Cross-Strait Oversight Regulations Reveal "Three Antis" Mentality

Cross-Strait Oversight Regulations Reveal "Three Antis" Mentality
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 10, 2016

Executive Summary: The Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations reflect traditional green camp antipathy toward the government, antipathy toward civil servants, and antipathy toward the Mainland. Ko Chien-min says the DPP version of the bill will prevail. But as long as the DPP's "Three Antis" mentality remains the rule, the cross-Strait status quo will be difficult to maintain, and Tsai Ing-wen's hope of "maintaining extremely good relations" with the Mainland will remain elusive.

Full Text Below:

Green camp legislators have recently drafted several "two-states theory" versions of the the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. DPP Party Convener Ko Chien-min has indeed drafted a version that "reaffirms the constitutional framework of the Republic of China". But most members of the new DPP-controlled legislature demand passage of the two states theory version. The DPP's long held "three Antis" mentality remains unchanged. It continues to oppose the government, oppose the civil service, and in particular, oppose the Mainland. This constitues a major stumbling block in the way of the Tsai government.

All of these drafts of the oversight regulations are based on the two states theory. Are they merely part of a “good cop, bad cop” approach to cross-Strait negotiations? If not, then their sponsors are intentionally making trouble for Tsai Ing-wen. The You Mei-jen and NPP drafts provide harsh penalties for negotiators who violate its provisions. For example, “undermining national sovereignty” would be punishable by not less than seven years' imprisonment. What constitutes "undermining national sovereignty"? That is left open to interpretation, as the occasion requires. Negotiators will have this Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads. No wonder it is being ridiculed as the "No Agreements Allowed” draft bill.

Tsai Ing-wen recently pledged to reaffirm the "ROC constitutional framework". Yet green camp legislators are trotting out various two states theory versions of the oversight regulations. Tsai Ing-wen recently pledged to "maintain good relations with [Mainland] China". Yet green camp legislators are proposing "No Agreements Allowed” draft bills. Tsai Ing-wen recently laid down the law, saying "When I say I intend to maintain the status quo, I intend to maintain the status quo". Yet the DPP's "Three Antis" mentality persists. The "status quo" is likely to be a leaf in the wind.

For starters, the DPP clings to an anti-government attitude. The DPP controlled the central government for eight years. It governed locally for much longer than that. Yet it remains blind to the larger picture. High-ranking officials within the party remain addicted to confrontation. They cannot understand the concept of stable governance. They even ignore the truism that "The master does not make trouble in his own house". Chen government political appointee Hsu Chi-hsiung criticized the DPP, saying that whenever it is in the opposition, it champions one policy. But the moment it is in office, it completely reverses course. When it changes its role, it changes its position. This is not a good thing. Even Chen Shui-bian admitted that it is impossible to change the name of the country. "Impossible means impossible.” After all, many things can be said when one is in the opposition. But once one becomes the ruling party, one must exercise restraint. One can charge ahead heedlessly when one is in the opposition. But once one becomes the ruling party, one must practice impulse control. The DPP's confrontational mentality is hard to change. Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly warned legislators that legislation requires strategic vision and good timing. But in the end DPP legislators invariably fall back on Party Convener Ko to hammer out deals between the DPP and outsiders.

Next, the DPP is contemptuous and suspicious of the civil service. The various green camp versions of the oversight regulations enable the legislature to meddle in cross-Strait negotiations. This blurs legislative and executive responsibilities. It divorces authority from responsibility, and undermines administrative efficiency. In particular, the bill turns a any number of ill-defined actions during cross-Strait negotiations into criminal offenses. They include "undermining our national sovereignty and our international status". Draconian punishments would be meted out to cross-Strait negotiators, who would be impeached or even prosecuted. Is intimidating those responsible for cross-Strait negotiations really better than promoting cross-Strait exchanges and consultations?

Premier Chang San-cheng said civil servants responsible for negotiations must not be treated as criminal suspects. Doing so would be a major blow to civil servants. The DPP has a long history of taking to the streets. It has developed a distrustful, even hostile attitude toward civil servants. If the DPP shows scant respect for the dignity of the civil service,  if it refuses to adopt a professional attitude toward civil servants, how can a Tsai government control the vast machinery of state, and lead Taiwan forward?

Finally, the DPP has a deep-rooted anti-Mainland mentality. The current oversight regulations include the two states theory version and the No Agreement Allowed version. Both violate the Constitution's definition of Taiwan and the Mainland. This reflects the DPP's deep-rooted anti-Mainland mentality. It is also a legacy of the Sunflower Student movement. First, de-Sinicization. Then, genetic engineering that artificially yields "natural Taiwan independence". The DPP has trapped itself on the horns of a dilemma, between "spiritual Taiwan independence" and the harsh reality of domestic and foreign pressure. It is now forced to flip-flop endlessly between the two. Trust between the CCP and DPP is non-existent. The DPP repeatedly misreads the situation and falls flat on its face. This can only be described as reaping what one sowed. Opposing anything having to do with the Mainland has become second nature.  The DPP's anti-Mainland mentality is an obstacle to the transformation of the party. It also constitutes a blind spot and a minefield for the incoming Tsai Ing-wen regime.

The Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations reflect traditional green camp antipathy toward the government, antipathy toward civil servants, and antipathy toward the Mainland. Ko Chien-min says the DPP version of the bill will prevail. But as long as the DPP's "Three Antis" mentality remains the rule, the cross-Strait status quo will be difficult to maintain, and Tsai Ing-wen's hope of "maintaining extremely good relations" with the Mainland will remain elusive.

《兩岸監督條例》暴露的「三反」心態

2016-03-10 聯合報

綠營立委最近紛紛提出泛屬「兩國論」版本的《兩岸協議監督條例》草案。儘管總召柯建銘強調黨版草案「會回到中華民國的憲政體制來談」，但民進黨多數主導下的新國會不斷出現「兩國論」入法現象，反映的是民進黨長期以來反對政府、反對公務員、特別是反對中國的「三反」心態未改，這將是蔡英文執政之路的大石頭。

這幾個已分別付委的《監督條例》草案，一方面在立法精神上概屬「兩國論」；此舉，若非刻意在兩岸議題上與蔡英文扮黑白臉唱雙簧，那就只能說是為「扯小英後腿」了。另一方面，「尤美女版」及「時代力量版」都設有嚴苛罰則，對相關人員違反相關規定致損害主權者，議處七年以上徒刑。所謂「損害主權」，又是可以隨意認定；有這種懸在談判事務官員頭上的大刀，也難怪被譏稱為「不協議條例」。

蔡英文才稱要回歸「中華民國憲政體制」，綠營「兩國論」版條例便紛紛出籠；蔡英文才承諾「一定會與大陸維持非常良好的關係」，綠營「不協議條例」即大拋絆馬索；蔡英文才霸聲定調，「我說維持現狀，就是維持現狀」，但民進黨「三反」心結難解，「現狀」恐成漂移的新常態。

首先，是反對政府的心態。民進黨雖有過八年中央執政經驗，各路諸侯的地方執政經驗更綿延不輟，但整體心態上仍缺乏主持大局的體認，黨內大員亦戒不掉在野衝撞體制的脾性，不僅無法理解平穩執政之要諦，甚至罔顧「當家不鬧事」的道理。扁政府政務委員許志雄批評，民進黨在野時提一種主張，執政了就一百八十度轉變，換位子就換腦袋，不是好現象。事實上，包括陳水扁也曾坦言任內要改國號，「做不到就是做不到」。畢竟，很多話在野但說無妨，執政就得態度嚴謹；很多事在野可以衝，執政就是要節制。正因在野衝撞心態難改，蔡英文雖一再告誡立委提案要有整體戰略觀與節奏感，卻終須仰賴柯總召黨內黨外忙著「喬」法案。

其次，是輕蔑及懷疑公務員的心態。綠營所提《監督條例》諸版本，國會對兩岸談判過程皆高度介入，不僅混淆立法、行政分際，將致權責難斷，更傷及行政效率。尤其，部分草案以「損害主權、國際地位」等範圍廣泛但定義不明的罪名，對兩岸協商嚴苛問責，談判人員將動輒被彈劾甚或科以刑責；如此，嚇阻兩岸談判之意，豈不更甚於促進兩岸交流協商？

閣揆張善政說，不能把負責談判的公務員當成嫌疑人，這對公務員是很大的打擊。然而，民進黨長期街頭衝撞，養成這種不信任、甚至敵視公務人員的心態。試想，民進黨若經常流露出不尊重公務員尊嚴與專業的態度，蔡英文執政後將如何駕馭這部龐大的國家機器，帶領台灣前進？

