South China Sea Ruling: Preposterous Folly

South China Sea Ruling: Preposterous Folly
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 13, 2016

Executive Summary: Five judges handed down an obtuse and unjust “ruling” that ignored historical facts and international realities. The tribunal pandered to US hegemony, revealed flagrant favoritism, and attempted to change the existing order in the South China Sea by decree. The tribunal was simultaneously delusional and naive. Most regrettably, the new government remains oblivious about these developments. As a result the entire nation was stunned by the outcome. How can one not be distraught?

Full Text Below:

Yesterday the Hague “Permanent Court of Arbitration” ruled that the PRC has no legal basis for its nine-dotted line claim, and that the ROC's Taiping Island is a "reef" that lacks an Exclusive Economic Zone, rather than an "island". This ruling is categorically unacceptable to both Taipei and Beijing. The tribunal ignored facts, revealed its bias, and demonstrated its obtuseness. Its myopia is certain to provoke even more disputes in the South China Sea.

First, in order to grant the Philippines a favorable ruling, the “Permanent Court of Arbitration” classified all islands in the South China Sea as “reefs”, including Nansha Island. It even classified Taiping Island, the largest island in the region, which belongs to the ROC and is clearly an island suitable for human habitation, as a "reef".  This, as the Chinese expression goes, is “pointing to a deer and calling it a horse”. The “ruling” ignores reality, has zero credibility, and does the ROC a gross injustice. In response, the president has issued a statement protesting the tribunal, which never invited the ROC to participate, and which has trampled over our rights in the South China Sea. We will never accept the outcome of this arbitration. We support the government's position, and call on the ruling and opposition parties to back the government on this issue.

Second, the tribunal alleged that the Mainland's nine-dotted line was illegal, thereby trampling over the Mainland's rights. The United States, Japan and other countries claim that the Mainland, as a party to the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea", must accept binding arbitration. But Beijing long ago announced that it “would not accept, would not participate in, and would not recognize" any “rulings” by the tribunal. Mainland Foreign Affairs Office Chief Executive Dai Bingguo was even more blunt. Dai dismissed the ruling as "nothing more than a piece of scrap paper". Clearly any attempt to change the situation in the South China Sea by the tribunal is futile.

In fact, the arbitrary and biased “ruling” may well lead to even more disputes. For example, the tribunal first ruled that Huangyan Island was a reef. It then ruled that Huangyan Island was part of the Exclusive Economic Zone of Luzon, and that the Philippines could engage in fishing, oil and gas exploration, mining, and scientific research in the island's waters. But Huangyan Island is currently occupied by the Mainland. Beijing is not about to simply hand it over. The “ruling” may force the Mainland to engage in even more aggressive land reclamation efforts. When Philippine fishing or research boats attempt to enter, even more violent conflicts could occur.

Furthermore, the “ruling” may force Beijing to escalate foreign policy confrontation. Beijing has long regarded the area within the nine-dotted line as China's territorial waters. Some in Beijing even propose the establishment of a South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone to defend its sovereignty. Given nationalist sentiment on the mainland, Beijing is concerned about popular sentiment. It has instructed relevant agencies to maintain an around the clock state of wartime alert to deal with unexpected eventualities.

Before the “rulings” were announced, the United States was worried the PLA would move against disputed islands and reefs, including Renai Reef and Huangyan Island. The United States felt the need to preempt with military deterrence. It dispatched aircraft carriers and cruisers to the South China Sea. Beijing was worried that once the “ruling” was announced, the US military would invade nine islands and reefs occupied by Mainland ships. It felt the need to mobilize three fleets consisting of hundreds of warships and hundreds of warplanes to the North China Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. It held live fire exercises to forestall any unexpected developments. The two sides maneuvered back and forth through the region, but without any immediate risk of conflict. For now at least, both Mainland and US actions were limited to demonstrations, not provocations.

The United States and the Chinese mainland confronted each other in the South China Sea, without actually clashing. The “ruling” was the worst possible outcome. But both Beijing and Taipei were losers. Therefore it did not lead to further deterioration in cross-Strait relations. Recently, rumors emerged that the DPP government was prepared to "fine tune" its South China Sea sovereignty claims. Rumors were that it might forsake the Kuomintang government's claims regarding "inherent territory", “historical sovereignty", and the “eleven-dotted line". Its motive? To ensure that the international community did not perceive Taiwan and the Mainland as acting in concert. Now the “Permanent Court of Arbitration” in the Hague has ruled that Taiping Island is not an island. How can Taipei acquiesce to the Hague “ruling” on the "nine-dotted line"? The “ruling” has ironically put Taipei and Beijing on the same side of the South China Sea battle line.

The Presidential Office issued a statement yesterday.  She reiterated that the "South China Sea islands and their waters belong to the Republic of China. This is the Republic of China's position. We intend to defend the territory and sovereignty of our country". Such a statement ought not provoke the Mainland or the US. This is the key to the controversy over the “ruling”.

Five judges handed down an obtuse and unjust “ruling” that ignored historical facts and international realities. The tribunal pandered to US hegemony, revealed flagrant favoritism, and attempted to change the existing order in the South China Sea by decree. The tribunal was simultaneously delusional and naive. Most regrettably, the new government remains oblivious about these developments. As a result the entire nation was stunned by the outcome. How can one not be distraught?

南海仲裁是荒腔走板的不智判決
2016-07-13 聯合報

海牙國際法庭常設仲裁法院昨天作出裁決，認定中國大陸主張的九段線並無法律基礎，我國擁有的太平島則被認定為「礁岩」而非「島嶼」，不可主張專屬經濟海域。這一裁決，對兩岸來說都是不可接受的結果，仲裁法庭不僅昧於事實，且偏頗不智，勢必治絲益棼，引發南海更多爭端。

首先，仲裁法院為了作出有利菲律賓的判決，將南沙群島所有島礁皆認定為「礁岩」，連我國所有之面積最大且適於人居的太平島都被貶抑為「礁」，這完全是「指鹿為馬」的行徑，昧於既存事實，且毫無公信可言，且對台灣極端不公。對此，總統府已發表聲明，抗議仲裁庭從未邀請我國參與，現在又嚴重損害我在南海諸島的權利，我方絕不接受此一仲裁結果。我們支持政府的立場，也呼籲朝野團結一致作政府的後盾。

其次，仲裁否定中國大陸主張的九段線之合法基礎，嚴重損害大陸的權益。儘管美、日等國均認為，中國作為《聯合國海洋法公約》的締約國，必須接受仲裁的約束；但北京早已宣布了三不「不接受、不參與、不承認」，外事辦主任戴秉國更直指仲裁「不過是廢紙一張」。可見，想要藉一次仲裁改變南海現狀，絕無可能。

事實上，仲裁法院的武斷及偏頗，可能會引發更多的紛爭。例如，認定「黃岩島」為礁岩，即將它歸屬為呂宋島的專屬經濟區，菲國可在該島附近海域捕魚、探採油氣及進行科學研究。但目前黃岩島由大陸占領，中共絕不可能退讓；判決一出，可能促使大陸更積極填島造陸，菲國漁船或科學船若企圖進入，可能引爆更多、更大的衝突。

進一步看，裁決引發的對峙，可能將北京的外交政策激化到新的高點。中共長久以來一直將九段線的歷史水域視為領海，更有人提出要設置南海防空識別區，以捍衛主權。目前大陸民族主義情緒高漲，北京擔心民間出現過激行為，特指示各有關單位進入「戰時狀態」，全天候應對突發狀況。

仲裁宣布前，美國擔心解放軍會對有爭議的島礁——如仁愛礁、黃岩島採取進一步行動，美國必須先一步展現軍力嚇阻；因此，出動了航空母艦及巡洋艦等在南海巡弋。中共方面則擔心，仲裁出爐後，美軍船艦將趁勢入侵中方占據的九個島礁，因而必須加強戒備；所以調動北海、東海、南海三個艦隊上百艘艦艇和戰機，舉行實兵實彈對抗演習，目的即為阻止突發狀況發生。雙方雖你來我往，但並無立即衝突之險；至少目前看來，美中雙方的行動均止於示威而非挑釁的程度。

如果說美中兩國在南海是「鬥而不破」，對兩岸而言，這次仲裁雖出現最壞的結果，但由於兩岸同屬「輸家」，倒反而避免了兩岸關係的進一步惡化。日前，一度傳出民進黨政府準備「微調」對南海主權的論述，可能不再重複過去國民黨政府強調的「固有疆域」或「十一段線」的歷史主權說，以免讓國際社會誤認為台灣與大陸「聯手」。如今，既然海牙仲裁法院否定太平島為島，台灣如何可能苟同它對「九段線」的判決？如此一來，反而在南海問題上將兩岸推向同一陣線。

