Washington's Status Quo Approximates Beijing's One Country, Two Systems

Washington's Status Quo Approximates Beijing's One Country, Two Systems
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 20, 2016

Executive Summary: The East Asian and global strategic situation is changing. Relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei are sure to become more turbulent. Taiwan has no say in the changes that may be coming. The only thing it can do is clarify its position, drop anchor, and avoid being tossed by the waves. Taiwan must grasp two principles. Principle One. It must continue to issue goodwill gestures toward the Mainland, and improve public understanding. Two. Its diplomacy must be independent. It must not opportunistically cozy up to the United States and Japan. The status quo closely approximates one China, two systems. Therefore it must not lightly depart from the status quo.

Full Text Below:

During a year end White House press conference, President Barack Obama talked about relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. He said Washington's one China policy has maintained the status quo among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Obama stressed that Washington's one China policy ensured stability in the Taiwan Strait. He hoped to dispel Donald Trump's doubts about the One China Policy. But Obama also blurted out the “unmentionable secret” in the three-way relationship among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.

According to Obama, Washington's one China policy acknowledges that both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist that there is only one China, and as long as people on Taiwan enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, they will not declare independence. Since Washington and Taipei broke off diplomatic ties, Washington has been using the one China policy to control cross-Strait relations. It has urged Beijing to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully. It has also urged Taipei not to go down the road toward Taiwan independence.

Taiwan independence elements are indignant. They think Obama disrespected public opinion on Taiwan. But their criticisms selectively ignore Taiwan's political realities. During the presidential election, candidates from both parties either sent representatives to Washington to explain their cross-Strait policy stance, or went there in person. Had Washington concluded that their stance was contrary to US policy, it would have objected publicly. This could have impacted the election.

Tsai Ing-wen's defeat in 2012 was a clear example. During the 2016 election, Washington vetted Tsai Ing-wen. That was a clear example of the opposite result. In fact, if a sitting ROC president defies US policy, the US will also "manage" him or her, the way it did when Chen Shui-bian was president. In other words, no political party on Taiwan, advocating any sort of policy, can refuse to "maintain the status quo" in cross-Strait relations. The US government is committed to safeguarding the principle that "Both sides of the Strait are Chinese, both sides of the Strait are one country". It is also committed to the premise that "The two sides each have their own model of government. Taiwan has its own mode of development”.

Specifically, the US presents two-way guarantees and norms for the two sides of the Strait. For the Mainland, the US acknowledges that both sides of the Strait are part of one country. Washington may not be involved in resolving the Taiwan issue. But it clearly makes every effort to ensure that Taiwan does not move toward independence. The United States is committed to maintaining the status quo on Taiwan, without interference from the Mainland, and to ensuring that Taiwan enjoyes a high degree of autonomy.

To some extent, the One China Policy maintained by the US over the past 40 years amounts to "one country, two systems". That “both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist that there is only one China” implies “one China”, and “autonomy for Taiwan” implies “two systems”. The real dispute is merely over who represents China? The Mainland has never repudiated one country, two systems. Deng Xiaoping said that under one country, two systems, Taiwan could retain its military. Some worry that one country, two systems would reduce Taiwan to the status of Hong Kong. But Xi Jinping has said that Taiwan's one country, two systems would differ from Hong Kong and Macao's. In other words, what sort of entity would Taiwan be? The Mainland has not actually delineated this.

For the Mainland, when it comes to Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan, the key issue is sovereignty and national unity. As long these remain under the one China framework, internal differences will be respected. That is the core meaning of one country, two systems. Unfortunately, it has become Politically Incorrect on Taiwan, rendering rational evaluation and debate impossible.

Throw off the shackles of “us vs. them” thinking, and one country, two systems will not be as intolerable as people on Taiwan have imagined. One country, two systems has run into problems in Hong Kong. But it has been in effect nearly 20 years, and maintained freedom and prosperity for Hong Kong society. This shows that the system is sound. Furthermore, the Republic of China exercises sovereignty over the Taiwan Region and its nationals. Any arrangement or change involving sovereignty would require the consent of the entire population. This is entirely different from the transfer of sovereignty from Britain to the Mainland in 1997. Taipei must consider the pros and cons of one country, two systems objectively. It must establish the most favorable conditions under such a system, rather than rejecting it out of hand.

The key is the DPP government and whether it is willing to reach a consensus with the Mainland on the one China principle. According to Obama, cross-Strait relations and the Washington Taipei relationship are based on the one China framework. If the DPP government insists on rejecting the one China framework, it will lose any footing it might have had in cross-Strait relations. More troublesome still, cross-Strait relations are now riddled with uncertainty. President elect Trump has indicated his willingness to make a deal with the Mainland over the one China policy. The Mainland has two choices. One choice is to make a deal with the US. The US would abandon its one China policy. Taiwan would be forced to accept "reunification without dignity". The other choice is to issue a warning to Taiwan, or even move against Taiwan, and deprive the US of its bargaining chip.

The East Asian and global strategic situation is changing. Relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei are sure to become more turbulent. Taiwan has no say in the changes that may be coming. The only thing it can do is clarify its position, drop anchor, and avoid being tossed by the waves. Taiwan must grasp two principles. Principle One. It must continue to issue goodwill gestures toward the Mainland, and improve public understanding. Two. Its diplomacy must be independent. It must not opportunistically cozy up to the United States and Japan. The status quo closely approximates one China, two systems. Therefore it must not lightly depart from the status quo.

美國的維持現狀 大陸的一國兩制
2016/12/21 中國時報

歐巴馬在白宮年終記者會罕見談到美中台關係，強調是在美國一個中國政策原則下，維持了美中台之間的「不改變現狀」默契。歐巴馬的用意在強調，美國一中政策是維繫台海穩定的基礎，希望平衡川普對一中政策的質疑。不過，歐巴馬也說出了美中台三邊關係「不能說的祕密」。

依據歐巴馬的敘述，美國一中政策的核心在「認知海峽兩岸中國人均堅持一個中國」，同時「台灣人民同意，只要能在某種程度自主下持續運作，就不會宣布獨立」。自美台斷交後，美國一直藉此管控兩岸關係，不光敦促大陸應和平解決，也要求台灣不能走台獨之路。

台灣獨派對歐巴馬的說法不以為然，認為沒有尊重台灣民意，但這種批評是選擇性忽略台灣的政治現實。歷次總統大選期間，兩黨候選人都親自或派代表赴美說明兩岸政策立場，美國若認為違反美國政策，就會以某種形式表達立場，就會對選情造成一定的影響。

2012年蔡英文落選就是鮮明例子，2016年大選美國表態支持蔡英文，又是鮮明的反向例子。甚至在職總統若違反美國政策，美國也會出手「管理」，陳水扁時代事蹟昭昭。亦即台灣無論哪一黨，無論他們主張何種政策，在兩岸關係真實作為上，不會跳脫「維持現狀」框架。可以說，美國政府致力維護的是「兩岸都是中國人、兩岸一國」及「兩岸採行不同運作方式，台灣是自有發展方式的實體」。

具體而言，美國對兩岸提出雙向保證與規範，對大陸而言，美國認知兩岸同屬一國，美國雖不介入台灣問題的解決，但明確反對並極力確保台灣不會走向獨立。對台灣而言，美國致力維持台灣政治運作現狀不受大陸干預，保障台灣的高度自治。

其實，某種程度而言，美國過去40年來致力的「美國版一中政策」，某種程度就是「一國兩制」，「兩岸均堅持一個中國」就是「一國」，「獨立運作實體」就是「兩制」，爭議只是誰代表中國？大陸從未否定一國兩制台灣的實體地位，鄧小平曾經說過，台灣若施行「一國兩制」將可以保有自己的軍隊。有的人擔心實施「一國兩制」，台灣會變成香港，但習近平也說過，台灣實施的「一國兩制」，有別於香港、澳門，台灣有自己的模式，換句話說，台灣是一個什麼樣的實體，大陸並沒有劃出界線。

就大陸而言，無論是港澳問題還是台灣問題，最重要是主權完整和國家統一，只要是在一中框架之下，內部運作都會予以尊重。這是「一國兩制」的核心意涵，可惜在台灣早已成為政治不正確，失去理性評估、討論的意願與能力。

