Movement, or Revolution? Big Power Wrangling behind Occupy Central
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 63, 2014
Executive Summary: The Hong Kong Occupy Central movement has been internationalized. It has led to a struggle between Mainland China and Russia on the one side, and the United States and Britain on the other. It will make human rights the chief bone of contention during the APEC Obama/Xi meeting. It is making waves all across the pond. The CCP is particularly wary of interference by 'foreign forces.' To expect it to continue allowing the protesters to occupy the streets of Hong Kong, is wishful thinking.
Full Text Below:
The Occupy Central movement in Hong Kong has been going on for over one week. Public demonstrations have recently turned into factional strife between Occupy Central and Anti-Occupy Central elements. Student demands for "genuine universal suffrage" have morphed into "opposition to China." Fueled by the foreign media, a pro-democracy movement has turned into a political revolution.
The Hong Kong Government's attitude has changed in response to this development. Leung Chun-ying was originally playing a waiting game. This weekend however, he issued an ultimatum. He threatened to clear the protest grounds completely before work resumes on Monday. The CCP has also taken a tougher line. Originally it resolved to safeguard Hong Kong's prosperity and the resolution reached by the NPC. Now it talks of upholding the rule of law and attempts to foment a color revolution on Mainland China. Clearly foreign intervention could become a reason or excuse for the CCP and the Hong Kong Government to take action.
The foreign media has spun the Occupy Central movement as an "Umbrella Revolution." The demonstrators used umbrellas to ward off police tear gas attacks but the umbrella tips are actually pointed at Beijing. The term "revolution" is highly loaded. Hong Kong protesters refer to the campaign as a "take cover/strike out revolution." What they mean, is that the purpose of the protests is not merely to seek cover, but also to strike out. It is not only to overthrow Leung Chun-ying, but also to overthrow the National People's Congress resolution.
Semantic differences have led to political wrangling over the terms "movement" and "revolution." The campaigin was initially merely a demand for "geunine universal suffrage" in the Hong Kong chief executive elections. But the foreign media spun the movement as a "revolution." It made no difference whether it was an "umbrella revolution" or a "take cover/strike out revolution." It was inevitably cast as "anti-China." At the same time, foreign solidarity with the protests provoked suspicions of foreign intervention. This touched a sensitive nerve, and set off alarm bells in Beijing.
In response to accusations of foreign intervention, scholars have launched a signature camaign in Hong Kong, drawing clear lines between themselves and the foreign media. In their view, the Hong Kong student boycott of classes should be referred to as a "movement," and not a "revolution." The students are seeking a democratic society, and have no intention of overthrowing the existing order.
The movement gradually morphed from Occupy Central to Oppose China. Meanwhile, within Hong Kong, Occupy Central and Anti-Occupy Central confrontations began to appear. The Occupy Central movement was dispersed over multiple locations. This seriously impacted traffic and economic activities in Hong Kong. On top of this, the Occupy Central movement was labeled a "revolution." Anti-Occupy Central forces begain to appear. Occupy Central students provoked bloody conflicts, giving the movement a violent image. Fortunately, to avoid Hong Kong being torn by crisis, university and middle school principals have issued a statement. They have appealed to students to disperse as soon as possible. They have stressed dialogue as the best way to resolve the current impasse. Clearly both external and internal forces are at work in Hong Kong.
One thing cannot be denied. When Western countries conflate the "umbrella revolution" with the "color revolutions," they are looking at the demonstrations through rose colored glasses. Let us examine Bejing's attitude under a magnifying glass. The Umbrella Revolution should be regarded as a sign of "peaceful evolution" within China. For example, the United States, avoids lightly taking stands on cross-Strait issues. But it openly took sides on the demonstrations in Hong Kong. It claimed that universal suffrage was a right in accordance with the Hong Kong People's "Basic Law." It hoped that Hong Kong could maintain its open system. It apparently equated support for the high school students with support for the Dalai Lama.
Russia has seldom concerned itself with East Asia. This time however, it issued an unprecedented statement. It openly sided with the Beijing authorities. It named the United States and Britain as behind the scenes conspirators. Moscow's purpose was apparently to use the movement to settle old debts from the Ukraine "orange revolution" and to use the opportunity to repudiate it.
Beijing swiftly drew a line in the sand in response to the Hong Kong demonstrations. It clearly indicated that the Hong Kong issue is an internal affair. Outside forces have no right to interfere. It hopes the United States will exercise caution, and not issue the wrong signals. A pro-democracy movement has apparently become an arena for great power political struggle.
Hong Kong has long maintained a tradition of liberality and openness. This has given the United States an opening by which to inject itself into the Chinese mainland's internal affairs. Academics in the United States are equating the movement with the May Fourth Movement. That is why the U.S. government loudly trumpeted its support for Hong Kong for three straight days. Beijing is convinced that the U.S. government wants to use Hong Kong as a foward base to strengthen democracy and to contain China. This is why the Beijing leaders have taken such a hard line on the demonstrations, and are unwilling to give an inch.
The Hong Kong Occupy Central movement has been internationalized. It has led to a struggle between Mainland China and Russia on the one side, and the United States and Britain on the other. It will make human rights the chief bone of contention during the APEC Obama/Xi meeting. It is making waves all across the pond. The CCP is particularly wary of interference by 'foreign forces.' To expect it to continue allowing the protesters to occupy the streets of Hong Kong, is wishful thinking.
運動vs.革命:香港占中背後的大國角力
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.10.06 02:20 am
香港占中運動已超過一周。近日,民眾示威演變成「占中」與「反占中」兩派的衝突,學生的訴求也從爭取「真普選」轉為「反中」;在外國媒體的推波助瀾下,一場民主運動幾乎被形容成一場政治革命。
隨著這樣的情勢發展,港府的態度也有所不同。梁振英先前持「以拖待變」策略,到周末卻發出強硬的最後通牒,揚言要在星期一上班前完成「清場」。中共的態度更日漸強硬,從稍早聲稱堅決維護香港繁榮、堅定維護全國人大的決議,到近日強調堅持維護香港的法治,並指責有人想在大陸內地製造「顏色革命」是白日作夢。可見,所謂「外國勢力介入」的因素,可能成為中共和港府對群眾採取行動的基調或藉口。
外國媒體把這次占中運動稱為「雨傘革命」,形容示威者以雨傘來遮抵警方催淚彈的攻擊,傘尖其實是直指北京,但「革命」一詞尤顯沉重。香港示威者則把這場運動稱為「遮打革命」,意指抗爭的目的不只在「遮」,還要「打」,不但要打倒梁振英,也要推翻中共「人大」的決議。
也正由於用詞與認知不同,因而形成「運動」和「革命」的政治角力,原本港人旨在爭取特首的「真普選」運動,被國際媒體冠上「革命」的帽子後,不論是「雨傘革命」或「遮打革命」,都難免被抹上「反中」色彩。同時,因為外國人民的聲援,也引發「外國勢力介入」之說,挑動了中國的敏感神經,也引起北京的戒懼。
針對「外國勢力介入」之說,目前許多香港學者已經展開連署,與外國媒體的報導畫清界線。他們認為,這次香港學生罷課占中活動,應稱為「運動」,不該被視為「革命」,因為學生推動的是爭民主的社會運動,沒有推翻現有政權之意。
也就在這場運動逐漸從「占中」轉為「反中」之際,香港內部也開始出現「占中」與「反占中」的對抗。由於占中據點分散多處,讓香港的交通及經濟活動受到相當大的影響,再加上占中運動被貼上「革命」的標籤,香港社會內部一股「反占中」的勢力開始出現,並與占中學生爆發數波肢體流血衝突,讓運動染上暴力色彩。所幸,為避免香港陷入被撕裂的危機,香港各大學及中學校長紛紛發表聲明,呼籲學生儘快撤離現場,並強調「對話」是解決當前僵局的最佳方式。可見,外部的推力及內部的阻力正在香港拉鋸。
不可諱言,當西方國家把「雨傘革命」與「顏色革命」畫上等號,就註定他們會以有色眼鏡來看待這次示威,以放大鏡來檢視北京政權的態度,同時也將雨傘革命視為中國內部進行「和平演變」的前哨站。舉例而言,在兩岸問題上不輕易表態的美國,竟罕見地對香港示威運動選邊站,不但宣稱香港人民根據《基本法》擁有普選的權利,同時希望香港能持續維持開放的體制。這種作法,似把支持占中學生與支持達賴、熱比婭畫上了等號。
在另外一頭,從不關心東亞問題的俄羅斯,這回也破天荒地發表聲明。它不但鮮明地選擇站在中共政權這一邊,還指稱這次占中活動是美英在背後策畫的「陰謀」。莫斯科的目的,似乎想藉這次占中運動,來清算烏克蘭「橙色革命」的舊帳,並趁機否定它。
北京方面,則迅速為這次香港示威活動畫下了紅線。中共直接表明:香港問題是「內政」,外部勢力無權干涉,同時希望美方謹言慎行,不要對外釋放錯誤的訊息。一場爭取民主的活動,儼然已成為大國政治角力的場域。
香港一向具有自由化與開放的傳統,這讓美國找到向中國大陸內部推進的缺口。這次,有美國學者將占中運動與「五四運動」畫上等號,這也是美國政府連續三天高調支持香港占中的主因。此外,北京則認為,美國政府想利用香港作為據點,來強化對中國的民主圍堵,這也是北京領導人對這次示威格外強硬、且寸步不讓的原因。
這次香港占中運動的國際化,不但形成中俄及美英之間的相互角力,也將使人權議題成為APEC歐習會爭辯的主調,它吹皺了一池春水。在中共格外戒慎「外國勢力」介入的心理下,要期待它放任示威者持續占領香港街頭,恐怕是奢望。
從臺北看天下 . chinese language newspaper editorials . translated by bevin chu . no endorsement of the editorials should be inferred
Sunday, October 5, 2014
Thursday, October 2, 2014
Tsai Cho-yung Scandal: Clues to Wen-Je Ko Private Accounts
Tsai Cho-yung Scandal: Clues to Wen-Je Ko Private Accounts
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 3, 2014
Executive Summary: How many sins have been exempted from punishment by means of phony labels. In both the 402 and MG 149 scandals, physicians wore the halos of public service. They may escape prosecution because of their image as public benefactors. But how worthy of white robes are those charged with reforming the system and plugging the loopholes?
Full Text Below:
The Wen-Je Ko MG 149 accounts scandal has exploded. As many as 402 accounts with the National Taiwan University Hospital have been found in violation of the "Charity Donations Destined For Social Welfare Funds Implementation Regulations." The Ministry of Finance says it never approved the establishment of MG 149. Yesterday the Taipei Prosecutor's Office summoned Ko account manager Liu Ru-yi for questioning. The Ministry of Education will also pay a visit to NTU to examine the 402 accounts. But this is an election year. Can the circumstances surrounding these accounts be brought to light? Is is doubtful.
The Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the Ministry of Finance are each singing their own tune. Obviously the 402 NTU accounts have been relegated to no mans's land for some time. Business operations are overseen by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Nominally they are governed by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Finance is responsible only for nuclear medicine equipment. Think about it. Even donations to the 402 NTU accounts were not reported. The MG 149 aspect was subject to even less oversight. Wen-Je Ko set up personal accounts and private accounts under MG 149. He mixed public accounts with private accounts, making mess even more difficult to unravel.
In recent years, large domestic hospitals have made improper use of charitable donations, for which they are currently under investigation. Two cases have received a great deal of attention. One. In 2003, Chang Mao-sung, former president of the Veterans General Hospital, misappropriated funds from 2929 secret accounts. Two. In 2011, doctors at the Tri-Service General Hospital and Veterans General Hospital used Academia Sinica member Tsai Cho-yung's "Siyuan Foundation for the Advancement of Education and Academics," and Li Hong's "Cheng Han Educational Foundation" to evade taxes. Over 500 physicians were involved. These two cases may help people understand the twists and turns of the Ko accounts.
The 2929 Veterans General Hospital accounts were established early on to prevent corruption and ensure quality health care. It set aside a certain amount from the surplus each year, to serve as incentives and benefits for physicians. But account management authority resided solely in the hands of the president and comptroller. When Chang Mao-sung served as president, he and Chief Accountant Yi Ping-tung repeatedly misappropriated funds. They used them for private investments and stock trades, then pocketed the funds. The amount was as high as 80 million NT.
The case came to light in 2003. Prosecutors spent more than two years investigating. They eventually prosecuted them for embezzlement. They sought a 15 year sentence for Chang Mao-sung. Predictably, the Shihlin District Court took over five years to hand down a verdict. The charge was changed to misappropriation of funds and the sentence reduced to one year and two months. Prosecutors appealed. The appeal process dragged on until last year. The High Court found Chang Mao-sung guilty only of business misappropriation. The sentence was further reduced to six months, then commuted to a fine. He did not even have to serve time. The case dragged on for more than nine years. Prosecutors sought a 15 year sentence, based in high ethical standards. Judges gradually whittled down the sentence. In the end his sentence was reduced to six months for a misdemeanor.
Now take the 2011 Tsai Cho-yung Si Yuan scandal. This was characterized as the biggest group tax evasion scheme by physicians in history. The case was relatively simple. The main problem was that physicians' incomes were too high. To reduce their tax burden, many Tri-Services General Hospital and Veterans General Hospital physicians put their money into two foundations, the "Si Yuan" foundation and the "Cheng Han" foundation, established by Tsai Cho-yung and Li Hong-chen. They received 20% tax deductions on their donations. Later, they sought research grants fom the foundations, for which they could receive 90% to 95% deductions. By putting the money in then taking it out, they made false donations, but received real tax benefits.
This case was uncovered by the National Tax Bureau and the Taipei Tax Contributions Department while pursuing tax evasion cases. They then submitted it to prosecutors. Tsai Cho-yung was an Academia Sinica member, and a former president of the National Defense Medical Center. Li Hong-yi was a National Defense Medical Center alumni. As a result, over 500 physicians, mostly from military backgrounds, were involved. So were hospitals throughout Taiwan. The large number of people meant a large volume of work, and slow progress with the investitgation. Little news emerged. Prosecutors said many physicians had no prior criminal records. They showed remorse, and were willing to make up for the taxes they evaded. They were usually not prosecuted.
Compare the above two cases to the Ko case. The Wen-Je Ko 149 MG case is a synthesis of these two cases. On the one hand they accepted donations. , On the other hand they fund studies. Physicians help each other. The Ko account also accepted vendor contriubutions. As far as account management, Wen-Je Ko has yet to be accused of misappropriation of public funds. But he single-handedly controlled account management, The account had little transparency. Consider the account usage rules. According to MG 149 provisions, a physician could first make a donation, then receive a subsidy. The rules stipulated a minimum balance. This mode of operation resembled Tsai Cho-yung's "phony donations, real tax evasion" model.
The Tsai Cho-yung scandal gobbled up three years of time. So far no visible progress has been made. So many physicians were involved in the case, justice system personnel felt they were dealing with a hot potato. Had the Tsai Cho-yung scandal erupted before their very eyes, Wen-Je Ko would have been more cautious about his own account. He would have modifed the regulations, and desisted from "phony donations, really tax evasion." Wen-Je Ko would probably walk. But hundreds of physicians are involved. He is still taking advantage of the opportunity, Thefore he has no right to talk the voters about morality.
How many sins have been exempted from punishment by means of phony labels. In both the 402 and MG 149 scandals, physicians wore the halos of public service. They may escape prosecution because of their image as public benefactors. But how worthy of white robes are those charged with reforming the system and plugging the loopholes?
