Tuesday, April 21, 2015

A Silent Victory? Tsai Ing-wen Breaks Out of the One China Framework

A Silent Victory? Tsai Ing-wen Breaks Out of the One China Framework
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 22, 2015


Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has issued another challenge in her 2016 presidential campaign. She has decided to address economic policy. She has remained silent on the cross-Strait issues that the middle class and young people are concerned about. She appears to be giving internal policy top priority. In fact of course, the two issues are inseparable. Four years ago, during a similar election, Tsai Ing-wen evaded cross-Strait issues. She played the economic stability card and turned public opinion around. This time, she is taking a hands-on approach to economic and public welfare issues, hoping to win voter trust and create an atmosphere of safety.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen has issued another challenge in her 2016 presidential campaign. She has decided to address economic policy. She has remained silent on the cross-Strait issues that the middle class and young people are concerned about. She appears to be giving internal policy top priority. In fact of course, the two issues are inseparable. Four years ago, during a similar election, Tsai Ing-wen evaded cross-Strait issues. She played the economic stability card and turned public opinion around. This time, she is taking a hands-on approach to economic and public welfare issues, hoping to win voter trust and create an atmosphere of safety.

Why bother to address economic security issues? For one reason alone. Most people think the dividends of cross-Strait policy have been monopolized by Big Government and Big Business. Tsai Ing-wen wants voters to consider a new model of economic development not reliant on Mainland China. She hopes that the coming general election will deconstruct the one China framework.

Tsai Ing-wen first took part in party primaries five years ago. She has never left that battlefield. Her determination is obvious. But her attempts to break out of the one China framework date back many years. During the early days she was general counsel for international trade organization negotiations. She began attacking the one China principle back then. She was responsible for Lee Teng-hui's two-states theory, for cross-Strait policy during the Chen regime. and for the "Taiwan consensus" during her first run at the presidency. Even her advocacy of "maintaiing the status quo" is part of her attempt to maximize Taiwan independence and shatter the one China framework.

The one China principle is the CCP's sole framework for dealing with the Taiwan issue. The two governments clashed in the international arena during the last century. Later the two sides began a dialogue. The one China principle became a precondition for bilateral exchanges. It even plays a part in every presidential election. Every time the public on Taiwan exercises sovereignty, Beijing sees it as a challenge to the status quo. Therefore it feels compelled to reaffirm the framework.

In 1998, the ROC held its first direct presidential election. The Taiwan Strait crisis erupted. Just before the 2000 presidential election, Lee Teng-hui advanced his two states theory. The Mainland realized that Chen Shui-bian might be elected. It subsequently engaged in sabre rattling and verbal attacks. The United States demanded that Chen reaffirm the one China principle. Before the election Chen advanced his "Chen seven points". Later, during his inaugural speech, he advanced the "five noes". The five noes became the joint US-PRC tool to constrain the DPP. Only when Ma Ying-jeou took office was the 1992 consensus rehabilitated and reinstated. In 2008, Hu Jintao and George W. Bush rebooted cross-Strait talks on the hotline. For the first time the United States, the Mainland, and Taiwan reached tripartite agreement on the 1992 consensus. Since then the situation in the Taiwan Strait has changed rapidly. Comprehensive cross-Strait exchanges, economic interdependence, and political dialogue have all progressed by leaps and bound. 

During the last election, the United States and the Mainland joined hands to contain Tsai Ing-wen. The main reason was that her "Taiwan consensus" clashed with the 1992 consensus. This time she is taking a roundabout approach. She has adopted no name, generic label, policy rhetoric. She has made no mention of her "Taiwan consensus" or how she plans to circumvent the 1992 consensus. She has banished the one China principle and everything pertaining to reunification vs. independence from her cross-Strait policy rhetoric. She is attempting to maximize voter support by maximizing policy ambiguity. Her goal is to break out of the one China framework. Maintaining the status quo is her no name, generic brand, cross-Strait policy. It prevents opponents from getting a lock on her. It enables voters to agree with its positive implications. As a result, this presidential election has become a referendum on whether cross-Strait relations can break out of the one China framework.

The one China principle has long been the core of the tripartite relationship between the United States, the Mainland, and Taiwan. None of the three sides can pull away from it on their own. Tsai Ing-wen's attempt to break out of the one China framework depends on changing public opinion. It also hangs on an imbalance in US-Mainland China relations. In recent years, Mainland China has gradually neutralized US dominance in Asia. Conflicts between the two sides have increased in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The Taiwan issue has become a bargaining chip in their two way struggle. The balance of power in the Asian region is undergoing comprehensive change. The ROC presidential election offers an opportunity to break out of the one China framework. How will the United States assess the value of this chip? What attitude will it adopt? It could voice no objection. It could aggressively intervene. There is abundant room for maneuvering. Tsai Ing-wen may have decided this is her chance. She may well be making plans.

Tsai Ing-wen must not be naive. She must not imagine that "maintaining the status quo" can replace the one China principle. She has reverted to repudating the 1992 consensus and the five noes. She says she wants to "maintain Taiwan's democratic values and future independence... and maximize the space and options for the next generation." How much do such aspirations overlap with US national interests? That depends on the Mainland's response regarding the big picture.

How will Beijing respond to such an attempt to breakout of the one China framework? That is difficult to predict. For Xi Jinping, all this is Great Power Politics. He has his calculations. He has his cards to play. As voters, we must see great power politics and partisan rivalry for what they are. We must see who is attempting to break out of the one China framework, and whose opportunism is creating risks. More importantly, we must see who are the pawns on this chessboard.

The phrase "maintaining the status quo" is as old as the hills. But it cannot be taken seriously. The public must cast a jaudiced eye on those who peddle it in ever more ambiguous language. Politicians in power never have any trouble saying what they mean. Some merely have inner calculations. Everyone is advised to ponder the question. Less than a year remains. How will you respond to this attempt to break out of the one China framework? How will you respond to the ensuing change in the status quo?

無聲勝有聲?看蔡英文的「破框行動」
2015-04-22聯合報

蔡英文再度挑戰二○一六年總統大位,她選擇從經濟治理切入,主訴中產階級及年輕人,眾所關注的兩岸問題被冷處理,看似內政優先,實則互為犄角。和四年前大選時類似,蔡英文為避免兩岸問題最後轉化為經濟安定牌造成民意反轉,她這次起手式便直指經濟民生,先鞏固選民的信任與安全感。

之所以費心建構經濟安全的論述,理由無他,當多數民意質疑兩岸紅利被政商集團壟斷,從而反思交流利弊時,她似乎企圖說服選民相信,透過經濟發展新模式,不必依賴中國也有成長空間,希望這次大選有可能突破「一個中國」的框架。

蔡英文從五年前投入黨內初選,至今未有一刻離開這個戰場。她的意志堅決從表面難窺一二,但值得關注的是,她的「破框行動」非自近年始。從早年擔任台灣加入國際經貿組織的談判總顧問起,她和「一個中國原則」的纏鬥便已展開,李登輝的兩國論、扁時期的兩岸政策、她自己首次參選總統提出的「台灣共識」,乃至今次宣示的「維持現狀」,一以貫之,就是主張台灣的獨立自主空間要擴張到最大,盡可能突破一中框架限制。

一個中國原則是中共處理台灣問題的唯一框架,原本用於兩岸政府上世紀在國際社會交鋒,直到雙方開始對話,一中原則成為雙方交往前提,甚至每次總統大選都要起些作用。因為台灣人民每行使一次主權,對北京來說就是對現狀的挑戰,便慣性地重提框框。

九六年台灣首次民選總統,爆發台海危機。兩千年大選前,李登輝提出兩國論,大陸得知陳水扁當選可能性升高,文攻武嚇外,另透過美方要求扁提出關於一中原則的承諾。扁選前提出「陳七點」,即後來就職演說中「四不一沒有」的原型。「四不一沒有」後來成為美中聯手約束民進黨政府的工具,直到馬英九執政,便以「九二共識」轉型再續。二○○八年大陸透過布胡熱線啟動兩岸復談,由於美中台三方首次對九二共識有交集,自此台海情勢驟變,兩岸全面交流,經濟互相依賴,政治對話催促不輟。

