Trump Tsai Fever: Short Term Rewards, Long Term Risks

Trump Tsai Fever: Short Term Rewards, Long Term Risks
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 9, 2016

Executive Summary: Trump Tsai fever rages on. But blowback is gathering strength. The government cannot afford to look only at superficial political gains. It must pay attention to the impact of Trump's policies on our economy as well. It must respond early, in order to find a better way and to end uncertainty in Taiwan's economy.

Full Text Below:

Donald Trump will not take office for another month. Yet his election victory has already had a major impact on the global economic and political order, in many respects. The Taiwan issue was not originally a matter of concern for the incoming Trump government. But the Trump Tsai phone call blew the matter out of proportion, and upset relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. For the Tsai government, the incident may be a minor diplomatic victory. But for the people, greater uncertainty in cross-Strait relations is certain to make Taiwan's economic challenges even more daunting.

Following the Trump Tsai phone call, Trump and his administration used social media to accuse Mainland China of manipulating exchange rates, dumping products in the United States, and stealing American jobs. Trump issued a series of provocations. The US media predicted that Trump would continue to opeate in this manner after taking office. US-China relations will therefore be riddled with friction and uncertainty. In other words, if the Trump Tsai phone call benefits the Tsai government, and US-China relations became tense, the Mainland will exact revenge. Taiwan will be a fish in a barrel. The result will be a short term gains at the expense of long term losses.

The response from Beijing in the wake of the Trump Tsai phone call has been restrained. That is because Beijing sees Trump as merely a "president elect", and is in no hurry for a showdown. Beijing may have exercised restraint. But affiliated organizations, including party media channels, have not held back. They are even prepared to respond to a pro-Taiwan policy on the part of Trump once he takes office. If and when it becomes necessary, Beijing will lash out at Taiwan, politically or economically. The Tsai government must not misjudge the situation.

Mainland China, which has become economically powerful in recent years, often uses economic leverage to strongarm opponents. For example, South Korea agreed to allow the United States to deploy the THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea earlier this year. Beijing launched a diplomatic counterattack. It also forbade the airing of South Korean film and television programs on the Mainland. This and other economic sanctions exerted indirect pressure on South Korea. In the case of Taiwan, Beijing often applies pressure on Taiwan businessmen at critical moments, as a form of psychological warfare. For example, just before the Anti-Secession Law was passed in 20015, Hsu Wen-lung, former chairman of Chi Mei, was pressured into to publishing an open letter in support of the CCP's Anti-Secession Law.

This practice of "using business to influence politics" was replayed this year. The star of this year's show was the Hai Pa Wang Company, owned and operated by Tsai Ing-wen's family. The company's investments on the Mainland were audited for tax evasion, and its products were investigated for failure to meet health standards. Hai Pa Wang was forced to issue a public statement saying that "both sides of the Strait are part of one China". Meanwhile, Taiwan Semiconductor Chairman Morris Chang and Giant Tour Chairman Liu Chin-piao have reportedly resigned as presidential consultants. In fact the two resigned before the Hai Pa Wang incident, and before Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun said he "opposed allowing Taiwan businessmen who advocate Taiwan independence to make money on the Mainland”. In any event, these changes and cross-Strait relations have become increasingly sensitive, and are directly and indirectly linked. They will inevitably undermine public confidence in the government.

Over the past two weeks, PLA Air Force warplanes have twice circumnavigated Taiwan, indicating that Beijing's intimidation against Taiwan has escalated to military means. Such intimidation is mostly symbolic, but will only increase in the foreseeable future. Taiwan cannot afford to be optimistic or naive.

Trump has declared that he will abolish the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). If it is replaced by bilateral economic and trade agreements, the United States is bound to exert major pressure on smaller nations, in order to reap economic and trade benefits beyond those provided by the TPP. Naturally this does not favor smaller nations. Protectionist barriers to US trade will inevitably be raised, and trade friction between the United States and China will inevitably increase. This will have a major impact on Taiwan, which remains highly dependent upon exports to the US and the Mainland. Hon Hai intends to invest in the United States. This is something the business community must do to cope with the Trump government's new economic policies.

Under the circumstances, the Tsai government must deal with the aftermath of the Trump Tsai phone call. She must minimize the impact on cross-Strait relations, and avoid harming Taiwan businessmen on the Mainland. The US will focus its attention on exports from Taiwan over the next few years. Government ministries charged with economics and finance must have a response ready during bilateral trade negotiations on everything from pork to arms purchases. The government must develop a strategy for balance of trade issues between the US and Taiwan consistent with Taiwan's best interests.

Trump Tsai fever rages on. But blowback is gathering strength. The government cannot afford to look only at superficial political gains. It must pay attention to the impact of Trump's policies on our economy as well. It must respond early, in order to find a better way and to end uncertainty in Taiwan's economy.

川蔡熱對台灣經濟是「短多長空」
2016-12-12 聯合報

川普還有一個多月才要上任，但其當選已為全球政經秩序帶來嚴重衝擊，且遍及各個領域。台灣議題原非美國新人新政的焦點，但在「川蔡通電」經放大解讀後，美中台三角關係頓時風起雲湧。對蔡政府而言，這在外交上或許有少許加分作用；但對人民而言，兩岸關係的不確定因素升高，勢必使經濟面的挑戰愈發艱鉅。

川普與蔡英文通電之後，川普與其團隊密集地利用社群網路與媒體發聲批評中國大陸操縱匯率、對美傾銷產品、搶走美國人工作等等，一連串動作皆充滿挑釁意味。美國媒體評論都認為，川普就任後若仍維持這種風格，美中關係將進入一個不確定性高、且充滿摩擦的階段。亦即，「川蔡電」雖為蔡政府加分，但美中關係若轉趨緊張，大陸一旦採取報復行動，反而可能讓台灣遭到池魚之殃，這將是「短多長空」的局面。

「川蔡電」後，北京的反應尚稱克制，因為中共認為川普目前只是「總統當選人」，不急著現在就跟他攤牌。北京政權雖然克制，但一些官方外圍組織、包括特定黨媒卻已露出口風，包括要對川普執政後可能的友台政策做好準備，必要時將在政治或經濟上打擊台灣，並警告蔡政府不要誤判情勢。

利用經濟上的優勢向對手施壓，是近年經濟崛起的中國常用的手段。例如，今年韓國同意美國在其境內部署薩德反飛彈系統，北京除在外交上給予反擊，也透過封殺韓國影視節目等經濟制裁方式，間接向韓國施壓。對於台灣，北京也常在關鍵時刻向台商施壓，以達到心理戰的目的。例如，二○○五年在台灣舉行反「反分裂國家法」遊行前，奇美前董事長許文龍被迫發表支持中共《反分裂國家法》的公開信，就是一個令人印象深刻的例子。

這類「以商逼政」的案例，今年又見重演。這次的主角，是與蔡英文家族關係密切的海霸王，該公司在大陸的投資遭到查稅，並傳出產品品質不合規定；為此，海霸王被迫在媒體上發表公開聲明，稱該公司支持「兩岸同屬一中」政策。與此同時，台積電董事長張忠謀、巨大董事長劉金標又先後傳出請辭總統府資政，儘管兩人辭職其實早在「海霸王事件」之前，也早於國台辦主任張志軍「反對支持台獨的台商到大陸賺錢」的談話；無論如何，這些變化與兩岸關係轉趨敏感都有直接間接的關聯，必然影響民眾對政府的信心。

再看，最近半個月內，共軍戰機兩度「繞台飛行」，顯示北京對台灣的威嚇行動已經「升級」，進階到軍事手段。這些恫嚇，雖然多為象徵性動作，但在未來可預見的期間內，恐怕只會升高，不會減緩，台灣似乎沒有樂觀或天真的餘地。

川普已宣稱要廢除跨太平洋夥伴協定（ＴＰＰ），若改以雙邊經貿談判取代，美方必然會以大壓小，牟取超乎ＴＰＰ條件的經貿利益，這對小國當然不利。可以預見，未來美國經貿保護主義的藩籬必然高築，美、中之間的貿易摩擦也將升高；這對高度倚賴對美、中出口的台灣，必然深受衝擊。鴻海傳出有意赴美投資，其實也是企業界因應川普新政不得不走的布局。