從蔡作雍案一窺柯文哲私帳端倪
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.10.03 02:01 am
柯文哲MG一四九帳戶風波擴大,牽扯出台大醫院四○二帳戶違反《公益勸募條例》的問題,財政部更稱從未核准MG一四九設立。北檢昨天傳喚柯帳管理人劉如意訊問,教育部也將赴台大稽查四○二帳戶;然而,在選舉當前的氛圍下,這本來龍去脈不清的帳能查到什麼地步,令人存疑。
從近日教育部、衛福部、財政部各說各話的情況,不難得知,台大四○二帳戶長期處於「三不管」地帶:業務上受衛福部督促,名義上受教育部管轄,財政部僅負責形式的核備。試想,連台大四○二帳戶接受捐款都未依法呈報,它底下的MG一四九則更是自由自在,不受督管;而柯文哲又在MG一四九底下另設了個人帳和私帳,公私雜混,更難釐清。
近年來,國內大型醫院的公益或研究帳戶因運用不當而受到調查的,有兩個頗受矚目的案例。其一,是二○○三年前榮總院長張茂松挪用「二九二九」密帳案;其二,則是二○一一年三總及榮總醫師透過中研院士蔡作雍之「思源教育學術促進基金會」及李鴻的「成漢教育基金會」集體逃漏稅,涉案醫師超過五百人。回顧一下這兩個案件,或許有助人們一探柯帳的曲折。
榮總的「二九二九帳戶」,是該院早年為了保持醫師廉潔並兼顧醫療品質,每年從盈餘中提撥若干金額,充當醫師的獎勵金及福利金。然而,由於帳戶管理權掌握在院長及會計長手中,張茂松擔任院長期間,竟和會計主任易屏東多次挪用帳下款項,用於私人投資及股票買賣,並納入私囊,金額高達八千多萬元。
此案在二○○三年被揭發後,檢方花了兩年多的時間調查,最後依「貪汙罪」起訴,對張茂松求刑十五年。孰料,士林地院花了五年多才宣判,改依「侵占罪」判刑一年兩個月。檢方上訴,二審拖到前年底才宣判,高院認定張茂松僅構成業務侵占,因此輕判半年,得易科罰金,連坐牢都不必。亦即,此案歷經九年多的司法程序,檢方求刑十五年的高道德標準,在法官手中一層層流失,最後僅剩半年的輕罪。
再看二○一一年蔡作雍的「思源」案,雖被稱為「史上最大」的醫師集體逃漏稅案,其實案情還比較單純。主要問題,是醫師收入太高,為了規避綜所稅稅負,許多三總與榮總的醫師先將錢捐入蔡作雍和李鴻成立的「思源」和「成漢」兩基金會,可取得捐款兩成抵稅的優惠;其後,再向基金會申請研究補助,可以取回九成至九成五的捐款。如此一進一出,即構成「假捐贈,真逃稅」。
這樁案件,是國稅局台北稅捐處在追查逃漏稅時所發現,報請檢調追查。由於蔡作雍是中研院院士、前國防醫學院院長,李鴻亦是國防醫學院校友,因此涉案的五百名醫師多為軍系出身之醫師,遍及全台醫院。而由於人數龐大,調查程序浩繁,偵辦進度緩慢,幾無下文。檢調稱,許多涉案醫師並無前科,且犯後態度良好,願意補繳逃漏稅款,通常可獲緩刑起訴。
與上述兩個案件比較,柯文哲的MG一四九約略是上述兩個案件的綜合體:一方面接受捐款,一方面進行研究,兼具醫師互助功能,柯帳還多了廠商捐款。在帳戶管理上,柯文哲目前尚未聞挪用公款的行徑,但他一手操控帳戶管理,確讓該帳戶的透明度低。再看帳戶的運用規則,MG一四九規定醫師可以先行捐款再利用計畫補助方式撥回,並規定留存比例;這樣的操作方式,更接近蔡作雍案的「假捐贈、真逃稅」的運作軌跡。
蔡作雍案一辦三年,至今看不到具體的司法進度;可見,這類大批醫師涉入之案件,讓司法人員辦起來備感棘手。假使因眼見蔡作雍案爆發,讓柯文哲對自己的帳戶心生警惕,從而修改規定,自行關掉「假捐贈、真逃稅」的便道;那麼,柯文哲應該可以過得了這一關。但是,如果那邊幾百名醫師的案子在辦,他這邊仍在利用空檔下手,那他恐怕沒有資格再向選民呼喊什麼道德。
共業!共業!多少罪過假汝之名豁免於刑。四○二也好,MG一四九也罷,頂著醫師的光環和共業的大傘,極可能在道德疑義下安然脫身。但無論如何,主事者若不把既有制度修正、漏洞堵住,如何對得起自己一身白袍?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 3, 2014
Executive Summary: How many sins have been exempted from punishment by means of phony labels. In both the 402 and MG 149 scandals, physicians wore the halos of public service. They may escape prosecution because of their image as public benefactors. But how worthy of white robes are those charged with reforming the system and plugging the loopholes?
Full Text Below:
The Wen-Je Ko MG 149 accounts scandal has exploded. As many as 402 accounts with the National Taiwan University Hospital have been found in violation of the "Charity Donations Destined For Social Welfare Funds Implementation Regulations." The Ministry of Finance says it never approved the establishment of MG 149. Yesterday the Taipei Prosecutor's Office summoned Ko account manager Liu Ru-yi for questioning. The Ministry of Education will also pay a visit to NTU to examine the 402 accounts. But this is an election year. Can the circumstances surrounding these accounts be brought to light? Is is doubtful.
The Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the Ministry of Finance are each singing their own tune. Obviously the 402 NTU accounts have been relegated to no mans's land for some time. Business operations are overseen by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Nominally they are governed by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Finance is responsible only for nuclear medicine equipment. Think about it. Even donations to the 402 NTU accounts were not reported. The MG 149 aspect was subject to even less oversight. Wen-Je Ko set up personal accounts and private accounts under MG 149. He mixed public accounts with private accounts, making mess even more difficult to unravel.
In recent years, large domestic hospitals have made improper use of charitable donations, for which they are currently under investigation. Two cases have received a great deal of attention. One. In 2003, Chang Mao-sung, former president of the Veterans General Hospital, misappropriated funds from 2929 secret accounts. Two. In 2011, doctors at the Tri-Service General Hospital and Veterans General Hospital used Academia Sinica member Tsai Cho-yung's "Siyuan Foundation for the Advancement of Education and Academics," and Li Hong's "Cheng Han Educational Foundation" to evade taxes. Over 500 physicians were involved. These two cases may help people understand the twists and turns of the Ko accounts.
The 2929 Veterans General Hospital accounts were established early on to prevent corruption and ensure quality health care. It set aside a certain amount from the surplus each year, to serve as incentives and benefits for physicians. But account management authority resided solely in the hands of the president and comptroller. When Chang Mao-sung served as president, he and Chief Accountant Yi Ping-tung repeatedly misappropriated funds. They used them for private investments and stock trades, then pocketed the funds. The amount was as high as 80 million NT.
The case came to light in 2003. Prosecutors spent more than two years investigating. They eventually prosecuted them for embezzlement. They sought a 15 year sentence for Chang Mao-sung. Predictably, the Shihlin District Court took over five years to hand down a verdict. The charge was changed to misappropriation of funds and the sentence reduced to one year and two months. Prosecutors appealed. The appeal process dragged on until last year. The High Court found Chang Mao-sung guilty only of business misappropriation. The sentence was further reduced to six months, then commuted to a fine. He did not even have to serve time. The case dragged on for more than nine years. Prosecutors sought a 15 year sentence, based in high ethical standards. Judges gradually whittled down the sentence. In the end his sentence was reduced to six months for a misdemeanor.
Now take the 2011 Tsai Cho-yung Si Yuan scandal. This was characterized as the biggest group tax evasion scheme by physicians in history. The case was relatively simple. The main problem was that physicians' incomes were too high. To reduce their tax burden, many Tri-Services General Hospital and Veterans General Hospital physicians put their money into two foundations, the "Si Yuan" foundation and the "Cheng Han" foundation, established by Tsai Cho-yung and Li Hong-chen. They received 20% tax deductions on their donations. Later, they sought research grants fom the foundations, for which they could receive 90% to 95% deductions. By putting the money in then taking it out, they made false donations, but received real tax benefits.
This case was uncovered by the National Tax Bureau and the Taipei Tax Contributions Department while pursuing tax evasion cases. They then submitted it to prosecutors. Tsai Cho-yung was an Academia Sinica member, and a former president of the National Defense Medical Center. Li Hong-yi was a National Defense Medical Center alumni. As a result, over 500 physicians, mostly from military backgrounds, were involved. So were hospitals throughout Taiwan. The large number of people meant a large volume of work, and slow progress with the investitgation. Little news emerged. Prosecutors said many physicians had no prior criminal records. They showed remorse, and were willing to make up for the taxes they evaded. They were usually not prosecuted.
Compare the above two cases to the Ko case. The Wen-Je Ko 149 MG case is a synthesis of these two cases. On the one hand they accepted donations. , On the other hand they fund studies. Physicians help each other. The Ko account also accepted vendor contriubutions. As far as account management, Wen-Je Ko has yet to be accused of misappropriation of public funds. But he single-handedly controlled account management, The account had little transparency. Consider the account usage rules. According to MG 149 provisions, a physician could first make a donation, then receive a subsidy. The rules stipulated a minimum balance. This mode of operation resembled Tsai Cho-yung's "phony donations, real tax evasion" model.
The Tsai Cho-yung scandal gobbled up three years of time. So far no visible progress has been made. So many physicians were involved in the case, justice system personnel felt they were dealing with a hot potato. Had the Tsai Cho-yung scandal erupted before their very eyes, Wen-Je Ko would have been more cautious about his own account. He would have modifed the regulations, and desisted from "phony donations, really tax evasion." Wen-Je Ko would probably walk. But hundreds of physicians are involved. He is still taking advantage of the opportunity, Thefore he has no right to talk the voters about morality.
How many sins have been exempted from punishment by means of phony labels. In both the 402 and MG 149 scandals, physicians wore the halos of public service. They may escape prosecution because of their image as public benefactors. But how worthy of white robes are those charged with reforming the system and plugging the loopholes?
從蔡作雍案一窺柯文哲私帳端倪
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.10.03 02:01 am
柯文哲MG一四九帳戶風波擴大,牽扯出台大醫院四○二帳戶違反《公益勸募條例》的問題,財政部更稱從未核准MG一四九設立。北檢昨天傳喚柯帳管理人劉如意訊問,教育部也將赴台大稽查四○二帳戶;然而,在選舉當前的氛圍下,這本來龍去脈不清的帳能查到什麼地步,令人存疑。
從近日教育部、衛福部、財政部各說各話的情況,不難得知,台大四○二帳戶長期處於「三不管」地帶:業務上受衛福部督促,名義上受教育部管轄,財政部僅負責形式的核備。試想,連台大四○二帳戶接受捐款都未依法呈報,它底下的MG一四九則更是自由自在,不受督管;而柯文哲又在MG一四九底下另設了個人帳和私帳,公私雜混,更難釐清。
近年來,國內大型醫院的公益或研究帳戶因運用不當而受到調查的,有兩個頗受矚目的案例。其一,是二○○三年前榮總院長張茂松挪用「二九二九」密帳案;其二,則是二○一一年三總及榮總醫師透過中研院士蔡作雍之「思源教育學術促進基金會」及李鴻的「成漢教育基金會」集體逃漏稅,涉案醫師超過五百人。回顧一下這兩個案件,或許有助人們一探柯帳的曲折。
榮總的「二九二九帳戶」,是該院早年為了保持醫師廉潔並兼顧醫療品質,每年從盈餘中提撥若干金額,充當醫師的獎勵金及福利金。然而,由於帳戶管理權掌握在院長及會計長手中,張茂松擔任院長期間,竟和會計主任易屏東多次挪用帳下款項,用於私人投資及股票買賣,並納入私囊,金額高達八千多萬元。
此案在二○○三年被揭發後,檢方花了兩年多的時間調查,最後依「貪汙罪」起訴,對張茂松求刑十五年。孰料,士林地院花了五年多才宣判,改依「侵占罪」判刑一年兩個月。檢方上訴,二審拖到前年底才宣判,高院認定張茂松僅構成業務侵占,因此輕判半年,得易科罰金,連坐牢都不必。亦即,此案歷經九年多的司法程序,檢方求刑十五年的高道德標準,在法官手中一層層流失,最後僅剩半年的輕罪。
再看二○一一年蔡作雍的「思源」案,雖被稱為「史上最大」的醫師集體逃漏稅案,其實案情還比較單純。主要問題,是醫師收入太高,為了規避綜所稅稅負,許多三總與榮總的醫師先將錢捐入蔡作雍和李鴻成立的「思源」和「成漢」兩基金會,可取得捐款兩成抵稅的優惠;其後,再向基金會申請研究補助,可以取回九成至九成五的捐款。如此一進一出,即構成「假捐贈,真逃稅」。
這樁案件,是國稅局台北稅捐處在追查逃漏稅時所發現,報請檢調追查。由於蔡作雍是中研院院士、前國防醫學院院長,李鴻亦是國防醫學院校友,因此涉案的五百名醫師多為軍系出身之醫師,遍及全台醫院。而由於人數龐大,調查程序浩繁,偵辦進度緩慢,幾無下文。檢調稱,許多涉案醫師並無前科,且犯後態度良好,願意補繳逃漏稅款,通常可獲緩刑起訴。
與上述兩個案件比較,柯文哲的MG一四九約略是上述兩個案件的綜合體:一方面接受捐款,一方面進行研究,兼具醫師互助功能,柯帳還多了廠商捐款。在帳戶管理上,柯文哲目前尚未聞挪用公款的行徑,但他一手操控帳戶管理,確讓該帳戶的透明度低。再看帳戶的運用規則,MG一四九規定醫師可以先行捐款再利用計畫補助方式撥回,並規定留存比例;這樣的操作方式,更接近蔡作雍案的「假捐贈、真逃稅」的運作軌跡。
蔡作雍案一辦三年,至今看不到具體的司法進度;可見,這類大批醫師涉入之案件,讓司法人員辦起來備感棘手。假使因眼見蔡作雍案爆發,讓柯文哲對自己的帳戶心生警惕,從而修改規定,自行關掉「假捐贈、真逃稅」的便道;那麼,柯文哲應該可以過得了這一關。但是,如果那邊幾百名醫師的案子在辦,他這邊仍在利用空檔下手,那他恐怕沒有資格再向選民呼喊什麼道德。
共業!共業!多少罪過假汝之名豁免於刑。四○二也好,MG一四九也罷,頂著醫師的光環和共業的大傘,極可能在道德疑義下安然脫身。但無論如何,主事者若不把既有制度修正、漏洞堵住,如何對得起自己一身白袍?
Race to the Bottom Election Campaign: Alarm Bells for Taiwan's Democracy
Race to the Bottom Election Campaign: Alarm Bells for Taiwan's Democracy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 2, 2014
Executive Summary: The Taipei mayorship has long been regarded as a stepping stone to the presidency. Recently however, the Taipei mayoral race has turned into a "race to the bottom." Television and newspaper reports hardly ever report anything good about Sean Lien and Wen-Je Ko. This leaves Taipei citizens more anxious than ever. For Sean Lien and Wen-Je Ko, whoever can look into the voters' hearts, will immediately remove himself from the current "race to the bottom." He should speak plainly about how he intends to govern Taipei. He should lead the public towards a happy and prosperous life. He should win the hearts of the voters.
Full Text Below:
The Taipei mayorship has long been regarded as a stepping stone to the presidency. Recently however, the Taipei mayoral race has turned into a "race to the bottom." Television and newspaper reports hardly ever report anything good about Sean Lien and Wen-Je Ko. This leaves Taipei citizens more anxious than ever. Who will win on November 29? No one can be certain. What is certain is that Ko voters will probably feel little peace of mind, and Lien voters are unlikely to feel much confidence in their candidate.
Many people are voting for Lien, not because they like Sean Lien, but because they cannot accept a blustering, pompous, and sexist Wen-Je Ko. They are afraid that someone like him would be a disaster for Taipei. Those who are voting for Wen-Je Ko do not necessarily believe Wen-Je Ko will be a competent mayor of Taipei. They may simply hate Sean Lien because he represents wealth and privilege.
This election should have been about choosing the best mayor for Taipei. Instead it has become about preventing the worst candidate from becoming mayor for Taipei. Ko has unwittingly become the head of Sean Lien's campaign committee. Lien has unwittingly helped Ko gain votes. Voters are shaking their heads and sighing, wondering how the capital city mayoral election ever came to this?
Past Taipei mayoral elections were not like this. Take former Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian, who later became president. Compare him to Ma Ying-jeou, his rival for the mayorship of Taipei. Some voters hated Chen and voted for Ma. Some voters hated Ma and voted for Chen. But most people voted for Chen or Ma because they wanted to, because they believed one or the other would be the best mayor for Taipei. Some were even proud of their vote.