若拋開敵我意識的桎梏，應該會發現「一國兩制」並不像台灣社會想像的那麼不堪。「一國兩制」在香港的運作雖然遭遇了一些問題，但也持續運行接近20年，並延續了香港社會的生活自由與經濟繁榮，足以說明這一制度的合理性。何況台灣主權屬於中華民國及其國民，任何涉及主權的安排與改變，都須經全體國民同意，這與香港主權屬於英國，97年由英國政府移交中國完全不同。台灣應該客觀思考一國兩制的利弊得失，創造最有利的條件，而非對抗性全盤否定。

現在的關鍵在於，民進黨政府是否願意與大陸就一中原則達成共識。依據歐巴馬的陳述，兩岸關係及美台關係基礎在一中框架，民進黨政府若堅持拒絕接受一中框架，不但兩岸關係失去依附，美台關係也可能地動山搖。更麻煩的是，兩岸關係已陷入高度不確定性與一定的危險性，即將就任美國總統的川普卻表明願與大陸交易一個中國政策。大陸可能有兩個選擇，一是與美國交易，美國放棄一中政策，台灣接受「沒有尊嚴的統一」命運，一是對台灣殺雞儆猴，甚至直取台灣，讓美國失去交易籌碼。

東亞及全球戰略格局正在重新調整，美中台關係勢必劇烈動盪，台灣在這場可能地動山搖的變動中完全沒有發言權，唯一可以做的是明確自己的定位，放下船錨，不隨海潮波濤擺盪。台灣應把握兩個原則，一、持續對大陸發出善意訊號，發展民共共識，二、獨立外交，切勿趁勢倒向美日。對大陸而言，現狀距離一國兩制最近，不可輕言打破。

Beware the New Disguise for State Violence

Beware the New Disguise for State Violence
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 20, 2016

Executive Summary: Most state violence during the authoritarian era was inflicted in the name of "national security" and "social stability". Even the hoarding of rice could lead to prosecution. As we think back, such measures were unreasonable. But amidst the turbulence of the era, it was seen as a means of social control. Today, Taiwan has undergone 30 years of democratization. Is it not shameful for the government to shout "transitional justice" while purging political opponents, evicting people from their property, bulldozing their homes, and climbing over each other to occupy official positions? Tsai would have us believe that state violence exists only in the history books. In fact, at the urging of the DPP, the specter of state violence has reemerged, cloaked in new camouflage, woven whole cloth from "transitional justice".

Full Text Below:

In recent years, democracy has been in retreat. This has become a matter of global concern, and Taiwan is no exception. In a recent speech on World Human Rights Day, President Tsai reiterated the importance of "transitional justice", the need to confront history and ascertain the truth, in order to prevent the recurrence of state violence. Her speech was pretty. But if she thinks state violence exists only history books, she has blinded herself to reality. In fact, when Ms. Tsai took office seven months ago, signs of the new government's state violence were everywhere. The people saw this all too clearly.

When Tsai Ing-wen first came to power, she called for “qian bei, qian bei, zai qian bei”, i.e., "humility, humility, and more humility". But the moment she felt her hold on power was secure, she and the DPP began practicing a different sort of “qian bei, qian bei, zai qian bei”, i.e., “a thousand cups, a thousand cups, and a thousand cups more". She and the DPP became drunk, both from the alcohol they imbibed during celebratory feasts, and from the power they now abuse so flagrantly. "Transitional justice" has become the Tsai government's prime mover, its political pretext to proceed at full speed and run amok. Meanwhile many developments have left people in shock. Tsai and the DPP have lined their pockets, purged their opponents, ignored the law, and treated the public with contempt, all in the name of "transitional justice". In short, even as Tsai Ing-wen points to history and condemns "state violence", she commits new forms of state violence, about which she appears utterly oblivious.

The most obvious example is her use of the CIPAS to conduct a political purge of the Kuomintang. The public hoped to see KMT party assets dealt with in a reasonable and transparent manner. Doing so would enable party politics to begin anew on a level playing field. But Wellington Koo wielded power as if it were an executioner's axe. Any business or individual who had anything to do with the KMT was summoned, stigmatized, and accused. Even when the High Administrative Court and Supreme Administrative Court ruled that Koo had conducted himself improperly, he continued to act as if he was above the law. During the entire process, President Tsai and the DPP said nothing. What was this, if not naked state violence?

Such cases are ubiquitous. They differ only in degree.  For example, the DPP was in office only three months when without any debate, it abused its majority in the legislature to abolish the Special Investigation Group. But the original proposal to establish the Special Investigation Group came from the DPP. The reason given then, was that high-ranking officials were guilty of corruption or dereliction of duty. But when the Special Investigation Group investigated Chen Shui-bian, it led to his imprisonment. The DPP wanted revenge, so it abolished the Special Investigation Group on its own. The DPP sees government institutions as tools to be used for the benefit of the party. It establishes them when it wants. It abolishes them when it wants. Its authoritarian mentality makes that of the Two Chiangs era pale by comparison.

Another example is the ruling DPP's seizure of state owned enterprises and even NGOs. These seizures are so flagrant they provoke disgust. If a new ruling party wants to assign credible individuals to head up state owned enterprises, that is perfectly understandable. But the successor's ability must be subject to careful evaluation. Many Tsai government appointments were made merely to mollify certain factions, or to reward certain cronies for their “cooperation”. This is hardly conducive to the development of the public sector. Even worse, some entities had term limits to avoid political controversy. Yet the ruling DPP used all manner of underhanded means to take them over. They include the Central News Agency, the Chinese Cultural Association, and the Taipei Agricultural Marketing Company. The Tsai government has repeatedly abused state power, and revealed zero tolerance for democracy.

Recently Chu Chi-yang, chairman of the Fair Friend Group, resigned as vice chairman of the Kuomintang think tank. The main reason was that the Fair Friend Group recently applied three times for bank loans, and all three times his applications were rejected. He then realized his presence was detrimental to the company. The Fair Friend Group has an annual turnover of over 40 billion dollars in machine tool business. Absent outside pressure, no bank would refuse to loan it money. When the CCP pressures pro-green camp Taiwan businessmen, the Tsai government takes its hostility out on pro-blue camp businessmen, and brutally oppresses them. Under such pressures from regimes on both sides of the Strait, how can businesses possibly enjoy normal development?

Most state violence during the authoritarian era was inflicted in the name of "national security" and "social stability". Even the hoarding of rice could lead to prosecution. As we think back, such measures were unreasonable. But amidst the turbulence of the era, it was seen as a means of social control. Today, Taiwan has undergone 30 years of democratization. Is it not shameful for the government to shout "transitional justice" while purging political opponents, evicting people from their property, bulldozing their homes, and climbing over each other to occupy official positions? Tsai would have us believe that state violence exists only in the history books. In fact, at the urging of the DPP, the specter of state violence has reemerged, cloaked in new camouflage, woven whole cloth from "transitional justice".

注意「國家暴力」幽靈的新偽裝
2016-12-20 聯合報

近年「民主在退潮」成為全球矚目的話題，台灣也不例外。蔡英文總統最近在世界人權日發表演說，再度強調「轉型正義」的重要，必須要還原歷史、找出真相，阻止國家暴力再度發生。演說固然動聽，但若以為國家暴力只存在於歷史之中，恐怕就犯了「對現實盲目」的謬誤。事實上，蔡英文上任七個月，政府新形式的「國家暴力」痕跡斑斑，人民其實都看在眼裡。

蔡英文上台時雖呼籲「謙卑，謙卑，再謙卑」，但一實際拿到政權，民進黨就上演了「千杯，千杯，再千杯」的傲慢戲碼。「轉型正義」作為蔡政府的政治發動機，一路往前推進，橫行無阻。然而，其間也出現了不少讓民眾錯愕與驚心的現象，一些遂行己利、打擊對手、漠視法制、蔑視民意的作為，都在「轉型正義」招牌的掩護下公然進行。簡言之，當蔡英文一手指著歷史罵「國家暴力」時，另一手其實是在製造新形式的國家暴力，她自己對此卻彷彿毫無自覺。

最明顯的例子，首推「黨產會」對國民黨無所不用其極的追殺和羞辱。本來，人們極期待看到國民黨黨產問題有一個合理而透澈的清理，讓政黨政治回歸公平的起跑點；但顧立雄的做法，卻是拿著御賜寶劍大開殺戒，只要跟國民黨沾上一點邊的企業或個人，都遭到傳喚、汙名與株連。甚至，當高等行政法院及最高行政法院裁定其做法不當，顧立雄還要蠻幹到底，自以為比法律還大；而在此過程中，蔡總統及整個民進黨對此皆默不作聲。這種行徑，不是赤裸裸的國家暴力是什麼？

