Ds. When the Chen government scandals erupted, no one argued that "academics led the nation towards disaster." The intellectuals who were made cabinet members were beatified as contributing to "clean government." They were praised for "upgrading the government." The intellectuals who are cabinet members today on the other hand, are vilified as a "leading the nation towards disaster." Their involvement is characterized as a "tragedy." To paraphrase President Ma's famed expression, "If this is not a double standard, what is a double standard?"
New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof recently urged university professors to emerge from their ivory towers to actively debate and research public issues, and to have the courage to exert influence. In an article entitled "Professors, We Need You!" Kristoff wrote, "Some of the smartest thinkers on problems at home and around the world are university professors, but most of them just don't matter in today's great debates." He urged scholars not to isolate themselves from society. When a public issue arises, they must not be as disoriented as the public. He thinks university professors have more and more tools by which they can educate the public. Kristof concluded by saying, "So, professors, don't cloister yourselves like medieval monks -- we need you!"
Kristof may not realize it. But the vision expressed in "Professors, We Need You!" was long ago realized on Taiwan. But it has been demonized by some as the chief culprit in misgovernance.
Does the ability to govern have any relationship to the number of academics in the cabinet? That is a question that can be debated. Ph.Ds and professors may have their own prejudices on the matter, based on their own specialities. A cabinet consisting entirely of Ph.Ds could find itself mired in rational decision-making while ignoring the feelings of ordinary citizens. That does not mean one must reject "rule by academia" in toto, or make generalizations such as "leading the nation towards disaster," or even referring to their involvement as a "tragedy."
Many academics who become cabinet members give up high-paying jobs. They contribute their professional insights. They have no fear of slander or criticisms. To characterize them as "predatory" is grossly unfair. Many of them could have remained on campus, above it all. They could have criticized from the sidelines. But they chose to emerge from academia to practice their professions. They chose to contribute. To level such blanket condemnations of academics is unfair. If anything, we should be more concerned about anti-intellectual political commentary. It has already added fuel to the fire of an increasingly populist society. Anti-intellectualism is the harbinger of social and national decline.
社論－反知識是國家衰落的開始
2014-03-10 01:31
中國時報
本報訊
經濟長期不振，政府施政未能振奮人心，社會顯得異常苦悶，政府官員施政能力更受到民眾普遍的質疑，言論場域充滿了對政治與政府的批評。一般印象認為，馬政府團隊以博士教授為主力，「不食人間煙火」、「天龍國」就成為批評者的慣性用詞。
但最近媒體出現「台灣最糟糕的就是知識分子誤國」的評論，更說「一個政府博士太多，不是好事，而是悲劇！」，這是對「學者從政」最嚴厲的批評。
最近出現的詞彙，除了「誤國」外，還包括「在位置上時一直掠奪」、「沒有真正奉獻」、「很傲慢」、「不承認自己不懂」、「不聆聽平民百姓的意見」等，在歷來批判「學者從政」的論述中，這套辭彙恐怕是對知識分子最負面、也最敵意的，說是「反知識分子」也不為過！當知識分子的角色被如此醜化、甚至被這般妖魔化之後，將馬政府的治理危機，簡單歸咎成是「博士太多」，也就不太困難了！
問題是，這並非有說服力的論述，評價一國的治理問題，本來就不容易，大到全球的景氣循環、區域的地緣競爭，小到朝野關係、政策取向乃至領導人風格等等，都可以拿來做為推論的前提，也都可以形成仁智互見的論述，但是拿「博士太多」做為推論前提，大概是最奇特的論述！
如果這組推論是正確的，那是否意味：把政府團隊中的博士教授等全趕回校園，全換成學歷較低的學士或更低的高中職學歷，當前政府的治理問題就全部迎刃而解了？稍具常識的人都清楚，邏輯好像不能這樣推吧！
耐人尋味的是，昔日李登輝擔任總統期間，內閣團隊同樣充斥著博士教授，比例絕不輸今日的馬政府，當時好像未曾見到任何的負面批評；接下來的陳水扁前總統，更是由當時擔任中研院院長的李遠哲動員一群博士甚至院士所籌組的「國政顧問團」支持當選的，陳水扁主政8年期間的歷屆內閣團隊中，具有博士教授背景的閣員同樣沒有少過，那時節扁政府充斥著大小弊案，好像也未曾聽聞過誰站出來說過任何一句什麼「知識分子誤國」的話。如果說當年的知識分子入閣，可以被美化成是「清流政府」，是在「向上提升」，今天的知識分子入閣，卻被醜化成是「誤國」、是「悲劇」，那麼我們還真想套句馬總統著名的修辭學，如果這不是「雙重標準」，那什麼才是「雙重標準」！
紐約時報專欄作家紀思道（Nicholas D.Kristof）不久前撰文，呼籲大學教授應走出學術象牙塔，積極參與重大公共議題的論辯和研究，勇於發揮影響力。紀思道在題為「聰明頭腦，渺小影響」的文章中寫道，對國內外問題有最聰明見解的人之中，有些是大學教授，但絕大多數人在當今重大議題的論辯上，卻是無足輕重。他呼籲學者切莫自絕於社會大眾，也不應在公共問題發生時，和大眾一樣茫然。他認為現在的大學教授可以教育大眾的工具和管道，已經愈來愈多了。紀思道最後強調，社會需要教授，請教授別像中世紀的僧侶一樣與世隔絕！
紀思道或許不知道，他所憧憬的「教授，我們需要你！」之景象，早就在台灣實現了，但卻被部分論者視國政治理不佳的元凶。
政府治理能力與內閣學者是否太多，當然是一個可以討論的議題，任何博士或教授都可能有其學科上的本位與偏見，一群全由博士與教授所組成的團隊，也很有可能會拘泥於決策理性，而忽略了平民最素樸的感受，但這絕不意味如此就必須將「學者從政」全盤加以否定，或概括式評為「誤國」，甚至是「悲劇」！
當今不少入閣從政的學者，不僅放棄高薪，全心貢獻一已的專業與識見，無畏外界的詆毀與抨擊，說他們是在「掠奪」，真的是言重了！他們其中的許多人本可留在校園扮清高，動嘴批判即可，但他們寧可選擇走出校園將自己專業予以實踐，選擇奉獻一己之力，對學者概括式的批評是不公平的。我們更憂心「反知識」的政治評論，對已經民粹化的社會將更增推波助瀾之效，反知識是社會沉淪、國家衰落的開始。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
March 10, 2014
Summary: Many academics who become cabinet members give up high-paying jobs. They contribute their professional insights. They could have criticized from the sidelines. But they chose to emerge from academia to practice their professions. They chose to contribute. To level such blanket condemnations of academics is unfair. If anything, we should be more concerned about anti-intellectual political commentary. It has already added fuel to the fire of an increasingly populist society. Anti-intellectualism is the harbinger of social and national decline.
Full text below:
The economy has remained in a long-term slump. Government policies have inspired little public confidence. People are depressed. The public questions the ability of officials to govern. Public fora echo with criticisms of politics and the government. The general impression is that the Ma administration consists mainly of Ph.Ds sequestered in ivory towers, and has little idea how the other half lives. The expressions "bu shi ren jian yan huo" and "tian long guo" have become rote criticisms.
Recently the local media has begun arguing that "Taiwan's worst mistake was allowing intellectuals to lead the nation to disaster." Some even argue that "If a government has too many Ph.Ds, it is not a blessing. It is a tragedy!" These are among the harshest criticisms of "rule by academia."
A number of charges have recently been leveled against academics within the cabinet. They include, "They are leading the nation to disaster," "When in office, they use their positions to engage in plunder," "They lack real dedication," "They are extremely arrogant," "They refuse to admit that they do not understand," and "They refuse to listen to ordinary people." Among the usual criticisms of "rule by academia," these are perhaps the most negative and most hostile. To refer to such criticisms as "anti-intellectual" is no exaggeration. The role of intellectuals has been vilified, even demonized. As a result, it did not require much of a stretch to blame the Ma government's crisis of governance on "Too many Ph.Ds."
But this is an unconvincing argument. Evaluating a nation's governance is not easy. At the macro level, there is the global business cycle and regional geopolitical competition. At the micro level, there are matters of government vs. opposition rivalry, policy orientation, and even leadership style. Any and all of these could be reasons. To offer "Too many Ph.Ds" as the sole reason is probably the most bizzarre reasoning of all.
If this reasoning is correct, then the Ph.Ds and professors in the administration should be herded back to the campus. They should be replaced with less educated candidates with high school diplomas at best. The current governance issues will then magically be solved. Clearly no one with any modicum of common sense would ever make such an argument.
Interestingly enough, former President Lee Teng-hui's cabinet was filled with university professors and Ph.Ds. The percentage was as high as it is in today's Ma cabinet. No one seemed to have any criticisms of them back then. Lee was followed by President Chen Shui-bian. Then Academia Sinica President Lee Yuantse mobilized a large group of academics. He even formed a "National Policy Advisory Group" in support of Chen's election campaign. Chen Shui-bian remained in power for eight years. During that time his cabinet had no shortage of professors and Ph.Ds. When the Chen government scandals erupted, no one argued that "academics led the nation towards disaster." The intellectuals who were made cabinet members were beatified as contributing to "clean government." They were praised for "upgrading the government." The intellectuals who are cabinet members today on the other hand, are vilified as a "leading the nation towards disaster." Their involvement is characterized as a "tragedy." To paraphrase President Ma's famed expression, "If this is not a double standard, what is a double standard?"
New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof recently urged university professors to emerge from their ivory towers to actively debate and research public issues, and to have the courage to exert influence. In an article entitled "Professors, We Need You!" Kristoff wrote, "Some of the smartest thinkers on problems at home and around the world are university professors, but most of them just don't matter in today's great debates." He urged scholars not to isolate themselves from society. When a public issue arises, they must not be as disoriented as the public. He thinks university professors have more and more tools by which they can educate the public. Kristof concluded by saying, "So, professors, don't cloister yourselves like medieval monks -- we need you!"
Kristof may not realize it. But the vision expressed in "Professors, We Need You!" was long ago realized on Taiwan. But it has been demonized by some as the chief culprit in misgovernance.
Does the ability to govern have any relationship to the number of academics in the cabinet? That is a question that can be debated. Ph.Ds and professors may have their own prejudices on the matter, based on their own specialities. A cabinet consisting entirely of Ph.Ds could find itself mired in rational decision-making while ignoring the feelings of ordinary citizens. That does not mean one must reject "rule by academia" in toto, or make generalizations such as "leading the nation towards disaster," or even referring to their involvement as a "tragedy."
Many academics who become cabinet members give up high-paying jobs. They contribute their professional insights. They have no fear of slander or criticisms. To characterize them as "predatory" is grossly unfair. Many of them could have remained on campus, above it all. They could have criticized from the sidelines. But they chose to emerge from academia to practice their professions. They chose to contribute. To level such blanket condemnations of academics is unfair. If anything, we should be more concerned about anti-intellectual political commentary. It has already added fuel to the fire of an increasingly populist society. Anti-intellectualism is the harbinger of social and national decline.
社論－反知識是國家衰落的開始
2014-03-10 01:31
中國時報
本報訊
經濟長期不振，政府施政未能振奮人心，社會顯得異常苦悶，政府官員施政能力更受到民眾普遍的質疑，言論場域充滿了對政治與政府的批評。一般印象認為，馬政府團隊以博士教授為主力，「不食人間煙火」、「天龍國」就成為批評者的慣性用詞。
但最近媒體出現「台灣最糟糕的就是知識分子誤國」的評論，更說「一個政府博士太多，不是好事，而是悲劇！」，這是對「學者從政」最嚴厲的批評。
最近出現的詞彙，除了「誤國」外，還包括「在位置上時一直掠奪」、「沒有真正奉獻」、「很傲慢」、「不承認自己不懂」、「不聆聽平民百姓的意見」等，在歷來批判「學者從政」的論述中，這套辭彙恐怕是對知識分子最負面、也最敵意的，說是「反知識分子」也不為過！當知識分子的角色被如此醜化、甚至被這般妖魔化之後，將馬政府的治理危機，簡單歸咎成是「博士太多」，也就不太困難了！
問題是，這並非有說服力的論述，評價一國的治理問題，本來就不容易，大到全球的景氣循環、區域的地緣競爭，小到朝野關係、政策取向乃至領導人風格等等，都可以拿來做為推論的前提，也都可以形成仁智互見的論述，但是拿「博士太多」做為推論前提，大概是最奇特的論述！
如果這組推論是正確的，那是否意味：把政府團隊中的博士教授等全趕回校園，全換成學歷較低的學士或更低的高中職學歷，當前政府的治理問題就全部迎刃而解了？稍具常識的人都清楚，邏輯好像不能這樣推吧！
耐人尋味的是，昔日李登輝擔任總統期間，內閣團隊同樣充斥著博士教授，比例絕不輸今日的馬政府，當時好像未曾見到任何的負面批評；接下來的陳水扁前總統，更是由當時擔任中研院院長的李遠哲動員一群博士甚至院士所籌組的「國政顧問團」支持當選的，陳水扁主政8年期間的歷屆內閣團隊中，具有博士教授背景的閣員同樣沒有少過，那時節扁政府充斥著大小弊案，好像也未曾聽聞過誰站出來說過任何一句什麼「知識分子誤國」的話。如果說當年的知識分子入閣，可以被美化成是「清流政府」，是在「向上提升」，今天的知識分子入閣，卻被醜化成是「誤國」、是「悲劇」，那麼我們還真想套句馬總統著名的修辭學，如果這不是「雙重標準」，那什麼才是「雙重標準」！
紐約時報專欄作家紀思道（Nicholas D.Kristof）不久前撰文，呼籲大學教授應走出學術象牙塔，積極參與重大公共議題的論辯和研究，勇於發揮影響力。紀思道在題為「聰明頭腦，渺小影響」的文章中寫道，對國內外問題有最聰明見解的人之中，有些是大學教授，但絕大多數人在當今重大議題的論辯上，卻是無足輕重。他呼籲學者切莫自絕於社會大眾，也不應在公共問題發生時，和大眾一樣茫然。他認為現在的大學教授可以教育大眾的工具和管道，已經愈來愈多了。紀思道最後強調，社會需要教授，請教授別像中世紀的僧侶一樣與世隔絕！
紀思道或許不知道，他所憧憬的「教授，我們需要你！」之景象，早就在台灣實現了，但卻被部分論者視國政治理不佳的元凶。
政府治理能力與內閣學者是否太多，當然是一個可以討論的議題，任何博士或教授都可能有其學科上的本位與偏見，一群全由博士與教授所組成的團隊，也很有可能會拘泥於決策理性，而忽略了平民最素樸的感受，但這絕不意味如此就必須將「學者從政」全盤加以否定，或概括式評為「誤國」，甚至是「悲劇」！
當今不少入閣從政的學者，不僅放棄高薪，全心貢獻一已的專業與識見，無畏外界的詆毀與抨擊，說他們是在「掠奪」，真的是言重了！他們其中的許多人本可留在校園扮清高，動嘴批判即可，但他們寧可選擇走出校園將自己專業予以實踐，選擇奉獻一己之力，對學者概括式的批評是不公平的。我們更憂心「反知識」的政治評論，對已經民粹化的社會將更增推波助瀾之效，反知識是社會沉淪、國家衰落的開始。
Thursday, March 6, 2014
Hold the Ma Xi Meeting in a Third Locale?
