Managing Post-Election Cross-Strait Differences

Managing Post-Election Cross-Strait Differences 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 12, 2016

Executive Summary: 2016 will be a troublesome year for Beijing. The political situation will become increasingly volatile the world over, from the Middle East, Central Europe, and Central Asia, all the way over to North Korea. Economic growth will be significantly weaker. Pressure to transform is already intense. The USD is stronger, and the RMB weaker. Global stock markets are crashing. Taiwan may well undergo yet another change in ruling parties. Cross-Strait relations may well be destabilized.

Full Text Below:

2016 will be a troublesome year for Beijing. The political situation will become increasingly volatile the world over, from the Middle East, Central Europe, and Central Asia, all the way over to North Korea. Economic growth will be significantly weaker. Pressure to transform is already intense. The USD is stronger, and the RMB weaker. Global stock markets are crashing. Taiwan may well undergo yet another change in ruling parties. Cross-Strait relations may well be destabilized.

To achieve the 21st century Chinese Dream, Beijing must continue reforms, deal with external pressure, work with other governments to ensure regional stability, expand economic and trade cooperation, and generate new economic growth. Stable cross-Strait relations are essential to regional security and economic cooperation. Beijing cannot afford turbulent cross-Strait relations. It must deal with political differences and limit conflict.

Let us sum up the past year. The situation in the Taiwan Strait will surely change the political landscape on Taiwan. But despite difficulties, the Ma government continues to promote cross-Strait cooperation and broaden official exchanges. Election season may be a sensitive time. Nevertheless leaders from the two sides held an historic meeting in third locale. They established a hotline between the heads of cross-Strait organizations. They designated three cities as Mainland tourists transit points. Beginning in 2016, Mainland undergraduate student quotas will be increased. Despite difficulties, MTA negotiations continue unabated. Cross-Strait relations have been stable for nearly eight years. The peace dividend has benefited not only people on the two sides, but the entire Asian-Pacific region.

Alas, the Democratic Progressive Party may return to power. It may clash with Beijing over the 1992 Consensus. This could destablize cross-Strait relations. Beijing has already issued several warnings. It declared that without the 1992 Consensus as political basis for cross-Strait relations, “the earth will move and the mountains will shake". The DPP does not believe military conflict will erupt. But it also believes Beijing may suspend consultations between the two cross-Strait organizations, the official hotline, Mainland traveler transits. It may terminate Mainland tourism to Taiwan, cancel past concessions, cancel orders from Taiwan's high-tech industries, even precipitate an avalanche of severed diplomatic relations to achieve Beijing's “earth will move , mountains will shake” effect.

Mainland tourism brings Taiwan nearly 300 billion in annual income, nearly 2% of GDP. If cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges are undermined, nearly one million people on Taiwan could become unemployed. Taiwan is striving for economic recovery. If the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, pressures will be felt immediately after the election. It must be prepared for this latest challenge in cross-Strait relations.

From Beijing's perspective, a reversion to cross-Strait conflict and confrontation is antithetical to winning hearts and minds on Taiwan. It is antithetical to Beijing's goal of a prosperous society by 2020. The new "Ten Three Five" economic plan also requires cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation. Beijing's “One Belt, One Road” strategy requires stable regional relations even more.

The new year has begun. The USD and RMB currency war rages on. Risk management in the Washington-Beijing strategic and economic dialogue is made more difficult by thorny issues such as anti-terrorism in the Middle East, North Korean nuclear tests, disputes in the South China Sea islands and reefs, and Internet security. Beijing and Washington are establishing a new major power relationship. This too requires stable cross-Strait relations.

Stable cross-Strait relations are essential for a win/win outcome for both sides. Currently no hotline links heads of state on the two sides. No direct line of communication is available at international conferences or during visits by heads of state. Therefore the communications channels between between the two cross-Strait organizations, and the hotline between them must not be lightly interrupted .

Tsai Ing-wen, the front runner in the current presidential election, has made “opposition to black box operations" in cross-Strait agreements a major issue. This rules out normal channels of communications between governments, including special envoys and back channel negotiations. The DPP and Beijing do not trust each other. Should an unexpected development arise, should either party misjudges the other side's motives, should either party respond wrongly, the consequences will be serious indeed.

Before the inauguration of the new government, Xi Jinping should consider meeting with the president elect in a third locale, in a manner similar to the Ma Xi summit. Such a meeting could narrow differences, defuse crises, even lead to an historic reboot of cross-Strait relations. If Beijing insists on adherence to the 1992 Consensus, a “Tsai Xi summit” would be premature. In that case, the two sides should continue communicating through the existing hotline between the MAC and Taiwan Affairs Office. They must control and manage risk. They must ensure that divergent political stances do not lead to stalemate. They must control the damage as much as possible. They must avoid overreactions that could cause cross-Strait relations to spin out of control.

Tsai Ing-wen may become president. She must, as soon as possible, establish a green camp administration, implement inter-party consultations, and reach a consensus with opposition parties. The newly-elected Legislative Yuan will review the "cross-strait agreement oversight regulations". That will be its first litmus test. The two leaders have yet to establish mutual trust. In the meantime, the DPP should view cross-Strait exchanges pragmatically. The newly-elected legislature can pass legislation that will gradually restore trust and communications with Beijing. Following inauguration, the two sides must reestablish communication channels, avoid misunderstandings, and ensure stable cross-Strait relations.

選後兩岸分歧擴大 如何控管？

2016年01月12日 中國時報

2016將是中國大陸的麻煩年，就國際政治而言，從中東、中歐、中亞到北韓，外部安全情勢更加動盪。就經濟而言，成長動能已明顯趨弱，轉型壓力本已極緊迫，更遭遇美元強升、人民幣重貶、全球股災肆虐的考驗；就對台關係而言，台灣很可能再次政黨輪替，兩岸關係又陷入不穩定狀態。

為實現21世紀中國夢，大陸必須持續推動各項改革，面對嚴峻的外在壓力，更需要與各利害關係國及地區攜手合作，確保區域穩定，擴大經貿合作，挹注新的經濟動能。兩岸關係的穩定，更是區域安全和經貿合作平穩運行的定海神針。兩岸關係沒有動盪的本錢，必須攜手合作，共建處理政治分歧和衝突風險管控機制。

總結過去一年，雖然台海情勢不免受到台灣內部政治版圖變化的牽扯，但馬政府仍然在困難環境下，繼續推動兩岸各項合作和深化制度性交流機制。即使在大選前的敏感時刻，兩岸實現了最高領導人在第三地的歷史性會晤；並且積極的設置兩岸事務主管部門首長的熱線電話；啟動3個試點城市陸客中轉；自105學年度起，將擴大開放大陸專升本學生名額；兩岸貨貿協議協商在艱困的談判中繼續進行，兩岸交流持續正向發展。兩岸關係近8年來的穩定交流，和平紅利不僅兩岸人民受惠，整個亞太區域同樣分享。

然而，不容否認的，可能重返執政的民進黨和北京當局關於「九二共識」的爭執，對當前穩定向前的兩岸關係投下新的變數。北京已數度發出諸如「九二共識」政治基礎不存在，兩岸關係將「地動山搖」的警告，民進黨雖然評估兩岸不致於爆發軍事熱衝突，但也認為北京很可能中止兩會協商機制、官方熱線、陸客中轉，或者進一步停止陸客來台觀光、取消讓利政策、加速對台灣高科技產業抽單等手段，甚至讓台灣遭致「雪崩式斷交風暴」的衝擊，達到北京所謂的「地動山搖」的效應。

需知陸客觀光每年為台灣帶來將近3000億產值，占GDP近2%，如果兩岸經貿受到衝擊，更可能造成台灣近百萬人的失業潮，對力求經濟回升的台灣，當然會形成相當的壓力，可能重返執政的民進黨，選後應即戒慎周全地籌畫，以因應兩岸關係的最新挑戰。

對大陸而言，兩岸關係一旦倒退回衝突和對抗狀態，將不利於爭取台灣民心，也不利於大陸在2020年全面建成小康社會的目標；而且實現新的「十三五」經濟計畫，也有兩岸維持經貿合作的實際需要，北京要推動「一帶一路」戰略，更需要穩定的區域關係。

新年伊始，美元和人民幣貨幣大戰持續上演，中東反恐、北韓核試、南海島礁爭端、網路安全等棘手的熱點問題，將使美、中在年度「戰略與經濟對話」中處理控管風險和分歧的困難度增大。大陸要與美國朝建立新型態大國關係方向繼續深化，也需要有穩定的兩岸關係。

維護兩岸關係的穩定發展，實為兩岸互利雙贏的必要條件。由於兩岸最高當局目前不存在「元首熱線」，也無從在國際會議、元首互訪等活動中直接溝通，建立緩解爭端共識，已經建立的兩會協商和主管部門的熱線機制，絕對不應輕言中斷。

