Constitutional Amendment Requires Public Debate

Constitutional Amendment Requires Public Debate
United Daily News (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 21, 2015

Executive Summary: The Legislative Yuan "constitutional amendment committee" is conducting a substantive review of constitutional amendment proposals. The committee will convene 10 times over three weeks to discuss nine proposed constitutional amendments. Tsai Ing-wen hurriedly declared that the constitutional amendments must be passed. She said the legislature must not allow itself to be "condemned by history." The blue camp immediately countered. Tsai Ing-wen now opposes the restoration of prime ministerial consent, it said. She has flip-flopped on this matter repeatedly. If the constitutional amendments fail to pass, she bears the greatest responsibility.

Full Text Below:

The Legislative Yuan "constitutional amendment committee" is conducting a substantive review of constitutional amendment proposals. The committee will convene 10 times over three weeks to discuss nine proposed constitutional amendments. Tsai Ing-wen hurriedly declared that the constitutional amendments must be passed. She said the legislature must not allow itself to be "condemned by history." The blue camp immediately countered. Tsai Ing-wen now opposes the restoration of prime ministerial consent, it said. She has flip-flopped on this matter repeatedly. If the constitutional amendments fail to pass, she bears the greatest responsibility.

The constitutional issues are still unclear. Yet the ruling and opposition parties have already begun passing the buck to each other. It hard to be optimistic about the current constitutional amendment process for three reasons. One. The time alloted is insufficient. According to provisions, ruling and opposition legislators must reach an accord by June 16. Only then can a public referendum be held on January 16 concurrent with the presidential election. The legislature must resolve differences between the ruling and opposition parties in 20 short days. That is an impossible task. Constitutional amendments are major undertakings. How can we allow so little public debate?

Two. The constitutional amendment process has been reduced to a political tool. For both the ruling and opposition parties, the constitutional amendment process is all about 2016 campaign strategy. It reeks of political calculation. For example, the two major parties' positions overlap on some issues. These include lowering the voting age to 18 and lowering the threshold for non-constituency legislators. Both parties are determined to convey an image of openness and to avoid offending young voters. But the DPP advocates lowering the threshold for constitutional amendments, the abolition of the Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan. It hopes to undermine the foundations of the Republic of China and challenge the legitimacy of its five-power constitution. Naturally the KMT is not going to agree.

By contrast, the ruling and opposition parties and the general public support the restoration of prime ministerial consent. Just last year, Tsai Ing-wen demanded the restoration of of prime ministerial consent. But this year the DPP has performed a complete about face and is suddenly firmly opposed. The reason is obvious. Tsai Ing-wen thinks a change in ruling parties will take place in 2016. She will hold the reins of power. So why give the legislature the power to appoint the prime minister? As for the KMT, including this as part of a "constitutional package" gives it confidence. Ruling and opposition party constitutional amendment proposals may be prettified with high-minded rhetoric. But the selfish motivations are glaringly obvious.

Three. Limits to constitutional debate and debate venues. The constitutional amendment process was originally supposed to begin with public debate. That way constitutional amendments would have a broader base of popular support. The debate process would help the public reach a consensus. It would enable the public to understand the ins and outs of the constitutional amendment process and to establish their priorities. Earlier this year, Tsai Ing-wen proposed a "national affairs conference". This would have been a good venue. Unfortunately ruling and opposition party differences rendered it stillborn. As a result, the Legislative Yuan established a "Constitutional Amendment Committee" to continue the investigation of constitutional amendment issues.

Alas, the constitutional amendment process has hit a wall in the legislature. The legislature is reenacting ruling vs. opposition party political wrangling and under the table deal-making. The process is rushed. Open and full discussion is impossible. Even participation by experts, social groups, and activists is impossible. The most obvious example of this took place in 2004. Under pressure from Lin Yi-hsiung a ruling and opposition party "constitutional reform committee" in the Legislative Yuan unanimously adopted a resolution to reduce legislative seats by half, and to raise the threshold for constitutional amendments. Eleven years later, reducing the legislative seats by half is considered an irrational amendment passed under pressure from populism. It constituted a fatal decline in legislative professionalism. Back then the DPP demanded a higher threshold for constitutional amendments. Now it is demanding that a lower one. So whose fault is it? Current legislators will remain in office until January next year. They have achieved little over the past three years. During that time the legislature was even occupied by force. Now they are engaged in a bidding war to amendment the nation's basic laws. How can we not be concerned?

Consider previous constitutional amendments. To say that if a constitutional amendment fails to pass, then so and so will be "condemned by history" is nonsense. In fact, history tells us that constitutional amendments must be well thought out. They must not be ill-conceived or motivated by momentary whim. Those who view the constitutional amendment process as a chess game, are the real culprits who will be condemned by history. The current constitutional amendment proposals, with the exception of lowering the voting age to 18, all require careful thought.

This includes lowering the threshold for political parties non-constituency legislators to 3%. The blue and green camps may have reached a bipartisan consensus on the matter. But it should be evaluated from a long-term perspective. This might help the disenfranchised. But it could also result in increasingly fragmented political parties. Once small parties proliferate, political consensus will be more difficult. National governance will be more difficult. Take the Taiwan Solidarity Union for example. By virtue of its party vote it has three non-constituency seats. But when their legislators speak, they often utter nonsense. Some even suggested "recruiting black people as mercenaries" and raised alarms about the "People's Liberation Army occupying Kinmen with kitchen knives". Is this sort of small party diversification really what Taiwan needs?

That the legislative process is haphazard is bad enough. But to take a hatchet to such an important matter as the constitution is infinitely worse. We cannot afford to be this reckless.

修憲欠缺的不是協商，而是公共討論

2015-05-21聯合報

立法院「修憲委員會」進入修憲提案的實質審查，將在三週內召開十場委員會，討論九大修憲議題。蔡英文率先喊話，說修憲必須成功、不能失敗，要求立法院不要做「歷史的罪人」。藍營立即反擊，蔡英文堅決反對恢復「閣揆同意權」，言行反覆，若修憲破局她要負最大責任。

修憲八字尚無一撇，朝野即開始互推責任，可想而知，這次修憲結果難以樂觀。從客觀環境看，這次修憲不可能有太大成果，主要原因有三：第一，時程太過緊迫。依規定，立法院必須在六月十六日前將朝野修憲議案送出，才能趕得上明年一月十六日大選同步進行公民複決；但是，立法院要在短短廿多天中處理完朝野歧見，幾乎是不可能的任務。修憲的重大工程，豈容如此草草討論？

第二，修憲議題被工具化。朝野兩黨的修憲主張，幾乎都與二○一六選戰策略掛勾，因此充滿算計與心機。例如，兩黨目前有交集的主張，包括降低投票門檻到十八歲，以及降低不分區立委得票門檻，都是為了塑造開放形象，避免得罪年輕選民。但是，民進黨主張降低修憲門檻，以及廢除考、監兩院等，目的則在挑戰及動搖「中華民國」及「五權憲法」的基礎及正當性，自然不易取得國民黨的認同。

相對的，對於朝野及民間皆有廣泛共識的「閣揆同意權」，蔡英文去年才喊了要爭取恢復，今年民進黨卻變臉堅決反對；其原因可想而知，主要是蔡英文自認二○一六政黨輪替在望，屆時自己大權在握，何必將閣揆任命權讓給立法院。至於國民黨，抓住這個環節要求「包裹修憲」，似乎也就喊得理直氣壯。從這個角度看，朝野修憲無論說得多動聽，其私心也就昭然若揭了。

第三，修憲討論與參與場域的局限。本來，比較理想的修憲議案，應該是開放更多的社會討論與公民參與；那樣，修憲議題將具有更廣泛的民意基礎，同時也能藉討論的過程凝聚共識，並讓社會大眾了解修憲工程的來龍去脈及應該選擇的優先順序。蔡英文今年初稍早曾有召開「國是會議」之議，這原是一個不錯的場域，遺憾的是，此一提議在朝野歧見下流產；也因此，才轉而由立法院成立「修憲委員會」，以接續研擬修憲議題。

問題在，修憲議題一進入立法院的圍牆，即無異是在複製朝野的政治角力和密室協商，倉促而密集的會議，不僅難以達到開放、完整的討論，同時也隔絕了專家菁英、社會團體、乃至積極公民的參與機會。最明顯的例子是，二○○四年立法院在林義雄的靜坐施壓下，朝野在立法院「修憲委員會」一致通過「立委席次減半」的決議，同時提高了修憲的門檻。十一年後，立委席次減半被認為是一次民粹威脅下的非理性修憲，也是國會專業職能下降的致命傷；不僅如此，當時墊高的修憲門檻，民進黨今天又喊著要降低，請問：這是誰之過？更何況，本屆立委的任期至明年一月就要結束，他們過去三年多並無多少作為，其間還發生國會遭到占領的憾事，此刻若讓他們用「喊價」的方式來執行國家基本大法的修改，豈不可憂？

