Eric Chu's Gamble: To Run or Not to Run

Eric Chu's Gamble: To Run or Not to Run
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2015

Executive Summary: The KMT presidential nomination process is what the theatrical world refers to as a “turkey”. The countdown has begun. This weekend, the 16th, is the deadline for primary registration. It is also the day KMT Chairman Eric Chu promised to lay out his plans for the future. In theory, the KMT presidential candidates will be announced today. So far it appears that Eric Chu and Wang Jin-pyng will be the leading men, while Hung Hsiu-chu and Yang Chi-liang will play supporting roles. . Each of them will have their own role to play.

Full Text Below:

The KMT presidential nomination process is what the theatrical world refers to as a “turkey”. The countdown has begun. This weekend, the 16th, is the deadline for primary registration. It is also the day KMT Chairman Eric Chu promised to lay out his plans for the future. In theory, the KMT presidential candidates will be announced today. So far it appears that Eric Chu and Wang Jin-pyng will be the leading men, while Hung Hsiu-chu and Yang Chi-liang will play supporting roles. . Each of them will have their own role to play.

First take Hung Hsiu-chu. Many blue camp leaders are pretentious, insecure, and indecisive. Hung Hsiu-chu by contrast, is resolute and forceful. Her recent performance warrants a "Best Supporting Actor" nomination. Hung Hsiu-chu's candidacy is generally interpreted as "making a statement". She wants to rebuild KMT morale. More importantly, she wants to use her candidacy to underscore the Kuomintang's policy path. The media has also interpreted her candidacy as a way to pressure the party princes to throw their hat in the ring.

Hung Hsiu-chu was a New KMT Alliance member. She is a high-profile “non-mainstream” member. Her political colors are deep blue. It is believed that after the KMT's historic debacle in the nine in one elections, Hung Hsiu-chu intended to run for party chairman, in order to save the party from extinction. When Eric Chu chose to run for party chairman, those close to Hung encouraged her to enter the KMT presidential primaries. They hoped Hung Hsiu-chu's unambiguous political colors, made even brighter during the campaign, would promote debate within the KMT, forcing the KMT to clarify its policy path. Hung Hsiu-chu's nickname is "little hot pepper". Her candidacy would draw attention to key issues and challenge Tsai Ing-wen.

Recently Hung swore to “campaign to the bitter end". Her candidacy has indeed begun to rally deep blue support. But party members are still gathering signatures. Hung's criticisms have largely been directed at the party leadership and the rules of the game. Hung Hsiu-chu's campaign to promote the Kuomintang has not met with much success. Hung Hsiu-chu's political colors may have difficulty attracting swing voters and younger voters. This is Hung's shortcoming.

Another candidate, Yang Chi-liang, has been rather disappointing. When Yang Chi-liang began his campaign, he had much to say. He was right to blast the KMT's money and power games. But Yang Chi-liang failed to seize the opportunity to stand for office. His courageous and resolute demands for fairness and justice did encourage public debate and public attention.

In its early days, right after its founding, the KMT had a left-wing bias. But ever since, it has been a center-right political party. Now that Eric Chu is party chairman, he has vowed to pay attention to social justice and distributive justice, and correct the evils of capitalism and the market economy. So far these have remained at the declaration stage. Except for a wage increase bill, little has been done, and little has been discussed.

If on the matter of reunification vs. independence, Hung Hsiu-chu represents the KMT right-wing, then on the matter of socio-economic policy, Yang Chi-liang

represents the KMT left-wing. Hung and Yang, one right, one left, are perfectly positioned to drive debate within the KMT, to broaden the spectrum of the KMT, give it greater diversity, character, and color.

Eric Chu has repeatedly stated that he will not run. Wang Jin-pyng's moves have since attracted attention. They will definitely affect the KMT nomination. If Wang Jin-pyng eventually decides not to run, the KMT's presidential nomination will likely be an historic first. It will be one without any front runner. It that happens, the party may be forced to draft Eric Chu.

Wang Jin-pyng has long been a political representative of the so-called "nativist blues". He knows how to schmooze and has far-ranging contacts. But Wang's political colors are unclear. He has long maintained his distance from cross-Strait affairs. His cross-Strait policy remains unknown. On the other hand, he has repeatedly opposed the de-Sinicization of the name of the Chinese Kuomintang. He has long maintained links with deep blue elements. But last year, when he and Ma Ying-jeou clashed, he did not hesitate to play the provincial affiliation card and nativist card.

Wang Jin-pyng has long handled political matters in a thorough and prudent manner. If he eventually he decides to run, he must make clear his policy path and let the voters get to know him. In particular, Wang Jin-pyng must not evade matters of cross-Strait relations, legislative reform, and money politics. These are matters about which people have long harbored doubts about him.

On April 20, the China Times published one of three articles on how love of Taiwan must be rooted in reason, and why Eric Chu is the one who can best stabilize cross-Strait relations. He is the one who can turn things around for the KMT. He merely needs to decide.

If he sticks to this guns, and refuses to enter the 2016 presidential election, he would be taking a huge gamble. The risk would be no less than choosing to run now. As “chief coach”, Chairman Eric Chu must demonstrate ambition and energy. The KMT presidential primary must become a political movement in which the Kuomintang rises from the ashes, reborn. The KMT must create a platform and plan a campaign. Both party stalwarts and ordinary voters must focus on the KMT primaries, participate in the debate, and discuss the Kuomintang policy path and Kuomintang party reform. .

社論－選或不選 都是朱立倫的豪賭
2015年05月12日 04:10 主筆室

歹戲拖棚的國民黨總統提名大戲，進入倒數的關鍵時 刻，本周末（16日）就是初選領表並進行連署的最後一天，也是朱立倫主席先前宣布要向社會說明他的規畫的日子。理論上，哪些人參加國民黨總統初選，這一天 就會明朗。目前看來，這場提名大戲有朱立倫、王金平兩位主角和洪秀柱、楊志良兩名配角，各自扮演不同角色、發揮不同作用。

首先來談洪秀 柱。相對於許多藍營領袖人物的矯揉造作，或是左顧右盼、瞻前顧後，洪秀柱的參選倒是明快果敢，近日以來的表現，確實也有「最佳配角」的架式。洪秀柱的參 選，一般的解讀是「志在參加」，目的在於活絡國民黨的整體氛圍，同時，更重要的是要藉參選來闡述她所主張的國民黨路線，也曾有媒體解讀她的參選是為了逼黨 內天王出馬。

洪秀柱過去是新國民黨連線成員，非主流色彩比較鮮明，政治光譜偏於深藍。據了解，九合一大選國民黨空前敗選之後，洪秀柱原本 就有參選黨主席之意，希望救黨圖存，朱立倫參選黨主席之後，親近洪秀柱的人士轉而鼓勵她投入總統初選，希望藉著洪秀柱比較鮮明的政治色彩，透過參選，促進 國民黨內部的辯論，澄清國民黨的路線。當然，以洪秀柱「小辣椒」的封號，她的參選，也有發動議題、挑戰蔡英文的重要功能。

近日以來，洪的 口風轉為「參選到底」，她的參選確實也讓部分深藍支持者開始集結。不過，或許是因為還在黨員連署階段，洪的發言多是集中在炮打黨中央遊戲規則之上，在洪秀 柱參選的初衷─促進國民黨大鳴大放方面，並未見多少成效。另一方面，以洪的政治光譜，也比較難吸引中間選民和年輕族群的目光與支持，這是洪的先天劣勢。

另一位參選者楊志良的表現，就相對令人失望。楊志良參選之初，確實話題性十足，他批評國民黨的金權遊戲規則也有一定道理。不過，楊志良顯然未能把握參選的契機，勇敢而堅定地拋出他向來關注的「公平正義」的課題，捲動更多論辯，和更多社會力的參與。

我們都知道，雖然國民黨創黨初期，曾有一段偏向左翼的歷史淵源，但是長期以來都是偏右翼的政黨，朱立倫擔任黨主席之後，宣稱要重視「公平正義」、「分配正義」課題，要矯治資本主義與市場經濟的弊害，不過迄今多停留在宣示階段，除了加薪法案之外，實際作為有限，更缺乏討論。

如果說，洪秀柱是國民黨統獨立場的右翼代表人物，楊志良本可扮演國民黨內社經立場左翼代表人物，洪楊兩人，一左一右，恰恰好可以既帶動國民黨內論辯，又拉大國民黨的左右光譜，讓國民黨出現比較多元、豐富的政治性格與色彩。

在朱立倫反覆表示絕不參選的情況下，王金平的動向確實動見觀瞻，也將大大決定國民黨的提名人選。如果王金平最後決定棄選，國民黨的總統提名將極可能史無前例成為一場沒有主將的大選，這將逼迫黨內做出決斷，是否決意徵召朱立倫參選。

