Weekend Replacement of Hung Hsiu-chu: Three Scenarios

Weekend Replacement of Hung Hsiu-chu: Three Scenarios
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 13, 2015

Executive Summary: The Kuomintang Provisional National Party Congress met this Saturday to consider replacing Hung Hsiu-chu as KMT presidential candidate. Those who seek to replace Hung and those who seek to retain Hung now find themselves at loggerheads. Unless Eric Chu and Hung Hsiu-chu reach some sort of accord, the session will become an embarrassment. Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen said the biggest difference between the DPP and the KMT is unity. The DPP is currently the most united it has ever been in history. When the blue camp hears comments like this, one can only wonder how it feels?

Full Text Below:

The Kuomintang Provisional National Party Congress met this Saturday to consider replacing Hung Hsiu-chu as KMT presidential candidate. Those who seek to replace Hung and those who seek to retain Hung now find themselves at loggerheads. Unless Eric Chu and Hung Hsiu-chu reach some sort of accord, the session will become an embarrassment. Yesterday Tsai Ing-wen said the biggest difference between the DPP and the KMT is unity. The DPP is currently the most united it has ever been in history. When the blue camp hears comments like this, one can only wonder how it feels?

The Kuomintang's 2016 election prospects are what they are today because the party lacks unity. For the general public, unity is nothing more than a slogan. But for a political party, lack of unity means the lack of a unified goal. It means the inability to win public support. Consider the blue camp's current plight. One. Ma, Chu, Wang, Wu and other leaders each have their own selfish agendas that trump larger considerations. Two. Local factions flip-flop endlessly. The blue camp is falling to pieces. The Party Central Committee is now at odds with Hung Hsiu-chu, the very candidate it nominated. It is utterly indifferent to the enemy at the gates. The situation resembles the situation in 2000, on the eve of the first change in ruling parties.

The KMT is already in dire straits. Yet it persists in internal power struggles. Apparently it has not woken up from last year's election debacle. Handicapped by internal strife, it has no chance whatsoever of reversing its political fortunes. Any political party that enages in such internecine power struggles will inevitably self-destruct. It hardly needs outside enemies. By contrast, the prospects of the DPP, normally characterized by factionalism and turf fights, are now bright. Its leaders are willing to set aside their differences and unite under the command of Tsai Ing-wen. This temporary harmony may be illusory. But it is a necessary condition for political party development. If the Kuomintang plenary session fails to reach a resolution this weekend, and allows internal strife to persist, it will not matter whether it replaces Hung with someone else. It will not be able to turn the tide. Unless it addresses the root of the problem, its plight will only worsen.

As matters stand, the plenary session's move to replace Hung has three possible outcomes. One.  Full mobilization and arm-twisting by the KMT Central Committee. Eric Chu replaces Hung Hsiu-chu in the 2016 presidential race. This might not reverse the party's fortunes in the presidential election. But it could offer a coat tails effect in the legislative elections. Two. A majority of party representatives reject the call to replace Hung. They cite a lack of legitimacy. Hung retains the KMT candidacy, but loses the support of the KMT Central Committee and those who sought to replace Hung, making her election prospects even dimmer. Three. Those who champion Hung lash back. Outside the venue, they scream in protest. Eventually the move to replace Hung passes, but only barely, provoking serious internal divisions. Chu loses the support of those who championed Hung. The blowback spreads.

How will it all play out? Outsiders have no way of knowing. But the latter two scenarios are not ones that blue camp supporters are eager to see. The KMT is adopting extraordinary measures. Its purpose is to avoid a debacle during next year's presidential and legislative elections. If so, the task must be accomplished in one fell swoop. The discussions held within the plenary session must end the dispute over the nomination, once and for all. They must mark an end to the "replace Hung" controversy. If any faction remains disgruntled, or stage a boycott, the KMT will not merely lose the upcoming election, all the King's horses and all the King's men will not be able to put Humpty Dumpty back together again.

To avoid such an outcome, the KMT cannot wait for the Chu Hung duel to play out over the weekend. The KMT must assign someone to engage in shuttle diplomacy. It must ensure that those who wish to replace Hung and those who wish to retain Hung conduct themselves in a gentlemanly fashion. Most importantly, Eric Chu and Hung Hsiu-chu must reach a consensus regarding the big picture. They must exercise restraint, in both word and deed. They must not pay lip service to unity and love for the party, while promoting their selfish interests and harming the party. Ideally, before the session, Chu and Hung should shake hands and jointly declare that whatever the decision, the two will work together selflessly for the nominee's campaign. The blue camp must end its internal strife and return to the job of waging an election campaign.

Why can the DPP unite? Why can't the KMT? Several reasons come to mind. One. The KMT leadership is too selfish. Each goes his own way. Two. The KMT lacks core values, as well as the ability to express them. Three. The KMT lacks grass-roots political support. It is out of touch with the pulse of the community. Four. The KMT party structure is outdated. It lacks fairness. Rushing to convene a provisional session shows just how outdated the system is. The blue camp is in dire  straits. If it refuses to unite but persists in quibbling over minutiae, it will die without a plot to bury itself.

The blue camp controversy over whether to replace Hung involves endless debates over hurt feelings, right and wrong, and due process. The situation must not be allowed to deteriorate. Otherwise, when people look back at 2016, will Eric Chu or Hung Hsiu-chu feel greater regret? Before it is too late, the two must think about what they are doing. They must then make the right choice. After all, history cannot be rewound and replayed. A single mistep could lead to eternal regret.

周末換柱大戲的三種想像

2015-10-13 聯合報

分享國民黨將在本周六召開臨時全國黨代表大會，就「換柱」提案作出取捨。以目前換柱、保柱雙方的角力看，除非朱立倫和洪秀柱在會前達成某種程度的和解，否則會中之難堪將可想而知。蔡英文前天說，民進黨和國民黨最大的不同就是「團結」，現在是民進黨有史以來最團結的時刻；這話聽在藍營耳裡，不知作何感想？

國民黨二○一六選情落到今天的地步，一言以蔽之，就是不團結所致。對一般民眾而言，團結不過是句陳腔濫調；但就一個政黨而言，不團結就不可能有一致的目標，就不可能召喚民眾的認同。今天藍營的情勢正是如此：最初，是馬朱王吳等領導人各有私心盤算，置大局於不顧；然後，是地方派系東搖西擺，藍營分崩離析；如今，則是黨中央與其提名的洪秀柱形成對決，渾然不顧敵營已兵臨城下。這情勢，與二○○○年首度政黨輪替前夕的景象有幾分相似。

面對這場大選，國民黨本就情勢嚴峻之極，卻至今仍處於一種「內戰」狀態，似尚未從去年底的敗選中醒轉，如此對立的氣氛自無可能扭轉頹勢。一個耽於內鬥的政黨，自己就能把自己搞垮鬥臭，還需要敵人動手嗎？反觀民進黨，平日派系林立、各有地盤，今天眼見形勢大好，皆願放下歧見，團結在蔡英文麾下。這種臨時的和諧看似取巧，卻是政黨求取發展的必要條件。從這個角度看，周末國民黨的臨全會若不能作出有助排難解紛的決議，卻讓內部戰火繼續延燒，無論換柱計畫成功與否，都無助於力挽狂瀾，只是治絲益棼。

以目前情勢看，臨全會「換柱」大戲的發展有三種可能的想像：其一，經過黨中央全力動員與勸說，「換柱」提案在臨全會中順利通過，由朱立倫代替洪秀柱出馬角逐二○一六大選，雖未必能逆轉總統選情，卻可藉以帶動立委選情。其二，多數黨代表以缺乏「正當性」為由，否決換柱之提議，依然由洪秀柱披掛上陣；在這種情況下，洪秀柱雖保住候選人身分，卻可能全面失去黨中央及「換柱派」的任何援助，局面反而更艱難。其三，「保柱派」人馬強力反彈，在場內外抗議或叫囂，最後雖勉強通過換柱，卻造成內部嚴重撕裂，朱立倫亦失去目前挺柱民眾的支持，後座力繼續延燒。

局面會如何發展，外界無法預料，但後二者應不是藍營樂見的景象。國民黨採取非常手段，目的無非是為了避免明年總統與立委選情的雙雙崩盤，既然如此，即必須畢其功於一役，藉著臨全會的召開和討論，作為黨內結束提名之爭、共同合力對外的宣示，將「換柱」風波徹底終結。如果任何一方仍有不服，甚至仍意圖發動支持者杯葛抵制，那麼國民黨不僅這場大選將未戰先敗，明年敗戰後將是一片分崩離析無可收拾之局。

要如何避免這樣的殘破局面出現，就不能等到周末任由朱洪對決對撞，黨內必須有人居間穿梭，要求換柱和保柱兩方人馬保持君子之爭。最關鍵的，還是朱立倫和洪秀柱必須要有一個大局共識，節制自己和己方人馬之言行；不能嘴巴上談的是團結與愛黨，實際做的卻是為私心私利而害黨。最美好的想像，是在臨全會之前，朱洪兩人能夠握手言和，並共同宣示：無論臨全會如何決定，兩人都會攜手合作，無私地為黨的提名人助選。如此，藍營才能結束這場內戰，回歸民主選舉與政黨政治。

民進黨能團結而國民黨不能，主要原因為：一，領導階層私心盤算太多，各行其是；二，缺乏核心價值與論述能力；三，基層經營耕耘不足，與社會脈動脫節；四，制度老舊鬆散，無法彰顯公平。此刻，之所以倉卒再召開臨全會，即驗證上述每一個環節都出了差錯。問題是，當藍軍城池一片岌岌可危之聲，再不齊心對外，卻還在爭辯小是小非，難道不怕死無葬身之地嗎？

今天藍營的換柱風波，論感情、論是非、論程序，都有爭論不完的事理。重要的是，不能再袖手任由情勢惡化，否則當人們從二○一六回看此局，試問朱立倫或洪秀柱誰會懊悔更多一點？在太遲之前，這兩個人都必須審慎思考自己的作為，作出正確的抉擇；畢竟歷史不能重來，一失足恐成千古恨。

Political Calculations Must Not Obliterate a History of National Suffering

Political Calculations Must Not Obliterate a History of National Suffering
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 10, 2015

Executive Summary: Happy Birthday Republic of China! Today, during a ceremony held before the presidential palace, military personnel, civilians, and students took part and rejoiced amidst the festive atmosphere of Double Ten. In a rare exception, ruling and opposition party leaders were in full attendance.