Chen Shui-bian was a star legislator. His interpellations were incisive. He came from a category three impoverished household. Ma Ying-jeou was a Minister of Justice with the courage of his convictions. He never spoke ill of others. His style was more palatable to middle class Taipei voters. These two were political superstars. Even Hau Lung-bin and Frank Hsieh, the loser, or Su Tseng-chang, all held high office. Voters who supported them believed for the most part that they would do a good job if they won. Those perceived as spoilers, Wang Chien-hsuan and James Soong, received few votes. This was not because their ability to govern was in doubt, but because the balance of power among the political parties convinced voters that Ma Ying-jeou was likely to win. Therefore they voted for Ma Ying-jeou.
The election for mayor of the capital has now become an appalling "race to the bottom." What other places are like this? The answer is, give other cities, including New Taipei, Taoyuan, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung, where all the candidates seem to have been "spirited away." All the news about the Taipei mayoral election has been bad news, but at least there is news, The other five cities are not even being covered. Never mind counties and municipalities outside the six major metropolises.
This shows that democratic elections on Taiwan now face a structural crisis that requires soul-searching by both the ruling and opposition parties, as well as the media and the public.
First of all, the guiding principle of every candidate's campaign committee, in every county and municipality across the island, appears to be "avoid all press coverage." This guiding principle has led to a second guiding principle, "make sure your opponent gets plenty of press coverage." The reason is simple. Any media coverage is bad. Good news is bad news, at least for viewer ratings. Bad news is good news, at least for viewer ratings. Good news does not get reported. Only bad news attracts the spotlight. No wonder campaign committees hope that their own candidate remains hidden in the shadows, and their opponent gets caught in the glare of the klieg lights.
Secondly, this sort of "bad news is good news" norm calls for media soul-searching. Even more importantly, people have lost faith in politicians. All they feel for politics is revulsion or indifference. This is something that all politicians and political parties should reflect upon. More than a few political superstars in the past have been lionized by the voters then swept into office. Have their political records affirmed voter faith? Or have they left voters bitterly disillusioned? Voters have repeatedly lionized candidates and held out high hopes for them, only to be repeatedly disappointed in the end. It is not difficult to understand why they would become deeply skeptical. Any good news about the candidates and their first thought is likely to be, "Here it comes again, more lionization. Spare me."
Say an electric fan is broken. You take it to the appliance repair shop a hundred times for repair. But it never gets restored to working order. One day, you take it to a local snack bar for repair. This seems nonsensical in the extreme. But after a hundred disappointments it may seem like a rational choice. Wen-Je Ko and Sean Lien are political novices. They have generated a political wind, one akin to sending one's fan to the snack bar for repair. But if the appliance repair shop cannot fix the fan, one should not expect much from the snack bar.
Third, on top of voter skepticism, the political parties have failed to cultivate new talent. The mayorship of the capital city is an important position. Yet the candidates fielded by the blue and green camps are novices with almost no municipal level political experience. People cannot help wondering what the ruling and opposition parties have been doing for the past few years?
This may be worrisome, but it is what the year end Taipei mayoral election has come to. No matter how disgusted one might feel, one must face the facts. From a pessimistic perspective, one may not be able to vote for the best candidate. One can only refuse to vote for the worst candidate. Consider this election a costly lesson. The price paid must not be in vain. The ruling and opposition parties, as well as people across the country, must engage in soul searching. Political talent must be cultivated. The political culture must be reformed to inspire public confidence. Taiwan's democratic politics must be rehabilitated. We must restore the core value of democratic elections. We must elect the wise and the able.
For Sean Lien and Wen-Je Ko, whoever can look into the voters' hearts, will immediately remove himself from the current "race to the bottom." He should speak plainly about how he intends to govern Taipei. He should lead the public towards a happy and prosperous life. He should win the hearts of the voters.
社論-扣分選戰是台灣民主警訊
2014年10月02日 04:09
本報訊
向來被視為「總統養成所」的台北市長選舉,變成一場比賽失分的「扣分大戰」,電視新聞裡、報紙版面上,幾乎看不到連勝文和柯文哲的正面新聞,台北市民空前焦慮,因為11月29日那天,誰當選也許還沒有人說得準,但可以確定的是,選柯的人恐怕不覺得心安理得,投連的人也不會理直氣壯。
許多人之所以投連,不是因為喜歡連勝文,而是沒有辦法接受一個口出狂言、目中無人、歧視女性的柯文哲,他們擔心,這樣的人當選,是台北市的大災難;投柯文哲的人,也未必相信柯文哲會是稱職的台北市長,可能只是單純討厭連勝文的權貴標籤。
於是,一場本應是選最優的台北市長選舉,變成防最爛當選的爛戲,柯變成了連的頭號助選員;連變成了柯的王牌加分機。選民們看得搖頭嘆氣,首都市長選舉,怎會演變至如此田地?
過去的台北市長選舉,並非如此。以後來分別當上總統的前台北市長陳水扁和馬英九為例。其角逐台北市長寶座時,雖然也有一些因討厭扁而投馬,或因為討厭馬而投扁的人在,但大多數的人在投扁或投馬時,是打從心底認為,他們會是稱職的台北市長,甚至為自己投下的一票感到驕傲。
陳水扁是明星立委,問政犀利、三級貧戶苦讀出身;馬英九是堅持理念的法務部長,口不出惡言的風格更符合台北市中產階級的胃口。不說這兩位超級政治明星,即便是郝龍斌,乃至於落選者謝長廷、蘇貞昌,也都歷任政治上要職,投他們的選民,多半也都相信他們當選台北市長後會有好的表現。就算是被視為陪榜或攪局的王建煊與宋楚瑜,得票不高,並不是因為治理能力被否定,而是政黨政治的結構以及選民認為比較起來還是喜歡馬英九多一些,所以票投馬英九。
首都市長進入了慘不忍睹的「比爛模式」,其他的地方又如何呢?包括新北、桃園、台中、台南、高雄的其他五都,似乎都進入了「神隱模式」,台北市長選舉雖然都是爛新聞,但至少還有新聞,其他五都則幾乎連版面都沒有,更不要說六都以外的其他縣市了。
這透露了台灣的民主選舉,出現了結構性的警訊,需要朝野政黨、媒體與民眾一起省思。
首先,這場選戰,全國各縣市各陣營候選人的最高指導原則似乎都變成了「努力不讓自己上新聞」,而這個最高指導原則,則演化出第二原則,就是「努力讓對手上新聞」。道理很簡單,現在的媒體氛圍傾向負面,好新聞是爛(收視率)新聞,爛新聞是好(收視率)新聞。正面新聞上不了版面,只有負面新聞才能吸引鎂光燈,無怪乎各陣營的選戰主軸就愈來愈清楚:我神隱、你上報。
其次,這種負面新聞當道的文化,除了媒體要自我檢討外,更重要的原因是民眾對政治人物失去了信心,對政治只剩下惡感或冷感,這一點是所有參與政治的政治人物及其所屬的政黨都要共同反省的。過去多少明星級的政治人物,在受到選民英雄式的擁戴當選後,其治理表現是讓選民認為深慶得人還是所託非人呢?如果一次又一次對英雄的翹首企盼,換來的是一次又一次的無奈失望,就不難理解會出現一種心情制約:只要看到對候選人的正面新聞,就會想:「又在造神,少來!」
就像家裡的電風扇壞了,你送到電器行修了一百次都修不好,有一天,你改送到小吃店修電扇,這看起來無厘頭至極的行為,卻是經歷一百次失望後,再理性不過的選擇,柯文哲與連勝文颳起的素人政治風,就是另一種把電風扇送小吃店修理的無奈反應。只是電器行修不好的電扇,送小吃店也不必有太多的期待。
第三,除了不被選民信任,這也反映了各政黨人才培養的嚴重斷層,首都市長是何其重要的職務,到最後,藍綠推出的代表,卻都是幾無政治歷練的市政小白兔。讓人不禁要問,過去幾年朝野政黨在幹什麼?
不管再憂心,年底的選舉尤其是台北市長選舉,已經是長成現在這個樣子了,再無奈也得面對,從消極的角度來說,投不出最好的,也只能退一萬步不要選出最爛的,就當這次選舉我們得繳一筆昂貴的學費。但學費不能白繳,朝野政黨、全國民眾,都得好好深思,從政治人才養成、政治文化重塑到人民信心重建,要如何進行台灣民主政治的復建工作,找回民主選舉「選賢與能」的核心價值。
對連勝文與柯文哲兩位候選人而言,誰能看清楚選民的心,立刻擺脫「扣分賽」的迷思,說清楚要如何治理台北市、帶領市民邁向更幸福繁榮的生活,一定會贏得選民的心。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 2, 2014
Executive Summary: The Taipei mayorship has long been regarded as a stepping stone to the presidency. Recently however, the Taipei mayoral race has turned into a "race to the bottom." Television and newspaper reports hardly ever report anything good about Sean Lien and Wen-Je Ko. This leaves Taipei citizens more anxious than ever. For Sean Lien and Wen-Je Ko, whoever can look into the voters' hearts, will immediately remove himself from the current "race to the bottom." He should speak plainly about how he intends to govern Taipei. He should lead the public towards a happy and prosperous life. He should win the hearts of the voters.
Full Text Below:
The Taipei mayorship has long been regarded as a stepping stone to the presidency. Recently however, the Taipei mayoral race has turned into a "race to the bottom." Television and newspaper reports hardly ever report anything good about Sean Lien and Wen-Je Ko. This leaves Taipei citizens more anxious than ever. Who will win on November 29? No one can be certain. What is certain is that Ko voters will probably feel little peace of mind, and Lien voters are unlikely to feel much confidence in their candidate.
Many people are voting for Lien, not because they like Sean Lien, but because they cannot accept a blustering, pompous, and sexist Wen-Je Ko. They are afraid that someone like him would be a disaster for Taipei. Those who are voting for Wen-Je Ko do not necessarily believe Wen-Je Ko will be a competent mayor of Taipei. They may simply hate Sean Lien because he represents wealth and privilege.
This election should have been about choosing the best mayor for Taipei. Instead it has become about preventing the worst candidate from becoming mayor for Taipei. Ko has unwittingly become the head of Sean Lien's campaign committee. Lien has unwittingly helped Ko gain votes. Voters are shaking their heads and sighing, wondering how the capital city mayoral election ever came to this?
Past Taipei mayoral elections were not like this. Take former Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian, who later became president. Compare him to Ma Ying-jeou, his rival for the mayorship of Taipei. Some voters hated Chen and voted for Ma. Some voters hated Ma and voted for Chen. But most people voted for Chen or Ma because they wanted to, because they believed one or the other would be the best mayor for Taipei. Some were even proud of their vote.
Chen Shui-bian was a star legislator. His interpellations were incisive. He came from a category three impoverished household. Ma Ying-jeou was a Minister of Justice with the courage of his convictions. He never spoke ill of others. His style was more palatable to middle class Taipei voters. These two were political superstars. Even Hau Lung-bin and Frank Hsieh, the loser, or Su Tseng-chang, all held high office. Voters who supported them believed for the most part that they would do a good job if they won. Those perceived as spoilers, Wang Chien-hsuan and James Soong, received few votes. This was not because their ability to govern was in doubt, but because the balance of power among the political parties convinced voters that Ma Ying-jeou was likely to win. Therefore they voted for Ma Ying-jeou.
The election for mayor of the capital has now become an appalling "race to the bottom." What other places are like this? The answer is, give other cities, including New Taipei, Taoyuan, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung, where all the candidates seem to have been "spirited away." All the news about the Taipei mayoral election has been bad news, but at least there is news, The other five cities are not even being covered. Never mind counties and municipalities outside the six major metropolises.
This shows that democratic elections on Taiwan now face a structural crisis that requires soul-searching by both the ruling and opposition parties, as well as the media and the public.
First of all, the guiding principle of every candidate's campaign committee, in every county and municipality across the island, appears to be "avoid all press coverage." This guiding principle has led to a second guiding principle, "make sure your opponent gets plenty of press coverage." The reason is simple. Any media coverage is bad. Good news is bad news, at least for viewer ratings. Bad news is good news, at least for viewer ratings. Good news does not get reported. Only bad news attracts the spotlight. No wonder campaign committees hope that their own candidate remains hidden in the shadows, and their opponent gets caught in the glare of the klieg lights.
Secondly, this sort of "bad news is good news" norm calls for media soul-searching. Even more importantly, people have lost faith in politicians. All they feel for politics is revulsion or indifference. This is something that all politicians and political parties should reflect upon. More than a few political superstars in the past have been lionized by the voters then swept into office. Have their political records affirmed voter faith? Or have they left voters bitterly disillusioned? Voters have repeatedly lionized candidates and held out high hopes for them, only to be repeatedly disappointed in the end. It is not difficult to understand why they would become deeply skeptical. Any good news about the candidates and their first thought is likely to be, "Here it comes again, more lionization. Spare me."
Say an electric fan is broken. You take it to the appliance repair shop a hundred times for repair. But it never gets restored to working order. One day, you take it to a local snack bar for repair. This seems nonsensical in the extreme. But after a hundred disappointments it may seem like a rational choice. Wen-Je Ko and Sean Lien are political novices. They have generated a political wind, one akin to sending one's fan to the snack bar for repair. But if the appliance repair shop cannot fix the fan, one should not expect much from the snack bar.
Third, on top of voter skepticism, the political parties have failed to cultivate new talent. The mayorship of the capital city is an important position. Yet the candidates fielded by the blue and green camps are novices with almost no municipal level political experience. People cannot help wondering what the ruling and opposition parties have been doing for the past few years?
This may be worrisome, but it is what the year end Taipei mayoral election has come to. No matter how disgusted one might feel, one must face the facts. From a pessimistic perspective, one may not be able to vote for the best candidate. One can only refuse to vote for the worst candidate. Consider this election a costly lesson. The price paid must not be in vain. The ruling and opposition parties, as well as people across the country, must engage in soul searching. Political talent must be cultivated. The political culture must be reformed to inspire public confidence. Taiwan's democratic politics must be rehabilitated. We must restore the core value of democratic elections. We must elect the wise and the able.
For Sean Lien and Wen-Je Ko, whoever can look into the voters' hearts, will immediately remove himself from the current "race to the bottom." He should speak plainly about how he intends to govern Taipei. He should lead the public towards a happy and prosperous life. He should win the hearts of the voters.
社論-扣分選戰是台灣民主警訊
2014年10月02日 04:09
本報訊
向來被視為「總統養成所」的台北市長選舉,變成一場比賽失分的「扣分大戰」,電視新聞裡、報紙版面上,幾乎看不到連勝文和柯文哲的正面新聞,台北市民空前焦慮,因為11月29日那天,誰當選也許還沒有人說得準,但可以確定的是,選柯的人恐怕不覺得心安理得,投連的人也不會理直氣壯。
許多人之所以投連,不是因為喜歡連勝文,而是沒有辦法接受一個口出狂言、目中無人、歧視女性的柯文哲,他們擔心,這樣的人當選,是台北市的大災難;投柯文哲的人,也未必相信柯文哲會是稱職的台北市長,可能只是單純討厭連勝文的權貴標籤。
於是,一場本應是選最優的台北市長選舉,變成防最爛當選的爛戲,柯變成了連的頭號助選員;連變成了柯的王牌加分機。選民們看得搖頭嘆氣,首都市長選舉,怎會演變至如此田地?