王 金平長期以來是所謂「本土藍」的政治代表，政通人和，人脈廣結，但是王的政治面貌並不清晰，他本人始終和兩岸事務保持距離，兩岸政策主張不明，另一方面， 他多次反對中國國民黨在黨名上「去中國化」，以維持和深藍群眾的紐帶，然而，當年他與馬英九抗衡時，「省籍牌」、「本土牌」始終是他的一門利器。

如果向來處事穩健周到、政治布局嚴密謹慎的王金平拍板決定參選，確實有必要徹底談清楚路線主張，讓國人真正了解認識王金平，王金平尤其不應迴避兩岸關係、國會改革和金權政治等相關課題，畢竟這是王金平長期受人疑慮的焦點所在。

《中國時報》在4月20日真道理性真愛台灣系列社論三之一就認為朱立倫最能力穩定台海，只要他做出決斷，是最有機會讓國民黨逆轉勝的一個。

但 如果他真的貫徹初衷，堅持不投入2016總統大選，這將是朱立倫政治生命的另一場豪賭，其風險絕不下於親自參選。自居總教練的朱立倫主席，必須展現最大的 政治企圖與能量，讓國民黨的總統初選真正成為一場國民黨浴火重生的政治運動，透過議題的設定和選舉的規畫，讓更多支持者和一般選民將目光集中在國民黨的初 選上，參與到國民黨的政治路線辯論與黨務改革辯論中來。

Tsai Ing-wen Must Explain Why She Opposes the 1992 Consensus

Tsai Ing-wen Must Explain Why She Opposes the 1992 Consensus
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 9, 2015

Executive Summary: The logic of the 1992 consensus is actually quite simple. If one advocates Taiwan independence, then one opposes the 1992 Consensus. It one opposes Taiwan independence, then one supports the 1992 consensus. The 1992 consensus has become a label. This has enabled Tsai Ing-wen to bob and weave. Why not drop the 1992 consensus label altogether and just ask Tsai Ing-wen directly: Why are you opposed to one China, difference interpretations. Why do you champion Taiwan independence? Surely she owes the next generation a reason why or why not.

Full Text Below:

In 2012, Tsai Ing-wen refused to recognize the 1992 consensus and lost the election. This newspaper predicted back then that the battle in 2016 would still be over the 1992 consensus. Our prediction has now proven correct.

Over the past three years, Tsai Ing-wen has consistently opposed the 1992 consensus. But she has never fully explained the reasons why. One. In 2013, she declared there is no such thing as a "1992 consensus". Two. This year, she no longer denied its existence, but she dismissed the 1992 consensus as nothing more than a “label”. Three. She now claims the 1992 consensus is merely a "KMT/CCP consensus". In fact, the 1992 consensus has become a trilateral Taipei/Washington/Beijing consensus. In fact, even if were only a "KMT/CCP consensus" she would have no reason to object. After all, Tsai Ing-wen has already said she "unconditionally accepts" ECFA. Why hasn't she denounced that as a "KMT/CCP consensus"? In short, rather than bobbing and weaving, shouldn't Tsai Ing-wen explain why she opposes the 1992 Consensus?

Tsai Ing-wen said the 1992 consensus is merely a “label” and a KMT/CCP consensus. But she has never explained what she thinks the 1992 consensus contains and what exactly she thinks it means. She refuses to say what the 1992 consensus is, and why she is opposed to it. Yet she persists in waving an anti-1992 consensus banner while running for Republic of China president. Is this not the height of absurdity?

We should first clarify what the 1992 consensus is. In 1991 and early 1992, the SEF and ARATS clashed over the one China principle. When President Lee convened the National Unification Council. On August 1, 2003 he published his “Concerning the Meaning of One China”. Namely, "Both sides adhere to the One China Principle, but the two sides interpret it differently”. Later, in late October, the SEF proposed further talks in Hong Kong. The two associations verbally agreed over the one China principle. Our side openly endorsed the August 1 resolution on the one-China principle. We said "We think one China means the Republic of China established in 1912". ARATS did not comment on the August 1 resolution. But on November 16, it referred to the SEF's "verbal declaration of support for the one China principle with different interpretations". It replied officially, indicating "I fully respect and accept your proposal", and said that negotiations over transactional matters do not involve any “one China” political implications. Following this agreement, the two associations quickly arranged for Koo-Wang talks in Singapore in February 1993, to break the ice. As a result, so-called "one China, different interpretations" or "different interpretations of one China" commonly became known as "one China, different interpretations". When Eric Chu discussed the 1992 consensus during the Chu/Xi meeting, he stuck to this framework.

In 2005, after Lien Chan met with Hu Jingtao, the two sides used the term 1992 consensus. Beijing stressed the one China framework. The Kuomintang and the Ma government stressed one China, different interpretations. Next, the Ma government interpreted the 1992 consensus under the framework of the ROC Constitution, as "no reunification (within his term), no Taiwan independence, and no use of force". He too adhered to the one China definition and one China, different interpretations. These were contained within the August 1 resolution, the 1992 consensus, and the Republic of China's one China Constitution. At first Beijing emphasized only the one China framework. But with changes in the cross-Strait situation, it began linking the 1992 consensus to opposition to Taiwan independence. Obviously this was directed at the DPP. The Ma government meanwhile, bases its conduct on the ROC Constitution and the August 1 resolution. It upholds its “no Taiwan independence” declaration.

As we can see, the 1992 consensus underwent three stages of development. One. During the Lee Teng-hui era, SEF talks led by the National Unification Council, established the content of one China, different interpretations. Two. One China, different interpretations is based on the ROC Constitution. Three. In accordance with the one China constitution, the Republic of China rulers oppose Taiwan independence. These are the implications of the 1992 Consensus.

To summarize, the 1992 consensus makes two key points. One. One China, different interpretations. Two. Opposition to Taiwan independence. If Tsai Ing-wen supports one China, different interpretations, she has no reason to oppose the 1992 consensus. If Tsai Ing-wen does not advocate Taiwan independence, she has no reason to oppose the 1992 consensus. People wonder how Tsai Ing-wen can demand Taiwan independence while defending the status quo. Oddly enough, Tsai Ing-wen has never explicitly advocated Taiwan independence. Not has she explicitly opposed a constitutionally-based one China. Tsai Ing-wen is afraid to say she advocates Taiwan independence,. She is also afraid to say she opposes Taiwan independence. The contradictions and confusions therein are the reason she cannot bring herself to say why she opposes the 1992 consensus.

So far, Tsai Ing-wen has said little about her cross-strait policy. She has openly announced only two principles. One. She opposes the 1992 consensus. Two. She hopes to maintain the cross-Strait status quo. But she refuses to say what the status quo is. Everyone argues over the 1992 consensus. But all they argue over is strawmen erected by Tsai Ing-wen. She evades the serious implications of the 1992 consensus: one China, different interpretations, and opposition to Taiwan independence. That is why she avoids saying why she opposes a constitutionally based one China and supports Taiwan independence.

The logic of the 1992 consensus is actually quite simple. If one advocates Taiwan independence, then one opposes the 1992 Consensus. It one opposes Taiwan independence, then one supports the 1992 consensus. The 1992 consensus has become a label. This has enabled Tsai Ing-wen to bob and weave. Why not drop the 1992 consensus label altogether and just ask Tsai Ing-wen directly: Why are you opposed to one China, difference interpretations. Why do you champion Taiwan independence? Surely she owes the next generation a reason why or why not.

蔡英文應明確交代反對九二共識的理由
2015-05-09 聯合報

二○一二年，蔡英文因否定「九二共識」而輸掉大選，本報當時即預言，二○一六大選的決戰議題仍將是「九二共識」。如今此說已可確立。

三年多來，蔡英文始終反對九二共識，但從未明白交代過她反對的理由。一、二○一二年，她說，根本沒有「九二共識」。二、今年，她不再否認，卻說九二共識只是「標籤」。三、接著，她又說，九二共識只是「國共共識」。且不說九二共識如今不啻已成「台／美／中」三邊共識，即便只是「國共共識」，如果正確，似亦無反對的理由，蔡英文也曾「概括承受」過ＥＣＦＡ，怎不說那是「國共共識」？總之，左閃右躲，蔡英文迄今未交代她反對九二共識的理由何在？

其實，蔡英文除了說九二共識是標籤及國共共識外，也從未交代過她所認知的九二共識究竟是何內容？她不說九二共識是什麼，又不說反對九二共識是何理由，竟要打著「反對九二共識」的旗號競選中華民國總統，豈不荒唐加恐怖？

