Peace, Reunification, and the Chinese People: Three Antidotes for Taiwan's Crisis
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 22, 2016
Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen and the ruling DPP regime need to realize that hate is a poison, born of mutual deception. Hatred of Mainland China will eventually force the Mainland to hate Taiwan. The hatred incited on Taiwan today, will be reciprocated in kind tomorrow by the Mainland, and push Taiwan inexorably toward the abyss. As the party in power, the DPP should be happy to see the KMT help Taiwan extricate itself from its threefold dilemma. “The Chinese people”. How long has it been since we have heard these words? Only "Chinese people helping Chinese people" can extricate Taiwan from its predicament.
Full Text Below:
Taiwan was once one of the “Four Asian Tigers". It created an "economic miracle". It was a "beacon of democracy". But everyone on Taiwan, with the exception of a few willfully blind, willfully deaf politicians, knows that Taiwan now faces marginalized on the world stage, enmity from the other side of the Strait, and social divisions from within. If it continues on its current course, Taiwan will eventually lose everything it has. It will even suffer the indignity of being reunified by force.
The most serious crisis facing Taiwan is cross-Strait relations. Fortunately it is the crisis most easily remedied. In fact, a former president proposed a solution to the cross-Strait crisis 20 years ago, during his inaugural address. His address has been touted as the most enlightened in two decades. During his address, he said historical factors may have led to divided rule, but both sides of the Strait nevertheless seek national reunification as their goal. Only through sincerity and patience, through communications, through the seeking of common ground while shelving differences, can the two sides resolve the problem of national reunification, and ensure the common good of the Chinese nation as a whole.
He said the two sides of the Strait must end hostilities in order to facilitate national reunification. He said peace and tolerance is the only way to defuse confrontation and hatred. The former president's inaugural address invoked many current catchphrases, including “peace, tolerance, national reunification, the Chinese people, an end to hostilities”, and “overcoming hatred”.
The former president was of course Lee Teng-hui. In 1996, during his inauguration, he issued his "Promote a Great Taiwan, Establish a New Chinese Nation" proclamation. Even the title was praised as "lofty in its sentiment, extraordinary in its courage". But soon afterward "national reunification" became a taboo expression. Even "peace agreements" were denounced as "selling out Taiwan", as part of an "evil agenda".
Any president today who echoed Lee Teng-hui's "Promote a Great Taiwan, Establish a New Chinese Nation" inaugural speech would immediately be crucified on Facebook. The presidential palace would be besieged by mobs of students. Talking heads would hold him up to ridicule. They would conclude that he no longer wanted to be president, and was intent on committing political suicide.
If this speech by Lee Teng-hui from 20 years ago, were delivered today, it would obviously be deemed Politically Incorrect. In fact, the first person to leap forward and denounce this speech as “selling out Taiwan”, the first person to cast a stone, would be none other than Godfather of Taiwan Independence Lee Teng-hui himself. But set aside Politic Correctness for the moment. Return to the reality of the three crises facing Taiwan. Is this inaugural speech, which today seems so Politically Incorrect, factually incorrect? Are not the ringing sentiments expressed in this speech in fact the remedy for Taiwan's marginalization in the world today, for the enmity between the two sides of the Strait, and for the social divisions tearing Taiwan apart from within?
If so, why must we be held hostage by Political Correctness? Why can't “Chinese people help Chinese people". Why can't they acknowledge that they are members of the same family? Why can't people on the two sides be friends? Why can't people on the two sides benefit from their association and pursue a brighter future? If this is not wrong, our course of action should crystal clear.
The two sides have been isolated from each other for some time. Nevertheless the two sides' political, cultural, social, economic links have never truly bee broken. People on Taiwan and people on the Mainland have never had any real grievances with each other. Current opposition and hatred of Mainland China is the result of political manipulation. Young people in particular, never experienced the Chinese Civil War. They don't realize that this hate is the result of "mutual vilification". It is a remnant of history. Much of today's emotionalism is a legacy of the Chinese Civil War. It is hatred between regimes, not hatred among people.
Cross-Strait hatred is a legacy of KMT vs. CCP history. An end to enmity can only be achieved by the enemies themselves. The KMT and CCP are the ones who must put an end to the enmity. Hung Shiu-chu should meet with Xi Jinping and issue a joint declaration. The two parties should declare an end to hostilities. They should declare an end to the Chinese Civil War. Hung should pledge that upon a KMT return to power, she will promote the normalization of cross-Strait relations, the rule of law, and the concept of Chinese people helping Chinese people. When the Kuomintang was in office, it lacked courage. Now it has been reduced to a feeble opposition party. If it still cannot muster the courage to defy Political Correctness, if it still lacks the fortitude to uphold National Correctness, Taiwan Correctness, and Cross-Strait Correctness, what chance does it have of returning to office?
Tsai Ing-wen and the ruling DPP regime need to realize that hate is a poison, born of mutual deception. Hatred of Mainland China will eventually force the Mainland to hate Taiwan. The hatred incited on Taiwan today, will be reciprocated in kind tomorrow by the Mainland, and push Taiwan inexorably toward the abyss. As the party in power, the DPP should be happy to see the KMT help Taiwan extricate itself from its threefold dilemma.
“The Chinese people”. How long has it been since we have heard these words? Only "Chinese people helping Chinese people" can extricate Taiwan from its predicament.
真道理性真愛台灣》社論－台灣三危解藥 和平、統一、中國人
2016年06月22日 04:10 主筆室
今日的台灣，除了一些蒙眼裝瞎、遮耳扮聾的政客外，有識之士無不清楚看見，曾是「亞洲小龍」、曾創造「經濟奇蹟」、曾被譽為「民主燈塔」的台灣，正面對在世界舞台邊緣化、兩岸關係對立化、社會內部撕裂化三危之局，如果繼續無所作為，台灣將一步一步走向滿盤皆輸，甚至淪為沒有尊嚴的被統一局面。
其中，最關鍵危局在兩岸，三個危局中最可解者也是在兩岸。其實早就有一位前總統，在就職演說中提出過兩岸危局的解方，這篇就職演說堪稱台灣20年來最有高度與氣度的演說。在這篇就職演說中，他指出，海峽兩岸因為歷史因素隔海分治，乃是事實；但是海峽雙方都以追求國家統一為目標，也是事實。兩岸唯有面對這些事實，以最大的誠意與耐心，進行對談溝通，化異求同，才能真正解決國家統一的問題，謀求中華民族的共同福祉。
他說，海峽兩岸都應該正視處理結束敵對狀態這項重大問題，以便為追求國家統一的歷史大業，做出關鍵性的貢獻。他說，我們深信，和平寬容是化解對立仇恨的唯一手段。這位前總統的就職演說，使用了許多今日看來仍然是打開兩岸死結、為台灣衝出生路的關鍵字：和平寬容、國家統一、中國人及結束敵對、化解仇恨等。
這位前總統的名字叫李登輝，這是他在1996年就職總統時發表的演說「經營大台灣，建立新中原」，連演說的標題都可謂「豪情萬丈、氣魄非凡」。然而曾幾何時，「國家統一」變成了不可說的「禁忌」，連談「和平協議」都變成「賣台」「邪議」。
今日此時若有哪一位總統，敢把李登輝這篇「經營大台灣，建立新中原」的就職演說拿出來照念，大概立刻就會被網路鄉民灌爆臉書，總統府前可能馬上圍聚大批學生想要衝進去，媒體名嘴也會齊出訕笑，認為這位總統當得不耐煩了，想要政治自殺。
20年前李登輝這篇演說若今日重現，注定是政治不正確，而且會第一個跳出來痛批這篇演說是賣台言論、會丟出第一個石頭的，應該就是號稱台獨教父的李登輝。但讓我們放下所謂「政治正確」局限，回到台灣面對的三危局現實，好好想想，今日看來如此「政治不正確」的這篇就職演說，真的那麼不正確嗎？難道這篇演說裡句句鏗鏘的主張，不是台灣今日在世界邊緣化、在兩岸對立化、在台灣撕裂化，解救三疾齊發的一帖對症處方嗎？
如果是，那麼為什麼我們要被「政治正確」綁架，為什麼不能以「中國人幫中國人」一家親的高度，讓兩岸人民可以立足於友好善意，追求兩岸同利共榮的光明未來？如果大家認為這些方向沒錯，那麼，接下來，台灣該做的事就非常清楚而明白了。
兩岸政治雖然長期隔絕，兩岸民眾的文化、社會、經濟連結卻未真正斷絕，台灣人與大陸人從來沒有冤仇，眼前社會充斥的「反中」與「仇中」情緒都是政治操控的結果。尤其年輕人不曾走過兩岸烽火那段歷史，不知道仇恨是一種「相互醜化」的歷史遺留，今天很多的情緒是國共內戰遺留下來的，那是「政權間的仇恨」，不是「人民間的仇恨」。
兩岸的仇恨是國共兩黨的歷史遺留，解仇還需結仇人，國共兩黨理當率先笑泯恩仇，洪秀柱與習近平不妨會面並共同發表宣言，實現兩黨結束敵對，藉此宣示國共內戰的歷史終結，並承諾執政後將推動兩岸關係的正常化與法制化、中國人幫助中國人的社會認知。國民黨執政時沒有勇氣，現在淪為弱勢的在野黨，若還不拿出抗拒政治正確的勇氣，以大格局堅持國家正確、台灣正確、兩岸正確，豈有機會再起？
握有政權的蔡英文與民進黨更要知道，仇恨是一種「互相矇蔽」的歷史毒藥，今天台灣煽起的仇中，都是讓明日大陸醞釀仇台的種子，那將把台灣推向不可逆的深淵。身為執政者當有氣度樂見國民黨側翼幫助台灣脫離三危困境。
中國人，好久不見的三個字，唯有開創「中國人幫中國人」新局，台灣才能走出困局。
Tuesday, June 21, 2016
Monday, June 20, 2016
End KMT-CCP Hostilities, Create New Cross-Strait Opportunities
End KMT-CCP Hostilities, Create New Cross-Strait Opportunities
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 20, 2016
Executive Summary: A KMT that finds itself in the opposition need not belittle itself. It must have courage. It must be determined to prove its worth to the Taiwan public. If the KMT and CCP can make peace, then a KMT CCP forum makes sense, and a Hong Hsiu-chu-Xi Jinping has value. If the KMT can take this step, history will affirm it, and people will remember it. This may be the only way the KMT can return to power.
Full Text Below:
Ma Ying-jeou was in office for eight years. During that time his cross-Strait policy was "one China, different interpretations”, "no reunification, no Taiwan independence", "maintain the status quo", and “economics not politics”. This policy failed to end the 60 year long civil war between the two sides. It failed to create a stable framework for lasting cross-Strait peace and mutual trust.
Private sector interactions without a peace agreement are destined to remain unstable. Cross-Strait relations without mutual trust are destined to remain fragile. Ma Ying-jeou governed for eight years. Cross-Strait relations ended where they began. The party was over, and the guests went home. Worse still, Ma allowed the green camp to paint him as a cross-Strait pimp, “pandering to China and selling out Taiwan”. The result was eventual defeat and loss of power. This is Ma Ying-jeou's place in history. Put nicely, he was a well-meaning bungler. Put less nicely, he rejected heaven's mandate, only to receive heaven's retribution.
Over the past eight years, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party's cross-Strait rhetoric has not evolved. The party still clings to separatism. But once it felt assured of victory, even before the election, Tsai Ing-wen began parroting the KMT. She began talking about “maintaining the status quo". She substituted the "1992 spirit", the "facts of 1992", and the "acknowledgement of 1992" to win Beijing's approval. Beijing ignored her. As a result, some DPP members want this year's Party Congress to replace the “Taiwan independence party platform” with "maintain the status quo". But these expedients were rendered moot when the new Minister of Education issued an executive order repealing any and all corrections to the public school history texts.
The DPP's refusal to correct the public school history texts betrays the party's overeagerness. In fact, the original history texts featured "one version of history for each side". The so-called "fine tuning of the course curriculum” did not change this structure. It merely modified a few terms and added a few historical facts. Nevertheless the DPP considered it intolerable, and demanded immediate rejection. Ironically, this move touched Beijing's most sensitive nerve, namely the DPP's "cultural Taiwan independence", the instrument by which the DPP advances "soft Taiwan independence" and "creeping Taiwan independence".
The DPP's "cultural Taiwan independence" will make trust between the DPP and CCP over the next four years utterly impossible. Mainland intelligentsia are now concerned that “We will eventually lose Taiwan". They have concluded that the public on Taiwan no longer supports the Mainland's traditional arguments for reunification. Taiwan's rapid alienation from the Mainland also makes peaceful reunification virtually impossible. Therefore only military force can prevent a split between the two sides.
Cross-Strait developments truly are worrisome. The DPP cannot possibly accept the 1992 Consensus, which demands that the two sides be reunited. Beijing cannot possibly accept "cultural Taiwan independence" and allow Taiwan independence sentiment to reach a point of no return. Fundamental contradictions in political stance make trust between the DPP and CCP impossible. That means that over the next four years cross-Strait relations will be plagued by anxiety, even war.
At such a time the opposition Kuomintang's responsibility is greater than ever, even greater than when it was in office. It must make Beijing feel that peaceful cross-Strait relations are still possible. It must let the public on Taiwan know that only the KMT can prevent cross-Strait war. The situation is similar to what it was in 2005. Without the Lien-Hu summit and the five-point consensus, it is difficult to imagine how cross-Strait relations could have successfully survived the late Chen Shui-bian era.
When the KMT was in office, the China Times called on the KMT and CCP to jointly announce an end to hostilities or issue a declaration of peace. The two governments could then legally end the civil war. But in a democracy the ruling party's political position is not necessarily the government's. Such an action by the Kuomintang would not have been appropriate. Now however, the Kuomintang is in the opposition. It can reach a consensus with the CCP on the two sides' political status. The two parties can even sign a declaration of peace, and propose a framework for continued cross-Strait peace.
The KMT must have the courage to make peace. Can the KMT and CCP complete the above mentioned transactions? If they can, then the KMT, Taiwan, and both sides of the Strait can enjoy an historic breakthrough. First, the KMT can fundamentally distinguish its cross-Strait policy from the DPP's. Ma Ying-jeou's "one China, different interpretations", and "maintaining the status quo" served its purpose. In the wake of the Sunflower Student Movement, it is obsolete. Now that Tsai Ing-wen is spouting "maintaining the status quo" along with the KMT, the catechism has lost its rhetorical value. A KMT in the opposition must offer a whole new cross-Strait strategy. Only then can it justify its continued existence. Second, Mainland intelligenstia have lost confidence in peaceful reunification. They now think military reunification may be unavoidable. If the KMT and the CCP can reach a consensus to legally end the civil war, continued peace may still be possible. This would be the KMT's contribution to Taiwan. Third, if the KMT and the CCP can take the first step toward legally ending the civil war, the DPP may decide to follow. Only then can an official cross-Strait peace treaty become a reality.
A KMT that finds itself in the opposition need not belittle itself. It must have courage. It must be determined to prove its worth to the Taiwan public. If the KMT and CCP can make peace, then a KMT CCP forum makes sense, and a Hong Hsiu-chu-Xi Jinping has value. If the KMT can take this step, history will affirm it, and people will remember it. This may be the only way the KMT can return to power.