Hold the Ma Xi Meeting in a Third Locale?
United Daily News editorial
(Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
March 7, 2014
Summary: As we can see from Sun Yafu's remarks, Beijing knows it must not pass up this chance for a Ma Xi meeting. The APEC conference in Beijing is still the preferred venue for a Ma Xi meeting. If it is held in a third venue, Honolulu and Geneva are equally good. But most importantly, it must underscore that neither side gobbles up the other.
Full text below:
Sun Yafu is vice president of ARATS. During an interview with a reporter from this newspaper, Sun said many venues are suitable for a Ma Xi meeting. He said a third locale could be considered. He said, "If we make detailed plans for a meeting of leaders from the two sides, the possibilities are endless."
In response, an unnamed senior MAC official responded. He said the Taipei side still believes the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference remins the most appropriate venue for a Ma Xi meeting. He said that for time being the Taipei side had no other view on the matter.
Sun Yafu's statement suggests the following. One. Beijing has ruled out a Ma Xi meeting at APEC this fall. This is increasingly apparent. Two. Beijing is more willing to arrange a Ma Xi meeting than before. This too is increasingly apparent. Three. Beijing is not being stubborn when it refuses to hold the meeting at APEC. Beijing is willing to hold it at a third locale. Four. Sun Yafu's language shows that if Ma and Xi meet, they will be able to address each other as "the leader of the Taiwan side" and "the leader of the Mainland side." Five. Sun is emphasizing the content of a Ma Xi meeting.
We think the Beijing APEC conference is the most suitable venue for a Ma Xi meeting. Consider Taipei's perspective. Suppose Ma Ying-jeou as "the leader of the Taiwan side" is able to meet with "the leader of the Mainland side," in the Great Hall of the People? Suppose he is also able to meet with other economic leaders at APEC? This would be interpreted as a further expression of the "one China framework." Consider Beijing's perspective. Suppose Ma Ying-jeou visits the Great Hall of the People and meets with Xi Jinping? This would underscore the connection between the two sides within the "one China framework." On the other hand, suppose Ma Ying-jeou is photographed shuttling back and forth between various heads of state? This is something that Beijing may have difficulty accepting, internationally and domestically.
Sun Yafu's remarks are revealing. Beijing has reiterated that the "cross-strait leaders meeting need not be held in an international venue." Beijing probably means that an international conference such as APEC need not be the venue for a Ma Xi meeting. Beijing however is amenable to holding the meeting in a third locale, i.e., a foreign locale. As Beijing sees it, that would be a "foreign venue" but not an "international venue."
Zhongnanhai has yet to exercise "greater imagination ." Beijing considers a Ma Xi meeting at APEC problematic. Ma Ying-jeou would not merely arrive in Beijing. He would also attend APEC. He would not merely attend APEC. He would also meet Xi Jinping alone in the Great Hall of the People. A Ma Xi meeting held in Beijing's "home court" would be the Mainland's first choice. But Beijing wants the Ma Xi meeting delinked from the APEC conference. That is why it has suggested a "third locale." Beijing is willing to forsake its "home court advantage" and to ask the Ma government to choose a "third locale." The ball is now back in the Ma's court.
As previously noted, a Ma Xi meeting held in Beijing at the APEC conference is the Ma government's first choice. This is due to public sentiment on Taiwan. A Ma Xi meeting at the APEC conference in Beijing would receive greater public support. If the meeting were moved to a "third locale" it would be obvious that it was Ma's second choice. it would be obvious that it was the resulf of his failure to get his first choice, APEC. This would be sure to generate controversy. But consider another perspective. Holding the meeting at a "third locale" would avoid Beijing's "home court advantage." Ma and Xi would still be able to address each other as "the leader of the Taiwan side" and "the leader of the Mainland side." They would still meet as peers and equals, even more than they would have had they met in Beijing. A "third locale" would not be an "international conference" and an "international venue." But no one could deny it was "international" in character. Therefore a Ma Xi meeting held in Beijing at the APEC conference, as opposed to one held at a "third locale" each have their pros and cons.
Further contemplation raises two questions. One. Where would this "third locale" be? Two. Sun Yafu asked how the content of the meeting for the leaders of the two sides would be determined. First consider the locale. Allow us to make a suggestion. The third locale could be Honolulu. Reason One: Honolulu is where Sun Yat-sen founded the Xinzhonghui. It is the common origin for both sides. Reason Two: The Hawaiian Islands are offshore islands of the United States. This would underscore how far peaceful cross-strait relations have come. This would show that it is an undertaking of global significance. A second choice for the third locale could be Geneva, Switzerland. Geneva is a symbol of human civilization and peace. Singapore would also do. But it might make it harder for any Ma Xi meeting to outshine the Koo-Wang meeting.
Finally, the key is the content of the Ma Xi meeting. We think the content of the Ma Xi meeting must include certain elements. It must advance toward the "big roof concept of China." It must avoid "You gobbling me up and me gobbling you up." In other words, the Ma Xi meeting must recognize the Republic of China under the big roof concept of China.
Any Ma Xi meeting must be consistent with the above. Otherwise Ma Ying-jeou could participate in a Ma Xi meeting at a third locale, but the results would add up to nothing. A Ma Xi meeting in a third locale must produce these results. Otherwise its impact on cross-strait relations would be negative. Why? Because during any Ma Xi meeting, the ROC public and not just Ma, would be seated across from Xi Jinping.
As we can see from Sun Yafu's remarks, Beijing knows it must not pass up this chance for a Ma Xi meeting. The APEC conference in Beijing is still the preferred venue for a Ma Xi meeting. If it is held in a third venue, Honolulu and Geneva are equally good. But most importantly, it must underscore that neither side gobbles up the other.
論馬習會在第三地舉行
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.03.07 04:23 am
海協會副會長孫亞夫接受本報記者採訪時表示，舉行馬習會的地點想像空間很大，包括可在第三地。他並說：「如果我們對兩岸領導人會面的內容設計得很豐富，這時候想像空間還可以更大。」
對此，陸委會高層在第一時間的不具名回應是：我方認為，亞太經合會（ＡＰＥＣ）仍是馬習會最適當的場合，目前沒有新的說法。
孫亞夫的談話顯示：一、北京排除今秋北京ＡＰＥＣ馬習會的傾向已更趨明顯；二、但北京對促成馬習會的意願亦更趨明顯；三、不在ＡＰＥＣ舉行是北京的固執，可在第三地舉行則是北京的讓步；四、從孫亞夫的用語可知，馬習若會面，互稱「台灣方面領導人」及「大陸方面領導人」的規格似已確定。五、強調馬習會的「內容設計」。
我們也認為，北京ＡＰＥＣ應是馬習會最適當的場合。畢竟，對台北而言，馬英九以「台灣領導人」身分在人民大會堂見「大陸領導人」習近平，又能在ＡＰＥＣ與其他「經濟體領袖」共處一堂，這自是對「一中架構」的進階詮釋；但對北京而言，馬英九赴人民大會堂見習近平固可顯示兩岸「一中框架」的連結，若也見馬英九在各國元首間穿梭合影，則恐是北京在現階段氛圍中對外與對內的難題。
因而，孫亞夫的說法顯示：前此北京屢申「兩岸領導人會面無須藉助國際場合」，至此已經轉化為「無須藉助ＡＰＥＣ的國際會議場合」，但可在第三地，也就是可在「外國」。北京的認知是：那是「外國」，但不是「國際（會議）場合」。
在中南海尚無「更大的想像力」之前，北京所認為的ＡＰＥＣ馬習會的難題是：馬英九不能只到「北京」，卻不到「ＡＰＥＣ」；也不能只到「ＡＰＥＣ」，卻不赴人民大會堂單獨會習近平。因而，馬習會若能在北京的「主場」舉行，雖是大陸方面的第一選擇；但北京既要馬習會與ＡＰＥＣ脫鉤，於是有了「第三地舉行」之議。亦即，北京放棄了「主場」，並要馬政府改選「第三地」。如今，球又打回了馬政府的場中。
如前所論，在北京ＡＰＥＣ舉行馬習會，自是馬政府的首選。因為，以台灣的民意民情論，「北京ＡＰＥＣ馬習會」自能獲得較大的支持；若是轉至「第三地」，又明知是爭取ＡＰＥＣ馬習會失敗後的第二選擇，必定較滋爭議。但是，從另一角度看，在「第三地」舉行，避免了北京的「主場效應」，且馬習又能以「台灣領導人」、「大陸領導人」互稱，卻也比若在北京會面更能呈現「對等／平等」；而「第三地」雖不是「國際會議場合」，但無人可以否認其為「國際」。所以，馬習會在「北京ＡＰＥＣ」或「第三地」之間的選擇，仍可從相對的角度評估其得失利害。
進一步的評估元素有二：一、「第三地」究係何地？二、孫亞夫所說的「兩岸領導人會面的內容設計」究係如何？先說地點。若容我們借箸代籌，第三地可選在檀香山。理由一、檀香山是孫中山創建興中會之地，是兩岸精神的共同淵源；理由二、夏威夷是美國的離島，可彰顯兩岸和平發展的進階工程，為世界共襄之盛舉。第三地的第二選擇，也可在瑞士日內瓦，因為那是人類文明的和平象徵。新加坡亦可，卻會使馬習會在形式上的意義未能超越當年辜汪會。
最後，關鍵則在馬習會的「內容設計」。我們認為，馬習會的「內容設計」必須維持一個主軸要素，那就是：必須朝向「大屋頂中國」的方向思考，絕不能有「你吃掉我／我吃掉你」的意念。也就是說，馬習會上必須確立「在大屋頂架構下／正視中華民國」的政策原則。
倘若馬習會的「內容設計」不作此想，馬英九赴第三地參與馬習會的可能性即趨近於零。如果馬英九在第三地馬習會上不能攜回這類的成果，此會在兩岸關係上恐怕反而會變成負數。因為，在馬習會上，坐在習近平對面的，不只是馬英九，同時也是中華民國的民意。
從孫亞夫的談話可以看出，北京畢竟知道馬習會的機不可失。我們認為，北京ＡＰＥＣ仍是馬習會的首選場合；如果是在第三地，則檀香山、日內瓦均佳；但最重要的是，必須端出「不是誰吃誰」的「內容設計」。
United Daily News editorial
(Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
March 7, 2014
Summary: As we can see from Sun Yafu's remarks, Beijing knows it must not pass up this chance for a Ma Xi meeting. The APEC conference in Beijing is still the preferred venue for a Ma Xi meeting. If it is held in a third venue, Honolulu and Geneva are equally good. But most importantly, it must underscore that neither side gobbles up the other.
Full text below:
Sun Yafu is vice president of ARATS. During an interview with a reporter from this newspaper, Sun said many venues are suitable for a Ma Xi meeting. He said a third locale could be considered. He said, "If we make detailed plans for a meeting of leaders from the two sides, the possibilities are endless."
In response, an unnamed senior MAC official responded. He said the Taipei side still believes the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference remins the most appropriate venue for a Ma Xi meeting. He said that for time being the Taipei side had no other view on the matter.
Sun Yafu's statement suggests the following. One. Beijing has ruled out a Ma Xi meeting at APEC this fall. This is increasingly apparent. Two. Beijing is more willing to arrange a Ma Xi meeting than before. This too is increasingly apparent. Three. Beijing is not being stubborn when it refuses to hold the meeting at APEC. Beijing is willing to hold it at a third locale. Four. Sun Yafu's language shows that if Ma and Xi meet, they will be able to address each other as "the leader of the Taiwan side" and "the leader of the Mainland side." Five. Sun is emphasizing the content of a Ma Xi meeting.
We think the Beijing APEC conference is the most suitable venue for a Ma Xi meeting. Consider Taipei's perspective. Suppose Ma Ying-jeou as "the leader of the Taiwan side" is able to meet with "the leader of the Mainland side," in the Great Hall of the People? Suppose he is also able to meet with other economic leaders at APEC? This would be interpreted as a further expression of the "one China framework." Consider Beijing's perspective. Suppose Ma Ying-jeou visits the Great Hall of the People and meets with Xi Jinping? This would underscore the connection between the two sides within the "one China framework." On the other hand, suppose Ma Ying-jeou is photographed shuttling back and forth between various heads of state? This is something that Beijing may have difficulty accepting, internationally and domestically.
Sun Yafu's remarks are revealing. Beijing has reiterated that the "cross-strait leaders meeting need not be held in an international venue." Beijing probably means that an international conference such as APEC need not be the venue for a Ma Xi meeting. Beijing however is amenable to holding the meeting in a third locale, i.e., a foreign locale. As Beijing sees it, that would be a "foreign venue" but not an "international venue."
Zhongnanhai has yet to exercise "greater imagination ." Beijing considers a Ma Xi meeting at APEC problematic. Ma Ying-jeou would not merely arrive in Beijing. He would also attend APEC. He would not merely attend APEC. He would also meet Xi Jinping alone in the Great Hall of the People. A Ma Xi meeting held in Beijing's "home court" would be the Mainland's first choice. But Beijing wants the Ma Xi meeting delinked from the APEC conference. That is why it has suggested a "third locale." Beijing is willing to forsake its "home court advantage" and to ask the Ma government to choose a "third locale." The ball is now back in the Ma's court.