過去的台北市長選舉,並非如此。以後來分別當上總統的前台北市長陳水扁和馬英九為例。其角逐台北市長寶座時,雖然也有一些因討厭扁而投馬,或因為討厭馬而投扁的人在,但大多數的人在投扁或投馬時,是打從心底認為,他們會是稱職的台北市長,甚至為自己投下的一票感到驕傲。
陳水扁是明星立委,問政犀利、三級貧戶苦讀出身;馬英九是堅持理念的法務部長,口不出惡言的風格更符合台北市中產階級的胃口。不說這兩位超級政治明星,即便是郝龍斌,乃至於落選者謝長廷、蘇貞昌,也都歷任政治上要職,投他們的選民,多半也都相信他們當選台北市長後會有好的表現。就算是被視為陪榜或攪局的王建煊與宋楚瑜,得票不高,並不是因為治理能力被否定,而是政黨政治的結構以及選民認為比較起來還是喜歡馬英九多一些,所以票投馬英九。
首都市長進入了慘不忍睹的「比爛模式」,其他的地方又如何呢?包括新北、桃園、台中、台南、高雄的其他五都,似乎都進入了「神隱模式」,台北市長選舉雖然都是爛新聞,但至少還有新聞,其他五都則幾乎連版面都沒有,更不要說六都以外的其他縣市了。
這透露了台灣的民主選舉,出現了結構性的警訊,需要朝野政黨、媒體與民眾一起省思。
首先,這場選戰,全國各縣市各陣營候選人的最高指導原則似乎都變成了「努力不讓自己上新聞」,而這個最高指導原則,則演化出第二原則,就是「努力讓對手上新聞」。道理很簡單,現在的媒體氛圍傾向負面,好新聞是爛(收視率)新聞,爛新聞是好(收視率)新聞。正面新聞上不了版面,只有負面新聞才能吸引鎂光燈,無怪乎各陣營的選戰主軸就愈來愈清楚:我神隱、你上報。
其次,這種負面新聞當道的文化,除了媒體要自我檢討外,更重要的原因是民眾對政治人物失去了信心,對政治只剩下惡感或冷感,這一點是所有參與政治的政治人物及其所屬的政黨都要共同反省的。過去多少明星級的政治人物,在受到選民英雄式的擁戴當選後,其治理表現是讓選民認為深慶得人還是所託非人呢?如果一次又一次對英雄的翹首企盼,換來的是一次又一次的無奈失望,就不難理解會出現一種心情制約:只要看到對候選人的正面新聞,就會想:「又在造神,少來!」
就像家裡的電風扇壞了,你送到電器行修了一百次都修不好,有一天,你改送到小吃店修電扇,這看起來無厘頭至極的行為,卻是經歷一百次失望後,再理性不過的選擇,柯文哲與連勝文颳起的素人政治風,就是另一種把電風扇送小吃店修理的無奈反應。只是電器行修不好的電扇,送小吃店也不必有太多的期待。
第三,除了不被選民信任,這也反映了各政黨人才培養的嚴重斷層,首都市長是何其重要的職務,到最後,藍綠推出的代表,卻都是幾無政治歷練的市政小白兔。讓人不禁要問,過去幾年朝野政黨在幹什麼?
不管再憂心,年底的選舉尤其是台北市長選舉,已經是長成現在這個樣子了,再無奈也得面對,從消極的角度來說,投不出最好的,也只能退一萬步不要選出最爛的,就當這次選舉我們得繳一筆昂貴的學費。但學費不能白繳,朝野政黨、全國民眾,都得好好深思,從政治人才養成、政治文化重塑到人民信心重建,要如何進行台灣民主政治的復建工作,找回民主選舉「選賢與能」的核心價值。
對連勝文與柯文哲兩位候選人而言,誰能看清楚選民的心,立刻擺脫「扣分賽」的迷思,說清楚要如何治理台北市、帶領市民邁向更幸福繁榮的生活,一定會贏得選民的心。
Tuesday, September 30, 2014
How Can the DPP Change Its Anti-Business Image
How Can the DPP Change Its Anti-Business Image
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 1, 2014
Executive Summary: Given the political reality, the KMT should announce that the STA has been temporarily shelved. It can be left until negotiations over the MTA have been concluded. The ruling and opposition parties can then conduct negotiations. The DPP totally repudiated the KMT's Fiscal Policy Act. It must change its attitude. The DPP must take concrete actions to change its anti-business public image.
Full Text Below:
The pressure on President Ma must be enormous. A student hurled a book at him, hitting him. The Beijing authorities are again pressuring him to endorse one country, two systems. Former Minister of Economic Affairs Yin Chi-min recently published an article in the China Times, asking "Is anyone still willing to step forward and defend the Ma government?" In the dead of night, President Ma has to be feeling the pain.
Tsai Ing-wen is also having a hard time. She is clearly concerned about the DPP's public image. She wants to the DPP legislative caucus to establish an ad hoc group for fiscal affairs. She has proposed a fiscal bill to "enrich the nation and benefit the people." She hopes to reverse the party's anti-business image, as groundwork for a return to power in 2016.
Tsai Ing-wen has established short, medium, and long-term development strategies. In the short term the DPP will wrangle over fiscal policy matters in the Legislative Yuan. In the medium term the DPP will propose a Financial Industry Act and related policy proposals. In the long term, she will use the "Citizens Economic Conference" to propose a new model for economic development. She hopes this will enable the DPP to become a quasi-ruling party.
Tsai Ing-wen's declaration shines a spotlight on the DPP's Achilles Heel. The party is deeply distrusted by the business sector. Tsai Ing-wen is hoping to remedy this. The KMT has long enjoyed good relations with the business community. But during President Ma's second term, the government's direction on the petrochemical industry development, policy on energy , and particularly policy on nuclear power, as well as the minimum wage, have deeply alienated the business community.
Faced with current economic difficulties, both parties must offer something in the way of fiscal policy and legislation.
The DPP has long trumpeted its concern for the interests of labor, farmers, SMEs, and other disadvantaged segments of society. It has long evinced a socialistic flavor. During the 2012 presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen raised the banner of "fairness and justice." This underscored the DPP's solidarity with disadvantaged segments of society. But in a pluralistic society, championing fairness and justice, and attending to the interests of disadvantaged segments of society, are not necessarily the same as being "anti-business." The DPP is widely regarded as anti-business for two reasons. One. It lacks any robust arguments or proposals on fiscal policy. Two. It maintains to an "oppose anything having to do with [Mainland] China" closed door stance on cross-Strait economic and trade policy. During the Chen era it cavalierly halted construction on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. It flip-flopped repeatedly on construction of the Number Eight Naphtha Cracking Plant. It stubbornly blocked passage of ECFA (cross-Strait economic cooperation framework agreement). It even obstructed review of the recent STA (cross-Strait trade in services agreement) and FEPZ (special regulations for the free economic pilot zones). These reveal the degree to which the DPP ignores the voice of the business community. It was inevitable that it would be seen as anti-business.
By contrast, during the KMT's long rule on Taiwan, it has enjoyed close relations with the industrial and business sector, relations that the DPP cannot hope to match. Couple this with farsighted fiscal policy during its rule, including Yin Chung-jung, Li Kuo-ting, Chao Yao-tung in the early years, to Vincent Siew, Chiang Pin-kung and other fiscal experts during later years. All in an unbroken succession. It earned the business community's trust and affirmation. As a result the general public has the impression that the KMT is more adept than the DPP at promoting economic prosperity. But once President Ma was re-elected, he attempted to practice his own brand of "fairness and justice." With the worst possible timing, he introduced in rapid succession, the capital gains tax, gasoline price and electricity rate hikes, and other unpopular policies. This undermined trust between the government and the business sector. Add to this the impact of the Ma Wang rivalry and the Sunflower Student Movement. The Ma government's cross-Strait policy has been staunchly affirmed by the business community. But its inability to implement its policies due to Legislative Yuan obstruction has saddled it with an image of incompetence. This too, has deepened the alienation between the Ma government and the business community. The KMT's long-term advantages in fiscal policy have also been rapidly eroded.
Tsai Ing-wen is eager to reverse the DPP's anti-business image. She has proposed a "new model of economic development for Taiwan." She is attempting to change the DPP's image as a party inept at fiscal policy. Her "new model" includes three points. One. Economic growth is not limited to GDP. It must also factor in employment, wages, income distribution, regional balance, generational justice, quality of life, and environmental protection. Two. She hopes to change the "Taiwan takes the orders, then manufactures the product overseas" growth model. She hopes to transform the industrial structure. Three. The economic decision-making model should be "bottom-up" and require a social consensus.
The above rhetoric sounds oh so pretty. The direction is admittedly correct. But where are the specifics? Where is the road map? A policy without beef is no policy, merely a slogan. Her rhetoric provoked renewed criticism that Tsai was "water spinach" (a vegetable with hollow stems, hence one lacking substance). To escape criticism, she must present a clear and workable policy, along with a specific blueprint for public scrutiny.
The DPP may be able to change public perception. It must accelerate deliberation and offer a "new model of economic development for Taiwan" in the Legislative Yuan. This would definitely help the DPP change is anti-business image. Important fiscal policy bills have been stalled in the Legislative Yuan, unable to pass. Policy cannot be implemented. The KMT's image has been seriously undermined. The KMT must make compromises to breakthrough the legislative deadlock.
The "special regulations for the free economic pilot zones" are actually aimed at promoting industrial restructuring. It is consistent with the DPP's "new model" concept. The DPP should accelerate its proposed amendments to the law, and participate in advance consultations. The two major parties' legislative caucuses have undergone personnel changes. The "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" bill should be reviewed as soon as possible. As long as the ruling and opposition parties do not dig in their heels, a compromise should be possible. As for the controversies over STA (cross-Strait agreement on trade in services) and MTA (cross-Strait agreemento on trade in merchandise), the Mainland has explicitly rejected restarting negotiations. For the moment, all we can do is put the matter on hold. We can proceed later at the current pace. But the consultation process must be totally transparent. We must be in continuous communication with the relevant industries.
Given the political reality, the KMT should announce that the STA has been temporarily shelved. It can be left until negotiations over the MTA have been concluded. The ruling and opposition parties can then conduct negotiations. The DPP totally repudiated the KMT's Fiscal Policy Act. It must change its attitude. The DPP must take concrete actions to change its anti-business public image.
社論-民進黨如何改變反商形象
2014年10月01日 04:09
本報訊
馬總統內心的壓力一定非常沉重,學生丟他書,大陸重提一國兩制讓他腹背受敵,前經濟部長尹啟銘日前在《中時》發表文章,詢問「還有誰願意出來捍衛馬政府?」馬總統夜深人靜,想必情傷。
蔡英文的日子也不好過,顯然她對民進黨形象不振深感焦慮,要求立法院黨團成立財經專案小組,提出「福國利民」的財經法案,以扭轉外界對民進黨反商的認知,做好2016年重返執政的準備。
蔡英文訂出短、中、長期發展策略:短期在立院鎖定財經議題攻防;中期推出財經產業法案議題及政策主張;長期則透過「公民經濟會議」提出經濟發展新模式,讓民進黨成為準執政黨。
蔡英文的表態,凸顯出長期以來民進黨不受工商界信任的罩門,蔡英文希望能有所挽回。至於國民黨方面,雖然長期以來與工商界關係良好,但馬總統第二任後,在石化業發展方向、能源政策,尤其核電政策、基本工資等問題上,和工商界間疏離感也愈來愈深。
面對當前台灣經濟困境,兩黨都有必要在財經政策及立法上有所作為。
民進黨一貫標榜照顧勞工、農民、中小企業等弱勢利益,具有某種程度社會主義色彩;2012年總統大選,蔡英文高舉「公平正義」旗幟,凸顯民進黨和弱勢者同站一邊。惟在多元化社會裡,主張公平正義及照顧弱勢利益,不必然和「反商」畫上等號,而民進黨之所以被外界視為反商,癥結原因有二:一是在財經政策上缺乏強有力的論述及主張;二是在兩岸經貿政策上故步自封,甚至「逢中必反」。從扁政府時期率爾停建核四,對「八輕」設廠政策反覆,到強力反對ECFA《兩岸經濟合作架構協議》,乃至近來杯葛《兩岸服貿協議》、《自由經濟示範區特別條例》等法案審查,在在顯示民進黨漠視企業界的聲音,自難免被認為有反商情結。
相較之下,國民黨在台灣長期執政,和財團及工商界的深厚關係自非民進黨可比,再加上執政時期以財經政策見長,從早年尹仲容、李國鼎、趙耀東到蕭萬長、江丙坤等財經首長,一脈相傳,備受企業界信任和肯定,因而在一般民眾印象中,國民黨比民進黨會拚經濟。然而,在馬總統當選連任後,以實踐「公平正義」自居,在不適當的時機,接連推出課徵證所稅、油電雙漲等不得人心的政策,重創政府與工商界的信賴關係。再加上受到馬王政爭及太陽花學運等影響,馬政府最受企業界肯定的兩岸政策因立法院阻力致難以落實,從而更被冠以「無能」形象,也更為加深馬政府和企業界的疏離感;國民黨在財經施政上的長期優勢亦迅速流失。
蔡英文亟欲扭轉民進黨反商形象,提出「台灣經濟發展新模式」政策論述,試圖改變民進黨不擅長財經政策的刻板印象。「新模式」涵蓋三內涵:一是經濟成長不只重GDP,也要兼顧就業、薪資、所得分配、區域平衡、世代正義、生活品質及生態環境保護等;二是改變「台灣接單、海外生產」成長模式,改造產業結構;三是經濟決策模式應「由下而上」,先期凝聚社會共識。
上述方向與論述看起來都很漂亮,方向也很正確,但看不出執行的具體方案與路線圖,沒有「牛肉」的政策不是政策,只是口號,因而再度引起「空心菜」的批評,要擺脫批評,就必須提出明確可行的具體政策主張及推動藍圖,供社會各界檢驗。
不過,民進黨可以翻轉社會認知,若能在現階段就加速研議可實現「台灣經濟發展新模式」理念的具體法案,在立法院推動實現,絕對有助民進黨澄清反商形象。而重大財經法案在立法院遲遲無法通過,施政停滯不前,對國民黨形象已造成極大傷害,國民黨亦應作出妥協,突破立法僵局。
《自由經濟示範區特別條例》其實目的在推動產業轉型,與民進黨「新模式」理念相符,民進黨宜速提出修法版本,及早進行協商;《兩岸協議監督條例》在兩黨立院召委換人後應及早付委審查,只要朝野不堅持己見,達成妥協版本並非困難。至於《兩岸服貿協議》及《兩岸貨貿協議》的爭議,前者大陸已明確拒絕重啟協商,目前似乎只有暫時擱置一途,後者則可依目前節奏進行,但協商過程需維持最大透明度,與相關業者持續溝通。
衡諸政治現實,國民黨實可宣布暫時擱置服貿審議,留待貨貿完成談判後,再一併進行朝野協商,民進黨亦須改變全盤否定國民黨財經法案的態度。民進黨須作出具體行動,才能改變社會反商形象。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 1, 2014
Executive Summary: Given the political reality, the KMT should announce that the STA has been temporarily shelved. It can be left until negotiations over the MTA have been concluded. The ruling and opposition parties can then conduct negotiations. The DPP totally repudiated the KMT's Fiscal Policy Act. It must change its attitude. The DPP must take concrete actions to change its anti-business public image.
Full Text Below:
The pressure on President Ma must be enormous. A student hurled a book at him, hitting him. The Beijing authorities are again pressuring him to endorse one country, two systems. Former Minister of Economic Affairs Yin Chi-min recently published an article in the China Times, asking "Is anyone still willing to step forward and defend the Ma government?" In the dead of night, President Ma has to be feeling the pain.
Tsai Ing-wen is also having a hard time. She is clearly concerned about the DPP's public image. She wants to the DPP legislative caucus to establish an ad hoc group for fiscal affairs. She has proposed a fiscal bill to "enrich the nation and benefit the people." She hopes to reverse the party's anti-business image, as groundwork for a return to power in 2016.
Tsai Ing-wen has established short, medium, and long-term development strategies. In the short term the DPP will wrangle over fiscal policy matters in the Legislative Yuan. In the medium term the DPP will propose a Financial Industry Act and related policy proposals. In the long term, she will use the "Citizens Economic Conference" to propose a new model for economic development. She hopes this will enable the DPP to become a quasi-ruling party.
Tsai Ing-wen's declaration shines a spotlight on the DPP's Achilles Heel. The party is deeply distrusted by the business sector. Tsai Ing-wen is hoping to remedy this. The KMT has long enjoyed good relations with the business community. But during President Ma's second term, the government's direction on the petrochemical industry development, policy on energy , and particularly policy on nuclear power, as well as the minimum wage, have deeply alienated the business community.
Faced with current economic difficulties, both parties must offer something in the way of fiscal policy and legislation.
The DPP has long trumpeted its concern for the interests of labor, farmers, SMEs, and other disadvantaged segments of society. It has long evinced a socialistic flavor. During the 2012 presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen raised the banner of "fairness and justice." This underscored the DPP's solidarity with disadvantaged segments of society. But in a pluralistic society, championing fairness and justice, and attending to the interests of disadvantaged segments of society, are not necessarily the same as being "anti-business." The DPP is widely regarded as anti-business for two reasons. One. It lacks any robust arguments or proposals on fiscal policy. Two. It maintains to an "oppose anything having to do with [Mainland] China" closed door stance on cross-Strait economic and trade policy. During the Chen era it cavalierly halted construction on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. It flip-flopped repeatedly on construction of the Number Eight Naphtha Cracking Plant. It stubbornly blocked passage of ECFA (cross-Strait economic cooperation framework agreement). It even obstructed review of the recent STA (cross-Strait trade in services agreement) and FEPZ (special regulations for the free economic pilot zones). These reveal the degree to which the DPP ignores the voice of the business community. It was inevitable that it would be seen as anti-business.