在這種情況下，蔡政府必須謹慎處理「川蔡電」的後續效應，以降低對兩岸關係的衝擊，同時避免大陸台商受到牽累。財經部會必須就我可能遭美方盯上的出口產業擬好應對策略，對於未來數年我與美國的雙邊經貿談判，小至美豬、大至軍購，政府也應重新擬定戰略，在美台經貿天秤上找到符合台灣發展利益的最大公約數。

「川蔡電」的熱潮還在延燒，但反撲的力道也將泉湧而至。政府不能只看到浮面的政治效應，更要留意川普新政對我國經濟的衝擊並提早因應，才能在其不確定性中幫台灣經濟找到趨吉避凶之路。

Strategic Implications of PLA Air Force Circumnavigation of Taiwan

Strategic Implications of PLA Air Force Circumnavigation of Taiwan 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 9, 2016

Executive Summary: Since taking office, the Tsai government has made an effort to develop the military hardware and shipbuilding industries. It has made gains in military procurements from the United States. But this is a declaration of military strength. It is of no help whatsoever to the real goal of national defense, peace and prosperity. Since time immemorial, the highest ideal in warfare, has been "to win without fighting”. For Taiwan, it is the only option.

Full Text Below:

PLA Air Force military aircraft flew through the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel across the first island chain, and eventually rendezvoused off the eastern coast of Taiwan. Japanese military aircraft rushed to intercept them. The ROC Air Force maintained long-range monitoring but did not intercept them. This raised many questions.

First of all, consider the significance of the Mainland military aircraft circumnavigation of Taiwan. Was this a paramilitary operation, or was it a political statement? If it was the former, then the ROC Air Force should have taken decisive military action to ensure our national security. Failure to act would have been a dereliction of duty. Military dereliction of duty is a serious matter.

In this case, Mainland military aircraft did not enter the ROC air defense identification zone. Nor did they cross the midline of the Taiwan Strait. The flight was clearly a political statement rather than a military action. This Mainland military show of force directed at Taiwan, the United States and Japan, was unprecedented. Over the past eight years, cross-Strait relations have greatly improved, Military confrontations have greatly eased. But that does not mean the Mainland has reduced its military build up or deployment against Taiwan. On the contrary, the Mainland's economic strength has grown by leaps and bounds. Its military strength has kept pace. The cross-Strait military balance has been lopsided for quite some time. More importantly, Mainland military preparations are no longer verbal declarations and responses to isolated political events. They are no longer emergency responses, but part of normal readiness.

The two missile crises in 1995 and 1996, which the public on Taiwan still remembers clearly, were the Mainland's response to Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States and the presidential election. Events have shown that such military actions failed to produce results. Instead, they increased public resentment against the Mainland. The Mainland has made timely adjustments, and is less inclined to resort to military action. During the Hu Jintao era, it stressed its commitment to peaceful cross-Strait relations. The Mainland position is that "We have made no commitment to abandon the use of force". But this has gradually faded from its official discourse.

During the missile crises, the United States dispatched aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait. This thorn in the Mainland's side accelerated the Mainland's commitment to military reform and weapons and equipment updates. The Mainland now has an aircraft carrier group and a space force. This time PLA military aircraft circumnavigated Taiwan from north to south, on both sides of the island. It was the most intensive military exercise in nearly 20 years. It revealed the extent of Mainland military preparations. Similar incidents will happen more often in the future. Taiwan must awaken to this reality.

Of course, we have also noted the Japanese response to this incident. ROC and Japanese air defense identification zones abut each other. Mainland military aircraft flew outside the eastern edge of the ROC air defense identification zone. This meant it flew inside Japan's air defense identification zone. The Japanese Air Force immediately intercepted. This showed that the Japanese are closely monitoring Mainland military actions. It means that once the People's Liberation Army takes military action on the eastern coast of Taiwan, it faces a threat from the rear by US and Japanese forces. From this perspective, the cross-Strait military balance of power has not drastically changed the overall regional strategic military balance. Taiwan is not actually under that great a military threat.

Mainland military strength has grown by leaps and bounds. The Japanese military is exhausted. The Mainland passed through the Tsugaru Strait and Miyako Strait. It passed through Diaoyutai Island waters, as a matter of routine. Japan pays close attention to this, but no longer responds. US forces in Japan also refrain from confronting the Mainland military head on. From this perspective, even if the strategic balance in the western Pacific does not change in the short term, United States and Japanese influence on cross-Strait relations will gradually decline. Ultimately Taiwan will be forced to focus on the Mainland, as the US and Japan lose their determination to lend their strategic support to Taiwan.

Many people dream that the United States and Japan will rush to Taiwan's aid. But this will not happen.  Many Taiwan independence advocates are unafraid of cross-Strait military conflict. They remember the previous Taiwan Strait missile crises. They remember the US aircraft carrier support. These people are convinced that in the event of a cross-Strait war, the United States and Japan will immediately rush to defend Taiwan. They are convinced that even though Taiwan's military strength has deteriorated, that will not affect Taiwan's security. But current reality clearly contradicts their assumptions. As recent events have shown, the United States and Japan will find it increasingly difficult to remain as involved as they were in the past. They will be reduced to passivity. If people on Taiwan are pinning their hopes on unrealistic expectations of foreign support, they are merely revealing defects in their strategic thinking.

Therefore one must consider the actual situation in cross-Strait military strength. Even if one factors the US and Japan into the strategic picture, the result does not favor Taiwan. Mainland military aircraft circumnavigating the island is sufficient to demonstrate the pressure it can exert on Taiwan. Mainland military aircraft refrained from entering the ROC air defense identification zone. They also refrained from crossing the center line of the Strait. This shows the flight was merely a political statement. PLA Air Force restraint was a show of rationality.

Since taking office, the Tsai government has made an effort to develop the military hardware and shipbuilding industries. It has made gains in military procurements from the United States. But this is a declaration of military strength. It is of no help whatsoever to the real goal of national defense, peace and prosperity. Since time immemorial, the highest ideal in warfare, has been "to win without fighting”. For Taiwan, it is the only option.

從國家戰略高度看共機繞島事件
2016/12/9 中國時報

大陸解放軍軍機分別由宮古海峽和巴士海峽穿越第一島鏈，最後在台灣東部會合，日本軍機緊急起飛攔截伴飛，我空軍則維持遠距監控並未伴飛，引發許多質疑。

首先應探究大陸軍機繞島飛行事件的意義，究竟是準軍事行動，或政治宣示行為，如果是前者，我空軍理應果斷採取相對應的軍事行為，以確保國家安全。應行動未行動是失職，軍人失職是非常嚴重的行為。

不過，這次事件，大陸軍機未進入我防空識別區，亦未穿越海峽中線，可以研判，此舉政治宣示性質大於軍事行為，目的在向台灣及美、日兩國宣示大陸軍事能量今非昔比。過去8年兩岸關係大幅推進，軍事對峙氛圍也有所緩解，但這並不意味著大陸放鬆了軍事建設及對台軍事部署，恰恰相反，隨著大陸經濟實力的大幅躍升，其軍事實力也在突飛猛進，兩岸軍事對比早已失衡。更重要的是，大陸的軍事準備不再停留在口頭宣示和針對個別政治事件的緊急應對，而是進入常態化備戰階段。

台灣民眾記憶猶新的1995年和1996年兩次飛彈危機，是大陸針對李登輝訪美和總統大選的應對作法，事實證明軍事動作不僅沒有發揮效果，反而助長了台灣民眾對大陸的反感。對此大陸及時做出調整，此後即較少公開訴諸軍事動作。到胡錦濤時代，進一步宣告要致力於兩岸關係和平發展，「不承諾放棄使用武力」的說法雖未被摒棄，但也逐漸淡出官方論述。

飛彈危機期間美國派出航母進入台灣海峽，也讓大陸深感芒刺在背，因而加速軍事革新，致力於武器裝備更新，現在又組建航母編隊及外太空武力，對台軍事力量今非昔比。這次軍機繞飛行動，解放軍完成從台灣南北兩側的閉環，正是大陸近20年軍事實力提升的集中表現，也展現大陸的常態化軍事準備。相信今後類似事件還會經常發生，台灣對此必須清醒認識。