上次大選,美中分進合擊圍堵蔡英文,主因之一即是她用「台灣共識」與九二共識正面對抗。這次她迂迴前進,採取「無標籤論述」,不提「台灣共識」,也不設想如何繞過九二共識,而是將「一個中國原則」及統獨相關文字從兩岸政策論述中抹掉;企圖用最大的模糊維持最大的可能,達到破框目的。「維持現狀」就像一個沒有標籤的兩岸論述,無以名之,便不致被對手鎖定攻擊,同時可訴求認同其言外之意的選民支持。於是,這場總統大選儼然成為兩岸關係能否破框前行的抉擇。

一中原則始終是美中台三方關係的核心,沒有一方能自行抽離。而蔡英文的破框行動,除了依恃台灣民意的求變,也正等待另一個時勢條件,即美中關係的失衡。近年中國大陸在亞洲主導地位漸次抗衡美國,雙方在東、南海矛盾不時升高,台灣問題隱然成為雙方博弈的籌碼選項。亞洲的區域平衡正全面變動,台灣大選出現突破一中框架的力量,美國如何評估這支籌碼的價值,又將採取什麼態度,便顯得相當重要。從消極不反對到積極干預之間,有很大的運作空間,蔡英文可能認為她的機會在此,也已著手布局。

蔡英文應該不會天真到以為「維持現狀」可完全取代「一個中國原則」,但她致力回到沒有九二共識、四不一沒有這些緊箍咒的階段,宣稱「保有台灣的民主價值和未來自主性,……為下一代留住最多的空間和選擇。」這點訴求和美方國家利益究竟有多大交集,關鍵在大陸衡量全局後掀示的底線。

我們難以預知北京將如何因應這局破框行動,習近平的視野裡,這是大國政治的一角,掛角追落自有其運籌。作為選民,必須從大國政治及政黨對抗的棋局裡看清,這項破框行動是利用誰的風險營造誰的機遇,更重要的是,看清自己在這盤枰上究竟是誰的棋子。

「維持現狀」這話與「地老天荒」一般,當真不得;反而針對那些歷經多年卻愈發說不清楚的事,人民愈該認真看待。權勢在握的政治人物從來就沒有難言之隱,有的只是謀算心機;只剩不到一年的時日裡,大家不妨盤算一下,如何面對這個「破框行動」,以及隨之而來的「現狀改變」。

Monday, April 20, 2015

Closely Scrutinize both Taipei Dome Safety and the Attitude of the Taipei City Government

Closely Scrutinize both Taipei Dome Safety and the Attitude of the Taipei City Government
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 21, 2015


Executive Summary: A Taipei City Government inspection team says the Taipei Dome has five major defects. The dome may have to be demolished. But the composition of the city government inspection team, its inspection standards, and its computer simulation of emergency evacuation procedures also lack objectivity and have raised eyebrows. In any case, the alleged major defects involve public safety. Therefore they warrant public scrutiny. Massive public works projects such as these allow no room for error. We must seek perfection.

Full Text Below:

A Taipei City Government inspection team says the Taipei Dome has five major defects. The dome may have to be demolished. But the composition of the city government inspection team, its inspection standards, and its computer simulation of emergency evacuation procedures also lack objectivity and have raised eyebrows. In any case, the alleged major defects involve public safety. Therefore they warrant public scrutiny. Massive public works projects such as these allow no room for error. We must seek perfection.

The inspection team says that the Taipei Dome's biggest problem is emergency evacuation. This is indeed the most important consideration for all large public buildings. The Taipei Dome is situated in Taipei's bustling East District. That makes transportation, evacuation, and security problems even more serious. Leave aside the question of whether the the Taipei Dome should have been built here for the moment. The question today is another matter. The roof of the dome was originally supposed to be operable. But high costs led to a fixed roof, and required sinking the dome 10.5 more meters into the ground. This put infield and outfield viewers below the grade level, and made evacuation from the stadium much harder than from ordinary open stadiums.

The computer simulation parameters used by the Taipei City Government inspection team for building fires were far too simplistic. For example, what would we do in the event of a powerful earthquake or a terrorist attack? Mass panic is actually more dangerous than a terrorist attack. On New Year's Eve Shanghai held an open air outdoor event on the Bund. For reasons unknown, the crowd began pushing each other. The result was 36 deaths and 47 injuries. The Taipei Arena is an indoor space. If an accident occurred during an evening event, the crowds would inevitably try to escape. Imagine tens of thousands of people, colliding against each other in dark underpasses, amidst a power outage. The danger of being trampled to death would be far greater than on the surface in the open air.

Besides, mass panic involves more than seeking a quick escape. It involves being pushed sideways. Alas the few computer simulations of emergency evacuations show people moving ant like in an orderly fashion at a constant speed. The animations also assumed that once people were evacuated, they would not cross the street, but instead remain in the vicinity, prevented from leaving by fire department fire lines. Such assumptions are too bizarre to have any credibility.

City government inspections of the Taipei Dome resulted in computer animations such as the "tian long dong hua" (sky dragon animation). That was hardly a surprise. Earlier, the city government was asked how the Taipei Dome would be evacuated in the event of an emergency. Officials were actually quoted saying that "evacuations could be delayed, and take place in stages." This was just plain naive. Emergency evacuations are not elementary school student processions in which teacher instruct students on how to leave the campus. Emergency evacuations take place in a state of panic. The city government's response revealed the inadequacy of its emergency evacuation procedures. The city government wanted the Taipei Dome. Therefore it ignored everything else, including the need for professionalism.

The Taipei Dome is situated in the bustling East District. This makes evacuation extremely difficult. The design of the Taipei Dome emulates Toronto's multi-purpose Rogers Center, or "SkyDome". It combines sports, leisure, and commercial functions. Unfortunately the Taipei Dome emulated the SkyDome in a haphazard manner. The SkyDome is Canada's first domed stadium. Because it was so huge, Canada established a special committee, the TSSC, to research dome safety, operations, and evacuation requirements. The committee established clear site selection criteria. One. The dome must be situated next to at least one freeway and several major roads. Two. The dome must avoid residential areas. Three. The site for the dome must be large enough to cope with multi-functional use. Four. The design of the dome must consider emergency evacuation.

Toronto's SkyDome was designed more carefully, and kept evacuation in mind. For example, the area surrounding the SkyDome includes a zoo and other low-density functions. It includes two freeways, two major roads, and is next to Lake Ontario, allowing unlimited means of evacuation. The site of the Taipei Dome is nothing like that of Toronto's SkyDome. This if a fact. Unfortunately, the Taipei Dome specifications were established carelessly and in haste.

The basic egg shape design of the Taipei Dome emulates the Tokyo Dome. The Tokyo Dome is a second generation derivation of Toronto's SkyDome. Tokyo is densely populated. But the Tokyo Dome is situated in northeast Tokyo. Temples, schools, and parks keep the density low. Even then, the Tokyo Dome relies on three subway lines to disperse its crowds. Whenever evening events end, the Korakuen and Haru subway stations are packed. This raises serious concerns.

The conditions for the Taipei Dome are inherently unfavorable. This requires close scrutiny. But the same standard must be applied to the Taipei City Government inspection team. As with any public facility, the responsibility cannot fall exclusively on the construction company. The city government must assume responsibility for crowd dispersal and emergency response. Most importantly, those in authority must adopt an objective, rational, and scientific approach to the problem. They must run simulation exercises for different conditions. They must seek solutions rather than raise alarms. They must not abuse their official authority to intimidate businesses, attack political opponents, and shirk government responsibility.

To ensure that the Taipei Dome is safe, we must be both humane and pragmatic. We must run realistic simulation exercises. The most important thing is we must to work together in search of solutions, and not seek ways to intimidate each other. That will do nothing to improve safety and security.

