Tsai Ing-wen's Ability Compared to Wen-Je Ko
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 14, 2015
Executive Summary: With a single declaration that "One China is not a problem", Wen-Je Ko won the approval of Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office. Tsai Ing-wen meanwhile, vowed to "maintain the cross-Strait status quo". Yet the Taiwan Affairs Office responded with, "If you cling to a "one country each side" Taiwan independence separatist stance, it will undermine the political foundation for peaceful development of cross-Strait relations."
Full Text Below:
With a single declaration that "One China is not a problem", Wen-Je Ko won the approval of Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office. Tsai Ing-wen meanwhile, vowed to "maintain the cross-Strait status quo". Yet the Taiwan Affairs Office responded with, "If you cling to a "one country each side" Taiwan independence separatist stance, it will undermine the political foundation for peaceful development of cross-Strait relations."
When confronted with the 1992 consensus, Wen-Je Ko passed muster. Tsai Ing-wen on the other hand, did not. Some say that Ko was more effective than Tsai. In fact, the two have very different roles. Such comparisons wrongly compare apples and oranges. Ko is a city mayor. He is not a DPP member. A little lip service is enough to earn him a free pass. But Tsai Ing-wen may become the next President of the Republic of China. She is bound by the Taiwan independence party platform. She has also a hostage of the Sunflower Student Movement. Therefore she cannot sweep the matter aside with a simple pledge to "maintain the status quo". Tsai and Ko have different roles. That is why Beijing has different strategies for dealing with them. They allow Ko to quickly pass muster, but make Tsai bear the brunt of responsibility.
A politician's abilities must be commensurate with his responsibiities. Ko is a city mayor, unconstrained by partisan loyalties. He was able to pass muster merely by proposing a "New Perspectives for 2015". HIs abilities were commensurate with his responsibilities. But Tsai Ing-wen aspires to be the next president of the Republic of China. Her perfunctory lip service to "maintaining the status quo", was intended to draw attention away from her rejection of the 1992 consensus. Instead they merely showed that her abilities fell short of her responsibilities as president.
One's abilities must be commensurate with one's responsibilities. A plumber must be able to fix a leaky faucet, but need not deal with a building's structural frame. A structural or civil engineer must deal with a building's structural frame, but need not repair a leaky faucet. Wen-Je Ko characterizes himself as "deep green". But he is not bound by the DPP's Taiwan independence party platform. He can ignore the DPP altogether. Nor is he competing for the ROC presidency. As long as he is willing to say that "One China is not a problem", he has done his duty. But Tsai Ing-wen is DPP Chairperson. She is also seeking the presidency. Beijing is exerting more pressure on her. The US is imposing tighter constraints on her. She must wear many hats. She must demonstrate many abilities. She cannot rattle off a pledge to "maintain the status quo". Naturally she cannot be compared with Wen-Je Ko.
A person's abilities must be commensurate with his or her responsibilities. Is Tsai Ing-wen a chairperson who can uplift and transform the DPP? Can she be an effective President of the Republic of China, and ensure peace? The answer hinges on two questions. One. Can Tsai Ing-wen be an effective DPP party chairperson? Two. Can Tsai Ing-wen be an effective ROC president in 2016?
A politician's ability must be commensurate with his or her responsibilities. A politician's responsibilities vary with the times. A current Chairperson of the Democratic Progressive Party, and a future 2016 President of the Republic of China must face a major challenge. He or she must deal with 1992 consensus or the "one China premise". Tsai Ing-wen's general competence is not in doubt. But she must now deal with the 1992 consensus. If a faucet is leaking, Tsai Ing-wen must be able to stop the leak. Whether she can deal with a building's structural frame is irrelevant.
Tsai Ing-wen faces a test. One. The DPP must upgrade and transform itself. Two. The two sides of the Strait must not be destabilized. Over the years, Tsai Ing-wen has resorted to deception to secure her political status. For this, she has paid a price. She has been drawn, step by step, into the Ah-Bian supporters vortex. She has been taken hostage by the Sunflower Student Movement, and must parrot its Taiwan independence rhetoric. So far, Tsai Ing-wen has equivocated well enough to mollify her political support. But she has forfeited the ability to set the agenda and determine the direction taken by her political supporters. In other words, Tsai Ing-wen has the same limited ability that DPP leaders have always had. When addressing the party and the nation, she is unable to change with the times. Is this what the DPP expects of its chairperson at this critical moment in time? Is this what the nation expects of the President of the Republic of China in 2016? Wen-Je Ko need not be concerned about such matters. But Tsai Ing-wen must.
Ability involves gradations. Lee Teng-hui said the DPP "only knows how to campaign, not how to govern." Ma Ying-jeou has been blasted as "incompetent". But what about Tsai Ing-wen's competence? Ma Ying-jeou's mistakes included gasoline price and electricity rate hikes and the capital gains tax. These were not mistakes in policy. They were merely mistakes in execution. Sometimes they merely revealed an inability to deal with the DPP. In particular, Ma's 1992 consensus and "one china, different interpretations" ought to be deemed policy achievements. The DPP found it difficult to undermine these achievements by citing technicalities. By contrast, Tsai Ing-wen's ability, like that of past DPP leaders, is purely technical. Her shortcomings, by contrast, are often at the policy level. For example, Tsai Ing-wen successfully demanded the abolition of nuclear energy. But her "non-nuclear energy" policy is wanting. Tsai Ing-wen successfully blocked ECFA. Yet she has no choice but to "unconditionally accept the cross-Strait policies of the previous administration". Finally, the DPP has successfully stirred up Taiwan independence sentiment. But it has been unable to resolve the problems posed by the 1992 consensus. That is why Tsai Ing-wen's pledge to "maintain the cross-Strait status quo" has been dismissed by the other side as idle chatter.
Tsai Ing-wen has never been able to shake off her "content-free Tsai" nickname. Her abilities have proven inadequate relative to her responsibilities, whether as current chairperson or future president.
蔡英文的能力 從柯文哲談起
2015-04-14 聯合報
柯文哲以一句「一個中國不是問題」，贏得北京國台辦的「讚賞」。蔡英文宣示「維持兩岸現狀」，國台辦卻回稱：「如果堅持『一邊一國』的台獨分裂立場，勢必破壞兩岸關係和平發展的政治基礎。」
同是面對「九二共識」，柯文哲過關，蔡英文碰壁。有人說，柯比蔡強。其實，由於二人的角色不同，若以此評比，可能進入比擬不倫的誤區。柯是市長，不是民進黨員，所以嘴皮翻兩番，就過了關。但蔡可能當選下屆中華民國總統，一方面有台獨黨綱的捆綁，一方面受太陽花勢力的挾持，因此不易用一句「維持現狀」就交代了事。亦正因蔡柯的角色不同，所以北京對二人的對應策略不一，計在使柯草草過關，而讓蔡站回首當其衝的位置。
政治人物的能力，必須與其擔任的角色對應。柯做為一個不受黨派捆綁的市長，他能以「一五新觀點」過關，可謂其能力與角色相當；但蔡英文則是下屆中華民國總統的競逐者，若欲以「維持現狀」來敷衍「九二共識」，卻徒然暴露了其能力與角色不相當的軟肋。
能力必須與角色相當。水電工要會修水龍頭，但不一定要會扶正樑柱；土木工要會扶正樑柱，但不必會修水龍頭。柯文哲雖自稱「深綠」，但因不必背負台獨黨綱，不必理會民進黨，又未角逐中華民國總統位，因而他只要有說出「一個中國不是問題」的能力，即與其角色相當。但蔡英文是民進黨主席，又要角逐總統大位，北京給她的壓力不同，美國對她的牽制不同，人民對她的期待亦不同，因此她就必須具備與其角色相當的能力，不能只會說「維持現狀」，當然不能與柯文哲相提並論。
以角色與能力的對稱性而言，蔡英文若是一位沒有能力提升民進黨、帶民進黨轉型的黨主席，即無可能成為一位做好和平治理的中華民國總統。此中涉及兩個問題：一、蔡英文有否做好現階段民進黨黨主席的能力？二、蔡英文有否做好後二○一六中華民國總統的能力？
政治人物的能力必須與其角色有對稱性，而政治人物的角色又有其時代性。現階段民進黨黨主席及後二○一六中華民國總統的最大時代性考驗，可以說就是有無處理「九二共識」或「一個中國」的能力。蔡英文的綜合才能或許不必懷疑，但她的時代角色卻是在處理「九二共識」；正如水龍頭正在漏水，蔡英文必須有能力把它止住，這無關她是否具備能夠扶正樑柱的其他才能。
蔡英文所面對的時代考驗是：一、民進黨必須提升與轉型。二、兩岸不能出現「地動山搖」的局面。但是，蔡英文近年展現的能力，卻是用鄉愿作風來維繫其共主地位；她所付出的代價，則是一步步更加遷就黨內以挺扁為表徵的節操沉淪，並受太陽花勢力的挾制而困陷於台獨論述。當下所見，蔡英文確有能力以媚俗及蒙混手法組織起她的政治轎夫，但她卻失去了決定路途的能力，而由政治轎夫決定了方向。也就是說，蔡英文具備的能力，與民進黨傳統領袖並無不同；對黨及國家言，她似乎並不具備與其時代考驗相對稱的能力。這樣的能力，難道是時代對現階段民進黨主席所期待的嗎？又難道是時代對後二○一六中華民國總統所寄望的嗎？這些，都不必求諸柯文哲，但蔡英文必須面對。
能力亦有層次之分。李登輝說「只會選舉／不會治國」即是層次論。馬英九深受「無能」的指責，但我們何曾討論蔡英文的能力？馬英九的失誤大多非在政策層次，如油電漲價、證所稅等，而是在執行的技術層次，甚至只是在無能對付民進黨。尤其，馬的「九二共識／一中各表」應視為政策性的成就，民進黨不易用技術謀略加以推翻。相對而言，蔡的才能卻一如民進黨傳統領袖，是以技術層次取勝，卻常在政策層次出現大敗筆。例如，蔡英文炒作廢核的技術性能力極強，但對「非核能源」的政策論述仍付闕如；又如，蔡英文反ECFA的技術性抗爭極強，卻自陷於「概括承受／反對服貿」的政策性矛盾。尤其，民進黨炒作台獨的技術性能力極強，卻拿不出化解「九二共識」的政策性主張；所以，蔡英文一句「維持兩岸現狀」，被對岸說成「對空氣說話」。
蔡英文一直擺脫不去「空心蔡」的綽號，這正是對其能力的一貫質疑，可謂也是對其能力的角色性、時代性、層次性是否對稱的一種通俗評價。
Monday, April 13, 2015
Sunday, April 12, 2015
A Content-Free Tsai Ing-wen: More Frightening than Ma Ying-jeou or Chen Shui-bian
A Content-Free Tsai Ing-wen: More Frightening than Ma Ying-jeou or Chen Shui-bian
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 13, 2015
Executive Summary: Rising public opinion in the Internet era, along with a rising Mainland China under globalization, is forcing rapid change on Taiwan. The wrong choice of ROC leader could force the entire nation to pay a painful price. Former president Chen Shui-bian and current president Ma Ying-jeou presidents are well-known examples. But another kind of leader is even worse, a leader afraid to make decisions. Such a leader will destroy Taiwan's chances and throttle Taiwan's lifeblood.
Full Text Below:
Rising public opinion in the Internet era, along with a rising Mainland China under globalization, is forcing rapid change on Taiwan. The wrong choice of ROC leader could force the entire nation to pay a painful price. Former president Chen Shui-bian and current president Ma Ying-jeou presidents are well-known examples. But another kind of leader is even worse, a leader afraid to make decisions. Such a leader will destroy Taiwan's chances and throttle Taiwan's lifeblood.
Decisions are often multi-faceted. Right or wrong are often compromises. In other words, the decisions made by national leaders are seldom absolutely right. They are merely relatively wrong. If one is decisive, one may confuse failure with success. But if one is indecisive, whatever was right with one's policy may remain unseen, while whatever was wrong will become highly visible. One will wind up spinning one's wheels and going nowhere. Any opportunity to minimize the damage will be lost, and the nation's strength will be eroded.
Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to lead remains our greatest concern. On February 14, Tsai Ing-wen posted an article on Facebook, entitled "Pioneering an Era that Truly Belongs to the People". Her 1500 word delaration concerning the DPP presidential primaries revealed no signs of leadership or concrete policy proposals. All that remained was a disclaimer that "I am not Chen Shui-bian. I am not Ma Ying-jeou."
Based on Tsai Ing-wen's words and deeds over the years, she is indeed not Chen Shui-bian. Nor is she Ma Ying-jeou. But this by itself is hardly reassuring or encouraging. Neither Ma nor Chen are models of leadership. Chen Shui-bian was too pragmatic and opportunistic. He abused his power, engaged in corruption power, and sowed pandemonium. Ma Ying-jeou, by contrast, inhabited an ivory tower. He was inflexible and knew only how to "go by the book". He alienated the people and lost their hearts and minds. But at least these two presidents had a sense of direction. They were at least willing to make decisions.
What about Tsai Ing-wen? She does not appear to be as opportunistic as Chen Shui-bian. But neither does she appear to be sufficiently pragmatic. She is not as inflexible as Ma Ying-jeou. But she also lacks Ma Ying-jeou's burning idealism. This convinces us that Tsai Ing-wen is neither Chen Shui-bian nor Ma Ying-jeou. But not being Ma or Chen does no mean that Tsai Ing-wen will be a good leader. For this, we must observe Tsai Ing-wen's behavior.