由於可能在總統選舉中勝出的蔡英文高舉反兩岸「黑箱」協議的大旗，一般正常國家間採取的特使斡旋、第二軌協商等溝通管道，新政府可能無法建立。萬一未來發生突發性意外的事件，民進黨政府與大陸間原本就互信不足，如果任何一方誤判對方動機，做出錯誤回應，後果將非常嚴重。

在新政府未就職前，大陸應考慮比照「馬習會」，在第三地讓總統當選人與習近平會晤，既有助於縮小分歧、化解危機，也可能把兩岸關係帶入新的歷史起點。如果大陸必須堅持九二共識，「蔡習會」的條件仍不成熟，兩岸也應繼續透過現有的陸委會與國台辦會晤機制和熱線電話，持續溝通、控管風險，讓政治立場歧異造成的僵持、傷害能夠約制在適度且合理程度內，避免誤採過當的回應措施，讓兩岸關係的裂痕和損害陷入螺旋式加深。

對可能進入總統府的蔡英文而言，她必須在最短時間內，整合泛綠營隊伍，落實跨黨派協商機制，形塑朝野共識。尤其立法院新會期「兩岸協議監督條例」的審查，將是第一個試金石。在雙方領導人尚未建立互信基礎之前，民進黨可以從務實看待兩岸交流，從新國會積極推動相關立法和政策著手，逐步重建和北京的互信和溝通的基調；在520之後，雙方尤其應積極建立各層次溝通管道，避免誤判，讓兩岸關係能繼續穩定向前。

Ko Wen-je's Concern: Too High Expectations

Ko Wen-je's Concern: Too High Expectations
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 11, 2016

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen is about to complete the final mile on her road to the presidency. But has the pendulum of public opinion on Taiwan reached its limit? Is it about to swing in the opposite direction? Tsai Ing-wen's public support is based on her supporters'  high expectations and false expectations, as outlined above. Following the election, will the pendulum of public opinion swing in the opposite direction? The outcome will reveal whether Ko Wen-je's predictions were accurate.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen is about to complete the final mile on her road to the presidency. But has the pendulum of public opinion on Taiwan reached its limit? Is it about to swing in the opposite direction?

Tsai Ing-wen undoubtedly stands at the pinnacle of current mainstream public opinion. Her election prospects are excellent. But as she rides this wave of public approval on her final mile, the pendulum of public opinion on Taiwan appears to be reaching its high point, and is about to swing in the opposite direction.

Ko Wen-je predicts that "Once Tsai Ing-wen is elected president, the biggest danger will be excessively high expectations, such that no matter what she does, people will be disappointed." Is He predicting that the pendulum of public opinion is about to swing the other way?

Tsai Ing-wen's problem is not so much high expectations, as it is false expectations. On the eve of Tsai Ing-wen's imminent victory, public doubts about Tsai's ability to fulfill the role of Republic of China president are on the rise. Tsai Ing-wen is oblivious to the danger she faces. But more importantly, Tsai Ing-wen's supporters continue to deceive themselves to bolster their faith. They have no desire to ask themselves whether their expectations are too high or simply false.

The event that elevated Tsai Ing-wen to her current lofty perch was the Sunflower Student Movement. Just before the Sunflower Student Movement erupted, Tsai Ing-wen was dispatching Lin Chuan to the Mainland to open channels of communication. The DPP was even contemplating freezing the Taiwan independence party platform. This shows that Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP can change their cross-Strait policy. But at this very moment, the Sunflower Student Movement yanked Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP back to their original position. The Sunflower Student Movement began by denouncing the STA as "black box operations". It then used opposition to the STA, MTA, and FEPZ to incite anti-Mainland sentiment and demand Closed Door political and economic policies. These issues now remain a complete muddle. Did the Sunflower Student Movement make these political and economic demands to legitimize their occupation of the Legislative Yuan? Or did their occupation of the Legislative Yuan legitimize their political and economic demands?

This Closed Door, anti-Mainland, anti-globalization thinking argues that Taiwan's predicament is entirely due to Ma Ying-jeou's “pandering to China, selling out Taiwan” cross-Strait policy. It argues that provided the public on Taiwan hates China, opposes China, opposes the KMT, opposes Ma, and opposes Ma's cross-Strait policy, Taiwan will be saved. The Sunflower Student Movement occupied the legislature to justify these demands, and uses these demands to justify their occupation legislature. Public opinion was swayed by the Sunflower Student Movement. Tsai Ing-wen responded. She reverted to rhetoric such as "Taiwan independence is a natural component of the younger generation." Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP, and the Sunflower Student Movement, each have expectations of the other. Are such expectations too high? Or just plain false?

Tsai Ing-wen may refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus. But she can hardly deny that cross-Strait relations is the key to Taiwan's political and economic welfare. Cross-Strait relations may not be the whole of Taiwan's political and economic infrastructure. But it does constitute its core. Cross-Strait instability means utter chaos. Tsai Ing-wen has been bolstered by the younger generation, for whom "Taiwan independence is a natural component", and by "mainstream public opinion". She continues however, to shift her positions. She speaks of "maintaining the status quo", "promoting the constitutional framework of the Republic of China", "not ruling out a Tsai Xi summit”, “joining the TPP", "acknowledging that a meeting was held in 1992”, “seeking common ground while shelving differences” and "giving the highest priority to the STA and MTA in the legislature”. These already depart from the expectations of the Sunflower Student Movement. The Sunflower Student Movement and Tsai Ing-wen have expectations of each other. Are these high expectations? Or false expectations?

The Sunflower Student Movement categorically repudiated Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy in order to incite public anger. Yet Tsai Ing-wen can "unconditionally accept" Ma's cross-Strait policy -- lock, stock and barrel. How odd is that? On top of which, the DPP leadership persists in deluding itself, by mischaracterizing false expectations as “high expectations”. Sunflower Student Movement leaders, including Huang Kuo-chang, Lin Chang-tso, Chen Wei-ting and Liu Chiao-an, have gradually emerged and shown their faces. Should these people be regarded as “pioneers of democracy”, or “political showmen”? Clearly they too are part of the problem of false expectations being disingenuosly spun as “high expectations”.

The Sunflower Student Movement's main proposition is that “All the evil that has befallen Taiwan is due to Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy errors”. The general election is just around the corner. Current "mainstream public opinion" is the product of Sunflower Student Movement rabble-rousing. Has the public given the Sunflower Student Movement's political and economic ideas any further thought? Election victory is now in sight. Has the public engaged in any self-introspection? Has it come to the realization that its expectations are not “too high”, but simply false?

This is one reason why the pendulum of public opinion may change directions just before the election. After all, for people to admit that their expectations about the Sunflower Student Movement were not just too high, but just plain false, can't be easy. Tsai Ing-wen rode a wave of public support generated by the Sunflower Student Movement. Can she fulfill the expectations of "half the public”? That will be her biggest test.

Tsai Ing-wen's public support is based on her supporters'  high expectations and false expectations, as outlined above. Following the election, will the pendulum of public opinion swing in the opposite direction? The outcome will reveal whether Ko Wen-je's predictions were accurate.

期望太高：等待驗證柯文哲的預言

2016-01-11 聯合報

蔡英文即將走完她總統大選的最後一哩，但台灣民意的鐘擺是否也即將擺向它的最後一吋？

此時的蔡英文無疑是站在「主流民意」的高點，這使得她的選情看好。但是，當她乘著這股民意走完大選的最後一哩，彷彿台灣民意的鐘擺也擺到了最後一吋；走至此刻，民意的鐘擺也可能到了即將回頭的時候。

柯文哲說：「蔡英文一旦當選總統，最大的危機是期望值太高，所以不管她怎麼做，滿意度都會很低。」這莫非即是對民意鐘擺回盪的預言？

蔡英文與現今民意的關係，不僅是「期望太高」的問題，也可能是「期望錯誤」的問題。在蔡英文可能勝選的前夕，社會上對蔡英文能否勝任此階段中華民國總統的疑慮，其實也在上升。情勢發展到今天，不只是蔡英文自己對當前的風險不知警惕與反省，更重要的是蔡英文的支持者也以一種自欺的心態來維持心中的信念，而不去思考「期望太高」及「期望錯誤」的問題。

此波推高蔡英文的民意濫觴是太陽花事件。在太陽花事件前，蔡英文派林全登陸建立聯通管道，民進黨內也出現凍結《台獨黨綱》運作的聲音。這些，皆顯示蔡英文與民進黨的兩岸操作有轉型的空間；但就在此際，一場太陽花事件卻把蔡英文及民進黨拉回原點。太陽花學運以抗議服貿協議「黑箱作業」啟動，而以反對服貿、貨貿及自由經濟示範區的反中鎖國政經路線收場；但事至今日，沒有人說得清楚：太陽花究竟是因這些政經訴求而神聖化了他們占據立法院的動作？或因占據立法院的實際動作，而神聖化了這些政經主張？