檢視歷次的修憲，若要說某個修憲提案不過，誰就是「歷史的罪人」云云，這種說法完全是毫無根據的指控。事實上，歷史經驗告訴我們，必須完整配套的憲政架構，若因思慮不周或一時突發奇想而胡亂更動，這種視憲法如棋局和草芥的玩弄者，才是真正的歷史罪人。以目前攤在桌上的修憲主張看，除了放寬投票年齡至十八歲一案，其餘皆有待審慎思考。

包括放寛政黨不分區席次門檻到三％一案，儘管藍綠兩黨在此議意見一致，其實仍有待從長計議。理由是，此舉固然照顧了零星選票的綜合代表性，卻可能造成政黨政治的愈發破碎化，一旦小黨林立，政治共識將更難凝聚，國家治理也將愈發困難。就以台聯為例，它憑藉政黨票分配到三個不分區席次，但審視其立委的發言，有時不僅言不及義，甚至常出現「找黑人當傭兵」、「解放軍拿菜刀占領金門」等荒誕質詢，這是台灣需要的多元化小黨嗎？

國會的立法工作離離落落也就罷了，要向憲法動刀這等大事，還是小心為上！

Will Accommodating the US Enable Tsai Ing-wen to Pass Muster?

Will Accommodating the US Enable Tsai Ing-wen to Pass Muster?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation 
May 20, 2015

Executive Summary: If she is not to stumble along the final mile, Tsai Ing-wen's road to the presidency requires winning US trust. But the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen must amend the Taiwan independence party platform. They must improve relations with the CCP. They cannot simply accommodate the United States while ignoring Beijing/Washington/Taipei relations. If they do, they will shoot themselves in the foot, and find it impossible to walk the final mile.

Full Text below:

The KMT has been routed. Tsai Ing-wen's road to the presidency appears clear. In response to a reporter's question, Tsai Ing-wen boasted, "No matter who represents the KMT in the 2016 presidential elections, it's all the same to the DPP." Tsai Ing-wen is right to be confident. But Tsai Ing-wen's road to the presidency does not hinge solely on favorable conditions within Taiwan. Cross-Strait and international factors also play a decisive role. From that perspective, Tsai Ing-wen's "final mile" remains rife with uncertainty.

To tell this story, we must return to September 16, 2011, more than three years ago. Then DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen was visiting Washington. The US government let its feelings be known through Britain's Financial Times, which published an article entitled, "US concerned about Taiwan candidate", saying "a victory by Tsai Ing-wen... could raise tensions with China". This seriously undermined Tsai Ing-wen's campaign. The article was blunt. US officials said that Tsai Ing-wen met with Obama administration officials, and that “She left us with distinct doubts about whether she is both willing and able to continue the stability in cross-Strait relations the region has enjoyed in recent years,”

Of course we cannot determine how many voters decided to give Ma Ying-jeou a second term because of US government doubts. But cross-Strait relations and trust between Mainland China and the United States are indeed key factors. Tsai Ing-wen lost the election. Three years later, Tsai Ing-wen visited the United States again. According to Tsai's official statement, one of the three purposes was to visit Washington and exchange views on Taipei/Washington relations and Asian-Pacific regional security with various US government agencies, including the executive branch, congress, and think tanks. Tsai Ing-wen said, "For some time communications between the DPP and the US have been good. I hope that sitting down and talking face to face during this trip will further clarify the various parties' positions". Signals from all quarters suggested that during this visit Tsai Ing-wen avoided old mistakes and clearly "accomodated the US".

Tsai Ing-wen has been promoting the DPP's "maintain the status quo" theory of cross-Strait relations. This theory has been criticized as "still hollow". It fails to make clear what the status quo is and how it would be maintained. Confronted with outside criticism, Tsai Ing-wen offers stock answers. Tsai told Yao Chia-wen and other Taiwan independence elders that her "status quo" is "the same as the US government's."

Tsai Ing-wen's explanation provoked criticism from the KMT. Tsai Ing-wen is running for the presidency of the Republic of China. How can she allow her cross-Strait policy to be determined by the US government? Tsai Ing-wen will of course say that she has her own strategic considerations. When the Democratic Progressive Party was in power, Huang Wei-feng, the MAC Vice Chairman and Deputy Representative to the United States, was blunt. He said that in trilateral Washington/Beijing/Taipei relations, Taipei was the weakest party. Therefore It is incapable of maintaining the status quo. All it can do is "go with the flow" and "not disrupt the status quo". He said the status quo is defined and maintained by the great powers, and that the current status quo is defined and maintained by the United States. Taipei cannot follow Beijing's definition of the status quo. That is why Tsai Ing-wen argued that the cross-Strait status quo should be "the status quo according to the United States."

Huang Wei-feng said that when Tsai Ing-wen visited the US, she was merely seeking agreement between Taipei and Washington on the definition of the status quo and proposing concrete solutions. She was most assuredly not disrupting the status quo as understood by Taipei and Washington. But she also wanted to voice the concerns of the people of Taiwan. She said, "This would preclude any major problems, and therefore pass muster". Clearly Huang Wei-feng's optimistic calculation is based on the dynamic relationship between Beijing and Washington.

The dispute between the United States and Mainland China in the South China Sea has recently intensified. DPP cross-Strait and international policy think-tanks consider this a golden opportunity for the DPP. They think that US vs. Mainland China confrontation in the East China Sea and South China Sea, along with Mainland China's growing political and economic strength, is changing US attitudes toward Taiwan. For example, during Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the United States, it said "Taiwan should commit itself to economic independence." The United States is now more eager for Taiwan to join the TPP.

Lai Yi-chung, former head of the DPP Delegation to the United States, expressed optimism. In 2011, the DPP was considered the troublemaker in the Taiwan Strait. Mainland China land reclamation on South China Sea islands and reefs, and its stance on the nine-dotted line, are seen by the United States as a "desire to change the status quo". When Sino-US strategic conflicts arise, the "balance appears to favor the green camp," Tsai Ing-wen's "maintaining the cross-Strait status quo" comports with US strategic interests. The US should welcome this. As one can imagine, when Tsai visits the US, she is likely to offer all sorts of concessions to the United States to win its support, on cross-Strait relations, US arms sales, the Asia-Pacific region and sensitive issues such as Taipei's support for the nine-dotted line in the South China Sea. 

On the other hand, on matters of concern for the Mainland, such as the 1992 consensus and one China, the DPP will find it nearly impossible to offer any clean breakthroughs. DPP officials may imagine that as long as they accomodate the United States, Tsai can win even if the DPP fails to improve relations with the CCP. If the DPP is really that naive, it may fail yet again. When Tsai Ing-wen visited the United States in 2011, US officials criticized her, saying that it was “far from clear... that she and her advisers fully appreciate the depth of [Mainland Chinese] mistrust of her motives and DPP aspirations”.

The United States may wish to maintain influence in East Asia. Perhaps it hopes that Taiwan can help it counterbalance Mainland China. But relations between Beijing and Washington have long been a struggle without end. In September of this year, Xi Jinping will make a state visit to the United States, and firm up Sino-US relations. No matter what, the United States is unwilling to risk a break with Mainland China by supporting Chen Shui-bian's brinksmanship.

If she is not to stumble along the final mile, Tsai Ing-wen's road to the presidency requires winning US trust. But the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen must amend the Taiwan independence party platform. They must improve relations with the CCP. They cannot simply accomodate the United States while ignoring Beijing/Washington/Taipei relations. If they do, they will shoot themselves in the foot, and find it impossible to walk the final mile.

