Straits Exchange Foundation? Or Straits Election Foundation?
Hong Chi-chang's appointment to SEF Chairman
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 3, 2007
It was unexpected, but not totally unexpected. Hong Chi-chang will take over as Chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation. Hong Chi-chang is regarded as a member of the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) "west bound faction." His appointment to the Straits Exchange Foundation could be considered a logical move. But precisely because he holds certain views on cross-Straits economics and trade, "Go West Chang" has been branded one of the "Eleven Brigands" within the DPP. He was subjected to such vilification that he couldn't even win the party's nomination for the legislature.
This is the Hong Chi-chang who will be taking over the position of Straits Exchange Foundation chairman. He will be subjected to questions from all directions. Blue camp lawmakers will assume he won't be able to get much done. Green camp high officials will wonder out loud "Will he sell out Taiwan?" But the real question is: If Hong Chi-chang takes over at the Straits Exchange Foundation, will he be able to break the deadlock in cross-Straits relations? Or is his appointment merely a way to appeal to the New Tide Faction within the party, a way to win the votes of mainland-based Taiwan businessmen?
The Straits Exchange Foundation originally performed a cross-Straits intermediary role. If hands are willing to reach out across the Taiwan Straits, then such an intermediary role has its uses. The SEF's very first chairman was Koo Chen-fu. His prestige and influence during his term was so great it overshadowed the policy making Mainland Affairs Council. But if the government's policy is to no longer reach out across the Taiwan Straits, then such an intermediary becomes useless. The SEF's second chairman Chang Chun-hsiung, by contrast, had no achievements to speak of during his term. No wonder, as former Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Su Chi said, during the seven years in which the DPP has been in power, "The Mainland Affairs Council formulates no policies, and the Straits Exchange Foundation conducts no negotiations," therefore it makes no difference who occupies these positions.
The DPP party hierarchy has picked Hong Chi-chang, a New Tide Faction elder who was vilified during the party primaries, as chairman of the SEF, when "it makes no difference who occupies this position." Can "Go West Chang" really allow cross-Straits policy to "Go West?" Or as Hong himself asked, was he was appointed merely "to ensure party unity and cooperation with the government's policies?"
"Go West Chang" is a member of the "non-mainstream faction" within the DPP. He has the image of a reformer. He worked with People First Party lawmaker Liu Yi-ju to sponsor a bill to relax the upper limit on business investments on the mainland to 40%. The bill quickly made it into committee, and the business community eagerly anticipated its passage. Needless to say, this proposal, along with bills for weekend cross-Straits charter flights, air cargo chartered flights, mainland tourist visits all turned out to be false alarms. No progress has been made. The bill became one of the main charges leveled against Hong Chi-chang when he sought the party's nomination for the legislature.
During the controversy over former Premier Su Tseng-chang's "Revisionist Su" path, Hong Chi-chang spoke frankly, saying that a cross-Straits Open Door Policy was inevitable. In his capacity as director of the Taiwan Economy and Industry Association, he submitted a letter to the media. He stressed the rise of the region's economy, saying that "Taiwan may soon be marginalized." He aggressively pleaded on behalf of industry, saying that "Our financial industries have been preparing to go west for a long time. All they need is an East Wind. Let's give the financial industry an East Wind. Don't make them wait until its too late."
Hong Chi-chang is known within the DPP as a maverick proponent of an Open Door Policy. He now occupies an important position responsible for cross-Straits affairs. He once called for "providing an East Wind for the finance industry." He may not be able to call the shots at the Straits Exchange Foundation. But he is probably not devoid of all influence. The question is, will he emulate first SEF chairman Koo Chen-fu, a latter day Zhu Geliang adept at strategy? Or will he imitate second SEF chairman Chang Chun-hsiung's policy, in which "The Mainland Affairs Council formulates no policies, and the Straits Exchange Foundation conducts no negotiations?"
Larger currents have landed Taiwan in a dangerous dilemma. Yet the only strategies its leaders concern themselves with are election strategies. On the one hand Hong Chi-chang has met with the Straits Exchange Foundation in an attempt to win over Taiwan businessmen. On the other hand Yu Hsi-kuen is attempting to fan Deep Green mob sentiment with his "Resolution for a Normal Nation."
Hong Chi-chang has assumed the chairmanship of the Straits Exchange Foundation. Will he be able to take a stand and make a fight, on the understanding that "Unless Taiwan immediately opens up, it will be marginalized?" Or will it be business as usual, on the understanding that "The DPP must present a united front" and "cooperate with the government's policies?" The answer to this question will bear on considerably more than Hong's personal reputation.
Original Chinese below:
洪奇昌掌海基會：兩岸思維或選舉炒作？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.07.03 04:12 am
有點意外又不太意外，洪奇昌將接任海基會董事長。洪奇昌在民進黨內被視為「西進派」，出長海基會亦可謂順理成章。但正由於他對兩岸經貿有其見地，「西進昌」的大帽子也使他列名「十一寇」，以致被圍剿到連立委初選都過不了關。
這樣的洪奇昌，如今將接掌海基會，自是質疑四起。藍營立委認為他做不成什麼事，綠營高層則嗆聲他「會不會把台灣拿去賣掉」。但就台灣整體政局而言，關於此一人事任命，只有一個層面值得觀察：洪奇昌接掌海基會，能否為兩岸關係打開僵局？抑或只不過是民進黨對內拉攏新系、對外拉攏台商的選舉操作手段？
海基會原本扮演兩岸「白手套」的角色。兩岸的交流之「手」如果願意伸出，則「白手套」自有作用；第一任董事長辜振甫任內的聲譽及影響力，甚至凌駕決策單位的陸委會之上。但是，政策上如果決定不再伸出兩岸交流之「手」，則「白手套」即成無用之物。海基會第二任董事長張俊雄任內有過什麼「業績」，讓人實在想不出來。也難怪，前陸委會主委蘇起說，民進黨執政七年以來，「陸委會不決策，海基會不談判」，誰來做都一樣。
「誰來做都一樣」的這個職位，民進黨府院高層卻挑了在立委初選中被圍剿倒地的新系大老洪奇昌來做。「西進昌」真的能為兩岸政策打開西進的趨勢嗎？還是如洪奇昌本人所自稱，其臨危受命只不過是為了「民進黨內此時需要團結，會盡最大努力配合政府政策」？
「西進昌」在民進黨內雖屬「非主流」，卻具改革形象。他和親民黨立委劉憶如聯手提出放寬企業投資大陸百分之四十上限的提案，一度衝進付委審查的階段，受到企業界的高度期望。當然，這個提案就和兩岸周末包機、貨運包機、陸客觀光等案一樣，從傳言今年三月間「春暖花開」，到「春天過了，燕子還是沒有飛來」，如今仍不見任何進度，甚至成為洪奇昌爭取立委連任提名時受到黨內攻訐的主要罪名之一。
洪奇昌在前任閣揆蘇貞昌的「蘇修」路線廣受爭議時即大膽直言，兩岸政策「以開放為主軸」的趨勢已經確定了。他以台灣產經建研社理事長的身分投書媒體，強調區域經濟崛起的情勢中，「台灣就會陷入邊緣化的困境」；又積極為業者請命，「我們的金融業已準備好西進很久了，只是一直欠個東風，請借一個東風給金融業吧，不要讓他們等到地老天荒」。
以民進黨內倡議開放政策而堪稱特立獨行的洪奇昌，如今坐上了處理兩岸事務的重要職位。他過去呼籲「借一個東風給金融業吧」，如今在海基會的職權雖未必能呼風喚雨，但應不至於毫無影響力可言。問題是，他所欲效法的海基會「前輩」型範，將是喜好在舞台上扮演善用奇計孔明的第一任董事長辜振甫，還是恪守「陸委會不決策，海基會不談判」原則而默默無聲的第二任董事長張俊雄？
台灣走到今天這一步，外在大環境的潮流已使台灣處於退一步即無死所的險境之中；而國家領導人所步步經營者，仍無非選戰策略作多而已。眼前所見，正是一方面洪奇昌接海基會拉攏台商，另一方面游錫?搞「正常國家決議文」煽動深綠的政治奇觀。
洪奇昌接下海基會，將會在「台灣不開放即將邊緣化」的認知下而力求一搏？或只是在「民進黨需要團結」的認知下而「配合政府政策」？這個答案所影響的，不只是洪奇昌本人的功過評價而已。
Tuesday, July 3, 2007
The Executive Yuan: Judge, Jury, and Executioner
The Executive Yuan: Judge, Jury, and Executioner
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 2, 2007
National Communications Commission Website
The National Communications Commission (NCC) is authorized to approve the transfer of Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC) shareholder rights. The Executive Yuan has accused the NCC of "obvious patronage, definite dereliction." It says it will prosecute the NCC within the week, and is considering "suspending" NCC committee members.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is prepared to play the KMT party assets card for all it is worth in the upcoming legislative and presidential elections. The NCC approved the transfer of BCC shareholder rights that were once the property of the KMT. This naturally, has reduced some of the pressure on the KMT. That the Executive Yuan would react so violently was to be expected. But the use of executive authority against the rights and interests of any governmental agency, private association, or individual, must adhere strictly to due process and the rule of law. If in order to achieve a political objective one exceeds one's delegated enforcement, investigative, and prosecutorial powers, then that is the abuse of authority. If in the end such excesses are ruled illegal, then it will be too late for regrets.
The Executive Yuan alleges that the four companies holding BCC shareholder proxies are "shell companies whose source of funding is unclear." It accuses these four companies of violating Article Nine of the Company Law. It says "The Executive Yuan has already gotten to the bottom of the flow of funds." The Executive Yuan's accusations are obviously mutually contradictory. The Executive Yuan spokesperson's logic is incomprehensible. The charge that the buyer is a "shell company" and the charge that "the source of funding is unclear" are totally different charges. The charge that a company is a "shell company" means that the company is fictitious, that it doesn't in fact have any funds. If that were the case, then it would constitute a violation of Article Nine of the Company Law forbidding "funds entering an account but immediately withdrawn following the completion of registration." The practice of opening such companies is quite common. Loan sharks open such accounts in order to loan money to borrowers. Prosecutors and police have been investigating and dealing with these for some time. The charge that "the source of funding is unclear" is just the opposite. It means that funds are in fact available. It is merely the origin of the funds that is unclear. If that is the case, then Article Nine of the Company Law is inapplicable. Whether the origin of the funding violates any laws however, can be determined only after an investigation. Besides, as the NCC pointed out, intelligence and security agencies have already checked the source of the funding and verified that no mainland capital or foreign capital was involved, therefore no violations of the law were involved. So what basis does the Executive Yuan have for its allegations that "shell companies" were involved and that "the source of funding was unclear?"
As for the Executive Yuan's threats that it will "prosecute according to the law," apart from the judicial police and prosecutorial agencies, no agency within the executive branch is authorized to "prosecute according to the law." When an agency within the executive branch learns of illegal conduct, it turns any evidence over to the relevant judicial police or prosecutorial agencies. Its legal status is that of "plaintiff." Such being the case, the most that the Executive Yuan can do is to say that it "believes the NCC is guilty of a crime," then report the alleged crime to the relevant agencies. What authority does the Executive Yuan spokesperson have to accuse the NCC of "obvious patronage, definite dereliction?" A while ago, during the DPP presidential primary, documents belonging to the public prosecutor's office were leaked to the press. The documents charged Frank Hsieh of "clear violations of the law." Afterwards the Prosecutor General's Office was publicly required to correct its language. Prosecutorial agencies were also require to do so. Are Executive Yuan spokespersons to be exempt from responsibility for their public statements?
If the Executive Yuan believes that the NCC is guilty of "obvious patronage, definite dereliction," it can report its suspicions to the relevant judicial police or prosecutorial agencies, and allow them to handle the matter. Yet the Executive Yuan had the presumption to declare that it would "suspend" NCC Committee Members. This has even less legal basis. First of all, the NCC is an independent authority. NCC committee members enjoy tenure. Is the Executive Yuan authorized to arbitrarily suspend committee members of such a special administrative unit? Not long ago, the Chairman of the Financial Supervisory Commission was involved in a scandal. The Executive Yuan wanted him to resign. The commission chairman enjoyed tenure and refused to obeys orders. The Executive Yuan could do nothing. Given such a precedent, how can the Executive demand the resignation of NCC Committee Members?
Furthermore, NCC Committee Members are specially appointed. They are among the highest ranking officials in the civil service. Specially appointed officials may stay or go, but they cannot be "suspended." This is common knowledge. As for other civil service officials, if one wishes to suspend them, they are each subject to different disciplinary regulations and punishment methods. If they are suspected of a crime, if a warrant is issued for their arrest, if they are taken into custody, if they are convicted of a crime, if they are formally deprived of their political rights, if they are thrown in prison to serve a sentence, then of course they will be suspended in accordance with the law. But if one believes that a high ranking civil service official has broken the law and neglected his duty, if one believes he must be suspended, then one must inform his superior, namely the Chairman of the NCC, and allow him to handle the matter according to official disciplinary committee procedures. The Executive Yuan has neither authority nor responsibility in this matter. Nor has it submitted any facts or evidence to the disciplinary committee. How can they suspend any committee members?
In short, if the Executive Yuan has any evidence of illegal conduct, it should report such conduct. At the same time, it may also submit any evidence to the disciplinary committee. Instead the Executive Yuan foamed at the mouth, treating issues concerning the rule of law as political footballs, and the legal system as a political battleground. All it succeeded in doing was to confess its own political motivations.
