DPP: Domestic Bullying, International Cowardice
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 11, 2014
Summary: Just as the student protests against the CSSTA reached he boiling point, the DPP began distributing talking points to concerned departments of the United States government. The DPP was anxious to make clear that it was not totally opposed to the CSSTA, and was willing to seek solutions to the impasse created by the student protests. Wang Jin-pyng however, beat the DPP to the punch. He took credit for ending the student protests. The DPP looked tough on the outside. But it was weak on the inside. It wore two faces. One domestic. One international. People could only shake their heads and sigh.
Full text below:
Just as the student protests against the CSSTA reached he boiling point, the DPP began distributing talking points to concerned departments of the United States government. The DPP was anxious to make clear that it was not totally opposed to the CSSTA, and was willing to seek solutions to the impasse created by the student protests. Wang Jin-pyng however, beat the DPP to the punch. He took credit for ending the student protests. The DPP looked tough on the outside. But it was weak on the inside. It wore two faces. One domestic. One international. People could only shake their heads and sigh.
Consider the DPP's domestic propaganda. Everywhere it painted the CSSTA as evil and ill-intentioned. It even accused Ma Ying-jeou of "helping the CCP infiltrate Taiwan," and of "using the CSSTA to exterminate Taiwan." In short, the CSSTA was depicted as an untouchable toxic substance. Over the past nine months, The DPP has done everything possible to delay passage of the CSSTA in the Legislative Yuan. It forcibly occupied the podium and conducted filibusters expressly to prevent passage of the CSSTA. But as soon as the US accused the DPP of illegal obstructionism, it immediately caved in and insisted that it was not opposed to the CSSTA. The DPP says one thing to foreigners, and something else altogether to citizens back home. Does it think the public on Taiwan is so stupid they can get away with this?
This is the sad reality of Taiwan politics. Politicians hurl baseless allegations all day long. But the public cannot discern the truth. Only when politicians feel the need to pander to a particular party, do they actually speak the truth. Filled with passion, the students held sit-ins. They saw themselves expressing their "love of Taiwan." They imagined themselves on a sacred mission to "defend Taiwan." Who knew they were mere extras in the DPP's political theatrics, and that the campaign had nothing to do with "love of Taiwan?"
Whenever the DPP encounters objections from Uncle Sam, it caves in. When students occupied the legislative hall, Wang Jin-pyng asked the DPP to allow him to convene the legislature. The Green Camp responded. It said the legislative hall was a "sacred space," and vehemently rejected his appeal. But as soon as the United States uttered a few harsh words, then the DPP promptly kowtowed and acquiesced. Such posturing. Such hypocrisy. If the DPP truly considers the legislative hall a "sacred space," why do DPP legislators repeatedly occupy it by force in order to obstruct legislative business? Why when the students occupied the legislative hall, did DPP legislators hold a sit-in, form a human wall, and prevent the police from carrying out their duty? The slang expression, "That's the way a slut behaves!" is apropos.
Once the student movement announced its withdrawal, uncontrolled infighting erupted within the DPP. Some said the party had been marginalized. Some said the legislative process had been bypassed. Some even said "The day when the public abandons us is not far off." The 3/18 student movement may have embarrassed the Ma administration. But the DPP reaped no windfall. Instead, it was forced to repudiate its own policy positions. Those positions are increasingly difficult to justify.
Consider the changes wrought by the protests. The DPP originally hoped to use the student movement to topple Ma and oppose the Blue Camp. It hoped to use the protests to engage in end of year electioneering. It hoped to reap a major windfall. But the student movement eventually took on an hysterical tone as it opposed the Mainland and the CSSTA. This shattered its plan. The DPP has hoped to straddle the fence and muddle its way through. But the student movement dragged the DPP down. Student leaders inspired passionate public support. This expressed itself in dissatisfaction with all political parties and their failures. The DPP assumed it was safe because it stood on the same side as the student movement. Instead it was perceived as part of a "dysfunctional system." It too became an object of condemnation.
The DPP watched as the Ma administration hemmed and hawed indecisively. Needless to say, it wallowed in Schadenfreude. But during the 3/30 protest march, DPP members were asked to put away their party flags and banners, and sit quietly in the audience. The DPP surely realized the situation had been turned on its head, and that the hosts had become the guests. One after another, U.S. officials praised Taiwan's democracy and condemned Green Camp obstructionism. The DPP found itself backed into a corner and forced to justify its behavior. Wang Jin-pyng seized the opportunity to take credit for ending the student protest. The DPP gained almost nothing out of the process. The DPP used every trick in the book. But in the end it was marginalized. Now how sad is that?
The student movement rallied public support from the Youth Corps and civic groups on the Green Camp periphery. One reason was discontent with the Ma administration. But the main reason was the DPP's practice of valuing political trickery more highly than political conviction. The DPP has long considered strategy more important than values. That is why it is often unscrupulous in its means. It is willing to occupy the legislature using brute force, to lock the legislative hall doors, to fling shoes at political opponents, and to engage in open obstructionism. This is why it invariably invokes high-minded rhetoric when justifying its actions. The Green Camp Youth Corps long ago internalized these tricks. Exploiting their status as students, they bulldozed others aside without concern, and declared themselves boss. Some even boasted about forming a student movement based political party. In such an atmosphere, the new generation may be dissatisfied with Blue vs. Green confrontation and the Ma administration. But it is also likely to spurn the DPP.
The DPP hurried explained to the United States government that it was not opposed to the CSSTA. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu said, "If the procedures and provisions are legitimate, I support the CSSTA." Four Green Camp mayors chimed in. Currently only Chairman Su Tseng-chang is still demanding that negotiations be restarted from scratch. The students are withdrawing. The situation is changing. Will Green Camp legislators fall in line behind Su Tseng-chang? Will they oppose and obstruct legislative business? If they do, it will amount to domestic bullying and international cowardice. Worse, it will amount to self-deception and deception of others.
欺內怕外：民進黨在台反服貿，在美忙說明
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.04.11 03:45 am
學生反服貿如火如荼之際，民進黨卻忙著在美國向相關部門散發說帖，聲稱民進黨並非全面反服貿，也願意提出解決學運僵局的方案。然而，學運解決的大功被王金平捷足先登，而民進黨這種色厲內荏、內外有別的嘴臉，則讓人搖頭三嘆。
且看民進黨在國內的宣傳，處處指控服貿協議多麼邪惡、如何包藏禍心，甚至稱之為馬英九引中共入台的「服貿滅台」計畫；總之，是不可碰觸的劇毒之物。九個月來，民進黨在立法院千方百計拖延杯葛，霸占主席台、阻撓議事，為的就是不讓服貿協議過關。而如今一遭美方指責非法杯葛，民進黨立刻示軟，聲明自己不反服貿。這種對外說一套、對內做一套的作風，是覺得台灣民眾愚昧可欺嗎？
台灣政治的可悲就在於此。政治人物每天在那裡指控、叫囂，民眾根本分不清哪一句才是真話；事實上，只有面對需要「抱大腿」的對象，政客才會吐出實言。學生們滿腔熱血在那裡靜坐、抗議，以為自己是在進行「愛台」、「護台」的神聖使命；誰知，在民進黨的策略中他們不過是一群臨時演員，而這場運動跟「愛台」並沒有真正的關係。
民進黨的「逢美必軟」不止於此。學生占領國會期間，王金平要求易地召開院會，綠營卻以議場具有「神聖性」，極力反對；然而，俟美方一說出重話，民進黨立刻低頭同意。這種態度，多麼虛偽！若覺得議場「神聖」，為何民進黨立委平日動輒在那裡霸占圍堵，不讓議事進行？又為何學生占領期間，他們一直在場外靜坐形成保護牆，妨礙警方執勤？「賤人就是矯情」一語，用在此處還真貼切。
學運宣布退場之後，民進黨的內訌一發不可收拾：有人指責整個黨遭到邊緣化，有人批評議會路線失能，甚至說出「距離被人民拋棄日子不遠」的重話。由此看來，三一八學運雖弄得馬政府灰頭土臉，但民進黨非僅未撈到好處，反而使自己的問政路線被迫倒退，愈發難以修補。
觀察整起事件的變化，民進黨原本以為可以利用學運來倒馬反藍，趁機為年底的選舉造勢，大肆坐收漁利。然而，學運形勢最後衝成反中、反服貿的激進調性，突破了民進黨妄想操弄的模糊地帶，也把民進黨拖進了泥淖。不僅如此，當學運領袖激發了支持群眾的熱情，同時投射的是對體制的不滿及對政黨政治失敗的反感；在這種情況下，自以為站在學運同一方的民進黨，其實已經被視為「無效體制」的共犯，也成為應予聲討的對象。
亦即，民進黨一開始看著馬政府左支右絀、進退兩難時，必然是私心竊喜；但當三三○上凱道時全員被要求收起旗幟在台下當觀眾，民進黨應明白形勢已經反客為主了。接著，當美國官員連續表態，讚揚台灣民主、卻譴責綠營不當杯葛時，民進黨已被逼到必須緊急辯解表態的牆角；而當王金平出手把學運收割一空時，民進黨恐怕連掉在地上的穀子都沒揀到幾粒。民進黨機關算盡，卻只落得一個「邊緣化」的下場，豈不可悲？
這次學運之所以能從綠營外圍的青年軍和社運團體呼喚出一股公民力量，除了對馬政府不滿，主要也是受到民進黨長期問政「手段」高過「信仰」的影響。民進黨一向認為「戰略」比「價值」重要，因此往往不擇手段，霸占、鎖門、丟鞋等杯葛手段從未間斷，且總能虛詞狡飾、自我正當化。作為綠營側翼的青年軍，早已熟悉這套行動辯證法，甚至憑藉著學生身分無所顧忌地衝撞，終而喧賓奪主。且看，近日已有人鼓動學運群眾組黨；在這種氛圍下，厭憎藍綠對峙的新一代固不滿馬政府，但也會一樣唾棄民進黨吧？
民進黨在美國政府解釋它並不是「反服貿」，在高雄市長陳菊說出「若符合程序正義且有配套，我支持服貿」後，有四名綠營縣市長也表態跟進；目前，唯獨主席蘇貞昌還在喊重啟談判。面對學生退場後的新形勢，如果綠營立委還跟著蘇貞昌在那裡喊反、喊擋，阻止議事進行，那不僅是欺內怕外，更是自欺欺人了！
Thursday, April 10, 2014
Wednesday, April 9, 2014
Student Movement Anti-Climax: Mere Taiwan Independence After All
Student Movement Anti-Climax: Mere Taiwan Independence After All
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 10, 2014
Summary: The student movement's "Articles for Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight: Peoples Edition" has turned out to be nothing more than an "Articles for Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight: Taiwan Independence Edition." This has to be the biggest anticlimax of the 3/18 student movement. So all the fuss was about Taiwan independence after all.
Full text below:
The student movement's "Articles for Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight: Peoples Edition" has turned out to be nothing more than an "Articles for Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight: Taiwan Independence Edition." This has to be the biggest anticlimax of the 3/18 student movement. So all the fuss was about Taiwan independence after all.
The student movement proposes to "legislate first, review last." The "Articles for Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight: Peoples Edition" has been renamed the "Articles Defining Cross-Strait Agreements." It adopts a "two states theory" framework. Its purpose is to make future cross-strait agreements impossible. It attempts to nullify agreements already signed. This "Peoples Edition" is the student movement's political manifesto. It is the student movement's "Taiwan independence with a different label."
Why must Taiwan independence advocates torment the public on Taiwan so? The DPP need only declare that if it returns to power, it will rescind Article 16 of ECFA. Everything will revert to zero. Why even bother promoting this "Articles to Prevent Cross-Strait Agreements" bill?
The mass psychology informing the student movement is not Taiwan independence, per se. Rather it is younger generation anxiety and discontent. It is fear and suspicion of cross-strait exchanges, rooted in indecision and anxiety about the future. Several student movement members revealed long-repressed emotions. They inadvertently showed everyone why they reverted to the promotion of Taiwan independence. This was a disappointing anticlimax.
Fear and suspicion of cross-strait exchanges is ubiquitous among the Taiwan public. Many who support the CSSTA are as wary as those who oppose it. The difference is not whether they are wary. The difference is in their responses. Supporters of the CSSTA welcome the challenges of globalization. They seek to use globalization to control cross-strait relations. Opponents of the CSSTA meanwhile, run from the Mainland, avoid the Mainland, run from globalization, run from globalization. Eventually this leads them to a Closed Door Policy and Taiwan independence. Hence the "Articles for Cross-Strait Agreemen Oversight: Taiwan Independence Edition."
Speaking from Ketegelan Boulevard, Lin Fei-fan said, "Our actions have redefined relations between Taiwan and [Mainland] China." What was his "redefinition?" Was it "avoid haste, exercise restraint?" Was it the "rectification of names?" Was it "one country on each side?" Was it seeking a high two-thirds supermajority threshold to prevent the passage of any cross-strait agreements? This provision was concealed in the "Peoples Edition" of his "redefinition." Has any "redefinition" proved to be anything other than an "old and unworkable definition?" How are they in any way "new?"
The student movement has opened up a can of worms. Movement instigators mistakenly believed or led others to believe that "Taiwan independence under a different label" somehow amounts to a problem solving "redefinition." But the real problem facing Taiwan is globalization. Cross-strait relations make Taiwan's globalization more complex. But refusing to confront the reality of the Mainland will only make globalization impossible. Without globalization, Taiwan will have nothing by which to restrain the Mainland. Therefore Taiwan must choose. It must decide whether to meet the challenges or to retreat. Close observation reveals that the student movement's anti-Ma sentiment is merely disguised anti-[Mainland] China sentiment. Sinophobia is in fact widespread among the public on Taiwan. But a Sinophobic mindset is a defeatist mindset. It is impossible to accomplish anything constructive from a defeatist mindset. It is impossible to "redefine" cross-strait relations, or formulate a global survival strategy from a defeatist mindset. Embark on the path towards Taiwan independence, and one is lost.
The student movement has not offered any new countermeasures by which to oppose the Mainland or resist the Mainland. It has merely spun anti-Ma sentiment as countermeasures against Mainland influence. It has merely spun anti-KMT sentiment as countermeasures against the CCP. It has merely transformed the same tired Sinophobia into brutal infighting. The student movement has merely reverted to the promotion of Taiwan independence. The student movement was highly dramatic. But it merely reenacted the same tired Taiwan independence dog and pony show. It failed to offer anything new.
The movement made media stars of two twenty something student leaders. But if that is all it did, the price was too high. If student movement participants and observers look back, they will find that the student movement merely trotted out the same old Taiwan independence phobia and defeatism. At best the experience deepended everyone's political understanding.
The student movement wants to make the "Articles Defining Cross-Strait Agreements" the legal imprimateur of the Sunflower student movement. Whether this is possible will depend on the persistence of key student movement players. The legislature may engage in Blue vs. Green battles over the proposed legislation. Nevertheless it is probably a non-starter. If key student movement players demand legislative passage, the conflict will be even more difficult to resolve.
The "globalist generation" faces a hard road ahead. Spain has no cross-strait issues. Yet youth unemployment has reached 57.7%. For the Eurozone the figure is 24.2%. Therefore young people on Taiwan must realize that globalization and cross-strait issues are not the creation of Ma Ying-jeou. Blaming him will not solve difficult cross-strait and globalization problems. Failure to confront the challenge of globalization will make it difficult to control cross-strait relations. Therefore, the younger generation on Taiwan must not adopt a defeatist Sinophobic, anti-globalist mentality. It must realize cross-strait and global coopetition requires a determination to fight. It is not that one must think of winning. It is that losing is unthinkable.