As previously noted, a Ma Xi meeting held in Beijing at the APEC conference is the Ma government's first choice. This is due to public sentiment on Taiwan. A Ma Xi meeting at the APEC conference in Beijing would receive greater public support. If the meeting were moved to a "third locale" it would be obvious that it was Ma's second choice. it would be obvious that it was the resulf of his failure to get his first choice, APEC. This would be sure to generate controversy. But consider another perspective. Holding the meeting at a "third locale" would avoid Beijing's "home court advantage." Ma and Xi would still be able to address each other as "the leader of the Taiwan side" and "the leader of the Mainland side." They would still meet as peers and equals, even more than they would have had they met in Beijing. A "third locale" would not be an "international conference" and an "international venue." But no one could deny it was "international" in character. Therefore a Ma Xi meeting held in Beijing at the APEC conference, as opposed to one held at a "third locale" each have their pros and cons.
Further contemplation raises two questions. One. Where would this "third locale" be? Two. Sun Yafu asked how the content of the meeting for the leaders of the two sides would be determined. First consider the locale. Allow us to make a suggestion. The third locale could be Honolulu. Reason One: Honolulu is where Sun Yat-sen founded the Xinzhonghui. It is the common origin for both sides. Reason Two: The Hawaiian Islands are offshore islands of the United States. This would underscore how far peaceful cross-strait relations have come. This would show that it is an undertaking of global significance. A second choice for the third locale could be Geneva, Switzerland. Geneva is a symbol of human civilization and peace. Singapore would also do. But it might make it harder for any Ma Xi meeting to outshine the Koo-Wang meeting.
Finally, the key is the content of the Ma Xi meeting. We think the content of the Ma Xi meeting must include certain elements. It must advance toward the "big roof concept of China." It must avoid "You gobbling me up and me gobbling you up." In other words, the Ma Xi meeting must recognize the Republic of China under the big roof concept of China.
Any Ma Xi meeting must be consistent with the above. Otherwise Ma Ying-jeou could participate in a Ma Xi meeting at a third locale, but the results would add up to nothing. A Ma Xi meeting in a third locale must produce these results. Otherwise its impact on cross-strait relations would be negative. Why? Because during any Ma Xi meeting, the ROC public and not just Ma, would be seated across from Xi Jinping.
As we can see from Sun Yafu's remarks, Beijing knows it must not pass up this chance for a Ma Xi meeting. The APEC conference in Beijing is still the preferred venue for a Ma Xi meeting. If it is held in a third venue, Honolulu and Geneva are equally good. But most importantly, it must underscore that neither side gobbles up the other.
論馬習會在第三地舉行
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.03.07 04:23 am
海協會副會長孫亞夫接受本報記者採訪時表示，舉行馬習會的地點想像空間很大，包括可在第三地。他並說：「如果我們對兩岸領導人會面的內容設計得很豐富，這時候想像空間還可以更大。」
對此，陸委會高層在第一時間的不具名回應是：我方認為，亞太經合會（ＡＰＥＣ）仍是馬習會最適當的場合，目前沒有新的說法。
孫亞夫的談話顯示：一、北京排除今秋北京ＡＰＥＣ馬習會的傾向已更趨明顯；二、但北京對促成馬習會的意願亦更趨明顯；三、不在ＡＰＥＣ舉行是北京的固執，可在第三地舉行則是北京的讓步；四、從孫亞夫的用語可知，馬習若會面，互稱「台灣方面領導人」及「大陸方面領導人」的規格似已確定。五、強調馬習會的「內容設計」。
我們也認為，北京ＡＰＥＣ應是馬習會最適當的場合。畢竟，對台北而言，馬英九以「台灣領導人」身分在人民大會堂見「大陸領導人」習近平，又能在ＡＰＥＣ與其他「經濟體領袖」共處一堂，這自是對「一中架構」的進階詮釋；但對北京而言，馬英九赴人民大會堂見習近平固可顯示兩岸「一中框架」的連結，若也見馬英九在各國元首間穿梭合影，則恐是北京在現階段氛圍中對外與對內的難題。
因而，孫亞夫的說法顯示：前此北京屢申「兩岸領導人會面無須藉助國際場合」，至此已經轉化為「無須藉助ＡＰＥＣ的國際會議場合」，但可在第三地，也就是可在「外國」。北京的認知是：那是「外國」，但不是「國際（會議）場合」。
在中南海尚無「更大的想像力」之前，北京所認為的ＡＰＥＣ馬習會的難題是：馬英九不能只到「北京」，卻不到「ＡＰＥＣ」；也不能只到「ＡＰＥＣ」，卻不赴人民大會堂單獨會習近平。因而，馬習會若能在北京的「主場」舉行，雖是大陸方面的第一選擇；但北京既要馬習會與ＡＰＥＣ脫鉤，於是有了「第三地舉行」之議。亦即，北京放棄了「主場」，並要馬政府改選「第三地」。如今，球又打回了馬政府的場中。
如前所論，在北京ＡＰＥＣ舉行馬習會，自是馬政府的首選。因為，以台灣的民意民情論，「北京ＡＰＥＣ馬習會」自能獲得較大的支持；若是轉至「第三地」，又明知是爭取ＡＰＥＣ馬習會失敗後的第二選擇，必定較滋爭議。但是，從另一角度看，在「第三地」舉行，避免了北京的「主場效應」，且馬習又能以「台灣領導人」、「大陸領導人」互稱，卻也比若在北京會面更能呈現「對等／平等」；而「第三地」雖不是「國際會議場合」，但無人可以否認其為「國際」。所以，馬習會在「北京ＡＰＥＣ」或「第三地」之間的選擇，仍可從相對的角度評估其得失利害。
進一步的評估元素有二：一、「第三地」究係何地？二、孫亞夫所說的「兩岸領導人會面的內容設計」究係如何？先說地點。若容我們借箸代籌，第三地可選在檀香山。理由一、檀香山是孫中山創建興中會之地，是兩岸精神的共同淵源；理由二、夏威夷是美國的離島，可彰顯兩岸和平發展的進階工程，為世界共襄之盛舉。第三地的第二選擇，也可在瑞士日內瓦，因為那是人類文明的和平象徵。新加坡亦可，卻會使馬習會在形式上的意義未能超越當年辜汪會。
最後，關鍵則在馬習會的「內容設計」。我們認為，馬習會的「內容設計」必須維持一個主軸要素，那就是：必須朝向「大屋頂中國」的方向思考，絕不能有「你吃掉我／我吃掉你」的意念。也就是說，馬習會上必須確立「在大屋頂架構下／正視中華民國」的政策原則。
倘若馬習會的「內容設計」不作此想，馬英九赴第三地參與馬習會的可能性即趨近於零。如果馬英九在第三地馬習會上不能攜回這類的成果，此會在兩岸關係上恐怕反而會變成負數。因為，在馬習會上，坐在習近平對面的，不只是馬英九，同時也是中華民國的民意。
從孫亞夫的談話可以看出，北京畢竟知道馬習會的機不可失。我們認為，北京ＡＰＥＣ仍是馬習會的首選場合；如果是在第三地，則檀香山、日內瓦均佳；但最重要的是，必須端出「不是誰吃誰」的「內容設計」。
Wednesday, March 5, 2014
State Owned Bank Mergers Must be Privatized
State Owned Bank Mergers Must be Privatized
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
March 6, 2014
Summary: The FSC wants to create model regional banks. It wants to give Taiwan's financial industry the opportunity to emerge from the doldrums and to achieve prosperity. We support the Cabinet and the FSC in their effort to promote mergers and restructuring of state owned banks.
Full text below:
Over the next 30 years, the Asian economy will flourish. Our own state owned banks must seize these growth opportunities. They must move as quickly as possible. The government is determined to promote the merger of state owned banks. Recently three financial heavyweights, including the Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the FSC, and the President of the Central Bank, urged Premier Chiang to promote the consolidation of Asian regional banks and shares for state owned financial institutions. Premier Chiang gave his blessing. The responsible agencies will take action. Mergers of state owned banks will take a giant leap forward. This is an important development for our nation's fiscal policy. But the mergers of state owned banks must not merely increase the size of state owned banks. The state owned banks must also develop market-oriented management skills.
In recent years, domestic banking sector profits have reached record highs. In particular, the Bank of Taiwan and Megabank have enjoyed substantial increases in overseas profits. This means that deregulation of cross-strait financial transactions and the finance industry has enabled Taiwan banks to reach their full potential. But as everyone knows, the domestic banking sector has too much competition and market fragmentation. State owned banks are all rushing to gain market share. The result is cuthroat price competition. Promoting financial consolidation and overseas expansion is indeed a top priority.
Mergers of state owned banks, carried out for their own sake, will not result in favorable conditions and operating synergies. We must do more than advocate mergers. An even more importan consideration is how the banks will be operated following the mergers. We must create a new method of operations for state owned banking organizations.
The chairman said state owned bank mergers require separate management and ownership. We agree. We need a flexible pay system for individuals with talent, and other measures. Senior management salaries in state owned financial institutions are restricted. Their pay may not exceed ministerial level salaries in government agencies. This lack of flexibility in regional financial institutions makes it difficult to attract effective, high-quality senior managers. The defects in the system must be addressed. Take operations. Policies must be market-oriented and consider costs. The government must budget for this. Only then will the costs and benefits of state owned banks be apparent. Accounting must be clear. Rewards and punishments must relate to job performance. Only then will company performance improve.
A more fundamental problem is the assignment of chairmen. In the past state owned bank chairman appointments were based on seniority. If one was old enough and if one's resume included the Treasury or FSC. one could become a bank chairman. The appointment would be based on "can't go wrong" considerations. It would value a highly cooperative attitude in policy execution. Avoiding corruption would be a high priority. Seldom would a candidate be creative or make any substantive contribution to the industry. Future appointments should not be political rewards. They should be based on professionalism. Job evaluations for employees of state owned banks should also consider this. Let the concept of state owned private banks be fully implemented. When the government shackles are reduced, business management flexibility will increase. State owned banks will no longer seek only market share. They will no longer engage in price cutting. And they will no longer have excuses for inferior performance.
Banks should emulate the corporate governance policy of Singapore's state owned Temasek Holdings. Temasek is 100% owned by the Singaporean government. Its fiscal year ended on March 31, 2013. The group's investment portfolio was worth $169 billion. It full-year earnings were $8.3 billion. Shareholders received returns of up to 8.9%. How did it achieve this performance? Temasek is an independently operated investment company. The government assigns a treasury official as director. But he does not interfere with business operations. The board is not involved in the daily operations of the company. It merely expects management to evince good conduct. detailed monitoring, regulatory compliance, and risk management. Its manager are recruited from all ogver the globe, from world-class financial institutions such as HSBC, Citigroup, and American Express. It hires financial professionals and experts familiar with the different sectors of the investment environment. As a result their performance is outstanding.
Temasek's corporate governance ensures the separation of ownership and management. It ensures high profits. This enterprise management system is worth applying to our own newly merged, state owned banking organizations.
Finally, government financial regulation must advance with the times. The way financial institutions are assessed must be reasonable. The scale of the institution must not lead to unfair treatment. We should no longer demand that "The government support the banks, and the banks support business." Everything should revert to market mechanisms. We can encourage "corporate support for employees" however, as a matter of corporate social responsibility.
When state owned banks perform well, the surplus will increase. For 100% state-owned financial institutions, the surplus should go to the treasury, to reduce the government's fiscal deficit. For listed banks, as long as earnings increase, the stock price will rise. Government-owned shares of the assets will increase. The surplus will increase. The dividends will increase. These can all be injected into the treasury.
When the mergers of state owned financial institutions are privatized, their stock performance will improve. This will reduce the the threat of foreign intervention. This will enable them to expand abroad. This will give them the opportunity to increase their profits. These are the positive results that we can expect.
The FSC wants to create model regional banks. It wants to give Taiwan's financial industry the opportunity to emerge from the doldrums and to achieve prosperity. We support the Cabinet and the FSC in their effort to promote mergers and restructuring of state owned banks.