這類事例俯拾即是，只是程度不同。例如，民進黨執政僅三個月，未經任何討論程序，即仗著國會多數優勢廢掉特偵組。然而當初提議成立特偵組的正是民進黨，說要專辦高官的貪腐失職；結果只因特偵組辦到陳水扁鎯鐺入獄，民進黨今天便「有仇報仇」，私刑將它廢了。這種把國家體制當成本黨工具的行徑，要設就設、要廢就廢，其威權心態比起兩蔣時代恐怕猶有過之。

再看，民進黨執政後對公營事業乃至民間社團的強取豪奪，更到了吃相難看的地步。隨著政黨輪替，執政者指派可信的人出任公營事業主管，當然是可以理解的事；但是，接替者的能力與才德是否足堪勝任，仍必須經過慎選，不可草率。但蔡政府任命的許多人事，卻只是為了滿足派系索求，或出於獎功賞勞的目的，對於公營事業本身的發展並無助益。更惡劣的是，對於一些為避免政治紛擾而設計了「任期制」的職務，執政者竟以各種手段強逼強取，從中央社、中華文化總會、台北農產運銷公司等的董座之爭，在在暴露蔡政府濫用國家權力，毫無民主氣度可言。

最近，友嘉集團董事長朱志洋辭去國民黨智庫副董事長，其主因，是友嘉集團最近向銀行申請三筆貸款均遭拒絕，他意識到自己的角色對公司不利。友嘉是年營業額四百多億元的工具機事業，若非相關部門施壓，往來銀行不可能無故拒絕其貸款。試想，正當親綠台商遭到中共施壓之際，台灣政府如果也將政治敵意對準友藍企業，粗暴打壓；在兩岸政權交相傾軋下，企業如何正常發展？

威權年代的國家暴力，多半是在「國家安全」與「社會安定」的大帽子底下進行，連囤積米糧都可能遭到法辦。如今回顧，或許覺得極不合理，但在當年的動盪情勢下，卻是政府遂行社會控制的手段。而時至今日，台灣民主化已經卅年，但政府一邊喊著「轉型正義」，一邊卻仍繼續施行鬥爭對手、強徵民產、強拆民宅、強奪職位等惡劣作為，豈不可恥？蔡英文以為國家暴力只存在於歷史，事實上，在民進黨的催喚下，國家暴力的幽靈正以新的偽裝出現；而它的披風，正是用「轉型正義」的符咒織成。

PLA Air Force Planes Circle Taiwan: Do Not Respond With Frivolity

PLA Air Force Planes Circle Taiwan: Do Not Respond With Frivolity 
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 17, 2016

Executive Summary: PLA Air Force planes circled Taiwan as a symbolic gesture. They were saber rattling. But tension between the US and China will turn Taiwan into a front line where the two sides clash. If we refuse to understand that we are merely a pawn, but instead self-righteously imagine that we enjoy leverage, and pat ourselves on the back, we can only be described as stupid beyond belief.

Full Text Below:

Last week, four PLA Air Force bombers and electronic reconnaissance planes flew through the Miyako Strait into the western Pacific Ocean. They proceed southward through the Bashi Channel, then flew westward back to the Mainland. They set a record by circling Taiwan twice in two weeks. Defense Minister Feng Shi-kuan said the PLA may increase the frequency of such flights in the future. The PLA may even circle Taiwan once a month. ROC military officials think the PLA Air Force may even use tankers, so that fighters can accompany them for the entire duration of the flight.

Beginning in 2013, PLA Air Force planes have been patrolling the first island chain, from the northern end of Taiwan to the southern end, on a regular basis. This time the PLA planes changed the way they flew. They did not return the way they came. The planes took off from the south, and returned in the north. They took off from the north, and returned in the south. From a military training perspective, this was nothing new. Bombers and electronic reconnaissance aircraft are big and slow. In the event of war, unless ROC military air defense systems have disintegrated, PLA Air Force planes, even accompanied by tankers and fighters, will not be able to come and go freely from the east. In any event, taking a different route back after circling Taiwan, has gotten the attention of Taipei, Washington, and Tokyo.

Since taking office, the Tsai government has refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. This has changed cross-Strait relations. Following the Trump Tsai phone call, Trump and his administration have challenged the One China principle repeatedly. Therefore Beijing's preemptive saber rattling is not hard to understand. The saber rattling has gotten peoples' attention, without the need to issue any actual threats. Its intent is psychological intimidation.

The PLA Air Force's long range flights, cannot avoid entering Japan's air defense identification zone. An ADIZ is not sovereign airspace. It has no legal status. It is international airspace. An ADIZ however, is an international demarcation of one's “turf”. It is a show of one's hand in a test of strength. If military aircraft enter one's ADIZ without a response, one will be seen as a paper tiger. Therefore, as long as PLA Air Force planes fly through the Miyako Strait, the Japanese must dispatch interceptors to greet them. This may exhaust Japanese interceptors dispatched from the Ryukyus, but they must assert their claim over this airspace.

Taipei has a much smaller ADIZ. Therefore it has no problem with intrusions. But if cross-Strait relations continue to deteriorate, CCP confidence in the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue might weaken. The situation in the Western Pacific could become tense due to the collision between Washington and Beijing. Flights around Taiwan will become more frequent. They will come closer and closer. They may even enter out ADIZ in the name of freedom of navigation in international airspace. The Ministry of Defense has declared that if PLA Air Force planes enter our ADIZ, we “will not fear, will not evade, will not show weakness". He also declared that if PLA planes must ditch at sea, we will abide by humanitarian principles. But just how should these "three noes" be implemented? In the event of an accident, how should the crisis be resolved? Agencies charged with national security must be thoroughly briefed. They should establish a tacit agreement among all parties, even Beijing.

Militarily speaking, "secret weapons" and "saber rattling" should be used each in their own turn. One must not be too quick to back down. But neither should one prematurely reveal one's trump cards. This time, agencies charged with national security made public for the first time information regarding the PLA Air Force flights around Taiwan. This was a marked change from its past secrecy. They seized the propaganda initiative. They reminded people of the possible consequences. But they must also guard against pride and complacency. When they publicly disclose such information, they reveal their own hand as well. They must not repeat Lee Teng-hui's blunder. During the Taiwan Strait missile crisis, he revealed that the PLA was "merely firing blanks". They must not repeat Chen Shui-bian's blunder, when he revealed knowledge of PLA missile locations in Fujian. By doing so, he blew the cover of ROC agents on the Mainland. Past experience suggests that the military is conservative and patient. But Feng Shi-kuan told the Legislative Yuan he was confident we could shoot down any PLA planes that entered our ADIZ". We must be wary of such unguarded outbursts.

Even more worrying, some high-level government aides shot off their mouths pandering to deep green voters. They said "We locked on to PLA military aircraft, forcing them to depart". On top such ignorant boasts about military affairs, they red-baited the former Ma government, accusing it of being afraid to say anything. In particular, after Trump questioned the One China Principle, the Green Camp could barely contain itself. It was prepared to lead an "Anti-China Jihad", and brushed aside all concern for Taiwan's security. Given their state of mind, how can there be any national security?

PLA Air Force planes circled Taiwan as a symbolic gesture. They were saber rattling. But tension between the US and China will turn Taiwan into a front line where the two sides clash. If we refuse to understand that we are merely a pawn, but instead self-righteously imagine that we enjoy leverage, and pat ourselves on the back, we can only be described as stupid beyond belief.