倒向美國 蔡英文就能過關？ 2015年05月20日 中國時報 蔡英文的總統路，因國民黨似已潰不成軍而顯得十分「坦蕩」，令蔡英文在面對記者提問時，不無傲慢地說：「我覺得國民黨究竟是誰要出來參選2016年總統的選舉，對民進黨來講，其實都沒有太大的差別。」蔡英文的自信自有其道理，但蔡英文的總統路絕不只要理順台灣內部環境，兩岸及國際兩個因素也有決定性的影響，從這個角度，蔡英文的最後一哩路就充滿不確定性。 要說清楚這個故事，得回到3年多前的2011年9月16日。當時，蔡英文作為民進黨總統候選人正在華盛頓訪問，美國官方卻透過管道放話，讓國際知名的英國《金融時報》刊登題為〈美國：蔡英文勝選可能加劇台海緊張〉的報導，給蔡英文造成極其嚴重的傷害。該篇報導明確寫到：美國高官在蔡英文與歐巴馬政府官員會晤後清楚表示，「她給我們留下一些很大的疑問，即她是否願意並且能夠繼續維持台海兩岸近年享有的穩定關係。」 當然，我們無法確定有多少選民因為美國政府的疑問與放話，決定投票給當時爭取連任的馬英九，不過，兩岸關係與大陸和美國的信任感，確實是蔡英文輸掉選舉的關鍵因素。3年多以後，蔡英文又將訪問美國，根據蔡英文的官方說法，她訪美的3個目的之一，就是要到華盛頓，與美國各部門，包括行政、國會、智庫，就台美關係、亞太區域安全交換意見，蔡英文說，「過去一段時間民進黨與美國各方溝通的狀況都不錯，希望透過此行，面對面地坐下來談，能夠談得更徹底，對雙方立場的理解能更進一步釐清。」各方面的訊息顯示，這一次的訪美行，為了避免重蹈覆轍，蔡英文明顯採取了更清晰的「對美一邊倒」政策。 蔡英文提出民進黨兩岸關係的「維持現狀論」後，被批評為「依舊空洞」，說不清楚是怎樣的「現狀」，以及如何「維持」。然而，面對外界的抨擊，蔡英文卻有其定見。蔡向獨派大老姚嘉文等表示，她的「維持現狀」就是「與美國政府立場一樣」。 蔡英文的說法引起了國民黨方面的批評，認為蔡英文選的是中華民國總統，她的兩岸政策豈能由美國政府來解釋？然而蔡英文會這樣說，顯然有她的戰略性思考。民進黨執政時曾任陸委會副主委、駐美副代表的黃偉峰就坦率指出，美中台三邊關係中，台灣是實力最小的一方，沒有能力去「維持」現狀，只能「追隨」現狀以及「不破壞」現狀。他認為，現狀是由大國定義並維持，而目前台海現狀是由美國定義並維持，台灣不可能追隨大陸定義的現狀，所以，蔡英文提出的維持兩岸現狀，應該就是「追隨美國的現狀」。 黃偉峰認為，蔡英文訪美時只要找出台灣與美國對現狀認知的交集，提出具體作法，並保證不會破壞台美共同認知的現狀，而且要強調台灣人民的心聲，「這樣就不會有太大問題，就算過關了」。黃偉峰的樂觀估計，顯然跟中美動態關係有很大關聯。 近來，中美兩強在南海的爭逐與摩擦愈來愈白熱化，對民進黨的兩岸與國際政策智囊來說，這是民進黨的最佳時機，他們判斷由於中美在東海、南海爭端以及中國政經實力的增強，美國對台灣的態度開始有所轉變。例如，美方對蔡英文訪美，特別提到「台灣應該致力經濟自主」，美國對台灣加入TPP的問題也展現更積極的態度。 曾任民進黨駐美代表處主任的賴怡忠就樂觀表示，2011年時民進黨被視為台海麻煩製造者的一方，如今，大陸在九段線以及南海島礁建設上的立場與作為，會被美方認定是「有意改變現狀」，在中美戰略出現矛盾衝突時，「天平似乎朝向有利於綠營的一方」，蔡英文「維持兩岸現狀」的主張與美國的戰略利益相符，美方應該是樂見的。可以想像，蔡英文訪美時，很可能針對兩岸關係、台美軍售，甚至亞太區域的敏感議題，包括台灣是否在南海九段線爭議問題上退讓，向美方示好，爭取美國的支持。 另一方面，針對大陸方面的關切，如九二共識、一個中國等問題，民進黨方面幾乎已不可能提出更清晰、更突破性的主張。民進黨人士可能認定，只要向美一邊倒，不處理、不改善民共關係，蔡英文仍能獲得勝選。如果民進黨人士真的如此天真，那麼民進黨有可能再度跌跤。在2011年蔡英文訪美時，美方官員對蔡英文的批評就是：「對於她和她的顧問們是否充分領悟（大陸方面）對她的動機和民進黨的抱負，不信任到什麼程度…遠遠不那麼清楚。」 美國也許希望在東亞地區繼續維持強大影響力，也許希望台灣能對中國多少產生一些平衡作用，但中美兩國的關係始終鬥而不破，今年9月，習近平就要赴美進行國是訪問，鞏固中美關係，無論如何美國不會甘冒與中國決裂的風險，支持類似陳水扁的冒進主義路線。 蔡英文的總統路仍然需要取得美國的信賴，才不會在最後一哩馬失前蹄。但如果民進黨和蔡英文再不修正台獨黨綱、不改善民共關係前提下，只想對美一邊倒，忽視陸美台三方關係的平衡點，極有可能是搬石頭砸自己的腳，走不好最後一哩路。

Time for the Silent Majority to Be Heard

Time for the Silent Majority to Be Heard
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 19, 2015

Executive Summary: DPP chairperson Tsai Ing-wen is her party's presidential candidate. She is now on the campaign trail. The KMT is having a difficult time choosing. Which party will rule the nation in 2016 has become a matter of intense public concern. Every so often polls will publish voter support figures for various presidential and vice presidential tickets. Online data analysis, fortune-telling, and astrological predictions are ubiquitous. But election results on Taiwan often surprise everyone. Only when the ballots are counted early next year will the result be known. Until then, nobody can say for certain. We have no intention of joining the ranks of soothsayers. We merely wish to explore whether Taiwan has a "Great Silent Majority” isolated from the media, including traditional and new media, and how much influence these invisible voters will exercise in next year's election.

Full Text Below:

DPP chairperson Tsai Ing-wen is her party's presidential candidate. She is now on the campaign trail. The KMT is having a difficult time choosing. Which party will rule the nation in 2016 has become a matter of intense public concern. Every so often polls will publish voter support figures for various presidential and vice presidential tickets. Online data analysis, fortune-telling, and astrological predictions are ubiquitous. But election results on Taiwan often surprise everyone. Only when the ballots are counted early next year will the result be known. Until then, nobody can say for certain. We have no intention of joining the ranks of soothsayers. We merely wish to explore whether Taiwan has a "Great Silent Majority” isolated from the media, including traditional and new media, and how much influence these invisible voters will exercise in next year's election.

Our curiosity was piqued by a recent poll conducted by an academic institution. The survey data was quite interesting. The questionnaire asked respondents "Do you support or oppose lowering the voting age from 20 to 18?" The poll results were: Strongly support 10.9%, Somewhat support 33.3%. Total 44.2%. Somewhat oppose 31.2%. Strongly oppose 15.9%. Total 47.1%. In other words, those opposed to reducing the voting age outnumbered those who support it. Furthermore, those who strongly oppose it outnumber those who strongly support it by five percentage points.

The survey data runs counter to current mainstream media wisdom. The Conventional Wisdom is that the opinions of the younger generation must be taken seriously, therefore the voting age should be lowered from 20 to 18, and that the public on Taiwan has already arrived at this conclusion. One finds little opposition to lowering the voting age from 20 to 18 in the mainstream media. In fact the poll shows more people oppose this move than support it, and that those who oppose lowering of the voting age represent mainstream public opinion.

This raises an interesting question – why has a view that is obviously in the majority nearly vanished from mainstream media mention? If those who oppose lowering the voting age constitute the majority, why are their voices going unheard? Why has a minority viewpoint overwritten a majority viewpoint? Frankly, had the survey not revealed the truth, many people would still assume that the mainstream favored lowering the voting age.

This is the "spiral of silence” theory elucidated by German scholar Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann during the last century. The theory is that in the marketplace of public opinion, a minority that aggressively airs its opinions can silence a majority, and gradually lead to minority opinion overwriting majority opinion. It can even create the illusion that it represents mainstream public opinion. In many societies extremist minority views can sometimes overwhelm moderate majority views. This is why.

Consider mainstream public opinion on a variety of issues. Is it possible that given the vocal expression of minority views, mainstream public opinion has chosen to remain silent the entire time? Given the above data, it is entirely possible. In other words, Taiwan has a large number of "invisible voters." They often object to those who shrilly air their views in pubic. But they may be too busy, or perhaps too afraid of the wrath of the radical minority. They are afraid of attracting trouble, so they choose to remain silent, and become invisible voters. The end result is that what was obviously minority opinion, ends up righteously depicting itself as mainstream public opinion.

Another issue is even more troublesome. The government agencies in charge of policy often dance to the tune of an extremist minority. Since March last year, the student movement established new media groups. They aired their views on the web and demanded that the government refer to them during policymaking. This evolved into the bizarre phenomenon of "governance by cyberarmy", with official oblivious to the fact that many of these opinions are extremist minority opinions. If policymakers were to take all these views seriously, policies would be riddled with internal contradictions. They would lack rational justification, and even violate basic laws. The government would eventually lose all credibility and cease all functioning.