社論－要公公併 更要市場化
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊
2014年03月06日 04:09
未來30年亞洲經濟將蓬勃發展，國銀必須把握亞洲成長契機，盡速走出去，政府決心推動國銀「公公併」，日前財政部長、金管會主委及中央銀行總裁財金三巨頭，向江院長報告推動亞洲區域性銀行及公股金融整併計畫，得到江院長的支持，相關部會將展開行動，讓公股銀行整併計畫往前邁進一大步。這是我國金融政策重要的發展方向。但「公公併」不能只是國銀規模的虛胖，必須同時培養公股銀行市場化的企業管理能力與制度。
近幾年國內銀行業獲利屢創新高，尤其台銀及兆豐海外獲利大幅增加。代表在兩岸金融往來開展及產業鬆綁後，台灣銀行業的潛在能量逐漸發揮出來。但大家熟知，國內銀行業過度競爭、市場零散，公股銀行為衝市占業績，殺價惡性競爭問題嚴重。推動金融整併及走出去，的確是重中之重。
然而公股銀行如果只是為併購而併購，將無法創造有利的條件與經營的綜效。因此我們主張合併不應只是業務上的合併，而更重要的考量是合併後如何經營，創造新的公股銀行企業文化。
我們贊同曾主委提出公股銀行整併需有經營權與所有權分離、人才薪資制度彈性化等配套措施。目前公股金融機構的高階經理人薪資，受限不得超過政府機構部長級薪水，在區域型金融機構的缺乏彈性，也很難吸引到優質高階經理人效力，制度缺失不改不行。在運作上，我們也認為政策任務應該市場化計算成本，並請求政府編預算埋單。如此才有辦法讓公有銀行的成本與效益都能夠透明。有了清楚的數字，據以賞罰相關的人員，公司的績效就可以更好。
一個更根本的問題就是董座的派任。過去我們對於公股銀行的董事長派任，往往是年紀夠大，經歷完整的財政部或金管會官員。可以想像這樣的董座，一定以「不出錯」為考量，而且對於政策任務，配合度極高，營運以防弊優先，少有開創性及業務上的實質貢獻。我們主張未來政府派任的董事長，不應是酬庸，而是應以專業為考量。對於公股銀行從業人員的考核也應以業績為考量。讓公有民營的觀念徹底執行。當政府的束縛越少，企業經營的彈性才能越大。公股銀行就不會只衝市占業績，亂殺價來競爭。績效的良窳也不能再找代罪羔羊。
另外，公股銀行應仿效淡馬錫的公司治理。淡馬錫由新加坡政府擁有100%的股權。截至2013年3月31日的財政年度，集團投資組合價值約1690億美元，全年盈利83億美元，股東回報率高達8.9%。能有如此績效，最重要原因是淡馬錫為獨立運作的投資公司，政府只派一位財政部官員擔任董事，完全不干預公司的商業運作。董事會也不介入公司的日常運作，只有要求管理層具備良好的品行、遵循法規和詳細監控風險管理的系統與程式。其管理層是一批面向全球招聘，從世界級金融機構如匯豐、花旗、美國運通聘來的金融專才及熟悉不同行業投資環境的專家，因此績效卓著。
淡馬錫這樣的公司治理制度在很大程度上保證了監督權和管理權的分離，也保證了高利潤的形成，這種企業管理值得未來套用在新併後的公股銀行身上。
最後，政府的金融監管，也應該與時俱進，考核金融機構的方式也應合情合理，不要因規模擴大，反而導致不公平的待遇。我們也不應再要求「政府挺銀行、銀行挺企業」這樣的政策思維，而是一切回歸市場機能。但可以鼓勵「企業挺員工」的企業社會責任。
當公有的銀行有好的績效，盈餘就可以增加。對於百分之百國有的金融機構，盈餘繳庫有助於改善政府的財政赤字。在上市的銀行中，只要盈餘增加，股價就會上升，政府擁有的股份資產就會增值。而盈餘增加，扣除各項準備，分配的股息股利也會增加，這些都是可以挹注國庫。
當「公公併」後加上市場化的企業管理可以讓公股銀行績效變好。讓外商入市的威脅減少，讓自己走出去獲利的機會增加。這是我們可以期待的好結果。
金管會有心打造指標性區域銀行，是台灣金融業打破沉悶再造繁榮的契機，我們支持江內閣與金管會，認真推動公股銀行的合併與體制改革。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
March 6, 2014
Summary: The FSC wants to create model regional banks. It wants to give Taiwan's financial industry the opportunity to emerge from the doldrums and to achieve prosperity. We support the Cabinet and the FSC in their effort to promote mergers and restructuring of state owned banks.
Full text below:
Over the next 30 years, the Asian economy will flourish. Our own state owned banks must seize these growth opportunities. They must move as quickly as possible. The government is determined to promote the merger of state owned banks. Recently three financial heavyweights, including the Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the FSC, and the President of the Central Bank, urged Premier Chiang to promote the consolidation of Asian regional banks and shares for state owned financial institutions. Premier Chiang gave his blessing. The responsible agencies will take action. Mergers of state owned banks will take a giant leap forward. This is an important development for our nation's fiscal policy. But the mergers of state owned banks must not merely increase the size of state owned banks. The state owned banks must also develop market-oriented management skills.
In recent years, domestic banking sector profits have reached record highs. In particular, the Bank of Taiwan and Megabank have enjoyed substantial increases in overseas profits. This means that deregulation of cross-strait financial transactions and the finance industry has enabled Taiwan banks to reach their full potential. But as everyone knows, the domestic banking sector has too much competition and market fragmentation. State owned banks are all rushing to gain market share. The result is cuthroat price competition. Promoting financial consolidation and overseas expansion is indeed a top priority.
Mergers of state owned banks, carried out for their own sake, will not result in favorable conditions and operating synergies. We must do more than advocate mergers. An even more importan consideration is how the banks will be operated following the mergers. We must create a new method of operations for state owned banking organizations.
The chairman said state owned bank mergers require separate management and ownership. We agree. We need a flexible pay system for individuals with talent, and other measures. Senior management salaries in state owned financial institutions are restricted. Their pay may not exceed ministerial level salaries in government agencies. This lack of flexibility in regional financial institutions makes it difficult to attract effective, high-quality senior managers. The defects in the system must be addressed. Take operations. Policies must be market-oriented and consider costs. The government must budget for this. Only then will the costs and benefits of state owned banks be apparent. Accounting must be clear. Rewards and punishments must relate to job performance. Only then will company performance improve.
A more fundamental problem is the assignment of chairmen. In the past state owned bank chairman appointments were based on seniority. If one was old enough and if one's resume included the Treasury or FSC. one could become a bank chairman. The appointment would be based on "can't go wrong" considerations. It would value a highly cooperative attitude in policy execution. Avoiding corruption would be a high priority. Seldom would a candidate be creative or make any substantive contribution to the industry. Future appointments should not be political rewards. They should be based on professionalism. Job evaluations for employees of state owned banks should also consider this. Let the concept of state owned private banks be fully implemented. When the government shackles are reduced, business management flexibility will increase. State owned banks will no longer seek only market share. They will no longer engage in price cutting. And they will no longer have excuses for inferior performance.
Banks should emulate the corporate governance policy of Singapore's state owned Temasek Holdings. Temasek is 100% owned by the Singaporean government. Its fiscal year ended on March 31, 2013. The group's investment portfolio was worth $169 billion. It full-year earnings were $8.3 billion. Shareholders received returns of up to 8.9%. How did it achieve this performance? Temasek is an independently operated investment company. The government assigns a treasury official as director. But he does not interfere with business operations. The board is not involved in the daily operations of the company. It merely expects management to evince good conduct. detailed monitoring, regulatory compliance, and risk management. Its manager are recruited from all ogver the globe, from world-class financial institutions such as HSBC, Citigroup, and American Express. It hires financial professionals and experts familiar with the different sectors of the investment environment. As a result their performance is outstanding.
Temasek's corporate governance ensures the separation of ownership and management. It ensures high profits. This enterprise management system is worth applying to our own newly merged, state owned banking organizations.
Finally, government financial regulation must advance with the times. The way financial institutions are assessed must be reasonable. The scale of the institution must not lead to unfair treatment. We should no longer demand that "The government support the banks, and the banks support business." Everything should revert to market mechanisms. We can encourage "corporate support for employees" however, as a matter of corporate social responsibility.
When state owned banks perform well, the surplus will increase. For 100% state-owned financial institutions, the surplus should go to the treasury, to reduce the government's fiscal deficit. For listed banks, as long as earnings increase, the stock price will rise. Government-owned shares of the assets will increase. The surplus will increase. The dividends will increase. These can all be injected into the treasury.
When the mergers of state owned financial institutions are privatized, their stock performance will improve. This will reduce the the threat of foreign intervention. This will enable them to expand abroad. This will give them the opportunity to increase their profits. These are the positive results that we can expect.
The FSC wants to create model regional banks. It wants to give Taiwan's financial industry the opportunity to emerge from the doldrums and to achieve prosperity. We support the Cabinet and the FSC in their effort to promote mergers and restructuring of state owned banks.
社論－要公公併 更要市場化
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊
2014年03月06日 04:09
未來30年亞洲經濟將蓬勃發展，國銀必須把握亞洲成長契機，盡速走出去，政府決心推動國銀「公公併」，日前財政部長、金管會主委及中央銀行總裁財金三巨頭，向江院長報告推動亞洲區域性銀行及公股金融整併計畫，得到江院長的支持，相關部會將展開行動，讓公股銀行整併計畫往前邁進一大步。這是我國金融政策重要的發展方向。但「公公併」不能只是國銀規模的虛胖，必須同時培養公股銀行市場化的企業管理能力與制度。
近幾年國內銀行業獲利屢創新高，尤其台銀及兆豐海外獲利大幅增加。代表在兩岸金融往來開展及產業鬆綁後，台灣銀行業的潛在能量逐漸發揮出來。但大家熟知，國內銀行業過度競爭、市場零散，公股銀行為衝市占業績，殺價惡性競爭問題嚴重。推動金融整併及走出去，的確是重中之重。
然而公股銀行如果只是為併購而併購，將無法創造有利的條件與經營的綜效。因此我們主張合併不應只是業務上的合併，而更重要的考量是合併後如何經營，創造新的公股銀行企業文化。
我們贊同曾主委提出公股銀行整併需有經營權與所有權分離、人才薪資制度彈性化等配套措施。目前公股金融機構的高階經理人薪資，受限不得超過政府機構部長級薪水，在區域型金融機構的缺乏彈性，也很難吸引到優質高階經理人效力，制度缺失不改不行。在運作上，我們也認為政策任務應該市場化計算成本，並請求政府編預算埋單。如此才有辦法讓公有銀行的成本與效益都能夠透明。有了清楚的數字，據以賞罰相關的人員，公司的績效就可以更好。
一個更根本的問題就是董座的派任。過去我們對於公股銀行的董事長派任，往往是年紀夠大，經歷完整的財政部或金管會官員。可以想像這樣的董座，一定以「不出錯」為考量，而且對於政策任務，配合度極高，營運以防弊優先，少有開創性及業務上的實質貢獻。我們主張未來政府派任的董事長，不應是酬庸，而是應以專業為考量。對於公股銀行從業人員的考核也應以業績為考量。讓公有民營的觀念徹底執行。當政府的束縛越少，企業經營的彈性才能越大。公股銀行就不會只衝市占業績，亂殺價來競爭。績效的良窳也不能再找代罪羔羊。
另外，公股銀行應仿效淡馬錫的公司治理。淡馬錫由新加坡政府擁有100%的股權。截至2013年3月31日的財政年度，集團投資組合價值約1690億美元，全年盈利83億美元，股東回報率高達8.9%。能有如此績效，最重要原因是淡馬錫為獨立運作的投資公司，政府只派一位財政部官員擔任董事，完全不干預公司的商業運作。董事會也不介入公司的日常運作，只有要求管理層具備良好的品行、遵循法規和詳細監控風險管理的系統與程式。其管理層是一批面向全球招聘，從世界級金融機構如匯豐、花旗、美國運通聘來的金融專才及熟悉不同行業投資環境的專家，因此績效卓著。
淡馬錫這樣的公司治理制度在很大程度上保證了監督權和管理權的分離，也保證了高利潤的形成，這種企業管理值得未來套用在新併後的公股銀行身上。
最後，政府的金融監管，也應該與時俱進，考核金融機構的方式也應合情合理，不要因規模擴大，反而導致不公平的待遇。我們也不應再要求「政府挺銀行、銀行挺企業」這樣的政策思維，而是一切回歸市場機能。但可以鼓勵「企業挺員工」的企業社會責任。
當公有的銀行有好的績效，盈餘就可以增加。對於百分之百國有的金融機構，盈餘繳庫有助於改善政府的財政赤字。在上市的銀行中，只要盈餘增加，股價就會上升，政府擁有的股份資產就會增值。而盈餘增加，扣除各項準備，分配的股息股利也會增加，這些都是可以挹注國庫。
當「公公併」後加上市場化的企業管理可以讓公股銀行績效變好。讓外商入市的威脅減少，讓自己走出去獲利的機會增加。這是我們可以期待的好結果。
金管會有心打造指標性區域銀行，是台灣金融業打破沉悶再造繁榮的契機，我們支持江內閣與金管會，認真推動公股銀行的合併與體制改革。
Tuesday, March 4, 2014
How the Republic of China Can Become an Asset to China
How the Republic of China Can Become an Asset to China
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
March 5, 2014
Summary: We seek to survive. But we have made too many erroneous assumptions. The Republic of China is not Taiwan. Taiwan is not the Republic of China. The Republic of China is 103 years old. Its sovereignty includes the whole of China. People still cherish the goal of national reunification and the dream of a strong and prosperous China. Sun Yat-sen dreamed of founding a nation. Only such a Republic of China can deal with the Mainland on equal terms and with equal dignity. Only such a Republic of China can sit down with Beijing to discuss the future of the Chinese nation, and realize the Chinese Dream.
Full text below:
Leaders from the ROC have recently visited the Chinese mainland, twice. Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan told CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping that, "The Republic of China is an asset, not a liability." This newspaper has published a series of editorials repeating that same fact. The existence and prosperity of the Republic of China is an asset for China, for both the Mainland and Taiwan. This is something we encourage and anticipate. But it has a precondition. The Republic of China must survive. The ruling and opposition parties must set aside their differences. The ruling party must have the courage to do the right thing. The opposition party must be willing to change its course. The public must be rational in its decisions. Otherwise, everything will remain as it was. Internecine political battles will persist. The two sides of the strait will remain becalmed in deep water. Taiwan will be left behind by regional integration. It will truly become the "orphan of Asia."
Many people on Taiwan feel powerless. They sense that time is not on our side. They believe Taiwan's best days are over. They suspect it is becoming another Philippines. They see no light at the end of the tunnel. Think back to the outbreak of civil war in 1946. Three years later, the KMT government was forced to hand control of the nation to others. The exiled Nationalist government on Taiwan had to learn from bitter experience the lesson of good governance. The Two Chiangs promoted land reform, economic reform, and the gradual introduction of democracy. They laid the foundation for Taiwan's modernization. But this minor miracle, during which people struggled side by side, shoulder to shoulder, was much too short-lived.
Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian practiced political separatism while paying lip service to political reform. People became adept at infighting, but terrified of outsiders. Their vision became myopic. Ideology reigned supreme. People lost their sense of direction. The economy lost its momentum. Taiwan pointlessly squander 20 years. Anyone who dared to invoke the Two Chiang era was pilloried. They were condemned as reactionaries. They were subjected to public witch trials and labeled Communists. Ma Ying-jeou, who attempted to set the record straight, was one such victim.
The DPP has long painted others as "Reds." Only their position is acceptable. Others are not allowed to have ideas. They refuse to recognize the Republic of China, while simultaneously engaging in backdoor listing. They fly the ROC banner while opposing the ROC. The ruling KMT lost its bully pulpit. But most surprisingly, it dared not champion the Three People's Principles and its long-cherished goal of national reunification. Instead it promoted a policy of "no reunification, no independence, no use of force." They were equally myopic. They concerned themselves only with near term election success. They saw maintaining the status quo as the supreme value. They sought only safety. They blanked out any personal responsibility for the Chinese nation as a whole.