學運反高潮：原來還是台獨
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.04.10 03:54 am
學運提出的《兩岸協議監督條例民間版》，儼然是《兩岸協議監督條例台獨版》。這是三一八學運最大的反高潮，原來，搞來搞去還是台獨那一套。
學運主張「先立法／後審查」，這個《監督條例民間版》（現改稱《兩岸協定締結條例》）以「兩國論」為架構，其極盡刁難又以幾乎能使未來兩岸任何協議皆簽不成為目標，更欲對已簽成的所有協議翻案否決；倘若此一「民間版」即是這場學運的政治宣言，則這場學運其實是「換一塊路牌的台獨」。
其實，台獨何必如此折騰台灣人？只須宣布民進黨若再執政，即啟動ＥＣＦＡ第十六條的終止條款，讓一切歸零即可，何須訂此《兩岸協議簽不成條例》？
這場學運的基礎群眾心理不是台獨，而是新世代對國情的憂慮與不滿，對兩岸關係的恐懼與猜疑，及對己身前途的徬徨與焦慮等等；幾名學運發動者引爆了積澱已久的情緒，不料卻給了大家一個「重新回過頭去搞台獨」的答案，這難道不是令人錯愕的反高潮？
對兩岸關係的恐懼與猜疑，確實普遍存在於台灣民間；許多支持服貿的民眾，對兩岸關係的警覺也不下於反服貿者。雙方的差別不在有無警覺，而在所主張的對策不同。挺服貿者主張迎向全球化的挑戰，用全球化的成果來節制兩岸關係；反服貿者則是「逃中／避中」，進而「逃全球化／避全球化」，最後遁入「鎖國／台獨」，才會出現這種《兩岸協議監督條例台獨版》。
林飛帆在凱道談話指出，「我們的行動，在台灣與中國的關係之間，也做了新的定義」。然而，什麼是他的「新定義」？是「戒急用忍」嗎？是「正名制憲」嗎？是「一邊一國」嗎？是「用三分之二的高門檻阻禁兩岸一切協議」嗎？這些若就是隱藏在「民間版」下的「新定義」，則其中哪一種「新定義」不是已經被驗證為根本行不通的「老辦法」？那又何新之有？
這場學運掀開了大家都深覺憂慮的問題，主事者卻誤認為或誤導為「換一塊路牌的台獨」就是能解決問題的「新定義」。全球化才是台灣面對的真正問題，兩岸關係固使台灣的全球化課題更形複雜；但不面對大陸，就不可能全球化；不全球化，就無以節制大陸。因此，台灣必須選擇「迎對」或「退卻」。仔細觀察可知：這場學運在「反馬」的剽悍表象中，內藏的卻是「逃中」的失敗主義。其實，「恐中／懼中」是台灣人的共同心理，「反中／抗中」亦是台灣人的共同警覺，但「逃中／避中」卻是「失敗主義」；在失敗主義之上，不可能構築任何有建設性、有發展性的「兩岸新定義」及「全球化生存戰略」。若走上台獨的回頭路，更是必敗無疑。
因而，這場學運並未對「反中／抗中」提出任何新對策；只是將「反馬」炒作成「抗中」，將「反國民黨」炒作成「反共產黨」，亦即又把空泛八股的「抗中」轉移為殘暴的「內鬥」而已。倘若這場學運的政治宣言就是「再回頭去搞台獨」，則這場學運的戲劇性雖然很高，其實只是複製了台灣不斷上演的「老戲碼」，看不出任何新意。
這場運動若只是捧紅了兩名二十多歲的學運領袖，這個社會承付的代價未免太大了。但如果學運的參與者與觀察者驀然回首，能發現這場學運其實只是恐懼心理及失敗主義的台獨鎖國老梗，則這個「見山又是山」的過程，也算是讓大家又增長了一些政治見識。
學運欲以《兩岸協定締結條例》作為這場太陽花學運的法律印記，這要看學運要角的堅持程度如何。即使聽任立法院以藍綠惡鬥來面對這個版本，恐怕已不可開交；倘若學運要角堅持立院非通過此一版本，那就更難以收拾。
這一代「全球化世代」的生涯確實十分辛苦，西班牙沒有「兩岸問題」，青年失業率達五十七‧七％，整個歐元區亦達二十四‧二％。因此，台灣青年應認知，「全球化」及「兩岸問題」不是馬英九一個人造成的，且不解決兩岸問題就很難解決全球化問題，而不贏得全球化的挑戰即難以節制兩岸關係。因此，台灣新世代絕對不能有「逃中／避中／逃全球化／避全球化」的失敗主義心理，而應知無論對兩岸競合或全球競合而言，皆須有「不要想著贏／要想不能輸」的迎戰決志。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 10, 2014
Summary: The student movement's "Articles for Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight: Peoples Edition" has turned out to be nothing more than an "Articles for Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight: Taiwan Independence Edition." This has to be the biggest anticlimax of the 3/18 student movement. So all the fuss was about Taiwan independence after all.
Full text below:
The student movement's "Articles for Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight: Peoples Edition" has turned out to be nothing more than an "Articles for Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight: Taiwan Independence Edition." This has to be the biggest anticlimax of the 3/18 student movement. So all the fuss was about Taiwan independence after all.
The student movement proposes to "legislate first, review last." The "Articles for Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight: Peoples Edition" has been renamed the "Articles Defining Cross-Strait Agreements." It adopts a "two states theory" framework. Its purpose is to make future cross-strait agreements impossible. It attempts to nullify agreements already signed. This "Peoples Edition" is the student movement's political manifesto. It is the student movement's "Taiwan independence with a different label."
Why must Taiwan independence advocates torment the public on Taiwan so? The DPP need only declare that if it returns to power, it will rescind Article 16 of ECFA. Everything will revert to zero. Why even bother promoting this "Articles to Prevent Cross-Strait Agreements" bill?
The mass psychology informing the student movement is not Taiwan independence, per se. Rather it is younger generation anxiety and discontent. It is fear and suspicion of cross-strait exchanges, rooted in indecision and anxiety about the future. Several student movement members revealed long-repressed emotions. They inadvertently showed everyone why they reverted to the promotion of Taiwan independence. This was a disappointing anticlimax.
Fear and suspicion of cross-strait exchanges is ubiquitous among the Taiwan public. Many who support the CSSTA are as wary as those who oppose it. The difference is not whether they are wary. The difference is in their responses. Supporters of the CSSTA welcome the challenges of globalization. They seek to use globalization to control cross-strait relations. Opponents of the CSSTA meanwhile, run from the Mainland, avoid the Mainland, run from globalization, run from globalization. Eventually this leads them to a Closed Door Policy and Taiwan independence. Hence the "Articles for Cross-Strait Agreemen Oversight: Taiwan Independence Edition."
Speaking from Ketegelan Boulevard, Lin Fei-fan said, "Our actions have redefined relations between Taiwan and [Mainland] China." What was his "redefinition?" Was it "avoid haste, exercise restraint?" Was it the "rectification of names?" Was it "one country on each side?" Was it seeking a high two-thirds supermajority threshold to prevent the passage of any cross-strait agreements? This provision was concealed in the "Peoples Edition" of his "redefinition." Has any "redefinition" proved to be anything other than an "old and unworkable definition?" How are they in any way "new?"
The student movement has opened up a can of worms. Movement instigators mistakenly believed or led others to believe that "Taiwan independence under a different label" somehow amounts to a problem solving "redefinition." But the real problem facing Taiwan is globalization. Cross-strait relations make Taiwan's globalization more complex. But refusing to confront the reality of the Mainland will only make globalization impossible. Without globalization, Taiwan will have nothing by which to restrain the Mainland. Therefore Taiwan must choose. It must decide whether to meet the challenges or to retreat. Close observation reveals that the student movement's anti-Ma sentiment is merely disguised anti-[Mainland] China sentiment. Sinophobia is in fact widespread among the public on Taiwan. But a Sinophobic mindset is a defeatist mindset. It is impossible to accomplish anything constructive from a defeatist mindset. It is impossible to "redefine" cross-strait relations, or formulate a global survival strategy from a defeatist mindset. Embark on the path towards Taiwan independence, and one is lost.
The student movement has not offered any new countermeasures by which to oppose the Mainland or resist the Mainland. It has merely spun anti-Ma sentiment as countermeasures against Mainland influence. It has merely spun anti-KMT sentiment as countermeasures against the CCP. It has merely transformed the same tired Sinophobia into brutal infighting. The student movement has merely reverted to the promotion of Taiwan independence. The student movement was highly dramatic. But it merely reenacted the same tired Taiwan independence dog and pony show. It failed to offer anything new.
The movement made media stars of two twenty something student leaders. But if that is all it did, the price was too high. If student movement participants and observers look back, they will find that the student movement merely trotted out the same old Taiwan independence phobia and defeatism. At best the experience deepended everyone's political understanding.
The student movement wants to make the "Articles Defining Cross-Strait Agreements" the legal imprimateur of the Sunflower student movement. Whether this is possible will depend on the persistence of key student movement players. The legislature may engage in Blue vs. Green battles over the proposed legislation. Nevertheless it is probably a non-starter. If key student movement players demand legislative passage, the conflict will be even more difficult to resolve.
The "globalist generation" faces a hard road ahead. Spain has no cross-strait issues. Yet youth unemployment has reached 57.7%. For the Eurozone the figure is 24.2%. Therefore young people on Taiwan must realize that globalization and cross-strait issues are not the creation of Ma Ying-jeou. Blaming him will not solve difficult cross-strait and globalization problems. Failure to confront the challenge of globalization will make it difficult to control cross-strait relations. Therefore, the younger generation on Taiwan must not adopt a defeatist Sinophobic, anti-globalist mentality. It must realize cross-strait and global coopetition requires a determination to fight. It is not that one must think of winning. It is that losing is unthinkable.
學運反高潮：原來還是台獨
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.04.10 03:54 am
學運提出的《兩岸協議監督條例民間版》，儼然是《兩岸協議監督條例台獨版》。這是三一八學運最大的反高潮，原來，搞來搞去還是台獨那一套。
學運主張「先立法／後審查」，這個《監督條例民間版》（現改稱《兩岸協定締結條例》）以「兩國論」為架構，其極盡刁難又以幾乎能使未來兩岸任何協議皆簽不成為目標，更欲對已簽成的所有協議翻案否決；倘若此一「民間版」即是這場學運的政治宣言，則這場學運其實是「換一塊路牌的台獨」。
其實，台獨何必如此折騰台灣人？只須宣布民進黨若再執政，即啟動ＥＣＦＡ第十六條的終止條款，讓一切歸零即可，何須訂此《兩岸協議簽不成條例》？
這場學運的基礎群眾心理不是台獨，而是新世代對國情的憂慮與不滿，對兩岸關係的恐懼與猜疑，及對己身前途的徬徨與焦慮等等；幾名學運發動者引爆了積澱已久的情緒，不料卻給了大家一個「重新回過頭去搞台獨」的答案，這難道不是令人錯愕的反高潮？
對兩岸關係的恐懼與猜疑，確實普遍存在於台灣民間；許多支持服貿的民眾，對兩岸關係的警覺也不下於反服貿者。雙方的差別不在有無警覺，而在所主張的對策不同。挺服貿者主張迎向全球化的挑戰，用全球化的成果來節制兩岸關係；反服貿者則是「逃中／避中」，進而「逃全球化／避全球化」，最後遁入「鎖國／台獨」，才會出現這種《兩岸協議監督條例台獨版》。
林飛帆在凱道談話指出，「我們的行動，在台灣與中國的關係之間，也做了新的定義」。然而，什麼是他的「新定義」？是「戒急用忍」嗎？是「正名制憲」嗎？是「一邊一國」嗎？是「用三分之二的高門檻阻禁兩岸一切協議」嗎？這些若就是隱藏在「民間版」下的「新定義」，則其中哪一種「新定義」不是已經被驗證為根本行不通的「老辦法」？那又何新之有？
這場學運掀開了大家都深覺憂慮的問題，主事者卻誤認為或誤導為「換一塊路牌的台獨」就是能解決問題的「新定義」。全球化才是台灣面對的真正問題，兩岸關係固使台灣的全球化課題更形複雜；但不面對大陸，就不可能全球化；不全球化，就無以節制大陸。因此，台灣必須選擇「迎對」或「退卻」。仔細觀察可知：這場學運在「反馬」的剽悍表象中，內藏的卻是「逃中」的失敗主義。其實，「恐中／懼中」是台灣人的共同心理，「反中／抗中」亦是台灣人的共同警覺，但「逃中／避中」卻是「失敗主義」；在失敗主義之上，不可能構築任何有建設性、有發展性的「兩岸新定義」及「全球化生存戰略」。若走上台獨的回頭路，更是必敗無疑。
因而，這場學運並未對「反中／抗中」提出任何新對策；只是將「反馬」炒作成「抗中」，將「反國民黨」炒作成「反共產黨」，亦即又把空泛八股的「抗中」轉移為殘暴的「內鬥」而已。倘若這場學運的政治宣言就是「再回頭去搞台獨」，則這場學運的戲劇性雖然很高，其實只是複製了台灣不斷上演的「老戲碼」，看不出任何新意。
這場運動若只是捧紅了兩名二十多歲的學運領袖，這個社會承付的代價未免太大了。但如果學運的參與者與觀察者驀然回首，能發現這場學運其實只是恐懼心理及失敗主義的台獨鎖國老梗，則這個「見山又是山」的過程，也算是讓大家又增長了一些政治見識。
學運欲以《兩岸協定締結條例》作為這場太陽花學運的法律印記，這要看學運要角的堅持程度如何。即使聽任立法院以藍綠惡鬥來面對這個版本，恐怕已不可開交；倘若學運要角堅持立院非通過此一版本，那就更難以收拾。
這一代「全球化世代」的生涯確實十分辛苦，西班牙沒有「兩岸問題」，青年失業率達五十七‧七％，整個歐元區亦達二十四‧二％。因此，台灣青年應認知，「全球化」及「兩岸問題」不是馬英九一個人造成的，且不解決兩岸問題就很難解決全球化問題，而不贏得全球化的挑戰即難以節制兩岸關係。因此，台灣新世代絕對不能有「逃中／避中／逃全球化／避全球化」的失敗主義心理，而應知無論對兩岸競合或全球競合而言，皆須有「不要想著贏／要想不能輸」的迎戰決志。
Tuesday, April 8, 2014
Student Movement: Beware of Becoming What You Denounce
Student Movement: Beware of Becoming What You Denounce
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 9, 2014
Summary: Week three will be a test for the student movement. We hope that upon emerging from the legislature their members will become more mature. We hope they will not replicate the dirty politics they themselves deplored. We hope they will not become replicas of the very people they criticized.
Full text below:
Wang Jin-pyng provided the student movement a bully pulpit. The student movement reciprocated by rolling out the red carpet. This is how the 3/18 student movement announced a peaceful conclusion to the protests. Many are relieved. Many others are worried. Why did this high profile student movement seem so familiar? Why did it exhibit so many of the same traits as realpolitik?
Conclusions about the 3/18 student movement may be premature. After all, the students have yet to actually vacate the premises. Also, the students have threatened to expand their protests into the community with a "May the Flowers Bloom" movement. What happens next remains to be seen. But overall student movement mobilization was successful and its public relations were impressive. The movement's impact on the CSSTA exceeded expectations. These are worthy of affirmation. More importantly, they allowed the younger generation to express its views on cross-strait issues. Their strong attitudes surprised the older generation.