嚴格檢視巨蛋安全,也檢視市府態度
2015-04-21聯合報

北市府體檢小組認定大巨蛋園區有五大缺失,大巨蛋面臨存廢問題;但是,市府體檢團隊的成員、檢查標準及電腦模擬逃生設計等,本身也因客觀性不足而受到質疑爭議。無論如何,五大缺失攸關大眾安全值得各界重視,如此巨型的公共建設不容有任何閃失,必須力求完善。

體檢小組直指大巨蛋最大的問題是疏散,這確實是所有大型公共建設的首要考慮。尤其,大巨蛋建在高密度的北市東區,交通、疏散及安全挑戰更是嚴苛。先撇開大巨蛋選址失當的往事不談,今天的問題是,原本可以開闔的蛋頂因為造價太高改成較便宜的固定式屋頂,造成原有量體必須下沉才能容納。如此一來,球場下挖到地下十點五公尺,內、外野觀眾席都低於地面,疏散的難度較一般的露天球場高出許多。

北市府的體檢報告,設定的模擬參數是發生火災,不客氣地說,這未免把問題看得太簡單。試問,如果發生強烈地震或遭恐怖攻擊,那種情況該怎辦?此外,群眾慌亂引起踩踏的危險更恐怖。今年上海外灘舉辦跨年活動,是在室外、露天的情況下,由於不明原因引起群眾爭相推擠踩踏,造成三十六死、四十七傷。而台北大巨蛋是在室內,若夜間大型活動發生意外,群眾爭相逃離是必然的;若再加上停電,幾萬人在黑暗的地下通道衝撞,踩踏風險勢將高於在地表的開闊空間。

再者,恐慌逃命的群眾行為不止是想快速前進,更有橫向推擠。很遺憾,幾支公布的模擬疏散電腦動畫,離場的民眾竟像螞蟻一樣有秩序地一隻接一隻,速度一致,井然有序。同時,動畫也假設所有群眾離場後,都會駐足擠在園區地面,被消防救火熱線擋在現場,不會穿越馬路離去。這樣的動畫情境,未免太過離奇,簡直不食人間煙火。

市府體檢巨蛋會發生這種「天龍動畫」的情境,並不意外。稍早,市府被問及大巨蛋發生緊急事件時如何撤離,官員的回答竟是:可以「延遲散場,分散時間離場」,簡直天真。緊急疏散不可能像國小放學排路隊,聽從導護老師指揮次第離校,而是爭先恐後。市府的回應,充分暴露它對緊急疏散的素養太差;市府一味嚴格要求大巨蛋,似乎也忘了自己應有的專業與角色。

落腳在鬧市東區,大巨蛋疏散的大環境極端不利。台北大巨蛋的設計,是參考加拿大多倫多巨蛋的運動、休閒和商業多功能規劃,卻未學到它的嚴謹態度。多倫多巨蛋是加拿大第一個「天幕巨蛋」,因為量體巨大,加國特別成立研究巨蛋安全、營運、疏散規格的專門委員會(TSSC),訂出選址標準:一,須有一條以上高速公路,數條主要道路;二,避免周遭鄰接住宅區;三,基地面積足以應付多功能使用;四,疏散應思考緊急狀態。

在這種情況下,多倫多巨蛋的疏散有更周密的設計。例如,周遭是動物園等低密度利用區,兩條高速公路,兩條主要道路,且緊鄰安大略湖,疏散量無限。台北大巨蛋的現址遠不及多倫多巨蛋的條件,當然更應戒慎面對。遺憾的是,連市府體檢大巨蛋的標準都是臨時訂的,實在太草率與托大了。

台北大巨蛋的蛋體基本設計是出自東京巨蛋團隊,東京巨蛋是沿襲多倫多巨蛋的二代天幕。東京都雖人口稠密,但位於北東京文京區的巨蛋因有寺廟、學校、公園等配置,密度較低。即使如此,只靠三條地鐵輸運人潮,每當子夜賽事結束,後樂園、春日等地鐵站擠得水泄不通,依然是隱憂。

台北大巨蛋的條件先天不利,當然需要嚴格檢視;但同樣的標準,也應用於檢視北市府的態度。任何公共設施,責任不可能都只落在建商身上,政府對人群的疏運、緊急事故的因應,也都有相對的責任。重要的是,主政者要用客觀、理性、科學的態度面對問題,針對不同的狀況模擬演練,尋求解決之道;而不是一味在那裡危言聳聽,只想擺官威恫嚇企業,或藉機打擊對手,而推卻自己應有的責任。

要確保大巨蛋的安全,必須回到人性面務實思考,找出真實的情境模擬演練。最重要的,是要共同找出解決模式,而不是相互放話威嚇,那對安全改善一點幫助都沒有。

Sunday, April 19, 2015

Tripartite Alliance Can Stabilize the Taiwan Strait, Eric Chu Can Reverse Course

Tripartite Alliance Can Stabilize the Taiwan Strait, Eric Chu Can Reverse Course
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 20, 2015


Executive Summary: No matter how dire the situation, the KMT must not surrender prematurely. Tsai Ing-wen is hardly invulnerable. Tsai Ing-wen has momentum. But not because people like her. She has momentum only because the KMT cannot articulate why they ought to prefer the KMT. As long as one remains determined, focused, and full of fight, as long as one offers a vision and takes action, the outcome of the 2016 election will not be preordained.

Full Text Below:

Eric Chu has announced that he will not run for president in 2016. Most people think he is motivated by one of two reasons. Reason one is that he feels bound by his promise to serve out his term as New Taipei City mayor. Reason two is that he is afraid he will lose. If reason one is his real motive, then Eric Chu's priorities are seriously out of order. Putting on a show by keeping his promise to New Taipei City, would sacrifice continuity in cross-Strait relations. The KMT must fulfill a far more important promise to check DPP power.

A well-known story from the Warring States Period involves one Wei Sheng, an inhabitant of the Lu Kingdom, who promised to meet a woman under a bridge. The woman failed to show, but the waters gradually rose. Wei Sheng, being a man of his word, refused to leave. He clung to a bridge pier and eventually drowned. The story spawned the idiom "as trustworthy as Wei Sheng". The story can be construed as an exhortation to remain true to one's word even if it means death. In this sense, the story contains an inspirational element. But it can also be construed as an example of blind obstinacy.

Leave aside the question of whether the KMT will implode. Tsai Ing-wen has proposed a new cross-Strait policy. But DPP cross-Strait policy remains reactionary at its core. DPP behavior remains impetuous and erratic. Tsai Ing-wen's campaign committee has been fighting over the Vice Presidential nomination. This has led to tensions among sect leaders and under the table maneuvering. Green Camp local leaders have also evinced unseemly triumphalism. Since Tsai Ing-wen secured the DPP party nomination, her poll numbers have hovered at approximately 45%. Tsai Ing-wen still faces internal resistance to her 2016 presidential bid. If Eric Chu chooses to run, he may not lose. Besides, if Eric Chu is elected president and diligently works on behalf of Taiwan as a whole, he would actually be fulfilling his commitment to New Taipei City even more effectively.

Perhaps Eric Chu believes he need not be the KMT candidate. But as matters stand, Eric Chu is the KMT's heaviest hitter. If a leader is cowardly, his followers will be timid. Even if Eric Chu goes to bat, a Kuomintang presidency remains a long shot. But if Eric Chu does not go to bat, a Kuomintang presidency is an impossibility. If no suitable candidates run, a nine in one elections "negative coat tails effect" will recurr. The KMT will lose even the legislative elections. Never mind the rise and fall of the Kuomintang as a party. If the legislature lacks adequate oversight, how can that possibly be good for Taiwan?

Eric Chu promised to make a full report on the general election on May 16. Eric Chu should use the coming month to engage in soul-searching. He should clear his mind of preconceptions and choose to fulfill a greater commitment over a lesser commitment.

Now consider the fear of losing. The nine in one election debacle left the KMT at an overwhelming disadvantage for 2016. Everyone's eyes are now on Eric Chu. He is their last hope. But even if Eric Chu chooses to run, that may not reverse the KMT's fortunes. The KMT must fling open the doors and make bold decisions. Only then does it stand a chance of pulling off an election upset.

The entry point for such bold decisions is cross-Strait relations. This is the key to Taiwan's survival and prosperity. It is also the Achilles Heel haunting Tsai Ing-wen's current political momentum. The KMT must be willing to make highly effective, highly visible, highly shocking cross-Strait policy proposals. Only that will demonstrate why the KMT can maintain mutually beneficial cross-Strait peace, and why Tsai Ing-wen cannot.

The KMT should emulate Lien Chan, who courageously broke through a DPP seige to visit the Mainland and reach an accord between the KMT and the CCP. The KMT should promote a three way relationship between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, and a new relationship between Taipei and Beijing. The best time to do so is May 3 in Shanghai, at the KMT-CCP forum. If the Mainland can arrange a Chu Xi meeting, the KMT and CCP can create a new cross-Strait relationship.

