Ma Xi Summit: Equality in Protocol, Divergence in Rhetoric

Ma Xi Summit: Equality in Protocol, Divergence in Rhetoric
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 10, 2015

Executive Summary: Consider the Ma Xi summit from two perspectives: protocol and rhetoric. In terms of protocol, the Ma Xi summit clearly confirmed the existence of “one China, different interpretations”. In terms of rhetoric, the Ma Xi summit also confirmed that the definition of "one China" remains the cross-strait bone of contention.

Full Text Below:

Consider the Ma Xi summit from two perspectives: protocol and rhetoric. In terms of protocol, the Ma Xi summit clearly confirmed the existence of “one China, different interpretations”. In terms of rhetoric, the Ma Xi summit also confirmed that the definition of "one China" remains the cross-strait bone of contention.

All political rituals are rooted in political substance. They reflect political substance. Therefore we must not underestimate the substantive impact of the Ma Xi summit. According to Zhang Zhijun, the Ma Xi summit was "a pragmatic arrangement rooted in the principle of one China". It was "rooted in the status [of Ma and Xi] as the two sides' leaders. Therefore "they addressed each other as Mister” and "shelved disputes and demonstrated mutual respect", in accordance with Taipei's call for "equality and dignity". The summit set high standards. Therefore its protocol stressed equality. Each side paid its own bills, including the cost of the dinner. Neither side hung flags in the hotel.

The Ma Xi summit was “rooted in the status [of Ma and Xi] as the two sides' leaders”. This was its greatest achievement. The protocol of the summit reflected political realities on both sides of the Strait. Both sides continue to define "one China" differently. Beijing does not accept the premise that "one China equals the Republic of China". Taipei does not accept the premise that "one China equals the People's Republic of China". Therefore Ma cannot attend the summit as "President of the Republic of China", and Xi cannot attend the summit as "Chairman of the People's Republic of China".

When Zhang Zhijun spoke of shelving disputes, he was referring to the dispute over the meaning of "one China”. When he spoke of mutual respect, he was referring to respect for the other side's definition of one China. In other words, the summit protocol acknowledged the ongoing cross-Strait controversy over the definition of one China. One could say it acknowledged the existence of "one China, different interpretations".

Political rituals reflect political substance. The summit also reflected the ongoing dispute over the definition of "one China". In the .past, the two sides talked past each other. The Ma Xi summit was the first time this dispute has been addressed at the highest level. On the surface, it underscore the disagreement. But substantively, it confronted the disagreement and initiated the process of resolution. Leaders from the two sides agreed that the dispute was over the definition of "one China". This was the summit's greatest achievement.

Before the summit, the two sides reached an understanding. During the opening speeches, neither side would make any pointed remarks.  They would limit themselves to references to the 1992 consensus. The would save their pointed remarks for closed-door sessions. This may have been the result of a compromise, and leaves much room for discussion.

Beijing's inclusion of "one China, different interpretations" into the summit protocol and rhetoric was gesture of goodwill toward the public on Taiwan. For Taiwan, "one China, different interpretations" is a necessary precondition for the 1992 consensus. The two sides referred to "one China, different interpretations" during closed-door sessions. Had Beijing agreed to Ma Ying-jeou's use of the term in public, the impact would have been very different. Summing up the pros and cons, it is hard not to feel some regret.

For the Ma government, "shelving differences" was as important as "seeking agreement". Therefore he had no need to make pointed remarks during his opening statement. He should however, have at least mentioned his core proposition, "one China, different interpretations". The other side could have responded appropriately, at its own discretion, with consideration for the political consequences. Ma failed to mention "one China, different interpretations" in public. He reserved it for the closed-door sessions. This gave political opponents a pretext to attack him. That is a pity.

To sum up, the Ma Xi summit may be viewed as an overly cautious, insufficiently bold trial balloon for "one China, different interpretations". Nevertheless, both sides accepted the protocol for "leaders from the two sides taking part in the summit". They accepted the rhetoric of the "one China principle" and "one China, different interpretations". The two sides accepted the 1992 consensus as the shared foundation for cross-Strait relations  The 1992 consensus was termed a "masterpiece of ambiguity"m precisely because it included "one China, different interpretations".

Xi Jinping made no mention of "one country, two systems" or "peaceful reunification" during the summit. Beijing wanted to of course. But it exercised restraint during the summit. Both sides know that without military or political coercion, "one China" as either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China is impossible. The two sides must clarify the meaning of "one China". Otherwise political integration at the national level will be difficult. The Ma Xi summit's protocol was equal, even as its rhetoric was divergent. The Ma Xi summit did not resolve these differences. But it underscored the divergence in "one China, different interpretations". That in itself is a significant cross-Strait achievement.

The summit will consolidate the 1992 consensus as the vessel for peaceful development. It simultaneously highlights the sharp differences over "one China, different interpretations". The DPP must affirm the 1992 consensus, and fight on behalf of "one China, different interpretations". If Tsai Ing-wen repudiates the 1992 consensus, then even "one China, different interpretations" will be off the table. If that happens, the consequences will be grave indeed.

一中各表馬習會：儀節對等 論述分歧

2015-11-10 聯合報

試從「儀節」與「論述」兩個面向解析馬習會。馬習會的儀節，確立了「一中各表」的存在；馬習會的論述，亦確認了「一個中國的定義」問題仍是兩岸的爭議項目。

任何政治儀式，皆出自政治實質，也反映了政治實質。所以，不能輕估馬習會的儀式。這次馬習會，據張志軍稱，「是根據一個中國原則做出務實安排」，「互以兩岸領導人的身分與名義舉行，見面互稱先生」，並指這是「擱置爭議，相互尊重」；台北方面則稱「對等／尊嚴」為此會最高準據。因而，此會的儀式，處處強調「對等」，包括晚餐各自付帳，酒店不懸國旗等。

我們認為，這次馬習會的最高成就，是在儀式上「互以兩岸領導人的身分及名義舉行」。這雖是儀式的準則，卻也反映了兩岸的政治現狀。由於兩岸對「一個中國的定義」仍呈分歧，你不承認「一個中國是中華民國」，我也不承認「一個中國是中華人民共和國」；所以，我不能以「中華民國總統」與會，你也不能以「中華人民共和國主席」與會。

張志軍所稱「擱置爭議」，指雙方「擱置」了對「一中定義」的爭議；所謂「相互尊重」，則是對「一中定義」之各持己見的「尊重」。也就是說，此會的儀式安排，即是相互承認了「一中定義在兩岸間仍處爭議狀態」，因此可以說，此會確立了「一中各表」的存在。

政治儀式反映政治實質。因而，此會的論述，也反映出「一個中國的定義」在兩岸之間是一個「爭議問題」。過去，爭議皆在各說各話的狀態，本會則使此一爭議首次在馬習峰會的最高規格下提出，並嘗試尋求解決。表面上看，這是呈現分歧；從實質上看，則是面對分歧及解決分歧的開端。所以，我們認為，在兩岸領導人面前呈現「一個中國定義的分歧問題」，毋寧是此會最大的論述成就。

會前雙方達成諒解，在「開場公開致詞」時，相互不提尖銳的政治主張，僅互以「九二共識」四字點到為止，而將鮮明尖銳的政治主張留在閉門會談中各自論述。我們認為，這可能是雙方妥協的結果，此中不無討論空間。

就北京言，「一中各表」在儀式及論述上的寬鬆化，是北京對台灣人民能展現的最大善意。畢竟，在台灣，無「一中各表」，即無「九二共識」。因而，既在閉門會談中談到「一中各表」，若北京亦樂見馬英九在公開致詞中提出，兩種語境的意義及分量畢竟不同。得失相較，不無遺憾。

對馬政府言，要在此會達成「存異」的目標，應不低於「求同」。因此，在開場公開致詞時固不必言語尖銳，但至少應說出己方的核心主張，那就是「一中各表」。至於對方如何斟酌其發言，可由對方自己斟酌其言語效應及政治後果。爾今，未在公開致詞時說「一中各表」，而留在閉門會議中發表，以致竟成反對人士攻擊話柄。太可惜了。

綜上所論，此次馬習會仍可視為兩岸在「一中各表」的儀式及論述上的初階試探。小心有餘，大膽不足。但無論如何，雙方接受了「互以兩岸領導人的身分及名義進行」（儀式）；並各陳「一中原則」及「一中各表」（論述）；此皆由於雙方均以「模糊的傑作──九二共識」為「兩岸共同政治基礎」。九二共識為何被稱為「模糊的傑作」？正是緣於存有「一中各表」的空間。

習近平在此會未提出「一國兩制」「和平統一」等語，絕非北京已無此想，卻是在此會中有意識的保留。兩岸均知，除非經由軍事或政經的暴力，「一個中國是中華人民共和國」（或「中華民國」）應無可能實現。兩岸如果不釐清「一個中國」的定義，即難有在國家層次的政治整合；這從此次馬習會的「儀節對等」及「論述分歧」中皆可概見。馬習會並未解決這些分歧，但既能呈現此種「一中各表」的分歧，已屬極重大的兩岸成就。

此會鞏固了九二共識為「和平發展之舟」的地位，但也鮮明呈現了一中各表的分歧。為民進黨計，此後亦應回到九二共識，並力爭一中各表。倘若蔡英文丟掉了「九二共識」，將連「一中各表」的陣地也一併棄守，那就真是不知將伊於胡底了。

Tsai Ing-wen Would Divide Taiwan rather than Allow Cross-Strait Reconciliation

Tsai Ing-wen Would Divide Taiwan rather than Allow Cross-Strait Reconciliation
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 9, 2015

Executive Summary: The world watched as the Ma Xi summit turned a new leaf for cross-Strait peace. Yet Tsai Ing-wen appears determined to find fault. She denounces the summit as an attempt to impose a political framework that limits the people's options. She accused President Ma of surrendering Taiwan's dignity and rights. Alas, Tsai Ing-wen's fit of apoplexy merely reveals that green camp efforts to demonize Mainland China and Ma Ying-jeou are losing their effectiveness.