且先弄清「九二共識」究為何物。一九九一年及九二年前期，海基、海協兩會因「一個中國原則」觸礁。李登輝總統召集國統會，於九二年八月一日公布我方所主張的《關於「一個中國」的涵義》指出：「海峽兩岸均堅持『一個中國』之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵義有所不同。」後來，海基會在十月下旬的香港會談中進一步主張，「兩會各自以口頭聲明方式表述一個中國原則」，且言明我方是以「八一決議」表述一中原則，即「我方認為『一個中國』應指一九一二年成立至今之中華民國」。對此，海協會未就「八一決議」作出評論，但在十一月十六日對海基會所提「以口頭聲明方式各自表述一個中國原則」，正式回函表示「我會充分尊重並接受貴會的建議」，並謂事務性協商不涉「一個中國」的政治意涵。經此協議，兩會迅速安排一九九三年二月的新加坡辜汪破冰會談。此即所謂「一個中國／各自表述」或「各自表述／一個中國」，亦即通稱的「一中各表」。朱立倫此次在朱習會中對九二共識的論述，並未脫軼這個範疇。

二○○五年連胡會後，兩岸在使用「九二共識」一詞時，北京強調「一中框架」，國民黨及馬政府則強調「一中各表」。接下來，馬政府將九二共識演繹為，在中華民國憲法架構下的「不統（任內不談判統一）／不獨／不武」，也未超出「八一決議」所指的「一中定義」及「一中各表」，且將九二共識與中華民國的「一中憲法」作了連結。北京方面，剛開始僅強框架」，但隨著兩岸情勢變遷，遂將「九二共識」與「反對台獨」連結，這當然是針對民進黨而來。馬政府則基於中華民國憲法及「八一決議」的規範，維持「不獨」的宣示。

由此可知，九二共識的原型及發展有三大內容：一、在李登輝政府時代，由海基會談判，國統會主導，確立了「一中各表」的內容。二、「一中各表」係以中華民國憲法為依據。三、根據一中憲法，中華民國執政者反對台獨，此為九二共識當然的引申之義。

綜上所述，九二共識有兩大要點。一、一中各表；二、反對台獨。如果蔡英文支持「一中各表」，她就沒有反對「九二共識」的理由；如果蔡英文不主張台獨，她也沒有反對「九二共識」的理由。但奇怪的是，當各方質疑蔡英文若堅持台獨如何還能「維持現狀」時，蔡英文卻從未表示過她主張台獨，也從未表示過她反對憲法一中。蔡英文不敢說主張台獨，也不敢說反對台獨，此中的矛盾與錯亂，正是她說不出「反對九二共識」理由何在的原因。

迄至當下，蔡英文對於她的兩岸政策，只公開宣示了兩大原則：一、反對九二共識。二、維持兩岸現狀。但她沒說什麼是「現狀」，也不說九二共識是什麼？大家為九二共識吵來吵去，卻吵的都是被蔡英文淘空內容的稻草人。她遮蓋了「九二共識」在「一中各表」及「反對台獨」上的嚴肅意義，因此也迴避了回答她為何反對憲法一中及支持台獨的理由。

九二共識的道理其實十分簡單。主張台獨，就反對九二共識；反對台獨，就支持九二共識。九二共識的標籤化，使蔡英文有了閃避與操作的空間，因此何妨放下「九二共識」四字的標籤，直接問蔡英文：妳為何反對一中各表，及為何主張台獨？這總該給國人交代一個理由吧。

3/18 Local Weather Conditions vs. AIIB Macro Level Climate Change

3/18 Local Weather Conditions vs. AIIB Macro Level Climate Change
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 8, 2015

Executive Summary: The AIIB or Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as the name suggests, is a bank that “invests in Asia”. But this March, many European countries apparently "invested in Asia" or “defected to Asia”. This "investment in Asia/defection to Asia", reflects a shift in global power and investment destinations. It also shows that the current atmosphere of opposition to the Mainland and hatred of the Mainland on Taiwan is both wrong and ill-timed.

Full Text Below:

The AIIB or Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as the name suggests, is a bank that “invests in Asia”. But this March, many European countries apparently "invested in Asia" or “defected to Asia”. This "investment in Asia/defection to Asia", reflects a shift in global power and investment destinations. It also shows that the current atmosphere of opposition to the Mainland and hatred of the Mainland on Taiwan is both wrong and ill-timed.

This "investment in Asia" phenomenon and last year's 3/18 student movement form a dichotomy. The two events are separated by only one year. But they represent two distinctly different political visions and two distinctly different political movements. They are akin to a left-right dialogue. The 3/18 student movement calls for opposition to Mainland China and apartheid across the Taiwan Strait. The AIIB, on the other hand, shows the West arriving en masse, clearly indifferent to their Sinophobia.

The 3/18 student movement subverted the political environment and political language on Taiwan. It silenced and immobilized certain political elements. For example, Su Tseng-chang was forced to eliminate himself from the ranks of the presidential nominees. It gave Tsai Ing-wen a burst of political momentum. The 2016 presidential nomination became hers for the taking. The blue camp, on the other hand, found itself beleaguered. The one person who should have gone into battle hung back. In fact, from a global perspective, the 3/18 student movement was merely a local weather condition confined to Taiwan. Its radius was limited to Taiwan, only a few hundred miles. By contrast, the AIIB represents a global current that except for North America, has swept five continents.

The 3/18 student movement was a violent reaction to the “rise of China". Unfortunately, instead of acknowledging it and analyzing it, the movement adopted a negative, closed-minded perspective. As a result, its frame of reference was flimsy and incoherent. It perceived Mainland China as a newly awakened sleeping lion, and the US as a unipolar global hegemon who could tame the beast. The 3/18 student movement concluded that United States backing was ambiguous. Therefore preemptive measures could keep the Mainland relegated forever to the other side of the Strait.

Yet the British “defected to Asia” in March. This revealed the truth. US global power has shrunk. A quiet East Asian empire dormant for a century, has reappeared on the world stage. Not just China, but also India, have grand ambitions. The AIIB reveals the student movement's wishful thinking about the global situation.

The 3/18 student movement was not entirely without contributions. It called for new civic values ​​and new generational ideals. Unfortunately for Taiwan's future, uninformed youths assumed they had all the answers. In fact, the "defected to Asia" phenomenon shows that the US-centric global power structure is disintegrating. It also shows that unipolar power cannot fulfill the pipe dreams of the Sunflower Student movement.

Western scholars have long predicted a new world power spectrum. One year ago, US and UK scholars in international relations Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow published “Goodbye Hegemony: Power and Influence in the Global System”. They predicted that Europe would set the global rules and norms, that China would stabilize the global economy, and the United States would provide military security. The world would no longer be dominated by the United States on all global issues.

Among these, the prediction that "China would stabilize the global economy" was confirmed by the "invest in Asia" phenomenon: The US is no longer the engine of the world economy. For years, multi-national autonomous division of labor viewed US consumers as its final destination. But earned foreign exchange purchased US bonds, enabling the US to consume beyond its means. This played a major role in the global financial tsunami. Now, urgently needed Asian infrastructure investment has begun to attract the attention of other countries. They see it as a source for lost momentum in the new global economy.

This trend makes the Japanese extremely anxious. As a staunch US ally, Japan has yet to join the AIIB. I has instead accelerated TPP negotiations with the United States. But Abe has repeatedly asked to meet with Xi Jinping. The two met finally in Jakarta, and held the longest meeting between them since the two took office. Abe announced that Japan too would consider joining the AIIB.

The 3/18 student movement spewed anti-Mainland venom. It was truly incomprehensible. If the students think opposition to the Mainland is the answer, they are spouting nonsense. What is needed is cross-Strait economic and trade relations that break the monopoly held by a minority of business and political groups. A new role must be found for Taiwan within Mainland China's changing global position. If Taiwan resists the Mainland, it will be marginalized the world over. Tsai Ing-wen thinks she received a shot in the arm from the student movement. In fact holding such a view forfeits the principle of leadership, whereby a leader leads the masses. She bobs and weaves while reassuring us that she wants to "maintain the cross-Strait status quo". In fact she knows the situation has changed, but she remains trapped within the old framework.

The 3/18 local weather condition may be enough to put Tsai Ing-wen on the throne. But the AIIB macro level climate will make it impossible for Tsai Ing-wen to govern. The key to the AIIB remains the 1992 consensus. The 1992 consensus is the elephant in the room. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP cannot pretend it does not exist. We on Taiwan must distinguish between local weather conditions and macro level climate change, and choose accordingly. Historic opportunities always arrive silently. Tsai Ing-wen and Taiwan society must engage in humble self-introspection.