Invisible voters can still play a key role. Often an extremist minority can monopolize the marketplace of public opinion. But on election day, invisible voters can teach them a lesson. Take the recent British election. Pollsters, experts, and netizens, all failed to guess the final result. Why? No one knew what percentage invisible voters accounted for. Isn't this true for Taiwan as well?

Most people are busy with their lives. They are politically apathetic, and easily manipulated by the media. Reunification vs. independence battles over the years have gradually led to a he loss of reason. Many people who disagree with the views expressed in the media, often play safe by remaining silent. This newspaper recently published an editorial by veteran reporter Yang Ai-li entitled "Invisible Supporters, Take a Stand in 2016". Yang warned about this phenomenon. She appealed to families busy with work or domestic obligations, and to politically apathetic swing voters, to stop allowing the cyberarmy to dictate Taiwan's future. These voters must stand up and voice their own views. If again and again they remain silent, or refrain from voting, they will hand the the right to dictate their futures over to others.

沉默隱性選民該發聲了
2015年05月19日 中國時報

民進黨蔡英文主席獲得提名擔任總統大選候選人，密集展開競選拜會行程，國民黨提名人選雖然難產，但2016年究竟會換誰當家已成為社會關切的話題，每隔一段時間就會有民調公布，預告各種配對的支持比例是多少，加上網上鋪天蓋地的各種大數據分析，連算命、占星預言都出爐了！但台灣選舉經常讓人跌破眼鏡，沒到明年初開票結束，其實誰也拿不準結果。無意加入預言遊戲，只想就近日幾樁訊息，探索台灣究竟存不存在著所謂「沉默的隱性選民」，也就是絕緣於媒體（包括傳統與新媒體）之外的民意，而這群隱性的民意會不會在明年大選發揮力量？


我們的好奇，在於最近一家學術單位做的一項民調，其中一項調查數據挺有意思，問卷中詢問受訪者「贊不贊成將投票的年齡從20歲放寬到18歲？」調查的結果是非常贊成10.9%，還算贊成33.3%，合計贊成的有44.2%；不太贊成31.2%，非常不贊成15.9%，合計不贊成的有47.1%。換言之，不贊成降低投票年齡的比例，不僅超過贊成，而且非常不贊成與非常贊成的強烈態度對比差距竟然達5個百分點。

這項調查數據，與最近以來的媒體主流意見相違背。流行的觀點是，新世代的意見應該受到重視，因而將投票的年齡從20歲放寬到18歲，應該已是當下台灣社會共識，至少在主流媒體的論述中，基本上是找不到太多反對將投票年齡從20歲降到18歲的；但民意調查的數據結果卻顯示，原來更多的人是反對這種主張的，甚至反對降低投票年齡的意見，照比例看應該才算是主流意見才對。

有趣的問題來了，為什麼一個明明是占多數的意見，竟然在媒體論述中幾近乎全面消失？如果說反對將投票年齡降低的人確實占多數，為什麼他們的聲音發不出來？甚至還聽任少數意見凌駕他們的多數意見？不諱言的說，如果不是調查數據透露了事實真相，許多人恐怕還是認定降低投票年齡，就是當下占多數的主流意見呢！

這種現象，很像是上世紀德國學者紐曼所提出的「沉默的螺旋」理論。意旨在意見市場上原本占少數的意見，因為積極主動表達，反而造成那些原本占多數的意見選擇沉默，造成了少數意見逐漸凌駕多數意見，甚至被塑造成是主流民意的假象。許多社會中的偏激少數意見，有時能夠壓垮溫和多數的意見，正是源於這樣的因素。

台灣面對各項議題的真實主流民意，可不可能因為少數意見的強烈表達，而一路都選擇沉默以對呢？從上述的數據看來，這種可能性是很大的，換言之，這意味台灣的民意板塊中，存在著為數不少的「隱性選民」，他們對那些活躍於各個平台的意見喧囂，很多時候是不以為然的，但或許是因為工作忙，或許害怕觸怒激進少數惹麻煩上身，因而多半選擇沉默以對，變成安靜的隱性選民，最終的結果就是，明明根本是少數意見，竟能理直氣壯的以主流意見自居。

更麻煩的是，主管政策的政府相關部門，竟然也選擇向這種偏激的少數意見看齊！自去年3月學運之後，成立新媒體小組也就罷了，還督促各單位將網路上的意見，引以為施政上的重要參考，甚至演成「婉君治國」的奇特現象，殊不知這些每天量產的意見，很多都是偏激的少數意見。如果決策者全要將這些意見都當回事，許多政策可能前後矛盾、左右失據，甚至違背法理，最後自失立場，政府功能大概也都要停擺。

隱性選民還是可能發揮關鍵作用，很多時候在意見市場上占有壟斷位置的偏激少數，經常會在選舉中遭到隱性選民教訓。遠的不說，最近英國大選的結果，事前包括民調、專家、網路等幾乎都沒猜準最後的結果，原因就在於誰都估不出隱性選民究竟占多少比例。台灣何嘗不是如此？

多數人忙於生活，對政治冷感，很容易受媒體觀點的操控。過去幾年台灣陷入統獨惡鬥，社會漸失理性，許多人雖不贊成媒體通行的觀點，卻選擇明哲保身。本報時論廣場日前刊登資深媒體人楊艾俐一篇專欄文章，題為「隱性支持者，2016站出來」，對此現象心所謂危，乃針對終日忙於工作或家庭，對政治冷感的中間選民，呼籲他們不能再聽任網軍主導台灣未來，應該站出來積極表達自己的看法，若是一而再、再而三的緘默不語，甚至放棄投票，就等於把自己未來主宰權拱手讓人了！

Renewed Sino-US Conflict Must Be Controlled

Renewed Sino-US Conflict Must Be Controlled
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 18, 2015

Executive Summary: Sino-US relations have had their ups and downs this year. They include clashes over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Net security, China threat theory, and the revised United States Japan "Defense Cooperation Guidelines," The two sides have been at loggerheads. Recent South China Sea disputes have nearly led to military conflict. The US Department of Defense recently accused Mainland China of land reclamation in South China Sea islands and reefs.

Full Text Below:

Sino-US relations have had their ups and downs this year. They include clashes over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Net security, China threat theory, and the revised United States Japan "Defense Cooperation Guidelines," The two sides have been at loggerheads. Recent South China Sea disputes have nearly led to military conflict.

The US Department of Defense recently accused Mainland China of land reclamation in South China Sea islands and reefs. Citing "freedom of navigation", the US military may dispatch military aircraft and warships to within 12 nautical miles of the disputed reefs. Under the United Nations Convention, territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles from the coast. If the US military enters this zone, it will violate China's territorial sovereignty, and its action will amount to a military provocation.

Beijing's Foreign Minister Guo Chuhua urged Washington to treat the South China Sea issue with "caution". He declared support for freedom of navigation within the South China Sea. But not within China's territorial waters and airspace. There, China will firmly safeguard its territorial sovereignty. The US State Department is playing good cop. It emphasizes that the United States first choice is diplomatic negotiations. Secretary of State Kerry visited Beijing yesterday. The ostensible reason was to make arrangements for the annual US-China Strategic Dialogue to be held in Washington in June. In reality he was there to communicate the US position.

The US has been considering military deterrence in response to the South China Sea dispute for some time. As early as 2010, when Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State, the South China Sea was defined as a vital national interest of the United States. Indications were that Washington might resort to military intervention. Last July, during the sixth Sino-US strategic dialogue, the United States proposed that the South China Sea situation be “frozen". The parties no longer seize reefs, the South China Sea landscape would not change, and no one would take unilateral action. In August it proposed that ASEAN Foreign Ministers meet and voluntarily freeze the South China Sea situation", giving priority to a political solution before a military one. The parties involved were unenthusiastic. Beijing subsequently proposed a "two-track approach", in which the disputants would engage in peaceful negotiations followed by South China Sea maintenance of the peace by the Mainland and ASEAN members. This too failed to receive a positive response from Washington.

Recently, the ASEAN summit declared that "The South China Sea islands and reefs undermine regional peace and security". This was followed by Japan and the Philippines holding South China Sea military exercises under the guise of anti-piracy exercises. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore held talks on possible joint South China Sea patrols. Japan asked the US to lift export bans on F-22 Raptor stealth fighters. These provocative actions were no accident, and fail to conceal the United States' behind the scenes planning the direction.

The Pentagon recently released its "2015 China's Military and Security Development Report". It endlessly underscored Mainland China's military threat, but turned a blind eye to identical actions by Vietnam and the Philippines, which have also been building military facilities on South China Sea islands and reefs. This reveals the United States' double standards in the face of China's military rise. David Shear, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, was blunt. Mainland China's airbase runway on Yong Shu Reef in the South China Sea will be complete by 2018. It will then be able to dock an aircraft carrier, posing a major challenge to continued United States military superiority in the western Pacific.