Specifically, the Mainland should implement Xi Jinping's "two sides, one family" and "cross-Strait symbiosis", making them forces that support Taiwan's stability and prosperity. For example, the CCP should form a transparent alliance with the KMT. It should participate in equitable and substantive talks with the KMT that are favorable to Taiwan. Such talks should include a coordination and cooperation framework to deal with political issues and implement policy measures. Such an alliance should be enough to avoid political baggage, including green camp allegations that Eric Chu "accepted an imperial decree" or "sold out Taiwan". If this political goal can be achieved, the demonization, alienation and uglification of the Mainland can be eliminated in one fell swoop.

The public on Taiwan has long distrusted the Mainland. Therefore such an alliance cannot be a purely bilateral relationship between the KMT and the CCP. A third party, trusted by the public on Taiwan, such as the United States, must take part. Over the past decade, the United States has ceased to consider Mainland China as an enemy, or even a strategic competitor. Instead, the Mainland is seen as a constructive strategic partner. The two countries may have different political systems. But they also share economic and even strategic interests. Therefore the strategic partnership can be a constructive one. The key is trust. That means the US must trust Mainland China's peaceful rise. That trust is important not just for the United States. It is also important for the Mainland.

It is on this point that Taiwan can play an important role. Taiwan can help build three way trust. Taiwan and the Mainland are linked by language, heredity, and history. Taiwan has inherited Chinese culture uncontaminated by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. Taiwan and the United States share the same belief in democracy and economic systems. This link makes Taiwan a bridge between the Mainland and the United States. At the core of this alliance of ideals, is a shared interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This alliance of ideals is increasingly stable and increasinly opposed to the DPP's fragile and risky cross-Strait policy. This is the KMT's biggest advantage in the elections.

Lastly, no matter how dire the situation, the KMT must not surrender prematurely. Tsai Ing-wen is hardly invulnerable. Tsai Ing-wen has momentum. But not because people like her. She has momentum only because the KMT cannot articulate why they ought to prefer the KMT. As long as one remains determined, focused, and full of fight, as long as one offers a vision and takes action, the outcome of the 2016 election will not be preordained.

三方聯盟穩定台海 朱立倫可逆轉
20150420 中國時報

朱立倫宣布不選2016年,一般解讀有兩個因素,一是新北做滿的誠信之結難解;二是怕輸。如果是第一個因素,我們認為朱立倫顛倒了輕重、誤判了緩急。表面信守做好做滿新北市長的小諾,卻失去讓兩岸和平發展政策延續、讓國民黨成為有力政黨平衡政局的大信。

有一個家喻戶曉的典故,戰國時有一位魯國人尾生,與女子約於橋下,女子沒來,水流漸漸高漲,尾生卻為守信而不肯離去,終於抱橋柱而亡。這個故事衍生出「尾生之信」的成語,可解為堅守信用至死不渝,故事固然有令人感佩的一面,但也可解讀為「固執不化的控固力」。

先不講國民黨會不會倒?蔡英文雖然提出新的兩岸論述,但民進黨兩岸政策核心理念堅定保守、行為卻躁進不安的本質並未改變,近來蔡英文的競選班底與副總統提名人選的爭奪,造成派系山頭關係緊張,檯面下動作不斷,綠營地方諸侯亦呈現驕兵之姿。加上蔡英文確定獲民進黨提名後,至今民調支持度仍在45%上下徘徊,蔡英文的2016總統路並非沒有內憂,朱立倫若決心參選,並非絕無勝算。況且,如果朱立倫選上總統,只要真心為台灣造福,才是實踐對新北市「做好」的大信。

或許朱立倫認為「選總統沒有非誰不可」,但擺在眼前的就是,國民黨目前的最強棒就是朱立倫,一怯眾懦,朱立倫出戰,國民黨總統之路仍九死一生,朱立倫不戰,國民黨總統之路很可能十死無生,如果最後推了不適合人選上陣,重蹈九合一選舉母雞壓死小雞的覆轍,那麼,國民黨連立委選舉都會輸得傾家蕩產,國民黨一黨興衰或不足論,但國會沒有足夠監督力道,對台灣會是好事嗎?

對於大選布局,朱立倫說會在516日做出完整報告,我們認為朱立倫應用這一個月的時間好好沉澱、歸零思考,在大信與小諾之間,做出明智的選擇。

再來看所謂的「怕輸」。九合一大敗後,2016年國民黨的總統選情確實落入超級劣勢,萬方矚目的一線生機,是朱立倫披掛上陣,然而就算朱上陣,仍不足以扳轉劣勢,必須輔以大開大闔的大決策,才有機會撼動目前不利的選舉板塊。

大決策的切入點還是兩岸,既是台灣生存發展的重中之重,也是目前氣勢正殷的蔡英文唯一的軟肋,國民黨必須在兩岸上,有極具實效性、極高能見度、極度震撼性的大決策,才能凸顯為什麼國民黨執政才可以維持兩岸和平互利發展,而蔡英文不行。

我們建議,國民黨應效法當年連戰勇闖民進黨群眾包圍陣,毅然訪問大陸發展國共關係的前例,發展與美中三方締結理念大聯盟,開創並展現全新的兩岸格局。最可利用的時機是即將於53日在上海登場的國共論壇。大陸如能共同創造朱習會的條件,如能實現當可讓國共與兩岸關係進入一個新的境界與階段。

具體而言,我們建議大陸,可研究如何落實習近平「兩岸一家親」與「兩岸生命共同體」理念,使之成為支持台灣安定繁榮的正面力量。譬如,願意和國民黨共同締結透明的國共聯盟關係、與國民黨對等商談實質有利台灣,包括處理政治問題的協調合作框架,並付諸行動。這樣應該足以避免讓朱立倫登陸成為政治包袱,被綠營以「領聖旨」、「出賣台灣」等汙名化標籤大扣帽子。倘若這個政治目標可以達成,就有機會一舉把大陸在台灣被「敵化、仇化與醜化」的三原罪洗脫。

基於台灣內部長期對大陸的不信任氛圍,這樣的聯盟無法單單靠國民黨與陸方雙邊建立,必須加入受台灣社會信任的第三方,也就是美國。10年來,美國已不再視中國為敵,也不是單純的戰略競爭國,而是把大陸視為建設性戰略夥伴,但由於兩國政治體制不同,經濟乃至戰略利益仍有伏流,這個戰略夥伴能否發揮建設性效果,關鍵在於信任關係,也就是要讓中國大陸的和平崛起被美國視為可信任的崛起,這不僅對美國重要,對大陸也重要。

在這一點,其實台灣可以扮演重要角色,幫助建立台美中三方信任循環,台灣一方面與大陸擁有同文同種的血緣與歷史連結,更承續著去馬列毛思想的純淨中華文化。另一方面,台灣在政治體制上有著和美國一樣的民主信仰與經濟制度,這讓台灣成為一個可以連結美中的重要橋梁。這個理念聯盟,核心是一個共同的利益,就是台海的和平與穩定。這個理念聯盟的力量愈穩定,也就愈反襯民進黨兩岸政策的脆弱性與危險性,而這正是國民黨在選舉劣勢中最大的優勢。

最後,即便局面不利,國民黨也不應過早悲觀,蔡英文也並非有著不破的金鐘罩,蔡英文的聲勢,不是來自於民眾喜歡她,而是國民黨說不出讓民眾支持的理由。一旦人選確定、戰力集中、提出願景、拿出行動,2016大選的勝負輸贏,還在未定之天。

Thursday, April 16, 2015

Tsai Ing-wen Puts the Elephant in the Refrigerator

Tsai Ing-wen Puts the Elephant in the Refrigerator
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 17, 2015


Executive Summary: A riddle that has been circulating asks "How does one put an elephant in a refrigerator?" The answer comes in four parts. First, one opens the refrigerator door. Next, one finds an elephant. Next, one puts the elephant in the refrigerator. And lastly, one closes the refrigerator door. This may be a joke. But it is an apt metaphor for Tsai Ing-wen's new mantra about "maintaining the status quo".

Full Text Below:

A riddle that has been circulating asks "How does one put an elephant in a refrigerator?" The answer comes in four parts. First, one opens the refrigerator door. Next, one finds an elephant. Next, one puts the elephant in the refrigerator. And lastly, one closes the refrigerator door. This may be a joke. But it is an apt metaphor for Tsai Ing-wen's new mantra about "maintaining the status quo".