Original Chinese below:
NCC事件：行政院可以告發，無權定罪！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.07.02 03:34 am
國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ）有條件同意中廣股權移轉，行政院指為「明顯圖利、確定瀆職」，並稱將於一周內移送法辦，且考慮將ＮＣＣ委員停職云云。
黨產議題是民進黨準備在立委和總統選舉中傾全力主打的政治訴求之一。如今ＮＣＣ同意原為黨產的中廣移轉股權，自是解消了國民黨的部分壓力，行政院有此激烈反應原在意料之中。然而，動用行政權力處理任何機關團體或個人的權益問題，都必須嚴守依法行政的分際；倘為達政治目的而侵越了原應由司法偵審所為之事，那就是濫用權力，若最後被認定為違法，那更將噬臍莫及了。
行政院指買受中廣股權的四家公司是「空頭公司、資金來源不明」，又指該四家公司違反公司法第九條，且謂「行政院已查清資金流向」。這些指控顯然彼此矛盾，行政院發言的邏輯令人不解。買家是「空頭公司」或「資金來源不明」，其實是完全不同的。空頭公司意味公司只是虛設，沒有真正的資金；倘係如此，即有可能是公司法第九條所禁止的「資金進帳完成登記隨即撤走」的情形。坊間開設公司，這種情形極為常見，甚至有專門借錢給人作出帳面以開設公司的地下錢莊，檢警也一直在查辦。反之，「資金來源不明」則是確有資金到位，只是來源不明；若是這樣，就絕不可能扯上公司法第九條；至於資金來源究竟違反什麼法律，那就要看調查的結果以及有無法律規範了。何況，ＮＣＣ指出，曾就資金來源向情治單位查證有無陸資及外資，據告皆無違法，則行政院所指「空頭公司」與「資金來源不明」究何所本？
至於說要移送法辦，其實除了司法警察或檢察機關，沒有任何行政單位有權將人「移送法辦」。行政單位知悉不法情事，將證據資料移請權責司法警察或偵查機關偵辦，其法律上的地位應是「告發」；就算是審理機關即法院，在審案過程發現未經偵辦的不法情事，亦只得移請該管檢察署偵辦，其意義亦是告發。既然如此，行政院最多只能說「認為ＮＣＣ同意中廣案涉嫌犯罪」，然後告發；行政院發言人豈有權力逕自宣稱「明顯圖利、確定瀆職」？不久前，民進黨總統初選發生檢察官公文外洩，公文內容指謝長廷「犯行明確」，事後高檢署還要公開更正用語；檢察機關尚且如此，行政院發言人豈可信口開河？
進一步說，行政院若認為有圖利、瀆職等違法情事，其實逕可告發到司法警察或檢察機關偵辦，以待司法處置；但行政院另一方面竟宣稱要將ＮＣＣ委員「停職」云云，這更是於法無據。首先，ＮＣＣ是獨立行使職權的機關，ＮＣＣ委員為任期制，對這種特殊的行政單位，行政院有權任意將其委員停職嗎？過去金管會主委涉案，行政院要求其去職，該主委以其具有任期保障拒不從命，行政院亦毫無辦法。先例如此，誠不知行政院將如何停ＮＣＣ委員之職？
再者，ＮＣＣ委員的主任委員為特任，其餘則比照最高階文官；特任官只有去留問題，沒有停職問題，這是基本常識。至於其他文官委員，倘欲加以停職，依公務員懲戒法的規定，則有各種不同狀況。如因涉案被通緝羈押，或刑事判決確定受褫奪公權宣告，或入獄服刑，當然即可依法停職。但如認為高階文官違法失職情節重大，有必要先行停職，則須由受理懲戒案的公懲會通知該管長官辦理，即由ＮＣＣ主委辦理。行政院既非權責單位，又未舉出具體事實移送公懲會，如何將委員停職？
總之，行政院若真有ＮＣＣ違法的證據資料，告發偵辦即是；同時，亦可移送公懲會進行處理。行政院氣急敗壞口不擇言，公然將法制議題當作選舉議題來渲染，將法制議題當作政治鬥爭來炒作，只是洩漏其政治動機罷了！
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
July 2, 2007
National Communications Commission Website
The National Communications Commission (NCC) is authorized to approve the transfer of Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC) shareholder rights. The Executive Yuan has accused the NCC of "obvious patronage, definite dereliction." It says it will prosecute the NCC within the week, and is considering "suspending" NCC committee members.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is prepared to play the KMT party assets card for all it is worth in the upcoming legislative and presidential elections. The NCC approved the transfer of BCC shareholder rights that were once the property of the KMT. This naturally, has reduced some of the pressure on the KMT. That the Executive Yuan would react so violently was to be expected. But the use of executive authority against the rights and interests of any governmental agency, private association, or individual, must adhere strictly to due process and the rule of law. If in order to achieve a political objective one exceeds one's delegated enforcement, investigative, and prosecutorial powers, then that is the abuse of authority. If in the end such excesses are ruled illegal, then it will be too late for regrets.
The Executive Yuan alleges that the four companies holding BCC shareholder proxies are "shell companies whose source of funding is unclear." It accuses these four companies of violating Article Nine of the Company Law. It says "The Executive Yuan has already gotten to the bottom of the flow of funds." The Executive Yuan's accusations are obviously mutually contradictory. The Executive Yuan spokesperson's logic is incomprehensible. The charge that the buyer is a "shell company" and the charge that "the source of funding is unclear" are totally different charges. The charge that a company is a "shell company" means that the company is fictitious, that it doesn't in fact have any funds. If that were the case, then it would constitute a violation of Article Nine of the Company Law forbidding "funds entering an account but immediately withdrawn following the completion of registration." The practice of opening such companies is quite common. Loan sharks open such accounts in order to loan money to borrowers. Prosecutors and police have been investigating and dealing with these for some time. The charge that "the source of funding is unclear" is just the opposite. It means that funds are in fact available. It is merely the origin of the funds that is unclear. If that is the case, then Article Nine of the Company Law is inapplicable. Whether the origin of the funding violates any laws however, can be determined only after an investigation. Besides, as the NCC pointed out, intelligence and security agencies have already checked the source of the funding and verified that no mainland capital or foreign capital was involved, therefore no violations of the law were involved. So what basis does the Executive Yuan have for its allegations that "shell companies" were involved and that "the source of funding was unclear?"
As for the Executive Yuan's threats that it will "prosecute according to the law," apart from the judicial police and prosecutorial agencies, no agency within the executive branch is authorized to "prosecute according to the law." When an agency within the executive branch learns of illegal conduct, it turns any evidence over to the relevant judicial police or prosecutorial agencies. Its legal status is that of "plaintiff." Such being the case, the most that the Executive Yuan can do is to say that it "believes the NCC is guilty of a crime," then report the alleged crime to the relevant agencies. What authority does the Executive Yuan spokesperson have to accuse the NCC of "obvious patronage, definite dereliction?" A while ago, during the DPP presidential primary, documents belonging to the public prosecutor's office were leaked to the press. The documents charged Frank Hsieh of "clear violations of the law." Afterwards the Prosecutor General's Office was publicly required to correct its language. Prosecutorial agencies were also require to do so. Are Executive Yuan spokespersons to be exempt from responsibility for their public statements?
If the Executive Yuan believes that the NCC is guilty of "obvious patronage, definite dereliction," it can report its suspicions to the relevant judicial police or prosecutorial agencies, and allow them to handle the matter. Yet the Executive Yuan had the presumption to declare that it would "suspend" NCC Committee Members. This has even less legal basis. First of all, the NCC is an independent authority. NCC committee members enjoy tenure. Is the Executive Yuan authorized to arbitrarily suspend committee members of such a special administrative unit? Not long ago, the Chairman of the Financial Supervisory Commission was involved in a scandal. The Executive Yuan wanted him to resign. The commission chairman enjoyed tenure and refused to obeys orders. The Executive Yuan could do nothing. Given such a precedent, how can the Executive demand the resignation of NCC Committee Members?
Furthermore, NCC Committee Members are specially appointed. They are among the highest ranking officials in the civil service. Specially appointed officials may stay or go, but they cannot be "suspended." This is common knowledge. As for other civil service officials, if one wishes to suspend them, they are each subject to different disciplinary regulations and punishment methods. If they are suspected of a crime, if a warrant is issued for their arrest, if they are taken into custody, if they are convicted of a crime, if they are formally deprived of their political rights, if they are thrown in prison to serve a sentence, then of course they will be suspended in accordance with the law. But if one believes that a high ranking civil service official has broken the law and neglected his duty, if one believes he must be suspended, then one must inform his superior, namely the Chairman of the NCC, and allow him to handle the matter according to official disciplinary committee procedures. The Executive Yuan has neither authority nor responsibility in this matter. Nor has it submitted any facts or evidence to the disciplinary committee. How can they suspend any committee members?
In short, if the Executive Yuan has any evidence of illegal conduct, it should report such conduct. At the same time, it may also submit any evidence to the disciplinary committee. Instead the Executive Yuan foamed at the mouth, treating issues concerning the rule of law as political footballs, and the legal system as a political battleground. All it succeeded in doing was to confess its own political motivations.
Original Chinese below:
NCC事件：行政院可以告發，無權定罪！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.07.02 03:34 am
國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ）有條件同意中廣股權移轉，行政院指為「明顯圖利、確定瀆職」，並稱將於一周內移送法辦，且考慮將ＮＣＣ委員停職云云。
黨產議題是民進黨準備在立委和總統選舉中傾全力主打的政治訴求之一。如今ＮＣＣ同意原為黨產的中廣移轉股權，自是解消了國民黨的部分壓力，行政院有此激烈反應原在意料之中。然而，動用行政權力處理任何機關團體或個人的權益問題，都必須嚴守依法行政的分際；倘為達政治目的而侵越了原應由司法偵審所為之事，那就是濫用權力，若最後被認定為違法，那更將噬臍莫及了。
行政院指買受中廣股權的四家公司是「空頭公司、資金來源不明」，又指該四家公司違反公司法第九條，且謂「行政院已查清資金流向」。這些指控顯然彼此矛盾，行政院發言的邏輯令人不解。買家是「空頭公司」或「資金來源不明」，其實是完全不同的。空頭公司意味公司只是虛設，沒有真正的資金；倘係如此，即有可能是公司法第九條所禁止的「資金進帳完成登記隨即撤走」的情形。坊間開設公司，這種情形極為常見，甚至有專門借錢給人作出帳面以開設公司的地下錢莊，檢警也一直在查辦。反之，「資金來源不明」則是確有資金到位，只是來源不明；若是這樣，就絕不可能扯上公司法第九條；至於資金來源究竟違反什麼法律，那就要看調查的結果以及有無法律規範了。何況，ＮＣＣ指出，曾就資金來源向情治單位查證有無陸資及外資，據告皆無違法，則行政院所指「空頭公司」與「資金來源不明」究何所本？
至於說要移送法辦，其實除了司法警察或檢察機關，沒有任何行政單位有權將人「移送法辦」。行政單位知悉不法情事，將證據資料移請權責司法警察或偵查機關偵辦，其法律上的地位應是「告發」；就算是審理機關即法院，在審案過程發現未經偵辦的不法情事，亦只得移請該管檢察署偵辦，其意義亦是告發。既然如此，行政院最多只能說「認為ＮＣＣ同意中廣案涉嫌犯罪」，然後告發；行政院發言人豈有權力逕自宣稱「明顯圖利、確定瀆職」？不久前，民進黨總統初選發生檢察官公文外洩，公文內容指謝長廷「犯行明確」，事後高檢署還要公開更正用語；檢察機關尚且如此，行政院發言人豈可信口開河？
進一步說，行政院若認為有圖利、瀆職等違法情事，其實逕可告發到司法警察或檢察機關偵辦，以待司法處置；但行政院另一方面竟宣稱要將ＮＣＣ委員「停職」云云，這更是於法無據。首先，ＮＣＣ是獨立行使職權的機關，ＮＣＣ委員為任期制，對這種特殊的行政單位，行政院有權任意將其委員停職嗎？過去金管會主委涉案，行政院要求其去職，該主委以其具有任期保障拒不從命，行政院亦毫無辦法。先例如此，誠不知行政院將如何停ＮＣＣ委員之職？
再者，ＮＣＣ委員的主任委員為特任，其餘則比照最高階文官；特任官只有去留問題，沒有停職問題，這是基本常識。至於其他文官委員，倘欲加以停職，依公務員懲戒法的規定，則有各種不同狀況。如因涉案被通緝羈押，或刑事判決確定受褫奪公權宣告，或入獄服刑，當然即可依法停職。但如認為高階文官違法失職情節重大，有必要先行停職，則須由受理懲戒案的公懲會通知該管長官辦理，即由ＮＣＣ主委辦理。行政院既非權責單位，又未舉出具體事實移送公懲會，如何將委員停職？
總之，行政院若真有ＮＣＣ違法的證據資料，告發偵辦即是；同時，亦可移送公懲會進行處理。行政院氣急敗壞口不擇言，公然將法制議題當作選舉議題來渲染，將法制議題當作政治鬥爭來炒作，只是洩漏其政治動機罷了！
Monday, July 2, 2007
The DPP: L'etat, c'est moi!
The DPP: L'etat, c'est moi!
The Democratic Progressive Party treats the Government as its Private Resource
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 28, 2007
Having condemned the Kuomintang (KMT) for the past twenty years for drawing no distinctions between what belongs to the party and what belongs to the nation, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) cannot be unaware of the difference between what is public and what is private. But take a look at the high-handed attitude of ruling Chen regime officials when setting public policy, assigning public offices, and distributing public funds. They treat national resources as if they were the party's private property, to be freely disbursed any way they see fit. The DPP has been sharpening its knives and demanding that the KMT account for its party assets. If the DPP could take a look at itself in the mirror, it would realize how much more repulsive it looks than its opponent, as it seeks to enrich itself.
Examples abound. The Executive Yuan recently spent tens of millions of dollars on a traveling "Investigation of Improper Party Assets" exhibit. Accusations that no one knows where the budget for the exhibit originated, that bidders were limited to cronies for whom the ruling government wished to provide patronage, and that public funds were misused to underwrite partisan political propaganda, were hardly unfounded. The root of the problem is that if a government wishes to investigate illegal party assets, it must do so according to the rule of law. The Executive Yuan knows perfectly well it can't find any legal basis for its allegations. It knows perfectly well that sponsoring an exhibit won't help it reclaim party assets. Yet it persists in doing so regardless, because its real purpose is to divert government resources into the DPP's election coffers. If this isn't "public works for private gain," what is?
If the ruling regime actually believes that sponsoring an exhibit will help recover improper party assets, or promote public understanding of the issue, then its public relations campaign attacking an opposition political party ought to be sponsored by the DPP. Yu Hsi-kuen, the head of the DPP's Central Party Committee, should pick up the tab. The activity should not be organized by the government, and the cost should not be borne by the state treasury. Only that would qualify as making the proper distinction between partisan and public interests.