總統府昨天的聲明重申：「南海諸島及其相關海域主權屬於中華民國所有，這是中華民國的立場與堅持，我們絕對會捍衛國家的領土與主權。」這樣的陳述，應不致被認為挑釁大陸或倒向美國的立場；這也是這場仲裁敏感而關鍵之處。

五名仲裁法官，作出如此昧於歷史事實及國際現實的判決，可謂既不明智，亦不公平。而如果仲裁者一味為了迎合某方霸權，甚至是心存偏私，卻妄想藉此改變南海既有的複雜秩序，恐怕太過天真。而令人遺憾的是，新政府事前對事態的發展缺乏掌握，以致舉國倉皇迎來如此讓人錯愕的結局，能不令人扼腕？

The Government Must Defend the U-Shaped Line to Ensure Cross-Strait Trust

The Government Must Defend the U-Shaped Line to Ensure Cross-Strait Trust
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 12, 2016

Executive Summary: Does the DPP have the courage to take a stand on the U-shaped line? If it does, it can ensure cross-Strait trust. Does the DPP government have the wisdom to recognize the nature of the South China Sea conflict? If it does, it must adopt a "shared sovereignty, divided jurisdictions' stance vis a vis the South China Sea. It must work with the Mainland to create prosperity. If Tsai Ing-wen has the courage and wisdom to do all of the above, she can break the cross-Strait deadlock and rebuild cross-Strait trust. That would be a blessing for people on both sides of the Strait.

Full Text Below:

In 2013, the government of the Philippines appealed to the so-called “Permanent Court of Arbitration”, over the matter of South China Sea sovereignty. The “verdict” of this body will be announced today. We call on the Tsai government to uphold the Republic of China's long held position. Taipei must not allow itself to be dragged into a rights dispute among major powers.

The Philippines appeal raised 15 issues, two of which directly impact the Republic of China government on Taiwan. The first issue is whether Taiping Island should be classified as an island or a reef. Or, does the Hague think Taiping Island has a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone along its perimeter?

The other issue concerns the legal status of the U-shaped line. Does the Hague think the U-shaped line conforms to the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea", aka UNCLOS. If it does not, that constitute a major setback for the two sides in the South China Sea, and will make huge waves in the South China Sea.

Facts speak louder than words. Before leaving office, President Ma Ying-jeou personally set foot on Taiping Island. He invited reporters around the world to visit the island and familiarize themselves with its economic and living conditions. He proved that Taiping Island is not a reef. The United States has never classified Taiping Island as a reef. Therefore, unless the tribunal totally ignores the facts in order to deliver a malicious verdict, one can safely predict that the Philippines claims will not stand. It now appears the key issue will be the U-shaped line.

The Tsai Ing-wen government's position on the South China Sea issue is as follows. One. It abides by the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. Two. It upholds freedom of navigation and flight through the South China Sea. Three. It advocates the peaceful settlement of South China Sea disputes. Four. It will defend its sovereignty over South China Sea islands, including Taiping Island. The first three are consistent with US positions. The fourth continues the Ma government's position on sovereignty. So far, Tsai Ing-wen has avoided all mention of the legal status of the U-shaped line.

Will the Hague claim that that the U-shaped line is “illegal”? Will it claim that the Ma and Beijing governments' "traditional U-shaped line", "line of historic waters", "line of historic rights", "national borders", and "island lines", are meaningless? Will the Hague decide that the only issue remaining is who owns which islands and reefs in the South China Sea? Such a Hague “ruling” would mean victory for the US, and a setback for Mainland China and Taiwan.

Legally speaking, arbitration requires participation by by all of the parties named. Arbitration may not be applied to matters of territorial sovereignty. Beijing has therefore sternly rejected any arbitration “rulings”. Politically speaking, Beijing long ago concluded that so-called “arbitration” is merely the US fanning the flames of conflict. It is part of Washington's Asian-Pacific rebalancing strategy. It is an attempt to prevent Mainland China's peaceful rise. In particular, US deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) missile system in South Korea has caused extreme anxiety in Beijing.

Concern for domestic tranquility may make Beijing even less likely to cave in on South China Sea “arbitration”. Otherwise even the legitimacy of the CCP could be called into question. The Mainland conducted military exercises in the South China Sea between the 5th and 11th of this month. Its determination to defend China's sovereignty in the South China Sea is crystal clear.

South China Sea “arbitration” is a textbook case of “making trouble where none existed”. The Philippines initiated the case. Newly-elected Philippines President Duterte has changed former President Aquino's reckless pro-US policy. He seeks to improve relations with Beijing. But he cannot afford to publicly withdraw the appeal already submitted. Duterte's position is quite clear. Whatever the outcome of “arbitration”, he will engage in bilateral consultations with Beijing. His desire to maintain a low profile is abundantly clear.

The Tsai government must have wisdom. It must understand the situation in the South China Sea. If the Hague denies the legality of the U-shaped line, and the Tsai government meekly complies, it will invalidate its position and forfeit its sovereignty. The people will not stand for this. Cross-Strait tensions will skyrocket. Already chilly cross-Strait relations will reach the freezing point. This would undoubtedly be Tsai Ing-wen government's worst and most irresponsible policy decision ever.

US and Japanese incitement of South China Sea disputes mean no peace for some time to come. The Tsai Ing-wen government must not surrender sovereignty over Taiping Island. The Tsai Ing-wen government must not surrender sovereignty over Taiping Island in exchange for membership in the “US-Japan alliance of values". It must not permit US and Japanese fleets to approach Taiping Island. It must not provide them them with any assistance. If it does, it will be making a grave mistake.

The Cerulean blue South China Sea is in fact a window for cross-Strait peace, trust, and cooperation. If the DPP government chooses to follow the US and Japan in the South China Sea, it will destroy any remaining vestige of trust between the two sides and make peace impossible.

Does the DPP have the courage to take a stand on the U-shaped line? If it does, it can ensure cross-Strait trust. Does the DPP government have the wisdom to recognize the nature of the South China Sea conflict? If it does, it must adopt a "shared sovereignty, divided jurisdictions' stance vis a vis the South China Sea. It must work with the Mainland to create prosperity. If Tsai Ing-wen has the courage and wisdom to do all of the above, she can break the cross-Strait deadlock and rebuild cross-Strait trust. That would be a blessing for people on both sides of the Strait.

社論－政府應堅守U形線 保住兩岸互信
2016年07月12日 04:10 主筆室

2013年菲律賓向海牙國際法庭常設仲裁法院提出南海仲裁案，將於今天宣布裁決。我們呼籲蔡英文政府要嚴守中華民國立場，更要避免讓台灣陷入可能的大國權力衝突。

菲律賓提出的南海仲裁案包括15項請求，與我政府目前直接有關的包含兩部分。一是太平島是島還是礁的法律認定，這涉及我是否享有太平島周邊200浬專屬經濟海域的權利。

另一是U形線的法律地位認定，如果U形線被以《聯合國海洋公約》為由判定不具備法律地位，那將是兩岸在捍衛南海權益的一次重大挫折，也必然會引發南海的巨浪波濤。

事實勝於雄辯。前總統馬英九在卸任前不僅親自登上太平島，亦邀請國際傳媒登島了解其可供生活的經濟條件，以證明太平島是島不是礁。美國基本的立場也從來沒有認定太平島是礁，因此，除非仲裁庭敢完全昧於事實做出惡意的判決，我們可以大膽預測，菲律賓的主張應該不會得逞。現在看來，問題的重點在U形線，而這也正是這次仲裁案中最重要的關鍵。

蔡英文政府迄今在南海議題上的立場為：第一，依據海洋法和《聯合國海洋法公約》相關規定提出主張和立場；第二，維持南海地區航行和飛行的自由權利；第三，和平處理南海的爭議；第四、堅持對南海諸島，包括太平島的主權。前三點完全符合美國的觀點，第四點則是延續馬政府的部分立場。迄今為止，蔡英文一直迴避對U形線的法律地位表態。

如果仲裁的結果否決了U形線的法律地位，等於是馬政府與北京所主張的「傳統U形線」、「歷史性水域線」、「歷史性權利線」、「國界線」、「島嶼歸屬線」的各類說法，均將失去意義，剩下的就只是南海裡面島或礁的認定及歸屬，其結果是美國的全勝，兩岸的徹底受挫。