最後，則是根深柢固的反中心態。目前《監督條例》草案從「兩國論」到「不協議」的版本，皆違背憲法的兩岸定位，這一則反映了深植的「反中」心態，二則是太陽花學運遺緒。從「去中國化」到改造基因培育「天然獨」，民進黨如今在「心靈台獨」與國內外現實壓力之間擺盪、反覆與拉鋸，民共互信不存，屢生錯解誤讀，面對兩岸情勢躓踣顛頓，只能說是「種什麼因，結什麼果」。然而，當「逢中必反」已經變成反射動作，「反中」心態就不僅是民進黨轉型前進的障礙，更會形成蔡英文未來執政的盲點與雷區。

一部《兩岸協議監督條例》的立法，映照了傳統綠營從反對政府、反對公務員到反對中國的心態。柯建銘雖然強調未來審查將以黨版為主，然而只要民進黨「三反」心態不除，兩岸「現狀」終難維持。如此這般，蔡英文要與大陸「維持非常良好關係」，恐也終將如同鏡花水月。

A Golden Opportunity Awaits Tsai Ing-wen Upon Awakening from Her Dream

A Golden Opportunity Awaits Tsai Ing-wen Upon Awakening from Her Dream
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 9, 2016

Executive Summary: It is time for President-elect Tsai Ing-wen to awaken from her dream. It is time for green camp supporters to abandon their unrealistic fantasies and face reality. May 20, inauguration day, is only two months away. Tsai Ing-wen must behave responsibly. She must tell her supporters the truth. The DPP can persuade the CCP to accept it. But if the DPP refuses to change its cross-Strait policy, Taiwan's 23 million people will be the ones who suffer. During her inaugural address, Tsai must shine a light on cross-Strait relations.

Full Text Below:

It is time for President-elect Tsai Ing-wen to awaken from her dream. It is time for green camp supporters to abandon their unrealistic fantasies and face reality. May 20, inauguration day, is only two months away. Tsai Ing-wen must behave responsibly. She must tell her supporters the truth. The DPP can persuade the CCP to accept it. But if the DPP refuses to change its cross-Strait policy, Taiwan's 23 million people will be the ones who suffer. During her inaugural address, Tsai must shine a light on cross-Strait relations.

After its defeat in the 2012 presidential election, the DPP reviewed its cross-Strait policy. It determined that the key to victory was the final mile. The party began modifying its cross-Strait policy. Some called for freezing the Taiwan independence party platform. But all these demands were shelved by Tsai Ing-wen.

Following the Sunflower Student movement, Tsai Ing-wen told Commonwealth magazine that as long as the DPP emerges victorious in the 2014 nine in one elections, "Even [Mainland] China will accommodate the DPP". Reality shows that even though the DPP routed the KMT in the nine in one elections, the CCP did not throw open its doors to the DPP.

Tsai Ing-wen did not mind of course. Even though the DPP refused to change its cross-Strait policy platform, it won the presidential and legislative elections anyway, and now enjoys “total government”. Tsai Ing-wen remains indifferent to cross-Strait policy. She refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. She is willing only to admit the historical fact that a consensus was reached in 1992. She evades any discussion of the significance of that consensus. She clings to her dream that as long as she wins the election, the CCP will accommodate the DPP.

Objective reality is not going to change to conform to our subjective desires. Tsai Ing-wen's subjective fantasies have been shattered. During a visit to the United States, Mainland Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke of “constitutionalism”. Tsai concluded that the Mainland was changing its Taiwan policy in response to the DPP election victory. This revived the fantasy that as long as the DPP won the election, the CCP would see things its way. This dream was short-lived, as the Mainland soon made clear.

On March 5, Mainland supreme leader Xi Jinping attended the Shanghai People's Congress. Xi said "Our Taiwan policy is clear and consistent. It will not change because the political situation on Taiwan changes". Xi said "Recognize the historical fact of the 1992 Consensus, recognize its core meaning. The two sides will then have a common political basis, one that can ensure positive interaction". Beijing has said these words before. But Xi said them right after the general election on Taiwan. It was the first time Xi Jinping publicly addressed cross-Strait relations. It was the Mainland's definitive response to the election results on Taiwan.

In other words, the DPP may score successive victories in the nine in one local government elections and the two in one central government elections. It may enjoy “total government”. But none of that matters. As Xi Jinping made clear, Beijing's basic policy toward Taiwan will not change. The 1992 Consensus means that Taiwan and the Mainland are both part of one China. That will remain their shared political foundation. Tsai Ing-wen fantasized that as long as the DPP won the election, Beijing would see things their way. That dream has been totally shattered.

Mainland policy toward Taiwan opposes Taiwan independence and “one China, one Taiwan”.  It insists on “two sides, one China”. It insists that cross-Strait relations are not international relations. No matter how Taiwan's political situation evolves, Beijing will not waver. If the DPP refuses to change its cross-Strait policy, then cross-Strait relations after 5/20 will definitely be worse. Maintaining the status quo will be impossible.

But a crisis is also an opportunity. The CCP's basic policy toward Taiwan will never change. But its leaders' style is not necessarily static. They may show some flexibility. As long as the two sides can establish mutual trust, they can establish a win-win situation. This is especially true of Xi Jinping, a fifth-generation leader whose door is always open. In fact, this represents a golden opportunity for cross-Strait relations.

In the past, the heads of the Taiwan Affairs Office and Mainland Affairs Council could not address each other by their official titles. When ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin visited Taiwan, he repeatedly addressed MAC Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan as "you" or "Shin-yuan", not "Chairman".

This was perceived as a major obstacle to cross-Strait relations, one difficult to overcome. But once Xi Jinping was in power, the other side was willing to address the MAC Chairwoman by her official title. This was entirely unexpected. Soon afterwards the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Mainland Affairs Council established a hotline.

Leaders from the two sides tried to meet when Jiang Zemin and Lee Teng-hui were in office. But the Mainland considered the international situation highly problematic. At one time rumors emerged claiming that Lee and Jiang would meet on a ship in the middle of the Taiwan Strait.

Last year Xi Jinping agreed to meet Ma Ying-jeou in Singapore. For Xi, this constituted a major breakthrough. Singapore was viewed as a third locale, rather than an “international venue”. This was only possible because Xi was willing to throw open the doors to Taiwan.

Measures to facilitate cross-Strait, people to people exchanges played a part. Many have wanted visits to the Mainland from Taiwan to be like going home, with no need to obtain visas.

Xi Jinping listened to these voices. He then proclaimed "two sides, one family”. Xi Jinping had the courage to implement a visa-free policy for Taiwan compatriots. This revealed Xi Jinping's character, his willingness to throw the doors wide open.

President elect Tsai Ing-wen and her supporters must not fly into fits of apoplexy upon seeing their dream shattered. They must adopt a pragmatic attitude. During the 5/20 inaugural speech, Tsai Ing-wen must exercise wisdom. She must affirm the core meaning of the 1992 Consensus. She must acknowledge that both sides of the Strait are part of one China, and that cross-Strait relations are not international relations. She must respond in good faith. Xi Jinping flung the doors open to cross-Strait relations. She must shine a light on this development, and become a force for political progress rather than political reaction.

蔡英文夢醒時分與可能機遇

2016年03月09日 中國時報

現在該是總統當選人蔡英文的夢醒時分了，也是綠營支持者拋棄不切實際幻想，面對現實的時候了。到五二０還有兩個多月的時間，蔡英文應該負責任地清楚告訴支持者，要讓中共靠向民進黨，不可能就是不可能，民進黨若不調整兩岸政策，受害的是全體台灣兩千三百萬人，就職演說一定要努力點亮兩岸關係。

2012年總統大選敗選後，民進黨曾檢討兩岸政策是民進黨重返執行的關鍵及最後一哩路，黨內一度有調整兩岸政策，凍結台獨黨綱的聲音出現，但是這些主張全被蔡英文束之高閣。

太陽花學運後，蔡英文接受《天下》雜誌專訪時曾說，只要打好2014年的九合一大選，「連中國都會朝民進黨方向來調整。」但事實證明，民進黨在九合一大選中狂勝，並沒有為民共對話打開大門。

但蔡英文並不在意，甚至因為沒有調整兩岸政策，還是在總統與立法委員選舉中大勝，取得完全執政權，蔡英文在兩岸政策上更為無動於衷，始終不認同接受九二共識，只願承認九二共識的歷史事實，避而不談九二共識的一中內涵，多少還存在著只要打贏選戰，中共就會向民進黨方向來調整的夢想。