Tsai Ing-wen always answers a question with a question. She never provides any answers. When asked about her position on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, she passed the buck to Ma Ying-jeou. She said, "The AIIB issue has provoked tremendous controversy over the past few days. After seven years, President Ma Ying-jeou still does not seem to understand why so many people are suspicious, lack trust, and cannot relax." So, should Taiwan join the AIIB? Tsai refused to answer. But the opportunities the AIIB will bring to Taiwan will not wait. A Eurasian tectonic plate is taking shape. The global landscape is changing. The world will not wait for Taiwan.
When the time comes to make decisions, Tsai Ing-wen habitually passes the buck to "public opinion". She refuses to state her own views. When asked why she went from supporting the cabinet system to opposing the cabinet system, she gave a short answer. "Current mainstream public opinion demands direct presidential elections." She refused to say that the cabinet system was bad, and that was why she opposed it. She merely passed the buck on to "mainstream public opinion."
Whenever a decision must be made, Tsai Ing-wen often resorts to procedural obfuscation, thereby ducking questions of substance. When addressing constitutional reform, Tsai Ing-wen never forgets to mention the threshold requirement for a "national conference". If the KMT disagrees, and constitutional reform is delayed, she blames the KMT. If the KMT agrees, and the President convenes a conference, Tsai Ing-wen adds procedural obstacles. She asserts that "The current government has entered the caretaker government stage. It lacks the necessary public confidence." She opposes the President convening a national conference. She ignores the fact that historically speaking national conferences have always been convened by the President, as they are duly authorized to do so. This sort of "head I win, tails you lose" strategy may matter little when one is an opposition leader. But this is not genuine leadership. If this is how Tsai Ing-wen intends to govern once elected president, we should all be worried.
We must remind Tsai Ing-wen that when the people elect a leader, they are not electing a yes-man who refers everything to "mainstream public opinion". If "mainstream public opinion" becomes an excuse for shirking responsibility, then we may as well make a polling company president. Everything will be decided by "mainstream public opinion". No policy debate will be required. Everytyhing will be decided by large sample public opinion polls. After all, "mainstream public opinion" has the final say.
A society unable to solve problems cannot progress. A leader who shirks responsibility, cannot lead a society and resolve its problems. Taiwan faces many tangled structural problems. Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou enjoyed highly popularity when first elected. Voters overlooked two considerations, the fact that neither man saw the larger picture. As a result the nation's problems worsened. ROC voters need a more rigorous test of leadership ability, one with a high degree of transparency. Only then can Taiwan break the impasse. Tsai Ing-wen boasts that she is neither Chen Shui-bian nor Ma Ying-jeou. That is not a bad thing. But never taking a stand, and never making a decision, in order to evade voter scrutiny, is even more worrisome than Ma Ying-jeou or Chen Shui-bian.
Our advice to Tsai Ing-wen is the very phrase she often repeats, "Think about it". Thinking about it is the last thing Tsai Ing-wen needs. What she needs to do is offer concrete proposals for public scrutiny.
社論－空心蔡英文可能比馬扁更可怕
2015年04月13日 04:10 主筆室
網路時代高漲的民意、全球化浪潮下中國大陸的崛起，推動台灣進入超高速變遷時代，國家領導人巨變中的一個錯誤決定，就可能讓整個國家付出慘痛的代價，從過去陳水扁到現在馬英九兩任總統執政過程已屢見不鮮。但還有一種更糟糕的領導人，就是不做決定的領導人，這種領導人，會貽誤台灣的機會、掐死台灣的命脈。
決策常帶有多面性，對錯往往是比重的問題，也就是說，國家領導人面對的選項中並沒有絕對對的決策，只有相對錯得較少的決策，而且決策後如果具有強大的執行力，往往就能易錯為對。但不做決策，將使得對的一面無法彰顯，錯的一面卻不會消失，原地空轉的結果，會讓台灣連做「錯誤最少」、「傷害最小」決定的機會都流失，讓國家力量逐漸消蝕。
這種「不領導的領導性格」，是我們對蔡英文最大的憂心。今年2月14日蔡英文在臉書發表〈開創一個真正屬於人民的時代〉聲明，宣布投入民進黨總統初選，在1500字的聲明中，看不到她以領導高度提出具體的國政主張，只留下一句媒體標題：「我不是陳水扁，不是馬英九，我是蔡英文。」
從蔡英文過去這些年角逐總統大位時的言行，她確實不是陳水扁，也不是馬英九。然而，這並不因此讓人覺得安心或欣慰。馬與扁都不被認為是好的領導典範，陳水扁有太強烈的務實或投機性格，甚至濫權乃至於涉貪涉弊，把台灣搞得烏煙瘴氣；馬英九卻有著太不食人間煙火的理想性，不知變通、激怒眾方，弄得離心離德。但這兩位總統至少都是有方向感，肯做決定的領導人。
蔡英文呢？她的投機性沒有陳水扁那麼強烈，但似乎也沒有足夠的務實性，她不像馬英九那麼不知變通，但也缺乏馬英九那種為理想灼身的使命感。這些都讓我們相信蔡英文不是陳水扁或馬英九。然而不是馬、不是扁的蔡英文，卻未必是好的領導人。這可以從蔡英文的行為模式觀察。
遇到質詢，蔡英文總是反問，而不給答案。當問及她對亞投行的態度時，她把問題拋向馬英九：「亞投行議題這幾天引發極大的爭議，經過了7年，馬英九總統似乎還是不明白，為什麼人民對他有這麼多質疑、這麼不信任、不放心？」台灣該不該加入亞投行？她沒回答。但亞投行帶來的機會，不會等台灣。歐亞大板塊正在形成，全球大格局正在改變，世界不會等台灣。
該當選擇時，蔡英文習慣推給民意，不表達己見。當外界問及她為什麼從支持內閣制改為反對內閣制時，她給了12字的回答：「目前主流民意堅持總統直選」。她沒有說內閣制有哪些不好，所以反對，敷衍地把球丟給了「主流民意」。
需要下決定時，蔡英文經常訴求程序，迴避實質主張。談到憲改，蔡英文不忘加「國是會議」的程序門檻，國民黨不同意，拖延憲改的責難就落在國民黨頭上，但當國民黨同意由總統府召開時，蔡英文就再加一個程序障礙，以「這個政府已經進入看守狀態，民眾信賴不足」為由，反對由總統府召開國是會議，不理會台灣有史以來國是會議都由總統府召集的慣例，以及主政者召開本身的正當性。這是一種不失分策略，當她是在野黨領袖時，影響不大，但如果這種「不領導的領導」就是蔡英文選上總統後的治國模式，就讓人憂心萬分了。
對此，我們必須提醒蔡英文，人民選的是「領導者」，不是凡事拿「主流民意」當藉口的「應聲蟲」。如果「主流民意」變成了不負責的理由產生器，那麼，台灣讓時下最夯的大數據公司當總統就好。凡事都透過大數據調查「主流民意」再決定政策，不需要政策論辯與損益檢驗，因為「主流民意」說了算。
沒有解決問題能力的社會，不會進步，迴避問題的領導人，不可能帶領社會解決問題。台灣面對眾多糾結的結構性問題，陳水扁與馬英九競選期間的高人氣，讓選民輕忽了對二人的檢驗，忽略了他們思考不全面的毛病，使國家糾結的問題愈結愈緊。從這一點來看，台灣需要一個經過選民嚴格檢驗、高透明度的新形態領導人，才能領導台灣突破困局。蔡英文自詡不是陳水扁與馬英九，這不是壞事，但凡事不表態、不做決定，以逃避選民檢驗，那麼，她可能比馬英九或陳水扁更加令人擔心。
我們給蔡英文的建議是，她常常掛在口中的兩個字是「想想」，但蔡英文目前最不缺的就是「想想看」，而是拿出具體主張接受檢驗。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 13, 2015
Executive Summary: Rising public opinion in the Internet era, along with a rising Mainland China under globalization, is forcing rapid change on Taiwan. The wrong choice of ROC leader could force the entire nation to pay a painful price. Former president Chen Shui-bian and current president Ma Ying-jeou presidents are well-known examples. But another kind of leader is even worse, a leader afraid to make decisions. Such a leader will destroy Taiwan's chances and throttle Taiwan's lifeblood.
Full Text Below:
Rising public opinion in the Internet era, along with a rising Mainland China under globalization, is forcing rapid change on Taiwan. The wrong choice of ROC leader could force the entire nation to pay a painful price. Former president Chen Shui-bian and current president Ma Ying-jeou presidents are well-known examples. But another kind of leader is even worse, a leader afraid to make decisions. Such a leader will destroy Taiwan's chances and throttle Taiwan's lifeblood.
Decisions are often multi-faceted. Right or wrong are often compromises. In other words, the decisions made by national leaders are seldom absolutely right. They are merely relatively wrong. If one is decisive, one may confuse failure with success. But if one is indecisive, whatever was right with one's policy may remain unseen, while whatever was wrong will become highly visible. One will wind up spinning one's wheels and going nowhere. Any opportunity to minimize the damage will be lost, and the nation's strength will be eroded.
Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to lead remains our greatest concern. On February 14, Tsai Ing-wen posted an article on Facebook, entitled "Pioneering an Era that Truly Belongs to the People". Her 1500 word delaration concerning the DPP presidential primaries revealed no signs of leadership or concrete policy proposals. All that remained was a disclaimer that "I am not Chen Shui-bian. I am not Ma Ying-jeou."
Based on Tsai Ing-wen's words and deeds over the years, she is indeed not Chen Shui-bian. Nor is she Ma Ying-jeou. But this by itself is hardly reassuring or encouraging. Neither Ma nor Chen are models of leadership. Chen Shui-bian was too pragmatic and opportunistic. He abused his power, engaged in corruption power, and sowed pandemonium. Ma Ying-jeou, by contrast, inhabited an ivory tower. He was inflexible and knew only how to "go by the book". He alienated the people and lost their hearts and minds. But at least these two presidents had a sense of direction. They were at least willing to make decisions.
What about Tsai Ing-wen? She does not appear to be as opportunistic as Chen Shui-bian. But neither does she appear to be sufficiently pragmatic. She is not as inflexible as Ma Ying-jeou. But she also lacks Ma Ying-jeou's burning idealism. This convinces us that Tsai Ing-wen is neither Chen Shui-bian nor Ma Ying-jeou. But not being Ma or Chen does no mean that Tsai Ing-wen will be a good leader. For this, we must observe Tsai Ing-wen's behavior.
Tsai Ing-wen always answers a question with a question. She never provides any answers. When asked about her position on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, she passed the buck to Ma Ying-jeou. She said, "The AIIB issue has provoked tremendous controversy over the past few days. After seven years, President Ma Ying-jeou still does not seem to understand why so many people are suspicious, lack trust, and cannot relax." So, should Taiwan join the AIIB? Tsai refused to answer. But the opportunities the AIIB will bring to Taiwan will not wait. A Eurasian tectonic plate is taking shape. The global landscape is changing. The world will not wait for Taiwan.
When the time comes to make decisions, Tsai Ing-wen habitually passes the buck to "public opinion". She refuses to state her own views. When asked why she went from supporting the cabinet system to opposing the cabinet system, she gave a short answer. "Current mainstream public opinion demands direct presidential elections." She refused to say that the cabinet system was bad, and that was why she opposed it. She merely passed the buck on to "mainstream public opinion."
Whenever a decision must be made, Tsai Ing-wen often resorts to procedural obfuscation, thereby ducking questions of substance. When addressing constitutional reform, Tsai Ing-wen never forgets to mention the threshold requirement for a "national conference". If the KMT disagrees, and constitutional reform is delayed, she blames the KMT. If the KMT agrees, and the President convenes a conference, Tsai Ing-wen adds procedural obstacles. She asserts that "The current government has entered the caretaker government stage. It lacks the necessary public confidence." She opposes the President convening a national conference. She ignores the fact that historically speaking national conferences have always been convened by the President, as they are duly authorized to do so. This sort of "head I win, tails you lose" strategy may matter little when one is an opposition leader. But this is not genuine leadership. If this is how Tsai Ing-wen intends to govern once elected president, we should all be worried.
We must remind Tsai Ing-wen that when the people elect a leader, they are not electing a yes-man who refers everything to "mainstream public opinion". If "mainstream public opinion" becomes an excuse for shirking responsibility, then we may as well make a polling company president. Everything will be decided by "mainstream public opinion". No policy debate will be required. Everytyhing will be decided by large sample public opinion polls. After all, "mainstream public opinion" has the final say.
A society unable to solve problems cannot progress. A leader who shirks responsibility, cannot lead a society and resolve its problems. Taiwan faces many tangled structural problems. Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou enjoyed highly popularity when first elected. Voters overlooked two considerations, the fact that neither man saw the larger picture. As a result the nation's problems worsened. ROC voters need a more rigorous test of leadership ability, one with a high degree of transparency. Only then can Taiwan break the impasse. Tsai Ing-wen boasts that she is neither Chen Shui-bian nor Ma Ying-jeou. That is not a bad thing. But never taking a stand, and never making a decision, in order to evade voter scrutiny, is even more worrisome than Ma Ying-jeou or Chen Shui-bian.
Our advice to Tsai Ing-wen is the very phrase she often repeats, "Think about it". Thinking about it is the last thing Tsai Ing-wen needs. What she needs to do is offer concrete proposals for public scrutiny.