就法律而言，由於仲裁案必須由當事者均表同意，且不能涉及領土與主權的事物，北京因而嚴正拒絕接受仲裁及結果。就政治而言，北京已經將此仲裁案視為美國在後面煽風點火，是美國亞太再平衡戰略的一環、打亂中國大陸和平崛起的策略。特別是美國已經決定在南韓部署「薩德」（終端高空防禦系統，THAAD）飛彈，讓大陸的導彈系統受到監視，已引起北京極度的不安。

就大陸內部安全來說，北京更不可能在南海仲裁案上讓步，否則連共產黨政權的正當性都會受到質疑。大陸軍方在本月5至11日在南海進行演習，其不惜以武力捍衛南海立場的態度，已經表明無遺。

「天下本無事，庸人自擾之」是這次南海仲裁案的本質寫照。始作俑者的菲律賓，其新總統杜特蒂上任後，已經一改前任總統艾奎諾三世的親美盲動政策，期盼修改與北京的關係，只差不方便公開撤回已經交付的仲裁案。杜特蒂的立場已經很清楚，不論仲裁案結果如何，都將要與北京進行雙邊對話協商，其低姿態展現無遺。

蔡英文政府應該有足夠的智慧認清南海目前的情勢，如果仲裁法庭否定了U形線的法律地位，蔡英文政府卻予以附和，那不僅是自失立場，自動放棄主權權利，將為人民所不容，更會讓兩岸關係立刻陷入緊張，為已經暮氣沉沉的兩岸關係再雪上加霜。這毫無疑問將是蔡英文最壞，也是最不負責任的選擇。

在美國與日本的操弄下，南海不可能在短時間內風平浪靜。蔡英文政府當然不可能放棄太平島，但是如果蔡英文政府一方面主張擁有太平島的主權，但是另一方面又將太平島作為換取參與美日「價值同盟」的籌碼，或而讓美、日艦隊接近，或而提供戰略協助，這也是不智的選擇。

蔚藍的南海其實是兩岸和平、互信與合作之窗。如果民進黨政府選擇追隨美、日的南海作為，兩岸之間不僅不會有互信，甚而連和平都會沒有。

如果民進黨能夠堅持U形線的立場，還可以讓兩岸維繫一點可能的互信空間。如果民進黨政府能夠認清南海的問題本質，在南海上採行「主權共享、治權分立」的立場，共同在南海合作創造經濟效益，蔡英文將可以打開兩岸僵局，重建互信，這才是兩岸人民之福。

National Security Requires Honest Communications

National Security Requires Honest Communications
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 7, 2016

Executive Summary: The accidental launching of a guided missile, and the South China Sea crisis, are trials by fire for President Tsai Ing-wen and her new government. They test her ability to assess and respond to the big picture. Tsai Ing-wen's fumbling of the accidental missile launch obviously undermined her credibility. She paid too much attention to domestic political consequences, while completely ignoring the strategic picture, particularly the reaction of the Mainland. Her blindness over the South China Sea crisis is likely to lead to the same mistakes in the future. We call on Tsai to exercise caution.

Full Text Below:

The so-called “ruling” on South China Sea sovereignty will be announced tomorrow. The People's Liberation Army held a week-long large-scale military exercise in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and North China Sea. Hundreds of warships and warplanes took part in a show of force against the United States and neighboring countries. Meanwhile, on the Taiwan side, a non-commissioned officer in the ROC Navy mistakenly launched a Hsiung Feng III missile. Yet the Tsai government swept the matter under the rug. It cited "Typhoon Prevention" as pretext for the withdrawal of frigates stationed at Taiping Island. This retreat in the face of crisis has left the public on Taiwan flabbergasted.

The government's priorities must be well considered. They cannot be based on fleeting whims. Even wise men sometimes make mistakes. The Tsai government on the other hand, is totally inexperienced. Its officials do not understand their larger responsibilities. Blunders and tardy responses are inevitable. Over the past month, one blunder has followed another. That everyone has seen. The greatest danger is that Tsai government actions may appear self-assured, but may be nothing more than empty bravado or kneejerk responses. Either sends the wrong message, both domestically and internationally. This is deeply troubling.

Take the accidental missile launch for example. The Tsai government lacked all sense of urgency, proportionality, or focus. First, it Tsai government lacked all sense of urgency. It was far too slow to respond. President Tsai was in the United States when she learned of the incident. She was accompanied by the Secretary General of the National Security Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. She should have convened a provisional meeting of high-level national security council members immediately, in order to evaluate possible responses. Instead she “hung out” at a strictly ceremonial banquet for “overseas Taiwanese” for four long hourss, before finally convening a national security meeting. Seconds count during a national security crisis. A four hour delay during a major crisis could seriously harm the nation's interests. That is hardly something the ROC can afford.

Second, the Tsai government lacked all sense of proportionality. Its priorities were upside down. A guided missile fired in the direction of the Mainland,  is a hostile and provocative act. Even if one assumes it was a mistake, the first party that should have been notified was the Mainland. Instead, Tsai Ing-wen first notified the United States, then one by one notified Japan, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines, pointedly ignoring Beijing. How is the other side supposed to react to Tsai's attitude? Cross-Strait relations are currently at a low ebb. But proper communications during a crisis facilitate a thaw. Unfortunately the new government's obliviousness merely made matters worse.

Third, the Tsai government lacked all sense of focus. It considered anything that might have political repercussions, but ignored everything of strategic importance. A lowly sergeant single-handedly launched a guided missile worth billions toward the Mainland. This appalling act of negligence in military weapons handling was a thousand times more serious than the death of Hung Chung-chiu. Yet the Tsai government's first concern was to shield Minister of Defense Feng Shi-kuan. It searched far and wide to hunt down those responsible for the leak. To provide the public with whipping boys for their wrath, the Tsai government ordered the naval officers to kneel before the family of the fishing boat captain. In what must be the height of absurdity, green camp legislators colluded with the green media to spin the farce as evidence of the Hsiung Feng III missile's superior performance. This amounted to a real life example of “covering one's ears while stealing a bell”. The Tsai government's response showed that it failed to engage in any soul searching whatsoever.

Now take the Tsai government's withdrawal of warships from Taiping Island. The so-called “ruling” on South China Sea sovereignty will soon be announced. Neighboring countries are on tenterhooks, closely following developments. The Republic of China clearly possesses sovereignty over Taiping Island, the largest island in the South China Sea. Yet the Tsai government chose this very moment to withdraw Coast Guard cutters from Taiping Island, and lied to the public about "Typhoon Measures". Does the Tsai government take people for fools? The Coast Guard cutters will not return to Taiping Island before the end of the typhoon season. Exactly what sort of message is the Tsai government sending to neighboring countries with this self-initiated evacuation?? What good will dispatching the warship Weihsing to the island for three to five days do?

Taiping Island is remote. It is admittedly difficult to resupply. But it has long been ROC territory. The South China Sea has enormous strategic importance. Cong Zhi Niao Reef is the size of three tamami mats. Yet Japan is busy building it up. Taiping Island, by contrast, boasts lush forests and ancient wells. Yet the Tsai government sees it as nothing more than a hot potato. Does the Tsai government intend to hand it over to others before it will be happy? President Tsai has long been mealy-mouthed in her policy pronouncements. She has habitually muddled through by talking out of both sides of her mouth. Her withdrawal of Coast Guard cutters from Taiping Island reveals her cowardice and reluctance to defend the nation's territorial sovereignty. She lacks the necessary resolve and aggressiveness. When it comes to cozying up to the US or fawning over the Japanese however, she is more than willing to be a pawn manipulated by foreign powers. That is even more inexcusable.

The accidental launching of a guided missile, and the South China Sea crisis, are trials by fire for President Tsai Ing-wen and her new government. They test her ability to assess and respond to the big picture. Tsai Ing-wen's fumbling of the accidental missile launch obviously undermined her credibility. She paid too much attention to domestic political consequences, while completely ignoring the strategic picture, particularly the reaction of the Mainland. Her blindness over the South China Sea crisis is likely to lead to the same mistakes in the future. We call on Tsai to exercise caution.