客觀情勢不隨主觀意願而改變，蔡英文的主觀意願果然破碎。大陸外交部長王毅在美國提及「憲法說」，曾一度被外界解讀為大陸對台政策因民進黨勝選而有所調整，又勾起民進黨打贏選戰中共就會靠向民進黨的夢想。但這夢想只是曇花一現，大陸立即做出澄清。

大陸最高領導人習近平3月5日參加人大上海代表團審議時，明確強調，「對台大政方針是明確的、一貫的，不會因台灣政局變化而改變。」「承認九二共識的歷史事實，認同其核心意涵，兩岸雙方就有了共同政治基礎，就可以保持良性互動。」這些話大陸方面其實都說過，但這是台灣大選之後，習近平首度針對兩岸關係的公開談話，等於是大陸對台灣選舉結果的結論性回應。

換言之，即使民進黨在九合一的地方選舉及二合一的中央選舉連戰皆捷，取得全面執政，習近平表明了大陸的對台大政方針不會因此而改變，九二共識的核心內涵（台灣和大陸同屬一個中國），還是兩岸的共同政治基礎。到此蔡英文的只要打贏選戰中共就會靠向民進黨的夢想已確定完全破滅。

事實證明，大陸對台大政方針，反對台獨、反對一中一台、堅持兩岸一中、堅持兩岸不是國與國關係，不管台灣政局怎麼演變是不會動搖改變的。民進黨不調整兩岸政策，五二○之後兩岸關係絕對會變壞，是不可能維持現狀的。

但是危機也會變成轉機，中共對台基本方針固然不會改變，但是政策靈活度和最高領導人的作風並非一成不變，兩岸只要建立起互信，還是可以創造雙贏，尤其是中共第五代領導人習近平大開大闔的作風，其實是兩岸關係的大好機遇。

例如，過去陸委會和國台辦的首長不可能互稱官銜，海協會會長陳雲林來台協商時，多次會見陸委會主委賴幸媛時，對賴只稱呼「你」或「幸媛」，就是不稱「主委」。

當時外界認為這是兩岸關係的一大障礙，難以克服。但是習近平主政後，對岸接受且稱呼陸委會主委的官銜了，這是外界意料不到的，也從此建立陸委會和國台辦首長的熱線電話。

再如，兩岸領導人會面，其實在江澤民和李登輝時代就一直想嘗試，但大陸始終認為國際場合不宜，一度傳出李江於是有登船在海峽中線會面的計畫。

但是，去年習近平同意在新加坡舉行馬習會，這也是習的重大突破，把新加坡解釋成第三地而非國際場合，也只有習的大開大闔作風才做得到。

還有，兩岸人民往來的便利措施，過去有人希望台灣人民去大陸就像回到自己的家一樣，不應每次都要簽證嘛。

這些聲音習近平聽進去了，在喊出「兩岸一家親」之後，習近平也展現魄力，實施台胞全面免簽。這些都讓我們看到習近平大開大闔勇於突破的性格。

希望準總統蔡英文及其支持者，美夢破碎後不必賭氣，要務實調整自己，在五二○就職演說中展現智慧，正視九二共識的核心內涵，對兩岸同屬一中、兩岸非國與國關係作出善意的回應，以習近平大開大闔的作風，兩岸關係會成為點亮台灣的助力而非阻力。

DPP Must Answer to Everyone, not just Deep Greens

DPP Must Answer to Everyone, not just Deep Greens
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 8, 2016

Executive Summary: Sad to say, the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulation draft bills presented by pan green legislators show that Political Correctness still trumps professionalism. They show pan green legislators have yet to rid themselves of old thinking. Before Tsai Ing-wen holds forth about a "national consensus", she must review the "DPP consensus" version. She must then propose a version of the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations that is acceptable to everyone.

Full Text Below:

The newly elected Legislative Yuan has convened. Now that the DPP has assumed control, the public is waiting to see what it intends to do. Will it show the public something new? Does it have the courage and ability to propose useful legislation? Sad to say, the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulation draft bills presented by pan green legislators show that Political Correctness still trumps professionalism. They show pan green legislators have yet to rid themselves of old thinking. The Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations will establish mechanisms for cross-Strait negotiations. They will determine how urgent cross-Strait economic and trade negotiations will be conducted. Whether they are blue or green, legislators must propose legislation that answers to all the people, not just a specific group of supporters.

The legislature lacks comprehensive rules for the review of bills pertaining to cross-Strait agreements. The Sunflower Student movement and other activist groups staged violent protests during deliberations over the Service Trade Agreement. They falsely accused the KMT of “black box operations”. The green camp then exploited these allegations during the legislative elections to win an overwhelming majority in the legislature. When the Legislative Yuan convened, NPP and DPP legislators proposed numerous Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulation draft bills designed to please deep green supporters.

Unfortunately, the draft law proposed by NPP and DPP legislators, demagogued the name of bill to pander to deep green supporters. This was contrary to the principle of proportionality. It violated the power of the executive and judiciary. If passed, it would make cross-Strait negotiations time consuming, uncertain, and virtually impossible. The bill would be more accurately described as the “Cross-Strait Non-Agreement Regulations”. Take for example, the Li Chun-yi version of the bill. It was entitled the "Taiwan and China Agreement Regulation” bill. It included the phrase “one China and one Taiwan”. The NPP version of the bill deliberately underscored the NPP's Taiwan independence stance. It referred to its bill as a “draft law regulating agreements between our country and the People's Republic of China". It referred to "bilateral agreements", without making any reference to either the “Republic of China” or any “Nation of Taiwan”. Instead it substituted “our country”. It was clearly intended as a slap in Beijing's face.

The bill sponsored by pan green legislators even called for the criminal prosecution of negotiators. Clearly they were pandering to a certain political constituency. The NPP version of the bill stipulated that the express consent of the Legislative Yuan was required in advance. Anyone who concluded an agreement with a foreign nation that harmed our national sovereignty, national territory, or international status, shall be subject to criminal prosecution and liable to imprisonment for seven years or more.

What constitutes "harming our sovereignty"? Taiwan currently uses certain working names when participating in international organizations. Do those count as harm to our "international status"? In fact, members of the legislature and the executive may conclude agreements with foreign nations. The legislature can then veto, revise, or restart negotiations. But it cannot prosecute the negotiators. Crimes both domestic and foreign, can be punishe according to the law. But the crude NPP version subjects our own negotiators to the "Flying Guillotine". One false move and heads could roll.

The most controversial aspect of legislative oversight is making the negotiation process transparent. The version proposed by pan green legislators requires cross-Strait negotiations before agreements may be signed. Those concluding the agreements must present a full report to the legislature, on as many as 11 items. The legislature may then amend, retain, or add riders. The legislature will then review the terms of the agreement line by line. They may veto the bill or restart negotiations. Only the pan green version subjects cross-Straits agreements to line item approval. If the MTA or STA is subject to line item approval, neither is likely to pass, even if legislators burn the midnight oil. Contrast this with the US government's fast track “Trade Promotion Authority”, or TPA. Congress may use this bill prior to negotiations to set the agenda and negotiation process. Afterwards however, it must vote up or down on a package deal. Efficiency is a consideration. So are lines between legislative and administrative authority.

The cross-Strait negotiation process should be transparent. But over-emphasis on transparency obviously works against us when negotiations require confidentiality. That amounts to prematurely showing our hand in a game of cards. Globalization makes trade negotiations difficult and time-consuming. Legislative oversight may conflict with efficient negotiations. Crisis resolution may be urgent. An appropriate balance must be struck between thoroughness and speed. Otherwise oversight regulations will only bind us hand and foot. They will lead to lost opportunities. They will deprive us of room to maneuver during negotiations.

The executive, legislative, and judicial branches must all abide by the principle of proportionality. Any legislation or regulation must be reasonable, fair, and proportionate. It must have a sound legal basis. It must be rational, both technically and socially. The legislative process must respect precedent. It must conform with jurisprudence. In achieving its purpose, it must be both feasible and efficient. Any law must be rational. It must maintain and promote society's values. The pan green draft version clearly violates all three principles.

Before Tsai Ing-wen holds forth about a "national consensus", she must review the "DPP consensus" version. She must then propose a version of the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations that is acceptable to everyone.