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Happy Birthday Republic of China! Today, during a ceremony held before the presidential palace, military personnel, civilians, and students took part and rejoiced amidst the festive atmosphere of Double Ten. In a rare exception, ruling and opposition party leaders were in full attendance.

But as the history of Double Ten ceremonies shows, whether ruling and opposition leaders attend makes little difference. Political calculations will be difficult to eliminate. The presidential election is less than 100 days away. The campaign process compelled both ruling and opposition party leaders to attend the ceremonies. For this reason many see the ceremonies as pro form lip service to "one ROC, same interpretation" by parties that have different agendas. These parties actually subscribe to "one ROC, different interpretations". Imagine how loyal citizens of the Republic of China must feel? They yearn for a ceremony that bridges the chasm between blue and green.

Double Ten National Day ceremonies held since the ROC government moved to Taiwan, can be divided into two phases. During the first decade, "Oppose Chinese Communism, and resist the Soviet Union" was the watchword. A single party dominated. No real opposition existed. The nation's direction however, was crystal clear. Double Ten was celebrated universally, with jubilation. A consensus prevailed among the ruling and opposition parties. Everyone watched the National Day parade. Every house displayed the national flag. Everyone remembered those days with fond memories.

In 1991, when President Lee Teng-hui assumed power, organizers of the National Day ceremonies issued an unprecedented invitation to Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Huang Hsin-chieh. Huang was happy to attend. But alas, he was seated outside the VIP area. This and other factors angered Huang, who refused to attend a second time. This year, Tsai Ing-wen attended the National Day ceremonies. The last time an opposition Democratic Progressive Party Chairperson participated in a National Day ceremony was 24 years ago.

When the DPP came to power during Chen Shui-bian's first term, blue camp party chairpersons boycotted all four National Day ceremonies. The blue camp had difficulty accepting a minority president. Its doubts about green camp "backdoor listing" of the ROC have persisted. The divide between blue and green remains insurmountable. In 2005, Ma Ying-jeou became the first KMT Chairperson to attend the National Day ceremony since the change in ruling parties. In 2006, however, the full extent of Chen Shui-bian's corruption came known. That year the National Day ceremony turned into an arena for political conflict. People First Party legislators made a huge row.  Blue and green camp legislators engaged in physical scuffles, and created an international embarrassment. The following year, during the last National Day ceremony of his term, President Chen actually refused to make mention the "Republic of China". He refused to display the "Celebrate the Republic of China National Day" slogan on the presidential palace tower. He replaced it with a sign that read, "Taiwan must join the United Nations".

When the Kuomintang returned to power, the DPP chairperson also refused to attend the National Day ceremony. This year, Tsai Ing-wen eventually decided to attend. With the presidential election approaching, "maintaining the status quo" became an unexpected consensus shared by ruling and opposition parties. Front-runner Tsai Ing-wen once alleged that "The Republic of China is a government in exile". She now postures as a "champion of the ROC constitutional framework". How can she be absent on National Day? Therefore, Tsai Ing-wen has "revised her agenda" and participated in the National Day ceremony. Her attendance was facetiously characterized as "an inauguration ceremony in advance".

Imagine the National Day ceremonies next year. in the event Tsai Ing-wen becomes the star of the show. As New Party Chairman Yok Mu-ming said, when the Democratic Progressive Party was in power, Republic of China flags were piled up like garbage following New Year's Day flag-raising and National Day ceremonies. Will such scenes be reenacted? The Kuomintang is undergoing intraparty strife. No one is asking Tsai Ing-wen how she intends to "maintain the status quo", or even what she means by "maintaining the status quo". Tsai Ing-wen and her fellow Taiwan independence supporters are already see Taiwan independence as "innate" and "natural". Their "defense" of the ROC is mere backdoor listing and expedience. How can they possibly be expected to treat the Republic of China with sincerity? Tsai Ing-wen claims that she attended the National Day ceremonies in order to end blue vs. green opposition, to work toward tolerance, reconciliation, and social unity.

The KMT probably cannot imagine what next year's National Day ceremony will look like. President Ma Ying-jeou could not conceal his embarrassment at the last Double Ten ceremony held during his administration. The impass over "removing Hung and replacing her with Chu" persists. The prospect of a head-on collision remains. Ma has no solution for internal party disunity. Ma has no power to conduct foreign policy. All Ma can do is watch power change hands, while the nation undergoes a changing of the guard. Where will the blue camp party princes who attended this year's National Day ceremonies find themselves next year? Can Eric Chu and Hung Hsiu-chu reach an understanding? Can they bury the hatchet, fight shoulder to shoulder, share responsibility, and prevent the structure from collapsing? Does the KMT really intend to wait until it loses public support, then create a scene at the National Day ceremony?

The Double Ten National Day ceremony should be an event that does not distinguish between ruling or opposition party affiliation. But for the past twenty years, it has been subject to the rise and fall of ruling vs. opposition party political status, not to mention public support for sundry political stars. They have never allowed the birthday party of the ROC to be a true ceremony that the people as a whole may enjoy.

The theme of this year's National Day ceremony is "Unite in love for Taiwan. Create a new future together". It is inscribed on a gateway straddling Ketagalan Boulevard. A reviewing stand for ruling and opposition leaders has been erected in front of the Presidential Palace. This will be the last National Day ceremony held while Ma Ying-jeou is president. Both ruling and opposition parties will participate. Ruling and opposition party leaders each have their own calculations. But as we watch military personnel, civilians, and students put on their show, remember to wish the nation well.

Happy birthday, Republic of China. Long may it live!

一頁國慶滄桑史，怎堪政治算計百摧磨

2015-10-10 聯合報

中華民國，生日快樂！今天在總統府前的國慶大會上，當軍民學生一起獻上精采表演，展現歡欣鼓舞、齊賀雙十的節慶氛圍之時，朝野政黨領袖也難得齊聚，共同獻上了「全出席」的國慶大禮。

只是，翻開一頁國慶大會史，朝野領袖無論出不出席，都難脫政治考量。明年總統大選投票距今不到百日，選情的發展，催出了今年國慶大會朝野領袖共同出席的盛況。正因如此，許多人認為，那恐怕是一個典禮上「一國同表」行禮如儀，內心裡「一國各表」另有盤算的場景；但這對過生日的中華民國將情何以堪，國民期待的是一個跨越鴻溝、藍綠同慶的盛典。

中華民國政府播遷來台後的雙十國慶大會，大抵可分成兩階段。在前數十年「反共抗俄」時期，雖然一黨獨大，沒有真正像樣的在野黨，但國家方向清楚，雙十時節，「普天同慶、薄海歡騰」就是朝野的共同賀辭；而國慶看閱兵、家戶掛國旗，也早已成為全民共同記憶。

民國八十年國慶，李登輝掌總統大位時，主辦單位首次以黨主席名銜發出邀請函給當時的民進黨主席黃信介，黃也欣然出席。但因座位被安排在貴賓區外圍等原因讓黃信介不滿，此後未再出席。蔡英文今年出席國慶大會，算一算，上次在野的民進黨主席參加國慶大典，竟然已是廿四年前的事了。

至於民進黨執政時期，陳水扁第一個總統任期內的四個國慶，藍營政黨主席全數缺席。面對少數總統，藍營難以心服；中華民國被借殼的疑慮，始終未除；藍綠鴻溝，終究難以跨越。直到民國九十四年，馬英九才成為政黨輪替以來第一個參加國慶大會的國民黨主席。但隨著九十五年陳水扁貪腐案逐漸被揭發，終讓當年國慶大典成了抗爭秀場，親民黨立委大鬧會場、藍綠立委扭打衝突的難堪場面傳遍國際。翌年扁任內最後一次國慶，總統談話竟避提「中華民國」，總統府塔樓更拒掛「慶祝中華民國國慶」標語，改懸「台灣入聯」口號。