But from another perspective, the student occupation of the legislature was illegal. The student leaders' manner of addressing government officials showed a lack of respect for others' dignity and equality. The manner in which they demanded that legislators sign a letter of consent was high-handed. The manner in which they called for public demonstrations of solidarity was flippant. The manner in which they demanded legislative approval of their "Articles for the Supervision of Cross-Strait Agreements" without question was self-righteous. It lacked any understanding of democracy and its manner of operation. These are faults that the young people who led or participated in the student movement, including those who merely stood on Ketegelan Boulevard, must contemplate.
Student movements invariably demand reform. This is why the 3/18 student movement has won respect. The public is willing to listen to young people. After alll, the government is obligated to build a better future for the next generation. It has a responsibility to amend existing policy. But respect for the protesters' right to free speech, does not mean endorsing everything they do. Still less does it mean that all the students' demands should be fulfilled unconditionally. If students are laboring under that sort of delusion, they have underestimated the complexity of a nation's operations.
The day student leaders announced they were withdrawing, other student movement members on the legislature floor opposed any sort of withdrawal. One radical member was so incensed he denounced the decision to withdraw as "black box operations," arrived at without public debate. He said any decision to withdraw should be subject to an "All Peoples' Forum." This brief interlude shattered the student movement's democratic pretensions.
The 3/18 student movement was ostensibly a protest against the ruling KMT's "black box operations" vis a vis the CSSTA. Consider the epithet "black box operations." It is such a self-righteous slogan. But a mere three weeks later, a dispute over whether to withdraw has resulted in the "black box operations" epithet directed at student leaders by their own comrades. This boomerang effect confirms that critics must also accept criticism. The students should be feeling the sting by now.
Should the students withdraw? Is there any way to hold an "All Peoples Forum" before making a decision, as one dissident demanded? Of course not. Where are "all the people" amidst this mass movement? For 20 odd days, the student movement protest site has brimmed over with such sloganeering. The students held a "People's Assembly" in the Legislative Yuan. Chen Ting boasted, "We are the masters of this island!" Lin Fei-fan shouted, "President Ma, obey The Peoples' commands." The crowd has made the term "The People" sacrosanct. These "commanders" have designated themselves the personification of "The People." But they simultaneously ground elected heads of state and elected representatives underfoot. For democracy, the scene was contradictory, ironic, and absurd.
The student movement experienced three schisms. Schism One. The hawks and the doves clashed. The result was the violent occupation of the Executive Yuan. Schism Two. The elites and the unwashed clashed amidst a class struggle. The result was an "Untouchables Liberation Zone." Schism Three. Differences over whether to withdraw may have led to the "May the Flowers Bloom" compromise. These differences and disputes were not necessarily bad. They may at least prompt key members of the student movement to reflect upon the need for organization and communications. From the outside, this marks the inevitable tarnishing of the student movement halo. Political movements, after all, are merely temporary means of mobilization. They are not the norm. Therefore three weeks is long enough for the sanctimonius, imperious student movement to reach the end of their rope.
We admire the student movement's organization, mobilization, public relations, and maintainence of order. The younger generation made full use of its advantages. But the student movement's violent occupation of public buildings, supercilious rhetoric, and blanket rejection of dissent, are hard to countenance. In particular, the student leaders blindly demonized the officials who signed the CSSTA. Yet they gave the ruling and opposition legislators who failed to review the bill a free pass. Privately, they engaged in under the table transactions through go-betweens. This is probably the the student movement's mos serious blind spot and failure.
Week three will be a test for the student movement. We hope that upon emerging from the legislature their members will become more mature. We hope they will not replicate the dirty politics they themselves deplored. We hope they will not become replicas of the very people they criticized.
學運慎勿淪為自己批評對象的翻版
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.04.09 04:48 am
王金平幫學生搭起了下台階，學生為王金平鋪上了紅地毯，三一八學運以這樣的方式宣布和平收場，讓許多人鬆了一口氣。但與此同時，不少人恐怕也因此感到憂心：一場轟轟烈烈的學生運動，為何許多地方看起來如此眼熟，甚至複製了現實政治？
現在就要對三一八學運作出總結，或嫌太早；畢竟，學生尚未真正撤離，而且學生揚言未來將走入社會「遍地開花」持續運動，後勢仍有待觀察。但整體而言，學運在組織動員上是成功的，在宣傳整合上是令人刮目相看的，在反服貿抗爭上收到了超乎預期的效果；這些，都是值得正面看待的部分。更重要的是，他們表達了年輕世代對兩岸議題的不同聲音，其態度之強烈，是上一代所始料未及。
但從另一方面看，學生們占領國會議場的手段是非法的，他們要求政府官員對話的方式缺乏尊重與對等的教養，他們要求立委簽署同意書的動作流於霸道，他們呼喚群眾前來聲援的態度過嫌輕率，他們要求國會直接接受所謂民間版《兩岸協議監督條例》則顯得自以為是，缺乏民主和體制運作的概念。這些，是所有領導或參與此次學運，乃至只是在凱道或網路上表態的年輕人，必須省思的事。
任何學運都帶有呼籲改革的本質，這是三一八學運受到重視及珍惜的原因。社會大眾願意聆聽年輕人的聲音，是因為國家有義務為下一代建構更美好的前景，也有責任修正既有政策的偏差。然而，包容或尊重示威者的發言權，並不表示承認他們的一切行徑合理，更不意味學生的所有要求都應該被無條件答應；學生若有那樣的執念，就未免太小看了一個國家運作的精密及複雜程度。
觀察宣布退場那天的情況，議場內顯然有其他成員反對撤出。一名激進者甚至激動怒罵退場的決定是「黑箱作業」，未經公開討論；他並說，要退場，應該經過「全民討論」才行。短短的一幕，便戳破了學運自身披掛的民主表相。
試想，三一八學運的發動，是因反對執政黨服貿協議的「黑箱作業」而起；這「黑箱」二字，喊得多麼義正詞嚴。但也不過三周的時光，這張「黑箱」的標籤，只因為退場之爭，便由同志貼回了學運領袖身上。這種「回力棒」效應，證明批評者也須接受批評，學生不該一無感受吧！
再說，學生要不要撤退，有沒有辦法像那名異議者所提的那樣，先經過「全民討論」再作決定？當然不可能！群眾運動的現場，全民在哪裡？然而，這廿多天來，學運場上充斥著這個全稱式的字眼，學生在議場召開「人民會議」，陳為廷宣稱：「我們才是這個島嶼的主人！」林飛帆高呼：「馬總統，請你接受人民指揮。」在學運場上，群眾可以把「人民」喊得那麼神聖，指揮者可以把自己膨脹成人民的化身，卻同時又把經選舉產生的國家元首和代議士踩在腳下；這一幕，是矛盾，也是反諷，更是民主的荒謬。
這次學運歷經三次分裂：第一次，是鷹派與鴿派的路線之爭，結果產生了攻占行政院的暴衝事件；第二次，是菁英與賤民的階級之爭，因此有了「賤民解放區」的論壇設置；第三次，則是撤離議場與否的意見分歧，所以才會有「遍地開花」的妥協。這些歧見與爭執，未必全是壞事，至少促使學運核心成員反省組織及溝通的方式。而從外界看來，這也是學運光環殞落的必然過程，運動畢竟只是社會動員的暫時形式，而不是常態；於是，僅僅三週也夠讓神聖、銳氣逼人的學運圖窮匕現了。
對這次學運的組織、動員、宣傳和秩序，我們深感佩服，年輕的一代充分運用了他們的優勢。但對於這次學運的占領手段、霸道的論述方式、對異議者的一味否定，則讓人難以苟同。尤其，學運領袖一味醜化行政部門簽訂服貿協議的用心，對於朝野立委不認真審議的作為卻不以為意，而私下又和某些「黑手」進行交易，這恐怕是此次學運最大的盲點與敗筆。
這三周的運動對學生是一場試煉，我們期待，走出議場能使他們變得更成熟，切勿複製自己聲言不齒的政治伎倆，更勿變成自己批評對象的翻版。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 9, 2014
Summary: Week three will be a test for the student movement. We hope that upon emerging from the legislature their members will become more mature. We hope they will not replicate the dirty politics they themselves deplored. We hope they will not become replicas of the very people they criticized.
Full text below:
Wang Jin-pyng provided the student movement a bully pulpit. The student movement reciprocated by rolling out the red carpet. This is how the 3/18 student movement announced a peaceful conclusion to the protests. Many are relieved. Many others are worried. Why did this high profile student movement seem so familiar? Why did it exhibit so many of the same traits as realpolitik?
Conclusions about the 3/18 student movement may be premature. After all, the students have yet to actually vacate the premises. Also, the students have threatened to expand their protests into the community with a "May the Flowers Bloom" movement. What happens next remains to be seen. But overall student movement mobilization was successful and its public relations were impressive. The movement's impact on the CSSTA exceeded expectations. These are worthy of affirmation. More importantly, they allowed the younger generation to express its views on cross-strait issues. Their strong attitudes surprised the older generation.
But from another perspective, the student occupation of the legislature was illegal. The student leaders' manner of addressing government officials showed a lack of respect for others' dignity and equality. The manner in which they demanded that legislators sign a letter of consent was high-handed. The manner in which they called for public demonstrations of solidarity was flippant. The manner in which they demanded legislative approval of their "Articles for the Supervision of Cross-Strait Agreements" without question was self-righteous. It lacked any understanding of democracy and its manner of operation. These are faults that the young people who led or participated in the student movement, including those who merely stood on Ketegelan Boulevard, must contemplate.
Student movements invariably demand reform. This is why the 3/18 student movement has won respect. The public is willing to listen to young people. After alll, the government is obligated to build a better future for the next generation. It has a responsibility to amend existing policy. But respect for the protesters' right to free speech, does not mean endorsing everything they do. Still less does it mean that all the students' demands should be fulfilled unconditionally. If students are laboring under that sort of delusion, they have underestimated the complexity of a nation's operations.
The day student leaders announced they were withdrawing, other student movement members on the legislature floor opposed any sort of withdrawal. One radical member was so incensed he denounced the decision to withdraw as "black box operations," arrived at without public debate. He said any decision to withdraw should be subject to an "All Peoples' Forum." This brief interlude shattered the student movement's democratic pretensions.
The 3/18 student movement was ostensibly a protest against the ruling KMT's "black box operations" vis a vis the CSSTA. Consider the epithet "black box operations." It is such a self-righteous slogan. But a mere three weeks later, a dispute over whether to withdraw has resulted in the "black box operations" epithet directed at student leaders by their own comrades. This boomerang effect confirms that critics must also accept criticism. The students should be feeling the sting by now.
Should the students withdraw? Is there any way to hold an "All Peoples Forum" before making a decision, as one dissident demanded? Of course not. Where are "all the people" amidst this mass movement? For 20 odd days, the student movement protest site has brimmed over with such sloganeering. The students held a "People's Assembly" in the Legislative Yuan. Chen Ting boasted, "We are the masters of this island!" Lin Fei-fan shouted, "President Ma, obey The Peoples' commands." The crowd has made the term "The People" sacrosanct. These "commanders" have designated themselves the personification of "The People." But they simultaneously ground elected heads of state and elected representatives underfoot. For democracy, the scene was contradictory, ironic, and absurd.
The student movement experienced three schisms. Schism One. The hawks and the doves clashed. The result was the violent occupation of the Executive Yuan. Schism Two. The elites and the unwashed clashed amidst a class struggle. The result was an "Untouchables Liberation Zone." Schism Three. Differences over whether to withdraw may have led to the "May the Flowers Bloom" compromise. These differences and disputes were not necessarily bad. They may at least prompt key members of the student movement to reflect upon the need for organization and communications. From the outside, this marks the inevitable tarnishing of the student movement halo. Political movements, after all, are merely temporary means of mobilization. They are not the norm. Therefore three weeks is long enough for the sanctimonius, imperious student movement to reach the end of their rope.
We admire the student movement's organization, mobilization, public relations, and maintainence of order. The younger generation made full use of its advantages. But the student movement's violent occupation of public buildings, supercilious rhetoric, and blanket rejection of dissent, are hard to countenance. In particular, the student leaders blindly demonized the officials who signed the CSSTA. Yet they gave the ruling and opposition legislators who failed to review the bill a free pass. Privately, they engaged in under the table transactions through go-betweens. This is probably the the student movement's mos serious blind spot and failure.
Week three will be a test for the student movement. We hope that upon emerging from the legislature their members will become more mature. We hope they will not replicate the dirty politics they themselves deplored. We hope they will not become replicas of the very people they criticized.
學運慎勿淪為自己批評對象的翻版
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.04.09 04:48 am
王金平幫學生搭起了下台階，學生為王金平鋪上了紅地毯，三一八學運以這樣的方式宣布和平收場，讓許多人鬆了一口氣。但與此同時，不少人恐怕也因此感到憂心：一場轟轟烈烈的學生運動，為何許多地方看起來如此眼熟，甚至複製了現實政治？
現在就要對三一八學運作出總結，或嫌太早；畢竟，學生尚未真正撤離，而且學生揚言未來將走入社會「遍地開花」持續運動，後勢仍有待觀察。但整體而言，學運在組織動員上是成功的，在宣傳整合上是令人刮目相看的，在反服貿抗爭上收到了超乎預期的效果；這些，都是值得正面看待的部分。更重要的是，他們表達了年輕世代對兩岸議題的不同聲音，其態度之強烈，是上一代所始料未及。
但從另一方面看，學生們占領國會議場的手段是非法的，他們要求政府官員對話的方式缺乏尊重與對等的教養，他們要求立委簽署同意書的動作流於霸道，他們呼喚群眾前來聲援的態度過嫌輕率，他們要求國會直接接受所謂民間版《兩岸協議監督條例》則顯得自以為是，缺乏民主和體制運作的概念。這些，是所有領導或參與此次學運，乃至只是在凱道或網路上表態的年輕人，必須省思的事。
任何學運都帶有呼籲改革的本質，這是三一八學運受到重視及珍惜的原因。社會大眾願意聆聽年輕人的聲音，是因為國家有義務為下一代建構更美好的前景，也有責任修正既有政策的偏差。然而，包容或尊重示威者的發言權，並不表示承認他們的一切行徑合理，更不意味學生的所有要求都應該被無條件答應；學生若有那樣的執念，就未免太小看了一個國家運作的精密及複雜程度。
觀察宣布退場那天的情況，議場內顯然有其他成員反對撤出。一名激進者甚至激動怒罵退場的決定是「黑箱作業」，未經公開討論；他並說，要退場，應該經過「全民討論」才行。短短的一幕，便戳破了學運自身披掛的民主表相。
試想，三一八學運的發動，是因反對執政黨服貿協議的「黑箱作業」而起；這「黑箱」二字，喊得多麼義正詞嚴。但也不過三周的時光，這張「黑箱」的標籤，只因為退場之爭，便由同志貼回了學運領袖身上。這種「回力棒」效應，證明批評者也須接受批評，學生不該一無感受吧！
再說，學生要不要撤退，有沒有辦法像那名異議者所提的那樣，先經過「全民討論」再作決定？當然不可能！群眾運動的現場，全民在哪裡？然而，這廿多天來，學運場上充斥著這個全稱式的字眼，學生在議場召開「人民會議」，陳為廷宣稱：「我們才是這個島嶼的主人！」林飛帆高呼：「馬總統，請你接受人民指揮。」在學運場上，群眾可以把「人民」喊得那麼神聖，指揮者可以把自己膨脹成人民的化身，卻同時又把經選舉產生的國家元首和代議士踩在腳下；這一幕，是矛盾，也是反諷，更是民主的荒謬。
這次學運歷經三次分裂：第一次，是鷹派與鴿派的路線之爭，結果產生了攻占行政院的暴衝事件；第二次，是菁英與賤民的階級之爭，因此有了「賤民解放區」的論壇設置；第三次，則是撤離議場與否的意見分歧，所以才會有「遍地開花」的妥協。這些歧見與爭執，未必全是壞事，至少促使學運核心成員反省組織及溝通的方式。而從外界看來，這也是學運光環殞落的必然過程，運動畢竟只是社會動員的暫時形式，而不是常態；於是，僅僅三週也夠讓神聖、銳氣逼人的學運圖窮匕現了。
對這次學運的組織、動員、宣傳和秩序，我們深感佩服，年輕的一代充分運用了他們的優勢。但對於這次學運的占領手段、霸道的論述方式、對異議者的一味否定，則讓人難以苟同。尤其，學運領袖一味醜化行政部門簽訂服貿協議的用心，對於朝野立委不認真審議的作為卻不以為意，而私下又和某些「黑手」進行交易，這恐怕是此次學運最大的盲點與敗筆。
這三周的運動對學生是一場試煉，我們期待，走出議場能使他們變得更成熟，切勿複製自己聲言不齒的政治伎倆，更勿變成自己批評對象的翻版。
Monday, April 7, 2014
CSSTA vs. Delusion of Modest but Real Wealth
CSSTA vs. Delusion of Modest but Real Wealth
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 8, 2014
Summary: Establishing monitoring mechanisms does not require withdrawing the CSSTA. Doing so would be pointless. First of all, many people do not oppose the CSSTA. Many people took part in one public hearing after another over the past nine months. Restarting negotiations would negatively impact the perception of the Mainland and the international community. This must not be treated lightly.
