Frozen Taiwan Independence = Republic of China +Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 9, 2014
Summary: The DPP longs to complete the "final mile." But the final mile is not
about returning to power. It is about publicly renouncing Taiwan
independence. If the DPP returns to power but refuses to renounce Taiwan
independence, internal and external pressures will prevent the DPP from
governing the nation. If the DPP ever hopes to complete the "final mile," it must publicly
renounce Taiwan independence. It may wish to begin with Stage Five, with
the "Republic of China plus Taiwan,"
Full Text Below:
The DPP longs to complete the "final mile." But the final mile is not about returning to power. It is about publicly renouncing Taiwan independence. If the DPP returns to power but refuses to renounce Taiwan independence, internal and external pressures will prevent the DPP from governing the nation.
Beijing has explicitly voiced opposition to the DPP's Taiwan Independence Party Platform. If the DPP returns to power, it will not be able to cling to Taiwan independence. The DPP refuses to nullify its Taiwan Independence Party Platform. It insists on affirming its Resolution on Taiwan's Future. This presents two problems. One. The Taiwan Independence Party Platform and Resolution for a Normal Nation have yet to be nullified or frozen. As long as this remains the case, the Resolution on Taiwan's Future will lose all force. Two. The Resolution on Taiwan's Future asserts that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. Its current name is the Republic of China." This is "backdoor listing." This is "one nation on each side." This is the "two states theory." There is no such thing as a "Republic of Taiwan Constitution." There is no such thing as "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation." Neither has any basis in fact.
No current representative of the DPP champions the Taiwan Independence Party Platform or demands the founding of a "Republic of Taiwan." The Taiwan Independence Party Platform has already been abandoned in actual practice. But when the DPP takes a detour via the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, and embraces the Republic of China, it is merely using backdoor listing as a cover for Taiwan independence. It is not citing the Constitution of the Republic of China in order to defend the Republic of China. Those who use backdoor listing as a cover for Taiwan independence say that "Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. It's current name is the Republic of China." But genuine defenders of the Republic of China simply say, "The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation."
What is the relationship between "Taiwan" and the "Republic of China government?" Taiwan independence advocates speak of "four stages." Stage One. The Republic of China is on the Chinese mainland. The Republic of China government is founded in 1912 on the Chinese mainland. Taiwan was still under Japanese colonial occupation. 1945 marked Taiwan retrocession. Stage Two. The Republic of China comes to Taiwan. Four years after the retrocession of Taiwan, the KMT central government loses control of the Chinese mainland. It retreats to Taiwan. The Nationalist government comes to Taiwan and uses it as a "base to recover the Mainland." But talk of a "foreign regime" surfaces. Stage Three. The Republic of China on Taiwan. In the 1970s the Republic of China government pulls out of the United Nations. It resolves to defend Taiwan and "nativize" the government. Taiwan independence sentiment increases. Stage Four. The Republic of China is Taiwan. Martial law is lifted. Taiwan independence forces are cut loose. But they can find no way out. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian assert that "The Republic of China is Taiwan." This is "backdoor listing." Tsai Ing-wen asserts that "Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan."
The assertion that "The Republic of China is Taiwan" implies that the Republic of China is equivalent to Taiwan, by law. This is a way to create a "de-Sinicized Republic of China," i.e., a "Republic of China, but without China." It is also a way to create a "backdoor Taiwan independence Republic of China." This is why Chen Shui-bian revised the textbooks, turning Chinese history into foreign history and Sun Yat-sen into a foreigner. Tsai Ing-wen asserts that "My Republic of China has no Yangzi River, Yellow River, or Heilongjiang." But a Republic of China without Sun Yat-sen and without the Yangzi River is not the Republic of China. A Republic of China which has nothing besides Taiwan, is not the Republic of China. As long as the DPP asserts that "Taiwan equals the Republic of China," it has neither acknowledged the error of its ways, nor honestly proclaimed what nation it identifies with.
From now on, both the blue and green camps should speak of the "Republic of China plus Taiwan." History and the global political situation constantly change. The Republic of China's relationship to Taiwan has naturally evolved to Stage Five, i.e., the "Republic of China plus Taiwan." In other words, today's Republic of China is still the Republic of China founded in 1912. It still has Sun Yat-sen. It still has the Yellow River. But today's Republic of China has also had 65 years to integrate "Taiwan Elements." This is what we mean by the "Republic of China plus Taiwan."
The term "Taiwan Elements" refers to free and democratic political and social systems, values, and lifestyles. Zhang Zhijun recently said that the Mainland respects the "Taiwan People's Choice," aka "Taiwan values" or "Taiwan consciousness." The Republic of China is infused with these "Taiwan elements." In cross-Strait relations, the term "China" provides a point of linkage. Meanwhile, the term "Republic of China" reaffirms its sovereignty. This means that the future of cross-Strait relations will continue to be determined by the Republic of China Constitution. This future will be decided by 23 million people on Taiwan. Cross-Strait relations will be directed by a rational process that leads to clearer goals.
One may opt for either process orientation or goal orientation. But whichever way one chooses, the Taiwan independence path will remain inferior to the Republic of China constitutional path. Take process orientation. Under Taiwan independence, peaceful cross-Strait relations are impossible. Take goal orientation. Taiwan independence is guaranteed to lead to military reunification. It would provide a justification for military reunification. By contrast, the Republic of China constitutional path is a rational path that ensures cross-Strait peace. It may be referred to as the "big roof concept of China," or the "grand framework for one China" that clarifies our goals. Taiwan is the water. The Republic of China is the glass. As long as the glass remains intact, the water remains contained. Destroy the glass, and the water is lost.
If the DPP ever hopes to complete the "final mile," it must publicly renounce Taiwan independence. It may wish to begin with Stage Five, with the "Republic of China plus Taiwan,"
凍獨的路徑：中華民國加台灣
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.07.09 02:02 am
民進黨的「最後一哩」，不在重返執政，而在必須公開宣示放棄台獨路線。因為，即使民進黨重返執政，若不宣示放棄台獨路線，在內外壓力下，亦必不可能平順主政治國。
北京挑明反對《台獨黨綱》，可知民進黨若重返執政必不可能維持台獨路線。但民進黨目前所採策略，似一方面拒絕廢凍《台獨黨綱》，另一方面則欲轉移到《台灣前途決議文》的立場上。然而：一、只要《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》尚未廢凍，《台灣前途決議文》即失立場。二、《台灣前途決議文》略謂，「台灣是一主權獨立的國家，現在的名字叫中華民國」，這是「借殼上市」，是「一邊一國」，是「兩國論」；何況，既無一部「台灣共和國憲法」，「台灣是一主權獨立的國家」之說，即無由成立。
今日，民進黨的代表人物幾已無人宣稱仍要依據《台獨黨綱》建立「台灣共和國」，可謂《台獨黨綱》其實已被棄置。但是，當民進黨繞經《台灣前途決議文》回頭擁抱「中華民國」時，其心目中，卻只有台獨意識借殼上市的「中華民國」，而不是依據《中華民國憲法》而存在的「中華民國」。其間的差異在於：借殼上市的台獨說「台灣是一主權獨立的國家，現在的名字叫中華民國」；但真正的「中華民國論述」則直稱：「中華民國是一主權獨立的國家。」
「台灣」與「中華民國」的關係，台獨理論曾有「四階段說」。一、中華民國在大陸：中華民國一九一二年肇建於中國大陸，當時台灣尚在日據時代，至一九四五年始光復台灣。二、中華民國到台灣：國民黨中央政府在台灣光復後四年即失去大陸，撤遷台灣；國府以台灣為「反攻大陸的基地」，但後來出現的「外來政權」之說亦潛滋暗長。三、中華民國在台灣：上世紀七○年代退出聯合國後，革新保台的意識使本土化蔚為風氣，台獨運動亦告興起。四、中華民國是台灣：解嚴後，台獨勢力迅猛釋出，但又尋無出路，李扁二朝遂倡「中華民國是台灣」，此即「借殼上市」。蔡英文亦稱：「台灣是中華民國，中華民國是台灣。」
中華民國是台灣，有「中華民國在法理上等於台灣」之義；這是「去中國化的中華民國」，也是「台獨借殼化的中華民國」。於是，陳水扁修改課綱，以中國史為外國史，以孫中山為外國人；蔡英文則稱「我的中華民國沒有長江、黃河、黑龍江」。但是，沒有孫中山，沒有長江的中華民國，就不是中華民國；只有台灣的中華民國，也不是中華民國。因此，「台灣（等於）是中華民國，中華民國（等於）是台灣」之說，絕非民進黨在國家認同轉型上的正確落點。
今後，不論藍綠，應當以「中華民國加台灣」為共識；亦即順著歷史及世局的流變，使「中華民國與台灣的關係」，順理成章地進入「中華民國加台灣」的「五階段說」。亦即：今日的中華民國，仍是源自一九一二年的中華民國，有孫中山，也有黃河；但今日的中華民國，更是增加了經歷了六十五年「台灣元素」淬鍊的中華民國，這就是「中華民國加台灣」。
此處所稱「台灣元素」，是指民主自由的政治及社會制度、價值理念及生活方式，亦是日前張志軍所稱大陸表示尊重的「台灣人民的選擇」，也可稱作「台灣價值」或「台灣意識」。這個「浸潤了台灣元素」的「中華民國」，在兩岸關係上，一方面以「中華」為連結點，另一方面以「民國」為主體性，即能持守「兩岸關係的未來由中華民國憲法程序決定，亦即由台灣兩千三百萬人決定」的憲政戰略，設法將兩岸關係「由合理的過程導向改善之目的」。
無論從「過程論」或「目的論」來看兩岸關係，台獨路線皆不如中華民國的憲政戰略。就「過程論」看，台獨路線的兩岸關係不可能有「和平發展」；就「目的論」言，台獨恐將召喚武力統一，使武力統一有了藉口。相對而言，中華民國的憲政戰略，如今正在維持兩岸「和平發展」的「合理的過程」，也可能以「大屋頂中國」或「大一中架構」創造兩岸「改善之目的」。因為：台灣是水，中華民國是杯；杯在水在，杯破水覆。
民進黨的「最後一哩」應在公開宣示放棄台獨路線，不妨就從「中華民國加台灣」的「五階段說」入手。
Tuesday, July 8, 2014
Why Hong Kong's Occupy Central Ended Peacefully
Why Hong Kong's Occupy Central Ended Peacefully
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 8, 2014
Summary: Hong Kong students are also engaged in civil disobedience. But they have never attempted shirk legal responsibility. They declared that they were prepared "to assume the risks and bear the consequences." Compare the two. Perhaps the rule of law tradition in Hong Kong, inherited from the British, is rooted more deeply than it is on Taiwan. Perhaps Hong Kong students have greater respect for the rule of law. In June, "anti-New Territories development" demonstrators twice occupied the Legislative Council. Later, they either retreated or were arrested by the police. By contrast, when students on Taiwan occupied the Legislative Yuan, the government dithered for over 20 days. The rule of law took an incredible hit.
Full Text Below:
Many observers have compared Hong Kong's July 1st "Occupy Central" protest, to the late March occupation of the Executive Yuan by students on Taiwan. They have expressed surprise at how peacefully the protest in Hong Kong ended. DPP Legislator Lee Ying-yuan noted how Hong Kong police did not use water jets, batons, or shields. He wondered "Is Taiwan really second to Hong Kong?"
This is true. In March riot police on Taiwan expelled protestors occupying the Executive Yuan. In July, four Hong Kong police officers carried away each student demonstrator. Everyone on Taiwan was impressed, and noted the sharp contrast between the two. Lee Ying-yuan wrung his hands. He wondered, "Is Taiwan really second to Hong Kong?" What he meant was the police in Hong Kong treated the protestors gently, while the police on Taiwan used excessive force. The only problem was the two groups of student demonstrators behaved differently, and Lee swept this difference under the rug. If Taiwan is in fact second to Hong Kong, it is because the public on Taiwan lacks Hong Kongers' respect for the rule of law.
Look back at Hong Kong's July 1st "Occupy Central" protest. The students staged an impromptu "preview." After dark, less than 1000 remained in the Central District. At two in the morning, Hong Kong police dispatched 3000 police to the scene. They urged crowds to leave. They carried away those who did not. Five hundred and eleven people were arrested. They were bussed to the Wong Chuk Hang Police Academy for questioning. The entire eviction process took six hours. Hong Kongers estimate that any future "Occupy Central" protest will probably involve over 10,000 people. The police may need to deploy riot police and use tear gas to disperse the crowd. Bloodshed my be unavoidable.
During the Occupy Central protest many students linked arms and shouted slogans. In this respect it resembled scenes from the Sunflower Student Movement in Taipei. Perhaps this was the result of communications between students in Hong Kong and Taipei. But when students and others were evicted from the Central District, they did not resist as violently. They allowed police to carry them off. The reasons were twofold. One. Most Hong Kongers have reservations about the Occupy Central protestors' methods. Therefore the student demonstrators were unwilling to fight to the bitter end. Two. The students reached a consensus before the demonstration. They agreed that they must be "willing to bear the legal consequences." They were willing to be arrested. This was why Hong Kong students displayed greater restraint than members of the Sunflower Student Movement while being evicted.
Compare this to the March 23 student occupation in Taipei. The students occupied the Legislative Yuan for six days. They stormed the Executive Yuan. Morale soared. Taiwan society faces the threat of chaos. The Sunflower Student Movement received green camp backing, from within and without. The ruling KMT was rendered helpless. Police did not know where they stood. At dawn, on March 24, the Ma government issued eviction orders. Students at the scene numbered over 1000. Crowds nearby numbered 6000 or more. The cacaphony was unimaginable. That night police advanced in six waves. The crowd dispersed, then regrouped. Some even began attacking the police and puncturing the tires of police vehicles. Early that morning, the police were forced to use water cannons to expel the protestors.
The eviction of demonstrators in Hong Kong proceeded smoothly. The implication that police on Taiwan used excessive force when they evicted the students is entirely one-sided. Students in Hong Kong and students on Taiwan both waged "civil disobedience" campaigns. But had dramatically different attitudes from students in Hong Kong held dramatically different attitudes from students on Taiwan. Political protests on Taiwan exhibit all the characteristics of "dang wai"era street protests waged by the DPP. These protests deliberately maximize conflict without regard for bloodshed. The Sunflower Student Movement adopted a number of different protest methods. But they knew they would be difficult to pick out from the masses in the streets. As a result, they took full advantage of this ambiguity.
The paint flinging incident during Zhang Zhijun's Taiwan visit, and the Wulai road chaining incident, show that student protests on Taiwan invoke "civil disobedience" to rationalize all manner of behaviors and give them a moral sheen. They need only shout anti-China and anti-Ma slogans. Then they can do whatever they want yet bear no legal responsibility. Taiwan society has invented a myth. This myth asserts that the rule of law must yield before democracy. This myth is seen as obvious and unchallengeable truth. Under the circumstances, government administration and police enforcement have become tentative and have lost all legitimacy.
Hong Kong students are also engaged in civil disobedience. But they have never attempted shirk legal responsibility. They declared that they were prepared "to assume the risks and bear the consequences." Compare the two. Perhaps the rule of law tradition in Hong Kong, inherited from the British, is rooted more deeply than it is on Taiwan. Perhaps Hong Kong students have greater respect for the rule of law. In June, "anti-New Territories development" demonstrators twice occupied the Legislative Council. Later, they either retreated or were arrested by the police. By contrast, when students on Taiwan occupied the Legislative Yuan, the government dithered for over 20 days. The rule of law took an incredible hit.
Compare the two Occupy movements, one on Taiwan, the other in Hong Kong. Taiwan has more democracy, but Hong Kong has far greater respect for the rule of law. Students in Hong Kong behaved better. So did the police. The July 1st Occupy Central protest is over, But it has taught both sides of the Strait a valuable lesson.