真道理性真愛台灣》社論－國共結束敵對 開創兩岸新機會
2016年06月21日 04:10 主筆室
馬英九執政8年，以「一中各表」、「不統不獨」、「維持現狀」定位兩岸關係，使得兩岸關係「只經不政」，既沒有結束長達60多年法理內戰狀態，解除兩岸敵對狀態；也沒有為兩岸創造穩定安全的和平架構，建立真正的互信與永遠的和平。
缺少和平結構的民間互動絕不穩定，沒有互信的兩岸關係必然脆弱，馬英九執政8年的兩岸關係最終落得人走茶涼、人去政息，還讓國民黨背上傾中賣台、兩岸掮客惡名，終至慘敗，失去政權。這就是馬英九在兩岸關係上的歷史定位，說得好聽些是「為德不卒」，說得嚴苛點是「天予不取、反受其咎」。
這8年以來，在野的民進黨在兩岸論述上也沒有進展，仍維持其分離主義的立場。但是在自認即將贏得選舉前與取得勝選後，蔡英文也牙牙學語跟著國民黨喊「維持現狀」，改用「九二精神」、「九二事實」、「九二認知」等修飾語，期盼獲得北京的認可。看到北京沒有正面回應，一些著急的民進黨員甚而希望在今年全代會中，以「維持現狀」來取代以往的台獨黨綱及相關決議文。不過，這些權宜之計，因為新任教育部長一紙廢除課綱微調的行政命令後已全部破功。
廢除課綱微調，暴露了民進黨過於急切的企圖。原有的課綱其實已是「一邊一史」的結構，所謂「課綱微調」並沒有撼動原有的結構，只是一些用語的調整、史實的增加而已。即使如此，民進黨仍然難以忍受，要去之而後快。但是此一行為恰恰觸動到北京最敏感的神經，坐實了民進黨以「文化台獨」為工具，走一條「柔性台獨」與「穩健台獨」的道路。
民進黨的「文化台獨」作為，使得未來4年民共之間幾乎不可能建立互信。大陸知識界已有「我們終將失去台灣」的警語，認為大陸傳統的統一論述已經無法再得到台灣人民的支持，台灣對大陸認同的快速疏離也使得「和平統一」幾乎已經絕望，因而出現唯有武力才能促使兩岸不分裂的「武統」言論。
兩岸的發展的確讓人憂心忡忡。民進黨不可能接受在本義上兩岸不可永久分裂的「九二共識」，北京也不會輕易地讓「文化台獨」成為一條不歸路。立場上的根本矛盾使得民共之間不可能建立互信，這也使得蔡英文政府未來4年的兩岸關係注定不安，衝突的可能也並非全無。
此時在野的國民黨，責任較執政時期更為重要，一方面要讓北京感覺到兩岸和平發展的機會仍然存在，另一方面要讓台灣民眾了解，國民黨有能力讓兩岸關係避免衝突。其情形類似於2005年的情景，如果沒有當時的連胡會及五點共識，我們很難想像，兩岸關係如何能夠平穩地度過陳水扁後期的兩岸敏感期。
國民黨執政期間，《中國時報》曾呼籲國共兩黨應率先宣布結束敵對狀態，或共同發表和平宣言，為兩岸政府未來結束法理內戰創造條件。但是，基於民主責任政治原則，執政黨的立場與行為必須與政府一致，當時由國民黨採先行主張並不適當。不過，既然國民黨現在已經在野，可以嘗試與共產黨就兩岸應有的政治定位達成共識，甚而簽署和平宣言，提出兩岸和平發展應有的框架。
國民黨要有勇氣創造和平。如果國共兩黨能夠完成上列重大事務，對國民黨、台灣及兩岸均是一大突破與貢獻。第一、對國民黨而言，可以在兩岸論述及政策上與民進黨做出根本性的區隔。馬英九的「一中各表」、「維持現狀」論述，在太陽花運動以後已經失去其階段性的功能。在蔡英文也提出「維持現狀」後，國民黨基本上也不再享有論述的優勢。在野的國民黨必須要創造兩岸和平論述，才有存在的價值。第二、對台灣而言，大陸的知識界已經開始對「和平統一」失去信心，視「武統」為可能的必要選擇。國共兩黨如果能夠就結束法理內戰達成共識，和平發展的聲音將不致成為絕響，這是國民黨對台灣的貢獻。第三、對兩岸而言，國共兩黨能夠往結束法理內戰跨出第一步，民進黨才有可能認真思考是否要跟進，官方的兩岸和平協議也才有簽署的可能。
在野的國民黨切勿妄自菲薄，應當勇敢向台灣人民證明國民黨存在的價值。從國共兩黨共同創造和平這個角度出發，國共論壇才有意義，洪習會也才有價值。國民黨如果能夠成功地跨出這一步，歷史會正面評價，人民也不會忘記，這或許才是國民黨重返執政的必由之路。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 20, 2016
Executive Summary: A KMT that finds itself in the opposition need not belittle itself. It must have courage. It must be determined to prove its worth to the Taiwan public. If the KMT and CCP can make peace, then a KMT CCP forum makes sense, and a Hong Hsiu-chu-Xi Jinping has value. If the KMT can take this step, history will affirm it, and people will remember it. This may be the only way the KMT can return to power.
Full Text Below:
Ma Ying-jeou was in office for eight years. During that time his cross-Strait policy was "one China, different interpretations”, "no reunification, no Taiwan independence", "maintain the status quo", and “economics not politics”. This policy failed to end the 60 year long civil war between the two sides. It failed to create a stable framework for lasting cross-Strait peace and mutual trust.
Private sector interactions without a peace agreement are destined to remain unstable. Cross-Strait relations without mutual trust are destined to remain fragile. Ma Ying-jeou governed for eight years. Cross-Strait relations ended where they began. The party was over, and the guests went home. Worse still, Ma allowed the green camp to paint him as a cross-Strait pimp, “pandering to China and selling out Taiwan”. The result was eventual defeat and loss of power. This is Ma Ying-jeou's place in history. Put nicely, he was a well-meaning bungler. Put less nicely, he rejected heaven's mandate, only to receive heaven's retribution.
Over the past eight years, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party's cross-Strait rhetoric has not evolved. The party still clings to separatism. But once it felt assured of victory, even before the election, Tsai Ing-wen began parroting the KMT. She began talking about “maintaining the status quo". She substituted the "1992 spirit", the "facts of 1992", and the "acknowledgement of 1992" to win Beijing's approval. Beijing ignored her. As a result, some DPP members want this year's Party Congress to replace the “Taiwan independence party platform” with "maintain the status quo". But these expedients were rendered moot when the new Minister of Education issued an executive order repealing any and all corrections to the public school history texts.
The DPP's refusal to correct the public school history texts betrays the party's overeagerness. In fact, the original history texts featured "one version of history for each side". The so-called "fine tuning of the course curriculum” did not change this structure. It merely modified a few terms and added a few historical facts. Nevertheless the DPP considered it intolerable, and demanded immediate rejection. Ironically, this move touched Beijing's most sensitive nerve, namely the DPP's "cultural Taiwan independence", the instrument by which the DPP advances "soft Taiwan independence" and "creeping Taiwan independence".
The DPP's "cultural Taiwan independence" will make trust between the DPP and CCP over the next four years utterly impossible. Mainland intelligentsia are now concerned that “We will eventually lose Taiwan". They have concluded that the public on Taiwan no longer supports the Mainland's traditional arguments for reunification. Taiwan's rapid alienation from the Mainland also makes peaceful reunification virtually impossible. Therefore only military force can prevent a split between the two sides.
Cross-Strait developments truly are worrisome. The DPP cannot possibly accept the 1992 Consensus, which demands that the two sides be reunited. Beijing cannot possibly accept "cultural Taiwan independence" and allow Taiwan independence sentiment to reach a point of no return. Fundamental contradictions in political stance make trust between the DPP and CCP impossible. That means that over the next four years cross-Strait relations will be plagued by anxiety, even war.
At such a time the opposition Kuomintang's responsibility is greater than ever, even greater than when it was in office. It must make Beijing feel that peaceful cross-Strait relations are still possible. It must let the public on Taiwan know that only the KMT can prevent cross-Strait war. The situation is similar to what it was in 2005. Without the Lien-Hu summit and the five-point consensus, it is difficult to imagine how cross-Strait relations could have successfully survived the late Chen Shui-bian era.
When the KMT was in office, the China Times called on the KMT and CCP to jointly announce an end to hostilities or issue a declaration of peace. The two governments could then legally end the civil war. But in a democracy the ruling party's political position is not necessarily the government's. Such an action by the Kuomintang would not have been appropriate. Now however, the Kuomintang is in the opposition. It can reach a consensus with the CCP on the two sides' political status. The two parties can even sign a declaration of peace, and propose a framework for continued cross-Strait peace.
The KMT must have the courage to make peace. Can the KMT and CCP complete the above mentioned transactions? If they can, then the KMT, Taiwan, and both sides of the Strait can enjoy an historic breakthrough. First, the KMT can fundamentally distinguish its cross-Strait policy from the DPP's. Ma Ying-jeou's "one China, different interpretations", and "maintaining the status quo" served its purpose. In the wake of the Sunflower Student Movement, it is obsolete. Now that Tsai Ing-wen is spouting "maintaining the status quo" along with the KMT, the catechism has lost its rhetorical value. A KMT in the opposition must offer a whole new cross-Strait strategy. Only then can it justify its continued existence. Second, Mainland intelligenstia have lost confidence in peaceful reunification. They now think military reunification may be unavoidable. If the KMT and the CCP can reach a consensus to legally end the civil war, continued peace may still be possible. This would be the KMT's contribution to Taiwan. Third, if the KMT and the CCP can take the first step toward legally ending the civil war, the DPP may decide to follow. Only then can an official cross-Strait peace treaty become a reality.
A KMT that finds itself in the opposition need not belittle itself. It must have courage. It must be determined to prove its worth to the Taiwan public. If the KMT and CCP can make peace, then a KMT CCP forum makes sense, and a Hong Hsiu-chu-Xi Jinping has value. If the KMT can take this step, history will affirm it, and people will remember it. This may be the only way the KMT can return to power.
真道理性真愛台灣》社論－國共結束敵對 開創兩岸新機會
2016年06月21日 04:10 主筆室
馬英九執政8年，以「一中各表」、「不統不獨」、「維持現狀」定位兩岸關係，使得兩岸關係「只經不政」，既沒有結束長達60多年法理內戰狀態，解除兩岸敵對狀態；也沒有為兩岸創造穩定安全的和平架構，建立真正的互信與永遠的和平。
缺少和平結構的民間互動絕不穩定，沒有互信的兩岸關係必然脆弱，馬英九執政8年的兩岸關係最終落得人走茶涼、人去政息，還讓國民黨背上傾中賣台、兩岸掮客惡名，終至慘敗，失去政權。這就是馬英九在兩岸關係上的歷史定位，說得好聽些是「為德不卒」，說得嚴苛點是「天予不取、反受其咎」。
這8年以來，在野的民進黨在兩岸論述上也沒有進展，仍維持其分離主義的立場。但是在自認即將贏得選舉前與取得勝選後，蔡英文也牙牙學語跟著國民黨喊「維持現狀」，改用「九二精神」、「九二事實」、「九二認知」等修飾語，期盼獲得北京的認可。看到北京沒有正面回應，一些著急的民進黨員甚而希望在今年全代會中，以「維持現狀」來取代以往的台獨黨綱及相關決議文。不過，這些權宜之計，因為新任教育部長一紙廢除課綱微調的行政命令後已全部破功。
廢除課綱微調，暴露了民進黨過於急切的企圖。原有的課綱其實已是「一邊一史」的結構，所謂「課綱微調」並沒有撼動原有的結構，只是一些用語的調整、史實的增加而已。即使如此，民進黨仍然難以忍受，要去之而後快。但是此一行為恰恰觸動到北京最敏感的神經，坐實了民進黨以「文化台獨」為工具，走一條「柔性台獨」與「穩健台獨」的道路。
民進黨的「文化台獨」作為，使得未來4年民共之間幾乎不可能建立互信。大陸知識界已有「我們終將失去台灣」的警語，認為大陸傳統的統一論述已經無法再得到台灣人民的支持，台灣對大陸認同的快速疏離也使得「和平統一」幾乎已經絕望，因而出現唯有武力才能促使兩岸不分裂的「武統」言論。
兩岸的發展的確讓人憂心忡忡。民進黨不可能接受在本義上兩岸不可永久分裂的「九二共識」，北京也不會輕易地讓「文化台獨」成為一條不歸路。立場上的根本矛盾使得民共之間不可能建立互信，這也使得蔡英文政府未來4年的兩岸關係注定不安，衝突的可能也並非全無。
此時在野的國民黨，責任較執政時期更為重要，一方面要讓北京感覺到兩岸和平發展的機會仍然存在，另一方面要讓台灣民眾了解，國民黨有能力讓兩岸關係避免衝突。其情形類似於2005年的情景，如果沒有當時的連胡會及五點共識，我們很難想像，兩岸關係如何能夠平穩地度過陳水扁後期的兩岸敏感期。
國民黨執政期間，《中國時報》曾呼籲國共兩黨應率先宣布結束敵對狀態，或共同發表和平宣言，為兩岸政府未來結束法理內戰創造條件。但是，基於民主責任政治原則，執政黨的立場與行為必須與政府一致，當時由國民黨採先行主張並不適當。不過，既然國民黨現在已經在野，可以嘗試與共產黨就兩岸應有的政治定位達成共識，甚而簽署和平宣言，提出兩岸和平發展應有的框架。
國民黨要有勇氣創造和平。如果國共兩黨能夠完成上列重大事務，對國民黨、台灣及兩岸均是一大突破與貢獻。第一、對國民黨而言，可以在兩岸論述及政策上與民進黨做出根本性的區隔。馬英九的「一中各表」、「維持現狀」論述，在太陽花運動以後已經失去其階段性的功能。在蔡英文也提出「維持現狀」後，國民黨基本上也不再享有論述的優勢。在野的國民黨必須要創造兩岸和平論述，才有存在的價值。第二、對台灣而言，大陸的知識界已經開始對「和平統一」失去信心，視「武統」為可能的必要選擇。國共兩黨如果能夠就結束法理內戰達成共識，和平發展的聲音將不致成為絕響，這是國民黨對台灣的貢獻。第三、對兩岸而言，國共兩黨能夠往結束法理內戰跨出第一步，民進黨才有可能認真思考是否要跟進，官方的兩岸和平協議也才有簽署的可能。
在野的國民黨切勿妄自菲薄，應當勇敢向台灣人民證明國民黨存在的價值。從國共兩黨共同創造和平這個角度出發，國共論壇才有意義，洪習會也才有價值。國民黨如果能夠成功地跨出這一步，歷史會正面評價，人民也不會忘記，這或許才是國民黨重返執政的必由之路。
Sunday, June 19, 2016
Tsai Ing-wen's Three Major Problems
Tsai Ing-wen's Three Major Problems
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 20, 2016
Executive Summary: After one month in office, the challenges faced by Tsai Ing-wen are clear. She must stabilize the cabinet and ministries. She must end administration policy flip-flops. The new government's image is steadily being eroded. The public will soon lose its patience. Once that happens, any policy reform whatsoever will be difficult. The difficulties encountered by Ma Ying-jeou during his second term of office prove that.
Full Text Below:
Since her inauguration on May 20, President Tsai Ing-wen has been in office three full months. Polls show her public approval rating at around 50%. Apparently a majority supports her leadership. But Premier Lin Chuan's approval rating is nearly 10 points lower, indicating public dissatisfaction with the new cabinet.
The gap in approval ratings for Tsai Ing-wen and Lin Chuan is intriguing for three reasons. First, the Cabinet Chief's lower approval rating may be the result of either personal faux pas or extreme policy statements. For this, Lin Chuan must bear full responsibility. It also reveals uneven quality among cabinet members. Second, the chaos within the cabinet makes Tsai Ing-wen's role as head of state even more essential. The public distinguishes between the two. It does not consider them the same. Third, the public still has high hopes for the new government. It is still willing to give the new president time to improve. Alas, no one knows when public discontent with the cabinet chief will burn through the firewall between the Office of the President and the Executive Yuan. The new government cannot afford to be careless about this.
One month after taking office, Tsai Ing-wen's status was secure. She concentrated on visiting the armed forces, and called for unity. She met with foreign dignitaries. As a finishing touch, she participated in various social activities to prove she was a “woman of the people”. Cabinet ministers were reckless. She used her status in the party and the government to mollify green camp legislators. She invited government heads into her home and communicated with them. She differed from Chen Shui-bian, a loose cannon. She also differed from Ma Ying-jeou, who stood on the front lines with a target painted on his back. This has helped her maintain her stature as president. It has also provided the new government room to retreat and flexibility in decision-making.
In any event, after one month in office, the challenges faced by Tsai Ing-wen are clear. She must stabilize the cabinet and ministries. She must end administration policy flip-flops. The new government's image is steadily being eroded. The public will soon lose its patience. Once that happens, any policy reform whatsoever will be difficult. The difficulties encountered by Ma Ying-jeou during his second term of office prove that.
In summary, Tsai Ing-wen faces three major problems, each of which require her personal attention. The first problem is the gap between electoral politics and the reality of governance. During Tsai Ing-wen's presidential campaign, she opposed certain policies out of sheer spite. She failed to consider the issues with due diligence. Now that she is in power, she finds herself out of touch with reality. During the past month, she has completely reversed herself on one policy after another. Even cabinet members charged with carrying out her imperial edicts are grumbling. Electoral politics is running head on into harsh reality. Tsai must either collide with reality head on, derail, or make a “hairpin turn”. The most obvious example is her ostensibly unshakable commitment to a nuclear free homeland. Power shortages loom. Yet her only response was to ask universities to conserve electricity, or return to old-fashioned hydropower. Are these really wise moves? Tsai Ing-wen's only solution is to default on her campaign promises and confront harsh reality.
