Green Camp Celebrates Victory with Confrontation
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 10, 2014
Executive Summary: The DPP is apparently on the verge of returning to power. But if the party princes blindly celebrate their victory by engaging in confrontation instead of winning people over through wise governance, they are being foolish indeed. In Tsai Ing-wen’s victory speech she said, "The people have given us their support. But it can be withdrawn at any time." She knows the final mile is the hardest. But are these county chiefs and city mayors too drunk with hubris to care?
Full Text Below:
The Democratic Progressive Party took 13 counties and municipalities during the recent elections. Wen-Je Ko won by a landslide in the capital city of Taipei. The green camp significantly expanded its territory. It won because the ruling KMT lost the peoples’ hearts and minds. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen however has not been carried away by the victory. She said the DPP “must remain vigilant, as if walking on thin ice." She said the DPP must see the KMT’s loss as a warning. Yet lo and behold, little more than a week after the elections, victorious DPP county chiefs and city mayors were talking and acting in just the opposite manner.
It is not wrong to say that the KMT lost this election. But is it right for the DPP to boast that it won this election? No, it is not. The reason is simple. The Kuomintang suffered a crushing defeat. The main reason was that the public was disappointed with the central government’s performance. Many people simply could not bring themselves to cast their ballots for the KMT. Under these circumstances, for the DPP to boast that they did something miraculous to win peoples’ hearts and minds, can only provoke ridicule.
This was why Tsai Ing-wen pledged to remain prudent and low-key about the DPP’s victory. Hers was the right attitude. She knew it was merely a one-time expression of dissatisfaction with the ruling KMT. It was not a heartfelt affirmation of the Democratic Progressive Party. Lest we forget, one of the main reasons Ma government policies could not be implemented was DPP obstructionism. Voters did not take the DPP to task on this during the recent election. But that does not mean they will not take them to task during the next election.
Pundits are scrutinizing the shortcomings of the Ma government. Many in the DPP cannot suppress their Schadenfreude. They constantly reveal their arrogance, even an overweening haughtiness. The most obvious examples are the DPP’s newly-elected county chiefs and city mayors. Upon emerging victorious, they did not inform voters how they intend to restart the economy. Instead, the very first thing they did was launch an attack on the central government. They threatened to push for a "fiscal revenue allocation law" and an "administrative regions law" demanding money and usurping authority from the central government.
From a political perspective, this is entirely consistent with the DPP strategy of "using local governments to besiege the central government." But from an economic perspective, this is merely more evidence of local DPP government "ineptitude at wealth creation and aptitude at wealth redistribution.” Some DPP ruled counties have become accustomed to the long term abuse of welfare to buy voter support. But repeatedly rejecting necessary construction and development has led to financial embarrassments, accumulated debts, and increased unemployment. Under these circumstances, cities and counties must explore economic alternatives. If they habitually extort money from the central government when it is in trouble, can Taiwan's economy withstand such plundering of a weak central government by strong local governments?
Another result of the DPP victory has been calls to "Free Chen Shui-bian!" Is Chen's physical condition reason for medical parole? That is a question that ought to be decided by medical experts. But DPP county chiefs and city mayors have deliberately politicized the Chen corruption case. They explicitly or implicitly claim that the Chen corruption case was the result of "unjust verdicts" and a "miscarriage of justice." They are attempting to use political means to override the criminal justice system, and mislead the public about the facts of the case.
The green camp has begun a siege of the central government. The pan green “bai li hou” has adopted a confrontational posture. It is attempting to overthrow existing construction plans. The clearest example is Ilan County Chief Lin Tsung-hsien. He and Wen-Je Ko are demanding that the “Taipei-Ilan Direct Railway Line” plan be discarded, and the "shortest route" be adopted. In order to save eight to nine minutes of time, they are willing to jeopardize the safety and natural beauty of the Jade Reservoir. Wen-Je Ko considers himself smarter than other people. Whenever he challenges existing policies, he adopts an air of unassailable righteousness. But these routes were subjected to careful planning. Environmentalists, geologists, and ecologists have debated the options repeatedly. Why does a surgeon think he knows more than these experts?
Ko’s "Ilan direct railway route" is hardly an isolated case. The same drama is playing out in Taoyuan and Keelung. Taoyuan City Mayor Elect Cheng Wen-chan is demanding the overthrow of the already finalized "Nan Tao elevated railway plan" and demanding that it be built underground. He is even blackmailing Taoyuan by threatening to stop payment of 10 billion NTD. In Keelung, Lin You-chang is demanding that the Taipei MRT Bannan Line be extended to Keelung. He wants to overturn the Executive Yuan’s original decision to extend the Xizhi Minsheng Line. How these two construction projects should proceed may be a matter of opinion. But the plans are subject to real world constraints, and most of all, by limited funds. If every project on Taiwan must be built to the highest standards and biggest budgets, where will the money come from? Won’t these plans sacrifice the interests of other communities?
Even more incredibly, Tu Hsing-che insists on changing the name of "Chueiyang Road" in Chiayi City to “Chen Cheng-po Avenue." Why? Because he considers the name “chuei yang” to be "prejudicial to masculine honor." Chuei Yang means “hanging poplar.” But Tu Hsing-che thinks it can be read as “non-erect phallus.” When Tu Hsing-che raised this issue before the election, his poll numbers plummeted. After the election everyone assumed the matter would be laid to rest. But Tu insists that the issue be the subject of a public referendum. Is changing the name of old streets really the highest priority?
The DPP is apparently on the verge of returning to power. But if the party princes blindly celebrate their victory by engaging in confrontation instead of winning people over through wise governance, they are being foolish indeed. In Tsai Ing-wen’s victory speech she said, "The people have given us their support. But it can be withdrawn at any time." She knows the final mile is the hardest. But are these county chiefs and city mayors too drunk with hubris to care?
綠營決以對抗模式慶祝勝選？
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.10 01:54 am
民進黨在這次選舉中豪取十三個縣市，加上柯文哲在首都的大勝，泛綠執政版圖大幅擴張。因執政黨的不得人心而暴得勝利，民進黨主席蔡英文並未被欣喜沖昏頭，表示「誠惶誠恐、如履薄冰」，並強調會以國民黨的失敗為警惕。然而，觀察選後一個多星期以來民進黨新科縣市長們的言行，卻似與此背道而馳。
老實說，分析這次選舉結果，固然可以說國民黨敗得一點都不冤枉，但是民進黨能宣稱自己贏得理直氣壯嗎？恐怕不然！原因無他，國民黨這次落得一敗塗地，主要是中央執政成績欠佳使民眾失望，讓許多人覺得「投不下去」；在這種情況下，民進黨若要宣稱自己做了什麼大獲民心之舉而贏得勝選，只怕會招來訕笑。
也因此，蔡英文對勝利當頭而保持審慎的低調，是正確的態度；因為她了解這只是一次民意對執政黨的倒戈，而不是全民對民進黨的心悅誠服。更何況，馬政府施政之難以施展，其實有很大成分是受到民進黨的激烈掣肘所致；這筆帳，這次選舉無法清算，並不表示下次選舉不會被提起。
然而，正當輿論全面檢討馬政府施政缺失之際，民進黨不少人卻抑不住勝利的狂喜，而不斷露出驕態，甚至表現出唯我獨尊的倨傲。最明顯的例子是，民進黨新科縣市首長勝選後的第一件事，不是向選民談如何為地方創造財富，而是集體向中央政府叫陣，揚言推動《財政收支劃分法》和《行政區劃法》的修法，向中央搶錢、搶權。
從政治面看，這是民進黨「以地方包圍中央」的一貫策略；但從經濟面看，這卻是地方政府「拙於生產、巧於爭錢」現象的進一步惡化。民進黨長期執政的一些縣市慣於濫用社福措施討好選民，卻又屢屢否決相關的建設開發，導致財政越來越困窘，債務越積越多，失業率越來越高。在這種情況下，各縣市若不開發經濟出路，一味想對中央政府趁火打劫，台灣的經濟和財政豈禁得起這樣「弱中央、強地方」的掠奪嗎？
民進黨勝選軍團另一項急如星火的聯合訴求，是呼籲「釋放陳水扁」。陳水扁的身體狀況是否能獲保外就醫的機會，理應經由專業的評估決定，但民進黨縣市長的訴求，甚至故意將扁案政治化，明示或暗示扁案是「不公平審判」的結果，是個「冤獄」。這種態度，是試圖用政治手段干預司法，並誤導民眾對正義的認知。
除了發起包圍中央的戰爭，泛綠新百里侯也開始以對抗的姿態，試圖推翻一些既定的建設計畫。最具代表性的例子，是柯文哲聯合宜蘭縣長林聰賢要求對四月核定的「北宜直鐵」路線翻案，要求採「最短路線」，為了搶八、九分鐘的時間，寧可賭上翡翠水庫的安全與品質。柯文哲自許聰明過人，他要質疑或推翻什麼都理直氣壯；但是，這些路線的規劃與選擇早已經過不同環境、地質、生態專家的多少次辯論，憑什麼一名外科醫師覺得自己的才智可以壓倒這些專家？
「北宜直鐵」遭到質疑並非特例，桃園和基隆也有類似情事。桃園市長當選人鄭文燦要求推翻已定案的「南桃鐵路高架化方案」，要求改採地下化，甚至不惜以停編桃園要負擔的一百億元為要脅。基隆的林右昌則堅持捷運延伸至基隆之規劃，必須改採「板南線延伸」，推翻由「汐止民生線」延伸的行政院原決定。這兩項建設要如何選擇，容或見仁見智，但除了計畫本身的條件及可行性，問題主要都在經費是否容許；試想，若全台各地都要求以最高預算執行最佳計畫，政府財政哪裡足夠支應？如此一來，豈不要犧牲其他地方的利益？
更令人匪夷所思的，是涂醒哲執意將嘉義市的「垂楊路」更名「陳澄波大道」，理由竟是垂楊二字「有損男性雄風」。涂醒哲在選前提出此議時，曾一度讓他的選情跌落谷底；選後各方認為此議可以休矣，但他竟然堅持將此案交付公投。改掉一個有歷史記憶的路名，真是施政優先重點嗎？
民進黨在「重返執政」的路上大勢看好，如果這些諸侯們一味採取「對抗模式」來慶祝勝利，而不是透過良性的「治理模式」來爭取人心，絕非明智的選擇。那天蔡英文在勝選演說中說：「人民給予我們的支持，也隨時可能被收回」；她知道最難的是最後一哩路，但那些狂傲的縣市長在乎嗎？
Tuesday, December 9, 2014
Monday, December 8, 2014
Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.
Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 9, 2014
Executive Summary: In 1997, the Republic of China Constitution was amended for the fourth time. This newspaper published a series of 58 articles entitled, "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.” Today all manner of calls for constitutional amendments are being heard. Clearly the constitution has been undermined by the past seven constitutional amendments. Today we reiterate our long held position. "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.”
Full Text Below:
In 1997, the Republic of China Constitution was amended for the fourth time. This newspaper published a series of 58 articles entitled, "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.” Today all manner of calls for constitutional amendments are being heard. Clearly the constitution has been undermined by the past seven constitutional amendments. Today we reiterate our long held position. "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.”
This newspaper originally advocated a cabinet system. Between 1991 and 2004, the Constitution was amended seven times. Those demanding the amendments claimed they were based on the French Fifth Republic’s “dual leadership system." This newspaper has consistently advocated four principles during these seven constitutional amendment processes. One. Presidents must be elected by an absolute majority. Two. Authority must correspond with responsibility. Three. The Legislative Yuan must retain the right to approve nominees for premier. Four. Depending on whether the president and premier belong to the same political party, executive power must automatically revert to the Premier. The above four principles are the four pillars of the French Fifth Republic’s system. The seven amendments to our constitution were touted as a replication of the French system. In fact, they destroyed these four pillars. This failed attempt at replication led to our current disaster.
These amendments created confusion in the institutional framework for authority and responsibility. The main reason was Taiwan's unique political character. The meaning of the constitution has long remained unclear. Who knows when it will be clarified? Space is limited. Therefore we will confine ourselves to only two of these unclear issues. One. National identity remains divided. Some support "one China, different interpretations." Others support "backdoor listing." Taiwan independence elements go so far as to say “Except for the electoral system, I do not recognize the constitution." As a result, the constitution gets no respect, and the constitutional amendment process becomes a political battleground. Two. Playing fast and loose with the constitution is a fundamental breach of the democratic process. Currently some advocate changing the "presidential system" to a "cabinet system." Note how the so-called "dual-leadership system" has morphed into a "presidential system" in the real world? This is a distortion of the political culture. Yet when the cabinet system is adopted, the green camp demands back room political deals and resorts to forcible occupations of the podium. This rides roughshod over the spirit of majority rule. Therefore what difference would it make if we adopted the cabinet system?
Therefore when calls for constitutional amendments are renewed, three things must be understood. One. What are the the pros and cons of the current system? What defects are buried in its structure? What scourges will the amendment process let loose? Two. What advantages if any, would a new Constitution offer? What disadvantages? We must not make things worse. Three. Seven constitutional amendment processes turned into power struggles. The current constitutional amendment process also shows signs of turning into a political struggle. For example, the KMT advocates the “dual leadership system." Some even advocate a cabinet system. The DPP originally advocated a cabinet system. Now it advocates a presidential system. Tsai Ing-wen would only touch on the issue of "mixed-member proportional representation, parallel voting." The past seven constitutional amendment processes have taught us a lesson. The constitutional amendment process is an opportunity for waging political struggles. The constitutional amendment process is not easy. It must not be undertaken lightly.
Consider first the pros and cons of the current system. Taiwan has been torn asunder by disagreements over cross-Strait relations and reunification vs. independence. Presidential elections have become defacto referenda. They have shown that a Taiwan First mindset has had a powerful impact on democracy and cross-Strait relations. This is precisely what a cabinet system finds difficult to cope with. Authority and responsibility remain unclear. As long as the President appoints a majority party legislative leader as premier, the result is likely to be executive power automatically reverting to the premier, and a "cabinet system style dual leadership system." Add to this calls to eliminate back room political deals and return to majority rule. Some even think the dual leadership system need not be eliminated. They think all that is needed is the amending of the constitution and improvements in its implementation.
Consider the political calculations behind the constitutional amendment process. The advantage of the cabinet system is its flexibility. The flipside is that political currents are changeable, and cabinets lack longevity. This is confirmed by the painful experience of Japan. Furthermore, in most cabinet systems the Premier is the Chief Executive, therefore also the head of state. Britain, Japan, Thailand, and the British Commonwealth all have hereditary monarchs as figureheads. Therefore they are more stable. If Taiwan wants a cabinet system, will it also have a president? How would such a system be established? Could a president legally and realistically be relegated to a figurehead? People on Taiwan remain divided on the question of national identity. Suppose the the president supports Taiwan independence while the cabinet opposes Taiwan independence? How will they rule? Taiwan has essentially adopted a presidential system. Changing the role of the president requires more than merely changing some constitutional provisions.
In particular, under the current constitution the executive power and the elected legislature are distinct from each other. This has become an important firewall against political corruption. Years of corruption cases have shown us that campaign contributions can easily be used to bribe Chief Executives. The cabinet system links elections, political contributions, administrative power, and political bribery. This could lead to intolerable violations of government ethics.
Some advocate increasing the number of legislators and "mixed-member proportional representation. with parallel voting." Such calls are commonplace. But the political spectrum for elected representatives on Taiwan has long been indistinguishable from the political spectrum for public policy. Candidates invariably fall somewhere on the reunification vs. independence, blue vs. green political policy spectrum. The New Party was followed by the PFP. The TAIP was followed by the TSU, then by the Taiwan Citizen Union. Do these distinctions further constitutional interests or not? Furthermore, if the number of legislators is increased, voting district must be shrunk. if smaller voting districts elect legislators who become cabinet ministers, will these legislators become cabinet leaders, or obedient puppets?