這些反中鎖國及反全球化主張的邏輯推演是：台灣的困局完全是因於馬英九傾中賣台的兩岸政策。只要仇中、反中、反國民黨、反馬，及反馬英九的兩岸政策，台灣就能得救。太陽花以占領立法院來正當化這樣的訴求，又以這樣的訴求來正當化占領立法院的行動。一時之間，社會民意也受到太陽花的感染，而蔡英文則回報以「台獨是年輕世代的天然成分」。太陽花與民進黨及蔡英文之間的相互期望、互相拉抬，究竟是「期望太高」或「期望錯誤」？

蔡英文可以否認「九二共識」，但她不能否認兩岸關係是台灣政經架構的關鍵指針；兩岸關係縱非台灣政經治理之全部，卻是主要的脊幹架構。兩岸不穩，大局動盪。如今，當蔡英文挾著「台獨是年輕世代天然成分」的「主流民意」鵲起，她卻不斷地修正拋出「維持現狀」、「中華民國憲政體制推動論」、「不排除蔡習會」、「加入TPP」、「九二事實／求同存異」，及「將以服貿協議、貨貿協議為立法院新會期最優先法案」等政治訴求，這已不同於太陽花當時的期望。太陽花與蔡英文的相互期望，究竟是「期望太高」或「期望錯誤」？

太陽花運動以全面否定馬英九的兩岸政策掀起民憤，蔡英文卻可能以「概括承受」馬英九的兩岸政策主體框架收場，這何其弔詭！莫說在上層政策上這極可能是一場「期望太高」、「期望錯誤」的錯解，連太陽花鋒頭人物包括黃國昌、林昶佐、陳為廷及劉喬安等也逐漸露出其完整面貌；社會公眾應將這些人物視為民主先鋒或政治演員，顯然也有「期望太高」或「期望錯誤」的問題。

太陽花的主命題是：台灣一切災禍皆因馬英九錯誤的兩岸政策而起。如今大選投票在即，這股被太陽花激起的「主流民意」，是否曾對太陽花的政經主張及人物品類有過反省？而整個選情既顯示勝利在望，這種民意又豈會自我反省，承認自己犯了「期望太高／期望錯誤」？

這就是民意鐘擺在投票前可能擺到最後一吋的原因。畢竟，要民眾承認自己誤陷於這場「太陽花的期望」，不是容易之事。蔡英文顯然是因太陽花風潮掀起的「一半民意」而扶搖直上；她能不能實現這「一半人民」的期望，這是最大的檢驗。

蔡英文的民氣，是建立在她與支持者相互的「期望太高／期望錯誤」之上。選後，民意鐘擺是否回盪，這將驗證柯文哲的預言是否準確。

Beijing Should Rethink Its Taiwan Policy

Beijing Should Rethink Its Taiwan Policy
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 8, 2016

Executive Summary: The result of the election is pretty much a forgone conclusion. The KMT will probably lose the presidency. The blue camp will probably lose, for the first time ever, its legislative majority. The KMT in particular, is likely to lose many seats. Any attempt to emulate Chen Shui-bian era legislative checks and balances will be difficult. This means that Beijing must also rethink its Taiwan policy.

Full Text Below:

The result of the election is pretty much a forgone conclusion. The KMT will probably lose the presidency. The blue camp will probably lose, for the first time ever, its legislative majority. The KMT in particular, is likely to lose many seats. Any attempt to emulate Chen Shui-bian era legislative checks and balances will be difficult. This means that Beijing must also rethink its Taiwan policy.

This does not mean that Beijing's past Taiwan policy was a failure. Over the past eight years, cross-Strait relations have improved dramatically. This change cannot be undone. According to most polls, nearly half of all young people are willing to go to the Mainland to work, study, even marry. An Academia Sinica survey showed that 49.7% of the public on Taiwan believes the two sides "will eventually be reunified". This shows that cross-Strait people to people relations are good. In the past, Beijing dealt mainly with the KMT. Once the KMT loses power, the importance of KMT-CCP links will decline. Beijing will have to deal directly with the public on Taiwan, and develop people to people relations.

Beijing has long advocated pinning its hopes on the Taiwan public. Over the past two years it has underscored the importance of “San Zhong Yi Qing”, or “Three Middles One Young” policy. This policy reaches out to small and medium enterprises, middle and low-income people, people in central and southern Taiwan, and Taiwan youth. As long as the KMT was in power, Beijing relied on the KMT's organizational structure and contacts. Now a change in ruling parties is imminent. Beijing has the opportunity to conduct a thorough review of its Taiwan policy, to think about how to reach hearts and minds on Taiwan, to think about how to win  public support within Taiwan.

Consider the public relations perspective. Beijing has long used the "China Taiwan Network" and other such media to reach Taiwan. Stars from Taiwan are invited to appear on Mainland television shows. Unfortunately the focus is usually on the Mainland. As a result the impact on Taiwan leaves much to be desired. After all, these programs are propaganda permeated with Mainland thinking. They are one-way communications. That makes identification with it difficult for people from Taiwan. That makes it difficult to encourage dialogue. Prejudice may even result in people from Taiwan rejecting Mainland media content out of hand, for purely emotional reasons. That does not mean the Mainland media is uncompetitive. Mainland television dramas and variety shows are extremely popular on Taiwan. They demonstrate just how competitive the Mainland's cultural and creative industries can be.

Beijing must realize the importance of news broadcasting and cultural dissemination. It must make cross-Strait cultural exchanges more convenient. It must form cross-Strait strategic TV news alliances, even cross-Strait strategic media alliances. It must enable media workers, directors, producers, screenwriters, and actors from Taiwan to incorporate Taiwan elements into media content. It must provide greater opportunities for people from Taiwan to accept Mainland soft power. Doing so will also enable people from the Mainland to better understand the real Taiwan. Over the long term, this will improve cross-Strait understanding among the general public.

Beijing must gain a greater appreciation of Mainland students and Mainland business travelers. President Ma governed for eight years. Mainland tour groups flocked to Taiwan in an unending stream. Official visits often made headlines. But for the general public, such exchanges were irrelevant. Their itineraries made authentic interaction with ordinary people difficult. The number of Mainland tourists increased year to year. But most joined “If It's Tuesday This must be Belgium” style tour groups. They had little chance to interact with ordinary people on Taiwan. Under these circumstances, people to people exchanges can hardly be expected to increase mutual understanding.

Based on current group visits, communications between Mainland students and Mainland business travelers with people on Taiwan have been the most effective. Only these two groups can change public perception of the Mainland. Only these two groups can foster goodwill toward the Mainland. Many Taiwan students support Mainland students on many issues. This proves that. The main reason for this is that Mainland students live on Taiwan long term. They remain in close communication with Taiwan students. Much of the discrimination and hostility arising from misunderstandings can be dispelled by such long term exchanges.

Business travelers have had a similar effect. Many of them shuttle back and forth between the two sides. They work alongside colleagues on Taiwan. They achieve tacit understanding and trust with each other. They gradually change the impression of Taiwan office workers have of the Mainland. That is why Beijing must understand the importance of non-governmental forces. Taiwan may undergo a change in ruling parties. Nevertheless Beijing should expand, not shrink cross-Strait exchanges among students and business people.

Beijing must pay attention to the importance of market forces and civil society. On today's Taiwan, a close relationship between government and business often raises concerns. By contrast, seeking to enter Taiwan for purely market-based reasons seldom provokes strong opposition. This is why Alipay and Taobao, which have allowed online shopping from Taiwan, have experienced positive results. We must allow Taiwan industry to collaborate with Mainland industry, based on supply and demand. In fact, this sort of win/win cross-Strait cooperation is most helpful to SMEs.

At the same time, the Mainland must promote cross-Strait interaction among civic organizations. For people on Taiwan, their daily lives are not about political parties, but rather public interest or shared interest groups. The Mainland has a thriving civil society. People from the Mainland and Taiwan are fully capable of interacting with each other on their own. It is not difficult for them to organize sports events, cultural exhibits, and seminars. If the Mainland expands cross-Strait interaction to include civic organizations, it can better reach the people of Taiwan.