國安處理不可釋放錯誤訊息
2016-07-11 01:04 聯合報 聯合報社論

南海仲裁案宣布前夕，中共解放軍在南海舉行為期一週的大型軍事演習，出動南海、東海、北海艦隊上百艘船艦及上百架戰機進行實戰化攻防，意在向美國和周邊國家示威。在此之際，我國發生士官誤射雄三飛彈事件，蔡政府卻輕描淡寫處理，同時更以「防颱」為由撤回駐守太平島的巡防艦。這種「遇張則弛」的國安處理手法，讓人完全摸不著頭緒。

我們相信，政府處理國家要務應當經過深思熟慮，而非一時興起。但智者千慮必有一疏，且蔡政府剛剛「新手上路」，許多官員對於職務未必全盤熟悉，難免擦槍走火或因應遲緩。一個多月來閣員突槌事件頻傳，即一目了然。最怕的是，政府的因應看似成竹在胸，實則虛有其表或行禮如儀；如此一來，對內對外釋放出錯誤的訊息，不免令人擔憂。

以飛彈誤射事件為例，蔡政府的處理即暴露出失時、失衡、失焦的「三失」問題。第一，所謂「失時」，是第一時間的延宕處理。蔡總統在美接獲事件通報，即應會同隨行的國安會秘書長、外交部長召開臨時國安高層會議，研商對策；但蔡英文卻把儀式性的僑宴活動放在前面，四個多小時後才舉行國安會議。試想，國安因應分秒必爭，若遇上重大危機，四個多小時的延宕，即可能造成國家利益的嚴重損害，台灣承受得起嗎？

第二，所謂「失衡」，是指處理的輕重緩急本末倒置。飛彈朝海峽方向發射，是一種敵意及挑釁舉措，即使是誤射，首需溝通的對象當然是海峽對岸。但蔡政府先向美國通報，然後逐一告知日本、新加坡、越南和菲律賓，卻獨獨跳過北京；這樣的態度，教對岸作何感想？兩岸關係目前處於低潮自是事實，但如果在緊急時刻溝通得當，或許有助於化解冰封心結；遺憾的是，新政府的因應完全缺乏這方面的著眼，反而使雪上加霜。

第三，所謂失焦，是指處理手法充滿政治考量，該檢討的反而未加檢討。一名中士即可隻手任意發射造價上億的飛彈，是軍隊管理及武器操作上的可怕疏失，這要比洪仲丘事件嚴重千百倍；但是蔡政府的處理，卻為了要力保國防部長馮世寬，牽強地將調查方向導向偵辦「洩密」；又為了宣洩民怨，讓官兵去向受難船長家屬下跪。更荒謬的是，綠委和綠媒全力配合將發言口徑調整為誇示雄三飛彈的性能卓越，活脫脫「掩耳盜鈴」的寫照。如此偏頗的因應，到底反省了什麼？

再談太平島的撤艦。南海仲裁結果宣布在即，周邊國家無不繃緊神經，密切注意其發展。唯獨台灣，明明擁有南海最大島嶼之主權，卻在此時自甘示弱似地將駐防太平島的海巡艦撤回，而且向民眾謊稱是為了「防颱」。政府以為民眾都是無知之愚民嗎？海巡署更聲稱，在今年颱風季結束前，這些海巡艦均不會再返回太平島；這種「自唱空城」的言論，究竟想要向周邊國家發出什麼訊息？再說，昨天派出「偉星艦」，也只能填補三五天的空檔，有何作用？

太平島位處偏遠、補給不易確是事實，卻是中華民國固有疆土，更是南海戰略前哨。試想，日本連三個榻榻米大的沖之鳥礁都百般建設，台灣卻視擁有森林、古井的太平島為燙手山芋，難道要拱手讓人方才干休？蔡總統行事一向莫測高深，但即以「模糊原則」觀察此事，太平島撤艦只讓人嗅出政府怯懦、缺乏主權意識的氣味，毫無保守堅定乃至積極進取的精神。如果是為了親美媚日，而甘願充當棋子聽人擺布，那就更不可原諒。

飛彈誤射和南海風雲變化，都是對新政府國安危機處理的重大考驗，也測試蔡英文總統因應國際情勢的總體決策能力。蔡英文處理誤射事件明顯失分，主因在她過度強調國內的政治效應，而忽略總體——尤其是和對岸的關係的平衡。這樣的盲點，也可能導致她在南海問題上重蹈覆轍，我們呼籲她謹慎而行。

Hatred of Mainland China and Opposition to Cross-Strait Exchanges Are Annihilating Taiwan's Economy

Hatred of Mainland China and Opposition to Cross-Strait Exchanges Are Annihilating Taiwan's Economy
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 6, 2016

Executive Summary: The global economic situation is grim. Taiwan's exports have plummeted. Its economy remains troubled. The new government does nothing but complain. It does nothing to address the problem. The public remains under a dark cloud. Even a one percent growth rate is unlikely. The Liberty Times should be happy. After all, the economy is in dire straits. The new government is deadlocked on cross-Strait exchanges. Taiwan companies that "don't love Taiwan" are leaving in droves. Isn't that what the Liberty Times has wanted all these years?

Full Text Below:

The Liberty Times has long held high the banner of "Loving Taiwan". It has opposed anything and everything that links Taiwan to the Mainland. It has exaggerated the impact of cross-Strait economic cooperation on local industry. It has brainwashed the public into fearing cross-Strait exchanges. It has demonized fellow Chinese on the other side of the Strait. It has incited mob sentiment on both sides of the Strait. It has poormouthed the fruits of cross-Strait exchanges. It has made every effort possible to end all contact between the two sides. Over the past eight years, it has opposed any and every Ma government cross-Strait liberalization measure to the bitter end.

Today the paper continues to mislead the public. For example, it claims that Taiwan's economic difficulties are due to excessive reliance on the Mainland, and that excessive reliance on the Mainland was the handiwork of the Ma government. It claims that profits from cross-Strait trade have been monopolized by a small number of pro-Mainland businessmen, who have exacerbated the wealth gap and social divisions. It claims that price equalization and closer cross-Strait trade have dragged salary levels on Taiwan down to the level of the Mainland. It claims that allowing Mainlanders to own land on Taiwan will enable them to gobble up Taiwan's industries. It claims that allowing Taiwan companies to invest on the Mainland will lead to the offshoring of Taiwan technology, finance, human resources, and employment opportunities. In fact, all of the Liberty Times' wild allegations are nothing more than attempts to prevent people on Taiwan from having any connection whatsoever with their compatriots the Mainland.

Whenever the Liberty Times latches on to certain policy issues, it piles on relentlessly. For example, it attacks, smears, and defames anyone who supports the ECFA Service Trade Agreement (STA). From the beginning of talks to the signing of the agreement, the paper published a total of 4,000 articles. The paper published nearly 700 articles last year inciting fear of the “red supply chain”. The paper is a willing accomplice of the DPP. Buttressed by a massive media campaign to manipulate public opinion, the DPP successfully blocked the STA, FEPZ, and any further opening of Taiwan to Mainland industry. The impact on Taiwan's economy has been devastating.

Once the new government came to power, the paper played an even more active role. It made an even greater effort to obstruct anything that linked Taiwan to the Mainland. For example, it opposed Mainland ownership of our IC industry, even as it trumpeted the "New Southern Strategy". As everyone knows, such moves will finish off Taiwan's economy, which is already in its death throes.

Economic development, including industrial development, requires market opportunities, a competitive production capacity, and a business environment that allows companies to adopt the best business models possible. The Liberty Times however, under the new government's direction, is demanding Taiwan's withdrawal from the world's largest market and production base. It is attempting to push it into secondary markets and other high-risk areas. It is attempting to drive Taiwan away from the Mainland, where it enjoys a relatively advantageous position, to environments where it enjoys no advantages. The Liberty Times and the new government are disconnecting Taiwan from the global value chain, and undermining Taiwan's economic integration in the region. Businesses are being compelled by the new government to operate in total violation of the principles of economics. They are losing their competitiveness. They are being forced to flee or face ruin.

The Liberty Times has long misled the public into thinking that the Mainland economy is in dire straits, and that its investment environment is on the decline. Beginning in 2012, the Mainland economy went from high growth to medium high-growth. Nevertheless, as the world's second largest economy, it enjoys a relatively high growth rate. It contributes 30 to 40% of the world's economic growth. It ranks first in the world in foreign direct investment. Mainland GDP is four times that of the 10 ASEAN countries combined, and five times that of India. In 2014 the Mainland economy's incremental growth rate was 62 times that of ASEAN, and five times that of India. In other words, the immense business opportunities on the Mainland are the main reason for multinational company investment.