三一八小氣旋vs.亞投行大氣候

2015-05-08聯合報

亞投行依其名稱旨趣，是「投資亞洲」的銀行，但三月歐洲諸國倒戈，卻彷彿一齣「投奔亞洲」的劇碼。這場演出或可名之為「投亞事件」，它不只反映了全球權力格局及投資重心的遷移變化，也映照了台灣現下的「反中」、「仇中」氛圍的突兀與失時。

「投亞事件」與去年的「三一八學運」形成相互詰問的情狀。兩者相隔恰恰一年，卻是兩種截然不同的政治想像，亦是兩種政治形勢的擺盪與撞擊，更像一次左右對話：「三一八學運」吹起反中號角，企圖在海峽兩岸割開更深的阻隔；「亞投行」卻描繪西方諸強歡欣奔來，反中似乎大昧於形勢。

「三一八學運」顛覆了台灣內部的政治生態與語彙，逼使各路人馬噤聲止步。例如，蘇貞昌不得不黯然退出總統爭雄行列，它拱出了蔡英文超高聲勢，二○一六於她幾如探囊取物；藍營則是風雨如晦，應披掛上陣的卻躑躅再三。事實上，放在全球的格局上看，「三一八學運」不過是台灣內部的小氣旋，其暴風半徑僅及台灣方圓數百里；相形之下，「亞投行」卻是全球性的風潮，除了北美，席捲了五個大陸。

三一八的導火線，是對「中國崛起」的一次劇烈反應；遺憾的是，它選擇從否定、閉鎖的角度出發，而不是選擇剖析和面對。在這種情況下，它的思考框架顯得單薄與脫節：即認為中國只是一隻剛甦醒的睡獅，而美國的單極全球霸權足以馴服這頭野獸。亦即，它以為可在美國若即若離的撐腰下，只要及早構置法規障礙，即可將中國大陸永遠摒於海峽彼岸。

然而，英國三月在亞投行「脫美奔中」的演出，宣告了世界權力版圖已經變遷的現實，東方沉寂逾百年的古老帝國已以新的面貌崛興於世，不只是中國，印度亦雄心勃勃。如果說，「投亞事件」是對「三一八學運」全球形勢認知偏差的一次匡正，並不為過。

三一八並非全無貢獻，它呼喚出若干新的公民價值和新世代理想；然而，對於台灣未來的歸趨，它卻以年輕氣盛強作解人。事實上，「投亞事件」折射了以美國為中心的全球權力構圖正在崩解，同時也宣告單極權力圖像已無力支撐太陽花一廂情願的政治想像。

西方學者早已預測了新的世界權力光譜，一年多前美英國際關係學者雷奇與勒博合著的《再見霸權：全球系統裡的權力與影響》一書，即預言地球將以「歐洲主導全球制度規範」、「中國穩定全球經濟」、與「美國提供軍事安全保障」的三大支柱體系前行，不再由美國主宰所有全球性事務。

其中，「中國穩定全球經濟」的預言，正可透過「投亞事件」顯示：美國不再是驅動世界經濟的引擎，多年以來透過多國自主分工，以美國市場為產品最終消費去處，但所賺取的外匯卻又購買美國債券，讓美國持續消費的模式，在金融海嘯中禍殃全球的問題不輕。此際，亞洲亟待部署的基礎建設開始受到各國的注目，認為可以供輸全球新的經濟動力。

這個趨勢，也讓日本極度焦慮。作為美國堅定的安全同盟，日本雖未加入投亞行列，甚至加快步履與美國展開ＴＰＰ談判，但安倍晉三不斷求見習近平，終於在雅加達舉行了兩人上任後最長的一次會面，而安倍也宣示將思考加入亞投行。

三一八學運所噴發的反中、仇中情緒，確實不難理解；然而，若以為「反」就是解答，卻大謬不然。真正要做的，是重新梳理兩岸經貿關係，破除少數政商集團壟斷兩岸交流利益，並設法找到台灣在中國全球戰略位置變化中的新角色和利基，台灣才不會因抗拒面對中國而遭到世界邊緣化。汲取了學運能量的蔡英文，在此其實完全缺乏領先群眾的觀點，她躲躲閃閃地宣稱要「維持兩岸現狀」，其實是認知上察覺外在形勢已變，但行動上卻跳不出舊有框架。

三一八的小氣旋，或許足以將蔡英文推上寶座，但亞投行的大氣候，卻勢必讓蔡英文的治理難以為繼。打開亞投行的鑰匙，仍在「九二共識」；「九二共識」依然站在蔡英文與民進黨的前方，讓他們無從迴避。而台灣，也必須辨明小氣旋與大氣候的區別，並作出抉擇。歷史的機遇總是靜默而來，蔡英文與台灣社會都須謙卑地向內心探問。

Can Tsai Ing-wen Prove that the DPP is not Anti-Business?

Can Tsai Ing-wen Prove that the DPP is not Anti-Business?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 7, 2015

Executive Summary: DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen is the DPP nominee for the 2016 presidential election. When Tsai met with the National Federation of Industries she solemnly declared, "The DPP will not be anti-business." The media immediate decided this was a major news item. This is strange indeed. Why must a presidential candidate in a democracy solemnly declare that she is "not anti-business"? Why would the media perceive this as newsworthy? Is this not a classic case of “Methinks thou dost protest too much”?

Full Text Below:

DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen is the DPP nominee for the 2016 presidential election. When Tsai met with the National Federation of Industries she solemnly declared, "The DPP will not be anti-business." The media immediate decided this was a major news item. This is strange indeed. Why must a presidential candidate in a democracy solemnly declare that she is "not anti-business"? Why would the media perceive this as newsworthy? Is this not a classic case of “Methinks thou dost protest too much”?

We do not question Tsai Ing-wen's "not anti-business" stance. Business and economic development is Taiwan's lifeblood. The people's livelihood depends on it. It is their hope for the future. Tsai Ing-wen majored in trade law. She cannot be unaware of this. Alas, knowing is not the same as doing. Tsai Ing-wen panders to anti-nuclear groups. She panders to opponents of thermal power. When she wants to discredit BOT projects, she denounces it as government business collusion. When she meets with business groups however, she tries to curry favor with the business community. But can her word be trusted? If Tsai Ing-wen wants to prove that the DPP is not anti-business, she must do at least four things.

First. If Tsai Ing-wen is not anti-business, she must lead the fight against a different Tsai Ing-wen, a leading inciter of anti-business sentiment. During the 2012 presidential election, entrepreneurs criticized Tsai for not accepting the 1992 consensus. They expressed concern that hostile cross-Strait relations would harm Taiwan's economic development. Tsai immediately lashed back. She demanded to know, "Are the interests of conglomerates the same as the interests of most people?" Tsai Ing-wen is the chairperson of the largest opposition party on Taiwan. She is also a presidential candidate. Yet she divided Taiwan into two hostile camps, "conglomerates" and "people". Over the next three years, Taiwan society experienced a gradual rise in anti-business sentiment.

Second. Tsai Ing-wen still refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus. Not recognizing the 1992 consensus will make maintaining the status quo and peaceful cross-Strait development difficult. The loss of peaceful cross-strait development will deliver an intolerable blow to Taiwan's economy. When visiting the National Federation of Industries, Tsai told industry and commerce elders that “The cross-Strait card is not a panacea for Taiwan's ills. The KMT government spends far too much time on cross-Strait issues. We must put the focus back on internal economic problems and social concerns."

When Tsai Ing-wen insists she is "not anti-business", that is the greatest irony of all. She is attempting to divide cross-Strait relations and economics into two independent and unrelated categories. This is a serious mistake. Cross-Strait relations and the economy are hardly unrelated. They go hand in glove. If cross-Strait relations are good, Taiwan's economy will not necessarily be good. But if cross-Strait relations are bad, Taiwan's economy will surely be bad. Can Tsai Ing-wen tell us how she intends to maintain peaceful cross-Strait exchanges while refusing to recognize the 1992 Consensus? If not, it makes no difference whether Tsai Ing-wen is anti-business. Once Tsai Ing-wen is in power, she will probably create an anti-business environment.

Third. Even if cross-Strait relations and economics could be divided into two independent systems, Tsai Ing-wen has other anti-business demons to purge. The Democratic Progressive Party, under Tsai Ing-wen's leadership, betrays an anti-business proclivity and scant regard for economic development. It does this from the legislature at the central level, to counties and municipalities at the local level. 

For example, electrical power is the key to economic development, Without a stable supply of electricity, all talk of economic development is hollow. At the national level, the DPP forced the government to halt construction on the Number 4 Nuclear Power Plan. It opposes continued operation of the Number 1, 2, and 3 Nuclear Power Plants. It is bent on ending nuclear power generation. If nuclear power generation is unacceptable, what about thermal power? The DPP rules six central Taiwan counties and municipalities. Under the strong leadership of Taichung and Yunlin, it is determined to prohibit the burning of bituminous coal and petroleum coke. The affected Taichung power plant accounts for 16.5% of the island's total electricity generation. The Yunlin LINMARK thermal plant accounts for 5.3%. This will shake the foundations of the country. What about "green power"? Last month, the Penghu Wind Energy Company in DPP ruled Penghu went belly up even before it could go into operation. Green power is not easy to come by.

The DPP is anti-nuclear and anti-thermal. Green energy, meanwhile, is not available. As Liang Chi-yuan, Chairman of the Chung Hua Economic Studies Institute put it, the DPP “wants the electricity but it doesn't want the plant”. This sort of energy policy offers only blind opposition, but no constructive solutions. How can the DPP convince people that the DPP is "not anti-business"?