國民黨奪回政權後的國慶，民進黨主席也均未參加，今年蔡英文終於出席。隨著總統大選逼近，「維持現狀」意外成為朝野最大共識；明年最有希望入主總統府的蔡英文，縱使曾稱「中華民國是流亡政府」，但既言「中華民國憲政體制」，則中華民國國慶豈能缺席？因此，蔡英文「調整行程」，參加國慶，並被戲稱是「勝券在握、提前見習」。

那麼，想像明年此時的國慶畫面，如果蔡英文成為大典主角，新黨主席郁慕明所說，過去民進黨執政時元旦升旗、國慶大典後，中華民國國旗被參與民眾丟棄在垃圾桶、堆積如山的場景，會再度出現嗎？現在國民黨內亂方殷，已經沒人追問蔡英文要如何「維持現狀」或維持「什麼現狀」了；但蔡英文的重要課題之一，當在思考如何讓自己及其把台獨當「基因」或「天然成分」的支持者，摒棄權宜或借殼心態，真誠對待中華民國。這樣，蔡英文所稱盼藉出席國慶典禮，終結藍綠對立，用包容、和解來團結社會的目的，庶幾能逐漸達成。

至於國民黨，大概已經不敢想像明年此時的國慶畫面了。馬英九總統任內的最後一個雙十慶典，難掩尷尬。「抽柱換朱」僵局未解，火車對撞危機猶存，對內團結無方，對外征戰無力，眼看政權拱手，江山易幟，今年在國慶觀禮台上的藍營天王諸將，明年安在？朱立倫和洪秀柱如果不能相互諒解，放棄前嫌，並肩作戰，共同承擔，扶大廈之將傾，難道要等到社稷不奉，再度以鬧場秀的方式出席國慶大典？

雙十國慶大會，原應是不分黨派、顏色，朝野共同參與的慶祝盛會，但廿多年來，卻始終隨著政局起伏與朝野易位而迭生枝節，更不要說是受這些政治菁英影響的廣大支持群眾，都讓中華民國的生日派對，始終缺乏真正朝野共賀、全民同歡的氣氛。

今年國慶大會「齊心愛台灣、共創新未來」主軸的大牌樓，早在凱達格蘭大道矗立；朝野領袖齊聚的觀禮台，也已在總統府前架好，國慶大會政治大秀舞台準備就緒。難得馬英九執政的最後一次國慶，朝野同賀；雖然朝野領袖各懷政治盤算，但在觀賞軍民學生的歡樂表演時，莫忘國民最誠摯的祝願：

中華民國，生日快樂，國祚延綿！

Inadequate Internationalization Lethal for Higher Education on Taiwan

Inadequate Internationalization Lethal for Higher Education on Taiwan
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 8, 2015

Executive Summary: A few days ago, The Times "Higher Education" supplement published its global university rankings for 2016. Twenty-four universities on Taiwan made the list. But their overall performance was far from satisfactory, National Taiwan University fell 13 places to 167th.  Tsinghua University, National Chiao Tung University , National Cheng Kung University fell even further, to 41st, 58th, and 73rd places respectively. Only the National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, the leading technical and vocational institute on Taiwan, rose 25 places to 333rd, surpassing National Chiao Tung University and National Cheng Kung University. We must of course face the ugly truth. But in doing so, we must also be prudent. Education is a long term project. It must be carefully considered. We must not draw hasty conclusions or make ill-considered decisions.

Full Text Below:

A few days ago, The Times "Higher Education" supplement published its global university rankings for 2016. Twenty-four universities on Taiwan made the list. But their overall performance was far from satisfactory, National Taiwan University fell 13 places to 167th.  Tsinghua University, National Chiao Tung University , National Cheng Kung University fell even further, to 41st, 58th, and 73rd places respectively. Only the National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, the leading technical and vocational institute on Taiwan, rose 25 places to 333rd, surpassing National Chiao Tung University and National Cheng Kung University. We must of course face the ugly truth. But in doing so, we must also be prudent. Education is a long term project. It must be carefully considered. We must not draw hasty conclusions or make ill-considered decisions.

According to The TImes official website, the survey adopted five criterion: teaching, research, dissertations, internationalization, and corporate sponsorship. The first three criteria accounted for 30% of the score. The latter two criteria accounted for 7.5% and 2.5% of the score respectively. Taiwan performed poorly according to all criteria. Only NTU received over 50 points for education, and 100 points for corporate contributions. National Chiao Tung University and Tai Keda received over 90 points. But 2.5% in weighted rankings failed to raise its final standing. Taiwan ranked lowest overal in internationalization. National Taiwan University and National Taiwan Normal University scored 38.1 points and 27.7 points. The University of Singapore ranked first in Asia for internationalization. It received 96.2 points. The University of Hong Kong received 99.5 points, a near perfect score. The shortfall between Taiwan and others is excessive. The same problem plagues Japan. The University of Tsukuba received 34.4 points. The University of Tokyo received 30.3 points. Japan's ranking also fell.

The internationalization index was only 7.5%. It was divided into three categories: internationalization of faculty, internationalization of students, and internationalization of cooperation. These indices put a non-English-speaking society and an island "nation" with limited resources at a disadvantage. But these bear on the previous categories. Teaching, research, and dissertations conducted in languages other than English suffer. For example, the colonial experience of Hong Kong and Singapore make English the most widely used language in society. Large numbers of English textbooks and books in other original languages are used. Internationalization is much easier to implement there than on Taiwan. English research is published in international journals. This enables much greater internationalization than on Taiwan. Rankings for many traditional schools in Japan, Korea and other countries have fallen over the years for this reason. If our government no longer values university internationalization, Taiwan's ranking will fall even more.

Last September, Japan's Ministry of Education declared that 13 schools would implement key reforms. Entrance exams would include TOEFL aptitude tests. The ratio of foreign teachers would be increased to 50%. The ratio of foreign language classes would be increased to 20%. Annual salaries for teachers would be increased as well. Outstanding teachers would receive special awards. These measures constitute responses to crises in internationalization. They warrant our consideration.

The provision and creation of internationalized education are closely related. The international battle for international scholars is especially critical. University professor salaries on Taiwan lag far behind international standards. Last year Saudi-Arabia offered 10 million NT annual salaries. This, plus dormitories and laboratories, lured several professors away from National Taiwan University. Mainland China spent lavishly to attract international talent. In fact, Peking University and Tsinghua University have recruited hundreds of talented teachers since 2001. They introduced Yang Chen-ning and other Nobel Prize winners to Tsinghua and Peking. They invited more than a dozen Nobel Prize winners to act as lecturers. These are critical to high scores in internationalization.

In recent years famous schools on the Mainland have received full government support. They have also been provided abundant external resources. The the ENN Group donated 300 million RMB to Peking University this year. It provided incentives to outstanding teachers for industry academia cooperation. No wonder Peking University has scored 100 points for two consecutive years for corporate contributions.

By contrast, Taiwan is stretched to the limit. As NTU Vice President Chen Liang-chi said, "International exchanges require us to actually go out, or others to actually come in. If we lack funds, then phone calls and emails will not lead to true internationalization. As an old addage advises, "Upon encountering a man of virtue, strive to become his equal." Taiwan must provide government resources. It must establish corporate foundations. Corporate resources will attract world-class teachers and raise the academic standing of our universities.

The government once established world-class universities. It invested 50 billion dollars over five years. It enabled key domestic universities to enage in leading edge research and teaching. But in recent years, Ministry of Education funding has been slashed. Generous financial support once enabled the world to participate in University Union conferences. Now only a handful are able to participate. Our international prestige and academic exposure have naturally declined.

Society is responsible for our inadequate internationalization. We must ask ourselves why people have neglected the need for internationalization. Singapore's high degree of internationalization is attributable to its use of English as an official language. It is also the result of television coverage of international news in English, and Singaporean society concern for political, economic, and social developments the world over.

Taiwan television cares only about "native" tempests in teapots. The public lacks exposure to international news. Society lacks appreciation for the vital importance of internationalization.

國際化不足 害慘台灣高等教育

2015年10月08日 中國時報

日前《泰晤士報》高等教育特刊（Times Higher Education）公布2016年最新全球大學排名，台灣雖然高達24所大學進入排名，但整體表現並不理想，台大倒退13名，成為第167名，清華、交大、成大排名下滑速度更是驚人，分別退步41、58、73名。表現較為優異的只有技職龍頭台科大，逆勢上揚25名，排名333，超越交大及成大。面對殘酷事實當然必須檢討，但檢討時要審慎，教育為國家百年基業，必須慎思明辨，避免即興式藥方與決策。

根據官方網站指出，該項調查主要是以各校教學、研究、論文引用、國際化程度、企業捐贈共5項指標來進行分析。前3項各占30%，後兩項分別占7.5%及2.5%。台灣在各項評比中，表現都不好。教學只有台大超過50分，企業捐贈雖然成大拿100分，交大與台科大都超過90分，但評比權重僅有2.5%，並無法大幅拉升排名。整體來看，台灣最差的是國際化程度，最好是台師大的38.1分，台大只有27.7分。相對亞洲排名第一的新加坡大學國際化程度為96.2分，香港大學逼近滿分水準（99.5分），差距實在很大。同樣問題也出現在日本，國際化表現最好的是筑波大學34.4分，東京大學則僅有30.3分，日本的排名也上不去。