共機繞台敲山震虎，勿輕佻以對
2016-12-17 聯合報

上周中共空軍四架轟炸機與電偵機，飛越宮古水道進入西太平洋，再南下經巴士海峽西飛大陸，創下半月內兩度「繞台飛行」的紀錄。國防部長馮世寬坦承，不排除未來共軍提高訓練頻率，甚至可能每月繞台一次。軍方官員也研判，共機日後甚至將帶上空中加油機，戰鬥機便可全程伴飛。

二○一三年起，共機分從台灣南北兩端飛出第一島鏈，已成常態。這次，解放軍將「原路去回」改為「南出北回」與「北出南回」的繞行，就軍事演訓角度，並無創新之處。且轟炸機與電偵機都是大型慢速機，一旦爆發戰事，除非我國軍防空體系瓦解，否則，就算有加油機與戰鬥機隨行，也不可能堂皇進出台灣東方。但無論如何，較之原路去回，「共機繞台一周」對台灣甚至美、日在宣傳層面都有一定衝擊。

蔡政府上任以來，因拒絕承認九二共識，使得兩岸關係丕變。加以川蔡通話後，川普及其執政團隊數度挑戰一中原則，因此北京提前施展「敲山震虎」動作，不難理解。「敲山震虎」之舉，既製造聲勢，卻無強烈實質敵對之意，意在心理威嚇。

共機遠海長航的路線，必然飛越日本防空識別區。但識別區並非領空，不具法理地位，仍然是國際空域。一個國家公告劃設防空識別區，一方面是對外宣示地盤，另方面卻也是將自身實力端上檯面與他人「梭哈」。如果劃了識別區，卻又仍憑他國軍機任意去來，本身毫無因應動作，就會被看成紙老虎。因此，只要共機飛臨宮古水道，日方明知無權阻攔，仍必派出戰機近距離監控，儘管駐琉球戰機疲於奔命，也要宣示自己在這片空域的話語權。

對我方而言，因防空識別區當初劃設範圍較小，尚無遭共機闖入問題。但是，如果兩岸關係持續低迷，中共對和平解決台灣問題的信心減弱，西太平洋局勢又因華府與北京的權力碰撞而益加緊繃，共機繞飛台灣的機率將愈來愈頻繁，航路也會愈來愈貼近，甚至以國際空域自由航行為名切入我方防空識別區。國防部宣稱，共機若進入我識別區，我將「不畏懼、不迴避、不示弱」；也稱共機如在外海故障，將依人道原則救援。但「三不」究竟要如何實際操作，一旦發生意外要如何化解危機，國安單位須有周全思量，甚至設法與包括北京在內的各方建立默契。

在軍事上，「藏鋒」與「示威」應交互為用；在「勢」不可輕易示弱，在「實」不可輕易讓人看穿底牌。這次，國安單位第一時間決定公布共軍繞台飛行訊息，一改以往諱莫如深的態度，固在宣傳上搶得先機，也有提醒國人憂患意識的效果。然而，在博得好評之餘，須避免得意忘形；在公開與私下透露消息之時，切莫暴露自己對敵情掌握能力的高低，以免重演李登輝宣稱台海飛彈危機「只是啞彈」，及陳水扁細數福建飛彈陣地部署狀況，導致國軍情蒐系統遭到重創的覆轍。從過往經驗看來，軍方個性保守，不致太過躁進；但馮世寬在立院宣稱「有信心擊落進入防空識別區共機」，暴露其口無遮攔，必須警惕。

更值得憂心的，是政府高層某些狂熱幕僚忙不迭地放話，除迎合深綠選民口味，講出「我方鎖定中國軍機迫使離去」這種軍事無知的大話，更將公布共軍演訓套上「馬政府過去都不敢講」的紅帽。尤其，在川普公開嗆聲一中原則後，綠營興奮之情溢於言表，一副要毛遂自薦扮演「反中聖戰」支點之姿，完全不以台灣安全為慮。這種心態，究竟置國家安全於何地？

共機繞台雖只是「敲山震虎」的象徵性動作，卻可看出：美中關係緊張，台灣必成為雙方交鋒之前線，首當其衝。如果我們不能明白自己只是「棋子」，卻還自以為是「槓桿」，而樂在其中，只能說是愚不可及。

Peace is the Highest Value: Beware the Charybdis of US Arms Sales

Peace is the Highest Value: Beware the Charybdis of US Arms Sales 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 16, 2016

Executive Summary: If the government's “national defense autonomy” proposal can be implemented smoothly, it will undoubtedly reduce Taiwan's need for US arms purchases, and reduce pressure on the defense budget. But this is not what the US side wants to see. Trump in particular, is committed to arms sales to Taiwan. In such a case, the Tsai government must choose between supporting domestic manufacture and US arms purchases.

Full Text Below:

US president-elect Donald Trump has touched a sensitive nerve by calling attention to cross-Strait issues. One cannot assume that this will be his policy upon taking office. But Trump himself and his appointments of key White House staff members and national security advisors do not bode well. The three way interaction among Washington, Beijing, Taipei may be troubled.

After speaking with President Tsai, Trump Tweeted that the US sells billions of dollars in arms to Taiwan every year. This explains why he picked up the phone, and raised speculation that he would increase arms sales to Taiwan upon taking office. Trump even questioned the need for the United States to adhere to the One China Policy. His main purpose however, was to adopt a hard bargaining position, in the hope of linking the One China Policy to Sino-US trade negotiations. Trump is aware of the importance of the One China Policy. But he intends to use it as a bargaining chip in exchange for other concessions. He simultaneously used the opportunity to increase US strategic commitment to Mainland China, allowing for greater latitude in US policy toward Taiwan.

In fact, the US government has long adhered to the One China Policy. But it has also had its own counter-strategies. The United States government is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act and will resist any resort to force or other high-handed means to endanger the safety and socio-economic system of the public on Taiwan. This is a commonly held perception on Taiwan. The United States will help in the event of cross-Strait crisis. But this does not mean that the United States will send troops to confront the Mainland directly. The main idea is to enhance Taiwan's independent defense capability. The most important means of achieving this, is arms sales to Taiwan. But pressure from the Mainland and the international situation, limits the quality and quantity of US arms sold to Taiwan. They do not fully meet Taiwan's needs, and are often delayed for various reasons.

The government's budget is limited, and the funds earmarked for national defense have been inadequate. Since democratization, the defense budget has declined relative to GDP. It has remained close to 2% in recent years, far below US expectations. The United States has long urged Taiwan to increase the percentage of defense budget to 3%. US Department of Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asian Affairs Abraham Denmark recently took part in a think tank forum. He made clear that the Mainland has undergone military modernization and is determined to reunify China. Taiwan must make preparations and invest in order to contain aggression. Taiwan's defense budget has not kept pace with the threat, and therefore must be increased.

President Tsai declared her commitment to this goal during her election campaign. At this moment, the Tsai government's defense policy and the United States government's policy for Taiwan are aligned. Trump's words and deeds have not broken out of this US government framework. They actively promote it. Increasing tensions in US-China relations will make arms sales to Taiwan easier. Either that, or they may enable the US to extract concessions from the Mainland in other areas. In any event this strategy is favorable to the US.

The problem is mainly on the Taiwan side. President Tsai declared her desire for "national defense autonomy". She wants “domestic manufacture of warplanes” and “domestic manufacture of warships”. She wants a win-win situation whereby she can upgrade Taiwan's armaments, while developing the defense industry. But Taiwan is limited in its R & D capability and experience. It can implement localization only in limited areas. It may be able to realize small-scale projects such as the Hsiung Feng II and Hsiung Feng III Mobile Launch Vehicles. Important projects include the Air Force next-generation military trainer. The Han Hsiang Company would make replacements for the AT-3 trainer and F-5E/F fighters. But R&D time and capacity constraints, and the transition period required, mean that foreign arms purchases would still be needed to fill the gap. The design and construction of submarines still presents many difficulties for Taiwan, which must rely on the US for technical support. Taiwan remains dependent upon the US for missiles, helicopters, and other weapons and equipment. In the short term, these must be purchased from the United States. They cannot change our dependence on the United States. Taiwan also finds itself in at a disadvantage when bargaining over high-priced weapons from the United States.

If the government's proposal can be implemented smoothly, it will undoubtedly reduce Taiwan's need for US arms purchases, and reduce pressure on the defense budget. But this is not what the US side wants to see. Trump in particular, is committed to arms sales to Taiwan. Also, weapons projects would be based on R&D progress on Taiwan. Promoting the domestic manufacture of weapons systems would enable Taiwan to produce competitive weapons, as it has in the past. In such a case, the Tsai government must choose between supporting domestic manufacture and US arms purchases.

President Tsai wants national defense autonomy to develop the relevant industries. She faces constraints from internal R&D technical capacity. More importantly, she faces constraints from the United States. If Taiwan is subject to US policy needs, any efforts toward national defense autonomy will be in vain. More importantly, Taiwan's budget is limited. Many needs must be met. Social welfare, national pensions, health care reform, and other needs, all require funding. Adequate funding is also needed to cope with the temporary turmoil caused by reform. Clearly the government lacks the capacity to increase the defense budget. Still less can it afford to flip-flop between the localization of the arms industry and US arms purchases.