The DPP has condemned the KMT for "failing to make proper distinctions between party and state." But once the Chen regime assumed power the "failure to make proper distinctions between party and state" only got worse. Take the case of China Steel board chairman Chang Yi-ren for example. During a general shareholders meeting the board of directors approved another term for Jiang Yao-tsung. Yet four days later, the Executive Yuan replaced Jiang Yao-tsung with Lin Wen-yuan. According to the buzz among industry insiders and local governments, the replacement was motivated primarily by election considerations. At the same time, a subcontractor for the Kaohsiung Mass Rapid Transit who encountered a problem obtaining payment due to contractual limitations, miraculously found his way cleared. Obviously, in the eyes of the ruling regime, the publicly owned China Steel Corporation is the ruling DPP's private property and political machine.
The KMT routinely used state-owned enterprises to reward cronies for services rendered. For this it was rightly condemned. This led to a wave of privatization of state-owned enterprises. But now the DPP ignores the fact that state-owned enterprises have supposedly been privatized. It continues to regard high level positions in such companies as rewards for services rendered, and routinely interferes in the management of these companies. Chiang Yao-tsung was replaced because he was not sufficiently "flexible" in enforcing the terms of the Kaohsiung MRT contract. So what was Lin Wen-yuan's duty? Was it to ignore the terms of the contract and neglect the interests of China Steel in order to cater to the needs of a Kaohsiung MRT subcontractor? Were political contributions or election advantages being traded in the process?
Because he gave himself an annual salary amounting to tens of millions of dollars, plus dividends, Lin Wen-yuan's reputation came under attack and he lost his job. Now because he is willing to play ball with the ruling regime, he has made a glorious comeback. Can the misuse of state owned enterprises as the ruling party's election machine and money tranfer machine be regarded as anything other than flagrant cronyism?
Research, Development and Evaluation Commission Vice Chairman Chen Chun-lin said that the purpose of sponsoring an "Investigation of Improper Party Assets" exhibit was to let people know "how a nation's resources are drained away." But who really needs to look at the exhibit? By now everybody knows exactly how a nation's resources are drained away. All one has to do is look at the Executive Yuan's recent "Entitlement of the Week" policy. Checks amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars are cavalierly issued in an orgy of irresponsible pork barrel vote-buying. Policies are not subjected to cost-benefit analysis. Under the circumstances, does the ruling DPP really think the public cannot see who is squandering the nation's resources?
One of the DPP's biggest problems is that it equates good governance with issuing large checks. It has never understood that one must first learn how to make money and deposit the money in a bank account. An even bigger problem for the DPP is that it can't seem to understand the distinction between the "ruling party" and the "Democratic Progressive Party." It seems to think that the government's resources may be transferred into the coffers of the Democratic Progressive Party, to be used as it sees fit. It denies "outsiders'" any right to share in these resources. The result has been the creation of a incompetent political authority utterly impervious to reform.
The KMT's improper party assets have complex historical origins. But at the very least the KMT governed competently for many decades. The DPP has no party assets. Instead it treats government policy, government positions, and government budgets as its private property, to freely disposed of as it pleases. Governing, to the DPP, has alway meant the manipulation of resources, never the management of resources.
From one end of Taiwan to the other, government offices, auxiliary organizations, and even local government construction contracts, have all been painted a bright, glossy DPP Green and transformed into DPP franchises under DPP management. And the Executive Yuan has the temerity to use government money to condemn KMT party assets? The entire government has degenerated into a DPP campaign chest and election machine. Talk about eating people alive without bothering to spit out the bones!
Original Chinese below:
民進黨把整個政府當作選舉財庫與機器！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.28 03:53 am
打了廿年黨產議題，罵國民黨公私不分，民進黨不可能不知道「公」和「私」的分際何在；但看看執政舞台上的扁政府，官員們在決定政策、分配職位及支用公帑的霸道姿態，幾乎把國家資源當成該黨的私產在任意揮霍。當民進黨磨刀霍霍向國民黨討黨產時，若能照照鏡子，即知自己貪婪營私的嘴臉較對手還要醜陋。
類似事例，俯拾即是。行政院最近決動用近千萬元預算舉辦「清查不當黨產」巡迴展，招致預算來源不明、限制招標圖利特定對象，以及用公帑搞政黨鬥爭等批評；這些質疑，皆非無的放矢。根本的問題在：政府要追討不法黨產，唯一根據便是法制；行政院明知在法制上找不到立足點，辦展覽亦無助討回黨產，卻仍執意而為，目的無非是要挪用行政資源供民進黨炒作選舉而已。這不是假公濟私是什麼？
換一個說法，也許更容易理解。如果執政者覺得辦展覽有助討回黨產，或增進民眾對問題的了解，那麼這項以攻擊特定政黨為目標的文宣，應由民進黨舉辦，且由游錫?為首的黨中央買單，絕不應由政府舉辦、讓國庫付錢。這才是「黨」和「政」的分際。
民進黨過去罵國民黨「黨政不分」，但扁政府主政後黨政不分的惡劣情況愈發嚴重。以最近中鋼董事長易人為例，股東常會方才通過江耀宗續任，四天後行政院卻逕自撤換江耀宗而改派林文淵。據業界及地方政壇傳聞，此舉主要在為選舉布局，同時也為高捷下包廠商受限合約拿不到錢的問題預為排除障礙。可見，在主政者眼中，中鋼已形同執政黨的私庫和選舉操作機器了。
早年國民黨經常利用國營事業酬庸人事，迭遭批評，後來才有了一波國營事業「民營化」的推動。但民進黨現今的作為，不僅無視於公股企業已然民營化的事實，照樣隨手將高層職位當成酬庸賞賜，更動輒無理干預公司治理。試想，江耀宗因處理高捷合約彈性不夠而遭撤換，那麼林文淵的任務是否就在罔顧合約規定及中鋼利益以滿足高捷小包需索？而滿足包商需索的原因，是否即在換取政治獻金或其他選舉利益？
再說，林文淵先前曾因為自己編列千萬年薪及分紅，操守遭外界訾議，因而去職；如今竟又因能在政治上配合主政者需要，而怡然回鍋重操舊業。這樣的人事安排，豈非將公股企業當成執政黨的輔選機和資金調度機看待？
研考會副主委陳俊麟說，辦「清查黨產」展覽之目的，是要讓全民知道「國家資產如何流失」。但是，不必看展覽，如今大家也知道國家資產怎麼流失。光看行政院近來「一周一利多」的政策大放送，隨便支票一開就拋出千億資金，政策不必做分析，也不必評估效益；如此，民眾還會看不出來誰在揮霍國家資產嗎？
民進黨的一大問題，是把開支票當成施政，從來不知道要先學會賺錢並把錢存進戶頭。民進黨更大的問題，是分不清「執政黨」和「民進黨」有何不同，以為所有政府資源都可以轉供民進黨使用，他拒絕「外人」分享其資源的結果，是造就了一個無能而封閉的政權，這才是最大的悲劇。
國民黨不當黨產有其歷史的盤根錯節，但它至少經歷了數十年的經營；民進黨沒有黨產，它卻將政府政策、國家職位、公共預算全當成可以予取予求、任意揮霍之物，且從來只是「操作」，而不「經營」。
從台灣頭到台灣尾，從政府職務、周邊機構乃至地方工程包商，早都洗成綠油油一片的「本黨經營」連鎖企業，行政院還要動用公款打黨產，整個政府儼然已經淪為民進黨的選舉財庫與選舉機器，這真是吃人夠夠還不吐骨頭！
The Democratic Progressive Party treats the Government as its Private Resource
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 28, 2007
Having condemned the Kuomintang (KMT) for the past twenty years for drawing no distinctions between what belongs to the party and what belongs to the nation, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) cannot be unaware of the difference between what is public and what is private. But take a look at the high-handed attitude of ruling Chen regime officials when setting public policy, assigning public offices, and distributing public funds. They treat national resources as if they were the party's private property, to be freely disbursed any way they see fit. The DPP has been sharpening its knives and demanding that the KMT account for its party assets. If the DPP could take a look at itself in the mirror, it would realize how much more repulsive it looks than its opponent, as it seeks to enrich itself.
Examples abound. The Executive Yuan recently spent tens of millions of dollars on a traveling "Investigation of Improper Party Assets" exhibit. Accusations that no one knows where the budget for the exhibit originated, that bidders were limited to cronies for whom the ruling government wished to provide patronage, and that public funds were misused to underwrite partisan political propaganda, were hardly unfounded. The root of the problem is that if a government wishes to investigate illegal party assets, it must do so according to the rule of law. The Executive Yuan knows perfectly well it can't find any legal basis for its allegations. It knows perfectly well that sponsoring an exhibit won't help it reclaim party assets. Yet it persists in doing so regardless, because its real purpose is to divert government resources into the DPP's election coffers. If this isn't "public works for private gain," what is?
If the ruling regime actually believes that sponsoring an exhibit will help recover improper party assets, or promote public understanding of the issue, then its public relations campaign attacking an opposition political party ought to be sponsored by the DPP. Yu Hsi-kuen, the head of the DPP's Central Party Committee, should pick up the tab. The activity should not be organized by the government, and the cost should not be borne by the state treasury. Only that would qualify as making the proper distinction between partisan and public interests.
The DPP has condemned the KMT for "failing to make proper distinctions between party and state." But once the Chen regime assumed power the "failure to make proper distinctions between party and state" only got worse. Take the case of China Steel board chairman Chang Yi-ren for example. During a general shareholders meeting the board of directors approved another term for Jiang Yao-tsung. Yet four days later, the Executive Yuan replaced Jiang Yao-tsung with Lin Wen-yuan. According to the buzz among industry insiders and local governments, the replacement was motivated primarily by election considerations. At the same time, a subcontractor for the Kaohsiung Mass Rapid Transit who encountered a problem obtaining payment due to contractual limitations, miraculously found his way cleared. Obviously, in the eyes of the ruling regime, the publicly owned China Steel Corporation is the ruling DPP's private property and political machine.
The KMT routinely used state-owned enterprises to reward cronies for services rendered. For this it was rightly condemned. This led to a wave of privatization of state-owned enterprises. But now the DPP ignores the fact that state-owned enterprises have supposedly been privatized. It continues to regard high level positions in such companies as rewards for services rendered, and routinely interferes in the management of these companies. Chiang Yao-tsung was replaced because he was not sufficiently "flexible" in enforcing the terms of the Kaohsiung MRT contract. So what was Lin Wen-yuan's duty? Was it to ignore the terms of the contract and neglect the interests of China Steel in order to cater to the needs of a Kaohsiung MRT subcontractor? Were political contributions or election advantages being traded in the process?
Because he gave himself an annual salary amounting to tens of millions of dollars, plus dividends, Lin Wen-yuan's reputation came under attack and he lost his job. Now because he is willing to play ball with the ruling regime, he has made a glorious comeback. Can the misuse of state owned enterprises as the ruling party's election machine and money tranfer machine be regarded as anything other than flagrant cronyism?
Research, Development and Evaluation Commission Vice Chairman Chen Chun-lin said that the purpose of sponsoring an "Investigation of Improper Party Assets" exhibit was to let people know "how a nation's resources are drained away." But who really needs to look at the exhibit? By now everybody knows exactly how a nation's resources are drained away. All one has to do is look at the Executive Yuan's recent "Entitlement of the Week" policy. Checks amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars are cavalierly issued in an orgy of irresponsible pork barrel vote-buying. Policies are not subjected to cost-benefit analysis. Under the circumstances, does the ruling DPP really think the public cannot see who is squandering the nation's resources?
One of the DPP's biggest problems is that it equates good governance with issuing large checks. It has never understood that one must first learn how to make money and deposit the money in a bank account. An even bigger problem for the DPP is that it can't seem to understand the distinction between the "ruling party" and the "Democratic Progressive Party." It seems to think that the government's resources may be transferred into the coffers of the Democratic Progressive Party, to be used as it sees fit. It denies "outsiders'" any right to share in these resources. The result has been the creation of a incompetent political authority utterly impervious to reform.
The KMT's improper party assets have complex historical origins. But at the very least the KMT governed competently for many decades. The DPP has no party assets. Instead it treats government policy, government positions, and government budgets as its private property, to freely disposed of as it pleases. Governing, to the DPP, has alway meant the manipulation of resources, never the management of resources.
From one end of Taiwan to the other, government offices, auxiliary organizations, and even local government construction contracts, have all been painted a bright, glossy DPP Green and transformed into DPP franchises under DPP management. And the Executive Yuan has the temerity to use government money to condemn KMT party assets? The entire government has degenerated into a DPP campaign chest and election machine. Talk about eating people alive without bothering to spit out the bones!