社論－空心蔡英文可能比馬扁更可怕
2015年04月13日 04:10 主筆室
網路時代高漲的民意、全球化浪潮下中國大陸的崛起，推動台灣進入超高速變遷時代，國家領導人巨變中的一個錯誤決定，就可能讓整個國家付出慘痛的代價，從過去陳水扁到現在馬英九兩任總統執政過程已屢見不鮮。但還有一種更糟糕的領導人，就是不做決定的領導人，這種領導人，會貽誤台灣的機會、掐死台灣的命脈。
決策常帶有多面性，對錯往往是比重的問題，也就是說，國家領導人面對的選項中並沒有絕對對的決策，只有相對錯得較少的決策，而且決策後如果具有強大的執行力，往往就能易錯為對。但不做決策，將使得對的一面無法彰顯，錯的一面卻不會消失，原地空轉的結果，會讓台灣連做「錯誤最少」、「傷害最小」決定的機會都流失，讓國家力量逐漸消蝕。
這種「不領導的領導性格」，是我們對蔡英文最大的憂心。今年2月14日蔡英文在臉書發表〈開創一個真正屬於人民的時代〉聲明，宣布投入民進黨總統初選，在1500字的聲明中，看不到她以領導高度提出具體的國政主張，只留下一句媒體標題：「我不是陳水扁，不是馬英九，我是蔡英文。」
從蔡英文過去這些年角逐總統大位時的言行，她確實不是陳水扁，也不是馬英九。然而，這並不因此讓人覺得安心或欣慰。馬與扁都不被認為是好的領導典範，陳水扁有太強烈的務實或投機性格，甚至濫權乃至於涉貪涉弊，把台灣搞得烏煙瘴氣；馬英九卻有著太不食人間煙火的理想性，不知變通、激怒眾方，弄得離心離德。但這兩位總統至少都是有方向感，肯做決定的領導人。
蔡英文呢？她的投機性沒有陳水扁那麼強烈，但似乎也沒有足夠的務實性，她不像馬英九那麼不知變通，但也缺乏馬英九那種為理想灼身的使命感。這些都讓我們相信蔡英文不是陳水扁或馬英九。然而不是馬、不是扁的蔡英文，卻未必是好的領導人。這可以從蔡英文的行為模式觀察。
遇到質詢，蔡英文總是反問，而不給答案。當問及她對亞投行的態度時，她把問題拋向馬英九：「亞投行議題這幾天引發極大的爭議，經過了7年，馬英九總統似乎還是不明白，為什麼人民對他有這麼多質疑、這麼不信任、不放心？」台灣該不該加入亞投行？她沒回答。但亞投行帶來的機會，不會等台灣。歐亞大板塊正在形成，全球大格局正在改變，世界不會等台灣。
該當選擇時，蔡英文習慣推給民意，不表達己見。當外界問及她為什麼從支持內閣制改為反對內閣制時，她給了12字的回答：「目前主流民意堅持總統直選」。她沒有說內閣制有哪些不好，所以反對，敷衍地把球丟給了「主流民意」。
需要下決定時，蔡英文經常訴求程序，迴避實質主張。談到憲改，蔡英文不忘加「國是會議」的程序門檻，國民黨不同意，拖延憲改的責難就落在國民黨頭上，但當國民黨同意由總統府召開時，蔡英文就再加一個程序障礙，以「這個政府已經進入看守狀態，民眾信賴不足」為由，反對由總統府召開國是會議，不理會台灣有史以來國是會議都由總統府召集的慣例，以及主政者召開本身的正當性。這是一種不失分策略，當她是在野黨領袖時，影響不大，但如果這種「不領導的領導」就是蔡英文選上總統後的治國模式，就讓人憂心萬分了。
對此，我們必須提醒蔡英文，人民選的是「領導者」，不是凡事拿「主流民意」當藉口的「應聲蟲」。如果「主流民意」變成了不負責的理由產生器，那麼，台灣讓時下最夯的大數據公司當總統就好。凡事都透過大數據調查「主流民意」再決定政策，不需要政策論辯與損益檢驗，因為「主流民意」說了算。
沒有解決問題能力的社會，不會進步，迴避問題的領導人，不可能帶領社會解決問題。台灣面對眾多糾結的結構性問題，陳水扁與馬英九競選期間的高人氣，讓選民輕忽了對二人的檢驗，忽略了他們思考不全面的毛病，使國家糾結的問題愈結愈緊。從這一點來看，台灣需要一個經過選民嚴格檢驗、高透明度的新形態領導人，才能領導台灣突破困局。蔡英文自詡不是陳水扁與馬英九，這不是壞事，但凡事不表態、不做決定，以逃避選民檢驗，那麼，她可能比馬英九或陳水扁更加令人擔心。
我們給蔡英文的建議是，她常常掛在口中的兩個字是「想想」，但蔡英文目前最不缺的就是「想想看」，而是拿出具體主張接受檢驗。
Thursday, April 9, 2015
Tsai Ing-wen Must Take a Stand on Energy Security
Tsai Ing-wen Must Take a Stand on Energy Security
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 10, 2015
Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen is the DPP's 2016 presidential candidate. Naturally she has a responsibility to tell voters where she intends to lead Taiwan in the event she is elected. How would she handle cross-Strait policy? On that she hasn't uttered a peep. How would she hanlde industrial and consumer energy policy? On that she is also opaque and unaccountable. The party platform stipulates a non-nuclear homeland. Last year, as the nine in one elections loomed, her only statement on energy was a tap dance about "keeping one nuclear power plant open" and "launching a new energy policy".
Full Text Below:
Tsai Ing-wen is the DPP's 2016 presidential candidate. Naturally she has a responsibility to tell voters where she intends to lead Taiwan in the event she is elected. How would she handle cross-Strait policy? On that she hasn't uttered a peep. How would she hanlde industrial and consumer energy policy? On that she is also opaque and unaccountable. The party platform stipulates a non-nuclear homeland. Last year, as the nine in one elections loomed, her only statement on energy was a tap dance about "keeping one nuclear power plant open" and "launching a new energy policy".
Frankly, her rhetoric was worse than shallow. It was nothing more than propaganda. It showed that she is far from prepared to govern. True, the slogan "Keep one nuclear power plant open" was copied from protests in Seoul, South Korea during 2012, when protestors objected to the construction of high tension pylons. Over two years we saved the same amount of equipment contained in Nuclear Power Plant Number One. But that required detailed planning. Tsai Ing-wen's "new energy policy" remains a giant question mark.
Energy security affects the nation's economy. Tsai Ing-wen must submit a detailed energy policy white paper for everyone to evaluate. Voters can then decide whether she is preparted to govern. Before drawing up such a white paper, please tell voters your premise. Let them know the thrust of your White Paper, and where you stand.
Fine suspended particles fill the atmosphere (PM2.5). Should this be part of energy policy? Elementary schools in Taichung's Huiwen district and Kaohsiung's Wenfu district are located next to industrial areas. Teachers and students must wear masks during class. They are often forced to cancel outdoor activities. They often cannot see the sky. This harsh teaching and learning environment must be improved. But that involves energy policy. That involves policy changes for energy intensive industries. Small problems often point to bigger ones. Should they be a part of energy policy? Does Tsai Ing-wen have a clue?
On March 11, the fourth anniversary of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Tsai Ing-wen vowed to "retain one nuclear power plant." Taiwan was retroceded to the ROC 70 years ago. Demand for electricity has grown rapidly, without interruption. It has increased rapidly despite the global oil crisis of the 1970s, and the financial crisis of the 1990s. In fact, it has skyrocketed. Demand for electricity is directly correlated with economic growth and higher living standards. It is difficult to deliberately resist. Energy-saving is a good thing. But how should one go about it? Tsai Ing-wen must tell us how. She must offer us policies.
Tsai Ing-wen said that "upon taking power, 13 counties and municipalities would begin saving energy and promoting green energy". The words were pretty enough. But voters remember the DPP's broken promises.They will decide whether they wish to believe in the DPP, or refuse to be deceived.
Take the "promotion of green energy". The government began promoting green energy last July. According to the Bureau of Energy, Tsai Ing-wen's name is not on the list of subscribers. Among the green ruled counties and municipalities, Pingtung County Chief Tsao Chi-hung is the sole subscriber. If the DPP fails to support green power when it is out of power, can voters really expect them to support it once they are in power?
The DPP party platform includes calls for a non-nuclear homeland. In August, the DPP legislative caucus, led by Tsai Ing-wen, vigorously promoted preliminary review of a "non-nuclear homeland Law". The Legislative Yuan would then have the authority to establish a non-nuclear Taiwan by 2025. Tsai Ing-wen praised Germany's commitment to eliminate nuclear power. But the SPD/Green Party coalition government established in 1998, sought legislation and public support for the abolition of nuclear power plants. This, and the Fukushima nuclear disaster enabled Germany to call for a non-nuclear homeland by 2022. Contrast this with Taiwan. Even if the "non-nuclear homeland Law" passes its Third Reading tomorrow, do voters actually think Tsai Ing-wen can eliminate all nuclear power plants within 10 years?
Achieving a non-nuclear homeland requires comprehensive preparations. Only then can one talk about denuclearization. Anything less will result in catastrophic energy shortages. In 2000, the German parliament passed the "Renewable Energy Law". The goal would be to create green electricity and reward green technology development. In 2002, the "Energy Conservation Law" established residential, commercial, transportation, energy subsidies and incentives to reduce the nation's total energy consumption by 30%. We believe Tsai Ing-wen is determined to promote a nuclear-free homeland. But de-nuclearization is not something that can happen overnight.
Energy security is a national security issue. If the "non-nuclear homeland Law" passes its third reading, Nuclear Power Plant Number 4 will not be issued a license. The previous three nuclear power plants will cease operation. How will electricity shortages be made up? The DPP rejects nuclear power and coal power, the two main sources of base load power. Taiwan already suffers a baseload power crisis. Power generation is a money losing proposition. Privately owned power plants abroad would already have shut down. Taipower is a state-owned enterprise. Losses are passed on to taxpayers and electricity users.If President Tsai comes to power, will she continue this unfair and unjust practice, in perpetuity?
Energy security determines the investment environment. We can look forward to frequent rolling blackouts, power outages without warning, voltage fluctuations, elevators stopped between floors, and manufacturing processes subject to random stoppages. This is not alarmism. Such incidents are certain to increase, creating problems in everyday life, public safety, and foreign investor confidence. Does Tsai Ing-wen have any response to these problems?
The headaches hardly end here. How will a smart energy grid be upgraded? Late this year, the UN will hold a climate summit in Paris. Suppose Taiwan is listed as a "polluting entity", and subject to sanctions? How will we meet our carbon reduction commitments? All of these have a bearing on energy security, President Tsai must be able to tell voters, "I'm ready."
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 10, 2015
Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen is the DPP's 2016 presidential candidate. Naturally she has a responsibility to tell voters where she intends to lead Taiwan in the event she is elected. How would she handle cross-Strait policy? On that she hasn't uttered a peep. How would she hanlde industrial and consumer energy policy? On that she is also opaque and unaccountable. The party platform stipulates a non-nuclear homeland. Last year, as the nine in one elections loomed, her only statement on energy was a tap dance about "keeping one nuclear power plant open" and "launching a new energy policy".
Full Text Below:
Tsai Ing-wen is the DPP's 2016 presidential candidate. Naturally she has a responsibility to tell voters where she intends to lead Taiwan in the event she is elected. How would she handle cross-Strait policy? On that she hasn't uttered a peep. How would she hanlde industrial and consumer energy policy? On that she is also opaque and unaccountable. The party platform stipulates a non-nuclear homeland. Last year, as the nine in one elections loomed, her only statement on energy was a tap dance about "keeping one nuclear power plant open" and "launching a new energy policy".
Frankly, her rhetoric was worse than shallow. It was nothing more than propaganda. It showed that she is far from prepared to govern. True, the slogan "Keep one nuclear power plant open" was copied from protests in Seoul, South Korea during 2012, when protestors objected to the construction of high tension pylons. Over two years we saved the same amount of equipment contained in Nuclear Power Plant Number One. But that required detailed planning. Tsai Ing-wen's "new energy policy" remains a giant question mark.
Energy security affects the nation's economy. Tsai Ing-wen must submit a detailed energy policy white paper for everyone to evaluate. Voters can then decide whether she is preparted to govern. Before drawing up such a white paper, please tell voters your premise. Let them know the thrust of your White Paper, and where you stand.
Fine suspended particles fill the atmosphere (PM2.5). Should this be part of energy policy? Elementary schools in Taichung's Huiwen district and Kaohsiung's Wenfu district are located next to industrial areas. Teachers and students must wear masks during class. They are often forced to cancel outdoor activities. They often cannot see the sky. This harsh teaching and learning environment must be improved. But that involves energy policy. That involves policy changes for energy intensive industries. Small problems often point to bigger ones. Should they be a part of energy policy? Does Tsai Ing-wen have a clue?
On March 11, the fourth anniversary of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Tsai Ing-wen vowed to "retain one nuclear power plant." Taiwan was retroceded to the ROC 70 years ago. Demand for electricity has grown rapidly, without interruption. It has increased rapidly despite the global oil crisis of the 1970s, and the financial crisis of the 1990s. In fact, it has skyrocketed. Demand for electricity is directly correlated with economic growth and higher living standards. It is difficult to deliberately resist. Energy-saving is a good thing. But how should one go about it? Tsai Ing-wen must tell us how. She must offer us policies.
Tsai Ing-wen said that "upon taking power, 13 counties and municipalities would begin saving energy and promoting green energy". The words were pretty enough. But voters remember the DPP's broken promises.They will decide whether they wish to believe in the DPP, or refuse to be deceived.
Take the "promotion of green energy". The government began promoting green energy last July. According to the Bureau of Energy, Tsai Ing-wen's name is not on the list of subscribers. Among the green ruled counties and municipalities, Pingtung County Chief Tsao Chi-hung is the sole subscriber. If the DPP fails to support green power when it is out of power, can voters really expect them to support it once they are in power?