The Obama government is mired in both domestic and diplomatic difficulties. At a time like this, the United States does not want China-US military conflict. The Pentagon is now threatening force to deter Mainland China. This is the result of three considerations. One. Anti-China political sentiment in on the rise in Washington. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker recently applied pressure on Obama, demanding US military action in the East China Sea. Two. Japan, the Philippines, and other Asia-Pacific allies are demonstrating greater leadership compared to the past. Three. Military intimidation may hinder Beijing's one belt, one road maritime Silk Road-building process, delaying the pace of Mainland China's military rise.

Originally the United States had no intention of intervening in East China Sea and South China Sea territorial disputes. It only emphasized freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. Beijing has reiterated that the facilities on the South China Sea islands and reefs are for meteorological research, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. They will not affect freedom of navigation. The problem is that Washington has never acknowledged Beijing's "never hegemony, never seek hegemony," the declaration of the recent US military layout in the South China Sea is the "freedom of navigation in the South China Sea" as an excuse.

If the US refuses to change its attitude regarding Mainland China's rise, the Mainland and the US will not be able to resolve their structural differences, let alone establish political trust. Washington cannot stop Mainland China's military rise. Mainland China is not about to change its position on South China Sea territorial sovereignty. Instead of military containment, the US should promote strategic cooperation with Mainland China. Fear and suspicion will only increase the risk of China-US conflict and friction.

Secretary of State Kerry's recent high-profile visit to Moscow did little to improve US-Russian relations. His visit to Beijing may not yield any concrete results either. If Washington thinks that military pressure against Beijing is a bargaining chip, it has misjudged the situation. If the two sides clash, the impact on stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region will be serious. America prides itself on leading the Asia-Pacific countries. It must be prudent. For Taiwan, the less stable relations are between Beijing and Washington, the greater the risk to relations across the Strait. Unfortunately Taiwan's partisan political struggles are fierce. The presidential election is approaching. It is at risk as well. When Beijing and Washington clash, Taipei often finds itself the object of reproach. There is no trust between the DPP and the Mainland whatsoever. Therefore it must be especially cautious.


中美衝突再起 小心控管危機
2015-5-18 旺報（中時集團）

摘要: 年初迄今，中美關係波瀾起伏。從亞投行、網路安全、中國威脅論至美日修訂《防衛合作指針》，雙方劍拔弩張，近期再因南海爭端瀕臨軍事衝突。 美國防部日前透露，針對中國在南海島礁填海造地，

年初迄今，中美關係波瀾起伏。從亞投行、網路安全、中國威脅論至美日修訂《防衛合作指針》，雙方劍拔弩張，近期再因南海爭端瀕臨軍事衝突。

美國防部日前透露，針對中國在南海島礁填海造地，依據美軍「通航自由」準則研擬出因應方案，可能的選項包括派遣軍機和戰艦至爭端島礁12海哩內巡航。根據《聯合國海洋法公約》的規定，領海範圍僅12海哩，美軍果真進入，就屬侵犯中國領土主權，是另類的軍事挑釁。

北京外交部敦促華府對南海問題「謹言慎行」，宣示支持南海航行自由，但不容隨意進入中國領海和領空，中方會堅定的維護領土主權。美國務院扮演起白臉的角色，強調美方優先考慮的仍是外交協商。國務卿凱瑞昨日訪問北京，理由是為6月間華府舉行的年度中美戰略對話做安排，實則為傳遞美方立場。

美國以軍事嚇阻手段回應南海爭端已醞釀多時。早在2010年前國務卿希拉蕊時代，南海就定位成美國的重大國家利益，已顯露華府可能採取軍事介入的端倪。去年7月中美第6輪戰略對話，美國倡議「南海凍結」（各方不再奪取島礁、不改變南海地貌、不採行單邊行動），8月在東協外長會議上提議「自願凍結激化南海爭端行為」，足見軍事動作前政治探路的著墨，但各方反應並不積極。北京隨後提出的「雙軌思路」（爭端國和平協商解決，再由中國與東協共維南海和平與穩定），也未獲華府的正面回應。

最近這段時間，東協峰會聲明先表態「南海島礁造地破壞區域和平與安全」、隨後日菲假反海盜之名舉行南海軍演、印馬新三國展開南海聯合巡邏談判、日本更要求美方解除F-22「猛禽」隱形戰機出口禁令，這些一連串具挑釁的動作應非偶然，難掩美國幕後的策畫與導演。

五角大廈不久前公布的《2015年中國軍事與安全發展報告》不斷渲染中國軍事威脅，卻無睹於越南或菲律賓等國同樣在南海島礁軍事建設的舉動，說明了美國的雙重標準全起於對中國軍事崛起的焦慮。美助理國防部長施大偉就直言，中國在南海永暑礁興建的機場跑道將於2018年前竣工，屆時可以停靠航母，對美國維繫西太平洋軍事優勢構成很大的挑戰。

歐巴馬政府陷入內政與外交困境，此時的美國絕不樂見中美爆發軍事衝突，五角大廈此刻擺出武力嚇阻中國的姿態，無非是三項現實考量：華府內部反中的政治氣氛高漲，參院外交關係委員會主席柯克（Bob Corker）日前施壓歐巴馬，要求美軍積極正面回應中國在東亞海域的軍事動作；其次，針對日菲等亞太盟國較已往展現優勢的領導地位；第三，軍事威嚇可阻礙北京「一帶一路」海上絲路的建設進程，拖延中國軍事崛起的腳步。

長期以來，美國都表示無意介入東海和南海領土爭端，只強調南海的航行與飛越自由。北京針對此已多次重申，南海島礁興建設施是為氣象研究、人道救援與救災，不會影響既有的通航自由。問題是，華府從未正視北京「永不爭霸、永不稱霸」的宣示，近期美軍在南海的布局只是把「南海航行自由」當成藉口。

美國防備中國崛起的心態不改，中美關係即無法解決結構性的分歧，遑論政治互信。華府抵擋不住中國軍事崛起的趨勢，中國堅守南海領土主權的立場又不曾鬆動，美國與其篤信軍事圍堵，不如與中國推動戰略合作，懼怕和疑慮只會增添中美衝突與摩擦的風險。

凱瑞國務卿日前高姿態訪問莫斯科，絲毫無助於改善美俄關係，此行北京恐亦無任何具體成果。華府若以為軍事施壓可以增添對北京的談判籌碼，極可能誤判情勢，雙方一旦擦槍走火，必然嚴重衝擊亞太區域的安定與繁榮。美國自詡亞太領導國家，不可不慎。對台灣而言，中美關係愈不穩定，兩岸關係風險更大，不巧的是，台灣政治因總統大選在即黨爭激烈，也進入高風險狀態，台灣在中美兩強間往往動輒得咎，尤其民進黨與大陸間毫無互信可言，更必須謹慎。

Tsai Ing-wen: From Anti-Business to Anti-Labor?

Tsai Ing-wen: From Anti-Business to Anti-Labor?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 15, 2015

Executive Summary: The DPP has never been a leftist political party. During Chen Shui-bian's eight years in power, it swiftly cozied up to Big Business. It was even worse than the Kuomintang. Therefore the anti-business image of the DPP is mere appearance. From this perspective, Tsai Ing-wen's remark "Taiwan has too many holidays” was no surprise. To be a competent national leader, Tsai Ing-wen must resolve the contradiction between paying lip service and speaking from the heart. She cannot continue using ambiguity to avoid taking a stand, and citing “verbal gaffes” to evade responsibility.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen recently launched a traveling lecture series in the business community, in an attempt to clean up the DPP's anti-business image, and to gain the trust of the business community. To everyone's surprise, while addressing industrialists in the Changhua Coastal Industrial Park, she said, "To be honest, I think Taiwan has too many holidays!" Her comment caused an uproar, and provoked labor groups to blast her. Tsai Ing-wen immediately went on Facebook and apologized.

Let us return to that day. When Tsai Ing-wen made that comment, she was responding to industry-related work hours and vacations. Industrialists object to the draft amendments to the Labor Standards Law adopted by the legislature on first reading. Work hours were reduced to 40 hours a week. She blamed her political opponents, saying "That was something the KMT advanced on its own", implying that she disagreed with the reduction in working hours. She then said unequivocally, "Taiwan has too many holidays." Tsai Ing-wen said the DPP actually has a "more flexible plan”, and that she had no idea how the Kuomintang draft law got passed.