Original Chinese below:
民進黨把整個政府當作選舉財庫與機器！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.28 03:53 am
打了廿年黨產議題，罵國民黨公私不分，民進黨不可能不知道「公」和「私」的分際何在；但看看執政舞台上的扁政府，官員們在決定政策、分配職位及支用公帑的霸道姿態，幾乎把國家資源當成該黨的私產在任意揮霍。當民進黨磨刀霍霍向國民黨討黨產時，若能照照鏡子，即知自己貪婪營私的嘴臉較對手還要醜陋。
類似事例，俯拾即是。行政院最近決動用近千萬元預算舉辦「清查不當黨產」巡迴展，招致預算來源不明、限制招標圖利特定對象，以及用公帑搞政黨鬥爭等批評；這些質疑，皆非無的放矢。根本的問題在：政府要追討不法黨產，唯一根據便是法制；行政院明知在法制上找不到立足點，辦展覽亦無助討回黨產，卻仍執意而為，目的無非是要挪用行政資源供民進黨炒作選舉而已。這不是假公濟私是什麼？
換一個說法，也許更容易理解。如果執政者覺得辦展覽有助討回黨產，或增進民眾對問題的了解，那麼這項以攻擊特定政黨為目標的文宣，應由民進黨舉辦，且由游錫?為首的黨中央買單，絕不應由政府舉辦、讓國庫付錢。這才是「黨」和「政」的分際。
民進黨過去罵國民黨「黨政不分」，但扁政府主政後黨政不分的惡劣情況愈發嚴重。以最近中鋼董事長易人為例，股東常會方才通過江耀宗續任，四天後行政院卻逕自撤換江耀宗而改派林文淵。據業界及地方政壇傳聞，此舉主要在為選舉布局，同時也為高捷下包廠商受限合約拿不到錢的問題預為排除障礙。可見，在主政者眼中，中鋼已形同執政黨的私庫和選舉操作機器了。
早年國民黨經常利用國營事業酬庸人事，迭遭批評，後來才有了一波國營事業「民營化」的推動。但民進黨現今的作為，不僅無視於公股企業已然民營化的事實，照樣隨手將高層職位當成酬庸賞賜，更動輒無理干預公司治理。試想，江耀宗因處理高捷合約彈性不夠而遭撤換，那麼林文淵的任務是否就在罔顧合約規定及中鋼利益以滿足高捷小包需索？而滿足包商需索的原因，是否即在換取政治獻金或其他選舉利益？
再說，林文淵先前曾因為自己編列千萬年薪及分紅，操守遭外界訾議，因而去職；如今竟又因能在政治上配合主政者需要，而怡然回鍋重操舊業。這樣的人事安排，豈非將公股企業當成執政黨的輔選機和資金調度機看待？
研考會副主委陳俊麟說，辦「清查黨產」展覽之目的，是要讓全民知道「國家資產如何流失」。但是，不必看展覽，如今大家也知道國家資產怎麼流失。光看行政院近來「一周一利多」的政策大放送，隨便支票一開就拋出千億資金，政策不必做分析，也不必評估效益；如此，民眾還會看不出來誰在揮霍國家資產嗎？
民進黨的一大問題，是把開支票當成施政，從來不知道要先學會賺錢並把錢存進戶頭。民進黨更大的問題，是分不清「執政黨」和「民進黨」有何不同，以為所有政府資源都可以轉供民進黨使用，他拒絕「外人」分享其資源的結果，是造就了一個無能而封閉的政權，這才是最大的悲劇。
國民黨不當黨產有其歷史的盤根錯節，但它至少經歷了數十年的經營；民進黨沒有黨產，它卻將政府政策、國家職位、公共預算全當成可以予取予求、任意揮霍之物，且從來只是「操作」，而不「經營」。
從台灣頭到台灣尾，從政府職務、周邊機構乃至地方工程包商，早都洗成綠油油一片的「本黨經營」連鎖企業，行政院還要動用公款打黨產，整個政府儼然已經淪為民進黨的選舉財庫與選舉機器，這真是吃人夠夠還不吐骨頭！
Saturday, June 30, 2007
The Funnel and the Trumpet
The Funnel and the Trumpet:
Ten Years after the Return of Hong Kong, 20 years after Martial Law, 30 years after the Cultural Revolution
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 27, 2007
Deng Xiaoping
Lee Teng-hui
Chen Shui-bian
This is the 10th anniversary of Hong Kong's retrocession, the 20th anniversary of the lifting of martial law on Taiwan, and the 30th anniversary, more or less, of the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Taiwan's political path following the lifting of martial law resembles a funnel. The broad horizons opened up by the lifting of martial law represent the large end of the funnel, Taiwan's every narrowing horizons represent the small end of the funnel. By contrast, the political path followed by the mainland and Hong Kong regions, 30 years after the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and 10 years after Hong Kong's retrocession, resembles a trumpet. From the small end with mouthpiece, their horizons have steadily broadened as they advanced confidently toward the ever wider bell.
Of course, the mainland and Taiwan regions of China have many areas in which they cannot be compared. The biggest difference is that the Taiwan region has established a procedural framework for democracy. It has surpassed Hong Kong in directly electing its president. It has surpassed the mainland in ways too numerous to be cited individually, such as multiparty politics, direct elections at all levels, and a free media.
But Taiwan qua Taiwan, 20 years after the lifting of martial law, truly has been marching into the small end of a funnel. Martial Law and the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion were rescinded 20 years ago. Politically and economically, the Taiwan region found itself at a watershed moment, reborn into a new world of limitless possibilities. Who knew it would soon fall victim to Lee Teng-hui's relentless attempts to undermine the constitution and practice "black gold" (cronyist) politics? Furthermore the direct election of the president required only a plurality, enabling the Democratic Progressive Party and Chen Shui-bian to seize power, and by means of "two bullets" obtain an illegal second term, during which time divisions arose over national identity, chaos undermined constitutional rule, the judiciary became a rubber stamp, the economy fell into depression, corruption became the norm, and the quality of life declined. Instead of progressing, Taiwan began regressing in every way, sliding toward the bottom of the funnel. Democracy and constitutionalism have become nothing more than tools with which Chen Shui-bian can hijack the nation and safeguard his kleptocracy.
Twenty years after the lifting of martial law, the core value of Taiwan's ruling regime has become: How to safeguard Chen Shui-bian's corruption, and how to work with Chen Shui-bian to continue deceiving oneself and others about Taiwan independence. Is this why we lifted 20 years of martial law? Is this to be its crowning achievement?
Do not compare the mainland with Taiwan, you say? Well then let's discuss the mainland qua mainland. Let's look at the changes 30 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, at
Deng Xiaoping's "Black Cat, White Cat" thesis, at his declaration that "Only economic development is a hard truth," and at his call to "Let some people get rich first." His logic is incontrovertible, and the benefits are incalculable. Thirty years ago, if a farmer's wife sold two eggs on the street, she risked vilification as a "capitalist-roader." Thirty years later, the mainland has become the industrial workshop of the world. A conformist ant hill in which everyone wore blue Lenin jackets, has become a prosperous consumer society. Yes, problems still plague the mainland. The democratization of its political system lags behind others'. But China qua China, 30 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, truly does suggest the ever widening bell of a trumpet.
Looking at Hong Kong qua Hong Kong, the ten year trend is also remarkably trumpet like. Ten years ago, Hong Kong was panic-stricken. The bottom had dropped out of the real estate and stock markets. Today it is booming. Its global economic and trade roles are on the rise. Its virtues prior to retrocession, clean and transparent government, have been preserved. Hong Kongers continue to push for the direct election of governors and an upgrade of the region's status. Hong Kong's retrocession to China was a thorny problem. But Deng Xiaoping's formula "one country, two systems" has allowed the mainland and Hong Kong to advance step by step toward the broad end of the trumpet over the past ten years. A single phrase has shrugged off ideology. A simple formula has allowed a nation to extricate itself from a dead end. (At this point we must add that we do not advocate "one country, two systems" for Taiwan.)
Lee Teng-hui was the first president following the lifting of martial law. Chen Shui-bian was the first president following regime change. Both stood at historic watersheds, full of possibilty. But they both stooped to racist demagoguery and political intrigue, and took Taiwan down the path to constitutional ruin, political corruption, and economic decline. By contrast, Deng Xiaoping was the first leader following Mao Zedong. He rescued a mainland on the verge of disintegration, and set it back on the path toward national greatness. It is not easy to draw comparisons between Lee, Chen, and Deng. But if we simply compare their starting points and end points, we can see that Deng Xiaoping went from narrow to wide. He was dealt a losing hand, but parlayed it into a fortune. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian meanwhile, went from wide to narrow. They were dealt winning hands, yet frittered away the family fortune.
What is the reason behind the rise of the mainland and the decline of Taiwan over the past 20 years? Put simply, it is because they had Deng Xiaoping, while we had Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.
Original Chinese below:
解嚴20年／文革後30年／香港回歸10年
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.27 04:10 am
今年是香港「回歸」十年，解嚴二十年，亦是文革後約莫三十年。
從大歷史來看，台灣解嚴後二十年的歷史走向是「漏斗型」；二十年來，從解嚴當時最寬闊的地帶（猶如漏斗的上端開口處），一步一步，愈走愈窄（走向漏斗窄狹的底部）。相對而言，文革後的三十年，及香港回歸十年的歷史走向，則宛如「喇叭型」；自頂端窄小的吹嘴，愈走愈寬，走向前方寬闊的喇叭口。
當然，中國與台灣頗多不能相比之處。最大的差異在於台灣已經大抵建立了民主運作的完整程序架構；例如，超越香港者是總統直選等，超越中國者更不可以道里計，如政黨政治、里長以上的各級直選與自由媒體等等，不勝枚舉。
但是，以台灣論台灣，解嚴後的二十年，確實是愈走愈窄的「漏斗型」。二十年前解嚴時，因戒嚴令的取消與動員戡亂時期的終止，台灣在政治經濟各方面確實曾有大開大闔、脫胎換骨的契機。當時的台灣，宛如站在歷史的大出口，何其開闊！詎料，解嚴後不久竟即陷入李登輝毀憲亂憲的風潮及黑金政治的夢魘。接著，因總統選舉採相對多數制，使民進黨及陳水扁奪得政權，又以兩顆子彈而僥倖連任；其間國家認同分裂、憲政濁亂、司法受到操弄、經濟低迷、貪腐成風、民生凋敝……。整個台灣，亦即台灣的各方面，不進反退，皆一步一步滑向漏斗的底端；情勢演變至今，整個民主憲政，竟然沉淪墮落到了只成為被陳水扁挾持以捍衛貪腐的私器而已！
解嚴二十年，如今台灣主政當局的核心政策議題竟然是：如何捍衛貪腐的陳水扁？以及如何陪陳水扁繼續操弄「自欺欺人」的台獨騙術！這難道就是當年解嚴所追求的目標？這難道就是台灣解嚴二十年的終極成就？
不要用中國和台灣來比，然而，不妨以中國論中國，看看文革後三十年的變化。鄧小平的「黑貓白貓論」、「發展才是硬道理」及「讓一部分人先富起來」，道理淺白，效益宏大。三十年前，連農村大媽捧兩顆雞蛋到街上求售，皆可能被打成「走資派」；三十年後的中國，已成了世界工廠與世界市場。穿著列寧裝制服的藍螞蟻社會，如今儼然已經成了繽紛滿目的花花世界。是的，中國仍有極多問題，政治的民主化尤其落伍太多；但是就中國論中國，文革後三十年的政經趨勢，確實是走向愈來愈寬的喇叭口。
再以香港論香港，十年的走向亦大體上是「喇叭型」。經濟方面，從十年前的人心惶惶，房價股市狂跌，到如今非但景氣回溫，且其世界經貿角色亦仍見上升空間。在社會及政治方面，回歸前的優勢如政府廉能及公信力仍然維持，且政治議題亦朝向「特首直選」等升級領域進行試探。試想，香港回歸中國曾是多麼棘手的問題，但鄧小平一句「一國兩制」，卻使十年來的中港關係一步步走向寬闊的喇叭口；一句話甩掉了意識形態的包袱，一句話使國家從死胡同裡鑽出來。（在此須附一語，我們不贊成台灣施行「一國兩制」。）
李登輝是站在解嚴時代的第一人，陳水扁是站在政黨輪替時代的第一人。他們皆曾站在歷史的最開闊處，但他們皆沉溺於政爭權謀，將國家在大歷史上帶往憲政沉淪、政治腐敗及經濟下坡的漏斗下端。相對而言，鄧小平則是站在後毛澤東時代的第一人，他卻在大歷史上將中國從瀕臨解構帶向「大國崛起」的氣勢。即使不宜以李扁鄧三人相互比較，就以他們自己的政治起點與政治終點比較，鄧小平的歷史表現應是由窄而寬的「喇叭型」，把一手爛牌打旺了；李登輝與陳水扁則無疑是由寬而窄的「漏斗型」，把一手好牌打臭掉。
兩岸二十年來的消長，因何所致？一個比較簡化但中肯的答案可能是：因為他們有鄧小平，我們有李登輝與陳水扁。
Ten Years after the Return of Hong Kong, 20 years after Martial Law, 30 years after the Cultural Revolution
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 27, 2007
Deng Xiaoping
Lee Teng-hui
Chen Shui-bian
This is the 10th anniversary of Hong Kong's retrocession, the 20th anniversary of the lifting of martial law on Taiwan, and the 30th anniversary, more or less, of the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Taiwan's political path following the lifting of martial law resembles a funnel. The broad horizons opened up by the lifting of martial law represent the large end of the funnel, Taiwan's every narrowing horizons represent the small end of the funnel. By contrast, the political path followed by the mainland and Hong Kong regions, 30 years after the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and 10 years after Hong Kong's retrocession, resembles a trumpet. From the small end with mouthpiece, their horizons have steadily broadened as they advanced confidently toward the ever wider bell.
Of course, the mainland and Taiwan regions of China have many areas in which they cannot be compared. The biggest difference is that the Taiwan region has established a procedural framework for democracy. It has surpassed Hong Kong in directly electing its president. It has surpassed the mainland in ways too numerous to be cited individually, such as multiparty politics, direct elections at all levels, and a free media.
But Taiwan qua Taiwan, 20 years after the lifting of martial law, truly has been marching into the small end of a funnel. Martial Law and the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion were rescinded 20 years ago. Politically and economically, the Taiwan region found itself at a watershed moment, reborn into a new world of limitless possibilities. Who knew it would soon fall victim to Lee Teng-hui's relentless attempts to undermine the constitution and practice "black gold" (cronyist) politics? Furthermore the direct election of the president required only a plurality, enabling the Democratic Progressive Party and Chen Shui-bian to seize power, and by means of "two bullets" obtain an illegal second term, during which time divisions arose over national identity, chaos undermined constitutional rule, the judiciary became a rubber stamp, the economy fell into depression, corruption became the norm, and the quality of life declined. Instead of progressing, Taiwan began regressing in every way, sliding toward the bottom of the funnel. Democracy and constitutionalism have become nothing more than tools with which Chen Shui-bian can hijack the nation and safeguard his kleptocracy.
Twenty years after the lifting of martial law, the core value of Taiwan's ruling regime has become: How to safeguard Chen Shui-bian's corruption, and how to work with Chen Shui-bian to continue deceiving oneself and others about Taiwan independence. Is this why we lifted 20 years of martial law? Is this to be its crowning achievement?
Do not compare the mainland with Taiwan, you say? Well then let's discuss the mainland qua mainland. Let's look at the changes 30 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, at
Deng Xiaoping's "Black Cat, White Cat" thesis, at his declaration that "Only economic development is a hard truth," and at his call to "Let some people get rich first." His logic is incontrovertible, and the benefits are incalculable. Thirty years ago, if a farmer's wife sold two eggs on the street, she risked vilification as a "capitalist-roader." Thirty years later, the mainland has become the industrial workshop of the world. A conformist ant hill in which everyone wore blue Lenin jackets, has become a prosperous consumer society. Yes, problems still plague the mainland. The democratization of its political system lags behind others'. But China qua China, 30 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, truly does suggest the ever widening bell of a trumpet.