Lien Chan said, "The Republic of China is an asset." Not a single KMT politician or party official echoed his sentiment. So-called Kuomintang elders paid pro forma lip service to the concept of "two sides, one China" and "one nation, two regions" during visits to the Mainland. But they never promote these enlightened concepts upon returning to Taiwan. No wonder outside observers characterize Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties as "one chaotic party" and "one crummy party." This may be self-deprecating. But it reflects public opinion.
Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew said that Taiwan independence is a thing of the past. Reunification of the two sides is inevitable. John Mearsheimer is a famous scholar of international relations and a chaired professor at the University of Chicago. In the March issue of the the National Interest, Mearsheimer published an article entitled, "Say Goodbye to Taiwan." He pointed out how the Chinese mainland's economic and military power is growing. A decade or two from now, America will no longer be able to protect Taiwan. Taiwan will have no choice but to move toward reunification. Many allies agree. Taiwan has been unfairly treated by the international community. But Taiwan's future will not include a "Republic of Taiwan." This is dictated by objective factors in the international environment. But the main factor is cross-strait relations. They cannot be severed. The CCP regime continues to grow and thrive. It is becoming stronger and more powerful. Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties need to ask themselves how many cards Taiwan holds? Fifteen years from now, politically and economically, in international diplomacy, in strategy and tactics, how strong a hand will Taiwan still hold?
If the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan persist in political and ideological infighting, it will lead only to a dead end. They will no longer be able to remain outside China's future. The ruling administration must regain the initiative. It must insist that "We too are China's masters!" They must ensure China's economic future. The public must understand the situation. It must accomodate or exploit Mainland China's economic growth. This is the inevitable path it must go down.
Under the circumstances, everyone must share Taiwan's past experience with the Mainland. They must share their experience with economic growth. They must shared the traditional Chinese culture that has been preserved on Taiwan. They must share the civic virtues embodied by the Taiwan public. They must inject new elements into the development process. Even the negative examples learned during Taiwan's democratization process can help future Mainland reform. We on Taiwan must have the courage to display our weaknesses as well as our strengths. That is the right way. We must not compete with the Mainland over our own weaknesses.
Only by respecting ourselves, can we expect respect from posterity. We seek to survive. But we have made too many erroneous assumptions. The Republic of China is not Taiwan. Taiwan is not the Republic of China. The Republic of China is 103 years old. Its sovereignty includes the whole of China. People still cherish the goal of national reunification and the dream of a strong and prosperous China. Sun Yat-sen dreamed of founding a nation. Only such a Republic of China can deal with the Mainland on equal terms and with equal dignity. Only such a Republic of China can sit down with Beijing to discuss the future of the Chinese nation, and realize the Chinese Dream.
社論－中華民國如何成為「中國的資產」
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年03月05日 04:09
「中華民國」最近兩度叩關中國大陸，國民黨榮譽主席連戰更告訴中共總書記習近平「中華民國是資產，不是負債」，本報連續發表社論，呼應中華民國的存在與繁榮是「包含台灣與大陸在內整體中國」的資產，這是我們的鼓勵和期許，但前提是中華民國要能成長茁壯、朝野要能捐棄成見，執政黨得拿出魄力，反對黨必須改弦易轍，民眾更要理性抉擇，否則一切將停留在現狀，內部繼續政黨惡鬥，兩岸不能在深水區順利前行，台灣將在區域整合趨勢中被拋棄，真正成為亞細亞孤兒。
如今許多人覺得孤臣無力回天，時間完全不在我們這一邊，台灣的好日子已經過完，正在往菲律賓化過程中掙扎，而隧道的盡頭還看不到光亮。回想1946年內戰爆發，3年內國民黨政府把大好江山拱手讓人，避禍來台的國民政府在痛定思痛之餘勵精圖治，兩蔣推動土改、經改以及漸進式的民主發展，奠下了台灣現代化的基礎，但這種少康中興、全民奮鬥的氣象為時很短。
經過李登輝、陳水扁所謂民主改革及分離主義後，大家勇於內鬥，怯於公戰，目光短淺，政治掛帥，逐漸失去方向與動力，平白浪費20多年時光。稍有人敢為過去兩蔣時期、如今的馬英九政府說句比較公允持平的話，輕則遭人侮衊、批為反動保守分子，重則被政治公審，扣上紅帽子。
民進黨素來喜歡給人戴帽子，只准自己有立場，不讓別人有想法，既不接受中華民國，又要借殼上市，打著中華民國旗號反中華民國。令人驚訝的是，執政的國民黨丟了話語權不說，居然連長期追求的三民主義建國理想和國家統一目標也不敢堅持，搞個「不統、不獨、不武」，同樣是短視近利、只顧眼前的選舉成敗，以維持現狀為最高執政原則，完全是一種偏安心態，忘卻了中華民族一分子的責任。
對於連戰提到「中華民國是資產」的說法，國民黨從政同志和黨籍民意代表沒有人呼應，國民黨內所謂大老只會在中國大陸發表兩岸一中、一國兩區談話，從不見他們回到台灣發表這種振聾發聵的主張。難怪外界有謂，台灣的朝野政黨，一個是亂黨，一個是爛黨。雖然有點自貶，倒也反映了一些民意。
新加坡內閣資政李光耀說過，台獨已成過去，兩岸統一將是無法避免的結果；著名的國際政治學者、美國芝加哥大學講座教授米夏摩在美國期刊《國家利益》3月號撰文〈向台灣說再見〉指出，中國大陸在經濟及軍事上日漸強大，十數年或數十年後，美國保不了台灣，台灣無從選擇，只能走向統一。許多國際友人也都承認，台灣確實受到國際社會不公平對待，但台灣未來不太可能成立一個所謂的「台灣共和國」，這是國際客觀環境使然，更主要的因素是兩岸關係根本無法割斷。當中共政權不斷成長、茁壯，實力更強大時，台灣朝野不妨想想，15年後，從政治到經濟，從外交到國際，從戰略到戰術，台灣還剩下多少優勢與利基？
但如果朝野能袪除當前的政治及意識形態鬥爭，知道偏安只有走向死胡同，不再自外於中國的未來；如果政府當局能夠化被動為主動，堅持自己也是中國的主人，誓言經略中原；如果民眾能夠理解，配合或利用中國大陸的發展，將是一條無可避免且可以走出的康莊大道。
在這個基礎上，各界願意把台灣過去的發展經驗、台灣保留的中華文化、台灣民眾的善良特質，提供大陸，做為發展過程中挹注的新元素；甚至把台灣民主化過程的負面教材引為大陸未來改革的借鏡，勇於發揮我們還有的優勢，而非以自己的短處和大陸競爭，這才是正道與王道。
自重而後人重，台灣要為自己找到出路和活路，其中有太多假設和如果。然而中華民國並不等於台灣，台灣也不等於中華民國。中華民國建國103年，是主權及於全中國的中華民國，民眾心中仍然得懷有國家統一、民族富強的中國夢，一如孫中山先生建國的理想，只有這樣的中華民國才能和大陸對等、尊嚴的坐下來商談中華民族的未來，共築中國夢。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
March 5, 2014
Summary: We seek to survive. But we have made too many erroneous assumptions. The Republic of China is not Taiwan. Taiwan is not the Republic of China. The Republic of China is 103 years old. Its sovereignty includes the whole of China. People still cherish the goal of national reunification and the dream of a strong and prosperous China. Sun Yat-sen dreamed of founding a nation. Only such a Republic of China can deal with the Mainland on equal terms and with equal dignity. Only such a Republic of China can sit down with Beijing to discuss the future of the Chinese nation, and realize the Chinese Dream.
Full text below:
Leaders from the ROC have recently visited the Chinese mainland, twice. Honorary KMT Chairman Lien Chan told CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping that, "The Republic of China is an asset, not a liability." This newspaper has published a series of editorials repeating that same fact. The existence and prosperity of the Republic of China is an asset for China, for both the Mainland and Taiwan. This is something we encourage and anticipate. But it has a precondition. The Republic of China must survive. The ruling and opposition parties must set aside their differences. The ruling party must have the courage to do the right thing. The opposition party must be willing to change its course. The public must be rational in its decisions. Otherwise, everything will remain as it was. Internecine political battles will persist. The two sides of the strait will remain becalmed in deep water. Taiwan will be left behind by regional integration. It will truly become the "orphan of Asia."
Many people on Taiwan feel powerless. They sense that time is not on our side. They believe Taiwan's best days are over. They suspect it is becoming another Philippines. They see no light at the end of the tunnel. Think back to the outbreak of civil war in 1946. Three years later, the KMT government was forced to hand control of the nation to others. The exiled Nationalist government on Taiwan had to learn from bitter experience the lesson of good governance. The Two Chiangs promoted land reform, economic reform, and the gradual introduction of democracy. They laid the foundation for Taiwan's modernization. But this minor miracle, during which people struggled side by side, shoulder to shoulder, was much too short-lived.
Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian practiced political separatism while paying lip service to political reform. People became adept at infighting, but terrified of outsiders. Their vision became myopic. Ideology reigned supreme. People lost their sense of direction. The economy lost its momentum. Taiwan pointlessly squander 20 years. Anyone who dared to invoke the Two Chiang era was pilloried. They were condemned as reactionaries. They were subjected to public witch trials and labeled Communists. Ma Ying-jeou, who attempted to set the record straight, was one such victim.
The DPP has long painted others as "Reds." Only their position is acceptable. Others are not allowed to have ideas. They refuse to recognize the Republic of China, while simultaneously engaging in backdoor listing. They fly the ROC banner while opposing the ROC. The ruling KMT lost its bully pulpit. But most surprisingly, it dared not champion the Three People's Principles and its long-cherished goal of national reunification. Instead it promoted a policy of "no reunification, no independence, no use of force." They were equally myopic. They concerned themselves only with near term election success. They saw maintaining the status quo as the supreme value. They sought only safety. They blanked out any personal responsibility for the Chinese nation as a whole.
Lien Chan said, "The Republic of China is an asset." Not a single KMT politician or party official echoed his sentiment. So-called Kuomintang elders paid pro forma lip service to the concept of "two sides, one China" and "one nation, two regions" during visits to the Mainland. But they never promote these enlightened concepts upon returning to Taiwan. No wonder outside observers characterize Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties as "one chaotic party" and "one crummy party." This may be self-deprecating. But it reflects public opinion.
Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew said that Taiwan independence is a thing of the past. Reunification of the two sides is inevitable. John Mearsheimer is a famous scholar of international relations and a chaired professor at the University of Chicago. In the March issue of the the National Interest, Mearsheimer published an article entitled, "Say Goodbye to Taiwan." He pointed out how the Chinese mainland's economic and military power is growing. A decade or two from now, America will no longer be able to protect Taiwan. Taiwan will have no choice but to move toward reunification. Many allies agree. Taiwan has been unfairly treated by the international community. But Taiwan's future will not include a "Republic of Taiwan." This is dictated by objective factors in the international environment. But the main factor is cross-strait relations. They cannot be severed. The CCP regime continues to grow and thrive. It is becoming stronger and more powerful. Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties need to ask themselves how many cards Taiwan holds? Fifteen years from now, politically and economically, in international diplomacy, in strategy and tactics, how strong a hand will Taiwan still hold?
If the ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan persist in political and ideological infighting, it will lead only to a dead end. They will no longer be able to remain outside China's future. The ruling administration must regain the initiative. It must insist that "We too are China's masters!" They must ensure China's economic future. The public must understand the situation. It must accomodate or exploit Mainland China's economic growth. This is the inevitable path it must go down.
Under the circumstances, everyone must share Taiwan's past experience with the Mainland. They must share their experience with economic growth. They must shared the traditional Chinese culture that has been preserved on Taiwan. They must share the civic virtues embodied by the Taiwan public. They must inject new elements into the development process. Even the negative examples learned during Taiwan's democratization process can help future Mainland reform. We on Taiwan must have the courage to display our weaknesses as well as our strengths. That is the right way. We must not compete with the Mainland over our own weaknesses.
Only by respecting ourselves, can we expect respect from posterity. We seek to survive. But we have made too many erroneous assumptions. The Republic of China is not Taiwan. Taiwan is not the Republic of China. The Republic of China is 103 years old. Its sovereignty includes the whole of China. People still cherish the goal of national reunification and the dream of a strong and prosperous China. Sun Yat-sen dreamed of founding a nation. Only such a Republic of China can deal with the Mainland on equal terms and with equal dignity. Only such a Republic of China can sit down with Beijing to discuss the future of the Chinese nation, and realize the Chinese Dream.