The second problem she faces, is friction between the new government and the new ruling party. The Lin Chuan cabinet stresses its "professionalism". As such, its cabinet members lack political sensitivity. When cabinet ministers speak out, they frequently touch sensitive political nerves. This includes peripheral appointees, several of whom have angered DPP legislators. Unfortunately, if Tsai is too accommodating towards the party, the result will be an image of green camp favoritism, which would undermine her status as head of state. She would also be responsible for the misallocation of national resources. Tsai Ing-wen is both DPP chairman and ROC president. As such, she must master communications. Otherwise, if she leaves an impression of favoritism, she will find it difficult to retain public respect.
The third problem is that her cross-Strait policy, which puts the ROC at an economic and diplomatic disadvantage. The new government longs to rid itself of economic dependence on the Mainland. It longs to develop relations with Southeast Asia. Affirming the sovereignty of the Republic of China is are the right thing to do. But implementation must be prudent. One cannot suddenly deny the importance of the Mainland market, or even the benefits of cross-Strait exchanges, on the assumption that one can “pick chestnuts out of the fire”. The public expects the new government to revive Taiwan's economy. But cross-Strait relations have become increasingly tense. The first victim of such tensions will be the economy. The stalled STA talks have undermined our export competitiveness. Fewer Mainland tourists has cut into vendor profits. Once the flames of diplomatic war erupt, they will be difficult to extinguish. Tsai Ing-wen must persuade Taiwan independence elements to change course. At the very least, she must have the courage to get out from under their thumb. Otherwise the new government, which is currently walking a tightrope, cannot possibly achive prosperity for Taiwan.
Taiwan politics, which has long been divided along blue vs. green lines, remains trapped within a whirlpool. Tsai Ing-wen's honeymoon period is not quite over. But Lin Chuan's honeymoon period is about to end. Genuine vigilance is the order of the day.
聯合／蔡英文執政滿月的三大難題
2016-06-20 01:39 聯合報 聯合報社論
分享五二○就任至今，蔡英文總統執政正好滿月。綜觀各方的民調，蔡英文的滿意度在五成上下，可見多數國人對其領導表示支持；然而，閣揆林全的滿意度低她近十個百分點，顯示新內閣的表現無法讓民眾滿意。
蔡英文與林全的偌大支持差距，耐人尋味。其中原因有三：第一，內閣首長狀況頻傳，或因個人言行失當，或因政策發言偏頗，均須由林全概括承受，這也暴露了閣員素質不齊。第二，相對於新閣的亂象橫生，蔡英文的元首角色詮釋更為妥貼，民眾也能區辨兩者之別，未混為一談。第三，民眾對於新政府仍然頗有期待，願意多給新總統一些時間改善；問題是，民眾對內閣首長頻頻凸槌的怒火，不知何時便會燒過府院之間的防火線，新政府不能不謹慎以對。
蔡英文上任一個月來的表現，堪稱穩健。她集中心力走訪三軍號召團結，不時接見外賓，並畫龍點睛地參與社會活動，表現元首親民的一面；對於內閣部長的暴衝，她則利用黨政平台安撫綠委，並在家中設宴與首長溝通。比較起來，她不像陳水扁那樣動輒暴走，也不像馬英九那樣直接站上火線挑起話題；這除了有助於她保持總統高度，也讓政府決策多了一些進退彈性和轉圜空間。
無論如何，經過一個月的考驗，蔡英文面對的挑戰其實也很清楚：如果她不能提升內閣部會的穩定度，如果行政決策一直處於東拉西扯、碰碰撞撞的狀態，新政府的形象勢必日漸磨損，民眾的耐性也將迅速耗光。屆時，要再推動什麼改革，恐怕就困難重重。這點，馬英九第二任期內的困頓，就是最佳的殷鑑。
歸納而言，蔡英文面對的是三大難題，每一項都需要她親手解決。第一道難題，是競選政見與施政現實的差距。蔡英文的競選政見是在野時所提出，當時或許為了反對而反對，或許因未及深思熟慮，如今到了實踐時刻，未免與現實有所扞格。一個月來出現諸多的政策「髮夾彎」，乃至閣員奉若聖旨的一些論調，問題都出在競選政見與社會現實碰撞，發生了脫軌現象或被迫轉彎。其中最明顯的例子是，廢核的承諾不可動搖，但眼看著缺電危機迫在眉睫，卻只能求諸大學節電、或重返水力發電等「古方」，果真是明智之舉嗎？解決之道，恐怕蔡英文必須適度修改選舉支票，以符合兌現之可能。
第二道難題，是新政府與執政黨的磨合。林全內閣的組成強調的是「專業」，相對而言，閣員的政治性格和政治敏感度則普遍偏弱；也因此，許多閣員的發言動輒挑動社會神經，包括一些周邊的人事任命，都讓民進黨立委破口大罵。問題在，如果過度遷就黨意，勢必形成對綠營的「偏袒」，喪失國家元首的超然，也造成國家資源分配的誤用。這點，蔡英文既然黨政雙駕，即必須妥慎拿捏溝通；否則，若留下徇私的口實，即難以再獲民眾尊重。
第三道難題，是現行兩岸政策對經濟和外交的不利。新政府要擺脫對中國大陸的經濟依賴，要建立主權尊嚴，要發展與東南亞的關係，都是正確的目標；問題是，作法上應該穩健以行，不宜驟然否定中國大陸市場的重要性，甚至否定兩岸既有的良好交流，卻以為可以火中取栗。目前民眾對新政府期待最深的，正是台灣經濟的重振；但兩岸關係轉趨緊張，首當其衝的必然是經濟，不僅服貿貨貿停議影響廠商出口競爭，包括陸客減少都會影響攤商經濟。一旦外交烽火點燃，勢必更難收拾。關鍵在，蔡英文必須在兩岸政策上設法說服獨派，或至少要有勇氣擺脫其牽制；否則，要在鋼索上打造富強的台灣，豈有可能？
台灣的政治，在藍綠二分後，已陷入一種相互牽制的漩渦。蔡英文的蜜月期餘溫猶在，但林全的蜜月期轉瞬即逝，實值得警惕。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 20, 2016
Executive Summary: After one month in office, the challenges faced by Tsai Ing-wen are clear. She must stabilize the cabinet and ministries. She must end administration policy flip-flops. The new government's image is steadily being eroded. The public will soon lose its patience. Once that happens, any policy reform whatsoever will be difficult. The difficulties encountered by Ma Ying-jeou during his second term of office prove that.
Full Text Below:
Since her inauguration on May 20, President Tsai Ing-wen has been in office three full months. Polls show her public approval rating at around 50%. Apparently a majority supports her leadership. But Premier Lin Chuan's approval rating is nearly 10 points lower, indicating public dissatisfaction with the new cabinet.
The gap in approval ratings for Tsai Ing-wen and Lin Chuan is intriguing for three reasons. First, the Cabinet Chief's lower approval rating may be the result of either personal faux pas or extreme policy statements. For this, Lin Chuan must bear full responsibility. It also reveals uneven quality among cabinet members. Second, the chaos within the cabinet makes Tsai Ing-wen's role as head of state even more essential. The public distinguishes between the two. It does not consider them the same. Third, the public still has high hopes for the new government. It is still willing to give the new president time to improve. Alas, no one knows when public discontent with the cabinet chief will burn through the firewall between the Office of the President and the Executive Yuan. The new government cannot afford to be careless about this.
One month after taking office, Tsai Ing-wen's status was secure. She concentrated on visiting the armed forces, and called for unity. She met with foreign dignitaries. As a finishing touch, she participated in various social activities to prove she was a “woman of the people”. Cabinet ministers were reckless. She used her status in the party and the government to mollify green camp legislators. She invited government heads into her home and communicated with them. She differed from Chen Shui-bian, a loose cannon. She also differed from Ma Ying-jeou, who stood on the front lines with a target painted on his back. This has helped her maintain her stature as president. It has also provided the new government room to retreat and flexibility in decision-making.
In any event, after one month in office, the challenges faced by Tsai Ing-wen are clear. She must stabilize the cabinet and ministries. She must end administration policy flip-flops. The new government's image is steadily being eroded. The public will soon lose its patience. Once that happens, any policy reform whatsoever will be difficult. The difficulties encountered by Ma Ying-jeou during his second term of office prove that.
In summary, Tsai Ing-wen faces three major problems, each of which require her personal attention. The first problem is the gap between electoral politics and the reality of governance. During Tsai Ing-wen's presidential campaign, she opposed certain policies out of sheer spite. She failed to consider the issues with due diligence. Now that she is in power, she finds herself out of touch with reality. During the past month, she has completely reversed herself on one policy after another. Even cabinet members charged with carrying out her imperial edicts are grumbling. Electoral politics is running head on into harsh reality. Tsai must either collide with reality head on, derail, or make a “hairpin turn”. The most obvious example is her ostensibly unshakable commitment to a nuclear free homeland. Power shortages loom. Yet her only response was to ask universities to conserve electricity, or return to old-fashioned hydropower. Are these really wise moves? Tsai Ing-wen's only solution is to default on her campaign promises and confront harsh reality.
The second problem she faces, is friction between the new government and the new ruling party. The Lin Chuan cabinet stresses its "professionalism". As such, its cabinet members lack political sensitivity. When cabinet ministers speak out, they frequently touch sensitive political nerves. This includes peripheral appointees, several of whom have angered DPP legislators. Unfortunately, if Tsai is too accommodating towards the party, the result will be an image of green camp favoritism, which would undermine her status as head of state. She would also be responsible for the misallocation of national resources. Tsai Ing-wen is both DPP chairman and ROC president. As such, she must master communications. Otherwise, if she leaves an impression of favoritism, she will find it difficult to retain public respect.
The third problem is that her cross-Strait policy, which puts the ROC at an economic and diplomatic disadvantage. The new government longs to rid itself of economic dependence on the Mainland. It longs to develop relations with Southeast Asia. Affirming the sovereignty of the Republic of China is are the right thing to do. But implementation must be prudent. One cannot suddenly deny the importance of the Mainland market, or even the benefits of cross-Strait exchanges, on the assumption that one can “pick chestnuts out of the fire”. The public expects the new government to revive Taiwan's economy. But cross-Strait relations have become increasingly tense. The first victim of such tensions will be the economy. The stalled STA talks have undermined our export competitiveness. Fewer Mainland tourists has cut into vendor profits. Once the flames of diplomatic war erupt, they will be difficult to extinguish. Tsai Ing-wen must persuade Taiwan independence elements to change course. At the very least, she must have the courage to get out from under their thumb. Otherwise the new government, which is currently walking a tightrope, cannot possibly achive prosperity for Taiwan.
Taiwan politics, which has long been divided along blue vs. green lines, remains trapped within a whirlpool. Tsai Ing-wen's honeymoon period is not quite over. But Lin Chuan's honeymoon period is about to end. Genuine vigilance is the order of the day.
聯合／蔡英文執政滿月的三大難題
2016-06-20 01:39 聯合報 聯合報社論
分享五二○就任至今，蔡英文總統執政正好滿月。綜觀各方的民調，蔡英文的滿意度在五成上下，可見多數國人對其領導表示支持；然而，閣揆林全的滿意度低她近十個百分點，顯示新內閣的表現無法讓民眾滿意。
蔡英文與林全的偌大支持差距，耐人尋味。其中原因有三：第一，內閣首長狀況頻傳，或因個人言行失當，或因政策發言偏頗，均須由林全概括承受，這也暴露了閣員素質不齊。第二，相對於新閣的亂象橫生，蔡英文的元首角色詮釋更為妥貼，民眾也能區辨兩者之別，未混為一談。第三，民眾對於新政府仍然頗有期待，願意多給新總統一些時間改善；問題是，民眾對內閣首長頻頻凸槌的怒火，不知何時便會燒過府院之間的防火線，新政府不能不謹慎以對。
蔡英文上任一個月來的表現，堪稱穩健。她集中心力走訪三軍號召團結，不時接見外賓，並畫龍點睛地參與社會活動，表現元首親民的一面；對於內閣部長的暴衝，她則利用黨政平台安撫綠委，並在家中設宴與首長溝通。比較起來，她不像陳水扁那樣動輒暴走，也不像馬英九那樣直接站上火線挑起話題；這除了有助於她保持總統高度，也讓政府決策多了一些進退彈性和轉圜空間。
無論如何，經過一個月的考驗，蔡英文面對的挑戰其實也很清楚：如果她不能提升內閣部會的穩定度，如果行政決策一直處於東拉西扯、碰碰撞撞的狀態，新政府的形象勢必日漸磨損，民眾的耐性也將迅速耗光。屆時，要再推動什麼改革，恐怕就困難重重。這點，馬英九第二任期內的困頓，就是最佳的殷鑑。
歸納而言，蔡英文面對的是三大難題，每一項都需要她親手解決。第一道難題，是競選政見與施政現實的差距。蔡英文的競選政見是在野時所提出，當時或許為了反對而反對，或許因未及深思熟慮，如今到了實踐時刻，未免與現實有所扞格。一個月來出現諸多的政策「髮夾彎」，乃至閣員奉若聖旨的一些論調，問題都出在競選政見與社會現實碰撞，發生了脫軌現象或被迫轉彎。其中最明顯的例子是，廢核的承諾不可動搖，但眼看著缺電危機迫在眉睫，卻只能求諸大學節電、或重返水力發電等「古方」，果真是明智之舉嗎？解決之道，恐怕蔡英文必須適度修改選舉支票，以符合兌現之可能。
第二道難題，是新政府與執政黨的磨合。林全內閣的組成強調的是「專業」，相對而言，閣員的政治性格和政治敏感度則普遍偏弱；也因此，許多閣員的發言動輒挑動社會神經，包括一些周邊的人事任命，都讓民進黨立委破口大罵。問題在，如果過度遷就黨意，勢必形成對綠營的「偏袒」，喪失國家元首的超然，也造成國家資源分配的誤用。這點，蔡英文既然黨政雙駕，即必須妥慎拿捏溝通；否則，若留下徇私的口實，即難以再獲民眾尊重。
第三道難題，是現行兩岸政策對經濟和外交的不利。新政府要擺脫對中國大陸的經濟依賴，要建立主權尊嚴，要發展與東南亞的關係，都是正確的目標；問題是，作法上應該穩健以行，不宜驟然否定中國大陸市場的重要性，甚至否定兩岸既有的良好交流，卻以為可以火中取栗。目前民眾對新政府期待最深的，正是台灣經濟的重振；但兩岸關係轉趨緊張，首當其衝的必然是經濟，不僅服貿貨貿停議影響廠商出口競爭，包括陸客減少都會影響攤商經濟。一旦外交烽火點燃，勢必更難收拾。關鍵在，蔡英文必須在兩岸政策上設法說服獨派，或至少要有勇氣擺脫其牽制；否則，要在鋼索上打造富強的台灣，豈有可能？
台灣的政治，在藍綠二分後，已陷入一種相互牽制的漩渦。蔡英文的蜜月期餘溫猶在，但林全的蜜月期轉瞬即逝，實值得警惕。
Thursday, June 16, 2016
Trust between the People: The Foundation for Cross-Strait Relations
Trust between the People: The Foundation for Cross-Strait Relations
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 17, 2016
Executive Summary: One cannot establish trust among people overnight. But cross-Strait relations and trust among ordinary people has far-reaching significance. As the saying goes, "Deep roots enable a tree to live long". If trust between people cannot be established, then trust between governments will be impossible. Cross-Strait relations are currently in deep water. A key reason is insufficient trust at the grassroots level. This is the reason for the lack of momentum.
Full Text Below:
The "Straits Forum" convened in Xiamen on the 12th as scheduled. Cross-Strait relations are now in a state of "Cold Confrontation". The convening of the forum however, sent several positive signals. First, cross-Strait relations remain on track. They remain sustainable. The channels for communication and consultations between MAC and the SEF, and between ARATS and the Taiwan Affairs Office have been admittedly been interrupted. But the Straits Forum was held as usual. This means that fundamentally, Mainland policy has not changed as a result of political changes on Taiwan. Second, the Mainland dealings with Taiwan have changed, from "official" to "unofficial". Both Mainland CPPCC Chairman Yu Zhengsheng and Taiwan political party leaders were present at the meeting. They will continue promoting non-governmental exchanges. Third, cross-Strait private sector cooperation is being expanded. This year the forum agenda covers issues relating to youth, the public interest, community, science and technology, meteorology, and think tank exchanges. The surfeit of projects underscores the potential for cross-Strait private sector cooperation.