Finally, we must clarify the relationship between the parties in this political struggle. Is the motive long-term stability and constitutional justice? Or are constitutional amendment processes merely opportunities to engage in political struggle? The nation has endured seven constitutional amendments in 13 years. Do we really need to relive the nightmare of constitutional amendments designed to destroy the constitution?
修憲，不可再毀憲！
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.09 02:54 am
一九九七年第四次修憲期間，本報發表《修憲，不可毀憲》系列社論五十八篇；如今，種種修憲主張又起，可見此部憲法確因過去七次修憲受到毀傷，而我們今天的看法仍是：「修憲，勿再毀憲！」
本報原本主張內閣制，唯一九九一年至二○○四年的七次修憲，宣稱是以法國第五共和「雙首長制」為範本，因此本報對七次修憲的一貫主張有四：一、總統選舉應採絕對多數制；二、權責相副；三、不宜取消立法院的閣揆同意權；四、視總統與閣揆是否同屬一個政黨，採行政權換軌制。以上四項，皆法國第五共和憲法的樑柱，而我國七次修憲宣稱仿襲法制，卻拆毀此四樑柱，遂致畫虎不成，貽禍至今。
憲政混亂至此，除了前述體制架構的錯亂以致中樞權責不明以外，主要又因台灣政治文化的特異，以致憲政久陷混濁，河清無日。篇幅所限，僅舉二端：一、國家認同呈撕裂狀態，有人「一中各表」，有人「借殼上市」，獨派甚至稱「除了選舉制度外，不承認這部憲法」，因此憲法的尊嚴無以確立，修憲亦成政治鬥爭的平台。二、憲政操作根本違反民主法則，今日有主張改「總統制」為「內閣制」者（「雙首長制」竟然在實際運作中變成了「總統制」，此即政治文化造成的變體），但若改行「內閣制」，卻仍採「政黨協商」及「霸占主席台」的運作，完全違反「多數主治」的精神，則改成內閣制又有何用？
因而，在修憲之議再起時，必須先弄清三件事：一、現制的利弊何在？架構形成的缺陷是什麼？操作引發的禍害又是什麼？二、新憲的必然優點是什麼？或然的缺點又是什麼？不要愈修愈糟糕。三、七次修憲淪為政治權力鬥爭的平台，這次修憲呼聲亦現鬥爭端倪。例如，國民黨主張「雙首長制」，如今有人改推「內閣制」；而民進黨原有「內閣制」的主張，今又改持「總統制」，蔡英文甚至只願碰「聯立制／並立制」的問題。鑑於過去七次修憲的教訓，倘未廓清「以修憲為政治鬥爭平台」的權謀思維，非徒修憲不易，更不可輕言修憲。
先略論現制的利弊何在。在統獨撕裂及兩岸關係成為國政主體的台灣，總統直選儼然已成某種形式的「全民公投」，這對凸顯台灣主體性、反映民主及平衡節制兩岸關係有重大效能，而這卻恰是內閣制難以匹比之處。至於中樞權責不明，只要由總統建立「任命國會多數為行政院長」的體制，即可能形成「行政權換軌制」及「傾內閣制的雙首長制」。再加上廢止「政黨協商」的操作，即可回復「多數主治」的原則。甚至有一種看法是，「雙首長制」其實未必要廢，只需藉修憲及端正操作加以改善。
再簡論修憲新制的利害。內閣制的優點在政府的去留較靈活，但從相對的角度看，即是政潮洶湧，內閣不長命，此從日本的痛苦經驗即可印證。再者，一般內閣制，閣揆為行政首長，因此仍設國家元首。英、日、泰及大英國協，皆以世襲君主為虛位元首，因此較為穩定。台灣若行內閣制，要不要另設總統？要如何設？總統在法制上及現實政治上有無可能完全「虛位」？且台灣畢竟在國家認同上尚處撕裂狀態，如果是「獨總統／非獨內閣」，如何左右共治？再者，台灣已然形成「總統制」的政治氛圍，則改變總統角色絕非只是改個憲法條文就能辦到的事。
尤其，現行憲法將行政權與經由選舉產生的立法院作出區隔，這對政治清廉成為重要的防火牆。從這些年來的貪腐案件可知，選舉時期的政治獻金關係，極易轉為對行政首長的賄賂行為，而內閣制若將「選舉／政治獻金／行政權／政治賄賂」連成一線，可能導致政府操守不堪聞問。
另有主張增加立委名額及重新斟酌「聯立制／並立制」者，皆不無見地。但台灣的民意代表光譜一向難用公共政策來區別，最後皆落在統獨藍綠的光譜上，如新黨後又有親民黨，又如建國黨後又有台聯再有公民組合，此種區分究竟是否符合憲政利益？再者，增加立委名額，即表示選區要再縮小；而若在愈來愈小的選區中選出立法委員，而要這些立委成為內閣制的閣員大臣，會不會令人不寒而慄？
最後，必須廓清各方主張修憲的政治鬥爭關係。如果不是真正為憲政正義的長治久安而修憲，而只是想藉修憲作為政治鬥爭的平台；國家曾因十三年七次修憲而創鉅痛深，難道還要重演「修憲以致再次毀憲」的噩夢？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 9, 2014
Executive Summary: In 1997, the Republic of China Constitution was amended for the fourth time. This newspaper published a series of 58 articles entitled, "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.” Today all manner of calls for constitutional amendments are being heard. Clearly the constitution has been undermined by the past seven constitutional amendments. Today we reiterate our long held position. "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.”
Full Text Below:
In 1997, the Republic of China Constitution was amended for the fourth time. This newspaper published a series of 58 articles entitled, "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.” Today all manner of calls for constitutional amendments are being heard. Clearly the constitution has been undermined by the past seven constitutional amendments. Today we reiterate our long held position. "Amend the Constitution. Do Not Destroy It.”
This newspaper originally advocated a cabinet system. Between 1991 and 2004, the Constitution was amended seven times. Those demanding the amendments claimed they were based on the French Fifth Republic’s “dual leadership system." This newspaper has consistently advocated four principles during these seven constitutional amendment processes. One. Presidents must be elected by an absolute majority. Two. Authority must correspond with responsibility. Three. The Legislative Yuan must retain the right to approve nominees for premier. Four. Depending on whether the president and premier belong to the same political party, executive power must automatically revert to the Premier. The above four principles are the four pillars of the French Fifth Republic’s system. The seven amendments to our constitution were touted as a replication of the French system. In fact, they destroyed these four pillars. This failed attempt at replication led to our current disaster.
These amendments created confusion in the institutional framework for authority and responsibility. The main reason was Taiwan's unique political character. The meaning of the constitution has long remained unclear. Who knows when it will be clarified? Space is limited. Therefore we will confine ourselves to only two of these unclear issues. One. National identity remains divided. Some support "one China, different interpretations." Others support "backdoor listing." Taiwan independence elements go so far as to say “Except for the electoral system, I do not recognize the constitution." As a result, the constitution gets no respect, and the constitutional amendment process becomes a political battleground. Two. Playing fast and loose with the constitution is a fundamental breach of the democratic process. Currently some advocate changing the "presidential system" to a "cabinet system." Note how the so-called "dual-leadership system" has morphed into a "presidential system" in the real world? This is a distortion of the political culture. Yet when the cabinet system is adopted, the green camp demands back room political deals and resorts to forcible occupations of the podium. This rides roughshod over the spirit of majority rule. Therefore what difference would it make if we adopted the cabinet system?
Therefore when calls for constitutional amendments are renewed, three things must be understood. One. What are the the pros and cons of the current system? What defects are buried in its structure? What scourges will the amendment process let loose? Two. What advantages if any, would a new Constitution offer? What disadvantages? We must not make things worse. Three. Seven constitutional amendment processes turned into power struggles. The current constitutional amendment process also shows signs of turning into a political struggle. For example, the KMT advocates the “dual leadership system." Some even advocate a cabinet system. The DPP originally advocated a cabinet system. Now it advocates a presidential system. Tsai Ing-wen would only touch on the issue of "mixed-member proportional representation, parallel voting." The past seven constitutional amendment processes have taught us a lesson. The constitutional amendment process is an opportunity for waging political struggles. The constitutional amendment process is not easy. It must not be undertaken lightly.
Consider first the pros and cons of the current system. Taiwan has been torn asunder by disagreements over cross-Strait relations and reunification vs. independence. Presidential elections have become defacto referenda. They have shown that a Taiwan First mindset has had a powerful impact on democracy and cross-Strait relations. This is precisely what a cabinet system finds difficult to cope with. Authority and responsibility remain unclear. As long as the President appoints a majority party legislative leader as premier, the result is likely to be executive power automatically reverting to the premier, and a "cabinet system style dual leadership system." Add to this calls to eliminate back room political deals and return to majority rule. Some even think the dual leadership system need not be eliminated. They think all that is needed is the amending of the constitution and improvements in its implementation.
Consider the political calculations behind the constitutional amendment process. The advantage of the cabinet system is its flexibility. The flipside is that political currents are changeable, and cabinets lack longevity. This is confirmed by the painful experience of Japan. Furthermore, in most cabinet systems the Premier is the Chief Executive, therefore also the head of state. Britain, Japan, Thailand, and the British Commonwealth all have hereditary monarchs as figureheads. Therefore they are more stable. If Taiwan wants a cabinet system, will it also have a president? How would such a system be established? Could a president legally and realistically be relegated to a figurehead? People on Taiwan remain divided on the question of national identity. Suppose the the president supports Taiwan independence while the cabinet opposes Taiwan independence? How will they rule? Taiwan has essentially adopted a presidential system. Changing the role of the president requires more than merely changing some constitutional provisions.
In particular, under the current constitution the executive power and the elected legislature are distinct from each other. This has become an important firewall against political corruption. Years of corruption cases have shown us that campaign contributions can easily be used to bribe Chief Executives. The cabinet system links elections, political contributions, administrative power, and political bribery. This could lead to intolerable violations of government ethics.
Some advocate increasing the number of legislators and "mixed-member proportional representation. with parallel voting." Such calls are commonplace. But the political spectrum for elected representatives on Taiwan has long been indistinguishable from the political spectrum for public policy. Candidates invariably fall somewhere on the reunification vs. independence, blue vs. green political policy spectrum. The New Party was followed by the PFP. The TAIP was followed by the TSU, then by the Taiwan Citizen Union. Do these distinctions further constitutional interests or not? Furthermore, if the number of legislators is increased, voting district must be shrunk. if smaller voting districts elect legislators who become cabinet ministers, will these legislators become cabinet leaders, or obedient puppets?
Finally, we must clarify the relationship between the parties in this political struggle. Is the motive long-term stability and constitutional justice? Or are constitutional amendment processes merely opportunities to engage in political struggle? The nation has endured seven constitutional amendments in 13 years. Do we really need to relive the nightmare of constitutional amendments designed to destroy the constitution?
修憲，不可再毀憲！
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.09 02:54 am
一九九七年第四次修憲期間，本報發表《修憲，不可毀憲》系列社論五十八篇；如今，種種修憲主張又起，可見此部憲法確因過去七次修憲受到毀傷，而我們今天的看法仍是：「修憲，勿再毀憲！」
本報原本主張內閣制，唯一九九一年至二○○四年的七次修憲，宣稱是以法國第五共和「雙首長制」為範本，因此本報對七次修憲的一貫主張有四：一、總統選舉應採絕對多數制；二、權責相副；三、不宜取消立法院的閣揆同意權；四、視總統與閣揆是否同屬一個政黨，採行政權換軌制。以上四項，皆法國第五共和憲法的樑柱，而我國七次修憲宣稱仿襲法制，卻拆毀此四樑柱，遂致畫虎不成，貽禍至今。
憲政混亂至此，除了前述體制架構的錯亂以致中樞權責不明以外，主要又因台灣政治文化的特異，以致憲政久陷混濁，河清無日。篇幅所限，僅舉二端：一、國家認同呈撕裂狀態，有人「一中各表」，有人「借殼上市」，獨派甚至稱「除了選舉制度外，不承認這部憲法」，因此憲法的尊嚴無以確立，修憲亦成政治鬥爭的平台。二、憲政操作根本違反民主法則，今日有主張改「總統制」為「內閣制」者（「雙首長制」竟然在實際運作中變成了「總統制」，此即政治文化造成的變體），但若改行「內閣制」，卻仍採「政黨協商」及「霸占主席台」的運作，完全違反「多數主治」的精神，則改成內閣制又有何用？
因而，在修憲之議再起時，必須先弄清三件事：一、現制的利弊何在？架構形成的缺陷是什麼？操作引發的禍害又是什麼？二、新憲的必然優點是什麼？或然的缺點又是什麼？不要愈修愈糟糕。三、七次修憲淪為政治權力鬥爭的平台，這次修憲呼聲亦現鬥爭端倪。例如，國民黨主張「雙首長制」，如今有人改推「內閣制」；而民進黨原有「內閣制」的主張，今又改持「總統制」，蔡英文甚至只願碰「聯立制／並立制」的問題。鑑於過去七次修憲的教訓，倘未廓清「以修憲為政治鬥爭平台」的權謀思維，非徒修憲不易，更不可輕言修憲。
先略論現制的利弊何在。在統獨撕裂及兩岸關係成為國政主體的台灣，總統直選儼然已成某種形式的「全民公投」，這對凸顯台灣主體性、反映民主及平衡節制兩岸關係有重大效能，而這卻恰是內閣制難以匹比之處。至於中樞權責不明，只要由總統建立「任命國會多數為行政院長」的體制，即可能形成「行政權換軌制」及「傾內閣制的雙首長制」。再加上廢止「政黨協商」的操作，即可回復「多數主治」的原則。甚至有一種看法是，「雙首長制」其實未必要廢，只需藉修憲及端正操作加以改善。
再簡論修憲新制的利害。內閣制的優點在政府的去留較靈活，但從相對的角度看，即是政潮洶湧，內閣不長命，此從日本的痛苦經驗即可印證。再者，一般內閣制，閣揆為行政首長，因此仍設國家元首。英、日、泰及大英國協，皆以世襲君主為虛位元首，因此較為穩定。台灣若行內閣制，要不要另設總統？要如何設？總統在法制上及現實政治上有無可能完全「虛位」？且台灣畢竟在國家認同上尚處撕裂狀態，如果是「獨總統／非獨內閣」，如何左右共治？再者，台灣已然形成「總統制」的政治氛圍，則改變總統角色絕非只是改個憲法條文就能辦到的事。
尤其，現行憲法將行政權與經由選舉產生的立法院作出區隔，這對政治清廉成為重要的防火牆。從這些年來的貪腐案件可知，選舉時期的政治獻金關係，極易轉為對行政首長的賄賂行為，而內閣制若將「選舉／政治獻金／行政權／政治賄賂」連成一線，可能導致政府操守不堪聞問。
另有主張增加立委名額及重新斟酌「聯立制／並立制」者，皆不無見地。但台灣的民意代表光譜一向難用公共政策來區別，最後皆落在統獨藍綠的光譜上，如新黨後又有親民黨，又如建國黨後又有台聯再有公民組合，此種區分究竟是否符合憲政利益？再者，增加立委名額，即表示選區要再縮小；而若在愈來愈小的選區中選出立法委員，而要這些立委成為內閣制的閣員大臣，會不會令人不寒而慄？
最後，必須廓清各方主張修憲的政治鬥爭關係。如果不是真正為憲政正義的長治久安而修憲，而只是想藉修憲作為政治鬥爭的平台；國家曾因十三年七次修憲而創鉅痛深，難道還要重演「修憲以致再次毀憲」的噩夢？
Sunday, December 7, 2014
Youth Power: Wanjun vs. Xiaocao
Youth Power: Wanjun vs. Xiaocao
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 8, 2014
Executive Summary: Taiwan has a problem with justice. The basic problem is that the "class gap" is wider than the "generational gap." This is something the young generation must realize. During the recent election, the people got a taste of "youth power," full force. The "Wanjun" and "Xiaocao" streams showed that new generation discontent must be translated into political participation. Only then will young people be able to improve their lot.