By contrast, during the KMT's long rule on Taiwan, it has enjoyed close relations with the industrial and business sector, relations that the DPP cannot hope to match. Couple this with farsighted fiscal policy during its rule, including Yin Chung-jung, Li Kuo-ting, Chao Yao-tung in the early years, to Vincent Siew, Chiang Pin-kung and other fiscal experts during later years. All in an unbroken succession. It earned the business community's trust and affirmation. As a result the general public has the impression that the KMT is more adept than the DPP at promoting economic prosperity. But once President Ma was re-elected, he attempted to practice his own brand of "fairness and justice." With the worst possible timing, he introduced in rapid succession, the capital gains tax, gasoline price and electricity rate hikes, and other unpopular policies. This undermined trust between the government and the business sector. Add to this the impact of the Ma Wang rivalry and the Sunflower Student Movement. The Ma government's cross-Strait policy has been staunchly affirmed by the business community. But its inability to implement its policies due to Legislative Yuan obstruction has saddled it with an image of incompetence. This too, has deepened the alienation between the Ma government and the business community. The KMT's long-term advantages in fiscal policy have also been rapidly eroded.
Tsai Ing-wen is eager to reverse the DPP's anti-business image. She has proposed a "new model of economic development for Taiwan." She is attempting to change the DPP's image as a party inept at fiscal policy. Her "new model" includes three points. One. Economic growth is not limited to GDP. It must also factor in employment, wages, income distribution, regional balance, generational justice, quality of life, and environmental protection. Two. She hopes to change the "Taiwan takes the orders, then manufactures the product overseas" growth model. She hopes to transform the industrial structure. Three. The economic decision-making model should be "bottom-up" and require a social consensus.
The above rhetoric sounds oh so pretty. The direction is admittedly correct. But where are the specifics? Where is the road map? A policy without beef is no policy, merely a slogan. Her rhetoric provoked renewed criticism that Tsai was "water spinach" (a vegetable with hollow stems, hence one lacking substance). To escape criticism, she must present a clear and workable policy, along with a specific blueprint for public scrutiny.
The DPP may be able to change public perception. It must accelerate deliberation and offer a "new model of economic development for Taiwan" in the Legislative Yuan. This would definitely help the DPP change is anti-business image. Important fiscal policy bills have been stalled in the Legislative Yuan, unable to pass. Policy cannot be implemented. The KMT's image has been seriously undermined. The KMT must make compromises to breakthrough the legislative deadlock.
The "special regulations for the free economic pilot zones" are actually aimed at promoting industrial restructuring. It is consistent with the DPP's "new model" concept. The DPP should accelerate its proposed amendments to the law, and participate in advance consultations. The two major parties' legislative caucuses have undergone personnel changes. The "Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations" bill should be reviewed as soon as possible. As long as the ruling and opposition parties do not dig in their heels, a compromise should be possible. As for the controversies over STA (cross-Strait agreement on trade in services) and MTA (cross-Strait agreemento on trade in merchandise), the Mainland has explicitly rejected restarting negotiations. For the moment, all we can do is put the matter on hold. We can proceed later at the current pace. But the consultation process must be totally transparent. We must be in continuous communication with the relevant industries.
Given the political reality, the KMT should announce that the STA has been temporarily shelved. It can be left until negotiations over the MTA have been concluded. The ruling and opposition parties can then conduct negotiations. The DPP totally repudiated the KMT's Fiscal Policy Act. It must change its attitude. The DPP must take concrete actions to change its anti-business public image.
社論-民進黨如何改變反商形象
2014年10月01日 04:09
本報訊
馬總統內心的壓力一定非常沉重,學生丟他書,大陸重提一國兩制讓他腹背受敵,前經濟部長尹啟銘日前在《中時》發表文章,詢問「還有誰願意出來捍衛馬政府?」馬總統夜深人靜,想必情傷。
蔡英文的日子也不好過,顯然她對民進黨形象不振深感焦慮,要求立法院黨團成立財經專案小組,提出「福國利民」的財經法案,以扭轉外界對民進黨反商的認知,做好2016年重返執政的準備。
蔡英文訂出短、中、長期發展策略:短期在立院鎖定財經議題攻防;中期推出財經產業法案議題及政策主張;長期則透過「公民經濟會議」提出經濟發展新模式,讓民進黨成為準執政黨。
蔡英文的表態,凸顯出長期以來民進黨不受工商界信任的罩門,蔡英文希望能有所挽回。至於國民黨方面,雖然長期以來與工商界關係良好,但馬總統第二任後,在石化業發展方向、能源政策,尤其核電政策、基本工資等問題上,和工商界間疏離感也愈來愈深。
面對當前台灣經濟困境,兩黨都有必要在財經政策及立法上有所作為。
民進黨一貫標榜照顧勞工、農民、中小企業等弱勢利益,具有某種程度社會主義色彩;2012年總統大選,蔡英文高舉「公平正義」旗幟,凸顯民進黨和弱勢者同站一邊。惟在多元化社會裡,主張公平正義及照顧弱勢利益,不必然和「反商」畫上等號,而民進黨之所以被外界視為反商,癥結原因有二:一是在財經政策上缺乏強有力的論述及主張;二是在兩岸經貿政策上故步自封,甚至「逢中必反」。從扁政府時期率爾停建核四,對「八輕」設廠政策反覆,到強力反對ECFA《兩岸經濟合作架構協議》,乃至近來杯葛《兩岸服貿協議》、《自由經濟示範區特別條例》等法案審查,在在顯示民進黨漠視企業界的聲音,自難免被認為有反商情結。
相較之下,國民黨在台灣長期執政,和財團及工商界的深厚關係自非民進黨可比,再加上執政時期以財經政策見長,從早年尹仲容、李國鼎、趙耀東到蕭萬長、江丙坤等財經首長,一脈相傳,備受企業界信任和肯定,因而在一般民眾印象中,國民黨比民進黨會拚經濟。然而,在馬總統當選連任後,以實踐「公平正義」自居,在不適當的時機,接連推出課徵證所稅、油電雙漲等不得人心的政策,重創政府與工商界的信賴關係。再加上受到馬王政爭及太陽花學運等影響,馬政府最受企業界肯定的兩岸政策因立法院阻力致難以落實,從而更被冠以「無能」形象,也更為加深馬政府和企業界的疏離感;國民黨在財經施政上的長期優勢亦迅速流失。
蔡英文亟欲扭轉民進黨反商形象,提出「台灣經濟發展新模式」政策論述,試圖改變民進黨不擅長財經政策的刻板印象。「新模式」涵蓋三內涵:一是經濟成長不只重GDP,也要兼顧就業、薪資、所得分配、區域平衡、世代正義、生活品質及生態環境保護等;二是改變「台灣接單、海外生產」成長模式,改造產業結構;三是經濟決策模式應「由下而上」,先期凝聚社會共識。
上述方向與論述看起來都很漂亮,方向也很正確,但看不出執行的具體方案與路線圖,沒有「牛肉」的政策不是政策,只是口號,因而再度引起「空心菜」的批評,要擺脫批評,就必須提出明確可行的具體政策主張及推動藍圖,供社會各界檢驗。
不過,民進黨可以翻轉社會認知,若能在現階段就加速研議可實現「台灣經濟發展新模式」理念的具體法案,在立法院推動實現,絕對有助民進黨澄清反商形象。而重大財經法案在立法院遲遲無法通過,施政停滯不前,對國民黨形象已造成極大傷害,國民黨亦應作出妥協,突破立法僵局。
《自由經濟示範區特別條例》其實目的在推動產業轉型,與民進黨「新模式」理念相符,民進黨宜速提出修法版本,及早進行協商;《兩岸協議監督條例》在兩黨立院召委換人後應及早付委審查,只要朝野不堅持己見,達成妥協版本並非困難。至於《兩岸服貿協議》及《兩岸貨貿協議》的爭議,前者大陸已明確拒絕重啟協商,目前似乎只有暫時擱置一途,後者則可依目前節奏進行,但協商過程需維持最大透明度,與相關業者持續溝通。
衡諸政治現實,國民黨實可宣布暫時擱置服貿審議,留待貨貿完成談判後,再一併進行朝野協商,民進黨亦須改變全盤否定國民黨財經法案的態度。民進黨須作出具體行動,才能改變社會反商形象。
Monday, September 29, 2014
Xi Jinping's Remarks: A Level-Headed Reading
Xi Jinping's Remarks: A Level-Headed Reading
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 30, 2014
Summary: One can advocate national reunification. One can advocate Taiwan independence. But everyone must understand that Taiwan is not Hong Kong. Hong Kong's sovereignty was transferred by the British to the People's Republic of China. Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to the Republic of China. As such, the ROC's existence and development is a given. Taiwan must respect itself. Only then can it win the respect of the other side. Putting one's future in the hands of others is not the way. What Taiwan needs is not independence, but self-reliance. It needs strength, not arrogance. It needs to cooperate with the Mainland, on behalf of national reunification, national rejuvenation, and the early realization of the Chinese Dream. That is the correct option.
Full Text Below:
On the 26th of this month, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping addressed a delegation of nearly 60 individuals from 24 Taiwan-based groups that support peaceful reunification. His mention of the term "one country, two systems" attracted considerable attention and a range of interpretations. In fact, his remarks were the result of long planning. Beijing had a definite agenda. According to media reports and on scene participants, Xi's remarks can be interpreted several ways. Some say that peaceful development is the process, peaceful reunification is the goal, and one country will be the final result. Xi's remarks had a deeper meaning. Some think Xi merely reiterated past policy. Perhaps this means that Beijing's position on certain matters will change. Some feel his remarks revealed weakness, and were disappointed.
Other governments and Taipei are concerned about the term "one country, two systems." In recent years, Beijing has come to realize that there is no market for one country, two systems on Taiwan. The term has been stigmatized. As a result, when referring to the one China framework, Beijng does not use the term one country, two systems as often as it did before. During the current legislative session, the DPP demanded that the Ma Ying-jeou government take a stand on the matter. Foreign reporters also probled for Xi's meaning. Some on Taiwan think Beijing is saber-rattling, as a warning to the DPP. Some say Beijing is tightening up its policy towards Taiwan. They say Xi's remarks are closely related to the current situation in Hong Kong. Some think the situation is serious, and that Beijing intends to propose a timetable for reunification. People hold a wide range of views. One meeting, different interpretations.
General Secretary Xi's remarks to visitors had both symbolic and substantive meanings.
First consider the symbolic meaning. The CCP probably knows that given the current political and social clmate on Taiwan, advocating reunification, national prosperity, and national strength, is out of favor, and even actively suppressed. Beijing has deliberately greeted these guests in a high profile manner. It is offering them encouragement and support. It is hoping that they will continue to be a mainstay. It hopes the public on Taiwan will cherish the spirit of patriotism, which currently hangs by a thread. It hopes to strengthen those advocating reunification on Taiwan, and change the way people think, contributing to early reunification. The CCP naturally supports groups that advocate reunification. But care must be taken in future implementation. Excessive intervention in Taiwan's internal affairs will probably not be required, and could be adverse and counterproductive.
Now consider the substantive meaning. Beijing expressed its position full with Xi's remarks. In the past it has referred to the two sides being one family, to peaceful development, and to peaceful reunification as its basic policy. Beijing is not about to give up on national reunification. It is convinced that national reunification is the final destination for Chinese people on both sides of the Strait, and is in the best interests of the public on Taiwan. The two sides can cooperate, and achieve the Chinese Dream sooner, rather than later. General Secretary Xi used the term one country, two systems. But he also said Beijing would consider political realities on Taiwan. It would consider views and suggestions from all sectors. As long as it can achieve national reunification, everything can be discussed. He even reaffirmed Beijing's position regarding the DPP. Past conduct does not matter. As long as the DPP comes to its senses, bygones will be bygones. These were all reiterations of past policies. Overall, Xi Jinping's remarks expressed goodwill, patience, and tolerance. The Mainland faces a multitude of domestic and international challenges. Beijing has no intention of making significant adjustments to cross-Strait policy in the short term.
Everyone on Taiwan, from top to bottom, considers one country, two systems unacceptable. Everyone knows why. In recent years, Beijing has made fewer references to one country, two systems. That does not mean that its basic position has changed. Xi's use of the term may have given people a start. But the Mainland's Taiwan policy remains within bounds. We have no cause to overreact. As far as the Republic of China is concerned, the pursuit of national reunification should not be a problem. The focus should be on the two sides' timing, manner, and preconditions for reunification. One country, two systems is far more relaxed than federalism. But in the face of the CCP's one country, two systems offensive, Taipei has three options. The best option for Taiwan and the rest of China, is to seek a more reasonable model for reunification. The next best option is to clarify the meaning of the term one country. It must be interpreted in a way more favorable to Taiwan. The worst option is to accept one country, two systems in part. This has not happened. If Taipei is eventually forced to accept one country, two systems as currently defined, that would not be reunification. That would be annihilation. Everyone in the ROC, from top to bottom, considers that totally unacceptable.
One can advocate national reunification. One can advocate Taiwan independence. But everyone must understand that Taiwan is not Hong Kong. Hong Kong's sovereignty was transferred by the British to the People's Republic of China. Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to the Republic of China. As such, the ROC's existence and development is a given. Taiwan must respect itself. Only then can it win the respect of the other side. Putting one's future in the hands of others is not the way. What Taiwan needs is not independence, but self-reliance. It needs strength, not arrogance. It needs to cooperate with the Mainland, on behalf of national reunification, national rejuvenation, and the early realization of the Chinese Dream. That is the correct option.
社論-平心靜氣 解讀習近平談話
2014年09月30日 04:09
本報訊
中共總書記習近平26日在接待台灣24個支持和平統一團體近60人的參訪團時,發表有關一國兩制的講話,引起各界廣泛重視與各種解讀。其實,這是一個經過長時間規畫的活動,北京自有其目的。由媒體的報導看來,即或是當時在場的參與者,對習的談話內容,也有不同的看法和觀察,有的同意,和平發展是進程,和平統一是目標,一國兩制則是最後結果,習的談話饒有深意。也有人認為,習仍是重申過去的政策基調,或許只是表明北京今後在某些具體事務上會有不同的作法,也有些人認為仍然軟弱,因此感到失落。
國際及台灣關切的重點都集中在「一國兩制」4個字上,因為近年以來,北京或知一國兩制在台並無市場,且已遭汙名化,所以多用一中框架而少用一國兩制,民進黨為此在國會提出質詢,要求馬英九政府表達立場,國際媒體也分別探詢其中意涵,國內有人認為北京是敲山震虎,意在警告民進黨,有人說是緊縮對台政策,而且顯與當前香港局勢有關,有人更認為事態嚴重非同小可,北京意在提出統一時間表,各式各樣的觀點不一而足,一次會面,各自解讀。
其實,習總書記接見訪賓,發表談話應該兼具形式意義與實質意義。
先就形式意義言,中共應該深知在當前台灣的政治,社會氛圍裡,主張國家統一,贊成民族富強的聲音與力量已經處於弱勢,甚至是是被打壓的,北京刻意以高規格,高調地加以接待,不無給予鼓勵及支持之意,希望他們持續扮演中流砥柱的角色,把台灣民眾愛國主義的傳統及精神不絕如縷的傳承下去,並能夠強化壯大台灣主張統一的聲音與力量,產生移風易俗的教化作用,促成國家統一的早日實現。中共表達支持統派團體的態度與立場自是理所當然,但未來在執行上必須謹慎拿捏分寸,應在不過度介入台灣內政前提下,把這種想法化為具體的行動,避免造成愛之適足以害之的反效果。
再說實質意義,透過這次談話,北京充分表達了立場,除了過去所說的兩岸一家親之外﹐和平發展、和平統一仍是大陸不變的基本國策,北京當然不會放棄追求國家統一的立場,堅信國家統一將是兩岸中國人最後歸宿,最符合台灣利益,兩岸可以合作,共同努力促成中國夢的早日實現。雖然習總書記使用了一國兩制的用語,但他也提到,會充分考慮台灣的現實情況,吸收各界的意見和建議,顯然只要能夠實現國家統一,一切都可商量,即使對民進黨也還重申,不管過去如何如何,只要幡然悔悟都能既往不咎,這一切都是過去政策的延續。整體來說,習近平的談話是善意、耐心與包容的,如果我們再把大陸當前面臨的國內外挑戰考慮進去,若說北京無意在短期內做出兩岸政策的重大調整應不為過。
台灣上下拒絕接受一國兩制的原由,大家知之甚詳。北京近年雖然少提,但並不表示此一基本立場有所改變。換句話說,即使習的談話讓人感到突兀,但仍在大陸對台政策的合理範圍之內,大家委實不必反應過度。就中華民國而言,追求國家統一其實不應該是個問題,兩岸系爭的重點應是統一的時機、方式與條件,雖說一國兩制的部分內容遠較聯邦制更為寬鬆,但在面對中共一國兩制的攻勢時,台灣應有上中下三策,上策是為了台灣與中國的未來,找到一個更合理的統一模式,中策是不斷充實一國兩制的內容,將其作出對台灣最為有利的解釋與發展,下策則是接受有一國兩制的部分實質內容,但沒有此一名詞的出現。如果台灣最後被時勢所迫接受現行的一國兩制,那就不是統一而是滅亡,中華民國上上下下是萬萬不能接受的。
無論主張國家統一或支持台灣獨立,都必須理解,台灣不是香港,香港主權是由英國轉交中華人民共和國,台灣主權屬於中華民國。因此,中華民國的存在與發展才是根本。台灣唯有自尊而後才能贏得對岸的尊重,把自己的前途寄託在別人不確定的善意上絕非正辦。台灣要在自立但不獨立、自強但不自大的基礎上與中國大陸合作,共同為國家的統一、民族的復興及中國夢的早日實現而共同努力,這才是正確的選擇。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 30, 2014
Summary: One can advocate national reunification. One can advocate Taiwan independence. But everyone must understand that Taiwan is not Hong Kong. Hong Kong's sovereignty was transferred by the British to the People's Republic of China. Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to the Republic of China. As such, the ROC's existence and development is a given. Taiwan must respect itself. Only then can it win the respect of the other side. Putting one's future in the hands of others is not the way. What Taiwan needs is not independence, but self-reliance. It needs strength, not arrogance. It needs to cooperate with the Mainland, on behalf of national reunification, national rejuvenation, and the early realization of the Chinese Dream. That is the correct option.