同是占領，為何香港「占中」能和平收場？
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.07.08 03:09 am
香港七一遊行的「占領中環」預演，被很多人拿來和台灣三月下旬的學生占領行政院事件相提並論，並對港方驅離過程之平和感到驚訝。民進黨立委李應元對此評論說，香港警方沒有噴水，沒有動用警棍或盾牌，難道「台灣輸香港嗎？」
確實，看過三月台灣鎮暴警察驅離行政院的占領行動後，人們對這次香港警察以「四抬一」的方式輕易移走示威學生，莫不印象深刻，覺得港台兩地的對比鮮明。然而，當李應元談到「台灣輸香港」時，他企圖強調的是台灣警方處理的手法與陣仗過當，不如港警的平和溫文；問題是，他對兩地示威學生迥異的抗爭態度卻避而不談。事實上，如果「台灣輸香港」，其實是輸在公民的法治精神。
回看香港七一的「占中」行動，由於是學生臨時發動之「預演」，入夜後留守在中環的人數不足一千。凌晨二時，香港警方出動三千警力，一方面勸離群眾，一方面將人抬走，共逮捕五一一人，以大巴送至黃竹坑警校拘留訊問；整個驅離行動，達六小時之久。也因此，港方人士估計，萬一未來「占中」上演真實版，人數一旦超過萬人，警方可能必須出動防暴部隊、祭出催淚彈等來驅散人群，恐難避免流血衝突。
觀察這次占中抗議，許多學生手勾著手、重複呼喊口號，和台北太陽花的某些場景極為類似，或許也是兩地學運「交流」的成果之一。所不同的是，在中環的驅離過程中，包括學生和其他民眾皆未激烈抵抗，聽由警方將他們架離送走。其中主要原因應是：一，一般香港居民對「占中」行動仍有諸多疑慮，示威學生不願貿然將抗爭推到極致；二，學生示威前已有共識，「願意面對法律後果」，接受拘捕。正因為如此，香港學生遇上驅離，表現遠比太陽花學運節制。
反觀台北的三二三占領行動，當時學生占領國會已經六天，又奪下行政院，氣勢一片高漲，台灣社會卻面臨脫序的嚴重危機。由於太陽花有綠營的裡外接應，執政黨束手無策，警方維安更陷於無所適從之境。三二四凌晨，馬政府下達驅離命令時，現場聚集的學生多達一千多人，周邊地區群眾更多達六千人，場面喧囂難以想像。那夜，警方總計發動了六波行動，人潮散去又復湧來，甚至有人開始攻擊警察並刺破警車輪胎；直到清晨，警方不得不使用水柱驅離。
因此，從香港驅離行動的平順，要推論出台灣警察鎮壓學生太過凶殘無情，完全是片面觀點。其中最值得關注的是，港、台兩地學生從事「公民不服從」運動，態度卻有偌大區別。台灣的抗爭文化，承續黨外時代及民進黨的街頭行動，一直有一種「衝突極大化」的傾向，無畏流血；太陽花雖掌握了更多公民抗爭技巧，卻也明知「學生」與「群眾」在街頭難以區隔，因而頗能操弄其間的模糊地帶。
事實上，從張志軍訪台期間的「潑漆事件」及烏來的「鐵鍊鎖路」事件，都可看出，台灣若干學生的示威，已藉著「公民不服從」之名，將自己的一切抗爭行為都道德化、合理化了。亦即，只要打出「反中」、「反馬」口號，他們可以盡情挑戰一切既有體制，不必承擔任何法律責任。而台灣社會面對這樣的挑戰，似乎也產生了一股迷思，認為法治為民主而「讓步」似乎是情有可原或理所當然；在這種情況下，政府行政或警方的執法，便愈發顯得膽怯而瞻顧失據。
從這點看，香港學生雖同樣是在從事「公民不服從」運動，卻未曾企圖脫免全部法律責任，且聲明準備「承擔風險和後果」。兩相比較，或許是香港社會自港英以來的法治傳統確較台灣厚實，或許也是香港學生對於法治仍保有更多的信任與尊重。六月間，香港「反新界東北發展」的示威群眾，曾兩度占領及侵入立法會，後來或自行撤退或遭警方逮捕；對比之下，政府縱容台灣學生占領國會廿多日，也是不可思議的法治失守。
如果台灣和香港的兩場占領可以比較，台灣的民主程度或者較高，但香港的法治絕對勝出。香港學生的表現如此，警察的表現亦然；也因此，七一占中和平收場，對海峽兩岸都是有意義的一課。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 8, 2014
Summary: Hong Kong students are also engaged in civil disobedience. But they have never attempted shirk legal responsibility. They declared that they were prepared "to assume the risks and bear the consequences." Compare the two. Perhaps the rule of law tradition in Hong Kong, inherited from the British, is rooted more deeply than it is on Taiwan. Perhaps Hong Kong students have greater respect for the rule of law. In June, "anti-New Territories development" demonstrators twice occupied the Legislative Council. Later, they either retreated or were arrested by the police. By contrast, when students on Taiwan occupied the Legislative Yuan, the government dithered for over 20 days. The rule of law took an incredible hit.
Full Text Below:
Many observers have compared Hong Kong's July 1st "Occupy Central" protest, to the late March occupation of the Executive Yuan by students on Taiwan. They have expressed surprise at how peacefully the protest in Hong Kong ended. DPP Legislator Lee Ying-yuan noted how Hong Kong police did not use water jets, batons, or shields. He wondered "Is Taiwan really second to Hong Kong?"
This is true. In March riot police on Taiwan expelled protestors occupying the Executive Yuan. In July, four Hong Kong police officers carried away each student demonstrator. Everyone on Taiwan was impressed, and noted the sharp contrast between the two. Lee Ying-yuan wrung his hands. He wondered, "Is Taiwan really second to Hong Kong?" What he meant was the police in Hong Kong treated the protestors gently, while the police on Taiwan used excessive force. The only problem was the two groups of student demonstrators behaved differently, and Lee swept this difference under the rug. If Taiwan is in fact second to Hong Kong, it is because the public on Taiwan lacks Hong Kongers' respect for the rule of law.
Look back at Hong Kong's July 1st "Occupy Central" protest. The students staged an impromptu "preview." After dark, less than 1000 remained in the Central District. At two in the morning, Hong Kong police dispatched 3000 police to the scene. They urged crowds to leave. They carried away those who did not. Five hundred and eleven people were arrested. They were bussed to the Wong Chuk Hang Police Academy for questioning. The entire eviction process took six hours. Hong Kongers estimate that any future "Occupy Central" protest will probably involve over 10,000 people. The police may need to deploy riot police and use tear gas to disperse the crowd. Bloodshed my be unavoidable.
During the Occupy Central protest many students linked arms and shouted slogans. In this respect it resembled scenes from the Sunflower Student Movement in Taipei. Perhaps this was the result of communications between students in Hong Kong and Taipei. But when students and others were evicted from the Central District, they did not resist as violently. They allowed police to carry them off. The reasons were twofold. One. Most Hong Kongers have reservations about the Occupy Central protestors' methods. Therefore the student demonstrators were unwilling to fight to the bitter end. Two. The students reached a consensus before the demonstration. They agreed that they must be "willing to bear the legal consequences." They were willing to be arrested. This was why Hong Kong students displayed greater restraint than members of the Sunflower Student Movement while being evicted.
Compare this to the March 23 student occupation in Taipei. The students occupied the Legislative Yuan for six days. They stormed the Executive Yuan. Morale soared. Taiwan society faces the threat of chaos. The Sunflower Student Movement received green camp backing, from within and without. The ruling KMT was rendered helpless. Police did not know where they stood. At dawn, on March 24, the Ma government issued eviction orders. Students at the scene numbered over 1000. Crowds nearby numbered 6000 or more. The cacaphony was unimaginable. That night police advanced in six waves. The crowd dispersed, then regrouped. Some even began attacking the police and puncturing the tires of police vehicles. Early that morning, the police were forced to use water cannons to expel the protestors.
The eviction of demonstrators in Hong Kong proceeded smoothly. The implication that police on Taiwan used excessive force when they evicted the students is entirely one-sided. Students in Hong Kong and students on Taiwan both waged "civil disobedience" campaigns. But had dramatically different attitudes from students in Hong Kong held dramatically different attitudes from students on Taiwan. Political protests on Taiwan exhibit all the characteristics of "dang wai"era street protests waged by the DPP. These protests deliberately maximize conflict without regard for bloodshed. The Sunflower Student Movement adopted a number of different protest methods. But they knew they would be difficult to pick out from the masses in the streets. As a result, they took full advantage of this ambiguity.
The paint flinging incident during Zhang Zhijun's Taiwan visit, and the Wulai road chaining incident, show that student protests on Taiwan invoke "civil disobedience" to rationalize all manner of behaviors and give them a moral sheen. They need only shout anti-China and anti-Ma slogans. Then they can do whatever they want yet bear no legal responsibility. Taiwan society has invented a myth. This myth asserts that the rule of law must yield before democracy. This myth is seen as obvious and unchallengeable truth. Under the circumstances, government administration and police enforcement have become tentative and have lost all legitimacy.
Hong Kong students are also engaged in civil disobedience. But they have never attempted shirk legal responsibility. They declared that they were prepared "to assume the risks and bear the consequences." Compare the two. Perhaps the rule of law tradition in Hong Kong, inherited from the British, is rooted more deeply than it is on Taiwan. Perhaps Hong Kong students have greater respect for the rule of law. In June, "anti-New Territories development" demonstrators twice occupied the Legislative Council. Later, they either retreated or were arrested by the police. By contrast, when students on Taiwan occupied the Legislative Yuan, the government dithered for over 20 days. The rule of law took an incredible hit.
Compare the two Occupy movements, one on Taiwan, the other in Hong Kong. Taiwan has more democracy, but Hong Kong has far greater respect for the rule of law. Students in Hong Kong behaved better. So did the police. The July 1st Occupy Central protest is over, But it has taught both sides of the Strait a valuable lesson.
同是占領，為何香港「占中」能和平收場？
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.07.08 03:09 am
香港七一遊行的「占領中環」預演，被很多人拿來和台灣三月下旬的學生占領行政院事件相提並論，並對港方驅離過程之平和感到驚訝。民進黨立委李應元對此評論說，香港警方沒有噴水，沒有動用警棍或盾牌，難道「台灣輸香港嗎？」
確實，看過三月台灣鎮暴警察驅離行政院的占領行動後，人們對這次香港警察以「四抬一」的方式輕易移走示威學生，莫不印象深刻，覺得港台兩地的對比鮮明。然而，當李應元談到「台灣輸香港」時，他企圖強調的是台灣警方處理的手法與陣仗過當，不如港警的平和溫文；問題是，他對兩地示威學生迥異的抗爭態度卻避而不談。事實上，如果「台灣輸香港」，其實是輸在公民的法治精神。
回看香港七一的「占中」行動，由於是學生臨時發動之「預演」，入夜後留守在中環的人數不足一千。凌晨二時，香港警方出動三千警力，一方面勸離群眾，一方面將人抬走，共逮捕五一一人，以大巴送至黃竹坑警校拘留訊問；整個驅離行動，達六小時之久。也因此，港方人士估計，萬一未來「占中」上演真實版，人數一旦超過萬人，警方可能必須出動防暴部隊、祭出催淚彈等來驅散人群，恐難避免流血衝突。
觀察這次占中抗議，許多學生手勾著手、重複呼喊口號，和台北太陽花的某些場景極為類似，或許也是兩地學運「交流」的成果之一。所不同的是，在中環的驅離過程中，包括學生和其他民眾皆未激烈抵抗，聽由警方將他們架離送走。其中主要原因應是：一，一般香港居民對「占中」行動仍有諸多疑慮，示威學生不願貿然將抗爭推到極致；二，學生示威前已有共識，「願意面對法律後果」，接受拘捕。正因為如此，香港學生遇上驅離，表現遠比太陽花學運節制。
反觀台北的三二三占領行動，當時學生占領國會已經六天，又奪下行政院，氣勢一片高漲，台灣社會卻面臨脫序的嚴重危機。由於太陽花有綠營的裡外接應，執政黨束手無策，警方維安更陷於無所適從之境。三二四凌晨，馬政府下達驅離命令時，現場聚集的學生多達一千多人，周邊地區群眾更多達六千人，場面喧囂難以想像。那夜，警方總計發動了六波行動，人潮散去又復湧來，甚至有人開始攻擊警察並刺破警車輪胎；直到清晨，警方不得不使用水柱驅離。
因此，從香港驅離行動的平順，要推論出台灣警察鎮壓學生太過凶殘無情，完全是片面觀點。其中最值得關注的是，港、台兩地學生從事「公民不服從」運動，態度卻有偌大區別。台灣的抗爭文化，承續黨外時代及民進黨的街頭行動，一直有一種「衝突極大化」的傾向，無畏流血；太陽花雖掌握了更多公民抗爭技巧，卻也明知「學生」與「群眾」在街頭難以區隔，因而頗能操弄其間的模糊地帶。
事實上，從張志軍訪台期間的「潑漆事件」及烏來的「鐵鍊鎖路」事件，都可看出，台灣若干學生的示威，已藉著「公民不服從」之名，將自己的一切抗爭行為都道德化、合理化了。亦即，只要打出「反中」、「反馬」口號，他們可以盡情挑戰一切既有體制，不必承擔任何法律責任。而台灣社會面對這樣的挑戰，似乎也產生了一股迷思，認為法治為民主而「讓步」似乎是情有可原或理所當然；在這種情況下，政府行政或警方的執法，便愈發顯得膽怯而瞻顧失據。
從這點看，香港學生雖同樣是在從事「公民不服從」運動，卻未曾企圖脫免全部法律責任，且聲明準備「承擔風險和後果」。兩相比較，或許是香港社會自港英以來的法治傳統確較台灣厚實，或許也是香港學生對於法治仍保有更多的信任與尊重。六月間，香港「反新界東北發展」的示威群眾，曾兩度占領及侵入立法會，後來或自行撤退或遭警方逮捕；對比之下，政府縱容台灣學生占領國會廿多日，也是不可思議的法治失守。
如果台灣和香港的兩場占領可以比較，台灣的民主程度或者較高，但香港的法治絕對勝出。香港學生的表現如此，警察的表現亦然；也因此，七一占中和平收場，對海峽兩岸都是有意義的一課。
Sunday, July 6, 2014
Mainland and Japan Grapple: Koreas Benefit, Taiwan Marginalized
Mainland and Japan Grapple: Koreas Benefit, Taiwan Marginalized
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2014
Summary: The Korean Peninsula has been quiet for quite some time. Recently however, it has suddenly become the object of Mainland Chinese and Japanese attention. In the past, Japan warmed to South Korea to oppose North Korea. Mainland China warmed to North Korea to oppose South Korea. Both offered concessions. This enabled the two Koreas benefit from the Sino-Japanese conflict. It also impacted the East Asian political situation, and marginalized Taiwan.
Full Text below:
The Korean Peninsula has been quiet for quite some time. Recently however, it has suddenly become the object of Mainland Chinese and Japanese attention. In the past, Japan warmed to South Korea to oppose North Korea. Mainland China warmed to North Korea to oppose South Korea. Both offered concessions. This enabled the two Koreas benefit from the Sino-Japanese conflict. It also impacted the East Asian political situation, and marginalized Taiwan.
Now however, Beijing is attempting to undermine the United States-South Korea military containment strategy. Beijing broke with its customary practice of making diplomatic visits to North Korea first, and South Korea second. Mainland President Xi Jinping led a 300 person delegation to South Korea. Most delegation members were economic and trade officials and entrepreneurs. As we can see, the purpose of the trip was economic rather than political.
During the Beijing-Seoul leaders summit Xi Jinping gave Seoul a generous present. He intends to sign the PRC-ROK FTA by the end of the year. He will use economic concessions to win over South Korea. This move allows South Korea to conclude FTAs with the United States, the EU, and Mainland China. South Korean President Park Geun-hye noted also that the "China Dream" and the "Korean Dream" are the same. Both dreams are aimed squarely at the Japanese.
Japan and South Korea have long-standing historical grievances and intractable territorial disputes. Despite careful mediation by the United States, Abe is still awaiting a response from Park Geun-hye. Japan therefore, has changed course. It has made overtures to North Korea. It has announced that Japan will relax economic sanctions against North Korea. This move was an attempt to weaken Beijing's influence over North Korea. In order to counter the "Xi Park meeting," North Korea has agreed to re-establish the "Japanese Hostage Special Investigation Committee." It has decided to extend Japan an olive branch.
When Japan lifts economic sanctions against North Korea, it will also relax restrictions on "Association of Korean Residents in Japan" officials traveling between Korea and Japan. It will open a pipeline for bilateral political dialogue. Japan has also decided to relax restrictions. Millions of Koreans in Japan can now visit North Korea with cash or money transfers. North Korea has long been the target of international economic sanctions. It has a shortage foreign currency. This influx of capital will have a considerable impact. No wonder Kim Jong-un sees this as his biggest diplomatic breakthrough. This "heart to heart" exchange between Japan and North Korea is of course aimed squarely at the Chinese mainland.