Looking at Hong Kong qua Hong Kong, the ten year trend is also remarkably trumpet like. Ten years ago, Hong Kong was panic-stricken. The bottom had dropped out of the real estate and stock markets. Today it is booming. Its global economic and trade roles are on the rise. Its virtues prior to retrocession, clean and transparent government, have been preserved. Hong Kongers continue to push for the direct election of governors and an upgrade of the region's status. Hong Kong's retrocession to China was a thorny problem. But Deng Xiaoping's formula "one country, two systems" has allowed the mainland and Hong Kong to advance step by step toward the broad end of the trumpet over the past ten years. A single phrase has shrugged off ideology. A simple formula has allowed a nation to extricate itself from a dead end. (At this point we must add that we do not advocate "one country, two systems" for Taiwan.)
Lee Teng-hui was the first president following the lifting of martial law. Chen Shui-bian was the first president following regime change. Both stood at historic watersheds, full of possibilty. But they both stooped to racist demagoguery and political intrigue, and took Taiwan down the path to constitutional ruin, political corruption, and economic decline. By contrast, Deng Xiaoping was the first leader following Mao Zedong. He rescued a mainland on the verge of disintegration, and set it back on the path toward national greatness. It is not easy to draw comparisons between Lee, Chen, and Deng. But if we simply compare their starting points and end points, we can see that Deng Xiaoping went from narrow to wide. He was dealt a losing hand, but parlayed it into a fortune. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian meanwhile, went from wide to narrow. They were dealt winning hands, yet frittered away the family fortune.
What is the reason behind the rise of the mainland and the decline of Taiwan over the past 20 years? Put simply, it is because they had Deng Xiaoping, while we had Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.
Original Chinese below:
解嚴20年／文革後30年／香港回歸10年
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.27 04:10 am
今年是香港「回歸」十年，解嚴二十年，亦是文革後約莫三十年。
從大歷史來看，台灣解嚴後二十年的歷史走向是「漏斗型」；二十年來，從解嚴當時最寬闊的地帶（猶如漏斗的上端開口處），一步一步，愈走愈窄（走向漏斗窄狹的底部）。相對而言，文革後的三十年，及香港回歸十年的歷史走向，則宛如「喇叭型」；自頂端窄小的吹嘴，愈走愈寬，走向前方寬闊的喇叭口。
當然，中國與台灣頗多不能相比之處。最大的差異在於台灣已經大抵建立了民主運作的完整程序架構；例如，超越香港者是總統直選等，超越中國者更不可以道里計，如政黨政治、里長以上的各級直選與自由媒體等等，不勝枚舉。
但是，以台灣論台灣，解嚴後的二十年，確實是愈走愈窄的「漏斗型」。二十年前解嚴時，因戒嚴令的取消與動員戡亂時期的終止，台灣在政治經濟各方面確實曾有大開大闔、脫胎換骨的契機。當時的台灣，宛如站在歷史的大出口，何其開闊！詎料，解嚴後不久竟即陷入李登輝毀憲亂憲的風潮及黑金政治的夢魘。接著，因總統選舉採相對多數制，使民進黨及陳水扁奪得政權，又以兩顆子彈而僥倖連任；其間國家認同分裂、憲政濁亂、司法受到操弄、經濟低迷、貪腐成風、民生凋敝……。整個台灣，亦即台灣的各方面，不進反退，皆一步一步滑向漏斗的底端；情勢演變至今，整個民主憲政，竟然沉淪墮落到了只成為被陳水扁挾持以捍衛貪腐的私器而已！
解嚴二十年，如今台灣主政當局的核心政策議題竟然是：如何捍衛貪腐的陳水扁？以及如何陪陳水扁繼續操弄「自欺欺人」的台獨騙術！這難道就是當年解嚴所追求的目標？這難道就是台灣解嚴二十年的終極成就？
不要用中國和台灣來比，然而，不妨以中國論中國，看看文革後三十年的變化。鄧小平的「黑貓白貓論」、「發展才是硬道理」及「讓一部分人先富起來」，道理淺白，效益宏大。三十年前，連農村大媽捧兩顆雞蛋到街上求售，皆可能被打成「走資派」；三十年後的中國，已成了世界工廠與世界市場。穿著列寧裝制服的藍螞蟻社會，如今儼然已經成了繽紛滿目的花花世界。是的，中國仍有極多問題，政治的民主化尤其落伍太多；但是就中國論中國，文革後三十年的政經趨勢，確實是走向愈來愈寬的喇叭口。
再以香港論香港，十年的走向亦大體上是「喇叭型」。經濟方面，從十年前的人心惶惶，房價股市狂跌，到如今非但景氣回溫，且其世界經貿角色亦仍見上升空間。在社會及政治方面，回歸前的優勢如政府廉能及公信力仍然維持，且政治議題亦朝向「特首直選」等升級領域進行試探。試想，香港回歸中國曾是多麼棘手的問題，但鄧小平一句「一國兩制」，卻使十年來的中港關係一步步走向寬闊的喇叭口；一句話甩掉了意識形態的包袱，一句話使國家從死胡同裡鑽出來。（在此須附一語，我們不贊成台灣施行「一國兩制」。）
李登輝是站在解嚴時代的第一人，陳水扁是站在政黨輪替時代的第一人。他們皆曾站在歷史的最開闊處，但他們皆沉溺於政爭權謀，將國家在大歷史上帶往憲政沉淪、政治腐敗及經濟下坡的漏斗下端。相對而言，鄧小平則是站在後毛澤東時代的第一人，他卻在大歷史上將中國從瀕臨解構帶向「大國崛起」的氣勢。即使不宜以李扁鄧三人相互比較，就以他們自己的政治起點與政治終點比較，鄧小平的歷史表現應是由窄而寬的「喇叭型」，把一手爛牌打旺了；李登輝與陳水扁則無疑是由寬而窄的「漏斗型」，把一手好牌打臭掉。
兩岸二十年來的消長，因何所致？一個比較簡化但中肯的答案可能是：因為他們有鄧小平，我們有李登輝與陳水扁。
Thursday, June 28, 2007
Cutthroat Island
Cutthroat Island
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 26, 2007
Cutthroat Island (1995, directed by Renny Harlin, written by Michael Frost Beckner and James Gorman)
The Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) "Cutthroat Election Campaign" has begun. The DPP's cutthroat strategy divides the party's election platform into different planks. When it comes time to cut the throats of political rivals, each is cut using a different technique.
Campaigns for major elections such as legislative elections and presidential elections require political platforms that can rally the people, that reflect their aspirations and goals. The DPP has been unable to offer such a political platform. Therefore it has transformed elections into cutthroat wars. Elections are no longer mechanisms for comparing political perspectives and reaching consensus. They are national catastrophes that tear the nation apart.
The DPP uses the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution" to cut the throats of Deep Green political rivals. The DPP uses "development of rural communities" to go cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon farmers. But even assuming the DPP wins these elections, does that really mean Taiwan independence has scored a victory? By the same token, is the "development of rural communities," a policy intended to phase out agriculture altogether, truly advantageous to Taiwan independence?
One need only examine two recent campaigns launched by the DPP to realize that Lee Teng-hui was right. The DPP's brand of Taiwan independence is a fraud. Let's examine the DPP's platform for the "reduction of military service to one year" and its platform for the "development of rural communities." If one truly intends to promote Taiwan independence, one must make preparations for war. If one nullifies one's ability to wage war while engaging in wild talk about Taiwan independence, that is phony Taiwan independence. If one reduces military service to one year, so that even corporals are a thing of the past, how can one possibly fight a war? To phase out agriculture in order to develop rural communities, is to open a Pandora's Box. It is nothing less than a declaration of surrender, nothing less than giving up on Taiwan independence.
This is the real consequence of the DPP's cutthroat campaigns. The DPP's "rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution" plank has cut the throats of Deep Green political rivals. The "reduction of military service to one year" plank has cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon military servicemen. The "development of rural communities" plank has cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon farmers. Three throats cut using three different techniques, all are critical to the election results, but none have a common denominator, and some even conflict. The Taiwan independence movement has been rendered toothless, its ability to fight a war for independence neutralized. An agricultural policy that endured for 60 years has been repudiated. Even assuming the DPP wins the election, the nation will pay a heavy price, and everyone will be the loser.
For eight years, the DPP has been squatting in the halls of power, abusing its authority to satisfy its power lust, indulging in corruption to line its pockets. Now, relying on its authority as the ruling regime, it has launched its insane "Three Middles Policy," targeting the central and middle regions of Taiwan, small and middle enterprises, and middle and lower income voters. Previous cutthroat wars promoting the DPP's "welfare subsidies for the elderly" plank and "welfare subsidies for elderly farmers" plank were small potatoes. At most they consumed some public funds. Today's "reduction of military service to one year" plank and "development of rural communities" plank will weaken the island's military capabilities and destroy the island's agricultural base. How can such pork barrel politics not shake the foundations of the nation?
The DPP's Taiwan independence agenda boasts constantly evolving cutthroat techniques. One minute it announces its "Five Noes." The next minute it announces its "Four Imperatives and One Non-Issue." The current "rectification of names and authoring a new constitution" plank, having cut the throats of the Deep Greens and consolidated Chen Shui-bian's hold on power, is complete. As we approach election season, the Taiwan independence plank has faded out. Now it is time to cut the throats of swing voters. Oddly enough when the DPP engages in deception to cut the throats of the Deep Greens, they passively acquiesce. Conversely, when the DPP cuts the throats of swing voters, they voluntarily extend their necks as well.
Deceptive Taiwan independence appeals to Deep Greens, in addition to "Three Middles Policy" political patronage, cannot establish a coherent political and economic agenda for the nation, or indicate the direction it ought to go. If the DPP wins the election, would that amount to a victory for Taiwan independence? Or would it amount to a victory for political patronage? Furthermore, once they win the election, do they intend to use "Three Middles Policy" political patronage to promote Taiwan independence and the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution?"
But at least the DPP has a strategy. At the strategic level, it has its Taiwan independence election rhetoric. At the tactical level, it has its pork barrel election techniques. Its cutting techniques may be different, but the throats cut are the same. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou's Kuomintang (KMT) has neither fresh concepts, nor effective countermeasures. All it can do is watch passively as the DPP's "Three Middles Policy" cuts one KMT throat after another. When we look at the two camps side by by side, the winners and losers are obvious.
As each segment of society's throat is cut, so Taiwan's throat is cut.
Cutthroat Island
Original Chinese below:
割喉戰：利刃劃向役男及農夫的咽喉！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.26 02:56 am
民進黨的「大選割喉戰」已經全面發動。所謂「割喉戰」，就是將原本被視為「整體」的選舉，分割成一塊一塊的「區塊」來看待，亦即區分為一個一個不同的「喉嚨」來處理。割喉時，對於每一個「喉嚨」，皆有不一樣的「割」法，刀工亦自不同。
照理說，在國會改選或總統大選這類最高層次的選舉中，應當有一套足以號召全民的綱領性訴求，以反映全民的總體利益與期待，為國家指出全民共同的追求與歸趨。但是，民進黨由於未能建立一個足以號召全民的綱領性訴求，竟將選舉變成了「割喉戰」；用不同的「刀工」，來切斷不同的「喉嚨」。選舉非但不再是政見評比與整合的機制，反而成了撕裂國家的災禍。
例如：一方面用「正名制憲」來「割」深綠的「喉嚨」，這是一種「刀工」；另一方面又用「開發田園社區」去「割」農民的喉嚨，這又是另一種「刀工」。然而，如果民進黨未來贏了選舉，這能證明是台獨贏得了勝利嗎？相對而言，「開發田園社區」這類「廢農政策」，又難道有利於台獨嗎？
其實，只要細究民進黨最近發動的兩種「割喉戰」，即知民進黨的「台獨」根本如李登輝所說是一個「假議題」。一、兵役減為一年；二、開發田園社區。若要台獨，即須有戰爭的準備；但若自廢作戰的準備卻妄言台獨，就是假台獨。然而，兵役減為一年，連「上等兵」亦因役期縮短而可能成為歷史名詞，豈能作戰？開發田園社區，打開了「廢農政策」的潘朵拉魔盒，更不啻是宣示放棄戰爭，亦即放棄了台獨。
這就是「割喉戰」的真實效應：民進黨用「正名制憲」割了深綠的喉嚨，再用「兵役減為一年」割了役男的喉嚨，另用「開發田園社區」割了農民的喉嚨。三個喉嚨分別以三種不同的刀工割斷，而三個被割斷的喉嚨皆變成關鍵的選票；但是，三個斷喉之間並無一致的政策邏輯，且可能相互矛盾；台獨破滅了，國防虛弱了，維護了六十年的國家農業部門也解構了。民進黨即使贏了選舉，國家卻將付出全盤皆輸的代價！
八年來，民進黨盤踞政府之內，濫權縱欲，貪腐自肥；如今又憑藉其執政權力，瘋狂發動以「三中政策」（中南部、中小企業、中下階層）為目標的「割喉戰」。如今回顧，過去老年津貼及老農津貼的「割喉戰」，其實只是小兒科，頂多消耗一些公帑；現今搞到兵役減為一年、開發田園社區的地步，竟是要以弱化國防及停廢農業為代價了！這樣的「政策賄選」，豈不是要「動搖國本」？
尤有甚者，民進黨之台獨訴求也有變化不定的「割喉刀工」。一下子說「四不一沒有」，這是一種「割」法；一下子又說「四要一沒有」，則是另一種「割」法。如今看來，這一波「正名制憲」的亂刀狂割，似已完成了「階段性任務」，割斷了深綠的喉嚨，亦即穩住了陳水扁的權位；現在隨著漸漸進入大選的情勢，台獨論述已不無淡出的可能性，這是為了割「中間選民」的喉嚨。奇怪的是，民進黨以「自欺欺人」的手法割深綠的喉嚨時，深綠甘心被割；回過頭來割「中間選民」的喉嚨時，「中間選民」也一樣伸長脖子被它割！
對深綠「自欺欺人」的台獨號召，加上對「三中階層」的政策賄選，這樣的選舉不能塑造國家政經總路線，亦不能指出國家未來的方向與目標。民進黨若贏得選舉，究竟是「台獨」的勝利？或是政策賄選「割喉」刀工的勝利？再者，一旦勝選以後，難道要以賄選所獲的「三中階層」的支持，來繼續推動正名制憲的台獨路線？
不過，無論如何，民進黨總算有一套大選戰略。就高層次言，以台獨論述為基調；就低層次言，以政策賄選為手段。刀工不同，割喉則一。相對而言，國民黨馬英九方面，在高層次上始終未能建立鮮明的主體論述，就低層次言，亦只能坐視「三中階層」等等一個一個喉嚨被人割斷。兩相對照，消長立見。
當一個一個「區塊」的咽喉被一一割斷，台灣的咽喉也被割斷了！
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 26, 2007
Cutthroat Island (1995, directed by Renny Harlin, written by Michael Frost Beckner and James Gorman)
The Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) "Cutthroat Election Campaign" has begun. The DPP's cutthroat strategy divides the party's election platform into different planks. When it comes time to cut the throats of political rivals, each is cut using a different technique.