應向全民交代 而非深綠選民

2016年03月08日 中國時報

立法院新會期開議至今，國人都在期待，民進黨掌握國會方向舵後，能一新國人耳目，展現主導優質立法的氣魄和能力；然而，幾位泛綠立委提出的「兩岸協議監督條例」草案中，依然呈現以「政治正確」凌駕專業、不能擺脫慣性思維的舊文化。「兩岸協議監督條例」攸關兩岸協商機制的建立，更將決定兩岸迫切需要解決的經貿談判未來的命運。立委們不分藍綠，立法提案應該要為全民負責，而不是只求向特定的選民「交代」。

由於立法院關於兩岸協議的審議程序欠缺完整規範，致使服貿協議在立法院審議時，爆發「太陽花」學生和社運團體的激烈抗爭，泛綠陣營在本屆立委選舉打著「反黑箱協議」的旗幟，大舉搶占國會席次；因而立法院開議後，包括時代力量和民進黨多位立委紛紛提出「兩岸協議監督條例」草案，以具體行動回應支持者。

遺憾的是，時代力量和民進黨部分立委提出的草案，為向支持者交代，在法案名稱上、監督授權上大做文章；不但有違「比例原則」，更已侵犯行政權和司法權，將造成兩岸協商寸步難行、曠日費時且充滿不確定性，令人懷疑根本是「兩岸不協商條例」。譬如，李俊俋版「台灣與中國締結協議處理條例草案」隱含兩岸「一中一台」；時代力量版刻意加碼凸出台獨的立場，提出以「我國與中華人民共和國締結協議處理條例草案」、簡稱「兩國協議」，甚至不願接受中華民國又沒有台灣國號的情況下，以「我國」替代，實在唐突。

其次，針對兩岸協議的監督程序、授權乃至對談判人員祭出刑法追訴的手段等，顯然也是為滿足特定選民的「政治重口味」而設計。時代力量版明訂行政機關未經立法院同意，逕就影響我國主權之各項協議締結計畫進行協商或簽署協議，致生損害於我國領土、主權或國際地位者，參酌刑法私與外國訂約罪，最高處7年以上有期徒刑。

何謂「影響我國主權」？目前台灣採用變通的名稱參與國際組織算不算損害「國際地位」？事實上，依各國國會和行政部門關於對外締約和協議的審議規範，國會可以否決、更改、要求重啟談判，但鮮有入談判者於罪。何況關於內亂和外患罪，自可依刑法規定懲處，時代力量版這樣粗糙的規範形同對我方談判代表祭出「血滴子」，一不小心，人頭就會落地。

另外，在監督程序設計上，爭議最大的仍在如何讓談判透明化。泛綠立委版本要求兩岸協商在協議簽署前，締結協定機關必須提出締結計畫，向國會提出完整報告，其中有多達11項必要的報告事項；國會對締結計畫得以修正、保留、加附款；國會對協議進行逐條審查、否決、要求重啟談判。僅以泛綠版本要求兩岸協議採取逐條審查為例，不論是兩岸服貿或貨貿協議，採取逐條表決，恐怕挑燈夜戰也難以通過。對照美國的「快速授權法案」（TPA），雖然國會事前可利用該法案設定談判議題及目標授權、談判過程，但在事後也僅能包裹表決；除了效率的考量外，還有立法權和行政權應有的分際。

雖然兩岸協議過程透明化的立論正當且有其必要性，但如過度強調透明顯然將侵害我方談判應有的保密需求，形同談判前底牌就全亮光了。而且因應當前全球化熱點議題和經貿協商，經常是艱困而且耗費時日，在國會監督和維護談判效率、解決急迫危機間，也必須適切的平衡，否則，監督條例將反過來導致我方自縛手腳，喪失談判先機和必要的斡旋空間。

不論是行政、立法或司法的規定，都應遵循「比例原則」，任何立法或規範在其手段與所欲實現之目的間，皆應有合理、適當及公允之比例關係，且禁止過當、不成比例。國會立法必須要求法律理性、技術理性和社會理性，亦即立法手段之選案不得踰越現行法令或慣例，即法理之範圍；對目的之達成必須注意到技術的「可行性」以及該可行性的「效能」；最後，無論為何種選案，必須具備「理性」的特質，且為維持或促進社會價值的制度。從這三個原則檢視，泛綠版草案顯然都不符合。

蔡英文在談論「全民共識」之前，應趕快整合出「民進黨共識」，提出全民版的「兩岸協議監督條例」。

The Red and Green Trains are About to Collide

The Red and Green Trains are About to Collide
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 7, 2016

Executive Summary: How will the DPP's Tsai Ing-wen respond to Beijing? She has two options. One. Insist on "Taiwan's sovereignty and independence". Two. Make concessions to Beijing. The red and green camps are two freight trains about to collide head on. Two meetings on the Mainland have made clear that Beijing will not back down. Will the red and green trains run into each other head on? Or will one of the two swerve? The answer will be clear during Tsai's inauguration on 5/20.

Full Text Below:

When the Democratic Progressive Party was in the opposition, it obdurately opposed the 1992 Consensus and Two Sides, One China. Most of all it refused to relinquish Taiwan independence. But it is now the ruling party. It enjoys “total government”. It must now confront Beijing directly, on the front lines. This lands the DPP on the horns of a dilemma. If Tsai Ing-wen refuses to change her position, she must deal with Xi Jinping. If she accepts Beijing's cross-Strait political premise, she is admitting to the public on Taiwan that the DPP's twenty year long "struggle for Taiwan independence" was merely a way to deceive voters and seize political power, at which point the DPP's credibility will totally collapse.

Tsai Ing-wen realizes her dilemma. That is why before and after the election, she studiously adopted euphemistic rhetoric such as “maintain the status quo”, "uphold the Republic of China's existing constitutional framework", and "acknowledge that a meeting was held in 1992", to avoid touching hot button issues. She desperately hopes Beijing will relent, and cross-Strait relations will not revert to the past.

During two Mainland meetings, CPPCC Chairman Yu Zhengsheng and Premier Li Keqiang issued statements. General Secretary Xi Jinping attended delegate deliberations in Shanghai on cross-Strait relations. Xi set the tone with his "Ten Three Five Planning Outline" for the Taiwan issue. He completely dashed DPP hopes in that connection. Yu Zhengsheng said Beijing would continue promoting peaceful cross-Strait relations by adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwan independence.
 In Li Keqiang's "Government Work Report", he said "We must adhere to our major policies on Taiwan, to the 1992 Consensus as our political basis, resolutely oppose Taiwan independence separatism, safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and safeguard peaceful cross-Straits relations and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait". Li Keqiang made clear the legal ramifications of the 1992 Consensus, equating it with "safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity."

Xi Jinping's speech on future DPP rule clarified the Chinese Communist Party's Taiwan policy bottom line on DPP rule. It was the first time Xi Jinping addressed the Taiwan issue since the ROC presidential election. His was an important declaration. In his view, recognizing the historical reality of the 1992 Consensus and affirming its core meaning, will give the two sides a shared political basis, one that will maintain a constructive relationship. He vowed to "resolutely curb any form of Taiwan independence separatist activities, safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and prevent a secessionist historical tragedy. This is the common and steadfast aspiration of all Chinese people. It is also our our solemn commitment and responsibility to our history and our people." Xi Jinping's remarks confirmed that the core meaning of the 1992 Consensus is to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. He used words such as “desire”, “will”, “commitment”, and “responsibility” to underscore that determination. When Wang Yi addressed a United States think tank, he referred to "Their constitution". He was referring to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation represented by that constitution. He was not referring to divided sovereignty.

Chapter 55 of the "Ten Three Five Planning Outline" draft resolution calls for "promoting peaceful cross-Straits relations and the reunification process". From the very beginning it calls for adherence to the 1992 Consensus and the one-China principle, and resolute opposition to Taiwan independence. Based on a principled foundation, it calls for a mutually beneficial, win-win approach to cross-Strait cooperation, including economic cooperation, to promoting the welfare of compatriots on both sides, and consolidating and promoting peaceful cross-Strait relations".

Beijing continues invoking other terms related to cross-Strait relations. For example, the Taiwan Affairs section of this year's government work report, explicitly mentions for the first time "cross-Strait common destiny" and reaffirms "two sides, one family".

Xi Jinping first used the term "cross-Strait common destiny" during the 2013 Lien Xi summit. Xi Jinping referred to "cross-Strait common destiny" when he met with KMT Chairman Eric Chu in 2015. He
made a five-point proposal, of which the core substance was adherence to the 1992 Consensus, opposition to Taiwan independence, and recognition that the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China.

From the above speeches delivered by and documents penned by Xi, Li, and Yu, Beijing is issuing the DPP yet another reminder. For Beijing, the core content of the 1992 Consensus is the one China principle, opposition to Taiwan independence, and the indivisibility of China's sovereignty. This is the basis for peaceful cross-Strait relations. Without the 1992 Consensus, cross-Strait relations will be as Xi Jinping said, "Without solid foundation. The earth will move and the mountains will shake”. Naturally there would be no "cross-Strait common destiny" and "two sides, one family".