雖然國際化指標占比才7.5%，且又分為國際教師、國際學生、國際合作等三部分。這些項目對非英語系社會且資源有限的島國的確不利。但這些部分其實都會影響到前面3項的評比。因為教學、研究、論文引用，若不是使用英語，都會吃大虧。例如在教學方面，由於香港及新加坡本身的殖民歷史與經驗，英語是社會廣泛使用的語言。大量的英語授課及原文書使用，也讓其國際化程度明顯優於台灣。研究成果在英文的國際期刊刊登，成果展示及學界互相引用自然多有幫助。日、韓等國的許多傳統名校，這幾年排名下滑，都是此原因。我國若不再加以重視提升大學國際化，未來可能會讓台灣的排名持續落後。

日本文部科學省去年9月宣示政策，鎖定13所名校進行重點改革，如要將入學考增加TOEFL等能力測驗，外國教師比率提高到半數，外語授課比率五分之一，提高年薪制教師比率，對表現優異教師特別獎勵，都是反映對國際化危機的對策，值得我們學習。

因為給予學生國際化教育，誰來創造國際化教育，都息息相關。這其中最關鍵的更是國際間互相搶國際學者的問題。台灣的大學教授薪水遠低於國際水準，去年沙烏地阿拉伯就開出年薪千萬、外加宿舍及實驗室建置條件，挖走數名台大教授。對比對岸的中國大陸挖掘國際人才是花錢不手軟。事實上北京大學、清華大學聘任大師，自2001年清華大學啟動百名人才引進計畫，聘請楊振寧等諾貝爾大師級人物進駐清華園，而北京大學也邀請十多位諾貝爾獎得主擔任講座，這都是讓國際化得分的重要關鍵。

這幾年大陸的重點學校，不僅政府全力支援，外界也提供相當豐沛的資源。例如大陸新奧集團今年就一口氣捐贈3億人民幣給北京大學，提供獎勵給北京大學優秀教師用於產學合作。難怪北京大學已連續兩年在企業捐贈上得分100分。

相形之下，我們社會實在捉襟見肘。誠如台大副校長陳良基所言：「國際交流需要實際走出去，或邀請對方走進來，沒錢的話，光靠打電話、寫E-mail，不可能達到真正國際化。」見賢思齊，未來台灣除了政府資源挹注外，也應該積極透過企業設立基金會，透過企業的資源與力量，吸引國際級大師，提升國內大學學術地位與聲望。

過去政府為建設世界級的頂尖大學，投入5年500億資源，讓國內重點大學有較多的資源做拔尖的研究與教學。但近年教育部大砍頂尖大學經費，過去在頂大經費支持下，幾乎世界所有大學聯盟會議都能參加，如今只能選擇性參加，國際聲望和學術曝光自然下滑。

國際化不足，社會也有責任。我們必須檢討國人長期忽略國際化的原因。新加坡之所以國際化程度高，除了英語為官方語言外，電視媒體也經常報導國際新聞，關注各國在政治、經濟、社會的重大議題，凸顯出新加坡重視國際化的程度。

台灣電視只關心本土茶壺風暴的談話節目，民眾自然無法吸收到國際性相關新聞。社會就不會體會國際化的重要性。

New Southern Policy and the Great Game of Nations

New Southern Policy and the Great Game of Nations
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 7, 2015

Executive Summary: Two images compete for our attention. On the 4th of this month, the 12 member states of the US-led TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) announced the conclusion of substantive negotiations. On the 6th of this month, Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen, who may well become president next year, left for Japan, to increase her International capital, strengthen Taiwan-Japan relations, and kick off her "New Southern Policy". Within the Great Game of Nations, Tsai Ing-wen's New Southern Policy offers both visible opportunities and hidden risks.

Full Text Below:

Two images compete for our attention. On the 4th of this month, the 12 member states of the US-led TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) announced the conclusion of substantive negotiations. On the 6th of this month, Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen, who may well become president next year, left for Japan, to increase her International capital, strengthen Taiwan-Japan relations, and kick off her "New Southern Policy". Within the Great Game of Nations, Tsai Ing-wen's New Southern Policy offers both visible opportunities and hidden risks.

The TPP required 10 years to complete. It is the most closely watched regional free trade organization in recent memory. It is an important chess piece in the global geopolitical struggle. The 12 Member States of the TPP account for 36% of global GDP, and 30% of global trade volume. When it was established in 2006, the TPP included only four small nations, among them Singapore and Brunei. The United States joined later, then took control. Backdoor listing enabled Obama to "return to Asia", to keep Asian countries on a short leash, to be used as pawns countering the rise of Mainland China. TPP member nations include Japan, the world's third largest economy, as well as Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. Mainland China is excluded.

Mainland China however, has adopted countermeasures. In 2010, the ASEAN plus One free trade zone was established. More importantly, this year Mainland China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Mainland China's One Belt, One Road offers a wealth of business opportunities. Central Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Southeast Asia, and India in South Asia, all fall within the One Belt, One Road. Mainland China dominates. The RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement), currently being negotiated, is another Mainland China-led regional economic and trade organization intended to counter the US. Needless to say, the United States has been excluded from these.

The 10 ASEAN nations include 600 million people. Their overall share of global GDP is less than 4%. But over the past 10 years, the share has grown steadily. Traditionally, by means of the Asian Development Bank, Japan has maintained total control over ASEAN. Since the establishment of the Mainland China and ASEAN Free Trade Area Zone however, bilateral economic and trade relations have bloomed. Mainland China is ASEAN's largest trading partner. It is the region's largest source of foreign investment. In response to the AIIB, Japan has added 100 billion USD to Asian Development Bank accounts. Obviously it seeks to dominate ASEAN and South Asia economic and trade relations.

Taiwan is caught within this Great Game of Nations, which presents both risks and opportunities. For Taiwan, its best strategy is the one adopted by the Southeast Asian nations, New Zealand, and Australia. It is to seek the best of both worlds, avoid offending either side, and to join every economic and trade organization it can, in order to maximize its economic benefits. If one cannot have it both ways, then at least one should avoid offending either side. Otherwise, one will have to bet the farm on one side. Bet wrong and suffer the consequences.

Tsai's New Southern Policy Tsai seeks to hitch a ride with Japan and the United States, to jointly develop ASEAN, South Asian, and other markets. Taiwan High Speed Rail may join forces with Japan to help other Asian nations build high-speed rail systems. Chen era Foreign Minister James Huang is the director of the DPP International Department. Huang says that previous Southern Policy programs focused on investor relations. The New Southern Policy is more diverse. It addresses industry, tourism, youth entrepreneurship, culture, agriculture, medicine, and fisheries. It is more policy-oriented. It seeks to introduce regional talent to Taiwan, in two-way exchanges. James Huang believes these are "promising". He believes the prospects are limitless.

This is a pretty picture. But let us not forget the hidden risks. Taiwan has already tried the Southern Policy three times. The only time the results were anywhere near satisfactory, was the first time. The Asian financial crisis, coupled with Mainland China's economic rise, eventually rendered the Southern Policy unsustainable. Tsai proposes a New Southern Policy. True, it coincides with Mainland China's economic slowdown. The economic situation in Southeast Asia and South Asia, mainly India, may look better. It may promise opportunities. But Mainland China's economy is likely to get back on track next year, Southeast Asian nations face another wave of emerging economy shocks. Whether India's growth is sustainable remains to be seen. If Taiwan bets the farm on the New Southern Policy, the results could disappoint. That is the first risk.

The first Southern Policy was implemented over 20 years ago. Since then, international trade has undergone major changes. Mainland China is already the world's second largest economy. Its trade and economic power within ASEAN has tripled. Whether alone or with Japan, can Taiwan really compete with the Mainland? No one knows. That is the second risk.

What the New Southern Policy most needs is entrepreneurial will and competitiveness. The government can exert little influence, let alone lead. Consider linguistic differences, cultural differences, market size, and market prospects, as well as one's existing network of people. How companies respond to the New Southern Policy remains to be seen. That is the third risk.

Finally, a bird in the hand is worth ten in the bush. Taiwan is highly dependent upon exports to the Mainland. It should explore other markets and diversify. The New Southern Policy presents a few opportunities. It may be worth a try. But developing new markets is risky. They can easily fail. At times like these, one must first protect existing markets. No matter who comes to power, cross-Strait economic and trade relations must come first. They account for the largest share of Taiwan's exports. Taiwan will not be able to join the TPP for several years. Realistically it has no alternative. Only the MTA can prevent Taiwan's trade marginalization. Under the Great Game of Nations, the New Southern Policy seeks new opportunities. But we must also avoid the risks. Otherwise they could easily outweigh any benefits.