大陸對台政策應有新思維

2016年01月08日 中國時報

大選結果基本已確定，國民黨不但可能失去行政權，泛藍也可能首次失去國會過半優勢，特別是國民黨的席次可能大幅下降，想複製扁時代以立法權制衡民進黨將困難重重。對大陸來說，也意味著對台政策必須重新思考、再做調整。

當然，這並非表示過去大陸對台政策失敗，過去8年兩岸關係已進入相當程度不可逆階段，綜合各家民調，有近半數年輕人願意到大陸工作、求學，甚至通婚，中研院調查更顯示，49.7%民眾認知台灣「終將被統一」，顯示兩岸民間關係密不可斷。只是，過去大陸主要跟國民黨打交道，國民黨失去政權後，國共平台的作用將相應下降，大陸將需要直接面對台灣民眾，發展民間關係。

大陸早就提出「將希望寄託於台灣人民」，最近兩年更幾次三番強調要重視三中一青。但在國民黨執政的狀況之下，大陸主要還是依賴國民黨的組織與人脈。如今政黨輪替在即，或許也給了大陸一個機會，可以徹底檢討對台政策，思考如何深入台灣民心，從台灣內部爭取民心向背。

首先從宣傳策略來看，長期以來大陸透過「中國台灣網」等自辦媒體對台宣傳，影視節目也會邀請很多台灣明星加盟，只可惜主要視角還是放在大陸，效果並不理想。畢竟這些宣傳或節目都屬於大陸式思維及單向傳播，難以讓台灣民眾真正產生認同感，創造對話的動力，甚至因為既定印象的緣故，根本從內心排斥大陸媒體的新聞內容。但這並不意味大陸在文化媒介層面缺乏競爭力，看看大陸電視劇和娛樂節目在台灣的爆紅，即可知道大陸的文創競爭力。

如果大陸能察覺新聞文化傳播的重要性，為兩岸新聞與影視文化交流與策略結盟提供更多便利，甚至開放兩岸媒體策略結盟，讓台灣媒體工作者與導演、製片、編劇及演員有更大自主空間納入「台灣元素」，那麼台灣民眾將會有更多機會接受大陸的文化軟實力。大陸民眾也有機會可以認識「原汁原味」的台灣，長期而言有利兩岸民眾相互理解。

大陸應該更正面看待陸生和大陸商務客的積極意義。馬總統執政八年，大陸來台參訪團絡繹不絕，各種官式拜會也常見諸報端，但對一般民眾來說，這類交流活動都與他們無關，而這些活動的行程設計也注定他們難以跟底層民眾有實質的互動。至於年年擴大的陸客團，其實多以走馬觀花為主，跟台灣的庶民社會基本不會產生聯繫。在這種情況之下，自然難以期待通過這類交流活動可以加強兩岸民眾之間的相互理解。

以目前各類群體的交流成效觀之，還是陸生和商務客跟台灣民眾的交流是最有效的，也只有這兩大群體最能改變台灣民眾對大陸的認識，甚至還可以在交流過程中培養善意，那麼多台生對許多涉及陸生權益問題採取支持的態度，一葉知秋。這主要是因為陸生長期生活在台灣，可以跟台灣青年進行最為直接而密切的交流，許多因為誤解而產生的歧視和敵意也會通過這種長時間的交流而消解。

商務人士的交流也有類似效果，他們之中也有很多人頻繁往來兩岸，跟台灣的同事合作共事，彼此也產生了默契與信任，也能逐漸改變台灣上班族對大陸的印象。因此，大陸方面要充分了解民間力量的重要性，即便政黨輪替之後，也應該對兩岸學生和商務人士的交流採取擴大而非限縮的政策。

再次，大陸應該重視市場力量和公民社會的重要性。在台灣目前的社會氛圍下，密切的政商關係常常會引起疑慮，相反，純粹基於市場原因而謀求進入台灣的商業行為，在台灣並不會引起強烈的反對，這在支付寶入台、淘寶開放台灣網購等問題上都可見其積極成效。如果能夠讓台灣業界可以根據市場供需跟大陸相關業者合作，其實才最有助於兩岸中小企業的互利共贏。

與此同時，大陸方面也應該推動兩岸民間社會組織的互動，對台灣民眾來說，生活息息相關的不是政黨，而是公益團體或共同興趣組織。以大陸現在蓬勃發展的民間社會來看，大陸民眾完全有能力自主跟台灣相應的團體互動，共同合作籌辦興趣比賽、文化展覽以及研討會，都並非難事。如果大陸能夠擴大兩岸民間社會組織的互動，顯然可以更容易地接觸台灣民眾。

Taiwan's One-Sided Love Affair with Japan

Taiwan's One-Sided Love Affair with Japan
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 7, 2016

Executive Summary: The comfort women issue is not a matter of numbers, but of whether justice prevails. It is not a matter of compensation, but of whether human dignity is honored. A few days ago, the government held an ad hoc meeting with Taiwan comfort women. It asked Japan to make a formal apology, offer humanitarian compensation, lifetime care, and restore their honor. Will Japan deliver on these? People will be watching.

Full Text Below:

Several years ago Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Yung-le told reporters the Japanese government had agreed to consult with the government on Taiwan and earnestly confront the issue of Taiwan's comfort women. Lin said the Japanese displayed genuine goodwill. Who knew that several years later, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga would tell reporters that the consultation mechanism adopted by Japan to deal with South Korea, would not be applied to Taiwan. Nor would Japan establish any new, alternative consultation mechanism to deal with Taiwan. Japan's arrogant and obdurate attitude towards Taiwan, so utterly at odds with its attitude toward South Korea, came as a shock.

The relationship between Taiwan and Japan has long been unequal. This unequal relationship reflects the gap in perception and attitude between the two governments. Taiwan sees Japan as a counterweight between the major powers. Japan, on the other hand, sees Taiwan as a bargaining chip in its dealings with the Chinese mainland. Taiwan needs Japan -- all the time. Japan, on the other hand, needs Taiwan only part of the time. Given their differing perceptions and attitudes, Taiwan's Japanophilia has become a constant. Japan's "friendship toward Taiwan", by contrast, has become a matter of convenience.

Over time, this unequal relationship between Taiwan and Japan has led to a peculiar "Japanese disease". This was particularly the case after Lee Teng-hui rose to power. Taiwanese afflicted with intense Japanophilia adopted a hardline stance against the Chinese mainland, They were frequently applauded for their stance. But anyone who adopted a hardline stance against Japan, was often booed off the stage by the opposition green camp. Given the circumstances, Taiwan's "special relationship" with Japan was nothing more than wishful thinking. People were persecuated even though they did nothing wrong. This was true in the past with the DPP, and it is true now with the KMT.

Judging by his rhetoric, Yoshihide Suga was merely conducting business as usual. He was merely perpetuating the Japanese government's long tradition of discriminatory treatment toward Taiwan. In other words, agreements made between Japan and other governments are not applicable to Taiwan. This demonstrates that Japan has not shed its colonialist attitude towards Taiwan. Worse still, the Japanese government has decided to procrastinate, and delay establishing any consultation mechanism with Taiwan. It perceives the comfort women issue as a Kuomintang election ploy. It has concluded it might as well wait for a Japanophilic DPP to come to power, then deal with it. Therefore the Ma government may still be in office, but in Japan's eyes it has long been a lame duck.

On a deeper level, Japan has long been ambiguous in its public declarations. This time however, it was extraordinarily frank and unequivocal. The main reason was that Japan knows Taiwan is not Korea. Taiwan has long remained Japanophilic, even as Japan has looked down is nose at Taiwan from high above. The comfort women issue in particular, has never been as sensitive as the Diaoyutai Islands issue. it has never been the main thrust of Taiwan-Japan relations. In short, the government has always tread lightly when it comes to Taiwan-Japan relations. It has never dared to offend Japan. That has led to today's contemptuous treatment.

The Japanese government knows that powerful disagreement prevails among Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties over the comfort women issue. Consensus is difficult to achieve. Also, the Mainland is currently keeping a low profile. For the time being, the two sides are unlikely to join forces. As a result, Japan holds all the cards. It feels no pressure at this time to compromise with Taiwan over the comfort women issue.

Now consider Taiwan's reaction. Our own Foreign Ministry not only failed to protest the Japanese government's statement. It rushed to whitewash Yoshihide Suga's remarks by explaining them away. It argued that since Taiwan and Japan lack diplomatic relations, any consultation mechanism between Taiwan and Japan would have to be different. It argued that since Taiwan and Japan currently have an "Asian Association" communication mechanism, obviously there is no need to negotiate a new one. These rationalizations were strained and incredible.

The problem is that rationalizations cannot help the situation. After all, diplomacy must be backed by power and persistence. When confronted with Japan's patronizing sophistry, one must not blindly and passively expect goodwill. As everyone can see, Japan was perfectly willing to sign a comfort women agreement with South Korea. US pressure was a factor. But the main factor was the comfort women issue seriously undermined relations between Japan and South Korea. This forced the Japanese government to make concessions. Therefore when confronted with Japanese bullying, only increased political pressure and diplomacy will have any effect.

During the 3/11 earthquake four years ago, Taiwan's generosity was unparalled. Taiwanese gave Japan "most favored nation" treatment. But all Taiwan has received in return on the comfort women issue, is the Japanese government's discriminatory treatment. Japan is reluctant to part with one thin dime in compensation. It is unwilling to even sit down and talk to us. How are people on Taiwan supposed to feel about this?

This is why the government must not wallow in feel good "Taiwan-Japan relations are currently the best they have ever been" sentimentality. It must not be afraid that standing up for Taiwan will harm Taiwan-Japan relations. It must not see the comfort women issue as a bargaining chip in Taiwan Japan relations. Only by shattering the long held unequal relationship between Taiwan and Japan, can we solve the comfort women issue.