The Straits Forum was born of the need for cross-Strait communications. Eight years of work at the grass roots level has enabled hundreds of thousands of people to understand each other better, develop friendships, and discover affinities. Political party exchanges may be frozen, but the forum retains its vitality. It adopts a private sector approach. This suits the Mainland, which seeks to increase cross-Strait economic and social integration, and narrow the distance between hearts and minds. It also addresses the need for increased private sector trust amidst a lack of government trust.
Over the past 30 years, cross-Strait exchanges have increased. But cross-Strait trust has not increased accordingly. Mainland demands for reunification have never changed. But the two sides' values, societies, and political systems remain different. Doubts about the sustainability of differing economic models persist. The rise of the Mainland has led to a "I call the shots" mindset toward Taiwan. The Sunflower Student Movement and opposition to the STA revealed how differently people on the two sides perceive cross-Strait cooperation. Public reaction toward Taiwan on the Mainland also varies widely. Taiwan scam artists operating out of Kenya sparked heated debate on the Mainland. As one online comment put it, "Taiwan's boast that its greatest tourist attraction is her people is a lie”. Mainland discontent with Taiwan was also in evidence when Mainlanders broke through the Great Firewall and left comments on Taiwan Facebook pages.
People on both sides of the Strait have the cultural roots. The same blood flows through their veins. The only difference is their historical perception. Prolonged isolation has left the two sides unable to share the same experience, still less create a common history. The inevitable result has been some degree of alienation. Their perceptions, feelings, and values differ. Taken as a whole, they have a "You and I are different" feeling. Cross-Strait information exchange is hampered by geography and government and media inertia. These limitations result in isolation and distorted information. People on the two sides have trouble understanding who their real enemy is. Politicians incite political divisions, making trust among people difficult.
One cannot establish trust among people overnight. But cross-Strait relations and trust among ordinary people has far-reaching significance. As the saying goes, "Deep roots enable a tree to live long". If trust between people cannot be established, then trust between governments will be impossible. Cross-Strait relations are currently in deep water. A key reason is insufficient trust at the grassroots level. This is the reason for the lack of momentum.
Breaking through the current dilemma requires bottom-up support. Shared living experiences and a shared history contribute to mutual trust and the creation of a shared cross-Strait destiny. The Straits Forum offers a model. It focuses on youth and the grassroots. It highlights the sharing of experiences. This new form of cross-Strait dialogue links young entrepreneurs. It enabled Jingdong Group CEO Liu Qiangdong and Taiwan Phison Chairman Pan Chien-Cheng to provide employment and entrepreneurship opportunities, and to fulfill their shared dream of a platform for exchanges. Livelihood-related topics include a Fujian FTA, the construction of a "Marine Silk Road", community governance, and public service activities. All of these involve in depth, shared experiences and opportunities for cooperation between industry on both sides.
Without communication there can be no trust. Only in depth exchanges can establish shared memories and develop mutual trust. Addressing the future cross-strait development, Yu Zhengsheng said the more complex relations are between the two sides, the more people must communicate.
KMT Vice Chairman Hu, Hualien County Chief Fu Kun-chi and others also addressed the forum. Ordinary people on both sides are the most powerful promoters of cross-Strait relations, they said. People to people exchanges must be increased.
Regarding information distortions, think tanks and the media must play a larger role. They are the channel by which people on the two sides can understand each other. The two sides must build mutual trust through media interaction. They must objectively and impartially communicate information. This will build cross-Strait trust at the grassroots level. Exchanges among think tanks can fill the void left by interrupted political party exchanges. They can communicate real intentions, reduce misunderstandings, and offer constructive suggestions.
Establishing a shared identity among the younger generation will take longer. The wider the door is opened, the more opportunities there will be for interaction. The more extensive the interactions, the more cross-Strait trust will grow. But all this depends on official mobilization of private sector forces. Official cross-Strait relations have been interrupted. High-level party officials must be more open minded. They must keep the common people in mind. They must respect their wishes. The must devote their energy and resources to cross-Strait exchanges among young people, for they are the basis for long-term cross-Strait peace and goodwill.
深化民間互信是兩岸基礎工程
2016年06月17日 中國時報
「兩岸海峽論壇」12日如期在廈門舉行，在兩岸關係進入「冷對抗」情勢下，此次論壇的召開傳遞了幾個訊號：一是兩岸關係仍在可持續發展的軌道上，兩會、陸委會與國台辦常態化溝通機制與協商管道雖告中斷，海峽論壇照常舉辦，表示大陸對台大政方針未因台灣政局變化而變化。二是大陸對台工作模式調整，由「官」轉「民」。大陸政協主席俞正聲、台灣政黨領袖均出席大會，將共同致力推動民間交流。三是兩岸民間合作領域擴大。今年論壇議程涵蓋青年、公益、社區、科技、氣象、智庫交流，專案之豐富凸顯兩岸民間合作面廣闊，且可發掘的潛力巨大。
海峽論壇應兩岸關係而生，8年間深耕兩岸基層，數十萬兩岸民眾由此增進了解、加深情誼，展現親和力與生命力，在兩岸政黨交流「急凍」情境下，仍展現出巨大活力。走民間道路，契合大陸現階段「深化兩岸經濟社會融合發展，拉近同胞心靈距離」思路，也切合化解兩岸「政治互信不足，民間互信待提升」的需要。
30多年來，兩岸互動雖然漸趨頻繁，但互信水準卻未升至相應高度。大陸對台灣堅持統一從未鬆動，兩岸價值觀、社會運作模式與政治制度都有一段差距，對經濟模式的可持續性又存有疑慮，加上大陸崛起後社會反向瀰漫的「台灣我最大」氛圍。太陽花反服貿就體現出民間社會對兩岸合作的認知落差，大陸民間社會對台灣也出現多樣情緒。肯亞事件在大陸民間引發熱議，網路媒體上出現「台灣最美的風景是騙人」等言論，大陸「帝吧出征」台灣，論戰中對立情緒也可見一斑。
兩岸血脈相通、文化同根，但歷史記憶大不同。兩岸因長期隔絕，未能分享相同的經驗，更未創造共同歷史，積蓄了一定的反向力量，彼此的認知、情感和價值不同，社會運作亦有別，聚在一起，容易有「你和我不同」的感覺。兩岸資訊交流受到地理、政府管理及傳播機構慣性等因素限制，造成相互封閉、訊息扭曲等現象，兩岸民眾非常不容易全面了解真實的對方，加上政治人物操縱政治對立，民間互信自然十分困難。
建立民間互信非一日之功，但民間互信對兩岸關係發展有深遠意義。「柢固則生長，根深則樹久」，民間互信若不能建立，上層互動乃至互信建立則更加艱難。當前兩岸關係進入深水區，重要原因亦在於兩岸民間層面社會支援度不夠，動力不足。
突破當前困境，需要自下而上的力量支撐。創造共同生活的經歷乃至共同歷史記憶才能有助於互信，繼而建設兩岸命運共同體。此次海峽論壇做出典範，側重青年和基層，突出體驗式交流。新增的兩岸青年企業家對話環節，提供了京東集團首席執行官劉強東與台灣群聯電子董事長潘健成等就兩岸青年就業創業、共圓夢想深入交流的平台。有關民生話題，從福建自貿區、「海絲」建設，到社區治理、公益活動，都有深度參與環節，兩岸業界共用經驗和機遇，對口合作。
沒有交流就沒有互信，有了深度交流才能建立起共同的記憶，就可以培養互信。俞正聲在海峽論壇中談及兩岸未來發展時表示，兩岸愈複雜，民眾愈須交流。
國民黨副主席胡志強、花蓮縣縣長傅崐萁等也在發言中表示，兩岸民眾是兩岸關係發展最有力的推動者，應當大力加強兩岸民眾交流。
針對兩岸資訊扭曲問題，智庫和媒體可以扮演更重要角色。作為兩岸民眾了解彼此的最主要管道，兩岸媒體應通過互動交流建立互信，客觀、公正地溝通兩岸，建立起兩岸民間互信的基礎。智庫交流則可以補位當前政黨交流的空缺，溝通彼此真正意圖，減少誤判，並提出建設性建議。
青年一代建立認同需要更長的時間，兩岸之門開得越多，雙向進入的機會越多，交流的領域越廣，兩岸互信就會得到根本的增長。但這一切都有賴兩岸官方更多的擘畫，調動民間力量廣泛參與。當此兩岸官方關係中斷之際，格外需要兩岸政黨高層放寬格局，以蒼生為念，順民心而行，把精力、資源更多的投向兩岸青年的民間往來，長期奠基兩岸和平，是為仁、智也。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 17, 2016
Executive Summary: One cannot establish trust among people overnight. But cross-Strait relations and trust among ordinary people has far-reaching significance. As the saying goes, "Deep roots enable a tree to live long". If trust between people cannot be established, then trust between governments will be impossible. Cross-Strait relations are currently in deep water. A key reason is insufficient trust at the grassroots level. This is the reason for the lack of momentum.
Full Text Below:
The "Straits Forum" convened in Xiamen on the 12th as scheduled. Cross-Strait relations are now in a state of "Cold Confrontation". The convening of the forum however, sent several positive signals. First, cross-Strait relations remain on track. They remain sustainable. The channels for communication and consultations between MAC and the SEF, and between ARATS and the Taiwan Affairs Office have been admittedly been interrupted. But the Straits Forum was held as usual. This means that fundamentally, Mainland policy has not changed as a result of political changes on Taiwan. Second, the Mainland dealings with Taiwan have changed, from "official" to "unofficial". Both Mainland CPPCC Chairman Yu Zhengsheng and Taiwan political party leaders were present at the meeting. They will continue promoting non-governmental exchanges. Third, cross-Strait private sector cooperation is being expanded. This year the forum agenda covers issues relating to youth, the public interest, community, science and technology, meteorology, and think tank exchanges. The surfeit of projects underscores the potential for cross-Strait private sector cooperation.
The Straits Forum was born of the need for cross-Strait communications. Eight years of work at the grass roots level has enabled hundreds of thousands of people to understand each other better, develop friendships, and discover affinities. Political party exchanges may be frozen, but the forum retains its vitality. It adopts a private sector approach. This suits the Mainland, which seeks to increase cross-Strait economic and social integration, and narrow the distance between hearts and minds. It also addresses the need for increased private sector trust amidst a lack of government trust.
Over the past 30 years, cross-Strait exchanges have increased. But cross-Strait trust has not increased accordingly. Mainland demands for reunification have never changed. But the two sides' values, societies, and political systems remain different. Doubts about the sustainability of differing economic models persist. The rise of the Mainland has led to a "I call the shots" mindset toward Taiwan. The Sunflower Student Movement and opposition to the STA revealed how differently people on the two sides perceive cross-Strait cooperation. Public reaction toward Taiwan on the Mainland also varies widely. Taiwan scam artists operating out of Kenya sparked heated debate on the Mainland. As one online comment put it, "Taiwan's boast that its greatest tourist attraction is her people is a lie”. Mainland discontent with Taiwan was also in evidence when Mainlanders broke through the Great Firewall and left comments on Taiwan Facebook pages.
People on both sides of the Strait have the cultural roots. The same blood flows through their veins. The only difference is their historical perception. Prolonged isolation has left the two sides unable to share the same experience, still less create a common history. The inevitable result has been some degree of alienation. Their perceptions, feelings, and values differ. Taken as a whole, they have a "You and I are different" feeling. Cross-Strait information exchange is hampered by geography and government and media inertia. These limitations result in isolation and distorted information. People on the two sides have trouble understanding who their real enemy is. Politicians incite political divisions, making trust among people difficult.
One cannot establish trust among people overnight. But cross-Strait relations and trust among ordinary people has far-reaching significance. As the saying goes, "Deep roots enable a tree to live long". If trust between people cannot be established, then trust between governments will be impossible. Cross-Strait relations are currently in deep water. A key reason is insufficient trust at the grassroots level. This is the reason for the lack of momentum.
Breaking through the current dilemma requires bottom-up support. Shared living experiences and a shared history contribute to mutual trust and the creation of a shared cross-Strait destiny. The Straits Forum offers a model. It focuses on youth and the grassroots. It highlights the sharing of experiences. This new form of cross-Strait dialogue links young entrepreneurs. It enabled Jingdong Group CEO Liu Qiangdong and Taiwan Phison Chairman Pan Chien-Cheng to provide employment and entrepreneurship opportunities, and to fulfill their shared dream of a platform for exchanges. Livelihood-related topics include a Fujian FTA, the construction of a "Marine Silk Road", community governance, and public service activities. All of these involve in depth, shared experiences and opportunities for cooperation between industry on both sides.
Without communication there can be no trust. Only in depth exchanges can establish shared memories and develop mutual trust. Addressing the future cross-strait development, Yu Zhengsheng said the more complex relations are between the two sides, the more people must communicate.
KMT Vice Chairman Hu, Hualien County Chief Fu Kun-chi and others also addressed the forum. Ordinary people on both sides are the most powerful promoters of cross-Strait relations, they said. People to people exchanges must be increased.
Regarding information distortions, think tanks and the media must play a larger role. They are the channel by which people on the two sides can understand each other. The two sides must build mutual trust through media interaction. They must objectively and impartially communicate information. This will build cross-Strait trust at the grassroots level. Exchanges among think tanks can fill the void left by interrupted political party exchanges. They can communicate real intentions, reduce misunderstandings, and offer constructive suggestions.
Establishing a shared identity among the younger generation will take longer. The wider the door is opened, the more opportunities there will be for interaction. The more extensive the interactions, the more cross-Strait trust will grow. But all this depends on official mobilization of private sector forces. Official cross-Strait relations have been interrupted. High-level party officials must be more open minded. They must keep the common people in mind. They must respect their wishes. The must devote their energy and resources to cross-Strait exchanges among young people, for they are the basis for long-term cross-Strait peace and goodwill.
深化民間互信是兩岸基礎工程
2016年06月17日 中國時報
「兩岸海峽論壇」12日如期在廈門舉行，在兩岸關係進入「冷對抗」情勢下，此次論壇的召開傳遞了幾個訊號：一是兩岸關係仍在可持續發展的軌道上，兩會、陸委會與國台辦常態化溝通機制與協商管道雖告中斷，海峽論壇照常舉辦，表示大陸對台大政方針未因台灣政局變化而變化。二是大陸對台工作模式調整，由「官」轉「民」。大陸政協主席俞正聲、台灣政黨領袖均出席大會，將共同致力推動民間交流。三是兩岸民間合作領域擴大。今年論壇議程涵蓋青年、公益、社區、科技、氣象、智庫交流，專案之豐富凸顯兩岸民間合作面廣闊，且可發掘的潛力巨大。
海峽論壇應兩岸關係而生，8年間深耕兩岸基層，數十萬兩岸民眾由此增進了解、加深情誼，展現親和力與生命力，在兩岸政黨交流「急凍」情境下，仍展現出巨大活力。走民間道路，契合大陸現階段「深化兩岸經濟社會融合發展，拉近同胞心靈距離」思路，也切合化解兩岸「政治互信不足，民間互信待提升」的需要。
30多年來，兩岸互動雖然漸趨頻繁，但互信水準卻未升至相應高度。大陸對台灣堅持統一從未鬆動，兩岸價值觀、社會運作模式與政治制度都有一段差距，對經濟模式的可持續性又存有疑慮，加上大陸崛起後社會反向瀰漫的「台灣我最大」氛圍。太陽花反服貿就體現出民間社會對兩岸合作的認知落差，大陸民間社會對台灣也出現多樣情緒。肯亞事件在大陸民間引發熱議，網路媒體上出現「台灣最美的風景是騙人」等言論，大陸「帝吧出征」台灣，論戰中對立情緒也可見一斑。
兩岸血脈相通、文化同根，但歷史記憶大不同。兩岸因長期隔絕，未能分享相同的經驗，更未創造共同歷史，積蓄了一定的反向力量，彼此的認知、情感和價值不同，社會運作亦有別，聚在一起，容易有「你和我不同」的感覺。兩岸資訊交流受到地理、政府管理及傳播機構慣性等因素限制，造成相互封閉、訊息扭曲等現象，兩岸民眾非常不容易全面了解真實的對方，加上政治人物操縱政治對立，民間互信自然十分困難。
建立民間互信非一日之功，但民間互信對兩岸關係發展有深遠意義。「柢固則生長，根深則樹久」，民間互信若不能建立，上層互動乃至互信建立則更加艱難。當前兩岸關係進入深水區，重要原因亦在於兩岸民間層面社會支援度不夠，動力不足。
突破當前困境，需要自下而上的力量支撐。創造共同生活的經歷乃至共同歷史記憶才能有助於互信，繼而建設兩岸命運共同體。此次海峽論壇做出典範，側重青年和基層，突出體驗式交流。新增的兩岸青年企業家對話環節，提供了京東集團首席執行官劉強東與台灣群聯電子董事長潘健成等就兩岸青年就業創業、共圓夢想深入交流的平台。有關民生話題，從福建自貿區、「海絲」建設，到社區治理、公益活動，都有深度參與環節，兩岸業界共用經驗和機遇，對口合作。
沒有交流就沒有互信，有了深度交流才能建立起共同的記憶，就可以培養互信。俞正聲在海峽論壇中談及兩岸未來發展時表示，兩岸愈複雜，民眾愈須交流。
國民黨副主席胡志強、花蓮縣縣長傅崐萁等也在發言中表示，兩岸民眾是兩岸關係發展最有力的推動者，應當大力加強兩岸民眾交流。
針對兩岸資訊扭曲問題，智庫和媒體可以扮演更重要角色。作為兩岸民眾了解彼此的最主要管道，兩岸媒體應通過互動交流建立互信，客觀、公正地溝通兩岸，建立起兩岸民間互信的基礎。智庫交流則可以補位當前政黨交流的空缺，溝通彼此真正意圖，減少誤判，並提出建設性建議。
青年一代建立認同需要更長的時間，兩岸之門開得越多，雙向進入的機會越多，交流的領域越廣，兩岸互信就會得到根本的增長。但這一切都有賴兩岸官方更多的擘畫，調動民間力量廣泛參與。當此兩岸官方關係中斷之際，格外需要兩岸政黨高層放寬格局，以蒼生為念，順民心而行，把精力、資源更多的投向兩岸青年的民間往來，長期奠基兩岸和平，是為仁、智也。
Wednesday, June 15, 2016
Crisis of Confidence in Tsai Government
Crisis of Confidence in Tsai Government
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 16, 2016
Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen's new government is not yet beyond repair. But it must enage in thorough soul-searching. It must see the danger signs. It must see where its path leads. Tsai Ing-wen's new government is wading into deep waters. It is treading on thin ice. If it fails to take proper measures, it will lose the public trust, it will lose control of the nation. The people will suffer and in time will cast the new government aside.