The DPP party platform includes calls for a non-nuclear homeland. In August, the DPP legislative caucus, led by Tsai Ing-wen, vigorously promoted preliminary review of a "non-nuclear homeland Law". The Legislative Yuan would then have the authority to establish a non-nuclear Taiwan by 2025. Tsai Ing-wen praised Germany's commitment to eliminate nuclear power. But the SPD/Green Party coalition government established in 1998, sought legislation and public support for the abolition of nuclear power plants. This, and the Fukushima nuclear disaster enabled Germany to call for a non-nuclear homeland by 2022. Contrast this with Taiwan. Even if the "non-nuclear homeland Law" passes its Third Reading tomorrow, do voters actually think Tsai Ing-wen can eliminate all nuclear power plants within 10 years?
Achieving a non-nuclear homeland requires comprehensive preparations. Only then can one talk about denuclearization. Anything less will result in catastrophic energy shortages. In 2000, the German parliament passed the "Renewable Energy Law". The goal would be to create green electricity and reward green technology development. In 2002, the "Energy Conservation Law" established residential, commercial, transportation, energy subsidies and incentives to reduce the nation's total energy consumption by 30%. We believe Tsai Ing-wen is determined to promote a nuclear-free homeland. But de-nuclearization is not something that can happen overnight.
Energy security is a national security issue. If the "non-nuclear homeland Law" passes its third reading, Nuclear Power Plant Number 4 will not be issued a license. The previous three nuclear power plants will cease operation. How will electricity shortages be made up? The DPP rejects nuclear power and coal power, the two main sources of base load power. Taiwan already suffers a baseload power crisis. Power generation is a money losing proposition. Privately owned power plants abroad would already have shut down. Taipower is a state-owned enterprise. Losses are passed on to taxpayers and electricity users.If President Tsai comes to power, will she continue this unfair and unjust practice, in perpetuity?
Energy security determines the investment environment. We can look forward to frequent rolling blackouts, power outages without warning, voltage fluctuations, elevators stopped between floors, and manufacturing processes subject to random stoppages. This is not alarmism. Such incidents are certain to increase, creating problems in everyday life, public safety, and foreign investor confidence. Does Tsai Ing-wen have any response to these problems?
The headaches hardly end here. How will a smart energy grid be upgraded? Late this year, the UN will hold a climate summit in Paris. Suppose Taiwan is listed as a "polluting entity", and subject to sanctions? How will we meet our carbon reduction commitments? All of these have a bearing on energy security, President Tsai must be able to tell voters, "I'm ready."
能源安全 蔡英文必須說清楚了
2015年04月10日 中國時報
身為代表民進黨競逐2016大位的蔡英文，
不客氣地說，這寥寥數語，內容連淺碟都談不上，僅係文宣層次，
能源安全攸關國計民生，
細懸浮微粒（PM2.5）惡化的改善，要列入能源政策嗎？
311福島核災4周年記者會，蔡英文宣示要「省下一座核電廠」。
蔡英文說「執政後將率執政13縣市開始節能、推動綠能……。」
就以「推動綠能」來看，政府去年7月開始推動綠色電價認購，
倒是黨綱的非核家園蔡英文大力推動，8日還在立法院主導黨團通過
必須強調先要有完善廢核準備，才夠資格談實現非核，
能源安全是國安層次。《非核家園法》若三讀，核四不發照，前面3
能源安全決定投資環境，如果三不五時分區輪流停電、無預警斷電、
傷腦筋的絕不僅此，升級智慧型電網怎麼推？
Wednesday, April 8, 2015
Tsai Ing-wen Must Take a Stand on Cross-Strait Relations
Tsai Ing-wen Must Take a Stand on Cross-Strait Relations
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 9, 2015
Executive Summary: Speculation on next year's election results may be premature. But are the voters really that easy to deceive? Tsai Ing-wen has yet to take a position. That means her position remains unchanged from what it was in the past. That means she still refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, that she intends to seal Taiwan off from the rest of the world, that she intends to return to confrontation with the Mainland, and that she intends to return Taiwan to what it was seven years ago. If Tsai Ing-wen thinks this characterization of her is unfair, she need not be shy. Tell the public on Taiwan what is really in your heart.
Full Text Below:
Tsai Ing-wen is the DPP 2016 presidential candidate. Both Mainland China and the United States have taken an unusual step. They have issued stern warnings to the DPP regarding its cross-Strait policy. Popular green camp mayor Wen-Je Ko surprised everyone by issuing his own "New Perspectives for 2015", reaching an understanding with the Mainland on the "one China" issue. These developments have clearly exerted pressure on the green camp regarding its cross-Strait policy. Over the past few days green camp elders have spoken out on cross-Strait issues. They have all addressed the DPP bottom line on Mainland China policy.
Among them was Frank Hsieh, who said, "A Taiwan consensus is not the same as a DPP consensus", and should include the opinions of the KMT and other parties. It should also include the position of the "current ROC Constitution." Hung Chi-chang wants the DPP to pledge that if it returns to power in 2016, it will not pursue de jure Taiwan independence. Hung said the DPP should formulate an intraparty "Resolution on the Republic of China." Hsu Hsin-liang wants the DPP to understand that any cross-Strait concept the Mainland cannot accept, the United States cannot accept. These statements and ideas undeniably differ little from the blue camp position on cross-Strait policy.
Why are so many green camp elders suddenly so eager to express their views on cross-Strait issues, now, at election time? None of these views are mainstream green camp views. Why are they so anxious? The answer is obvious. On the final mile to the presidency, the key remains green camp cross-Strait policy. They heard Taipei Mayor Wen-Je Ko issue his "New Perspectives for 2015" and say that "The one China principle is not a problem." They heard the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office express open "appreciation" for Ko's declaration. They think that if the green camp fails to seize this rare opportunity, then early next year all sorts of obstacles could prevent the DPP from negotiating the final mile.
The problem is that no matter how anxious these green camp elders might feel, DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen remains as immovable as a mountain. Everyone is waiting for Tsai Ing-wen to make her cross-Strait policy clear, in advance. But her response to all of them has been "No comment". She often makes statements that sound quite reasonable. But on closer examination, one realizes she in fact said nothing.
Tsai Ing-wen's recent comments on cross-Strait issues have reminded people why they call her "kong xin cai" or "no substance Tsai". She said "Recently many people have expressed concern over DPP cross-Strait policy. We have heard their views. Maintaining stable cross-Strait relations and maintaining security in the Taiwan Strait, remains our common goal. As for the future of Taiwan, it must be decided by the 23 million people living on it. That is the social consensus." Such words sound agreeable enough. But in fact they say nothing.
Why is Tsai Ing-wen so calm? She is calm because she has her strategy all mapped out. According to the polls, if the election were held tomorrow, she would become president. The 2016 presidency is hers for the taking. Why should she make her position any clearer? If she moves too close to the center, she runs the risk of offending deep green Taiwan independence elements. If she moves too close to the Taiwan independence fundamentalists, she will raise eyebrows on both sides of the Strait and in the United States. She has concluded that for her, the best position is no position. All of her statements are vague and fuzzy. Anything that can be put off, gets put off. After all, she's already won, right?
Tsai Ing-wen may think that time is on her side, that once she achieves her presidential dream that will be that. But how much time does Taiwan have left to squander? Her political party has obstructed passage of the STA, MTA, and other bills. Taiwan independence groups are pushing to amend the referendum law. Evidently Tsai opposes membership in the AIIB. It is precisely because she refuses to take a stand, that anti-STA, pro-Taiwan independence student movement voices are growing louder. They are about to snatch the green camp bully pulpit from the green camp mainstream. Tsai Ing-wen's silence has not just allowed the new generation to speak. It has tacitly affirmed their position. Put even more plainly, her refusal to take a stand has enabled deep green Taiwan independence fundamentalists to hijack her party.
If this is actually what Tsai Ing-wen wants, that would be one thing. After all, this is what she wanted at one time. But recently many want her to take a clear stand before she assumes high office. They want her to adopt a broader perspective. They want her to be more responsible. They want her to offer her own cross-Strait vision. Anyone who aspires to be a leader should evince such tolerance and insight. But apparently Tsai Ing-wen feels no need to do so. She thinks that even if she refuses to take a stand, she will nevertheless be elected. That is why even though green camp elders are anxious, she sits idly by, as motionless as a mountain.
Speculation on next year's election results may be premature. But are the voters really that easy to deceive? Tsai Ing-wen has yet to take a position. That means her position remains unchanged from what it was in the past. That means she still refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, that she intends to seal Taiwan off from the rest of the world, that she intends to return to confrontation with the Mainland, and that she intends to return Taiwan to what it was seven years ago. If Tsai Ing-wen thinks this characterization of her is unfair, she need not be shy. Tell the public on Taiwan what is really in your heart.
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 9, 2015
Executive Summary: Speculation on next year's election results may be premature. But are the voters really that easy to deceive? Tsai Ing-wen has yet to take a position. That means her position remains unchanged from what it was in the past. That means she still refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, that she intends to seal Taiwan off from the rest of the world, that she intends to return to confrontation with the Mainland, and that she intends to return Taiwan to what it was seven years ago. If Tsai Ing-wen thinks this characterization of her is unfair, she need not be shy. Tell the public on Taiwan what is really in your heart.
Full Text Below:
Tsai Ing-wen is the DPP 2016 presidential candidate. Both Mainland China and the United States have taken an unusual step. They have issued stern warnings to the DPP regarding its cross-Strait policy. Popular green camp mayor Wen-Je Ko surprised everyone by issuing his own "New Perspectives for 2015", reaching an understanding with the Mainland on the "one China" issue. These developments have clearly exerted pressure on the green camp regarding its cross-Strait policy. Over the past few days green camp elders have spoken out on cross-Strait issues. They have all addressed the DPP bottom line on Mainland China policy.
Among them was Frank Hsieh, who said, "A Taiwan consensus is not the same as a DPP consensus", and should include the opinions of the KMT and other parties. It should also include the position of the "current ROC Constitution." Hung Chi-chang wants the DPP to pledge that if it returns to power in 2016, it will not pursue de jure Taiwan independence. Hung said the DPP should formulate an intraparty "Resolution on the Republic of China." Hsu Hsin-liang wants the DPP to understand that any cross-Strait concept the Mainland cannot accept, the United States cannot accept. These statements and ideas undeniably differ little from the blue camp position on cross-Strait policy.
Why are so many green camp elders suddenly so eager to express their views on cross-Strait issues, now, at election time? None of these views are mainstream green camp views. Why are they so anxious? The answer is obvious. On the final mile to the presidency, the key remains green camp cross-Strait policy. They heard Taipei Mayor Wen-Je Ko issue his "New Perspectives for 2015" and say that "The one China principle is not a problem." They heard the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office express open "appreciation" for Ko's declaration. They think that if the green camp fails to seize this rare opportunity, then early next year all sorts of obstacles could prevent the DPP from negotiating the final mile.
The problem is that no matter how anxious these green camp elders might feel, DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen remains as immovable as a mountain. Everyone is waiting for Tsai Ing-wen to make her cross-Strait policy clear, in advance. But her response to all of them has been "No comment". She often makes statements that sound quite reasonable. But on closer examination, one realizes she in fact said nothing.
Tsai Ing-wen's recent comments on cross-Strait issues have reminded people why they call her "kong xin cai" or "no substance Tsai". She said "Recently many people have expressed concern over DPP cross-Strait policy. We have heard their views. Maintaining stable cross-Strait relations and maintaining security in the Taiwan Strait, remains our common goal. As for the future of Taiwan, it must be decided by the 23 million people living on it. That is the social consensus." Such words sound agreeable enough. But in fact they say nothing.
Why is Tsai Ing-wen so calm? She is calm because she has her strategy all mapped out. According to the polls, if the election were held tomorrow, she would become president. The 2016 presidency is hers for the taking. Why should she make her position any clearer? If she moves too close to the center, she runs the risk of offending deep green Taiwan independence elements. If she moves too close to the Taiwan independence fundamentalists, she will raise eyebrows on both sides of the Strait and in the United States. She has concluded that for her, the best position is no position. All of her statements are vague and fuzzy. Anything that can be put off, gets put off. After all, she's already won, right?
Tsai Ing-wen may think that time is on her side, that once she achieves her presidential dream that will be that. But how much time does Taiwan have left to squander? Her political party has obstructed passage of the STA, MTA, and other bills. Taiwan independence groups are pushing to amend the referendum law. Evidently Tsai opposes membership in the AIIB. It is precisely because she refuses to take a stand, that anti-STA, pro-Taiwan independence student movement voices are growing louder. They are about to snatch the green camp bully pulpit from the green camp mainstream. Tsai Ing-wen's silence has not just allowed the new generation to speak. It has tacitly affirmed their position. Put even more plainly, her refusal to take a stand has enabled deep green Taiwan independence fundamentalists to hijack her party.
If this is actually what Tsai Ing-wen wants, that would be one thing. After all, this is what she wanted at one time. But recently many want her to take a clear stand before she assumes high office. They want her to adopt a broader perspective. They want her to be more responsible. They want her to offer her own cross-Strait vision. Anyone who aspires to be a leader should evince such tolerance and insight. But apparently Tsai Ing-wen feels no need to do so. She thinks that even if she refuses to take a stand, she will nevertheless be elected. That is why even though green camp elders are anxious, she sits idly by, as motionless as a mountain.
Speculation on next year's election results may be premature. But are the voters really that easy to deceive? Tsai Ing-wen has yet to take a position. That means her position remains unchanged from what it was in the past. That means she still refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, that she intends to seal Taiwan off from the rest of the world, that she intends to return to confrontation with the Mainland, and that she intends to return Taiwan to what it was seven years ago. If Tsai Ing-wen thinks this characterization of her is unfair, she need not be shy. Tell the public on Taiwan what is really in your heart.