社論－中華民國如何成為「中國的資產」
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年03月05日 04:09
「中華民國」最近兩度叩關中國大陸，國民黨榮譽主席連戰更告訴中共總書記習近平「中華民國是資產，不是負債」，本報連續發表社論，呼應中華民國的存在與繁榮是「包含台灣與大陸在內整體中國」的資產，這是我們的鼓勵和期許，但前提是中華民國要能成長茁壯、朝野要能捐棄成見，執政黨得拿出魄力，反對黨必須改弦易轍，民眾更要理性抉擇，否則一切將停留在現狀，內部繼續政黨惡鬥，兩岸不能在深水區順利前行，台灣將在區域整合趨勢中被拋棄，真正成為亞細亞孤兒。
如今許多人覺得孤臣無力回天，時間完全不在我們這一邊，台灣的好日子已經過完，正在往菲律賓化過程中掙扎，而隧道的盡頭還看不到光亮。回想1946年內戰爆發，3年內國民黨政府把大好江山拱手讓人，避禍來台的國民政府在痛定思痛之餘勵精圖治，兩蔣推動土改、經改以及漸進式的民主發展，奠下了台灣現代化的基礎，但這種少康中興、全民奮鬥的氣象為時很短。
經過李登輝、陳水扁所謂民主改革及分離主義後，大家勇於內鬥，怯於公戰，目光短淺，政治掛帥，逐漸失去方向與動力，平白浪費20多年時光。稍有人敢為過去兩蔣時期、如今的馬英九政府說句比較公允持平的話，輕則遭人侮衊、批為反動保守分子，重則被政治公審，扣上紅帽子。
民進黨素來喜歡給人戴帽子，只准自己有立場，不讓別人有想法，既不接受中華民國，又要借殼上市，打著中華民國旗號反中華民國。令人驚訝的是，執政的國民黨丟了話語權不說，居然連長期追求的三民主義建國理想和國家統一目標也不敢堅持，搞個「不統、不獨、不武」，同樣是短視近利、只顧眼前的選舉成敗，以維持現狀為最高執政原則，完全是一種偏安心態，忘卻了中華民族一分子的責任。
對於連戰提到「中華民國是資產」的說法，國民黨從政同志和黨籍民意代表沒有人呼應，國民黨內所謂大老只會在中國大陸發表兩岸一中、一國兩區談話，從不見他們回到台灣發表這種振聾發聵的主張。難怪外界有謂，台灣的朝野政黨，一個是亂黨，一個是爛黨。雖然有點自貶，倒也反映了一些民意。
新加坡內閣資政李光耀說過，台獨已成過去，兩岸統一將是無法避免的結果；著名的國際政治學者、美國芝加哥大學講座教授米夏摩在美國期刊《國家利益》3月號撰文〈向台灣說再見〉指出，中國大陸在經濟及軍事上日漸強大，十數年或數十年後，美國保不了台灣，台灣無從選擇，只能走向統一。許多國際友人也都承認，台灣確實受到國際社會不公平對待，但台灣未來不太可能成立一個所謂的「台灣共和國」，這是國際客觀環境使然，更主要的因素是兩岸關係根本無法割斷。當中共政權不斷成長、茁壯，實力更強大時，台灣朝野不妨想想，15年後，從政治到經濟，從外交到國際，從戰略到戰術，台灣還剩下多少優勢與利基？
但如果朝野能袪除當前的政治及意識形態鬥爭，知道偏安只有走向死胡同，不再自外於中國的未來；如果政府當局能夠化被動為主動，堅持自己也是中國的主人，誓言經略中原；如果民眾能夠理解，配合或利用中國大陸的發展，將是一條無可避免且可以走出的康莊大道。
在這個基礎上，各界願意把台灣過去的發展經驗、台灣保留的中華文化、台灣民眾的善良特質，提供大陸，做為發展過程中挹注的新元素；甚至把台灣民主化過程的負面教材引為大陸未來改革的借鏡，勇於發揮我們還有的優勢，而非以自己的短處和大陸競爭，這才是正道與王道。
自重而後人重，台灣要為自己找到出路和活路，其中有太多假設和如果。然而中華民國並不等於台灣，台灣也不等於中華民國。中華民國建國103年，是主權及於全中國的中華民國，民眾心中仍然得懷有國家統一、民族富強的中國夢，一如孫中山先生建國的理想，只有這樣的中華民國才能和大陸對等、尊嚴的坐下來商談中華民族的未來，共築中國夢。
Monday, March 3, 2014
Elegy to a Bronze Statue: Cross-Strait Points of Connection and Contention
Elegy to a Bronze Statue:
Cross-Strait Points of Connection and Contention
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
March 4, 2014
Summary: Taiwan independence is on a dead end path. This has nothing to do with whether Tang Tak Cheung Park has a bronze statue of Sun Yat-sen. It was the result of global, cross-strait, and internal trends. The only way Taiwan can survive is to confront the existence of the Mainland, and to rehabilitate the ROC and Sun Yat-sen as points of connection and contention. This will enable us to seek prosperity, a win/win relationship, and equal justice under the big roof concept of China.
Full text below:
Consider the global and national situation. Taiwan must adopt a different cross-strait strategy. It must forsake "de-Sinicization" and acknowledge the reality of Mainland China. This is the only chance it has to survive.
A statue of Sun Yat-sen was recently pulled down at a traffic circle in Tainan. Taiwan independence elements may regard this as a kind of victory. In fact, it represents the end of the Taiwan independence path. On today's Taiwan, Taiwan independence can be made part of a political party's party charter. Taiwan independence elements may demonstrate in the streets. They may even stand for public office, including the presidency. People may vote for Taiwan independence political parties and candidates. A Taiwan independence president may demagogue Taiwan independence issues, such as the "rectification of names." But under our democracy, Taiwan independence is becoming weaker and weaker. The act of pulling down the statue may have offered a savage catharsis. But it also showed that Taiwan independence had arrived at a dead end.
The Taiwan independence movement rose to power on a wave of democratization. But during democratization, Taiwan independence became more and more flagrantly anti-democratic. As mentioned earlier, the Republic of China's democratic framework gave Taiwan independence elements a stage on which they could do as they pleased. They could even engage in a democratic contest with the Republic of China. But Taiwan independence elements are unwilling to tolerate even a statue of Sun Yat-sen. The Tainan traffic circle was a political symbol, one supported by most of the public on Taiwan. Today, Taiwan independence elements refuse to tolerate Sun Yat-sen. But Sun Yat-sen is a political icon whom most people on Taiwan support. Can Taiwan independence elements picture opponents of Taiwan independence pulling down a statue of Tang Tak Cheung? For the record, Tang Tak Cheung was not a Taiwan independence advocate. This "elegy to a bronze statue" merely underscores the Taiwan independence elements' anti-democratic mentality.
The Taiwan independence movement has reached the end of its road. The main reason was that Taiwan independence elements misjudged the global and cross-strait strategic situation. Taiwan independence elements see Sun Yat-sen and the Republic of China as points of connection between the two sides, within the "one China framework." In order to "de-Sinicize" Taiwan, they want to sever these points of connection. But these points of connection are also the chief guarantors of cross-strait peaceful development. They are also Taiwan's chief defenses within the "one China framework."
Today, few if any Green Camp politicians publicly advocate a "Republic of Taiwan" to resist the People's Republic of China. The Taiwan independence movement has already switched strategies. It now stoops to "backdoor listing." It asserts that "The ROC is one nation on one side, while the PRC is a separate nation on the other side." It attempts to sever the points of connection between the two sides. This is the psychology behind the Taiwan independence elements who pulled down the bronze statue. Lai Ching-teh was among them. On the one hand, Lai called for the removal of the statue of Sun Yat-sen. On the other hand, he presided over the ROC flag-raising ceremony, and visited Hong Kong in order to promote Mainland trade with Tainan. His mask slipped and his contradictions became apparent.
Exploiting the Republic of China to defend against Beijing depends primarily on Sun Yat-sen, the Three People's Principles, and the Constitution of the Republic of China. Taiwan independence elements have trampled Sun Yat-sen underfoot. Yet Sun is precisely the point of connection and point of contention that Taiwan can best use to hold off Beijing. In other words, one must transform the points of connection into leverage by which one can maintain Taiwan's security.
Taiwan's cross-strait policy cannot revert to Taiwan independence. Su Tseng-chang himself acknowledged this. In other words, it is impossible to continue down the Taiwan independence path, with its "one nation on each side" rhetoric and "backdoor listing" tactics. Instead, we must strive to strengthen the hand of the Republic of China within the "one China framework." The "one China framework" is in fact the "ROC vs. PRC framework." We must seek a solution within the points of connection and points of contention. Taiwan's most valuable asset in seeking a solution is Sun Yat-sen's ideology, including the ROC Constitution. If the Republic of China disowns Sun Yat-sen's ideology, then within the "one China framework" it will not be a match for the People's Republic of China.
Taiwan independence elements insist that "One China is the People's Republic of China." But such assertions cannot sever the points of connection. They merely forfeit our own leverage. In fact, the more they advocate Taiwan independence, and the more they poormouth the Republic of China and Sun Yat-sen, the more they affirm that "One China is the People's Republic of China." The more they make it difficult for the ROC to compete with the PRC within the "one China framework." This sort of Taiwan independence has gone from a "Save Taiwan Movement" to an "End Taiwan Movement."
Chen Chu has dismembered the bronze statue of Chiang Kai- Chen. It has been broken into eight pieces. That statue cannot be put back together again. It now resides at "Back Chihu." Mainland scholars studying Chiang's diaries have began a movement to vindicate Chiang. Now, under Lai Ching-teh, Sun Yat-sen's statue has been pulled down. Beijing is considering conceding the reality of the Republic of China. Vandalizing bronze statues will hardly sever the points of connection between the two sides. The points of connection are not really the statues. They are the intricate history and reality. If anything, vandalizing the bronze statue forfeits the leverage Taiwan needs during cross-strait wrangling. It is tantamount to political suicide. It amounts to internal subversion, and merely reveals a lack of understanding.
Does anyone remember Chen Shui-bian's change of airport names? He changed "CKS Airport" to "Taoyuan Airport." He was attempting to undermine the Republic of China, and to implement de-Sinicization. But what has been the result? Millions of visitors from the Mainland were unable to land at "CKS Airport." How foolish was this self-inflicted injury?
Taiwan independence is on a dead end path. This has nothing to do with whether Tang Tak Cheung Park has a bronze statue of Sun Yat-sen. It was the result of global, cross-strait, and internal trends. The only way Taiwan can survive is to confront the existence of the Mainland, and to rehabilitate the ROC and Sun Yat-sen as points of connection and contention. This will enable us to seek prosperity, a win/win relationship, and equal justice under the big roof concept of China.
銅像悲歌：兩岸的連結點與抗衡點
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.03.04 03:10 am
縱目世局國情，台灣的兩岸戰略主軸，必將漸由「去中國化」，轉為「面對中國」，捨此無活路。
台南圓環拖倒孫中山銅像的一幕，台獨分子可能視為勝利，其實卻反映了台獨的末路。今日台灣，台獨可成政黨黨綱，台獨人士可以示威遊行，可以參選所有公職甚至總統，人民也可投票支持台獨政黨及候選人，台獨總統也可操弄正名制憲……。但是，如今台獨在民主體制中卻愈來愈耗弱萎縮，拖倒銅像之舉，正是末路台獨的一種野蠻宣洩。
台獨在台灣「民主化」的大潮中興起，但在台灣民主化的歷程中，台獨卻愈來愈走向「反民主」的歧路。如前所述，中華民國的民主體制，可謂已為台獨提供了一個「為所欲為」的舞台，足可與「中華民國」進行民主競賽；但台獨卻連一尊象徵中華民國的孫中山銅像也不容。台南圓環原是一個孫中山與湯德章共容的天地，如今台獨卻不容孫中山，但孫中山畢竟也是大多台灣人支持的政治符號，台獨能想像反台獨者去拖倒湯德章的銅像嗎（其實湯德章根本不是台獨）？這齣「銅像悲歌」，恐怕只是凸顯了台獨的反民主心態吧！
台獨之所以在內外走上末路，主要是誤判了世界及兩岸大局。台獨將「孫中山／中華民國」視為「一中架構」的「連結點」，為了「去中國化」，所以欲將這些「連結點」切斷；但是，這些「連結點」卻也正是兩岸得以和平發展的主要憑藉，更是台灣在「一中架構」中得以立足的主要「抗衡點」。
如今，已罕聞檯面上的綠營政治人物主張以「台灣國」來對抗「中華人民共和國」；台獨主流已轉入「借殼上市」，主張「中華民國／中華人民共和國」是「一邊一國」，因而試圖要切斷二者的「連結點」，這也正是台獨拖倒銅像的心理背景。賴清德正是此中代表人物，他一面主張撤除國父銅像，一面主持升旗典禮，一面到香港「行銷台南」；不免捉襟見肘，矛盾百出。
然而，若欲以中華民國因應北京，主要的力量即在「孫中山／三民主義」與「中華民國憲法」等政治資產；被台獨踐踏的孫中山，其實正是台灣在「面對中國」時的主要「連結點／抗衡點」。亦即：「化連結為抗衡的槓桿，以抗衡維持連結的安全。」
台灣未來兩岸政策的走向，不可能「再走台獨的回頭路」（蘇貞昌語），亦即不可能再走台獨、一邊一國、借殼上市的路，而是必須在「一中架構」之中力爭中華民國的地位；亦即在「中華民國vs.中華人民共和國」的架構下，力求在「連結的抗衡／抗衡的連結」中尋求出路。台灣在這條出路的主要憑藉就是「孫中山論述體系」（包括中華民國憲法），中華民國若自絕於「孫中山論述體系」，即無可能在「一中架構」中與中華人民共和國分庭抗禮。
台獨主張「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，然而此等主張不但絕對切不斷「連結點」，且也因而失去了「抗衡點」。尤其，愈主張台獨，愈否定中華民國，愈否定孫中山，就愈鞏固了「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，也愈使「中華民國」不能力爭「一中架構」的共容性與正義性。這樣的台獨，已經從過去的「救台運動」，轉變為「亡台思想」。
陳菊曾將蔣介石銅像大卸八塊，現在那座已經拼不回去的銅像置於後慈湖，大陸學者則正因蔣氏日記公布而掀起「平反」風潮；如今，在賴清德治下，孫中山銅像又被拖倒，而北京卻正在思酌「必須正視中華民國」的課題。惡整銅像，絕對無法斬斷兩岸的「連結點」，因為「連結點」其實不在銅像，而在千絲萬縷的歷史與現實；反之，惡整銅像卻是自毀台灣在兩岸間的「抗衡點」，與政治自殺無異，這是潢池弄兵，徒見其淺薄。
還記得陳水扁將「中正機場」改為「桃園機場」嗎？那也是要「淘空中華民國」、「去中國化」；但因此卻使今日數百萬大陸來客不能降落「中正機場」，這是多麼愚妄的自殘行為？
台獨走上末路，絕不是因湯德章公園曾有一座孫中山銅像，而是世界、兩岸及台灣內部之大勢所趨。面對中國，重建「中華民國／孫中山」的「連結的抗衡」，以力爭大屋頂一中架構的共榮、雙贏與正義，這是台灣的唯一生路。
Cross-Strait Points of Connection and Contention
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
March 4, 2014
Summary: Taiwan independence is on a dead end path. This has nothing to do with whether Tang Tak Cheung Park has a bronze statue of Sun Yat-sen. It was the result of global, cross-strait, and internal trends. The only way Taiwan can survive is to confront the existence of the Mainland, and to rehabilitate the ROC and Sun Yat-sen as points of connection and contention. This will enable us to seek prosperity, a win/win relationship, and equal justice under the big roof concept of China.