Full Text Below:
Observers of the nine in one elections underestimated the power of the younger generation in every way, from the propaganda offensive to voter mobilization. The younger generation had a profound impact on the election results. This emerging “youth power” participated in the recent elections, and includes two streams. One stream is the "Wanjun" or “Cyber Army,” which actively aired its views online. The other is the “Minzhu Xiaocao” stream, which used the election campaigns to infiltrate existing political parties at the grassroots level. Each stream has its own agenda. The long-term impact of the latter stream is likely to be substantial.
Wen-Je Ko won the enthusiastic support of many netizens. The younger generation used social networking to demand Ma Ying-jeou's ouster. It also opposed power elites. This won it considerable support. The Internet generation's alternative mobilization techniques persuaded many young people at the grassroots level to stand up and be counted. For example, Chen Jiheng, the newly elected Mayor of Chichi, in Nantou County, is a 30-something with a tech industry background. He ran on the ticket of the “Tree Party,” which split from the Green Party only three months ago. He was swept right into office. The Green Party won two council member seats. One candidate was the youngest person ever elected on Taiwan, 26-year-old Wang Hao-yu. He received the second highest number of votes among Taoyuan City council candidates. A mere doctoral candidate, Chou Chiang-jie, was also elected to the Hsinchu County Council.
Nor was that all. The DPP's “Minzhu Xiaocao”(democratic grassroots) plan backed many young candidates for alderman. Forty-seven candidates were fielded. They won nine alderman races in six municipalities, and six more village and township races in other counties and municipalities. These “grassroots” candidates may constitute a small percentage of the larger political scene. But the younger generation is willing to work its way up from arid this nutrient-deprived grassroots level. By constantly planting new shoots, they may subvert the traditional model for grassroots politics. Over time, they may flourish. From this perspective, the development is cause for optimism. This of course is something the KMT must also do.
In recent years, one protest has followed on the heels of another. The Ta Pu protests were followed by protests against urban renewal and the death of Hung Chung-chiu, and more recently by protests staged by the Sunflower Student Movement. Various social movements on Taiwan claim to be fighting on behalf of justice. The front lines are often manned by members of the younger generation. They have raised the banner of "generational justice." They are reminiscent of surging youth demonstrations the world over, including the Jasmine Revolution and the Wall Street movement. All of these involve generational tensions rooted in globalization. Taiwan has not been spared. The election results were an outbreak of accumulated youth anger.
On the surface, the ability of these “Wanjun” to set the agenda by pounding away on their keyboards all day is immense. The rapidity with which they can spread ideas by social networking is amazing. The anger in their hearts is real. But on a deeper level, The Wanjun are emotional, and lack restraint. They often behave irrationally. They lack the insight required to cope with the inevitable frustrations one encounters in real life. Therefore when the government confronts this "youth power," it must do more than just listen to their demands. It must help them overcome their anger. It must help them understand the nature of society. It must help them solve social problems. It must help them understand life. It must help them find a new direction for the nation. All these are essential.
Chang San-cheng is about to take over the post of deputy premier. He says his administration will heed the "Wanjun." But he must remember that the government cannot merely implement some "little things that make us happy” style measures. That will not win over the Internet generation. That will not help one recruit a vast Cyber Army. That will not tame the new generation. If Chang attempts that, he will be barking up the wrong tree. Any effect is likely to be negative. The key is not Cyber Army wildfires. The key is real world generational contradictions. The government must implement generational transition. It must solve economic, social, and political generational conflicts. Only that offers a root cure.
The new generation faces lost opportunities due to changing times. The younger generation hides out in cyberspace venting its anger and frustrations. Either that, or it takes to the streets and protests. In fact, it would be better if they participated in the political process and sought reform. They might have a greater impact. During the recent election, the KMT did nothing. As a result it suffered a major defeat. The DPP also did nothing. Yet it enjoyed a major victory. This shows that democracy has seriously malfunctioned. Where does the problem lie? Does the political and economic system need a major course change? Does the national resource allocation system need to be be realigned? Only by allowing new blood into politics, can one find a solution. From this point of view, "Minzhu Xiaocao" sowing seeds at the grass roots, means a great deal.
Taiwan has a problem with justice. The basic problem is that the "class gap" is wider than the "generational gap." This is something the young generation must realize. During the recent election, the people got a taste of "youth power," full force. The "Wanjun" and "Xiaocao" streams showed that new generation discontent must be translated into political participation. Only then will young people be able to improve their lot.
青勢力：解讀「婉君」和「小草」的分流
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.08 02:08 am
九合一選舉，從文宣攻防到投票動員，年輕世代的力量不可小覷，也對選舉結果產生了深刻影響。若將這股力量稱為「青勢力」，青年世代的政治參與在這次選舉中出現兩股分流：一股是活躍在輿論表層的「婉君」（網軍），另一股則是藉選舉潛入政治基層的「民主小草」，兩者各有目標，而後者的長期影響將更可觀。
這次選舉，不僅柯文哲獲得了網友的狂熱支持，青年世代透過社群網站呼籲倒馬、反權貴，也收到了可觀的效果。除此之外，網路世代的另類動員，也促成了一些年輕素人在基層的出線。例如，南投縣集集鎮選出的新鎮長，是年方卅、科技業出身的陳紀衡，他披的是三個月前才從綠黨分裂的「樹黨」戰袍，一舉當選。此外，綠黨這次也誕生了兩名議員，包括全台最年輕的當選人——廿六歲的王浩宇，以第二高票當選桃園市議員；以及仍就讀博士班的周江杰，當選新竹縣議員。
不僅如此，民進黨號召青年競選里長的「民主小草」計畫，共推出四十七名候選人，結果拿下六都的九個里長以及其他縣市的六個鄉鎮民代表。在整個政治的大盤中，這些「小草」所占的比率雖然不高，但年輕世代願意從養分貧瘠的基層開拓耕耘，藉由不斷植入較新穎的理念，應能持續顛覆台灣傳統的基層政治經營模式，久而久之，或許能產生開枝散葉的效果。從這點看，是值得樂觀的發展，這當然也是國民黨必須警惕的事。
近幾年，從大埔事件到都更抗爭，從洪仲丘事件到太陽花學運，台灣社會各項訴諸正義的抗爭，前線的戰鬥主力屢屢由新世代擔綱，擎起了「世代正義」的大旗。這和世界風起雲湧的青年示威、茉莉花革命，乃至占領華爾街運動一樣，都是全球化衝擊引發世代緊張的一環，台灣亦未倖免。這次的選舉結果，正是這股青年憤怒積累之後的總爆發。
從表層看，網路上這些成天敲著鍵盤沸沸揚揚的各路「婉君」，他們創造議題的能力是強大的，他們透過社群網路散播訊息的速度是驚人的，他們心中的憤怒也是極真實的。但深一層看，這些婉君們宣洩情緒的方式是缺乏節制的，他們探討問題的方式有時流於非理性，他們面對生命、處理挫折的態度則是不太瞻前顧後的。也因此，政府面對這股「青勢力」，除了呼應他們的想法與需要，如何引導他們走出憤怒的循環，如何讓他們透過參與了解社會問題的本質和解決之道，如何提升他們看待人生及國家格局的眼光，恐怕都不可或缺。
也因此，當即將接任副閣揆的張善政提到未來施政將把「婉君」和年輕人放在心上時，他必須意識到，政府不能只是提出一些「小確幸」措施，就想要籠絡網路世代；或以為培養一支網路大軍，就能馴服新世代。如果那樣的話，不僅是抓錯處方開錯藥，可能更收到反效果。關鍵不在「婉君」的喧囂野火，而在現實的世代矛盾；政府必須正視價值與實踐的世代遷移，並設法解決經濟、社會、政治各層面的世代矛盾，才是根本之道。
再回到新世代的立場看，面對自己因時代變化而流失的機會，年輕族群與其躲在網路自艾自怨，或游擊於街頭抗議發洩情緒，不如進入政治親自尋求體制的改革力量，或許能產生更大的能量。這次選舉，國民黨因缺乏作為而大敗，民進黨因缺乏作為而大勝，都顯示民主政治已面臨嚴重的功能性障礙。其中癥結，究竟是政經制度需要徹底改弦更張，或者是國家資源分配制度必須重新調整，只有讓更多新血投入政治，才能發現解決之道。從這點看，「民主小草」的植根基層，便具有更積極的意義。
台灣的正義課題，基本上是「階級差距」大過「世代差距」，這是年輕世代必須認清的方向。這次選舉，人們已領略了「青勢力」的奔放，而從「婉君」與「小草」的分流看，新世代浮泛的不滿若能轉為實際的政治參與，應更有助改善青年自身的處境。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 8, 2014
Executive Summary: Taiwan has a problem with justice. The basic problem is that the "class gap" is wider than the "generational gap." This is something the young generation must realize. During the recent election, the people got a taste of "youth power," full force. The "Wanjun" and "Xiaocao" streams showed that new generation discontent must be translated into political participation. Only then will young people be able to improve their lot.
Full Text Below:
Observers of the nine in one elections underestimated the power of the younger generation in every way, from the propaganda offensive to voter mobilization. The younger generation had a profound impact on the election results. This emerging “youth power” participated in the recent elections, and includes two streams. One stream is the "Wanjun" or “Cyber Army,” which actively aired its views online. The other is the “Minzhu Xiaocao” stream, which used the election campaigns to infiltrate existing political parties at the grassroots level. Each stream has its own agenda. The long-term impact of the latter stream is likely to be substantial.
Wen-Je Ko won the enthusiastic support of many netizens. The younger generation used social networking to demand Ma Ying-jeou's ouster. It also opposed power elites. This won it considerable support. The Internet generation's alternative mobilization techniques persuaded many young people at the grassroots level to stand up and be counted. For example, Chen Jiheng, the newly elected Mayor of Chichi, in Nantou County, is a 30-something with a tech industry background. He ran on the ticket of the “Tree Party,” which split from the Green Party only three months ago. He was swept right into office. The Green Party won two council member seats. One candidate was the youngest person ever elected on Taiwan, 26-year-old Wang Hao-yu. He received the second highest number of votes among Taoyuan City council candidates. A mere doctoral candidate, Chou Chiang-jie, was also elected to the Hsinchu County Council.
Nor was that all. The DPP's “Minzhu Xiaocao”(democratic grassroots) plan backed many young candidates for alderman. Forty-seven candidates were fielded. They won nine alderman races in six municipalities, and six more village and township races in other counties and municipalities. These “grassroots” candidates may constitute a small percentage of the larger political scene. But the younger generation is willing to work its way up from arid this nutrient-deprived grassroots level. By constantly planting new shoots, they may subvert the traditional model for grassroots politics. Over time, they may flourish. From this perspective, the development is cause for optimism. This of course is something the KMT must also do.
In recent years, one protest has followed on the heels of another. The Ta Pu protests were followed by protests against urban renewal and the death of Hung Chung-chiu, and more recently by protests staged by the Sunflower Student Movement. Various social movements on Taiwan claim to be fighting on behalf of justice. The front lines are often manned by members of the younger generation. They have raised the banner of "generational justice." They are reminiscent of surging youth demonstrations the world over, including the Jasmine Revolution and the Wall Street movement. All of these involve generational tensions rooted in globalization. Taiwan has not been spared. The election results were an outbreak of accumulated youth anger.
On the surface, the ability of these “Wanjun” to set the agenda by pounding away on their keyboards all day is immense. The rapidity with which they can spread ideas by social networking is amazing. The anger in their hearts is real. But on a deeper level, The Wanjun are emotional, and lack restraint. They often behave irrationally. They lack the insight required to cope with the inevitable frustrations one encounters in real life. Therefore when the government confronts this "youth power," it must do more than just listen to their demands. It must help them overcome their anger. It must help them understand the nature of society. It must help them solve social problems. It must help them understand life. It must help them find a new direction for the nation. All these are essential.
Chang San-cheng is about to take over the post of deputy premier. He says his administration will heed the "Wanjun." But he must remember that the government cannot merely implement some "little things that make us happy” style measures. That will not win over the Internet generation. That will not help one recruit a vast Cyber Army. That will not tame the new generation. If Chang attempts that, he will be barking up the wrong tree. Any effect is likely to be negative. The key is not Cyber Army wildfires. The key is real world generational contradictions. The government must implement generational transition. It must solve economic, social, and political generational conflicts. Only that offers a root cure.
The new generation faces lost opportunities due to changing times. The younger generation hides out in cyberspace venting its anger and frustrations. Either that, or it takes to the streets and protests. In fact, it would be better if they participated in the political process and sought reform. They might have a greater impact. During the recent election, the KMT did nothing. As a result it suffered a major defeat. The DPP also did nothing. Yet it enjoyed a major victory. This shows that democracy has seriously malfunctioned. Where does the problem lie? Does the political and economic system need a major course change? Does the national resource allocation system need to be be realigned? Only by allowing new blood into politics, can one find a solution. From this point of view, "Minzhu Xiaocao" sowing seeds at the grass roots, means a great deal.
Taiwan has a problem with justice. The basic problem is that the "class gap" is wider than the "generational gap." This is something the young generation must realize. During the recent election, the people got a taste of "youth power," full force. The "Wanjun" and "Xiaocao" streams showed that new generation discontent must be translated into political participation. Only then will young people be able to improve their lot.