兩岸關係蔡英文必須表態了
2015年04月09日 中國時報
蔡英文代表民進黨參選2016大選態勢底定，
這中間包括謝長廷主張「台灣共識不等於民進黨共識」，
為什麼突然有那麼多綠營大老選在這個時候，
問題是，不論這些綠營大老有多焦慮，
蔡英文近一次針對兩岸議題的談話，聽來真的讓人想起了「空心菜」
蔡英文為什麼能這般淡定？當然有她的算計！
問題是，蔡英文也許認為時間站在她那邊，
如果這真是蔡英文心理的真實想法，那倒也無妨，
或許，現在就猜測明年的選舉結果有些太早，
Tuesday, April 7, 2015
Rise of Mainland China Requires Four Revolutions on Taiwan
Rise of Mainland China Requires Four Revolutions on Taiwan
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 8, 2015
Executive Summary: Academia Sinica member Chu Yun-han's new work, "Lofty Thoughts Amidst the Clouds" has provoked considerable soul-searching. He boldly proclaimed that the world dominated by the West since the 18th century has changed. The non-Western world, led by China, is rapidly rising. Taiwan must decide how to deal with this cataclysmic change. Recently the ruling and opposition parties have been arguing about whether to join the AIIB. Actually, that is no longer the main point. If we truly love Taiwan, we must join the AIIB. We must discard old ideas and respond to new realities.
Full Text Below:
Academia Sinica member Chu Yun-han's new work, "Lofty Thoughts Amidst the Clouds" has provoked considerable soul-searching. He boldly proclaimed that the world dominated by the West since the 18th century has changed. The non-Western world, led by China, is rapidly rising. Taiwan must decide how to deal with this cataclysmic change. Recently the ruling and opposition parties have been arguing about whether to join the AIIB. Actually, that is no longer the main point. If we truly love Taiwan, we must join the AIIB. We must discard old ideas and respond to new realities.
Put plainly, the benefits to Taiwan's growth from joining the AIIB far outweigh any disadvantages. One. Finance is the lifeblood of economic growth. The AIIB will undoubtedly become an important platform for economic growth in Asia. Taiwan has become a founding member. This will increase its international profile, provide it with an international forum and increased participation in international trade organizations. Two. The outlook for the emerging economies of East Asia is bullish. This is the world's economic engine. Joining the AIIB symbolizes of our willingness to participate in Asian economic integration. It gives us the opportunity to share in future economic growth.
Even more importantly, the AIIB supports the Mainland's "one belt, one road" international strategy. It provides financing for railways, energy, telecommunications, airports and other projects in countries along the way. It reconstructs a Mainland dominated international economic and trade system. The two complement each other. A "Greater China Economic Circle" is swiftly taking shape, and will greatly benefit Taiwan's economy.
That said, once Mainland China rises, and a "Greater China economic circle" takes shape, Taiwan industries will face direct competition from the Mainland, Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, and other Asian economies. Taiwan will face more severe job competition from abroad. We must see clearly. We can no longer assume that we have nothing to fear, We can no longer sit on our hands. Still less can we seal ourselves off from the world. Any attempt to do so will only relegate ourselves to the margins of the East Asian economy, and steadily lower our quality of life. We must understand the current situation. The government must work with the private sector to promote four revolutions to transform Taiwan and enable it to become a special link in the Greater China economic circle.
One. A production revolution. Industrial robots and the Internet of Things are progressing. A global "Industry 4.0" era has arrived. Industry 4.0 is not merely industrial robots replacing labor or services. It is the merging of the Internet of Things with Big Data. Under the Internet of Things, production will be fully automated, personalized, flexible, and self-optimizing. This new mode of production will increase production efficiency and reduce production costs.
This megatrend is favorable to growth. The electrical and electronic industry, precision machinery industry, and ICT have long been Taiwan's traditional strengths. if we can improve integration, adopt correct policies, encourage research and innovation, Taiwan should have no trouble catching the Industry 4.0 gravy train. This is something within our control.
Two. An educational revolution. Famed NTU Honorary PhD. Yang Tseng-ning thinks that students on Taiwan "have become lazy". His remarks provoked controversy. Hard work is important for young people on Taiwan, but thinking ability and creative ability are even more so. The 21st century is a dynamic environment. We must learn from the Scandinavian countries, where students are trained to think independently and creatively. Our rigid education system must be reformed. We must recognize each person's unique potential. We must provide them with the right sort of education. Education must be individualized, so that every child will be able to find his own way. The government must do better.
Three. A civil service revolution. The death of former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore set off a wave of "Taiwan vs. Singapore" comparisons. Many experts have criticized our civil service regime. They say this is what Taiwan most desperately needs to learn from Singapore. The admission rate for Singapore's civil service is only 2%. It is as competitive as Taiwan's. But the difference is after admission, the Singaporean government first sends these civil service candidates abroad to study. Only then are they admitted to the civil service. Also, salaries for civil servants in Singapore are exactly the same as in the private sector. Competitiveness and performance are the criteria for salary increases. Civil servants have incentives to use their initiative and get things done. By contrast, on Taiwan the longer you have been employed, the more you earn. We lack an appropriate system of rewards. Naturally we have cultivated a habit of ducking responsibility. Internet era government decision-making must be decentralized. Government officials must seize the initiative and address the problems. They must respond to the public, accept challenges, and solve problems.
Blue vs. green political wrangling has become the greatest obstacle to a sound civil service system. Ruling party changes often force even career civil servants to step down or be assigned to dead end jobs. This results in a lack of policy continuity, incites anxiety among the civil service, and renders them unable to concentrate on their work. Both major political parties should engage in soul-searching. They should establish a civil service system in which civil servants enjoy self-esteem, confident they can do their jobs without worrying about politics. Only then can planning be long-term, and lead to the transformation of Taiwan.
Four. A conceptual revolution. Taiwan society is too hermetic. The slightest mention of the Mainland evokes terror. Nothing is permitted. Mainland investments are not permitted. Mainland tourists are not permitted. The STA is not permitted. The MTA is not permitted. All these things that are not permitted, are things that South Korea, Singapore, and others welcome with open arms. Taiwan, by contrast, shuns them all. Nor is Taiwan particularly friendly to foreign investors. It is wary of foreign talent in mergers and acquisitions, in exchange controls, and in tax regimes. The gap between ourselves and Singapore, Hong Kong and other free economies is considerable. Following transformation, these economies will be our main competitors. If public attitudes on Taiwan fail to keep pace with the times, even the best policies cannot replicate Taiwan's economic miracle.
社論－因應大陸興起 台灣需要4個革命
2015年04月08日 04:10 主筆室
中央研究院院士朱雲漢新作《高思在雲》發人深省，他大膽指出，18世紀以來西方主導世界的格局已經改變，以中國為首的非西方世界正迅猛興起，台灣如何面對大格局的變化非常重要。從這個角度觀察近日朝野陷入對峙的應否加入亞投行問題，其實已經不是重點，真正愛台灣，不但應該參與亞投行，還有太多舊觀念應該改變，實事必須推動。
平實而論，從台灣發展的角度來看，加入亞投行利遠大於弊。首先，金融是經濟發展的血脈，無庸置疑，未來亞投行將是亞洲經濟發展的重要平台之一，台灣成為創始會員國，能增加國際能見度、國際話語權，提高未來參與其他國際經貿組織的可能性。其次，東亞新興經濟體成長後市看漲，是全球經濟最重要的引擎，加入亞投行象徵我們積極加入亞洲經濟整合的意願，未來也才有機會共享經濟成長的果實。
更重要的是，亞投行名正言順支持大陸「一帶一路」國際戰略布局，藉由為沿線國家提供鐵公路、能源、電信、機場等專案融資的方式，重新建構出一個由大陸主導的國際經貿體系，兩者相輔相成，「大中華經濟圈」將可快速整合，這將對台灣經濟產生很大的助益。
不過，一旦中國興起，大中華經濟圈實現，台灣產業將直接面對來自大陸、港、澳、星等所有亞洲國家的競爭，工作機會也會面臨更嚴酷的外來競爭。台灣要看清現況，不能再有恃無恐、坐以待斃，更不能企圖閉關自守，淪為東亞經濟的邊陲，國民生活日漸凋敝。認清時勢，政府與民間應合作推動4個革命，改造台灣，讓台灣成為大中華經濟圈一顆獨特的珍珠。
第一、產業革命。在智慧機器人與物聯網的進步下，全球「工業4.0」的時代已經來了。簡單來說，「工業4.0」，並不只是使用智慧機器人取代勞動的工業或服務業，更重要的是還要結合物聯網的網路，以及大數據（Big Data）的整合分析，在「物聯網」系統分析下，最大程度地做到生產全自動化、個性化、彈性化、自我優化和提高生產資源效率，降低生產成本的全新生產方式。
這是對我國發展有利的大趨勢，電子電機業、精密機械業、資通訊，本來就是我國傳統強項，若能加以整合，輔以合宜的政策推動，鼓勵積極研發創新，台灣要搭上工業4.0的列車並不難，這是操之在我的契機。
第二、教育革命。台大名譽博士楊振寧認為「台灣學生『懶惰了』！」的言論引發爭論。我們認為台灣年輕人行不行，努力固然重要，思考力與創意更重要。在21世紀高度動態的環境中，應學習北歐國家，將每個學生都培養成具有獨立思考的創意人才。如何反轉死板的教育體制，認清每個人都是可造之材，落實適性教育，因材施教，讓每個兒童都能找到自己的道路，政府應再加把勁。
第三、文官革命。新加坡前總理李光耀逝世後掀起一波「台灣vs.新加坡」的比較風潮，其中，文官體制被許多專家詬病，指出這是台灣最應該要跟新加坡學習的地方。新加坡公務員錄取率只有2%，與台灣一樣競爭激烈，但不同是，錄取後，政府會讓這些已考取的準公務員先公費留學，學成之後才會到公部門工作，而且新加坡公務員的薪資變動與私人企業完全相同，競爭力與績效是加薪準則，公務員才有誘因主動把事情做好。反觀與台灣做越久領愈多的情況，沒有合宜的加薪升遷制度，當然養成遇事就躲的惡習。進入網路世代，政府決策權必須下放基層，讓政府官員尤其應能主動面對問題，快速反應民意，接受挑戰，解決困難。
藍綠政治角力已成為健全文官體制最大的阻力，只要政黨輪替，常務官通常也被迫下台，或下放閒職，政策缺乏連續性，更造成文官人心惶惶，無法專心做事。兩黨都應反省，共同建立文官制度，讓文官有自尊、有信心可以好好做事，不介入政治，在政策上才能長遠規畫，帶領台灣轉型。
第四、觀念革命。台灣社會仍有許多觀念過於封閉，只要提到大陸，什麼都怕，什麼都不准，不准陸資、不准陸客、不准服貿、貨貿簽署，而這些都是南韓、新加坡等國張開雙手，歡迎都來不及的事，台灣卻是避之唯恐不及。除此之外，台灣對外資也不算友善，對外國人才充滿戒心，在企業併購、匯率管制、租稅環境等，都距離新加坡、香港等自由經貿國家有著不小差距，而這些國家又正是我們轉型後的主要競爭對手，台灣社會觀念若不與時俱進，只怕再好的政策也難以重現台灣經濟奇蹟。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 8, 2015
Executive Summary: Academia Sinica member Chu Yun-han's new work, "Lofty Thoughts Amidst the Clouds" has provoked considerable soul-searching. He boldly proclaimed that the world dominated by the West since the 18th century has changed. The non-Western world, led by China, is rapidly rising. Taiwan must decide how to deal with this cataclysmic change. Recently the ruling and opposition parties have been arguing about whether to join the AIIB. Actually, that is no longer the main point. If we truly love Taiwan, we must join the AIIB. We must discard old ideas and respond to new realities.
Full Text Below:
Academia Sinica member Chu Yun-han's new work, "Lofty Thoughts Amidst the Clouds" has provoked considerable soul-searching. He boldly proclaimed that the world dominated by the West since the 18th century has changed. The non-Western world, led by China, is rapidly rising. Taiwan must decide how to deal with this cataclysmic change. Recently the ruling and opposition parties have been arguing about whether to join the AIIB. Actually, that is no longer the main point. If we truly love Taiwan, we must join the AIIB. We must discard old ideas and respond to new realities.
Put plainly, the benefits to Taiwan's growth from joining the AIIB far outweigh any disadvantages. One. Finance is the lifeblood of economic growth. The AIIB will undoubtedly become an important platform for economic growth in Asia. Taiwan has become a founding member. This will increase its international profile, provide it with an international forum and increased participation in international trade organizations. Two. The outlook for the emerging economies of East Asia is bullish. This is the world's economic engine. Joining the AIIB symbolizes of our willingness to participate in Asian economic integration. It gives us the opportunity to share in future economic growth.
Even more importantly, the AIIB supports the Mainland's "one belt, one road" international strategy. It provides financing for railways, energy, telecommunications, airports and other projects in countries along the way. It reconstructs a Mainland dominated international economic and trade system. The two complement each other. A "Greater China Economic Circle" is swiftly taking shape, and will greatly benefit Taiwan's economy.
That said, once Mainland China rises, and a "Greater China economic circle" takes shape, Taiwan industries will face direct competition from the Mainland, Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, and other Asian economies. Taiwan will face more severe job competition from abroad. We must see clearly. We can no longer assume that we have nothing to fear, We can no longer sit on our hands. Still less can we seal ourselves off from the world. Any attempt to do so will only relegate ourselves to the margins of the East Asian economy, and steadily lower our quality of life. We must understand the current situation. The government must work with the private sector to promote four revolutions to transform Taiwan and enable it to become a special link in the Greater China economic circle.