TPP大國博弈下的新南向政策

2015年10月07日 中國時報

兩個場景，交替而過。以美國為首的12個TPP（跨太平洋戰略經濟夥伴關係協議）會員國，4日在美國宣布完成實質談判；明年執政希望濃厚的民進黨主席蔡英文，6日上午啟程訪日，既為其增加「國際資本」，也為加強台日未來關係、啟動其新南向政策作準備。在大國博弈中，蔡英文的新南向政策既有機會又潛藏著風險。

TPP堪稱近10年來完成、最受矚目的區域自由貿易組織，同時也是全球地緣政治爭奪中的一步重要棋子。TPP12個會員國涵蓋全球GDP（國內生產毛額）的36%，貿易額占全球的30%以上；2006年成立時只是星、汶萊等4個小國的自由貿易組織。後來美國以「借殼上市」方式加入且強勢主導，作為歐巴馬「重返亞太」，拉緊亞洲國家、抗衡中國勢力崛起的重要棋子。TPP成員國包含全球第三大經濟體日本，及加拿大、智利、墨西哥、秘魯、澳大利亞、汶萊、馬來西亞、紐西蘭、新加坡、越南等國家，中國則被排除在外。

中國的抗衡之道，除了2010已上路的「東協加一」自由貿易區外，更重要的是今年中國主導的亞投行創立，及因之而來的「一帶一路」商機，不僅把從中亞、中東到歐洲都納入，東南亞、印度南亞大陸也在「一帶一路」範圍。而中國主導、仍在談判中的RCEP（區域全面經濟伙伴關係協議），則是另一個中國抗衡美國的區域經貿組織─當然，美國全部都被排除在外。

東協10國人口超過6億，雖然總體GDP占全球的比重仍不到4%，但近10年來穩定成長。傳統上日本透過亞洲開發銀行，在東協擁有舉足輕重的影響力；但在中國與東協的自由貿易區上路後，雙方經貿關係快速成長，中國已是東協最大的貿易夥伴，更是區內多個國家最大的外資投資來源。不過，受亞投行事件刺激，日本5月宣布對亞銀增資千億美元，明顯要搶回在東協與南亞的經貿主導權。

處在此大國博弈夾縫中的台灣，既有風險，又是機會。對台灣而言，上上之策當然是如東南亞國家、紐澳等國一樣「左右逢源」，兩邊都不得罪、全部經貿組織都能加入，獲取最大的經濟利益；如果作不到左右逢源，至少也要不開罪任何一邊，甚至把賭注全押一邊，一旦押錯則全盤皆輸。

因此，蔡英文提出的新南向政策，確實可乘著這股上揚之風，與日、美聯手開拓東協、南亞等市場─例如台灣高鐵與日本準備聯手幫助亞洲其他國家建高鐵。扁政府時期的外交部長、現任民進黨國際部主任的黃志芳說，以往南向政策只著重在投資關係，新的南向政策是多元的，從產業、觀光、年輕人創業，到文化、農漁醫療等，是多面向的政策；此外，還希望能吸引當地人才來台工作，是雙向交流。黃志芳認為這些地區都「大有可為」，似乎前景無限。

但在擘畫美景的同時，也別忘了其中潛藏的風險。台灣曾先後啟動過3次南向政策，只有第1次的效益較佳，之後因亞洲金融風暴，加上中國經濟崛起，南向即無以為繼。蔡英文提出新南向政策，雖然正逢中國經濟放緩，東南亞與南亞（主要是印度）的經濟相對似乎較佳，而顯得有可為之際；不過，中國經濟仍有可能在明年逐漸回到穩定增長的軌道，東南亞國家也正面臨另一波「新興國家震盪」中，印度的增長是否能持續亦待觀察。台灣如強押新南向，未必能如意，此為第一個風險。

此外，距離第1次南向政策已超過20年，國際經貿版圖早已大變，中國已是全球第二大經濟體，在東協的經貿勢力呈三級跳。台灣不論是獨力或與日本攜手，要與大陸在此的勢力競爭，成敗勝負仍在未知之數，此為風險之二。

再者，新南向最重要的還是企業的意願及競爭力，政府很難影響更別談主導，在考慮到語言、文化、市場規模與前景，以及原有的人脈後，企業響應新南向的意願也有待觀察，此為風險之三。

最後，我們要強調的是：十鳥在林不如一鳥在手。台灣對大陸出口依存度偏高，確實應開拓其他市場以分散市場，新南向有可能是一個機會，可以嘗試；但新市場的開展既要時間又有風險，更未必成功，這時就該注意、也要先顧好原先的市場。未來無論誰執政，仍要優先顧好占台灣出口份額最高的兩岸經貿關係；而在台灣幾年內都不可能加入TPP、亦無其他替代方案的現實情況下，完成兩岸貨貿協議才是化解台灣經貿邊緣化之道。在大國博弈中，新南向既要開拓機會，更要注意並迴避其風險，否則最後可能得不償失。

Will Tsai's Japan Visit "Shine a Light" on Taiwan?

Will Tsai's Japan Visit "Shine a Light" on Taiwan?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 6, 2015

Executive Summary: DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen will leave today for Japan, on a four-day "Shine a Light on Taiwan, Taiwan-Japan Friendship Tour". This visit differs from her US visit, primarily because both the DPP and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe harbor a congenital hatred of “China” (Mainland China). Both advocate the establishment of an “Alliance of Asian Values" to counter Mainland China. Tsai Ing-wen and Abe share this anti-China hatred. How exactly do they plan to "shine a light on Taiwan"? That will be something worth watching.

Full Text Below:

DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen will leave today for Japan, on a four-day "Shine a Light on Taiwan, Taiwan-Japan Friendship Tour". This visit differs from her US visit, primarily because both the DPP and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe harbor a congenital hatred of “China” (Mainland China). Both advocate the establishment of an “Alliance of Asian Values" to counter Mainland China. Tsai Ing-wen and Abe share this anti-China hatred. How exactly do they plan to "shine a light on Taiwan"? That will be something worth watching.

DPP policy toward Japan has been heavily influenced by two factors. The first is a legacy of Sinophobia, inherited from Taiwan independence elders within the party. The second is immersion in Lee Teng-hui's Japanophile spin on history. These two factors have inculcated a Japanophile mindset and nurtured Sinophobic hatred. The DPP diplomatic posture has long been to collude with Japan in order to oppose Mainland China.

Given its colonial subject view of history, the DPP mistakenly assumes that Japan's Sinophobia is an immutable fact, cast in stone. In fact, Sinophobia is merely Japan's justification to become a "normal nation". Sinophobia is merely Japan's stepping stone to get around its postwar pacifist constitution. Japan may oppose China. It may resist China. But in fact its Sinophobia is merely an amulet Abe wears in order to restore Japan's former glory.

The DPP apparently believes its one-sided policy of colluding with Japan to oppose Mainland China means the US-Japan axis will protect Taiwan in the event war erupts in the Taiwan Strait. It apparently believes Japan will rush to Taiwan's aid when the time comes. But lest the DPP forget, Mainland China has become Japan's number one trading partner. Mainland China and Japan now share an unshakable common destiny. Colluding with Taiwan to oppose Mainland China is nothing more than the pipe dream of a handful of Japanese right-wing politicians.

During the Chen Shui-bian era, the DPP's Japanophile policy failed to gain the Japanese government's favor. The DPP ruled for eight years. During that time, negotiations over the "Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement" were convened a dozen or more times. Yet the Japanese government never once budged. As soon as the Ma administration took office however, cross-Strait relations improved substantially. Japan worried that Taiwan and the Mainland might join hands on the Diaoyutai Islands issue. As a result, Japan made significant concessions in the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement.

The DPP's Sinophobic stance may appear to win favor in Japan. In reality, competition in the international diplomatic arena requires wise use of cross-Strait leverage, based on real world developments, to further Taiwan's interests. In short, colluding with Japan to oppose Mainland China, is wishful thinking.

Tsai Ing-wen ignored objections from Taiwan independence elements within the party. She advocates maintaining the status quo in cross-Strait relations. Having adopted this stance, can Taipei base its relationship with Tokyo on something other than a Taiwan independence perspective on history? Tsai Ing-wen's visit to Japan will only last four days. An entire day is being devoted to the remote Yamaguchi Prefecture. Yamaguchi Prefecture is a traditional Japanese agricultural region. It has little economic relationship with Taiwan. It is however, the home of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. It is the home of Ito Hirobumi, who signed the Maguan Treaty (Treaty of Shimonoseki) which ceded Taiwan to Japan. It is the home of Kodama Gentaro, Japanese Governor General during Taiwan's colonial occupation, who implemented the carrot and stick policy. Superficially, the purpose of Tsai Ing-wen's visit to Yamaguchi Prefecture is investment. In fact its purpose is to curry favor with Abe. It is to demonstrate to Abe that the DPP holds the same view of Japanese colonial history and opposition to Mainland China. Clearly Tsai Ing-wen's visit to Japan remains a prisoner of the DPP's traditional Japanophilia.

Tsai Ing-wen recently proposed a "New Southern Policy". She hopes to increase cooperation with Southeast Asia and South Asia in order to reduce dependence on the Mainland China market. This echoes Abe's 2012 "Southern Industry Policy", proposed when Beijing Tokyo relations were especially tense. Tsai Ing-wen's "New Southern Policy" differs from three previous Southern Policies only because it includes the Indian subcontinent. It echoes Abe's strategy of joining with India to oppose Mainland China. Clearly Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are still trapped within their collude with Japan to oppose Mainland China policy. Faulty execution is likely to leave Tsai and the DPP overly dependent upon Japan, while sacrificing their autonomy.

Abe recently addressed the UN General Assembly. He said Japan is committed to peaceful, stable, and mutally beneficial relations with Mainland China. Japan is softening its stance toward Mainland China. Tsai meanwhile, is still marching down the same old path, colluding with Japan to oppose Mainland China. Abe looks to a new bright spot. Tsai meanwhile, remains the victim of an old blind spot.