The Tsai government faces a dilemma. It must extricate itself from this whirlpool. The best way to do this, is to institutionalize peaceful cross-Strait relations and end cross-Strait military confrontation.

和平是王道 警惕對美軍購漩渦
2016/12/16 中國時報

美國總統當選人川普接連挑起兩岸問題的敏感神經，雖然不能就此論斷他就任以後的對中政策，但從川普本人及他任命白宮重要幕僚與國安團隊要角的言談，可以清楚嗅出令人不安的氣息，美中台三角互動關係將進入多事之秋。

川普在與蔡總統通電話之後，就在推特上以美國每年對台軍售數十億美元作為理由，說明他為什麼該接這通電話，引發外界對他強化對台軍售動機的猜測。後續川普進一步質疑美國堅持一中政策的必要性，但他主要思路是將其視為一種交易，希望將一中政策納入中美有關貿易的談判之中。川普並非不知道一中政策的重要，而是打算拿來交換其他問題的解決，同時，也可以藉此機會拉高美國對中政策的戰略縱深，讓美國的對台政策可以更為游刃有餘。

事實上，美國政府雖然堅持一中政策，但一直以來都有自己的應對策略。美國政府受到《台灣關係法》的約束，會抵抗任何訴諸武力或使用其他高壓手段，而危及台灣人民安全及社會經濟制度的行動。這也構成台灣社會普遍認知，一旦兩岸出現危機，美國會出手相助，但這並不意味著美國會為此直接派兵與大陸正面對抗。美國的主要思路是提升台灣的自主國防能力，其最重要的實現形式就是對台軍售。只是受限於來自大陸的壓力和國際局勢，美國對台軍事的品質和數量並不完全符合台灣的需求，且常常因為種種原因而延宕。

對台灣來說，政府財政預算有限，投入國防的資金一直難以滿足需求，而自從民主化以來國防預算占GDP的比重更是一直在下降，近年來已經接近2%，遠低於美國對台灣的期許。一直以來，美國都要求台灣將國防預算的比重提高到3%，美國國防部主管亞洲事務的副助理部長鄧志強近日在參與智庫論壇時即明確表示，大陸的軍事現代化和統一決心，使得台灣在準備和投資遏制侵略的能力變得義不容辭，而台灣的國防預算沒有跟上威脅的演進，因此應該增加。

對此，蔡總統在競選期間也曾明確承諾要達到這個目標，現階段蔡政府的國防政策與美國的對台政策在方向上是一致的。而川普的言行，也並未跳脫出美國政府的這一框架，反而是在積極推動。透過升高美中關係的緊張局勢，可以讓對台軍售更為順利地推動，或者藉此換取大陸在別的議題上讓步，無論如何這都是對美方穩贏的策略。

問題主要在台灣這一邊。蔡總統宣告全力推動「國防自主」，並期望通過「國機國造」和「國艦國造」項目來實現提升軍備能力與發展國防工業的雙贏局面。但台灣受限於研發能力和經驗的不足，只能在有限幾個領域實現國產化，目前有實現前景的主要是雄二、雄三機動發射車等小規模項目，重要項目則有空軍下一代高教機，由漢翔公司負責，逐步取代AT-3教練機和F-5E/F戰鬥機，但即便如此，因為研發時程和產能的限制，機型轉換的間隙可能仍需要對外採購來填補。至於潛艦的設計建造，台灣也同樣面臨重重困難，仍須依賴美方的技術支持。至於飛彈、直升機等武器裝備，還是只能仰賴對美採購，短期內不可能改變依賴美國的局面，台灣對美國的高價武器也難有討價還價的能力。

政府的這一構想如果能夠順利實現，無疑會減少台灣對美國軍購的需求，降低國防預算的支出壓力，這一局面並非美方所樂見，尤其是川普致力於推動對台軍售，在相關武器項目上也會根據台灣方面研製的進度採取相應措施，比如推銷台灣有機會取得進展的武器項目以達到競爭目的，這在過去也是所在多有。在這種情況下，蔡政府必須在支持國產與對美軍購兩者之間做出取捨。

蔡總統想要透過國防自主來發展相關產業的構想，不光要受到內部研發技術能力的限制，更重要的是要面對來自美國的阻礙，若台灣要受制於美國的政策需要，相關努力很容易就付諸東流。更重要的是，台灣的財政預算十分有限，又有龐大的社會福利需求，後續國民年金、健保改革等議題都牽涉到財政資金的分配，需要政府給予足夠的資金保障應對改革帶來的暫時動盪。在這種情況下，顯然沒有餘力再進一步提升國防預算的比重，更無法承受在國產化與美國軍備之間搖擺的政策損失。

面臨此種困局，蔡政府必須設法跳出這一漩渦，根本之道還是實現兩岸關係和平發展的制度化，消解兩岸軍事對峙的氛圍，如此才不至於在國防預算上空耗資源。

Taiwan Must “Know Thyself”

Taiwan Must “Know Thyself”
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 15, 2016

Executive Summary: Former Vice President Annette Lu published an article in the China Times yesterday. She said there was no reason to be excited about the Trump Tsai phone call. On the contrary, she voiced unease, and called on President Tsai to be prepared for the storm that is about to hit. As a veteran green camp political leader, Annette Lu's reaction was level-headed. She hoped that President Tsai would "know thyself”. If Tsai is willing to be a bargaining chip for the US, she will not merely break with the Mainland, she will also have to pay the US protection money. Therefore she would be well advised to let cross-Strait problems be solved by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Full Text Below:

When president elect Donald Trump openly questioned the Mainland's “one China policy” the official response from the Tsai government was quite low-key. To everyone's surprise, Taiwan independence elders were uniformly silent. Instead, it was the Western media that seemed determined to make the most of the issue, especially the New York Times, which accused Trump of provoking China over its most sensitive core interest. If he persisted, the Mainland would have many bargaining chips it could use, and Taiwan would be its first victim. The Times noted several of these. They included trade sanctions, investment slowdowns, aid to North Korea, and aid to Iran. Among these, Taiwan most fears a Mainland launched diplomatic war that deprives Taiwan of its diplomatic allies. The Mainland could also limit investments on Taiwan and the number of Mainland tourists to Taiwan, thereby undermining Taiwan's economy.

The New York Times does not support Trump. Nor has it ever hesitated to criticize the Mainland. Trump's use of the One China Policy as a bargaining chip makes people shudder. Clear-minded people know it was not exaggerating. The Mainland is fully capable of punishing Taiwan. That was never in question. The only question is whether it wants to. The Trump Tsai phone call may have given Taiwan independence elements some cheap thrills. It may have held out hope that Taiwan would become a bargaining chip the US uses to check and balance the Mainland. But the question is, at what price?

What is a bargaining chip? It is the ante a gambler puts up before a bet, in the hope of making a greater gain. The concept of bargaining chips applies in many other areas, including international politics. Bargaining chips are often viewed as units of trade among players. All this talk about bargaining chips however, presumes that Taiwan's current and future status will not determined by Taiwan itself, but by the major powers. The United States has long treated Taiwan as a bargaining chip between the Mainland and the United States. This did not begin today. It began with the outbreak of the Korean War. Taiwan became the United States' unsinkable aircraft carrier in the first island chain, part of its plan to contain the Mainland. Its fate was sealed back then. Past US presidents have allowed Taiwan to save face. Trump did not. He made Taiwan's status explicit. The situation is now abundantly clear. In the current Great Game of Nations, is Taiwan a player? Or merely a bargaining chip? If the former, then it must possess the strategic wisdom to play with others. If the latter, then all it can do is wait and hope that others will be merciful.

Do not say that Taiwan is too small, and therefore lacks the means to play among the major powers, or that it cannot afford to play. Many small nations in the world today lack even Taiwan's resources. Yet they are still able to play among the major powers. Leave aside North Korea for the moment. Singapore has less territory and fewer people than Taiwan. But who can deny its key role in the Southeast Asian Great Game? During the Chiang Ching-kuo era, the United States feared the Mainland, and refused to sell second-generation fighters to Taiwan. Old F-104 fighters crashed often, and were derided as "widow makers". Taiwan's own IDF showed the United States that Taiwan could produce its own fighters. Therefore the US sold the F-16 to Taiwan, to the benefit of US arms merchants. During the Two Chiangs era, Taiwan remained dependent upon the United States. Nevertheless it maintained its Chinese identity.