Full Text Below:
Trust can reduce social costs within a nation, by facilitating cooperative relationships between people. Trust is not easy to establish. When it has been lost, it is often difficult to re-establish. Trust is a form of social capital. If people lose trust in the government, the government loses its mandate to lead the people. This is definitely an uneasy situation for any society.
In contrast to past administrations, the new government had four long months to prepare. Yet only one month after assuming power, the public has reached a reluctant conclusion. This new administration, dominated by a single party, one that enjoys “total government”, is an utterly clueless Rube Goldberg assembly. Tsai Ing-wen's new government now faces a challenge -- not from opposition political parties, but from the general public. This crisis of confidence is the result of structural contradictions and duplicity, of majoritarian arrogance and the betrayal of social justice, of haste and callousness that have led to loose cannon policy formulation.
This crisis of confidence in the new government manifests itself in a number of ways, and on many occasions. These include cross-Strait relations and relations between the ruling and opposition parties during legislative interpolation. They include the new government's distorted representations of history and national identity. This crisis shows no signs of subsiding, but only of worsening. Confidence in the new government's economic and trade strategy, and whether it can protect Taiwan's interests, is also rapidly diminishing.
DPP leaders at the city mayor and county chief level may enjoy popular support. But governing the nation is not the same as governing cities and counties. Local leaders may resort to emotional appeals to whitewash poor governance. They can pass the buck to the central government. But the central government must deal with international realpolitik, where the order of the say is “survival of the fittest”. Foreign competitors are not about to lend it a helping hand. Fail while enjoying “total government” and one must answer for it. Domestically, one will have no one to pass the buck to. Internationally, passing the buck to foreigners will be like shouting into the wind.
Governing a nation can be divided into two parts. One involves international strategic capability. One involves domestic governance. The moment the new government took office, it decided on several strategies. Culturally and educationally, it adopted an "Original Inhabitants History" strategy. It refused to correct fallacies in public school history texts. It distanced itself from Chinese culture. It embarked on wholesale de-Sinicization. Premier Lin Chuan even parroted the "Some comfort women volunteered" line promulgated by “History for Subjects of the Japanese Emperor".
In foreign trade, the new government proposes to "say goodbye to dependence on a single market". It proposes a "New Southern Strategy" that will weaken cross-Strait trade. In foreign policy, it hopes to join Shinzo Abe's "alliance of values", highlighting Taiwan's "anti-China" status.
The impact of the new government's strategy of cultural de-Sinicization, economic weakening of cross-Strait trade, and military alliances against the Mainland, is no longer limited to CCP decision-makers. It now includes the Mainland public. It now undermines their belief in DPP sincerity. This crisis of confidence is more terrifying than anything else imagineable. It will make the Taiwan Affairs Office increasingly wary about future concessions to the DPP government.
In terms of domestic governance, only one month after taking office, the new government is considering restarting the Number One Nuclear Power Plant. Tsai Ing-wen put it clearly. She said "We will not force people to choose between power shortages and nuclear power generation”. This constitutes a public admission that the DPP's "nuclear free homeland” pipe dream has bowed to reality. During her election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen vowed not to reduce the number of legal holidays below seven. Now that the DPP is in power however, it is preparing to cut them. As a result labor groups are protesting in front of the Executive Yuan. Nuclear energy issues and labor issues amount to a crisis of confidence, not just for the DPP administration and the legislative caucus. They amount to a crisis of confidence in the DPP among green camp voters.
The DPP treats the affairs of the nation as child's play. The list of examples is endless. The new Minister of Defense minister shipped 40,000 artillery shells to Taiping Island, raising alarms with the United States. The Ministry of Defense immediately covered for him, and said the shells were sent to Dongsha and Nansha instead. This 70-year-old minister told young people “When war comes, you must bravely march onto the battlefield and sacrifice your lives for the nation with a smile on your face”. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs flagrantly violated and conscience and her oath of office. She refused to say that Cong Zi Niao Reef is a reef, but instead claimed that its legal status is undetermined. On matters of national defense and foreign affairs, key officials have already seriously undermined trust in the new government's judgement and honesty.
Tsai Ing-wen's “vow of humility” still echoes in our ears. Yet she has in already given former President Ma Ying-jeou the cold shoulder. She refused to allow him go to Hong Kong to deliver a speech. Instead she granted former DPP president Chen Shui-bian medical parole. She characterized Chen Shui-bian's political fundraising dinner as a "healing”. She even thanked him for “his willingness to sit in a box seat”. If this is what the DPP considers "transitional justice", how the KMT and DPP possibly trust each other?
The crisis of confidence facing Tsai Ing-wen's new government is not confined to any single issue. It involves a chain of connected issues. It is the result of de-Sinicization, of intentionally weakened links to the Mainland, of opposing the Mainland while pretending to “maintain the status quo”. It is the result of meeting the demands of the opposition, while neglecting the demands of one's office. The new government's “transitional justice” rationalizes its failings while concealing its opportunism. Its internal contradictions have led to a crisis of confidence in the new government.
Tsai Ing-wen's new government is not yet beyond repair. But it must enage in thorough soul-searching. It must see the danger signs. It must see where its path leads. Tsai Ing-wen's new government is wading into deep waters. It is treading on thin ice. If it fails to take proper measures, it will lose the public trust, it will lose control of the nation. The people will suffer and in time will cast the new government aside.
社論－蔡英文政府的信任危機 瀕臨爆發
2016年06月16日 04:10 主筆室
「信任」可以減少社會運作的成本，也可以簡化人與人的合作關係。「信任」建立不易，卻可頃刻瓦解且難以再立。「信任」本身就是一項社會資本，如果人民失去對政府的信任，政府會逐漸喪失其引領社會的正當性，這個社會絕對是處於不安的情境。
相較以往，這次新政府的籌備期有長達4個月之久。但是，上任1個月的表現，卻讓外界感覺到，這個一黨獨大、完全執政的新政府是一輛毫無章法、匆匆上路的拼裝車。蔡英文新政府已經面臨到的，不是來自於在野黨政治權力的挑戰，而是最根本的信任危機。這些信任危機有的來自於結構性的矛盾，致使想法與作為表裡不一；也有的來自於多數權力的傲慢，偏離社會公義；還有的來自於草率地恣意妄為，致使荒腔走板。
新政府的信任危機出現在多方面。有兩岸間、朝野政黨間、立法行政間；在史觀認同、國家認同方面的信任危機，不但未見紓緩，反而更形深化；其對外經貿安全戰略能否確保台灣利益也出現信任危機。
或許在縣市首長層級，民進黨首長可以得到民眾的普遍支持，但是治國與治市畢竟是兩回事。地方首長可以用與人民博感情方式來掩蓋施政的不力，也可以將過失責任推給中央，但是中央卻必須面對優勝劣敗的國際權力競逐事實，外在競爭者不會雪中送炭，也不會錦上添花。完全執政的政府做不好，對內無責可推，對外沒人理會。
國家的治理可以分為兩大部分，一為涉外整體戰略能力，一為對內治理能力。新政府一上任就確定了幾個台灣的戰略方向。在文化教育上，採用「原民史觀」，廢除課綱微調，疏離中華文化，行「去中國」路線。林全院長甚而說出「慰安婦一些是自願」的談話，靠近日本的「皇民史觀」。
在對外經貿上，主張要「告別以往過於依賴單一市場的現象」，希望透過「新南向政策」的推動，形成「弱兩岸經貿」的事實。在對外安全上，希望能加入日本安倍晉三所倡導的「價值同盟」，凸顯台灣「抗中」的角色。
這種「文化去中、經貿弱中、安全抗中」的戰略選擇，所衝擊到的已經不只是中共的決策階層，更包括了大陸民間輿論對民進黨政府推動兩岸關係的信任，這種危機比什麼都可怕，也會使得國台辦未來在面對民進黨政府時更為戒慎恐懼，不敢輕率讓步。
在內部治理方面，新政府上任才1個月就考慮重啟「核一」運轉。蔡英文更明白地對外表示，「不會讓人民，只能在『缺電』和『核電』之間二選一」。這等於公開承認民進黨「廢核家園」理想最終可能向現實低頭。蔡英文選前曾承諾不會刪除7天勞工假期，但是民進黨一執政就準備砍假，勞工團體因此到行政院抗議。在核能與勞工議題上，存在的已經不僅是民進黨行政與立法團隊間的信任危機，更是綠營選民對民進黨的信任危機。
一些把國家事當兒戲的例子更是層出不窮。新任國防部長可以自爆要送4萬枚炮彈到南沙太平島，引起美國高度關切後，國防部為了掩過立刻澄清這批炮彈是送去東沙而非南沙，這位已經70多歲的部長還告訴年輕人，當戰爭來臨時，要勇敢走向戰場，「含笑」為國犧牲。新任外交部長也可以公開違背自己的知識與良心，不再說沖之鳥是個礁，反而主張其法律地位未定。國防與外交是國家大事，大政要員如此表現，已經嚴重傷害人民對新政府判斷力與誠實的信任。
蔡英文的「三個謙卑說」言猶在耳，但轉過頭來卻很霸氣地給馬英九前總統一個閉門羹，不讓他去香港發表演說，卻讓同黨的陳水扁前總統保外就醫備受禮遇，將陳水扁「會客」解釋成有益身心的「治療」活動，還感謝他願意委屈在「包廂」中會客。如果這就是民進黨所說的「轉型正義」，國、民兩黨之間還會有什麼信任可言？
蔡英文新政府所面臨的信任危機是環環相扣、節節相連，已經不是單一的一個點，而是由「去中、弱中、抗中／維持現狀」、「貫徹在野訴求／肩負執政責任」、「轉型正義／護短循私」所引發的結構性矛盾，這使得新政府的信任已經有全面崩裂的跡象。
蔡英文新政府要彌補的也不是點的修補，而應全面反思。見微知著，見始知終，蔡英文新政府若不能再有臨深履薄的戒慎，信任必將盡失，失去信任，施政必將失敗，將帶給人民苦難悲怨，遭人唾棄。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 16, 2016
Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen's new government is not yet beyond repair. But it must enage in thorough soul-searching. It must see the danger signs. It must see where its path leads. Tsai Ing-wen's new government is wading into deep waters. It is treading on thin ice. If it fails to take proper measures, it will lose the public trust, it will lose control of the nation. The people will suffer and in time will cast the new government aside.
Full Text Below:
Trust can reduce social costs within a nation, by facilitating cooperative relationships between people. Trust is not easy to establish. When it has been lost, it is often difficult to re-establish. Trust is a form of social capital. If people lose trust in the government, the government loses its mandate to lead the people. This is definitely an uneasy situation for any society.
In contrast to past administrations, the new government had four long months to prepare. Yet only one month after assuming power, the public has reached a reluctant conclusion. This new administration, dominated by a single party, one that enjoys “total government”, is an utterly clueless Rube Goldberg assembly. Tsai Ing-wen's new government now faces a challenge -- not from opposition political parties, but from the general public. This crisis of confidence is the result of structural contradictions and duplicity, of majoritarian arrogance and the betrayal of social justice, of haste and callousness that have led to loose cannon policy formulation.
This crisis of confidence in the new government manifests itself in a number of ways, and on many occasions. These include cross-Strait relations and relations between the ruling and opposition parties during legislative interpolation. They include the new government's distorted representations of history and national identity. This crisis shows no signs of subsiding, but only of worsening. Confidence in the new government's economic and trade strategy, and whether it can protect Taiwan's interests, is also rapidly diminishing.
DPP leaders at the city mayor and county chief level may enjoy popular support. But governing the nation is not the same as governing cities and counties. Local leaders may resort to emotional appeals to whitewash poor governance. They can pass the buck to the central government. But the central government must deal with international realpolitik, where the order of the say is “survival of the fittest”. Foreign competitors are not about to lend it a helping hand. Fail while enjoying “total government” and one must answer for it. Domestically, one will have no one to pass the buck to. Internationally, passing the buck to foreigners will be like shouting into the wind.
Governing a nation can be divided into two parts. One involves international strategic capability. One involves domestic governance. The moment the new government took office, it decided on several strategies. Culturally and educationally, it adopted an "Original Inhabitants History" strategy. It refused to correct fallacies in public school history texts. It distanced itself from Chinese culture. It embarked on wholesale de-Sinicization. Premier Lin Chuan even parroted the "Some comfort women volunteered" line promulgated by “History for Subjects of the Japanese Emperor".
In foreign trade, the new government proposes to "say goodbye to dependence on a single market". It proposes a "New Southern Strategy" that will weaken cross-Strait trade. In foreign policy, it hopes to join Shinzo Abe's "alliance of values", highlighting Taiwan's "anti-China" status.
The impact of the new government's strategy of cultural de-Sinicization, economic weakening of cross-Strait trade, and military alliances against the Mainland, is no longer limited to CCP decision-makers. It now includes the Mainland public. It now undermines their belief in DPP sincerity. This crisis of confidence is more terrifying than anything else imagineable. It will make the Taiwan Affairs Office increasingly wary about future concessions to the DPP government.
In terms of domestic governance, only one month after taking office, the new government is considering restarting the Number One Nuclear Power Plant. Tsai Ing-wen put it clearly. She said "We will not force people to choose between power shortages and nuclear power generation”. This constitutes a public admission that the DPP's "nuclear free homeland” pipe dream has bowed to reality. During her election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen vowed not to reduce the number of legal holidays below seven. Now that the DPP is in power however, it is preparing to cut them. As a result labor groups are protesting in front of the Executive Yuan. Nuclear energy issues and labor issues amount to a crisis of confidence, not just for the DPP administration and the legislative caucus. They amount to a crisis of confidence in the DPP among green camp voters.
The DPP treats the affairs of the nation as child's play. The list of examples is endless. The new Minister of Defense minister shipped 40,000 artillery shells to Taiping Island, raising alarms with the United States. The Ministry of Defense immediately covered for him, and said the shells were sent to Dongsha and Nansha instead. This 70-year-old minister told young people “When war comes, you must bravely march onto the battlefield and sacrifice your lives for the nation with a smile on your face”. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs flagrantly violated and conscience and her oath of office. She refused to say that Cong Zi Niao Reef is a reef, but instead claimed that its legal status is undetermined. On matters of national defense and foreign affairs, key officials have already seriously undermined trust in the new government's judgement and honesty.