By now Beijing's position should be abundantly clear. For Beijing, "China's sovereign territory may not be divided" is the core of the 1992 Consensus. It is the basis for cross-Strait relations. It is the precondition for the two sides becoming a "community of destiny" and “two sides, one family”.

How will the DPP's Tsai Ing-wen respond? She has two options. One. Insist on "Taiwan's sovereignty and independence". Two. Make concessions to Beijing. The red and green camps are two freight trains about to collide head on. Two meetings on the Mainland have made clear that Beijing will not back down. Will the red and green trains run into each other head on? Or will one of the two swerve? The answer will be clear during Tsai's inauguration on 5/20.

紅綠兩列火車正迎面對駛

2016年03月07日 中國時報

民進黨在野期間可以堅決不承認「九二共識」，也反對「兩岸一中」，更不願意「放棄台獨」，但是獲得完全執政的民進黨，必須站在第一線面對北京，讓民進黨處於兩難之局。如不調整原有的立場，擋在她前面的是習近平；如果接受北京的兩岸論述，等於告訴台灣民眾，這二十多年民進黨有關「台獨」的主張，其實全是為了騙取政權的工具藉口而已，那麼民進黨從此誠信瓦解。

蔡英文不是沒有看出這個兩難的困境，因此，在選舉前後，蔡英文不斷用一些不觸及核心問題的修飾言詞，例如「維持現狀」、「中華民國現行憲政體制」、「九二事實」等，企圖能得到北京的理解，讓兩岸關係不至於全面倒退。

兩會期間，大陸政協主席俞正聲與國務院總理李克強的發言，特別是習近平總書記在參加上海代表團審議中關於對兩岸關係定調以及《十三五規畫綱要》有關台灣問題的文件，等於徹底斷絕了民進黨的期望。俞正聲在發言中表示：「要在堅持『九二共識』、反對『台獨』的政治基礎上，繼續促進兩岸關係和平發展」。李克強在《政府工作報告》稱：「我們要繼續堅持對台工作大政方針，堅持『九二共識』政治基礎，堅決反對『台獨』分裂活動，維護國家主權和領土完整，維護兩岸關係和平發展和台海和平穩定」。李克強的談話等於再為「九二共識」做了法律上更清晰的詮釋，即將其等同於「維護國家主權和領土完整」。

習近平的講話就更加明確向未來執政的民進黨亮出中共對台政策底線。這是台灣大選後，習近平有關台灣問題的首次談話，也是一次重要的宣示。他認為，承認「九二共識」的歷史事實，認同其核心意涵，兩岸就有共同政治基礎，就可以保持良性互動，並表示，「將堅決遏制任何形式的『台獨』分裂行徑，維護國家主權和領土完整，絕不讓國家分裂的歷史悲劇重演。這是全體中華兒女的共同心願和堅定意志，也是我們對歷史對人民的莊嚴承諾和責任。」習近平的談話，再次確認「九二共識」的核心內涵就是「維護國家主權和領土完整」，並以「心願、意志、承諾、責任」等言詞強調其決心。王毅在美國智庫演講所稱「他們的憲法」，也是指《憲法》所代表的「國家主權與領土的完整」，而不是分裂的主權。

至於《十三五規畫綱要》草案的第55章「推進兩岸關係和平發展和祖國統一進程」，一開始就提到「堅持『九二共識』和一個中國原則，堅決反對台獨。在堅持原則立場基礎上，以互利共贏方式深化兩岸經濟合作，擴大兩岸合作領域，增進兩岸同胞福祉，鞏固和推進兩岸關係和平發展。」

其他有關兩岸關係的用語，北京均延續以往用法，例如今年政府工作報告中對台工作部分，首次明確寫入「兩岸命運共同體」，並重提「兩岸一家親」。

「兩岸命運共同體」是習近平在2013年的「連習會」上首次提出。2015年習近平在與時任國民黨主席朱立倫會面時，就「兩岸命運共同體」提出五點主張，其中核心內涵就是：堅持「九二共識」、反對「台獨」、認同大陸和台灣同屬一個中國。

從以上習、李、俞三人的談話及文件內容來看，北京等於再次明確告訴民進黨，對於北京來說，「九二共識」的核心內涵就是「一個中國原則」及「反對台獨」，即「整個中國的主權不可以分裂」，這個原則也是兩岸關係是否能夠和平發展的基礎。如果沒有這樣的「九二共識」，兩岸關係就會如習近平所說的「基礎不牢、地動山搖」，自然不會有「兩岸命運共同體」與「兩岸一家親」。

北京的立場應該已經很清楚。以「整個中國主權領土不可分裂」為核心的「九二共識」是北京發展兩岸關係的基礎，也是兩岸能否成為「命運共同體」、「兩岸一家親」的前提。

現在要看民進黨的蔡英文如何回應，她似乎只有兩個選擇，一是堅持「台灣主權獨立」立場，二是向北京讓步。紅綠兩輛火車開始迎面對駛，兩會的相關發言表示北京不會退讓。紅綠兩列車最終是否會相撞或其中一輛最後選擇轉彎，520蔡英文就職之日就會有答案。

Tsai Ing-wen Has Yet to Consolidate Cross-Strait Relations

Tsai Ing-wen Has Yet to Consolidate Cross-Strait Relations
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 4, 2016

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen hopes for cross-Strait stability. But she remains short of her goal. She must be willing to change her position on the Ma Xi summit. In her inaugural speech, she must acknowledge the “one China” provision in the two sides' constitutions, thereby paving the way for a new cross-Strait legal foundation. Such a constitutional framework would become the most advanced expression of the 1992 Consensus, and the best option under current cross-Strait circumstances.

Full Text Below:

Mainland Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently raised the issue of constitutionality. He hoped Taiwan's newly elected authorities would abide by “their own constitution, which stipulates that the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one China". His statement provoked controversy on both sides sides of the Strait, as well as overseas. DPP officials believe this is unprecedented. They say this is the first time Mainland officials have not mention the 1992 Consensus. They think it is a goodwill gesture toward Tsai Ing-wen. They think it means they have accepted Tsai Ing-wen's pledge to uphold the constitutional framework of the Republic of China, in lieu of recognizing the 1992 Consensus. The deep green New Power Party on the other hand, insists that Beijing has not changed. It is still compelling Taiwan to accept the one China principle. MAC chairwoman Hsia Li-yan said, "We are pleased to see the Chinese mainland recognize our Constitution". The KMT continues to stand by the 1992 Consensus. It does not think Beijing has made any concessions to Tsai Ing-wen. Many non-blue and non-green observers think Beijing has implicitly recognized the "Republic of China Constitution", "ROC jurisdiction", “ROC constitutional democracy", and even the "Republic of China". Therefore the DPP must pay close attention to this message.

Similar debates have erupted in Washington. Douglas Paal is vice president of the Carnegie Peace Foundation. Paal noted that several months ago Tsai Ing-wen underscored the importance of the "existing ROC constitutional framework". To Paal, Wang Yi's remarks imply that so far Beijing finds her handling of "one China" and the "1992 Consensus" acceptable. He thinks Beijing is able to tolerate Tsai's statement of position. Alan Romberg is director of the East Asia program at the Henry L. Stimson Center. Romberg thinks that Wang Yi knows Tsai Ing-wen, motivated by  both pragmatism and principle, will not explicitly recognize the 1992 Consensus and oppose Taiwan independence. Wang Yi's willingness to accept Tsai Ing-wen's pledge to uphold the ROC Constitution, reflects Beijing's pragmatism. Richard Bush is director of the Brookings Institution Center for Policy Research on East Asia. Bush thinks that Wang said nothing new. He thinks that although Wang made no mention of the 1992 Consensus, Wang nevertheless alluded to the concept of the 1992 Consensus.

Mainland agencies charged with Taiwan affairs think that pan green, pan blue, and Washington think tanks are over-thinking the issue, and fail to grasp Beijing's bottom line. Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun and other think tank academics have refuted Wang Yi. Beijing has not abandoned the 1992 Consensus. It does not accept Tsai Ing-wen's lip service to “constitutional framework” or "existing ROC constitutional democracy" as substitutes for recognition of the 1992 Consensus. It even warns that "reading too much into the matter, could result in an explosion".