當然，我們也注意到日軍對此事件的應對作為。台日防空識別區相鄰，大陸軍機沿我東部海岸防空識別區線外飛行，意味進入日本防空識別區，日空軍乃緊急升空伴飛，顯示日軍對大陸軍事行為滴水不漏的嚴密監控。這也意味一旦解放軍有意在台灣東部海岸採取軍事動作，要面對來自後方美、日軍隊的威脅。如此觀之，縱使海峽兩岸軍事實力對比失衡，從整體的區域戰略格局來看，這種戰略平衡的狀態並未發生劇變，台灣也不至於實質進入軍事威脅的困境之中。

大陸軍事實力突飛猛進，讓日本軍隊疲於奔命，大陸接連穿過津輕海峽、宮古海峽，更在釣魚台水域常態巡航，日本除了密切關注以外也無更多應對作為，駐日美軍也基本採取克制態度，未與大陸軍隊正面對峙。從這個角度看，即便西太平洋戰略平衡短期內不會改變，但美、日對台海兩岸的影響能力也逐漸下降，最終將不得不將主要精力放在與大陸的博弈，失去戰略支援台灣的決心。

這意味許多人幻想美、日馳援台灣的局面不可能再度發生，很多台獨主張者不怕兩岸軍事衝突，基本上都是來自上次海峽飛彈危機的經驗，看到美國航母的支援，讓這些人更加深信，一旦兩岸開戰，美、日會立即協防台灣，即便台灣軍事實力每況愈下，也不影響台灣的安全。但如今的局面顯然與他們的想像背道而馳，從近年來的幾次事件來看，美、日很難再如過去那樣直接介入，反而都只能採取被動因應的作法。台獨若將自己的希望寄託在不切實際的外來支援上，只會凸顯他們戰略思維的脆弱。

因此考量兩岸軍事對比的實際狀況，即便加入美、日因素後的整體戰略格局，也同樣不利於台灣，大陸軍機繞島飛行足以證明其軍事能量對台灣軍事壓力的實質存在。但大陸軍機並未進入我防空識別區，也未穿過海峽中線，只是單純政治宣示性質，空軍的克制動作顯得理性。

蔡政府上台以來致力於推動國機國造和國艦國造，對美軍事採購也有新的進展，但這更多是提升軍力的宣示，對改變兩岸軍事失衡格局沒有任何助益，根本之道仍在於以和平發展為目標的國防建設，「不戰而屈人之兵」自古以來都是戰爭的最高境界，對台灣來說，更是唯一選擇。

Trump Tsai Fever: Enjoy the Moment Before the Bubble Bursts

Trump Tsai Fever: Enjoy the Moment Before the Bubble Bursts
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 7, 2016

Executive Summary: Trump is arrogant and egotistical. Under his administration, the US will probably lack a clear and stable policy stance. He may adopt a confrontational strategy against the Mainland. He may provide Taiwan with a little more international breathing room. But his opportunism and caprice could result in him abandoning Taiwan at any time. Taiwan must assess the situation. It must take note of trends. It must not be reduced to a bubble in a breaking wave.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ying-wen and Donald Trump spoke over the phone, and provoke a firestorm among the US, the Mainland, and Taiwan. Two things are certain. One. The Trump administration is a loose cannon, and does not care whether it collides head on with Mainland China. Two. Trump has no intention of following Obama's Asian-Pacific policy. Washington's diplomatic conventions mean nothing to him. So the next question is: What role does Taiwan play in this picture, and how can it derive the most benefit?

The Trump Tsai phone call provoked intense international concern. First impressions
suggest that it was a diplomatic victory for Taiwan. One. It raised Taiwan's international profile. Two. It established a channel for future communication with the new Trump administration. Three. The subsequent tug of war between the US and the Mainland give Taiwan an extra chip in cross-Strait relations. These can be considered positive developments.

But the person responsible for this Trump Tsai Fever is wild man Donald Trump. People everywhere remain skeptical about his consistency and the potential consequences of the incident. The key is whether Trump consciously used Taiwan to provoke the Mainland, or whether he was steered wrong by aides. Trump is reckless and often repeats the same mistakes. He has the instincts of a businessman. His support for Taiwan will not be based on considerations of justice. It will be based solely on calculations of advantage. If we wish to talk about advantages, the Mainland can provide thousands of times the advantages of Taiwan. This is a reality the Tsai government must acknowledge.

Consider what happened after the Trump Tsai phone call. The attitudes adopted by the US, the Mainland, and Taiwan, are intriguing. The Trump camp is still experiencing the thrill of victory. It has countered Beijing's protests head on. His economic advisers even spouted obscenities such as "F**k 'em". The Obama administration was shocked by the Trump Tsai phone call. On the one hand, it was concerned that Obama's Asian rebalancing policy would go down the drain. On the other hand, it reiterated the "one China principle" to mollify Beijing. Beijing's reaction, by contrast, was not to blame Trump, but Taiwan, for “engaging in trickery”. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs even asked Washington to deny Tsai transit privileges when she visits Nicaragua next month. Tsai told an American reporter that the phone call was merely a reflection of Taiwan's respect for the US elections, and did not represent any change in policy.

The DPP was initially elated. But Tsai Ing-wen has turned low-key. Clearly invisible diplomatic pressures have been brought to bear. Three days ago, Tsai's visit to Nicaragua and three other nations was supposed to transit New York. Political pundits speculated that she might even meet with Trump. The latest news however, is that she will not transit New York, but Houston and San Francisco instead. There will be no Trump Tsai meeting. The reason should not be hard to imagine. The current US president is Barack Obama. Before the official handover, Washington is not about to allow a replay of the Trump Tsai phone call that undermines Obama's authority ahead of schedule.

What worries many in the political world is that Beijing may not stop at interfering with Tsai's trip to Central America. They may take revenge and embarrass her. They may turn ROC diplomatic allies. Nicaragua in particular, may change diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. If not for the Ma government's diplomatic truce, it would have recognized Beijing already. Therefore, the Tsai government must maintain a low profile. Otherwise, a phone call and less than a day's euphoria, may result in a string of retaliatory moves whose cost are not worth the candle.

Taiwan's prolonged diplomatic isolation has led some to use a points system or shallow pro forma ritual to tally wins and losses. For example: What title was given to some representative from Taiwan taking part in some international activity? How many national flags were displayed during some international event? Whom did James Soong meet and greet at APEC? Which cities did the president transit? Such petty pro forma gains and losses, sway popular sentiment again and again. Such clashes are not unimportant. But in terms of the ROC's survival and development, their form outweighs their substance. Far more important is strategy. Do we have a strategy that is more inclusive, one that is more politically and economically sophisticated, and more indicative of the nation's progress? We need a strategy that is less prone to intimidation, frustration, or incitement. This is why we have repeatedly stressed that cross-Strait policy is so important.

Trump is arrogant and egotistical. Under his administration, the US will probably lack a clear and stable policy stance. He may adopt a confrontational strategy against the Mainland. He may provide Taiwan with a little more international breathing room. But his opportunism and caprice could result in him abandoning Taiwan at any time. Taiwan must assess the situation. It must take note of trends. It must not be reduced to a bubble in a breaking wave.