Fourth. The question before us is not merely whether Tsai Ing-wen is personally anti-business. Even if she is not anti-business, how can a non anti-business party chairman lead an anti-business party? This is Tsai's bigger problem. Ever since the National Federation of Industries raised concerns,  Tsai Ing-wen's only reply has been, "We guarantee we will be the most communicative government in history", and that  "once we are in power, we will increase consultation and discussion with business". Such vague answers are no answers at all. Tsai Ing-wen's assurance that she is "not anti-business" and real life practice remain poles apart.

The election campaign is heating up. The political parties and candidates' campaign promises must now be subjected to opponent challenges and voter scrutiny. Do Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP want to prove they are not anti-business? If so, they need to do more than talk.

蔡英文能證明民進黨不反商嗎？
2015年05月07日 中國時報

獲民進黨提名競選2016總統大位的蔡英文主席，在拜會全國工業總會時，鄭重宣示「民進黨絕不反商」，立刻獲得媒體青睞成為重要新聞。弔詭的是，一個民主國家的民主政黨，總統候選人為什麼必須鄭重宣示「不反商」，還被媒體當成重要「新聞」？這不是「此地無銀三百兩」，什麼才是？

不必懷疑蔡英文「絕不反商」的出發點，因為商業與經濟發展是台灣的命脈，是人民生計所賴的根本，更是未來希望之所寄，這一點主攻經貿法的蔡英文不會不知道。問題在於「知道」不等於「做到」，蔡英文要討好反核團體、要討好反火力發電勢力、要抹黑BOT就是官商勾結，在會見工商團體時又想討好工商界，但一句話就能取信他人嗎？蔡英文要證明民進黨不反商，至少有四大功課。

第一，不反商的蔡英文，必須面對帶頭製造反商情結的蔡英文。2012年總統大選，多位企業家站出來表達對蔡英文不接受九二共識的憂心，認為不利兩岸關係，也將傷害台灣的經濟發展。蔡英文立刻反擊，質問發聲的企業家：「財團利益和多數人民一樣嗎？」蔡英文以最大在野黨主席與總統候選人的身分，率先將台灣社會一刀劃分出「財團」與「人民」的對立階級，揭開了接下來3年，台灣社會逐步升高的反商情緒。

第二，蔡英文至今不承認「九二共識」，不承認九二共識就難以維持兩岸和平發展現狀，失去了兩岸和平發展的機會，台灣的經濟不可能不受衝擊。拜訪工總時，蔡英文面對工商大老的質疑，回答是：「『兩岸牌』不能完全解決台灣的問題，國民黨政府真的花太多時間在兩岸牌上面，還是要把重心放回大家關切的內部經濟問題與社會問題。」

蔡英文這段話正是「不反商論」的最大悖論。她企圖把兩岸與經濟切成二個互不關聯的獨立存在，犯了嚴重的邏輯錯誤，因為兩岸與經濟絕非無關，而是相互牽連的關係，兩岸好，台灣經濟不一定好，兩岸壞，台灣經濟一定不會好。因此，如果蔡英文沒有辦法提出否定九二共識下，如何維繫兩岸和平交往的具體方法，不管蔡英文內心是不是反商，蔡英文一旦執政，很可能就會導引出「反商」的現實後果。

第三，就算把兩岸與經濟切成二個獨立系統，蔡英文還有另一個「反商課題」必須面對，那就是在蔡英文領導下的民進黨，從國會到執政縣市，讓大家看到的就是一系列不顧經濟發展的反商作為。

舉例來說，電力供應是經濟發展的動力開關，沒有穩定的電力供應，經濟發展即為空談。在全國層次，民進黨逼停了核四、反對核一核二核三延役，鐵了心要終結核能發電。核電不行，發展火力嗎？民進黨執政的中部六縣市，在台中、雲林的強勢帶領下，要聯合推動禁用生煤與石油焦，受到衝擊的台中火力發電廠，占全國發電的16.5%、雲林麥寮電廠則達5.3%，將動搖國本。「綠電」呢？上個月，民進黨執政的澎湖縣下的澎湖風能公司尚未營運就吹熄燈號，也預告了綠電的艱難。

反核電、反火力，綠電受挫，民進黨呈現的「能源圖譜」幾乎可用中華經濟研究院董事長梁啟源的名言「要電不要廠」來形容。這種對能源政策只能一味反對，卻提不出建設方案的態度，如何說服國人民進黨「不反商」？

第四，擺在眼前的問題，不只是蔡英文個人反不反商的問題，即便她不反商，她要面對的是「一個不反商的黨主席如何領導一個反商的黨」？這才是蔡英文更大的難題。這個難題，從工總提出的憂心八問，蔡英文的回答只是「保證作有史以來最會溝通的政府」、「執政後將加強與企業的諮詢與討論」這類虛無縹緲、有答等於沒答的空洞回應。蔡英文的「不反商」宣示，離實踐恐怕還有一段漫漫長路要走。

選戰慢慢進入深水區，各政黨及候選人要開始面對自己的從政軌跡，一言一行都要接受對手的質疑與選民的檢驗，蔡英文要證明民進黨不反商，不能只憑一張嘴。

Can “Think a Bit” be the Basis of Governance?

Can “Think a Bit” be the Basis of Governance?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 6, 2015

Executive Summary: Election day is a long way off. If Tsai Ing-wen seeks greater support, or even retain her lead, she and the DPP must “show us the beef”. Only then can they avoid writing rubber checks and leaving broken promises. Otherwise, even if they successfully negotiate the final mile towards the presidential palace, the result will only be more conflict and stagnation.

Full Text Below:

The KMT anticipates an internal power struggle. Tsai Ing-wen meanwhile, is sitting pretty, eagerly looking forward to winning the presidency in 2016. She is the uncontested candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party. She is also a veteran from four years ago. As such, Tsai Ing-wen should be offering voters more policy “beef” to convince them she would do a better job. But so far Tsai Ing-wen has been a major disappointment. She still merits the “kong xin cai” or "content free Tsai" epithet.

Political observers refer to Tsai Ing-wen as “content free Tsai”. Recently, they coined a term for her public policy. They facetiously refer to it as "xiang xiang liu", or “Think a bit”. Tsai Ing-wen's Thinking Taiwan Foundation has a webpage called "Thinking Taiwan", where both insiders and outsiders “think a bit” about political and social issues. Many articles comment on the status of Taiwan. But none offer comprehensive analyses, concrete programs. or effective solutions. They are mocked as "think a bit" because these discussions are full of empty rhetoric and pipe dreams with no connection to reality. They raise objections, but offer no solutions. They are of no help whatsoever to Tsai Ing-wen in the event she comes to power.

Tsai Ing-wen's political views are often the product of such "think a bit” musings. The most obvious example is the "50 Billion Kilowatt Hours Increase in Green Energy in Ten Years”, proposed in conjunction with green camp leaders. The policy sounds good, but it lacks direction and path. The DPP has long advocated environmental protection. It is a vocal advocate of a non-nuclear homeland. Singing the praises of the green ideal is easy. But people are reacting negatively to windmills. Solar power and biomass fuels are still under development. How can she possibly fulfill her promise of 50 billion kilowatt hours of green energy? Meanwhile the DPP is anti-nuclear, anti-coal, and opposed to electricity rate hikes. As everyone knows, the power shortage on Taiwan is critical. Imports of natural gas are prohibitively costly. Yet the DPP boasts of "30 billion kilowatt hours of energy-savings”? How does the DPP intend to provide 50 billion kilowatt hours of green energy? How does it intend to save 30 billion kilowatt hours of energy?

The "cross-Strait agreement oversight regulations" bill is a vivid example. The DPP obstructed the bill for nearly a year. Now that she may become president however, Tsai Ing-wen appears ready to call a truce. Now she says she will "fully support" the oversight regulations bill. The catch is that Tsai Ing-wen wants the DPP version of oversight regulations, the DPP "two states theory” version that simply will not fly. The outcome is obvious. The Legislative Yuan controversy persists in stops and starts. The bill will be shelved.

Even more classic is Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy. She refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus, yet claims she is "trying to maintain the status quo". But what is the status quo? She cannot or will not explain. How then can anyone believe she will "try to maintain the status quo?" What “status quo”? Consider the "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank". Is Tsai Ing-wen firmly opposed to Taiwan's membership? Or is she merely worried that the nation will be demeaned? The answer remains murky. In fact, she is deliberately singing a different tune than the ruling party. If the Ma government gains entry into the AIIB, and Tsai Ing-wen becomes president, she will sit back and enjoy the results.

Consider the voluntary military. This was promoted by the Chen government. Now that the Ma government is experiencing problems, DPP legislators are demanding military conscription. They are blasting the voluntary military as “unplanned". Tsai Ing-wen now boasts that "If the DPP returns to power, it will reexamine the issue within ten months", and find a balance between a the voluntary military and military conscription. The implication is “Just wait until I'm in office." The same is true of the six directly administered municipalities. Tsai Ing-wen blasted the creation of the six directly administered municipalities as "politically motivated" and unplanned. As to what would constitute “planned”, she bobs and weaves, saying only that "If the DPP returns to power, it will reexamine the matter.” Everything must wait until they are in power.