Full Text Below:

The world watched as the Ma Xi summit turned a new leaf for cross-Strait peace. Yet Tsai Ing-wen appears determined to find fault. She denounces the summit as an attempt to impose a political framework that limits the people's options. She accused President Ma of surrendering Taiwan's dignity and rights. Alas, Tsai Ing-wen's fit of apoplexy merely reveals that green camp efforts to demonize Mainland China and Ma Ying-jeou are losing their effectiveness.

Over the years, the DPP has conveniently demonized Mainland China and Ma Ying-jeou, to great political effect. The Sunflower Student Movement was its most rewarding victory. But closer scrutiny reveals that its demonization of Mainland China and Ma Ying-jeou have become ends in themselves, rather than means. In other words, the DPP, at no cost to itself, has used anti-Mainland sentiment to demonize the Ma government. But when asked how they would handle cross-Strait relations and defend Taiwan's interests, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have no answer. If a Tsai Xi summit is ever convened, will Tsai Ing-wen do a better job of defending the rights of the people than Ma Ying-jeou? We already know the answer to that.

The green camp's demonization of Mainland China and Ma Ying-jeou have become ends rather than means. This has led to a paradox. The harm it inflicts upon Taiwan is even greater than the rift across the Taiwan Strait. This is a worrying phenomenon. Is the Chinese Communist regime the chief threat to Taiwan's survival? If so, long term DPP policy has not harmed a hair on its head. But DPP policy has made blue and green camp political parties and individuals to hate each other. It has make peace impossible. It has incited internal strife and promoted Taiwan's self-destruction.

The Ma government's handling of cross-Strait relations acknowledges the two sides' international status in the real world. It uses leverage and the balance of power to ensure Taiwan's rights and dignity. The Ma Xi summit attracted world wide attention precisely because it was motivated by a yearning for peace. It reduces the potential for cross-strait conflict, and maintains Taiwan's stability. It is consistent with the aspirations of most people on Taiwan.

By contrast, DPP strategy exploits anti-Mainland sentiment. It distorts cross-Strait relations, and turns it into a triangular relationship. It creates a triangle with the pro-independence green camp at one corner, and the pro-reunification, pro-peace blue camp at a second corner. From the perspective of partisan politics, this triangular relationship is highly useful. It creates an enemy and wins voter identification. But from the perspective of the national interest, it paints the ruling KMT as “fellow travelers” of the Chinese Communist Party. Such demonization is more than ugly. It also runs counter to our national interests. Worse still, it creates political differences greater even than those separating Taipei from Beijing. Was this the DPP's intent? Whether it was or not, the DPP must bear responsibility for dividing the people on Taiwan in this manner.

Take the Ma Xi summit. Leaders the world over were delighted to see the two sides shake hands in a gesture of goodwill. Ma and Xi exchanged views on a variety of topics. They firmed up cross-Strait peace. Only the DPP badmouthed the summit. It suddenly expressed a willingness to participate in a Tsai Xi summit, even as it poo-pooed the Ma Xi summit as meaningless. The DPP revealed its inner panic. Their denunciations failed to compensate for their anxiety. Polls conducted following the Ma Xi summit tell a very different story. As many as 46% of the public approves of the Ma Xi summit. As many as 48% think it will help cross-Strait peace. It is not obvious how the public feels?

President Ma pledged to report to the Legislative Yuan after the Ma Xi summit. This set a precedent for presidential deference to the legislature. Who knew that during consultations between the ruling KMT and opposition DPP, the latter would demand that President Ma submit to an interrogation? Who knew that the DPP would deliberately attempt to exceed the legislature's constitutional authority? Needless to say, this led to a total impasse. If President Ma were to allow himself to be interrogated by legislators during a situation report, he would undermine the constitutional framework. The Democratic Progressive Party accuses the Ma government of "black box operations". Yet it refuses to listen to his report. Are their words and deeds not poles apart?

No matter how much the DPP belittles the Ma Xi summit, the public believes "The KMT is more capable than the DPP when handling cross-Strait relations". During the current campaign Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly stressed the need to "maintain the status quo". But she contradicts herself. She repeatedly demeans the peaceful cross-strait exchanges the Ma government made possible during its seven years in office, even as she vows to maintain the status quo. Just exactly whose status quo is she promising to maintain? Or does she intend to return cross-Strait relations to the tensions and chaos of the Chen Shui-bian era?

The public seeks merely to live contented lives free from war and other man-made disasters. Does Tsai Ing-wen understand their wishes? If she does, she should realize that cross-Strait policy must not push people over a precipice.  The DPP must forsake its strategy of demonizing Ma Ying-jeou for political advantage. The reason for this should be abundantly clear. The chasm within Taiwan is even wider than the chasm separating the two sides of the Strait. The DPP's strategy for achieving power is utterly immoral.

蔡英文寧見島內鴻溝比兩岸還深？

2015-11-09 聯合報

正當舉世樂見「馬習會」為兩岸翻開和平新頁之際，蔡英文卻痛批，馬習會唯一的效果，是企圖用政治框架框限人民在兩岸關係上的選擇；她並指責馬總統未做到對等尊嚴原則，沒有捍衛台灣的權利。蔡英文的氣急敗壞，顯示綠營一向操作「反中」來「打馬」的策略，已到了捉襟見肘的地步。

多年來，民進黨利用「反中」來「打馬」，運用起來得心應手，到了太陽花學運更是一場空前豐收。然而，仔細分析其間的質變和量變，「反中」漸漸由目的變成了手段，「反馬」則成為其主要目的。換句話說，民進黨藉著毫無成本、不須接觸的「反中」，達到了醜化馬政府的目的；但如果質問蔡英文有何處理兩岸關係卻不傷及台灣利益的更佳策略，民進黨恐怕回答不出來。如果未來真有「蔡習會」，蔡英文是否比馬英九更能捍衛台灣人的權利，答案恐怕你我皆心中有數。

必須注意綠營「反中」與「打馬」策略運用的主客易位，主要是這已造成了一種矛盾的自傷局面：它在台灣內部造成的撕裂，已遠大於海峽兩岸對立的裂痕，這不能不說是一個令人憂慮的現象。試想，中共政權是構成台灣生存威脅的主要敵人，而民進黨長期以來的策略，不僅傷不到對手任何皮毛，卻弄到島內藍綠政黨與民眾互相厭憎、毫無寧日；這對台灣而言，難道不是可怕的自殘與內耗？

進一步看，馬政府處理兩岸關係，是在兩岸國際地位不對等的現實中，極力運用迂迴借力使力的平衡技巧，追求台灣的權利與尊嚴。馬習會之所以能在舉世矚目下舉行，即是基於這樣的和平思維，企圖降低兩岸潛在的敵意因素，從而維持台灣更大可能的安定，那也符合多數台灣民眾的期待。

反觀民進黨的戰略，卻利用台灣民眾「反中」的心理，把兩岸關係扭曲成一個三角關係，將這個三角關係描繪成主張獨立的綠營獨力對抗主張統一的中國和主張兩岸和平共存的藍營。從政黨競爭的角度看，這種敵我關係的塑造，或有助於選民的認同識別；但從國家整體利益的角度看，把執政黨抹黑成中共的「同路人」，則不僅是惡劣的醜化手法，且完全不利於台灣國家利益的追求。更嚴重的是，這在國內製造出嚴重的政治歧見，鴻溝之深遠甚於兩岸的分歧。這或許不是民進黨的初衷，但島內人民因此而分化對立至此，它絕不能無動於衷。