Full text below:
Consider the global and national situation. Taiwan must adopt a different cross-strait strategy. It must forsake "de-Sinicization" and acknowledge the reality of Mainland China. This is the only chance it has to survive.
A statue of Sun Yat-sen was recently pulled down at a traffic circle in Tainan. Taiwan independence elements may regard this as a kind of victory. In fact, it represents the end of the Taiwan independence path. On today's Taiwan, Taiwan independence can be made part of a political party's party charter. Taiwan independence elements may demonstrate in the streets. They may even stand for public office, including the presidency. People may vote for Taiwan independence political parties and candidates. A Taiwan independence president may demagogue Taiwan independence issues, such as the "rectification of names." But under our democracy, Taiwan independence is becoming weaker and weaker. The act of pulling down the statue may have offered a savage catharsis. But it also showed that Taiwan independence had arrived at a dead end.
The Taiwan independence movement rose to power on a wave of democratization. But during democratization, Taiwan independence became more and more flagrantly anti-democratic. As mentioned earlier, the Republic of China's democratic framework gave Taiwan independence elements a stage on which they could do as they pleased. They could even engage in a democratic contest with the Republic of China. But Taiwan independence elements are unwilling to tolerate even a statue of Sun Yat-sen. The Tainan traffic circle was a political symbol, one supported by most of the public on Taiwan. Today, Taiwan independence elements refuse to tolerate Sun Yat-sen. But Sun Yat-sen is a political icon whom most people on Taiwan support. Can Taiwan independence elements picture opponents of Taiwan independence pulling down a statue of Tang Tak Cheung? For the record, Tang Tak Cheung was not a Taiwan independence advocate. This "elegy to a bronze statue" merely underscores the Taiwan independence elements' anti-democratic mentality.
The Taiwan independence movement has reached the end of its road. The main reason was that Taiwan independence elements misjudged the global and cross-strait strategic situation. Taiwan independence elements see Sun Yat-sen and the Republic of China as points of connection between the two sides, within the "one China framework." In order to "de-Sinicize" Taiwan, they want to sever these points of connection. But these points of connection are also the chief guarantors of cross-strait peaceful development. They are also Taiwan's chief defenses within the "one China framework."
Today, few if any Green Camp politicians publicly advocate a "Republic of Taiwan" to resist the People's Republic of China. The Taiwan independence movement has already switched strategies. It now stoops to "backdoor listing." It asserts that "The ROC is one nation on one side, while the PRC is a separate nation on the other side." It attempts to sever the points of connection between the two sides. This is the psychology behind the Taiwan independence elements who pulled down the bronze statue. Lai Ching-teh was among them. On the one hand, Lai called for the removal of the statue of Sun Yat-sen. On the other hand, he presided over the ROC flag-raising ceremony, and visited Hong Kong in order to promote Mainland trade with Tainan. His mask slipped and his contradictions became apparent.
Exploiting the Republic of China to defend against Beijing depends primarily on Sun Yat-sen, the Three People's Principles, and the Constitution of the Republic of China. Taiwan independence elements have trampled Sun Yat-sen underfoot. Yet Sun is precisely the point of connection and point of contention that Taiwan can best use to hold off Beijing. In other words, one must transform the points of connection into leverage by which one can maintain Taiwan's security.
Taiwan's cross-strait policy cannot revert to Taiwan independence. Su Tseng-chang himself acknowledged this. In other words, it is impossible to continue down the Taiwan independence path, with its "one nation on each side" rhetoric and "backdoor listing" tactics. Instead, we must strive to strengthen the hand of the Republic of China within the "one China framework." The "one China framework" is in fact the "ROC vs. PRC framework." We must seek a solution within the points of connection and points of contention. Taiwan's most valuable asset in seeking a solution is Sun Yat-sen's ideology, including the ROC Constitution. If the Republic of China disowns Sun Yat-sen's ideology, then within the "one China framework" it will not be a match for the People's Republic of China.
Taiwan independence elements insist that "One China is the People's Republic of China." But such assertions cannot sever the points of connection. They merely forfeit our own leverage. In fact, the more they advocate Taiwan independence, and the more they poormouth the Republic of China and Sun Yat-sen, the more they affirm that "One China is the People's Republic of China." The more they make it difficult for the ROC to compete with the PRC within the "one China framework." This sort of Taiwan independence has gone from a "Save Taiwan Movement" to an "End Taiwan Movement."
Chen Chu has dismembered the bronze statue of Chiang Kai- Chen. It has been broken into eight pieces. That statue cannot be put back together again. It now resides at "Back Chihu." Mainland scholars studying Chiang's diaries have began a movement to vindicate Chiang. Now, under Lai Ching-teh, Sun Yat-sen's statue has been pulled down. Beijing is considering conceding the reality of the Republic of China. Vandalizing bronze statues will hardly sever the points of connection between the two sides. The points of connection are not really the statues. They are the intricate history and reality. If anything, vandalizing the bronze statue forfeits the leverage Taiwan needs during cross-strait wrangling. It is tantamount to political suicide. It amounts to internal subversion, and merely reveals a lack of understanding.
Does anyone remember Chen Shui-bian's change of airport names? He changed "CKS Airport" to "Taoyuan Airport." He was attempting to undermine the Republic of China, and to implement de-Sinicization. But what has been the result? Millions of visitors from the Mainland were unable to land at "CKS Airport." How foolish was this self-inflicted injury?
Taiwan independence is on a dead end path. This has nothing to do with whether Tang Tak Cheung Park has a bronze statue of Sun Yat-sen. It was the result of global, cross-strait, and internal trends. The only way Taiwan can survive is to confront the existence of the Mainland, and to rehabilitate the ROC and Sun Yat-sen as points of connection and contention. This will enable us to seek prosperity, a win/win relationship, and equal justice under the big roof concept of China.
銅像悲歌：兩岸的連結點與抗衡點
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.03.04 03:10 am
縱目世局國情，台灣的兩岸戰略主軸，必將漸由「去中國化」，轉為「面對中國」，捨此無活路。
台南圓環拖倒孫中山銅像的一幕，台獨分子可能視為勝利，其實卻反映了台獨的末路。今日台灣，台獨可成政黨黨綱，台獨人士可以示威遊行，可以參選所有公職甚至總統，人民也可投票支持台獨政黨及候選人，台獨總統也可操弄正名制憲……。但是，如今台獨在民主體制中卻愈來愈耗弱萎縮，拖倒銅像之舉，正是末路台獨的一種野蠻宣洩。
台獨在台灣「民主化」的大潮中興起，但在台灣民主化的歷程中，台獨卻愈來愈走向「反民主」的歧路。如前所述，中華民國的民主體制，可謂已為台獨提供了一個「為所欲為」的舞台，足可與「中華民國」進行民主競賽；但台獨卻連一尊象徵中華民國的孫中山銅像也不容。台南圓環原是一個孫中山與湯德章共容的天地，如今台獨卻不容孫中山，但孫中山畢竟也是大多台灣人支持的政治符號，台獨能想像反台獨者去拖倒湯德章的銅像嗎（其實湯德章根本不是台獨）？這齣「銅像悲歌」，恐怕只是凸顯了台獨的反民主心態吧！
台獨之所以在內外走上末路，主要是誤判了世界及兩岸大局。台獨將「孫中山／中華民國」視為「一中架構」的「連結點」，為了「去中國化」，所以欲將這些「連結點」切斷；但是，這些「連結點」卻也正是兩岸得以和平發展的主要憑藉，更是台灣在「一中架構」中得以立足的主要「抗衡點」。
如今，已罕聞檯面上的綠營政治人物主張以「台灣國」來對抗「中華人民共和國」；台獨主流已轉入「借殼上市」，主張「中華民國／中華人民共和國」是「一邊一國」，因而試圖要切斷二者的「連結點」，這也正是台獨拖倒銅像的心理背景。賴清德正是此中代表人物，他一面主張撤除國父銅像，一面主持升旗典禮，一面到香港「行銷台南」；不免捉襟見肘，矛盾百出。
然而，若欲以中華民國因應北京，主要的力量即在「孫中山／三民主義」與「中華民國憲法」等政治資產；被台獨踐踏的孫中山，其實正是台灣在「面對中國」時的主要「連結點／抗衡點」。亦即：「化連結為抗衡的槓桿，以抗衡維持連結的安全。」
台灣未來兩岸政策的走向，不可能「再走台獨的回頭路」（蘇貞昌語），亦即不可能再走台獨、一邊一國、借殼上市的路，而是必須在「一中架構」之中力爭中華民國的地位；亦即在「中華民國vs.中華人民共和國」的架構下，力求在「連結的抗衡／抗衡的連結」中尋求出路。台灣在這條出路的主要憑藉就是「孫中山論述體系」（包括中華民國憲法），中華民國若自絕於「孫中山論述體系」，即無可能在「一中架構」中與中華人民共和國分庭抗禮。
台獨主張「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，然而此等主張不但絕對切不斷「連結點」，且也因而失去了「抗衡點」。尤其，愈主張台獨，愈否定中華民國，愈否定孫中山，就愈鞏固了「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，也愈使「中華民國」不能力爭「一中架構」的共容性與正義性。這樣的台獨，已經從過去的「救台運動」，轉變為「亡台思想」。
陳菊曾將蔣介石銅像大卸八塊，現在那座已經拼不回去的銅像置於後慈湖，大陸學者則正因蔣氏日記公布而掀起「平反」風潮；如今，在賴清德治下，孫中山銅像又被拖倒，而北京卻正在思酌「必須正視中華民國」的課題。惡整銅像，絕對無法斬斷兩岸的「連結點」，因為「連結點」其實不在銅像，而在千絲萬縷的歷史與現實；反之，惡整銅像卻是自毀台灣在兩岸間的「抗衡點」，與政治自殺無異，這是潢池弄兵，徒見其淺薄。
還記得陳水扁將「中正機場」改為「桃園機場」嗎？那也是要「淘空中華民國」、「去中國化」；但因此卻使今日數百萬大陸來客不能降落「中正機場」，這是多麼愚妄的自殘行為？
台獨走上末路，絕不是因湯德章公園曾有一座孫中山銅像，而是世界、兩岸及台灣內部之大勢所趨。面對中國，重建「中華民國／孫中山」的「連結的抗衡」，以力爭大屋頂一中架構的共榮、雙贏與正義，這是台灣的唯一生路。
Sunday, March 2, 2014
National Security Council Must Not Become a Meta-Executive
National Security Council Must Not Become a Meta-Executive
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
March 3, 2014
Summary: The basic principle of democracy is "powers must be consistent with responsibilities." Our constitutional framework is often criticized for unclear assignment of responsibilities. But direct presidential elections offer public accountability. The premier is the nation's highest executive. He is responsible to the president. He is also subject to Legislative Yuan oversight. The constitutional relationship still imposes constraints. But if the NSC were to become a "Meta-Executive Yuan," the ability of the framework to restrict its powers would vanish. President Ma has never given up the hope of leaving behind a legacy. Presumably he would not want to be remembered as "destroyer of the constitutional framework." The result depends on his last two years in office.
Full text below:
The constitutional framework limits the powers of the National Security Council (NSC). It has far less power than the U.S. National Security Council. Its power is limited. It is akin to the president's cabinet. But its role is not clearly defined. Therefore in practice its authority can be interpreted very broadly. President Ma has long relied on political aide King Pu-tsung, who recently returned home to serve as Secretary General of the NSC. Will the role of the NSC change? Will it become an outside the system decision-making body with immense powers but zero responsibility? Will it be able to override even the constitutional powers of the Executive Yuan? This is a matter that warrants concern.
The status of the NSC is not clearly defined. The proximate cause is the Additional Articles of the Constitution, which give the president the right to formulate national security policy. It divides executive power. In 1993, the Organic Law of the National Security Council was passed. It legally defined the president's national security authority as one, national defense; two, diplomacy; and three, cross-strait relations. It gave the NSC the same status as a presidential cabinet. During the Chen Shui-bian era, the organizational structure of the NSC was further expanded. The NSC was still nominally a cabinet level entity. But in fact it wielded considerable decision-making power.
The powers and responsibilities of the NSC are basically defined. Nevertheless the real powers of the NSC are highly extent dependent upon the president's whims. The Secretary-General of the NSC plays a real role. During the Lee Teng-hui era, the NSC Secretary-General was drawn mostly from military and diplomatic personnel. During the Chen Shui-bian era, he became the most important member of his political cabinet. Chiou I-jen served as Chen Shui-bian's Secretary-General of the NSC for four years. He even served as the DPP's election strategist. This provoked KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou to criticize the "confusion of roles."
We are now in the President Ma era. The role of the NSC is still a closely guarded secret. It is still not transparent. Recently the government announced that King Pu-tsung would become Secretary General of the NSC. The Presidential Office and King Pu-tsung both declared that their main purpose was to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Such regional economic integration measures have nothing to do with elections. But consider the past history of the NSC. How can we ensure that the role of the NSC is limited to matters of national security? That is a difficult question.
From the legal perspective, the Organic Law of the National Security Council defines the role of the NSC. It says, "The president may consult the National Security authorities on major policies." It says the Secretary-General's powers are limited to "dealing with National Security Council resolutions and commanding and supervising staff." But consider the composition of the NSC. The President is Chairman. The Vice President, Executive Yuan Vice President, MInister of the Interior, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Minister of Finance, Minister of Economic Affairs, Chief of the Mainland Affairs Council Chief, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary-General of the National Security Council, Chief of the NSB, will all of course be in attendance. Clearly it will be a president led "mini cabinet meeting."
King Pu-tsung is a long time member of the Ma government. His role has always been "under one man, but over 10,000 others." He likes to stress that he believes in confining himself to his official role and never exceeding his authority. But his central role is the leader of President Ma's political cabinet. Therefore no matter what position he accepts, that position becomes the power center. That is inevitable. Tha twas the case when King Pu-tsung was News Director of Taipei City. That was the case when he was Deputy Mayor. That was the case when he was KMT secretary-General. That was even more the case when he was ROC Representative to the US. During future "small cabinet meetings," King Pu-tsung will remain one of the president's key cabinet members. He will also be in a position to influence decision-making through the NSC. Under President Ma, King Pu-tsung will be "the most powerful Secretary-General of the NSC." Of that we can have no doubt.