Tsai Ing-wen's “vow of humility” still echoes in our ears. Yet she has in already given former President Ma Ying-jeou the cold shoulder. She refused to allow him go to Hong Kong to deliver a speech. Instead she granted former DPP president Chen Shui-bian medical parole. She characterized Chen Shui-bian's political fundraising dinner as a "healing”. She even thanked him for “his willingness to sit in a box seat”. If this is what the DPP considers "transitional justice", how the KMT and DPP possibly trust each other?
The crisis of confidence facing Tsai Ing-wen's new government is not confined to any single issue. It involves a chain of connected issues. It is the result of de-Sinicization, of intentionally weakened links to the Mainland, of opposing the Mainland while pretending to “maintain the status quo”. It is the result of meeting the demands of the opposition, while neglecting the demands of one's office. The new government's “transitional justice” rationalizes its failings while concealing its opportunism. Its internal contradictions have led to a crisis of confidence in the new government.
Tsai Ing-wen's new government is not yet beyond repair. But it must enage in thorough soul-searching. It must see the danger signs. It must see where its path leads. Tsai Ing-wen's new government is wading into deep waters. It is treading on thin ice. If it fails to take proper measures, it will lose the public trust, it will lose control of the nation. The people will suffer and in time will cast the new government aside.
社論－蔡英文政府的信任危機 瀕臨爆發
2016年06月16日 04:10 主筆室
「信任」可以減少社會運作的成本，也可以簡化人與人的合作關係。「信任」建立不易，卻可頃刻瓦解且難以再立。「信任」本身就是一項社會資本，如果人民失去對政府的信任，政府會逐漸喪失其引領社會的正當性，這個社會絕對是處於不安的情境。
相較以往，這次新政府的籌備期有長達4個月之久。但是，上任1個月的表現，卻讓外界感覺到，這個一黨獨大、完全執政的新政府是一輛毫無章法、匆匆上路的拼裝車。蔡英文新政府已經面臨到的，不是來自於在野黨政治權力的挑戰，而是最根本的信任危機。這些信任危機有的來自於結構性的矛盾，致使想法與作為表裡不一；也有的來自於多數權力的傲慢，偏離社會公義；還有的來自於草率地恣意妄為，致使荒腔走板。
新政府的信任危機出現在多方面。有兩岸間、朝野政黨間、立法行政間；在史觀認同、國家認同方面的信任危機，不但未見紓緩，反而更形深化；其對外經貿安全戰略能否確保台灣利益也出現信任危機。
或許在縣市首長層級，民進黨首長可以得到民眾的普遍支持，但是治國與治市畢竟是兩回事。地方首長可以用與人民博感情方式來掩蓋施政的不力，也可以將過失責任推給中央，但是中央卻必須面對優勝劣敗的國際權力競逐事實，外在競爭者不會雪中送炭，也不會錦上添花。完全執政的政府做不好，對內無責可推，對外沒人理會。
國家的治理可以分為兩大部分，一為涉外整體戰略能力，一為對內治理能力。新政府一上任就確定了幾個台灣的戰略方向。在文化教育上，採用「原民史觀」，廢除課綱微調，疏離中華文化，行「去中國」路線。林全院長甚而說出「慰安婦一些是自願」的談話，靠近日本的「皇民史觀」。
在對外經貿上，主張要「告別以往過於依賴單一市場的現象」，希望透過「新南向政策」的推動，形成「弱兩岸經貿」的事實。在對外安全上，希望能加入日本安倍晉三所倡導的「價值同盟」，凸顯台灣「抗中」的角色。
這種「文化去中、經貿弱中、安全抗中」的戰略選擇，所衝擊到的已經不只是中共的決策階層，更包括了大陸民間輿論對民進黨政府推動兩岸關係的信任，這種危機比什麼都可怕，也會使得國台辦未來在面對民進黨政府時更為戒慎恐懼，不敢輕率讓步。
在內部治理方面，新政府上任才1個月就考慮重啟「核一」運轉。蔡英文更明白地對外表示，「不會讓人民，只能在『缺電』和『核電』之間二選一」。這等於公開承認民進黨「廢核家園」理想最終可能向現實低頭。蔡英文選前曾承諾不會刪除7天勞工假期，但是民進黨一執政就準備砍假，勞工團體因此到行政院抗議。在核能與勞工議題上，存在的已經不僅是民進黨行政與立法團隊間的信任危機，更是綠營選民對民進黨的信任危機。
一些把國家事當兒戲的例子更是層出不窮。新任國防部長可以自爆要送4萬枚炮彈到南沙太平島，引起美國高度關切後，國防部為了掩過立刻澄清這批炮彈是送去東沙而非南沙，這位已經70多歲的部長還告訴年輕人，當戰爭來臨時，要勇敢走向戰場，「含笑」為國犧牲。新任外交部長也可以公開違背自己的知識與良心，不再說沖之鳥是個礁，反而主張其法律地位未定。國防與外交是國家大事，大政要員如此表現，已經嚴重傷害人民對新政府判斷力與誠實的信任。
蔡英文的「三個謙卑說」言猶在耳，但轉過頭來卻很霸氣地給馬英九前總統一個閉門羹，不讓他去香港發表演說，卻讓同黨的陳水扁前總統保外就醫備受禮遇，將陳水扁「會客」解釋成有益身心的「治療」活動，還感謝他願意委屈在「包廂」中會客。如果這就是民進黨所說的「轉型正義」，國、民兩黨之間還會有什麼信任可言？
蔡英文新政府所面臨的信任危機是環環相扣、節節相連，已經不是單一的一個點，而是由「去中、弱中、抗中／維持現狀」、「貫徹在野訴求／肩負執政責任」、「轉型正義／護短循私」所引發的結構性矛盾，這使得新政府的信任已經有全面崩裂的跡象。
蔡英文新政府要彌補的也不是點的修補，而應全面反思。見微知著，見始知終，蔡英文新政府若不能再有臨深履薄的戒慎，信任必將盡失，失去信任，施政必將失敗，將帶給人民苦難悲怨，遭人唾棄。
Tuesday, June 14, 2016
The Diaoyutai Conflict Affects the Strategic Triangle between US, Mainland China, and Russia
The Diaoyutai Conflict Affects the Strategic Triangle between US, Mainland China, and Russia
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 15, 2016
Executive Summary: Sino-US differences remain. US-Russian grievances deepen. China and Russia are no longer enemies. This describes the new US, Mainland China, Russian strategic triangle. The US continues to rally the nations of the world against China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are naturally going to band together. In a triangular relationship, any two sides of the triangle are necessarily greater than the third side. Sino-Russian cooperation is a nightmare for the United States. It will also shatter the existing international order.
Full Text Below:
Mainland Chinese and Russian missile destroyers have appeared simultaneously in Diaoyutai Island waters. The Abe Cabinet was taken aback. It concluded that Mainland China and Russia have joined hands to oppose Japan. It held an overnight emergency meeting and lodged a strong protest. But the US merely reiterated that "The US-Japan Security Treaty covers Diaoyutai Island waters". Beijing sternly refuted Japan. Russia denied that the two fleets "acted in unison”. Have Mainland China and Russia joined hands to oppose the US and Japan? More evidence is required. But the global strategic picture is rapidly coming into focus. Mainland China is attempting to ally itself with Russia in order to resist the US and Japan. A strategic triangle involving the US, Mainland China, and Russia is indeed taking shape.
During the Cold War the "strategic triangle" explained the triangular relationship between the US, Mainland China, and the Soviet Union. It remains applicable today. Since the end of the Cold War, all manner of strategic triangles have emerged from within the international community. But those involving the US continue to attract the most attention. In recent years, Russia has gradually restored its national power under the leadership of strongman Vladimir Putin. Events in Crimea and Ukraine have made the strategic triangle between the US, Mainland China, and Russia the most important one in today's world.
The strategic triangle between the US, Mainland China, and Russia, has never been an equal one. During the Cold War, the balance of power involved the US and Mainland China vs. the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, Washington attempted to contain not only Russia, but also Mainland China. Hence its "China Threat Theory". Obama's Asian-Pacific rebalancing is clearly aimed at Mainland China's increasing military might. In response to the Ukraine crisis, the US joined with the EU, both to contain Russia, and to resolve South China Sea disputes. The US pressured other nations to join its patrols. It constantly challenged Beijing's territorial sovereignty. The result is today's Sino-Russian anti-US posture. US Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Moscow in late March, was intended to normalize US-Russian relations. The US is already feeling the pressure of the Sino-Russian strategic alliance.
Within the new US, Mainland China, and Russia strategic triangle, Beijing remains most concerned about Sino-US relations. Xi Jinping has long reiterated his desire for a new "no conflict, no confrontation, cooperation and win-win" big power relationship. Xi is aware of the ups and downs of Sino-US relations. He knows the two sides have differences despite cooperation, conflict despite dialogue. But he also sees potential for cooperation in many areas.
Mainland China-Russia relations are at a historic peak. They are currently limited to a strategic partnership. But they are gradually moving toward "equality and trust, tolerance and learning, cooperation and win-win". As the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, the Moscow 2015 "5.9" Beijing Red Square parade, the 70th anniversary War of Resistance "9.3" parade showed, Xi Jinping and Putin have established a strong personal friendship. The Mainland and Russia cooperate closely on international and regional security matters. They enjoy a relatively solid "quasi-allies" relationship. By contrast, the new big power relationship between the Mainland and the US remains a castle in the air.
US-Russian relations are comparatively simple, but also the most complex. After the Cold War, the United States took advantage of the disintegration of the Soviet Union to expand NATO eastward. It incited 'color revolutions". It provoked divisions in the South Caucasus. Its imposed sanctions against Ukraine, forcing Moscow to suffer from Western economic sanctions and a US missile defense system in Eastern Europe. This led Russia to bolster its Asian-Pacific strategy, and ally with Mainland China to oppose the United States and Japan.
The international situation is treacherous and changeable. The interests of the United States, Mainland China, and Russia are constantly in flux. Western economic sanctions have accelerated Sino-Russian energy cooperation and the sale of sophisticated military hardware. The two sides have signed or intend to sign economic and trade agreements amounting to three trillion USD. Bilateral trade volume is likely to exceed 200 billion within five years. Bilateral trade includes weapons such as the new S-400 air defense missile systems and Su-35 fighters. It includes energy deals, in the form of a natural gas pipeline. It includes war production, such as wide-body aircraft, helicopter gunships, and navigation systems. It includes joint military exercises, twice last year, once in the Mediterranean, and once in the Sea of Japan. These further enhance bilateral strategic cooperation.
Trust between Mainland China and Russia remains inadequate. Short-term historical grievances have not been forgotten. But realpolitik considerations have led to strategic military cooperation. Putin will visit Beijing again later this month. Mainland China's alliance with Russia is bound to continue. Russia does not want its economic development determined by Mainland China. Its arms sales to Vietnam and India are intended to balance the US-Mainland China-Russia trilateral relationship. By the same token, Beijing's economic assistance to Russia also has limits. In particular, it must consider the potential impact of Mainland China-EU relations on the Sino-Russian alliance. Sino-Russian relations also have their limitations.
Sino-US differences remain. US-Russian grievances deepen. China and Russia are no longer enemies. This describes the new US, Mainland China, Russian strategic triangle. The US continues to rally the nations of the world against China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are naturally going to band together. In a triangular relationship, any two sides of the triangle are necessarily greater than the third side. Sino-Russian cooperation is a nightmare for the United States. It will also shatter the existing international order.
Kissinger warned Washington in the 1970s. He said that in the triangular relationship between the US, Mainland China, and Russia, relations between the US and China, and relations between the US and Russia, must be better than relations between China and Russia. But the current US, Mainland China, Russia strategic triangle is clearly inconsistent with Kissinger's expectations. The 2013 Joint Communique may not contain the words "based on the principles of non-alignment". But the term "non-group" implies an imminent bilateral alliance.
Sino-Russian relations have long involved a high degree of political friendship, a moderate degree of strategic cooperation, and a limited degree of economic cooperation. Even so, the Sino-Russian "quasi-alliance" is strong enough to threaten US global hegemony.
社論－釣島新風雲 牽動美中俄戰略三角
2016年06月15日 04:10 主筆室
中國與俄羅斯導彈驅逐艦同時出現在釣魚台海域，安倍內閣受到強烈震撼，認為是中俄聯手對抗日本，連夜召開緊急會議並提出強烈抗議，美國僅輕描淡寫強調「美日安保範圍包括釣魚台海域」。北京隨即嚴詞駁斥日方，俄羅斯則否認「聯合艦隊」的說法。中俄是否聯手對抗美日可能還需要更多證據，但全球戰略大局正在快速重整，中國企圖拉攏俄羅斯抗衡美日，「美中俄戰略三角」的確儼然成形。
冷戰年代就可以用「戰略三角」概念解讀美中蘇三邊互動，今日似乎依然適用。冷戰結束後國際社會出現各類型的戰略三角關係，但美國參與的戰略三角仍最受矚目。近年俄羅斯在強人普丁領導下國力逐漸恢復，經過克里米亞及烏克蘭事件考驗，「美中俄戰略三角」似漸成為今日世界最重要戰略三角。
美中俄戰略三角從來就不對等。冷戰時代，美國的權力平衡是「聯中制蘇」，後冷戰時期，華府的戰略既圍堵俄羅斯，又散播「中國威脅論」，歐巴馬的亞太再平衡，擺明是針對中國軍事崛起。因應烏克蘭危機，美國聯歐制俄，解決南海爭端，美國慫恿他國共同巡航，不斷挑戰北京護衛領土主權的底線，演變成今日中俄有意聯合抗美的態勢。美國務卿凱瑞3月下旬訪問莫斯科，意在重啟美俄正常化關係，似已感受到中俄戰略聯手的壓力。
美中俄新的戰略三角，北京最在意的還是中美關係。習近平多次重申願與美國建立「不衝突、不對抗、合作共贏」的新型大國關係，就是意識到中美關係起伏不定，雙方分歧中有合作、衝突中有對話，卻不乏多領域的潛在合作空間。
中俄關係正處於歷史巔峰，目前雖僅止於戰略協作夥伴，但逐步走向「平等互信、包容互鑒、合作共贏」。從2014索契冬季奧運、2015莫斯科「5.9」紅場閱兵與至北京紀念抗戰勝利70周年的「9.3」閱兵，習近平與普丁已建立深厚私誼。中俄在國際和區域安全事務的密切合作，已具有「準盟國」的架勢，較中美仍處於空中樓閣的新型大國關係，顯然紮實許多。
美俄關係相對單純，卻也最複雜。冷戰結束後，美國乘蘇聯解體之危，推動北約東擴、點燃「顏色革命」、分化南高加索國家，美國因烏克蘭危機的制裁，讓莫斯科再嘗西方經濟制裁及美國啟動東歐導彈防禦系統的苦果。加強亞太布局與「聯中抗美（日）」，成為其必要的戰略選擇。
國際情勢詭譎多變，美中俄新三角的利益交織亦隨之改變。西方的經濟制裁加速了中俄能源合作與尖端武器交易，雙方已簽訂或準備簽署的經貿協議總額高達3兆美元，5年內的雙邊貿易額更可能突破2000億美元。雙邊不斷就軍售（新型S-400防空導彈系統與蘇愷35型戰機）、能源（天然氣管線）、軍工生產（廣體客機、武裝直升機、導航系統等）尋求合作，去年兩次先後在地中海與日本海舉行的聯合軍演，進一步提升中俄戰略合作的層級。
中俄政治互信依然不足，歷史心結短期內亦難消除，但現實政治的考量，促使雙方走向軍事戰略合作。本月底普丁將再訪北京，勢必延續中俄結盟的態勢。論理，俄方不會樂見經濟發展受到中國牽制，其軍售越南與印度的作法，無非要平衡美中俄三邊關係；同樣，北京經濟援助俄國也有其限度，尤其要考量中俄結盟對中歐關係可能造成的衝擊，中俄關係緊密程度有其限制。
美中俄新三角的現狀是：中美分歧與摩擦不斷、美俄心結根深蒂固、中俄不再為敵。美國不斷塑造全球國家群起對抗中俄，北京與莫斯科自然會聯手。三角形的兩邊相加必然大於第三邊，中俄合作不僅是美國的噩夢，也會打破現有的國際格局。
季辛吉1970年代就警告華府，美中俄三角關係中的美中及美俄互動必須勝於中俄關係，但從現狀看來，美中俄新三角顯然不符季辛吉的預期。2013年中俄總理聯合公報雖未出現「依據不結盟原則」的字眼，但有關「非集團化」的表述暗喻了雙邊關係趨近於結盟。
中俄關係或有一段長時間處於「政治高度友好、戰略中度配合、經濟有限合作」的模式。即便如此，中俄的「準同盟」關係，卻足以威脅到美國獨霸全球的局面。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 15, 2016
Executive Summary: Sino-US differences remain. US-Russian grievances deepen. China and Russia are no longer enemies. This describes the new US, Mainland China, Russian strategic triangle. The US continues to rally the nations of the world against China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are naturally going to band together. In a triangular relationship, any two sides of the triangle are necessarily greater than the third side. Sino-Russian cooperation is a nightmare for the United States. It will also shatter the existing international order.