以這次「馬習會」為例，各界皆樂見兩岸領導人握手言和、互釋善意，馬習雙方也都能就各種議題暢談交換意見，這就是鞏固兩岸和平的莫大收獲。但唯獨民進黨的態度幾番轉折，突而聲稱願意比照辦理「蔡習會」，又突而將「馬習會」說得一文不值，只是徒然自曝心虛；彷彿非要如此強烈貶抑，不足以平衡其心中之焦慮。觀察馬習會後的民調，有四成六民眾贊成馬習會，有四成八認為有助兩岸和平，這不是很清楚淺顯的民情嗎？

更矛盾的是，馬總統原本願在「馬習會」後赴立法院報告，此舉也可創下總統尊重國會之先例；不料在朝野協商中，民進黨堅持馬總統必須「即問即答」，故意踰越憲法分際，最後當然只能宣告破局。如果馬總統答應在國會的「國情報告」接受立委質詢，他就破壞了憲法體制；反過來看，民進黨指控馬政府「黑箱作業」，卻又自甘放棄聽取報告的機會，其言行難道不是南轅北轍？

無論民進黨如何貶抑，經過這次馬習會，一般民眾認為「國民黨更有能力處理兩岸關係」，應已是確定的評價。事實上，蔡英文在大選中一再強調要「維持現狀」，就是一項自我矛盾的敘述：她一再否定馬政府執政七年多所推動的兩岸和平交流成果，卻又堅稱要維持現狀，那到底是誰想像的現狀？她難道能把兩岸關係帶回陳水扁時代的緊繃和混亂？

對一般人民而言，大家期待的不過是能過一個安樂的人生，免於戰亂與人禍的紛擾。如果蔡英文理解這樣的期待，她就應該清楚其兩岸政策不能有「驅民於淵」的冒進選項，而民進黨目前利用「反中打馬」作為其獲利模式的戰略也必須調整。理由很清楚：讓台灣內部的鴻溝深於兩岸間的歧見，完全是不道德的操作。

Is This Really How the DPP Wants to Play It?

Is This Really How the DPP Wants to Play It?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 6, 2015

Executive Summary: The Ma Xi summit will convene in Singapore this Saturday. As soon as the news emerged, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen reacted swiftly. Her tone was low-key. She refrained from inciting anti-Mainland sentiment. DPP candidates refrained from mobilizing mass protests or sieges of the Presidential Palace. Nevertheless Tsai Ing-wen failed to behave in a manner befitting a national leader. The DPP once again reverted to form, and hurled ideologically motivated accusations of “black box” decision-making. It once again alleged that “Taiwan's democracy will be undermined!”

Full Text Below:

The Ma Xi summit will convene in Singapore this Saturday. As soon as the news emerged, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen reacted swiftly. Her tone was low-key. She refrained from inciting anti-Mainland sentiment. DPP candidates refrained from mobilizing mass protests or sieges of the Presidential Palace. Nevertheless Tsai Ing-wen failed to behave in a manner befitting a national leader. The DPP once again reverted to form, and hurled ideologically motivated accusations of “black box” decision-making. It once again alleged that “Taiwan's democracy will be undermined!”

Most world leaders are concerned about East Asia. Political and intellectual elites concur. The strategic picture in East and Southeast Asia is turbulent, chaotic, and indeterminate. The Ma Xi summit may play an important role in cross-Strait peace. It is sure to become an important page in cross-Strait, even East Asian history. It provides a visible benchmark for peace in the Taiwan Strait and East Asia. Never mind the rest. The mere image of leaders from the two sides meeting and shaking hands reeks with historical significance. After all, the two sides have been separated for 66 years. Their leaders have finally reached the point where they can talk and shake hands. Think of all the twists and turns that came before. Think of the wisdom and effort required to bring us to this point. No wonder the global media considers this event so significant.

If Tsai Ing-wen becomes ROC president, the Ma Xi summit presents her with a highly advantageous, historic opportunity. After all, this meeting of leaders is the most difficult step. It will enable her to follow in Ma's footsteps and eventually go beyond. Tsai Ing-wen must now transcend blue vs. green. She must cease answering only to the Democratic Progressive Party. As Tsai Ing-wen herself said, the Republic of China is not synonymous with the KMT, and Taiwan is not synonymous with the DPP.

Sad to say, Tsai Ing-wen has failed to transcend her limitations. She persists in playing word games with terms such as "the people" and “the citizenry”. She is attempting to equate herself with "the people" and “the citizenry”. She is back to her old habits. These enable Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP to puff up their chests and indiscriminately reject any and all Ma government policies. They must realize that no matter how low President Ma's approval ratings have fallen, he remains a president elected by a majority of the people. He is fully authorized to implement his philosophy and his policies. The Ma Xi summit realizes an important plank in Ma's cross-Strait peace policy. Tsai Ing-wen has yet again reverted to the same tired rhetoric. By doing so, she has reneged on her pledge to make positive changes to her cross-Strait policy.

Those who arranged the Ma Xi summit emphasize that the two men are meeting as leaders of each side. They will address each other as "Mister". They will discuss no politics. They will engage in no negotiations. They will sign no agreements. They will issue no statements. They will make no private commitments. In other words, the Ma Xi summit on Saturday will be symbolic in nature. It will at most firm up the consensus between leaders from the two sides. By all accounts it will be consistent with Tsai's call for "equal dignity", "openness and transparency", and "apolitical nature". Furthermore, President Ma has publicly promised to report to the Legislative Yuan afterwards. Does this not consistute public and legislative oversight? Therefore, just exactly is Tsai Ing-wen's complaint?

Tsai Ing-wen's final remark reveals the true source of her inner anxiety. She said, "Taiwan is currently in the middle of an election. This is a sensitive time. Was the choice to convene a Ma Xi summit at this time intended to influence the election? The public has its suspicions." So this is what has Tsai in a tizzy. Tsai Ing-wen's real concern is that the Ma Xi summit will influence the presidential election. This footnote essentially nullified everything Tsai Ing-wen trotted out earlier. The same is true of the reaction of several DPP county chiefs and city mayors. All of them saw the summit as nothing more than an election ploy.

What's interesting is that Tsai Ing-wen considers herself a representative of "the people" and "the citizenry". If she really believes "the people" and "the citizenry" are offended by the Ma Xi summit, won't their reaction help her election prospects? Shouldn't she be delighted? Why wring her hands about any "attempts to influence the election"? If a single Ma Xi summit can influence the election, then which party needs to rethink its campaign platform? The KMT? Or the DPP? The results from a several live votes have been released. A majority of the public are happy to see a Ma Xi summit take place.

Let us not mince words. It is a widely held belief that the DPP cares only about winning elections, nothing else. This charge reveals Tsai Ing-wen's mindset more clearly than anything else. Since the election began, her cross-Strait policy platform has been one long tap dance. She has dodged every question asked her about the 1992 Consensus. She refuses to present any position whatsoever. Her irresponsible attitude has finally been outed by the Ma Xi summit. She has completely reverted to form. She has lost the moral high ground. She has unwittingly but clearly told "the people" and "the citizenry" that apart from winning the election, she cares about nothing else.

The Ma Xi summit held on Saturday will be an important moment in history. It will have positive repercussions for the future. At this critical juncture, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have left behind a record of their behavior. They have left behind damning insights into their character.

這就是民進黨的格局嗎？

2015年11月06日 中國時報

馬習會將在本周六於新加坡舉行的消息傳出後，民進黨及其總統參選人蔡英文很快都做出回應，雖然表現低調，未操作反中情緒，也沒有黨籍候選人發動包圍總統府或群眾示威抗議。但令人遺憾，蔡英文並沒有展現出國家領導人應有的高度與格局，再度展現民進黨意識型態原形，質疑決策過程「黑箱」，還指控對台灣民主政治會有傷害！

相信全球多數關注東亞局勢的國家領導人、政治與知識精英都會同意，在東亞與東南亞國際戰略情勢正進入風起雲湧、渾沌不明之際，馬習會的舉行將有機會對兩岸未來的和平發揮關鍵作用，勢必將會是兩岸發展史、乃至東亞區域史上重要的一頁！而台海的和平對區域和平亦具有觀察指標的意義。別的不談，僅就兩岸領導人正式見面握手的畫面，就具有彌足珍貴的歷史意義！畢竟兩岸分離66年，終於走到領導人握手交談這一步，中間歷經多少曲折，又凝聚了多少人的智慧與心力！難怪這兩天幾乎全球媒體都給予正面的評價。

對蔡英文而言，如果她有機會擔任下一屆的中華民國總統，這般的歷史發展，對她而言絕對是有利的契機，畢竟當「領導人會面」這最艱難的一步都跨過去了，她能夠接續布局的空間將更擴大許多！此刻的蔡英文，所選擇的位置應是超越藍綠的台灣，而不是台灣的民進黨！套用蔡英文自己的語言，如果中華民國不等於國民黨，台灣也從不等於民進黨。