Cross-Strait disagreement is an elephant that can trample cross-Strait peace. The first concern of leaders on both sides must be to shelve disputes, seek a win-win solution, and put the elephant in the refrigerator. The DPP has long allowed the elephant to run amok and undermine cross-Strait harmony. Tsai Ing-wen recently proposed "maintaining the status quo". She has opened the refrigerator door. But this is merely the first step in shelving disputes. Resolving cross-Strait disagreements requires three more steps. Defining the elephant, putting the elephant in the refrigerator, and closing the refrigerator door. The last three steps are more difficult than the first.

The 2016 election is fast approaching. Tsai Ing-wen will soon have less and less room for ambiguity in cross-Strait policy. Everyone on Taiwan, including those inside the DPP, will be asking questions. The United States will express concern. The Mainland will look on with a cold eye, as the United States, the Mainland, and even the public on Taiwan increase the pressure. Tsai Ing-wen recently declared that "maintaining the cross-Strait status quo is the DPP's basic principle for handling cross-Strait relations". This is indeed an improvement over the hollow statements of the past. It is indeed more concrete and more constructive. But DPP cross-Strait policy has long been capricious. The United States, the Mainland, and the public on Taiwan, are still wary of the DPP's attachment to Taiwan independence. Tsai Ing-wen's declaration merely sprinkled a few drops of water on the cracked earth. It was not enough to relieve the drought.

A substantial impact requires taking the second step. One must define the elephant. Tsai Ing-wen must define the status quo. Just what is it? In May 2004, when Tsai Ing-wen was Chairperson for the Mainland Affairs Council, she said "Taiwan, the US, and the Mainland each have a different understanding of the status quo. This determines whether one feels compelled to define the status quo." Her remark was dead on. If the various parties still cling to their own definition of the "status quo", disputes will never end, and Tsai Ing-wen will never be able to resolve the doubts in the minds of people on Taiwan, the Mainland and the US. The refrigerator door will never even open.

The status quo has already been successfully defined. One example is "no [immediate] reunification, no Taiwan independence, no use of force." Ma Ying-jeou's three noes is imperfect. It lacks aggressiveness. It may not be enough to cope with cross-Strait relations under Eric Chu's KMT. But for the past eight years, it was a compromise that most on Taiwan could accept. Even the United States accepted it. The Mainland was willing to remain silent about it and not voice open opposition. Tsai Ing-wen has no objections to "no reunification" and "no use of force," Her only objection is to "no Taiwan independence". On this, Tsai Ing-wen is subject to Taiwan independence pressure. But "no Taiwan independence" can be redefined to give her some wriggle room. For example, Hung Chi-chang has proposed defining "no Taiwan independence" as "no pursuit of de jure Taiwan independence". This would put Tsai Ing-wen and Ma Ying-jeou on the same footing regarding the "three noes". It would continue Ma Ying-jeou's established definition of the status quo.

These two interpretations of the three noes even differ in substance, especially when it comes to "no Taiwan independence". The three noes are old wine in new bottles. But they at least show that Tsai Ing-wen has the courage to take a step in the direction of cross-Strait peace. The blue camp agrees. The US is optimistic. The Mainland remains silent. The only obstacle Tsai faces is a deep green Taiwan independence backlash. She can however, still win the support of Hung Chi-chang and other green camp moderates. She would not be alone. If she lacks the courage to make a concession this small, how can she possibly lead Taiwan? How can she maintain the status quo? How can she maintain cross-Strait relations and ensure steady growth? Can she bring herself to utter these words? If not, she must tell us how her "maintaining the status quo" differs from Ma's "no reunification, no independence, no use of force".

Once the elephant has been found, the third step is to move the elephant into the refrigerator, thereby shelving controversy. Tsai Ing-wen should incorporate "maintaining the status quo" into her campaign literature and even the DPP party platform. On this, she must do more than talk the talk. She must walk the walk. Tsai Ing-wen must show that she has the elevated perspective befitting a ruler. She must encourage cooperation between DPP and KMT legislators. She must enable the "cross-strait agreement oversight regulations" and other bills currently blocked by the DPP to pass as soon as possible. She must allow stalled cross-Strait negotiations to continue. She must allow Taiwan to cease spinning its wheels.

The final step is to close the refrigerator door, and freeze the the status quo, so that the two sides can shelve disputes long term. This means that Tsai Ing-wen must break with Lin Yi-hsiung, Chen Shui-bian, Huang Kuo-chang, Lin Fei-fan, and other idealistic or opportunistic Taiwan independence advocates. She must not allow them to hijack the party and turn back the clock. Only this consitutes a meaningful, sustainable understanding of "maintaining the status quo."

The easiest of the four steps is opening the refrigerator door. But the second, third, and fourth steps are the key. For Tsai Ing-wen future steps will be increasingly difficult. This is a test of Tsai Ing-wen's leadership. We are happy to see Tsai Ing-wen propose "maintaining the status quo". But if she thinks that once the refrigerator door is open, the elephant will automatically walk in, then she is either stupid or naive.

社論-蔡英文把大象關進冰箱
2015年04月17日 04:10 主筆室

有個腦筋急轉彎的笑話,「如何把大象關到冰箱裡?」答案有4個步驟,一是打開冰箱門;二是找到大象;三是把大象放進冰箱;四是把冰箱門關起來。雖然是笑話,但拿來比喻蔡英文拋出的「維持現狀說」,倒也有神妙之處。

如果我們把兩岸之間的爭議,視為可能踩壞兩岸和平的大象,如何擱置爭議、尋求雙贏,把這隻大象關進冰箱裡,無疑是兩岸主政者的首要,但民進黨長期放任大象亂竄,破壞兩岸關係。現在蔡英文拋出「維持現狀」,可謂打開了冰箱門,但這只是擱置爭議的第一步,兩岸連鎖題還有三道功:定義大象、把大象放進冰箱、把冰箱門關起來,這三道功一道比一道難。

隨著2016大選的接近,蔡英文兩岸政策模糊的空間將愈來愈小,將面對包括民進黨本身在內的台灣內部眾聲質疑、美國關心、中共冷觀的「美中台」三方壓力。蔡英文最新的宣示:「維持兩岸現狀是民進黨處理兩岸關係的基本原則」,較諸過去空洞的表述,確實相對較具體、有建設性,是一種進步。但民進黨兩岸政策長期不穩定,美中及台灣內部對民進黨台獨黨綱仍然充滿疑慮,蔡英文的宣示只能說是乾涸大地裂土稍潤,不足以解旱。

要發揮實質效用,第二步,蔡英文必須定義大象,說清楚「維持現狀」是什麼?2004年5月時任陸委會主委的蔡英文曾說,「台美中三方對『維持現狀』的認知有落差,對於現狀認知的落差,在於我們是否有必要對現狀做定義。」這句話一針見血地道出了關鍵,如果各方仍然流於各說各話的「維持現狀」,爭議不會休止,蔡英文也無法化解台中美各方的疑慮,那麼冰箱門開了等於沒開。

現狀的定義,有成功的基準可參,就是「不統、不獨、不武」。馬英九的三不,雖不完美,積極性有缺,對朱立倫時代的國民黨可能不足以應對兩岸關係之所需,但在過去8年,毫無疑問是台灣最具妥協性的最大公約數,也是美國可以接受,大陸沉默不反對的最大可能。從字面論,「不統不獨不武」,不統與不武蔡英文不會反對,唯一要解的是「不獨」,即便蔡英文背負著獨派壓力,但「不獨」可以透過定義取得空間,例如參考洪奇昌建議,把「不獨」定義為「不追求法理台獨」,如此,蔡英文至少在字面上建立與馬英九完全等化的「三不」,也就可以藉以延續馬英九已經建立的「現狀定義」。

即便實質上,兩者認知的三不,尤其「不獨」的實質意涵仍有歧異,但這個舊瓶裝新酒的三不,至少展現蔡英文為兩岸和平有勇氣跨出腳步,藍營只能贊同,美國樂觀其成,大陸無話可說。蔡英文唯一要面對的是深綠獨派的反彈,但她仍能得到如洪奇昌等綠營溫和派的奧援,並非孤立,若連這一點為大局退讓的肩膀也無,如何讓人相信她領導的台灣,有能力維持「兩岸關係穩定發展的現狀」?如果蔡英文真的說不出口,就要負責任地告訴大家,她的維持現狀與馬英九的「不統、不獨、不武」差別何在?