Wang Yi's remarks do indeed have meaning. But one must not read too much into them. Instead, we must follow the spirit of the Ma Xi summit. We must interpret cross-Strait political relations as “shared sovereignty and divided jurisdiction”. Only this can resolve cross-Strait disputes, and facilitate pragmatic cross-Strait relations. Unfortunately, the DPP has flatly rejected the consensus reaffirmed during the Ma Xi summit. The DPP will soon face complex economic and domestic issues. To stablize cross-Strait relations, it must make a breakthrough. Wang Yi showed how to achieve this breakthrough. The ROC Constitution is our link to Mainland China. Tsai Ing-wen must rethink her position on the Ma Xi summit. During her 5/20 inaugural address, she must offer a constitutional interpretation of cross-Strait relations that Beijing can accept -- one that can resolve the current impasse.

Last November, during the Ma Xi summit, President Ma told Mainland President Xi Jinping that “the Mainland authorities should acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China and the ROC Constitution”. Understandably, Xi Jinping expressed no opposition. During the Ma Xi summit, Xi Jinping was paving the way for Wang Yi, for “Constitutionally-based Cross-Strait Relations" foundation. He hoped to ascertain whether the two sides could establish a cross-Strait political framework rooted in their respective constitutions. He sought to create a more workable and stable platform.

The Mainland constitution has been amended several times. In 1949, there was the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). In 1954 and 1975, it was amended several times, to liberate all Chinese territories, including Taiwan. In 1978, the preamble was amended to read, "Taiwan is China's sacred territory, we must liberate Taiwan, to complete the great cause of reunification of the motherland". The constitutional amendment in 1982 did not mention the liberation of Taiwan. But it stipulated that, "Taiwan is the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. Completing the great cause of reunification of the motherland is the sacred duty of all Chinese, including our compatriots on Taiwan". It included the framework of Taiwan's legal and administrative system.

The “Republic of China Constitution" implemented on Taiwan in 1946 has been amended seven times. But it still stipulates that "both sides of the Strait are part of one China". It establishes the basic framework for national sovereignty and regulates cross-Strait exchanges. It constitutes a legal affairs and management system. Pan green attempts to define cross-Strait relations according to the "two states theory", are utterly inconsistent with the constitution.

Tsai Ing-wen hopes for cross-Strait stability. But she remains short of her goal. She must be willing to change her position on the Ma Xi summit. In her inaugural speech, she must acknowledge the “one China” provision in the two sides' constitutions, thereby paving the way for a new cross-Strait legal foundation. Such a constitutional framework would become the most advanced expression of the 1992 Consensus, and the best option under current cross-Strait circumstances.

穩定兩岸 蔡英文還差最後一哩路

2016年03月04日 中國時報

大陸外交部長王毅在華府提出「憲法說」，希望台灣新執政者接受「自己憲法規定的大陸、台灣同屬一個中國」的說法，引發兩岸內部、兩岸之間及國際的關切與論爭。民進黨人士大體認為，這是大陸官方首度「破天荒」不提九二共識，是對蔡英文釋出善意，接受了蔡回歸憲政體制的主張；深綠的時代力量卻認為，北京沒有改變，仍強逼台灣接受「一中原則」。陸委會主委夏立言則說，「若中國大陸能面對我們的憲法，我們樂觀其成」；國民黨繼續堅守九二共識，不認為北京對蔡英文已有所退讓；更多非藍非綠人士則認為，其中確實隱含了默認《中華民國憲法》、默認「中華民國管轄權」、默認「中華民國憲政民主」、甚至默認「中華民國」之意，民進黨應重視這個訊號。

類似的論爭也在華府出現，卡內基和平基金會副總裁包道格指出，對照蔡英文月前接受專訪時強調「中華民國現行憲政體制」等政治基礎，王毅的說法顯示北京認為至少到目前為止，這是技巧性的處理「一個中國」或「九二共識」議題較可接受的結果，他推測北京至少默許蔡英文的說法。史汀生中心東亞研究室主任容安瀾則認為，基於各種實際政治和原則性的原因，王毅了解蔡英文不會以直接方式接受九二共識和反對台獨，因此當王毅表示願意接受用「他們自己的憲法」處理時，反映了北京務實態度的重要部分。但布魯金斯研究所東亞政策研究中心主任卜睿哲卻認為，王毅的說法沒有太多新意，雖然沒有提到九二共識，但還是暗指九二共識的概念。

顯然大陸對台系統認為泛綠、泛藍或華府智庫對王毅的談話已過度引伸，並未掌握真正關鍵的訊息，國台辦主任張志軍及相關智庫學者紛紛澄清，否認王毅的說法代表北京放棄九二共識、接受蔡英文憲政體制說，也不認同所謂「默認中華民國憲政民主」；甚至警告「如果過度解讀，恐曇花一現」。

實際上，王毅的談話當然有其意義，但也不能過度解讀，而應該與馬習會所彰顯的兩岸「主權同源、治權分立」精神放在同一個脈絡解讀，才是化解兩岸爭議、打開兩岸關係務實而明亮之窗的機會。遺憾的是，民進黨卻對馬習會採取幾乎全然負面的評價。不過，民進黨執政後面對台灣千絲萬縷的經濟與內政問題，兩岸關係必須力求穩定，那就得設法創造突破的窗口。而王毅已經指出了這個窗口，就是中華民國憲法與中國的連結，蔡英文如願意重新評價馬習會，並在520就職演說中，為兩岸憲法關係提出北京能夠接受的詮釋和連結，當可化解僵局。

馬總統於去年11月馬習會中，曾向大陸國家主席習近平當面提及「中華民國、中華民國憲法，大陸方面應正視中華民國存在的事實」等論述，習近平並沒有做出反對的表示，可以理解，習近平早在馬習會時，就為王毅鋪墊了「兩岸憲法關係」的基礎，試探兩岸從各自的憲法架構中，構築兩岸關係政治基礎的可能性，希望有機會打造出更可行而且更穩定的平台。

中國大陸憲法幾經修正，從1949年的《中國人民政治協商會議共同綱領》開始，1954年、1975年幾次憲法修定都是以解放中國領土來概括台灣問題，直到1978年修定才在序言明定：「台灣是中國的神聖領土。我們一定要解放台灣，完成統一祖國的大業。」1982年的修憲雖然不再提解放台灣，但仍明定：「台灣是中華人民共和國的神聖領土的一部分。完成統一祖國的大業是包括台灣同胞在內的全中國人民的神聖職責。」並且據以架構出涉台法律和行政管理體系。

台灣實施1946年制定的《中華民國憲法》，雖然經過7次修訂，但依然建立在「兩岸同屬一中」的基本國家主權論述架構上，並據以構成規範兩岸交流事務的法律和管理體系。綠營企圖以「兩國論」方向來定位兩岸關係，完全不符合憲法規定。

蔡英文希望穩定兩岸，只差最後一哩路，只要她願意重新認識、評價馬習會，在就職演說中針對兩岸憲政體制在「一中」主權觀的接合點，為兩岸關係鋪墊出新的法理基礎，那麼，其憲政體制說將成為九二共識的進階版，將是當前兩岸關係特殊環境下的最佳選擇。

Does Loving Taiwan Require Hating the Mainland?

Does Loving Taiwan Require Hating the Mainland?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 3, 2016

Executive Summary: We have to ask, does “loving Taiwan” really require hating the Mainland? If one day Taiwan were to purge itself of all Chinese characteristics, would it really be better off? Clearly not. The modern world is permeated with Chinese elements. Taiwan society cannot immunize itself against Chinese characteristics. On the contrary, it must make maximum use of Chinese characteristics to become self-reliant. Hatred of the Mainland runs counter to global trends. It amounts to butting one's head against a stone wall, and is doomed to failure.

Full Text Below:

Outside observers are concerned about the future of cross-Strait relations. They worry not merely about the uncertainty that Tsai Ing-wen will bring. They worry that even if she is determined to improve relations between the DPP and the Mainland, the backlash from within her party and her supporters will render any such attempt stillborn. Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly pledged to maintain the status quo. She has offered the United States important guarantees. This suggests that Tsai Ing-wen has no desire to provoke cross-Strait hostilities. Tsai Ing-wen may not wish to raise cross-Strait tensions. But that does not mean her colleagues within the party agree. Still less does it mean her supporters are willing to change their minds.

In fact, a variety of uncoordinated movements have emerged. The New Power Party (NPP) is generally regarded as a DPP ally. The NPP opposes the DPP version of the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations. It adheres to the two-states theory, and rejects the DPP's revisionist path.

The NPP adheres to this position to attract supporters. It intends to gradually shift toward the center, where it can induce DPP supporters to defect. DPP allies are making moves on the party. DPP insiders are waiting to make their moves as well. Legislator Kao Chi-peng suddenly demanded the elimination of portraits of founding father Sun Yat-sen from government buildings. This clearly represents a new wave of de-Sinicization. It is an attempt to completely sever ties between Taiwan and the Republic of China, especially the “Chinese version of the Republic of China”.