Taiwan must not resign itself to being a bargaining chip. The reason is simple. A player retains the initiative. A bargaining chip passively permits others to do with it as they will. When one is reduced to the status of a bargaining chip, do not assume that the players will feel any sympathy for you. As long as you can be traded for something more profitable, you will be. Never forget that Trump is a businessman. For businessmen, the main theme is trade. His eyes will always be focused on the interests of the United States, never on those of Taiwan. If Trump really “loved Taiwan”, he would proclaim that "Taiwan is the 51st state of the United States" and that Taiwan is protected. Is Trump about to do that?

Following the Trump Tsai phone call, Trump repeatedly railed against Mainland China. It appeared as if a sudden change had suddenly come over US-China relations. If some people on Taiwan are excited about this, their reaction can only be described as foolish. How do they know he is not merely bargaining with the Mainland? Is it not obvious Trump is using the Trump Tsai phone call as leverage, to raise the price during negotiations with the Mainland? If the Mainland is willing to pay Trump's asking price, who says the Taiwan chip will not be sacrificed and traded? The New York Times has already listed the Mainland's other chips. Has Taiwan counted its own chips? Do they really outnumber the other side's chips ?

As history can attest, numerous US presidents have loudly criticized the Mainland before taking office, and left Taiwan with high expectations. But when push came to shove, the presidents who inflicted the most damage to Taiwan, were often the ones who criticized the most loudly. Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Clinton, and Bush Jr. all did the same with the Mainland. Is Trump really going to be the lone exception? Especially since this time the outcry was the loudest. Therefore, will the injury visited upon Taiwan also be the greatest?

Former Vice President Annette Lu published an article in the China Times yesterday. She said there was no reason to be excited about the Trump Tsai phone call. On the contrary, she voiced unease, and called on President Tsai to be prepared for the storm that is about to hit. As a veteran green camp political leader, Annette Lu's reaction was level-headed. She hoped that President Tsai would "know thyself”. If Tsai is willing to be a bargaining chip for the US, she will not merely break with the Mainland, she will also have to pay the US protection money. Therefore she would be well advised to let cross-Strait problems be solved by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

台灣要確實認識自己
2016/12/15 中國時報

美國總統當選人川普公開挑戰大陸「一中政策」，台灣官方反應相當低調，令人意外的是，獨派大老居然一片沉寂，反而西方媒體彷彿炸了鍋，尤其《紐約時報》，直指川普碰觸了中國最敏感的「核心利益」，如果執意而為，大陸手上有不少牌可以回敬，台灣可能首當其衝先受害。紐時點出大陸可能操作的幾張牌，如經貿制裁、投資放緩、經援北韓、拉攏伊朗等，其中台灣最不想聽到應該是，大陸很可能發動外交戰，加緊挖角台灣邦交國，以及限制對台投資和赴台遊客數量，打擊台灣經濟。

《紐約時報》並不挺川普，批評大陸向來也不假辭色，這次在評論川普所謂一中政策「談判籌碼說」時，直白得讓人不寒而慄！腦筋清醒的人都知曉，紐時並沒有亂說，大陸要不要懲罰台灣，從來就不是能不能的問題，而是要不要的問題！蔡川通話或許讓獨派人士感到興奮，甚至盼望台灣成為美國制衡大陸的籌碼，問題是，台灣承受得起代價嗎？

什麼是籌碼？是賭徒在賭桌做為下注的本錢，目的是希望在對賭時獲取更大的利益，今天這概念被用在更多層面，包括在國際政治的博奕上，籌碼往往被隱喻成玩家對奕的交易單位。籌碼說表示台灣的地位與前途不操之在己，應由大國決定。美國把台灣視為中美關係的籌碼，並非始自今日，從韓戰爆發台灣成為美國遏制陸權大國第一島鏈的不沉航母時，就已經注定，只是歷任美國總統為盟國保留顏面，川普只是把話明說了。現在問題很清楚了，當前大國博奕中，台灣究竟定位自己是玩家？還是籌碼？如果是前者，還得要看你有沒有足夠的戰略智慧跟人家玩，如果是後者，那麼就等著任人宰割吧！

不要說台灣很小，在大國之間玩不動，也玩不起，當今世上有多少小國，掌握的資源可能還不及台灣，照樣在大國之間玩得虎虎生風？北韓就不提了，新加坡的面積與人口都不及台灣，有誰能否定它在東南亞博奕中的關鍵角色？蔣經國時代，美國忌憚大陸，拒絕出售第二代戰機給台灣，老舊F-104戰機事故頻頻，有「寡婦飛機」謔稱，台灣發憤圖強自行生產了IDF，美國眼看台灣可以自力生產，又強賣了F-16給台灣，圖利美國軍火商。兩蔣時代台灣依附美國，但仍然堅持自己中國人的身分。

台灣不可自居籌碼！原因很簡單，做玩家主動權在自己手上，做籌碼是你被動地讓人家玩，當自己被淪為籌碼之際，就請不要假定玩家會對你心存善念，因為只要可換得更大利益，你是隨時可以被交易的！永遠不要忘記一點，川普是商人，商人遊戲的主旋律是交易，眼中永遠只有美國的利益，永遠不會是台灣的利益。川普如果真的「愛台灣」，就宣布「台灣是美國第51州」，保護台灣，但川普會嗎？

蔡川通話後，川普不斷對大陸嗆聲，一副美中關係即將發生突變的態樣，台灣若有人因此而大感興奮，那恐怕也只能用愚蠢來形容！你怎麼知道他不是在對大陸喊價？有了蔡川通話做為槓桿，川普豈不是正好可以對大陸抬高價碼？如果大陸所提供的報酬夠大夠好，誰說台灣做為籌碼不能被犧牲、被交易？《紐約時報》不是早已羅列出大陸可以操縱的其他籌碼，台灣有真的秤過自己的分量，贏得過其他籌碼嗎？

歷史的經驗班班可考，多少美國總統在就任前大聲批判大陸，讓台灣懷了挺大的樂觀期待，最後對台灣傷害最大的，往往就是這些聲量最大的總統，從尼克森、卡特、雷根、柯林頓到小布希，都曾與大陸做過類似交易，川普有可能例外嗎？特別是這次喊價更高過以往，對台灣傷害會不會也更大呢？

呂前副總統日昨在《中國時報》發表文章，對蔡川通話效應不見興奮，反而表達了不安，呼籲蔡總統要嚴肅面對即將席捲而來的風浪。呂秀蓮身為綠營資深政治人物，反應極其冷靜，期待蔡總統也要「確實認識自己」，如果自甘當美國籌碼，不但會與大陸決裂，還要付保護費，兩岸問題還是放到兩岸平台解決吧。

Political Wildfire, Economic Freeze

Political Wildfire, Economic Freeze
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 13, 2016

Executive Summary: The Trump Tsai phone call thrilled everyone within the DPP. But the Tsai government must realize that no amount of political stimulants can unfreeze Taiwan's economy. If President Tsai refuses to change her political posture, and the DPP refuses to change its brazenly self-serving ways, but instead sets political wildfires everywhere it goes, the public will turn its back on them in short order. People are tightening their belts. Businesses are struggling to stay afloat. Meanwhile the ruling party bickers over who will be appointed to what position of power. One cannot help asking, just who was the third change in ruling parties for?

Full Text Below:

Frankly, we have no idea whether the Lin Chuan cabinet can be considered a “cabinet comprised of financial and economic experts”. For the past half year, it has shown hardly any financial or economic pronouncements. Amidst wave after wave of political proclamations, the entire cabinet has been demoted to the status of “gofer” for the Presidential Office. On the one hand, it must take orders from the DPP legislative caucus. On the other hand, it must be the whipping boy for Taiwan independence elders. The cabinet is even finding it difficult to serve as gatekeeper, let alone act on its own initiative. The smile on Lin Chuan's face remains. But the cabinet's fumbling reveals its enervated state.

Looking back over the past seven months, it is clear that Taiwan has been wracked by internal and external strife. Cross-Strait relations have been frozen. South China Sea arbitration has failed. Labor has gone on strike. Protests follow, one after another. Businesses have closed. Disputes rage over the importation of food products from Japan's nuclear disaster areas. The recent Trump Tsai phone call even led to PLA Air Force planes circling Taiwan. Not a day goes by without public anxiety, unease, and suspicions. Yet despite this political wildfire, the government has done nothing to address people's economic plight. The economy remains frozen. The problem is that when the new government came to power, it single-mindedly promoted its own political agenda. It was utterly indifferent to the people's livelihood and their economic future. The inevitable result was the president's poll numbers went straight down.