We look forward to friendly Taipei Tokyo relations, We hope however, that Tsai Ing-wen will refrain from inciting conflict between Taipei and Beijing, merely to shine a light on her final mile to the presidential palace.

蔡英文訪日之旅如何「點亮」台灣？

2015/10/06 聯合報

民進黨總統候選人蔡英文今天啟程訪問日本，進行為期四天的「點亮台灣，台日友好之旅」。此行與其訪美最大的不同，是民進黨與日本首相安倍都具有反中的天然基因，也都同樣主張建構亞洲價值同盟來抗衡中國大陸，在這種「反中同表」的共識下，蔡英文和安倍會擦出什麼樣的火花來「點亮」台灣，值得國人關注。

民進黨的對日政策，始終深受兩個因素影響：一方面，是繼承了黨內獨派大老的反中思維；另一方面，是受到李登輝媚日史觀之籠罩。在這種情況下，形成了它「親日」的思想基礎，並藉著「抗中」的意志為養分賴以壯大，「聯日抗中」則是它一向的外交手段。

在這樣的殖民史觀思維下，民進黨可能誤以為日本的「反中」是一成不變的定律，誤認為日本的「抗中」是千年不滅的方程式；殊不知，「反中」只是日本成為正常國家的藉口，「抗中」則是日本跳脫戰後和平憲法的墊腳石。對日本而言，無論「反中」或「抗中」，其實都只是安倍企圖恢復日本昔日榮光的護身符。

在這種對日一面倒的政策下，民進黨似乎相信，只要堅持「聯日抗中」的道路，美日同盟勢將會成為台灣的最佳保護傘，萬一台灣海峽出現軍事衝突，日本一定會適時出手援助台灣。但民進黨卻忘了，中國大陸早已成為日本最大的貿易夥伴，中日兩國也成為不可動搖的命運共同體，「聯台抗中」其實只是日本少數右翼政客的政治想像。

從實證上看，在過去陳水扁執政時期，民進黨的親日政策其實並未能取得日本政府的青睞。舉例而言，在民進黨執政的八年當中，「台日漁業協議」雖歷經十餘次的談判，日本政府仍然堅不讓步；反而是馬政府上台之後，在兩岸關係大幅改善的情況下，日本擔心台灣在釣魚台問題上與中國大陸聯手，因而在台日漁業協議上作出重大的讓步。

由此可見，民進黨的「反中」立場，表面上，似乎是可以用來拉攏日本；實質上，在國際外交競賽場域，必須善用兩岸關係的高低槓桿，視實際發展務實運用，才能爭取台灣最大的利益。簡言之，「聯日抗中」不能流於一廂情願。

蔡英文不顧黨內獨派的反對，在兩岸關係上極力主張維持現狀；標榜這樣的立場，對台日關係而言，能否跳脫過去獨派史觀的窠臼呢？我們看蔡英文這次的行程安排，在僅僅四天的訪日行程中，她刻意安排其中一天進到偏遠的山口縣訪問。山口縣是日本傳統的農業縣，與台灣的經濟關係並不密切；重點在，它不但是日本首相安倍的故鄉，也是簽署馬關條約割讓台灣的伊藤博文、和日治時期實施懷柔政策的總督兒玉源太郎的故鄉。從這樣的線索觀察，蔡英文到山口縣訪問，表面上說是要進行招商，實質上是為了拉攏及討好安倍，以示民進黨和安倍抱持相同的殖民史觀及反中立場。由此看來，蔡英文的訪日之行，仍然無法跳脫民進黨傳統媚日的思維。

從政策面來看，日前蔡英文提出「新南向政策」，希望透過加強與東南亞及南亞國家的經濟合作關係，來降低對中國大陸市場的依賴。這與安倍在二○一二年中日關係緊張之際所提出的「企業南進政策」，是相互呼應的。另外，蔡英文這次的「新南向政策」與台灣過去三次南向政策最大的不同，是其範圍涵括了南亞大陸的印度；這點，與目前安倍提出的「聯印抗中」戰略，也完全是若合符節的。由此可見，蔡英文仍然無法擺脫過往民進黨「聯日抗中」的政策路線；而萬一操作欠佳，她極可能使自己過度阿附日本，而失去了自主性。

安倍日前在聯合國大會上表示：在中日兩國之間，日本要致力於發展和平與穩定的關係，並進一步邁向共同戰略的互利關係。在日本正朝向中日關係緩和的同時，蔡英文卻還在走著過往聯日抗中的老路；安倍希望走出新亮點，而蔡英文卻仍抱持自己的舊盲點。

我們期待台日關係友好，卻不希望蔡英文在日本擦出挑激兩岸矛盾的火花，來點亮她在台灣大選的最後一哩路。

A New Interpretation of the 1992 Consensus for 2016

A New Interpretation of the 1992 Consensus for 2016
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 4, 2015

Executive Summary: Indications are that the Democratic Progressive Party is likely to return to power in 2016. Beijing's strategic goal in cross-Strait relations, will be to take advantage of this fact to resolve the problem of Taiwan independence. This will be a key performance indicator for Xi Jinping's cross-Strait policy.

Full Text Below:

Indications are that the Democratic Progressive Party is likely to return to power in 2016. Beijing's strategic goal in cross-Strait relations, will be to take advantage of this fact to resolve the problem of Taiwan independence. This will be a key performance indicator for Xi Jinping's cross-Strait policy.

The 2016 election has increased Beijing's determination to resolve the problem of Taiwan independence. Two reasons come to mind. One. Beijing must counter DPP "backdoor listing" and "spiritual Taiwan independence". The KMT's one China, different interpretations, no reunification, no independence, no use force stance is also moving Taiwan closer to de jure Taiwan independence. If Beijing cannot reverse this trend, then "spiritual Taiwan independence" and "de jure Taiwan independence" will lead to cross-Strait "peaceful separation". Two. Beijing may be able to solve this problem. If the DPP returns to power, Beijing may apply pressure. If the DPP regime cannot resist Beijing's pressure, it may be forced to yield on Taiwan independence. This is highly likely.

In other words, for Xi Jinping, "spiritual Taiwan independence" and de jure Taiwan independence are so advanced the problem is insoluble. Therefore if Beijing can pressure the DPP regime, 2016 will become a golden opportunity to resolve the problem of Taiwan independence, once and for all. Do DPP leaders from top to bottom, really imagine that mere lip service to "maintaining the status quo" will render Beijing helpless? If so, they have badly miscalculated and are mired in self-delusion.

The key, as always, is the 1992 consensus. Xi Jinping has affirmed that the 1992 consensus is the political foundation for peaceful cross-Strait relations. He says that "If the foundation is not secure, the earth will move and the mountains will shake". Beijing officials have continued to stress the importance of the framework. Ma Xiaoguang and Zhang Zhijun have said that if without the 1992 Consensus, the institutionalized cross-strait negotiation mechanism would disintegrate. Cross-Strait exchanges could even end. A reporter asked whether Tsai Ing-wen's "maintaining the status quo" is equivalent to "accepting the 1992 consensus". Ma Xiaoguang said "On the fundamental issue (of the 1992 Consensus), any responsible party must provide a clear answer". In other words, the 1992 consensus is it.

Beijing constantly stresses the 1992 Consensus. It warns of "collapse" without it. But Tsai persists in evading the term. This makes it even harder for Beijing to give Tsai a free pass, and even harder for Tsai Ing-wen to utter them. The 1992 Consensus has become hostage in a war of escalating rhetoric. It is accumulating unpredictable "earth-shaking" energy.

If we wish to avoid a head-on collision, there must be timely track change. If Xi Jinping backs down on the 1992 consensus, how can he face Washington? How can he face the public on the Mainland? How can he allow himself to be perceived as a political coward by green and blue alike? Expecting Xi Jinping to back down on the 1992 Consensus is impossible.

Expecting Tsai Ing-wen to accept these terms is also difficult. But consider the global strategic picture. If cross-Strait exchanges end, Xi Jinping need only rethink cross-Strait policy. By contrast, if Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP return to power, and cross-Strait exchanges end, politically and economically, the earth will move and the mountains will shake. This is especially true since Taiwan is undergoing a structural level economic crisis. If cross-Strait exchanges end, the crisis will be even more severe. An end to cross-Strait exchanges will inflict far greater damage on Taiwan than on the Mainland. Therefore if one has to guess, Tsai Ing-wen is the one will yield. It is not difficult to understand why. It is not that the DPP lacks determination. It is that the DPP will have no choice.

The DPP cannot pretend that as long as it stops short of de jure independence and the "rectification of names" and the "authoring of a new constitution", that Beijing will be unable to retaliate. The DPP must realize that even if it belatedly accepts the 1992 Consensus, it will be lucky if Beijing refrains from further action. Having been given an inch, Beijing could well decide to take a mile. It might well demand the abolition of the Taiwan independence party platform. Therefore, if the DPP wants to hold the line at the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations, it must not overplay its hand. It must leave well enough alone, and thereby gain a little breathing space.