In short, recent Beijing-Tokyo political wrangling over foreign policy was all about economic concessions for North and South Korea. South Korea's "best of both worlds" principle has opened up a gap in the U.S.'s "Asian rebalancing" policy. South Korea has seized the opportunity to get close to Mainland China. It has also accrued considerable economic benefits for itself. Progress on the STA, MTA, and other economic agreements remains stalled in the Legislative Yuan. Meanwhile, the Beijing-Seoul FTA leaps ahead, and cross-Strait economic development falls further and further behind.
Consider the United States' "Asian rebalancing" policy. The United States once signed military cooperation agreements with individual countries in order exert its influence in East Asia. The US-Japan, US-South Korea, and US-Philippines agreements were its three military pillars. But recently, in response to the rise of Mainland Chinese military power, the U.S. has turned toward strengthening horizontal cooperation among its three East Asian allies. The U.S. and South Korea, the US and Japan, and the US and the Philippines were once three points. These three points now define a plane. This is why Japan recent sold arms to the Philippines, and strengthened its partnership with the Philippine military.
The United States, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines are four allies. Currently the main problem is between Japan and South Korea. Japan and South Korea have historical grievances and territorial disputes. They find it difficult to cooperate. Soon after Park Geun-hye took office, he adopted a tough policy toward Japan. Japanese-Korean relations became strained. This left a major strategic gap in the U.S.'s return to Asia. It allowed Beijing to breakthrough and win over South Korea.
Secondly, cross-Strait economic relations have undergone a qualitative change. Since 2008, cross-Strait economic agreements have progressed much faster than FTAs between the Mainland and other countries. For example, the Mainland hoped that the STA and MTA could be signed by the end of the year, and the Mainland China-South Korea FTA signed next year. This would protect Taiwan businesses' competitive advantage in the Mainland market.
But lo and behold, the STA remains stalled in the legislature. MTA negotiations have been shelved. The Mainland's grand strategy to win over South Korea has accelerated FTA negotiations with South Korea. South Korean industry and our industry have a 60% overlap. If Mainland China and South Korea sign an agreement by the end of the year, Taiwan businesses on the Mainland will lose their competitive advantage.
Japan recently lifted its ban on collective self-defense, increasing Sino-Japanese tensions. The DPP assumed Japan would "protect" Taiwan, and secretly rubbed its hands in glee. But as everyone knows, the green camp has stalled the STA in the Legislative Yuan. Amidst the Sino-Japanese diplomatic tussle, Taiwan's economy has already been marginalized.
We would like to ask DPP leaders a question. Is this really cause for celebration, or is it cause for concern?
中日角力，兩韓得利，台灣邊緣化
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.07.07 02:09 am
沉寂已久的朝鮮半島，最近突然變得重要起來，成為中日兩國爭相拉攏的對象。與過去不同的是，日本的拉攏對象從南韓轉向北韓，中國大陸則從北韓轉為南韓，雙方皆祭出「讓利」手段。此舉，讓兩韓成為中日衝突下的受益者，也牽動東亞政治板塊的變化，台灣卻遭邊緣化了。
這次，在突破美日韓軍事圍堵策略的政治考量下，北京打破過去「先北韓、後南韓」的外交出訪慣例，由中共國家主席習近平率領三百人的龐大訪問團訪問南韓。訪問團多半由經貿主管官員和大企業家組成，由此可知，此行的目的是經濟拉攏遠高於政治結盟。
在中韓領袖高峰會議上，習近平主動送上年底前將完成簽署《中韓自由貿易協定》的大禮，以經濟讓利來拉攏南韓。此舉，讓南韓完成了與美國、歐盟及中國大陸三大自由貿易協定的經濟拼圖。韓國總統朴槿惠也隨即表態，稱「中國夢」與「韓國夢」是相通的，因為兩國的夢都是針對日本。
從過去以來，日韓兩國受限於歷史問題及領土爭議而難以交心，雖經美國精心調解，安倍仍苦等不到朴槿惠的善意回應。也因此，日本便改弦易轍，主動轉向北韓示好，宣布日本將單獨放寬對北韓的經濟制裁；此舉，無非是想削弱中共對北韓的影響力。北韓方面，為了抵制「習朴會」，也同意將重新成立「日本人質綁架特別調查委員會」，對日本伸出了橄欖枝。
日本對北韓解除經濟制裁之後，不僅放寬「在日朝鮮人總聯合會」官員往返日、朝的禁令，開啟兩國政治對話的管道。同時，對於上百萬在日本的朝鮮人前往北韓攜帶現金及匯款，日本也決定放寬限制。這對於長期受國際經濟制裁而外匯短缺的北韓而言，具有相當大的資金挹注作用；也難怪，金正恩將此舉視為他就任後最大的外交突破。日本與北韓這番「交心」，主要目標當然是針對中國大陸而來。
簡言之，中日近期升高的政治角力，表現在外交政策上，是兩國分別向南北韓採取經濟讓利的交好政策。其中，南韓的「左右逢源」原則，則不啻讓美國的「亞洲再平衡」政策出現了一個缺口。不僅如此，南韓抓住機會靠向中國大陸，也為自己取得可觀的經濟利益；這在兩岸服貿、貨貿等經濟協議進度被卡在立法院之際，中韓自由貿易協議的進度超前，讓兩岸經濟發展愈發顯得不利。
先談美國的「亞洲再平衡」政策。過去美國在亞洲，是以和個別國家簽署軍事合作協議的方式來發揮它在東亞的影響力，「美日」、「美韓」與「美菲」是它的三大軍事支柱。但近期，因應大陸軍事力量的崛起，美國的東亞政策轉為要強化三大同盟國之間的橫向合作，把過去的美韓、美日、美菲的三個「點」，擴大成美日韓菲的「面」。最近日本對菲軍售，並強化與菲律賓之間的軍事合作關係，原因在此。
在「美日韓菲」四個同盟國的組合中，目前主要問題出在日韓關係。日韓兩國由於歷史問題及領土爭議的關係，遲遲無法進行合作；而朴槿惠上台後對日又採取強硬政策，讓日韓關係更趨緊張。這點，已成為美國重返亞洲戰略上的一大缺口，也讓北京找到拉攏南韓的突破點。
其次，觀察兩岸經濟關係的「質變」。自二○○八年以來，兩岸經濟協議的進度一直遠快於中國大陸與他國簽署自貿協定的腳步。例如，大陸原希望兩岸服貿、貨貿協議能在年底完成簽署，《中韓自由貿易協定》談判則是規劃在明年完成談判，這是為保障台灣企業進入大陸市場的競爭優勢。
孰料，兩岸服貿協議如今卡在立法院，貨貿協議談判隨之擱置。而今，大陸在拉攏南韓的大戰略下，選擇加速與南韓進行自貿協定談判；而南韓產業與我國產業的重疊性高達六成，中韓協議若真在年底完成，將使我國企業在中國市場喪失競爭優勢。
日本日前通過解禁集體自衛權，引發中日關係緊張，民進黨還以為日本此後能夠「保護」台灣，而暗自竊喜。殊不知，綠營在立法院卡住的服貿協議，在這場中日外交角力戰的催化下，已把台灣經濟推向「邊緣化」的危機。
我們想反問民進黨諸公：對此是喜？還是憂？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2014
Summary: The Korean Peninsula has been quiet for quite some time. Recently however, it has suddenly become the object of Mainland Chinese and Japanese attention. In the past, Japan warmed to South Korea to oppose North Korea. Mainland China warmed to North Korea to oppose South Korea. Both offered concessions. This enabled the two Koreas benefit from the Sino-Japanese conflict. It also impacted the East Asian political situation, and marginalized Taiwan.
Full Text below:
The Korean Peninsula has been quiet for quite some time. Recently however, it has suddenly become the object of Mainland Chinese and Japanese attention. In the past, Japan warmed to South Korea to oppose North Korea. Mainland China warmed to North Korea to oppose South Korea. Both offered concessions. This enabled the two Koreas benefit from the Sino-Japanese conflict. It also impacted the East Asian political situation, and marginalized Taiwan.
Now however, Beijing is attempting to undermine the United States-South Korea military containment strategy. Beijing broke with its customary practice of making diplomatic visits to North Korea first, and South Korea second. Mainland President Xi Jinping led a 300 person delegation to South Korea. Most delegation members were economic and trade officials and entrepreneurs. As we can see, the purpose of the trip was economic rather than political.
During the Beijing-Seoul leaders summit Xi Jinping gave Seoul a generous present. He intends to sign the PRC-ROK FTA by the end of the year. He will use economic concessions to win over South Korea. This move allows South Korea to conclude FTAs with the United States, the EU, and Mainland China. South Korean President Park Geun-hye noted also that the "China Dream" and the "Korean Dream" are the same. Both dreams are aimed squarely at the Japanese.
Japan and South Korea have long-standing historical grievances and intractable territorial disputes. Despite careful mediation by the United States, Abe is still awaiting a response from Park Geun-hye. Japan therefore, has changed course. It has made overtures to North Korea. It has announced that Japan will relax economic sanctions against North Korea. This move was an attempt to weaken Beijing's influence over North Korea. In order to counter the "Xi Park meeting," North Korea has agreed to re-establish the "Japanese Hostage Special Investigation Committee." It has decided to extend Japan an olive branch.
When Japan lifts economic sanctions against North Korea, it will also relax restrictions on "Association of Korean Residents in Japan" officials traveling between Korea and Japan. It will open a pipeline for bilateral political dialogue. Japan has also decided to relax restrictions. Millions of Koreans in Japan can now visit North Korea with cash or money transfers. North Korea has long been the target of international economic sanctions. It has a shortage foreign currency. This influx of capital will have a considerable impact. No wonder Kim Jong-un sees this as his biggest diplomatic breakthrough. This "heart to heart" exchange between Japan and North Korea is of course aimed squarely at the Chinese mainland.
In short, recent Beijing-Tokyo political wrangling over foreign policy was all about economic concessions for North and South Korea. South Korea's "best of both worlds" principle has opened up a gap in the U.S.'s "Asian rebalancing" policy. South Korea has seized the opportunity to get close to Mainland China. It has also accrued considerable economic benefits for itself. Progress on the STA, MTA, and other economic agreements remains stalled in the Legislative Yuan. Meanwhile, the Beijing-Seoul FTA leaps ahead, and cross-Strait economic development falls further and further behind.
Consider the United States' "Asian rebalancing" policy. The United States once signed military cooperation agreements with individual countries in order exert its influence in East Asia. The US-Japan, US-South Korea, and US-Philippines agreements were its three military pillars. But recently, in response to the rise of Mainland Chinese military power, the U.S. has turned toward strengthening horizontal cooperation among its three East Asian allies. The U.S. and South Korea, the US and Japan, and the US and the Philippines were once three points. These three points now define a plane. This is why Japan recent sold arms to the Philippines, and strengthened its partnership with the Philippine military.
The United States, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines are four allies. Currently the main problem is between Japan and South Korea. Japan and South Korea have historical grievances and territorial disputes. They find it difficult to cooperate. Soon after Park Geun-hye took office, he adopted a tough policy toward Japan. Japanese-Korean relations became strained. This left a major strategic gap in the U.S.'s return to Asia. It allowed Beijing to breakthrough and win over South Korea.
Secondly, cross-Strait economic relations have undergone a qualitative change. Since 2008, cross-Strait economic agreements have progressed much faster than FTAs between the Mainland and other countries. For example, the Mainland hoped that the STA and MTA could be signed by the end of the year, and the Mainland China-South Korea FTA signed next year. This would protect Taiwan businesses' competitive advantage in the Mainland market.
But lo and behold, the STA remains stalled in the legislature. MTA negotiations have been shelved. The Mainland's grand strategy to win over South Korea has accelerated FTA negotiations with South Korea. South Korean industry and our industry have a 60% overlap. If Mainland China and South Korea sign an agreement by the end of the year, Taiwan businesses on the Mainland will lose their competitive advantage.
Japan recently lifted its ban on collective self-defense, increasing Sino-Japanese tensions. The DPP assumed Japan would "protect" Taiwan, and secretly rubbed its hands in glee. But as everyone knows, the green camp has stalled the STA in the Legislative Yuan. Amidst the Sino-Japanese diplomatic tussle, Taiwan's economy has already been marginalized.
We would like to ask DPP leaders a question. Is this really cause for celebration, or is it cause for concern?
中日角力，兩韓得利，台灣邊緣化
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.07.07 02:09 am
沉寂已久的朝鮮半島，最近突然變得重要起來，成為中日兩國爭相拉攏的對象。與過去不同的是，日本的拉攏對象從南韓轉向北韓，中國大陸則從北韓轉為南韓，雙方皆祭出「讓利」手段。此舉，讓兩韓成為中日衝突下的受益者，也牽動東亞政治板塊的變化，台灣卻遭邊緣化了。
這次，在突破美日韓軍事圍堵策略的政治考量下，北京打破過去「先北韓、後南韓」的外交出訪慣例，由中共國家主席習近平率領三百人的龐大訪問團訪問南韓。訪問團多半由經貿主管官員和大企業家組成，由此可知，此行的目的是經濟拉攏遠高於政治結盟。
在中韓領袖高峰會議上，習近平主動送上年底前將完成簽署《中韓自由貿易協定》的大禮，以經濟讓利來拉攏南韓。此舉，讓南韓完成了與美國、歐盟及中國大陸三大自由貿易協定的經濟拼圖。韓國總統朴槿惠也隨即表態，稱「中國夢」與「韓國夢」是相通的，因為兩國的夢都是針對日本。
從過去以來，日韓兩國受限於歷史問題及領土爭議而難以交心，雖經美國精心調解，安倍仍苦等不到朴槿惠的善意回應。也因此，日本便改弦易轍，主動轉向北韓示好，宣布日本將單獨放寬對北韓的經濟制裁；此舉，無非是想削弱中共對北韓的影響力。北韓方面，為了抵制「習朴會」，也同意將重新成立「日本人質綁架特別調查委員會」，對日本伸出了橄欖枝。
日本對北韓解除經濟制裁之後，不僅放寬「在日朝鮮人總聯合會」官員往返日、朝的禁令，開啟兩國政治對話的管道。同時，對於上百萬在日本的朝鮮人前往北韓攜帶現金及匯款，日本也決定放寬限制。這對於長期受國際經濟制裁而外匯短缺的北韓而言，具有相當大的資金挹注作用；也難怪，金正恩將此舉視為他就任後最大的外交突破。日本與北韓這番「交心」，主要目標當然是針對中國大陸而來。
簡言之，中日近期升高的政治角力，表現在外交政策上，是兩國分別向南北韓採取經濟讓利的交好政策。其中，南韓的「左右逢源」原則，則不啻讓美國的「亞洲再平衡」政策出現了一個缺口。不僅如此，南韓抓住機會靠向中國大陸，也為自己取得可觀的經濟利益；這在兩岸服貿、貨貿等經濟協議進度被卡在立法院之際，中韓自由貿易協議的進度超前，讓兩岸經濟發展愈發顯得不利。
先談美國的「亞洲再平衡」政策。過去美國在亞洲，是以和個別國家簽署軍事合作協議的方式來發揮它在東亞的影響力，「美日」、「美韓」與「美菲」是它的三大軍事支柱。但近期，因應大陸軍事力量的崛起，美國的東亞政策轉為要強化三大同盟國之間的橫向合作，把過去的美韓、美日、美菲的三個「點」，擴大成美日韓菲的「面」。最近日本對菲軍售，並強化與菲律賓之間的軍事合作關係，原因在此。
在「美日韓菲」四個同盟國的組合中，目前主要問題出在日韓關係。日韓兩國由於歷史問題及領土爭議的關係，遲遲無法進行合作；而朴槿惠上台後對日又採取強硬政策，讓日韓關係更趨緊張。這點，已成為美國重返亞洲戰略上的一大缺口，也讓北京找到拉攏南韓的突破點。
其次，觀察兩岸經濟關係的「質變」。自二○○八年以來，兩岸經濟協議的進度一直遠快於中國大陸與他國簽署自貿協定的腳步。例如，大陸原希望兩岸服貿、貨貿協議能在年底完成簽署，《中韓自由貿易協定》談判則是規劃在明年完成談判，這是為保障台灣企業進入大陸市場的競爭優勢。
孰料，兩岸服貿協議如今卡在立法院，貨貿協議談判隨之擱置。而今，大陸在拉攏南韓的大戰略下，選擇加速與南韓進行自貿協定談判；而南韓產業與我國產業的重疊性高達六成，中韓協議若真在年底完成，將使我國企業在中國市場喪失競爭優勢。
日本日前通過解禁集體自衛權，引發中日關係緊張，民進黨還以為日本此後能夠「保護」台灣，而暗自竊喜。殊不知，綠營在立法院卡住的服貿協議，在這場中日外交角力戰的催化下，已把台灣經濟推向「邊緣化」的危機。
我們想反問民進黨諸公：對此是喜？還是憂？
Thursday, July 3, 2014
Must Beijing Use "One China" to Squeeze Out Hong Kong's "Two Systems?"