青勢力：解讀「婉君」和「小草」的分流
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.08 02:08 am
九合一選舉，從文宣攻防到投票動員，年輕世代的力量不可小覷，也對選舉結果產生了深刻影響。若將這股力量稱為「青勢力」，青年世代的政治參與在這次選舉中出現兩股分流：一股是活躍在輿論表層的「婉君」（網軍），另一股則是藉選舉潛入政治基層的「民主小草」，兩者各有目標，而後者的長期影響將更可觀。
這次選舉，不僅柯文哲獲得了網友的狂熱支持，青年世代透過社群網站呼籲倒馬、反權貴，也收到了可觀的效果。除此之外，網路世代的另類動員，也促成了一些年輕素人在基層的出線。例如，南投縣集集鎮選出的新鎮長，是年方卅、科技業出身的陳紀衡，他披的是三個月前才從綠黨分裂的「樹黨」戰袍，一舉當選。此外，綠黨這次也誕生了兩名議員，包括全台最年輕的當選人——廿六歲的王浩宇，以第二高票當選桃園市議員；以及仍就讀博士班的周江杰，當選新竹縣議員。
不僅如此，民進黨號召青年競選里長的「民主小草」計畫，共推出四十七名候選人，結果拿下六都的九個里長以及其他縣市的六個鄉鎮民代表。在整個政治的大盤中，這些「小草」所占的比率雖然不高，但年輕世代願意從養分貧瘠的基層開拓耕耘，藉由不斷植入較新穎的理念，應能持續顛覆台灣傳統的基層政治經營模式，久而久之，或許能產生開枝散葉的效果。從這點看，是值得樂觀的發展，這當然也是國民黨必須警惕的事。
近幾年，從大埔事件到都更抗爭，從洪仲丘事件到太陽花學運，台灣社會各項訴諸正義的抗爭，前線的戰鬥主力屢屢由新世代擔綱，擎起了「世代正義」的大旗。這和世界風起雲湧的青年示威、茉莉花革命，乃至占領華爾街運動一樣，都是全球化衝擊引發世代緊張的一環，台灣亦未倖免。這次的選舉結果，正是這股青年憤怒積累之後的總爆發。
從表層看，網路上這些成天敲著鍵盤沸沸揚揚的各路「婉君」，他們創造議題的能力是強大的，他們透過社群網路散播訊息的速度是驚人的，他們心中的憤怒也是極真實的。但深一層看，這些婉君們宣洩情緒的方式是缺乏節制的，他們探討問題的方式有時流於非理性，他們面對生命、處理挫折的態度則是不太瞻前顧後的。也因此，政府面對這股「青勢力」，除了呼應他們的想法與需要，如何引導他們走出憤怒的循環，如何讓他們透過參與了解社會問題的本質和解決之道，如何提升他們看待人生及國家格局的眼光，恐怕都不可或缺。
也因此，當即將接任副閣揆的張善政提到未來施政將把「婉君」和年輕人放在心上時，他必須意識到，政府不能只是提出一些「小確幸」措施，就想要籠絡網路世代；或以為培養一支網路大軍，就能馴服新世代。如果那樣的話，不僅是抓錯處方開錯藥，可能更收到反效果。關鍵不在「婉君」的喧囂野火，而在現實的世代矛盾；政府必須正視價值與實踐的世代遷移，並設法解決經濟、社會、政治各層面的世代矛盾，才是根本之道。
再回到新世代的立場看，面對自己因時代變化而流失的機會，年輕族群與其躲在網路自艾自怨，或游擊於街頭抗議發洩情緒，不如進入政治親自尋求體制的改革力量，或許能產生更大的能量。這次選舉，國民黨因缺乏作為而大敗，民進黨因缺乏作為而大勝，都顯示民主政治已面臨嚴重的功能性障礙。其中癥結，究竟是政經制度需要徹底改弦更張，或者是國家資源分配制度必須重新調整，只有讓更多新血投入政治，才能發現解決之道。從這點看，「民主小草」的植根基層，便具有更積極的意義。
台灣的正義課題，基本上是「階級差距」大過「世代差距」，這是年輕世代必須認清的方向。這次選舉，人們已領略了「青勢力」的奔放，而從「婉君」與「小草」的分流看，新世代浮泛的不滿若能轉為實際的政治參與，應更有助改善青年自身的處境。
Thursday, December 4, 2014
DPP: From the Nation’s Adversary to the Nation’s Defender
DPP: From the Nation’s Adversary to the Nation’s Defender
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 5, 2014
Executive Summary: Wen-Je Ko said, "The Republic of China is the bottom line." Tsai Ing-wen and many DPP leaders have said something similar. But they usually mean that the name "Republic of China," is all that remains of the Republic of China. We hope that during the upcoming 2016 presidential election, the DPP will hold aloft the red, white, and blue ROC flag, and show its support for a "Republic of China that includes Taiwan." An "ROC that includes the DPP" is the DPP's way out. It is also Taiwan’s way out.
Full Text Below:
Wen-Je Ko said, "The Republic of China is the bottom line." Tsai Ing-wen and many DPP leaders have said something similar. But they usually mean that the name "Republic of China," is all that remains of the Republic of China.
Tsai Ing-wen said that her “Republic of China” includes Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. It includes the Tamsui River and the Cho Shui Creek. She said that Ma Ying-jeou’s Republic of China, on the other hand, includes the Yangtze River, Yellow River, and Heilongjiang River. Chen Shui-bian wanted to rewrite the history textbooks. He wanted to make Chinese history part of foreign history, and redefine Sun Yat-sen as a foreigner. Such a "Republic of China," that would excise Sun Yat-sen and the Yangtze River, yet retain the name "Republic of China," is nothing more than "backdoor listing."
Taiwan independence theory initially repudiated the ROC. It referred to the Republic of China as a "foreign government." Its goal was to "found a Republic of Taiwan." But global conditions changed. Taiwan independence advocates began to argue that "Taiwan is a sovereign country. Its current name is the Republic of China." That is what is known as "backdoor listing."
This change in Taiwan independence strategy was understandable. Taiwan independence advocates initially hoped to found a Republic of Taiwan and overthrow the Republic of China, severing all connection with "China." They assumed this would prevent annexation by the People's Republic of China. But global developments showed that the “rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution” would put Taiwan in danger. They realized that the "Republic of China" provided a strategic barrier for Taiwan. So they reverted to the term "Republic of China," but adopted a "backdoor listing" strategy. This is what they mean when they say "The ROC is the bottom line." Therefore when the DPP, which purports to defend the ROC, holds political rallies, not a single ROC flag can be seen.
Taiwan independence theory defines the relationship between "Taiwan" and the "Republic of China" in "four stages." Stage 1. The Republic of China is on the Mainland. Stage 2. The Republic of China arrives on Taiwan. Stage 3. The Republic of China is on Taiwan. Stage 4. The Republic of China is Taiwan. Stage 4 is Tsai Ing-wen’s so-called "The Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China." That is "backdoor listing." That is "the ROC that does not include the Yangtze River or the Yellow River."
The DPP's concept of national identity and constitutional allegiance contain a major contradiction. Why? Because "one China, different interpretations" is the cross-Strait bottom line. This bottom line is based on a "Republic of China that includes both the Yangtze River and the Cho Shui Creek.” But Tsai Ing-wen says "the Republic of China includes only the Tamsui River, not the Yellow River." She rejects "one China, different interpretations." As a result, the DPP rejects the "1992 consensus." It says there is no "1992 consensus." Therefore there is no "one China, different interpretations."
The DPP’s political and economic policy path has four pillars. One. Reject the 1992 consensus. Two. Retain the Taiwan independence party platform. Do not freeze it. Three. Argue that the Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China. Four. Connect with the rest of the world before connecting with Mainland China. These four pillars are erected on the strategic concept of "backdoor listing." But it leaves the DPP no way out.
If the DPP hopes for a breakthrough in its political and economic policy path, it must reject its "Republic of China is Taiwan" rhetoric and embrace a "Republic of China that includes Taiwan" stance.
Under a "Republic of China that includes Taiwan" framework, the Republic of China dates back to 1911. It upholds "one China, different interpretations." It is moving towards a "big roof concept of China." It even incorporates the DPP’s post-1949 "Taiwan elements" as value-added changes to the ROC. This means the DPP need not remain outside the "Republic of China." It need not see the ROC as the "KMT’s Republic of China." The DPP can accept a "Republic of China that includes Taiwan." Once it does, then the ROC Constitution, which includes the Yangtze River, no longer presents a problem, but becomes Taiwan's political firewall. If the DPP embraces a "ROC that includes Taiwan," it will surely strengthen the "one China, different interpretations" premise.
To reconstruct the peoples’ national identity, the DPP must change its own role. The DPP should embrace a "Republic of China that includes Taiwan." It should see the "Republic of China that includes the DPP" as a proud accomplishment. It should no longer see itself as something “other” than the Republic of China. It should no longer see itself as a “foreign body.” Sixty years of history have “included Taiwan" in the Republic of China. The DPP's contributions have made it part of the Republic of China. The DPP should therefore see itself as benefactors of the Republic of China, as reformers of the Republic of China. It should cease trying to jettison the ROC. It should cease trying to remain outside the Republic of China. It should go from being the Republic of China's "adversaries" to being its defenders. This is how the DPP can change its self-assigned role for the better.
We hope that during the upcoming 2016 presidential election, the DPP will hold aloft the red, white, and blue ROC flag, and show its support for a "Republic of China that includes Taiwan." An "ROC that includes the DPP" is the DPP's way out. It is also Taiwan’s way out.
民進黨：由國家敵對者 轉變為承當者
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.05 02:32 am
柯文哲說：「中華民國是底線。」蔡英文及許多民進黨人也說過類似的話。當他們這麼說的時候，有時是指「中華民國」只剩「中華民國」四個字。
蔡英文曾稱，她所說的中華民國，指的就是台澎金馬，包括淡水河、濁水溪；而馬英九說的中華民國，卻是包括長江、黃河、黑龍江。陳水扁也曾想改編歷史教科書，將「中國史」列入「外國史」，將孫中山改成「外國人」。這樣的「中華民國」，切割了孫中山與長江，雖然保留了「中華民國」四個字，卻是「借殼上市」。
台獨理論原來是根本否定中華民國的，指中華民國為「外來政權」，而以「建立台灣共和國」為宗旨；但隨著世局與國情的推移變化，台獨理論漸漸轉向「台灣是一個（主權獨立的）國家，他（現在）的名字叫做中華民國」。此即「借殼上市」。
台獨的戰略變革是可以理解的。原本認為，建立台灣共和國，推翻了中華民國，切斷了與「中國」的關係，即可防制中華人民共和國的併吞。但世局與國情的發展顯示，正名制憲將使台灣陷於凶險，「中華民國」反而是台灣的戰略屏障，於是又回到「中華民國」，但採「借殼上市」之策，亦即「以中華民國為底線」。因此，口喊中華民國的民進黨，在政治集會中看不到一面國旗。
「台灣」與「中華民國」的關係，台獨理論曾有「四階段說」。一、中華民國在大陸；二、中華民國到台灣；三、中華民國在台灣；四、中華民國是台灣。其中的第四階段，就是蔡英文所說的「中華民國是台灣／台灣是中華民國」，即是「借殼上市」，也就是「沒有長江、黃河的中華民國」。
這使得民進黨的國家認同與憲法論述陷於重大矛盾。因為，「一中各表」是兩岸的「底線」，而此一底線建立在「有長江，也有濁水溪的中華民國」之上；但蔡英文所稱「只有淡水河，沒有黃河的中華民國」，拒絕了「一中各表」。因此，民進黨否定「九二共識」；而沒有「九二共識」，即無「一中各表」。
民進黨的國家政經總路線有四大支柱：一、否定九二共識。二、不廢凍台獨黨綱。三、中華民國是台灣，台灣是中華民國。四、從世界走向中國。這四大支柱皆是建立在「借殼上市」的戰略構想之上，但這也使民進黨必無出路。
民進黨若欲在政經總路線上有所突破，必須從「中華民國是台灣」，朝向「中華民國加台灣」移動。
在「中華民國加台灣」的架構下，一方面以一九一一年以來的中華民國，來維持「一中各表」，推向「大屋頂中國」；另一方面，將一九四九年以後包括民進黨在內的「台灣元素」視為中華民國的加值與轉型。是則，民進黨即不必自外於這個「中華民國」，更無需再將這個中華民國視為「國民黨的中華民國」。當民進黨接受了「中華民國加台灣」，即能感知：對台灣而言，中華民國憲法法理上存在的長江，不是禍水，反而是台灣的政治天險。而民進黨若改持「中華民國加台灣」，亦必增加了「一中各表」的力度。
若要重建全民的國家認同，必須從改變民進黨的自我角色認同作起。民進黨倘能在「中華民國加台灣」之中，領悟到「中華民國加民進黨」的成就感，即不必再自視為中華民國的「他者」或「敵體」。因為，在這個經歷了六十餘年「加台灣」的過程中，中華民國確已加入了民進黨的貢獻與努力，因而民進黨應當自視為中華民國的加益者、改造者與承當者，勿再試圖拋棄中華民國，亦勿再自外於中華民國。由中華民國的「敵對者」轉為「承當者」，這就是民進黨自我角色認同的正向改變。
希望在接下來的二○一六總統大選中，民進黨能夠以擎持青天白日滿地紅的國旗，來展現「中華民國加台灣」與「中華民國加民進黨」的新形象。這是民進黨的生路，也是台灣的出路。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 5, 2014
Executive Summary: Wen-Je Ko said, "The Republic of China is the bottom line." Tsai Ing-wen and many DPP leaders have said something similar. But they usually mean that the name "Republic of China," is all that remains of the Republic of China. We hope that during the upcoming 2016 presidential election, the DPP will hold aloft the red, white, and blue ROC flag, and show its support for a "Republic of China that includes Taiwan." An "ROC that includes the DPP" is the DPP's way out. It is also Taiwan’s way out.
Full Text Below:
Wen-Je Ko said, "The Republic of China is the bottom line." Tsai Ing-wen and many DPP leaders have said something similar. But they usually mean that the name "Republic of China," is all that remains of the Republic of China.
Tsai Ing-wen said that her “Republic of China” includes Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. It includes the Tamsui River and the Cho Shui Creek. She said that Ma Ying-jeou’s Republic of China, on the other hand, includes the Yangtze River, Yellow River, and Heilongjiang River. Chen Shui-bian wanted to rewrite the history textbooks. He wanted to make Chinese history part of foreign history, and redefine Sun Yat-sen as a foreigner. Such a "Republic of China," that would excise Sun Yat-sen and the Yangtze River, yet retain the name "Republic of China," is nothing more than "backdoor listing."
Taiwan independence theory initially repudiated the ROC. It referred to the Republic of China as a "foreign government." Its goal was to "found a Republic of Taiwan." But global conditions changed. Taiwan independence advocates began to argue that "Taiwan is a sovereign country. Its current name is the Republic of China." That is what is known as "backdoor listing."
This change in Taiwan independence strategy was understandable. Taiwan independence advocates initially hoped to found a Republic of Taiwan and overthrow the Republic of China, severing all connection with "China." They assumed this would prevent annexation by the People's Republic of China. But global developments showed that the “rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution” would put Taiwan in danger. They realized that the "Republic of China" provided a strategic barrier for Taiwan. So they reverted to the term "Republic of China," but adopted a "backdoor listing" strategy. This is what they mean when they say "The ROC is the bottom line." Therefore when the DPP, which purports to defend the ROC, holds political rallies, not a single ROC flag can be seen.
Taiwan independence theory defines the relationship between "Taiwan" and the "Republic of China" in "four stages." Stage 1. The Republic of China is on the Mainland. Stage 2. The Republic of China arrives on Taiwan. Stage 3. The Republic of China is on Taiwan. Stage 4. The Republic of China is Taiwan. Stage 4 is Tsai Ing-wen’s so-called "The Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China." That is "backdoor listing." That is "the ROC that does not include the Yangtze River or the Yellow River."
The DPP's concept of national identity and constitutional allegiance contain a major contradiction. Why? Because "one China, different interpretations" is the cross-Strait bottom line. This bottom line is based on a "Republic of China that includes both the Yangtze River and the Cho Shui Creek.” But Tsai Ing-wen says "the Republic of China includes only the Tamsui River, not the Yellow River." She rejects "one China, different interpretations." As a result, the DPP rejects the "1992 consensus." It says there is no "1992 consensus." Therefore there is no "one China, different interpretations."
The DPP’s political and economic policy path has four pillars. One. Reject the 1992 consensus. Two. Retain the Taiwan independence party platform. Do not freeze it. Three. Argue that the Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China. Four. Connect with the rest of the world before connecting with Mainland China. These four pillars are erected on the strategic concept of "backdoor listing." But it leaves the DPP no way out.
If the DPP hopes for a breakthrough in its political and economic policy path, it must reject its "Republic of China is Taiwan" rhetoric and embrace a "Republic of China that includes Taiwan" stance.
Under a "Republic of China that includes Taiwan" framework, the Republic of China dates back to 1911. It upholds "one China, different interpretations." It is moving towards a "big roof concept of China." It even incorporates the DPP’s post-1949 "Taiwan elements" as value-added changes to the ROC. This means the DPP need not remain outside the "Republic of China." It need not see the ROC as the "KMT’s Republic of China." The DPP can accept a "Republic of China that includes Taiwan." Once it does, then the ROC Constitution, which includes the Yangtze River, no longer presents a problem, but becomes Taiwan's political firewall. If the DPP embraces a "ROC that includes Taiwan," it will surely strengthen the "one China, different interpretations" premise.
To reconstruct the peoples’ national identity, the DPP must change its own role. The DPP should embrace a "Republic of China that includes Taiwan." It should see the "Republic of China that includes the DPP" as a proud accomplishment. It should no longer see itself as something “other” than the Republic of China. It should no longer see itself as a “foreign body.” Sixty years of history have “included Taiwan" in the Republic of China. The DPP's contributions have made it part of the Republic of China. The DPP should therefore see itself as benefactors of the Republic of China, as reformers of the Republic of China. It should cease trying to jettison the ROC. It should cease trying to remain outside the Republic of China. It should go from being the Republic of China's "adversaries" to being its defenders. This is how the DPP can change its self-assigned role for the better.