但蔡英文還是無法超越局限！她在聲明中不斷玩弄「人民」、「國人」的語詞，意圖將她自己與「人民」、「國人」畫上等號，而也就是這種慣性的修辭操作，讓蔡英文與民進黨過往能理直氣壯地抵制馬政府的所有政策！要知道，馬總統就算今天的聲望再低落，畢竟也是多數民意選出的總統，他有完全的責任去實踐他的理念與政見，如今的馬習會，本來也就是落實兩岸和平政策上重要的一環，蔡英文再度祭出了同樣的修辭大加質疑，反而將她早先對兩岸正面的調整全破了功！

更何況，這次的馬習會，已經早就強調雙方是以兩岸領導人身分會面，互稱「先生」，而且完全不涉政治談判、不簽署協議、不發表共同聲明，也不會有私下承諾。換言之，周六舉行的馬習會，所展現更多的其實是其象徵的意義，至多只有凝聚兩岸領導人共識的功能。從各方面來看都符合蔡英文所強調的「對等尊嚴」、「公開透明」、「不涉政治前提」的原則，更何況馬總統都公開許諾了，他事後願意到立法院去報告，這不也等於是接受民意與國會監督嗎？那麼蔡英文的最大不滿究竟是什麼呢？

在蔡英文聲明中的最後，或許才道出她內心的真實焦慮，她說「目前正值台灣選舉的敏感時期，選擇在這個時間進行馬習會，是否意圖影響選舉，必定遭受社會質疑。」原來如此，蔡英文真正掛念的，是擔心馬習會的舉辦，會不會影響總統選情？這個註腳等於讓蔡英文先前說的所有冠冕堂皇的話全掉了漆，而幾位民進黨縣市長的反應也全一樣，全都將之視為是選舉操作！

耐人尋味的是，如果蔡英文自認代表台灣全部「人民」，她若認為所謂「國人」或「人民」都會不同意或不允許馬習會的舉辦，那麼豈不是對她的選情更有加分的作用！她高興都還來不及呢，何來「意圖影響選舉」之說，如果一場馬習會就能夠真的影響選情，那麼該檢討的是國民黨還是民進黨？要知道，已經公布的若干即時民調，多數民意可是樂見馬習會的哦！

不諱言地說，相較於其他的批評，這種「只圖選舉，不為其他」的思維慣性，徹底暴露了蔡英文的局限性。自選戰開打以來，在兩岸政策上，她一路模糊以對，對關鍵的九二共識立場更是完全躲閃，甚至是根本不論述，這種不負責任的態度，終於到了這次馬習會的議題上，完全現出了原形，不僅完全喪失了高度，而且明示的告訴國人，除了選舉，她其實不在乎其他的東西。

可預見的，周六舉行的馬習會，將在未來的大歷史中記上重要的一筆，它的正面效應也會在未來陸續展現，而在這個關鍵時刻中，蔡英文與民進黨所留下的紀錄，也將見證其識見與格局！

Ma Xi Summit: New Course, New Thinking

Ma Xi Summit: New Course, New Thinking
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 5, 2015

Executive Summary: Two years ago, the idea of a "Wang Zhang summit" was floated for the first time. Many felt it would be tough to implement. After a three year delay, the Ma Xi summit will finally take place. Clearly wishing was not enough. Bold action was required to succeed. This Saturday, the Ma Xi summit will convene. Tsai Ing-wen's proudly trumpeted "maintaining the status quo" will promptly be rendered obsolete.

Full Text Below:

Last year hopes for a Ma Xi summit at the APEC conference at Yanqi Lake in Beijing were dashed. Now, unexpectedly, the summit will take place in Singapore, the birthplace of the 1992 Consensus. The summit conveys strong suggestions of political continuity. President Ma's term is drawing to a close. Xi Jinping is implementing a global strategy. Leaders from the two sides are meeting for the first time after being separated for 66 years. The summit ushers in a new era of peace. It is also attracting international attention.

The Ma Xi summit, from initiative to realization, endured nearly three years of twists and turns. It failed to materialize before because both parties were too obstinate and lacked the necessary vision. First, consider the subjective factors. The Taiwan Affairs Office now appears willing to engage in cross-Strait negotiations. But it was slow to take action. As a result, the Ma Xi summit, rife with political significance, remained stalled. The Mainland side misjudged the situation and hobbled itself. Meanwhile, the Ma administration was bound hand and foot by internal constraints. The administration was overwhelmed. This made Beijing hesitant to commit to a meeting. The opportunity was lost.

Secondly, consider the objective factors. The two parties listed preconditions for a Ma Xi summit, including format, location, name, and other technical matters. These presented unnecessary obstacles. For example, our side insisted that the Beijing APEC was ideal for a Ma Xi summit. Xi Jinping would enjoy a home court advantage, and President Ma would attend in his capacity as an "economic leader". But APEC is an international conference. Therefore Beijing had concerns. If heads of state from Taipei and Beijing met in such a venue, Beijing would have trouble spinning its significance, both internally and externally. Therefore it insisted on convening the summit in a "third locale". The two sides missed an opportunity for a summit in Beijing during APEC. Cross-Strait relations subsequently encountered headwinds.

The Ma Xi summit will be held in Singapore, a “third locale where Beijing and Singapore established diplomatic relations 25 years ago. It is also where Taiwan and the Mainland, motivated by a shared sense of crisis, are thinking and acting anew.

Now consider how the situation has changed. The KMT was routed in the nine in one elections. It faces another rout in the 2016 general election. Tsai Ing-wen's election prospects appear bright. This increases Beijing's concerns about the future of cross-Strait relations. In the event they deteriorate, a return to today's peace will be impossible. Beijing therefore feels it must affirm the Ma administration's efforts to improve cross-Strait relations, and the two sides' efforts on behalf of peace. Only then can it prevent cross-Strait relations from deteriorating beyond repair. This constitutes a new course in cross-Strait relations. Had the two sides held a Ma Xi summit last year, the KMT would not be in its current pickle.

This new course allows the two sides to convene a Ma Xi summit, one that embodies new thinking and breaks new ground. The annual APEC meeting will be held in Manila this November. But the conflict in the South China Sea scotched any plans by Xi Jinping to visit the Philippines. Instead, Singapore has invited Xi Jinping to Singapore to celebrate the 25th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Singapore and Beijing. This in turn paved the way for a Ma Xi summit. The two parties are unwilling to forgo the opportunity for a summit while Ma is still in office.

Cross-Strait relations over the next four to eight years could be filled with twists and turns. A summit might never materialize. As a result, differences over venue, timing, and content, are now regarded as secondary in importance and have been shelved. Time and tide have compelled both sides to overcome past obstacles.

The Ma Xi summit in Singapore is a good choice, for both sides. Singapore was the venue for the Koo-Wang talks and the birthplace of the 1992 Consensus. Leaders from the two sides will now meet there to update the 1992 Consensus. Lee Kuan Yew and his son Lee Hsien Loong have a history of facilitating cross-Strait reconciliation. As hosts they have the two sides' trust, and are able to make appropriate and equitable arrangements, . The next question is what the Ma Xi summit will offer as far as content. Members of the public on both sides feel they have already benefitted. The mere fact that their leaders are meeting implies that cross-Strait peace will endure. If so, international applause is a forgone conclusion.

The DPP reacted vehemently to the Ma Xi summit yesterday. It issued five statements. It raised seven objections. It basted the timing, the status of the two parties, and the negotiation process. It said Ma must not undermine the dignity of the nation. In fact, every move of the Ma Xi summit will be carried out under global scrutiny. The Executive Yuan will be required to report to the Legislative Yuan. How can Ma possibly do anything contrary to the national interest? Furthermore, the Ma Xi summit will set a precedent. Even if the ruling party on Taiwan changes, leaders from the two sides will still be able to meet this way. This is surely easier than the DPP's promotion of high-level consultations, is it not?

Two years ago, the idea of a "Wang Zhang summit" was floated for the first time. Many felt it would be tough to implement. After a three year delay, the Ma Xi summit will finally take place. Clearly wishing was not enough. Bold action was required to succeed. This Saturday, the Ma Xi summit will convene. Tsai Ing-wen's proudly trumpeted "maintaining the status quo" will promptly be rendered obsolete.