Must Beijing Use "One China" to Squeeze Out Hong Kong's "Two Systems?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 4, 2014
Summary: All political problems are the result of conflict. Mature politicians know how to deal with conflict. Hong Kong's "Occupy Central" movement has made important progress. It has undergone continuous conflict, debate, and improvement. But will the movement elicit a positive response from Beijing? Will it help normalize democracy in Hong Kong? That remains to be seen. The key is Beijing's ability to adopt a more mature attitude when faced with Hong Konger political views and feelings. Deng Xiaoping advocated "peaceful reunification of the motherland." Beijing should respect his generous commitment to Hong Kongers, as embodied in his declaration of "one country, two systems."
Full Text Below:
On July 1, Hong Kongers took to the streets. Five hundred ten thousand people marched, demanding "real democratic elections" for Hong Kong's Chief Executive. From an outsider's perspective, the fight for democracy in Hong Kong has taken a giant leap forward. But within Hong Kong, the rift among Hong Kong democrats has deepened. Given its reaction, Beijing shows no desire to compromise.
The current "Occupy Central" protest, which followed on the tail of the July 1st march, was not organized by the original promoters of the "Occupy Central" movement. Rather it was organized on an ad hoc basis by two student groups. Hong Kong democrats are divided between "radicals" and "progressives." They are engaged in a power struggle and tug of war over policy. As a result an impatient new generation of students has taken the lead and radicalized the Hong Kong democracy movement.
One development is worrisome. The July 1st march is popular. The "Occupy Central" movement concluded without bloodshed. But success on the streets does not necessarily help the normal operation and development of democratic institutions. They may even do them a disservice. Hong Kong's democratic parties have engaged in long, drawn out disputes over "Occupy Central." Following the June referendum, Democratic Party Chairperson Emily Lau announced the party's withdrawal from the "Alliance for True Democracy." This reveals the profound differences within the "pan-democratic camp." A few years ago, Hong Kong democrats successfully fought for improvements in the democratic election system. Directly elected seats were increased. But the bitter fruit of this was fewer seats won. This shows that the success of street movements bears no relationship to the progress of democracy. Often, there is no direct correlation. This is something that members of the community must recognize as part of the democratic process.
The next thing we must await, is the CCP response. Beijing has long maintained a tough stance. Hong Kongers have repeatedly held referenda, marches, and occupied the Central District. They have repeatedly stepped over Beijing's red line. The general consensus is that Beijing is unlikely to make any concessions. Two days ago the "Global Times," the Chinese Communist Party's mouthpiece, published an editorial. It said that "The nation cannot possibly make concessions to the Hong Kong July 1st marchers." It characterized the dispute between the central government and Hong Kong as an case of "the nation making concessions." This shows how frustrated and angry the CCP is. But until the gavel comes down, Beijing still has room for accommodation. It can ease concerns among Hong Kongers without leaving outsiders with the impression that Beijing kowtowed to Hong Kong.
First. The July 1st marchers objected to how Chief Executive candidates are selected. The public wants more say in how the Hong Kong government selects the candidates. This desire is hardly radical. The selection of the Chief Executive candidates involves local support, and the SAR government's influence and oversight. This involves only Hong Kong's public interest. All of this falls under governance within the "two systems" framework. It involves no national level sovereignty issues whatsoever. Beijing need not perceive this as a challenge to the "one country" premise.
Second. Beijing has agreed to allow universal suffrage in Hong Kong by 2017. This is an important step. If Beijing demands that a "Nomination Committee" filter the candidates, Hong Kongers will wonder whether the elections are being manipulated. Outsiders may mistakenly conclude that Beijing still prohibits direct elections in Hong Kong. Such conclusions would be counterproductive. One country, two systems stressed that "Hong Kongers would rule Hong Kong." If this is reduced to "Only patriotic Hong Kongers may rule Hong Kong," then "one country" would squeeze out "two systems." This would contradict the original spirit of reunification. Besides, Hong Kongers will surely exercise judgment in whom they select. If Beijing questions Hong Kongers' patriotism, won't that just alienate and anger them?
Third. The "real democratic elections," referendum proposed three alternatives. Different groups in Hong Kong proposed 29 alternatives. The point was merely to increase of candidates nominated by the public, and ensure that the "Nomination Committee" members were more representative. None of these proposals were terribly threatening. Democracies usually resort to party nominations. Public petitions are the exception. Many Hong Kongers, including the "Alliance for Real Democracy" and student groups, may not even realize that the wider the spectrum of nominees, the more difficult it will be for voters to concentrate their votes. This will reduce the candidate's chances of being elected. This is something that Hong Kong democrats shuld be aware of. They must not reflexively conduct referenda or take to the streets. On the other hand, this means that Beijing need not be afraid. It need not tie itself up in knots over this. Beijing would be better to demonstrate goodwill in order to win Hong Kongers' hearts and minds.
All political problems are the result of conflict. Mature politicians know how to deal with conflict. Hong Kong's "Occupy Central" movement has made important progress. It has undergone continuous conflict, debate, and improvement. But will the movement elicit a positive response from Beijing? Will it help normalize democracy in Hong Kong? That remains to be seen. The key is Beijing's ability to adopt a more mature attitude when faced with Hong Konger political views and feelings. Deng Xiaoping advocated "peaceful reunification of the motherland." Beijing should respect his generous commitment to Hong Kongers, as embodied in his declaration of "one country, two systems."
北京何需用「一中」擠壓香港的「兩制」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.07.04 03:41 am
香港七一大遊行，五十一萬人上街表達了他們爭取特首「真普選」的意志。在外界看來，香港爭取民主的腳步確實往前跨出了一大步；但就香港內部而言，民主黨派間的裂痕卻反而因此更為加深；而觀察北京的反應，目前似乎仍看不出有退讓的跡象。
值得注意的是，這次七一遊行後的「占中」行動，並不是由「占中運動」的原始發起人所領導，而是由兩個「學生團體」臨時發難。亦即，香港民主黨派在「激進」與「漸進」的路線掙扎和拉鋸中，結果是不耐其煩的新生代學運團體跳出來帶頭衝刺，把調性拉向了更激進的一端。
讓人擔憂之處在於：「七一」大遊行固然展現了高人氣，「占中」行動也在未流血對峙中收場；但是，街頭的成功，對於體制的常態運作及民主政治的發展而言，有時卻未必是加分，甚至可能幫了倒忙。香港泛民主黨派為「占中」運動爭執甚久，在六月的公投後，民主黨主席劉慧卿更宣布退出「真普聯」，顯示「泛民」陣營歧見甚深。前幾年，民主派成功爭取了選制的改良，促使直選席次增加，結果卻只換得自身席次降低的苦果；這些，都說明街頭運動與民主進展的關係，往往不是成直線的正比。這點，也是一個社會的不同成員在民主磨合過程中，所必須認知與學習的事。
接下來，要看的就是中共將如何回應。以北京一向的強勢作風，對於香港人連續以公投、大遊行、占中的行動挑戰它畫下的紅線，一般研判，北京退讓的機率很低。這兩天，中共喉舌報「環球時報」已在社論中挑明：「香港七一遊行，國家不可能讓步」；把香港人與中央政府的爭議，輕易上綱上線到「國家讓步」，多少反映了中共的惱羞成怒。然而，我們認為，在最後的辦法拍板定案之前，北京仍然有些調整空間，既舒緩香港人民的憂慮，又不致讓外界感到北京向香港低頭或讓步。
首先，七一遊行所爭的是特首候選人的產生方式，主要是市民對港府的產生方式希望有更多發言權，這個願望其實並不激進。特首的產生方式，牽涉到的主要是在地民意對特首以及特區政府的影響力與監督權；這涉及的只是香港的公共利益，是「兩制」之下「治理」層次的問題，並不涉及一國層次的「主權」。因此，北京沒有必要認為這是對「一國兩制」的挑戰。
其次，北京既已同意讓香港在二○一七年進行「普選」，這是重要的一步；如果竟因要用「提名委員會」來過濾候選人，而讓港人質疑普選將流於「被操控」，或讓全世界誤以為北京仍禁止香港進行直選，都是得不償失的事。一國兩制原本強調的是「港人治港」，現在若將之限縮為「愛國的港人治港」，這其實是利用「一國」來擠壓「兩制」，違背了當初香港回歸的歷史背景。何況，香港人民的選擇應該自有分寸，如果北京居然質疑港人的「愛國心」，怎麼不讓他們因心寒而轉生憤怒？
第三，不論是這次「真普選」公投的三項方案，或是香港各界所提出的廿九個替代方案，其重點不外是增加民間提名的管道，並提高「提名委員會」成員的代表性；這些，都不是什麼洪水猛獸。事實上，民主國家常見的模式是政黨提名，公民連署則是少數例外；然而，包括「真普聯」及學生團體在內的許多港人可能都未意識到：提名越是廣泛，將導致投票越是不易集中，反而削弱了當選的機率。這點，香港民運界要有所警惕，不能一味以公投或上街人數龐大為已足；從另一方面，這也意味北京毋需對此過度戒懼而自縛手腳，不如釋出一些善意，換取港人的歸心。
一切政治問題都由衝突而產生，政治家的成熟與否就表現在如何處理衝突。香港「占中運動」的發展，經過不斷的衝突、辯論和修正，取得了重要的進展。然而，這些運動的成果能否換得北京的積極回應，乃至有助於香港民主的正常化，則仍有待觀察；其關鍵，就在北京的主政者能否以更成熟的政治態度來正視香港人的意見與感受，也尊重當初鄧小平「和平統一祖國」宣示下對港人「一國兩制」的寬大承諾。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 4, 2014
Summary: All political problems are the result of conflict. Mature politicians know how to deal with conflict. Hong Kong's "Occupy Central" movement has made important progress. It has undergone continuous conflict, debate, and improvement. But will the movement elicit a positive response from Beijing? Will it help normalize democracy in Hong Kong? That remains to be seen. The key is Beijing's ability to adopt a more mature attitude when faced with Hong Konger political views and feelings. Deng Xiaoping advocated "peaceful reunification of the motherland." Beijing should respect his generous commitment to Hong Kongers, as embodied in his declaration of "one country, two systems."
Full Text Below:
On July 1, Hong Kongers took to the streets. Five hundred ten thousand people marched, demanding "real democratic elections" for Hong Kong's Chief Executive. From an outsider's perspective, the fight for democracy in Hong Kong has taken a giant leap forward. But within Hong Kong, the rift among Hong Kong democrats has deepened. Given its reaction, Beijing shows no desire to compromise.
The current "Occupy Central" protest, which followed on the tail of the July 1st march, was not organized by the original promoters of the "Occupy Central" movement. Rather it was organized on an ad hoc basis by two student groups. Hong Kong democrats are divided between "radicals" and "progressives." They are engaged in a power struggle and tug of war over policy. As a result an impatient new generation of students has taken the lead and radicalized the Hong Kong democracy movement.
One development is worrisome. The July 1st march is popular. The "Occupy Central" movement concluded without bloodshed. But success on the streets does not necessarily help the normal operation and development of democratic institutions. They may even do them a disservice. Hong Kong's democratic parties have engaged in long, drawn out disputes over "Occupy Central." Following the June referendum, Democratic Party Chairperson Emily Lau announced the party's withdrawal from the "Alliance for True Democracy." This reveals the profound differences within the "pan-democratic camp." A few years ago, Hong Kong democrats successfully fought for improvements in the democratic election system. Directly elected seats were increased. But the bitter fruit of this was fewer seats won. This shows that the success of street movements bears no relationship to the progress of democracy. Often, there is no direct correlation. This is something that members of the community must recognize as part of the democratic process.
The next thing we must await, is the CCP response. Beijing has long maintained a tough stance. Hong Kongers have repeatedly held referenda, marches, and occupied the Central District. They have repeatedly stepped over Beijing's red line. The general consensus is that Beijing is unlikely to make any concessions. Two days ago the "Global Times," the Chinese Communist Party's mouthpiece, published an editorial. It said that "The nation cannot possibly make concessions to the Hong Kong July 1st marchers." It characterized the dispute between the central government and Hong Kong as an case of "the nation making concessions." This shows how frustrated and angry the CCP is. But until the gavel comes down, Beijing still has room for accommodation. It can ease concerns among Hong Kongers without leaving outsiders with the impression that Beijing kowtowed to Hong Kong.
First. The July 1st marchers objected to how Chief Executive candidates are selected. The public wants more say in how the Hong Kong government selects the candidates. This desire is hardly radical. The selection of the Chief Executive candidates involves local support, and the SAR government's influence and oversight. This involves only Hong Kong's public interest. All of this falls under governance within the "two systems" framework. It involves no national level sovereignty issues whatsoever. Beijing need not perceive this as a challenge to the "one country" premise.
Second. Beijing has agreed to allow universal suffrage in Hong Kong by 2017. This is an important step. If Beijing demands that a "Nomination Committee" filter the candidates, Hong Kongers will wonder whether the elections are being manipulated. Outsiders may mistakenly conclude that Beijing still prohibits direct elections in Hong Kong. Such conclusions would be counterproductive. One country, two systems stressed that "Hong Kongers would rule Hong Kong." If this is reduced to "Only patriotic Hong Kongers may rule Hong Kong," then "one country" would squeeze out "two systems." This would contradict the original spirit of reunification. Besides, Hong Kongers will surely exercise judgment in whom they select. If Beijing questions Hong Kongers' patriotism, won't that just alienate and anger them?
Third. The "real democratic elections," referendum proposed three alternatives. Different groups in Hong Kong proposed 29 alternatives. The point was merely to increase of candidates nominated by the public, and ensure that the "Nomination Committee" members were more representative. None of these proposals were terribly threatening. Democracies usually resort to party nominations. Public petitions are the exception. Many Hong Kongers, including the "Alliance for Real Democracy" and student groups, may not even realize that the wider the spectrum of nominees, the more difficult it will be for voters to concentrate their votes. This will reduce the candidate's chances of being elected. This is something that Hong Kong democrats shuld be aware of. They must not reflexively conduct referenda or take to the streets. On the other hand, this means that Beijing need not be afraid. It need not tie itself up in knots over this. Beijing would be better to demonstrate goodwill in order to win Hong Kongers' hearts and minds.
All political problems are the result of conflict. Mature politicians know how to deal with conflict. Hong Kong's "Occupy Central" movement has made important progress. It has undergone continuous conflict, debate, and improvement. But will the movement elicit a positive response from Beijing? Will it help normalize democracy in Hong Kong? That remains to be seen. The key is Beijing's ability to adopt a more mature attitude when faced with Hong Konger political views and feelings. Deng Xiaoping advocated "peaceful reunification of the motherland." Beijing should respect his generous commitment to Hong Kongers, as embodied in his declaration of "one country, two systems."