The Japanese distinguish between "jian qian”, or “paying lip service”, and “ben ying”, or “speaking from the heart”. Tsai Ing-wen told industrialists “Taiwan has too many holidays”. Was she paying lip service or speaking from the heart? Was she speaking from the heart, or making a verbal gaffe? If she was speaking from the heart, why did she apologize?

These are questions even Tsai Ing-wen cannot answer. In Tsai Ing-wen's heart of hearts, she probably does think Taiwan has too many holidays. Otherwise she would not have blurted it out so readily. She even prefaced her remark with “To be honest." Those seated opposite her were heads of small and medium enterprises. She was clearly “feeling them”. Of course, if Tsai Ing-wen had been visiting a labor group, such words would never come from her mouth. We must conclude that Tsai Ing-wen "let slip her true feelings". When cozying up to management, she really has no time for labor.

Tsai Ing-wen attempted to clean up the green camp's anti-business image. But while doing so, she fell into an anti-labor trap. This trap was of the DPP's own making. The DPP has habitually polarized every debate on public issues. Any proposals that deviate from their own, are demonized. Therefore when they seek the labor and environmental vote, they demonize business owners. When they obstruct cross-strait relations, they denounce Taiwan businessmen and the blue camp, calling them “Communist sympathizers”. When they incite young people to take to the streets, they repudiate the contribution of past generations. This is the political atmosphere the public is immersed in on Taiwan. Naturally any compromise is difficult. Naturally the public uses this simplistic dichotomy to evaluate politicians.

Taiwan politicians are long on lip service and short on speaking from the heart. In this, Tsai Ing-wen ranks among the best. For the longest time, Tsai Ing-wen has never remained fuzzy on specific issues. She speaks in vague terms to conceal her inner thoughts. For example, during the previous election she used the catchphrases "peace despite differences" and "peace to diminish differences" to duck the 1992 consensus. This time, she is using "maintaining the status quo". On the one hand, she denounces the Ma government's cross-Strait policy. On the other hand, she stresses that if elected, she would unconditionally continue the Ma government's ECFA agreement, flagrantly ignoring the glaring self-contradiction.

Recently, Tsai Ing-wen has brimmed over with confidence about the 2016 election. She has visited major industry and business tycoons, as well as small and medium enterprise owners. Nominally, she was "seeking advice". In fact she was seeking political support. She was attempting to win over the business community. Why did she call on the business community first? Why did she not call on labor or activist groups first, and ingratiate herself with them? We know the answer without asking. The sequence reflects her priorities. The former are those she most wants to cozy up to. Lest we forget, back in 2102 Tsai Ing-wen said Big Business supports the 1992 consensus. That means "the KMT and Big Business stand together". If this logic holds, and she is now “seeking advice” from Big Business, then who stands with whom?

What we want to know is not whether Tsai Ing-wen in her heart of hearts is "anti-business" or “anti-labor”. Our concern is that she and the DPP have no comprehensive, non-contradictory strategy to govern the nation. All she does, day after day, is spout empty rhetoric and make feel-good gestures. Once in power she will no longer be able to flip-flop from day to day, without any clue where she wants to go. Tsai Ing-wen may appear confident and poised when speaking. But just how much true faith does she have? Just how much does she really want to help Taiwan? Does she cares only about becoming president, and the DPP wielding full power?

The DPP has never been a leftist political party. During Chen Shui-bian's eight years in power, it swiftly cozied up to Big Business. It was even worse than the Kuomintang. Therefore the anti-business image of the DPP is mere appearance. From this perspective, Tsai Ing-wen's remark "Taiwan has too many holidays” was no surprise. To be a competent national leader, Tsai Ing-wen must resolve the contradiction between paying lip service and speaking from the heart. She cannot continue using ambiguity to avoid taking a stand, and citing “verbal gaffes” to evade responsibility.

蔡英文從「反商」到「反勞」？
2015-05-15 聯合報

蔡英文最近展開一連串拜會工商界人士的行程，試圖洗刷民進黨的「反商」形象，爭取企業界的信任。不料，她在彰濱工業區與廠商座談時，竟信口說出：「老實講，我真的也覺得台灣的假休太多了！」此話一出，外界譁然，更引起勞工團體痛批，蔡英文隨即在臉書上致歉。

還原當天的現場，蔡英文是在回應廠商有關工時與休假問題時，發表了上述的談話。對於廠商抱怨立法院一審通過《勞基法》修正草案，把勞工每周工時降低為四十小時，她把責任推給對手說：「那都是國民黨自己提出來的」，言下對縮減工時並不苟同，因而表明她覺得「假休太多」。蔡英文並說，民進黨其實有一個「更彈性」的備案，卻不知道為什麼，國民黨的草案就這樣通過了。

在日語的表達當中，有所謂的「建前」（場面話）與「本音」（真心話）之別，那麼，蔡英文在廠商面前說出「假放太多」，究竟是她的「建前」，或是「本音」呢？她是「真心話」，還是「失言」？而如果是「老實講」，為什麼還要道歉？

這些問題，恐怕連蔡英文自己也無法回答。在蔡英文心裡，她應是確實覺得台灣的假放得太多，否則不會如此輕易脫口而出，還加上一句「老實講」。尤其，坐在自己對面的，又是各種類型的中小企業廠商，這麼說一定最能和他們「博感情」。當然，如果蔡英文見的是勞工團體，這種話絕對不會從她嘴裡出來。因此，我們只能說，這恐怕是蔡英文「真心的失言」：當她急於拉攏資方時，她的心裡真的沒空想到勞工。

蔡英文為了洗刷綠營「反商」形象，卻跌入「反勞」的坑洞，這個陷阱，其實正是民進黨自己挖掘的。民進黨長期以來喜歡用「兩極化」的觀點談論公共事務：凡是與自己的主張不同的，便指為邪惡；於是在爭取勞工及環保選票時，便極力醜化企業經營者；在杯葛兩岸議題時，就給台商和藍軍扣上紅帽子；在鼓動年輕人上街時，就把上一代人的努力全部抹殺。台灣民眾在這種政治氛圍浸淫下，當然很難有折衷觀點，也學會用這種「二分法」看待政治人物。

台灣的政治人物，向來多「建前」而少「本音」，蔡英文也是其中佼佼者。長期以來，蔡英文對於特定政策從不輕易表示明確態度，時常以籠統、模糊的詞彙，來隱藏她內心真正的想法。例如，她在上次大選以「和而不同」、「和而求同」來規避「九二共識」，這次則以「維持現狀」一語帶過；在操作上，她一方面反對馬政府的兩岸政策，一方面又強調要概括承受馬政府所簽署的ＥＣＦＡ協議，矛盾而不自以為兀。

最近，蔡英文對於二○一六選情自信滿滿，因而大舉拜會工商大老及中小企業主，名為「請益」，實則為表現她對企業界的親善。她為何選擇先從拜訪企業界下手，而不是先向勞工或社運團體交心，我們不得而知；但這樣的次序，顯然反映了她的選擇與價值，覺得前者是她首先要拉攏的對象。若不健忘，人們應記得二○一二年蔡英文說過：大財團挺九二共識，所以代表「國民黨與大財團站在一起」；如果這樣的邏輯成立，她今天進行的企業請益之旅，又是跟誰站在一起？

我們想要探究的，並非蔡英文是不是「反商」，或者她骨子裡有多少「反勞」成分。我們關心的，是她和民進黨有沒有一套比較完整、而不自相矛盾的治國方略，而不是天天在那裡努力把空話說得漂亮，把姿態擺得八面玲瓏卻模糊曖昧；而一旦執政，卻可能忽東忽西搖擺，不知道自己要往哪裡去。我們同樣關心的，是在蔡英文貌似自信而優雅的談吐中，究竟含有多少真實的信念，想要把台灣帶到更好的境界；或者，她關心的只是自己能不能坐上總統大位，民進黨能不能全面掌權？

民進黨從來不是一個左派政黨，在陳水扁執政的八年，它迅速和各路財團建立了緊密的關係，比國民黨猶有過之。因此，民進黨的「反商」形象，其實只是表面；從這個角度看，蔡英文會說「假休太多」，並不意外。問題在，要當一個稱職的國家領導人，蔡英文必須學會解決自己「建前」和「本音」的矛盾，不要老是用模糊策略來迴避立場，老是用「失言」來逃避責任。

Clean Government Committee is a Loose Cannon: Professor Ke Must Act

Clean Government Committee is a Loose Cannon: Professor Ke Must Act
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 14, 2015

Executive Summary: Just what is the Taipei City Clean Government Committee doing? What does it want? Many people want to know. Ko Wen-che became Taipei Mayor by a landslide. We would like to believe that when he established this committee he wanted to get at the truth and uncover corruption. Unfortunately as facts now show, the committee itself has become a source of chaos, and responsible for the destruction of the rule of law. The committee itself has become a problem that must be fixed.