The comfort women issue is not a matter of numbers, but of whether justice prevails. It is not a matter of compensation, but of whether human dignity is honored. A few days ago, the government held an ad hoc meeting with Taiwan comfort women. It asked Japan to make a formal apology, offer humanitarian compensation, lifetime care, and the restoration of their honor. Will Japan deliver on these? People will be watching.

戀日情結下的台日不對等關係

2016-01-07 聯合報

年前，外交部長林永樂在記者會上信誓旦旦，稱日本政府已同意在年後啟動與我協商機制，誠懇面對台灣的慰安婦問題，並認為日方相當具有「善意」。孰料，年後傳來的訊息，日本內閣官房長官菅義偉在例行記者會上明確表示：日韓協商模式並不適用於台灣，日本也不會就慰安婦問題與台灣設立新的協商平台。相較於韓國，日本對台灣的強硬和傲慢，令人吃驚。

長期以來，台日之間就不是一種對等的關係。這種不對等關係，主要反映了兩國間的態度與認知差距：台灣把日本當成平衡大國勢力的「砝碼」，而日本則視台灣為抗衡中國大陸的「籌碼」；台灣的砝碼，時時拿出來使用；而日本的籌碼，則是看時機出手。在這兩種心態作祟下，台灣「親日」似乎變得理所當然，日本「友台」與否則視需要而定。

長期以來，這種不對等關係也導致台灣一種特有的「日本病」。尤其在李登輝當權後，由於一些台灣人高度戀日的心理，政府對中國大陸強硬，往往可以贏得喝采；但若表現對日本的堅持，則常遭到在野黨的倒采。在這種情況下，讓台灣的對日關係常常顯得一廂情願、動輒得咎；不論在過去的民進黨，亦或是現在的國民黨，皆是如此。

從表面的語意看，菅義偉只是依照日本政府過去的慣例，對台灣採取差別性待遇，也就是：日本和它國的協議並不全然適用於台灣。這多少反映了日本對台灣尚未消除的殖民心態。不僅如此，日本政府也決定以拖待變，暫時不與我國設立協商平台；它認為，「慰安婦」議題只是國民黨在選舉中操弄的議題，還不如等親日的民進黨上台，再作處理。由此可見，馬政府雖然仍在執政，但日本眼裡卻早已跛腳。

從深層的意涵來看，一向說話曖昧不明的日本，這次的表現，卻是如此「坦誠」以對，毫不遮掩。其原因，主要是日本深知台灣並非韓國，台灣向來具有「親日」的顯性基因，而日本也一直以居高臨下之姿看待台灣；尤其，慰安婦問題向來不像釣魚台議題那麼敏感，它從來就不是台日關係的主旋律。簡言之，長期以來政府擔心影響台日關係，而不敢對日據理力爭，以致今天有此待遇。

事實上，日本政府也了解：台灣朝野政黨對慰安婦議題存在極大的歧見，難以凝聚共識一致對外。另外，在中國大陸的刻意低調下，目前也不致有兩岸聯手的問題。也因此，手中滿是籌碼的日本，根本沒有需要在此時就慰安婦問題對台灣讓步。

反觀台灣的反應，我國外交部非僅未立刻對日本政府的發言表達抗議，反而還對菅義偉的發言進行「說文解字」，粉飾太平。其說詞諸如：由於台日間沒有邦交關係，當然與日韓模式不同；且台日兩國目前已有「亞協─交協」的溝通機制，當然也沒有新設協商平台的需要。這些說詞，顯得捉襟見肘，不知所云。

問題在，光靠「說文解字」，對形勢並無助益。外交畢竟要有實力和堅持為後盾，且面對勢利而詭辯的日本，更不能一味地被動期待它釋放善意。從日韓的慰安婦協議可以看出，日本之所以願意與韓國簽署協議，除了美國的壓力之外，主要是慰安婦問題已嚴重影響到日韓兩國關係的發展，這迫使日本政府不得不讓步。因此，面對怕強欺弱的日本，唯有升高政治壓力，並祭出外交手段，才可能收效。

四年前三一一大地震時，台灣舉國慷慨解囊，台灣人給予日本的是「最惠國」待遇。但這次的慰安婦問題，我們換得的卻是日本政府的歧視待遇，連一毛錢都不願賠償，連談都不願意談，這對台灣情何以堪？

由此可見，政府不應再耽溺於「目前是台日關係最好的時代」的自我感覺良好，也不要害怕堅持立場會影響台日關係，更不要把慰安婦問題當成砝碼，而要當成對日關係的籌碼。唯有打破長期以來台日之間的不對等關係，才能夠務實解決慰安婦問題。

慰安婦問題不在人數多寡，而在正義能否伸張；賠償金額也不在多寡，而在人道尊嚴能否彰顯。日前政府在召開慰安婦專案會議後，達成要求日本正式道歉、人道賠償、生活照顧及名譽恢復等四項原則，今後是否能夠具體落實，全民都睜大眼睛在看。

Tsai Ing-wen's Seeking Common Ground and Shelving Differences is not a Blank Check

Tsai Ing-wen's Seeking Common Ground and Shelving Differences is not a Blank Check
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 6, 2016

Executive Summary: Beijing has just rejected Tsai Ing-wen's “novel take” on the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen said, "I do not deny the historical fact that the two sides held talks in 1992". But the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office says Tsai must admit that these talks resulted in the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen said she endorsed “That year's spirit of seeking of common ground and shevling differences”. But the Taiwan Affairs Office responded, saying that the core meaning of the 1992 Consensus is "opposition to Taiwan independence, affirmation that both sides belong to one China, and affirmation that cross-Strait relations are not international relations".

Full Text Below:

Beijing has just rejected Tsai Ing-wen's “novel take” on the 1992 Consensus.

Tsai Ing-wen said, "I do not deny the historical fact that the two sides held talks in 1992". But the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office says Tsai must admit that these talks resulted in the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen said she endorsed “That year's spirit of seeking of common ground and shevling differences”. But the Taiwan Affairs Office responded, saying that the core meaning of the 1992 Consensus is "opposition to Taiwan independence, affirmation that both sides belong to one China, and affirmation that cross-Strait relations are not international relations".

Since 1992, the government and public on Taiwan have taken the 1992 Consensus to mean "one China, different interpretations". Back then Lee Teng-hui was still president. In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou became president. During an exchange with George W. Bush on the hotline, Hu Jintao invoked the term, "one China, different interpretations". The Ma government continue to advocate "one China, different interpretations". But Beijing switched to the phrase "seeking common ground while shelving differences". For example, Hu Jintao spoke of "adhering to the 1992 Consensus, meaning that the two sides can seek common ground on the basis of one China". During the Ma Xi summit, the phrase "meet in their capacity as leaders of the two sides, and address each other as Mister", was an expression of “one China, different interpretations”. Therefore the phrases "seeking common ground while shelving differences", and "one China, different interpretations" are interchangeable.

Tsai Ing-wen mentioned Beijing's phrase "seeking common ground while shelving differences". She did so to imply convergence. She meant "I agree we should seek common ground while shelving differences. So let us proceed to seek common ground while shelving differences!" But "seeking common ground while shelving differences" is hardly a blank check.

Beijing speaks of "opposing Taiwan independence”. It insists that “both sides are part of one China”, and “cross-Strait relations are not international relations". On points such as these, there is no room for “shelving differences”. The Ma government stressed that the ROC Constitution does not allow "one China, one Taiwan”, or “one nation on each side”, or Taiwan independence. On points such as these, there is also no room for "shelving differences". The only point on which the two sides may shelve differences, is the meaning of "one China, different interpretations". But this is precisely what Tsai Ing-wen refuses to accept. She refuses to accept any "one China", including “one China, different interpretations”.

What does Tsai Ing-wen mean when she speaks of “seeking common ground while shelving differences”? Does she reject Beijing's "opposition to Taiwan independence" or the Ma government's "one China, different interpretations”?  Does she think that "seeking common ground while shelving differences" will provide cover for the Taiwan independence party platform? If so, she needs to recall Chen Shui-bian's lament: "Impossible means impossible".

The Ma government speaks of “one China, different interpretations”. This is the clearest example of “seeking common ground while shelving differences”. If Tsai Ing-wen wins the election and becomes President of the Republic of China, the "one China, different interpretations" aspect of the 1992 Consensus will be even more important than “opposition to Taiwan independence". More importantly, this must become the way the phrase “seeking common ground while shelving differences” is understood after 2016.