北京何需用「一中」擠壓香港的「兩制」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.07.04 03:41 am
香港七一大遊行，五十一萬人上街表達了他們爭取特首「真普選」的意志。在外界看來，香港爭取民主的腳步確實往前跨出了一大步；但就香港內部而言，民主黨派間的裂痕卻反而因此更為加深；而觀察北京的反應，目前似乎仍看不出有退讓的跡象。
值得注意的是，這次七一遊行後的「占中」行動，並不是由「占中運動」的原始發起人所領導，而是由兩個「學生團體」臨時發難。亦即，香港民主黨派在「激進」與「漸進」的路線掙扎和拉鋸中，結果是不耐其煩的新生代學運團體跳出來帶頭衝刺，把調性拉向了更激進的一端。
讓人擔憂之處在於：「七一」大遊行固然展現了高人氣，「占中」行動也在未流血對峙中收場；但是，街頭的成功，對於體制的常態運作及民主政治的發展而言，有時卻未必是加分，甚至可能幫了倒忙。香港泛民主黨派為「占中」運動爭執甚久，在六月的公投後，民主黨主席劉慧卿更宣布退出「真普聯」，顯示「泛民」陣營歧見甚深。前幾年，民主派成功爭取了選制的改良，促使直選席次增加，結果卻只換得自身席次降低的苦果；這些，都說明街頭運動與民主進展的關係，往往不是成直線的正比。這點，也是一個社會的不同成員在民主磨合過程中，所必須認知與學習的事。
接下來，要看的就是中共將如何回應。以北京一向的強勢作風，對於香港人連續以公投、大遊行、占中的行動挑戰它畫下的紅線，一般研判，北京退讓的機率很低。這兩天，中共喉舌報「環球時報」已在社論中挑明：「香港七一遊行，國家不可能讓步」；把香港人與中央政府的爭議，輕易上綱上線到「國家讓步」，多少反映了中共的惱羞成怒。然而，我們認為，在最後的辦法拍板定案之前，北京仍然有些調整空間，既舒緩香港人民的憂慮，又不致讓外界感到北京向香港低頭或讓步。
首先，七一遊行所爭的是特首候選人的產生方式，主要是市民對港府的產生方式希望有更多發言權，這個願望其實並不激進。特首的產生方式，牽涉到的主要是在地民意對特首以及特區政府的影響力與監督權；這涉及的只是香港的公共利益，是「兩制」之下「治理」層次的問題，並不涉及一國層次的「主權」。因此，北京沒有必要認為這是對「一國兩制」的挑戰。
其次，北京既已同意讓香港在二○一七年進行「普選」，這是重要的一步；如果竟因要用「提名委員會」來過濾候選人，而讓港人質疑普選將流於「被操控」，或讓全世界誤以為北京仍禁止香港進行直選，都是得不償失的事。一國兩制原本強調的是「港人治港」，現在若將之限縮為「愛國的港人治港」，這其實是利用「一國」來擠壓「兩制」，違背了當初香港回歸的歷史背景。何況，香港人民的選擇應該自有分寸，如果北京居然質疑港人的「愛國心」，怎麼不讓他們因心寒而轉生憤怒？
第三，不論是這次「真普選」公投的三項方案，或是香港各界所提出的廿九個替代方案，其重點不外是增加民間提名的管道，並提高「提名委員會」成員的代表性；這些，都不是什麼洪水猛獸。事實上，民主國家常見的模式是政黨提名，公民連署則是少數例外；然而，包括「真普聯」及學生團體在內的許多港人可能都未意識到：提名越是廣泛，將導致投票越是不易集中，反而削弱了當選的機率。這點，香港民運界要有所警惕，不能一味以公投或上街人數龐大為已足；從另一方面，這也意味北京毋需對此過度戒懼而自縛手腳，不如釋出一些善意，換取港人的歸心。
一切政治問題都由衝突而產生，政治家的成熟與否就表現在如何處理衝突。香港「占中運動」的發展，經過不斷的衝突、辯論和修正，取得了重要的進展。然而，這些運動的成果能否換得北京的積極回應，乃至有助於香港民主的正常化，則仍有待觀察；其關鍵，就在北京的主政者能否以更成熟的政治態度來正視香港人的意見與感受，也尊重當初鄧小平「和平統一祖國」宣示下對港人「一國兩制」的寬大承諾。
Wednesday, July 2, 2014
Warning Signs From Japan
Warning Signs From Japan
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 3, 2014
Summary: Japan's Abe regime is under pressure from mass protests. On July 1, a provisional cabinet amended Japan's constitution. It substantially changed the peace constitution, authorizing the government to engage in "collective self-defense." Put simply, from this day forward, even if Japan has not been attacked, it can cite "preventing its allies from being attacked" as a justification for military aggression.
Full Text Below:
Japan's Abe regime is under pressure from mass protests. On July 1, a provisional cabinet amended Japan's constitution. It substantially changed the peace constitution, authorizing the government to engage in "collective self-defense." Put simply, from this day forward, even if Japan has not been attacked, it can cite "preventing its allies from being attacked" as a justification for military aggression.
As we all know, in 1946, under orders from the United States, a defeated Japan adopted its "peace constitution." Article 9 of the peace constitution clearly states, "The Japanese people, sincerely seeking international peace based on justice and order, forever renounce war, the threat of force, or the use of force, as means for settling international disputes." It states, "In order to achieve these goals, it will not maintain armed forces and other war-making forces, and does not recognize the right of the government to engage in war."
The peace constitution may have been passed under orders from the United States. But its basic intention, its pacifism, its democratic spirit, helped facilitate Japan's postwar recovery. With the end of the Cold War however, Japan's "1955 Framework" collapsed. Forces favoring rapid innovation faded. But abandoning the peace constitution remained difficult. Politicians worked around the problem in various ways. The "revised constitutional interpretation" is an important step.
The new resolution has overturned the "three conditions for initiating the right of self-defense" honored by successive Japanese Cabinets. In its place, Japan now has the new "three conditions for the exercise of force." One. If Japan is subject to an armed attack, or a nation with close relations with Japan is subject to an armed attack that threatens the survival of Japan and the lives of Japanese nationals, or poses a clear danger to their liberty and their pursuit of happiness. Two. To protect the state and citizens when no other means can prevent such attacks. Three. The exercise of force is limited to the "minimum required." If the above three conditions are satisfied, Japan may exercise force as a "self-defense" measure.
This is a major turning point. The media have responded in several ways. Some call this "the restoration of militarism." Some say this "moves toward a new era of security." South Korea's Chosun Ilbo linked this to an agreement reached late last month in Sweden between Japan and North Korea. Japan promised to lift sanctions against North Korea if it reviewed the cases against Japanese abductees. On June 20, the government of Japan published a "Kono Statement Verification Report" on the comfort women issue. South Korea linked these three issues and said that an "Abe led Japan appears indifferent to South Korea, and is moving further and further to the right." The newspaper also noted that "The Abe cabinet's three initiatives will lead to the deterioration of relations between South Korea and Japan. It will have a negative impact on peace, security, and order in northeast Asia."
How should we perceive the Abe regime's initiatives? Let us be precise. The international situation is very different from what it was during the Cold War and the Second World War. Has Mainland China risen? Has Japan reverted to militarism? These await more evidence. What is certain is that under Abe's efforts, Japan's post World War II "defense only" security policy is undergoing fundamental change. The right-wing Abe has led Japan far astray from its postwar pacifism.
Following the cabinet meeting, Abe declared that "Japan will not embark on a path of war" and "What Japan needs is the deterrent ability, so it can defend the peace." He stressed that "Normal circumstances do not permit sending troops overseas. That has not changed. The Self-Defense Forces will never be involved in fighting such as the Gulf War and the war in Iraq and the like. The possibility of Japan's involvement in war will be further reduced. Japan may never again be involved in a war." He said "Japan is taking the road to peace. That will not change. This will strengthen that resolve." Alas, his high-minded rhetoric does not change the fact that Japan has reached a major turning point in its national policy.
Two. Given the close relationship between the U.S. and Japan, Japan's initiative was clearly supported by the United States. Encouraged, even. The United States has asked Japan to assume greater international responsibility. It has demanded that Japanese remove the ban on collective self-defense. This complies with Japanese right-wing moves toward a "normal nation." That is why it succeeded.
Three. The strategic picture in East Asia is certain to become increasingly complex and tense. Mutual trust and understanding between Mainland China and Japan was already weak. Japan is worried about the rise of China. China cannot win the trust of the US-led, Japanese-squired Western nations. Sino-Japanese strategic confrontation, an arms race, and even regional conflicts, are possible, This of course will make Taiwan's international plight even more difficult and awkward. The Ma government's grand strategy of "close to America, at peace with the Mainland, and friendly with Japan" increasingly difficult.
Four. Japan's cabinet has interpreted the constitution, and changed its policy. In fact, this is a dangerous violation of democracy. The South Korean media said, "If the Prime Minister decides it is necessary, then Japan can go to war," "In Japan, something forbidden for 33 years, is now permitted merely because the Prime Minister thinks it is necessary. This in itself is a kind of dictatorship."
Scan the media for reports. One will find that almost all Japanese public opinion polls show the public strongly opposing this constitutional interpretation of collective self-defense. But as a Korean reporter noted, "In Japan's political circles, there is only the "wishes of the Prime Minister," there is no "wishes of the people." This being the case, is this not an obvious warning sign for all of East Asia?
Japan has strayed from the path of pacifism and democracy. Taiwan cannot afford to leave matters to chance and misjudge the situation. Vigilance and caution are essential.
社論－日本發出危險的警兆
2014年07月03日 04:10
本報訊
日本安倍政權7月1日在群眾群起抗議惡劣氛圍下，以「臨時內閣會議」程序，透過「修改憲法解釋」方式，達成實質改變日本《和平憲法》，授與政府行使「集體自衛權」，簡單來說，今後日本即使本國未遭到攻擊，亦可以「阻止盟國遭受攻擊」為理由行使武力。
眾所周知，1946年在美國支配下，戰敗的日本通過了《非戰憲法》、《和平憲法》，其中第9條明確規定：「日本國民衷心謀求基於正義與秩序的國際和平，永遠放棄以國權發動的戰爭、武力威脅或武力行使作為解決國際爭端的手段。」而「為達到前項目的，不保持陸海空軍及其他戰爭力量，不承認國家的交戰權。」
這部《和平憲法》，雖然基本是遵循美國意旨制定通過的，但其和平主義、民主主義的精神，戰後日本的革新陣營基本上都是維護鞏固的。冷戰結束，日本「五五年體制」崩壞後，雖然革新勢力急速衰退，但要修憲廢棄《和平憲法》，還是相當的困難。政客只得透過迂迴的方式進行，這次「修改憲法解釋」是非常重要的一步。
新決議已翻轉了日本歷屆內閣遵守的「自衛權發動3條件」，完成新的「武力行使3條件」：其一、日本遭到武力攻擊，或與日本關係密切國家遭到武力攻擊，威脅到日本的存亡，從根本上對日本國民的生命、自由和追求幸福的權利構成明確危險；其二、為保護國家和國民，沒有其他適當手段可以排除上述攻擊；其三、武力行使限於「必要最小限度」。在同時滿足上述3項條件的情況下，日本可以行使武力作為「自衛」手段。
對於這個重大的轉折，媒體有不同的評論，有人直指這是「軍國復辟」，有人說這是「邁向安保新紀元」，韓國媒體《朝鮮日報》則把此事與日本和北韓上月底在瑞典舉行的日北交涉並達成協議相提併論，日本承諾只要北韓重新調查被北韓綁架的日本人問題，日本就解除單獨進行的對北韓制裁措施。韓國更把6月20日日本政府發表關於慰安婦問題的《河野談話驗證報告》3件事聯繫在一起，批評「安倍領導的日本，似乎沒把韓國放在眼裡，在右傾化道路上愈走愈遠」，該報還指出「安倍內閣的這3項舉措會導致韓日關係惡化，還會對東北亞和平、安全秩序產生負面影響」。
怎樣看待安倍政權的舉措？準確地來說，由於國際局勢和冷戰時期、二次世界大戰前後都有重大的不同，尤其是中國國力的崛起，要說日本走上軍國主義復辟道路，還需要更多證據證明。但是，可以確定的是，在安倍晉三全力推動下，二戰後日本的「專守防衛」安保政策確實已發生根本性的變化，這是右翼領袖安倍帶領日本脫離「戰後和平主義」的重大步驟。
此次內閣會議之後，安倍雖然宣稱「日本不會走上戰爭之路」，「日本需要的是保衛和平的遏制力」，他還強調「一般情況下不允許向海外派兵的一貫原則絲毫不會改變。自衛隊今後也絕不會參與諸如波灣戰爭及伊拉克戰爭之類的戰鬥。日本捲入戰爭的可能性將進一步縮小。絕不可能成為再度進行戰爭的國家。」，「日本走和平國家道路的步伐不會改變，並將加強此一步伐。」但是，這些冠冕堂皇的詞彙無法改變日本國策重大轉折的事實。
其次，我們要認識到，以美日的密切關係，日本的舉措是在美國支持、甚至鼓勵下推動的，美國以要求日本承擔更大國際責任為由要求日本解禁集體自衛權，這又符合日本右翼推動「正常國家」的企圖，因而能夠成事。
第三，因此，東亞地區的戰略格局勢必出現更複雜、更緊張的局面，中日間互信互諒的基礎已極其薄弱，日本高度擔憂中國崛起，中國又無法讓以美國為首、日本侍從的西方體系信賴，中日的戰略對立、軍備競賽，甚至局部衝突的出現，都是可能發生的，這當然會對台灣的國際處境帶來更為艱困、尷尬的境況，馬政府所堅守的「親美、和陸、友日」大戰略，在實踐上會面臨越來越大的挑戰。
第四，我們也要注意，日本以內閣會議方式解釋憲法，調整國策，實際上是違反民主的，更是危險的。韓國媒體對此事的評論是「只要首相判斷有必要，日本就可參與戰爭」，「在日本這個國家，33年間不行的東西就因為首相一句『想法（解釋）改變了』而被推翻，這本身就是一種獨裁。」
只要我們全面觀看媒體報導，就會發現：幾乎所有的日本輿論調查都顯示，民意極力反對透過更改憲法解釋來行使集體自衛權，但就如韓國記者的評論：「目前日本的政治圈只有『首相的意願』，沒有『國民的意願』」，若真是如此，這不是整個東亞地區明顯的警兆嗎？
面對日本背離和平主義、民主主義的道路，台灣不能心存僥倖也不能誤判情勢，警醒而審慎的面對，絕對是必要的。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 3, 2014
Summary: Japan's Abe regime is under pressure from mass protests. On July 1, a provisional cabinet amended Japan's constitution. It substantially changed the peace constitution, authorizing the government to engage in "collective self-defense." Put simply, from this day forward, even if Japan has not been attacked, it can cite "preventing its allies from being attacked" as a justification for military aggression.
Full Text Below:
Japan's Abe regime is under pressure from mass protests. On July 1, a provisional cabinet amended Japan's constitution. It substantially changed the peace constitution, authorizing the government to engage in "collective self-defense." Put simply, from this day forward, even if Japan has not been attacked, it can cite "preventing its allies from being attacked" as a justification for military aggression.
As we all know, in 1946, under orders from the United States, a defeated Japan adopted its "peace constitution." Article 9 of the peace constitution clearly states, "The Japanese people, sincerely seeking international peace based on justice and order, forever renounce war, the threat of force, or the use of force, as means for settling international disputes." It states, "In order to achieve these goals, it will not maintain armed forces and other war-making forces, and does not recognize the right of the government to engage in war."
The peace constitution may have been passed under orders from the United States. But its basic intention, its pacifism, its democratic spirit, helped facilitate Japan's postwar recovery. With the end of the Cold War however, Japan's "1955 Framework" collapsed. Forces favoring rapid innovation faded. But abandoning the peace constitution remained difficult. Politicians worked around the problem in various ways. The "revised constitutional interpretation" is an important step.
The new resolution has overturned the "three conditions for initiating the right of self-defense" honored by successive Japanese Cabinets. In its place, Japan now has the new "three conditions for the exercise of force." One. If Japan is subject to an armed attack, or a nation with close relations with Japan is subject to an armed attack that threatens the survival of Japan and the lives of Japanese nationals, or poses a clear danger to their liberty and their pursuit of happiness. Two. To protect the state and citizens when no other means can prevent such attacks. Three. The exercise of force is limited to the "minimum required." If the above three conditions are satisfied, Japan may exercise force as a "self-defense" measure.
This is a major turning point. The media have responded in several ways. Some call this "the restoration of militarism." Some say this "moves toward a new era of security." South Korea's Chosun Ilbo linked this to an agreement reached late last month in Sweden between Japan and North Korea. Japan promised to lift sanctions against North Korea if it reviewed the cases against Japanese abductees. On June 20, the government of Japan published a "Kono Statement Verification Report" on the comfort women issue. South Korea linked these three issues and said that an "Abe led Japan appears indifferent to South Korea, and is moving further and further to the right." The newspaper also noted that "The Abe cabinet's three initiatives will lead to the deterioration of relations between South Korea and Japan. It will have a negative impact on peace, security, and order in northeast Asia."