找出大象後,第三步把大象移進冰箱,完成爭議的擱置。蔡英文應把定義後的「維持現狀」文件化,納入競選政見,乃至於民進黨的政綱。而這一點,不只是形式上的,也必須是行動上的,亦即,接下來蔡英文要展現準執政者的大格局,促使民進黨立委與國民黨合作,讓被民進黨阻撓擱置的「兩岸協議監督條例」等法案盡速通過,讓幾乎陷入停擺的兩岸協商可以繼續進行,不要再繼續讓台灣陷入空轉危機。

最後一步,則是把冰箱門關上,讓維持現狀的主張結凍固著,這樣兩岸爭議的擱置才可以長續維持。這也意謂,蔡英文要向林義雄、陳水扁、黃國昌、林飛帆等等不同的獨派世代,不管是理想獨派或投機獨派的群眾,發出不受綁架、不走回頭路的明確訊息,這才是有實質意義、可長可久的「維持現狀」。

關大象四步驟中,最簡單的一步就是把冰箱門打開,但第二步、第三步與第四步才是重點。當然,對蔡英文來說,愈後面的步驟愈難,但這正是考驗蔡英文處理難題的領導能力。我們樂見蔡英文拋出「維持現狀」,但如果認為把冰箱門打開,大象就會自動走進冰箱,那不是太傻,就是太天真。
Tsai Ing-wen of the elephant off into the refrigerator

April 17, 2015 China Times



There is a joke Riddles, "How close to the elephant in the fridge?" The answer is four steps, first open the refrigerator door; the second is to find an elephant; the third is the elephant in the fridge; four are in the fridge Door locked up. Although it is a joke, but used the metaphor thrown Tsai "maintaining the status quo, said," there might be a marvelous place.



If we take the dispute between the two sides, as a possible cross-strait peace elephant trampled how shelve disputes and seek win-win situation, the elephant put into the refrigerator, no doubt those in power on both sides of the primary, but the DPP long-faire elephants stampeding undermine cross-strait relations. Tsai now thrown "status quo", indeed opened the refrigerator door, but this is only the first step in putting aside disputes and questions on both sides of the chain there are three functions: defining the elephant, the elephant in the refrigerator, the refrigerator door shut up This three power than a hard one.



With the 2016 election approaching, Tsai Ing-wen cross-strait policy will become increasingly blurred space is small, the internal face of the Taiwan Democratic Progressive Voices include questioning itself, including the United States concerned, "the United States and Taiwan" tripartite concept CCP cold pressure. Tsai latest declaration: "maintaining the status quo on both sides of the DPP handling cross-strait relations are the basic principles" rather than in the last empty statements, indeed relatively specific, constructive, is an improvement. However, long-term instability in the DPP cross-strait policy, the United States and Taiwan DPP independence and internal party program is still full of doubts, Tsai Ing-wen of the declaration can only be said to be slightly moist soil dry cracked earth, not enough to dry the solution.



To play a substantial utility, the second step, you must define the elephant Tsai, clear "status quo" What is? May 2004 when he was chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council said Tsai Ing-wen, "Taiwan-US tripartite" maintain cognitive status quo "is there is a gap, the gap for cognitive status quo, is whether we need to make the definition of the status quo." Phrase sharply revealed the key words, if the parties still flow to each side of the "status quo", the dispute will not stop, can not resolve the doubts Taichung Tsai Mei parties, then opened the refrigerator door did not mean to open.



The definition of the status quo, there are benchmarks of success can participate, is "no unification, no independence, no use of force." Ma Ying-jeou of the three no, although not perfect, there is lack of enthusiasm for the KMT needed Chu era of cross-strait relations may not be enough to deal with, but in the past eight years, there is no doubt the most uncompromising of the greatest common divisor of Taiwan, but also the United States You can accept the mainland may not be the greatest silence opposition. On literally, "no unification, no independence will not use force," no unification and no use of force will not oppose Tsai, The only solution is "not only" pro-independence even though Tsai burdened with the pressure, but "not only" can be achieved through the definition of space such reference Hung Chi-chang proposal to "not only" is defined as "not pursue de jure Taiwan independence", and so, at least to establish Tsai and Ma complete equalization of "three noes" literally, it can in order to continue, "Ma Ying-jeou has been established status quo definition. "



Even in essence, both cognitive three not particularly substantive meaning "not only" still differences, but old wine in new bottles three no, at least have the courage to show Tsai taken for cross-strait peace pace, the blue camp can only agree US optimistic, Continental nothing to say. Tsai only to face the dark green pro-independence rally, but she can still get the green camp moderates such as Hung Chi-chang and other Austrian aid, not in isolation, even if it is not the overall yield of the shoulders, how to make people believe her leadership Taiwan, which has the ability to maintain the "status quo of cross-strait relations and steady development"? If you really can not say Tsai, we must responsibly tell you that she's maintaining the status quo with Ma's "no unification, no independence, no use of force," the difference between what?



Once identified, the elephant, the elephant moved into third step refrigerator, complete shelve controversial. Tsai Ing-wen should define the post "status quo" documented and incorporated into political campaigns, and even the DPP's platform. And this, not only in form, must also be in action, that is, to show the general pattern followed by Tsai prospective rulers, prompting DPP legislator to cooperate with the KMT, DPP obstruct let be shelved The "cross-strait agreements oversight regulations" as soon as possible, such as the bill is passed, almost stalled cross-strait negotiations can continue, will not continue to make Taiwan into a spin crisis.



The final step is to put the refrigerator door, so the idea of ​​freezing the status quo fixed, so the two sides can shelve disputes continued long maintained. This also means that, Tsai want to Lin Yi-hsiung, Chen, Huang Guochang, Lin Feifan different pro-independence generation, etc., whether or speculative ideal pro-independence mass pro-independence issue is not kidnapping, clear message not to go back, and this is meaningful, long way in the "status quo."



Fourth step off the elephant, the easiest step is to open the refrigerator door, but second and third step and the fourth step is the key. Of course, Tsai Ing-wen, the next steps the more the more difficult, but it is a challenge to deal with the problem of leadership Tsai. We would like to see Tsai dished "to maintain the status quo," but if you think that the refrigerator door is opened, the elephant will automatically into the refrigerator, it is not too stupid or too naive.

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

Hillary Will Not Change Cross-Strait Strategic Picture

Hillary Will Not Change Cross-Strait Strategic Picture
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 16, 2015


Executive Summary: No matter who becomes US president, Taiwan will no longer be able to rely on the United States to contain the Mainland. If anything, the Mainland may work with the US to deal with what they consider a peripheral issue. Taiwan's security and prosperity must not be overly dependent on the United States. In the end, we must find our own way.

Full Text Below:

As everyone expected, Hilary Clinton has finally announced her candidacy in the 2016 presidential race. Hillary has the necessary qualifications and financial backing, and may become the first female president in the history of the United States. But she also faces many difficult challenges. Her campaign may not be an easy one.

Hillary's candidacy is unique in the history of the United States. As first lady, she played the role of the good wife. But Hillary has extraordinary intellect. She is well versed in law and politics. She has an edge that she cannot hide and has no desire to hide. When her husband Bill Clinton was in the White House, she was an important advisor.  She promoted a health care reform bill. She knows how the two parties operate. After Bill Clinton stepped down, she began going her own way. In 2000, she was elected Senator from New York. She performed well. Six years later, she won reelection by an even larger margin.

Hillary had high hopes during the 2008 US presidential election. But she stumbled badly. During the Democratic Party primaries, she lost to African American Senator Barack Obama from Illinois. Following the election, Obama appointed her Secretary of State. As a result, she wrote a new page in history, as a First Lady with a second spring.

Hillary was diligent in her handling of international affairs. As Secretary of State, she flew nearly one million miles, visited 112 countries, and spent over 400 days on airplanes -- the most of any Secretary of State in the history of the United States. She often negotiated directly with the leaders of other nations. She has a full grasp of international affairs.

Today Hillary Clinton is making another run under more favorable conditions. She has however, encountered new difficulties. She appears to have no rivals within her own party. She will probably win the party nomination without much resistance. She also learned a lesson from past experience. The last time she emphasized herself: "I want to win." As a result, Obama won grassroots support and rode into the White House on an Internet whirlwind. This time she is taking a different approach. Her campaign ads are portraying her as a champion of the common man. She is now saying that "Americans have fought their way back from tough economic times. But the deck is still stacked in favor of those at the top. Everyday Americans need a champion, and I want to be that champion."