觀察「馬習會」的新脈絡與新思維

2015-11-05 聯合報

去年曾被寄予厚望卻未能實現的ＡＰＥＣ北京雁棲湖「馬習會」，如今意外成局，地點選在「九二共識」萌芽地的新加坡舉行，別具傳承之意。在馬總統任期接近尾聲、在習近平正展開環球戰略重新布局之際，兩岸領導人在兩岸分隔六十六年之後首度會面，不僅將寫下和平新頁，也深受國際矚目。

「馬習會」從最初倡議到成局，前後歷經近三年的迂迴曲折；稍早之所以功敗垂成，無非是雙方協商者心態太過拘泥所致，缺乏與時俱進的推演想像。首先，在主觀因素上：國台辦對當前的兩岸事務性協商似乎感到於願足矣，而怠於向前跨躍推進；也因此，對於「馬習會」這樣具高度政治意義的安排，便顯得止步不前，這是誤判形勢與自我設限。相對的，近兩年馬政府一再受國內形勢掣肘，顯得無暇他顧，這也讓北京方面對「馬習會」的安排感到遲疑，因而貽誤了時機。

其次，在客觀因素上：雙方對於「馬習會」的形式、地點、稱謂等技術性問題各有堅持，造成不必要的困擾。例如，我方先前堅持北京ＡＰＥＣ是「馬習會」的最佳場合，認為習近平擁有「主場」地位，而馬總統則可以「經濟領袖」身分出席；但北京方面忌憚ＡＰＥＣ是國際會議場合，台灣元首如果與會，對北京易滋對內及對外的解說難題，從而主張在「第三地」舉行。然而，一錯過北京ＡＰＥＣ的機遇，兩岸關係就遇上了可能逆轉的暗流。

這次「馬習會」得以成局，除了借重中星建交廿五周年這個「第三地」的時、地之便，另一方面，也是雙方對於兩岸關係的維繫在某種共同的危機感下，對於兩岸「新脈絡」觸發了「新思維」。

且看這段期間的形勢變化：國民黨歷經九合一選舉的慘敗，又面對二○一六大選的頹勢，蔡英文則形勢大好。這讓北京擔心，兩岸關係未來一旦倒退，即將再也無法重返今天的和平狀態，因而必須對馬政府推動兩岸交流的努力給予肯定，並對雙方追求和平的立場作出更積極的宣示，以免兩岸關係退至無可回復之地步。這是雙方看待兩岸關係的新脈絡。事實上，如果雙方去年能促成「馬習會」，國民黨今天的局勢也不致如此雪上加霜。

在這樣的新脈絡下，雙方對「馬習會」的安排便有了「新思維」，並有了突破。今年ＡＰＥＣ年會十一月將在馬尼拉舉行，但由於南海齟齬，習近平未計畫赴菲與會；此時，新加坡邀請習近平往訪慶祝星中建交廿五周年，則為「馬習會」鋪平了這條道路。雙方的主要思維是：一旦錯失了在馬總統任內完成兩岸領導人會晤的壯舉，那麼，接下來的四年或八年兩岸關係可能坎坷曲折，領導人峰會即再會無期。也因此，雙方在場合、時機和會晤內容上的分歧，也就被視為次要問題而暫擱；形勢和時機的迫促，反而讓雙方有了跳躍障礙的能量。

在新加坡舉行「馬習會」，對兩岸都是一個絕佳選擇。新加坡當年因為「辜汪會談」而成為「九二共識」的萌芽地，在此舉行兩岸領導人會談，有重新詮釋九二共識的作用。不僅如此，李光耀和李顯龍父子兩代都是追求兩岸和解的「調解人」，能以東道主身分作出最適當、公正的安排，值得兩岸信任。接下來的問題，就要看馬、習雙方將端出什麼樣的「內容設計」，既在形式上讓兩岸人民覺得各有斬獲而不虛此會，又在實質上傳遞出兩岸和平不會倒退的訊息；果真如此，贏得國際的掌聲自非難事。

對於「馬習會」，民進黨昨天反應強烈，發表五大聲明，就時機、對等性、交涉過程等提出七大質疑，並要求不可作出任何傷害國格的行為。事實上，「馬習會」每一步棋都是在全球注目下進行，行政院並已就此向立法院提出報告，如何可能作出違背國家利益的事？再說，「馬習會」此次開了先例之後，未來即使台灣政黨輪替，兩岸領導人仍可援此模式安排會晤，這絕對比民進黨推動兩岸高層會商容易得多，不是嗎？

兩年前，當「王張會」的構想首度被提及時，許多人也覺得設計上困難重重；但曾幾何時，蹉跎三年的「馬習會」如今也已水到渠成了。可見，對願景懷有瞻矚還不夠，必須有強烈的推動企圖才能成事。周六「馬習會」一開，蔡英文自詡的「維持現狀」立刻就顯得落後了。

Tsai Ing-wen Signals Beijing, Falls Short

Tsai Ing-wen Signals Beijing, Falls Short
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 3, 2015

Executive Summary: Many suspect that Tsai Ing-wen has not really embraced the ROC. Nevertheless the DPP's actions move it closer to the Republic of China. The DPP must join the public in supporting the ROC. It must refrain from accusing others of "not loving Taiwan ". If the DPP does this, the public will affirm it. The Mainland will also give any DPP course changes due consideration.

Full Text Below:

The outcome of the 2016 election is now virtually certain. KMT presidential candidate Eric Chu does not expect to win. He is merely attempting to preserve KMT strength in the Legislative Yuan to check the power of the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen has not allowed the prospect of victory to go to her head. During the opening ceremony for her campaign headquarters, she conceded that "The DPP is not synonymous with Taiwan, and the KMT is not synonymous with the Republic of China". On a highly symbolic occasion, she issued a statement with far-reaching political implications, provoking considerable debate. Tsai Ing-wen is apparently no longer campaigning against the Kuomintang, but rather sending a signal to Beijing.

Tsai Ing-wen's motive for her novel rhetoric is obvious. She is attempting to shatter the KMT's long-held monopoly on the political symbolism surrounding the “Republic of China”. She wants the chance to spin the meaning of the Republic of China. She conceded that "The Democratic Progressive Party is not synonymous with Taiwan". By doing so, she relinquished the Democratic Progressive Party's long-held monopoly on the political symbolism surrounding “Taiwan”. Tsai Ing-wen's rhetoric has long been random and haphazard. Public perception of Tsai Ing-wen as someone who merely issues hollow rhetoric runs deep. As a result, public skepticism about her Road to Damascus conversion persists. Eric Chu notes that the DPP has not nullified the Taiwan independence party platform, and that Tsai Ing-wen was the author of the "two states theory”. He warned that if DPP gains control of the central government in addition to local governments, and the executive as well as the legislature, it will implement de facto Taiwan independence or an "independent Taiwan". This will result in cross-Strait military conflict. He warned blue camp supporters that the Republic of China may face extinction.

Tsai Ing-wen reacted swiftly to Chu's criticisms. She said Chu's remarks were non sequiturs, and that he was playing the intimidation card.

In fact, Chu's suspicions are well founded. So why did Tsai play this trump card? Was Tsai addressing voters on Taiwan? Or was she addressing Beijing, on the other side of the Strait? Was she  attempting to exploit her newfound recognition of the "Republic of China" and the “constitutional framework of the Republic of China”? The Mainland insists that "The two sides of the Strait constitute one China”. DPP refusal to recognize the 1992 consensus could make "the earth move and the mountains shake". Given all this, her motives should be crystal clear.

Tsai Ing-wen has signaled her intentions to Beijing. She seeks face-saving middle ground outside the 1992 consensus. She seeks to avoid DPP vs CCP clash over the 1992 consensus and cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen's course remains fuzzy. Can she move toward the "constitutional one China" advanced by Frank Hsieh? Tsai Ing-wen's recent rhetoric appears to be paving the way toward the "constitutional one China” that Frank Hsieh advanced in 2000.

Tsai Ing-wen has yet to utter the phrase "constitutional one China". But she has emphasized the "ROC constitutional framework". She has embraced the "Republic of China". She has closed in on the "constitutional one China" concept. Tsai Ing-wen may be taking into consideration the Mainland's position. She may be suggesting a compromise and making a goodwill gesture.

When Tsai Ing-wen visited the US, she pledged to "maintain the status quo" and defend the "ROC constitutional framework". This won Washington's approval. Her next goal is to sweeten the pot and win Beijing's approval.

Suppose Tsai Ing-wen goes further and advocates a "constitutional one China"? Will the Mainland accept a "constitutional one China" or "quasi-constitutional one China" in lieu of the 1992 consensus? That remains to be seen. But the Mainland will undeniably see this development in a positive light.

So far the Mainland response to the elections has been restrained. It has not taken any drastic actions in response to the prospect of a Tsai Ing-wen presidency. On the one hand, the time may not be right. On on the other hand, the Mainland may still be considering the implications of Tsai Ing-wen's signal.

Tsai Ing-wen has not responded recklessly to the Mainland's warning that "the earth will move and the mountains will shake". We urge Tsai Ing-wen to keep an open mind, to fine tune her rhetoric, to narrow any differences and broaden any agreements with the Mainland. Tsai Ing-wen has recently demonstrated restraint regarding Taiwan independence. She has embraced the Republic of China. This should at least prevent the worst possible outcome, a military conflict between the two sides.