Full text below:
The Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) controversy remains unresolved. The government has responded to student movement demands and made numerous concessions. Yet the students remain unmoved and refuse to disperse. The anti-CSSTA protests are motivated by a mix of Sinophobic sentiment and generational rage. These feelings express themselves both internally and externally. That is why simple solutions are impossible.
The students and masses opposed to the CSSTA hold a variety of views. View One. Even if Taiwan and the Mainland sign the CSSTA, the Mainland will not necessarily green light Taiwan's participation in regional integration. View Two. Even if Taiwan fails to interact with the Mainland, and even if it fails to participate in regional economic integration, it need not be marginalized. View Three. Even if Taiwan is marginalized, it will not matter, as long as the public on Taiwan can enjoy "modest but real wealth." At least Mainland China's influence will not be able to extend to Taiwan.
These are dangerous views. They are no less dangerous than cross-strait opening. First of all, no one can guarantee that once the two sides sign the CSSTA and SSGTA, Taiwan will be able to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or ASEAN 10 plus 6 (RCEP). These require mutual trust through cross-strait dialogue. On the other hand, if the CSSTA is stillborn, one can be sure the road to the TPP will be a bumpy one. Never mind the road to the RCEP.
Secondly, will Taiwan be marginalized? Basically, all economic agreements or integration mechanisms provide benefits to signatories, but shut out non-signatories. If Taiwan is not part of economic integration, it can still export its services or goods. But without tariff concessions, price will be higher. Competitiveness will inevitably be lost to member nations. More importantly, the TPP and other economic integration mechanisms involve numerous regulations. They deny non-members export opportunities. For example, the United States is demanding that TPP member nations use fabrics and key components in order to qualify for duty-free export of clothing and machine tools. These provisions will gradually result in our marginalization.
Thirdly, it is rational to invoke "modest but real wealth" logic when dealing with the Mainland Leviathan? The Mainland is now the world's second largest economy. It is the largest economic partner of most nations in the Asian-Pacific region. Two decades of experience has shown that attempts to block industry interaction with the Mainland are futile. Besides, individuals may pursue "modest but real wealth," but nations cannot. South Korea, Japan, and even the Mainland are pursuing "grand but real wealth." The pursuit of "modest but real wealth" will merely cause Taiwan to shrivel up. Taiwan will be deprived of bargaining chips by which it can deal with cross-strait risk. It will find it more difficult to resist Mainland influence. Academics opposed to the CSSTA argue that a mere 7% devaluation of the NTD is equivalent to signing agreements with other countries. But if the nation's assets instantly shrink by 7%, and the price of imported goods immediately grow by 7%, what happens to our "modest but real wealth?"
All these disputes are over how Taiwan should deal with the Mainland. Anti-Ma sentiment coupled with distrust of the government prevents focusing on real problems. Therefore if President Ma wants to handle this problem, he must resolve new generation distrust, rather than repeatedly stress the importance of the CSSTA.
As we all know, promoting the CSSTA is important. It will revive the economy. It will enable Taiwan to join the TPP and RCEP, via free trade agreements with Asia and the rest of the world. If cross-strait economic and trade relations are obstructed, regional integration will be more difficult, and Taiwan may well be shut out.
Take the 12 member US-led TPP. Mainland China has yet to join. But the Mainland is already the largest trading partner of the six largest member nations. It is the second largest trading partner of the five other member nations. When Taiwan lobbies these states for support, it will have to answer the following questions. Is Taiwan ready? Does the U.S. support Taiwan's membership? Does Beijing support Taiwan's membership? These are questions we must answer. The more we are ready, the more U.S. support will appear. As for the last question, "Does Beijing support Taiwan's membership?" How will we answer? On this we must be pragmatic.
The CSSTA negotiation process definitely had problems with transparency. A line item review is necessary. The current monitoring mechanism for cross-strait agreements dates back to an era when almost no interaction took place between the two sides. It is no longer adequate. The public expects greater transparency in cross-strait agreements. Therefore legislation establishing monitoring mechanisms in step with the times is essential.
Establishing monitoring mechanisms however, does not require withdrawing the CSSTA. Doing so would be pointless. First of all, many people do not oppose the CSSTA. Many people took part in one public hearing after another over the past nine months. Restarting negotiations would negatively impact the perception of the Mainland and the international community. This must not be treated lightly. Therefore the establishment of a monitoring mechanism and the review of the CSSTA can be conducted simultaneously. That for Taiwan, is the most beneficial arrangement.
反服貿若只為追求小確幸，恐成虛幻
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.04.08 02:45 am
兩岸服貿協議之爭迄今無解。政府對於學運的要求雖有回應及讓步，但學生並不埋單，堅持不退。服貿抗爭背後夾雜著複雜的反中、恐中情緒及世代忿懣，對外對內兩種情緒交互糾纏，因而難有簡單的解方。
綜合反服貿學生和群眾的意見，大約可歸為幾類：一，是認為即使台灣和大陸簽署兩岸服貿協議，中國大陸也未必對台灣加入區域整合「亮綠燈」；二是認為即使台灣不與中國大陸互動，甚至不加入區域經貿整合，也不至於被「邊緣化」；三是認為台灣即使被邊緣化也沒關係，只要人民能過著「小確幸」的生活就好，至少中國的影響不會進到台灣。
這些說法，都具有相當高的風險，且其風險並不低於兩岸開放。首先，確實沒有人可以保證兩岸簽署服貿或貨貿協議後，就能爭取到加入跨太平洋夥伴協定（ＴＰＰ）或東協十加六（ＲＣＥＰ），因為這還需靠兩岸保持對話創造互信；但如果服貿協議胎死腹中，幾可斷言進入ＴＰＰ之路勢必坎坷，遑論加入ＲＣＥＰ。
其次，台灣會不會被「邊緣化」？基本上，所有經濟協議或整合機制都是為了提供簽約國相互優惠，而排擠非成員國。台灣若不加入經濟整合，服務或貨品照樣可以出口，只不過因沒有關稅優惠，價格優勢會越來越低，競爭力必然輸給其他加盟國。更重要的是，ＴＰＰ等經濟整合體會設下很多規定，直接排除非成員的出口機會；例如美國要求成衣、工具機出口要享免稅，必須使用來自ＴＰＰ成員國的布料及關鍵零組件。這些排擠規定，會逐漸造成我們的邊緣化。
第三，用「小確幸」對抗中國這條「大鯨魚」是否理性思考？中國已成為世界第二大經濟體，也是亞太地區大部分國家的最大經濟夥伴；過去二十年的經驗證明，台灣任何阻擋產業互動的政策都擋不住這個大趨勢。更何況，個人可以追求小確幸，但國家不能。特別是當韓國、日本甚至中國都在創造大確幸時，小確幸只會讓台灣愈發萎縮，更沒有籌碼處理兩岸風險，更難防止中國影響。反服貿學者說，只要新台幣貶值七％，其效果就等同與各國簽訂協定；但是，所有國民的資產立刻縮水七％，進口商品立刻大漲價，「小確幸」豈非立刻破滅？
這一切，涉及的都是「如何面對中國」的路線之爭，由於社會上的「反馬」情緒，加上對政府的不信任，使得討論無法聚焦。因此，馬總統處理此一問題，必須先化解新世代反彈與不信任，而非一再強調服貿協議的重要性。
眾所周知，台灣推動服貿一個很重要的理由，除了為經濟帶來活水，更要透過服貿協議走向亞太及世界，加入ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ。若兩岸經貿關係不順，加入區域整合的變數必然提高，也會加深台灣被排擠的危機。
以美國主導的ＴＰＰ為例，中國大陸雖尚未參加，但大陸已是十二個成員國其中六國的最大貿易夥伴，也是另外五國的第二大貿易夥伴。在這個情況下，當台灣遊說各國爭取支持時，必會面對以下的問題：台灣準備好了嗎？美國支持台灣嗎？北京支持台灣加入嗎？上述問題，準備工作操之在我，當我們準備程度越高，美國的支持就會出現；但對於最後一個問題「北京支持嗎」，我們將如何回答，就需要大家務實面對。
服貿協議在談判及協商過程中，確實存在不透明的問題，所以重新檢驗、逐條審查是必要的程序。目前兩岸協議的監督機制，是建立在兩岸幾乎沒有互動的年代，已不敷使用，也不符合社會對兩岸協議需要更高透明度的期待；因此，透過立法建立合乎時代需求的監督機制，亦是必要的。
但是，為了建立監督機制而要求退回服貿，卻顯得沒有意義。首先，很多民眾並不反對服貿協議本身，而過去九個月一場場的公聽會也有許多民眾參與。何況，重啟談判必須考量中國大陸和國際社會的反應和觀感，不可率爾為之。所以，監督條例立法與服貿審查同步進行，才是對台灣最有利的安排。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 8, 2014
Summary: Establishing monitoring mechanisms does not require withdrawing the CSSTA. Doing so would be pointless. First of all, many people do not oppose the CSSTA. Many people took part in one public hearing after another over the past nine months. Restarting negotiations would negatively impact the perception of the Mainland and the international community. This must not be treated lightly.
Full text below:
The Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) controversy remains unresolved. The government has responded to student movement demands and made numerous concessions. Yet the students remain unmoved and refuse to disperse. The anti-CSSTA protests are motivated by a mix of Sinophobic sentiment and generational rage. These feelings express themselves both internally and externally. That is why simple solutions are impossible.
The students and masses opposed to the CSSTA hold a variety of views. View One. Even if Taiwan and the Mainland sign the CSSTA, the Mainland will not necessarily green light Taiwan's participation in regional integration. View Two. Even if Taiwan fails to interact with the Mainland, and even if it fails to participate in regional economic integration, it need not be marginalized. View Three. Even if Taiwan is marginalized, it will not matter, as long as the public on Taiwan can enjoy "modest but real wealth." At least Mainland China's influence will not be able to extend to Taiwan.
These are dangerous views. They are no less dangerous than cross-strait opening. First of all, no one can guarantee that once the two sides sign the CSSTA and SSGTA, Taiwan will be able to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or ASEAN 10 plus 6 (RCEP). These require mutual trust through cross-strait dialogue. On the other hand, if the CSSTA is stillborn, one can be sure the road to the TPP will be a bumpy one. Never mind the road to the RCEP.
Secondly, will Taiwan be marginalized? Basically, all economic agreements or integration mechanisms provide benefits to signatories, but shut out non-signatories. If Taiwan is not part of economic integration, it can still export its services or goods. But without tariff concessions, price will be higher. Competitiveness will inevitably be lost to member nations. More importantly, the TPP and other economic integration mechanisms involve numerous regulations. They deny non-members export opportunities. For example, the United States is demanding that TPP member nations use fabrics and key components in order to qualify for duty-free export of clothing and machine tools. These provisions will gradually result in our marginalization.
Thirdly, it is rational to invoke "modest but real wealth" logic when dealing with the Mainland Leviathan? The Mainland is now the world's second largest economy. It is the largest economic partner of most nations in the Asian-Pacific region. Two decades of experience has shown that attempts to block industry interaction with the Mainland are futile. Besides, individuals may pursue "modest but real wealth," but nations cannot. South Korea, Japan, and even the Mainland are pursuing "grand but real wealth." The pursuit of "modest but real wealth" will merely cause Taiwan to shrivel up. Taiwan will be deprived of bargaining chips by which it can deal with cross-strait risk. It will find it more difficult to resist Mainland influence. Academics opposed to the CSSTA argue that a mere 7% devaluation of the NTD is equivalent to signing agreements with other countries. But if the nation's assets instantly shrink by 7%, and the price of imported goods immediately grow by 7%, what happens to our "modest but real wealth?"
All these disputes are over how Taiwan should deal with the Mainland. Anti-Ma sentiment coupled with distrust of the government prevents focusing on real problems. Therefore if President Ma wants to handle this problem, he must resolve new generation distrust, rather than repeatedly stress the importance of the CSSTA.
As we all know, promoting the CSSTA is important. It will revive the economy. It will enable Taiwan to join the TPP and RCEP, via free trade agreements with Asia and the rest of the world. If cross-strait economic and trade relations are obstructed, regional integration will be more difficult, and Taiwan may well be shut out.
Take the 12 member US-led TPP. Mainland China has yet to join. But the Mainland is already the largest trading partner of the six largest member nations. It is the second largest trading partner of the five other member nations. When Taiwan lobbies these states for support, it will have to answer the following questions. Is Taiwan ready? Does the U.S. support Taiwan's membership? Does Beijing support Taiwan's membership? These are questions we must answer. The more we are ready, the more U.S. support will appear. As for the last question, "Does Beijing support Taiwan's membership?" How will we answer? On this we must be pragmatic.
The CSSTA negotiation process definitely had problems with transparency. A line item review is necessary. The current monitoring mechanism for cross-strait agreements dates back to an era when almost no interaction took place between the two sides. It is no longer adequate. The public expects greater transparency in cross-strait agreements. Therefore legislation establishing monitoring mechanisms in step with the times is essential.
Establishing monitoring mechanisms however, does not require withdrawing the CSSTA. Doing so would be pointless. First of all, many people do not oppose the CSSTA. Many people took part in one public hearing after another over the past nine months. Restarting negotiations would negatively impact the perception of the Mainland and the international community. This must not be treated lightly. Therefore the establishment of a monitoring mechanism and the review of the CSSTA can be conducted simultaneously. That for Taiwan, is the most beneficial arrangement.