How should we perceive the Abe regime's initiatives? Let us be precise. The international situation is very different from what it was during the Cold War and the Second World War. Has Mainland China risen? Has Japan reverted to militarism? These await more evidence. What is certain is that under Abe's efforts, Japan's post World War II "defense only" security policy is undergoing fundamental change. The right-wing Abe has led Japan far astray from its postwar pacifism.
Following the cabinet meeting, Abe declared that "Japan will not embark on a path of war" and "What Japan needs is the deterrent ability, so it can defend the peace." He stressed that "Normal circumstances do not permit sending troops overseas. That has not changed. The Self-Defense Forces will never be involved in fighting such as the Gulf War and the war in Iraq and the like. The possibility of Japan's involvement in war will be further reduced. Japan may never again be involved in a war." He said "Japan is taking the road to peace. That will not change. This will strengthen that resolve." Alas, his high-minded rhetoric does not change the fact that Japan has reached a major turning point in its national policy.
Two. Given the close relationship between the U.S. and Japan, Japan's initiative was clearly supported by the United States. Encouraged, even. The United States has asked Japan to assume greater international responsibility. It has demanded that Japanese remove the ban on collective self-defense. This complies with Japanese right-wing moves toward a "normal nation." That is why it succeeded.
Three. The strategic picture in East Asia is certain to become increasingly complex and tense. Mutual trust and understanding between Mainland China and Japan was already weak. Japan is worried about the rise of China. China cannot win the trust of the US-led, Japanese-squired Western nations. Sino-Japanese strategic confrontation, an arms race, and even regional conflicts, are possible, This of course will make Taiwan's international plight even more difficult and awkward. The Ma government's grand strategy of "close to America, at peace with the Mainland, and friendly with Japan" increasingly difficult.
Four. Japan's cabinet has interpreted the constitution, and changed its policy. In fact, this is a dangerous violation of democracy. The South Korean media said, "If the Prime Minister decides it is necessary, then Japan can go to war," "In Japan, something forbidden for 33 years, is now permitted merely because the Prime Minister thinks it is necessary. This in itself is a kind of dictatorship."
Scan the media for reports. One will find that almost all Japanese public opinion polls show the public strongly opposing this constitutional interpretation of collective self-defense. But as a Korean reporter noted, "In Japan's political circles, there is only the "wishes of the Prime Minister," there is no "wishes of the people." This being the case, is this not an obvious warning sign for all of East Asia?
Japan has strayed from the path of pacifism and democracy. Taiwan cannot afford to leave matters to chance and misjudge the situation. Vigilance and caution are essential.
社論－日本發出危險的警兆
2014年07月03日 04:10
本報訊
日本安倍政權7月1日在群眾群起抗議惡劣氛圍下，以「臨時內閣會議」程序，透過「修改憲法解釋」方式，達成實質改變日本《和平憲法》，授與政府行使「集體自衛權」，簡單來說，今後日本即使本國未遭到攻擊，亦可以「阻止盟國遭受攻擊」為理由行使武力。
眾所周知，1946年在美國支配下，戰敗的日本通過了《非戰憲法》、《和平憲法》，其中第9條明確規定：「日本國民衷心謀求基於正義與秩序的國際和平，永遠放棄以國權發動的戰爭、武力威脅或武力行使作為解決國際爭端的手段。」而「為達到前項目的，不保持陸海空軍及其他戰爭力量，不承認國家的交戰權。」
這部《和平憲法》，雖然基本是遵循美國意旨制定通過的，但其和平主義、民主主義的精神，戰後日本的革新陣營基本上都是維護鞏固的。冷戰結束，日本「五五年體制」崩壞後，雖然革新勢力急速衰退，但要修憲廢棄《和平憲法》，還是相當的困難。政客只得透過迂迴的方式進行，這次「修改憲法解釋」是非常重要的一步。
新決議已翻轉了日本歷屆內閣遵守的「自衛權發動3條件」，完成新的「武力行使3條件」：其一、日本遭到武力攻擊，或與日本關係密切國家遭到武力攻擊，威脅到日本的存亡，從根本上對日本國民的生命、自由和追求幸福的權利構成明確危險；其二、為保護國家和國民，沒有其他適當手段可以排除上述攻擊；其三、武力行使限於「必要最小限度」。在同時滿足上述3項條件的情況下，日本可以行使武力作為「自衛」手段。
對於這個重大的轉折，媒體有不同的評論，有人直指這是「軍國復辟」，有人說這是「邁向安保新紀元」，韓國媒體《朝鮮日報》則把此事與日本和北韓上月底在瑞典舉行的日北交涉並達成協議相提併論，日本承諾只要北韓重新調查被北韓綁架的日本人問題，日本就解除單獨進行的對北韓制裁措施。韓國更把6月20日日本政府發表關於慰安婦問題的《河野談話驗證報告》3件事聯繫在一起，批評「安倍領導的日本，似乎沒把韓國放在眼裡，在右傾化道路上愈走愈遠」，該報還指出「安倍內閣的這3項舉措會導致韓日關係惡化，還會對東北亞和平、安全秩序產生負面影響」。
怎樣看待安倍政權的舉措？準確地來說，由於國際局勢和冷戰時期、二次世界大戰前後都有重大的不同，尤其是中國國力的崛起，要說日本走上軍國主義復辟道路，還需要更多證據證明。但是，可以確定的是，在安倍晉三全力推動下，二戰後日本的「專守防衛」安保政策確實已發生根本性的變化，這是右翼領袖安倍帶領日本脫離「戰後和平主義」的重大步驟。
此次內閣會議之後，安倍雖然宣稱「日本不會走上戰爭之路」，「日本需要的是保衛和平的遏制力」，他還強調「一般情況下不允許向海外派兵的一貫原則絲毫不會改變。自衛隊今後也絕不會參與諸如波灣戰爭及伊拉克戰爭之類的戰鬥。日本捲入戰爭的可能性將進一步縮小。絕不可能成為再度進行戰爭的國家。」，「日本走和平國家道路的步伐不會改變，並將加強此一步伐。」但是，這些冠冕堂皇的詞彙無法改變日本國策重大轉折的事實。
其次，我們要認識到，以美日的密切關係，日本的舉措是在美國支持、甚至鼓勵下推動的，美國以要求日本承擔更大國際責任為由要求日本解禁集體自衛權，這又符合日本右翼推動「正常國家」的企圖，因而能夠成事。
第三，因此，東亞地區的戰略格局勢必出現更複雜、更緊張的局面，中日間互信互諒的基礎已極其薄弱，日本高度擔憂中國崛起，中國又無法讓以美國為首、日本侍從的西方體系信賴，中日的戰略對立、軍備競賽，甚至局部衝突的出現，都是可能發生的，這當然會對台灣的國際處境帶來更為艱困、尷尬的境況，馬政府所堅守的「親美、和陸、友日」大戰略，在實踐上會面臨越來越大的挑戰。
第四，我們也要注意，日本以內閣會議方式解釋憲法，調整國策，實際上是違反民主的，更是危險的。韓國媒體對此事的評論是「只要首相判斷有必要，日本就可參與戰爭」，「在日本這個國家，33年間不行的東西就因為首相一句『想法（解釋）改變了』而被推翻，這本身就是一種獨裁。」
只要我們全面觀看媒體報導，就會發現：幾乎所有的日本輿論調查都顯示，民意極力反對透過更改憲法解釋來行使集體自衛權，但就如韓國記者的評論：「目前日本的政治圈只有『首相的意願』，沒有『國民的意願』」，若真是如此，這不是整個東亞地區明顯的警兆嗎？
面對日本背離和平主義、民主主義的道路，台灣不能心存僥倖也不能誤判情勢，警醒而審慎的面對，絕對是必要的。
Zhang Zhijun Insulted: Who Is To Blame?
Zhang Zhijun Insulted: Who Is To Blame?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 2, 2014
Summary: The Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun was seated in a car in Kaohsiung's West Bay when protesters flung paint at it. Zhang is a guest. Yet this is how he was received. This behavior made a lie of the boast, "Taiwan's most beautiful sights are its people." This incident must be considered a serious matter.
Full Text Below:
The Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun was seated in a car in Kaohsiung's West Bay when protesters flung paint at it. Zhang is a guest. Yet this is how he was received. This behavior made a lie of the boast, "Taiwan's most beautiful sights are its people." This incident must be considered a serious matter.
Consider his public safety. Those charged with his public safety had two responsibilities. One. They had responsibility for choosing the venue. Two. They had responsibility for maintaining security. The MAC chose the Sunset Beach Resort. An incident followed. It cannot shirk responsibility. But on the other hand, the MAC is not a security agency. Security professionals within the National Police Agency, together with the Kaohsiung City Police Department, evaluated the choice of venue. They concluded that security would not a problem. These agencies rendered their professional judgment. Therefore they must bear some degree of responsibility.
The Kaohsiung City Government expressed doubts about the West Bay site before the incident. But saying no is easy. Offering concrete recommendations is hard. The Kaohsiung City Government recommended holding the Wang Zhang meeting at the Grand Hotel where Zhang Zhijun was staying. This may have been a convenient choice from a security perspective. But fortunately the MAC did not go along iwth it. When Wang Yuqi visited Taiwan, the two sides deliberately avoided each other's hotels. This posed the problem of who was visiting whom, and who outranked whom. If Wang Yu-chi had actually visited Zhang Zhijun's hotel, it would have been denounced as a "pilgrimage." It would most assuredly been blasted as "self-abasement."
Obviously however, the choice of venue was not the only reason Zhang Zhijun was insulted. Chen Chu and Zhang Zhijun met at Hanshin Arena. This was Kaohsiung's choice of venues. Protestors there also chased after Zhang Zhijun's car and beat on it. That also resulted in bloodshed. This shows that the choice of venue was not the only factor that affected Zhang's personal security, Was personal security actually ensured? Did the Kaohsiung Police ensure Zhang's personal security during the Wang Zhang meeting at West Bay? The paint flinging was a scene of chaos. Why didn't the police set up protest zones to keep the crows away from Zhang? Why didn't they place the barricades farther away? These questions all demand answers. The police are of course responsible. But it is not fair to place all the blame on the police. The Kaohsiung paint flinging incident must be traced back to its source. Only then can we identify the real problem.
The scales of justice may help us imagine what good security for Zhang would have looked like. On the one hand, guests of the nation have a right to be protected. On the other hand, the protesters have the right to free speech. Basically the guest's personal security must come first. Protestors' freedom of speech must come second. But the scales of justice are never still. They are subject to social influences and official attitudes. The paint flinging incident cannot be seen as nothing more than flung paint. It must be seen as part of Zhang Zhijun's visit to Taiwan.
Zhang Zhijun arrived at Taoyuan International Airport. Protestors stalked him relentlessly. But police successfully maintained security around him. Zhang Zhijun's safety was their top priority. This was the right approach. If anything were to happen to Zhang Zhijun, cross-Strait relations and the nation's image would take a severe hit. But putting a guest's safety first has a price. It may inspire protest groups and some of the media , to provoke confrontations and level accusations of "state violence." This puts considerable pressure on the police.
The scales of justice tipped the other way after Chen Chu and Zhang Zhijun's meeting at the Hanshin Arena. During the Chen Zhang meeting, the police cracked down on the protesters. This led to bloodshed. Chen Chu caved in to intense pressure from the protesters, who were all green camp supporters. Chen Chu left a comment on facebook. She absolved protestors of blame for their behavior. Instead, blamed the police. She said that if the police used excessive force, they would be punished severely.
Chen Chu is the Mayor of Kaohsiung. Her declaration naturally had a crucial impact on the Kaohsiung Police's handling of security. Fearing they would be punished, the police abruptly changed their security procedures. They wavered when it came time to segregate the protestors. Chen Chu's threat of punishment forced police to loosen their security procedures. This was a key contributor to the paint flinging incident.
In addition to reviewing security procedures, we must also clarify responsibilities. We must consider attitudes on both sides of the Strait. The paint flinging incident shows that all three parties, red, blue, and green, need to have greater empathy for each other.
One. When Zhang Zhijun was on stage, Wang Yu-chi admonished Zhang Zhijun to "listen to the public on Taiwan." This was a reasonable request. But shouldn't Taiwan listen to the public on the Mainland as well? Shouldn't people on Taiwan empathize with the public on the Mainland? The paint flinging incident is sure to fester in the minds of the Mainland public. They are sure to feel insulted. Many Mainland netizens mock the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office or "guo tai ban." They refer to it contemptuously as the "guai tai ban," or "the office that kneels before Taiwan." The Mainland also has internal populist it must cope with. People on Taiwan expect the Mainland to feel empathy for Taiwan. But people on Taiwan should also feel empathy for the Mainland.
Two. The Mainland should refrain from giving excessive coverage tothe paint flinging incident. Most people on Taiwan are still rational. Historically speaking, the Zhang Zhijun paint flinging incident in Kaohsiung is regrettable. But the protest was significantly less intense than it was during Chen Yunlin's visit to Taiwan in 2008. This means that the public on Taiwan now has a more pacifistic view of cross-Strait exchanges. Breaking the ice results in safer navigation. Ice breaking such as Chen Yunlin's first visit to Taiwan has an enormous impact. As a result, it provoked a huge storm. But following his visit, the skies cleared. We must have confidence in this historical pattern. We must be patient. We believe that following Zhang Zhijun's ice-breaking voyage, the winds will be gentler and the sun will be warmer.
Three. The DPP must pay attention. Zhang Zhijun has visited Taiwan. Six years ago, when Chen Yunlin visited Taiwan, the DPP stood on the front lines. This represents progress of a sort. But the paint flinging incident reveals the DPP's shortcomings. Chen Chu's dilemma was obvious. She could not decide whether to take a hard line. The DPP and its supporters found themselves at odds with each other. The DPP wants to prove that it can manage cross-Strait relations. This however, remains its biggest obstacle.