川蔡熱：抓穩潮流，勿成泡沫
2016-12-08 聯合報

蔡英文和川普一通電話，在美中台之間捲起千堆雪。可以確定的有二：一是川普及其團隊是「自走砲」作風，根本不在乎與中共正面衝突；二是川普完全無意追隨歐巴馬的亞太政策，華府那一套外交規範也管不住川普團隊。接下來要問的是：台灣在這樣的變局中，該如何抓住自己的角色和利益？

從第一印象看，「川蔡電」引起如此熱烈的國際關注，對台灣而言，這次外交出擊可謂斬獲不菲。包括：第一，放大了台灣的能見度；第二，建立了未來與川普新政府溝通的管道；第三，由於美中的拉扯，或使台灣在兩岸關係中有出現新空間的機會。這些，都可說是正面的成果。

然而，正因為煽起這次「川蔡熱」效應的主角是狂人川普，儘管野火狂燒，各界對這種操作的一致性及可能後果不免抱持懷疑。其中關鍵，不在川普是否有意識地利用台灣向中共挑釁，或者他是否受到幕僚誤導；而在他過度輕率且易於反覆的性格，加上其商人本能的利益取向，他對台灣的支持絕對不會有「義」的考量，而將只有「利」的盤算。而若要談利，中國大陸能夠提供的誘因，絕對比台灣大上千百倍。這點，是蔡政府必須認清的現實。

觀察川蔡通話後的發展，美中台三方的態度均堪玩味。川普陣營方面始終未脫亢奮狀態，對北京的抗議直接反擊，其經濟顧問更粗話開罵「去他的」。歐巴馬政府則對川蔡通電難掩震驚，一方面憂心歐巴馬的亞洲再平衡政策將盡付東流，一方面則不斷重申「一中原則」安撫北京。相形之下，北京的反應則顯得有所選擇，並未大力指責川普，卻歸咎「台灣搞小動作」，中共外交部甚至進一步要求華府勿讓蔡英文下月出訪尼加拉瓜時過境美國。至於蔡英文，則在接受美國記者訪問時說，那通電話只是表達台灣對美國選舉的尊重，並不代表政策轉變；言下，顯得相當保留。

從民進黨第一時間的喜不自勝，到蔡英文後來轉為低調，可以窺知看不見的外交壓力已經泉湧而至。三日前，蔡英文出訪尼加拉瓜等三國的行程原稱要「過境紐約」，政壇甚至猜測她將在那裡會見川普。最新的消息則說，她不會過境紐約，而是過境休士頓和舊金山，同時也不會有「川蔡會」。這樣的變化應是不難想像：目前美國還是歐巴馬當家，在正式交接之前，華府當然不會讓「川蔡電」的意外重演，讓歐巴馬提前破功。

更讓政界擔心的，是中共除了干擾蔡英文的中美洲行程，會不會下重手以「奪取邦交」的方式作為報復，來使她難堪？尤其，尼加拉瓜近年屢傳外交生變的可能，若非馬政府的「外交休兵」政策，早就投靠對岸了。因此，蔡政府此刻除了小心為上，保持低調也是必要的。否則，為了一通電話，快樂不到一天，接下來可能要面對連串的報復，將得不償失。

長期以來，由於台灣外交上的孤立，人們似乎已習慣仰賴若干點狀或淺層的儀式交鋒來計算得失。例如：台灣代表在國際組織拿到了什麼頭銜，某場國際賽事又亮了幾面國旗，宋楚瑜在ＡＰＥＣ和誰照面，元首過境外交又前進了什麼城市；小小的形式得失，一再牽動國人的心。這類儀式性交鋒不能說不重要，但放在台灣生存發展的戰略脈絡中看，其實點綴性質大過實質。更重要的，是我們有沒有一套涵括面更大、政經縱深更厚、有效性更持久的策略，作為指引國家前進的方針，而不需要動輒因受到恐嚇、挫折、或慫恿而浮沉不定。這也是我們一再強調兩岸政策非常重要的原因所在。

以川普的自大狂暴，他主政後的美國恐怕不會有清晰、穩定的路線。他對中國採取對抗策略，或許能提供台灣多一點國際空間；但以他的投機與善變，也隨時可以棄台灣於不顧。明智之計，台灣必須審慎評估，把握潮流，但千萬小心，別淪為浪尖的泡沫。

Hipster Politics: Reality Bites

Hipster Politics: Reality Bites
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 7, 2016

Executive Summary: Unrest has persisted for nine months. It is time the "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day" drama ended. But has the DPP learned prudence and humility? Has it learned to avoid making trouble for itself? Has it learned that double standards are chickens that will eventually come home to roost? Tsai Ing-wen's "hipster politics" is clearly incapable of dealing with social reality. When it is necessary to persuade the public, do not resort to shouting slogans.

Full Text Below:

The president handed down an edict. She declared that the "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day" rule must pass. Yesterday the Legislative Yuan mobilized. Heavy crowd control barriers were installed, and police stood guard, ready to block labor protestors. Inside the legislature, blue and green legislators fought over control of the podium. Despite nine months of political wrangling, the "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day" dispute still had to be settled in such a crude fashion. This reflects the government's failure to communicate with the public. It also shows that “hipster politics” is incapable of dealing with harsh reality.

The year is nearing its end. If the government fails to resolve these problems by then, the number of public protests will be too long to print out. Employees and employers will not know what to do. The government has rammed the amendment through. Observers know why. The amendment process was an embarrassment, mainly due to DPP manipulation. For one, because when it was in the opposition, it behaved like a thug. Now that it in office, it must make 180 degree reversals in its policy course. For another, the DPP loves to show off before workers, but it has no idea how to strike a proper balance. In the end, all it can do is make reckless decisions in the heat of the moment.

During March of this year, former Minister of Labor Chen Hsiung-wen reduced the number of working hours per week in exchange for the elimination of seven legal holidays. He wanted labor and public servants to share the same holidays. But this policy was blocked by the DPP in the Legislative Yuan, on the pretext that it harmed the rights and interests of eight million workers. The newly installed DPP gloated. It now had the “total government” it longed for. It assumed the move would please labor. Therefore it gave labor carte blanche. Who knew that nine months later, different holidays for labor, public servants, and teachers would lead to social unrest. In the end, the Tsai government was forced to eliminate the seven legal holidays. Nine months later, the DPP was forced to make a 180 degree about face. The DPP was now reaping what it sowed.

Even more noteworthy is the government's changing attitude towards labor. Yesterday's deference has become today's arrogance. When the DPP was out of power, labor stood by it, shoulder to shoulder. Therefore the Tsai government was presumed to be a friend to labor. As soon as it rose to power, it expressed solidarity with labor. For example, the president illegally met with the boss of Far Eastone, and demanded that he help the government resolve the toll collectors strike. This opened a Pandora's box, by encouraging labor protests. When China Airlines flight attendants went on strike, Tsai Ying-wen boarded a chartered plane and proclaimed "You are not alone!” As a result, Ho Nuan-hsuan gave the flight attendants everything they demanded. One month later however, the flight attendants on Tsai's chartered plane were fired from the union.

The government's support for labor is praiseworthy. But policy decisions are a complicated process. If they are badly handled, if they are tailor made for specific individuals, if they are biased or even hostile, they can wreak havoc. For example, the DPP vehemently opposed Chen's elimination of seven legal holidays. But later this became a bitter pill the party itself had to swallow. Before, it repeatedly offered concessions to specified groups. The “squeaky wheel gets the grease”, after all. But more importantly, when a government finds itself at rope's end, goodwill gestures are futile. All it can do is get tough and clean up the mess. This time labor waged a month long hunger strike, but the ruling DPP completely ignored it.

Over the past few months Tsai frequently addressed labor. She said "Labor is the DPP's partner" and that "Labor occupies the softest spot in our hearts". In her eagerness to chummy up to them, she was a fount of “hipster rhetoric”. In the end though, the legislature was forced to erect heavy metal barriers to keep labor protestors far from the premises. Labor demanded seven legal holidays. But the government foisted its “three special holidays for new labor" scheme on them. The entire process was a waste of time, and left labor permanently aggrieved. Tsai's “hipster politics” ran up against reality, and fell flat on its face. That much is crystal clear.

Even more noteworthy was the Labor Law incident. Attention was focused on the "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day" and "seven legal holidays” issues. Structural gains and losses in the amendment were ignored. For example, while horse trading over the work week, the ruling party increased the rates for overtime hours. But this is fruit that not every worker will see or eat. Many local governments do not carry out labor inspections at all. How can officials know that overtime benefits due laborers are accurately credited to their accounts?

Unrest has persisted for nine months. It is time the "one fixed day off and one flexible rest day" drama ended. But has the DPP learned prudence and humility? Has it learned to avoid making trouble for itself? Has it learned that double standards are chickens that will eventually come home to roost? Tsai Ing-wen's "hipster politics" is clearly incapable of dealing with social reality. When it is necessary to persuade the public, do not resort to shouting slogans.