Full Text Below:
On the 26th of this month, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping addressed a delegation of nearly 60 individuals from 24 Taiwan-based groups that support peaceful reunification. His mention of the term "one country, two systems" attracted considerable attention and a range of interpretations. In fact, his remarks were the result of long planning. Beijing had a definite agenda. According to media reports and on scene participants, Xi's remarks can be interpreted several ways. Some say that peaceful development is the process, peaceful reunification is the goal, and one country will be the final result. Xi's remarks had a deeper meaning. Some think Xi merely reiterated past policy. Perhaps this means that Beijing's position on certain matters will change. Some feel his remarks revealed weakness, and were disappointed.
Other governments and Taipei are concerned about the term "one country, two systems." In recent years, Beijing has come to realize that there is no market for one country, two systems on Taiwan. The term has been stigmatized. As a result, when referring to the one China framework, Beijng does not use the term one country, two systems as often as it did before. During the current legislative session, the DPP demanded that the Ma Ying-jeou government take a stand on the matter. Foreign reporters also probled for Xi's meaning. Some on Taiwan think Beijing is saber-rattling, as a warning to the DPP. Some say Beijing is tightening up its policy towards Taiwan. They say Xi's remarks are closely related to the current situation in Hong Kong. Some think the situation is serious, and that Beijing intends to propose a timetable for reunification. People hold a wide range of views. One meeting, different interpretations.
General Secretary Xi's remarks to visitors had both symbolic and substantive meanings.
First consider the symbolic meaning. The CCP probably knows that given the current political and social clmate on Taiwan, advocating reunification, national prosperity, and national strength, is out of favor, and even actively suppressed. Beijing has deliberately greeted these guests in a high profile manner. It is offering them encouragement and support. It is hoping that they will continue to be a mainstay. It hopes the public on Taiwan will cherish the spirit of patriotism, which currently hangs by a thread. It hopes to strengthen those advocating reunification on Taiwan, and change the way people think, contributing to early reunification. The CCP naturally supports groups that advocate reunification. But care must be taken in future implementation. Excessive intervention in Taiwan's internal affairs will probably not be required, and could be adverse and counterproductive.
Now consider the substantive meaning. Beijing expressed its position full with Xi's remarks. In the past it has referred to the two sides being one family, to peaceful development, and to peaceful reunification as its basic policy. Beijing is not about to give up on national reunification. It is convinced that national reunification is the final destination for Chinese people on both sides of the Strait, and is in the best interests of the public on Taiwan. The two sides can cooperate, and achieve the Chinese Dream sooner, rather than later. General Secretary Xi used the term one country, two systems. But he also said Beijing would consider political realities on Taiwan. It would consider views and suggestions from all sectors. As long as it can achieve national reunification, everything can be discussed. He even reaffirmed Beijing's position regarding the DPP. Past conduct does not matter. As long as the DPP comes to its senses, bygones will be bygones. These were all reiterations of past policies. Overall, Xi Jinping's remarks expressed goodwill, patience, and tolerance. The Mainland faces a multitude of domestic and international challenges. Beijing has no intention of making significant adjustments to cross-Strait policy in the short term.
Everyone on Taiwan, from top to bottom, considers one country, two systems unacceptable. Everyone knows why. In recent years, Beijing has made fewer references to one country, two systems. That does not mean that its basic position has changed. Xi's use of the term may have given people a start. But the Mainland's Taiwan policy remains within bounds. We have no cause to overreact. As far as the Republic of China is concerned, the pursuit of national reunification should not be a problem. The focus should be on the two sides' timing, manner, and preconditions for reunification. One country, two systems is far more relaxed than federalism. But in the face of the CCP's one country, two systems offensive, Taipei has three options. The best option for Taiwan and the rest of China, is to seek a more reasonable model for reunification. The next best option is to clarify the meaning of the term one country. It must be interpreted in a way more favorable to Taiwan. The worst option is to accept one country, two systems in part. This has not happened. If Taipei is eventually forced to accept one country, two systems as currently defined, that would not be reunification. That would be annihilation. Everyone in the ROC, from top to bottom, considers that totally unacceptable.
One can advocate national reunification. One can advocate Taiwan independence. But everyone must understand that Taiwan is not Hong Kong. Hong Kong's sovereignty was transferred by the British to the People's Republic of China. Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to the Republic of China. As such, the ROC's existence and development is a given. Taiwan must respect itself. Only then can it win the respect of the other side. Putting one's future in the hands of others is not the way. What Taiwan needs is not independence, but self-reliance. It needs strength, not arrogance. It needs to cooperate with the Mainland, on behalf of national reunification, national rejuvenation, and the early realization of the Chinese Dream. That is the correct option.
社論-平心靜氣 解讀習近平談話
2014年09月30日 04:09
本報訊
中共總書記習近平26日在接待台灣24個支持和平統一團體近60人的參訪團時,發表有關一國兩制的講話,引起各界廣泛重視與各種解讀。其實,這是一個經過長時間規畫的活動,北京自有其目的。由媒體的報導看來,即或是當時在場的參與者,對習的談話內容,也有不同的看法和觀察,有的同意,和平發展是進程,和平統一是目標,一國兩制則是最後結果,習的談話饒有深意。也有人認為,習仍是重申過去的政策基調,或許只是表明北京今後在某些具體事務上會有不同的作法,也有些人認為仍然軟弱,因此感到失落。
國際及台灣關切的重點都集中在「一國兩制」4個字上,因為近年以來,北京或知一國兩制在台並無市場,且已遭汙名化,所以多用一中框架而少用一國兩制,民進黨為此在國會提出質詢,要求馬英九政府表達立場,國際媒體也分別探詢其中意涵,國內有人認為北京是敲山震虎,意在警告民進黨,有人說是緊縮對台政策,而且顯與當前香港局勢有關,有人更認為事態嚴重非同小可,北京意在提出統一時間表,各式各樣的觀點不一而足,一次會面,各自解讀。
其實,習總書記接見訪賓,發表談話應該兼具形式意義與實質意義。
先就形式意義言,中共應該深知在當前台灣的政治,社會氛圍裡,主張國家統一,贊成民族富強的聲音與力量已經處於弱勢,甚至是是被打壓的,北京刻意以高規格,高調地加以接待,不無給予鼓勵及支持之意,希望他們持續扮演中流砥柱的角色,把台灣民眾愛國主義的傳統及精神不絕如縷的傳承下去,並能夠強化壯大台灣主張統一的聲音與力量,產生移風易俗的教化作用,促成國家統一的早日實現。中共表達支持統派團體的態度與立場自是理所當然,但未來在執行上必須謹慎拿捏分寸,應在不過度介入台灣內政前提下,把這種想法化為具體的行動,避免造成愛之適足以害之的反效果。
再說實質意義,透過這次談話,北京充分表達了立場,除了過去所說的兩岸一家親之外﹐和平發展、和平統一仍是大陸不變的基本國策,北京當然不會放棄追求國家統一的立場,堅信國家統一將是兩岸中國人最後歸宿,最符合台灣利益,兩岸可以合作,共同努力促成中國夢的早日實現。雖然習總書記使用了一國兩制的用語,但他也提到,會充分考慮台灣的現實情況,吸收各界的意見和建議,顯然只要能夠實現國家統一,一切都可商量,即使對民進黨也還重申,不管過去如何如何,只要幡然悔悟都能既往不咎,這一切都是過去政策的延續。整體來說,習近平的談話是善意、耐心與包容的,如果我們再把大陸當前面臨的國內外挑戰考慮進去,若說北京無意在短期內做出兩岸政策的重大調整應不為過。
台灣上下拒絕接受一國兩制的原由,大家知之甚詳。北京近年雖然少提,但並不表示此一基本立場有所改變。換句話說,即使習的談話讓人感到突兀,但仍在大陸對台政策的合理範圍之內,大家委實不必反應過度。就中華民國而言,追求國家統一其實不應該是個問題,兩岸系爭的重點應是統一的時機、方式與條件,雖說一國兩制的部分內容遠較聯邦制更為寬鬆,但在面對中共一國兩制的攻勢時,台灣應有上中下三策,上策是為了台灣與中國的未來,找到一個更合理的統一模式,中策是不斷充實一國兩制的內容,將其作出對台灣最為有利的解釋與發展,下策則是接受有一國兩制的部分實質內容,但沒有此一名詞的出現。如果台灣最後被時勢所迫接受現行的一國兩制,那就不是統一而是滅亡,中華民國上上下下是萬萬不能接受的。
無論主張國家統一或支持台灣獨立,都必須理解,台灣不是香港,香港主權是由英國轉交中華人民共和國,台灣主權屬於中華民國。因此,中華民國的存在與發展才是根本。台灣唯有自尊而後才能贏得對岸的尊重,把自己的前途寄託在別人不確定的善意上絕非正辦。台灣要在自立但不獨立、自強但不自大的基礎上與中國大陸合作,共同為國家的統一、民族的復興及中國夢的早日實現而共同努力,這才是正確的選擇。
Sunday, September 28, 2014
Food Safety Oversight Has Failed, Yet the Government Obsesses over Penalties
Food Safety Oversight Has Failed, Yet the Government Obsesses over Penalties
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 29, 2014
Summary: Sun Yat-sen once related a story about a longshoreman who kept a lottery ticket in his carrying pole. Ecstatic that he had won the lottery, he flung his pole into the sea. When working toward a goal, one must never let one's imagination run amok. One must never forget one's roots. Think about it. If in order to punish Chang Guann, we sacrifice the rule of law, we may win the lottery, but we would have thrown away the pole.
Full Text Below:
The Executive Yuan recently approved a draft amendment to the Food Safety and Health Administration Law. It increased the fines tenfold for food companies that counterfeit foodstuffs. It also increased the criminal penalties for unscrupulous operators. Profiteers blindly pursuing profit at the expense of consumer safety, should be heavily penalized. But the laws have been amended six times in seven years. We are now in the embarrassing situation of amending the law for the seventh time. Leave aside the question of what these government agencies have in mind. Has focusing exclusively on heavy penalties after the fact resulted in neglecting preventive measures?
Worse still, under intense public pressure, certain individuals and government agencies, such as the Ministry of Health and Welfare, have proposed making the laws retroactive. They hope to impose heavy penalties on the Chang Guann Company, which was responsible for the rancid oil scandal. If this happens, it would set a national precedent for ex post facto law. Chang Guann may be heavily fined. But doing so would establish a negative precedent that destroys the rule of law.
Penalties must not be retroactive. That is a fundamental principle of democracy and the rule of law. The reason is obvious. How can the government formulate new laws that punish people for past conduct? For example, using asbestos, or using methyl chloride as a refrigerant in refrigerators. Scientific studies later showed that asbestos and methyl chloride are carcinogenic or pathogenic substances. Future use must of course be prohibited. But passing ex post facto laws to punish manufacturers who produced these products before they were made illegal, turns people into criminals against their will. The result can only be economic and social chaos. We would be no different from an authoritarian regime.
The Executive Yuan draft amendment to the Food Safety Law has three key points. One. It increases administrative fines tenfold for unscrupulous vendors. The maximum fine would be 200 million NT. Two. It increases sentences for manufacturers who defraud the public to seven years in prison. Fines would also be increased tenfold. Three. It abolishes industry regulations for court imposed fines. It plugs legal loopholes from the Chang Chi Foodstuff fake oil scandal. It imposes administrative fines of 1.85 billion NT. The court imposed fines of 38 million NT. The principle of double indemnity and provisions for priority penalties resulted in a paltry 38 million NT fine. This loophole has been plugged by provisions for the Chang Chi Foodstuff fake oil scandal.
In short, according to the rule of law, criminal penalties may not be retroactive. This is essential to ensure public trust in the justice system. Whether the issue is increased fines or longer sentences for manufacturers, ex post facto laws are unacceptable. Justice Minister Luo Yingxue notes that ex post facto law punishments amount to ex post facto subversions of democracy. This may not please the public. But it is the truth. It is something political appointees must uphold.
Take the Executive Yuan draft law. Only one provision pertains to the Chang Guann scandal, the provisions for the Chang Chi Foodstuff fake oil scandal. The Kaohsiung City Government has fined Chang Guann 50 million NT. Future ill-gotten gains may also lead to hundreds of millions in fines. According to current food safety laws, once Chang Guann pays the court imposed fines, it can avoid administrative penalties. The new law would abolish the court imposed corporate fines, as long as the legislature amends the law before the court imposes its sentence. Chang Guann could not escape administrative penalties by paying the court imposed fines.
The Food Safety draft law plugs past legal loopholes. It restores some measure of justice. But strictly speaking, the blind pursuit of heavier sentences without considering how the law would apply in practice, often leads to new problems when the law is found to be inadequate. It also reflects carelessness and haste by the executive and legislative branches. These result in broad brush laws that fail to discriminate.
In recent years, all sorts of food safety problems have arisen. Government policies often focus exclusively on increased penalties. This shows that government agencies are already at their wits end. Food safety management cannot rely only on the food companies' conscience. It must be rooted in a transparent and effective system of oversight. If the government system is circumspect and reliable, food companies will have little opportunity for deceit. Current health and welfare agencies rely on piecemeal, stop-gap measures. They do not know how to establish sound mechanisms that address the problem at its source. The result is seven amendments to the Food Safety Act in seven years, and Draconian punishments that still have not solved the problem. The crux of the problem is systemtic inadequacies.
When Shang Yang amended the laws, he first established credibility by keeping his word. The government must win first the public trust. More importantly, the authorities must fulfill their commitments. In the final analysis, the system is ill-conceived. Oversight is lacking at the front, and punishment is not swift enough at the back. These are the root cause of endless food safety problems. Fines may be increased and sentences may be lengthened. But as long as operators divest themselves of their holdings, lawsuits may drag on for years without resolution.
Under the circumstances, arguments that "new laws should be retroactive" may pander to the desire to punish profiteers. But opportunistic pandering to mob sentiment is not how a responsible democratic government should behave. Fortunately the Ministry of Justice has insisted that the law be non-retroactive. The Executive Yuan's final draft did not violate the principle of double indemnity. It did not turn the clock back on the rule of law.