Campaigns for major elections such as legislative elections and presidential elections require political platforms that can rally the people, that reflect their aspirations and goals. The DPP has been unable to offer such a political platform. Therefore it has transformed elections into cutthroat wars. Elections are no longer mechanisms for comparing political perspectives and reaching consensus. They are national catastrophes that tear the nation apart.
The DPP uses the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution" to cut the throats of Deep Green political rivals. The DPP uses "development of rural communities" to go cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon farmers. But even assuming the DPP wins these elections, does that really mean Taiwan independence has scored a victory? By the same token, is the "development of rural communities," a policy intended to phase out agriculture altogether, truly advantageous to Taiwan independence?
One need only examine two recent campaigns launched by the DPP to realize that Lee Teng-hui was right. The DPP's brand of Taiwan independence is a fraud. Let's examine the DPP's platform for the "reduction of military service to one year" and its platform for the "development of rural communities." If one truly intends to promote Taiwan independence, one must make preparations for war. If one nullifies one's ability to wage war while engaging in wild talk about Taiwan independence, that is phony Taiwan independence. If one reduces military service to one year, so that even corporals are a thing of the past, how can one possibly fight a war? To phase out agriculture in order to develop rural communities, is to open a Pandora's Box. It is nothing less than a declaration of surrender, nothing less than giving up on Taiwan independence.
This is the real consequence of the DPP's cutthroat campaigns. The DPP's "rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution" plank has cut the throats of Deep Green political rivals. The "reduction of military service to one year" plank has cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon military servicemen. The "development of rural communities" plank has cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon farmers. Three throats cut using three different techniques, all are critical to the election results, but none have a common denominator, and some even conflict. The Taiwan independence movement has been rendered toothless, its ability to fight a war for independence neutralized. An agricultural policy that endured for 60 years has been repudiated. Even assuming the DPP wins the election, the nation will pay a heavy price, and everyone will be the loser.
For eight years, the DPP has been squatting in the halls of power, abusing its authority to satisfy its power lust, indulging in corruption to line its pockets. Now, relying on its authority as the ruling regime, it has launched its insane "Three Middles Policy," targeting the central and middle regions of Taiwan, small and middle enterprises, and middle and lower income voters. Previous cutthroat wars promoting the DPP's "welfare subsidies for the elderly" plank and "welfare subsidies for elderly farmers" plank were small potatoes. At most they consumed some public funds. Today's "reduction of military service to one year" plank and "development of rural communities" plank will weaken the island's military capabilities and destroy the island's agricultural base. How can such pork barrel politics not shake the foundations of the nation?
The DPP's Taiwan independence agenda boasts constantly evolving cutthroat techniques. One minute it announces its "Five Noes." The next minute it announces its "Four Imperatives and One Non-Issue." The current "rectification of names and authoring a new constitution" plank, having cut the throats of the Deep Greens and consolidated Chen Shui-bian's hold on power, is complete. As we approach election season, the Taiwan independence plank has faded out. Now it is time to cut the throats of swing voters. Oddly enough when the DPP engages in deception to cut the throats of the Deep Greens, they passively acquiesce. Conversely, when the DPP cuts the throats of swing voters, they voluntarily extend their necks as well.
Deceptive Taiwan independence appeals to Deep Greens, in addition to "Three Middles Policy" political patronage, cannot establish a coherent political and economic agenda for the nation, or indicate the direction it ought to go. If the DPP wins the election, would that amount to a victory for Taiwan independence? Or would it amount to a victory for political patronage? Furthermore, once they win the election, do they intend to use "Three Middles Policy" political patronage to promote Taiwan independence and the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution?"
But at least the DPP has a strategy. At the strategic level, it has its Taiwan independence election rhetoric. At the tactical level, it has its pork barrel election techniques. Its cutting techniques may be different, but the throats cut are the same. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou's Kuomintang (KMT) has neither fresh concepts, nor effective countermeasures. All it can do is watch passively as the DPP's "Three Middles Policy" cuts one KMT throat after another. When we look at the two camps side by by side, the winners and losers are obvious.
As each segment of society's throat is cut, so Taiwan's throat is cut.
Cutthroat Island
Original Chinese below:
割喉戰：利刃劃向役男及農夫的咽喉！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.26 02:56 am
民進黨的「大選割喉戰」已經全面發動。所謂「割喉戰」，就是將原本被視為「整體」的選舉，分割成一塊一塊的「區塊」來看待，亦即區分為一個一個不同的「喉嚨」來處理。割喉時，對於每一個「喉嚨」，皆有不一樣的「割」法，刀工亦自不同。
照理說，在國會改選或總統大選這類最高層次的選舉中，應當有一套足以號召全民的綱領性訴求，以反映全民的總體利益與期待，為國家指出全民共同的追求與歸趨。但是，民進黨由於未能建立一個足以號召全民的綱領性訴求，竟將選舉變成了「割喉戰」；用不同的「刀工」，來切斷不同的「喉嚨」。選舉非但不再是政見評比與整合的機制，反而成了撕裂國家的災禍。
例如：一方面用「正名制憲」來「割」深綠的「喉嚨」，這是一種「刀工」；另一方面又用「開發田園社區」去「割」農民的喉嚨，這又是另一種「刀工」。然而，如果民進黨未來贏了選舉，這能證明是台獨贏得了勝利嗎？相對而言，「開發田園社區」這類「廢農政策」，又難道有利於台獨嗎？
其實，只要細究民進黨最近發動的兩種「割喉戰」，即知民進黨的「台獨」根本如李登輝所說是一個「假議題」。一、兵役減為一年；二、開發田園社區。若要台獨，即須有戰爭的準備；但若自廢作戰的準備卻妄言台獨，就是假台獨。然而，兵役減為一年，連「上等兵」亦因役期縮短而可能成為歷史名詞，豈能作戰？開發田園社區，打開了「廢農政策」的潘朵拉魔盒，更不啻是宣示放棄戰爭，亦即放棄了台獨。
這就是「割喉戰」的真實效應：民進黨用「正名制憲」割了深綠的喉嚨，再用「兵役減為一年」割了役男的喉嚨，另用「開發田園社區」割了農民的喉嚨。三個喉嚨分別以三種不同的刀工割斷，而三個被割斷的喉嚨皆變成關鍵的選票；但是，三個斷喉之間並無一致的政策邏輯，且可能相互矛盾；台獨破滅了，國防虛弱了，維護了六十年的國家農業部門也解構了。民進黨即使贏了選舉，國家卻將付出全盤皆輸的代價！
八年來，民進黨盤踞政府之內，濫權縱欲，貪腐自肥；如今又憑藉其執政權力，瘋狂發動以「三中政策」（中南部、中小企業、中下階層）為目標的「割喉戰」。如今回顧，過去老年津貼及老農津貼的「割喉戰」，其實只是小兒科，頂多消耗一些公帑；現今搞到兵役減為一年、開發田園社區的地步，竟是要以弱化國防及停廢農業為代價了！這樣的「政策賄選」，豈不是要「動搖國本」？
尤有甚者，民進黨之台獨訴求也有變化不定的「割喉刀工」。一下子說「四不一沒有」，這是一種「割」法；一下子又說「四要一沒有」，則是另一種「割」法。如今看來，這一波「正名制憲」的亂刀狂割，似已完成了「階段性任務」，割斷了深綠的喉嚨，亦即穩住了陳水扁的權位；現在隨著漸漸進入大選的情勢，台獨論述已不無淡出的可能性，這是為了割「中間選民」的喉嚨。奇怪的是，民進黨以「自欺欺人」的手法割深綠的喉嚨時，深綠甘心被割；回過頭來割「中間選民」的喉嚨時，「中間選民」也一樣伸長脖子被它割！
對深綠「自欺欺人」的台獨號召，加上對「三中階層」的政策賄選，這樣的選舉不能塑造國家政經總路線，亦不能指出國家未來的方向與目標。民進黨若贏得選舉，究竟是「台獨」的勝利？或是政策賄選「割喉」刀工的勝利？再者，一旦勝選以後，難道要以賄選所獲的「三中階層」的支持，來繼續推動正名制憲的台獨路線？
不過，無論如何，民進黨總算有一套大選戰略。就高層次言，以台獨論述為基調；就低層次言，以政策賄選為手段。刀工不同，割喉則一。相對而言，國民黨馬英九方面，在高層次上始終未能建立鮮明的主體論述，就低層次言，亦只能坐視「三中階層」等等一個一個喉嚨被人割斷。兩相對照，消長立見。
當一個一個「區塊」的咽喉被一一割斷，台灣的咽喉也被割斷了！
Wednesday, June 27, 2007
Chiou I-jen's Sophistry
Chiou I-jen's Sophistry
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 23, 2007
During the election of the board of directors for the China Development Financial Holding Corp. and the Hua Nan Financial Holding Co., their public shares took a catastrophic beating. People from all walks of life pointed the finger at the Ministry of Finance and the Financial Supervisory Commission for failing to protect the rights and interests of public shareholders. They felt that at the very least, Minister He and Chairman Hu should assume political responsibility. It appears however that Executive Yuan Vice-President Chiou I-jen is attempting to make excuses for the Executive Yuan's setback. Chiou I-jen claimed that the government lacked the necessary power, that for the government to attempt to seize the directorship would have been "asking for trouble." His statement was an attempt to intercede on behalf of the two officials. But democratic politics is supposed to be the politics of accountability. These officials, by flagrantly dispensing political pork to favored financial institutions, have been derelict in their duty and have brought dishonor to the nation. They have abused the authority of the executive branch, and must not be allowed to stonewall the public by simply ignoring the accusations leveled against them.
Chiou I-jen, by a narrow margin, holds a controlling interest in the China Development Financial Holding Corp. and the Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. Obviously he has jettisoned the government's previous policies. Take the China Development Financial Holding Corp for example. When Minister of Finance Lin Chuan allowed the Koo family-owned Chinatrust Commercial Bank to expel Diana Chen, one of the conditions was the Koo family had to own at least 15% of the stock. But according to its latest report to the Financial Supervisory Commission, Koo family shares fell short of the 15% threshold. Instead they joined with others to launch a proxy battle. First, they reneged on their pledge to the Ministry of Finance. Then they evaded the standard review for major stockholder suitability required by the Financial Supervisory Commission. On the one hand they wrung their hands over every detail. On the other hand they displayed utter indifference to their previous pledges and to the requirements of financial oversight. In the eyes of these financial institutions, the nation's administrative agencies were nothing. What credibility does this administration have to speak of?
Mr. Chiou needs to understand that how many government banks remain is not important. What is important is the process by which public shares are made available, because that is the key to the dispensing of political pork. It is also the current focus of public attention. If the government intends to make shares of Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. or China Development Financial Holding Corp. available to the public, whether by public auction or by feeling out strategic investors, it will receive a considerable sum of money. That money can become income for the state treasury. But if Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. or China Development Financial Holding Corp. (according to proxies) fall into hostile hands due to poor management of public shares, then large sums of income for the state treasury will be lost. The Minister of Transportation was forced tor resign and prosecuted merely on suspicion of accepting a few hundred thousand in cash hidden in tea canisters. In which case, shouldn't the Ministry of Finance and Financial Supervisory Commission accept responsibility for the loss of tens of billions of from the state treasury?
To allege that the public shares were not enough to allow the government to wage a proxy fight, and that any attempt to seize control of the board of directors would have been "asking for trouble" is amateur talk by someone who does not understand the market. Perhaps Vice-President Chiou has not dabbled in the money markets. Perhaps he did not understand that the recipients of the proxies were the Chang brothers, who are listed as major shareholders in the stockholders' report. Take Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. for example. The public shares obviously outnumbered those held by Lin Ming-cheng, yet the proxy fight was still a debacle. The only possible explanation is that those holding the public shares were unwilling to kneel down and kow tow to the Chang brothers. When private financial institutions were certain that public shares were not the object of a proxy fight, and wanted to avoid premium payments, the Executive Yuan should have boldly stepped forward to protect the public interest. Protecting the national interest is the solemn duty of all public servants. How can anyone dismiss it as "asking for trouble?"
Chiou I-jen's views on the Financial Supervisory Commission's intervention in the review of major stockholder suitability is also amateur talk. According to Articles 16 and 17 of the Financial Holding Company Act, the suitability of major stockholders must be reviewed by the Financial Supervisory Commission. If the Koo family, which controls less than 10% of the company, could evade the suitability requirements of the Financial Holding Company Act, merely because a daughter in law and a sister in law of the Koo family resigned from the board of directors, then the Financial Supervisory Commission may as well close its doors. Such obvious attempts to avoid legal supervision were followed by a coordinated attack on public shares. If the Executive Yuan insists on further restricting the conditions under which the Financial Supervisory Commission is permitted to intervene, then what we would like to know is whether the Financial Supervisory Commission is still a government institution or a vassal of private financial institutions.
We have already mentioned Chiou I-jen's inappropriate remarks. We must now go back and examine He Chih-chin and Hu Sheng-cheng's political responsibility. Although Minister He is familiar with US Internal Revenue Service procedures, he failed to understand domestic tax procedures, the political ecology of the legislature, the management of public shares, and even the appointment of the chairman of the board by means of public shares. In the China Development Financial Holding Corp matter, Minister He forfeited the veto that the 1/3 public shares offered him. He thereby made it impossible to use public shares to regulate policy in the future. Financial groups viewed him with contempt during negotiations. We consider his performance not merely a problem of political responsibility, but also of individual dignity.