Tsai Ying-lin trusted and relied on the Lin Chuan cabinet. The cabinet ought to enjoy ample latitude. So why in actual practice has the Lin Chuan cabinet become so passive, even irrelevant? There are three reasons.

Reason One. Lin is too weak. In the face of Tsai Ying-wen's strong leadership and DPP special interests, he has lost almost all initiative and will. It is all he can do to be carried along by political currents, while bobbing up and down in the waves. Other cabinet members are limited by their lack of experience and insight, or cowed by DPP political flak. They dare not advance their own ideas. This reflects the authoritarian structure of the Tsai regime and the aggressive nature of the DPP. The "old blue men" elements within the Lin cabinet are merely scapegoats.

Reason Two. Tsai Ying-wen lacks any sense of how to lead the nation. The moment the president came to power, she immediately rewrote cross-Strait relations. Internally, she rummaged through old records in order to settle old scores. She hastily pandered to the United States and Japan and sundry Social Justice Warriors. Under the circumstances, Taiwan's economy and the people's livelihood were naturally relegated to the bottom of her to do list. For the past seven months, the cabinet has been busy implementing President Tsai's policies, then struggling to clean up the mess they left behind. Where is she going to find time to revitalize the economy?

Reason Three. The Democratic Progressive Party considers itself more important than the nation. When considering fiscal matters, it is more concerned with how to benefit the party than the people's livelihood or the interests of the nation. Recently, major public works projects planned by the Tsai government include moving the Taoyuan Railway underground, raising the Chiayi Railway above ground, building the Taichung Shanshou Line and the Lugang Historical Scenic Area. Every one of these projects is in a county or city ruled by the DPP. These projects cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Yet the decisions were made in haste. The amount of economic momentum they have generated is questionable. Another example is the rise in produce prices after typhoons. The DPP thought only about how to acquire the rights to operate fruit and vegetable companies, not how bring down the price of fruits and vegetables. With such a selfish attitude, how can it possibly think about the future of Taiwan's economy?

Taiwan's economy faces two major variables. Variable One. Cross-Strait relations have been flash frozen. The result has been greatly reduced Mainland tourism, leading to a tourism industry recession. The tourism industry is suffering. TransAsia Airways has exited the industry. The DPP is reaping what it sowed. Beijing has recently increased pressure on large corporations, and even resorted to saber rattling. It is difficult to be optimistic. Variable Two. Donald Trump is inciting the rise of international trade protectionism. Leave aside the stilborn TPP for the moment. Taiwan's foreign trade will face more stringent challenges. The Tsai government's "New Southern Strategy" has yet to be implemented. Its Five Major Innovative Industries initiative, plus New Agriculture and the Recirculating Economy, remain paper projects. It is unlikely that over the next two years, the people will actually feel any benefits. This is probably the main reason for President Tsai's drop in popularity.

The Trump Tsai phone call thrilled everyone within the DPP. But the Tsai government must realize that no amount of political stimulants can unfreeze Taiwan's economy. If President Tsai refuses to change her political posture, and the DPP refuses to change its brazenly self-serving ways, but instead sets political wildfires everywhere it goes, the public will turn its back on them in short order. People are tightening their belts. Businesses are struggling to stay afloat. Meanwhile the ruling party bickers over who will be appointed to what position of power. One cannot help asking, just who was the third change in ruling parties for?

政治野火旺，經濟放冷灶
2016-12-14 聯合報

老實說，我們不知道林全內閣到底算不算「財經內閣」，因為半年多來，民眾幾乎看不到什麼財經作為。在一波又一波的政治喧囂中，整個內閣幾淪為總統府的「行政執行處」，這一頭受民進黨立院黨團使喚，那一頭被獨派大老當成出氣包；內閣連基本把關的守勢都難以維持，遑論主動出擊。儘管林全臉上的微笑沒有消失，對照紛亂的行政步調，不免顯得虛弱。

回顧過去七個月，台灣內外紛擾不斷。從兩岸關係急凍、南海仲裁失利、勞工罷工及抗爭不斷、企業關門收攤、日本核食進口爭議，乃至最近川蔡通話引發的共機繞台風波，民眾幾乎無日不在焦慮、不安、猜疑中度過。然而，在這片燎原的政治野火中，大家卻看不到政府對經濟民生事務有任何著墨，經濟仍是一口冷灶。問題是，新政府上台，若一心一意炒作自己屬意的政治議題，對人民生活及經濟前景毫無關注，總統的民調直直落，恐怕是必然的結果。

以蔡英文對林全的信賴和倚重，照理說，內閣應該不是沒有發揮的空間。但是，為什麼在實際運作中，林內閣的表現卻顯得如此消極與被動，甚至不著邊際？其中原因，可以從三點觀察。

其一，林全的政治性格太弱，在面對蔡英文的強勢領導及民進黨的利益掛帥下，幾乎完全失去了主動的意志，只能被政治議題帶著走，在其間載沉載浮。至於其他閣員，或受限於經驗和見識，或被民進黨的政治砲火震懾，更不敢提出自己的主張。這種情況，其實是蔡政府的威權結構與民進黨的好鬥性格使然，林內閣的「老藍男」成分只是代罪羔羊罷了。

其二，蔡英文的決策領導，缺乏本末先後的治國瞻矚。總統一上台，不僅立刻改寫兩岸關係，內政上什麼陳年舊帳都要翻箱倒櫃掏出來清算，還要忙著討好美日及各路社運團體。在這種情況下，台灣經濟和人民生活的議題，當然就被排到施政議程表的尾巴去了。試想，過去七個月，內閣光是忙著執行蔡總統決策及收拾其善後都來不及，哪有餘裕思考振興經濟之道？

其三，民進黨「黨大於國」的政治思維，對財經議題的思考向以如何「有利於自己」為先，而不是考慮民生或國家。最近蔡政府規畫的一些重大公共建設，包括桃園鐵路地下化、嘉義鐵路高架化、台中山手線、鹿港歷史風景區，幾無例外都落在民進黨執政縣市。這些工程動輒耗資上千億，在決策草率下，能創造什麼經濟動能，令人高度存疑。再如颱風後的菜價上漲問題，民進黨想到的，竟只是如何把果菜公司的經營權搶到手，而不是如何把菜價平抑下去。這種只圖近利的自私心態，又如何會想到台灣經濟的未來？

台灣經濟面對的是兩大變數：一是兩岸關係急凍，導致陸客大減及觀光產業衰退，旅遊業叫苦、復興航空解散，惡果已現。最近，中共更逐漸將壓力對準大企業，且動用軍事威嚇，前景難以樂觀。第二，是川普帶動的國際貿易保護主義興起，撇開ＴＰＰ破局不談，台灣對外貿易將遭遇更嚴苛的挑戰。蔡政府的「新南向」政策迄今未見開展，五大創新產業雖加上「新農業」和「循環經濟」兩項，也仍然只是紙上作業，未來兩年內，恐怕都無法讓人民對振興經濟「有感」。這點，恐怕才是蔡總統民意直落最大的罩門。

最近川蔡通話雖讓民進黨上下一陣振奮，但冷靜下來之後，蔡政府應該意識到：再多的政治「興奮劑」，其實已治不了台灣經濟的冷感症候群。蔡總統若不重新整理她自己的主政步調，民進黨如果不收斂自利的驕兵嘴臉，卻每天在那裡以燃放政治野火為樂，很快就會被人民厭棄。人民都在勒緊褲帶，商家都在苦撐待變，卻只見執政黨在那裡爭官封位，不可一世；試問：第三度政黨輪替，究竟為了誰？

DPP Using Democracy to Bury Democracy

DPP Using Democracy to Bury Democracy 
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
December 13, 2016

Executive Summary: Through the abuse of mass movements, the abuse of executive power, and violations of the rule of law, the DPP has cast a shadow over Taiwan's democracy. Ironically, mass movements, executive discretion, and majority rule were originally norms within a democracy. But the DPP has used all three in its effort to “use democracy to bury democracy". Unless the DPP pulls back from the precipice, Taiwan's democracy will be reduced to populism, and authoritarian will soon rear its ugly head.