反服貿若只為追求小確幸，恐成虛幻
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.04.08 02:45 am
兩岸服貿協議之爭迄今無解。政府對於學運的要求雖有回應及讓步，但學生並不埋單，堅持不退。服貿抗爭背後夾雜著複雜的反中、恐中情緒及世代忿懣，對外對內兩種情緒交互糾纏，因而難有簡單的解方。
綜合反服貿學生和群眾的意見，大約可歸為幾類：一，是認為即使台灣和大陸簽署兩岸服貿協議，中國大陸也未必對台灣加入區域整合「亮綠燈」；二是認為即使台灣不與中國大陸互動，甚至不加入區域經貿整合，也不至於被「邊緣化」；三是認為台灣即使被邊緣化也沒關係，只要人民能過著「小確幸」的生活就好，至少中國的影響不會進到台灣。
這些說法，都具有相當高的風險，且其風險並不低於兩岸開放。首先，確實沒有人可以保證兩岸簽署服貿或貨貿協議後，就能爭取到加入跨太平洋夥伴協定（ＴＰＰ）或東協十加六（ＲＣＥＰ），因為這還需靠兩岸保持對話創造互信；但如果服貿協議胎死腹中，幾可斷言進入ＴＰＰ之路勢必坎坷，遑論加入ＲＣＥＰ。
其次，台灣會不會被「邊緣化」？基本上，所有經濟協議或整合機制都是為了提供簽約國相互優惠，而排擠非成員國。台灣若不加入經濟整合，服務或貨品照樣可以出口，只不過因沒有關稅優惠，價格優勢會越來越低，競爭力必然輸給其他加盟國。更重要的是，ＴＰＰ等經濟整合體會設下很多規定，直接排除非成員的出口機會；例如美國要求成衣、工具機出口要享免稅，必須使用來自ＴＰＰ成員國的布料及關鍵零組件。這些排擠規定，會逐漸造成我們的邊緣化。
第三，用「小確幸」對抗中國這條「大鯨魚」是否理性思考？中國已成為世界第二大經濟體，也是亞太地區大部分國家的最大經濟夥伴；過去二十年的經驗證明，台灣任何阻擋產業互動的政策都擋不住這個大趨勢。更何況，個人可以追求小確幸，但國家不能。特別是當韓國、日本甚至中國都在創造大確幸時，小確幸只會讓台灣愈發萎縮，更沒有籌碼處理兩岸風險，更難防止中國影響。反服貿學者說，只要新台幣貶值七％，其效果就等同與各國簽訂協定；但是，所有國民的資產立刻縮水七％，進口商品立刻大漲價，「小確幸」豈非立刻破滅？
這一切，涉及的都是「如何面對中國」的路線之爭，由於社會上的「反馬」情緒，加上對政府的不信任，使得討論無法聚焦。因此，馬總統處理此一問題，必須先化解新世代反彈與不信任，而非一再強調服貿協議的重要性。
眾所周知，台灣推動服貿一個很重要的理由，除了為經濟帶來活水，更要透過服貿協議走向亞太及世界，加入ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ。若兩岸經貿關係不順，加入區域整合的變數必然提高，也會加深台灣被排擠的危機。
以美國主導的ＴＰＰ為例，中國大陸雖尚未參加，但大陸已是十二個成員國其中六國的最大貿易夥伴，也是另外五國的第二大貿易夥伴。在這個情況下，當台灣遊說各國爭取支持時，必會面對以下的問題：台灣準備好了嗎？美國支持台灣嗎？北京支持台灣加入嗎？上述問題，準備工作操之在我，當我們準備程度越高，美國的支持就會出現；但對於最後一個問題「北京支持嗎」，我們將如何回答，就需要大家務實面對。
服貿協議在談判及協商過程中，確實存在不透明的問題，所以重新檢驗、逐條審查是必要的程序。目前兩岸協議的監督機制，是建立在兩岸幾乎沒有互動的年代，已不敷使用，也不符合社會對兩岸協議需要更高透明度的期待；因此，透過立法建立合乎時代需求的監督機制，亦是必要的。
但是，為了建立監督機制而要求退回服貿，卻顯得沒有意義。首先，很多民眾並不反對服貿協議本身，而過去九個月一場場的公聽會也有許多民眾參與。何況，重啟談判必須考量中國大陸和國際社會的反應和觀感，不可率爾為之。所以，監督條例立法與服貿審查同步進行，才是對台灣最有利的安排。
Sunday, April 6, 2014
Globalization and Taiwan's Survival Strategy
Globalization and Taiwan's Survival Strategy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 4, 2014
Summary: The CSSTA debate must not remain mired in Blue vs. Green reunification vs. independence infighting. Any decision regarding the CSSTA must be made on the basis of a globalization-based survival strategy. If Taiwan chooses not to become an island of economic freedom, if it chooses to reject globalization, it will be marginalized both economically and politically. The loss of economic prosperity will mean the loss of political security. Yet those who oppose the CSSTA righteously trumpet their suicidal political views. The political theater surrounding the CSSTA may come across as farce, but it is in fact tragedy.
Full text below:
The debate over the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) must be understood from the perspective of Taiwan's globalization-based survival strategy. Only that allows a macro level, holistic understanding.
If Taiwan hopes to survive globalization, two things are unavoidable. One. It cannot avoid globalization. Two. It cannot avoid cross-strait links.
Globalization for Taiwan remains a challenge. If Taiwan fails to live up to this challenge, it will face a crisis. If it lives up to the challenge, it will enjoy a windfall. This is the big picture that Taiwan cannot avoid. Taiwan's globalization is related to cross-strait links. Why? Because the globalization framework is based on FTAs. Taiwan's globalization must include Mainland China. It must include, for example, ECFA. Taiwan's globalization, which includes the signing FTAs, requires trust between Taipei and Beijing. In short, Taiwan cannot achieve globalization without Mainland China's participation. This is part of the big picture that Taiwan cannot avoid.
Given the logic of globalization, Taiwan's survival strategy must be as follows. One. Sign ECFA and other agreements. This formalizes cross-strait economic and trade exchanges. It builds political goodwill and trust. Two. Having built cross-strait goodwill and trust, Taiwan must sign the TPP, RCEP and other major FTAs. Three. First improve cross-strait relations to promote Taiwan's political and economic globalization. Then use political and economic globalization to manage cross-strait relations.
If Taiwan cannot withstand the pace of globalization, it will inevitably become more economically dependent on the Mainland. It will be politically hijacked by the Mainland as well. Therefore we must use ECFA to consolidate cross-strait links. This, admittedly, is merely part of Taiwan's globalization-based survival strategy. But without this piece of the puzzle, there can be no TPP and RCEP. Taiwan will not be able to implement its globalization-based survival strategy.
In fact, Taiwan's survival may be more threatened than many are willing to admit. Even if it joins the TPP and RCEP, it may still lose in open competition. If internal bickering prevents it from joining regional alliances, its outlook will be even more pessimistic.
Therefore, when debating the CSSTA, one must consider Taiwan's globalization-based survival strategy. One must realize that Taiwan cannot avoid globalization. Taiwan cannot avoid cross-strait links. Taiwan must create a positive relationship between cross-strait links and globalization. Taiwan must avoid creating a negative relationship between cross-strait links and globalization. Internal conflict on Taiwan between the Blue camp and the Green camp over reunification and independence undermines cross-strait relations. Using cross-strait relations to implement Taiwan's globalization-based survival strategy, and creating a positive relationship between the two is difficult.
One must grasp the central concept of globalization before one can have a macro level understanding of the CSSTA. The primary theme of Taiwan's survival strategy must be globalization, with cross-strait links secondary. One must not perceive the issue primarily in terms of "fight or flight" relative to the Mainland, and only secondarily in terms of globalization. That would be a grave mistake.
One. A globalization-based survival strategy means Taiwan must become an island of economic freedom. It must join the TPP. The international reality is that if the Mainland does not join, then Taiwan cannot join. It must join the Mainland led RCEP. These must be its ultimate goals. The TPP and RCEP currently have a total of 21 members. That number will increase. In other words, Taiwan must be ready to open its markets to at least 21 regions or countries, with nearly four billion people, including the Mainland. Taiwan can not delude itself. It cannot globalize without the participation of the Mainland. If it must open itself up to 20 other regions or countries, how can it refuse to open itself up to the Mainland? Two. Beijing has its own globalization-based survival strategy considerations. It has opened its markets to Taiwan. It must also open its markets to other regions or countries. Therefore in the Mainland market, Taiwan must compete with other regions or countries. That is why Perng Huai-nan said that if the CSSTA is signed after an FTA between Mainland China and South Korea, 100 thousand workers in Taiwan's flat panel industry may face unemployment. One might say this is a matter of considerable urgency. Three. The formalization of cross-strait economic and trade relations will soften cross-strait political links, and increase cross-strait political trust. This should encourage mutually beneficial peaceful development. This should discourage the persecution of those who express their views on cross-strait policy. Four. Globalization is Taiwan's only viable survival strategy. If one realizes this, then one ought not incite anti-market opening policies. One should not incite anti-liberalization populist sentiment. The CSSTA makes only partial concessions. Yet it has deeply divided the public on Taiwan. If Taiwan joins future regional trade agreements that require even greater liberalization, consensus is unlikely. Taiwan's globalization-based survival strategy will be shattered. Taiwan will find itself at an impasse.
The CSSTA debate must not remain mired in Blue vs. Green reunification vs. independence infighting. Any decision regarding the CSSTA must be made on the basis of a globalization-based survival strategy. If Taiwan chooses not to become an island of economic freedom, if it chooses to reject globalization, it will be marginalized both economically and politically. The loss of economic prosperity will mean the loss of political security. Yet those who oppose the CSSTA righteously trumpet their suicidal political views. The political theater surrounding the CSSTA may come across as farce, but it is in fact tragedy.
台灣全球化生存戰略的抉擇
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.04.04 04:08 am
這一場服貿協議的爭議，應從「台灣全球化生存戰略」的高度加以認知，始能獲得宏觀與通盤的理解。
就全球化生存戰略言，台灣有兩個「躲不過」。一、躲不過「全球化」；二、躲不過「兩岸連結」。
全球化是台灣的挑戰，輸掉挑戰即是危機，贏得挑戰即是機遇，這是台灣躲不過的大形勢。而台灣的全球化又與「兩岸連結」相關，因為全球化的框架是建立在各種ＦＴＡ之上，一方面，台灣的全球化必定要包含中國大陸（如ＥＣＦＡ體系）；另一方面，台灣的全球化（如加入各種ＦＴＡ）亦必須建立在與北京的互信之上。這就是說，台灣不可能實現一個「甩掉中國的全球化」，這也是台灣躲不過的大形勢。
因此，台灣全球化生存戰略的基本邏輯是：一、透過簽訂ＥＣＦＡ體系等途徑，一則以法制化規範兩岸經貿交流，再則累積雙方在政治上的善意與互信。二、在兩岸的善意及互信上，台灣必須嘗試加入ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ等巨型ＦＴＡ。三、亦即，先藉改善的兩岸政經關係來推進台灣全球化，再藉台灣全球化的政經成果來節制兩岸關係。
台灣若不能站穩全球化的腳步，必然在經濟上更依賴中國，亦在政治上更受中國的挾制。因此，以ＥＣＦＡ體系來穩定「兩岸連結」雖只是台灣全球化生存戰略的一塊拼圖，但若少了這一塊拼圖，就拼不上ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ，也就拼不成台灣全球化生存戰略的全景。
其實，台灣的生存處境可能比許多人想像的更要凶險。因為，即使進入了ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ，台灣也未必能在開放的競爭中保持不敗；但若因陷於內鬥而無法進入區域結盟，台灣的前景必更趨悲觀。
因此，在爭論服貿協議時，不能不以「台灣全球化生存戰略」為思維基準。亦即必須知道：台灣躲不過全球化，也躲不過兩岸連結。台灣必須努力的是：使兩岸連結與全球化發生正向的關聯，而不使兩岸連結成為全球化的負面因素。然而，要在台灣藍綠統獨的內鬥下破壞兩岸關係易如吹灰，但要使兩岸關係在「台灣全球化生存戰略」上產生正向關聯卻是個艱難的工程。
必須先掌握住「全球化」這個中心概念，始能對服貿協議有宏觀的理解。亦即，台灣必須以「全球化」為生存戰略的「主題」，而將兩岸連結視為「子題」；若以對抗或逃避中國大陸為「主題」，卻視「全球化」為無關輕重的「子題」，那就錯得離譜。
因此，一、全球化生存戰略，就是台灣必須贏得「經貿自由島」的地位，而以加入ＴＰＰ（國際現實是：中國不加入，台灣即不可能加入）及ＲＣＥＰ（中國主導）為高階目標。ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ目前共有二十一國（會員仍將增加），也就是台灣至少要有對二十一國近四十億人口市場相互開放的準備，其中包括中國大陸。台灣不可能妄想一個「沒有中國的全球化」，若須對其他二十國開放，豈能不對中國大陸開放？二、北京自己也有其「全球化生存戰略」的考量；亦即，它對台灣開放市場，也須對其他國家開放市場，所以台灣在大陸市場上是與其他國家處於競爭地位。因此彭淮南才會說，若服貿協議簽遲於中韓ＦＴＡ，台灣恐有十萬面板業從業員面臨失業；可謂急如燃眉。三、兩岸經貿關係的法制化，有利於軟化兩岸政治連結，並優化兩岸政治互信；雙邊應當相互鼓勵這種有利「和平發展」的思維及行為，勿使在兩岸政策上持開明立場者遭到挫折。四、若知全球化為台灣唯一可行的生存戰略，即不應煽動反開放、反自由化的民粹情緒；倘片面讓利的服貿協議使台灣社會撕裂至此，未來若要加入開放程度更大的區域貿易協定，民意更無可能達成共識，那就將面臨「台灣全球化生存戰略」的破局，使台灣陷入絕境。
服貿協議爭議不可自陷於藍綠統獨的內鬥層次，而應當將之視為「台灣全球化生存戰略」的大抉擇。台灣若不選擇成為「經貿自由島」的全球化路線，在經濟上及政治上即必趨邊緣化，而經濟既失維繫，政治即失安全。然而，反服貿者竟然能將一個「台灣自殺」的政治主張說得如此正氣凜然，這個笑話其實是個大悲劇。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 4, 2014
Summary: The CSSTA debate must not remain mired in Blue vs. Green reunification vs. independence infighting. Any decision regarding the CSSTA must be made on the basis of a globalization-based survival strategy. If Taiwan chooses not to become an island of economic freedom, if it chooses to reject globalization, it will be marginalized both economically and politically. The loss of economic prosperity will mean the loss of political security. Yet those who oppose the CSSTA righteously trumpet their suicidal political views. The political theater surrounding the CSSTA may come across as farce, but it is in fact tragedy.
Full text below:
The debate over the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) must be understood from the perspective of Taiwan's globalization-based survival strategy. Only that allows a macro level, holistic understanding.
If Taiwan hopes to survive globalization, two things are unavoidable. One. It cannot avoid globalization. Two. It cannot avoid cross-strait links.
Globalization for Taiwan remains a challenge. If Taiwan fails to live up to this challenge, it will face a crisis. If it lives up to the challenge, it will enjoy a windfall. This is the big picture that Taiwan cannot avoid. Taiwan's globalization is related to cross-strait links. Why? Because the globalization framework is based on FTAs. Taiwan's globalization must include Mainland China. It must include, for example, ECFA. Taiwan's globalization, which includes the signing FTAs, requires trust between Taipei and Beijing. In short, Taiwan cannot achieve globalization without Mainland China's participation. This is part of the big picture that Taiwan cannot avoid.
Given the logic of globalization, Taiwan's survival strategy must be as follows. One. Sign ECFA and other agreements. This formalizes cross-strait economic and trade exchanges. It builds political goodwill and trust. Two. Having built cross-strait goodwill and trust, Taiwan must sign the TPP, RCEP and other major FTAs. Three. First improve cross-strait relations to promote Taiwan's political and economic globalization. Then use political and economic globalization to manage cross-strait relations.