From early on, in his presidential office report, Financial Supervisory Commission Chairman Hu Sheng-cheng proposed his now infamous "Second Financial Reform," and defended the policy on television. After that, he followed Tsai Ying-wen's lead in applying the brakes to financial reform. In response to a long string of China Development Financial Holding Corp. management scandals, he has done absolutely nothing. From beginning to end, he has been constant only in his inconstancy. Taiwan's financial system in in chaos. That financial groups sit in contempt of the administration is a well known fact. The fundamentals of our financial industry are not good. Our international ranking continues to fall, and could even be termed directionless. Confucius said that "When the Way [of Justice] prevails in your own state, to be poor and obscure is a disgrace. But when the Way does not prevail in your own state, to be rich and honored is a disgrace." Chairman Hu has hopped from one position in the cabinet to another over the past seven years. From Minister without Portfolio, to Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development, to Chairman of the Financial Supervisory Commission. His government experience is clear for all to see. If he still has an iota of political responsibility in him, he will not need the outside world to remind him of his duty.
By comparison, Minister Ho Chih-chin still resembles an ivory tower intellectual thrown into the political jungle. He is still a rookie, and has not lost his character. To demand that Minister He assume responsibility for public shares policy is actually an affirmation of his character. To demand that scoundrels assume responsibilty for their actions is no longer that important.
Original Chinese below:
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.06.23
邱義仁的錯辯 不能豁免財金首長政治責任
中時社論
在 開發金、華南金改選董監，官股慘敗之後，社會各界都將矛頭指向維護官股權益不力的財政部與金管會，認為至少何部長與胡主委應該要負起政治責任。但是，日前 行政院副院長邱義仁似乎又在為行政院的挫敗找下台階。邱義仁認為，以往官方實力不夠而要強行爭取董監席位，是「自討苦吃」。這樣的發言，當然有替兩位財金 首長緩頰之意。但是民主政治就是責任政治，我們認為國家的財金首長以幾近喪權辱國的方式豢養財團坐大、踐踏行政權，絕不能以唾面自乾的方式自我安慰。
邱 義仁先生以狹隘的持股比例來評估開發金與華南金的董監爭奪，顯然是把以往政府的延續性政策給刻意切除了。以開發金為例，當初財政部長林全同意中信辜家趕走 陳敏薰的條件之一，就是辜家持股必須達到十五％。但是，此次辜家向金管會申報的股權不及十五％的門檻，卻又聯合其他戰友分進合擊收委託書，一則將當初對財 政部的承諾一腳踢開，再則規避金管會對大股東適格性的審查，首鼠兩端，卻全然視政府政策、先前承諾與金融監理如無物。國家行政機關在財團眼中根本像是垃 圾，這政府還有威信可言嗎？
其次，邱先生要了解：公營行庫最後剩下幾家不重要，但是公股釋出的「過程」，才是利益輸送的關鍵，也才是全民 關注的焦點。如果國家要將華南金或開發金的股權釋出，不論是公開標售或洽詢策略性投資人，都可以得到一筆可觀的溢價金，成為國庫收入。但是，如果華南金或 開發金因為公股管理（如徵委託書）不善而失守，則大筆的國庫收入將因而流失。交通部長只因為涉嫌收下裝有數十萬現金的茶葉罐就下台起訴，那麼流失數百億溢 價國庫收入的財政部與金管會，難道不該負起責任？
若說官股實力不足，去搶委託書、爭董監席次就是「自討苦吃」；這又是不了解市場環境的外 行話。邱副院長可能從來不曾在金融市場上打滾過，也從來不了解收委託書的訣竅是股東名冊與「委託書大戶」張家兄弟。以華南金來說吧，官股持股明顯多於林明 成，但收委託書仍是慘敗，這只能說是官股不善向張家兄弟磕頭下跪而已。事實上，當民間財團吃定官股沒有收委託書之專業，而想逃避溢價支付時，行政院當然應 該挺身護衛全民利益。「護國產」是所有人民公僕的天職，又怎麼能說是自討苦吃呢？
此外，邱義仁對於金管會介入金控股東適格性審查的看法， 也是外行話。依據金控法十六條及十七條，金控大股東的適格性要經過金管會的審查。如果只因辜家二媳婦把中信證券的董事辭去，就以形式上持股不及十％而迴避 金控法的適格性規範，那麼金管會乾脆關門算了。這麼明顯的迴避法律監督，再以分進合擊硬吃官股，行政院如果還要限縮金管會介入的時機，真不知道金管會是公 家機關還是私人財團的附庸。
邱義仁緩頰發言不當既如前述，我們還是要回過頭來檢討何志欽與胡勝正的政治責任。何部長雖然熟悉美國內地稅務 的稽查，但是對於國內的租稅背景、立院的政治生態、公股的管理都極為陌生，甚至公股指派的董事長都管不動。開發金一事，何部長不但失去了官股三分之一董事 的否決勢力，也使以後的公股管理政策完全破功，更在談判過程中被財團看扁。我們認為，這樣的表現，已經不只是負起政治責任的問題，而是個人尊嚴的問題。
至 於金管會主委胡勝正，從他早年在總統府簡報提出二次金改，到電視做政策辯護、而後伴隨著蔡英文踩金改煞車，至今又對開發金的公司治理一長串弊端無所作為， 一路走來始終不一。如今，台灣的金融秩序凌亂、財團坐大而蔑視政府，已經是社會共識。我們的金融業內在環境不佳、國際排名殿後，堪稱無道。孔子曰，「邦無 道，富且貴焉，恥也」。胡主委遊走內閣各部會長達七年，從政務委員、經建會主委到金管會主委，官場練達圓通，大家有目共睹。他如果心中還有一絲政治責任的 觀念，也就不需要外界再多做提醒了。
相對而言，何志欽部長仍然像是從政的學者，雖有白兔的青稚，卻不失性情。我們認為何部長應該為公股政策負去留的責任，其實是肯定之辭。對於多說無益之輩，負不負責任已經不那麼重要了。
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 23, 2007
During the election of the board of directors for the China Development Financial Holding Corp. and the Hua Nan Financial Holding Co., their public shares took a catastrophic beating. People from all walks of life pointed the finger at the Ministry of Finance and the Financial Supervisory Commission for failing to protect the rights and interests of public shareholders. They felt that at the very least, Minister He and Chairman Hu should assume political responsibility. It appears however that Executive Yuan Vice-President Chiou I-jen is attempting to make excuses for the Executive Yuan's setback. Chiou I-jen claimed that the government lacked the necessary power, that for the government to attempt to seize the directorship would have been "asking for trouble." His statement was an attempt to intercede on behalf of the two officials. But democratic politics is supposed to be the politics of accountability. These officials, by flagrantly dispensing political pork to favored financial institutions, have been derelict in their duty and have brought dishonor to the nation. They have abused the authority of the executive branch, and must not be allowed to stonewall the public by simply ignoring the accusations leveled against them.
Chiou I-jen, by a narrow margin, holds a controlling interest in the China Development Financial Holding Corp. and the Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. Obviously he has jettisoned the government's previous policies. Take the China Development Financial Holding Corp for example. When Minister of Finance Lin Chuan allowed the Koo family-owned Chinatrust Commercial Bank to expel Diana Chen, one of the conditions was the Koo family had to own at least 15% of the stock. But according to its latest report to the Financial Supervisory Commission, Koo family shares fell short of the 15% threshold. Instead they joined with others to launch a proxy battle. First, they reneged on their pledge to the Ministry of Finance. Then they evaded the standard review for major stockholder suitability required by the Financial Supervisory Commission. On the one hand they wrung their hands over every detail. On the other hand they displayed utter indifference to their previous pledges and to the requirements of financial oversight. In the eyes of these financial institutions, the nation's administrative agencies were nothing. What credibility does this administration have to speak of?
Mr. Chiou needs to understand that how many government banks remain is not important. What is important is the process by which public shares are made available, because that is the key to the dispensing of political pork. It is also the current focus of public attention. If the government intends to make shares of Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. or China Development Financial Holding Corp. available to the public, whether by public auction or by feeling out strategic investors, it will receive a considerable sum of money. That money can become income for the state treasury. But if Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. or China Development Financial Holding Corp. (according to proxies) fall into hostile hands due to poor management of public shares, then large sums of income for the state treasury will be lost. The Minister of Transportation was forced tor resign and prosecuted merely on suspicion of accepting a few hundred thousand in cash hidden in tea canisters. In which case, shouldn't the Ministry of Finance and Financial Supervisory Commission accept responsibility for the loss of tens of billions of from the state treasury?
To allege that the public shares were not enough to allow the government to wage a proxy fight, and that any attempt to seize control of the board of directors would have been "asking for trouble" is amateur talk by someone who does not understand the market. Perhaps Vice-President Chiou has not dabbled in the money markets. Perhaps he did not understand that the recipients of the proxies were the Chang brothers, who are listed as major shareholders in the stockholders' report. Take Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. for example. The public shares obviously outnumbered those held by Lin Ming-cheng, yet the proxy fight was still a debacle. The only possible explanation is that those holding the public shares were unwilling to kneel down and kow tow to the Chang brothers. When private financial institutions were certain that public shares were not the object of a proxy fight, and wanted to avoid premium payments, the Executive Yuan should have boldly stepped forward to protect the public interest. Protecting the national interest is the solemn duty of all public servants. How can anyone dismiss it as "asking for trouble?"
Chiou I-jen's views on the Financial Supervisory Commission's intervention in the review of major stockholder suitability is also amateur talk. According to Articles 16 and 17 of the Financial Holding Company Act, the suitability of major stockholders must be reviewed by the Financial Supervisory Commission. If the Koo family, which controls less than 10% of the company, could evade the suitability requirements of the Financial Holding Company Act, merely because a daughter in law and a sister in law of the Koo family resigned from the board of directors, then the Financial Supervisory Commission may as well close its doors. Such obvious attempts to avoid legal supervision were followed by a coordinated attack on public shares. If the Executive Yuan insists on further restricting the conditions under which the Financial Supervisory Commission is permitted to intervene, then what we would like to know is whether the Financial Supervisory Commission is still a government institution or a vassal of private financial institutions.
We have already mentioned Chiou I-jen's inappropriate remarks. We must now go back and examine He Chih-chin and Hu Sheng-cheng's political responsibility. Although Minister He is familiar with US Internal Revenue Service procedures, he failed to understand domestic tax procedures, the political ecology of the legislature, the management of public shares, and even the appointment of the chairman of the board by means of public shares. In the China Development Financial Holding Corp matter, Minister He forfeited the veto that the 1/3 public shares offered him. He thereby made it impossible to use public shares to regulate policy in the future. Financial groups viewed him with contempt during negotiations. We consider his performance not merely a problem of political responsibility, but also of individual dignity.
From early on, in his presidential office report, Financial Supervisory Commission Chairman Hu Sheng-cheng proposed his now infamous "Second Financial Reform," and defended the policy on television. After that, he followed Tsai Ying-wen's lead in applying the brakes to financial reform. In response to a long string of China Development Financial Holding Corp. management scandals, he has done absolutely nothing. From beginning to end, he has been constant only in his inconstancy. Taiwan's financial system in in chaos. That financial groups sit in contempt of the administration is a well known fact. The fundamentals of our financial industry are not good. Our international ranking continues to fall, and could even be termed directionless. Confucius said that "When the Way [of Justice] prevails in your own state, to be poor and obscure is a disgrace. But when the Way does not prevail in your own state, to be rich and honored is a disgrace." Chairman Hu has hopped from one position in the cabinet to another over the past seven years. From Minister without Portfolio, to Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development, to Chairman of the Financial Supervisory Commission. His government experience is clear for all to see. If he still has an iota of political responsibility in him, he will not need the outside world to remind him of his duty.
By comparison, Minister Ho Chih-chin still resembles an ivory tower intellectual thrown into the political jungle. He is still a rookie, and has not lost his character. To demand that Minister He assume responsibility for public shares policy is actually an affirmation of his character. To demand that scoundrels assume responsibilty for their actions is no longer that important.