Full Text Below:
Mainland Chinese and Russian missile destroyers have appeared simultaneously in Diaoyutai Island waters. The Abe Cabinet was taken aback. It concluded that Mainland China and Russia have joined hands to oppose Japan. It held an overnight emergency meeting and lodged a strong protest. But the US merely reiterated that "The US-Japan Security Treaty covers Diaoyutai Island waters". Beijing sternly refuted Japan. Russia denied that the two fleets "acted in unison”. Have Mainland China and Russia joined hands to oppose the US and Japan? More evidence is required. But the global strategic picture is rapidly coming into focus. Mainland China is attempting to ally itself with Russia in order to resist the US and Japan. A strategic triangle involving the US, Mainland China, and Russia is indeed taking shape.
During the Cold War the "strategic triangle" explained the triangular relationship between the US, Mainland China, and the Soviet Union. It remains applicable today. Since the end of the Cold War, all manner of strategic triangles have emerged from within the international community. But those involving the US continue to attract the most attention. In recent years, Russia has gradually restored its national power under the leadership of strongman Vladimir Putin. Events in Crimea and Ukraine have made the strategic triangle between the US, Mainland China, and Russia the most important one in today's world.
The strategic triangle between the US, Mainland China, and Russia, has never been an equal one. During the Cold War, the balance of power involved the US and Mainland China vs. the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, Washington attempted to contain not only Russia, but also Mainland China. Hence its "China Threat Theory". Obama's Asian-Pacific rebalancing is clearly aimed at Mainland China's increasing military might. In response to the Ukraine crisis, the US joined with the EU, both to contain Russia, and to resolve South China Sea disputes. The US pressured other nations to join its patrols. It constantly challenged Beijing's territorial sovereignty. The result is today's Sino-Russian anti-US posture. US Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Moscow in late March, was intended to normalize US-Russian relations. The US is already feeling the pressure of the Sino-Russian strategic alliance.
Within the new US, Mainland China, and Russia strategic triangle, Beijing remains most concerned about Sino-US relations. Xi Jinping has long reiterated his desire for a new "no conflict, no confrontation, cooperation and win-win" big power relationship. Xi is aware of the ups and downs of Sino-US relations. He knows the two sides have differences despite cooperation, conflict despite dialogue. But he also sees potential for cooperation in many areas.
Mainland China-Russia relations are at a historic peak. They are currently limited to a strategic partnership. But they are gradually moving toward "equality and trust, tolerance and learning, cooperation and win-win". As the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, the Moscow 2015 "5.9" Beijing Red Square parade, the 70th anniversary War of Resistance "9.3" parade showed, Xi Jinping and Putin have established a strong personal friendship. The Mainland and Russia cooperate closely on international and regional security matters. They enjoy a relatively solid "quasi-allies" relationship. By contrast, the new big power relationship between the Mainland and the US remains a castle in the air.
US-Russian relations are comparatively simple, but also the most complex. After the Cold War, the United States took advantage of the disintegration of the Soviet Union to expand NATO eastward. It incited 'color revolutions". It provoked divisions in the South Caucasus. Its imposed sanctions against Ukraine, forcing Moscow to suffer from Western economic sanctions and a US missile defense system in Eastern Europe. This led Russia to bolster its Asian-Pacific strategy, and ally with Mainland China to oppose the United States and Japan.
The international situation is treacherous and changeable. The interests of the United States, Mainland China, and Russia are constantly in flux. Western economic sanctions have accelerated Sino-Russian energy cooperation and the sale of sophisticated military hardware. The two sides have signed or intend to sign economic and trade agreements amounting to three trillion USD. Bilateral trade volume is likely to exceed 200 billion within five years. Bilateral trade includes weapons such as the new S-400 air defense missile systems and Su-35 fighters. It includes energy deals, in the form of a natural gas pipeline. It includes war production, such as wide-body aircraft, helicopter gunships, and navigation systems. It includes joint military exercises, twice last year, once in the Mediterranean, and once in the Sea of Japan. These further enhance bilateral strategic cooperation.
Trust between Mainland China and Russia remains inadequate. Short-term historical grievances have not been forgotten. But realpolitik considerations have led to strategic military cooperation. Putin will visit Beijing again later this month. Mainland China's alliance with Russia is bound to continue. Russia does not want its economic development determined by Mainland China. Its arms sales to Vietnam and India are intended to balance the US-Mainland China-Russia trilateral relationship. By the same token, Beijing's economic assistance to Russia also has limits. In particular, it must consider the potential impact of Mainland China-EU relations on the Sino-Russian alliance. Sino-Russian relations also have their limitations.
Sino-US differences remain. US-Russian grievances deepen. China and Russia are no longer enemies. This describes the new US, Mainland China, Russian strategic triangle. The US continues to rally the nations of the world against China and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are naturally going to band together. In a triangular relationship, any two sides of the triangle are necessarily greater than the third side. Sino-Russian cooperation is a nightmare for the United States. It will also shatter the existing international order.
Kissinger warned Washington in the 1970s. He said that in the triangular relationship between the US, Mainland China, and Russia, relations between the US and China, and relations between the US and Russia, must be better than relations between China and Russia. But the current US, Mainland China, Russia strategic triangle is clearly inconsistent with Kissinger's expectations. The 2013 Joint Communique may not contain the words "based on the principles of non-alignment". But the term "non-group" implies an imminent bilateral alliance.
Sino-Russian relations have long involved a high degree of political friendship, a moderate degree of strategic cooperation, and a limited degree of economic cooperation. Even so, the Sino-Russian "quasi-alliance" is strong enough to threaten US global hegemony.
社論－釣島新風雲 牽動美中俄戰略三角
2016年06月15日 04:10 主筆室
中國與俄羅斯導彈驅逐艦同時出現在釣魚台海域，安倍內閣受到強烈震撼，認為是中俄聯手對抗日本，連夜召開緊急會議並提出強烈抗議，美國僅輕描淡寫強調「美日安保範圍包括釣魚台海域」。北京隨即嚴詞駁斥日方，俄羅斯則否認「聯合艦隊」的說法。中俄是否聯手對抗美日可能還需要更多證據，但全球戰略大局正在快速重整，中國企圖拉攏俄羅斯抗衡美日，「美中俄戰略三角」的確儼然成形。
冷戰年代就可以用「戰略三角」概念解讀美中蘇三邊互動，今日似乎依然適用。冷戰結束後國際社會出現各類型的戰略三角關係，但美國參與的戰略三角仍最受矚目。近年俄羅斯在強人普丁領導下國力逐漸恢復，經過克里米亞及烏克蘭事件考驗，「美中俄戰略三角」似漸成為今日世界最重要戰略三角。
美中俄戰略三角從來就不對等。冷戰時代，美國的權力平衡是「聯中制蘇」，後冷戰時期，華府的戰略既圍堵俄羅斯，又散播「中國威脅論」，歐巴馬的亞太再平衡，擺明是針對中國軍事崛起。因應烏克蘭危機，美國聯歐制俄，解決南海爭端，美國慫恿他國共同巡航，不斷挑戰北京護衛領土主權的底線，演變成今日中俄有意聯合抗美的態勢。美國務卿凱瑞3月下旬訪問莫斯科，意在重啟美俄正常化關係，似已感受到中俄戰略聯手的壓力。
美中俄新的戰略三角，北京最在意的還是中美關係。習近平多次重申願與美國建立「不衝突、不對抗、合作共贏」的新型大國關係，就是意識到中美關係起伏不定，雙方分歧中有合作、衝突中有對話，卻不乏多領域的潛在合作空間。
中俄關係正處於歷史巔峰，目前雖僅止於戰略協作夥伴，但逐步走向「平等互信、包容互鑒、合作共贏」。從2014索契冬季奧運、2015莫斯科「5.9」紅場閱兵與至北京紀念抗戰勝利70周年的「9.3」閱兵，習近平與普丁已建立深厚私誼。中俄在國際和區域安全事務的密切合作，已具有「準盟國」的架勢，較中美仍處於空中樓閣的新型大國關係，顯然紮實許多。
美俄關係相對單純，卻也最複雜。冷戰結束後，美國乘蘇聯解體之危，推動北約東擴、點燃「顏色革命」、分化南高加索國家，美國因烏克蘭危機的制裁，讓莫斯科再嘗西方經濟制裁及美國啟動東歐導彈防禦系統的苦果。加強亞太布局與「聯中抗美（日）」，成為其必要的戰略選擇。
國際情勢詭譎多變，美中俄新三角的利益交織亦隨之改變。西方的經濟制裁加速了中俄能源合作與尖端武器交易，雙方已簽訂或準備簽署的經貿協議總額高達3兆美元，5年內的雙邊貿易額更可能突破2000億美元。雙邊不斷就軍售（新型S-400防空導彈系統與蘇愷35型戰機）、能源（天然氣管線）、軍工生產（廣體客機、武裝直升機、導航系統等）尋求合作，去年兩次先後在地中海與日本海舉行的聯合軍演，進一步提升中俄戰略合作的層級。
中俄政治互信依然不足，歷史心結短期內亦難消除，但現實政治的考量，促使雙方走向軍事戰略合作。本月底普丁將再訪北京，勢必延續中俄結盟的態勢。論理，俄方不會樂見經濟發展受到中國牽制，其軍售越南與印度的作法，無非要平衡美中俄三邊關係；同樣，北京經濟援助俄國也有其限度，尤其要考量中俄結盟對中歐關係可能造成的衝擊，中俄關係緊密程度有其限制。
美中俄新三角的現狀是：中美分歧與摩擦不斷、美俄心結根深蒂固、中俄不再為敵。美國不斷塑造全球國家群起對抗中俄，北京與莫斯科自然會聯手。三角形的兩邊相加必然大於第三邊，中俄合作不僅是美國的噩夢，也會打破現有的國際格局。
季辛吉1970年代就警告華府，美中俄三角關係中的美中及美俄互動必須勝於中俄關係，但從現狀看來，美中俄新三角顯然不符季辛吉的預期。2013年中俄總理聯合公報雖未出現「依據不結盟原則」的字眼，但有關「非集團化」的表述暗喻了雙邊關係趨近於結盟。
中俄關係或有一段長時間處於「政治高度友好、戰略中度配合、經濟有限合作」的模式。即便如此，中俄的「準同盟」關係，卻足以威脅到美國獨霸全球的局面。
Monday, June 13, 2016
Taiwan's Primacy Requires Resolute Opposition to Taiwan Independence
Taiwan's Primacy Requires Resolute Opposition to Taiwan Independence
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 14, 2016
Executive Summary: Many on Taiwan are willing to relegate themselves to the status of pawns of other great powers intent on containing the Mainland, merely for the sake of Taiwan independence. In doing so, they have reduced Taiwan to the laughing stock of the world. Twenty-first century China is no longer post-Opium War China. Many think a new era of joint Sino-US co-governance has arrived. Others think the 21st century will be one in which the East dominates the West. China awaits transformation. It looks to a future full of challenges. The world is rapidly changing. Western models of governance are undergoing major crises. We on Taiwan should insist on Taiwan's primacy. But we must also approach the Mainland with an open mind. We must integrate the best of Chinese culture and Western values. We must work with the Mainland to birth a renaissance of the Chinese people. That is the path we should take.
Full Text Below:
In recent years, a rising tide of Taiwan independence sentiment suggests that "natural Taiwan independence" has gone mainstream. It suggests that a split between the two sides is a foregone conclusion. But upon closer scrutiny, the Taiwan independence movement's words and deeds always seem a little off, and always ring a little hollow. One might even say that the Taiwan independence movement's words and deeds are a tree without roots.
Advocates of Taiwan independence adopt an “If not me, who? If not now, when?” attitude. They claim the exclusive right to decide who “loves Taiwan”. They claim the exclusive right to define Taiwan's "sovereignty" and "dignity". Green camp “love for Taiwan” is presumed. The blue camp, conversely, cannot possibly “love Taiwan”. When the ruling DPP uses the term "Chinese Taipei", it has done nothing to demean Taiwan. When the ruling KMT uses the term "Chinese Taipei" however, it has “humiliated the nation”. When DPP city mayors and county chiefs solicit business on the Mainland, they are “rational and pragmatic”. When the KMT increases Mainland tourism to Taiwan, it is “pandering to China and selling out Taiwan”. Examples of such DPP hypocrisy are too numerous to list. Any rational person can see the absurdity of such DPP rhetoric. Unfortunately such demagoguery sells all too well on Taiwan.
Those inclined toward Taiwan independence consider “Taiwanese primacy” and “Taiwanese dignity” as matters of major importance. They scrutinize every exchange with the Mainland with a magnifying glass. Anything that can be perceived as a slight is cited as evidence that the Mainland has "demeaned Taiwan". Meanwhile, they themselves constantly taunt the Mainland. They constantly accuse the Mainland of having a "glass heart". They constantly boast that “Taiwan is Number One!” In their refusal to bow before the Mainland, one might imagine that they embody the Hakka spirit of defiance.
Sadly, that is not the whole picture. There is another, paradoxical phenomenon. Even the Japanese admit they imposed colonial rule on Taiwan. Yet many on Taiwan insist that their motherland is Japan. Really? Were these people in fact classified as Japanese during Japan's colonial occupation? When asked whether the comfort women volunteered or were forced, they say “Some were but some were not”. Opponents of school textbook corrections even argue that claims that the comfort women were forced hurts the feelings of the Japanese. When the Japanese expel Taiwan fishing boats from Cong Zi Niao Reef, these same advocates of Taiwan independence dare not utter a peep about whether Cong Zi Niao is a reef or an island. They dare not criticize Japan, yest insist they alone are qualified to deal with the fishing rights dispute. These advocates of Taiwan independence cannot even defend the dignity of their own countrymen. The Japanese spit in their faces, and they respond by meekly wiping the spittle away. How exactly have they defended Taiwan's sovereignty and dignity? What exactly has become of Taiwan's primacy?
For too many years Taiwan has paid too a high price on behalf of these advocates of Taiwan independence. Taiwan has sacrificed its sovereignty and dignity. It has suffered other more tangible losses as well. This is especially true since the new government came to power and allied with the US and Japan to oppose the Mainland. It has abandoned many positions long held by the Ma government. The importation of US pork was merely a matter of time. The new government is about to allow food imports from Japan's nuclear disaster region. Arms purchases from the US will soon be on its agenda. US lawmakers have even come calling, and demanded that arms purchases be increased to 3% of GDP. Many of these moves were intended to buy US and Japanese support in resisting pressure from the Mainland. Chen Shui-bian era checkbook diplomacy is still fresh in people's memories. Yet the new government yearns to become the next sucker?
In order to rid itself of so-called “dependence on the Mainland”, the new government is pushing its New Southern Strategy full force. It is even subsidizing descendants of immigrants if they return to Taiwan. It is calling for increased awareness of the mother country, and closer contacts. New immigrants and their descendants were subject to discrimination in the past. Taking care of new immigrants is the right thing to do, and something we support. But isn't the new government's discriminatory policy just a tad too flagrant? What about Mainland spouses and their children? Aren't they Republic of China citizens? Don't they need to strengthen ties with the Mainland? Or does anyone who has any connection to the Mainland vilified as “The Other”?
If we truly love Taiwan, if we truly believe in Taiwan's primacy, we must punch holes in the Taiwan independence movement's hypocrisy. We must resolutely oppose all words and deeds that incite hatred against our Chinese origins and Chinese heritage. We must confidently oppose Taiwan independence. As long as one lives on Taiwan, one is qualified to “love Taiwan”. Whether one was born on Taiwan, born on the Mainland, or an indigenous person is of no importance. Nor does it matter whether one is blue or green. Taiwanese are also Chinese. One can love Taiwan while supporting reunification. None of these should be cause for conflict.
We hope everyone on Taiwan will realize that Taiwan's dignity cannot be achieved by groveling. Still less can it be achieved by means of media deception. If we wish to win the world's respect, we must first determine who is really Taiwanese. Taiwan clearly cannot sever its links with the Mainland. The two sides share the same Chinese culture and Chinese civilization. Also, the Mainland has become a world-class nation with international influence.