社論－張志軍受辱 誰的錯？
2014年07月02日 04:10
編輯部
大陸國台辦主任張志軍，座車在高雄西子灣遭抗議民眾潑漆。來者是客卻受此待遇，有違台灣「最美的風景是人」美稱，應嚴肅看待。
先看維安責任。維安責任有二。一是規畫選址責任，二是維安執行責任。陸委會選了西子灣沙灘會館，出了事，受責不能算冤。但另一方面，陸委會並非安全單位，請有維安專業的警政署會同高雄市警察局評估場址，得到的結論既是安全沒有問題，那麼做出專業判斷的單位也有責任。
高雄市政府，雖然事前表達對選址西子灣的疑慮，但反對容易，建議難，高市府建議就在張志軍下榻的圓山飯店舉行王張會，看起來確實是維安上最方便的建議。但還好陸委會未採，王郁琦訪陸，雙方刻意避開對方下榻飯店，就是怕有誰拜見誰不對等的質疑。如果王郁琦真去張志軍下榻的飯店會談，豈不變成「朝拜」，必招引自我矮化的批評。
這也可以看出，選址不是造成張志軍受辱唯一的問題，陳菊與張志軍會談的漢神巨蛋是高雄方面選的，也發生了抗議民眾追著張志軍座車拍打的事件，還造成流血衝突。可知，選址不是維安唯一因素，維安執行是否確實，也應受到檢視。西子灣的王張會，高雄市警方有落實維安執行嗎？潑漆事件現場一片混亂，警方為何沒有設置抗議區隔開群眾？為何不拉出足夠的封鎖線距離？這些都該檢討。從這個角度，警方當然有責，但全部歸責警方也未必公允。必須回溯高雄潑漆事件的脈絡，才能找出問題癥結。
不妨用天秤來想像維安。一方是來客安全，一方是抗議者自由。基本上，警方維安應以來客安全為優先考量，再兼及抗議者自由。但維安天秤是浮動的，會受到社會氛圍、首長態度影響。潑漆事件不能只看潑漆，必須將張志軍訪台歷程回溯檢視。
從張志軍抵達桃園機場開始，抗議如影隨形，但警方執行維安任務，以張志軍安全為優先，這是正確做法，若張志軍發生意外，兩岸關係、國家形象都得賠進去。但來客「安全為先」的代價就是：抗議團體與部分媒體，不斷的營造「國家暴力」的社會氛圍，會造成警方執法的壓力。
警方執法天秤的真正變化，是在陳菊與張志軍的漢神會後。陳張會，警方在維安執法中，對抗議民眾採強制措施，造成流血。面對抗議者皆是綠營支持者的強大壓力，陳菊在臉書未對抗議民眾的踰越行為責難，卻表示警方「若確屬不當執法，絕對會進行相關懲處。」
陳菊身為高雄市長，其宣示當然對高雄市警方維安的執法天秤產生關鍵影響。擔憂受到懲處的警方，在維安工作上頓然失了準據，就會對要不要隔離、要不要採取強制手段產生猶疑。在陳菊的懲處宣示後，警方維安天秤鬆動，是潑漆事件重要的因素。
除了檢討維安，釐清責任，我們也應檢視，各方兩岸的交往到底該抱持什麼樣的態度。潑漆事件，顯示出紅藍綠三方的同理心功課都還要努力。
第一重同理心，張志軍登台前，王郁琦說要讓張志軍「多聽台灣民眾聲音。」這個同理心期待很好，但台灣是否也應對大陸民眾的感受「擁有同理心」呢？潑漆事件也在大陸民眾心中發酵，覺得受辱。甚至有大陸網民將國台辦稱為「跪台辦」。要知道，大陸內部也有民粹聲音壓力。期待大陸對台同理心的同時，也應擁有對大陸民眾情緒的同理心。
第二重同理心，大陸方面不宜太過放大這次潑漆事件。台灣社會的理性力量仍然強大。從歷史來看，張志軍在高雄遭遇潑漆固然遺憾，比起陳雲林在2008年來台時的流血圍城，抗議強度已大幅減低，這代表台灣民眾更平和看待兩岸交往。破冰當下對航行安全的衝撞性，強過破冰之後，就像陳雲林第一次來台雖引發了偌大風暴，但他其後來台，就變得雲淡風輕。我們應對這歷史規律有信心與耐心，相信張志軍此次破冰衝擊後，下次再來，風會更和、日會更暖。
第三重同理心要說給民進黨聽。此次張志軍來台，民進黨不像6年前陳雲林來台時站上衝突第一線，是種進步，但從潑漆事件中，民進黨左支右絀、陳菊輕重難斷的窘境，可以看出，民進黨想和但支持者不想和的矛盾，是民進黨在兩岸關係上想要有所施為，最難的功課。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 2, 2014
Summary: The Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun was seated in a car in Kaohsiung's West Bay when protesters flung paint at it. Zhang is a guest. Yet this is how he was received. This behavior made a lie of the boast, "Taiwan's most beautiful sights are its people." This incident must be considered a serious matter.
Full Text Below:
The Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun was seated in a car in Kaohsiung's West Bay when protesters flung paint at it. Zhang is a guest. Yet this is how he was received. This behavior made a lie of the boast, "Taiwan's most beautiful sights are its people." This incident must be considered a serious matter.
Consider his public safety. Those charged with his public safety had two responsibilities. One. They had responsibility for choosing the venue. Two. They had responsibility for maintaining security. The MAC chose the Sunset Beach Resort. An incident followed. It cannot shirk responsibility. But on the other hand, the MAC is not a security agency. Security professionals within the National Police Agency, together with the Kaohsiung City Police Department, evaluated the choice of venue. They concluded that security would not a problem. These agencies rendered their professional judgment. Therefore they must bear some degree of responsibility.
The Kaohsiung City Government expressed doubts about the West Bay site before the incident. But saying no is easy. Offering concrete recommendations is hard. The Kaohsiung City Government recommended holding the Wang Zhang meeting at the Grand Hotel where Zhang Zhijun was staying. This may have been a convenient choice from a security perspective. But fortunately the MAC did not go along iwth it. When Wang Yuqi visited Taiwan, the two sides deliberately avoided each other's hotels. This posed the problem of who was visiting whom, and who outranked whom. If Wang Yu-chi had actually visited Zhang Zhijun's hotel, it would have been denounced as a "pilgrimage." It would most assuredly been blasted as "self-abasement."
Obviously however, the choice of venue was not the only reason Zhang Zhijun was insulted. Chen Chu and Zhang Zhijun met at Hanshin Arena. This was Kaohsiung's choice of venues. Protestors there also chased after Zhang Zhijun's car and beat on it. That also resulted in bloodshed. This shows that the choice of venue was not the only factor that affected Zhang's personal security, Was personal security actually ensured? Did the Kaohsiung Police ensure Zhang's personal security during the Wang Zhang meeting at West Bay? The paint flinging was a scene of chaos. Why didn't the police set up protest zones to keep the crows away from Zhang? Why didn't they place the barricades farther away? These questions all demand answers. The police are of course responsible. But it is not fair to place all the blame on the police. The Kaohsiung paint flinging incident must be traced back to its source. Only then can we identify the real problem.
The scales of justice may help us imagine what good security for Zhang would have looked like. On the one hand, guests of the nation have a right to be protected. On the other hand, the protesters have the right to free speech. Basically the guest's personal security must come first. Protestors' freedom of speech must come second. But the scales of justice are never still. They are subject to social influences and official attitudes. The paint flinging incident cannot be seen as nothing more than flung paint. It must be seen as part of Zhang Zhijun's visit to Taiwan.
Zhang Zhijun arrived at Taoyuan International Airport. Protestors stalked him relentlessly. But police successfully maintained security around him. Zhang Zhijun's safety was their top priority. This was the right approach. If anything were to happen to Zhang Zhijun, cross-Strait relations and the nation's image would take a severe hit. But putting a guest's safety first has a price. It may inspire protest groups and some of the media , to provoke confrontations and level accusations of "state violence." This puts considerable pressure on the police.
The scales of justice tipped the other way after Chen Chu and Zhang Zhijun's meeting at the Hanshin Arena. During the Chen Zhang meeting, the police cracked down on the protesters. This led to bloodshed. Chen Chu caved in to intense pressure from the protesters, who were all green camp supporters. Chen Chu left a comment on facebook. She absolved protestors of blame for their behavior. Instead, blamed the police. She said that if the police used excessive force, they would be punished severely.
Chen Chu is the Mayor of Kaohsiung. Her declaration naturally had a crucial impact on the Kaohsiung Police's handling of security. Fearing they would be punished, the police abruptly changed their security procedures. They wavered when it came time to segregate the protestors. Chen Chu's threat of punishment forced police to loosen their security procedures. This was a key contributor to the paint flinging incident.
In addition to reviewing security procedures, we must also clarify responsibilities. We must consider attitudes on both sides of the Strait. The paint flinging incident shows that all three parties, red, blue, and green, need to have greater empathy for each other.
One. When Zhang Zhijun was on stage, Wang Yu-chi admonished Zhang Zhijun to "listen to the public on Taiwan." This was a reasonable request. But shouldn't Taiwan listen to the public on the Mainland as well? Shouldn't people on Taiwan empathize with the public on the Mainland? The paint flinging incident is sure to fester in the minds of the Mainland public. They are sure to feel insulted. Many Mainland netizens mock the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office or "guo tai ban." They refer to it contemptuously as the "guai tai ban," or "the office that kneels before Taiwan." The Mainland also has internal populist it must cope with. People on Taiwan expect the Mainland to feel empathy for Taiwan. But people on Taiwan should also feel empathy for the Mainland.
Two. The Mainland should refrain from giving excessive coverage tothe paint flinging incident. Most people on Taiwan are still rational. Historically speaking, the Zhang Zhijun paint flinging incident in Kaohsiung is regrettable. But the protest was significantly less intense than it was during Chen Yunlin's visit to Taiwan in 2008. This means that the public on Taiwan now has a more pacifistic view of cross-Strait exchanges. Breaking the ice results in safer navigation. Ice breaking such as Chen Yunlin's first visit to Taiwan has an enormous impact. As a result, it provoked a huge storm. But following his visit, the skies cleared. We must have confidence in this historical pattern. We must be patient. We believe that following Zhang Zhijun's ice-breaking voyage, the winds will be gentler and the sun will be warmer.
Three. The DPP must pay attention. Zhang Zhijun has visited Taiwan. Six years ago, when Chen Yunlin visited Taiwan, the DPP stood on the front lines. This represents progress of a sort. But the paint flinging incident reveals the DPP's shortcomings. Chen Chu's dilemma was obvious. She could not decide whether to take a hard line. The DPP and its supporters found themselves at odds with each other. The DPP wants to prove that it can manage cross-Strait relations. This however, remains its biggest obstacle.
社論－張志軍受辱 誰的錯？
2014年07月02日 04:10
編輯部
大陸國台辦主任張志軍，座車在高雄西子灣遭抗議民眾潑漆。來者是客卻受此待遇，有違台灣「最美的風景是人」美稱，應嚴肅看待。
先看維安責任。維安責任有二。一是規畫選址責任，二是維安執行責任。陸委會選了西子灣沙灘會館，出了事，受責不能算冤。但另一方面，陸委會並非安全單位，請有維安專業的警政署會同高雄市警察局評估場址，得到的結論既是安全沒有問題，那麼做出專業判斷的單位也有責任。
高雄市政府，雖然事前表達對選址西子灣的疑慮，但反對容易，建議難，高市府建議就在張志軍下榻的圓山飯店舉行王張會，看起來確實是維安上最方便的建議。但還好陸委會未採，王郁琦訪陸，雙方刻意避開對方下榻飯店，就是怕有誰拜見誰不對等的質疑。如果王郁琦真去張志軍下榻的飯店會談，豈不變成「朝拜」，必招引自我矮化的批評。
這也可以看出，選址不是造成張志軍受辱唯一的問題，陳菊與張志軍會談的漢神巨蛋是高雄方面選的，也發生了抗議民眾追著張志軍座車拍打的事件，還造成流血衝突。可知，選址不是維安唯一因素，維安執行是否確實，也應受到檢視。西子灣的王張會，高雄市警方有落實維安執行嗎？潑漆事件現場一片混亂，警方為何沒有設置抗議區隔開群眾？為何不拉出足夠的封鎖線距離？這些都該檢討。從這個角度，警方當然有責，但全部歸責警方也未必公允。必須回溯高雄潑漆事件的脈絡，才能找出問題癥結。
不妨用天秤來想像維安。一方是來客安全，一方是抗議者自由。基本上，警方維安應以來客安全為優先考量，再兼及抗議者自由。但維安天秤是浮動的，會受到社會氛圍、首長態度影響。潑漆事件不能只看潑漆，必須將張志軍訪台歷程回溯檢視。
從張志軍抵達桃園機場開始，抗議如影隨形，但警方執行維安任務，以張志軍安全為優先，這是正確做法，若張志軍發生意外，兩岸關係、國家形象都得賠進去。但來客「安全為先」的代價就是：抗議團體與部分媒體，不斷的營造「國家暴力」的社會氛圍，會造成警方執法的壓力。
警方執法天秤的真正變化，是在陳菊與張志軍的漢神會後。陳張會，警方在維安執法中，對抗議民眾採強制措施，造成流血。面對抗議者皆是綠營支持者的強大壓力，陳菊在臉書未對抗議民眾的踰越行為責難，卻表示警方「若確屬不當執法，絕對會進行相關懲處。」
陳菊身為高雄市長，其宣示當然對高雄市警方維安的執法天秤產生關鍵影響。擔憂受到懲處的警方，在維安工作上頓然失了準據，就會對要不要隔離、要不要採取強制手段產生猶疑。在陳菊的懲處宣示後，警方維安天秤鬆動，是潑漆事件重要的因素。
除了檢討維安，釐清責任，我們也應檢視，各方兩岸的交往到底該抱持什麼樣的態度。潑漆事件，顯示出紅藍綠三方的同理心功課都還要努力。
第一重同理心，張志軍登台前，王郁琦說要讓張志軍「多聽台灣民眾聲音。」這個同理心期待很好，但台灣是否也應對大陸民眾的感受「擁有同理心」呢？潑漆事件也在大陸民眾心中發酵，覺得受辱。甚至有大陸網民將國台辦稱為「跪台辦」。要知道，大陸內部也有民粹聲音壓力。期待大陸對台同理心的同時，也應擁有對大陸民眾情緒的同理心。
第二重同理心，大陸方面不宜太過放大這次潑漆事件。台灣社會的理性力量仍然強大。從歷史來看，張志軍在高雄遭遇潑漆固然遺憾，比起陳雲林在2008年來台時的流血圍城，抗議強度已大幅減低，這代表台灣民眾更平和看待兩岸交往。破冰當下對航行安全的衝撞性，強過破冰之後，就像陳雲林第一次來台雖引發了偌大風暴，但他其後來台，就變得雲淡風輕。我們應對這歷史規律有信心與耐心，相信張志軍此次破冰衝擊後，下次再來，風會更和、日會更暖。
第三重同理心要說給民進黨聽。此次張志軍來台，民進黨不像6年前陳雲林來台時站上衝突第一線，是種進步，但從潑漆事件中，民進黨左支右絀、陳菊輕重難斷的窘境，可以看出，民進黨想和但支持者不想和的矛盾，是民進黨在兩岸關係上想要有所施為，最難的功課。
Tuesday, July 1, 2014
Agent Exchange Promotes Cross-Strait Trust
Agent Exchange Promotes Cross-Strait Trust
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 1, 2014
Summary: The Wang Zhang meeting reached a number of agreements, among them humanitarian access. This has been made one of the functions of the newly established cross-Strait offices, and constitutes a major breakthrough. The two organizations have yet to discuss the scope of humanitarian access. Will it include ROC agents in Mainland custody? We do not know. But the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun has expressed goodwill. He has agreed to a cross-Strait prisoner exchange in the near future. This offers a glimmer of hope.
Full Text Below:
The Wang Zhang meeting reached a number of agreements, among them humanitarian access. This has been made one of the functions of the newly established cross-Strait offices, and constitutes a major breakthrough. The two organizations have yet to discuss the scope of humanitarian access. Will it include ROC agents in Mainland custody? We do not know. But the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun has expressed goodwill. He has agreed to a cross-Strait prisoner exchange in the near future. This offers a glimmer of hope.
Significant improvements in cross-Strait relations have occurred since 2008. ROC intelligence activity on the Mainland has changed in response to changing circumstances. Our needs have changed. We place greater emphasis on information gathering and evaluation, and less on undercover activity. Some of our military intelligence personnel are still prisoners of the Mainland. Some Taiwan business people are still under indictment, and rotting in prison. That is why recently many want prisoner exchanges to be made part of cross-Strait negotiations.
Our side has explored a variety of channels to rescue captured agents. In 2008, when Vice President Wu Den-yih was KMT secretary-general, the head of the military intelligence directorate asked him to seek the release of our agents. Wu Den-yih said that rescuing our agents was "the right thing to do."
When Wu became premier, he repeatedly instructed the SEF to consult with the Mainland through formal cross-Strait platforms, in order to obtain the release of our agents and to return them to Taiwan. The government made a sincere effort, but has yet to officially incorporate the return of agents into cross-Strait consultations.
As Vice President Wu Den-yih said, rescuing our agents was "the right thing to do." It is also something the public demands. Given the current state of cross-Strait relations, the time is ripe. The Mainland often talks about making generous concessions. In fact, noble gestures would be even more welcome than generous concessions.
Human intelligence is the oldest profession in the world. War or peace. Friend or foe. This country or that. Intelligence work never ceases. And so it is across the Taiwan Strait. Early intelligence work reflected the Cold War mentality. It was heads I win, tails you lose. But confrontation between the two sides has ended. The purpose of intelligence today is to obtain correct information to avoid incorrect conclusions. Its purpose is peace, not war. If the Mainland can adopt similar thinking, mutual trust between the two sides can make a giant leap forward.
Before the Mainland and the United States established diplomatic relations, they made a show of goodwill by releasing each others' agents. The two sides of the Strait belong to the same culture and speak the same language. Former Mainland leader Hu Jintao said the two sides must heal the wounds of history. The release of captured agents is more than a noble gesture. It is a symbolic act that can help heal the scars of history.
Taipei should also demonstrate that it is amenable to new thinking. The two sides have gradually dialed down military confrontation. But the two sides still have military deployments. They still see each other as strategic rivals. In particular, too many on Taiwan see the Mainland as their sole enemy. But cross-Strait relations have left the Cold War behind. They are progressing towards peaceful development. People on Taiwan must cease to think of the Mainland as their enemy. Economic and trade exchanges involve close public contacts. Military conflict would amount to a bizarre paradox. The two sides would have difficulty squaring the two. Our side may not have many chips to play. But we should release the Mainland's agents.