During the last election, Tsai Ing-wen was lampooned as "content free Tsai", because she was all talk and no substance. Who knew that four years later, her policy prescriptions would remain at the "think a bit" level? They remain content free – a dangerous thing. As matters stand, Tsai Ing-wen is on her final mile to the presidency. But what are her qualifications? Subjectively speaking, she has ambition. But objectively speaking, she is no better qualified than she was four years ago. If anything, she flip-flops even more. Therefore in the event she attains the highest office in the land, public disillusionment could turn out to be even greater. That is indeed worrisome.

Election day is a long way off. If Tsai Ing-wen seeks greater support, or to even retain her lead, she and the DPP must “show us the beef”. Only then can they avoid writing rubber checks and leaving broken promises. Otherwise, even if they successfully negotiate the final mile towards the presidential palace, the result will only be more conflict and stagnation.

「想想流」豈能當執政基石？

2015-05-06聯合報

當國民黨內戰將仍在觀望不前，蔡英文已好整以暇，準備攻取二○一六總統大位。做為民進黨唯一的候選者，又是四年前曾參選的老手，蔡英文理應拿出更多的政策牛肉說服民眾，說自己如果執政將如何做得更好；遺憾的是，到目前為止蔡英文的表現令人失望，她仍無法擺脫「空心蔡」之譏。

除了「空心蔡」的稱號，外界對於蔡英文陣營的公共政策論述，最近多了一個新的形容詞，叫做「想想流」。起因是，蔡英文的「小英教育基金會」底下有個網站叫《想想論壇》，由黨內外人士投稿，對不同的政治及社會現象都來「想想」一下。然而，許多文章雖對台灣現狀有所針砭，卻缺乏完整或宏大的分析與論述，更未提出具體有效的解答方案。之所以被譏為「想想流」，就是認為這些論述多屬於清談或空想，卻缺乏現實上的解決對策；只有問題，沒有答案，無助蔡英文日後可能的執政。

檢視蔡英文的政見，不時可見這類「想想流」之作品。最明顯的例子是，最近蔡英文聯合各綠營執政首長提出了「十年增加五百億度綠能」的主張，政策看似洋洋灑灑，卻徒有目標，而沒有路徑。民進黨一向支持環保，又大力主張廢核，高唱綠能的理想當然不難明瞭；問題是，正當各地民眾對風車的反彈很強，太陽能發電和生質燃料幾乎還在起步，五百億度綠能的大話要如何完成？再說，民進黨一面反核，一面反煤，同時又反對電力調漲；殊不知，眼看著台灣的電力供應已到了可能短缺的臨界點，而進口天然氣極為昂貴，民進黨卻還誇口要「節電三百億度」；請問，民進黨要如何提供五百億度綠能？又要在哪裡省下三百億度？

再看《兩岸協議監督條例》的立法，也是個鮮活的例子。民進黨抵制《監督條例》已近一年，如今眼看執政有望，蔡英文似擬放下屠刀，宣稱要「全力推動」監督條例的立法。但玄機在於，蔡英文心中想要的監督條例，其實是民進黨「兩國論版」的「兩岸談不成協議條例」；其結局可想而知，立法院吵來吵去，一再卡關，最後只能束諸高閣。

更經典，是蔡英文的兩岸政策。她拒絕承認九二共識，卻聲稱要「盡力維持現狀」；但究竟「現狀」為何，她都無法解說清楚，或拒絕回答，人民要如何相信她想「盡力維持」的是什麼狀態？再談「亞投行」問題，蔡英文究竟是堅決反對台灣加入，或者只是憂心我國的名稱與待遇遭到矮化，至今混沌不明；她的態度，其實只是從四面八方唱執政黨的反調罷了。不難想像，馬政府推動台灣加入亞投行後，若適逢政黨輪替，蔡英文也會臉不紅、氣不喘地坐享其成吧！

再看「募兵制」，這是扁政府任內所推動，而今馬政府推動上遇到波折，民進黨立委馬上又跳回要「徵兵制」的主張，批評募兵制「沒有完整規劃」。蔡英文則稱，「假如民進黨執政，十個月內再重新檢討」，希望找到募兵制和徵兵制的平衡點。言下之意，就是「等我上台再說」。對六都的看法也是如此，蔡英文批評六都是「政治考量」，缺乏完整思考；至於何謂完整思考，她亦支吾其詞，只說「如果民進黨執政，會重新檢討」。一切都是等執政再說。

上次大選，蔡英文被稱為「空心蔡」，就是因為她長於高談闊論，卻缺乏具體內容。不料四年過後，她的許多政策仍停留在「想想流」，沒有解決「空心」的問題，這是一件危險的事。原因是，以目前的政治情勢，蔡英文距離總統大位已經不足一哩之遙；但她的一切條件，除了主觀上渴望執政的企圖更強，客觀上當一名稱職元首的準備，卻沒有比四年前更充分而圓熟，甚至反覆擺盪的成分更大。也正因如此，她個人攻頂的滿足，會不會帶來民眾期待的更大落空，確實讓人憂慮。

距離投票還有很長的一段時間，若要爭取更多支持，甚至穩住自己的領先優勢，蔡英文和民進黨都必須在政策上有更多的著墨，才能避免不斷開出空頭支票，留下一堆難以實現的承諾。否則，就算成功走完「執政的最後一哩路」，帶來的恐怕也只是更多爭議與空轉。

Chu/Xi Meeting: No Way Around the Republic of China

Chu/Xi Meeting: No Way Around the Republic of China
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 5, 2015

Executive Summary: The current Chu/Xi meeting is mainly a KMT/CCP exchange. But it establishes a tripartisan KMT/CCP/DPP interactive framework for 2016. The DPP has yet to participate. But this will also affect its future role.

Full Text Below:

The current Chu/Xi meeting is mainly a KMT/CCP exchange. But it establishes a tripartisan KMT/CCP/DPP interactive framework for 2016. The DPP has yet to participate. But this will also affect its future role.

This meeting underscores three main points. One. It affirms the 1992 consensus, and opposition to Taiwan independence as the shared premise for cross-Strait relations. Two. Under the premise of "expanding Taiwan's international space", Beijing is willing to find ways for Taiwan to participate in the RCEP, AIIB, and One Belt, One Road. This is an extension of the KMT's "from China to the world" policy. Three. The KMT and CCP have emphasized social equity and justice for the next generation as sound reasons for cross-Strait exchanges, and appropriate responses to internal objections.

Three synergies may ensue. One. Cross-Strait policy remains stalled at the level of the 1992 consensus. This may affect the immediate situation. But failure to go beyond the 1992 Consensus could lead to regret. Two. Regional economic co-operation as a bargaining chip significantly increases pressure on the DPP. Will the DPP reform its cross-Strait policy in the event it returns to power? That remains to be seen. Therefore the damage it suffers could be serious.

First consider the impact of the meeting on the DPP. The DPP can find little to criticize in the KMT/CCP meeting. The most Tsai Ing-wen could say was that "Cross-Strait relations must not be a KMT/CCP monopoly." Ironically, this is the biggest danger for the DPP.

In 2005, under the 1992 consensus, the Lien/Hu meeting established a cross-strait policy framework. That could be characterized as the KMT and CCP monopolizing cross-Strait relations. But since 2008, the Ma government has been in power. Based on the 1992 consensus, it has signed 21 cross-strait agreements. These represent national policy. They cannot be characterized as monopolization of cross-Strait relations by the KMT and CCP. Besides, the 1992 consensus is nothing less than a Taipei/Washington/Beijing consensus.

Between 2005 and 2008, the DPP forfeited responsibility. The political climate on Taiwan and cross-Strait relations objectives, were indeed the result of the monopolization of cross-Strait relations by the KMT and CCP. Eventually, in 2008, the DPP government's failures in cross-Strait policy forced it to step down. Therefore, Tsai Ing-wen's charges of KMT/CCP monopolization of cross-Strait relations are meaningless. So-called monopolization of cross-Strait policy by the KMT and CCP was consistent with the currents of history. It eventually became national policy. If Tsai Ing-wen returns to power, she cannot repeal the 21 agreements signed by the KMT and CCP.

Tsai Ing-wen, beware! If your party returns to power, do not repeat the Chen regime's cross-strait policy failures, which forced the KMT and the CCP to hold a Lien/Hu meeting and take charge of cross-Strait policy. Zhang Zhijun said "KMT/CCP forums must continue, they must be both more frequent and better". The implication was that if the mountain would not come to Mohammed, then Mohammed would go to the mountain. If the DPP refuses to reform its cross-Strait policy, but instead denounces cross-Strait relations as a KMT/CCP monopoly, then the CCP will have to wait until the DPP steps down. If that happens, the damage inflicted upon Taiwan will be unimaginable.