As far as Beijing is concerned, Tsai Ing-wen can no longer advocate de jure Taiwan independence. Therefore "opposition to Taiwan independence" is superfluous. The  issue then becomes whether Tsai Ing-wen endorses "one China, different interpretations". If Tsai refuses to endorse “one China, different interpretations”, how can Beijing possibly “seek common ground” with her? As far as the blue camp is concerned, will it implode following the election? That too depends on the 1992 Consensus and “one China, different interpretations”. Will they survive? Without "one China, different interpretations”, blue camp opposition to Taiwan independence will lose support. The blue camp will no longer have its reason for being. As far as the DPP is concerned, advocacy of Taiwan independence after 2016 will be utterly impossible. If the 1992 Consensus and “one China, different interpretations” is cast aside, the DPP will immediately be confronted with the "one China principle” and “opposition to Taiwan independence”. It will then find itself unable to advance or retreat, unable to attack or defend.

Under the 1992 consensus, “one China, different interpretations” means “seeking common ground while shelving differences”. It is the Republic of China's sole lifeline. Tsai Ing-wen's “seeking common ground while shelving differences” cannot replace "one China, different interpretations”. Still leass can it provide political cover for "one China, one Taiwan, one nation on each side, and Taiwan independence”. It is not a blank check. Everyone on Taiwan must realize the strategic importance of "one China, different interpretations” and “seeking common ground while shelving differences”. Once there are no longer any differences to shelve, we will find ourselves faced with the premise that "One China is the People's Republic of China".

Tsai Ing-wen must beware. Rejecting the 1992 Consensus will not eliminate Beijing's opposition to Taiwan independence. Rejecting the 1992 Consensus will, however, eliminate "one China, different interpretations”. What will happen to the nation then?

Tsai Ing-wen  speaks of maintaining the status quo. For the public on Taiwan, maintaining the status quo is the greatest common denominator. In fact, the 1992 consensus is the political foundation for the status quo. Tsai Ing-wen declared her support for "maintaining the status quo". As a result many mistakenly assume she can cope with the controversy over the 1992 Consensus. But Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus may make the status quo impossible to maintain. Yet Tsai refuses to tell voters her reasons for rejecting it. Are voters willing to reaffirm the role of the 1992 Consensus in "maintaining the status quo"? Tsai Ing-wen must think things through. Do most voters support her approach to maintaining the status quo? Do they support her rejection of the 1992 Consensus? If she misjudges the consequences, voters may react badly.

The 1992 Consensus is not a game of chance. Tsai Ing-wen may insist that “the 1992 Consensus is not the only option". But if Beijing insists that “the 1992 Consensus is the only option", it is doubtful she can do anything about it.

Tsai Ing-wen must think twice. One China, different interpretations is the clearest example of “seeking common ground while shelving differences”. In order to seek common ground, she cannot dispense with “one China, different interpretations”.

蔡英文的求同存異不是空白支票

2016-01-06 聯合報

蔡英文的「九二共識」新解，已被北京否定。

蔡英文說，「不否認一九九二年兩岸會談的歷史事實」，但國台辦指必須承認一九九二年建立了「九二共識」的歷史事實；蔡英文說，認同當年「求同存異的精神」，國台辦則說，九二共識的核心內涵是「反對台獨／兩岸同屬一中／兩岸不是國與國的關係」。

自一九九二年起，台灣當局與台灣輿論就以「一個中國／各自表述」來闡釋九二共識，當時尚在李登輝執政時期。二○○八年，馬英九當選總統後，胡錦濤在與小布希的熱線電話中，亦完整表述了「一中各表」。後來，馬政府繼續標舉「一中各表」，但北京則轉為經常使用「求同存異」一詞。例如，胡錦濤曾說：「堅持九二共識，意味雙方可以在一個中國的基礎上求同存異。」至馬習會，「以兩岸領導人的身分與名義舉行，見面互稱先生」，亦可視為「一中各表」的體現。所以，在兩岸之間，「求同存異」與「一中各表」二詞，可謂有心照不宣的代換作用。

蔡英文提出「求同存異」，是使用了北京的詞彙，以示趨同的姿態；意謂：「我同意你的求同存異，那麼我們就求同存異吧！」但是，求同存異不是一張空白支票。

北京說，「反對台獨／兩岸一中／兩岸不是國與國關係」，這些皆似無「存異」的空間；馬政府指出「一中一台／一邊一國／台灣獨立」皆為中華民國憲法所不許，這也無可「存異」之處。唯一的存異空間，就是「一中各表」之「各表」的內涵，但這似乎正是蔡英文所拒絕接受的。她不接受任何「一中」，包括一中各表。

蔡英文所謂的求同存異，若是一方面想要甩掉北京「反對台獨」的糾纏，另一方面想要拋棄馬政府的「一中各表」，而藉「求同存異」來包裹《台獨黨綱》，這恐將如陳水扁所說的「做不到就是做不到」。

馬政府強調一中各表，就是最鮮明的求同存異。蔡英文若勝選出任中華民國總統，九二共識中的「一中各表」將比「反對台獨」更重要，這應當就是後二○一六的「求同存異」。

就北京言，蔡英文不可能再主張法理台獨，所以「反對台獨」即是無的放矢；屆時，蔡英文的政治立場，就要看她是否表態「一中各表」。蔡若是不說一中各表，北京如何與她求同存異？對藍營言，選後藍營是否大解體，也要看「九二共識／一中各表」的論述能否存活；若無「一中各表」，藍營的「反對台獨」必將失去支撐，則藍營更無存續的條件。對民進黨言，後二○一六將絕無可能再存「台獨」之異，且丟棄了「九二共識／一中各表」的槓桿，一旦直接面對「一中原則／反對台獨」的衝擊，恐陷進退兩難、攻守失據之境。

在九二共識的體系下，一中各表就是求同存異，而一中各表亦是中華民國唯一可能藉以突圍的出路。但蔡英文的求同存異，不可能去「一中各表」而取代之，更不可能成為一張包裹「一中一台／一邊一國／台灣獨立」之異的空白支票。如台灣不知藉「一中各表」維持求同存異的戰略綱領，一旦自陷「無異可存」，就可能將面對「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」的衝擊。

蔡英文必須警覺：即使否認九二共識，她也甩不掉北京的「反對台獨」；但若摧毀九二共識，因而失去「一中各表」的載具，國家以後的路要如何走下去？

蔡英文強調維持現狀，且謂維持現狀是台灣民意的最大公約數；其實九二共識正是維持一切現狀的政治基礎。現今的民意因蔡英文宣示「維持現狀」而支持她，並可能相信她有能力處理九二共識的爭議；但倘若有一天，蔡英文因無能處理九二共識，以致現狀傾覆不再能維持，而蔡英文又說不出她否定九二共識的理由，民意有無可能為了「維持現狀」而回過頭來思考「九二共識」的作用與利益？蔡英文要想清楚：主流民意究竟是支持她維持現狀？抑或支持她否定九二共識？如果誤判其本末輕重，可能遭民意反噬。

九二共識不是賭局。蔡英文可以說「九二共識不是唯一選項」，但萬一北京堅持「九二共識是唯一選項」，即恐非她所能左右。

蔡英文應須三思：一中各表就是最鮮明的求同存異，要求同存異，就不能丟掉一中各表。

Will Tsai Ing-wen Allow US Pork Imports? Will Huang Kuo-chang Yield on STA?

Will Tsai Ing-wen Allow US Pork Imports? Will Huang Kuo-chang Yield on STA?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 5, 2016

Executive Summary: US pork imports and cross-Strait agreements are merely preludes. Once Tsai Ing-wen is crowned, she will surely perform many more Szechuan opera style flip-flops and about faces. A bill passed by a KMT majority in the legislature was smeared as a "black box operation" by the DPP. But when the green camp acquires a legislative majority and can do what it wants, that will be prettified as "assuming total responsibility". Ko Chien-min was a corrupt influence peddler par excellence. But once he is reelected, he will in all probability, as the green camp's most senior legislator, be lionized as the "leader of legislative reform".

Full Text Below:

During the two presidential debates, Tsai Ing-wen surreptitiously changed her policy positions. She has clearly made two policy changes. One. She now proposes to allow in US pork containing clenbuterol, providing they meet Japanese and Korean standards. Two. She now wants the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations bill be given top priority during the coming session of the legislature. That means that soon after the election, Tsai Ing-wen may permit US pork imports containing clenbuterol, and Huang Kuo-chang may back passage of the STA.

For politicians to change their policy whenever they change roles is commonplace. As long as this sort of pragmatism serves the greater good, it is tolerable. But Tsai Ing-wen's ability to brazenly flip-flop, without batting an eyelash, is without peer. She has demonstrated the DPP's total lack of consistent principles. She has confirmed the truth of the addage, "Politics is the art of deceit". She has no qualms whatsoever about playing the public on Taiwan for fools.

Lest we forget, in mid-June 2012, the DPP demanded a zero tolerance policy for clenbuterol laced US beef imports. It forcibly occupied the legislature for five days and four nights, to prevent ruling party legislators from approving their importation. Earlier that year, pig farmers traveled north to Taipei to fling pig dung at the Ma government in protest. DPP legislators joined their ranks and castigated the KMT for "selling out the health of the nation", and for "destroying Taiwan's pork industry". They demagogued the US beef and US pork imports issue for all they were worth. Now however, Tsai Ing-wen is seizing the opportunity to flip-flop. Have the DPP's past lamentations about the "health of the nation" and the "pork farmers' livelihood" been forgotten?