When Chen Shui-bian was in power, Taiwan companies invested heavily on the Mainland. Taiwan's investments on the Mainland led exports. Exports led economic growth. This was when Taiwan's economy invested heavily on the Mainland. Today, the Liberty Times has actually urged the new government to restrict cross-Strait economic and trade relations. It argues that Taiwan should turn to ASEAN, India, and other places, leaving tens of thousands of Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland stranded and without support. By doing so, it is ensuring Taiwan's economic disintegration.

Taiwan has an island-based economy. Its economic growth depends on exports. Export depend upon membership in global value chains. Regional economic integration provides a platform for integration into global value chains. It expands the size of the market economy. It enables companies to adopt the best business models, and make the most of what they have. The STA has been blocked by the Liberty Times and the DPP. FTA signings with other countries have ground to a halt. The paper is now screaming that Taiwan must join the TPP. Participation in large scale regional integration for Taiwan is now even more hopeless. In the future Taiwan will find itself shut out of global value chains.

The global economic situation is grim. Taiwan's exports have plummeted. Its economy remains troubled. The new government does nothing but complain. It does nothing to address the problem. The public remains under a dark cloud. Even a one percent growth rate is unlikely. The Liberty Times should be happy. After all, the economy is in dire straits. The new government is deadlocked on cross-Strait exchanges. Taiwan companies that "don't love Taiwan" are leaving in droves. Isn't that what the Liberty Times has wanted all these years?

仇中反開放正裂解台灣經濟
2016/7/6 中國時報

長期以來《自由時報》高舉「愛台灣」口號，逢中必反、誇大兩岸經濟合作對本土產業的衝擊、製造民間社會對兩岸交流的恐懼、醜化對岸、激化兩岸民粹對立、抹殺兩岸交流成果，意圖砍斷兩岸所有往來。過去8年對馬政府任何有關兩岸開放措施，無一不反對到底。

現在該報仍持續扭曲訊息誤導人民，例如：台灣的經濟困境是因過度傾中，向大陸傾斜是馬政府造成的；兩岸經貿紅利僅由少數紅頂商人壟斷，加劇貧富差距與社會矛盾；在要素價格均等化下，兩岸經貿越緊密，台灣的薪資水準越會被大陸拖累；開放陸資來台，台灣產業會被吃掉，開放產業到大陸投資，技術、資金、人才、就業機會都會外移。凡此種種，無非就是要遂行其對大陸防堵的主張。

而某些政策議題一旦被該報鎖定，就以排山倒海之勢，持續加以抨擊、抹黑、謾罵，該報為了反對ECFA服貿協議，從該協議簽署至去年底，總計刊登了4千筆有關報導；為了製造對紅色供應鏈的恐懼，該報去年下半年又持續推出近700筆文章。就在該報甘為民進黨側翼之下，挾著龐大媒體攻勢操弄民意，讓民進黨成功攔阻了ECFA服貿協議、「自由經濟示範區條例」、對大陸產業進一步開放等，對台灣經濟造成深遠衝擊。

新政府上台後，該報更加積極扮演反中側翼工具的角色，加大力度對大陸採取更嚴厲的防堵措施，例如反對陸資參股我方IC產業，另方面則協助鼓吹「新南向政策」作為配套手段。殊不知，此等作為猶如五馬分屍，正將已陷入泥淖的台灣經濟進行裂解。

經濟或產業發展不可或缺的條件，是市場機會和具競爭力的生產資源，以及優良的經商環境可讓企業作最佳布局。該媒體配合新政府政策方向，促使台灣從全球最主要的市場和生產基地撤離，企圖將之推入另一個次要市場和風險較高的地區，驅使台商從擁有相對優勢地位的據點轉進到沒有優勢條件的環境。此外，該報和新政府也正將台灣從全球價值鏈中消除掉，讓台灣在區域經濟整合中被邊緣化。而企業則在完全違反經濟運行原則的政治迫害下，競爭力流失，不是被迫出走就是走向敗亡。

長期以來，在《自由時報》操弄下，誤導人民以為大陸的經濟遭遇困境、投資環境惡化。事實上從2012年開始，大陸經濟雖然從高度成長轉為中高成長，但以其為全球第2大經濟體、相對較高的成長率，帶動世界經濟成長的貢獻率均達30～40%，外國直接投資居全球第1位。就GDP言，大陸是東協10國的4倍、印度的5倍；2014年大陸經濟成長的增量是東協的62倍、印度的5倍。換言之，大陸的龐大商機仍是吸引跨國企業前往投資的主因。

陳水扁執政時，台商大舉投資大陸，以投資帶動台灣出口，並以出口帶動經濟成長，所謂經濟傾中於此時開始。今日該報竟催促新政府緊縮兩岸經貿關係，要台商轉往東協、印度等地，留下十多萬台商在大陸孤立無援，不就是要崩毀台灣經濟的未來。

台灣是海島型經濟體，經濟成長靠出口，出口依賴加入全球價值鏈，加入區域經濟整合則提供了融入全球價值鏈的平台，不僅擴大經濟體的市場規模，更讓企業將最佳營運模式發揮到淋漓盡致。《兩岸服貿協議》被《自由時報》和民進黨等攔阻後，對外洽簽自由貿易協定幾全停擺，該報高喊台灣應優先加入TPP大型區域整合更是緣木求魚，未來台灣將自絕於全球價值鏈之外。

全球經濟情勢嚴峻，台灣出口連黑，經濟重挫，新政府坐困愁城，拿不出有效因應作為，全民籠罩在經濟成長保1的低迷氣氛，最高興的應數《自由時報》，因為經濟陷入困境、新政府對兩岸僵局束手無策，逼迫「不愛台灣」的企業離開台灣，這不就是該報多年來所追求的目標嗎？

National Security System Failure More Serious Than Missile Launch Incident

National Security System Failure More Serious Than Missile Launch Incident
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 6, 2016

Executive Summary: President Tsai said the missile launch "simply should not have happened". What is that, except empty rhetoric? What really should not have happened was the National Security Council's inaction during a crisis, leaving no one minding the store. Military personnel abused dogs, and the public responded with outrage. But a guided missile was accidentally launched, and led to a national security crisis. Meanwhile, national leaders were literally out to lunch. That situation was one hundred times more serious than some nameless sergeant accidentally pushing the wrong button.

Full Text Below:

Several days ago the Jin Jiang, an ROC Navy warship mistakenly launched a Hsiung Feng III missile. So far the government has been preoccupied with assigning blame for the missile launch, and harping over matters of procedure. Worse, Lin Chuan is more concerned with hunting down who leaked information, and has strayed far from the real issue. Most worrisome of all, the two sides came closer to a shooting war than they have in a long time. The national security system responsible for security in the Taiwan Strait was slow to react, and ineffective when it did. This aspect of the incident must not be swept under the rug.

Let us review the Tsai government's reaction to the most outrageous missile fiasco in history. On July 1, at 8:15 AM, the Chin Chiang patrol vessel mistakenly launched a Hsiung Feng III missile toward the midline of the Taiwan Strait. Ten minutes later, President Tsai, who was visiting Los Angeles, and National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu, who was at her side, were notified of the incident. Yet the two lingered at a “Standing Room Only” banquet for “Overseas Taiwanese”. More than four hours later, Tsai Ing-wen notified the US. Only then did she finally convene a "high-level national security meeting" via secure communications, and take in a briefing by Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council Chen Jun-lin.

During this same time, President Tsai's "stand in”, Vice President Chen Chien-jen, was attending the opening ceremony of the High-Speed Rail System's Nangang Station. Defense Minister Feng Shi-kuan was greeting Tony Li, Chairman of the Friends of the ROC Military. All these were ceremonial activities. The cross-Strait hotline was no longer working. Yet that afternoon the MAC claimed it "initiated a variety of communication and liaison mechanisms" that allowed the other side to receive relevant information, in the hope that it would not misinterpret this incident. What were these channels? How effective were they? The government said what it wanted to, then ignored what anyone else had to say.

The incident had a direct bearing on national security. Yet Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Yan Tak, was kept completely out of the loop. Instead, Cabinet Chief Lin Chun, who is not directly responsible for national defense, national security, or cross-Strait relations, ran around like a headless chicken. Clearly the new government is not on track, and the national security system is in chaos.