We hope that during the upcoming 2016 presidential election, the DPP will hold aloft the red, white, and blue ROC flag, and show its support for a "Republic of China that includes Taiwan." An "ROC that includes the DPP" is the DPP's way out. It is also Taiwan’s way out.
民進黨：由國家敵對者 轉變為承當者
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.05 02:32 am
柯文哲說：「中華民國是底線。」蔡英文及許多民進黨人也說過類似的話。當他們這麼說的時候，有時是指「中華民國」只剩「中華民國」四個字。
蔡英文曾稱，她所說的中華民國，指的就是台澎金馬，包括淡水河、濁水溪；而馬英九說的中華民國，卻是包括長江、黃河、黑龍江。陳水扁也曾想改編歷史教科書，將「中國史」列入「外國史」，將孫中山改成「外國人」。這樣的「中華民國」，切割了孫中山與長江，雖然保留了「中華民國」四個字，卻是「借殼上市」。
台獨理論原來是根本否定中華民國的，指中華民國為「外來政權」，而以「建立台灣共和國」為宗旨；但隨著世局與國情的推移變化，台獨理論漸漸轉向「台灣是一個（主權獨立的）國家，他（現在）的名字叫做中華民國」。此即「借殼上市」。
台獨的戰略變革是可以理解的。原本認為，建立台灣共和國，推翻了中華民國，切斷了與「中國」的關係，即可防制中華人民共和國的併吞。但世局與國情的發展顯示，正名制憲將使台灣陷於凶險，「中華民國」反而是台灣的戰略屏障，於是又回到「中華民國」，但採「借殼上市」之策，亦即「以中華民國為底線」。因此，口喊中華民國的民進黨，在政治集會中看不到一面國旗。
「台灣」與「中華民國」的關係，台獨理論曾有「四階段說」。一、中華民國在大陸；二、中華民國到台灣；三、中華民國在台灣；四、中華民國是台灣。其中的第四階段，就是蔡英文所說的「中華民國是台灣／台灣是中華民國」，即是「借殼上市」，也就是「沒有長江、黃河的中華民國」。
這使得民進黨的國家認同與憲法論述陷於重大矛盾。因為，「一中各表」是兩岸的「底線」，而此一底線建立在「有長江，也有濁水溪的中華民國」之上；但蔡英文所稱「只有淡水河，沒有黃河的中華民國」，拒絕了「一中各表」。因此，民進黨否定「九二共識」；而沒有「九二共識」，即無「一中各表」。
民進黨的國家政經總路線有四大支柱：一、否定九二共識。二、不廢凍台獨黨綱。三、中華民國是台灣，台灣是中華民國。四、從世界走向中國。這四大支柱皆是建立在「借殼上市」的戰略構想之上，但這也使民進黨必無出路。
民進黨若欲在政經總路線上有所突破，必須從「中華民國是台灣」，朝向「中華民國加台灣」移動。
在「中華民國加台灣」的架構下，一方面以一九一一年以來的中華民國，來維持「一中各表」，推向「大屋頂中國」；另一方面，將一九四九年以後包括民進黨在內的「台灣元素」視為中華民國的加值與轉型。是則，民進黨即不必自外於這個「中華民國」，更無需再將這個中華民國視為「國民黨的中華民國」。當民進黨接受了「中華民國加台灣」，即能感知：對台灣而言，中華民國憲法法理上存在的長江，不是禍水，反而是台灣的政治天險。而民進黨若改持「中華民國加台灣」，亦必增加了「一中各表」的力度。
若要重建全民的國家認同，必須從改變民進黨的自我角色認同作起。民進黨倘能在「中華民國加台灣」之中，領悟到「中華民國加民進黨」的成就感，即不必再自視為中華民國的「他者」或「敵體」。因為，在這個經歷了六十餘年「加台灣」的過程中，中華民國確已加入了民進黨的貢獻與努力，因而民進黨應當自視為中華民國的加益者、改造者與承當者，勿再試圖拋棄中華民國，亦勿再自外於中華民國。由中華民國的「敵對者」轉為「承當者」，這就是民進黨自我角色認同的正向改變。
希望在接下來的二○一六總統大選中，民進黨能夠以擎持青天白日滿地紅的國旗，來展現「中華民國加台灣」與「中華民國加民進黨」的新形象。這是民進黨的生路，也是台灣的出路。
Wednesday, December 3, 2014
Seeking a Basis for CCP-DPP Political Relations
Seeking a Basis for CCP-DPP Political Relations
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 4th, 2014
Executive Summary: The results of the nine in one elections are now known. Most people consider them an accurate indicator of what partisan politics and partisan turf wars on Taiwan will be like over the next six years. The KMT's future today is as grim as the DPP's future following the debacle of 2006. The KMT probably cannot reverse its fortunes by the 2016 presidential and legislative elections.
Full Text Below:
The results of the nine in one elections are now known. Most people consider them an accurate indicator of what partisan politics and partisan turf wars on Taiwan will be like over the next six years. The KMT's future today is as grim as the DPP's future following the debacle of 2006. The KMT probably cannot reverse its fortunes by the 2016 presidential and legislative elections.
The KMT is about to lose power. The DPP may return to power. Add to this the power of civic groups. These three factors will determine the future of cross-Strait relations. Veteran analysts of cross-Strait relations say that "Cross-Strait relations will inevitably stagnate. They will not be able to move forward. We will be lucky if we can maintain the status quo." They say that "Cross-Strait relations will undergo serious trials. Opportunities will be few and far between. The Mainland must be psychologically prepared." They say that "Those struggling to promote better cross-Strait relations will face numerous obstacles. The Mainland will have to respond with patience.” Stagnation is likely. Patience will be required. But those truly in the know regarding cross-Strait relations, know that stagnation must be overcome, and solutions must be found.
The key factor in the development of cross-strait relations is the DPP. How will the DPP interpret its victory in the nine in one elections? Will it alter its policy path? That will be the most important variable in cross-Strait relations. The Sunflower Student Movement gave the withered old Taiwan independence movement a shot in the arm. Anti-China forces in the pan-green camp have blamed Taiwan's internal social and economic problems on closer cross-Strait relations. They have accused the KMT of "cozying up to China, selling out Taiwan, and favoring the financial conglomerates." They have concealed their anti-China animus and Taiwan independence agenda under a heavy layer of "social justice." Their ploy has worked. It has deceived many young voters. On the other hand, DPP cross-Strait policy reform has long been all thunder and no rain. long on talk but short on action, largely due to anti-China obstructionism.
As a result, DPP cross-Strait policy reform has been subject to civic group constraints. Call these groups a "white force.” Call them "civic groups" if you wish. In recent years, such civic groups have proliferated on Taiwan. These groups concern themselves with everything from local policy to cross-Strait relations. During the recent election, these civic groups argued that "Until the KMT falls, Taiwan cannot rise.” They presented an obstacle to DPP policy reform. They intend to use sovereignty, human rights, democracy, transparency, and oversight as weapons to obstruct progress in cross-Strait relations
The nine in one elections were a rout. Cross-Strait policy reform has become the Democratic Progressive Party’s final mile on its path to power. The DPP leadership must be clear. If it refuses to alter its cross-Strait policy path, it cannot gain the trust of Beijing, Washington, or even Taiwan’s “economic voters.” The DPP has long been reluctant to recognize the "1992 consensus," or alter its cross-Strait policy path. If it does, it will be attacked by Taiwan independence fundamentalists and lose the support of other groups.
The Ma government advocates "no reunification, no Taiwan independence, no use of force." It corrected the Chen Shui-bian government’s mistaken policy path. It won the cooperation of Mainland officials. It improved cross-Strait relations. But when cross-Strait relations entered more treacherous waters, and more sensitive political issues arose. Ma’s "no reunification" clause was no longer acceptable to the Mainland. The Ma government lacked the courage to resist accusations of “cozying up to China and selling out Taiwan." It could no longer unite the people behind it. It could no longer lead Taiwan toward lasting peace and cross-Strait progress. Those in the know called upon the KMT to adopt a more proactive cross-Strait policy. They urged the KMT to actively address the issue of the two sides’ political status. They urged the KMT to offer a long term vision for the Chinese nation. They urged the KMT to actively promote cross-Strait economic integration and a "KMT-CCP peace agreement." But the Ma government hesitated. Now it faces the prospect of losing power. The Kuomintang must reaffirm its roots. It must engage in “creative destruction.” It must have the courage to throw open its doors. It must debate and adjust its cross-Strait policy, and begin anew. Only then does it stand a chance of winning over a new generation of voters.
In any event, KMT power has already declined. The Mainland now faces an unprecedented change in Taiwan's political situation. It must adopt the "two sides, one family” principle. It must be more flexible, patient, and meticulous in handling cross-Strait relations. On the one hand, it must adhere to the 1992 consensus as the basis for interaction with Taiwan's political parties. It must not waver. But neither should it act in haste. It must remain open to change. It must continue in-depth exchanges with different segments of the Taiwan public. Through culture, daily life and psychological cohesion, a "two sides, one family" consensus can be reached. This will create a solid foundation for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. When the time is ripe, the DPP will accept the 1992 Consensus.
Taiwan has "socialism with Chinese characteristics." It is a convergence point in institutional and ideological competition with the Western nations. Taiwan's political path can serve as a reference point for the Mainland. It can be seen as an opposition party under the Mainland’s one-party dictatorship. Cross-Strait relations are something the Mainland must cherish.
社論－尋找民共政治關係的基礎
2014年12月04日 04:10
本報訊
九合一大選結果出爐後，多數人認為未來6年，台灣政治發展趨勢與政黨版圖已經確立，國民黨的前途就如同2006年民進黨的慘敗一樣，在2016年的總統和立委選舉中，幾乎可以確定沒有翻身的契機。
國民黨即將失去政權，民進黨可能重新執政，加上「公民運動」的牽制，將成為未來影響兩岸關係變動的三大因素。已經有資深的兩岸關係學者指出，「兩岸關係必然停滯，不可能繼續往前走，如果能維持現狀就很好了」，「未來兩岸關係考驗大、機遇少，希望大陸做好心理準備」，「兩岸關係推動會面臨很多障礙，大陸需要耐心因應」。「停滯」是兩岸關係前景極可能的圖像，「耐心」則是必須的心理準備。但真正關心兩岸關係和平發展的有識之士，還是必須尋求擺脫停滯、開創新局的方向與解答。
目前來看，影響兩岸關係發展的一大關鍵是民進黨的動向，民進黨如何解讀自己在九合一大選中的勝利，並從而調整該黨的路線策略，將是兩岸關係發展上的一大變數。太陽花學運以來，原本老舊凋零的台獨運動獲得了新生力量。這段時間，泛綠陣營中的反中力量一直將兩岸議題與台灣內部的社會經濟問題結合起來，主打國民黨「侵中、賣台、親財團」的政黨性格，試圖把「反中」或台獨路線塗抹厚厚一層「社會公平正義」的包裝，也獲得了效果，在年輕選民中有很大的欺騙性。另一方面，民進黨內部關於兩岸關係路線的調整始終雷聲大、雨點小，花言巧語多，實際作為少，在很大程度上也是因為反中力量的阻撓。
因此，民進黨在兩岸路線上的轉型，還將受到所謂「公民運動」很大的牽制。不管稱之為「白色力量」還是「公民運動」，近幾年台灣民間的反抗運動，已經蔚為風潮，其關注的議題已從地方公共政策延伸到兩岸關係，在這次選戰中，這股所謂的「公民運動」不但匯聚出「國民黨不倒，台灣不會好」的聲浪，更形成對民進黨轉型路線的牽制力量，他們將以主權、人權、民主、透明、監督等作為武器，在兩岸關係的進展上發揮阻滯的作用
在九合一狂勝後，兩岸路線的轉型，已真正成為民進黨重返執政的最後一哩路，民進黨的領導層應該清楚，如果不在兩岸路線上做出調整，將很難取信於北京、華盛頓，甚至台灣的經濟選民。但纏繞民進黨體質已久的痼疾，就是顧忌於如果接受、承認「九二共識」，或在兩岸路線上做出更大的調整，將會面臨基本教義派等支持力量的反撲與動盪。
馬政府堅持「不統、不獨、不武」，曾經發揮糾正陳水扁政府錯誤路線，取得大陸官方合作之效，帶領兩岸關係的正向發展，但當兩岸關係進入深水區要開始面對政治議題時，「不統」對大陸已不足以因應未來發展的需要，對台灣內部卻無法抵抗民進黨「傾中賣台」的攻擊，因而不再能凝聚人心支持，不能帶領台灣走向兩岸永久和平與永續發展的方向。有識之士曾呼籲國民黨，應採取更積極的兩岸路線，例如積極討論兩岸政治定位問題，多談中華民族的願景，積極推動兩岸經濟整合與「國共和平協議」，馬政府卻猶豫不決。如今面臨失去政權的可能性，國民黨如能正本清源，以大破大立、大開大闔的魄力，對兩岸關係的路線、論述、政策作調整、再出發，或有機會爭取新世代選民的認同。
無論如何，國民黨已勢衰。大陸面對台灣政治前所未有的變局，宜以「兩岸一家親」為基本方針，更靈活而有耐心的細緻處理兩岸關係，一方面，繼續堅持以「九二共識」作為與台灣各政黨互動的基礎，不輕易動搖，但也不要躁進，要以開放態度創造轉圜的空間，持續與台灣各階層民眾深入交流，從文化、生活、心理面凝聚「兩岸一家親」的共識，厚實兩岸關係和平發展的基礎，水到渠成，民進黨就會接受九二共識。
台灣是「中國特色社會主義」與西方國家在體制與意識形態競合的銜接點，台灣的道路可以做為大陸的借鑑，也可以視為大陸一黨專政體制下，治理範圍的反對黨，兩岸關係值得大陸珍惜。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 4th, 2014
Executive Summary: The results of the nine in one elections are now known. Most people consider them an accurate indicator of what partisan politics and partisan turf wars on Taiwan will be like over the next six years. The KMT's future today is as grim as the DPP's future following the debacle of 2006. The KMT probably cannot reverse its fortunes by the 2016 presidential and legislative elections.
Full Text Below:
The results of the nine in one elections are now known. Most people consider them an accurate indicator of what partisan politics and partisan turf wars on Taiwan will be like over the next six years. The KMT's future today is as grim as the DPP's future following the debacle of 2006. The KMT probably cannot reverse its fortunes by the 2016 presidential and legislative elections.
The KMT is about to lose power. The DPP may return to power. Add to this the power of civic groups. These three factors will determine the future of cross-Strait relations. Veteran analysts of cross-Strait relations say that "Cross-Strait relations will inevitably stagnate. They will not be able to move forward. We will be lucky if we can maintain the status quo." They say that "Cross-Strait relations will undergo serious trials. Opportunities will be few and far between. The Mainland must be psychologically prepared." They say that "Those struggling to promote better cross-Strait relations will face numerous obstacles. The Mainland will have to respond with patience.” Stagnation is likely. Patience will be required. But those truly in the know regarding cross-Strait relations, know that stagnation must be overcome, and solutions must be found.
The key factor in the development of cross-strait relations is the DPP. How will the DPP interpret its victory in the nine in one elections? Will it alter its policy path? That will be the most important variable in cross-Strait relations. The Sunflower Student Movement gave the withered old Taiwan independence movement a shot in the arm. Anti-China forces in the pan-green camp have blamed Taiwan's internal social and economic problems on closer cross-Strait relations. They have accused the KMT of "cozying up to China, selling out Taiwan, and favoring the financial conglomerates." They have concealed their anti-China animus and Taiwan independence agenda under a heavy layer of "social justice." Their ploy has worked. It has deceived many young voters. On the other hand, DPP cross-Strait policy reform has long been all thunder and no rain. long on talk but short on action, largely due to anti-China obstructionism.