Objectively speaking, any public policy must weigh the pros and cons of the different parties. It must consider the larger interests of society and individuals, and arrive at a balanced solution. The solution may not please everyone. But it must be the solution most beneficial to society as a whole. It must do individuals the least harm. It must provide compensation or subsidies to victims. Only that is sufficient. The Ma government advocated permitting US beef imports according to international standards. It advocated delinking beef and pork. Its approach was correct. Unfortunately, the DPP was out for blood, and incited mobs to obstruct the process.

Tsai Ing-wen's about face on US pork imports is inconsistent and impossible to justify. Tsai Ing-wen now proposes to permit US pork imports, providing they meet Japanese and South Korean standards. Is this a rational and pragmatic approach? Is it is, then why did the DPP react as it did when the KMT advocated international standards for US beef imports? Why did the DPP adopt a scorched earth policy? Why did the DPP accuse the Ma government of ignoring people's lives and health? Conversely, if the DPP's opposition and protests were justified, how can Tsai Ing-wen explain the DPP's double standards, and eat her words?

The STA and Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations were stalled in the Legislative Yuan for nearly two years. The main reason was DPP accusations of "black box operations". Students staged protests, occupied the legislature, and took advantage of the halo effect to continue their opposition. Were these bills so disastrous the DPP could not allow the ruling Kuomintang to pass them? If so, why has Tsai Ing-wen announced that they will be given top priority following the general election? Her deeds and words are diametrically opposed and totally inconsistent. What can one say but, “Will the real Tsai Ing-wen please step forward?”

Surely people have not forgotten Huang Kuo-chang, the “God of War” who led anti-STA protests during the Sunflower Student Movement? He is now running for a legislative seat, as a "Force of the Time" with Tsai Ing-wen's full support. On the streets, Huang Kuo-chang is virulently anti-China, anti-STA. At home, his businessman father in law is a major investor in the Mainland. His family has “gone west”. These are characterized as legitimate investments. But when others invest on the Mainland, they are excoriated for “selling out Taiwan”. What sort of logic is this?

Would be “God of War” Huang Kuo-chang opposed the STA. He has now thrown his hat in the ring, and organized a “rival” political party, one that is colluding with the DPP. Clearly the Sunflower Student Movement two years ago, was nothing more than cover for the Green Camp. They have even formed a "Capital Forward Alliance". Their next step is to play a role in the legislature. Huang Kuo-chang led Sunflower Student Movement opposition to the STA. Once he enters the legislature, it is easy to see him responding to calls by Tsai Ing-wen for the passage of the STA and Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations, and changing his position. We will have to wait and see.

US pork imports and cross-Strait agreements are merely preludes. Once Tsai Ing-wen is crowned, she will surely perform many more Szechuan opera style flip-flops and about faces. A bill passed by a KMT majority in the legislature was smeared as a "black box operation" by the DPP. But when the green camp acquires a legislative majority and can do what it wants, that will be prettified as "assuming total responsibility". Ko Chien-min was a corrupt influence peddler par excellence. But once he is reelected, he will in all probability, as the green camp's most senior legislator, be lionized as the "leader of legislative reform".

蔡英文放行美豬？黃國昌放過服貿？

2016-01-05 聯合報

在兩場大選辯論會中，蔡英文在舞台上釋放出她徐徐轉身的訊號。目前清晰的轉變有二：一是她主張比照日韓的標準，處理瘦肉精美豬進口問題；二是主張《兩岸協議監督條例》列為立法院下會期的優先法案，儘速處理。以這樣的前奏，大選過後，民眾或許很快就能看到蔡英文放行美國瘦肉精豬肉，也有可能看到黃國昌支持兩岸服貿協議過關。

換了位子就換了腦袋，是大家常見的事；但只要是為了整體利益務實考量，有時亦無可厚非。但像蔡英文這樣，還沒換位子就開始修正立場，露出原形而臉不紅氣不喘，則是少見的事。這除說明民進黨缺乏一貫原則，也顯示它供奉「政治是高明騙術」的信條，不憚於將台灣民眾玩弄於股掌之上。

如果不健忘的話，民眾應該還記得，二○一二年六月中旬，民進黨堅持進口美牛瘦肉精必須「零檢出」，並為此霸占立法院議場主席台達五天四夜之久，以阻止執政黨立委通過該案。同一年稍早，豬農北上向馬政府丟豬糞抗議時，民進黨立委在隊伍中示威叫陣，痛罵國民黨「出賣國民健康」、「摧毀台灣養豬產業」，把美牛美豬議題上綱到民粹最高點。如今，蔡英文趁著大好形勢要輕輕轉身，但民進黨當時喊得震天價響的「國民健康」、「豬農生計」，難道全拋諸腦後了？

客觀而論，政府任何公共政策都必須權衡各方利弊得失，考量整體和個體的利益，然後得出一個相對平衡的方案。最後的方案，也許不是人人滿意，但必須是對整體社會最為有益，對個別個體傷害最小，甚至設法向受害者提供賠償或補貼，以求圓滿。以這樣的標準檢驗，先前馬政府主張依國際標準開放美牛，以及堅持「牛豬分離」的原則，方向其實是正確的。遺憾的是，民進黨卻喊打喊殺，發動群眾杯葛。

如此一來，今天蔡英文在美豬政策上的轉變，就顯得前後矛盾且難以自圓其說了。今天蔡英文主張比照日韓標準開放美豬，如果是理性及務實的作法，那麼當初國民黨主張採國際標準開放美牛，民進黨為何焦土抗爭，指控馬政府罔顧人民生命安全？反過來說，如果當初民進黨的杯葛抗爭有理，那麼今天蔡英文又如何面對自己的雙重標準及自食其言？

再看，《服貿協議》和《兩岸協議監督條例》草案在立法院擱淺將近兩年，主要原因就是民進黨以「黑箱」為由，發動學生霸占國會抗爭，並利用其餘威持續杯葛。如果這些法案是禍國殃民的東西，民進黨拒絕讓執政的國民黨通過，而蔡英文卻說要列為大選後下會期的優先法案；作法如此南轅北轍，立場如此前後不一，言行如此自相矛盾，要教民眾相信哪一個蔡英文才是真的？

人們當然不會忘記，在太陽花學運中率領學生反服貿的「戰神」黃國昌，也在這次選舉中以「時代力量」主席的身分參選立委，並獲得蔡英文全力支持。眾目所見，黃國昌在街頭是反中、反服貿的先鋒；在家中，其岳父卻是在大陸有龐大投資事業的台商。家人西進，就是正當投資；別人登陸，就是禍台賣台，這是什麼邏輯？

從反服貿戰神的參選，另組政黨卻和民進黨攜手合作，不難看出，兩年前那場被稱為「學生運動」的太陽花事件，其實就是以學生名義為掩護的綠營側翼。在這次選舉，他們連手組成了所謂「首都進步大聯盟」，其下一步，就是要在立法院大顯身手。不難想像，曾率領太陽花反服貿的黃國昌，一旦被送入國會，也有可能一改立場響應蔡英文的號召，通過兩岸協議監督條例和服貿協議。且讓我們拭目以待。

美豬進口和兩岸協議，都只是前奏而已。當蔡英文威風凜凜地上台後，她勢必還有更多變臉和轉身的演出，像川劇一樣。大家不妨想像其中幾齣戲碼：例如，國民黨立委以國會優勢通過的法案，卻被民進黨貼上「黑箱」的罪名；而未來綠營若取得過半的國會而為所欲為，則自我美化為「完全執政」。例如，在關說案中扮演關鍵角色的柯建銘，一旦當選，將可能以綠營最資深立委的身分出任立法院長，帶領「國會改革」。

PRC-ROK FTA: Is Tsai Ing-wen's Alternative Path Passable?

PRC-ROK FTA: Is Tsai Ing-wen's Alternative Path Passable?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 2, 2016

Executive Summary: Economics is not a political game. When winter comes, those unprepared will be devastated. The PRC-ROK FTA has gone into effect in the icy cold of winter. Will the MTA continue to be falsely stigmatized, and come to naught? People should give the matter serious thought. They should realize that Tsai Ing-wen's “alternative path” leads to a mirage.

Full Text Below:

Time flies. Mainland China's FTAs with South Korea and Australia have gone into effect. Taiwan meanwhile, remains mired in political grievances, oblivious to the coming winter. No matter how bad the economic news, there is nary a ripple.