Live missile launches are admittedly part of normal military exercises and training programs. But they are also major national events. Otherwise, why have all past presidents gone to Pingtung Jiu-Peng Military Base to review the exercises? Today cross-Strait relations have reverted to what they were eight years ago, during the Chen regime's “Cold Peace”. Worse still, the military went so far as to launch missiles with active warheads in the Taiwan Strait. This is of course a matter that the President and Commander in Chief ought to handle personally. President Tsai and her national security aides failed to hold a timely emergency meeting to study the situation and adopt countermeasures. Instead they chose to linger at a banquet for “Overseas Taiwanese”. Clearly, they misjudged the situation.

Heads of State, without exception, are obligated to attend to major domestic and international incidents. In March 2010, North Korea sank the Cheonan, a South Korean ship. Tensions were high in Northeast Asia. Then President Ma Ying-jeou, was attending a tea party with journalists in Palau. He immediately left and conferred with Secretary-General of the National Security System Hu Wei-chen and other officials back home, to learn more about the situation and to issue instructions. In 2013, while visiting Central and South America, the Tam Mei typhoon struck Taiwan. Ma immediately canceled his transit diplomacy through Los Angeles and returned to Taiwan. The Cheonan incident and the Tam Mei typhoons posed far less danger to national security than the launching of a guided missile in the Taiwan Strait. This is especially true now that the Tsai government has undermined cross-Strait trust and killed communication channels. The launching of the guided missile even coincided with the anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. With all of these negative factors piling up upon one other, can one really expect the other side not to misjudge the situation, and respond with military action?

Ma Ying-jeou's response was ridiculed by the green camp as an "overreaction". But a head of state must keep tabs on the big picture. Tsai Ing-wen, on the other hand, when confronted with a major national security incident, failed to send a timely message to the other side. Instead, she notified the United States first, then lingered at a banquet for “Overseas Taiwanese”. Her actions left people flabbergasted.

President Tsai was abroad at the time. Obviously she could not convene a formal National Security Council meeting. But National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu was by her side. Immediately convening an interim National Security Council meeting and issuing an emergency directive, would not have been difficult. Instead, President Tsai and her entourage dallied for four hours. Tsai's response was tardy, and her reaction was not commensurate with the seriousness of the situation. The Tsai government is now harping on domestic military discipline, assignment of blame, and conspiracy theories. It is refusing to take into account the reaction of the Mainland side, and the implications for Taiwan Strait security. The national security staff is clearly guilty of dereliction of duty.

Furthermore, even assuming the president could not break free, she could have authorized the Vice-President and the Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council to evaluate the situation, convene an emergency meeting, and recommend appropriate measures for presidential approval. Instead, the itinerary for Chen Chien-jen and Feng Shi-kuan that day left the nation a ship without a rudder.

President Tsai said the missile launch "simply should not have happened". What is that, except empty rhetoric? What really should not have happened was the National Security Council's inaction during a crisis, leaving no one minding the store. Military personnel abused dogs, and the public responded with outrage. But a guided missile was accidentally launched, and led to a national security crisis. Meanwhile, national leaders were literally out to lunch. That situation was one hundred times more serious than some nameless sergeant accidentally pushing the wrong button.

國安系統失靈遠比誤射事件嚴重
2016-07-06 聯合報

海軍金江艦誤射雄三飛彈事發多日，政府迄今的處理，都在究責及誤射程序問題打轉；林全更將調查箭頭指向追究洩密，恐已離題太遠。事實上，真正讓人擔憂的是，當天是「兩岸最接近戰爭的一刻」，攸關台海安危的國安系統卻呈現遲鈍及失靈狀態，這是最不該輕忽的一環。

先回顧一下蔡政府對這件史上最離譜的飛彈誤射事件之因應。七月一日上午八時十五分，金江艦誤朝台灣海峽中線發射雄三飛彈；十分鐘後，在洛杉磯的蔡英文總統及國安會秘書長吳釗燮接獲通報，卻隨即繼續參加號稱「爆桌」的僑宴。四個多小時後，蔡英文才在美國以通訊保密方式越洋召開「國安高層會議」，聽取國安會副秘書長陳俊麟的「簡報」。

此一期間，理應為蔡總統「代班人」的副總統陳建仁，正出席高鐵南港車站通車典禮；國防部長馮世寬則在博愛營區接見中華民國軍人之友社理事長李棟樑，皆為儀式性活動。至於陸委會，在兩岸熱線中斷的情況下，宣稱在當天下午「啟動各種溝通聯繫機制」，讓對岸收到相關訊息，盼對方勿錯誤解讀此一事件。至於是什麼管道，收效如何，則顧左右而言他。

令人意外的是，與此國安事件直接相關的參謀總長嚴德發，竟似被排除於處理核心之外；反而是不直接掌管國防、國安、兩岸的閣揆林全，卻忙得焦頭爛額。這顯示，新政府分工仍未上軌道，國安體制一片混亂。

發射飛彈實彈，雖是正常軍事演訓項目，卻也是一等一的國家大事；否則，為何歷任總統均要親赴屏東九鵬基地視導？今天的兩岸關係，幾已退回八年前扁政府的冰凍期，軍方竟還任意由士兵朝台海發射實彈，這當然是總統兼三軍統帥必須親自處理的國家大事。那麼，蔡總統及國安幕僚不在第一時間舉行緊急會議，研商影響與對策，卻選擇先參加僑宴，便顯得誤判形勢。

國家元首出訪遭逢國內外大事，在所難免。二○一○年三月北韓擊沉南韓天安艦，東北亞局勢緊張，當時人在帛琉訪問的前總統馬英九正與媒體茶敘，在第一時間即離席召集隨行的國安會秘書長胡為真等與國內相關單位連線，了解詳情並下達指令。二○一三年出訪中南美，適因潭美颱風來襲，決定提前結束洛杉磯過境外交行程返台。無論天安艦事件或潭美颱風，均遠不及誤射飛彈牽動台海安全之嚴重；而兩岸互信正日趨走低，溝通管道阻滯，誤射之日又適逢中共黨慶的敏感期；種種負面因素交錯，如何確保對岸不致誤判、進而衍生軍事衝突？

馬英九當年的反應，曾遭逢綠營譏為「反應過度」，然終究是國家元首對大局必要的盱衡。反觀蔡英文，面對重大國安事件，第一時間不思如何及時向對岸傳遞正確訊息，卻先行通知美方，還選擇全程參與僑宴。如此作法，實讓人錯愕。

蔡總統正出訪國外，自不可能正式召開國安會議；但既然國安會秘書長吳釗燮同行，要立即召開臨時國安高層會議，作出緊急指令，並非難事。但這次，蔡總統一行卻等到事發四小時後才舉行，不僅因應遲緩，也是輕重不分。其中原因，如果只是想到國內的軍紀、究責、陰謀等問題，卻未考慮到對岸反應、台海的安全，則國安人員恐怕太過失職。

再說，就算總統無法抽身，也可以授權留守的副總統、國安會副秘書長緊急開會研判事態走向，並規畫相應建議措施供總統定奪。但從陳建仁及馮世寬當天的行程看，當時的情景似接近「群龍無首」狀態。

蔡總統說飛彈誤射「根本不該發生」，這其實是句空話；真正不該發生的是，國安應變機制竟在關鍵時刻失靈而變成空窗。軍人虐狗，民眾可以沸沸揚揚聲討；但誤射飛彈是重大國安問題，領導階層一失神，可能釀成的大禍，要比中士胡亂按鈕嚴重百倍。

Tsai Government Must Handle South China Sea Arbitration Issue with Care

Tsai Government Must Handle South China Sea Arbitration Issue with Care
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 5, 2016

Executive Summary: The US has been pressuring Taipei, demanding that we state our position on the nine-dashed line more clearly. It hopes our side will relinquish its own claim voluntarily. If President Cai cozies up to the US, the Mainland is sure to react negatively. Cross-Strait relations will deteriorate. Our side would effectively have relinquished its territorial sovereignty. The new government must consider its response carefully.

Full Text Below:

The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration will “rule” on the Philippines' South China Sea arbitration suit on the 12th. This is the most closely watched arbitration case of the decade. It impacts the relationship between China and Southeast Asia. It also impacts Sino-US and cross-Strait relations. The Tsai government must weigh its options and respond with care.

Mainland China's position has been to reject arbitration, in order to avoid being boxed in by any unfavorable finding. Two years ago, the CCP issued a "Position Paper on South China Sea Arbitration Jurisdiction". The paper criticized Philippine claims pertaining to sovereignty and lines of demarcation. It refused to recognize the Hague Tribunal's claim of jurisdiction. Beijing knows that the outcome of the arbitration will affect the international atmosphere and alienate ASEAN. Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Brunei, Cambodia, and Laos this year. The three countries expressed support for the Mainland's position. This provoked dissatisfaction among other ASEAN countries. During a special meeting last month with ASEAN foreign ministers, the Mainland objected to interference from Japan, the US, and other countries outside the South China Sea region. A number of ASEAN countries rejected the Mainland's objection, and the meeting adjourned without any agreement. Clearly the arbitration case has divided ASEAN.