How should the DPP go about accepting the 1992 Consensus? We suggest that it "recognize" the 1992 Consensus, under the aegis of the current ROC constitutional framework. One. This would be fully consistent with Tsai Ing-wen's "promotion of cross-Strait relations under the current ROC constitutional framework". Two. The term "recognize" is less explicit than "accept". Three. The adoption of such terminology, would enable the DPP to transition from Taiwan independence, backdoor listing, and move toward one China, different interpretations and a farsighted Big Roof concept of China.

If Tsai Ing-wen raises this possibility during her election campaign, she may avoid being caught in a passive posture, and subjected to pressure from Beijing. Beijing has responded positively. We have reason to hope that Beijing will revert to the "one China, different interpretations" and 1992 Consensus that Hu mentioned during the 2008 Bush Hu hotline exchange. This would forestall the further spread of "spiritual Taiwan independence" and de jure Taiwan independence. This would enhance win-win cross-strait relations and eliminate the problem of Taiwan independence.

Tsai Ing-wen and Beijing need a new way to interpret the 1992 consensus. That is the only way for 2016.

聯合／為九二共識在二○一六找出路
2015-10-04 03:39:10 聯合報 聯合報社論

跡象顯示：面對民進黨可能重返執政，北京在二○一六年兩岸關係的戰略目標，將是利用此一節點深化解決台獨問題，這將是習近平給北京團隊在兩岸政務上所定的ＫＰＩ（關鍵績效指標）。

對 北京言，二○一六年欲深化解決台獨問題，理由有二。一、必須解決：民進黨採「借殼上市／心靈台獨」的路線，國民黨的「一中各表／不統／不獨／不武」亦趨近 「法理獨台」。北京如果不能扭轉此一逆勢，即成「心靈台獨」及「法理獨台」合股的兩岸「和平分裂」之局。二、可能解決：民進黨若重返執政，提供了北京可以 挾制的情勢；民進黨政府如果抵擋不住北京的挾制，即有在台獨立場上退讓的可能性，且預估此可能性甚高。

也就是說，對習近平言，台灣問題既 走向「心靈台獨／法理獨台」，已至不能不解決的地步，若又出現可以挾制民進黨政府的情勢，北京自然會將二○一六視為必須深化解決台獨問題的節點，不會錯 失。如今，民進黨上下倘若認為只要空言「維持現狀」，就可使北京找不到可作的題目，將是對情勢的根本誤判，自欺欺人。

關鍵仍在九二共識四 個字。習近平說，九二共識是兩岸關係和平發展的共同政治基礎，「基礎不牢／地動山搖」；此一架構，已由北京涉台官員不斷地深化夯實。張志軍與馬曉光相繼表 示，如果沒有九二共識此一政治基礎，兩岸制度化協商機制將告坍塌，兩岸關係亦可能觸礁擱淺。甚至，記者問：可否將蔡英文所說的「維持現狀」等同於「接受九 二共識」？馬曉光說：「在（九二共識）這個根本問題上，任何負責任的政黨都必須作出明確回答」。也就是說：九二共識，就是這四個字。

北京不斷在「九二共識」四字上加碼，「坍塌論」已告確立，但蔡英文仍始終迴避此四字。這使得北京更不能收回這四字，而蔡英文也更難啟齒接受這四字。九二共識這四個字遂在這種相互增強的乒乓動作中，蓄積了「地動山搖」的莫測能量。

如果不想發生火車對撞的場景，必須有一邊適時轉轍。習近平若收回九二共識四字，他在美國面前如何抬得起頭？對內又如何站得住腳？更何況亦被綠的看破手腳，被藍的視作政治怯懦。就種種主客觀情勢看，要習近平丟掉這四個字的可能性不大。

當 然，要蔡英文接受這四個字也不易。不過，估算世局情勢，兩岸若就此破局，習近平只須在兩岸政策上打掉重練；但蔡英文若重返執政而面對撕裂的兩岸，將會面臨 台灣整個政經情勢的地動山搖。何況，台灣又進入結構性的經濟危機，如果兩岸復見風興浪作，將是雪上加霜，火上加油。盱衡情勢，兩岸破局對台灣的損傷更大， 也就是台灣更承受不起。因此，若猜測屆時在「九二共識」四字上退讓的或許是蔡英文，其因由亦不難理解。不是民進黨不想守，而是守不住。

民 進黨不可自欺欺人地認為「只要不操作法理台獨、正名制憲」，北京奈我何？須知，北京若在「只要民進黨接受九二共識」下，就告暫時煞車，那對民進黨已是一個 不錯的局面。因為，待攻下九二共識後，北京仍有可能得寸進尺，再以《台獨黨綱》作題目。因此，民進黨若先守住「九二共識／一中各表」，也許可對北京釋出 「莫為已甚／適可而止」的訊號，爭取緩衝喘息的時空。

民進黨如何接受九二共識？我們建議的論述是：「在中華民國現行憲政架構下，理解並發 展九二共識。」一、此論與蔡英文所說「在中華民國現行憲政體制下，推動兩岸關係」，是一水平移動，無縫接軌。二、「理解」較「接受」，為輕語彙。三、發展 一詞，可以帶出民進黨「台獨→借殼上市→一中各表→大屋頂中國」的國家論述新路徑，具未來性。

蔡英文若在想像中的當選談話中提出此說，或許即可免陷於被挾制的被動地位，而北京亦理當作出正面回應。而且，屆時有理由寄望北京能回到二○○八年布胡熱線所說「一中各表」的「九二共識」，以化解「心靈台獨／法理獨台」的發展，在兩岸雙贏的基礎上深化解決台獨問題。

蔡英文與北京對九二共識的新解讀，是九二共識在二○一六年的可能出路。

Lai Ching-teh's Taiwan Independence Rhetoric Bodes Ill for Cross-Strait Relations

Lai Ching-teh's Taiwan Independence Rhetoric Bodes Ill for Cross-Strait Relations
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 2, 2015

Executive Summary: Given the current social atmosphere, Tsai Ing-wen is likely to win the presidential election, and the DPP and its allies are likely to win a majority of the seats in the Legislative Yuan. But Taiwan's external security and internal strength have both reached a 30 year low. The public must not demand ruling party change merely to vent its spleen. It must also demand that Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP tell them where they intend to lead the nation. Starting today, this newspaper will explore the matter of Taiwan's post 2016b survival and development. We hope that all parties will engage in rational debate. We look forward to the candidates debating each other. We hope that social cohesion and consensus will emerge from the debate.

Full Text Below:

Given the current social atmosphere, Tsai Ing-wen is likely to win the presidential election, and the DPP and its allies are likely to win a majority of the seats in the Legislative Yuan. But Taiwan's external security and internal strength have both reached a 30 year low. The public must not demand ruling party change merely to vent its spleen. It must also demand that Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP tell them where they intend to lead the nation. Starting today, this newspaper will explore the matter of Taiwan's post 2016b survival and development. We hope that all parties will engage in rational debate. We look forward to the candidates debating each other. We hope that social cohesion and consensus will emerge from the debate.

Tainan City mayor and DPP political star Lai Ching-teh is rumored to be under consideration for the vice presidency. The day before yesterday, Lai unequivocally told the Tainan City Council, "I advocate Taiwan independence". DPP leaders and DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen meanwhile, have been reassuring voters that they are committed to "maintaining the status quo", and "abiding by the ROC constitutional framework". They have been underscoring their support for the ROC National Day, the national flag. They have been reassuring the international community that they are committed to maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait. Lai Ching-teh's bombshell shined a spotlight on the DPP's fundamental nature. It ripped the carefully cultivated mask of moderation off the face of the party. It confirmed that if Tsai Ing-wen is elected and the Democratic Progressive Party acquires a majority in the Legislative Yuan, cross-Strait relations may be in serious trouble.

Lai Ching-teh's declaration that "I advocate Taiwan independence" was no slip of the tongue. Let us reconstruct the event. During interpolation, KMT Tainan City Councilor Wang Chia-chen confirmed that Lai Ching-teh visited the Mainland. The city government established a cross-Strait group. So far, everything was well and fine. But then Wang asked Lai how he viewed cross-Strait relations. Did Lai think in terms of "killing Zhu De and Mao Zedong"? Wang asked Lai Ching-teh to tell people where he stood. Wang said, if Lai truly wants Taiwan independence, why not get rid of the Chinese Communist Party? Why not say so out loud? Or was Lai hoping for cross-Strait reconciliation?

Confronted with Wang's question, Lai Ching-teh could have answered any number of ways. He could have recited Tsai Ing-wen's "maintaining the status quo" mantra. He could have equivocated, and made vague references to Taiwan centric ideals. He could have mentioned cross-Strait peace and the importance of reconciliation. After all, cross-Strait exchanges and peaceful development are conducive to the welfare of Tainan citizens. He could have said that Taiwan independence was not within the purview of the Tainan City government. Yet lo and behold, Lai Ching-teh rejected the more prudent choices. Instead, in a clear and firm voice, he declared that "I advocate Taiwan independence. My advocacy of Taiwan independence does not mean we must go to war. I think that [Mainland] China should respect the people of Taiwan and their conviction that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation."

From the perspective of sticking to one's beliefs, Lai Ching-teh could be considered courageous and responsible. But this sort of courage and responsibility raises an important question. Cross-Strait relations appear stable. But behind the DPP's superficially moderate rhetoric, cross-Strait relations are entering a danger zone. Or to invoke a term used by the Mainland media, the two sides are about to enter a new "crisis management period".