Full Text Below:

Just what is the Taipei City Clean Government Committee doing? What does it want? Many people want to know. Ko Wen-che became Taipei Mayor by a landslide. We would like to believe that when he established this committee he wanted to get at the truth and uncover corruption. Unfortunately as facts now show, the committee itself has become a source of chaos, and responsible for the destruction of the rule of law. The committee itself has become a problem that must be fixed.

Problem One. Its status is unclear. This must be addressed. The commission is not a statutory body. Given its name, it sounds like some sort of anti-corruption agency, like Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption. But this committee was established through administrative procedures. Its function is merely advisory. It is not a statutory body. First, it has no formal investigative powers. Second, it cannot issue orders to the municipal government. Third, it has no budget or staff. It can only operate under the administrative authority of the Taipei City Government. It can only access information from affiliated agencies of the municipal government.

The Democratic Progressive Party has long criticized the KMT government for black box operations that lack legal foundation. The "Clean Government Committee" was established without the consent of the legislature or the city council. It is not subject to public oversight. Therefore the committee itself is a black box operation. Mayor Ko says he respects the integrity of the independent investigators on the committee. That is nonsense, since the committee is not independent, and its members are not investigators.

Problem Two. The status of the members is unclear, and fails to meet basic standards. Since the commission is merely advisory in nature, it should merely advise on matters of corruption and transparent governance. Yet since its establishment, members have made no constructive suggestions. They have merely followed the mayor's orders, and latched on to the five so-called "scandals". Many members stage frequent photo ops with designated media channels. They spin the government's official data according to their own subjective perceptions. They attempt to mislead the public about the five alleged "scandals" and make them forget that the commission members are “expressly required to respect confidentiality."

The performance of the committee members has been poor. Their reports have been sketchy. Strictly speaking, they are even inferior to term papers presented by the average graduate student. Much of their terminology is inaccurate. They often resort to emotional language. They often indulge in wild speculation instead of than rigorous exposition. Most outrageous of all, they never even interviewed the accused. They merely listed their names in their report, then challenged them "take the initiative to come forward to explain" when indicted.

Since the committee wants to refer the cases to the justice system, it must of course state why. But if one examines the report, its main argument is the "inference" that the mayor held a secret meeting with the manufacturers in order to alter the contract for private advantage, therefore the Taipei City Government should refer the case to the Ministry of Justice.

The committee failed to note that this “secret meeting place” was the conference room of the Taipei City Government. Many people attended this open meeting which was held in public. What precisely makes it a "secret meeting"? Also, the Ministry of Justice is not the governmental entity the case should be referred to. The commission's actions had nothing to do with its advisory function, and everything to do with framing the Taipei City Government. It brought Ko Wen-che another step closer to the partisan political battles the people detest.

Many people have been hoping that Ko Wen-che would transcend blue vs. green partisan bickering, and introduce a breath of fresh air into Taiwan's political atmosphere. Mayor Ko Wen-che's personal style is indeed candid. He does want to create a new municipal government. Unfortunately, the status of the committee was unclear from the outset. The status of its members was also unclear. It eventually became utterly detached from its original purpose. It became what many intellectuals fear, a new generation fascist white terror black box operation.

Mayor Ko has long been willing to engage in self-examination and change. This is why many people support him. The commission is a loose cannon. Mayor Ko must be bold and decisive. He must not permit himself to be hijacked by the committee. He must ensure that the committee operates on the basis of the law, promotes clean government, and upgrades the quality of committee members. Mayor Ko must launch committee version 2.0 to correct existing mistakes. He must ensure that the committee is as honest and transparent as originally advertised.

廉委會成自走炮 柯P該斷則斷
2015年05月14日 中國時報

台北市政府廉政透明委員會到底在做什麼？又想做什麼？相信是許多民眾都深感好奇的問題。我們願意相信，當柯文哲挾其壓倒性得票率就任台北市長之初，大力推動成立這個委員會，應出於發掘真相、檢討弊案的公共善意，可惜的是，事實證明這個委員會已成為破壞法治的亂源，本身就是必須正視與改造的問題。

問題一、定位錯亂必須改正：廉政委員會不是法定機關，從名稱上來看，似乎是一個如同香港廉政公署般的肅貪機構，但這個委員會只是依行政辦法成立的委員會，基本上只具有諮詢功能，不是法定機構。一來沒有正式調查權，二來令不出市政府，三來沒有預算與助理，只能假借台北市政府的行政權柄，去向市政府所屬各機構調閱資料。

過去民進黨經常批評國民黨政府有黑機關，批判準則就是法源之有無，現在這個「廉政委員會」，既沒有經過立法院或台北市議會同意設立，也不受民意機構的監督。依此而論，確實是黑機關。柯市長曾說過他尊重廉政委員的獨立辦案，此言差矣，因為這個委員會既非獨立，更不能辦案。

問題二、委員認知錯亂，不見基本水準：廉政委員會既然只是諮詢性質，就應該謹守角色，認真針對台北市政的廉政透明事宜提出建議，但是自從委員會成立以來，未見委員會成員提出廉政的建設性意見，反而只知秉承市長之意，死咬所謂五大「弊案」。許多委員屢屢站上媒體第一線，依據個人主觀認知包裝來自政府機關的公務資料，外流給特定媒體人士，企圖誤導社會對所謂五大「弊案」的認知與態度，全然忘記委員會設置要點中明示委員「應負保密義務」。

至於廉政委員諸公表現欠佳，已具體呈現在報告中，內容品質粗糙，嚴格來講，甚至比不上一般研究生期末作業的水準，包括許多用語不夠精準、甚至經常使用情緒性的措辭，而且還有諸多推論不嚴謹的臆測論述，最誇張的就是居然沒有訪談主要當事人，只在報告公布、並且揚言移送時才放話說「歡迎當事人主動來說明」。

退一步來說，廉政委員會既然要建請移送司法，當然必須具體指出移送的理由，但是檢視其內容，主要論點卻只是「推論」市長與廠商密會後修改合約涉及圖利，因此建請台北市政府將全案移送法務部。

廉政委員會並沒有說明，為什麼這場所謂密會的地點，是在台北市政府會議室。既然是多人參加、在公開場合舉行的公開會議，為何構成「密會」？也忽略了法務部根本不是移送的受理單位。廉政委員會這些表現，當然沒有發揮應有的諮詢功能，反而陷害台北市政府於困局，更一步步把柯文哲帶到了民眾最厭惡的政治惡鬥泥淖中。

許多民眾曾經寄望柯文哲能夠打破藍綠惡鬥，給台灣政壇帶來耳目一新的面貌。回顧過去，柯文哲市長確實也秉持個人坦率風格，積極努力想要推動新市政。可惜的是，廉政委員會的布局，一開始就定位錯亂，委員們又認知錯亂，終於完全脫離了當初設置的目的，變成了許多知識分子口中的新一代法西斯白色恐怖黑機關。

柯市長一向勇於自我檢討與進化，這也是許多民眾支持他的原因。面對已經荒腔走板的廉政委員會，柯市長應該壯士斷腕，停止再被這個委員會綁架與利用。只要確立法源與定位、整合現有政風功能，並且提高廉政委員會的位階與專業素質，柯市長立即就能推出廉政委員會2.0版來矯正既有過失，從而深化標榜廉政透明的初衷。

Tsai Ing-wen's Status Quo is Nothing Like Washington's

Tsai Ing-wen's Status Quo is Nothing Like Washington's
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2015

Executive Summary: Xi Jingping stresses adherence to the 1992 consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. Without the 1992 consensus “the two sides' foundation would no longer be secure and the earth would shake". Tsai Ing-wen refuses to abandon the Taiwan independence party platform. She seeks to “maintain the cross-Strait status quo" while repudiating the 1992 consensus. She offers no specific proposals, only slogans. That is a dangerous thing to do. The ROC needs a president who can stabilize the situation and ensure the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. It does not need a troublemaker who trots out fuzzy policies as camouflage for Taiwan independence.

Full Text Below:

DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen is the DPP's 2016 presidential candidate. On the 29th of this month, she will visit the United States in order to submit to an “oral exam”. American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Raymond Burghardt will soon visit Taiwan. He will meet with high-ranking government and party leaders, including Tsai Ing-wen as well.

The maintenance of stability in the Taiwan Strait is the cornerstone of American strategic interests in East Asia. Who is in authority on Taiwan affects Beijing/Washington relations. It also affects peace and prosperity in East Asia. Washington is concerned that the current election might end communications between Taipei and Beijing. That could result in miscalculations on either side or military conflict. It could even undermine the vital interests of the United States in the Western Pacific. Therefore Washington is deeply concerned about the leading candidates' cross-Strait policy platforms, especially Tsai Ing-wen's. It hopes to accurately gauge her cross-Strait policy path in case she comes to power. The Burghart/Tsai meeting amounts to a “pre-exam” before her “oral exam” in Washington. .