But this merely passively maintains cross-Strait relations. At best this prevents relations from descending into the abyss. This pro forma, preliminary course change, will at most maintain the status quo. It will not improve cross-Strait relations.

Tsai Ing-wen has begun a course change. She must now step up the pace. She must now consolidate the change. She must enable both Taiwan and the Mainland to feel the change. Tsai Ing-wen is now embracing the Republic of China. She must prove that she is not merely paying it pro forma lip service. She must demonstrate a deeper understanding of Taiwan's interests and the importance of cross-Strait peace. She must transcend personal ideology and walk the walk. Tsai Ing-wen must behave like a president elect. She must make cross-Strait peace her top priority. She must ensure that the hard-won cross-Strait peace is not lost.

Many suspect that Tsai Ing-wen has not really embraced the ROC. Nevertheless the DPP's actions move it closer to the Republic of China. The DPP must join the public in supporting the ROC. It must refrain from accusing others of "not loving Taiwan ". If the DPP does this, the public will affirm it. The Mainland will also give any DPP course changes due consideration.

蔡英文給北京的方向燈 正確但不夠 2015年11月03日 中國時報 2016選戰勝負幾乎已定，國民黨提名參選人朱立倫已無求勝之心，只求在立法院保留元氣，未來能夠制衡民進黨。但蔡英文並未被勝利的氛圍沖昏頭，卻在競選總部成立大會拋出「民進黨不等於台灣，國民黨也不等於中華民國」新論述。她在具高度象徵意義的場合，發表具高度政治意涵的談話，實足堪玩味。看來，蔡英文這場選戰不再以國民黨為對手，而是針對北京發出政治訊號。 解析蔡英文的論述可以理解，她企圖切斷國民黨長期以來對中華民國政治意象的獨占，分享對中華民國的接近與詮釋權，她又提出「民進黨不等於台灣」，則是讓出民進黨長期以來對台灣政治意象的獨占。由於蔡英文的表述太過跳躍，社會對蔡英文「空心」的刻板印象又太深，台灣內部對這兩句話普遍抱持質疑。朱立倫就以民進黨未廢除「台獨黨綱」，蔡英文又是「兩國論」製造者為出發警告，如果民進黨從中央到地方，從行政到立法全面完全執政，就會實質推動台獨或獨台、製造兩岸衝突，他警告藍營支持者，中華民國將面臨還存不存在的危險。 蔡英文也很快就回應了朱立倫的批評，語意中流露朱立倫沒有跟上節拍，還在打已無效的「恐嚇牌」。 朱立倫的主觀質疑並非沒有依據，但蔡英文為何打出這張「王牌」？如果蔡英文表述的對象不是台灣內部，而是海峽對岸北京，企圖藉對「中華民國」的認同與對中華民國憲政體制的堅持，與大陸堅持的「兩岸一中」相連結，解決民進黨拒絕承認九二共識所可能製造的「地動山搖」危機，她的動機就豁然開朗了。 蔡英文不無對北京打方向燈的意圖，示意她想要在九二共識以外，尋找中間論述做為兩岸在九二共識以外的緩衝帶，避免民共因為九二共識的歧異，而在兩岸關係上對撞。雖然蔡英文的摸索路徑仍然模糊，但如果以謝長廷曾提出的「憲法一中」做為對照，卻可以發現，蔡英文近來的論述與轉向，似乎頗有向著謝長廷在2000年提出的「憲法一中」鋪路的味道。 蔡英文雖然尚未直接說出「憲法一中」，但她一方面強調「憲政體制」，一方面擁抱「中華民國」，加總起來，與「憲法一中」概念的距離已經拉近，這未嘗不是蔡英文考慮大陸立場後的讓步與善意。 這樣的論述模式，蔡英文訪美透過「維持現狀」與「中華民國憲政體制」這兩張牌，已爭取到美國的認同，下一個目標就是如何添加元素，創造出北京可以接受的論述。 當然，就算蔡英文真的進一步走到了「憲法一中」框架，大陸方面能否接受「憲法一中」或「類憲法一中」做為九二共識的替代品，仍有待觀察。但不能輕率否認大陸從正向角度解讀的可能性。 大陸到目前為止對台灣選舉的態度尚稱自制，並未對蔡英文執政的可能性，發動震撼性的攻勢，一方面可能是時機未到，另一方面，也可能意味陸方可能正在消化解讀蔡英文釋出的訊息。 蔡英文並未輕率應對大陸的「地動山搖」警告，但我們仍要敦促蔡英文，要繼續抱持開放的態度，保持論述面的動態調整，以更大程度減少與陸方的差異，擴大交集與共識。我們相信，蔡英文近來已展現出對台獨的自抑與對中華民國的擁抱，當可最低程度保持兩岸關係不向兵戎相見的最壞狀況發展。 但這仍只能消極的確保兩岸關係，不要如墜深淵式的「向下沉淪」，卻不可能僅憑形式的、初步的轉向，就達到「維持現狀」的效果，遑論奢求兩岸關係「向上提升」。 蔡英文應在目前初步轉向的行動基礎上，加大步伐去「深化」、甚至「固化」其轉向，讓台灣內部與大陸都看得到，蔡英文擁抱中華民國，不是策略面的「假戲」，而是深刻認知台灣利益與兩岸和平重要性後，超越個人意識形態後的「真做」。蔡英文必須認真以準國家領導人高度，把兩岸和平調整做為她治國的最優先項，努力確保兩岸好不容易建立起來的和平交流成果不致崩壞。 雖然還是有很多人不相蔡英文真心擁抱中華民國，但只要民進黨能在行動端，多一步向中華民國光譜靠攏，並願意與社會大眾分享台灣的政治意象，不輕易質疑他方是否「愛台灣」，相信社會會給予肯定，中國大陸對民進黨這樣的調整，也應至少給予觀察的空間。

How to Overcome Fear of Being Reunified

How to Overcome Fear of Being Reunified
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 3, 2015

Executive Summary: People think Taiwan will be compelled to reunify. Faced with this prospect, Eric Chu has chosen to stand on maintaining the status quo. The fewest number of people consider this feasible. Tsai Ing-wen has chosen to stand on Taiwan independence. The largest number of people support this. Hung Hsiu-chu, by contrast, warned against "being compelled to reunify under humiliating circumstances”. Alas, her warnings have fallen on deaf ears. How can people on Taiwan overcome their Reunification Phobia? How can the gap between subjective desires and objective expectations be bridged? Slogans will not be enough.

Full Text Below:

The Academia Sinica recently conducted a "reunification vs. independence survey”. It discovered a significant gap between peoples' wishes regarding reunification and independence, and their expectations regarding reunification vs. independence.

When asked whether they favored, opposed, or were neutral regarding reunification vs. independence, 46.4% said they favored independence. Independence ranked first among the three options. But when asked whether Taiwan would eventually be reunified, independent, or remain as it is, 49.7% thought it would be reunified. Only 35.9% thought it would become independent. Even among those who favored independence, 37% believed that Taiwan would eventually be reunified.

This survey raises three concerns. One. On today's Taiwan, a plurality of 46.4% prefers independence. Those who adopted a neutral stance, ranked second at 37.5%.  The questionnaire did not use the term "maintain the status quo". Those who preferred reunification came in last, at 16.1%. Clearly independence is the dominant opinion.

Two. Up to 46.4% favored independence. Yet 49.7% predicted that Taiwan will eventually be reunified. Taiwan independence is the number one preference. Yet more people believe Taiwan will be reunified instead of becoming independent. Subjective desires and objective expectations differ. A plurality yearns for independence, but anticipates reunification.

Three. Those who favor reunification constitute a minority. At 14.4%, they constitute a even smaller minority than the 16.1% who prefer maintaining the status quo. Yet those who expect reunification constitute the largest percentage. They are unwilling to reunify, but expect reunification nonetheless. This amounts to a psychological gap. Those who expect the situation to remain the same constitute the smallest percentage. Those who expect Taiwan to be reunified constitute the largest percentage. They probably think that anyone who believes the situation will remain the same is a victim of “boiled frog syndrome”.

The survey addressed the cross-Strait policy platforms adopted during the current presidential election. Eric Chu would "maintain the status quo". He supports the 1992 consensus, one China, different interpretations, and no reunification, no independence, and no use of force. But the survey shows that those who expect the situation to remain the same constitute the smallest minority of all, at a mere 14.4%.

Tsai Ing-wen also advocates maintaining the status quo. But she refuses to recognize either the 1992 consensus or one China, different interpretations. She has yet to advocate no reunification, no independence, and no use of force. Since these amount to the status quo, how exactly does she propose to maintain it? In other words, suppose Tsai Ing-wen emerges victorious in 2016? The KMT supports the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. Suppose it is replaced by the DPP, which refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations? If “the earth moves and the mountains shake”, how exactly will Tsai "maintain the status quo"? Moreover, 46.4% yearn for independence, while 35.9% believe independence is feasible. Will Tsai Ing-wen have the guts to turn her back on these Taiwan independence supporters? Finally, 49.7% anticipate that Taiwan will be reunified. So how exactly does Tsai Ing-wen intend to fulfill the wishes of her Taiwan independence supporters?