「文青政治」終須面對的冷酷現實
2016-12-07 聯合報

在總統「一例一休非過不可」的命令下，立法院昨天重兵部署：院外是重重鐵柵及員警戒備，防堵示威勞工；院內則是藍綠立委衝突叫罵，爭奪主席台。歷經九個月拉鋸，一例一休之爭仍須以如此粗暴的方式完成立法，除反映政府的社會溝通失敗，也說明「文青政治」假裝溫暖的腔調應付不了冷酷的現實。

轉眼已至年底，國假問題若再不解決，不僅民間連行事曆都印不出來，廣大的勞工和企業雇主也將無所適從；因此，政府急著通過修法，外界不難理解。這次修法鬧得如此狼狽，主要是肇因於民進黨的討巧操弄：一方面是在野時一味蠻橫托大，到了執政後竟繞不過這個髮夾彎；二方面是喜歡向勞工賣弄交情，卻在必須決斷時不知如何求取平衡，最終只能訴諸蠻幹。

今年三月，勞動部前部長陳雄文以「降低每周工時」的方式換取刪除七天國假，希讓勞工和公教人員休假同步；然而，此政策卻在立院遭民進黨攔下，認為損及八百萬勞工權益。當時，剛剛取得完全執政的民進黨躊躇滿志，自以為可以加碼演出討好勞工，因而誇下繼續放假的海口。誰料，九個月來，勞、公、教國假不一的問題弄得社會紛擾不斷，蔡政府最後仍須食言砍掉這七天國假。這場九個月還繞不過的髮夾彎，正是民進黨自食其果的官場現形記。

更值得注意的是，政府對待勞工的態度，已陷入一種前恭後倨的窘境。民進黨在野的拚搏，一直有勞團相伴，也因此蔡政府將勞團視為友軍，一上台就向勞工示好。例如，總統以超乎法制的手法約見遠傳老闆，要求和政府共同出資解決國道收費員問題；這種法外施恩作法，打開了鼓勵勞工抗爭的潘朵拉之盒。再如，華航空服員罷工時，蔡英文在專機上喊話：「不會讓你們感到孤單」；結果，造成何煖軒在和空服員談判時照單全收，一個月後，專機空服員卻遭工會除名。

政府對勞工友善，原是值得肯定的事；但在複雜的決策過程中，如不妥善拿捏，或者流於針對性、偏向性的討好，甚至信口開河，都可能引發難以收拾的後遺症。例如，先前民進黨強硬反對陳雄文刪除七天假，到後來就變成自食其言的苦果；先前一再向特定團體示好讓步，就得到了「會吵才有糖吃」的效果。更有甚者，當政府疲於奔命、乃至釋放善意亦無補於事時，竟只能祭出冷酷手段以收拾殘局。就像這次，勞團絕食近月，而執政者幾乎不聞不問。

回顧過去數月，蔡英文頻頻對勞工喊話，稱「勞工是民進黨的夥伴」，「勞工是我們心中最軟的那塊」，充滿了「文青腔調」的拉攏意味。遺憾的是，到頭來，立法院仍必須以重重鐵柵拒勞工於千里之外；勞工要求七天國假，政府卻用「新勞工三天特休」搪塞，不僅雙方白忙一場，更留下難以消除的心結。從這點看，「文青政治」長於修辭卻拙於現實應對的窘境，已一目了然。

更值得注意的是，這次勞基法修法事件，因一直被聚焦在「一例一休」及「七天國假」的焦點上，至於整體修法的結構性得失，則似乎完全未受到應有的討論。例如，在一例一休討價還價的過程中，雖然執政黨提高了不同加班工時的累進加發乘數，然而，這是不是每個勞工「看得到、也吃得到」的果實，恐怕還有很大的疑問。原因是，許多地方政府根本不進行勞動檢查，官員如何知道勞工未依法休假應享有的加班待遇，能夠如實落入他們的口袋？

擾攘了九個月，一例一休事件也到了該落幕的時候。問題在，民進黨是否從中學到了審慎與謙卑，是否學到了避免「庸人自擾」及「兩套標準」的一課。蔡英文的「文青政治」，顯然已應付不了社會現實，在必須以理說服民眾的時候，請不要再用矯柔做作的喊話來敷衍。

Trump Intends to Change Sino-US Relations: Taiwan Must Beware

Trump Intends to Change Sino-US Relations: Taiwan Must Beware
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 6, 2016

Executive Summary: How should Taiwan deal with the new Sino-US strategic scenario after Trump takes office? This question will severely test the Tsai government's wisdom. Trump's national security team dispatched Henry Kissinger to Beijing, while simultaneously publicizing Tsai Ing-wen's phone call to Trump online. Trump placed emphasis on the "democratically elected president of Taiwan", then Tweeted about Mainland China, saying that China did not report its actions to the United States in advance. This shows that Trump's little drama was carefully orchestrated, not improvised. The Tsai government must realize that the new Trump government is a savvy decision-maker. The Tsai government must plan ahead. It must adopt a flexible "friendly with the US, at peace with the Mainland” strategy. Otherwise Taiwan may not be able to weather the Trump political storm.

Full Text Below:

US President-elect Donald Trump calls himself an "America Firster". Tsai Ing-wen's phone call to Trump made waves in the Asian-Pacific region. Trump Tweeted that when Mainland China acted, it did not consult with the United States first, therefore why must he report to Mainland China before picking up the phone? The international media is saying that Trump deliberately provoked Mainland China, and that the US and Mainland China may begin a "new cold war". It is saying that Trump deliberately poured gasoline on the fire regarding bilateral economic and trade relations, investments, and the conflict in the South China Sea, threatening peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

The outgoing Obama administration immediately declared that the one China policy stance of the US, which is based on the "one law and three communiques", remains unchanged. But once Trump comes to power, will he change China policy? That prospect has many worried. How should Taiwan deal with the new and changing situation? Considerable brainstorming will be needed to negotiate this passage.

Trump's national security adviser, Michael Flynn, noted that the United States' biggest advantage is that world leaders do not know what it intends to do. Flynn's mentality reflects the new government's "America First" strategic posture. It sees China as a competitor. Before coming to power, Flynn is challenging Mainland China over the Taiwan issue, RMB exchange rates, trade and investment barriers, South China Sea military expansion, and other issues. He is accumulating bargaining chips for future negotiations. At the same time, the new government will give priority to US economic, trade and security interests. It will use tax cuts to return 2 trillion dollars in multinational capital to the US, and impose heavy taxes on US companies who move their manufacturing plants overseas, as part of his "Make America Great Again" goal.

On the matter of international security, Trump does not want America to remain the "world's policeman". He wants allies to share the cost of their own security. He wants to use flexible strategies to ensure Asian-Pacific “Managable Instability”. An Asian-Pacific region arms race would enable the United States to increase US arms exports and reduce its trade deficit. It would enable the US to once again become a safe haven for Asian-Pacific capital, technology, and personnel. It would make United States issued bonds and real estate more popular, and accelerate Trump's "America First" industrial recovery plan, by injecting huge amounts of capital and talent.

The new government will also seek to win over Russian President Putin, reshape the US-Russian strategic cooperation framework, in order to apply pressure on Mainland China. This would enable the United States to gain a strategic advantage when negotiating with Mainland China. The Trump government's strategic goal is to make the United States the world's most secure and prosperous place. This will make the world's capital, technology, and talent flock to the United States, providing Americans with more high-quality job opportunities.

Sino-US relations are in a highly indeterminate state. Taiwan is caught in the middle. It can choose to rely entirely on the United States. It can play along with the new Trump government's challenge to Mainland China. But this risks turning Taiwan into America's cannon fodder or America's pawn. Or Taiwan can choose to respond to Mainland President Xi Jinping's appeal to a "shared destiny". It can establish a new cross-Strait consensus that upholds one China. It can publicly reaffirm that people on both sides of the Strait belong to one China. It can even stress that the two sides can cooperate in building a democratic China. This would provide a way out of the cross-Strait impasse, and a way out for Taiwan as well.