If Taiwan cannot withstand the pace of globalization, it will inevitably become more economically dependent on the Mainland. It will be politically hijacked by the Mainland as well. Therefore we must use ECFA to consolidate cross-strait links. This, admittedly, is merely part of Taiwan's globalization-based survival strategy. But without this piece of the puzzle, there can be no TPP and RCEP. Taiwan will not be able to implement its globalization-based survival strategy.
In fact, Taiwan's survival may be more threatened than many are willing to admit. Even if it joins the TPP and RCEP, it may still lose in open competition. If internal bickering prevents it from joining regional alliances, its outlook will be even more pessimistic.
Therefore, when debating the CSSTA, one must consider Taiwan's globalization-based survival strategy. One must realize that Taiwan cannot avoid globalization. Taiwan cannot avoid cross-strait links. Taiwan must create a positive relationship between cross-strait links and globalization. Taiwan must avoid creating a negative relationship between cross-strait links and globalization. Internal conflict on Taiwan between the Blue camp and the Green camp over reunification and independence undermines cross-strait relations. Using cross-strait relations to implement Taiwan's globalization-based survival strategy, and creating a positive relationship between the two is difficult.
One must grasp the central concept of globalization before one can have a macro level understanding of the CSSTA. The primary theme of Taiwan's survival strategy must be globalization, with cross-strait links secondary. One must not perceive the issue primarily in terms of "fight or flight" relative to the Mainland, and only secondarily in terms of globalization. That would be a grave mistake.
One. A globalization-based survival strategy means Taiwan must become an island of economic freedom. It must join the TPP. The international reality is that if the Mainland does not join, then Taiwan cannot join. It must join the Mainland led RCEP. These must be its ultimate goals. The TPP and RCEP currently have a total of 21 members. That number will increase. In other words, Taiwan must be ready to open its markets to at least 21 regions or countries, with nearly four billion people, including the Mainland. Taiwan can not delude itself. It cannot globalize without the participation of the Mainland. If it must open itself up to 20 other regions or countries, how can it refuse to open itself up to the Mainland? Two. Beijing has its own globalization-based survival strategy considerations. It has opened its markets to Taiwan. It must also open its markets to other regions or countries. Therefore in the Mainland market, Taiwan must compete with other regions or countries. That is why Perng Huai-nan said that if the CSSTA is signed after an FTA between Mainland China and South Korea, 100 thousand workers in Taiwan's flat panel industry may face unemployment. One might say this is a matter of considerable urgency. Three. The formalization of cross-strait economic and trade relations will soften cross-strait political links, and increase cross-strait political trust. This should encourage mutually beneficial peaceful development. This should discourage the persecution of those who express their views on cross-strait policy. Four. Globalization is Taiwan's only viable survival strategy. If one realizes this, then one ought not incite anti-market opening policies. One should not incite anti-liberalization populist sentiment. The CSSTA makes only partial concessions. Yet it has deeply divided the public on Taiwan. If Taiwan joins future regional trade agreements that require even greater liberalization, consensus is unlikely. Taiwan's globalization-based survival strategy will be shattered. Taiwan will find itself at an impasse.
The CSSTA debate must not remain mired in Blue vs. Green reunification vs. independence infighting. Any decision regarding the CSSTA must be made on the basis of a globalization-based survival strategy. If Taiwan chooses not to become an island of economic freedom, if it chooses to reject globalization, it will be marginalized both economically and politically. The loss of economic prosperity will mean the loss of political security. Yet those who oppose the CSSTA righteously trumpet their suicidal political views. The political theater surrounding the CSSTA may come across as farce, but it is in fact tragedy.
台灣全球化生存戰略的抉擇
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.04.04 04:08 am
這一場服貿協議的爭議，應從「台灣全球化生存戰略」的高度加以認知，始能獲得宏觀與通盤的理解。
就全球化生存戰略言，台灣有兩個「躲不過」。一、躲不過「全球化」；二、躲不過「兩岸連結」。
全球化是台灣的挑戰，輸掉挑戰即是危機，贏得挑戰即是機遇，這是台灣躲不過的大形勢。而台灣的全球化又與「兩岸連結」相關，因為全球化的框架是建立在各種ＦＴＡ之上，一方面，台灣的全球化必定要包含中國大陸（如ＥＣＦＡ體系）；另一方面，台灣的全球化（如加入各種ＦＴＡ）亦必須建立在與北京的互信之上。這就是說，台灣不可能實現一個「甩掉中國的全球化」，這也是台灣躲不過的大形勢。
因此，台灣全球化生存戰略的基本邏輯是：一、透過簽訂ＥＣＦＡ體系等途徑，一則以法制化規範兩岸經貿交流，再則累積雙方在政治上的善意與互信。二、在兩岸的善意及互信上，台灣必須嘗試加入ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ等巨型ＦＴＡ。三、亦即，先藉改善的兩岸政經關係來推進台灣全球化，再藉台灣全球化的政經成果來節制兩岸關係。
台灣若不能站穩全球化的腳步，必然在經濟上更依賴中國，亦在政治上更受中國的挾制。因此，以ＥＣＦＡ體系來穩定「兩岸連結」雖只是台灣全球化生存戰略的一塊拼圖，但若少了這一塊拼圖，就拼不上ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ，也就拼不成台灣全球化生存戰略的全景。
其實，台灣的生存處境可能比許多人想像的更要凶險。因為，即使進入了ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ，台灣也未必能在開放的競爭中保持不敗；但若因陷於內鬥而無法進入區域結盟，台灣的前景必更趨悲觀。
因此，在爭論服貿協議時，不能不以「台灣全球化生存戰略」為思維基準。亦即必須知道：台灣躲不過全球化，也躲不過兩岸連結。台灣必須努力的是：使兩岸連結與全球化發生正向的關聯，而不使兩岸連結成為全球化的負面因素。然而，要在台灣藍綠統獨的內鬥下破壞兩岸關係易如吹灰，但要使兩岸關係在「台灣全球化生存戰略」上產生正向關聯卻是個艱難的工程。
必須先掌握住「全球化」這個中心概念，始能對服貿協議有宏觀的理解。亦即，台灣必須以「全球化」為生存戰略的「主題」，而將兩岸連結視為「子題」；若以對抗或逃避中國大陸為「主題」，卻視「全球化」為無關輕重的「子題」，那就錯得離譜。
因此，一、全球化生存戰略，就是台灣必須贏得「經貿自由島」的地位，而以加入ＴＰＰ（國際現實是：中國不加入，台灣即不可能加入）及ＲＣＥＰ（中國主導）為高階目標。ＴＰＰ及ＲＣＥＰ目前共有二十一國（會員仍將增加），也就是台灣至少要有對二十一國近四十億人口市場相互開放的準備，其中包括中國大陸。台灣不可能妄想一個「沒有中國的全球化」，若須對其他二十國開放，豈能不對中國大陸開放？二、北京自己也有其「全球化生存戰略」的考量；亦即，它對台灣開放市場，也須對其他國家開放市場，所以台灣在大陸市場上是與其他國家處於競爭地位。因此彭淮南才會說，若服貿協議簽遲於中韓ＦＴＡ，台灣恐有十萬面板業從業員面臨失業；可謂急如燃眉。三、兩岸經貿關係的法制化，有利於軟化兩岸政治連結，並優化兩岸政治互信；雙邊應當相互鼓勵這種有利「和平發展」的思維及行為，勿使在兩岸政策上持開明立場者遭到挫折。四、若知全球化為台灣唯一可行的生存戰略，即不應煽動反開放、反自由化的民粹情緒；倘片面讓利的服貿協議使台灣社會撕裂至此，未來若要加入開放程度更大的區域貿易協定，民意更無可能達成共識，那就將面臨「台灣全球化生存戰略」的破局，使台灣陷入絕境。
服貿協議爭議不可自陷於藍綠統獨的內鬥層次，而應當將之視為「台灣全球化生存戰略」的大抉擇。台灣若不選擇成為「經貿自由島」的全球化路線，在經濟上及政治上即必趨邊緣化，而經濟既失維繫，政治即失安全。然而，反服貿者竟然能將一個「台灣自殺」的政治主張說得如此正氣凜然，這個笑話其實是個大悲劇。
Wednesday, April 2, 2014
Settle Down and Confront Taiwan's Collective Challenge
Settle Down and Confront Taiwan's Collective Challenge
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 3, 2014
Summary: President Ma has responded forthrightly in a number of ways to the student protestors' demands. But the student protestors refuse to acknowledge his efforts. They cling to their hardline "Withdraw the CSSTA! All else is irrelevant" stance. We call on the Ma administration to be patient. Better to settle down and allow society to absorb the shock and resolve the problem.
Full text below:
President Ma has responded forthrightly in a number of ways to the student protestors' demands. But the student protestors refuse to acknowledge his efforts. They cling to their hardline "Withdraw the CSSTA! All else is irrelevant" stance. Agitiation by White Wolf merely hardened the stance of the masses occupying the Legislative Yuan, and intensified the confrontation. We are deeply concerned. If the Ma administration feels compelled to resort to forced evictions, the consequences may be unpredictable. Society on Taiwan may be irreparably split. We call on the Ma administration to be patient. Better to settle down and allow society to absorb the shock and resolve the problem.
It is clear how we got here. The large scale protest march on Sunday gave the student movement a shot in the arm. The government beat a hasty retreat. Most pundits sided with the student movement. Their victories have eclipsed the DPP's eight to nine month long "fillibuster." Quitting while one is ahead may be the rational choice. But the student movement was an irrestible force that conquered everything in its path. They forced the ruling party to retreat, again and again. So what motivation do the students have to retreat? Besides, for many universities, this week is spring break. Students aren't even subject to academic pressures. The student movement already has the advantage. It is free of time pressure. The Ma government may be anxious, but the student movement is not. It has done the math. The longer it can delay implementation of the CSSTA, the greater its victory.
The key lies with the Ma administration, in particular President Ma himself. How exactly will he judge the seriousness of the situation?
Recall the past two weeks. But let us be fair. President Ma forcibly evicted the masses occupying the Executive Yuan. But otherwise he has kept a low profile. He held several press conferences. But each time he adopted a moderate tone. He never once engaged in provocation. He responded to student movement demands in good faith, but clearly to no effect. Instead his responses have merely provided Netizens with more fodder by which to humiliate and ridicule him. As matters stand, even if President Ma were to withdraw the CSSTA, the student movement would probably still refuse to disband. They might even use the opportunity to demand that President Ma step down.
Therefore we suggest that President Ma not be in a hurry to resolve the situation during the current legislative session. He might as as well slow the process down. Let the passage of time provide a solution. Let Taiwan society provide a solution. After all, Taiwan society is stable. Its roots run deep. The dispute will be resolved eventually. We hope future history remembers the CSSTA dispute as a legislative dispute, rather than a bloody clash between police and students. Such wounds are difficult to heal.
We understand the Ma administration's time pressures regarding CSSTA legislation. If the legislation is not passed during this session, TPP and FTA negotiations cannot begin. Taiwan will probably be further marginalized in regional and even global economic competition. President Ma has mentioned this several times in his public statements. Many industry elders, even ECB President Perng Hui-nan, have come forward to emphasize this point. Obviously to no effect. The students and masses inside and outside the Legislative Yuan continue to come and go. They have made clear they are preparing for long term occupation.
As matters stand, the Ma administration and President Ma himself must realize that Taiwan may have to undergo this process as part of its historical evolution. It may be unavoidable pain. The CSSTA itself is not that complicated. But it reflects a multitude of contradictions within Taiwan society. These include of course Blue vs. Green conflictd, reunification vs. independence conflict, and of course class conflict. These economic and social conflicts have simmered for some time. These contradictions and tensions have accumulated for some time. They merely chose the CSSTA to erupt. The Ma administration must not perceive the conflict as purely Blue vs. Green political conflict, and ignore other, more profound social psychological factors. It must not adopt the wrong measures. Otherwise it will pay too high a price.
President Ma must take note of some simple facts.
One. The DPP by itself could not have mobilized so many students. During the current wave of protests, the DPP was actually reduced to a supporting role. It was marginalized. Two. The younger generation protestors inside and outside the legislature have already reached a consensus. Their anger and frustration have long been ignored. They have their own language and mobilization techniques. Unless they decide they no longer wish to play, no one can talk them down. This includes the DPP and Wang Jin-pyng. Three. President Ma's rational persuasion can convince only those who would not have protested in the first place. For those students holding sit-ins inside and outside the legislature, such attempts at persuasion are akin to "mosquito bites on a bull's horn."
Therefore instead of feeling anxious, it would be better to slow things down. At this point, any radical political or legal measures would only provide the protestors the illusion of greater legitimacy. Better to settle down and let Taiwan society heal this wound.
社論－沉澱下來 面對台灣共業
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年04月03日 04:09
儘管馬總統已透過種種不同形式，正面回應了學運團體的多項訴求，但學運團體並不領情，展現「退回服貿、其他免談」的強硬態度。霸占立院議場內外的群眾，也因為白狼糾眾挑釁的激盪，而有愈見激化對立的趨勢，情勢發展到這個局面，我們真的很擔心，如果馬政府迫於無奈展開強力驅離，那將產生更不可預期的後果，屆時將造成台灣社會無可挽回的撕裂，我們呼籲馬政府千萬別躁進，不如沉澱下來，讓社會力吸納、解決這種種問題吧！
情勢的發展已經很清楚，在周日大規模的遊行之後，宛如給抗爭的學運團體打了一針興奮劑，再加上馬政府一路撤退，絕大部分輿論又都站在學運團體這一邊，他們的戰果，早已超過民進黨8、9個月來抵制的成效，儘管「見好就收」是個合理的選擇，但回顧先前的一路攻城掠地、勢如破竹，硬是讓執政黨節節敗退，試問此時此刻，學生們有什麼道理要撤退？更何況不少大學本周恰巧放春假，學生們連罷課的壓力都沒有！所以結論是，學運團體已經占據空間優勢，又沒有時間壓力，馬政府就算再焦急，學運團體可一點都不急，因為他們已經算準了，服貿的立法進程拖得越久，他們就贏得越多。
因而關鍵還是在於，馬政府，特別是馬總統本人，究竟怎麼評估這個嚴峻的情勢！
回顧這一兩周，除了強力驅離群眾攻占政院的行動外，我們必須公平的說，馬總統的姿態一直放得很低，記者會已經開了好幾次，都採取柔性說服的語氣，不見任何挑釁；在回應學運團體訴求上，能回應的都給予善意回應了，但很顯然功效都不大，反而提供網路鄉民更多羞辱揶揄的素材。估計照目前情勢演變，就算馬總統願意退回《服貿協議》，學運團體可能照樣不撤，說不定還進一步發動罷免，要馬總統下台了！
也因為這樣，我們建議馬總統，與其急著非要在本會期解決，不如乾脆放慢腳步，讓時間去解快，讓台灣社會去解決吧！畢竟台灣社會穩定、基礎深厚，爭議終究是會解決的，我們盼望的是，未來台灣歷史記載著是《服貿協議》立法發生重大爭議，而不是記載著警察與學運團體發生血腥衝突！要知道那種傷痕是很難彌補的！
我們當然理解，馬政府對《服貿協議》的立法有時間壓力，如果沒能在本會期完成立法，後續的TPP、FTA談判完全無法啟動，屆時台灣很可能在區域經濟、乃至在全球經濟競爭中被進一步邊緣化。馬總統已經在多次的公開談話中提到了這一點，許多工商界大老，甚至央行總裁彭淮南也都出面強調這一點，但很顯然收效不大，立院內外的學生與群眾照樣川流不息，甚且已表明了要做長期抗戰的準備。
情勢走到了這一步，馬政府，乃至馬總統本人恐怕都必須接受一個事實，這或許是台灣歷史進程中必須經歷的過程，甚至是一個免不了的陣痛。《服貿協議》本身或許並沒有那麼複雜，但它卻折射出台灣社會內部的諸多矛盾，這中間當然有藍綠、統獨對立的政治因素，但它絕對還有階級、世代張力的經濟與社會因素，這些矛盾與張力其實早已蓄積了許久，只是選擇《服貿協議》立法這個出口爆發而已，馬政府如果只是將它簡單理解為藍綠的政治衝突，卻忽略了其它更深層的社會、心理因素，採取錯誤的對策，恐怕會為此付出不小的代價。
馬總統必須承認幾項簡單的事實：
一、單憑民進黨，是動員不了這麼多學生的，民進黨在這波抗爭中，甚至已淪為邊緣化的配角了；二、議場內外的年輕世代，已經擁有他們集體的主體意識，他們的憤怒與無奈長期以來一直被忽略，此刻他們已擁有自己的語言與動員模式，除非他們自己不想玩了，誰也勸不退他們，包括王金平與民進黨在內；三、馬總統的理性說服，只能說服那些本來就不會去抗爭的民眾，對於那些睡在議場內外的學子而言，說直白一些，宛如蚊子叮牛角。
所以，與其急，不如緩吧！此時採取任何過激的政治或司法手段，只會讓他們的抗爭更有正當性，不如沉澱下來，讓台灣社會去治癒這個撕裂吧，一定可以的！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 3, 2014
Summary: President Ma has responded forthrightly in a number of ways to the student protestors' demands. But the student protestors refuse to acknowledge his efforts. They cling to their hardline "Withdraw the CSSTA! All else is irrelevant" stance. We call on the Ma administration to be patient. Better to settle down and allow society to absorb the shock and resolve the problem.