One. A production revolution. Industrial robots and the Internet of Things are progressing. A global "Industry 4.0" era has arrived. Industry 4.0 is not merely industrial robots replacing labor or services. It is the merging of the Internet of Things with Big Data. Under the Internet of Things, production will be fully automated, personalized, flexible, and self-optimizing. This new mode of production will increase production efficiency and reduce production costs.
This megatrend is favorable to growth. The electrical and electronic industry, precision machinery industry, and ICT have long been Taiwan's traditional strengths. if we can improve integration, adopt correct policies, encourage research and innovation, Taiwan should have no trouble catching the Industry 4.0 gravy train. This is something within our control.
Two. An educational revolution. Famed NTU Honorary PhD. Yang Tseng-ning thinks that students on Taiwan "have become lazy". His remarks provoked controversy. Hard work is important for young people on Taiwan, but thinking ability and creative ability are even more so. The 21st century is a dynamic environment. We must learn from the Scandinavian countries, where students are trained to think independently and creatively. Our rigid education system must be reformed. We must recognize each person's unique potential. We must provide them with the right sort of education. Education must be individualized, so that every child will be able to find his own way. The government must do better.
Three. A civil service revolution. The death of former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore set off a wave of "Taiwan vs. Singapore" comparisons. Many experts have criticized our civil service regime. They say this is what Taiwan most desperately needs to learn from Singapore. The admission rate for Singapore's civil service is only 2%. It is as competitive as Taiwan's. But the difference is after admission, the Singaporean government first sends these civil service candidates abroad to study. Only then are they admitted to the civil service. Also, salaries for civil servants in Singapore are exactly the same as in the private sector. Competitiveness and performance are the criteria for salary increases. Civil servants have incentives to use their initiative and get things done. By contrast, on Taiwan the longer you have been employed, the more you earn. We lack an appropriate system of rewards. Naturally we have cultivated a habit of ducking responsibility. Internet era government decision-making must be decentralized. Government officials must seize the initiative and address the problems. They must respond to the public, accept challenges, and solve problems.
Blue vs. green political wrangling has become the greatest obstacle to a sound civil service system. Ruling party changes often force even career civil servants to step down or be assigned to dead end jobs. This results in a lack of policy continuity, incites anxiety among the civil service, and renders them unable to concentrate on their work. Both major political parties should engage in soul-searching. They should establish a civil service system in which civil servants enjoy self-esteem, confident they can do their jobs without worrying about politics. Only then can planning be long-term, and lead to the transformation of Taiwan.
Four. A conceptual revolution. Taiwan society is too hermetic. The slightest mention of the Mainland evokes terror. Nothing is permitted. Mainland investments are not permitted. Mainland tourists are not permitted. The STA is not permitted. The MTA is not permitted. All these things that are not permitted, are things that South Korea, Singapore, and others welcome with open arms. Taiwan, by contrast, shuns them all. Nor is Taiwan particularly friendly to foreign investors. It is wary of foreign talent in mergers and acquisitions, in exchange controls, and in tax regimes. The gap between ourselves and Singapore, Hong Kong and other free economies is considerable. Following transformation, these economies will be our main competitors. If public attitudes on Taiwan fail to keep pace with the times, even the best policies cannot replicate Taiwan's economic miracle.
社論－因應大陸興起 台灣需要4個革命
2015年04月08日 04:10 主筆室
中央研究院院士朱雲漢新作《高思在雲》發人深省，他大膽指出，18世紀以來西方主導世界的格局已經改變，以中國為首的非西方世界正迅猛興起，台灣如何面對大格局的變化非常重要。從這個角度觀察近日朝野陷入對峙的應否加入亞投行問題，其實已經不是重點，真正愛台灣，不但應該參與亞投行，還有太多舊觀念應該改變，實事必須推動。
平實而論，從台灣發展的角度來看，加入亞投行利遠大於弊。首先，金融是經濟發展的血脈，無庸置疑，未來亞投行將是亞洲經濟發展的重要平台之一，台灣成為創始會員國，能增加國際能見度、國際話語權，提高未來參與其他國際經貿組織的可能性。其次，東亞新興經濟體成長後市看漲，是全球經濟最重要的引擎，加入亞投行象徵我們積極加入亞洲經濟整合的意願，未來也才有機會共享經濟成長的果實。
更重要的是，亞投行名正言順支持大陸「一帶一路」國際戰略布局，藉由為沿線國家提供鐵公路、能源、電信、機場等專案融資的方式，重新建構出一個由大陸主導的國際經貿體系，兩者相輔相成，「大中華經濟圈」將可快速整合，這將對台灣經濟產生很大的助益。
不過，一旦中國興起，大中華經濟圈實現，台灣產業將直接面對來自大陸、港、澳、星等所有亞洲國家的競爭，工作機會也會面臨更嚴酷的外來競爭。台灣要看清現況，不能再有恃無恐、坐以待斃，更不能企圖閉關自守，淪為東亞經濟的邊陲，國民生活日漸凋敝。認清時勢，政府與民間應合作推動4個革命，改造台灣，讓台灣成為大中華經濟圈一顆獨特的珍珠。
第一、產業革命。在智慧機器人與物聯網的進步下，全球「工業4.0」的時代已經來了。簡單來說，「工業4.0」，並不只是使用智慧機器人取代勞動的工業或服務業，更重要的是還要結合物聯網的網路，以及大數據（Big Data）的整合分析，在「物聯網」系統分析下，最大程度地做到生產全自動化、個性化、彈性化、自我優化和提高生產資源效率，降低生產成本的全新生產方式。
這是對我國發展有利的大趨勢，電子電機業、精密機械業、資通訊，本來就是我國傳統強項，若能加以整合，輔以合宜的政策推動，鼓勵積極研發創新，台灣要搭上工業4.0的列車並不難，這是操之在我的契機。
第二、教育革命。台大名譽博士楊振寧認為「台灣學生『懶惰了』！」的言論引發爭論。我們認為台灣年輕人行不行，努力固然重要，思考力與創意更重要。在21世紀高度動態的環境中，應學習北歐國家，將每個學生都培養成具有獨立思考的創意人才。如何反轉死板的教育體制，認清每個人都是可造之材，落實適性教育，因材施教，讓每個兒童都能找到自己的道路，政府應再加把勁。
第三、文官革命。新加坡前總理李光耀逝世後掀起一波「台灣vs.新加坡」的比較風潮，其中，文官體制被許多專家詬病，指出這是台灣最應該要跟新加坡學習的地方。新加坡公務員錄取率只有2%，與台灣一樣競爭激烈，但不同是，錄取後，政府會讓這些已考取的準公務員先公費留學，學成之後才會到公部門工作，而且新加坡公務員的薪資變動與私人企業完全相同，競爭力與績效是加薪準則，公務員才有誘因主動把事情做好。反觀與台灣做越久領愈多的情況，沒有合宜的加薪升遷制度，當然養成遇事就躲的惡習。進入網路世代，政府決策權必須下放基層，讓政府官員尤其應能主動面對問題，快速反應民意，接受挑戰，解決困難。
藍綠政治角力已成為健全文官體制最大的阻力，只要政黨輪替，常務官通常也被迫下台，或下放閒職，政策缺乏連續性，更造成文官人心惶惶，無法專心做事。兩黨都應反省，共同建立文官制度，讓文官有自尊、有信心可以好好做事，不介入政治，在政策上才能長遠規畫，帶領台灣轉型。
第四、觀念革命。台灣社會仍有許多觀念過於封閉，只要提到大陸，什麼都怕，什麼都不准，不准陸資、不准陸客、不准服貿、貨貿簽署，而這些都是南韓、新加坡等國張開雙手，歡迎都來不及的事，台灣卻是避之唯恐不及。除此之外，台灣對外資也不算友善，對外國人才充滿戒心，在企業併購、匯率管制、租稅環境等，都距離新加坡、香港等自由經貿國家有著不小差距，而這些國家又正是我們轉型後的主要競爭對手，台灣社會觀念若不與時俱進，只怕再好的政策也難以重現台灣經濟奇蹟。
Monday, April 6, 2015
The Vanishing Taiwan Relations Act
The Vanishing Taiwan Relations Act
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 6, 2015
Executive Summary: Mainland China is reinventing itself. The United States and Mainland China are engaged in a new tug of war. The value and strategic importance of Taiwan to the US has been diminished. US officials make little mention of the Taiwan Relations Act. That is certainly a matter of concern. But even more importantly, we must think about the next five years, 10 years, or even 20 years. Will the situation on Mainland China, the Asian-Pacific region, and the rest of the world change? Will Washington-Beijing relations change? What part will Taipei play in all this? The Republic of China's survival, development, and sovereignty will receive less and less US support. It must rely more on soft power and the flexible application of smart power. These are survival strategies we must consider, apart from the Taiwan Relations Act.
Full Text Below:
On April 10, 1979, US President Jimmy Carter signed the House and Senate approved "Taiwan Relations Act" (TRA). This important act pertaining to Washington-Taipei relations is now 36 years old. But recently high-ranking officials of the US have mentioned only the three joint communiques, and not the Taiwan Relations Act. Is the Taiwan Relations Act becoming less important to US policy? If it is, then the development is highly unfavorable to Taiwan.
Several months ago, during a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace seminar, US State Department Undersecretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman was asked about Taiwan. Sherman said the situation has changed. In the past, frequent mention of the Taiwan issue was a positive sign. Now however, the one China policy and the three communiques are the basis for stability and prosperity on Taiwan, and for stable relations with Mainland China.
Did we hear that right? If we did, then what happened to the Taiwan Relations Act? The US has long upheld the one China policy on the basis of "one act and three joint communiques." The one act is the Taiwan Relations Act. The three joint communiques are the Shanghai Communique, the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, and the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on Arms Sales. To be complete, the Taiwan Relations Act should be mentioned along with the three joint communiques. A senior State Department official omitted mention of the Taiwan Relations Act. Was this purely a verbal omission? Or were there other implications? Coincidentally, in February, US State Department Assistant Secretary for Asian-Pacific Affairs Daniel Russell also said that the US is guided by the one-China policy, which consists of the three joint communiques. He too failed to mention the Taiwan Relations Act. Scripted statements repeated for decades now fail to mention the TRA. The US apparently does not care. This is something that warrants our attention.
The Taiwan Relations Act is a unique bit of legislation. It is US domestic law. Yet it regulates US relations with a foreign nation, the Republic of China. When Taipei and Washington severed diplomatic relations, both the White House and Congress hoped to establish a legal basis and a policy framework for continued relations with Taipei. Whenever Beijing accused Washington of not adhering to the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on Arms Sales, and for not reducing arms sales to Taipei, Washington would cite the Taiwan Relations Act, since it stipulated that Washington would provide defensive weapons to Taipei.
In recent years however, there have been no major US arms sales to Taipei. This may be the reason US officials have forgotten to mention the Taiwan Relations Act in their recent statements. But frequent verbal omissions often reflect a change of heart. In 2009, US President Barack Obama failed to mention the Taiwan Relations Act during visits to the Chinese mainland. This has led to anxiety on Taiwan. Now US officials routinely fail to mention the Taiwan Relations Act. That probably means that Taiwan is being increasingly marginalized.
In fact, if we broaden our perspective, the strategic scenario between Washington and Beijing is undergoing major adjustments. These are merely the initial stages. Mainland China has mostly followed Deng Xiaoping's principle of keeping a low profile. But ever since Xi Jinping became president, it has become much more assertive in the international community. It has begun to make fundamental challenges to the old order.
Most attention-grabbing is the Beijing's hardline stance on sovereignty in territorial disputes. When Japan and Mainland China established diplomatic relations, they shelved their dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands. Mainland China has begun to patrol the territory, and announced the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Its moves in the South China Sea have been even more high profile. Mainland China has increased its territorial claims around occupied islands. It has already increased the area around Yong Shu Reef to 0.9 square kilometers. As a result, the Republic of China's Taiping Island is no longer the largest island in the Nansha Archipelago. This is unprecedented in international politics, but has many benefits. One. It clearly proclaims sovereignty. Two. It increases the number of military bases, and expands the scope of naval and air force power projection. Three. It facilitates future ocean and seabed resource development.
The Philippines and other South China Sea region nations have protested. The United States has dismissed this a "great wall of sand". But the reality is that no one can do anything about Beijing's actions. Everyone can only look on idly as the South China Sea strategic map is rewritten.
Mainland China is no longer what it once was. It is using both the carrot and the stick to redefine itself in the international arena. The US is unable to cope with this new reality. It is accustomed to thinking in terms of containment. Take the AIIB for example. The US continues to use the World Bank and other agencies to keep Mainland China down. From the very beginning, it attempted to block the AIIB. Who knew that other countries would see the situation more clearly, and express their desire to join, even America's closest ally Britain. Mainland China's rise is obvious. It has become a regional power. The US is unable to prevent or reverse this trend. Eventually it must compromise, and adapt to this new Asian-Pacific scenario. It must rethink its strategic policy and establish a new cooperative relationship with Mainland China.
Mainland China is reinventing itself. The United States and Mainland China are engaged in a new tug of war. The value and strategic importance of Taiwan to the US has been diminished. US officials make little mention of the Taiwan Relations Act. That is certainly a matter of concern. But even more importantly, we must think about the next five years, 10 years, or even 20 years. Will the situation on Mainland China, the Asian-Pacific region, and the rest of the world change? Will Washington-Beijing relations change? What part will Taipei play in all this? The Republic of China's survival, development, and sovereignty will receive less and less US support. It must rely more on soft power and the flexible application of smart power. These are survival strategies we must consider, apart from the Taiwan Relations Act.