Consider in particular the upcoming seven in one local elections, presidential election, and legislative elections. Electoral victory or defeat hinges on job performance. This includes regional integration and any other significant policy. None of these can be divorced from elections. Let us back up. Let us declare that the future task of the NSC will be to enable us to join the TPP and RCEP. Therefore the CEPD, MInistry of Transportation and Communication, Ministry of Agriculture and other cabinet members who did not attend NSC meetings, will now become essential attendees at NSC meetings. If so, this is cause for concern. The NSC meeting was the president's small cabinet meeting. Will it be transformed into the Secretary-General's Meta-Executive meeting?
The basic principle of democracy is "powers must be consistent with responsibilities." Our constitutional framework is often criticized for unclear assignment of responsibilities. But direct presidential elections offer public accountability. The premier is the nation's highest executive. He is responsible to the president. He is also subject to Legislative Yuan oversight. The constitutional relationship still imposes constraints. But if the NSC were to become a "Meta-Executive Yuan," the ability of the framework to restrict its powers would vanish. President Ma has never given up the hope of leaving behind a legacy. Presumably he would not want to be remembered as "destroyer of the constitutional framework." The result depends on his last two years in office.
莫使國安會成太上行政院
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.03.03 03:04 am
由於憲政體制設計，我國的國家安全委員會權力，雖遠不如美國國安會，應僅限於總統的幕僚性質；但由於角色定位曖昧不清，運作上有極大想像空間。馬總統長期倚賴的政治幕僚金溥聰近日將回國接任國安會秘書長，國安會的角色是否會因此變質，成為「有權無責」的體制外決策機關，甚至凌駕行政院的憲政職權，值得關注。
國安會妾身未明，直接原因是憲法增修條文賦予總統「制訂國家安全重大方針」之權，切割了行政權。民國八十二年國安會組織法的制訂，確定將總統關於「國家安全」的法定職權定義為國防、外交和兩岸關係三項，並賦與國安會的幕僚角色。到了陳水扁時代，進一步擴大國安會的組織結構，讓國安會雖名為「幕僚單位」，實際上具備一定的決策權能。
儘管國安會的權責有其基本界定，但國安會的實權仍相當程度取決於總統的態度，以及國安會秘書長角色的實際發揮。李登輝時期，國安會秘書長多半由軍情、外交專才出任；陳水扁時代，則變成由重要政治幕僚出掌。曾在扁政府擔任國安會秘書長四年之久的邱義仁，甚至還以此身分擔任民進黨的選舉操盤手，引來當時國民黨主席馬英九的批評，說他「角色混淆」。
到了馬總統時代，國安會的角色仍諱莫如深，並不透明。此次發布金溥聰擔任國安會秘書長，總統府和金溥聰本人都宣稱主要目的是為加入ＴＰＰ（跨太平洋夥伴協定）與ＲＣＥＰ（區域全面經濟夥伴關係）等區域經濟整合，與選舉無關。但從國安會過去歷史來看，如何讓職權「僅限於國家安全事項」，恐怕仍是個複雜的課題。
從法制看，國安會組織法雖將國安會定位為「總統決定國家安全有關大政方針之諮詢機關」，秘書長的職權僅限於「依據國安會決議處理會務，並指揮、監督所屬職員」；但國安會的組成，以總統為主席，副總統、行政院正副院長，內政、外交、國防、財政、經濟部長，以及陸委會主委、參謀總長、國安會秘書長、國安局長，都是當然出席人員，儼然是個由總統主導的「小內閣會議」。
金溥聰在馬政府的角色一向是「一人之下，萬人之上」之姿，他雖強調自己信奉「角色主義」，不會踰越；然而，他的核心角色就是馬總統的首席政治幕僚，因此，無論他進入哪個職位，哪個職位就成為權力核心，這是勢所難免。金溥聰擔任台北市新聞處長、副市長時如此，擔任國民黨秘書長、駐美代表時，更是如此。未來在「小內閣會議」裡裡外外，金溥聰一方面可銜總統之命總綰核心幕僚群，另一方面可透過國安會議召開直接影響決策。金溥聰將是馬總統任內「權力最大的國安會秘書長」，已無庸置疑。
尤其七合一地方選舉，和總統、立委大選接踵而來，選舉成敗繫於政績，包括加入區域整合，任何重大政策，恐怕都難與選舉脫鉤。退一萬步言，宣示未來國安會任務將以加入ＴＰＰ、ＲＣＥＰ為主，則包括經建、交通、農業等原本不在國安會議的內閣成員，都將成為國安會議的「必要出席者」。如此，不得不令人擔憂，國安會議是否會從「總統的小內閣會議」變身為「秘書長的太上行政院會」。
民主政治的基本原則就是「權責相符」。雖然我國憲政體制常被批評為「權責不清」，但總統直接民選，對民意負責；行政院長是國家最高行政首長，除向總統負責，亦受立法院監督，彼此憲政關係仍有一定的制約。然國安會若一旦成為「太上行政院」，這僅有的權責制約關係勢將蕩然無存。馬總統念茲在茲希望留下歷史地位，相信不會樂見「憲政體制的破壞者」稱號，在任期的最後兩年加諸己身吧。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
March 3, 2014
Summary: The basic principle of democracy is "powers must be consistent with responsibilities." Our constitutional framework is often criticized for unclear assignment of responsibilities. But direct presidential elections offer public accountability. The premier is the nation's highest executive. He is responsible to the president. He is also subject to Legislative Yuan oversight. The constitutional relationship still imposes constraints. But if the NSC were to become a "Meta-Executive Yuan," the ability of the framework to restrict its powers would vanish. President Ma has never given up the hope of leaving behind a legacy. Presumably he would not want to be remembered as "destroyer of the constitutional framework." The result depends on his last two years in office.
Full text below:
The constitutional framework limits the powers of the National Security Council (NSC). It has far less power than the U.S. National Security Council. Its power is limited. It is akin to the president's cabinet. But its role is not clearly defined. Therefore in practice its authority can be interpreted very broadly. President Ma has long relied on political aide King Pu-tsung, who recently returned home to serve as Secretary General of the NSC. Will the role of the NSC change? Will it become an outside the system decision-making body with immense powers but zero responsibility? Will it be able to override even the constitutional powers of the Executive Yuan? This is a matter that warrants concern.
The status of the NSC is not clearly defined. The proximate cause is the Additional Articles of the Constitution, which give the president the right to formulate national security policy. It divides executive power. In 1993, the Organic Law of the National Security Council was passed. It legally defined the president's national security authority as one, national defense; two, diplomacy; and three, cross-strait relations. It gave the NSC the same status as a presidential cabinet. During the Chen Shui-bian era, the organizational structure of the NSC was further expanded. The NSC was still nominally a cabinet level entity. But in fact it wielded considerable decision-making power.
The powers and responsibilities of the NSC are basically defined. Nevertheless the real powers of the NSC are highly extent dependent upon the president's whims. The Secretary-General of the NSC plays a real role. During the Lee Teng-hui era, the NSC Secretary-General was drawn mostly from military and diplomatic personnel. During the Chen Shui-bian era, he became the most important member of his political cabinet. Chiou I-jen served as Chen Shui-bian's Secretary-General of the NSC for four years. He even served as the DPP's election strategist. This provoked KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou to criticize the "confusion of roles."
We are now in the President Ma era. The role of the NSC is still a closely guarded secret. It is still not transparent. Recently the government announced that King Pu-tsung would become Secretary General of the NSC. The Presidential Office and King Pu-tsung both declared that their main purpose was to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Such regional economic integration measures have nothing to do with elections. But consider the past history of the NSC. How can we ensure that the role of the NSC is limited to matters of national security? That is a difficult question.
From the legal perspective, the Organic Law of the National Security Council defines the role of the NSC. It says, "The president may consult the National Security authorities on major policies." It says the Secretary-General's powers are limited to "dealing with National Security Council resolutions and commanding and supervising staff." But consider the composition of the NSC. The President is Chairman. The Vice President, Executive Yuan Vice President, MInister of the Interior, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Minister of Finance, Minister of Economic Affairs, Chief of the Mainland Affairs Council Chief, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary-General of the National Security Council, Chief of the NSB, will all of course be in attendance. Clearly it will be a president led "mini cabinet meeting."
King Pu-tsung is a long time member of the Ma government. His role has always been "under one man, but over 10,000 others." He likes to stress that he believes in confining himself to his official role and never exceeding his authority. But his central role is the leader of President Ma's political cabinet. Therefore no matter what position he accepts, that position becomes the power center. That is inevitable. Tha twas the case when King Pu-tsung was News Director of Taipei City. That was the case when he was Deputy Mayor. That was the case when he was KMT secretary-General. That was even more the case when he was ROC Representative to the US. During future "small cabinet meetings," King Pu-tsung will remain one of the president's key cabinet members. He will also be in a position to influence decision-making through the NSC. Under President Ma, King Pu-tsung will be "the most powerful Secretary-General of the NSC." Of that we can have no doubt.
Consider in particular the upcoming seven in one local elections, presidential election, and legislative elections. Electoral victory or defeat hinges on job performance. This includes regional integration and any other significant policy. None of these can be divorced from elections. Let us back up. Let us declare that the future task of the NSC will be to enable us to join the TPP and RCEP. Therefore the CEPD, MInistry of Transportation and Communication, Ministry of Agriculture and other cabinet members who did not attend NSC meetings, will now become essential attendees at NSC meetings. If so, this is cause for concern. The NSC meeting was the president's small cabinet meeting. Will it be transformed into the Secretary-General's Meta-Executive meeting?
The basic principle of democracy is "powers must be consistent with responsibilities." Our constitutional framework is often criticized for unclear assignment of responsibilities. But direct presidential elections offer public accountability. The premier is the nation's highest executive. He is responsible to the president. He is also subject to Legislative Yuan oversight. The constitutional relationship still imposes constraints. But if the NSC were to become a "Meta-Executive Yuan," the ability of the framework to restrict its powers would vanish. President Ma has never given up the hope of leaving behind a legacy. Presumably he would not want to be remembered as "destroyer of the constitutional framework." The result depends on his last two years in office.
莫使國安會成太上行政院
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.03.03 03:04 am
由於憲政體制設計，我國的國家安全委員會權力，雖遠不如美國國安會，應僅限於總統的幕僚性質；但由於角色定位曖昧不清，運作上有極大想像空間。馬總統長期倚賴的政治幕僚金溥聰近日將回國接任國安會秘書長，國安會的角色是否會因此變質，成為「有權無責」的體制外決策機關，甚至凌駕行政院的憲政職權，值得關注。
國安會妾身未明，直接原因是憲法增修條文賦予總統「制訂國家安全重大方針」之權，切割了行政權。民國八十二年國安會組織法的制訂，確定將總統關於「國家安全」的法定職權定義為國防、外交和兩岸關係三項，並賦與國安會的幕僚角色。到了陳水扁時代，進一步擴大國安會的組織結構，讓國安會雖名為「幕僚單位」，實際上具備一定的決策權能。
儘管國安會的權責有其基本界定，但國安會的實權仍相當程度取決於總統的態度，以及國安會秘書長角色的實際發揮。李登輝時期，國安會秘書長多半由軍情、外交專才出任；陳水扁時代，則變成由重要政治幕僚出掌。曾在扁政府擔任國安會秘書長四年之久的邱義仁，甚至還以此身分擔任民進黨的選舉操盤手，引來當時國民黨主席馬英九的批評，說他「角色混淆」。
到了馬總統時代，國安會的角色仍諱莫如深，並不透明。此次發布金溥聰擔任國安會秘書長，總統府和金溥聰本人都宣稱主要目的是為加入ＴＰＰ（跨太平洋夥伴協定）與ＲＣＥＰ（區域全面經濟夥伴關係）等區域經濟整合，與選舉無關。但從國安會過去歷史來看，如何讓職權「僅限於國家安全事項」，恐怕仍是個複雜的課題。
從法制看，國安會組織法雖將國安會定位為「總統決定國家安全有關大政方針之諮詢機關」，秘書長的職權僅限於「依據國安會決議處理會務，並指揮、監督所屬職員」；但國安會的組成，以總統為主席，副總統、行政院正副院長，內政、外交、國防、財政、經濟部長，以及陸委會主委、參謀總長、國安會秘書長、國安局長，都是當然出席人員，儼然是個由總統主導的「小內閣會議」。
金溥聰在馬政府的角色一向是「一人之下，萬人之上」之姿，他雖強調自己信奉「角色主義」，不會踰越；然而，他的核心角色就是馬總統的首席政治幕僚，因此，無論他進入哪個職位，哪個職位就成為權力核心，這是勢所難免。金溥聰擔任台北市新聞處長、副市長時如此，擔任國民黨秘書長、駐美代表時，更是如此。未來在「小內閣會議」裡裡外外，金溥聰一方面可銜總統之命總綰核心幕僚群，另一方面可透過國安會議召開直接影響決策。金溥聰將是馬總統任內「權力最大的國安會秘書長」，已無庸置疑。
尤其七合一地方選舉，和總統、立委大選接踵而來，選舉成敗繫於政績，包括加入區域整合，任何重大政策，恐怕都難與選舉脫鉤。退一萬步言，宣示未來國安會任務將以加入ＴＰＰ、ＲＣＥＰ為主，則包括經建、交通、農業等原本不在國安會議的內閣成員，都將成為國安會議的「必要出席者」。如此，不得不令人擔憂，國安會議是否會從「總統的小內閣會議」變身為「秘書長的太上行政院會」。
民主政治的基本原則就是「權責相符」。雖然我國憲政體制常被批評為「權責不清」，但總統直接民選，對民意負責；行政院長是國家最高行政首長，除向總統負責，亦受立法院監督，彼此憲政關係仍有一定的制約。然國安會若一旦成為「太上行政院」，這僅有的權責制約關係勢將蕩然無存。馬總統念茲在茲希望留下歷史地位，相信不會樂見「憲政體制的破壞者」稱號，在任期的最後兩年加諸己身吧。
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