By contrast, Hung Hsiu-chu's cross-Strait platform echoes the findings in this poll far more closely. Hung lost control over the way her cross-Strait policy platform was perceived in the media. She sprung terms such as "one China, same interpretation" and "eventual reunification" on voters. This backfired. But in fact her cross-Strait policy platform makes perfect sense. It must not be discarded merely because her campaign was derailed. Hung's campaign theme was "The Way". She knew that Taiwan independence had strong public support. But she also knew it was a dead end. She knew pressure from the Chinese mainland to reunify would only increase. Therefore she did not want Taiwan to be reunified under humiliating circumstances. Her cross-Strait policy platform was a warning.

Hung Hsiu-chu used the "compelled to reunify". The Academia Sinica poll used "compelled to reunify" in largely the same manner. This may be the first time the phrase “compelled to reunify” has appeared in any poll, particularly during a presidential election. This reflects changes in the global situation. Hung Hsiu-chu said, "I am not pro-reunification". She knew that being “pro-reunification" would make her vulnerable. But when “compelled to reunify", she proudly proclaimed, "I am reunifying them. They are not reunifying me.” She added, more quietly, that “We must not allow ourselves to be reunified under humiliating circumstances". She said the status quo is untenable. She said we must not become "gradually boiled frogs".  She said the Republic of China still has an opportunity to sign a peace agreement with the Mainland. Hung Hsiu-chu's policy platform addressed public anxieties about reunification even better than those of Eric Chu and Tsai Ing-wen apparently.  

Public support for independence on Taiwan is strong. But the expectation that Taiwan will be compelled to reunify is the strongest expectation of all. The most repugnant word in the phrase “compelled to reunify” is “compelled”. This objectively reveals the ebb and flow of the cross-Strait situation. It reveals the erosion of public confidence in cross-Strait policy. The public on Taiwan has little desire to reunify. Expectations that the future will be like today are even lower. Public desire for independence is strong, yet most people think Taiwan will be compelled to reunify. This is how public opinion and political reality have torn Taiwan apart. Such tears are difficult to heal. This is the main reason people think Taiwan will be compelled to reunify.

People think Taiwan will be compelled to reunify. Faced with this prospect, Eric Chu has chosen to stand on maintaining the status quo. The fewest number of people consider this feasible. Tsai Ing-wen has chosen to stand on Taiwan independence. The largest number of people support this. Hung Hsiu-chu, by contrast, warned against "being compelled to reunify under humiliating circumstances”. Alas, her warnings have fallen on deaf ears. How can people on Taiwan overcome their Reunification Phobia? How can the gap between subjective desires and objective expectations be bridged? Slogans will not be enough.

如何走出「被統一」的焦慮

2015-11-03 聯合報

中研院社會所最近所作「統獨」調查發現：民眾對「當下統獨意願選擇」，與「預期未來統獨走向」出現明顯的落差。

被問及「以你當下意願，選擇統一、獨立或中間立場」時，有四十六．四％選擇「獨立」，為三選項中最高者；但再被問及，你預期兩岸未來將走向是「被統一、獨立或維持現狀」時，卻有四十九．七％預期台灣將「被統一」，而只有三十五．九％預期將「獨立」。其中，當下意願選項為「獨立」者，亦有三十七％預期台灣將「被統一」。

此項調查引起關注的面向有三：一、台灣當下的民意結構，選擇「獨立」者居最多（四十六．四）。持「中間立場」（問卷此處未用「維持現狀」一詞）居次，占三十七．五。主張「統一」者居末，僅十六．一。可見主張「獨立」目前為強勢民意。

二、有四十六．四當下意願選擇「獨立」，卻有四十九．七預估台灣未來將「被統一」。可見台獨雖為強勢民意，卻有更多民眾認為台灣的未來走向是「被統一」，而非獨立。在此出現了「主觀意願」與「客觀預期」的落差，想要獨立，但預期被統一。

三、選擇「統一」是台灣的弱勢民意（十六．一），「維持現狀」則是比率最低的預期走向（十四．四）。選擇「統一」者最少，但預期「被統一」者最多，這也是一種心理落差（不願統，但預期被統一）。而預期「維持現狀」者最少，預期「被統一」者最多，則可能是認為維持現狀是「溫水煮青蛙」。

試以此項調查來解析此次總統大選中的兩岸論述。朱立倫據守「維持現狀」，主張「九二共識／一中各表」，「不統／不獨／不武」。但調查顯示，預期兩岸未來能「維持現狀」者卻居最少數（十四．四）。

蔡英文也主張維持現狀，但迄不承認「九二共識／一中各表」，也未說「不統／不獨／不武」；凡此皆非「現狀」，將如何「維持」？亦即，二○一六倘蔡英文勝選，台灣若由主張「九二共識／一中各表」的國民黨，換成以否定「九二共識／一中各表」的民進黨主政，萬一出現「地動山搖」的情勢，將如何「維持現狀」？何況，獨立是四十六．四％強勢民意的選擇，且畢竟仍有三十五．九％預期「獨立」可以實現，蔡英文如何能背棄這些廣義「台獨」的支持者？然而，卻又有四十九．七％預期台灣將「被統一」，試問蔡英文將如何實現台獨支持者的意願？

相對而言，洪秀柱的兩岸論述，卻可能更呼應此項民調。洪沒有能力駕御她的兩岸論述，如爆出「一中同表」「終極統一」，終至捉襟見肘；但她的論述主軸其實不無道理，不能因她選戰失敗就廢其言。洪的競選主題是「道路」，她看出了台獨是強勢民意，但不認為此路可通。她也預期中國大陸對台灣促統的壓力將愈來愈大，因此以台灣不要蹉跎至「在失去尊嚴的情形下被統一」，為其兩岸論述的總結性警語。

洪秀柱使用的「被統一」，與中研院民調中使用的「被統一」，應是同一概念。這可能是「被統一」一詞首見於民調，也是首見於總統大選，這多少反映了世局的遞變。洪秀柱說「我不是統派」，可見她知「統一」是弱勢民意；但面對「被統一」的壓力，她一方面高調地說「是我統他，不是他統我」，另一方面卻又低調地說「不能在失去尊嚴的情況下被統一」。她說，現狀是維持不住的，「不要溫水煮青蛙」，要在中華民國尚有機會時，與大陸簽定和平協議。如此看來，洪秀柱的論述，難道不比朱立倫或蔡英文更能反映此民調顯示的民間焦慮？

「獨立」是強勢民意，但「被統一」卻是最多數的預期。「被統一」的「被」字最刺眼，因為這顯示了兩岸客觀情勢的消長，及民眾對兩岸前景信心之消蝕。當台灣民眾對「統一」的意願低，對「維持現狀」的預期亦低，且「獨立」又是強勢民意，但又多數預期將「被統一」，這正是一個被民意及現實撕裂的台灣。而此種難以癒合的撕裂，正是預期台灣可能「被統一」的主因之一。

面對「被統一」的預期，朱立倫站在「維持現狀」的最少數預期上，蔡英文則站在最強勢的「獨立」民意上，洪秀柱的「不能在失去尊嚴下被統一」的警語又成馬耳東風。台灣如何走出「被統一」的焦慮，如何處理主客觀條件的落差，光憑口號是不夠的！

US Rattles Sabers in South China Sea

US Rattles Sabers in South China Sea 
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
November 2, 2015

Executive Summary: The US Navy's Arleigh Burke Class Aegis destroyer Lassen recently sailed through the South China Sea, past Subi Reef and Meichi ("Mischief") Reef. The People's Liberation Army Navy sent the Lanzhou missile destroyer and Taizhou frigate to track the Lassen the entire way. The two sides gave advance notice and insisted they were keeping the peace. But this brief confrontation,  this historical moment, conveyed a surreal feeling.

Full Text Below: 

The US Navy's Arleigh Burke Class Aegis destroyer Lassen recently sailed through the South China Sea, past Subi Reef and Meichi ("Mischief") Reef. The People's Liberation Army Navy sent the Lanzhou missile destroyer and Taizhou frigate to track the Lassen the entire way. The two sides gave advance notice and insisted they were keeping the peace. But this brief confrontation,  this historical moment, conveyed a surreal feeling.

The United States' action was a provocation. But its action were measured, and part of a larger plan. US reconnaissance planes provided air cover. An aircraft carrier in nearby waters was assigned a twofold mission. One. Monitoring and recording. Two. Emergency readiness. US warships patrolled the waters around the Philippines and Vietnam as well. This was intended to demonstrate that their "defense of Freedom of Navigation" in the South China Sea was non-discriminatory. These prevented the Peoples Liberation Army from acting rashly.