Lai Ching-teh's Taiwan independence rhetoric highlighted several problems. One. Lai Ching-teh has long been seen as Tsai Ing-wen's deputy, as a future cabinet member, or as a New Taipei City mayoral candidate. He will play a even more important role than he does today within the DPP. Lai Ching-teh was ingratiating himself with both newer and older generation Taiwan independence advocates. The word is that Lai's aides publicly thanked the KMT city councilor for asking the question. It enabled Lai to say what was on his mind. Lai Ching-teh is gradually making his way up the political ladder. The destructive effect he has hd upon cross-Strait relations is sure to increase.

Two. Lai Ching-teh's Taiwan independence rhetoric comes on the heels of his declining popularity. The Dengue fever epidemic continues to spread. It is difficult not to recall the Democratic Progressive Party's eight year long period of misrule. Taiwan independence and cross-Strait issues gave the DPP carte blanche. They enabled the DPP to manipulate Taiwan independence mob sentiment. Tsai Ing-wen may have given Taiwan independence a coat of whitewash. She may avoided mention of the Taiwan Independence Party Platform and Resolution for a Normal Nation. DPP advocacy of Taiwan independence may rise or fall with the political climate. But its fundamental nature has not changed. It has undermined domestic politics, but more importantly, it will undermine cross-Strait relations.

Even more important, is the DPP's response to Lai Ching-teh's statement. DPP insiders have pointed out that Lai Ching-teh declaration is the position long held by Lai and the party. "What Lai said is no different from what the party has been saying." This was not a case of Lai "putting his foot in his mouth". The Democratic Progressive Party has clearly endorsed Lai Ching-teh's remarks. DPP spokesman Cheng Yun-peng's official statement makes the DPP's position quite clear. Lai Ching-teh reaffirmed that "We are an independent and sovereign state called the Republic of China. This is the consensus within the party, and Mayor Lai is no exception." Cheng Yun-peng's explanation was important. First, the DPP expressed solidarity with Lai Ching-teh. Secondly, it made clear that the DPP's distorted definition of the "Republic of China" is merely a variation on Taiwan independence. Or, more accurately, it constitutes backdoor listing of Taiwan independence advocacy.

Lai Ching-teh's Taiwan independence rhetoric is even more direct and dangerous than Lai's remarks from last year. Lai mentioned Taiwan independence while visiting Fudan University in Shanghai on June 7. Some asked Lai about the DPP's Taiwan independence party platform. Lai said that for the public on Taiwan, "Taiwan independence is an overarching consensus". Lai said, "One can eliminate the DPP's Taiwan independence party platform, but one cannot eliminate the belief in Taiwan independence." Back then, Lai Ching-teh did not state his own position. This time Lai Ching-teh publicly declared that he is a "true green" political leader, and intends to be an important leader of the Democratic Progressive Party.

Lai Ching-teh openly declared his advocacy of Taiwan independence. The DPP responded by endorsing his remarks. This exposed the true face of DPP cross-Strait policy. This ripped away the mask Tsai Ing-wen created with her "Republic of China" rhetoric. But most importantly, it showed that a mere 100 days from election day, DPP leaders refuse to consider the Mainland's position and feelings. They care only about their personal political status as "true green political leaders" and the management of the Dengue fever crisis. Does such a party deserve the public trust?

Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait rhetoric may come across as moderate. But she refuses to establish a platform for pragmatic cross-Strait political dialogue. She is even less willing to recognize the 1992 Consensus, or abolish the Taiwan independence party platform. How can a political party that cares only about appearance and not substance, possibly warrant public trust?

賴清德台獨論是兩岸的凶兆

2015年10月02日 中國時報

就當前社會氛圍，蔡英文贏得總統大選、民進黨及其盟友囊括立法院多數席次，似乎已無懸念。但台灣外在安全環境與內部實力都處於30年最不利狀態，民眾不能只求政黨輪替的痛快，而不問蔡英文與民進黨要把國家帶往何方。本報今日起將就後2016台灣將面對的生存發展問題提出探究，盼帶動各方理性討論，更期待候選人相互辯論，從辯論中凝聚社會共識。

民進黨政治明星、傳聞中的副總統熱門人選、台南市長賴清德，前天在台南市議會表達了「我主張台灣獨立」的強烈聲音。另一方面，民進黨及民進黨總統候選人蔡英文卻反覆強調「維持現狀」、「遵循中華民國憲政架構」，凸顯中華民國國慶、國旗，並向國際社會保證將致力維護台海和平。賴清德的突兀呼喊，立即點明了民進黨的政治DNA，戳破了全黨刻意包裝的溫和形象，也證實了蔡英文當選後、尤其民進黨取得立法院多數席次後，兩岸關係陷入不可測風險的擔憂。

賴清德說「我主張台灣獨立」，並不是脫口而出，還原現場，是國民黨籍台南市議員王家貞在議會質詢，肯定賴清德到中國大陸訪問，市府成立兩岸小組，立意良好，但詢問賴清德是否想到兩岸就想到「殺豬拔毛」？王家貞並要求賴清德表態，如果真要台獨，想幹掉中國共產黨，直接說出來也沒關係，或是真的要兩岸和解？

面對王議員的質詢，賴清德可以有多種選擇，可沿襲蔡英文「維持現狀」說詞，其次是可以模糊的一方面談台灣主體的理想，另方面兼談兩岸和平、和解的重要，畢竟兩岸的交流與和平發展有利於台南市民、有利於台南市政，也可以以非市政問題為由迴避。令人意外的是，賴清德沒有做出比較穩健的選擇，反而清晰而堅定的表示：「我主張台灣獨立！我主張台灣獨立並沒有說主張一定要兵戎相向，我認為中國也應該要尊重台灣人民主張台灣是一個主權獨立的國家。」

從堅持自己的信念來說，賴清德是勇敢且負責的，但是他的勇敢與負責，卻提醒我們一個重要的課題：表面看似平穩的兩岸關係、表面看似溫和穩健的民進黨當前主張的背後，是兩岸關係即將進入高風險期，或者用對岸媒體的用語：台海兩岸隨時進入一個新的「危機管理期」的事實。

賴清德的台獨真言凸顯了幾個問題。首先，賴清德始終被視為蔡英文副手、未來重要閣員或是新北市長的人選，未來將在民進黨陣營中發揮比現在更重要、更關鍵的作用，賴清德的發言不無向新老獨派交心的意涵。據了解，賴的幕僚還公開感謝國民黨市議員的提問，讓賴可以表明心跡。看來隨著賴清德在政壇上的逐步爬升，他在兩岸關係上破壞作用想必更大。

其次，賴清德的台獨真言是在他聲望不斷下降，登革熱疫情持續蔓延的情況下流露的，很難不讓人聯想起過去民進黨執政8年時期，以台獨、兩岸議題為政治提款機，操作台獨民粹的政治文化。這也證實了即使蔡英文盡力粉飾台獨色彩與主張，迴避台獨黨綱和正常國家決議文的存在，但民進黨的台獨基因一定會隨著政情的起伏而不定期發作，不但牽動國內政局，更將會是兩岸關係動盪不安的重要因素。

更必須正視的問題，還在於民進黨對於賴清德發言的回應。民進黨黨內人士指出，賴清德的發言是他一貫立場，與黨的態度相同，「賴的說法跟黨沒有不同調，也不是『暴走』」，毫無疑問民進黨是替賴清德台獨真言背書。民進黨發言人鄭運鵬的正式說法是，民進黨的立場一直相當清楚，賴清德也是陳述他一貫論述，即「我們是主權獨立的國家，名字叫做中華民國，這是黨內一致的共識，賴市長也沒有例外。」鄭運鵬的說法很重要，首先，民進黨聲援賴清德的主張，其次，民進黨的中華民國論述就是台獨主張的變種，更精準的說，是台獨主張的借殼上市。

賴清德的台獨真言，比他去年6月7日赴上海復旦大學座談時，關於台獨的談話更為直接而危險。當時，賴清德回應在場有人質疑民進黨的台獨黨綱時表示，他所認識的台灣社會「台獨是極大共識」，「解決民進黨的台獨黨綱，沒有辦法解決台灣主張獨立的事實。」當時的賴清德並未闡述自己的立場，這次的賴清德卻是公開表態他要當正綠教主，而這一位賴清德，將是未來民進黨的重要領導人。

賴清德坦率表示主張台獨，加上民進黨的背書回應，除了凸顯民進黨兩岸主張的真相，戳破蔡英文中華民國論述的虛假以外，更重要的是表明，民進黨即使在選前一百多天這樣的關鍵時刻，他們的領袖與決策基本上都不願考慮大陸的立場底線與感情感受，只在乎個人的政治地位（正綠教主）與政治危機處理（登革熱疫情），這樣的政黨豈能信賴？

這一段時間以來，蔡英文在展現兩岸政策的「溫和穩健」上做足姿態，卻始終不願意務實的搭建兩岸溝通政治基礎的對話平台，更遑論認同九二共識、廢除台獨黨綱，只做表面工夫的政黨，豈值得人們信賴與支持？