When Tsai Ing-wen won the DPP party nomination, she told reporters she advocated "maintaining the cross-strait status quo". She later told Taiwan independence elements that her maintenance of the cross-Strait status quo “was the same as the US government's." She probably cited the United States position to preempt any backlash from Taiwan independence elements. That may silence Taiwan independence elements. But it does nothing to address the defects in DPP cross-Strait policy.

Tsai Ing-wen must understand that Washington's handling of the Taiwan issue includes five interlocking elements. (A) Adherence to US one-China policy and the "One Law and Three Communiques" frameworkd. (B) Adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act, continued provision of defensive weapons to maintain cross-Strait military equilibrium. (C) Explicit opposition to unilateral changes in the status quo in cross-Strait relations, in word or in deed, no support for Taiwan independence, as well as opposition to CCP military annexation of Taiwan. (D) The United States supports the democratization of Mainland China. It believes that if Mainland society becomes more open and free, this will narrow the gap between the two sides' lifestyles and political systems. The US hopes to promote cross-Strait peace and resolve cross-Strait differences, (E) It is in the United States' strategic interest to maintain peace and stability in the region and to reach a peaceful settlement.

Is Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait status quo actually consistent with Washington's? Or is it nothing more than short term campaign strategy? If it is, then she must clarify her position on "one China", and declare that she does not support Taiwan independence. Alas, Tsai Ing-wen's “maintenance of the status quo” is definitely not Washington's. The key distinction is in the meaning of "one China". The DPP argues that one China does not include Taiwan. The United States argues that one China does include Taiwan. The United States insists that any change in the status quo must be achieved through peaceful means. The US position is actually closer to the KMT's position. The KMT adheres to the 1992 consensus, to the KMT version of the definition of one China, based on the consensus the two sides reached in 1992, with "one China, different interpretations" which the Mainland was willing to accept.

Over the past seven years, the KMT has proved that the steady development of cross-Strait relations has enabled the United States to maintain cooperation with both governments. Therefore, as former American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Richard Bush noted, the US government attaches great importance to the policies set forth by political parties on the Mainland and Taiwan. Maintaining cross-Strait peace and stability is the shared responsibility of the United States, the Mainland, and Taiwan.

The public on Taiwan hopes to continue consultations with the Mainland. This includes Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, the passage of the MTA, the establishment of cross-Strait representative offices, issues of concern to both sides, participation in regional economic integration, sustainable development of cross-Strait peace and prosperity. Meanwhile, Taiwan will actively seek to membership in multilateral regional economic organizations such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Alas, the lack of a political basis for cross-Strait economic cooperation will make Taiwan's participation in regional economic integration mechanisms extremely difficult. Therefore presidential candidates from all political parties must confront the “China Factor” and strike a balance between cross-Strait economic policy and cross-Strait political policy.

Mainland China has undergone rapid economic growth in recent years. This has significantly increased international interaction and led to dramatic changes in people's lifestyles. This has inspired a new generation to pursue new ideas about freedom and democracy. The two sides have opened up channels of communication, politically, economically, and culturally. Communications and interactions continue to increase. , Taiwan's experience with democracy and constitutional rule may exert to some extent, a quiet influence on the Mainland. This may help the United States to understand the Republic of China's experience with democracy and constitutional rule. Its experience did more than ensure democracy and economic prosperity on Taiwan. It has also influenced democracy and constitutional rule on the Mainland. A prosperous Taiwan will facilitate the emergence of a democratic Mainland.

Xi Jingping stresses adherence to the 1992 consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. Without the 1992 consensus “the two sides' foundation would no longer be secure and the earth would shake". Tsai Ing-wen refuses to abandon the Taiwan independence party platform. She seeks to “maintain the cross-Strait status quo" while repudiating the 1992 consensus. She offers no specific proposals, only slogans. That is a dangerous thing to do. The ROC needs a president who can stabilize the situation and ensure the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. It does not need a troublemaker who trots out fuzzy policies as camouflage for Taiwan independence.

蔡英文的維持現狀與美國大不同

代表民進黨角逐2016年總統大位的蔡英文主席，29日即將赴美「接受口試」，美國在台協會理事主席薄瑞光適時訪台，除拜會我黨政高層外，預期也會和蔡英文會面。

維繫台海安定是美國東亞戰略利益的基石，台灣政權遞嬗攸關中美台互動前景，也對東亞地區能否保持和平繁榮影響甚鉅。美國擔憂，兩岸間的交流溝通管道若因這次選舉結果而中斷，可能導致雙方的誤判，甚至引發潛在軍事衝突，破壞美國西太平洋地區的關鍵利益，因此高度關注主要候選人的兩岸政策，尤其對蔡英文，希望能精準掌握她如果執政後的兩岸政策走向。如果我們形容這次薄蔡會是蔡英文「口試」的「預考」，應該不為過。

蔡英文在獲民進黨提名的記者會表示，她主張「維持兩岸現狀」，後來更告訴獨派，維持兩岸現狀「與美國政府立場一樣」，她也許希望拿美國壓制獨派的反彈，但這句話也許可以封獨派的嘴，要擺脫民進黨兩岸議題困境卻斷無可能。

蔡英文應該明白，美國政府處理台海議題，有5個環環相扣的要素：（一）堅守美國的一個中國政策立場和「一法三公報」架構；（二）遵循台灣關係法規範，繼續提供台灣防禦性武器，以保持兩岸軍力動態平衡；（三）明確反對兩岸任何一方做出片面改變現狀言行，既不支持台灣獨立，也反對中共武力併吞台灣；（四）美國支持中國大陸政治民主化，因為美國認為，大陸社會越開放、越自由，將會拉近兩岸生活方式和政治制度差距，同時也將為兩岸和平化解歧見，增加成功的機會；（五）美國對台海議題的戰略利益是維持此地區和平穩定與和平解決。

如果蔡英文的維持兩岸現狀主張，真的與美國政府立場一致，而不是暫時性的選舉策略，那麼，就應對「一個中國」內涵提出清楚的說明，並表態不支持台獨。但蔡英文的「維持現狀」絕對不是美國的「維持現狀」，兩者最核心的差異在「一個中國」認知。民進黨認為「一個中國」不包含台灣，美國卻承認一個中國包含台灣，但美國堅持改變現狀必須經由和平手段。美國的立場其實與國民黨較接近，國民黨堅持的「九二共識」，是國民黨版的一個中國定義，是依據兩岸在1992年達成「一個中國、各自表述」的共識，大陸也願意接受。

過去7年國民黨執政已證明，兩岸關係穩健發展能促使美國同時與兩岸政府維持建設性合作互動。因此，美國在台協會前理事主席卜睿哲表示，美國政府重視的是大陸與台灣各政黨提出的整套政策，是否能維持台海和平與穩定，因為這是美中台共同的責任。

台灣民眾希望未來繼續與大陸協商，包括陸客來台中轉、兩岸貨貿協議、兩岸兩會互設辦事機構，以及兩岸共同參與區域經濟整合等雙方關切的議題，期能促進兩岸永續和平與繁榮；同時，台灣也將積極爭取參與跨太平洋夥伴協議（TPP），區域全面經濟夥伴協議（RCEP），以及亞投行（AIIB）等多邊區域經濟組織。但是，兩岸若缺少經濟合作的政治基礎，台灣參與區域經濟整合機制將會非常困難。因此，任何政黨的總統候選人都需要面對「中國因素」的現實，在經濟政策與兩岸政策間求得平衡。

大陸近年來經濟快速成長，國際互動明顯增加，人民生活方式已產生巨大變化，促發了大陸新世代追求自由民主的新思維。尤其兩岸開放交流迄今，無論是在政治、經濟，以及文化等層面，透過持續深化的溝通互動，讓台灣民主憲政發展過程中的經驗與價值，在潛移默化中對大陸社會與人民產生不同程度的影響，同時也讓美國瞭解，中華民國發展民主憲政，不僅能夠成為民主與經濟繁榮國度，更對中國大陸未來民主憲政發展產生正面影響，讓「幸福台灣，民主中華」效應，日益擴大。

習近平強調，堅持九二共識、反對台獨，若沒有九二共識，兩岸「基礎不牢，地動山搖」。蔡英文不改變台獨黨綱、否定九二共識前提下的「兩岸維持現狀」主張，只是提不出具體方案的口號，這是非常危險的。台灣需要一位能夠拿出辦法，穩住兩岸關係和平發展大局的總統，而不是一位用模糊策略包裝台獨的麻煩製造者。