社論－消失中的台灣關係法
2015年04月06日 04:10
1979年4月10日，當時的美國總統卡特簽署了參眾兩院通過的《台灣關係法》（Taiwan Relations Act, TRA），這項規範美台關係的重要法案，至今即將邁入第36個年頭。但最近美方高層在論述對台政策時，卻只提三公報，不提《台灣關係法》，如果《台灣關係法》在美國的政策思維中漸漸退位，那對台灣而言，絕對大大不妙了。
月前華府智庫「卡內基國際和平基金會」研討會裡，美國國務院主管政治事務次卿薛曼被問到台灣問題時說，台灣不像過去常被提出來討論是好現象，這說明台灣的穩定繁榮及與中國大陸關係堅實，代表一個中國和美中三項公報的概念變成了標準。
咦？《台灣關係法》哪裡去了？美國向來秉持的「一個中國政策」，其基礎是「一法三公報」─《台灣關係法》、上海公報、美中建交公報、817公報，所以三公報之外還要加上《台灣關係法》才算完整。國務院資深官員漏講《台灣關係法》，究竟只是單純的口語疏漏，還是另有意涵？無獨有偶，2月間，國務院亞太助卿羅素在談到美台關係時，同樣表示是由美中三公報等構成的一個中國政策所指導，《台灣關係法》也被漏掉了。照本宣科了幾十年的東西，如今總是「三缺一」，而且美方似乎不以為意，這就很值得我們在意了。
《台灣關係法》是一項非常獨特的法案，它是美國的國內法，規範的卻是美國與某個外國（台灣）的關係，這是因為台美斷交後，美國府會都希望為雙方關係建立一個法律基礎與政策綱要。而當中方指責美方沒有遵循817公報逐年減少對台軍售時，美方也總抬出《台灣關係法》作為理由，因為該法明定美國要提供防衛性武器給台灣。
不過近年來美國沒有重大對台軍售項目，也許因為久未提及，美方官員表述時忘了要講《台灣關係法》，但口頭上經常性的遺漏，往往也反映了在心頭上的退位。2009年美國總統歐巴馬訪中時沒提《台灣關係法》，就令台灣大感焦慮，如今美方官員依舊經常性地遺忘《台灣關係法》，恐怕反映的，是決策思維上愈來愈把台灣放在邊緣位置。
其實，拉開視野看，美中之間的戰略態勢正在進行重大調整，現在只是在初始階段而已。中國過去的崛起之勢基本上仍遵循鄧小平韜光養晦的路線，但自從習近平擔任國家主席後，中國大陸在國際社會的舉止明顯益趨強勢，並且開始對舊有秩序作根本性的重寫。
最受矚目的，是對周邊主權爭議地區強硬劃定勢力版圖。例如對日中自建交以來即擱置爭議的釣魚台，中方開始頻繁巡航，並且宣布劃設東海防空識別區。在南海的動作更大，中方積極填海造地擴大占有小島的面積，永暑礁已經被增加到0.9平方公里，我國的太平島因而不再是南沙群島第一大島。這在國際政治史上可謂空前創舉，而且有多重效益。一來能夠極度鮮明地宣示主權地位；二來增加軍事據點，擴大海空軍武力投射範圍；三來有助未來海洋、海底資源開發的經濟收益。
菲律賓等南海諸國雖然抗議，美方雖然指責其為「沙土長城」，但現實是，沒有人能奈中方何，大家只能眼睜睜看著南海權力地圖一天天被改寫。
中國大陸確實和以前不一樣了，而當中國軟硬兼施重新在國際舞台上界定自己時，美國卻還沒能對新的現實思考出有足夠前瞻性的因應策略，仍習於過去圍堵式的思維。例如對亞投行，美方延續在世銀等機構壓制中國的政策，一開始也試圖阻擋，不料其他國家情勢看得比較清楚，紛紛表態加入，包括美國最親密的盟友英國。但中國的崛起態勢明確，已成區域強權，美方既無力攔阻或扭轉，終究要對亞太勢力版圖的調整作出妥協，重新思考一套戰略方針，建立能與中國積極交往合作的新關係。
在中國重塑自我、美中拉鋸新關係的過程當中，台灣對美國的政策價值與戰略意義都會受到影響。對台灣而言，美國官員少提《台灣關係法》固然值得警覺，但更重要的，是我們必須思考未來5年、10年乃至20年後，中國、亞太及國際局勢會有什麼變化，美中關係又會如何，而台灣要怎麼在其中開創自己的位置。未來台灣的生存發展與主權地位，能依賴美國作槓桿操作的空間會愈來愈少，必須更厚植軟實力，靈活運用巧實力。這是我們在《台灣關係法》之外，更必須慎重思考的生存課題。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 6, 2015
Executive Summary: Mainland China is reinventing itself. The United States and Mainland China are engaged in a new tug of war. The value and strategic importance of Taiwan to the US has been diminished. US officials make little mention of the Taiwan Relations Act. That is certainly a matter of concern. But even more importantly, we must think about the next five years, 10 years, or even 20 years. Will the situation on Mainland China, the Asian-Pacific region, and the rest of the world change? Will Washington-Beijing relations change? What part will Taipei play in all this? The Republic of China's survival, development, and sovereignty will receive less and less US support. It must rely more on soft power and the flexible application of smart power. These are survival strategies we must consider, apart from the Taiwan Relations Act.
Full Text Below:
On April 10, 1979, US President Jimmy Carter signed the House and Senate approved "Taiwan Relations Act" (TRA). This important act pertaining to Washington-Taipei relations is now 36 years old. But recently high-ranking officials of the US have mentioned only the three joint communiques, and not the Taiwan Relations Act. Is the Taiwan Relations Act becoming less important to US policy? If it is, then the development is highly unfavorable to Taiwan.
Several months ago, during a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace seminar, US State Department Undersecretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman was asked about Taiwan. Sherman said the situation has changed. In the past, frequent mention of the Taiwan issue was a positive sign. Now however, the one China policy and the three communiques are the basis for stability and prosperity on Taiwan, and for stable relations with Mainland China.
Did we hear that right? If we did, then what happened to the Taiwan Relations Act? The US has long upheld the one China policy on the basis of "one act and three joint communiques." The one act is the Taiwan Relations Act. The three joint communiques are the Shanghai Communique, the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, and the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on Arms Sales. To be complete, the Taiwan Relations Act should be mentioned along with the three joint communiques. A senior State Department official omitted mention of the Taiwan Relations Act. Was this purely a verbal omission? Or were there other implications? Coincidentally, in February, US State Department Assistant Secretary for Asian-Pacific Affairs Daniel Russell also said that the US is guided by the one-China policy, which consists of the three joint communiques. He too failed to mention the Taiwan Relations Act. Scripted statements repeated for decades now fail to mention the TRA. The US apparently does not care. This is something that warrants our attention.
The Taiwan Relations Act is a unique bit of legislation. It is US domestic law. Yet it regulates US relations with a foreign nation, the Republic of China. When Taipei and Washington severed diplomatic relations, both the White House and Congress hoped to establish a legal basis and a policy framework for continued relations with Taipei. Whenever Beijing accused Washington of not adhering to the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on Arms Sales, and for not reducing arms sales to Taipei, Washington would cite the Taiwan Relations Act, since it stipulated that Washington would provide defensive weapons to Taipei.
In recent years however, there have been no major US arms sales to Taipei. This may be the reason US officials have forgotten to mention the Taiwan Relations Act in their recent statements. But frequent verbal omissions often reflect a change of heart. In 2009, US President Barack Obama failed to mention the Taiwan Relations Act during visits to the Chinese mainland. This has led to anxiety on Taiwan. Now US officials routinely fail to mention the Taiwan Relations Act. That probably means that Taiwan is being increasingly marginalized.
In fact, if we broaden our perspective, the strategic scenario between Washington and Beijing is undergoing major adjustments. These are merely the initial stages. Mainland China has mostly followed Deng Xiaoping's principle of keeping a low profile. But ever since Xi Jinping became president, it has become much more assertive in the international community. It has begun to make fundamental challenges to the old order.
Most attention-grabbing is the Beijing's hardline stance on sovereignty in territorial disputes. When Japan and Mainland China established diplomatic relations, they shelved their dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands. Mainland China has begun to patrol the territory, and announced the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Its moves in the South China Sea have been even more high profile. Mainland China has increased its territorial claims around occupied islands. It has already increased the area around Yong Shu Reef to 0.9 square kilometers. As a result, the Republic of China's Taiping Island is no longer the largest island in the Nansha Archipelago. This is unprecedented in international politics, but has many benefits. One. It clearly proclaims sovereignty. Two. It increases the number of military bases, and expands the scope of naval and air force power projection. Three. It facilitates future ocean and seabed resource development.
The Philippines and other South China Sea region nations have protested. The United States has dismissed this a "great wall of sand". But the reality is that no one can do anything about Beijing's actions. Everyone can only look on idly as the South China Sea strategic map is rewritten.
Mainland China is no longer what it once was. It is using both the carrot and the stick to redefine itself in the international arena. The US is unable to cope with this new reality. It is accustomed to thinking in terms of containment. Take the AIIB for example. The US continues to use the World Bank and other agencies to keep Mainland China down. From the very beginning, it attempted to block the AIIB. Who knew that other countries would see the situation more clearly, and express their desire to join, even America's closest ally Britain. Mainland China's rise is obvious. It has become a regional power. The US is unable to prevent or reverse this trend. Eventually it must compromise, and adapt to this new Asian-Pacific scenario. It must rethink its strategic policy and establish a new cooperative relationship with Mainland China.
Mainland China is reinventing itself. The United States and Mainland China are engaged in a new tug of war. The value and strategic importance of Taiwan to the US has been diminished. US officials make little mention of the Taiwan Relations Act. That is certainly a matter of concern. But even more importantly, we must think about the next five years, 10 years, or even 20 years. Will the situation on Mainland China, the Asian-Pacific region, and the rest of the world change? Will Washington-Beijing relations change? What part will Taipei play in all this? The Republic of China's survival, development, and sovereignty will receive less and less US support. It must rely more on soft power and the flexible application of smart power. These are survival strategies we must consider, apart from the Taiwan Relations Act.
社論－消失中的台灣關係法
2015年04月06日 04:10
1979年4月10日，當時的美國總統卡特簽署了參眾兩院通過的《台灣關係法》（Taiwan Relations Act, TRA），這項規範美台關係的重要法案，至今即將邁入第36個年頭。但最近美方高層在論述對台政策時，卻只提三公報，不提《台灣關係法》，如果《台灣關係法》在美國的政策思維中漸漸退位，那對台灣而言，絕對大大不妙了。
月前華府智庫「卡內基國際和平基金會」研討會裡，美國國務院主管政治事務次卿薛曼被問到台灣問題時說，台灣不像過去常被提出來討論是好現象，這說明台灣的穩定繁榮及與中國大陸關係堅實，代表一個中國和美中三項公報的概念變成了標準。
咦？《台灣關係法》哪裡去了？美國向來秉持的「一個中國政策」，其基礎是「一法三公報」─《台灣關係法》、上海公報、美中建交公報、817公報，所以三公報之外還要加上《台灣關係法》才算完整。國務院資深官員漏講《台灣關係法》，究竟只是單純的口語疏漏，還是另有意涵？無獨有偶，2月間，國務院亞太助卿羅素在談到美台關係時，同樣表示是由美中三公報等構成的一個中國政策所指導，《台灣關係法》也被漏掉了。照本宣科了幾十年的東西，如今總是「三缺一」，而且美方似乎不以為意，這就很值得我們在意了。
《台灣關係法》是一項非常獨特的法案，它是美國的國內法，規範的卻是美國與某個外國（台灣）的關係，這是因為台美斷交後，美國府會都希望為雙方關係建立一個法律基礎與政策綱要。而當中方指責美方沒有遵循817公報逐年減少對台軍售時，美方也總抬出《台灣關係法》作為理由，因為該法明定美國要提供防衛性武器給台灣。
不過近年來美國沒有重大對台軍售項目，也許因為久未提及，美方官員表述時忘了要講《台灣關係法》，但口頭上經常性的遺漏，往往也反映了在心頭上的退位。2009年美國總統歐巴馬訪中時沒提《台灣關係法》，就令台灣大感焦慮，如今美方官員依舊經常性地遺忘《台灣關係法》，恐怕反映的，是決策思維上愈來愈把台灣放在邊緣位置。
其實，拉開視野看，美中之間的戰略態勢正在進行重大調整，現在只是在初始階段而已。中國過去的崛起之勢基本上仍遵循鄧小平韜光養晦的路線，但自從習近平擔任國家主席後，中國大陸在國際社會的舉止明顯益趨強勢，並且開始對舊有秩序作根本性的重寫。
最受矚目的，是對周邊主權爭議地區強硬劃定勢力版圖。例如對日中自建交以來即擱置爭議的釣魚台，中方開始頻繁巡航，並且宣布劃設東海防空識別區。在南海的動作更大，中方積極填海造地擴大占有小島的面積，永暑礁已經被增加到0.9平方公里，我國的太平島因而不再是南沙群島第一大島。這在國際政治史上可謂空前創舉，而且有多重效益。一來能夠極度鮮明地宣示主權地位；二來增加軍事據點，擴大海空軍武力投射範圍；三來有助未來海洋、海底資源開發的經濟收益。
菲律賓等南海諸國雖然抗議，美方雖然指責其為「沙土長城」，但現實是，沒有人能奈中方何，大家只能眼睜睜看著南海權力地圖一天天被改寫。
中國大陸確實和以前不一樣了，而當中國軟硬兼施重新在國際舞台上界定自己時，美國卻還沒能對新的現實思考出有足夠前瞻性的因應策略，仍習於過去圍堵式的思維。例如對亞投行，美方延續在世銀等機構壓制中國的政策，一開始也試圖阻擋，不料其他國家情勢看得比較清楚，紛紛表態加入，包括美國最親密的盟友英國。但中國的崛起態勢明確，已成區域強權，美方既無力攔阻或扭轉，終究要對亞太勢力版圖的調整作出妥協，重新思考一套戰略方針，建立能與中國積極交往合作的新關係。
在中國重塑自我、美中拉鋸新關係的過程當中，台灣對美國的政策價值與戰略意義都會受到影響。對台灣而言，美國官員少提《台灣關係法》固然值得警覺，但更重要的，是我們必須思考未來5年、10年乃至20年後，中國、亞太及國際局勢會有什麼變化，美中關係又會如何，而台灣要怎麼在其中開創自己的位置。未來台灣的生存發展與主權地位，能依賴美國作槓桿操作的空間會愈來愈少，必須更厚植軟實力，靈活運用巧實力。這是我們在《台灣關係法》之外，更必須慎重思考的生存課題。
Wednesday, April 1, 2015
Professor Ko Runs a Red Light, Beijing Gives HIm the Green Light
Professor Ko Runs a Red Light, Beijing Gives HIm the Green Light
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2, 2015
Executive Summary: Let us sum up Wen-Je Ko's remarks. His "New Perspective for 2015" affirms the substance of the 1992 consensus without using the term "1992 consensus". Does this conclusion take Ko's remarks "out of context"? Perhaps. But Wen-Je Ko should have expected this. He should be pleased with this. Even if he did not expect this, or is displeased with this, he now has no choice but to choke down this "out of context" conclusion, and try to restate it more clearly. Give Beijing an inch, and it will take a mile. Wen-Je Ko must now uphold his "1992 consensus under another name". Otherwise having given an inch, he will wind up losing a mile.