The South China Sea issue is not merely an issue that concerns ASEAN and the Mainland. It also concerns the Mainland's rise in the world and US hegemony. The Mainland has repeatedly stressed that the US is not a disputant in the South China Sea issue. It has blasted US statements about the South China Sea, and blocked or warned off US warships.

Newly elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has a more flexible attitude than his predecessor Aquino. He hopes to resolve the territorial dispute with the Mainland in a reasonable fashion. He says that even if the Philippines wins the arbitration, it will not go to war with the Mainland over Huangyan Island. Beijing has high expectations regarding Duterte, and hopes he will be willing to consult with Beijing. As a result, it has made a number of moves. It has offered the inducement of a high-speed rail project in the Philippines. Xi Jingping called to congratulate Duterte during his inauguration. He declared that "the two nations are neighbors forever". He allowed Filipino fishing boats to transit disputed waters. That said, Duterte's room for compromise remains limited. The United States is the chief instigator behind demands for arbitration. If compromises on sovereignty in the South China Sea lead to allegations of treason, Duterte will dare not act rashly.

The ROC government has taken a “viewing tigers fight each other on a neighboring mountain” posture regarding the South China Sea dispute. The initital complaint filed by the Philippines did not mention Taiping Island. Later on, in a written supplement, the Philippines alleged that Taiping Island, the largest island in the South China Sea is merely a reef. It made the same allegations about the second and third largest islands, which are also owned by the ROC. The Philippines seeks to invalidate the 200 nautical mile economic zone provision in the International Convention on the Law of the Sea, for all islands in the South China Sea. Doing so would enable the Philippines to claim waters starting from the Philippines coast. Therefore like it or not, the ROC is involved in the territorial waters dispute. That is why President Ma visited Taiping Island – to ensure that the international tribunal could not ignore the legitimate rights and interests of the ROC.

Beijing expects the result of international arbitration to be unfavorable to China. In recent months it has been clarifying its position through international law experts. Its Foreign Ministry has prepared a white paper to be distributed as soon as the results of the arbitration are announced. As for the ROC position, Tsai government aides are said to be working on it, and the government's policy has yet to be finalized. If so, the Tsai government must pay attention to several points.

First, Taipei has never at any time participated in the arbitration. So should Taipei accept the verdict? Some think we should wait for the results. If Taiping Island is classified as an island rather than a reef, they say we should accept it. If not, we should protest the result and reject it. Unfortunately one cannot selectively accept or reject the findings of arbitration. Accepting a favorable ruling on Taiping Island means accepting a unilateral decision by the Hague. It means that in the event of later disputes, we cannot claim we were not consulted beforehand.

Secondly, if Taiping Island is ruled to be the only island in the South China Sea, what are the repercussions? Taiping Island's special status would then make it the brass ring that everyone is attempting to snatch. Our military has no concrete plan to defend the island. The Coast Guard's firepower is inadequate. If foreign vessels provoke incidents, will we be able to stop them?

Finally, how should the ROC government respond to the Hague tribunal's ruling on the Mainland's "nine-dashed line"? The Ma government did its utmost to avoid mention of the PRC's nine-dashed line or the ROC's eleven-dashed line. Instead, it made a four part declaration: “Sovereignty belong to us. Disputes should be shelved. Peace is mutually beneficial. Resources should be Jointly developed”. Continuity of government remains a concern. Should President Tsai continue President Ma's policy? Can she offer something even better?

The US has been pressuring Taipei, demanding that we state our position on the nine-dashed line more clearly. It hopes our side will relinquish its own claim voluntarily. If President Cai cozies up to the US, the Mainland is sure to react negatively. Cross-Strait relations will deteriorate. Our side would effectively have relinquished its territorial sovereignty. The new government must consider its response carefully.

蔡政府須審慎因應南海仲裁案
2016-07-05 聯合報

海牙仲裁法院十二日將就菲律賓提請的「南海仲裁案」作出裁決。這是近十年來最受矚目的仲裁案，不僅衝擊中國大陸與東南亞各國關係，更將牽動中美及兩岸關係；蔡英文政府應妥為權衡，謹慎因應。

中國大陸的立場是拒絕仲裁，避免被不利的結果所框限。中共兩年前發布《關於南海仲裁案管轄權問題的立場文件》，批評菲律賓的訴求涉及主權和劃界問題，基本上先否定海牙法庭的管轄權。北京深知仲裁結果會影響國際氛圍，因此外交上要先離間東協，外長王毅今年訪問了汶萊、柬埔寨和寮國；三國分別表示支持中國的立場，從而引發東協其他國家不滿。上月與東協外長的特別會議上，大陸也提出不允許日美等區域外國家干涉南海爭端的草案，遭若干東協國家拒絕，會議不歡而散。這顯示，仲裁案已分化了東協。

南海問題其實不僅是東協與大陸的問題，也是崛起的中國與美國霸權的碰撞。中方一再強調，美國非南海爭議的聲索國，嚴斥美國對南海的發言，並以實際行動攔阻或警告美軍船艦的通行。

菲律賓新總統杜特蒂態度較前任的艾奎諾總統有彈性，希望與中國理智解決領土爭端，並表示縱贏得仲裁，菲律賓也不會因黃岩島向大陸開戰。北京對杜特蒂頗有期待，希望爭取他與北京協商，於是動作頻頻，除提出協建高鐵作為利誘，習近平致電慶賀杜特蒂就職時，還稱「兩國永遠是鄰居」，並不再阻攔航經爭議海域的菲籍漁船。然而，杜特蒂能妥協的空間有限，除了美國在仲裁案背後扮演主導角色，若在南海主權上讓步可能招致「叛國」的指控，使他不敢輕舉妄動。

對於南海爭議，我國原抱著「隔山觀虎鬥」的心態，因為菲律賓最初提交的訴狀並未涉及太平島，但在後來的書面補充中，菲國卻把南海最大島嶼──我國的太平島，連同該國占據的第二、第三大島都列為「岩礁」。其目的，是希望讓所有南海島嶼都無法依據《國際海洋法公約》宣告兩百浬經濟海域，從而所有合法起算線都要從菲國沿岸起算。我國因此被捲入領海爭議，所以馬總統才要親訪太平島，大動作提醒國際仲裁庭不能忽略台灣的正當權益。

北京預期國際仲裁對己不利，近月來已連續透過相關國際法團體與學者說明其立場，其外交部的政策白皮書也備妥，俟仲裁結果一出，將予批駁。至於我國的立場，據稱仍在幕僚作業階段，尚未進入政策定案。我們認為，蔡政府必須注意幾點：

首先，台灣自始即未參與仲裁，我方要不要接受裁決結果？有人認為要視結果而定，若認定太平島是島非礁，可表示肯定；若對我不利，則抗議不接受。問題是，仲裁判決不能選擇性接受，一旦接受對我方有利的「太平是島」，即等於接受仲裁法庭的所有片面裁決，以後再有爭議，我國便也無法抗議台灣事先未獲徵詢了。

其次，若僅太平島被認定為南海唯一島嶼，其後續影響為何？屆時，太平島的特殊地位，將成為各方搶奪的金碗；我軍方若沒有固守計畫，以海巡署的微薄火力，未必守得住。若成天有外籍船艦在該島挑釁巡弋，我們有能力阻止嗎？

最後，海牙仲裁庭對大陸「九段線」歷史海域的裁決，我國要如何看待？過去馬政府盡量避免提及九段線或我方主張的十一段線，僅提南海爭議四項主張：「主權在我，擱置爭議，和平互惠，共同開發」；基於施政的連續性，蔡總統是否繼承馬總統的政策，或能提出更高明的主張？

美國一直向台灣施壓，要求對九段線問題說清楚，最好我方能主動放棄。蔡總統若傾向美國的立場，勢將引發大陸的強烈不滿，兩岸關係將益形惡化，且亦形同我國自棄國權。這是新政府在考慮回應態度時，最最必須謹慎的部分。

Factions Pass the Baton, But DPP Sacred Cows Live On

Factions Pass the Baton, But DPP Sacred Cows Live On 
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
July 4, 2016 

Executive Summary: Some Party Representatives have already proposed the authoring of a new Party Platform during the upcoming Party Congress, one that substitutes “maintaining the status quo" for the "Three Major Resolutions". Will their proposal be successful or not? Frankly that is more important than any factional distribution of power within the Central Standing Committee and Central Executive Committee. Unfortunately, senior DPP officials have already decided to ignore their proposal. As a result, the proposal will be nothing more than “a dog chasing a train". The Party Congress will be reduced to nothing more than a DPP “company picnic”.