But Hillary's portfolio and financial resources clearly belong to someone at the top of the pyramid. They far exceed those of most of her opponents. The Clintons are fundraising experts. Since its inception in 2001, the Clinton Foundation has raised nearly 2 billion USD. It has plenty of cash with which to campaign.

Alas, Hillary's strengths are also her weaknesses, The Clinton Foundation has accepted contributions from foreign governments, subjecting it to much criticism. She and her husband Bill Clinton taking turns in the White House rubs many voters the wrong way. Does the United States really have no other candidates? Why are elections dominated by the Clinton and Bush political dynasties?

Hillary has a established a record in international diplomacy. But she is also haunted by ghosts. On September 11, 2012, the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, was attacked. The US Ambassador was killed. The Republican Party severely criticized Hillary and the State Department for negligence and dereliction. More recently, emailgate erupted. Apparently, during her four year term as Secretary of State, she never used an official State Department email address. Instead, she used her personal email account to deal with official matters. This provoked intense controversy. It may even violate the Federal Records Act. She received more than 60,000 emails as Secretary of State. Over 30,000 were private messages. All of these have been deleted. The remaining 30,000 messages have been forwarded to State Department officials.

Hillary Clinton said she did this out of convenience, and that doing so was not illegal. Were the messages deleted official in nature? The public has no way of knowing. Did they cover up the Benghazi incident? That too is impossible to know. A candidate for high office, a senior official with a wealth of political experience, dealt with problems in such a slapdash manner. No wonder the Republicans are in hot pursuit. This scandal probably has legs, and will probably have an adverse impact on Hillary's campaign.

But given the two parties' candidates, Hillary has a good chance of winning. If elected, she can at least can a running start on foreign affairs. She has addressed China policy and cross-Strait relations in the past. She has praised Taiwan's democracy. But she has also noted that the "one China policy" lies at the heart of US policy toward Taiwan and the Mainland. She hopes that Taiwan and the Mainland can get along, and that the ROC's sovereignty will not be threatened or destroyed.

In 2011 when she met with Mainland State Councilor Yang Jiechi, she said maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait was consistent with the strategic interests of the United States. She said the United States would like to see more cross-Strait interaction, to ensure trust and increase confidence.

In fact, US cross-Strait policy is influenced by the international environment. This, by nature ensure consistency. For example, the US wants to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait. It does not want trouble. It is less and less capable of suppressing the rise of China. It faces changes in the Asian Pacific strategic picture, but has no countermoves.  That is why it was unable to block membership in the AIIB. No matter who becomes US president, Taiwan will no longer be able to rely on the United States to contain the Mainland. If anything, the Mainland may work with the US to deal with what they consider a peripheral issue. Taiwan's security and prosperity must not be overly dependent on the United States. In the end, we must find our own way.

社論-不必期望希拉蕊改變兩岸格局
2015年04月16日 04:10 主筆室

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希拉蕊.柯林頓宣布角逐2016美國總統大選。(美聯社)
希拉蕊.柯林頓宣布角逐2016美國總統大選。(美聯社)

一如各方很久以來的預期,希拉蕊.柯林頓終於宣布角逐2016美國總統大選。就條件、資歷、財力等方面來說,希拉蕊確實有相當高的機率,能夠成為美國史上首位女總統,不過她也面對著諸多艱難挑戰,這場選戰未必好打。

希拉蕊參選,在美國史上真是特例,過去第一夫人扮演的都是溫柔賢內助的角色,但希拉蕊才智過人,法政學養俱佳,鋒芒藏不住,她也不想藏。隨著丈夫柯林頓入主白宮後,她一直是老公的重要策士,還曾力推健保改革法案,也因此熟悉府會兩黨運作。在柯林頓卸任後,她開始走自己的政治路,2000年贏得紐約州聯邦參議員選舉,問政表現沉穩亮眼,6年後更高票連任。

自視甚高的希拉蕊在2008年參與美國總統大選,卻跌了一大跤,民主黨內初選時,敗給來自伊利諾州的非裔參議員歐巴馬。歐巴馬當選後祭出奇招,邀請她出任國務卿,她因此又寫下第一夫人職場第二春的新歷史紀錄。

希拉蕊勤勉從公,為了斡旋國際事務,在國務卿任內總計飛行近百萬哩,造訪過112個國家,有超過400天是在飛機上度過,是美國史上出訪次數最多的國務卿,更曾直接與多國領袖懇談協商,對國際政治有充分的了解與掌握。

如今希拉蕊再度出馬,比上次增加了些有利條件,但也遭遇新的難關。目前看來,她在黨內應無對手,取得提名大概沒有問題。而且她也記取教訓,上次她的訴求是強調自我的「我要贏」,結果不敵歐巴馬從基層與網路掀起的旋風,這次她在宣布參選的影片中改走庶民路線,營造她和小老百姓站在一起的印象,她的訴求是:「美國民眾從艱難的經濟奮戰中走來,但仍是那些金字塔頂端的人占上風,民眾需要有人能為他們發聲,而我想成為那個鬥士」。

不過論希拉蕊的經歷和財力,都絕對屬於占上風的金字塔頂端,也遠遠超過大部分的競選對手。柯林頓夫婦一直是募款高手,柯林頓基金會自從2001年成立以來,已募得近20億美元,打起選戰來自然銀彈充沛。

不過希拉蕊強項之處,往往也藏著她的弱點,柯林頓基金會接受外國政府捐款,便受到不少批評。她和丈夫柯林頓輪流入主白宮,也有選民不以為然,覺得莫非美國沒人了,怎麼選舉就只見柯林頓和布希這兩大政治家族把持?

希拉蕊在國際外交雖有成績,但也有不少陰影。2012年9月11日美國在利比亞的班加西領事館遇襲,美駐利大使罹難,共和黨嚴厲批評希拉蕊及國務院輕忽警訊又因應不力。最近更爆發「電郵門」事件,原來她在擔任國務卿4年期間,並未開設國務院公務用的電子郵件信箱,全以私人電郵帳號處理公務,引發強烈爭議,甚至可能違反《聯邦檔案法》(Federal Records Act)。總計她在國務卿任內收到6萬多封郵件,其中3萬多是私人郵件,已經全刪,其餘3萬多公務電郵則轉交給國務院。

希拉蕊自稱她「貪圖方便,但絕無不法」,不過被刪掉的郵件到底有無涉及公務已無從追查,是否有掩蓋班加西事件因應失職則更不可考。一個有志大位、又有豐富政治經驗的高層官員,竟然行事如此鬆散輕怠,難怪被共和黨窮追猛打。這件事恐怕會一直延燒到選舉期間,對希拉蕊將有不利衝擊。

不過放眼美國兩黨諸多戰將,希拉蕊還是有相當贏面,如果她當選總統,至少對外交事務能夠立即上手。過去她曾多次談到中國政策與兩岸關係,除了肯定台灣的民主之外,也指出美國的「一個中國」政策核心是,希望中國大陸與台灣和平相處,不希望看到台灣的獨立自主性被威脅或破壞。

2011年她與中國大陸國務委員楊潔篪會面時指出,維繫台海和平穩定符合美國戰略利益,美國樂見兩岸保持更多的互動、互信與建立自信。

其實美國的兩岸政策在國際情勢的大環境下,先天有其一貫性,例如希望維持台海和平對話,不出亂子不惹麻煩,但又受制於愈來愈無法壓制的中國崛起,在亞太面臨新的變局,卻尚未有新的對策,因此才有對亞投行的阻攔無功。不管誰當美國總統,台灣在兩岸互動中能利用美國牽制中國的槓桿效應,恐怕會愈來愈少,反而可能在美中互動主軸中落於決策邊緣位置。台灣的安全與生機,不能再過於依賴美國,終究必須要自己找到出路。

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

Three Strategies for the Nomination of the KMT Presidential Candidate

Three Strategies for the Nomination of the KMT Presidential Candidate
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 15, 2015


Executive Summary: The KMT has announced how it will nominate its presidential candidate. But whom will the party nominate? That remains a mystery. Based on polls, whomever the KMT runs will trail Tsai Ing-wen. This is one reason for the delay. The 2016 election will be a combined presidential and legislative election. The KMT must go for broke. Otherwise it may even lose its legislative majority. For the blue camp, the situation is dire. It has no room for optimism or foolhardiness.