As a result, DPP cross-Strait policy reform has been subject to civic group constraints. Call these groups a "white force.” Call them "civic groups" if you wish. In recent years, such civic groups have proliferated on Taiwan. These groups concern themselves with everything from local policy to cross-Strait relations. During the recent election, these civic groups argued that "Until the KMT falls, Taiwan cannot rise.” They presented an obstacle to DPP policy reform. They intend to use sovereignty, human rights, democracy, transparency, and oversight as weapons to obstruct progress in cross-Strait relations
The nine in one elections were a rout. Cross-Strait policy reform has become the Democratic Progressive Party’s final mile on its path to power. The DPP leadership must be clear. If it refuses to alter its cross-Strait policy path, it cannot gain the trust of Beijing, Washington, or even Taiwan’s “economic voters.” The DPP has long been reluctant to recognize the "1992 consensus," or alter its cross-Strait policy path. If it does, it will be attacked by Taiwan independence fundamentalists and lose the support of other groups.
The Ma government advocates "no reunification, no Taiwan independence, no use of force." It corrected the Chen Shui-bian government’s mistaken policy path. It won the cooperation of Mainland officials. It improved cross-Strait relations. But when cross-Strait relations entered more treacherous waters, and more sensitive political issues arose. Ma’s "no reunification" clause was no longer acceptable to the Mainland. The Ma government lacked the courage to resist accusations of “cozying up to China and selling out Taiwan." It could no longer unite the people behind it. It could no longer lead Taiwan toward lasting peace and cross-Strait progress. Those in the know called upon the KMT to adopt a more proactive cross-Strait policy. They urged the KMT to actively address the issue of the two sides’ political status. They urged the KMT to offer a long term vision for the Chinese nation. They urged the KMT to actively promote cross-Strait economic integration and a "KMT-CCP peace agreement." But the Ma government hesitated. Now it faces the prospect of losing power. The Kuomintang must reaffirm its roots. It must engage in “creative destruction.” It must have the courage to throw open its doors. It must debate and adjust its cross-Strait policy, and begin anew. Only then does it stand a chance of winning over a new generation of voters.
In any event, KMT power has already declined. The Mainland now faces an unprecedented change in Taiwan's political situation. It must adopt the "two sides, one family” principle. It must be more flexible, patient, and meticulous in handling cross-Strait relations. On the one hand, it must adhere to the 1992 consensus as the basis for interaction with Taiwan's political parties. It must not waver. But neither should it act in haste. It must remain open to change. It must continue in-depth exchanges with different segments of the Taiwan public. Through culture, daily life and psychological cohesion, a "two sides, one family" consensus can be reached. This will create a solid foundation for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. When the time is ripe, the DPP will accept the 1992 Consensus.
Taiwan has "socialism with Chinese characteristics." It is a convergence point in institutional and ideological competition with the Western nations. Taiwan's political path can serve as a reference point for the Mainland. It can be seen as an opposition party under the Mainland’s one-party dictatorship. Cross-Strait relations are something the Mainland must cherish.
社論－尋找民共政治關係的基礎
2014年12月04日 04:10
本報訊
九合一大選結果出爐後，多數人認為未來6年，台灣政治發展趨勢與政黨版圖已經確立，國民黨的前途就如同2006年民進黨的慘敗一樣，在2016年的總統和立委選舉中，幾乎可以確定沒有翻身的契機。
國民黨即將失去政權，民進黨可能重新執政，加上「公民運動」的牽制，將成為未來影響兩岸關係變動的三大因素。已經有資深的兩岸關係學者指出，「兩岸關係必然停滯，不可能繼續往前走，如果能維持現狀就很好了」，「未來兩岸關係考驗大、機遇少，希望大陸做好心理準備」，「兩岸關係推動會面臨很多障礙，大陸需要耐心因應」。「停滯」是兩岸關係前景極可能的圖像，「耐心」則是必須的心理準備。但真正關心兩岸關係和平發展的有識之士，還是必須尋求擺脫停滯、開創新局的方向與解答。
目前來看，影響兩岸關係發展的一大關鍵是民進黨的動向，民進黨如何解讀自己在九合一大選中的勝利，並從而調整該黨的路線策略，將是兩岸關係發展上的一大變數。太陽花學運以來，原本老舊凋零的台獨運動獲得了新生力量。這段時間，泛綠陣營中的反中力量一直將兩岸議題與台灣內部的社會經濟問題結合起來，主打國民黨「侵中、賣台、親財團」的政黨性格，試圖把「反中」或台獨路線塗抹厚厚一層「社會公平正義」的包裝，也獲得了效果，在年輕選民中有很大的欺騙性。另一方面，民進黨內部關於兩岸關係路線的調整始終雷聲大、雨點小，花言巧語多，實際作為少，在很大程度上也是因為反中力量的阻撓。
因此，民進黨在兩岸路線上的轉型，還將受到所謂「公民運動」很大的牽制。不管稱之為「白色力量」還是「公民運動」，近幾年台灣民間的反抗運動，已經蔚為風潮，其關注的議題已從地方公共政策延伸到兩岸關係，在這次選戰中，這股所謂的「公民運動」不但匯聚出「國民黨不倒，台灣不會好」的聲浪，更形成對民進黨轉型路線的牽制力量，他們將以主權、人權、民主、透明、監督等作為武器，在兩岸關係的進展上發揮阻滯的作用
在九合一狂勝後，兩岸路線的轉型，已真正成為民進黨重返執政的最後一哩路，民進黨的領導層應該清楚，如果不在兩岸路線上做出調整，將很難取信於北京、華盛頓，甚至台灣的經濟選民。但纏繞民進黨體質已久的痼疾，就是顧忌於如果接受、承認「九二共識」，或在兩岸路線上做出更大的調整，將會面臨基本教義派等支持力量的反撲與動盪。
馬政府堅持「不統、不獨、不武」，曾經發揮糾正陳水扁政府錯誤路線，取得大陸官方合作之效，帶領兩岸關係的正向發展，但當兩岸關係進入深水區要開始面對政治議題時，「不統」對大陸已不足以因應未來發展的需要，對台灣內部卻無法抵抗民進黨「傾中賣台」的攻擊，因而不再能凝聚人心支持，不能帶領台灣走向兩岸永久和平與永續發展的方向。有識之士曾呼籲國民黨，應採取更積極的兩岸路線，例如積極討論兩岸政治定位問題，多談中華民族的願景，積極推動兩岸經濟整合與「國共和平協議」，馬政府卻猶豫不決。如今面臨失去政權的可能性，國民黨如能正本清源，以大破大立、大開大闔的魄力，對兩岸關係的路線、論述、政策作調整、再出發，或有機會爭取新世代選民的認同。
無論如何，國民黨已勢衰。大陸面對台灣政治前所未有的變局，宜以「兩岸一家親」為基本方針，更靈活而有耐心的細緻處理兩岸關係，一方面，繼續堅持以「九二共識」作為與台灣各政黨互動的基礎，不輕易動搖，但也不要躁進，要以開放態度創造轉圜的空間，持續與台灣各階層民眾深入交流，從文化、生活、心理面凝聚「兩岸一家親」的共識，厚實兩岸關係和平發展的基礎，水到渠成，民進黨就會接受九二共識。
台灣是「中國特色社會主義」與西方國家在體制與意識形態競合的銜接點，台灣的道路可以做為大陸的借鑑，也可以視為大陸一黨專政體制下，治理範圍的反對黨，兩岸關係值得大陸珍惜。
Tuesday, December 2, 2014
Can the White Vision Transcend Blue vs. Green Confrontation?
Can the White Vision Transcend Blue vs. Green Confrontation?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 3, 2014
Executive Summary: Like it or not, the Wen-Je Ko phenomena garnered the lion’s share of attention during the recent election. He won 57% of the vote in the nation’s capital. He took every voting district. This local Taiwan election repeatedly made international news, with him as the focus. Wen-Je Ko offered a "white vision." Can he transcend blue vs. green confrontation in real life? Will he be a positive force? That remains to be seen. But it is something to hope for.
Full Text Below:
Like it or not, the Wen-Je Ko phenomena garnered the lion’s share of attention during the recent election. He won 57% of the vote in the nation’s capital. He took every voting district. This local Taiwan election repeatedly made international news, with him as the focus. Wen-Je Ko offered a "white vision." Can he transcend blue vs. green confrontation in real life? Will he be a positive force? That remains to be seen. But it is something to hope for.
The Wen-Je Ko phenomenon has been compared to a tornado. If so, then Wen-Je Ko is a balloon. What really deserves attention is the unseen forces that support the balloon. Wen-Je Ko’s "white vision" was the result of a confluence of complex forces. One. Ko P’s record as a physician who treated many politicians overshadowed his political colors. Two. The Hung Chung-chiu incident and Sunflower Student Movement won him the support of social movements and younger voters. Three. Prolonged blue vs. green confrontation led to political and economic stagnation. People were fed up. Four. Citizens in the capital city were open-minded enough to give Ko’s "white experiment" a try. Five. With globalization as a catalyst. a backlash against political dynasties ensued, overriding traditional blue vs. green considerations. Together these factors enabled the white balloon to take flight.
Admittedly, this “white vision” hides a paradox. One. Under the "average Joe" image is a Wen-Je Ko who may have “white skin,” but is "green to the bone.” What is he really? Is he straightforward and ingenuous, or is he sinister and cunning? Two. All through the election campaign, Wen-Je Ko got a free pass, courtesy his "deification." But once he assumes office, will his god-like image be stripped away? Three. Ko loudly trumpeted "citizen participation." But is this something he can actually implement in real life?
In fact, Wen-Je Ko has already run into problems over the past two days, while recruiting members of his administration. For example, he announced his intention to make Lin Chin-wing, an advocate of urban renewal, deputy mayor. That provoked a wave of criticism from Wen Lin Yuan social movement activists and the Sunflower Student Movement. They consider Lin the hatchetman in the Tainan Railway eastward relocation plan and the Hsinchu Puyu Plan. Wen-Je Ko also decided to open up the Labor Bureau and the Environmental Protection Bureau to "I-VOTING," allowing netizens to go online and vote. This also provoked criticism from labor organizers and academics, who called it a "rotten idea." They say that insufficient information has been provided and that the trumpeted “citizen participation” simply will not work. DPP insiders also asked him to forsake this approach. They consider it inconsistent with taking personal political responsibility.
Wen-Je Ko's "citizen participation" initiative was certainly loudly promoted and attractively packaged. But when it came time for implementation, it inevitably collided with reality, and his pretty slogans became dead letters. Take the Selection Committee and the Director of the Bureau of Internet Balloting. Suppose a policy runs into trouble or the director’s views differ from the mayor’s? Who would assume responsibility? Wen-Je Ko’s charisma depends upon a large number of student movement and social movement activists. Yet his political appointments have already been questioned by these same student movement and social movement activists. Over time the relationship will inevitably sour, and the Wen-Je Ko legend will sour along with it.
That said, we still hold out hope for this "white vision." In fact, Wen-Je Ko is not the issue at all. The real issue is that people long for change. That yearning can tear down tiresome blue vs. green confrontation. At least it can help political parties on Taiwan move toward a more symbiotic, more mutually beneficial relationship. Wen-Je Ko overturned the traditional blue vs. green political arrangement in the capital city. He successfully created a “white zone.” That much is clear to all. But his influence extends deeper into the blue camp than the green camp.He must now ensure that the "white force" penetrates the green camp masses and politicians as well. That is probably a far greater challenge.
During the recent election, the KMT was traumatized. It paid a painful price. It still does not know how to clean up the mess. By contrast, all the DPP had to do was engage in obstructionism then wait for the ruling KMT to make a mistake. This enabled it to conquer the realm. But was this really a gift from heaven? Recall the first half of this year. The DPP found it almost impossible to field a candidate in the capital city mayoral election. Its plight became an embarrassment. It is now riding the currents of Wen-Je Ko’s "white vision." It has actually taken down all Taiwan. It is now preening, a winner. But it probably feels embarrassed as well. If the victors in counties and municipalities taken by the green camp immediately beging squabbling over the spoils, how will they look in the peoples’ eyes? How will the people feel?
Does the Wen-Je Ko phenomenon represent public rejection of blue vs. green confrontation in favor of a "white vision?" If it does, then this vision has successfully taken the first step. Next, Wen-Je Ko must "transcend blue vs. green" as he originally promised. He must urge the blue and green camps to reflect upon their values and behavior. This was the original intent of the "white force." The greatest danger is that Wen-Je Ko will forget his original intent amidst political consideration, or lose himself amidst the public adoration. In that happens, the Wen-Je Ko legend will be shattered sooner rather than later.
The white balloon took flight by virtue of a diverse confluence of forces. Wen-Je Ko’s responsibility is to keep the balloon afloat, to prevent it from falling because the wind has died out. He must not forget his “average Joe” promises. Ma Ying-jeou went from "box office magic" to " box office poison." That should serve as a stern warning.
白色憧憬能不能阻卻藍綠惡鬥？
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.03 01:58 am
無論喜不喜歡，柯文哲現象都是這次選舉最受矚目的風景。他除拿下首都五十七％的選票，橫掃所有行政區，台灣地方選舉幾度登上國際媒體版面也都是以他為焦點。柯文哲創造的「白色憧憬」，在現實上能否銷融藍綠的惡性對峙、帶來良性的刺激，值得期待，但實際作用則仍有待觀察。
如果把「柯文哲現象」比喻為一個上升氣旋，柯文哲好比一顆氣球，事實上，更值得探討的是支撐氣球升空的那個看不見的力量。柯文哲的「白色想像」能形成，是幾個主客觀條件與天時地利的結合：一，柯Ｐ的醫師專業及救治過許多政治人物的口碑，有效遮蓋了他的政治原色；二，連續的洪仲丘及太陽花事件，他因緣際會收編了公民運動的力量和年輕族群的支持；三，藍綠長年的對峙導致政經停滯，讓民眾忍無可忍；四，具開放精神的首都市民，願意接受「白色實驗」；五，全球化風潮中催化反中、反權貴氛圍，壓過傳統藍綠思維。這些因素加乘，讓這顆白色氣球高飛。
不可否認，在這個巨大的白色想像底下，其實也隱藏著幾個弔詭：其一，在「素人」包裝下「綠骨白皮」的柯文哲，究竟是天真率直或是陰險狡黠？其二，柯文哲在選戰期間豁免於一切質疑的「神化」現象，在正式執政後會不會剝落？其三，喊得震天價響的「公民參與」，在實際治理時能不能順利運轉？
事實上，這兩天柯文哲在組建市府團隊時，已遭到了若干挑戰。例如，他宣布要借重來推動都更的副市長人選林欽榮，即遭到文林苑社運人士和太陽花學運成員的批評，認為此人在台南鐵路東移徵收案及竹北璞玉計畫中扮演過「打手」角色。此外，柯文哲決定開放勞動局及環保局長以「I-VOTING」方式產生，讓網民登記投票，也遭工運團體和學界批評「爛透了」，認為資訊不足卻標榜公民參與根本行不通。不僅如此，民進黨內也傳出要求他放棄這種求才方式，認為不合責任政治的原理。
由此可見，柯文哲的「公民參與」倡議固然響亮迷人，但一落到執行層次，難免與現實發生扞格或碰撞；屆時，一些美好的誓言可能無法實現。例如，透過遴選委員及網路公民票選的局處長，若政策出了問題或者其意見與市長不同，誰該負責？再如，柯文哲魅力是靠著大批學社運人士的力挺所催生，但他的用人卻受到學社運界的質疑；久而久之雙方的關係必然磨損，柯文哲傳奇恐也會隨之掉漆。
無論如何，我們對這個「白色想像」仍抱持期待。重點其實不在柯文哲本身，而是希望這個民眾「渴望改變」的力量，能推倒令人厭倦的藍綠對峙，或至少使台灣政黨政治文化加進一些良性優質、共生互利的元素。從這點看，柯文哲推翻原本藍大於綠的首都基本盤，成功打開一個白色地帶，固是有目共睹的事實；然而，他的影響力滲透藍營的程度其實遠高於綠營。接下來，如何讓所謂「白色力量」也能穿透綠營群眾和政治人物，恐怕是他更大的挑戰。
國民黨在這次選舉遭到重創，付出慘痛的代價，至今仍不知如何收拾殘局。相對的，民進黨僅以「杯葛」一招，靠著執政者的錯誤，就贏得大片江山，恐怕也難謂天賜之福。回顧今年上半年，民進黨在首都幾乎推不出足堪一戰的人選，窘態畢露；如今乘著柯文哲打出的「白色憧憬」的氣流，竟然在全台攻城掠地，一副勝利者之姿，恐怕也會感到有些汗顏。而如果綠營新取得政權的縣市馬上展開一場權位大分贓，看在民眾眼裡，又將作何感想？
如果柯文哲現象代表了人民厭棄藍綠對峙的一種「白色想像」，那麼，這個憧憬已經成功跨出第一步。接下來，柯文哲必須將「超越藍綠」這個初衷逐一注入他的施政，並試圖召喚藍綠陣營在思想、價值和言行上自我反省，這才是「白色力量」進入政治的初始目的。最怕的是，柯文哲在紛亂的政治干擾中忘卻初衷，或在外界的掌聲中迷失自己；那樣的話，柯文哲神話破滅恐怕是遲早的事。
這顆白色氣球藉著各種力量之助益而升起，而柯文哲今天的責任是要維護這顆氣球，使它免於消風或下墜，他不能忘記自己的素人願望。馬英九如何從「超級吸票機」變成了「票房毒藥」，就是血淋淋的警惕。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 3, 2014
Executive Summary: Like it or not, the Wen-Je Ko phenomena garnered the lion’s share of attention during the recent election. He won 57% of the vote in the nation’s capital. He took every voting district. This local Taiwan election repeatedly made international news, with him as the focus. Wen-Je Ko offered a "white vision." Can he transcend blue vs. green confrontation in real life? Will he be a positive force? That remains to be seen. But it is something to hope for.