Full Text Below:

After three changes in ruling parties, the Republic of China is now regarded as a model for the transformation of an authoritarian state into a democratic state. Unfortunately this third change in ruling parties, which has allowed the DPP to enjoy “total government”, has not consolidated democracy. Instead it has facilitated a reaction against democracy. It has enabled the DPP to “use democracy to bury democracy”.

This so-called "using democracy to bury democracy" uses democratic procedures to take a nation back down the road toward authoritarianism. The overthrow of the Weimar Republic in Germany offers a clear reminder of how nations may fall. First, consider how the DPP abused mass movements. The DPP has long resorted to taking to the streets. The mass movements it led have never abjured violence. The first time it assumed power it had an opportunity to change the constitution. But once it lost power, it reverted to its old ways. During the eight year long Ma era, mass movements escalated. They became the means by which the DPP engineered its return to power. They also undermined democracy and the rule of law.

For example, in 2008, Chen Yunlin, chairman of the Mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, paid a visit to Taiwan. The DPP led a series of protests that ended in bloodshed. Back then DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen embraced violence, claiming that "[the Ma government] forced people to take to the streets. That was the greatest violence". During the latter half of the Ma era, the DPP and DPP affiliated pressure groups led an endless series of "Occupy" movements. Once the DPP came to power, these illegal activities became immune from prosecution. The DPP even expressed approval of these movements, even though they trampled over the rule of law. Recently, while protesting the Labor Law Amendment Act, labor groups assaulted DPP Chief Convener Ko Chien-min. The Presidential Office and the DPP led Legislative Yuan unanimously condemned the violence. But the public was unmoved. The reason was simple. Everyone knew that the DPP has long been the chief instigator of street protests and illegal acts of violence.

Consider the matter from another level. Now that it is the ruling party, the DPP is free to abuse state authority. When the US government fined Mega Bank for money laundering, the DPP used the incident as a pretext to accuse the KMT of money laundering. Investigations have discovered that former Mega Bank board chairman Tsai Yu-tsai did indeed violate the law. But his violations had no connection whatsoever with alleged “KMT money laundering".

Consider another matter. TransAsia Airways is exiting the airline industry. The Tsai government wanted to show how efficiently it could handle the matter. It announced that "The Ministry of Justice will freeze the TransAsia Airways trust fund". But how can an executive branch entity freeze funds? It then announced that "China Airlines will take over all of TransAsia Airway's air routes". But how can executive an branch entity take over international and cross-Strait air routes? These two cases are clear evidence that the executive branch has abused its authority for political purposes, and undermined the principle of "governing in accordance with the rule of law".

But the DPP's worst abuse of democracy is its direct enacting of laws contrary to democratic principles, in order to crack down on political opponents and consolidate its power. The DPP has repeated such practices again and again since seizing “total government” power. For example, the passage of the Act Governing the Handling of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations trampled over existing laws and even the Constitution. It not only presumed guilt, it even imposed ex post facto law extending back seven decades. It made itself judge, jury, and executioner. It combined the executive and judicial functions into one, allowing the CIPAS chairman to run amoke, even while claiming that he was “implementing transitional justice".

Under the same slogan, the Transitional Justice Ordinance, even more wide-reaching and limitless, is gaining momentum. Once the law is passed, an even larger, even less constrained "Transitional Justice Commitee" will investigate all cases of what it considers to be "unjust". The targets will not be limited to political parties. They will include any individuals or groups with the same history or background. Those targeted may be subjected to brutal Red Guard style inquisitions, then judged guilty without trial. Even if they are acquitted, the process will defame them in the court of public opinion.

In addition to transitional justice legislation, there is "loyalty legislation". DPP legislators are accusing retired generals of disloyalty by forming a United Front with the Mainland. They are demanding the revision of the Cross-Strait Relations Ordinance. They would forbid retired generals from visiting the Mainland for life. The would even make prosecution retroactive. In cases where "national loyalty" is difficult to define, the result would be political inquisitions, and anything the targeted individual did over the past 20 years would be dug up and used against him. The passage of this law will mark the beginning of another white terror.

Through the abuse of mass movements, the abuse of executive power, and violations of the rule of law, the DPP has cast a shadow over Taiwan's democracy. Ironically, mass movements, executive discretion, and majority rule were originally norms within a democracy. But the DPP has used all three in its effort to “use democracy to bury democracy". Unless the DPP pulls back from the precipice, Taiwan's democracy will be reduced to populism, and authoritarian will soon rear its ugly head.

「以民主埋葬民主」的三部曲
2016-12-13 聯合報

台灣歷經三次政黨輪替，稱得上是威權國家轉型為民主國家的典範之一。但第三次政黨輪替，民進黨的完全執政非但未能鞏固民主，反而使民主發展出現了逆流，漸漸出現「以民主埋葬民主」的趨勢。

所謂「以民主埋葬民主」，即透過民主程序，讓國家倒回威權、專制之路；當年德國威瑪民主的傾覆，堪為殷鑑。首先，是民進黨對群眾運動的濫用。民進黨過去靠街頭運動起家，主導的群眾運動始終不脫暴力色彩；首度執政原是改變體質的契機，但失去政權後，竟又回到這條路線。在馬政府執政的八年，群眾運動不斷升級，成為民進黨重返執政的助力，卻也使民主法治受到重創。

舉例而言，二○○八年大陸海協會長陳雲林來台，民進黨主導的一系列抗議活動多次以流血收場。當時，民進黨主席蔡英文擁抱暴力，宣稱「讓人民走上街頭，才是最大的暴力」。在馬政府後期，各種「占領」行動，在民進黨及其周邊組織支持下不斷延燒。俟民進黨執政後，對這些違法活動概不追究，甚至踐踏法治對脫序運動者表示嘉許。日前的勞基法修法，勞團拉扯民進黨總召柯建銘，府院黨一致「譴責暴力」，卻無法引起社會共鳴；究其原因，正是社會各界咸知民進黨才是促使街頭運動與違法或暴力結合的禍首。

從第二個層面看，是透過執政的優勢，在行政作為上濫權。例如清查兆豐銀的遭美重罰的洗錢案，先預設特定目的無限上綱，意圖找到「國民黨洗錢」的把柄。調查迄今，兆豐金前董事長蔡友才雖確涉違法，卻與民進黨設定的「國民黨洗錢」沾不上關係。

再如，處理復興航空解散時，政府為表現自己「明快處理」，竟宣布由「法務部凍結復興航空信託基金」。問題是，凍結任何基金，豈是行政部門可以任意為之？繼又宣布「華航接手興航所有路線」，但國際及兩岸航線豈是行政部門可以私相授受？此二例，都是行政部門為達政治目的而濫權，傷害「依法行政」原則的明證。

民進黨侵犯民主最惡劣的手法，是直接透過粗暴的立法手段，訂定違反民主法則的法令，據以打擊政敵，遂行其統治權力的穩固。這類例子，在民進黨完全執政後，一而再、再而三地出現。例如，不當黨產條例之立法，可謂超越了現行所有法令乃至憲法，不僅採取「有罪推定」原則，追溯期更長達七十年，更賦與「黨產會」警察兼法官的角色，集行政、司法功能於一身，僅憑主委一人之意志即能橫行無阻，卻厚顏宣稱是為了「轉型正義」。

在同一口號下，牽涉範圍更廣、更無限上綱的「促進轉型正義條例」，也正蓄勢待發。一旦立法完成，一個更大型、更無所限制的「促轉會」也將以正義為名，調查一切被它認定為「不合正義」的情事。而且，其對象不限於政黨，而是所有曾經歷那段歷史的個人或團體，任何人都可能遭到紅衛兵式的粗暴調查，然後輕率地入罪；或者就算未被定罪，也在「公審」過程把人鬥臭。

除了轉型正義立法，還有「忠誠立法」。民進黨立委指控，退休將領赴大陸參加「統戰活動」是不忠行為，因此要求修改《兩岸人民關係條例》，將管制退將赴大陸的年限推至「終身」，而且「溯及既往」。在「國家忠誠」難以定義的情況下，只怕最後變成「政治審查」，且過去二十年的行為都將被追溯。此案一旦修法完成，甚至將是另一次白色恐怖的來臨。

透過濫用群眾運動、行政濫權和違反法治原則的立法，民進黨在執政半年內，已讓台灣民主蒙上陰影。諷刺的是，無論群眾運動、行政裁量或多數立法，原都是民主的常態，但民進黨卻將之譜成「以民主埋葬民主」的三部曲。若不懸崖勒馬，只怕台灣民主淪為民粹、威權的日子很快就會到來。