Sun Yat-sen once related a story about a longshoreman who kept a lottery ticket in his carrying pole. Ecstatic that he had won the lottery, he flung his pole into the sea. When working toward a goal, one must never let one's imagination run amok. One must never forget one's roots. Think about it. If in order to punish Chang Guann, we sacrifice the rule of law, we may win the lottery, but we would have thrown away the pole.
食安監督機制失靈,卻一心想著嚴刑重罰
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.09.29 02:14 am
行政院會近日通過《食品安全衛生管理法》修法草案,對攙偽假冒廠商的罰鍰提高十倍,另加重不肖業者的刑度及罰金。奸商一味逐利而罔顧消費者安全,自應嚴刑重懲;但面對七年修法六次、如今又將七度修法的窘況,不論政府部門其實都該思考:一味強調事後的嚴刑重罰,是否反而疏失了制度的防範設計?
尤有甚者,在強大的民意壓力下,不論是當前的若干輿論或當事的主管機關衛福部,都提出「溯及既往」的主張,希以新法重懲餿水油案禍首強冠公司。一旦此舉成真,我國首開紀錄將刑罰溯及既往,就算能重罰強冠,勢必也將寫下破壞法治的惡例。
刑罰「不溯及既往」,是民主法治的根本原則。道理非常明白:政府怎能制定新法,去懲罰人民過去的行為?舉例而言,以往石棉瓦、使用氯甲烷做為冷媒的冰箱充斥人們生活周遭,但隨著科學研究顯示石棉或氯甲烷是致癌致病物質,當然必須禁止使用;然而,若立法「溯及既往」,要對以前曾生產的業者論處刑責,豈非變成強行入罪於民?如此一來,不僅經濟及社會秩序將大亂,也與威權體制無異。
檢視這次政院版食安法草案,重點有三:一是提高不肖廠商的行政罰鍰十倍,即最高可罰兩億元;二是加重不法業者攙偽假冒的刑度至七年徒刑,罰金也加十倍;三是取消法院對業者判處罰金規定,以修補之前「大統油案」的法律缺口。在大統假油案中,行政上處罰鍰十八億五千萬元,而法院判處罰金三千八百萬元,卻因「一事不兩罰」原則及優先適用刑罰規定,最後僅能罰三千八百萬元了事。此一缺口,透過俗稱之「大統條款」予以彌補。
簡言之,根據法治原則下的罪刑法定、不溯既往、信賴保護等基本精神,無論是對廠商提高罰鍰、對業主提高刑度或罰金等規定,均不宜作回溯之主張。法務部長羅瑩雪說,若刑罰可溯及既往等同「顛覆民主」,此語也許不符若干民意之期望,卻是實情,也是政務官該有的堅持。
就政院版草案看,唯一可適用於強冠案的條文,就是「大統條款」。目前強冠已被高雄市政府裁處五千萬元罰鍰,將來不當利得計算出來後,還可能再被裁罰數以億計的巨額罰鍰。若依現行食安法,強冠繳了法院判處的罰金後,即可逃過行政罰;但因新法草案取消了法院判處企業罰金之條文,只要立法院趕在強冠判決前通過修法,強冠即無法以繳罰金逃避巨額行政罰鍰。
《食安法》草案彌補過往立法缺口,算是還給社會一個公道。但嚴格而論,一味追求加重刑罰,卻不通盤思考法律在實務上的適用是否周全,每每碰到新的事件便發現法條不敷所需,這也反映出行政及立法部門的粗疏草率,使法律的功能變得太過扁平。
近幾年,面對層出不窮的各類食安問題,政府往往只能施展重罰策略,足見主管部門已黔驢技窮。食安管理不能僅指望廠商的道德良心,故必須建立在制度的透明及監督的有效之上;如果政府的制度周延可靠,廠商為惡取巧的空間就被壓縮。而如今,衛福部門卻往往只是頭痛醫頭、腳痛醫腳,不知從源頭建立良好的機制;結果七年七修食安法,濫用「重典」,仍治不了「亂世」,其癥結恐怕更在制度不當。
商鞅變法徙木以立信,除了政府必須取信於民,更重要的是「公權力必須貫徹」。歸根究柢,政府的初始制度設計不良,第一線的監督查察不力,而後端的懲處不夠迅速有效,才是食安問題層出不窮的根本原因。畢竟,就算罰金、刑責再高,只要業者能脫產、訴訟牽拖數年不決,仍無濟於事。
在這種情況下,「新法可溯及既往」之說或許滿足了民眾「重懲奸商」的想望,但以取巧、媚俗的心態去迎合民意,又豈是負責任的民主政府所應為?所幸,法務部能堅持「不溯及既往」的原則,政院版草案也終未違逆「一事不二罰」原則,沒有肇下一場開法治倒車的災難。
國父當年「扁擔與彩票」的寓言,說明行事絕不能心存妄想、而丟了根本。試想,如果只是為了重懲強冠,卻犧牲國家的法治精神,那跟中了彩券、而丟了扁擔有何兩樣?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 29, 2014
Summary: Sun Yat-sen once related a story about a longshoreman who kept a lottery ticket in his carrying pole. Ecstatic that he had won the lottery, he flung his pole into the sea. When working toward a goal, one must never let one's imagination run amok. One must never forget one's roots. Think about it. If in order to punish Chang Guann, we sacrifice the rule of law, we may win the lottery, but we would have thrown away the pole.
Full Text Below:
The Executive Yuan recently approved a draft amendment to the Food Safety and Health Administration Law. It increased the fines tenfold for food companies that counterfeit foodstuffs. It also increased the criminal penalties for unscrupulous operators. Profiteers blindly pursuing profit at the expense of consumer safety, should be heavily penalized. But the laws have been amended six times in seven years. We are now in the embarrassing situation of amending the law for the seventh time. Leave aside the question of what these government agencies have in mind. Has focusing exclusively on heavy penalties after the fact resulted in neglecting preventive measures?
Worse still, under intense public pressure, certain individuals and government agencies, such as the Ministry of Health and Welfare, have proposed making the laws retroactive. They hope to impose heavy penalties on the Chang Guann Company, which was responsible for the rancid oil scandal. If this happens, it would set a national precedent for ex post facto law. Chang Guann may be heavily fined. But doing so would establish a negative precedent that destroys the rule of law.
Penalties must not be retroactive. That is a fundamental principle of democracy and the rule of law. The reason is obvious. How can the government formulate new laws that punish people for past conduct? For example, using asbestos, or using methyl chloride as a refrigerant in refrigerators. Scientific studies later showed that asbestos and methyl chloride are carcinogenic or pathogenic substances. Future use must of course be prohibited. But passing ex post facto laws to punish manufacturers who produced these products before they were made illegal, turns people into criminals against their will. The result can only be economic and social chaos. We would be no different from an authoritarian regime.
The Executive Yuan draft amendment to the Food Safety Law has three key points. One. It increases administrative fines tenfold for unscrupulous vendors. The maximum fine would be 200 million NT. Two. It increases sentences for manufacturers who defraud the public to seven years in prison. Fines would also be increased tenfold. Three. It abolishes industry regulations for court imposed fines. It plugs legal loopholes from the Chang Chi Foodstuff fake oil scandal. It imposes administrative fines of 1.85 billion NT. The court imposed fines of 38 million NT. The principle of double indemnity and provisions for priority penalties resulted in a paltry 38 million NT fine. This loophole has been plugged by provisions for the Chang Chi Foodstuff fake oil scandal.
In short, according to the rule of law, criminal penalties may not be retroactive. This is essential to ensure public trust in the justice system. Whether the issue is increased fines or longer sentences for manufacturers, ex post facto laws are unacceptable. Justice Minister Luo Yingxue notes that ex post facto law punishments amount to ex post facto subversions of democracy. This may not please the public. But it is the truth. It is something political appointees must uphold.
Take the Executive Yuan draft law. Only one provision pertains to the Chang Guann scandal, the provisions for the Chang Chi Foodstuff fake oil scandal. The Kaohsiung City Government has fined Chang Guann 50 million NT. Future ill-gotten gains may also lead to hundreds of millions in fines. According to current food safety laws, once Chang Guann pays the court imposed fines, it can avoid administrative penalties. The new law would abolish the court imposed corporate fines, as long as the legislature amends the law before the court imposes its sentence. Chang Guann could not escape administrative penalties by paying the court imposed fines.
The Food Safety draft law plugs past legal loopholes. It restores some measure of justice. But strictly speaking, the blind pursuit of heavier sentences without considering how the law would apply in practice, often leads to new problems when the law is found to be inadequate. It also reflects carelessness and haste by the executive and legislative branches. These result in broad brush laws that fail to discriminate.
In recent years, all sorts of food safety problems have arisen. Government policies often focus exclusively on increased penalties. This shows that government agencies are already at their wits end. Food safety management cannot rely only on the food companies' conscience. It must be rooted in a transparent and effective system of oversight. If the government system is circumspect and reliable, food companies will have little opportunity for deceit. Current health and welfare agencies rely on piecemeal, stop-gap measures. They do not know how to establish sound mechanisms that address the problem at its source. The result is seven amendments to the Food Safety Act in seven years, and Draconian punishments that still have not solved the problem. The crux of the problem is systemtic inadequacies.
When Shang Yang amended the laws, he first established credibility by keeping his word. The government must win first the public trust. More importantly, the authorities must fulfill their commitments. In the final analysis, the system is ill-conceived. Oversight is lacking at the front, and punishment is not swift enough at the back. These are the root cause of endless food safety problems. Fines may be increased and sentences may be lengthened. But as long as operators divest themselves of their holdings, lawsuits may drag on for years without resolution.
Under the circumstances, arguments that "new laws should be retroactive" may pander to the desire to punish profiteers. But opportunistic pandering to mob sentiment is not how a responsible democratic government should behave. Fortunately the Ministry of Justice has insisted that the law be non-retroactive. The Executive Yuan's final draft did not violate the principle of double indemnity. It did not turn the clock back on the rule of law.
Sun Yat-sen once related a story about a longshoreman who kept a lottery ticket in his carrying pole. Ecstatic that he had won the lottery, he flung his pole into the sea. When working toward a goal, one must never let one's imagination run amok. One must never forget one's roots. Think about it. If in order to punish Chang Guann, we sacrifice the rule of law, we may win the lottery, but we would have thrown away the pole.
食安監督機制失靈,卻一心想著嚴刑重罰
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.09.29 02:14 am
行政院會近日通過《食品安全衛生管理法》修法草案,對攙偽假冒廠商的罰鍰提高十倍,另加重不肖業者的刑度及罰金。奸商一味逐利而罔顧消費者安全,自應嚴刑重懲;但面對七年修法六次、如今又將七度修法的窘況,不論政府部門其實都該思考:一味強調事後的嚴刑重罰,是否反而疏失了制度的防範設計?
尤有甚者,在強大的民意壓力下,不論是當前的若干輿論或當事的主管機關衛福部,都提出「溯及既往」的主張,希以新法重懲餿水油案禍首強冠公司。一旦此舉成真,我國首開紀錄將刑罰溯及既往,就算能重罰強冠,勢必也將寫下破壞法治的惡例。
刑罰「不溯及既往」,是民主法治的根本原則。道理非常明白:政府怎能制定新法,去懲罰人民過去的行為?舉例而言,以往石棉瓦、使用氯甲烷做為冷媒的冰箱充斥人們生活周遭,但隨著科學研究顯示石棉或氯甲烷是致癌致病物質,當然必須禁止使用;然而,若立法「溯及既往」,要對以前曾生產的業者論處刑責,豈非變成強行入罪於民?如此一來,不僅經濟及社會秩序將大亂,也與威權體制無異。
檢視這次政院版食安法草案,重點有三:一是提高不肖廠商的行政罰鍰十倍,即最高可罰兩億元;二是加重不法業者攙偽假冒的刑度至七年徒刑,罰金也加十倍;三是取消法院對業者判處罰金規定,以修補之前「大統油案」的法律缺口。在大統假油案中,行政上處罰鍰十八億五千萬元,而法院判處罰金三千八百萬元,卻因「一事不兩罰」原則及優先適用刑罰規定,最後僅能罰三千八百萬元了事。此一缺口,透過俗稱之「大統條款」予以彌補。
簡言之,根據法治原則下的罪刑法定、不溯既往、信賴保護等基本精神,無論是對廠商提高罰鍰、對業主提高刑度或罰金等規定,均不宜作回溯之主張。法務部長羅瑩雪說,若刑罰可溯及既往等同「顛覆民主」,此語也許不符若干民意之期望,卻是實情,也是政務官該有的堅持。
就政院版草案看,唯一可適用於強冠案的條文,就是「大統條款」。目前強冠已被高雄市政府裁處五千萬元罰鍰,將來不當利得計算出來後,還可能再被裁罰數以億計的巨額罰鍰。若依現行食安法,強冠繳了法院判處的罰金後,即可逃過行政罰;但因新法草案取消了法院判處企業罰金之條文,只要立法院趕在強冠判決前通過修法,強冠即無法以繳罰金逃避巨額行政罰鍰。
《食安法》草案彌補過往立法缺口,算是還給社會一個公道。但嚴格而論,一味追求加重刑罰,卻不通盤思考法律在實務上的適用是否周全,每每碰到新的事件便發現法條不敷所需,這也反映出行政及立法部門的粗疏草率,使法律的功能變得太過扁平。
近幾年,面對層出不窮的各類食安問題,政府往往只能施展重罰策略,足見主管部門已黔驢技窮。食安管理不能僅指望廠商的道德良心,故必須建立在制度的透明及監督的有效之上;如果政府的制度周延可靠,廠商為惡取巧的空間就被壓縮。而如今,衛福部門卻往往只是頭痛醫頭、腳痛醫腳,不知從源頭建立良好的機制;結果七年七修食安法,濫用「重典」,仍治不了「亂世」,其癥結恐怕更在制度不當。
商鞅變法徙木以立信,除了政府必須取信於民,更重要的是「公權力必須貫徹」。歸根究柢,政府的初始制度設計不良,第一線的監督查察不力,而後端的懲處不夠迅速有效,才是食安問題層出不窮的根本原因。畢竟,就算罰金、刑責再高,只要業者能脫產、訴訟牽拖數年不決,仍無濟於事。
在這種情況下,「新法可溯及既往」之說或許滿足了民眾「重懲奸商」的想望,但以取巧、媚俗的心態去迎合民意,又豈是負責任的民主政府所應為?所幸,法務部能堅持「不溯及既往」的原則,政院版草案也終未違逆「一事不二罰」原則,沒有肇下一場開法治倒車的災難。
國父當年「扁擔與彩票」的寓言,說明行事絕不能心存妄想、而丟了根本。試想,如果只是為了重懲強冠,卻犧牲國家的法治精神,那跟中了彩券、而丟了扁擔有何兩樣?
Thursday, September 25, 2014
Ma Xi Meeting: Beijing will Regret Lost Opportunity
Ma Xi Meeting: Beijing will Regret Lost Opportunity
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 26, 2014
Summary: Scotland and Hong Kong have shown that cross-Strait problems are more complex, both conceptually and methodologically. The Republic of China is undoubtedly a common asset for both sides. Therefore Beijing must not cling to the notion of destroying the Republic of China. If a Ma Xi Meeting can be held, the two sides can avoid at least two decades of suffering. Without a Ma Xi Meeting, Beijing might destroy the Republic of China amidst a Pyrrhic victory. Does Beijing possess the wisdom and compassion? Does it realize that if it passes up the opportunity to hold a Ma Xi Meeting, any future regret will be too late?
Full Text Below:
The hope that Beijing would use the APEC Meeting in November to arrange a Ma Xi Meeting has been shattered. But champions of the meeting have not given up trying. If Beijing passes up the opportunity to hold a Ma Xi Meeting, any future regret will be too late.
As the saying goes, "Follow the mandate of heaven and comply with the will of the people." An historical trend is the mandate of heaven. Public opinion is the will of the people. Any solution to cross-Straits problems requires following the mandate of heaven and complying with the will of the people. It must not defy the mandate of heaven and ignore the will of the people. The Ma Xi Meeting can be a meeting of "heaven and man," as well as a meeting of "history and public opinion." Pass up this rare opportunity, and another one may never come along.