PRC and US warships faced off in the South China Sea, raising eyebrows the world over. Planes and ships came and went. But more worthy of attention was the two sides' decision-making posture. In May, the Senate Armed Services Committee demanded that the Department of Defense make a show of force in the South China Sea, to "defend Freedom of Navigation". But the White House sat on the request for some time. Defense department officials began to feel anxious. They repeatedly released photos of Mainland land reclamation efforts on South China Sea islands and reefs. They sought to shape public opinion. The Obama administration waited until the Obama-Xi summit was over to approve action. It ordered the DOD not to allow conflict with the other side to erupt. Obama has clearly sought a balance between diplomatic and military options.

The response from Mainland China was the same. Statements were issued primarily by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than military officers. The Ministry urged the US to think twice, and avoid rash action. It summoned US Ambassador Max Baucus in protest. The Mainland media interviewed the PRC Ambassador to the US, who criticized US authorities. The timing of US saber rattling coincided with the CCP's Fifth Plenary Session. The Plenary Session may reassign high-level PLA personnel to avoid further complications. The Beijing authorities have deliberately downplayed hardline rhetoric. They have temporarily muzzled the media. News reports merely quote official statements.

Statements by the United States have been deliberately low profile as well, to avoid provoking Mainland China. The White House has instructed DoD officials not to issue press releases or make public comments. When Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter responded to questions the next day at a Senate Military Commission hearing, he was hesitant and uncertain. He said merely that whatever people were reading in the newspapers was accurate.

Furthermore, military officials from both sides immediately began dialogue. PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli video conferenced with US Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson on October 29. US Pacific Fleet Commander Harry Harris announced that he would visit Mainland China that day. US Pacific Fleet Commander Richardson and Harris are the commanders who ordered US warships to enter the South China Sea.  The officer directly in charge of the Lassen also plans to visit Mainland China in the coming weeks.  This shows that both sides want to continue communicating, and do not want to touch off a powder keg.

The two sides' stances over South China Sea sovereignty are diametrically opposed. The Mainland claims historical sovereignty over the South China Sea. It says that its island and reef land reclamation is for peaceful purposes. The United States claims that the artificial islands and reefs are for military use and impede freedom of navigation. But in view of the bigger picture, neither side is willing to allow the South China Sea issue undermine bilateral relations. Changes to the current situation can be viewed from two perspectives. One. Objectively, the PLA Navy is not as powerful as the US Navy. It is probably not even as powerful as the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. Preparing a military to fight a war is not an overnight process. It requires strategic patience, and even more, financial resources. Mainland economic growth has slowed. The defense budget has grown year after year. But it has limits. Its defense technology still lags behind that of other nations. Unfortunately this is an objective reality.

Two. Subjectively, PLA military fighting strength is inadequate. It must accept the olive branch offered by the United States. The two sides continue to communicate, while suppressing bellicose rhetoric at home, thereby avoiding problems for policy makers. But communications are communication. The Mainland will not compromise on matters of principle. It will stress that the United States is not a party to the South China Sea dispute, and has no excuse to meddle in regional affairs. After all, the South China Sea is on China's doorstep. As the PRC Foreign Ministry suggested: "If other parties repeatedly raise tensions in the region, the Mainland may well accelerate relevant construction."

Recent US action was meant to show Washington's allies in the Asian-Pacific region that its security assurances remain in effect. This helps Vietnam and the Philippines, who need US military protection. It also encourages Japan and Australia to engage in joint military action. Japan and Australia have also issued statements reaffirming freedom of navigation. But given political sensitivities, neither has committed to joint patrols with the United States in the South China Sea.

Taiping Island is recognized as Republic of China territory under international law. Of that there is no doubt. The problem is that our sovereignty over South China Sea islands and reefs overlaps with claims by five other governments. All of them are busy with island and reef land reclamation. The United States says this forces it to take military action. Such action however, accelerates Mainland military deployment. This has reduced the disputants' fuzzy sovereignty over these waters. The South China Sea situation is changing. This presents an unavoidable challenge to whoever becomes ROC president next year.

美軍南海示威攪亂誰的一池春水

2015-11-02 聯合報

美軍「拉森號」神盾驅逐艦日前進入南海渚碧礁和美濟礁海域巡航，中共解放軍也派出「蘭州號」導彈驅逐艦和「台州號」護衛艦一路尾隨。雙方的演出，雖然各如其原先的預告般保持和平對應的態勢；但這樣短短的交鋒場景，仍給人一種歷史時刻般的不真實感。

此次行動，雖是美國主動挑釁與試探，其行動仍步步為營，策劃周全。美方除了部署偵察機在空中掩護，並派出一艘航空母艦駛入附近水域，一則監視和記錄行動過程，二則準備應對任何突發狀況。此外，美艦也特別繞到菲律賓與越南的海域巡弋，以示其自由通過南海行動是「一視同仁」。這些，都讓解放軍不敢輕舉妄動。

中美軍艦這次在南海的過招，舉世矚目；但除了機艦的來來去去，更值得我們注意的是雙方的政治決策思維。美國國防部五月間應參議院軍事委員會的要求，即急於在南海展示武力以宣示「自由航行」；但白宮把此事壓了甚久，讓一些國防官員備感焦急，因而不斷發放中共在南海島礁從事工程建設的照片，以營造輿論氣氛。歐巴馬政府一直等到「歐習會」後才批准行動，並要求以「不與對方發生衝突」為前提；可見，歐巴馬在外交決策和軍事行動間小心地權衡。

中國大陸的反應亦然，相關發言主要由外交系統負責，而非軍方主導。外交部除奉勸美方要三思而後行，勿輕舉妄動，並召見美國駐華大使博卡斯表達抗議，大陸駐美大使也接受媒體訪問批評美國當局。尤其，美艦示威時機正值中共的「五中全會」，會中可能調整解放軍高層人事，為避免節外生枝，北京當局也刻意低調處理，所有強硬的言論都暫時消音，媒體只報導，要評論也只能引用官方認可的論調。

同樣的，美方的發言也刻意保持低調，避免激怒中方。白宮指示國防部官員，不要對巡航發布新聞或公開評論；也因此，國防部長卡特事發次日在參議院軍委會的聽證會上吞吞吐吐，不知如何作答，只稱：「你在報上讀到的東西，是準確的。」

不僅如此，雙方軍事官員立即展開對話。中共海軍司令員吳勝利，廿九日晚與美國海軍作戰部長理查森視頻通話；隨後，美軍太平洋司令哈里斯宣布將在今天訪問中國。理查森與哈里斯正是美艦進入南海行動的指揮者，而直接管轄「拉森號」的美國太平洋艦隊司令也計畫在未來幾周訪華；這代表著雙方有繼續溝通的意願，不想擦槍走火。

中美雙方對南海主權的立場，是針鋒相對的。中國大陸自認對南海有歷史主權，建設島礁是和平用途；而美方則認為人造島礁是為了軍事用途，將妨礙自由航行權。然而，在大局考量下，雙方都無意為了南海問題而破壞雙邊關係。目前情勢的變化可從兩方面觀察。首先，從客觀條件上看，解放軍海上實力不僅不如美軍，甚至遜於日本海上自衛隊；建軍備戰並非一蹴可幾，需要戰略忍耐，更需要財政支援。目前大陸經濟成長趨緩，雖然國防預算年年成長，但畢竟有其極限，而國防科技仍遠落人後，這都是無奈的客觀現實。

其次，就主觀條件而言，中共軍事戰力不如人，只好先接下美方的橄欖枝，雙方繼續溝通，同時壓制國內的好戰言論，不要給決策者製造難題。但溝通歸溝通，我們估計中方在原則問題上不會讓步，也將強調美國不是南海當事國，指其無由干預地區事務。畢竟，南海就在中國門口，就如中共外交部留下的伏筆：「如果有關方面一再在本地區製造緊張，也許會使中方加快相關建設。」

美國這次行動，是要向亞太盟國證明華府的安全保證是有效的，這不僅對需要美軍保護的越南和菲律賓有用，間接也鼓勵可能加入美軍聯合行動的日本與澳洲。日澳兩國也發表聲明，重申航行自由，但考慮事情敏感，兩國都迄未承諾未來會與美國並肩巡弋南海。

太平島是國際法公認的我國領土，已毫無疑議。問題在，我國南海其他島礁和其他五國有主權重疊之爭，如今各國競相填島造陸，迫使美國採取軍事行動，從而又可能加速中共的軍事部署。如此一來，將使得各國過去在此一海域採取的模糊主權空間越來越縮小。南海情勢正在變化，這是明年台灣新總統無法迴避的挑戰。