What about the nut and bolts of any prisoner exchange? The two sides have yet to sign an official prisoner exchange agreement. The two sides should allow humanitarian access. They should allow each side access to the other side's prisons and detention facilities. They should allow visits and assistance, to safeguard the basic rights of detained intelligence operative. We must understand their needs, including their need for legal assistance.
The issue of prisoner exchanges has surfaced. To reduce political sensitivities, it can be discussed in the same breath as exchanges of criminal offenders. The definition for intelligence operative can be made fuzzy to increase negotiating room. The definition of intelligence operative may be sensitive. Once the two sides begin confirming who is who, personnel whose identities were in doubt will have their covers blown. This is a problem that may impede progress.
Actually, according to the Geneva Convention, spies being released, repatriated, or resettled, have rights. The convention limits the definition of "spy." It states that unless an agent is captured while engaged in espionage, he or she must be treated as a prisoner of war. It also stipulates that those publicly identified as spies must be treated humanely. They may not be treated differently merely because they are spies. Taipei is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention. Cross-Strait relations are not international relations. But the prisoner exchange agreement nevertheless should be followed.
The Mainland has high expectations concerning political dialogue and consultation. Cross-Strait exchanges, and economic and trade relations have given cross-Strait peace a tremendous boost. But anti-China sentiment has also intensified. Taiwan society is clearly not ready to begin political negotiations. The release of ROC intelligence operatives is a humanitarian issue. It should be treated as a touchstone for the resolution of cross-Strait political hostility, and the building of cross-Strait military trust. If the two sides can agree on prisoner exchanges, it will mean that they no longer see each other as enemies. Military confidence building measures can then be left for another day.
We sincerely hope that prisoner exchanges can become an official part of cross-Strait negotiations, and mark a new page in history.
社論－兩岸釋放情報員 累積互信
2014年07月01日 04:10
編輯部
大陸國台辦主任張志軍（左4）25日與陸委會主委王郁琦（右3）舉行兩岸事務主管部門負責人第二次正式會面。（中新社）
大陸國台辦主任張志軍（左4）25日與陸委會主委王郁琦（右3）舉行兩岸事務主管部門負責人第二次正式會面。（中新社）
王張會達成多項共識，其中「人道探視」確定納入兩岸互設辦事處功能，更是重大突破。雖然兩會尚未談及人道探視範圍，是否包括我在大陸被羈押情報員等細節，但大陸國台辦主任張志軍帶來對岸的善意，已讓兩岸日後協商換俘議題，露出一道曙光。
兩岸關係自2008年來大幅改善，台灣對大陸情報工作也因應客觀情勢變化與國家需求已作出若干調整，愈來愈偏重資訊的蒐集與研判，減少對潛伏情報員的依賴，但當年軍情局派遣至大陸情蒐被俘人員，及若干被起訴的台商都還在蹲苦牢，因此，近來多有倡議兩岸協商情報員換俘議題。
我方曾經運用各種管道營救被俘情報員，副總統吳敦義於2008年擔任國民黨祕書長期間，曾接受軍情首長所託，透過國共平台要求大陸釋放情報員，吳敦義曾表示，營救我方情報員是「義所應為」。
他擔任行政院長後，持續指示海基會，透過兩岸正式平台積極與大陸協商，協助釋放台灣情報員回台。政府已努力相當時日，但至今尚未正式納入兩會協商議題。
誠如吳敦義副總統所言，營救我方情報員是「義所應為」，這也是國人普遍的期望。以當前兩岸關係，時機應已漸趨成熟，大陸常提「讓利」，其實「讓義」會更讓人有感。
情報工作是人類最古老的行業，不論戰爭與和平時期，不論彼此是敵是友，任何國家的情報工作都不會停止，兩岸亦然。唯早期的情報工作是冷戰思維，非得你死我活，現今兩岸早已結束對峙，情報工作的目的是為掌握正確資訊、避免誤判情勢，內涵是和平、非破壞手段進行。如果大陸能證明自己也採取類似新思維，相信兩岸互信關係將可大躍進一步。
大陸與美國建交前，為表善意，曾釋放美國間諜。兩岸同文同種，大陸前領導人胡錦濤亦曾說兩岸要撫平歷史傷痛。釋放被俘情報員，不僅只是讓義，更具撫平歷史傷痕的象徵意義。
台灣亦當有新思維與轉變，兩岸雖漸脫離軍事對峙局面，但雙方軍事部署和戰略思維仍互為假想敵，尤其台灣，更以大陸為唯一假想敵。然而，兩岸已經脫離冷戰時期關係，邁向和平發展進程，台灣理當改變以大陸為唯一假想敵的思維。在經貿交流、民眾互動頻密情況下，如果軍事還互相對峙，本身就是很矛盾的現象，雙方很難坦誠以對。因此，我方籌碼雖不多，亦應釋放對岸情報員。
至於在換俘的實務運作上，兩岸在尚未正式協商並簽署換俘協議前，雙方應透過人道探視，允許彼此到對方監獄或羈押處所，進行必要訪視、協助，以維護在押情報人員之基本權益，瞭解他們生活所需，有無需要提供必要之法律協助等。
待換俘議題浮上檯面，為降低政治敏感性，或可以與刑事罪犯互換一併提出討論，或將情報員定義模糊化，以爭取雙方談判空間。因為情報員之定義、事涉敏感，兩會協商一旦進入確認身分程序，原本晦暗不明的身分，經由談判前之探詢或者確認程序，而成為默認。這是個兩難問題，且無助談判進展。
事實上，依《日內瓦公約》相關規定，間諜在釋放、遣返或安置前，有權享受《公約》有關規定的利益。同法並限縮「間諜」之定義，強調除在從事間諜行為時被俘外，不應喪失其享有戰俘身分的權利，更於第一項明定具間諜身分者亦應受符合人道原則之處遇，不得以其具間諜身分而排除適用。我雖非公約簽署國，兩岸關係亦非國際關係，唯換俘協議之提出，仍可依循。
大陸對進入政治對話與協商的新進程期待很深，雖然兩岸交流與經貿關係確實已為兩岸和平發展累積了巨大的能量，但反中力量的激進化，顯示台灣社會還是沒準備好進入政治協商階段。釋放台灣情報員問題，與人道有關，應可以當成兩岸化解政治敵意的試金石及兩岸累積軍事互信的開始。換俘議題若能達成協議，意味兩岸雙方不再視彼此為敵人，軍事互信機制建立當有水到渠成之日。
我們由衷期盼，換俘議題能夠成為兩岸下一次會議正式的議題，開啟歷史另一新頁。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 1, 2014
Summary: The Wang Zhang meeting reached a number of agreements, among them humanitarian access. This has been made one of the functions of the newly established cross-Strait offices, and constitutes a major breakthrough. The two organizations have yet to discuss the scope of humanitarian access. Will it include ROC agents in Mainland custody? We do not know. But the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun has expressed goodwill. He has agreed to a cross-Strait prisoner exchange in the near future. This offers a glimmer of hope.
Full Text Below:
The Wang Zhang meeting reached a number of agreements, among them humanitarian access. This has been made one of the functions of the newly established cross-Strait offices, and constitutes a major breakthrough. The two organizations have yet to discuss the scope of humanitarian access. Will it include ROC agents in Mainland custody? We do not know. But the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun has expressed goodwill. He has agreed to a cross-Strait prisoner exchange in the near future. This offers a glimmer of hope.
Significant improvements in cross-Strait relations have occurred since 2008. ROC intelligence activity on the Mainland has changed in response to changing circumstances. Our needs have changed. We place greater emphasis on information gathering and evaluation, and less on undercover activity. Some of our military intelligence personnel are still prisoners of the Mainland. Some Taiwan business people are still under indictment, and rotting in prison. That is why recently many want prisoner exchanges to be made part of cross-Strait negotiations.
Our side has explored a variety of channels to rescue captured agents. In 2008, when Vice President Wu Den-yih was KMT secretary-general, the head of the military intelligence directorate asked him to seek the release of our agents. Wu Den-yih said that rescuing our agents was "the right thing to do."
When Wu became premier, he repeatedly instructed the SEF to consult with the Mainland through formal cross-Strait platforms, in order to obtain the release of our agents and to return them to Taiwan. The government made a sincere effort, but has yet to officially incorporate the return of agents into cross-Strait consultations.
As Vice President Wu Den-yih said, rescuing our agents was "the right thing to do." It is also something the public demands. Given the current state of cross-Strait relations, the time is ripe. The Mainland often talks about making generous concessions. In fact, noble gestures would be even more welcome than generous concessions.
Human intelligence is the oldest profession in the world. War or peace. Friend or foe. This country or that. Intelligence work never ceases. And so it is across the Taiwan Strait. Early intelligence work reflected the Cold War mentality. It was heads I win, tails you lose. But confrontation between the two sides has ended. The purpose of intelligence today is to obtain correct information to avoid incorrect conclusions. Its purpose is peace, not war. If the Mainland can adopt similar thinking, mutual trust between the two sides can make a giant leap forward.
Before the Mainland and the United States established diplomatic relations, they made a show of goodwill by releasing each others' agents. The two sides of the Strait belong to the same culture and speak the same language. Former Mainland leader Hu Jintao said the two sides must heal the wounds of history. The release of captured agents is more than a noble gesture. It is a symbolic act that can help heal the scars of history.
Taipei should also demonstrate that it is amenable to new thinking. The two sides have gradually dialed down military confrontation. But the two sides still have military deployments. They still see each other as strategic rivals. In particular, too many on Taiwan see the Mainland as their sole enemy. But cross-Strait relations have left the Cold War behind. They are progressing towards peaceful development. People on Taiwan must cease to think of the Mainland as their enemy. Economic and trade exchanges involve close public contacts. Military conflict would amount to a bizarre paradox. The two sides would have difficulty squaring the two. Our side may not have many chips to play. But we should release the Mainland's agents.
What about the nut and bolts of any prisoner exchange? The two sides have yet to sign an official prisoner exchange agreement. The two sides should allow humanitarian access. They should allow each side access to the other side's prisons and detention facilities. They should allow visits and assistance, to safeguard the basic rights of detained intelligence operative. We must understand their needs, including their need for legal assistance.
The issue of prisoner exchanges has surfaced. To reduce political sensitivities, it can be discussed in the same breath as exchanges of criminal offenders. The definition for intelligence operative can be made fuzzy to increase negotiating room. The definition of intelligence operative may be sensitive. Once the two sides begin confirming who is who, personnel whose identities were in doubt will have their covers blown. This is a problem that may impede progress.
Actually, according to the Geneva Convention, spies being released, repatriated, or resettled, have rights. The convention limits the definition of "spy." It states that unless an agent is captured while engaged in espionage, he or she must be treated as a prisoner of war. It also stipulates that those publicly identified as spies must be treated humanely. They may not be treated differently merely because they are spies. Taipei is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention. Cross-Strait relations are not international relations. But the prisoner exchange agreement nevertheless should be followed.
The Mainland has high expectations concerning political dialogue and consultation. Cross-Strait exchanges, and economic and trade relations have given cross-Strait peace a tremendous boost. But anti-China sentiment has also intensified. Taiwan society is clearly not ready to begin political negotiations. The release of ROC intelligence operatives is a humanitarian issue. It should be treated as a touchstone for the resolution of cross-Strait political hostility, and the building of cross-Strait military trust. If the two sides can agree on prisoner exchanges, it will mean that they no longer see each other as enemies. Military confidence building measures can then be left for another day.
We sincerely hope that prisoner exchanges can become an official part of cross-Strait negotiations, and mark a new page in history.
社論－兩岸釋放情報員 累積互信
2014年07月01日 04:10
編輯部
大陸國台辦主任張志軍（左4）25日與陸委會主委王郁琦（右3）舉行兩岸事務主管部門負責人第二次正式會面。（中新社）
大陸國台辦主任張志軍（左4）25日與陸委會主委王郁琦（右3）舉行兩岸事務主管部門負責人第二次正式會面。（中新社）
王張會達成多項共識，其中「人道探視」確定納入兩岸互設辦事處功能，更是重大突破。雖然兩會尚未談及人道探視範圍，是否包括我在大陸被羈押情報員等細節，但大陸國台辦主任張志軍帶來對岸的善意，已讓兩岸日後協商換俘議題，露出一道曙光。
兩岸關係自2008年來大幅改善，台灣對大陸情報工作也因應客觀情勢變化與國家需求已作出若干調整，愈來愈偏重資訊的蒐集與研判，減少對潛伏情報員的依賴，但當年軍情局派遣至大陸情蒐被俘人員，及若干被起訴的台商都還在蹲苦牢，因此，近來多有倡議兩岸協商情報員換俘議題。
我方曾經運用各種管道營救被俘情報員，副總統吳敦義於2008年擔任國民黨祕書長期間，曾接受軍情首長所託，透過國共平台要求大陸釋放情報員，吳敦義曾表示，營救我方情報員是「義所應為」。
他擔任行政院長後，持續指示海基會，透過兩岸正式平台積極與大陸協商，協助釋放台灣情報員回台。政府已努力相當時日，但至今尚未正式納入兩會協商議題。
誠如吳敦義副總統所言，營救我方情報員是「義所應為」，這也是國人普遍的期望。以當前兩岸關係，時機應已漸趨成熟，大陸常提「讓利」，其實「讓義」會更讓人有感。
情報工作是人類最古老的行業，不論戰爭與和平時期，不論彼此是敵是友，任何國家的情報工作都不會停止，兩岸亦然。唯早期的情報工作是冷戰思維，非得你死我活，現今兩岸早已結束對峙，情報工作的目的是為掌握正確資訊、避免誤判情勢，內涵是和平、非破壞手段進行。如果大陸能證明自己也採取類似新思維，相信兩岸互信關係將可大躍進一步。
大陸與美國建交前，為表善意，曾釋放美國間諜。兩岸同文同種，大陸前領導人胡錦濤亦曾說兩岸要撫平歷史傷痛。釋放被俘情報員，不僅只是讓義，更具撫平歷史傷痕的象徵意義。
台灣亦當有新思維與轉變，兩岸雖漸脫離軍事對峙局面，但雙方軍事部署和戰略思維仍互為假想敵，尤其台灣，更以大陸為唯一假想敵。然而，兩岸已經脫離冷戰時期關係，邁向和平發展進程，台灣理當改變以大陸為唯一假想敵的思維。在經貿交流、民眾互動頻密情況下，如果軍事還互相對峙，本身就是很矛盾的現象，雙方很難坦誠以對。因此，我方籌碼雖不多，亦應釋放對岸情報員。
至於在換俘的實務運作上，兩岸在尚未正式協商並簽署換俘協議前，雙方應透過人道探視，允許彼此到對方監獄或羈押處所，進行必要訪視、協助，以維護在押情報人員之基本權益，瞭解他們生活所需，有無需要提供必要之法律協助等。
待換俘議題浮上檯面，為降低政治敏感性，或可以與刑事罪犯互換一併提出討論，或將情報員定義模糊化，以爭取雙方談判空間。因為情報員之定義、事涉敏感，兩會協商一旦進入確認身分程序，原本晦暗不明的身分，經由談判前之探詢或者確認程序，而成為默認。這是個兩難問題，且無助談判進展。
事實上，依《日內瓦公約》相關規定，間諜在釋放、遣返或安置前，有權享受《公約》有關規定的利益。同法並限縮「間諜」之定義，強調除在從事間諜行為時被俘外，不應喪失其享有戰俘身分的權利，更於第一項明定具間諜身分者亦應受符合人道原則之處遇，不得以其具間諜身分而排除適用。我雖非公約簽署國，兩岸關係亦非國際關係，唯換俘協議之提出，仍可依循。
大陸對進入政治對話與協商的新進程期待很深，雖然兩岸交流與經貿關係確實已為兩岸和平發展累積了巨大的能量，但反中力量的激進化，顯示台灣社會還是沒準備好進入政治協商階段。釋放台灣情報員問題，與人道有關，應可以當成兩岸化解政治敵意的試金石及兩岸累積軍事互信的開始。換俘議題若能達成協議，意味兩岸雙方不再視彼此為敵人，軍事互信機制建立當有水到渠成之日。
我們由衷期盼，換俘議題能夠成為兩岸下一次會議正式的議題，開啟歷史另一新頁。
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