Eric Chu has asked why there is no relationship between the DPP and the CCP. If the DPP insists that there is no relationship between the DPP and CCP, then it is behaving like an ostrich with its head in the sand. Even if it returns to power, it must still deal with cross-Strait policy formulated by the KMT and CCP. This newspaper has repeatedly warned the DPP about winning the election campaign only to lose the policy path.

Consider the bottlenecks encountered during the current meeting, and how to break through them. Chu and Xi openly referred to the 1992 consensus. Eric Chu told Xi Jinping, to his face, that the 1992 consensus means that "The two sides of the Strait both belong to one China, but the content and definition differ”. He did not use the expression “one China, different interpretations”. This was the first time a KMT Chairman made such a statement in front of a CCP General Secretary. Eric Chu did not use the term "one China, different interpretations" out of restraint. But for him to make such a statement, face to face, may be regarded as a breakthrough.

One China, different interpretations is a solution to the problem of the Republic of China's status under “one China". In fact, for the past twenty years or so, Beijing has hoped that Taiwan would defend the ROC and the ROC Constitution. Unfortunately Beijing has been too restrictive about the "one China" definition, and too cavalier about de-legitimizing the Republic of China. It even argued that the "Republic of China has already been destroyed." This self-contradictory policy on cross-Strait relations has made any breakthrough on cross-Strait relations difficult.

The two sides must realize that if the “Republic of China” loses its foothold on Taiwan, "China" is even less likely to gain a foothold on Taiwan. Eric Chu referred to "one China different interpretations” in front of Xi Jinping. This proved that both sides know the Republic of China cannot be bypassed. Transcending the 1992 consensus however, is something we can look forward to. Also, if one China, different interpretations stands, the pressure on the DPP will be increased.

Xi Jinping said "all political parties on both sides of the Strait" must deal with issues pertaining to cross-Strait relations. He was clearly addressing the DPP. Ten years ago, during the Lien/Hu meeting, the two sides shared a vision, and made the Lien/Hu meeting a glorious event. Ten years later, the Chu/Xi meeting has arrived at a point of uncertainty. By contrast, it appears simple, low-keyed, even boring. But if it helps people realize there is no getting around the "Republic of China," then the two parties' efforts may yet yield fruit. If the DPP persists in believing that "There is no relationship between the DPP and the CCP", then even if it returns to power, cross-Strait relations will be DOA.

朱習會的瓶頸與突破：中華民國是繞不過去的

2015-05-05 01:25:48 聯合報      

此次以朱習會為主體的國共交流，大致確立了二○一六年「國／共／民」三黨的互動架構；民進黨雖未參與此會，但其未來角色亦將受此會制約。

此會呈現三項主要觀點：一、確立「九二共識／反對台獨」為兩岸共同政治基礎。二、在「擴大台灣國際空間」的提法下，對台灣參與RCEP、亞投行及一帶一路，北京方面表示「可探尋合作方式」，這可視為國民黨「由中國走向世界」政策的延伸。三、共同強調，為下一代建立公平正義社會，以加強兩岸交流的合理正當性，並各自向內部喊話。

這三個觀點所可能發生的主要綜效是：一、兩岸政策仍停留在「九二共識」的層次，或可影響眼前的情勢，但因未能超越九二共識，誠屬缺憾。二、以「區域經濟合作」為籌碼，大幅墊高了對於民進黨的壓力，倘若民進黨重返執政而不知轉型，其所受損傷將更慘重。

先論此會對民進黨的影響。民進黨對此次國共交流內容似乎找不到可以攻擊的題材，主要批評只見蔡英文說「兩岸關係不能國共化」，這卻正是民進黨最嚴重的危機所在。

二○○五年，連胡會在「九二共識」上建立的兩岸政策架構，可以稱為「國共化」；但至二○○八年馬政府主政，基於九二共識所簽二十一項協議而推動的兩岸互動，當然即是國家政策，而不能稱為「國共化」，何況九二共識如今不啻已成「台／美／中」的三邊共識。

不過，在二○○五年至二○○八年民進黨下野之間，台灣的政治氛圍與兩岸關係願景，確實是由「國共化」的連胡會所引領，終至二○○八年使得在兩岸政策上失敗的民進黨政府下野。因此，蔡英文批評「國共化」並無意義；因為，如果「國共化」的政策架構合乎歷史潮流，它終究會成為「國家政策」。例如，蔡英文即使重返執政，亦無可能廢止由「國共化」發展而來的兩岸二十一項協議。

蔡英文必須警覺：倘若重返執政，切勿再陷「扁政府兩岸政策失敗／由國共化連胡會引領兩岸願景」的噩夢。張志軍此次說，未來「國共論壇」不但要「繼續辦下去」，而且要「愈辦愈好」；言下之意是，山不轉人轉，民進黨若不知轉型，仍將由「國共化」引領兩岸政策的話語權，再等民進黨下台。倘係如此，台灣的蹉跎與損傷不堪想像。

朱立倫問：為什麼會缺了「民共關係」這一塊？民進黨如果堅持「沒有民共關係也是一種關係」的鴕鳥政策，即使重返執政，其兩岸領域仍將受「國共化」的制約，亦即恐將陷於本報屢次警告的「贏了選舉／輸了路線」的困境。

再論此會的瓶頸與突破。朱習二人在會上公開致詞中，皆提到「九二共識」，朱立倫當著習近平之面說：「兩岸同屬一中，但內涵、定義有所不同（的「九二共識」）。」這當然就是「一中各表」，卻未使用「一中各表」四字，這是國民黨主席首次當著中共總書記作此表述。朱未用「一中各表」四字，是保留；但當面說出了這一段話，卻可視為突破。

「一中各表」是要處理中華民國在「一個中國」中的地位問題。其實，二十餘年來，北京對台政策的核心，俱在希望台灣能維持中華民國，能維持中華民國憲法；但是，北京在「一個中國」的定義上，卻過於故步自封而意圖否認中華民國，甚至稱「中華民國已經滅亡」。此種政策上的自我矛盾，是使兩岸關係難以突破與超越的瓶頸。

兩岸皆應認知：如果中華民國在台灣失去了立足點，「中國」即更無可能在台灣找到立足點。朱立倫此次在習近平面前說出「一中各表」的立場，此一場景若在顯示兩岸均知「中華民國是繞不過去的」，則對九二共識的超越亦是可以期待之事。而且，如果「一中各表」可以確立，對民進黨的壓力將更形升高。

習近平說：當前兩岸關係處於新的重要節點上，是擺在「兩岸所有政黨」前的重大問題，已是擺明了向民進黨喊話。十年前的連胡會，兩岸充滿新憧憬，因而使連胡會顯得華麗與飛揚；十年後的此次朱習會，卻面臨吉凶莫卜的「重要節點」，遂顯得簡約、低調，甚至沉悶。不過，此會若能促成「中華民國繞不過去」的醒覺，則國共兩黨的共同努力尚可期待；相對而言，民進黨若仍認為「沒有民共關係也是一種關係」，則慎勿落到縱使重返執政，但在兩岸關係上卻形同被判出局。

US: 1992 Consensus Beneficial to Taiwan

US: 1992 Consensus Beneficial to Taiwan
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 1, 2015

Executive Summary: US policy toward Taiwan is paradoxical. On the one hand, it upholds Taiwan's democracy. On the other hand, it explicitly opposes Taiwan authorities from seeking Taiwan independence. The US considers Taiwan independence counter to Taiwan's own interests, and non-conducive to Taiwan's democracy.

Full Text Below:

US policy toward Taiwan is paradoxical. On the one hand, it upholds Taiwan's democracy. On the other hand, it explicitly opposes Taiwan authorities from seeking Taiwan independence. The US considers Taiwan independence counter to Taiwan's own interests, and non-conducive to Taiwan's democracy.

The United States believes that Taiwan independence agitation within the private sector falls within the scope of democracy. But it believes that Taiwan authorities must not engage in Taiwan independence activity. The US made its views abundantly clear during Lee Teng-hui's terms and Chen Shui-bian's second term. Back then, Lee and Chen were still engaged in trickery. They deceived people at home and abroad. They took advantage of US goodwill towards Taiwan's democracy to promote Taiwan independence. This led in time to a blow up with the United States.

Now that the DPP may return to power, it will once again face this test. Joseph Wu recently visited the United States. He appealed to the United States "to defend Taiwan's democracy, in the hope of maintaining peaceful cross-Strait exchanges". With so much at stake, Tsai Ing-wen must not repeat the mistakes made by Lee and Chen.