Any solution to cross-Strait problems must go with the flow of history. Modern and contemporary history has witnessed two waves of national self-determination. The first wave began at the end of World War II, in 1945. It was primarily motivated by calls for national self-determination. The second wave began with the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989, and in 1991, when the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact imploded. It was motivated primarily by the desire to overthrow a Communist dictatorship and establish political self-determination. Cross-Strait issues cannot be resolved by means of a "Taiwan independence referendum." But neither is it possible to stifle some form of "reunification referendum." This can be regarded as a form of "self-determination." This is a cross-Strait historical trend. This is a watershed for human civilization, democracy, and human rights that cannot be avoided.
Leave aside for the moment international opinion on the Scottish independence referendum. It was undoubtedly a positive example for human civilization, political rights, and democratic rule. By the same token, any solution for cross-Strait problems must also adhere to the requirements of human civilization. They must not lead to a tragedy for history, civilization, and democracy.
Furthermore, the solution to cross-Strait problems must comply with public opinion. Take the situation in Hong Kong for example. The political system is at odds with its value system. This is not something that rhetorical attacks, military intimidation, or financial inducements can reconcile. This is especially true when public opinion merges with historical trends. Defying the mandate of heaven and ignoring the will of the people will only make the situation harder to resolve. Public opinion in Hong Kong is "merely" fighting for genuine universal suffrage. Yet the wrangling has already led to an impasse. How would Beijing deal with public opinion on Taiwan during the upcoming sixth presidential election for the Republic of China?
Can the two sides find a solution? Will they remain deadlocked over the existence of the Republic of China? Is an APEC Ma Xi Meeting possible? Is the meeting also stuck on the Republic of China? What solution to cross-Strait problems does Beijing seek, in its heart of hearts? Does it want a one China erected on the grave of the Republic of China? Such a solution would be a catastrophe and tragedy for history, civilization, democracy, and human rights. This refusal to recognize the Republic of China, this determination to destroy the Republic of China, makes Beijing hesitant to support an APEC Ma Xi Meeting. Beijing is afraid to lend credence to the "Two States Theory," by acknowledging the existence of both the ROC and . the PRC. Can Beijing free its thinking and embrace realism, as Deng Xiaoping urged and Beijing recently reaffirmed? Can it embrace a one China solution that preserves the Republic of China? Such a solution would follow the mandate of heaven and comply with the will of the people. Under such a "big roof concept of China," both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China would be part of China. Why couldn't such a vision be realized at an APEC Ma Xi Meeting?
Beijing hopes to use the Republic of China to guard against Taiwan independence. Yet it refuses to admit that the Republic of China is part of China. It merely affirms that both the Mainland and Taiwan are part of one China. This encourages relentless attempts at "backdoor listing" on Taiwan. This has become the main reason the public on Taiwan finds it difficult to identify with "one China," and to refer to themselves as Chinese. The UDN News has advocated the "water glass theory." Taiwan is the water, the ROC is the glass. As long as the glass remains intact, the water in the glass will remain in place. Once the glass is shattered, the water will spill out everywhere. This theory remains true under "one China, different interpretations" or the "big roof concept of China." Therefore any cross-Strait solution should preserve the ROC as part of one China.
Can Beijing shift its thinking from destroying the Republic of China in order to ensure one China, to preserving the Republic of China to ensure one China? Must it back away from an APEC Ma Xi Meeting? If such a meeting can take place, couldn't authorities on both sides refer to the APEC Ma Xi Meeting as a "test case?" Ma Ying-jeou could attend the meeting as a "Chinese Taipei Economic Leader" and "leader of Taiwan." Sundry ceremonies and activities could be negotiated and planned by both sides. This flexible international/domestic context could give "one China" new meaning. Cross-Strait relations could benefit from new thinking and be given a new vitality. This could even establish a new model for political conflict resolution. A Ma Xi Meeting would not be just another meeting. It would affect how civilized society thinks.
Beijing's mistake is to see an APEC Ma Xi Meeting as a stage on which Taiwan might enact some sort of political theater. It has missed the greater importance of this meeting to the ruling government and political opposition on the Mainland. This meeting could free up Beijing's thinking and enable it to embrace realism. It could be an opportunity for the two sides to think anew. It is possible that Beijing realizes this is a golden opportunity, but lacks leaders of sufficient wisdom, strength, and compassion to make new choices and extricate the two sides from their never-ending struggle.
Scotland and Hong Kong have shown that cross-Strait problems are more complex, both conceptually and methodologically. The Republic of China is undoubtedly a common asset for both sides. Therefore Beijing must not cling to the notion of destroying the Republic of China. If a Ma Xi Meeting can be held, the two sides can avoid at least two decades of suffering. Without a Ma Xi Meeting, Beijing might destroy the Republic of China amidst a Pyrrhic victory. Does Beijing possess the wisdom and compassion? Does it realize that if it passes up the opportunity to hold a Ma Xi Meeting, any future regret will be too late?
錯失馬習會 北京會吃後悔藥
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.09.26 02:05 am
運用十一月北京APEC年會安排馬習會的構想幾告幻滅,
但鼓吹促成此事者似仍未放棄最後的努力。 北京若錯失了此次馬習會的不二機遇,未來恐會來不及吃後悔藥。
語云,順天應人。歷史的走向就是天,民意的歸趨就是人。 兩岸的解決方案必須順天應人,不能背天逆人。馬習會可以是一個「 天人交匯」之會,即「歷史與民意」之會;一旦錯失這個村, 也許就不再有這家店。
兩岸的解決方案必須順應大歷史的走向。近代及現代史上有兩波「 國家自決風潮」,一波在一九四五年二戰結束後,以「民族自決」 為主; 第二波起自一九八九年柏林圍牆倒塌及一九九一年蘇聯解體引爆的「 蘇東波」,則是以擺脫共黨專政的「政治自決」為主。 兩岸問題即使不能以「獨立公投」解決, 但也必然不可能扼殺某種形式的「統一公投」,這亦可視為一種「 自決」形式,將是兩岸在歷史走向、 人類文明及民主人權上無法迴避的一個關口。
準此以論,不論國際輿論對蘇格蘭獨立公投的評價如何, 但無疑是在政治文明及民主人權上樹立了典範。同理, 兩岸的解決方案也必須回應人類文明的基準要求, 不能釀成反歷史走向、反文明、反民主的悲劇。
再者,兩岸的解決方案自亦應以民意為歸趨。從香港的情勢可見, 政治體制及價值信念的歧異,不是「文攻/武嚇/利誘」所能彌合; 尤其,當民意的歸趨與前述歷史走向成為一致之時, 背天逆人的橫柴入灶將使情勢難以收拾。香港的民意「只是」 為了爭取「真普選」而已,卻已經鬧得不可開交, 則北京將如何面對即將「第六次直選中華民國總統」的台灣民意?
兩岸能否覓得解決方案,卡在「中華民國」; 而APEC馬習會之能否實現,亦卡在「中華民國」。 北京心中的兩岸解決方案若是建立一個「消滅中華民國的一個中國」 ,則不論在歷史文明上,或民主人權上,都是一個災難性、 悲劇性的想法。而亦正因出自這種「不承認中華民國」、「 消滅中華民國」的想法,所以北京對APEC馬習會猶豫, 深怕弄成「中華民國vs.中華人民共和國」的兩國論。但是, 倘若北京能「解放思想/實事求是」(這是北京最近倡導的「 鄧小平主旋律」),改以建立一個「保全中華民國的一個中國」 為兩岸解決方案,即可能順應歷史文明、回應民意歸趨;那麼, 在這個「大屋頂中國」之下,「 中華民國與中華人民共和國都是一部分的中國」, 為什麼不能在APEC實現馬習會?
北京欲以中華民國來防範台獨,卻又不肯承認中華民國是「 一部分的中國」(只說大陸與台灣同屬一個中國); 這就使得台灣內部「借殼上市」之念不絕,且成為台灣人民在「 一個中國」及「中國人」的認同上難以發展的根本原因。 我們曾經主張「杯子理論」,亦即:「台灣是水,中華民國是杯; 杯在水在,杯破水覆。」此一理論,不論在「一中各表」階段, 或進入「大屋頂中國」階段,皆可成立。亦即,應以「 保全中華民國的一個中國」為兩岸解決方案。
若北京能從「消滅中華民國的一個中國」,轉至「 保全中華民國的一個中國」, 則有什麼理由自APEC馬習會上退縮?若能成事, 兩岸當局何妨共同宣示以「試驗事件」來進行APEC馬習會; 馬英九以「中華台北經濟領袖」及「台灣領導人」的身分與會, 各種儀節活動均經雙方協商規劃;在此「國際/國內」 出現解讀彈性的情境中,「一個中國」即可能有了新內涵, 兩岸關係也有了新思維與新活力, 甚至能對人類解決政治衝突的方法與境界創造出新典範。因為, 馬習會不只是一個「會面」,且必是一個影響人類文明思維的「 號召」。
北京的思維誤區是,以為APEC馬習會只是給台灣搭台唱戲, 卻看不到此會更重要的是一個為大陸朝野「解放思想/實事求是」 以重新思考兩岸方案的珍貴機遇。或者,北京也有人看出此一機遇, 只是缺少一位有足夠大智慧及強烈慈悲心的領導人來為兩岸的糾纏解 套,作出新的抉擇。
從蘇格蘭及香港之例,足證兩岸問題在理念及方法上的不簡單,而「 中華民國」無疑是兩岸的共同資產,是以,切不可有「 消滅中華民國」的淺薄想法。若有馬習會, 兩岸至少可以省去二十年的磨難;若無馬習會,北京亦不當以「 消滅中華民國」為兩岸玉石俱焚的解決方案。 北京若能有此大智慧與大慈悲,即知一旦錯失馬習會, 來日必會來不及吃後悔藥。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 26, 2014
Summary: Scotland and Hong Kong have shown that cross-Strait problems are more complex, both conceptually and methodologically. The Republic of China is undoubtedly a common asset for both sides. Therefore Beijing must not cling to the notion of destroying the Republic of China. If a Ma Xi Meeting can be held, the two sides can avoid at least two decades of suffering. Without a Ma Xi Meeting, Beijing might destroy the Republic of China amidst a Pyrrhic victory. Does Beijing possess the wisdom and compassion? Does it realize that if it passes up the opportunity to hold a Ma Xi Meeting, any future regret will be too late?
Full Text Below:
The hope that Beijing would use the APEC Meeting in November to arrange a Ma Xi Meeting has been shattered. But champions of the meeting have not given up trying. If Beijing passes up the opportunity to hold a Ma Xi Meeting, any future regret will be too late.
As the saying goes, "Follow the mandate of heaven and comply with the will of the people." An historical trend is the mandate of heaven. Public opinion is the will of the people. Any solution to cross-Straits problems requires following the mandate of heaven and complying with the will of the people. It must not defy the mandate of heaven and ignore the will of the people. The Ma Xi Meeting can be a meeting of "heaven and man," as well as a meeting of "history and public opinion." Pass up this rare opportunity, and another one may never come along.
Any solution to cross-Strait problems must go with the flow of history. Modern and contemporary history has witnessed two waves of national self-determination. The first wave began at the end of World War II, in 1945. It was primarily motivated by calls for national self-determination. The second wave began with the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989, and in 1991, when the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact imploded. It was motivated primarily by the desire to overthrow a Communist dictatorship and establish political self-determination. Cross-Strait issues cannot be resolved by means of a "Taiwan independence referendum." But neither is it possible to stifle some form of "reunification referendum." This can be regarded as a form of "self-determination." This is a cross-Strait historical trend. This is a watershed for human civilization, democracy, and human rights that cannot be avoided.
Leave aside for the moment international opinion on the Scottish independence referendum. It was undoubtedly a positive example for human civilization, political rights, and democratic rule. By the same token, any solution for cross-Strait problems must also adhere to the requirements of human civilization. They must not lead to a tragedy for history, civilization, and democracy.
Furthermore, the solution to cross-Strait problems must comply with public opinion. Take the situation in Hong Kong for example. The political system is at odds with its value system. This is not something that rhetorical attacks, military intimidation, or financial inducements can reconcile. This is especially true when public opinion merges with historical trends. Defying the mandate of heaven and ignoring the will of the people will only make the situation harder to resolve. Public opinion in Hong Kong is "merely" fighting for genuine universal suffrage. Yet the wrangling has already led to an impasse. How would Beijing deal with public opinion on Taiwan during the upcoming sixth presidential election for the Republic of China?
Can the two sides find a solution? Will they remain deadlocked over the existence of the Republic of China? Is an APEC Ma Xi Meeting possible? Is the meeting also stuck on the Republic of China? What solution to cross-Strait problems does Beijing seek, in its heart of hearts? Does it want a one China erected on the grave of the Republic of China? Such a solution would be a catastrophe and tragedy for history, civilization, democracy, and human rights. This refusal to recognize the Republic of China, this determination to destroy the Republic of China, makes Beijing hesitant to support an APEC Ma Xi Meeting. Beijing is afraid to lend credence to the "Two States Theory," by acknowledging the existence of both the ROC and . the PRC. Can Beijing free its thinking and embrace realism, as Deng Xiaoping urged and Beijing recently reaffirmed? Can it embrace a one China solution that preserves the Republic of China? Such a solution would follow the mandate of heaven and comply with the will of the people. Under such a "big roof concept of China," both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China would be part of China. Why couldn't such a vision be realized at an APEC Ma Xi Meeting?
Beijing hopes to use the Republic of China to guard against Taiwan independence. Yet it refuses to admit that the Republic of China is part of China. It merely affirms that both the Mainland and Taiwan are part of one China. This encourages relentless attempts at "backdoor listing" on Taiwan. This has become the main reason the public on Taiwan finds it difficult to identify with "one China," and to refer to themselves as Chinese. The UDN News has advocated the "water glass theory." Taiwan is the water, the ROC is the glass. As long as the glass remains intact, the water in the glass will remain in place. Once the glass is shattered, the water will spill out everywhere. This theory remains true under "one China, different interpretations" or the "big roof concept of China." Therefore any cross-Strait solution should preserve the ROC as part of one China.
Can Beijing shift its thinking from destroying the Republic of China in order to ensure one China, to preserving the Republic of China to ensure one China? Must it back away from an APEC Ma Xi Meeting? If such a meeting can take place, couldn't authorities on both sides refer to the APEC Ma Xi Meeting as a "test case?" Ma Ying-jeou could attend the meeting as a "Chinese Taipei Economic Leader" and "leader of Taiwan." Sundry ceremonies and activities could be negotiated and planned by both sides. This flexible international/domestic context could give "one China" new meaning. Cross-Strait relations could benefit from new thinking and be given a new vitality. This could even establish a new model for political conflict resolution. A Ma Xi Meeting would not be just another meeting. It would affect how civilized society thinks.
Beijing's mistake is to see an APEC Ma Xi Meeting as a stage on which Taiwan might enact some sort of political theater. It has missed the greater importance of this meeting to the ruling government and political opposition on the Mainland. This meeting could free up Beijing's thinking and enable it to embrace realism. It could be an opportunity for the two sides to think anew. It is possible that Beijing realizes this is a golden opportunity, but lacks leaders of sufficient wisdom, strength, and compassion to make new choices and extricate the two sides from their never-ending struggle.
Scotland and Hong Kong have shown that cross-Strait problems are more complex, both conceptually and methodologically. The Republic of China is undoubtedly a common asset for both sides. Therefore Beijing must not cling to the notion of destroying the Republic of China. If a Ma Xi Meeting can be held, the two sides can avoid at least two decades of suffering. Without a Ma Xi Meeting, Beijing might destroy the Republic of China amidst a Pyrrhic victory. Does Beijing possess the wisdom and compassion? Does it realize that if it passes up the opportunity to hold a Ma Xi Meeting, any future regret will be too late?
錯失馬習會 北京會吃後悔藥
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.09.26 02:05 am
運用十一月北京APEC年會安排馬習會的構想幾告幻滅,
語云,順天應人。歷史的走向就是天,民意的歸趨就是人。
兩岸的解決方案必須順應大歷史的走向。近代及現代史上有兩波「
準此以論,不論國際輿論對蘇格蘭獨立公投的評價如何,
再者,兩岸的解決方案自亦應以民意為歸趨。從香港的情勢可見,
兩岸能否覓得解決方案,卡在「中華民國」;
北京欲以中華民國來防範台獨,卻又不肯承認中華民國是「
若北京能從「消滅中華民國的一個中國」,轉至「
北京的思維誤區是,以為APEC馬習會只是給台灣搭台唱戲,
從蘇格蘭及香港之例,足證兩岸問題在理念及方法上的不簡單,而「
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