Full Text Below:
Like it or not, the Wen-Je Ko phenomena garnered the lion’s share of attention during the recent election. He won 57% of the vote in the nation’s capital. He took every voting district. This local Taiwan election repeatedly made international news, with him as the focus. Wen-Je Ko offered a "white vision." Can he transcend blue vs. green confrontation in real life? Will he be a positive force? That remains to be seen. But it is something to hope for.
The Wen-Je Ko phenomenon has been compared to a tornado. If so, then Wen-Je Ko is a balloon. What really deserves attention is the unseen forces that support the balloon. Wen-Je Ko’s "white vision" was the result of a confluence of complex forces. One. Ko P’s record as a physician who treated many politicians overshadowed his political colors. Two. The Hung Chung-chiu incident and Sunflower Student Movement won him the support of social movements and younger voters. Three. Prolonged blue vs. green confrontation led to political and economic stagnation. People were fed up. Four. Citizens in the capital city were open-minded enough to give Ko’s "white experiment" a try. Five. With globalization as a catalyst. a backlash against political dynasties ensued, overriding traditional blue vs. green considerations. Together these factors enabled the white balloon to take flight.
Admittedly, this “white vision” hides a paradox. One. Under the "average Joe" image is a Wen-Je Ko who may have “white skin,” but is "green to the bone.” What is he really? Is he straightforward and ingenuous, or is he sinister and cunning? Two. All through the election campaign, Wen-Je Ko got a free pass, courtesy his "deification." But once he assumes office, will his god-like image be stripped away? Three. Ko loudly trumpeted "citizen participation." But is this something he can actually implement in real life?
In fact, Wen-Je Ko has already run into problems over the past two days, while recruiting members of his administration. For example, he announced his intention to make Lin Chin-wing, an advocate of urban renewal, deputy mayor. That provoked a wave of criticism from Wen Lin Yuan social movement activists and the Sunflower Student Movement. They consider Lin the hatchetman in the Tainan Railway eastward relocation plan and the Hsinchu Puyu Plan. Wen-Je Ko also decided to open up the Labor Bureau and the Environmental Protection Bureau to "I-VOTING," allowing netizens to go online and vote. This also provoked criticism from labor organizers and academics, who called it a "rotten idea." They say that insufficient information has been provided and that the trumpeted “citizen participation” simply will not work. DPP insiders also asked him to forsake this approach. They consider it inconsistent with taking personal political responsibility.
Wen-Je Ko's "citizen participation" initiative was certainly loudly promoted and attractively packaged. But when it came time for implementation, it inevitably collided with reality, and his pretty slogans became dead letters. Take the Selection Committee and the Director of the Bureau of Internet Balloting. Suppose a policy runs into trouble or the director’s views differ from the mayor’s? Who would assume responsibility? Wen-Je Ko’s charisma depends upon a large number of student movement and social movement activists. Yet his political appointments have already been questioned by these same student movement and social movement activists. Over time the relationship will inevitably sour, and the Wen-Je Ko legend will sour along with it.
That said, we still hold out hope for this "white vision." In fact, Wen-Je Ko is not the issue at all. The real issue is that people long for change. That yearning can tear down tiresome blue vs. green confrontation. At least it can help political parties on Taiwan move toward a more symbiotic, more mutually beneficial relationship. Wen-Je Ko overturned the traditional blue vs. green political arrangement in the capital city. He successfully created a “white zone.” That much is clear to all. But his influence extends deeper into the blue camp than the green camp.He must now ensure that the "white force" penetrates the green camp masses and politicians as well. That is probably a far greater challenge.
During the recent election, the KMT was traumatized. It paid a painful price. It still does not know how to clean up the mess. By contrast, all the DPP had to do was engage in obstructionism then wait for the ruling KMT to make a mistake. This enabled it to conquer the realm. But was this really a gift from heaven? Recall the first half of this year. The DPP found it almost impossible to field a candidate in the capital city mayoral election. Its plight became an embarrassment. It is now riding the currents of Wen-Je Ko’s "white vision." It has actually taken down all Taiwan. It is now preening, a winner. But it probably feels embarrassed as well. If the victors in counties and municipalities taken by the green camp immediately beging squabbling over the spoils, how will they look in the peoples’ eyes? How will the people feel?
Does the Wen-Je Ko phenomenon represent public rejection of blue vs. green confrontation in favor of a "white vision?" If it does, then this vision has successfully taken the first step. Next, Wen-Je Ko must "transcend blue vs. green" as he originally promised. He must urge the blue and green camps to reflect upon their values and behavior. This was the original intent of the "white force." The greatest danger is that Wen-Je Ko will forget his original intent amidst political consideration, or lose himself amidst the public adoration. In that happens, the Wen-Je Ko legend will be shattered sooner rather than later.
The white balloon took flight by virtue of a diverse confluence of forces. Wen-Je Ko’s responsibility is to keep the balloon afloat, to prevent it from falling because the wind has died out. He must not forget his “average Joe” promises. Ma Ying-jeou went from "box office magic" to " box office poison." That should serve as a stern warning.
白色憧憬能不能阻卻藍綠惡鬥？
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.03 01:58 am
無論喜不喜歡，柯文哲現象都是這次選舉最受矚目的風景。他除拿下首都五十七％的選票，橫掃所有行政區，台灣地方選舉幾度登上國際媒體版面也都是以他為焦點。柯文哲創造的「白色憧憬」，在現實上能否銷融藍綠的惡性對峙、帶來良性的刺激，值得期待，但實際作用則仍有待觀察。
如果把「柯文哲現象」比喻為一個上升氣旋，柯文哲好比一顆氣球，事實上，更值得探討的是支撐氣球升空的那個看不見的力量。柯文哲的「白色想像」能形成，是幾個主客觀條件與天時地利的結合：一，柯Ｐ的醫師專業及救治過許多政治人物的口碑，有效遮蓋了他的政治原色；二，連續的洪仲丘及太陽花事件，他因緣際會收編了公民運動的力量和年輕族群的支持；三，藍綠長年的對峙導致政經停滯，讓民眾忍無可忍；四，具開放精神的首都市民，願意接受「白色實驗」；五，全球化風潮中催化反中、反權貴氛圍，壓過傳統藍綠思維。這些因素加乘，讓這顆白色氣球高飛。
不可否認，在這個巨大的白色想像底下，其實也隱藏著幾個弔詭：其一，在「素人」包裝下「綠骨白皮」的柯文哲，究竟是天真率直或是陰險狡黠？其二，柯文哲在選戰期間豁免於一切質疑的「神化」現象，在正式執政後會不會剝落？其三，喊得震天價響的「公民參與」，在實際治理時能不能順利運轉？
事實上，這兩天柯文哲在組建市府團隊時，已遭到了若干挑戰。例如，他宣布要借重來推動都更的副市長人選林欽榮，即遭到文林苑社運人士和太陽花學運成員的批評，認為此人在台南鐵路東移徵收案及竹北璞玉計畫中扮演過「打手」角色。此外，柯文哲決定開放勞動局及環保局長以「I-VOTING」方式產生，讓網民登記投票，也遭工運團體和學界批評「爛透了」，認為資訊不足卻標榜公民參與根本行不通。不僅如此，民進黨內也傳出要求他放棄這種求才方式，認為不合責任政治的原理。
由此可見，柯文哲的「公民參與」倡議固然響亮迷人，但一落到執行層次，難免與現實發生扞格或碰撞；屆時，一些美好的誓言可能無法實現。例如，透過遴選委員及網路公民票選的局處長，若政策出了問題或者其意見與市長不同，誰該負責？再如，柯文哲魅力是靠著大批學社運人士的力挺所催生，但他的用人卻受到學社運界的質疑；久而久之雙方的關係必然磨損，柯文哲傳奇恐也會隨之掉漆。
無論如何，我們對這個「白色想像」仍抱持期待。重點其實不在柯文哲本身，而是希望這個民眾「渴望改變」的力量，能推倒令人厭倦的藍綠對峙，或至少使台灣政黨政治文化加進一些良性優質、共生互利的元素。從這點看，柯文哲推翻原本藍大於綠的首都基本盤，成功打開一個白色地帶，固是有目共睹的事實；然而，他的影響力滲透藍營的程度其實遠高於綠營。接下來，如何讓所謂「白色力量」也能穿透綠營群眾和政治人物，恐怕是他更大的挑戰。
國民黨在這次選舉遭到重創，付出慘痛的代價，至今仍不知如何收拾殘局。相對的，民進黨僅以「杯葛」一招，靠著執政者的錯誤，就贏得大片江山，恐怕也難謂天賜之福。回顧今年上半年，民進黨在首都幾乎推不出足堪一戰的人選，窘態畢露；如今乘著柯文哲打出的「白色憧憬」的氣流，竟然在全台攻城掠地，一副勝利者之姿，恐怕也會感到有些汗顏。而如果綠營新取得政權的縣市馬上展開一場權位大分贓，看在民眾眼裡，又將作何感想？
如果柯文哲現象代表了人民厭棄藍綠對峙的一種「白色想像」，那麼，這個憧憬已經成功跨出第一步。接下來，柯文哲必須將「超越藍綠」這個初衷逐一注入他的施政，並試圖召喚藍綠陣營在思想、價值和言行上自我反省，這才是「白色力量」進入政治的初始目的。最怕的是，柯文哲在紛亂的政治干擾中忘卻初衷，或在外界的掌聲中迷失自己；那樣的話，柯文哲神話破滅恐怕是遲早的事。
這顆白色氣球藉著各種力量之助益而升起，而柯文哲今天的責任是要維護這顆氣球，使它免於消風或下墜，他不能忘記自己的素人願望。馬英九如何從「超級吸票機」變成了「票房毒藥」，就是血淋淋的警惕。
Monday, December 1, 2014
Can the DPP's Win become Taiwan's Win?
Can the DPP's Win become Taiwan's Win?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 02, 2014
Executive Summary: The Democratic Progressive Party won this election. It now hopes to win the 2016 presidential election. But if Taiwan is to win, the DPP must not slam shut the nation’s doors and engage in political and economic obstructionism. The DPP must adopt a more pragmatic political and economic policy path. Can the DPP make such a pragmatic change? That remains a giant question mark.
Full Text Below:
Tsai Ing-wen said that the DPP will use this election to win back Taiwan. The DPP has won big. But can the DPP turn its own victory into Taiwan's victory?
This election was a political tsunami. It totally transformed Taiwan’s political landscape. No single factor can explain the outcome of this election. But everyone agrees that public discontent with the central government was the primary cause of this "democratic coup."
How should we interpret the results of this election? Does it mean that 60% of the public has rejected the Ma government’s political and economic policy path? Does it mean they prefer the Democratic Progressive Party’s political and economic policy path?
The Ma government's political and economic policy path is clear and consistent. It stresses business-oriented globalization and cross-Strait coopetition. On the one hand, cross-Strait relations supports globalization, On the other hand, globalization provides a check on cross-Strait relations, resulting in a virtuous circle. So what exactly are the election results telling us? Did they repudiate and overturn the nation’s political and economic path?
If the answer is yes, we must ask another question. Did this election wholeheartedly affirm the DPP’s economic and political path? The DPP’s current political and economic policy path is summed up in its "four pillars." One. Repudiate the 1992 consensus. Two. Refuse to nullify or freeze the Taiwan independence party platform. Three. Continue engaging in backdoor listing. Argue that “The Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China.” Four. Connect with the rest of the world before connecting with the Chinese mainland. The question now is this: Does the outcome of this election mean the public has given the DPP a mandate to implement its political and economic policy path?
During these local elections, political and economic issues were concealed, distorted, or diluted. Therefore this election merely reflected intense public dissatisfaction with the central government. Was this a reflection of opposition to the Ma government’s political and economic policy path, or identification with the opposition Democratic Progressive Party’s political and economic policy path? That is hard to say. Therefore, this election was merely an election that "critiqued the KMT" or "expressed dissatisfaction with the KMT." It cannot be interpreted as voter identification with the DPP.
This election has greatly increased the likelihood of the DPP returning to power in 2016. The DPP’s political and economic policy path will then be subject to an acid test. It will no longer be able to evade the issues. If the DPP is still clinging to the aforementioned "four pillars" that make up its political and economic policy path, it will have painted itself into a corner, on Taiwan and everywhere else. Therefore this election means only that the public rejected the Kuomintang. This may help the DPP return to power in 2016. But if the DPP refuses to change its political and economic policy path, Taiwan will find itself trapped with no way out. It will not be able to either advance or retreat. If the public on Taiwan asks the DPP to cure Taiwan's political and economic problems, it will be accepting medical advice from a snake oil salesman.
If the Democratic Progressive Party seeks a return to power, it must jettison its political and economic policy path. The key is Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP, and how they intend to interpret the results of this election. One. They can interpret it as an opportunity to divorce themselves from fundamentalist ideology. They can use it to overturn the DPP's "four pillars” political and economic policy path. Two. They can interpret the election as anti-Ma sentiment morphing into Taiwan independence fundamentalist anti-Mainland sentiment. They can cite it as reason to cling to its "four pillars” policy path. We urge the DPP to accept the first interpretation, capitalize on the trend, and throw off the shackles of the past.