The current disparity in the two sides' strength, coupled growing tensions between the US and Mainland China, have already done in the Tsai government's national security strategy. Does Tsai really believe that if the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have nothing to do with each other, that Taiwan can develop its economy through economic and trade interactions with the United States and Japan? That is simply impossible. Mainland China has become the world's second largest economy, Taiwan's largest trading partner, and the primary source of its trade surplus. Any US Expeditionary Force in the Western Pacific would face a PLA with a home court military advantage. It would no longer be assured of victory. Therefore, if Taiwan voluntarily forsakes the Mainland market, or even makes the Mainland its military enemy, the cost will be hard to bear. Moreover, the new Trump government strategic posture emphasize "America First". It will use Taiwan merely as a pawn or bargaining chip. Once it decides that the cost of using Taiwan is too high, it will adopt a quid pro quo trading strategy, and sell Taiwan out. Does the Tsai government really believe that once Trump becomes President of the United States, Sino-US rivalry will enable Taiwan to cozy up to the US and Japan and contain Mainland China? If she does, she is dreaming. War in the Taiwan Strait would only spell disaster for Taiwan's economy and security.

How should Taiwan deal with the new Sino-US strategic scenario after Trump takes office? This question will severely test the Tsai government's wisdom. Trump's national security team dispatched Henry Kissinger to Beijing, while simultaneously publicizing Tsai Ing-wen's phone call to Trump online. Trump placed emphasis on the "democratically elected president of Taiwan", then Tweeted about Mainland China, saying that China did not report its actions to the United States in advance. This shows that Trump's little drama was carefully orchestrated, not improvised. The Tsai government must realize that the new Trump government is a savvy decision-maker. The Tsai government must plan ahead. It must adopt a flexible "friendly with the US, at peace with the Mainland” strategy. Otherwise Taiwan may not be able to weather the Trump political storm.

川普意在翻轉中美關係 台灣要謹慎
2016/12/6 中國時報

美國總統當選人川普自稱是「美國優先」主義者，在「英川通話」掀起亞太新波瀾之際，他又在推特嗆聲中國亂搞也沒先問過美國，為什麼自己接個電話還要先報備。目前，國際主流媒體均以川普刻意觸怒中國為切入點，認為美中關係可能進入「新冷戰」時期。川普刻意在雙邊經貿、投資利益矛盾及南海議題火上澆油，為亞太地區和平穩定埋下火種。

即將卸任的歐巴馬政府立即宣示，美國基於「一法三公報」的一個中國政策立場不變。但川普上台後會不會改變對中國的政策，才是多數人關注的重點。台灣要如何應對山雨欲來的新變局，恐怕要多集思廣益，才能安然度過新風暴。

川普的國家安全顧問佛林指出，美國現在最大的優勢就是，世界各國領導人都搞不清楚美國準備怎麼做。佛林的心態正反映出川普新政府強調「美國優先」的決心與戰略布局方向，準備把中國當成競爭對象，在上台前就從台灣問題、人民幣匯率、貿易與投資壁壘，以及南海軍事擴張等議題，開始挑戰中國的底線，並為今後展開談判交易墊高籌碼。同時，川普新政府將以美國經貿與安全利益為優先考量，祭出減稅措施吸引2兆美元的跨國企業資金回流，並針對製造工廠外移的美國企業課徵重稅，以落實「讓美國再度強大」的目標。

在國際安全議題上，川普不想再當「世界警察」，準備要求盟國友邦增加分攤安全成本，並將運用細緻靈活策略，塑造亞太地區「可管理的不穩定」（Managable Instability），讓亞太各國展開軍備競賽，而美國不僅可以趁國際情勢動盪之際，增加美製武器出口以減少貿易赤字，更可以再度成為亞太資金、技術與人才的避風港，讓美國發行的公債與房地產成為搶手貨，並促使「美國優先」的製造業復興計畫獲得龐大資金與人才挹注，加速進行。

此外，川普新政府將積極拉攏俄羅斯總統普丁，重新發展美俄戰略合作架構，進而對中國形成新壓力，為美國與中國談判周旋時，取得新的國際戰略優勢地位。川普新政府的強國戰略目標，就是要打造美國成為世界最安全繁榮的地方，讓全世界的資金、技術與人才湧向美國，為美國人創造更多優質工作機會。

當中美關係將進入高度不確定狀態之際，台灣處在中美兩強夾縫中，一則可以選擇完全依賴美國，配合川普新政府挑戰中國的策略，但卻必須擔負淪為美國炮灰或馬前卒的風險。台灣亦可選擇回應大陸國家主席習近平的「命運共同體」思維，建立可以體現一中內涵的兩岸新共識，公開支持「兩岸人民同屬中華民族」的立場，甚至進一步強調兩岸可以合作建設「民主中國」，為台海兩岸主權對峙僵局解套，也為台灣找到新出路。

當前，兩岸綜合國力差距懸殊，加上美中關係恐趨向緊張，已讓蔡政府的國家安全戰略左支右絀。蔡政府若認為，兩岸不往來，台灣仍可透過美、日經貿互動發展經濟，這已不切實際，因為現今中國大陸已成為世界第二大經濟體，也是台灣最大的貿易夥伴與順差來源，而且美國遠征軍在西太平洋沿岸，面對共軍的主場優勢時，已不再擁有絕對勝算。所以，台灣若自絕於大陸市場，甚至在軍事上與大陸為敵，代價恐難承擔。更何況川普新政府強調「美國優先」的戰略布局，只會把台灣當成棋子或籌碼，一旦認為利用台灣的成本過高，恐會改採「交易策略」，用台灣換取對美國更有利的標的物。倘若蔡政府判斷川普上任美國總統後，中美競逐可以支撐台灣的「親美日、抗中」戰略主軸，一廂情願為美國圍堵中國，只怕會讓台海兵凶戰危，為台灣帶來經濟與安全的雙重災難。

對台灣而言，如何應對川普上台後的中美博弈新局，將嚴峻考驗蔡政府的能力與智慧。川普的國安團隊同時派出季辛吉訪問北京，並主動公布「英川通話」，強調「民主選舉產生的台灣總統」，隨後又在推特向中國嗆聲「中國亂搞也沒向美國報告」，這在在顯示川普的戲劇性演出經過精心設計，應非即興之作。蔡政府若不願正視川普新政府深沉精明的決策風格，並及早規畫「友美和中」的靈活策略因應新變局，台灣恐難逃川普風暴肆虐。

Can the DPP and CCP Reach a New Cross-Strait Consensus?

Can the DPP and CCP Reach a New Cross-Strait Consensus? 
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 3, 2016

Executive Summary: Zhou Zhihuai is the Director of the Taiwan Institute of Social Sciences of the Mainland based Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhou publicly declared that "What I want to stress, is that substitutes can be found for the 1992 Consensus. We do not oppose the creation of creative alternatives to the 1992 Consensus. We can form new commonly agreed upon expressions as the political basis for the development of cross-Strait relations."

Full Text Below:

Zhou Zhihuai is the Director of the Taiwan Institute of Social Sciences of the Mainland based Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhou publicly declared that "What I want to stress, is that substitutes can be found for the 1992 Consensus. We do not oppose the creation of creative alternatives to the 1992 Consensus. We can form new commonly agreed upon expressions as the political basis for the development of cross-Strait relations."

Zhou said "The Mainland's willingness to establish a new consensus on cross-Strait policy is every bit as strong as its determination to safeguard the consensus reached in 1992."

This is the first time that the Mainland has made clear that the 1992 Consensus can be replaced, and that it has no objection to the creation of an "alternative consensus", a "new shared interpretation", or "new cross-Strait consensus". Zhou Zhaihuai is considered the Mainland's chief Taiwan policy expert. His declaration is undoubtedly a policy statement, and should be treated seriously. Consider the following points.