Full text below:
President Ma has responded forthrightly in a number of ways to the student protestors' demands. But the student protestors refuse to acknowledge his efforts. They cling to their hardline "Withdraw the CSSTA! All else is irrelevant" stance. Agitiation by White Wolf merely hardened the stance of the masses occupying the Legislative Yuan, and intensified the confrontation. We are deeply concerned. If the Ma administration feels compelled to resort to forced evictions, the consequences may be unpredictable. Society on Taiwan may be irreparably split. We call on the Ma administration to be patient. Better to settle down and allow society to absorb the shock and resolve the problem.
It is clear how we got here. The large scale protest march on Sunday gave the student movement a shot in the arm. The government beat a hasty retreat. Most pundits sided with the student movement. Their victories have eclipsed the DPP's eight to nine month long "fillibuster." Quitting while one is ahead may be the rational choice. But the student movement was an irrestible force that conquered everything in its path. They forced the ruling party to retreat, again and again. So what motivation do the students have to retreat? Besides, for many universities, this week is spring break. Students aren't even subject to academic pressures. The student movement already has the advantage. It is free of time pressure. The Ma government may be anxious, but the student movement is not. It has done the math. The longer it can delay implementation of the CSSTA, the greater its victory.
The key lies with the Ma administration, in particular President Ma himself. How exactly will he judge the seriousness of the situation?
Recall the past two weeks. But let us be fair. President Ma forcibly evicted the masses occupying the Executive Yuan. But otherwise he has kept a low profile. He held several press conferences. But each time he adopted a moderate tone. He never once engaged in provocation. He responded to student movement demands in good faith, but clearly to no effect. Instead his responses have merely provided Netizens with more fodder by which to humiliate and ridicule him. As matters stand, even if President Ma were to withdraw the CSSTA, the student movement would probably still refuse to disband. They might even use the opportunity to demand that President Ma step down.
Therefore we suggest that President Ma not be in a hurry to resolve the situation during the current legislative session. He might as as well slow the process down. Let the passage of time provide a solution. Let Taiwan society provide a solution. After all, Taiwan society is stable. Its roots run deep. The dispute will be resolved eventually. We hope future history remembers the CSSTA dispute as a legislative dispute, rather than a bloody clash between police and students. Such wounds are difficult to heal.
We understand the Ma administration's time pressures regarding CSSTA legislation. If the legislation is not passed during this session, TPP and FTA negotiations cannot begin. Taiwan will probably be further marginalized in regional and even global economic competition. President Ma has mentioned this several times in his public statements. Many industry elders, even ECB President Perng Hui-nan, have come forward to emphasize this point. Obviously to no effect. The students and masses inside and outside the Legislative Yuan continue to come and go. They have made clear they are preparing for long term occupation.
As matters stand, the Ma administration and President Ma himself must realize that Taiwan may have to undergo this process as part of its historical evolution. It may be unavoidable pain. The CSSTA itself is not that complicated. But it reflects a multitude of contradictions within Taiwan society. These include of course Blue vs. Green conflictd, reunification vs. independence conflict, and of course class conflict. These economic and social conflicts have simmered for some time. These contradictions and tensions have accumulated for some time. They merely chose the CSSTA to erupt. The Ma administration must not perceive the conflict as purely Blue vs. Green political conflict, and ignore other, more profound social psychological factors. It must not adopt the wrong measures. Otherwise it will pay too high a price.
President Ma must take note of some simple facts.
One. The DPP by itself could not have mobilized so many students. During the current wave of protests, the DPP was actually reduced to a supporting role. It was marginalized. Two. The younger generation protestors inside and outside the legislature have already reached a consensus. Their anger and frustration have long been ignored. They have their own language and mobilization techniques. Unless they decide they no longer wish to play, no one can talk them down. This includes the DPP and Wang Jin-pyng. Three. President Ma's rational persuasion can convince only those who would not have protested in the first place. For those students holding sit-ins inside and outside the legislature, such attempts at persuasion are akin to "mosquito bites on a bull's horn."
Therefore instead of feeling anxious, it would be better to slow things down. At this point, any radical political or legal measures would only provide the protestors the illusion of greater legitimacy. Better to settle down and let Taiwan society heal this wound.
社論－沉澱下來 面對台灣共業
稍後再讀
中國時報 本報訊 2014年04月03日 04:09
儘管馬總統已透過種種不同形式，正面回應了學運團體的多項訴求，但學運團體並不領情，展現「退回服貿、其他免談」的強硬態度。霸占立院議場內外的群眾，也因為白狼糾眾挑釁的激盪，而有愈見激化對立的趨勢，情勢發展到這個局面，我們真的很擔心，如果馬政府迫於無奈展開強力驅離，那將產生更不可預期的後果，屆時將造成台灣社會無可挽回的撕裂，我們呼籲馬政府千萬別躁進，不如沉澱下來，讓社會力吸納、解決這種種問題吧！
情勢的發展已經很清楚，在周日大規模的遊行之後，宛如給抗爭的學運團體打了一針興奮劑，再加上馬政府一路撤退，絕大部分輿論又都站在學運團體這一邊，他們的戰果，早已超過民進黨8、9個月來抵制的成效，儘管「見好就收」是個合理的選擇，但回顧先前的一路攻城掠地、勢如破竹，硬是讓執政黨節節敗退，試問此時此刻，學生們有什麼道理要撤退？更何況不少大學本周恰巧放春假，學生們連罷課的壓力都沒有！所以結論是，學運團體已經占據空間優勢，又沒有時間壓力，馬政府就算再焦急，學運團體可一點都不急，因為他們已經算準了，服貿的立法進程拖得越久，他們就贏得越多。
因而關鍵還是在於，馬政府，特別是馬總統本人，究竟怎麼評估這個嚴峻的情勢！
回顧這一兩周，除了強力驅離群眾攻占政院的行動外，我們必須公平的說，馬總統的姿態一直放得很低，記者會已經開了好幾次，都採取柔性說服的語氣，不見任何挑釁；在回應學運團體訴求上，能回應的都給予善意回應了，但很顯然功效都不大，反而提供網路鄉民更多羞辱揶揄的素材。估計照目前情勢演變，就算馬總統願意退回《服貿協議》，學運團體可能照樣不撤，說不定還進一步發動罷免，要馬總統下台了！
也因為這樣，我們建議馬總統，與其急著非要在本會期解決，不如乾脆放慢腳步，讓時間去解快，讓台灣社會去解決吧！畢竟台灣社會穩定、基礎深厚，爭議終究是會解決的，我們盼望的是，未來台灣歷史記載著是《服貿協議》立法發生重大爭議，而不是記載著警察與學運團體發生血腥衝突！要知道那種傷痕是很難彌補的！
我們當然理解，馬政府對《服貿協議》的立法有時間壓力，如果沒能在本會期完成立法，後續的TPP、FTA談判完全無法啟動，屆時台灣很可能在區域經濟、乃至在全球經濟競爭中被進一步邊緣化。馬總統已經在多次的公開談話中提到了這一點，許多工商界大老，甚至央行總裁彭淮南也都出面強調這一點，但很顯然收效不大，立院內外的學生與群眾照樣川流不息，甚且已表明了要做長期抗戰的準備。
情勢走到了這一步，馬政府，乃至馬總統本人恐怕都必須接受一個事實，這或許是台灣歷史進程中必須經歷的過程，甚至是一個免不了的陣痛。《服貿協議》本身或許並沒有那麼複雜，但它卻折射出台灣社會內部的諸多矛盾，這中間當然有藍綠、統獨對立的政治因素，但它絕對還有階級、世代張力的經濟與社會因素，這些矛盾與張力其實早已蓄積了許久，只是選擇《服貿協議》立法這個出口爆發而已，馬政府如果只是將它簡單理解為藍綠的政治衝突，卻忽略了其它更深層的社會、心理因素，採取錯誤的對策，恐怕會為此付出不小的代價。
馬總統必須承認幾項簡單的事實：
一、單憑民進黨，是動員不了這麼多學生的，民進黨在這波抗爭中，甚至已淪為邊緣化的配角了；二、議場內外的年輕世代，已經擁有他們集體的主體意識，他們的憤怒與無奈長期以來一直被忽略，此刻他們已擁有自己的語言與動員模式，除非他們自己不想玩了，誰也勸不退他們，包括王金平與民進黨在內；三、馬總統的理性說服，只能說服那些本來就不會去抗爭的民眾，對於那些睡在議場內外的學子而言，說直白一些，宛如蚊子叮牛角。
所以，與其急，不如緩吧！此時採取任何過激的政治或司法手段，只會讓他們的抗爭更有正當性，不如沉澱下來，讓台灣社會去治癒這個撕裂吧，一定可以的！
Tuesday, April 1, 2014
DPP: Reduced to Riding the Coat Tails of the Youth Corps
DPP: Reduced to Riding the Coat Tails of the Youth Corps
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 2, 2014
Summary: The DPP party princes attended the 3/30 anti-CSSTA protest. Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen, Annette Lu, Yu Hsi-kuen, and Frank Hsieh showed up on Ketegelan Boulevard dressed in black. But all they did was stand on the sidelines. The Machiavellian DPP now confronts mistrust from the public without and ostracism from the Youth Corps within. It has waffled so long, it has a hard time distinguishing play acting from real life. This is where the DPP stands today.
Full text below:
The DPP party princes attended the 3/30 anti-CSSTA protest. Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen, Annette Lu, Yu Hsi-kuen, and Frank Hsieh showed up on Ketegelan Boulevard dressed in black. But all they did was stand on the sidelines. DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang was heckled. "The DPP needs to get serious!" "Don't think only about the presidential election!" The scene revealed the DPP's inability to find a niche amidst the social protests. The scene also underscored the embarrassing fact that the DPP was being ordered about by the Youth Corps, rather than the other way around.
The two main leaders of the student movement share history with the DPP. Lin Fei-fan was a member of the Youth Corps at Tsai Ing-wen's campaign headquarters in Ilan. Chen Wei-ting was a member of the Youth Corp support group at Yang Chang-cheng's campaign headquarters in Miaoli. Their anti-CSSTA demands faithfully echo the DPP's long-held Sinophobia. But the student movement embarrassed more than the KMT. It embarrassed the DPP as well. The DPP was forced to quietly participate in the sit-in and be reduced to mere cheerleaders. This is something the DPP probably did not anticipate.
The DPP may have provided various forms of support from the sidelines or behind the scenes. But at least in terms of appearance, the student leaders consciously distanced themselves from the DPP. One could even say that the student movement succeeded precisely because it kept the DPP at arms length. This "tail wagging the dog" phenomenon was a factor in the Tai Pu incident, the Hung Chung-chiu incident, and other incidents. It reveals how rigid, opportunistic, and outdated the Democratic Progressive Party's political methods have become. It has lost the public trust. It has been ostracized by social movements. The Youth Corps has realized this for quite some time. The DPP however, remains oblivious.
Consider the first day of legislative proceedings following the two week long occupation. Green Camp legislator Chen Chi-mai attacked Blue Camp legislator Chang Ching-chung. He flung a glass of water at Chang while Chang was speaking. The student movement clashes have ended. But the DPP has yet to change its crude and unreasoning political style. This shows that the DPP is utterly oblivious to public perception. As we can see, the DPP has never felt the need to conduct itself in a manner befitting a democracy. It still assumes that its modus operandi has a market. But as we all know, the new generation is already tired of those tricks.
We need not exaggerate the accomplishments of the student movement. The students may have fresh faces. But rhetorically, they have not fallen far from the DPP tree. Their organization and mobilization relied heavily on support from the Green Camp. The biggest difference between the student-led mass movement and DPP-led mass movements, was that the students stressed public order. Except for the occupation of the Executive Yuan, their movement took place in an atmosphere of peace. Just imagine if the 3/30 Ketegelan Road protest had been led by the DPP? Would the crowd have peacefully disbanded by 7pm? Would the Black Shirts have clashed with the White Shirts? Judging by such standards, Chen Chi-mai demonstrated less self-control than the students. He behaved in a juvenile and risible manner. Is it any wonder the DPP meekly followed the lead of the Youth Corps on Ketegelan Boulevard? In fact, the Green Camp probably would not have been able to persuade nearly as many people to participate.
The student movement generated considerable momentum for the anti-CSSTA movement. But is this necessarily helpful to the DPP? We don't think so. Admittedly the Ma government's campaign has suffered a serious setback. It has been staggered and is in retreat. But any windfall for the DPP is likely to be limited. One might even say that when student demonstrators precipitated a showdown on the CSSTA, they exposed the DPP's cross-strait dilemma, and did them a disservice.
The DPP has long been forced to retreat on cross-strait policy. The DPP obdurately refuses to engage the Mainland. But the Chinese mainland has risen, and Taiwan's economic dependence on it has increase. Ever closer cross-strait relations are unavoidable. The DPP's Taiwan independence rhetoric is an inadequate response to a cross-strait relationship that is simultaneously confrontational and mutually dependent. DPP rhetoric makes meaningful consultations with Beijing impossible. If the DPP persists in its blind opposition to anything related to Mainland China, the Democratic Progressive Party will find it difficult receive enough popular support in the general election and take power.
Recently several DPP leaders have modified their cross- strait thinking. They have modified their rhetoric. They hope that the DPP will be able to play a meaningful role in cross-strait relations. Ironically, it was at this very moment that students resorted to extreme measures to challenge cross-strait policy, greatly shrinking the DPP's maneuvering room. Students on the street or on the Internet may be happy to distance themselves from Mainland China. They may be happy to take a different path, economically and politically. But can the DPP really follow in the students' footsteps? Would doing so really be politically advantageous?