Full Text Below:

The DPP will convene its Party Congress in the middle of this month. This is the first Party Congress it has convened since its return to power. Therefore it is receiving greater attention than others in the past. In particular, it will be the first election of Central Executive Committee and Central Standing Committee members. These are important to the party power structure. Will the attention given to this event be commensurate with its impact on the future? That remains to be seen.

According to Democratic Progressive Party regulations, 365 Party Representatives will elect 30 Central Executive Committee members, and 11 Central Committee Judges. The Central Executive Committee will then elect 10 Central Standing Committee members. Altogether 38 people have registered as candidates for the Central Executive Committee, and 16 people have registered as candidates for Central Committee judges. Based on the numbers, competition is not particularly fierce. What has attracted attention is former Central Executive Committee members Frank Hsieh and Yu Hsi-kun, who are fading out and being replaced. Less than half the 13 current Central Executive Committee members are seeking reelection. Only four of the current Central Committee judges are seeking re-election. Party officials are being replaced at a surprisingly rapid rate.

But closer scrutiny shows that these new elites, who are about to enter the DPP power center, are not actual power holders, but merely factional representatives. These seven factions include the Tsai Ing-wen faction, the Chen Chu faction, the Frank Hsieh faction, the Su Tseng-chang faction, the Green Friendship Connection, the Yu Hsi-kun faction, and the so-called "Hai Pai". Whether the candidates will win or lose depends upon the relative strengths of the factions, but even more importantly, on all manner of factional quid pro quos.

The most interesting aspect of all this, is DPP boasts that it "abolished factions" years ago. In fact, whether the DPP was in the opposition or in power, factions remained. They merely changed names. The "Welfare State faction" became the "Frank Hsieh faction", the "Mei Li Dao faction” became the "Green Friendship Connection", and the "New Wave faction" became the “Chen Chu faction". The "abolition of factions" claim is even more ironic, now that the DPP has reassumed power.

The faction that has attracted the most attention is the “Hai Pai” faction. It represents the owner of a certain television station. He has backed two candidates for the Central Executive Committee. He may be the person every faction wants to cozy up to during the Central Standing Committee election. As we all know, the DPP has long held high the banner of social justice and "separating political parties, the government, and the military from the media" and "opposition to a media monopoly". Now however, the media has its own faction within the ruling DPP, in a naked attempt to share power and participate in policy making. How can the DPP possibly rationalize this?

These factions compete with each other for party offices. But the power center remains in the Presidential Office, not the Party Central Committee. Also, the DPP central government and local governments enjoy “total rule”. Executive powers are held by the Executive Yuan and local governments. Legislative powers are held by the Legislative Yuan and local leguislatures. Under such a division of powers between the party and the government, the Central Executive Committee members and Central Standing Committee members exercise very little power. They are akin to past KMT Central Standing Committee members, who are allowed to express themselves, but do little else.

One role that DPP party officials may be able to fulfill is determining the DPP's future by determining its party platform. After all, the DPP's ideological sacred cows, including Taiwan independence and the founding of a new nation, the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, and the Resolution for a Normal Nation, were the result of party decisions. If the DPP changes its ideological path, and moves toward the middle or toward Taiwan independence, it will do so via the party machinery. Only party officials have the authority to alter party policy.

Of course, power within the party is held by President Tsai, who is also Party Chairman Tsai. Any amendment to the party platform would require her approval or at least acquiescence. These historic documents have bound the DPP hand and foot, making progress in cross-Strait relations impossible for the foreseeable future. Even "maintaining the status quo" is now impossible. Despite all this, the likelihood that the situation will change is near zero.

Some Party Representatives have already proposed the authoring of a new Party Platform during the upcoming Party Congress, one that substitutes “maintaining the status quo" for the "Three Major Resolutions". Will their proposal be successful or not? Frankly that is more important than any factional distribution of power within the Central Standing Committee and Central Executive Committee. Unfortunately, senior DPP officials have already decided to ignore their proposal. As a result, the proposal will be nothing more than “a dog chasing a train". The Party Congress will be reduced to nothing more than a DPP “company picnic”.

派系世代交替，神主牌仍是那尊
2016-07-04 聯合報

民進黨將於月中舉行全國黨代表大會，由於這是民進黨重新執政後的第一次全代會，所受到的關注自然不同於以往。尤其是屆時將要登場的中執委、中評委和中常委的選舉，更被認為可能具有黨內權力結構調整的關鍵意義。不過，這樣一場盛會，所受的關注和其未來影響是否能成正比，恐怕還是得打上個問號。

依照民進黨的黨內規章，中執委將由六百六十五位全國黨代表選出三十位中執委和十一位中評委，再由中執委選出十位中常委。總計中執委部分共有三十八人登記參選，中評委也有十六人。從人數來看，並不特別激烈，較受外界關注的，倒是原本擔任中執委的謝長廷、游錫堃等派系大老，都已經淡出第一線，改由其他人披掛上陣。而在現任中執委當中，竟只有不到一半的十三人爭取連任。中評委爭取連任的，也只有四人，交替之快，令人驚訝。

但進一步分析，這些即將進入民進黨權力中樞的黨內新貴，與其說是「權力接班人」，不如說是「派系代理人」。其組成來自「七大派系」，包括泛英系、菊系、謝系、蘇系、綠色友誼連線、游系和所謂的「海派」。是否能夠當選，除了派系實力，更重要的可能還有彼此間的合縱連橫和權力交換。

最有趣的地方，是民進黨早在幾年前就已經宣示「解散派系」，但從在野到執政，幾年下來派系依舊，只是換湯不換藥。如「福利國」變成了「謝系」，「美麗島」變成了「綠色友誼連線」，「新潮流」變成了「菊系」而已。所謂的「解散派系」口號，在民進黨執政後，更顯諷刺。

而在諸多「派系」裡，最引人注意的，是由某電視台老闆代表的所謂「海派」，也被認為推出了兩人參選中執委，並是下一階段中常委選舉時，可能被各派系拉攏的對象。但眾所周知，「黨政軍退出媒體」和「反媒體壟斷」，一向是民進黨高舉的社會正義大旗之一，如今竟有媒體在執政黨內「自成一派」，企圖赤裸裸分享權力、參與決策。對此，不知民進黨內要如何自圓其說？

各派系如此煞有其事地競逐黨職，但從權力分配的角度來看，權力的中心仍在總統府，而不在黨中央。此外，民進黨從中央到地方都已「完全執政」，行政體系有行政院和地方政府，民代體系有中央到地方的立法院、議會黨團，並設有各種黨政協調平台。在這種黨政分野下，要說中執委、中常委真能扮演什麼權力角色，恐怕也只是如過去國民黨執政時中常會的「各言爾志」罷了。

但有一點，倒是民進黨的黨務體系最可能扮演角色之處，就是對未來黨的路線甚至黨綱的討論。畢竟，民進黨諸多意識形態的「神主牌」，包括台獨建國、台灣前途決議文以及正常國家決議文等，都是透過黨內機制的決策產生。假如民進黨要在意識形態的路線上有所調整——不管是更往中間靠攏或者向獨派傾斜——都必須透過黨內機制完成，才具有「轉彎」的正當性。

當然，在黨內權力定於蔡總統兼蔡主席一尊的情況下，若真的有黨綱的修正，也必定是來自黨內最高層的授意或至少是默許，才可能推得動。但儘管這些歷史文件已經綁住民進黨的手腳，讓兩岸關係在可預見的將來無法再向前推動，甚至連「維持現狀」都不可得；然而，目前看來，改變神主牌的可能性仍幾近於零。

這一次民進黨全代會，已有黨代表連署提案制訂新黨綱，想用「維持現狀」取代民進黨的「三大決議文」。平心而論，這樣的討論無論成功與否，都比「派系權力分配」的中執委、中常委、中執委選舉重要得多。可惜在民進黨高層已經定調將會冷處理的情況下，這些提案終究只會變成「狗吠火車」，讓這場民進黨的全代會，淪為派系的大拜拜而已。