One. What did Zhou mean when he said substitutes for the wording of the 1992 Consensus are acceptable? He meant that substitutes for the two words “1992 Consensus” are acceptable. Zhou reiterated that "the affirmation that the Mainland and Taiwan both belong to one country" is a key element that cannot be replaced. He said the new cross-Strait consensus must reaffirm the One China Principle, oppose Taiwan independence, and oppose de-Sinicization. This being the case, why not continue using the term “1992 Consensus”? After all, any new consensus would have to make these conditions regarding the core meaning of the 1992 Consensus even more explicit.

Two. Zhou's declaration included “One China Principle”, "two sides, one nation", "The Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one country", and "(Taiwan) may as well learn to get along with the Mainland under a One China framework”. But he did not explicitly define "one country". He left room for compromise.

The Ma government championed the 1992 Consensus, and refrained from contradicting Beijing. It qualified its position by stipulating that it championed "one China, different interpretations". Does the Tsai government intend to repudiate the "one China / one country" concept? If not, then what is its alternative? The Tsai government need not use the term "one China, different interpretations". But what alternative does it have? If it forfeits the 1992 Consensus, what will happen to “one China, different interpretations”?

3. Zhou said the Mainland's bottom line in its Taiwan policy is opposition to Taiwan independence. His new cross-Strait terminology merely stipulates that "the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one country". But will the Mainland follow up by adding the clause "opposition to Taiwan independence"?

Ma Ying-jeou advocated "no reunification, no independence, no use of force". This is an affirmation plus a repudiation. Only by saying "no independence", was it able to say "no reunification". If Tsai accepts the idea that "the Mainland and Taiwan are both part of one country", she must address the problem of “one China, different interpretations”. The contradictions in Taiwan independence will then resurface.

Four. Zhou advocates the establishment of a "new cross-Strait framework” or “cross-Strait consensus". He recommends that think tanks from both sides of the Strait "strive to reach a tacit understanding". He said "This understanding need not be a written agreement, or even a verbal agreement. But it is essential". He said “Cross-Strait exchanges and controllable contacts can be conducted only under specified conditions”.

Outsiders may not immediately understand the gap between “a consensus that does not require even a verbal agreement”, and "a new understanding of cross-Strait talks and a new cross-Strait consensus". Do "contacts through buffers” and “controllable contacts" mean that the two sides should arrange for secret exchanges outside the two cross-Strait agencies? If so, how can the Tsai government gain the trust of the general public, or allay suspicions within the Green Camp?

Five. Zhou Zhihuai said "The KMT occupies a special place in the history of cross-Strait peace, and cannot be replaced". The Mainland considers the KMT just as irreplaceable as “both sides of the Strait are part of one country". This and other remarks by Zhou Zhihuai were probably meant for the ears of the Tsai government, which is intent on exterminating the KMT. If the KMT is weakened too much, the cross-Strait framework created by the KMT-CCP civil war will also evaporate. Beijing may consider the DPP vendetta against the KMT an attempt to sever a historical connection between the two sides. Therefore as the DPP attempts to exterminate the KMT, it should not ignore the possible consequences.

Zhou has released a political trial balloon, a deliberate attempt to resolve the cross-Strait impasse. Meanwhile, the premise that "both sides of the Strait are part of one China" remains irreplaceable, and is a way to force the Tsai government to negotiate, or else.

If the Tsai government refuses to respond, if no response is forthcoming, how can it answer to the public? If it decides to respond, what will its bottom line be? Now that the gauntlet has been thrown down, the government can no longer afford to ignore it.

民共另建兩岸新共識的可能性
2016-12-03 聯合報

大陸社科院台研所所長周志懷公開表示：「我想強調的是『九二共識』文字表述的可替代性，我們並不反對在九二共識之外，建立具有創造性的替代性共識，在兩岸關係發展的政治基礎問題上形成新的共同表述。」

他說：「大陸建構兩岸新共識的政策創新動能，並不弱於維護九二共識的決心。」

這是大陸方面首次明確表示「九二共識」文字表述的可替代性，並明言不反對在「九二共識」之外，另建「替代性共識」、「新的共同表述」或「兩岸新共識」。由於周志懷的職位被視為首席涉台智囊，他的喊話無疑具有政策釋放意味，宜慎重看待。茲略述幾點看法：

一、揆其語意，所謂九二共識文字表述的可替代性，應是指九二函電的相關表述以及「九二共識」這四個字的可替代性。但周亦反覆指出，「大陸與台灣同屬一個國家的內涵」，則是不可替代的核心要素。他所謂的兩岸新共識，已定性為體現一中原則、反對台獨、反對去中國化的兩岸新共識。倘是如此，則何不繼續使用九二共識即可？而新共識要如何文字堆砌始能完整表述這些核心內涵？

二、在周的談話中，雖有「一中原則」、「兩岸一國」、「大陸與台灣同屬一個國家」、「（台灣）不如在一個中國框架下學會如何與大陸相處」等用語，但他並未明示「一國」的定義，這應是存留的空間。

馬政府主張「九二共識」，且未反駁北京的那類用語，但以「一中各表」加以平衡。蔡政府要不要反駁「一中／一國」的概念？如果不反駁，又要以什麼來平衡？蔡政府或許可以不用「一中各表」四字，但其「替代性」的表述是什麼？失去九二共識之皮，一中各表毛將焉附？

三、周說，大陸對台政策的底線思維是反對台獨。但他提出的兩岸新論述，只見正面表述「大陸與台灣同屬一個國家」等等，但會不會後續再增添「反對台獨」的負面表述？

馬英九主張「不統／不獨／不武」，這是正負俱陳的表述。因為說了「不獨」，才能說「不統」；倘只說「不統」，而不說「不獨」，在兩岸就擺不平。蔡政府若接受了「大陸與台灣同屬一個國家」，一方面有如何伸展「一中各表」的難題，且後續台獨黨綱的矛盾勢將浮現。

四、周志懷主張建立「兩岸新論述／兩岸新共識」，又倡議兩岸智庫對話「力爭達成默契」，並說「這一默契並非一紙協議，甚至連口頭協議都不是，但它至關重要」。他又說，「在一定條件下，兩岸可進行傳話性接觸與可控性接觸」。

外界一時不易理解，從「連口頭協議都不是的默契」到「兩岸新論述／兩岸新共識」之間，其中的缺口存有何種過程及意義？而所謂「傳話性接觸／可控性接觸」，是否意指兩岸兩辦兩會之外的「密使」往來。倘是如此，蔡政府如何取得台灣人民的信任，又如何處理綠營內部的猜疑，會不會橫生枝節？

五、周志懷說，「國民黨在兩岸關係和平發展中的歷史與特殊作用不可替代」，其高度竟與「兩岸一國」的「不可替代」居於同一階位。若與周志懷其他部分談話合併解讀，應是針對蔡政府如今意圖滅絕國民黨的動作而發。國民黨如果過度弱化，國共內戰的兩岸架構亦告解構；北京可能視此為民進黨欲切斷兩岸的歷史臍帶。因而，民進黨追殺國民黨，應勿忘唇亡齒寒的效應。

周志懷在此時釋出這個政治氣球，一方面可視為有意化解兩岸僵局，但另一方面由於「兩岸一中」的前提仍是不可替代，也可視為促迫蔡政府進行談判及攤牌的動作。

蔡政府若不回應，事態當會有不回應的演化，然則該當如何肆應？若是回應，則最高目標是什麼？最低底線又是什麼？如今已聞轅門叫陣，恐怕也不能相應不理了。

Tsai Ying-wen's Autocratic Overreach

Tsai Ying-wen's Autocratic Overreach  
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
November 30, 2016

Executive Summary: No matter how many grand plans one might have for the nation, Tsai Ing-wen's blueprint for reform has already provoked violence and chaos. The public cannot swallow it. In fact, even the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan have no idea where they are going. At this point, President Tsai must shift gears and change direction. She must re-prioritize her decision-making. More importantly, she must ensure that her administration understands her policy path. They cannot afford to look up to the sky and not pay attention to their feet on the ground.