Australia's trade situation is very different from Taiwan's. It can be left out of the discussion. But trade between the Mainland and South Korea is highly similar to trade between the Mainland and Taiwan. The PRC-ROK FTA is certain to displace cross-Strait trade. That goes without saying. Once the FTA goes into effect, approximately 1650 trade items exported to the Mainland from Korea will immediately enjoy tariff free status. This far exceeds the 539 trade items on the ECFA early harvest list that enjoy tariff free status.

South Korea can expect to make approximately 20 billion USD in tariff free exports to the Mainland this year. By contrast, the STA led to massive protests against the MTA and lingering fear of the Mainland. The Mainland felt the need to look after its own industries. Therefore it refused to budge on petrochemicals, flat panels, automobiles, and machine tools. These are four major industries on Taiwan. Despite 12 rounds of negotiations, little progress was made. Since elections are approaching, the political foundation is gone, and the MTA faces an uncertain future.

One small consolation is that just before the PRC-ROK FTA went into effect, the WTO made its greatest leap in nearly two decades. Dozens of participating countries reached an Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and expanded the tariff reduction list. Taiwan's chief exports, ICT products, have benefited. Last year the 201 items on the "ITA2 List" had an export value of 90 billion USD. The lion's share was liquid crystal displays. Unfortunately, Taiwan's flat panel industry is fighting for its life. Worst of all, it was not included. The MTA is its sole lifeline.

ICT products are pillars of Taiwan's foreign trade. But the ITA and ITA2 eliminate only three trade barriers. Barriers standing in the way of the petrochemical, textile, and machinery industries also need to be eliminated. Bilateral negotiations must result in trade agreements and regional economic integration. For Taiwan, this is the only way out.

If Taiwan wishes to engage in global trade, it cannot bypass the Mainland. Put simply, the Mainland is the key to Taiwan's integration into the world economy. Mainland China is currently on the rise. The undeniable reality is that without the STA and MTA, Taiwan cannot take part in regional integration or sign trade agreements.

A long corridor lies ahead of Taiwan. The corridor includes one set of doors after another, every one of them closed. Taiwan must first open the door to Mainland China. Only then can it open the doors to the RCEP, TPP, and other regional free trade organizations. This is the only path available. The first door it must open is the STA and MTA. The key required to open every one of the doors, is the 1992 Consensus.

Taiwan is in deep trouble. Last year, young people ignorant about the global power structure and the realities of trade launched a student movement. People on Taiwan lost all reason. They simplistically equated world trade with "black box operations". In fact, the STA is nothing more than a trade agreement. Yet is was depicted as a “Trojan Horse”. Anti-STA rumors spread far and wide. For example, one rumor alleged that passage of the STA would lead to mass immigration from the Mainland. Such nonsense persists even today. Wang Jin-pyng recently endorsed a KMT legislator. While standing on the podium, he told voters "The STA really is a black box operation", giving the lie a new lease on life.

Is Wang Jin-pyng really unaware that the KMT's dire straits and Tsai Ing-wen's invincible status, are the result of just such charges of "black box operations"? Does he really not know that such scurillous charges are mere cover for DPP hate mongering? Tsai Ing-wen is hardly going to tell the truth. She proposes an “alternative path”. She tells voters: Join the TPP and all our problems will be solved. We can join the TPP without recognizing the 1992 Consensus.

The TPP has been hailed as an “economic NATO” led by the US to contain Mainland China. Tsai Ing-wen assumes all that is required to join “Team America", is a nod from the Team Captain. Many US officials have advanced this argument, which if not an outright lie, is an obvious  misunderstanding. First of all, the United States is not the absolute ruler of the TPP. Taiwan hopes to become a second round member. To do so, it must obtain the consent of all 12 first round members. But the largest trading partner of several first round members is Mainland China. If the Mainland says no, are they really prepared to offend the Mainland by allowing Taiwan to join? Secondly, 40% of Taiwan's exports are to Mainland China. Can it really cling to the TPP and relinquish 40% of its market?

Economics is not a political game. When winter comes, those unprepared will be devastated. The PRC-ROK FTA has gone into effect in the icy cold of winter. Will the MTA continue to be falsely stigmatized, and come to naught? People should give the matter serious thought. They should realize that Tsai Ing-wen's “alternative path” leads to a mirage.

從中韓FTA生效問蔡英文替代路徑何在？

2016-01-02 聯合報

年凋歲殘之際，中國大陸跟韓國、澳洲的兩個自由貿易協定卻生效了，台灣陷在快意恩仇的政治熱浪裡，彷彿渾不知經濟的寒冬已漸漸逼近，再多的惡耗都激不起一絲漣漪。

澳洲的貿易結構與台灣迥然不同，可略而不論；但中韓貿易與兩岸之間卻是高度相似，中韓ＦＴＡ生效勢必造成兩岸貿易的替代效應，已無需贅言。生效之後，韓國約一千六百五十項稅號的原產貨品出口中國立即享受零關稅，這遠多於兩岸經濟合作架構協議ＥＣＦＡ的五百三十九項貨品降稅早收清單。

今年韓國可望約有兩百億美元規模的出口貨物在中國大陸享受關稅優惠；對照之下，兩岸貨貿協議不知是先前服貿引發大規模抗爭，以致對岸仍有所忌憚，還是因為大陸確有自己產業需要照顧，仍在石化、面板、整車、工具機等台灣的四大產業上堅守陣地，十二回合談判之後，仍缺乏進展。因大選在即，政治基礎一旦流失，貨貿依舊前途未卜。

稍可慰藉的是，就在中韓ＦＴＡ生效的前幾天，世界貿易組織獲致近二十年最大成就，數十個參與國達成資訊科技協定（ＩＴＡ）擴大範圍降稅清單，作為台灣出口主力的諸多ＩＣＴ產品普遍受惠。台灣在「ＩＴＡ２」的二○一項清單上，一年出口金額高達約九百億美元，其中最大的項目是液晶裝置零件。遺憾的是，台灣面臨存亡之秋的面板產業並未納入，兩岸貨貿將是它的唯一生機。

資通訊產品是台灣的外貿支柱，但靠ＩＴＡ、ＩＴＡ２，頂多解決三成的貿易障礙，其餘石化、紡織、機械等各類產業、勢須另外打開壁壘。以雙邊談判達成貿易協定、及加入區域經濟整合，仍是台灣唯一的出路。

要打開台灣的全球貿易經脈，中國大陸是我國繞不開的因素；說得貼切些，它是台灣參與世界經濟整合的唯一一把鑰匙。在中國大陸崛起的此刻，無法否認的現實是：不通過兩岸服貿與貨貿，台灣將無法參加任何區域整合，也勢難再簽署任何貿易協定。

而今迤邐於台灣前方的，猶如一條長長的甬道，甬道上則是一扇一扇掩閉的門；台灣必須先打開中國大陸這一扇門，最終才能打開加入ＲＣＥＰ、ＴＰＰ等區域性自貿區的那些門。這是唯一的路徑圖，第一扇門就是兩岸服貿、貨貿，而打開每一道門的鑰匙，都是「九二共識」。

但台灣深陷的麻煩是，經過前年那場由並不熟悉全球權力結構與經貿現實的年輕人所發動的學運後，台灣儼已蒸發了大半理性，將一把世界經貿鑰匙硬是貼上「黑箱」的罪名。事實上，兩岸服貿不過就是一紙貿易協議，卻被誇大成特洛伊屠城木馬，反服貿期間謠諑紛紛，譬如大陸人將可大舉來台定居等，這種任意編造的說詞，至今還未廓清。王金平最近為國民黨立委站台，竟再跟台下選民聲稱，「服貿真的是黑箱」，彷彿要將黑箱罪名一舉定讞。

王金平難道不知，國民黨如今陷於頹危，蔡英文之所以所向披靡，正是這股以「黑箱」作為掩飾的仇恨及恐懼席捲全台所致。蔡英文當然不會說出實情，她推波助瀾地提出了另一條路徑圖，告訴選民：只要加入ＴＰＰ，一切難題皆可迎刃而解；而加入ＴＰＰ，並不需要「九二共識」。

ＴＰＰ被喻為美國圍堵、排擠中國的「經濟北約」，蔡英文的概念是：加入這支「美國隊」，只需隊長點頭即可，美國多位官員也都作此說法。然而，這縱非謊言，也是顯然的誤解。首先，美國並不是ＴＰＰ一言九鼎的老大，台灣欲於第二輪加入，必須徵得第一輪所有十二個國家的同意；但有好幾個成員其最大貿易夥伴都是中國大陸，若大陸反對，他們會甘冒大不韙同意台灣加入嗎？其次，台灣本身就有四成出口市場是在大陸，難道可以只為擁抱ＴＰＰ，而任那四成市場糜爛？

經濟並非政治遊戲，當它的嚴冬降臨，恐怕哀鴻遍野。中韓ＦＴＡ已在歲寒中生效，兩岸貨貿還要繼續遭汙名蹂躪，竟至於化為烏有嗎？大家不妨認真想想，蔡英文的替代路線，是否只是虛無縹緲的海市蜃樓。