This election has become a highly ironic political paradox. The public is unhappy with Ma Ying-jeou and the Kuomintang. This makes it likely that the DPP will win the 2016 presidential election. But if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will be compelled to “continue the previous administration’s cross-Strait policy." Tsai Ing-wen publicly admitted as much in 2012. The DPP will be compelled to plagiarize the Ma government's political and economic policy path. If it refuses to do so, the DPP government and Taiwan will be trapped. The is the connection between globalization, the rise of the Chinese mainland, and Taiwan’s inevitable marginalization. Tsai Ing-wen or the DPP cannot change this merely by wishing it isn’t so. As the title of this article noted, the Democratic Progressive Party has emerged the winner of this election. But will Taiwan be a winner as well? That remains to be seen.
The DPP must now change its political and economic policy path, making it consistent with Taiwan’s long-term interests. It must make the party's victory Taiwan's victory. Only this will win it the public support it craves. Some have suggested that President Ma Ying-jeou serve as Tsai Ing-wen’s Premier. This of course is sheer fantasy. But it does suggest the political and economic policy path the DPP should take. The most urgent task for the DPP is to facilitate the passage of the STA, MTA, and to establish cross-Strait representative offices in the legislature. Doing so would reduce the cross-Strait friction generated by the Democratic Progressive Party’s return to power. This would lend greater credibility to the DPP government’s "unconditional acceptance" of the previous administration’s cross-Strait policy.
The Democratic Progressive Party won this election. It now hopes to win the 2016 presidential election. But if Taiwan is to win, the DPP must not slam shut the nation’s doors and engage in political and economic obstructionism. The DPP must adopt a more pragmatic political and economic policy path. Can the DPP make such a pragmatic change? That remains a giant question mark.
民進黨的贏，要如何化為台灣的勝利？
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.02 02:13 am
蔡英文說：民進黨要用這場選舉贏回台灣。現在，民進黨大贏，接下來的一步，是民進黨要如何把它自己的勝利轉化為台灣的勝利。
這場政治海嘯般的選舉，徹底改變了台灣的政治地貌。雖說不能用單一因素來解讀這場選舉，但眾議咸同的是：民意對「中央執政」的不滿，是造成這場「民主政變」的主要原因。
那麼，能否將這場選舉解讀為台灣六成民意對馬政府的國家政經總路線之否定與顛覆，而選擇了民進黨現今所主張的國家政經總路線？
馬政府的國家政經總路線，是清晰而一致的，那就是：專注經營以全球化為導向的兩岸競合關係。一方面，用兩岸關係來支持全球化，另一方面用全球化來制約兩岸關係。循環相生，往復利用。那麼，這次選舉結果，是否對於此一國家政經總路線的全盤否定與顛覆？
如果是，則另一層次的問題便是：這次選舉是否對民進黨的國家政經總路線的全盤肯定與支持？截至此刻，民進黨的國家政經總路線可謂有「四大支柱」：一、否認九二共識。二、不廢凍台獨黨綱。三、借殼上市，中華民國是台灣，台灣是中華民國。四、從世界走向中國。試問：這次選舉能否解讀為民意給了民進黨繼續貫徹這套政經總路線的政治令狀（mandate）？
在這場地方選舉中，國家政經總路線的議題被掩蓋或扭曲、淡化，因此我們認為，或許只能說這場選舉充分反映了民意對「中央執政」的強烈不滿，但是否顯示即是對馬政府政經總路線的反對與對民進黨政經總路線的認同，尚難定論。因而，這場選舉在相當程度上，就國家政經總路線而言，可視為一場「批判國民黨」或「不滿國民黨」的選舉，但尚不能直接解讀為選民「認同民進黨」。
這場選舉使民進黨在二○一六年重返執政的可能性大增，屆時，民進黨的國家政經總路線才將進入實際考驗，沒有掩蓋迴避的可能。到時候，民進黨如果仍然持守前述「四大支柱」的政經總路線，則台灣在裡裡外外必無出路。因而，這場選舉所造成的政治情勢儼然是：民意「反對國民黨」，可能使民進黨在二○一六重返執政；但民進黨若不翻轉調整其國家總路線，則台灣必無出路，成為「頭過身不過」的僵局。倘係如此，而台灣民意若欲藉此次選舉請民進黨提供台灣政經難題之解藥，那不啻是請鬼拿藥單。
民進黨若重返執政，必須翻轉其政經總路線。關鍵在於民進黨及蔡英文如何解讀這場選舉的意義：一、可將這次選舉解讀為突破意識形態及基本教義捆綁的契機，藉用中間選民為槓桿來翻轉民進黨的「四大支柱總路線」。二、也可將這次選舉解讀為「從反馬到仇中」基本教義的大發酵，因而愈加持守「四大支柱總路線」。我們的建議是，民進黨應當對這次選舉採用第一種解讀，因勢利導，始能頭過身也過。
容我們預言，這次選舉已形成了一個極諷刺的政治悖論，亦即：民意對國民黨及馬英九的不滿，極可能使民進黨贏得二○一六總統大選；然而，民進黨若重返執政，除了「延續前朝兩岸政策」（蔡英文二○一二年語），大幅抄襲延續馬政府的國家政經總路線之外，民進黨政府及台灣均難有出路。這是在全球化大局及中國大陸崛起，與台灣急劇邊緣化之下的必然趨勢，不會隨蔡英文或民進黨的個別意志為轉移。此即文首所說：民進黨贏了這場選舉，但台灣能不能贏，尚是未知數。
如今民進黨必須儘速思考的是：如何修正它的政經總路線，使之與台灣的長期利益接軌，使該黨的勝利轉換為台灣的勝利，這才是取得人民支持的根本之計。有人提議，由馬總統任蔡英文為行政院長；此議雖屬狂想，卻點出了民進黨自此刻即應負起為國家政經總路線鋪平道路的責任。目下最起碼的工作，是民進黨應協力促成兩岸服貿協議、貨貿協議及互設辦事處等立法工程的完成；如此即可減少民進黨重返執政所遭遇的兩岸折衝與磨擦，並增加民進黨政府「概括承受」的資產。
民進黨贏了這次選舉，並向二○一六總統大選的贏局逼近。但是，如果台灣也要贏，不能靠民進黨以封鎖、杯葛為主軸的政經路線，而有賴民進黨向更務實可行的國家政經路線調整。民進黨能否務實自我調整，目前仍是一座等待征服的大山。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 02, 2014
Executive Summary: The Democratic Progressive Party won this election. It now hopes to win the 2016 presidential election. But if Taiwan is to win, the DPP must not slam shut the nation’s doors and engage in political and economic obstructionism. The DPP must adopt a more pragmatic political and economic policy path. Can the DPP make such a pragmatic change? That remains a giant question mark.
Full Text Below:
Tsai Ing-wen said that the DPP will use this election to win back Taiwan. The DPP has won big. But can the DPP turn its own victory into Taiwan's victory?
This election was a political tsunami. It totally transformed Taiwan’s political landscape. No single factor can explain the outcome of this election. But everyone agrees that public discontent with the central government was the primary cause of this "democratic coup."
How should we interpret the results of this election? Does it mean that 60% of the public has rejected the Ma government’s political and economic policy path? Does it mean they prefer the Democratic Progressive Party’s political and economic policy path?
The Ma government's political and economic policy path is clear and consistent. It stresses business-oriented globalization and cross-Strait coopetition. On the one hand, cross-Strait relations supports globalization, On the other hand, globalization provides a check on cross-Strait relations, resulting in a virtuous circle. So what exactly are the election results telling us? Did they repudiate and overturn the nation’s political and economic path?
If the answer is yes, we must ask another question. Did this election wholeheartedly affirm the DPP’s economic and political path? The DPP’s current political and economic policy path is summed up in its "four pillars." One. Repudiate the 1992 consensus. Two. Refuse to nullify or freeze the Taiwan independence party platform. Three. Continue engaging in backdoor listing. Argue that “The Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China.” Four. Connect with the rest of the world before connecting with the Chinese mainland. The question now is this: Does the outcome of this election mean the public has given the DPP a mandate to implement its political and economic policy path?
During these local elections, political and economic issues were concealed, distorted, or diluted. Therefore this election merely reflected intense public dissatisfaction with the central government. Was this a reflection of opposition to the Ma government’s political and economic policy path, or identification with the opposition Democratic Progressive Party’s political and economic policy path? That is hard to say. Therefore, this election was merely an election that "critiqued the KMT" or "expressed dissatisfaction with the KMT." It cannot be interpreted as voter identification with the DPP.
This election has greatly increased the likelihood of the DPP returning to power in 2016. The DPP’s political and economic policy path will then be subject to an acid test. It will no longer be able to evade the issues. If the DPP is still clinging to the aforementioned "four pillars" that make up its political and economic policy path, it will have painted itself into a corner, on Taiwan and everywhere else. Therefore this election means only that the public rejected the Kuomintang. This may help the DPP return to power in 2016. But if the DPP refuses to change its political and economic policy path, Taiwan will find itself trapped with no way out. It will not be able to either advance or retreat. If the public on Taiwan asks the DPP to cure Taiwan's political and economic problems, it will be accepting medical advice from a snake oil salesman.
If the Democratic Progressive Party seeks a return to power, it must jettison its political and economic policy path. The key is Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP, and how they intend to interpret the results of this election. One. They can interpret it as an opportunity to divorce themselves from fundamentalist ideology. They can use it to overturn the DPP's "four pillars” political and economic policy path. Two. They can interpret the election as anti-Ma sentiment morphing into Taiwan independence fundamentalist anti-Mainland sentiment. They can cite it as reason to cling to its "four pillars” policy path. We urge the DPP to accept the first interpretation, capitalize on the trend, and throw off the shackles of the past.
This election has become a highly ironic political paradox. The public is unhappy with Ma Ying-jeou and the Kuomintang. This makes it likely that the DPP will win the 2016 presidential election. But if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will be compelled to “continue the previous administration’s cross-Strait policy." Tsai Ing-wen publicly admitted as much in 2012. The DPP will be compelled to plagiarize the Ma government's political and economic policy path. If it refuses to do so, the DPP government and Taiwan will be trapped. The is the connection between globalization, the rise of the Chinese mainland, and Taiwan’s inevitable marginalization. Tsai Ing-wen or the DPP cannot change this merely by wishing it isn’t so. As the title of this article noted, the Democratic Progressive Party has emerged the winner of this election. But will Taiwan be a winner as well? That remains to be seen.
The DPP must now change its political and economic policy path, making it consistent with Taiwan’s long-term interests. It must make the party's victory Taiwan's victory. Only this will win it the public support it craves. Some have suggested that President Ma Ying-jeou serve as Tsai Ing-wen’s Premier. This of course is sheer fantasy. But it does suggest the political and economic policy path the DPP should take. The most urgent task for the DPP is to facilitate the passage of the STA, MTA, and to establish cross-Strait representative offices in the legislature. Doing so would reduce the cross-Strait friction generated by the Democratic Progressive Party’s return to power. This would lend greater credibility to the DPP government’s "unconditional acceptance" of the previous administration’s cross-Strait policy.
The Democratic Progressive Party won this election. It now hopes to win the 2016 presidential election. But if Taiwan is to win, the DPP must not slam shut the nation’s doors and engage in political and economic obstructionism. The DPP must adopt a more pragmatic political and economic policy path. Can the DPP make such a pragmatic change? That remains a giant question mark.
民進黨的贏，要如何化為台灣的勝利？
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.02 02:13 am
蔡英文說：民進黨要用這場選舉贏回台灣。現在，民進黨大贏，接下來的一步，是民進黨要如何把它自己的勝利轉化為台灣的勝利。
這場政治海嘯般的選舉，徹底改變了台灣的政治地貌。雖說不能用單一因素來解讀這場選舉，但眾議咸同的是：民意對「中央執政」的不滿，是造成這場「民主政變」的主要原因。
那麼，能否將這場選舉解讀為台灣六成民意對馬政府的國家政經總路線之否定與顛覆，而選擇了民進黨現今所主張的國家政經總路線？
馬政府的國家政經總路線，是清晰而一致的，那就是：專注經營以全球化為導向的兩岸競合關係。一方面，用兩岸關係來支持全球化，另一方面用全球化來制約兩岸關係。循環相生，往復利用。那麼，這次選舉結果，是否對於此一國家政經總路線的全盤否定與顛覆？
如果是，則另一層次的問題便是：這次選舉是否對民進黨的國家政經總路線的全盤肯定與支持？截至此刻，民進黨的國家政經總路線可謂有「四大支柱」：一、否認九二共識。二、不廢凍台獨黨綱。三、借殼上市，中華民國是台灣，台灣是中華民國。四、從世界走向中國。試問：這次選舉能否解讀為民意給了民進黨繼續貫徹這套政經總路線的政治令狀（mandate）？
在這場地方選舉中，國家政經總路線的議題被掩蓋或扭曲、淡化，因此我們認為，或許只能說這場選舉充分反映了民意對「中央執政」的強烈不滿，但是否顯示即是對馬政府政經總路線的反對與對民進黨政經總路線的認同，尚難定論。因而，這場選舉在相當程度上，就國家政經總路線而言，可視為一場「批判國民黨」或「不滿國民黨」的選舉，但尚不能直接解讀為選民「認同民進黨」。
這場選舉使民進黨在二○一六年重返執政的可能性大增，屆時，民進黨的國家政經總路線才將進入實際考驗，沒有掩蓋迴避的可能。到時候，民進黨如果仍然持守前述「四大支柱」的政經總路線，則台灣在裡裡外外必無出路。因而，這場選舉所造成的政治情勢儼然是：民意「反對國民黨」，可能使民進黨在二○一六重返執政；但民進黨若不翻轉調整其國家總路線，則台灣必無出路，成為「頭過身不過」的僵局。倘係如此，而台灣民意若欲藉此次選舉請民進黨提供台灣政經難題之解藥，那不啻是請鬼拿藥單。
民進黨若重返執政，必須翻轉其政經總路線。關鍵在於民進黨及蔡英文如何解讀這場選舉的意義：一、可將這次選舉解讀為突破意識形態及基本教義捆綁的契機，藉用中間選民為槓桿來翻轉民進黨的「四大支柱總路線」。二、也可將這次選舉解讀為「從反馬到仇中」基本教義的大發酵，因而愈加持守「四大支柱總路線」。我們的建議是，民進黨應當對這次選舉採用第一種解讀，因勢利導，始能頭過身也過。
容我們預言，這次選舉已形成了一個極諷刺的政治悖論，亦即：民意對國民黨及馬英九的不滿，極可能使民進黨贏得二○一六總統大選；然而，民進黨若重返執政，除了「延續前朝兩岸政策」（蔡英文二○一二年語），大幅抄襲延續馬政府的國家政經總路線之外，民進黨政府及台灣均難有出路。這是在全球化大局及中國大陸崛起，與台灣急劇邊緣化之下的必然趨勢，不會隨蔡英文或民進黨的個別意志為轉移。此即文首所說：民進黨贏了這場選舉，但台灣能不能贏，尚是未知數。
如今民進黨必須儘速思考的是：如何修正它的政經總路線，使之與台灣的長期利益接軌，使該黨的勝利轉換為台灣的勝利，這才是取得人民支持的根本之計。有人提議，由馬總統任蔡英文為行政院長；此議雖屬狂想，卻點出了民進黨自此刻即應負起為國家政經總路線鋪平道路的責任。目下最起碼的工作，是民進黨應協力促成兩岸服貿協議、貨貿協議及互設辦事處等立法工程的完成；如此即可減少民進黨重返執政所遭遇的兩岸折衝與磨擦，並增加民進黨政府「概括承受」的資產。
民進黨贏了這次選舉，並向二○一六總統大選的贏局逼近。但是，如果台灣也要贏，不能靠民進黨以封鎖、杯葛為主軸的政經路線，而有賴民進黨向更務實可行的國家政經路線調整。民進黨能否務實自我調整，目前仍是一座等待征服的大山。
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