Full Text Below:

The KMT has announced how it will nominate its presidential candidate. But whom will the party nominate? That remains a mystery. Based on polls, whomever the KMT runs will trail Tsai Ing-wen. This is one reason for the delay. The 2016 election will be a combined presidential and legislative election. The KMT must go for broke. Otherwise it may even lose its legislative majority. For the blue camp, the situation is dire. It has no room for optimism or foolhardiness.

Party morale is low. The only candidate who has openly declared her candidacy is Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Yuan Hung Hsiu-chu. Other potential candidates, including Eric Chu, Wang Jin-pyng, and Wu Den-yih, remain tight-lipped. A sense of crisis is brewing within the party, leading to all manner of trickery and calculation. Ruling party changes are the norm in a democracy. The KMT is currently the ruling party. Yet its defense of the regime and its continued rule are so feeble, comrades are demoralized and supporters are desolate.

Recall the past six presidential elections. KMT or pan blue candidates never lost at the starting line. Now however, the situation is critical and different from the past. To be fair, public support for the blue camp and green camp is roughly equal. In fact, the blue camp may even have an edge. As long as the blue camp nominates the right candidate, listens to the public, and works toward the same goal, an election upset is possible. The real danger is that party insiders may do each other in before the battle even begins. If that happens, all hope of victory is lost.

To win this election, the KMT's best strategy is to regroup pan blue supporters, and lure back former party members. creating an atmosphere of pan blue unity. This is especially true for the legislative elections. In several districts, pan blue cross-party integration is essential. Private sector professionals with clean images should also be added to their ranks. This will attract swing voters who prefer a third force. The blue camp should create a "dream team" that crosses traditional party lines. If it can do so, internally and externally, it can create a synergy that could lead to a whole new political scenario.

Pan blue integration is easier said than done. The how of integration is a problem. Establishing mutual trust between political parties and political groups is not easy. Most importantly, the "Big Blue" KMT must demonstrate magnanimity. Only then can it persuade the "Little Blue" People First Party and New Party to work together. This means that the KMT party leadership must be willing to see the big picture. It means someone must engage in tireless shuttle diplomacy. If politicians care only for their own sectarian interests, pan blue integration will be impossible.

If pan blue integration proves too difficult, the KMT's second best strategy would be to send in its heaviest hitter. Traditionally KMT nominations involve first allowing willing candidates to step forward, then holding party negotiations or a party primary. But if the KMT wants to nominate its heaviest hitter, the nomination process should be bottom-up. The candidate could be Eric Chu, Wang Jin-pyng, even Wu Den-yi, Hung Hsiu-chu, or Hong-Yuan Lee, as long as he or she has the right stuff. The party should conduct an island-wide or hybrid poll, allowing the public to decide who should step up to the plate. Once this process has produced a winner, the candidate should not hesitate. He or she should do battle on behalf of the KMT.

The key to this process is shattering prevailing stereotypes about the nomination process. The heavy hitter must see the party nomination as a call to duty, not just the acquisition of power. After all, the KMT government is already under siege. Anyone who makes other, purely selfish calculations, will only find himself going down with the party. Such people need to think again.

The worst strategy would be for the KMT to cling to its traditional "announce, register, negotiate, hold primary" process for presidential candidate nomination. If the KMT chooses to go down this road, it should skip the negotiation process. If two or more candidates have registered, a party primary should be held. One. This will eliminate negotiations that lead to sore losers. Two. The party primaries will help generate candidate and party political momentum.

The candidate chosen by the party primary process need not be the party's heaviest hitter. But he or she must be willing. He or she must have won public support. He or she must be the candidate with the most legitimacy. In retrospect, KMT presidential candidates have always been vetted by the party. They have either been "designated successors", or the product of negotiations. If a party primary can produce a candidate, it will establish a precedent for intraparty democracy.

If the KMT hopes to win the presidential election, the road ahead will be a long one. Meanwhile, the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen must fight for her "final mile". Campaigning is never easy. Past KMT defeats were almost always the result of internal divisions and blunders, rather than their opponent's actions. The same error, repeated, amounts to stupidity. Offer up your best candidate. Show that they know how to solve problems. Do this and the blue camp has a chance to make a comeback.

國民黨總統人選的上中下三策

2015-04-15聯合報

     

國民黨公布了總統候選人提名辦法,但黨內由誰出戰二○一六迄今仍無眉目。綜觀目前各項民調,國民黨無論由誰出馬,都與民進黨的蔡英文尚有一段差距,人選遲遲未定正是主要原因之一。由於二○一六是總統與立委併選,若不全力以赴,國民黨可能連國會多數黨的地位都要拱手讓人。對藍營而言,情勢之嚴峻,絲毫沒有樂觀或徼幸的餘地。



在黨內低迷的氣氛中,目前明確表態願意一戰的,只有立法院副院長洪秀柱;其餘可能的人選,如朱立倫、王金平、吳敦義,都表現得諱莫如深。如此一來,更加深了黨內的危機感,包括各種權謀、算計運作不斷。雖說政黨輪替是民主政治的常態,但國民黨身為執政黨,對於保衛政權、延續執政如此消極,不僅讓同志感到失望,也讓支持者無所適從。



回顧過去六次總統直選,國民黨或泛藍候選人的民調從未一開始就輸在起跑點上;可知,這次形勢之危殆異於已往。但平心而論,藍綠基本盤其實相差無幾,甚至泛藍要略勝一籌,只要藍軍提名「對的人」,又能集思廣益採取對的戰略,大家齊心一搏,未必沒有逆轉勝的可能。最怕的是,選戰還沒開打,黨內自己人就先明槍暗箭殺得死去活來;若走到那步田地,就不必再奢想勝算。



要打贏這場選戰,國民黨的「上策」,就是要設法重新整合「泛藍基本盤」,找回離家出走的黨員,營造泛藍大團結氣象。尤其在立委選舉方面,若干地區除了進行泛藍的跨黨整合,甚至可以結合一些形象清新的民間專業人士共同出征;如此,亦有利吸引可能投向第三勢力的中間選民。若能整合出一個跳脫傳統黨派思維的「夢幻組合」,對內對外都可發揮「一加一大於二」的效果,創造出不同局面。



「泛藍整合」說來容易,做來困難;整合機制如何產生是個問題,各政黨、政團間如何取得互信又是個問題。最重要的是,「大藍」國民黨必須展現大器和大義,才能說服「小藍」親民黨和新黨的攜手合作。這點,除了需要黨中央的宏觀思考,也需要有人不辭辛勞居間穿梭。否則,政治人物若各懷鬼胎營一己私利,泛藍整合將無可能。



若泛藍難以整合,國民黨的「中策」至少應該是派出「最強棒」應戰。傳統上,國民黨提名的思維是:可能人選先有「意願」,然後再用「協調」或「初選」方式產生候選人。但若要推出「最強棒」,提名程序應該「由下而上」,朱立倫也好,王金平也罷,甚至吳敦義、洪秀柱或李鴻源,只要是可戰之才,黨內就應採全民調或混合式民調,由人民決定誰代表出征。一旦在此機制勝出,此人選就應義無反顧,代表國民黨決戰。



這個機制的關鍵,首需打破現有提名機制的窠臼,其次是黨內的強棒們必須視代表黨參選為一種「義務」,而不只是權利。畢竟,國民黨已面臨政權保衛戰,若此時還想著其他後路或別的私念,最後只會與黨俱沉。這種人必須慎思!



如果國民黨決定仍以傳統的「表態、登記、協調、初選」程序來產生總統候選人,那麼「下策」就是跳過「協調」程序,只要有兩人以上登記參選,便進行初選。如此,一來可以杜絕協調可能產生的「不服氣」心理,二來也可藉由初選的過程拉抬候選人的和政黨的氣勢。



經由黨內初選程序選出的人選,未必就是「最強棒」;但既有主動代表國民黨參選的意願,又在競爭中獲得民意的支持,應就是黨內最具參選正當性之人。回顧過去,國民黨的總統候選人總是透過「指定接班人」或「協調」產生,此次若能經黨內初選產生,也算開創黨的民主典範。



國民黨要贏得總統大選,路途仍遙;反觀民進黨,蔡英文也仍在為她的「最後一哩」奮鬥。選舉從來不是容易的事,過去國民黨敗選,原因幾乎都出在自己內部分裂、犯錯,而不是對手做對了什麼。同樣的錯誤,若再重蹈,就是愚蠢。提出最好的人選,證明自己最有解決問題的能力,藍軍才有反敗為勝的機會。