During the Clinton era, the United States proclaimed that it would "safeguard democracy while opposing Taiwan independence". In June 1998, in Shanghai, Clinton reiterated the one China policy and declared that the US does not support Taiwan independence or one China, one Taiwan. This was part of its "three non-supports" policy. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger told reporters that even if the elected government of Taiwan chose Taiwan independence, or an overwhelming majority of the public voted yes in a public referendum on Taiwan independence, the United States would not support it. This was the first time the pledge to "defend democracy while opposing Taiwan independence" was expressed in such unambiguous terms. Clinton aides were blunt. The one China policy is beneficial to Taiwan.

The following year, the KMT's 2000 presidential election prospects were gloomy. Lee Teng-hui announced his "two states theory" and pushed for a fifth constitutional amendment that would make his two states theory part of the constitution. Then American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Richard Bush immediately rushed to Taiwan to remind Lee Teng-hui that One China is the cornerstone of US policy, and has led to an environment favorable to a democratic Taiwan. In other words, Taiwan's democracy depends on the one China policy. Therefore those in power on Taiwan must not overturn the one China policy. This amounted to a reiteration of the “One China is advantageous to Taiwan” declaration. Because the US intervened, Lee Teng-hui was forced to retreat. While meeting face to face with Richard Bush, Lee withdrew his plan to incorporate his two states theory into the constitution. Richard Bush said, "I am firmly opposed to Taiwan independence!"

Alas, Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui repeated their mistakes. As the 2008 presidential election approached, Chen Shui-bian found himself mired in corruption scandals. He stage managed Taiwan independence political theater and demanded a public referendum paving the way for “Taiwan's entry into the UN”. The US State Department publicly and repeatedly blasted Chen Shui-bian, saying that the US hoped the people of Taiwan would see through the rhetoric of the referendum, and realize that the referendum is inconsistent with Taiwan's interests. It said Taiwan independence will not enrich Taiwan's democracy. The US once again declared that the one-China policy is favorable to Taiwan, while Taiwan independence is not. At the time, Chen Shui-bian openly defied the US. He dismissed the US statement as "election rhetoric", and promised that "nothing will happen after the election." As a result, Chen Shui-bian became persona no grata to the United States.

Chen declared that "Democracy has no red lines." But the US government's position is that “Policies must have red lines”. The two may seem contradictory, but this is a dialectical relationship. The United States feels that its one China policy achieves balance in cross-Strait policy. It defends Taiwan's democracy, therefore the Taiwan authorities must not overthrow the existing framework. This newspaper has long championed this view as well. We believe the opposition DPP has a right to advocate Taiwan independence. But it has no right to make it policy when it is in power.

The United States is gradually changing its wording vis a vis its one China policy. Before it said that the one China policy is beneficial to Taiwan. Now it says the 1992 consensus is favorable to Taiwan. The United States uses the one China policy to stabilize the Taiwan Straits, and defend Taiwan's democracy. But the one China policy had no room for growth. In March 2008, Hu Jintao mentioned the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations to George W. Bush on the hotline. This instantly increased US latitude on the one China policy. The meaning of the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations have yet to be finalized. But they have already become the United States' upgraded version of the one China policy. It has become nothing less than the common political basis for the tripartite relationship between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing. It is definitely not just a matter of KMT-CCP relations.

Therefore when the DPP repudiates the 1992 Consensus, it upsets the United States' Taiwan Strait policy. The US perceives the DPP attitude as nothing less than self-destruction. The US wonders why the DPP cannot seem to understand that the 1992 consensus is beneficial to Taiwan. Why inflict harm upon Taiwan's interests? That is why when Douglas Paal visiting Taiwan in 2012, he said the 1992 consensus is the cross-Strait bottom line. This March, Barbara Schrage explicitly referred to the 1992 consensus as beneficial and essential to the United States and to cross-Strait relations. She urged Tsai Ing-wen not to evade the reality of the 1992 consensus. This amounted to a declaration that the 1992 consensus is favorable to Taiwan.

Lee and Chen used Taiwan independence as election tools. But in the end, they shot themselves in the foot and seriously undermined Taiwan's interests. Does Tsai Ing-wen really not know that the 1992 consensus is beneficial to Taipei, Washington, and Beijing? Is she really determined to reduce the 1992 consensus to election rhetoric? She is advised to pull back from the brink. She must never repeat the mistakes made by Lee and Chen.

細看美國的「九二共識對台灣有利論」
2015-05-01聯合報

美國對台政策有一辯證形式的弔詭：一方面維護台灣的民主政治，但另一方面明確反對台灣主政者採台獨路線，認為台獨違反了台灣自己的利益，不能豐富台灣民主的內涵。

美國認為，在台灣民間的台獨活動屬民主政治的範圍，但台灣的主政者若採台獨路線則是政策上的禁區。美國的此一觀點，在李登輝及陳水扁二任政府時皆有完整的操作與體現。當時，李扁二人皆尚權謀，對內對外均無誠信，玩到後來皆不啻「利用」美國對台灣民主政治的善意，而操弄台獨政治，為此，最後美國皆與之翻臉反目。

如今，可能重返執政的民進黨也將面對此一考驗。吳釗燮日前訪美，亦獲美國「維護台灣民主政治／但希望兩岸和平交流」的說法，殷鑒在目，蔡英文不可重蹈李扁二人覆轍。

在柯林頓時代，美國就公開了「維護民主／反對台獨」的政策架構。一九九八年六月，柯林頓在上海重申「一個中國政策」，並發表包括「不支持台獨或一中一台」在內的「三不支持」；且當記者問同行的國家安全顧問柏格：「即使台灣民選政府選擇了台獨，或經由公民投票壓倒性的傾向支持台獨，美國也不支持嗎？」柏格回答：「不支持。」這可視為對「維護民主／反對台獨」的首次直白宣示。柯林頓幕僚並直言，「一個中國」的政策，對台灣有利。

次年，李登輝面臨國民黨在二○○○年總統大選的頹勢，鋌而走險發表「兩國論」，並醞釀在第五次修憲中將兩國論入憲。當時的美國在台協會理事主席卜睿哲迅速銜命來台，向李登輝表示：「『一個中國』是美國政策的基石……這個原則促成了有利的環境，使得……台灣得以繁榮和民主……。」言下之意，台灣的「民主」有賴「一中政策」的維繫，所以台灣的主政者不可推翻「一中政策」。這不啻又是「一個中國對台灣有利論」的宣示。由於美國介入，李登輝縮了回去，他當著卜睿哲的面收回了「兩國論」入憲的念頭，並對卜睿哲說：「我是堅決反對台獨的！」

但是，陳水扁又蹈李登輝覆轍。在迫近二○○八年總統大選時，陷入貪腐醜聞的陳水扁又大玩台獨戲法，操弄「公投入聯」。美國國務院連番公開轟擊陳水扁，並「希望台灣人民能看穿（入聯公投）這套政治說詞……，且能明確分辨這項公投不符台灣利益」，更直指「台獨不能豐富台灣民主的內涵」。在此，美國不啻又宣示「一中政策對台灣有利／台獨對台灣不利」。在那段時間，陳水扁甚至公開對美放話稱，他說的只是「選舉語言」，並保證「選後一切都不會發生」。至此，陳水扁在美國眼中，已是人格掃地。

陳水扁說：「民主無紅線。」但美國政府的立場是：「政策有紅線。」二者看似弔詭，其實卻是辯證關係。美國認為，一中政策所形成的兩岸平衡，維護了台灣的民主政治，所以台灣的主政者不可推翻這個架構。此一觀點與本報長久以來的觀點可謂不約而同，我們認為：台獨可以是台灣反對黨的「專利」，但絕不可是台灣執政者的「政策」。

如今，美國的「一中政策對台灣有利論」，似已逐漸轉向「九二共識對台灣有利論」。因為，美國是以「一中政策」來穩定台海形勢，用以維護台灣的民主政治，但一中政策卻找不到發展的空間；至二○○八年三月，胡錦濤在熱線中對布希提出「九二共識／一中各表」，形同霎時放大了美國「一中政策」的發展空間。至此，「九二共識／一中各表」的內涵雖然尚未定型，但儼然已成為美國「一中政策」的升級版，亦不啻成為台、美、中三方關係的「共同政治基礎」，而絕非只是「國共關係」。

因而，民進黨否定九二共識，看在美國眼裡，豈僅是打亂美國的台海政策，更不啻是台灣在自毀長城。美國的疑問是：民進黨為何不知九二共識對台灣有利？為何要自損台灣的利益？所以，包道格在二○一二來台說「九二共識是兩岸底線」，施藍旗今年三月間則明指九二共識對美國、對兩岸關係及對台灣皆有利，且建議蔡英文必須面對九二共識，不要閃躲。此皆可視為「九二共識對台灣有利論」的表現。

李扁二人將台獨視為選舉操作，最後不但自身落得狼狽不堪，且皆重傷了台灣的利益。蔡英文難道不知「九二共識」對台美中的三邊大局有利嗎？難道也要將「否定九二共識」視為「選舉語言」嗎？奉勸懸崖勒馬，萬勿重蹈李扁二人覆轍。