Politicians naturally pander to voters. There is a market for radicalism. Expecting politicians to refrain from opportunism is wishful thinking. Therefore the most important question is how to change voter antagonism toward the Mainland. At one time government policy was “Retake the Mainland!” Now many sing the tune of “Taiwan independence”.  Many who now insist they were “Taiwanese” from birth, once admitted they were Chinese. They may not have wanted to sacrifice themselves to "save our Mainland compatriots”, but at least they did not consider people on the other side of the Strait any different from themselves.

The perceived differences between compatriots on the two sides is a consequence of authoritarian era policy. The government made people fearful of “Communist spies”. As a result, the perception that Mainland compatriots were the same as us became unreal, while the perception that they were different from us became real. Individual Mainlanders came to be seen as hated “Communist fellow travelers". Long term anti-Communist education and propaganda made the Mainland public, the Mainland government, and the Chinese Communist Party indistinguishable from one another. This directly affected follow-up cross-Strait exchanges, and public first impression of the Mainland.

For the public on the Mainland, this has become an unexpected calamity. They did nothing wrong, yet have been vilified as the enemy. They come to Taiwan on visits, never realizing they are "presumed guilty". No wonder the public on Taiwan feels indiscriminate hostility towards the Mainland. Later, with Taiwan's democratization, politicians held high the banner of “loving Taiwan”. They indoctrinated the public, making them think that in order to love Taiwan, they had to hate the Mainland, only that makes one a “brave Taiwanese”. If one compromise even slightly, then one does not “love Taiwan”, one is “selling out Taiwan”.  Never mind that compromise is merely cross-Strait interaction that improves cross-Strait relations. Never mind that both sides make concessions.

The perception is mistaken. Authorities on the two sides may have fought each other, but the public on the Mainland has never harmed the public on Taiwan. That is an indisputable fact. Cross-Strait differences are between governments and political parties are based on ideology and political interests. The people are not party to these disputes.

That is why the hatred so many people feel for the Mainland is absurd. The objects of their hatred never harmed them personally, yet they have become the targets of their own groundless accusations. This irrational atmosphere envelops Taiwan society today. Many people do not consider this attitude irrational. They think it means “loving Taiwan”, and “defending the Taiwan's dignity”. In order to prove themselves right, they cite the Mainland's demeaning of Taiwan's status in the international arena. This, they claim, justifies their hostility towards the Mainland.

Of course, Mainland officials demeaning Taiwan's status in the international arena does undermine Taiwan's dignity. We hope the Mainland can appreciate the importance of international status to the public on Taiwan. We hope it is willing to change old ways of thinking. But therein lies the problem. Why should ordinary people be blamed for what governments do in the international arena? After all, no one would attempt to justify the behavior of terrorists on such reasoning. This lack of discernment shows how blind their hatred for the Mainland is.

Hatred of the Mainland is not limited to hatred of the public on the Mainland. It  includes hatred of Mainland-related symbols. Even if the symbols are an integral part of Taiwan's history, they will not hesitate to purge it. The term "Republic of China" is one example. So is the term "founding father". Some extremists even advocate the abolition of the Mandarin dialect and Chinese characters, and the romanization of “Taiwanese”, i.e., the Minan dialect of China.

We have to ask, does “loving Taiwan” really require hating the Mainland? If one day Taiwan were to purge itself of all Chinese characteristics, would it really be better off? Clearly not. The modern world is permeated with Chinese elements. Taiwan society cannot immunize itself against Chinese characteristics. On the contrary, it must make maximum use of Chinese characteristics to become self-reliant. Hatred of the Mainland runs counter to global trends. It amounts to butting one's head against a stone wall, and is doomed to failure.

愛台灣一定要恨中國嗎？

2016年03月03日 中國時報

外界對未來的兩岸關係感到憂慮，恐怕不僅僅是擔心蔡英文執政後會帶來更多的不確定性，而是擔心即便她有心改進民進黨政府與大陸的關係，卻因為遭遇黨內和支持者的反彈而夭折。蔡英文三番兩次宣示要維持現狀，而且也對美方做出重要保證，這就意味著蔡英文自己並不想挑動兩岸的敏感神經。可是蔡英文不挑起兩岸紛爭，不表示她的黨內同仁不會，更不表示她的支持者願意改變。

事實上，各種不協調的動作已經開始出現，普遍被視為民進黨盟友的時代力量，針對民進黨版的「兩岸協議監督條例」，繼續堅持兩國論的兩岸定位，拒絕民進黨的修正路線。

時代力量之所以堅持既定立場，當然是看準可以吸引更多人支持，並讓自己跟漸漸調整到中道路線的民進黨有市場區隔。民進黨不僅黨外盟友蠢蠢欲動，黨內也有人伺機而動。立委高志鵬突然提案要求廢除懸掛國父孫中山先生遺像，這顯然是「去中國化」的新一波行動，是徹底斷絕台灣與中華民國，特別是中國版「中華民國」的連結。

政客作為當然是投選民所好，因為激進作法自有其市場、也有選票，寄望政客改變投機性格無異於天方夜譚，因此最重要的，還是如何解構選民對大陸的激進對抗情緒或心理特質。曾幾何時，台灣還在宣揚反攻大陸國策的時候，許多現在高唱台獨讚歌、自認為生來就是台灣認同的人們，其實也曾自認是中國人，就算不曾真正想為「解救大陸同胞」犧牲，起碼也不會將對岸人民視為不同於自己的人。

要說兩岸同胞間有差別心，那也是當時威權政府時刻警告人民要小心匪諜，使兩岸同胞「同」變得虛幻、「異」變得真實，因為個別的大陸人已被視為「中共同路人」而必須敵視。在長期的反共教育宣傳下，大陸人民、大陸政府或者中共，在人們的心中早就不加區分，這直接影響到後續兩岸交流漸趨啟動之際，台灣人民對大陸的第一印象。

對大陸人來說卻是無妄之災，自己什麼都沒做，就已經先被定性為敵方，要想到台灣參觀訪問從來也都是某種意義上的「有罪推定」，這也難怪台灣人民對大陸不加區別的心存敵意。再到後來台灣民主化啟動，政客高舉愛台灣的大旗，洗腦人民，讓人民以為要愛台灣，就要對抗大陸，做勇敢的台灣人。如果向大陸稍作妥協，就是不愛台灣、出賣台灣，哪怕妥協只是兩岸交流互動中，為了取得進展而必須為，更不管兩岸之間都在彼此讓步的事實。

這畢竟是錯誤的認知，無論兩岸官方如何爭鬥，大陸人民都不曾真正傷害過台灣人民，這是無可爭辯的事實，要說兩岸有分歧，那是政府和政黨基於意識型態、政治利益諸多考量的造成紛爭，與人民無涉。

也正因為此，許多台灣人時刻流露出的仇中反中思想才顯得荒謬，他們敵視的對象從未傷害過自己，卻被自己無端指責，這就是當下台灣社會瀰漫的一種近乎荒誕的情緒氛圍。當然，很多人並不這樣認為，因為他們自認為這是愛台灣，是為了捍衛台灣尊嚴。有人為了證明自己正確，就拿大陸在國際場合打壓台灣尊嚴，證明自己敵視大陸有理。

當然，大陸官方打壓台灣國際空間確實對台灣尊嚴造成傷害，我們也希望大陸能夠體諒台灣人民對國際空間和尊嚴的重視，願意改變舊思維。但這其中的問題在於，國際間的政府行為為何要人民買單？事實上，恐怖分子也常常拿西方國家侵犯他們的家園，來為他們的恐怖行徑做正當性的解釋，但恐怕沒有人會認為恐怖分子的罪行就可以因此得到寬恕。連起碼的事理都分辨不清，說明反中仇中者已經理盲到何種程度。

反中仇中的社會情緒不光是針對大陸人民，他們還針對許多與大陸有關的符號，甚至即使那也是台灣的一部分，他們也不惜一併清除乾淨。「中華民國」就是典型的例子，「國父」當然也不能除外，更有極端者主張廢除國語和中文字，改行台語和羅馬拼音。

我們不禁要問，愛台灣就真的必須敵視中國嗎？如果台灣有一天真的完全沒有了中國因素，台灣就會因此變得更好嗎？答案顯然是否定的，在全世界都充滿中國因素的時候，台灣社會不可能成為中國因素的免疫體。相反地，應該善用中國因素自強。反中仇中去中無異於逆世界潮流，其實也是以卵擊石、注定失敗。

Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement: New Disputes Arise

Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement: New Disputes Arise
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 2, 2016

Executive Summary: Earlier this year, the moment the Democratic Progressive Party won the election, Japan's attitude quickly changed. Japan knows that the DPP shares its hatred of Mainland China. Japan's fear that Taiwan might side with the Mainland against Japan has diminished dramatically. The Japanese know they need no longer offer concessions to Taiwan. As a result, during the ongoing Taiwan Japan Fisheries Agreement Committee meeting, the Japanese government has not merely refused to silence the Okinawan fishermen, it has deliberately used them as political bargaining tool against us.