This is the paradox of the student movement. On the surface, the students' stand is consistent with Green Camp thinking. It appears to have given the DPP added momentum. In fact the more extreme the students' demands, the more they stand in the way of DPP policy reform, and the more they push the DPP towards a Sinophobic vortex. The DPP may pay ritual lip service to the students demands on Ketegelan Boulevard. But once the students scatter, the DPP will have to bear the political cost of shattering the cross-strait status quo. On this point, American Institute in Taiwan Director David Brown has already burst the DPP's balloon. No wonder the Green Camp party princes were willing to sit on the sidelines and allow themselves to be ordered about by the students. That was their insurance policy.
The Machiavellian DPP now confronts mistrust from the public without and ostracism from the Youth Corps within. It has waffled so long, it has a hard time distinguishing play acting from real life. This is where the DPP stands today.
當民進黨只能在青年軍的場邊插花
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.04.02 03:55 am
三三○凱道反服貿活動，民進黨天王蘇蔡呂游謝皆穿著黑衣現身，卻只能在場邊插花表態。主席蘇貞昌更遭到民眾嗆聲：「民進黨要認真點！」「不要只想著選總統！」此一景象，不僅暴露民進黨在公民運動中找不到位置的尷尬，更凸顯了他們被青年軍「反領導」的窘境。
此次學運兩名主要領袖皆與民進黨素有淵源：林飛帆曾是蔡英文宜蘭競選總部青年軍，陳為廷則是楊長鎮苗栗競選總部青年後援會會長；他們的反服貿訴求，也如實呼應了民進黨一貫的反中立場。但在這場學運中，不僅國民黨被打得灰頭土臉，就連民進黨在場外靜坐、當啦啦隊的角色都深受約制，這恐怕是民進黨始料未及。
儘管民進黨透過各種形式在側翼或幕後支援，但至少在外觀上，學生領袖在運動過程中刻意與民進黨切割；甚至可以說，正因為做了高度切割，才能成功為學運造勢。這種「尾巴搖狗」的現象，在反大埔、洪仲丘等事件中反覆出現，也說明民進黨的反對角色因過於僵化、投機和老套，已完全失去民眾的信任，更遭公民運動排斥。這點事實，青年軍早已看穿，民進黨卻仍不自覺。
且看，在立法院被占領兩周後重新開會的首日，綠委陳其邁趁著藍軍立委張慶忠正在發言時上前偷襲，往他身上潑了一杯水。經過一場學運衝撞，民進黨依然不改其低級、無理的問政風格，恰恰說明民進黨對民意的毫無自覺。可見，民進黨從來不覺得自己對民主素質需要負什麼責任，甚至以為自己的杯葛慣技還有市場；殊不知，新生代已經煩透了這些老套。
我們不必過度高估這次學運的表現。除了學生的臉孔顯得相對清新，在論述上，他們的說詞和民進黨相去不遠；在組織動員上，他們相當倚賴綠營的各路支援。然而，學生和民進黨主導的群眾運動最大的不同，在於他們對公共秩序的強調，使運動控制在和平的氛圍下（攻占行政院行動除外），而得以持續。試想，如果三三○凱道行動由民進黨主導，群眾可能在七點多和平解散嗎？黑衫軍能不和白衫軍發生衝突嗎？從這個標準看，陳其邁的自制能力，比起學生，簡直是幼稚得可笑。這也難怪，民進黨這次在凱道上只能接受青年軍的領導，事實上，綠營恐怕也叫不動這麼多群眾站出來。
進一步問：學運創造了「反服貿」的大好聲勢，但這對民進黨問政有絕對助益嗎？只怕不然。不可否認，馬政府在此役確實遭遇重挫，踉蹌失措，節節失守；但民進黨能坐收的漁利，其實也相當有限。甚至可以說，當示威的學生把服貿爭議緊繃到攤牌的地步時，也正好暴露了民進黨在兩岸關係上的進退維谷，同時也幫了它倒忙。
民進黨在兩岸議題上素來退縮，一味強調不接觸；但隨著中國大陸的崛起及台灣在經濟上對大陸的依賴，兩岸關係愈趨緊密已勢無可免，民進黨既有的台獨論述不足以因應兩岸這種「既對立、又相依」的關係，更無從與北京進行有意義的溝通磋商。若不摘掉「逢中必反」的帽子，民進黨便很難在大選中獲得台灣民眾足夠的支持而取得政權。
就在近期，民進黨幾位領導人都正在積極調整自己的兩岸思維，試圖改變以往的論述，以期民進黨能在兩岸關係中扮演有意義的參與角色；此時學生用激烈手法挑戰兩岸議題，正好大大壓縮了民進黨調整轉型的空間。學生在街頭或網路上可以痛快地主張與中國切割，主張台灣在經濟上、政治上另覓出路；但是，民進黨有可能跟進學生的主張嗎？跟進的話，在政治上是有利的算計嗎？
這次學運的弔詭正在於此。表面上，學生主張與綠營的思維一致，似在幫民進黨拉抬聲勢；實質上，學生越是激越堅持，越是阻擋了民進黨調整轉型的出路，把它更推向反中的漩渦。在凱道上，民進黨可以跟著學生行禮如儀；但在學生散去後，民進黨卻得承擔打破兩岸關係現狀的政治代價。這點，美國在台協會理事卜道維已直接戳破民進黨的心機。也難怪，綠營天王甘願俯首坐在場邊接受學生指揮，因為那才是保險的策略。
權謀機詐如民進黨，今天面臨的是：外不受社會公民信任、內則遭青年軍冷落的局面。搖擺久了，竟連自己的虛實都有點分不清，這正是民進黨今天的寫照。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
April 2, 2014
Summary: The DPP party princes attended the 3/30 anti-CSSTA protest. Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen, Annette Lu, Yu Hsi-kuen, and Frank Hsieh showed up on Ketegelan Boulevard dressed in black. But all they did was stand on the sidelines. The Machiavellian DPP now confronts mistrust from the public without and ostracism from the Youth Corps within. It has waffled so long, it has a hard time distinguishing play acting from real life. This is where the DPP stands today.
Full text below:
The DPP party princes attended the 3/30 anti-CSSTA protest. Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen, Annette Lu, Yu Hsi-kuen, and Frank Hsieh showed up on Ketegelan Boulevard dressed in black. But all they did was stand on the sidelines. DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang was heckled. "The DPP needs to get serious!" "Don't think only about the presidential election!" The scene revealed the DPP's inability to find a niche amidst the social protests. The scene also underscored the embarrassing fact that the DPP was being ordered about by the Youth Corps, rather than the other way around.
The two main leaders of the student movement share history with the DPP. Lin Fei-fan was a member of the Youth Corps at Tsai Ing-wen's campaign headquarters in Ilan. Chen Wei-ting was a member of the Youth Corp support group at Yang Chang-cheng's campaign headquarters in Miaoli. Their anti-CSSTA demands faithfully echo the DPP's long-held Sinophobia. But the student movement embarrassed more than the KMT. It embarrassed the DPP as well. The DPP was forced to quietly participate in the sit-in and be reduced to mere cheerleaders. This is something the DPP probably did not anticipate.
The DPP may have provided various forms of support from the sidelines or behind the scenes. But at least in terms of appearance, the student leaders consciously distanced themselves from the DPP. One could even say that the student movement succeeded precisely because it kept the DPP at arms length. This "tail wagging the dog" phenomenon was a factor in the Tai Pu incident, the Hung Chung-chiu incident, and other incidents. It reveals how rigid, opportunistic, and outdated the Democratic Progressive Party's political methods have become. It has lost the public trust. It has been ostracized by social movements. The Youth Corps has realized this for quite some time. The DPP however, remains oblivious.
Consider the first day of legislative proceedings following the two week long occupation. Green Camp legislator Chen Chi-mai attacked Blue Camp legislator Chang Ching-chung. He flung a glass of water at Chang while Chang was speaking. The student movement clashes have ended. But the DPP has yet to change its crude and unreasoning political style. This shows that the DPP is utterly oblivious to public perception. As we can see, the DPP has never felt the need to conduct itself in a manner befitting a democracy. It still assumes that its modus operandi has a market. But as we all know, the new generation is already tired of those tricks.
We need not exaggerate the accomplishments of the student movement. The students may have fresh faces. But rhetorically, they have not fallen far from the DPP tree. Their organization and mobilization relied heavily on support from the Green Camp. The biggest difference between the student-led mass movement and DPP-led mass movements, was that the students stressed public order. Except for the occupation of the Executive Yuan, their movement took place in an atmosphere of peace. Just imagine if the 3/30 Ketegelan Road protest had been led by the DPP? Would the crowd have peacefully disbanded by 7pm? Would the Black Shirts have clashed with the White Shirts? Judging by such standards, Chen Chi-mai demonstrated less self-control than the students. He behaved in a juvenile and risible manner. Is it any wonder the DPP meekly followed the lead of the Youth Corps on Ketegelan Boulevard? In fact, the Green Camp probably would not have been able to persuade nearly as many people to participate.
The student movement generated considerable momentum for the anti-CSSTA movement. But is this necessarily helpful to the DPP? We don't think so. Admittedly the Ma government's campaign has suffered a serious setback. It has been staggered and is in retreat. But any windfall for the DPP is likely to be limited. One might even say that when student demonstrators precipitated a showdown on the CSSTA, they exposed the DPP's cross-strait dilemma, and did them a disservice.
The DPP has long been forced to retreat on cross-strait policy. The DPP obdurately refuses to engage the Mainland. But the Chinese mainland has risen, and Taiwan's economic dependence on it has increase. Ever closer cross-strait relations are unavoidable. The DPP's Taiwan independence rhetoric is an inadequate response to a cross-strait relationship that is simultaneously confrontational and mutually dependent. DPP rhetoric makes meaningful consultations with Beijing impossible. If the DPP persists in its blind opposition to anything related to Mainland China, the Democratic Progressive Party will find it difficult receive enough popular support in the general election and take power.
Recently several DPP leaders have modified their cross- strait thinking. They have modified their rhetoric. They hope that the DPP will be able to play a meaningful role in cross-strait relations. Ironically, it was at this very moment that students resorted to extreme measures to challenge cross-strait policy, greatly shrinking the DPP's maneuvering room. Students on the street or on the Internet may be happy to distance themselves from Mainland China. They may be happy to take a different path, economically and politically. But can the DPP really follow in the students' footsteps? Would doing so really be politically advantageous?
This is the paradox of the student movement. On the surface, the students' stand is consistent with Green Camp thinking. It appears to have given the DPP added momentum. In fact the more extreme the students' demands, the more they stand in the way of DPP policy reform, and the more they push the DPP towards a Sinophobic vortex. The DPP may pay ritual lip service to the students demands on Ketegelan Boulevard. But once the students scatter, the DPP will have to bear the political cost of shattering the cross-strait status quo. On this point, American Institute in Taiwan Director David Brown has already burst the DPP's balloon. No wonder the Green Camp party princes were willing to sit on the sidelines and allow themselves to be ordered about by the students. That was their insurance policy.
The Machiavellian DPP now confronts mistrust from the public without and ostracism from the Youth Corps within. It has waffled so long, it has a hard time distinguishing play acting from real life. This is where the DPP stands today.
當民進黨只能在青年軍的場邊插花
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.04.02 03:55 am
三三○凱道反服貿活動，民進黨天王蘇蔡呂游謝皆穿著黑衣現身，卻只能在場邊插花表態。主席蘇貞昌更遭到民眾嗆聲：「民進黨要認真點！」「不要只想著選總統！」此一景象，不僅暴露民進黨在公民運動中找不到位置的尷尬，更凸顯了他們被青年軍「反領導」的窘境。
此次學運兩名主要領袖皆與民進黨素有淵源：林飛帆曾是蔡英文宜蘭競選總部青年軍，陳為廷則是楊長鎮苗栗競選總部青年後援會會長；他們的反服貿訴求，也如實呼應了民進黨一貫的反中立場。但在這場學運中，不僅國民黨被打得灰頭土臉，就連民進黨在場外靜坐、當啦啦隊的角色都深受約制，這恐怕是民進黨始料未及。
儘管民進黨透過各種形式在側翼或幕後支援，但至少在外觀上，學生領袖在運動過程中刻意與民進黨切割；甚至可以說，正因為做了高度切割，才能成功為學運造勢。這種「尾巴搖狗」的現象，在反大埔、洪仲丘等事件中反覆出現，也說明民進黨的反對角色因過於僵化、投機和老套，已完全失去民眾的信任，更遭公民運動排斥。這點事實，青年軍早已看穿，民進黨卻仍不自覺。
且看，在立法院被占領兩周後重新開會的首日，綠委陳其邁趁著藍軍立委張慶忠正在發言時上前偷襲，往他身上潑了一杯水。經過一場學運衝撞，民進黨依然不改其低級、無理的問政風格，恰恰說明民進黨對民意的毫無自覺。可見，民進黨從來不覺得自己對民主素質需要負什麼責任，甚至以為自己的杯葛慣技還有市場；殊不知，新生代已經煩透了這些老套。
我們不必過度高估這次學運的表現。除了學生的臉孔顯得相對清新，在論述上，他們的說詞和民進黨相去不遠；在組織動員上，他們相當倚賴綠營的各路支援。然而，學生和民進黨主導的群眾運動最大的不同，在於他們對公共秩序的強調，使運動控制在和平的氛圍下（攻占行政院行動除外），而得以持續。試想，如果三三○凱道行動由民進黨主導，群眾可能在七點多和平解散嗎？黑衫軍能不和白衫軍發生衝突嗎？從這個標準看，陳其邁的自制能力，比起學生，簡直是幼稚得可笑。這也難怪，民進黨這次在凱道上只能接受青年軍的領導，事實上，綠營恐怕也叫不動這麼多群眾站出來。
進一步問：學運創造了「反服貿」的大好聲勢，但這對民進黨問政有絕對助益嗎？只怕不然。不可否認，馬政府在此役確實遭遇重挫，踉蹌失措，節節失守；但民進黨能坐收的漁利，其實也相當有限。甚至可以說，當示威的學生把服貿爭議緊繃到攤牌的地步時，也正好暴露了民進黨在兩岸關係上的進退維谷，同時也幫了它倒忙。
民進黨在兩岸議題上素來退縮，一味強調不接觸；但隨著中國大陸的崛起及台灣在經濟上對大陸的依賴，兩岸關係愈趨緊密已勢無可免，民進黨既有的台獨論述不足以因應兩岸這種「既對立、又相依」的關係，更無從與北京進行有意義的溝通磋商。若不摘掉「逢中必反」的帽子，民進黨便很難在大選中獲得台灣民眾足夠的支持而取得政權。
就在近期，民進黨幾位領導人都正在積極調整自己的兩岸思維，試圖改變以往的論述，以期民進黨能在兩岸關係中扮演有意義的參與角色；此時學生用激烈手法挑戰兩岸議題，正好大大壓縮了民進黨調整轉型的空間。學生在街頭或網路上可以痛快地主張與中國切割，主張台灣在經濟上、政治上另覓出路；但是，民進黨有可能跟進學生的主張嗎？跟進的話，在政治上是有利的算計嗎？
這次學運的弔詭正在於此。表面上，學生主張與綠營的思維一致，似在幫民進黨拉抬聲勢；實質上，學生越是激越堅持，越是阻擋了民進黨調整轉型的出路，把它更推向反中的漩渦。在凱道上，民進黨可以跟著學生行禮如儀；但在學生散去後，民進黨卻得承擔打破兩岸關係現狀的政治代價。這點，美國在台協會理事卜道維已直接戳破民進黨的心機。也難怪，綠營天王甘願俯首坐在場邊接受學生指揮，因為那才是保險的策略。
權謀機詐如民進黨，今天面臨的是：外不受社會公民信任、內則遭青年軍冷落的局面。搖擺久了，竟連自己的虛實都有點分不清，這正是民進黨今天的寫照。
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