Full Text Below:
Wen-Je Ko recently explained his "New Perspectives for 2015" to the Mainland media. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office expressed "appreciation". The Shanghai Taiwan Affairs Office immediately announced that it would contact the Taipei City Government and organize a joint forum. A Chinese expression says, "When one has reached the end of one's rope, do not give up hope. Better days will come." Professor Ko apparently ran a red light, but Beijing gave him the green light.
Beijing dispatched two of its official media organizations, the Xinhua News Agency and CCTV, as well as Hong Kong's China Review News Agency (CRNA) in response to this news. The interview however, was not really an interview. The interviewer referred to a list of prepared questions. The interviewee referred to a list of prepared answers. The entire event was clearly scripted in advance. Its purpose was purely political. Its purpose was to leave behind a record for future reference.
This scenario was revealing. One. While the political theater played out onstage, all manner of transactions were taking place behind the scenes. Two. Wen-Je Ko demonstrated flexibility and ingenuity. His move could be regarded as a sign of weakness. It could be regarded as an admission of error. Or it could be regarded as unprincipled caprice. Three. Political confrontation is often mere show. It is often nothing more than sophistry. It can shift from "issuing warnings" to "expressing appreciation" in the blink of an eye. Four. Will such political games bring hope, or breed even greater distrust?
Consider Wen-Je Ko's statement. He acknowledged and accepted a number of Beijing's policies and proposals. But he did not explicitly recognize or accept of the 1992 consensus or the one China framework. One. He said no one in the world believes there are two Chinas. Therefore "one China" is not an issue. This of course has long been Beijing's view. Taiwan independence theory advocates "one nation on each side" and "one China, one Taiwan". Therefore "one China" represents Beijing's own position. It was never in question to begin with. Wen-Je Ko failed to distinguish between the two. Two. Ko said he would "honor previously signed cross-Strait agreements, past interactions, and the existing political foundation". The "previously signed agreements" and "past interactions" are presumed to be the 1992 consensus, aka the "existing political foundation". Ko responded to Beijing's declaration, saying that "The 1992 consensus is the political foundation for cross-Strait relations". Yet Ko never explicitly used the term "1992 consensus". Three. Ko said that "one China" is not a problem. But what does that mean? How do Wen-Je Ko's views differ from the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations? Four. Ko agreed with Xi that the two sides are both members of one family. But when responding to a reporter's question, Wen-Je Ko was evasive. When the Taiwan Affairs Office expressed its "appreciation", Wen-Je Ko accused the media of taking his remarks "out of context".
Beijing listened to Ko's comments eagerly. Ko said everything Beijing wanted to hear. But Wen-Je Ko was playing games. He was speaking in the coded language of internal Taiwan politics. He was deliberately saying things that Beijing could take out of context. That said, the interview offered the two sides new hope. Therefore it should be affirmed as it is sure to have broad repercussions:
One. Wen-Je Ko now has a pass to the cross-Strait debate. He is no longer just a local Taipei City politician who trips over his own tongue. Will he be the one responsible for the next cross-Strait breakthrough? We may find out in June, when Professor Ko visits the Mainland. Two. The DPP made Wen-Je Ko what he is today. Yet Professor Ko mocks the DPP. He says "The DPP of is bound by ideology. It is suspicious or even hostile towards [Mainland] China. This has led to stagnation in cross-Strait relations." How should Ko's remarks about the DPP be read? As repudiation? As transcendence? or as betrayal? Three. Will Beijing allow Wen-Je Ko to substitute his "New Perspectives for 2015" for the 1992 consensus? Wen-Je Ko said, "I am not the DPP. I lack its baggage". The DPP is not Wen-Je Ko. It is burdened with the Taiwan independence party platform and political commitments to the Sunflower Student Movement. Four. Wen-Je Ko is deep green. Yet he has memorized his lines so well others have take his remarks "out of context". The KMT has defended the 1992 consensus to the death. But the green camp is destined to break ranks on the 1992 consensus, sooner or later. What will the KMT do then?
Is Wen-Je Ko a "pig attempting to eat a tiger"? Or is he a mouse caught in Beijing's mousetrap? It is still too early to tell. The lessons of history are right under our noses. Lee Teng-hui began with the "National Unification Guidelines" and ended up as TSU spiritual leader, Chen Shui-bian began with his "five nos" and ended up wtih "one nation on each side". Each time something which began as drama degenerated into farce. Does Wen-Je Ko imagine that a single "It was taken out of context" disclaimer will allow him to pass muster with Beijing and the Taiwan public? He is already in Beijing's pocket. We must be prepared to "listen to what he says and watch what he does". Can he avoid suffocation while in Beijing's pocket? He can no longer turn back and use the 1992 consensus as an oxygen mask. The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations remains his best means of life support.
Let us sum up Wen-Je Ko's remarks. His "New Perspective for 2015" affirms the substance of the 1992 consensus without using the term "1992 consensus". Does this conclusion take Ko's remarks "out of context"? Perhaps. But Wen-Je Ko should have expected this. He should be pleased with this. Even if he did not expect this, or is displeased with this, he now has no choice but to choke down this "out of context" conclusion, and try to restate it more clearly. Give Beijing an inch, and it will take a mile. Wen-Je Ko must now uphold his "1992 consensus under another name". Otherwise having given an inch, he will wind up losing a mile.
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2, 2015
Executive Summary: Let us sum up Wen-Je Ko's remarks. His "New Perspective for 2015" affirms the substance of the 1992 consensus without using the term "1992 consensus". Does this conclusion take Ko's remarks "out of context"? Perhaps. But Wen-Je Ko should have expected this. He should be pleased with this. Even if he did not expect this, or is displeased with this, he now has no choice but to choke down this "out of context" conclusion, and try to restate it more clearly. Give Beijing an inch, and it will take a mile. Wen-Je Ko must now uphold his "1992 consensus under another name". Otherwise having given an inch, he will wind up losing a mile.
Full Text Below:
Wen-Je Ko recently explained his "New Perspectives for 2015" to the Mainland media. Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office expressed "appreciation". The Shanghai Taiwan Affairs Office immediately announced that it would contact the Taipei City Government and organize a joint forum. A Chinese expression says, "When one has reached the end of one's rope, do not give up hope. Better days will come." Professor Ko apparently ran a red light, but Beijing gave him the green light.
Beijing dispatched two of its official media organizations, the Xinhua News Agency and CCTV, as well as Hong Kong's China Review News Agency (CRNA) in response to this news. The interview however, was not really an interview. The interviewer referred to a list of prepared questions. The interviewee referred to a list of prepared answers. The entire event was clearly scripted in advance. Its purpose was purely political. Its purpose was to leave behind a record for future reference.
This scenario was revealing. One. While the political theater played out onstage, all manner of transactions were taking place behind the scenes. Two. Wen-Je Ko demonstrated flexibility and ingenuity. His move could be regarded as a sign of weakness. It could be regarded as an admission of error. Or it could be regarded as unprincipled caprice. Three. Political confrontation is often mere show. It is often nothing more than sophistry. It can shift from "issuing warnings" to "expressing appreciation" in the blink of an eye. Four. Will such political games bring hope, or breed even greater distrust?
Consider Wen-Je Ko's statement. He acknowledged and accepted a number of Beijing's policies and proposals. But he did not explicitly recognize or accept of the 1992 consensus or the one China framework. One. He said no one in the world believes there are two Chinas. Therefore "one China" is not an issue. This of course has long been Beijing's view. Taiwan independence theory advocates "one nation on each side" and "one China, one Taiwan". Therefore "one China" represents Beijing's own position. It was never in question to begin with. Wen-Je Ko failed to distinguish between the two. Two. Ko said he would "honor previously signed cross-Strait agreements, past interactions, and the existing political foundation". The "previously signed agreements" and "past interactions" are presumed to be the 1992 consensus, aka the "existing political foundation". Ko responded to Beijing's declaration, saying that "The 1992 consensus is the political foundation for cross-Strait relations". Yet Ko never explicitly used the term "1992 consensus". Three. Ko said that "one China" is not a problem. But what does that mean? How do Wen-Je Ko's views differ from the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations? Four. Ko agreed with Xi that the two sides are both members of one family. But when responding to a reporter's question, Wen-Je Ko was evasive. When the Taiwan Affairs Office expressed its "appreciation", Wen-Je Ko accused the media of taking his remarks "out of context".
Beijing listened to Ko's comments eagerly. Ko said everything Beijing wanted to hear. But Wen-Je Ko was playing games. He was speaking in the coded language of internal Taiwan politics. He was deliberately saying things that Beijing could take out of context. That said, the interview offered the two sides new hope. Therefore it should be affirmed as it is sure to have broad repercussions:
One. Wen-Je Ko now has a pass to the cross-Strait debate. He is no longer just a local Taipei City politician who trips over his own tongue. Will he be the one responsible for the next cross-Strait breakthrough? We may find out in June, when Professor Ko visits the Mainland. Two. The DPP made Wen-Je Ko what he is today. Yet Professor Ko mocks the DPP. He says "The DPP of is bound by ideology. It is suspicious or even hostile towards [Mainland] China. This has led to stagnation in cross-Strait relations." How should Ko's remarks about the DPP be read? As repudiation? As transcendence? or as betrayal? Three. Will Beijing allow Wen-Je Ko to substitute his "New Perspectives for 2015" for the 1992 consensus? Wen-Je Ko said, "I am not the DPP. I lack its baggage". The DPP is not Wen-Je Ko. It is burdened with the Taiwan independence party platform and political commitments to the Sunflower Student Movement. Four. Wen-Je Ko is deep green. Yet he has memorized his lines so well others have take his remarks "out of context". The KMT has defended the 1992 consensus to the death. But the green camp is destined to break ranks on the 1992 consensus, sooner or later. What will the KMT do then?
Is Wen-Je Ko a "pig attempting to eat a tiger"? Or is he a mouse caught in Beijing's mousetrap? It is still too early to tell. The lessons of history are right under our noses. Lee Teng-hui began with the "National Unification Guidelines" and ended up as TSU spiritual leader, Chen Shui-bian began with his "five nos" and ended up wtih "one nation on each side". Each time something which began as drama degenerated into farce. Does Wen-Je Ko imagine that a single "It was taken out of context" disclaimer will allow him to pass muster with Beijing and the Taiwan public? He is already in Beijing's pocket. We must be prepared to "listen to what he says and watch what he does". Can he avoid suffocation while in Beijing's pocket? He can no longer turn back and use the 1992 consensus as an oxygen mask. The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations remains his best means of life support.
Let us sum up Wen-Je Ko's remarks. His "New Perspective for 2015" affirms the substance of the 1992 consensus without using the term "1992 consensus". Does this conclusion take Ko's remarks "out of context"? Perhaps. But Wen-Je Ko should have expected this. He should be pleased with this. Even if he did not expect this, or is displeased with this, he now has no choice but to choke down this "out of context" conclusion, and try to restate it more clearly. Give Beijing an inch, and it will take a mile. Wen-Je Ko must now uphold his "1992 consensus under another name". Otherwise having given an inch, he will wind up losing a mile.
柯Ｐ闖過紅燈 北京開了綠燈
2015-04-02聯合報
柯文哲接受陸媒訪問，表達了他的「一五新觀點」；
為了這則消息，北京出動兩大官媒——新華社、央視記者，
此一場景顯示：一、在檯面上公開的政治表演中，
先試分析柯文哲的談話內容。他承認並接受了若干北京的政策主張，
北京是以取供畫押的心情安排此一訪談，
一、柯文哲已取得登上兩岸劇場的入場券，
眼前這一幕，究竟是柯文哲扮豬吃老虎，
總結柯文哲的此次談話，他其實是在主張「沒有九二共識符號／
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