Full Text Below:

The "Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement Committee",
which regulates Taiwan and Japanese fishing vessel operations, has convened a three day meeting in Taipei. This is the fifth such meeting convened since the “Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement" was signed three years ago, in April 2013. Past meetings have been low-keyed. This meeting however, is just the opposite. Okinawan fishermen are demanding that the Japanese government modify the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement. They hope to significantly shrink the area in which Chinese fishermen may operate. Fishermen from Taiwan are naturally unwilling to back down. They have demanded that the government protect their fishing rights, and refuse to compromise.

The talks were originally purely technical in nature. But they have escalated into a confrontation between the two nations' fishermen, not because the times have changed, but because the political climate has changed. Fishermen from Okinawa are demanding that the area that Taiwan fishermen may operate be reduced. They are relentless. They were never this strident in the past. Their demands have filled the meeting room with the unmistakable odor of gun smoke and political calculation.

The Japanese government has long attempted to cozy up to Taiwan, in order to discourage us from joining forces with the Mainland against Japan over the Diaoyutai Islands dispute. It ignored the interests of Okinawan fishermen and signed the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement. Once the agreement was signed, large numbers of Taiwanese fishing vessels took to the open sea. The Japanese government silenced Okinawan fishermen, preventing them from undermining relations between Taiwan and Japan. Political considerations overrode economic interests.

Earlier this year, the moment the Democratic Progressive Party won the election, Japan's attitude quickly changed. Japan knows that the DPP shares its hatred of Mainland China. Japan's fear that Taiwan might side with the Mainland against Japan has diminished dramatically. The Japanese know they need no longer offer concessions to Taiwan. As a result, during the ongoing Taiwan Japan Fisheries Agreement Committee meeting, the Japanese government has not merely refused to silence the Okinawan fishermen, it has deliberately used them as political bargaining tool against us.

Under the circumstances, the government must demand adherence to existing provisions in the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement, and defend our fishing rights. At the technical level, it must also demand the establishment of a "Fishing Gear Recovery Mechanism" to protect the interests of our fishermen. This will prevent fishing disputes from undermining diplomatic relations.

First, we must uphold the existing Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement. This will protect our existing fishing rights and fisheries. The Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement enabled our fishing vessels to operate in waters north of Pachungshan. That area is a traditional fishing ground for Taiwan fishermen. Every fishing season, from April to August, as many as 300 of our fishing vessels register for access to these waters, far more than the 100 fishing boats from Japan. Clearly our fishermen are highly active. But large numbers of our fishing vessels in waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands have made Okinawan fishermen feel victimized.

Since 2013, Okinawan fishermen have cited conservation of natural resources as their reason for their relentless appeals to the Japanese government. They hope to increase the distance between fishing vessels, from two nautical miles to four nautical miles, in order to effectively manage the area's fisheries resources. But increasing the spacing between fishing vessels will affect our fishing rights. The government must argue this point, and must not compromise.

Next, we must establish a Fishing Gear Recovery Mechanism to protect our fishermen. According to the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement, the area that the Japanese government opened up for our fishing vessels is not very large. When trawlers release their nets, the nets frequently extend out more than three miles. The slightest mistake and the nets drift into prohibited fishing areas. The Japanese government fines our fishing vessels up to 30 million Yen, or 10 million NT in fines. The loss to our fishermen is substantial.

Our government must bargain hard with the Japanese side. It must establish a Fishing Gear Recovery Mechanism that enables our vessels to enter no-fishing zones unharmed in order to recover our fishing nets. It must urge the Japanese government to reduce the unreasonably high fines, to avoid excessive losses to our fishermen.

Defending our fishing rights is of course a non-partisan task. Unfortunately the current fisheries coordination meeting coincides with the handover of presidential power. The DPP invariably questions and obstructs anything the Ma government tries to do. It invariably sees everything as a conspiracy and does its utmost to interfere. Its attitude will do more harm than good during Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement talks. We call on the DPP to cease its obstructionism and reach unanimous agreement on this issue. Otherwise, the next time a Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement meeting is convened, the onus will be on the DPP.

台日漁業協議：空窗期下的新紛爭

2016-03-02聯合報

規範台日兩國漁船作業規則的「台日漁業協議委員會」，今起在台北召開三天，這是繼二○一三年四月「台日漁業協議」簽署以來，雙方所召開的第五次協調會議。對照過去會議的低調，這次卻出現對立之聲：沖繩漁民日前要求日本政府修改「台日漁業協議」，大幅限縮我國漁民在此海域捕魚的適用範圍；台灣漁民對此當然寸步不讓，要求政府積極維護我國漁權，絕不能退讓。

原本單純的技術性談判，卻演成兩國漁民的對立，並非因為時空移易，而在政治氛圍的轉變。沖繩漁民要求限縮漁場的呼聲其來有自，不曾停歇，然從未像這次這樣被刻意放大。這不僅使此次會議瀰漫著硝煙味，也讓談判沾染上濃濃政治色彩。

過去日本政府為了拉攏台灣，避免我國與中國大陸在釣魚台問題上聯手，權衡之下，遂不顧沖繩漁民的利益，逕與台灣簽署「台日漁業協議」。在協議通過後，台灣漁船大量進入開放海域捕魚時，它也極力壓制沖繩漁民的反對聲浪，唯恐台日關係受到影響。這是政治考量凌駕經濟的利益。

今年初民進黨勝選之後，日方的態度卻幡然改觀。主要是，日方認為民進黨與日本擁有相同的「反中」基因，日本以往擔憂兩岸聯手的疑慮，自然大為減緩，故日本即不必再對台灣積極「讓利」。於是，在這次的台日漁業委員會當中，日本政府不但不壓制沖繩漁民的反對聲音，反而刻意放大，把他們當成對我方討價還價的政治工具。

面對這種局勢，我們認為，政府在主權層面不但要堅持現有「台日漁業協議」的底線，以保障我國的漁權；在技術層面，更要進一步與日本建立「漁具回收機制」，以捍衛我國漁民的權益，也可以避免台日外交因為漁業糾紛而再生紛爭。

首先，要維持現有「台日漁業協議」的架構，以保障我國的既有漁權與漁場。在「台日漁業協議」開放我國漁船進入八重山北方海域捕魚之後，由於該海域長期以來便是台灣漁民的傳統漁場，因此，在每年四月至八月漁汛期間，我國登記進入該海域捕魚的漁船，每年平均多達三百艘，遠多於日本的一百艘，可見我漁民之積極。但我漁船大量進入釣魚台的海域捕魚，自然讓沖繩漁民有相對剝奪感。

因此，從二○一三年以來，日本沖繩漁民便以自然資源保育為理由，多次向日本政府建議，希望能夠放寬漁船的間距，從現行的兩海里擴大到四海里，以便有效管理該海域的漁業資源。但是漁船間距的擴大，卻會影響我國漁船到此海域捕魚的權益，對此，政府應該要據理力爭，不應對此妥協。

其次，要建立「漁具回收機制」，以保障我國漁民的權益。依照「台日漁業協議」的規範，日本政府開放我國漁船作業的海域並不大，而漁船的拖網一放，又動輒長達三十海里；這常常造成我國漁船在作業期間，稍一不慎，拖網便會漂流到禁止捕魚區。日本政府對於我國漁船的漁具越界，往往課以高達三千萬日圓（約台幣一千萬元）的罰鍰，漁民損失不貲。

對此，我國政府應積極與日方協商，建構「漁具回收機制」，讓我國漁船能夠無害進入禁止捕魚區，回收拖網。同時也應促使日本政府降低不合理的高額罰鍰，以避免我國漁民蒙受重大損失。

捍衛台灣漁權，當然是不分黨派的任務。問題在，這次台日漁業協調會議召開之時，正逢我國政權交接的空窗期，民進黨對於馬政府的施政，凡事都要過問與杯葛，以「陰謀論」的想法干擾其作為；這樣的態度，對於台日漁業談判，恐怕有害無益。我們呼籲，民進黨應揚棄扯後腿的心理，在此議題上抱持共識一致對外；否則，下次的台日漁業協議，難保不成為民進黨執政的大包袱。