Many on Taiwan are willing to relegate themselves to the status of pawns of other great powers intent on containing the Mainland, merely for the sake of Taiwan independence. In doing so, they have reduced Taiwan to the laughing stock of the world. Twenty-first century China is no longer post-Opium War China. Many think a new era of joint Sino-US co-governance has arrived. Others think the 21st century will be one in which the East dominates the West. China awaits transformation. It looks to a future full of challenges. The world is rapidly changing. Western models of governance are undergoing major crises. We on Taiwan should insist on Taiwan's primacy. But we must also approach the Mainland with an open mind. We must integrate the best of Chinese culture and Western values. We must work with the Mainland to birth a renaissance of the Chinese people. That is the path we should take.
社論－堅持台灣主體性 就要反台獨
2016年06月14日 04:10 主筆室
這些年來台獨思潮甚囂塵上，給人感覺就是「天然獨」已成主流、兩岸分裂也幾成定局。但仔細推敲現在檯面上這些台獨言行，又總讓人感覺有些奇怪，給人一種強烈的虛無之感，若再進一步言，則可說現在的這些台獨言行，根本是無本之木。
具體而言，現在的台獨主張者擺出一副捨我其誰的架勢，壟斷了「愛台灣」的詮釋權，也壟斷了所謂「主權」與「尊嚴」的界定權。綠營愛台灣是天經地義，藍營卻注定沒權利愛台灣；民進黨政府使用「中華台北」叫沒有矮化，國民黨政府使用「中華台北」卻叫喪權辱國；民進黨縣市長登陸行銷叫理性務實，國民黨推動陸客來台叫親中賣台；舉凡種種，不敢說罄竹難書，也只能是族繁不及備載。任何理性的人都會看出這種說辭的荒謬，但現實就是這類說法還十分有市場。
傾向獨立的人將台灣人的主體性、台灣人的尊嚴視為一大事，在與大陸交往拿著放大鏡檢視，任何一件小事都能找到大陸「矮化」台灣的證據，與此同時，還處處挑釁大陸，動輒就說大陸是「玻璃心」，而台灣則是NO.1。看起來這些人確實都具備了客家人的「硬頸」精神，面對大陸絲毫不會低頭。
但我們同時也看到一個弔詭的現象，日本人都承認是對台灣殖民統治，卻有很多台灣人說當年自己的祖國是日本，問題是當年你也配當日本人？當問到慰安婦是自願還是強迫時，他們會說兩者都有，反課綱的抗議者甚至還說，不能說慰安婦是被強迫的，不然會傷害日本人的感情。我們還會看到，當日本人在沖之鳥礁驅趕台灣漁船時，這些人竟然連沖之鳥是礁還是島，都不敢說出個立場來，甚至還敢批評前朝，自誇自己才有能力處理漁權爭議。主張台獨到連同胞都保護不了，自己的尊嚴被隨便踐踏也可以唾面自乾，這豈是維護主權和尊嚴，台灣主體性又放在哪裡？
這些年來台灣為了這些人所主張的台獨已經付出太多代價，不光是主權和尊嚴，更有實實在在的利益。尤其是新政府上台之後，為了推行聯美日制大陸的政策，馬政府原本堅持的各種立場紛紛棄守，美豬開放進口只是時間問題，日本核災區食品也即將要開放進口，對美軍事採購也必須迅速提上議事日程，美國議員甚至直接來到家門口要求軍費提升到GDP的3%。如此種種，無非就是為了讓美日繼續支持台灣，抗拒來自大陸的壓力。陳水扁時代的凱子外交還未從人們的記憶中消失，現在新政府又打算來當新凱子？
為了擺脫對大陸的所謂依賴，新政府現在如火如荼地推行新南向政策，甚至還要補助新移民後代回到母國，美其名曰增加對母國的認識，加深彼此的聯繫。過去新移民及其後代在台灣社會或多或少受到歧視，現在政府要照顧新移民當然無可厚非，我們當然全力支持，但政府如此直接的進行差別待遇，是否過分了一些？陸配和他們的子女難道就不是中華民國的國民？難道他們就不需要加強與大陸的聯繫？還是說他們只要跟大陸沾到邊，就注定是非我族類？
如果我們真心愛台灣，真誠堅持台灣主體性，就要戳破這些說辭的虛偽本質，要堅決反對一切否定兩岸血緣與文化連結的言行，要理直氣壯反對台獨。只要是台灣人，就有權力愛台灣，不分本省人、外省人以及原住民，更不分藍營還是綠營。台灣人也是中國人、愛台灣也可以支持統一，這些都不應該是衝突的概念。
我們也希望所有台灣人都能意識到，台灣人的尊嚴不能靠搖尾乞憐來獲得，更不應拿一些新聞事件來自欺欺人，台灣要贏得世人的尊重，就必須真正弄清楚台灣人到底是誰。顯然，台灣不可能擺脫與大陸的連結，不光是因為兩岸共享中華文化與文明，更因為現在的大陸早已成為具國際影響力的世界級大國。
我們看到許多台灣人為了台獨主張，不惜自甘為其他大國制衡大陸的棋子，卻大言不慚是為了維護台灣的主權與尊嚴，實在是滑天下之大稽。誰都不能否認，21世紀中國已非鴉片戰爭後的中國，許多人認為世界已進入中美共同治理的2G格局，也有人相信21世紀東風將壓倒西風。誠然，中國正待轉型，前瞻未來充滿挑戰，但世界也在快速改變，西方治理模式也出現重大危機。對台灣來說，堅持台灣主體，虛心理解大陸、走好中華文化與西方體制價值觀的融合之路，以此利基與中國大陸攜手實現中國人共同的復興，才是正確的抉擇。
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 14, 2016
Executive Summary: Many on Taiwan are willing to relegate themselves to the status of pawns of other great powers intent on containing the Mainland, merely for the sake of Taiwan independence. In doing so, they have reduced Taiwan to the laughing stock of the world. Twenty-first century China is no longer post-Opium War China. Many think a new era of joint Sino-US co-governance has arrived. Others think the 21st century will be one in which the East dominates the West. China awaits transformation. It looks to a future full of challenges. The world is rapidly changing. Western models of governance are undergoing major crises. We on Taiwan should insist on Taiwan's primacy. But we must also approach the Mainland with an open mind. We must integrate the best of Chinese culture and Western values. We must work with the Mainland to birth a renaissance of the Chinese people. That is the path we should take.
Full Text Below:
In recent years, a rising tide of Taiwan independence sentiment suggests that "natural Taiwan independence" has gone mainstream. It suggests that a split between the two sides is a foregone conclusion. But upon closer scrutiny, the Taiwan independence movement's words and deeds always seem a little off, and always ring a little hollow. One might even say that the Taiwan independence movement's words and deeds are a tree without roots.
Advocates of Taiwan independence adopt an “If not me, who? If not now, when?” attitude. They claim the exclusive right to decide who “loves Taiwan”. They claim the exclusive right to define Taiwan's "sovereignty" and "dignity". Green camp “love for Taiwan” is presumed. The blue camp, conversely, cannot possibly “love Taiwan”. When the ruling DPP uses the term "Chinese Taipei", it has done nothing to demean Taiwan. When the ruling KMT uses the term "Chinese Taipei" however, it has “humiliated the nation”. When DPP city mayors and county chiefs solicit business on the Mainland, they are “rational and pragmatic”. When the KMT increases Mainland tourism to Taiwan, it is “pandering to China and selling out Taiwan”. Examples of such DPP hypocrisy are too numerous to list. Any rational person can see the absurdity of such DPP rhetoric. Unfortunately such demagoguery sells all too well on Taiwan.
Those inclined toward Taiwan independence consider “Taiwanese primacy” and “Taiwanese dignity” as matters of major importance. They scrutinize every exchange with the Mainland with a magnifying glass. Anything that can be perceived as a slight is cited as evidence that the Mainland has "demeaned Taiwan". Meanwhile, they themselves constantly taunt the Mainland. They constantly accuse the Mainland of having a "glass heart". They constantly boast that “Taiwan is Number One!” In their refusal to bow before the Mainland, one might imagine that they embody the Hakka spirit of defiance.
Sadly, that is not the whole picture. There is another, paradoxical phenomenon. Even the Japanese admit they imposed colonial rule on Taiwan. Yet many on Taiwan insist that their motherland is Japan. Really? Were these people in fact classified as Japanese during Japan's colonial occupation? When asked whether the comfort women volunteered or were forced, they say “Some were but some were not”. Opponents of school textbook corrections even argue that claims that the comfort women were forced hurts the feelings of the Japanese. When the Japanese expel Taiwan fishing boats from Cong Zi Niao Reef, these same advocates of Taiwan independence dare not utter a peep about whether Cong Zi Niao is a reef or an island. They dare not criticize Japan, yest insist they alone are qualified to deal with the fishing rights dispute. These advocates of Taiwan independence cannot even defend the dignity of their own countrymen. The Japanese spit in their faces, and they respond by meekly wiping the spittle away. How exactly have they defended Taiwan's sovereignty and dignity? What exactly has become of Taiwan's primacy?
For too many years Taiwan has paid too a high price on behalf of these advocates of Taiwan independence. Taiwan has sacrificed its sovereignty and dignity. It has suffered other more tangible losses as well. This is especially true since the new government came to power and allied with the US and Japan to oppose the Mainland. It has abandoned many positions long held by the Ma government. The importation of US pork was merely a matter of time. The new government is about to allow food imports from Japan's nuclear disaster region. Arms purchases from the US will soon be on its agenda. US lawmakers have even come calling, and demanded that arms purchases be increased to 3% of GDP. Many of these moves were intended to buy US and Japanese support in resisting pressure from the Mainland. Chen Shui-bian era checkbook diplomacy is still fresh in people's memories. Yet the new government yearns to become the next sucker?
In order to rid itself of so-called “dependence on the Mainland”, the new government is pushing its New Southern Strategy full force. It is even subsidizing descendants of immigrants if they return to Taiwan. It is calling for increased awareness of the mother country, and closer contacts. New immigrants and their descendants were subject to discrimination in the past. Taking care of new immigrants is the right thing to do, and something we support. But isn't the new government's discriminatory policy just a tad too flagrant? What about Mainland spouses and their children? Aren't they Republic of China citizens? Don't they need to strengthen ties with the Mainland? Or does anyone who has any connection to the Mainland vilified as “The Other”?
If we truly love Taiwan, if we truly believe in Taiwan's primacy, we must punch holes in the Taiwan independence movement's hypocrisy. We must resolutely oppose all words and deeds that incite hatred against our Chinese origins and Chinese heritage. We must confidently oppose Taiwan independence. As long as one lives on Taiwan, one is qualified to “love Taiwan”. Whether one was born on Taiwan, born on the Mainland, or an indigenous person is of no importance. Nor does it matter whether one is blue or green. Taiwanese are also Chinese. One can love Taiwan while supporting reunification. None of these should be cause for conflict.
We hope everyone on Taiwan will realize that Taiwan's dignity cannot be achieved by groveling. Still less can it be achieved by means of media deception. If we wish to win the world's respect, we must first determine who is really Taiwanese. Taiwan clearly cannot sever its links with the Mainland. The two sides share the same Chinese culture and Chinese civilization. Also, the Mainland has become a world-class nation with international influence.
Many on Taiwan are willing to relegate themselves to the status of pawns of other great powers intent on containing the Mainland, merely for the sake of Taiwan independence. In doing so, they have reduced Taiwan to the laughing stock of the world. Twenty-first century China is no longer post-Opium War China. Many think a new era of joint Sino-US co-governance has arrived. Others think the 21st century will be one in which the East dominates the West. China awaits transformation. It looks to a future full of challenges. The world is rapidly changing. Western models of governance are undergoing major crises. We on Taiwan should insist on Taiwan's primacy. But we must also approach the Mainland with an open mind. We must integrate the best of Chinese culture and Western values. We must work with the Mainland to birth a renaissance of the Chinese people. That is the path we should take.
社論－堅持台灣主體性 就要反台獨
2016年06月14日 04:10 主筆室
這些年來台獨思潮甚囂塵上，給人感覺就是「天然獨」已成主流、兩岸分裂也幾成定局。但仔細推敲現在檯面上這些台獨言行，又總讓人感覺有些奇怪，給人一種強烈的虛無之感，若再進一步言，則可說現在的這些台獨言行，根本是無本之木。
具體而言，現在的台獨主張者擺出一副捨我其誰的架勢，壟斷了「愛台灣」的詮釋權，也壟斷了所謂「主權」與「尊嚴」的界定權。綠營愛台灣是天經地義，藍營卻注定沒權利愛台灣；民進黨政府使用「中華台北」叫沒有矮化，國民黨政府使用「中華台北」卻叫喪權辱國；民進黨縣市長登陸行銷叫理性務實，國民黨推動陸客來台叫親中賣台；舉凡種種，不敢說罄竹難書，也只能是族繁不及備載。任何理性的人都會看出這種說辭的荒謬，但現實就是這類說法還十分有市場。
傾向獨立的人將台灣人的主體性、台灣人的尊嚴視為一大事，在與大陸交往拿著放大鏡檢視，任何一件小事都能找到大陸「矮化」台灣的證據，與此同時，還處處挑釁大陸，動輒就說大陸是「玻璃心」，而台灣則是NO.1。看起來這些人確實都具備了客家人的「硬頸」精神，面對大陸絲毫不會低頭。
但我們同時也看到一個弔詭的現象，日本人都承認是對台灣殖民統治，卻有很多台灣人說當年自己的祖國是日本，問題是當年你也配當日本人？當問到慰安婦是自願還是強迫時，他們會說兩者都有，反課綱的抗議者甚至還說，不能說慰安婦是被強迫的，不然會傷害日本人的感情。我們還會看到，當日本人在沖之鳥礁驅趕台灣漁船時，這些人竟然連沖之鳥是礁還是島，都不敢說出個立場來，甚至還敢批評前朝，自誇自己才有能力處理漁權爭議。主張台獨到連同胞都保護不了，自己的尊嚴被隨便踐踏也可以唾面自乾，這豈是維護主權和尊嚴，台灣主體性又放在哪裡？
這些年來台灣為了這些人所主張的台獨已經付出太多代價，不光是主權和尊嚴，更有實實在在的利益。尤其是新政府上台之後，為了推行聯美日制大陸的政策，馬政府原本堅持的各種立場紛紛棄守，美豬開放進口只是時間問題，日本核災區食品也即將要開放進口，對美軍事採購也必須迅速提上議事日程，美國議員甚至直接來到家門口要求軍費提升到GDP的3%。如此種種，無非就是為了讓美日繼續支持台灣，抗拒來自大陸的壓力。陳水扁時代的凱子外交還未從人們的記憶中消失，現在新政府又打算來當新凱子？
為了擺脫對大陸的所謂依賴，新政府現在如火如荼地推行新南向政策，甚至還要補助新移民後代回到母國，美其名曰增加對母國的認識，加深彼此的聯繫。過去新移民及其後代在台灣社會或多或少受到歧視，現在政府要照顧新移民當然無可厚非，我們當然全力支持，但政府如此直接的進行差別待遇，是否過分了一些？陸配和他們的子女難道就不是中華民國的國民？難道他們就不需要加強與大陸的聯繫？還是說他們只要跟大陸沾到邊，就注定是非我族類？
如果我們真心愛台灣，真誠堅持台灣主體性，就要戳破這些說辭的虛偽本質，要堅決反對一切否定兩岸血緣與文化連結的言行，要理直氣壯反對台獨。只要是台灣人，就有權力愛台灣，不分本省人、外省人以及原住民，更不分藍營還是綠營。台灣人也是中國人、愛台灣也可以支持統一，這些都不應該是衝突的概念。
我們也希望所有台灣人都能意識到，台灣人的尊嚴不能靠搖尾乞憐來獲得，更不應拿一些新聞事件來自欺欺人，台灣要贏得世人的尊重，就必須真正弄清楚台灣人到底是誰。顯然，台灣不可能擺脫與大陸的連結，不光是因為兩岸共享中華文化與文明，更因為現在的大陸早已成為具國際影響力的世界級大國。
我們看到許多台灣人為了台獨主張，不惜自甘為其他大國制衡大陸的棋子，卻大言不慚是為了維護台灣的主權與尊嚴，實在是滑天下之大稽。誰都不能否認，21世紀中國已非鴉片戰爭後的中國，許多人認為世界已進入中美共同治理的2G格局，也有人相信21世紀東風將壓倒西風。誠然，中國正待轉型，前瞻未來充滿挑戰，但世界也在快速改變，西方治理模式也出現重大危機。對台灣來說，堅持台灣主體，虛心理解大陸、走好中華文化與西方體制價值觀的融合之路，以此利基與中國大陸攜手實現中國人共同的復興，才是正確的抉擇。
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