Full Text Below:

Recently the streets of Taipei have overflowed with protesters. The number of protesters continues to rise. Labor organizations have protested the longer work week. Gay rights activists have protested the lack of same-sex marriages. Consumers have protested the importation of food products from Japan's nuclear disaster area. More recently, TransAsia Airways workers have protested the Civil Aeronautics Administration, and KMT party workers have protested CIPAS nationalization of KMT assets. This does not even include military personnel, civil servants, and public school teachers, who have called a temporary truce. President Tsai Ing-wen remains committed to her reformist crusade. She assumes it is the quickest way to a new Taiwan. But with brush fires breaking out everywhere, and protests erupting all around, she is seriously testing the public's patience.

There is no doubt that this rash of protests on Taiwan is the result of political deadlock. The reason for the deadlock is Tsai's autocratic reforms, combined with her incompetent governance. If Tsai were a charismatic leader, and her administration comprised of experienced political veterans, she might get away with her “reform of the week” crusade. But Tsai Ing-wen's support comes from an array of finger-pointing Taiwan independence elders. Her administration is staffed by panicked and confused cabinet members. Under the circumstances how can the Tsai government possibly impose her half-baked policies with a heavy hand? How can she possibly expect the public to swallow them?

One month after taking office, Tsai Ing-wen's approval rating was 60%. Six months after taking office, her approval rating was down to 30%. We have no idea how Tsai Ing-wen is interpreting this public disappointment. Is she kidding herself when she says "Reforms invariably encounter setbacks"? Is she flattering herself when she says "Reactionary forces are lashing back"? Either way, the moment President Tsai falls back on such psychological defense mechanisms, she is likely to lose sight of her original goal. All of Tsai Ing-wen's pledges can be summed up in her May 20 inaugural address, when she said "What people are looking for is a solution to their problems". But what has the government actually done over the past six months to help people solve their problems? Has it merely created more problems?

Tsai's reforms have provoked public protests for three reasons. First, her reforms were not properly planned. She failed to consider the pros and cons of her reforms. She presented no clear blueprint, therefore people remained skeptical. Second, the Tsai government refused to listen to the views of different segments of society. She resisted open dialogue with the public. Third, during decision-making, she used all manner unscrupulous means to pander to the DPP at the expense of democracy and the rule of law.

In fact, the recent protests are not necessarily in opposition to Tsai government reforms per se. They are in opposition to reforms whose goals are none too clear, or whose means are far too autocratic. They are in opposition to partisan vendettas disguised as reform, with the government trampling over democracy and the rule of law. Tsai Ing-wen's flowery rhetoric, arrant overreach, and forked tongue, have all been fatal to her image.

During the recent controversy over same-sex marriage, the Tsai Ing-wen government never consulted with the public. It never even asked the cabinet or the DPP legislative caucus for a draft version. Instead, it allowed Yu Mei-jen to present a common law draft version, to be rammed through the legislature. Naturally this caused public panic. Same-sex marriage is an issue unrelated to blue vs. green ideology. Taiwan society is becoming more open. It has gradually become one of the most open in Asia. The younger generation is far friendlier toward gays than previous generations. If the government is well prepared and communicates effectively, Taiwan can take a giant step forward in same-sex marriage compared to its neighbors. But Yu Mei-jen ignored the need for public consultation. She took the lead in ramming the bill through the legislature. Meanwhile, Tsai Ying-wen feined neutrality. The result was proponents and opponents at dagger points, taking to the streets and screaming at each other. This was a negative development no one wanted to see.

As such, however the chips fall, serious disagreements have divided society and the generations. Such an outcome is the inevitable consequence of poor governance. Consider internal dissent on this issue just within the DPP itself. Legislators without portfolio are out in front leading the charge. Legislators who represent regional constituents on the other hand, are in the rear, dragging their feet. Divisions among the public run deep. How can Tsai Ing-wen pretend not to see?

No matter how many grand plans one might have for the nation, Tsai Ing-wen's blueprint for reform has already provoked violence and chaos. The public cannot swallow it. In fact, even the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan have no idea where they are going. At this point, President Tsai must shift gears and change direction. She must re-prioritize her decision-making. More importantly, she must ensure that her administration understands her policy path. They cannot afford to look up to the sky and not pay attention to their feet on the ground.

改革暴衝：蔡英文的眼高手低
2016-12-02 聯合報

最近台北街頭每天充塞著抗爭群眾，且隊伍不斷增加。從勞工的一例一休之爭，同性婚姻的正反兩軍之戰，民眾抵制日本核虞食品的示威活動，最近又新添了興航員工突襲民航局、及國民黨黨工包圍黨產會的抗議事件。這些，都還沒算上暫時休兵的軍公教隊伍。儘管蔡英文總統仍耽溺於她的改革大業，以為可以在最短的時間打造一個全新的台灣，但隨著烽火連綿，抗爭四起，她也嚴重考驗著民眾的耐性。

毫無疑問，台灣社會這種抗爭四起的現象，正是「政治塞車」的後遺症；而政治之所以塞車，則是「改革暴衝」加上「行政無能」的結果。假使蔡英文是一位魅力領袖，而她的執政團隊又是支經驗老到的精兵，或許還可堪當其「每周一改革」的志業。而如今的景象卻是，蔡英文背後站著成排指指點點的獨派大老，其行政團隊則是一群面露惶恐、不知所措的閣員；在這種情況下，蔡政府要用雷霆手段推動一堆半生不熟的政策，如何教民眾吞得下去？

從執政滿月時逾六成的支持度，跌到執政半年後僅剩三成的滿意度，我們不知道蔡英文如何解讀民意對她的失望：是要以「改革總會遭遇反挫」故作鎮定呢；或要以「保守勢力反撲」來自我增強？無論如何，一旦蔡總統陷入這樣的心理防衛機制，她極可能就失卻了自己的初衷。在五二○就職演說中，蔡英文所有的承諾可化約為一句話：「人民期待的，就是解決問題」；但執政半年來，政府究竟幫台灣解決了什麼問題，或者反而製造了更多問題？

改革之所以會發生暴衝，原因有三：第一，在改革構思上，缺乏審慎的計議和利弊分析，因提不出清晰的推動藍圖，讓民眾心生疑懼。第二，在政治過程中，政府一意孤行，缺乏聆聽社會不同意見的胸襟，亦不願虛心與民眾溝通對話；第三，在決策操作上，為達一己政黨之目的，不擇手段，踰越民主法治界線而在所不惜。

事實上，民眾近期抗爭不斷，未必是反對蔡政府的改革本身，而是反對改革的目標太不明確，或是反對改革的手段太過粗暴，或者反對藉改革之名行鬥爭之實，甚至是不滿政府踐踏民主法治。這些情況，對映蔡英文口口聲聲華麗的文青詞藻，她的「眼高手低」，乃至「心口不一」，皆是其致命傷。

以最近同性婚姻的爭議為例，蔡英文政府從未就此議題進行任何社會溝通，甚至未及待內閣提出政院版本或立院黨團提民進黨版本草案，即讓尤美女帶著她的「民法版」草案直接闖關，這當然會引起社會大眾的慌亂。同性婚姻是一個無關藍綠的議題，以台灣社會的開放性，走到今天，已漸漸成為亞洲最開放的國家之一，年輕世代對同志的友善程度也大大超越上一代。如果政府做好準備，經過有效溝通，台灣不無可能在同性婚姻立法上超越鄰國，邁開一大步。然而，在社會溝通付諸闕如下，尤美女帶頭闖關，蔡英文態度曖昧；結果造成正反兩派人馬劍拔弩張，甚至上街對嗆，互相鄙視，這是大家不樂見的反向發展。

如此一來，無論此一法案最後以何種方式收場，對社會及世代都將是一場嚴重的撕裂；這樣的結局，就是惡劣操作的必然後果。只消看民進黨內部對此議題的分歧，不分區立委在前方衝刺，區域立委在後方拉扯，即可知民間歧見之深；對此，蔡英文可以裝作看不見嗎？

無論胸中還有多少治國大計，她的改革藍圖已經出現頻頻暴衝並導致社會混亂，不僅民眾消化不良，事實上連行政和立法部門都不知道自己將走向何方。此際，蔡總統必須調整她施政的速度和方向，重新整理決策的優先順序。更重要的，是要確保她的執政團隊有能力掌握政策走向，不要眼睛望著天空，卻不留心自己腳下步履是否穩妥。