Original Chinese below:
中時電子報
中國時報 2007.06.23
邱義仁的錯辯 不能豁免財金首長政治責任
中時社論
在 開發金、華南金改選董監，官股慘敗之後，社會各界都將矛頭指向維護官股權益不力的財政部與金管會，認為至少何部長與胡主委應該要負起政治責任。但是，日前 行政院副院長邱義仁似乎又在為行政院的挫敗找下台階。邱義仁認為，以往官方實力不夠而要強行爭取董監席位，是「自討苦吃」。這樣的發言，當然有替兩位財金 首長緩頰之意。但是民主政治就是責任政治，我們認為國家的財金首長以幾近喪權辱國的方式豢養財團坐大、踐踏行政權，絕不能以唾面自乾的方式自我安慰。
邱 義仁先生以狹隘的持股比例來評估開發金與華南金的董監爭奪，顯然是把以往政府的延續性政策給刻意切除了。以開發金為例，當初財政部長林全同意中信辜家趕走 陳敏薰的條件之一，就是辜家持股必須達到十五％。但是，此次辜家向金管會申報的股權不及十五％的門檻，卻又聯合其他戰友分進合擊收委託書，一則將當初對財 政部的承諾一腳踢開，再則規避金管會對大股東適格性的審查，首鼠兩端，卻全然視政府政策、先前承諾與金融監理如無物。國家行政機關在財團眼中根本像是垃 圾，這政府還有威信可言嗎？
其次，邱先生要了解：公營行庫最後剩下幾家不重要，但是公股釋出的「過程」，才是利益輸送的關鍵，也才是全民 關注的焦點。如果國家要將華南金或開發金的股權釋出，不論是公開標售或洽詢策略性投資人，都可以得到一筆可觀的溢價金，成為國庫收入。但是，如果華南金或 開發金因為公股管理（如徵委託書）不善而失守，則大筆的國庫收入將因而流失。交通部長只因為涉嫌收下裝有數十萬現金的茶葉罐就下台起訴，那麼流失數百億溢 價國庫收入的財政部與金管會，難道不該負起責任？
若說官股實力不足，去搶委託書、爭董監席次就是「自討苦吃」；這又是不了解市場環境的外 行話。邱副院長可能從來不曾在金融市場上打滾過，也從來不了解收委託書的訣竅是股東名冊與「委託書大戶」張家兄弟。以華南金來說吧，官股持股明顯多於林明 成，但收委託書仍是慘敗，這只能說是官股不善向張家兄弟磕頭下跪而已。事實上，當民間財團吃定官股沒有收委託書之專業，而想逃避溢價支付時，行政院當然應 該挺身護衛全民利益。「護國產」是所有人民公僕的天職，又怎麼能說是自討苦吃呢？
此外，邱義仁對於金管會介入金控股東適格性審查的看法， 也是外行話。依據金控法十六條及十七條，金控大股東的適格性要經過金管會的審查。如果只因辜家二媳婦把中信證券的董事辭去，就以形式上持股不及十％而迴避 金控法的適格性規範，那麼金管會乾脆關門算了。這麼明顯的迴避法律監督，再以分進合擊硬吃官股，行政院如果還要限縮金管會介入的時機，真不知道金管會是公 家機關還是私人財團的附庸。
邱義仁緩頰發言不當既如前述，我們還是要回過頭來檢討何志欽與胡勝正的政治責任。何部長雖然熟悉美國內地稅務 的稽查，但是對於國內的租稅背景、立院的政治生態、公股的管理都極為陌生，甚至公股指派的董事長都管不動。開發金一事，何部長不但失去了官股三分之一董事 的否決勢力，也使以後的公股管理政策完全破功，更在談判過程中被財團看扁。我們認為，這樣的表現，已經不只是負起政治責任的問題，而是個人尊嚴的問題。
至 於金管會主委胡勝正，從他早年在總統府簡報提出二次金改，到電視做政策辯護、而後伴隨著蔡英文踩金改煞車，至今又對開發金的公司治理一長串弊端無所作為， 一路走來始終不一。如今，台灣的金融秩序凌亂、財團坐大而蔑視政府，已經是社會共識。我們的金融業內在環境不佳、國際排名殿後，堪稱無道。孔子曰，「邦無 道，富且貴焉，恥也」。胡主委遊走內閣各部會長達七年，從政務委員、經建會主委到金管會主委，官場練達圓通，大家有目共睹。他如果心中還有一絲政治責任的 觀念，也就不需要外界再多做提醒了。
相對而言，何志欽部長仍然像是從政的學者，雖有白兔的青稚，卻不失性情。我們認為何部長應該為公股政策負去留的責任，其實是肯定之辭。對於多說無益之輩，負不負責任已經不那麼重要了。
Monday, June 25, 2007
The DPP has lost its Soul
The DPP has lost its Soul
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 23, 2007
As a result of vicious infighting during the party primaries, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidates wound up airing each others' dirty laundry. The dirty tricks that candidates pulled on each, such as falsifying the opinion polls that helped determine the final candidate roster, left the average citizen flabbergasted. The DPP Central Committee, which has provided a negative example for the party, has chosen to deal with the ugly mess by passing the buck. Apparently the DPP doesn't realize this scandal constitutes a major crisis.
The falsified opinion polls came to light primarily because of the Central Party Committee's improper "Exclude Blue" clause. This greatly limited the sample size of the target population, enabling candidates to take advantage of convenient loopholes. Huang Chien-hui, for example, applied for and obtained 1,000 telephone numbers from the phone company. Tsao Lai-wang, for example, installed a special telecommunications transfer device in a retirement home he owned. Their purpose was to inflate their own poll numbers. DPP candidates' skill at corrupt election practices is truly extraordinary. Their ability to make use of science and technology to totally invalidate the results of public opinion polls, is truly eye opening.
Once the scientific basis of opinion polls has been discredited, then the fairness of the nomination process has also been invalidated. After such an election, is anything above suspicion? What is really interesting is how cavalier the DPP is about the matter. Party members have raised all sorts of questions, but the Central Party Committee has indicated it has no intention of investigating the matter on its own initiative. When party members who lodged protests investigated matters and offered evidence on their own, the Central Party Committee made clear it still had no intention of conducting any further investigations or imposing any punishments. This may be motivated by the desire to keep the scandal under wraps, or by the hope that the struggle between Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang would subside as soon as possible. But it has left outsiders with the impression that the DPP cares nothing about morality and ethics, and turns a blind eye to fraud and deception.
This election was merely a party primary within the DPP. But the DPP is the ruling party. As the ruling party it must prove that it is capable of and committed to holding free and fair elections. In recent years, repeated incidents of DPP election fraud have left people with serious doubts about its integrity. These include the infamous Bulletgate scandal during the 2004 presidential election; two Kaohsiung mayoral elections; one involving audio tapes of alleged KMT candidate marital infidelity, later confirmed to be fake; the other involving dubious video footage of alleged KMT vote buying; and last but not least, DPP vote buying during the Taipei County magistrate's election. These have led the public to seriously doubt whether the DPP is willing to compete fairly in the democratic process. Chen Chu's election to Kaohsiung mayor has been declared invalid due to rule violations. Does the DPP have no desire whatsoever to regain public trust by investigating party primary malfeasance?
Even more incredibly, Lin Shufen, a member of the Su Tseng-chang camp, has accused Huang Chien-hui, a member of the Frank Hsieh camp, of using 1,000 telephones to influence public opinion polls. This result of this dispute was that Huang Chien-hui, along with three party elders, citing "larger considerations" announced his withdrawal from the race. The Central Party Committee attempts to sweep the candidates' dirty tricks under the rug, only made them more apparent.
Think about it. If Huang Chien-hui had a clear conscience, why did he refuse to be investigated? Doesn't quietly withdrawing his candidacy amount to a tacit admission that he cheated? Since the Central Party Committee could force him to withdraw from the race, that means they already had concrete evidence in their possession. But the party committee chose not to investigate the truth, to impose party discipline, and to shine a light on the matter. Instead it helped him pretend he was withdrawing because he was a "stand up guy" who sacrificed himself for the greater good of the party. This amounted to deceiving the voters. Huang Chien-hui's withdrawal from the race may have allowed the DPP to hide the skeletons in its closet. But in fact it buried the DPP's soul along with Huang Chien-hui. Is this what they consider the "greater good?"
The acquisition of extra telephones to inflate his own poll numbers may have been a new trick unique to this primary election. But other illegal methods such as issuing a flood of cell phone text messages smearing one's rivals, and entertaining local political bosses with illegal banquets and junkets, have popped up continuously. Especially serious examples include mobilizing the media to carry out simultaneous one-sided criticisms, smears, and malicious personal attacks. These tactics led to the annihilation of the Su Tseng-chang camp and the so-called "Eleven Brigands." These tactics reveal that the DPP, in its quest for victory, will resort to any means at its disposal. If they are willing to behave so viciously toward comrades within their own party, what aren't they willing to do to seize power amidst the Blue vs. Green political struggle?
After Huang Chien-hui withdrew from the election, rumors emerged that he joined the Frank Hsieh team to help with the 2008 presidential election. Based on his conduct during the party primary election, what kind of impression is Huang's participation going to give the public, in the event the campaign needs to rely on his "creativity,"
In recent years the DPP's election ploys have gradually moved toward a dead end of "technique over substance." This includes the unconstitutional "linkage" of plebiscites to elections, control of the Central Election Commission, the delivery of political pork by means of patronage, even the setting of election dates. Every one of these have become tools for the manipulation of elections. This has eroded not only the spirit of fair play, but even the substance of democratic politics. This is why the DPP's malfeasance during its party primary received so much attention. The public may be in no position to question the degeneration of morals within the DPP. But the problem is this party is currently the ruling party. If it is incapable of holding a free and fair election, what will become of Taiwan's democracy?
Original Chinese below:
民進黨初選舞弊：掩遮家醜，黨魂陪葬！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.23 03:34 am
若非民進黨因同志惡鬥而互揭瘡疤，一般人要知道黨內初選民調居然可以玩出那麼多造假花招，恐怕不是容易的事。然而，始作俑者的民進黨中央，面對難堪的民調弊端，殘局要如何收拾，卻仍在推拖拉。民進黨知不知道這是一場醜聞危機？
其所以會爆出民調造假風波，主要出在黨中央的「排藍」設計不當，大幅限縮了有效樣本的認定規模，使別有用心者找到鑽營的「巧門」。包括黃劍輝臨時申請了千支電話，包括曹來旺在自己經營的安養機構加裝特殊的電訊轉接裝置，都是為了在民調中灌水。民進黨民代將選舉舞弊玩到如此出神入化，用科學技術來滿足社會調查的形式要件、卻充分破壞它的內容，這款的手法，令人大開眼界。
一旦民調的科學根據遭到破壞，提名的公平性蕩然，這項選舉還能剩下什麼可以倖免受質疑的東西呢？但耐人尋味的是，民進黨中央對此事卻始終消極迴避：在同志舉發種種疑點時，黨中央擺明了無意主動介入調查；在舉發同志自行調查舉證後，黨中央仍無意作出進一步的調查或處分。這無論是為免弊端事態擴大，或希儘早平息謝蘇系之爭，都已留給外界「罔顧道德」、甚至「縱容造假」的觀感。
儘管只是黨內初選，但別忘記，民進黨是執政黨，它有義務證明自己有主持公平選舉的能力和決心。近幾年，民進黨在多次重大選戰中留下了重重懸疑，包括：總統大選的「兩顆子彈」、兩次高雄市長選舉的「錄音帶事件」及「指控賄選事件」、乃至台北縣長選舉的「走路工事件」，在在使人民對它能否以公平手段進行民主競賽產生嚴重懷疑。陳菊當選甫因違規操作被宣判為「無效」，民進黨難道連趁主動處理初選弊端以求扳回一點公眾信任的企圖都沒有？
更令人匪夷所思的是，謝系立委黃劍輝，被蘇系立委林淑芬指控以千支電話影響民調；此一紛爭，最後竟是黃劍輝在黨團三長陪同下，以「顧全大局」為由，宣布退讓。黨中央的和稀泥作法，簡直是欲蓋彌彰。
試想：黃劍輝若問心無愧，何不接受調查；把提名權拱手讓人，豈不等於承認「作弊」？黨中央既有辦法逼他退選，即表示已掌握具體證據；但黨部非但不追究真相、訴諸黨紀以昭炯戒，反而布置舞台讓他作「有情有義」的退選演出，不啻在欺騙選民。黃劍輝退選，也許使民進黨的「家醜」免於外揚，其實是民進黨拿「黨德」為黃劍輝陪葬。這就是他們所謂的「大局」嗎？
再看，增設電話虛灌民調，只是這次初選中手法比較「新穎」的招數，其他諸如濫發簡訊抹黑對手、招待樁腳宴飲出遊等違規手法，更是層出不窮。尤其嚴重的，例如動員媒體作一面倒地批判抹黑，乃至惡意的人身攻擊，最後導致蘇系及所謂十一寇的全軍覆滅。這些，都說明民進黨為求勝選不擇手段。對內同志相殘尚且如此狠毒，對外藍綠爭奪政權，還有什麼做不出來的事？
黃劍輝退選後，傳聞他將接受安排加入謝長廷團隊，協助二○○八大選的輔選工作。以他在初選的表現看，若大選要借重其「創意」，這將給民眾什麼觀感？
民進黨近年的選舉操作，已漸走向「技術重於本質」的末流，包括公投綁大選、對中選會的掌控、政策利多的放送，乃至於選舉時程的訂定，都變成左右選舉取向的技術性工具。在刻意的操作下，不僅選舉的公平競爭精神不斷遭到侵蝕，民主政治的公平與正義本質也一步步淪為虛無。民進黨這次初選弊端之所以深受矚目，原因正在於此。民進黨內部的道德墮落，民眾也許無力過問；問題是，在這個執政黨手中，如果已不可能辦出乾淨、公平的選舉，台灣的民主該怎麼辦？
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 23, 2007
As a result of vicious infighting during the party primaries, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidates wound up airing each others' dirty laundry. The dirty tricks that candidates pulled on each, such as falsifying the opinion polls that helped determine the final candidate roster, left the average citizen flabbergasted. The DPP Central Committee, which has provided a negative example for the party, has chosen to deal with the ugly mess by passing the buck. Apparently the DPP doesn't realize this scandal constitutes a major crisis.
The falsified opinion polls came to light primarily because of the Central Party Committee's improper "Exclude Blue" clause. This greatly limited the sample size of the target population, enabling candidates to take advantage of convenient loopholes. Huang Chien-hui, for example, applied for and obtained 1,000 telephone numbers from the phone company. Tsao Lai-wang, for example, installed a special telecommunications transfer device in a retirement home he owned. Their purpose was to inflate their own poll numbers. DPP candidates' skill at corrupt election practices is truly extraordinary. Their ability to make use of science and technology to totally invalidate the results of public opinion polls, is truly eye opening.
Once the scientific basis of opinion polls has been discredited, then the fairness of the nomination process has also been invalidated. After such an election, is anything above suspicion? What is really interesting is how cavalier the DPP is about the matter. Party members have raised all sorts of questions, but the Central Party Committee has indicated it has no intention of investigating the matter on its own initiative. When party members who lodged protests investigated matters and offered evidence on their own, the Central Party Committee made clear it still had no intention of conducting any further investigations or imposing any punishments. This may be motivated by the desire to keep the scandal under wraps, or by the hope that the struggle between Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang would subside as soon as possible. But it has left outsiders with the impression that the DPP cares nothing about morality and ethics, and turns a blind eye to fraud and deception.
This election was merely a party primary within the DPP. But the DPP is the ruling party. As the ruling party it must prove that it is capable of and committed to holding free and fair elections. In recent years, repeated incidents of DPP election fraud have left people with serious doubts about its integrity. These include the infamous Bulletgate scandal during the 2004 presidential election; two Kaohsiung mayoral elections; one involving audio tapes of alleged KMT candidate marital infidelity, later confirmed to be fake; the other involving dubious video footage of alleged KMT vote buying; and last but not least, DPP vote buying during the Taipei County magistrate's election. These have led the public to seriously doubt whether the DPP is willing to compete fairly in the democratic process. Chen Chu's election to Kaohsiung mayor has been declared invalid due to rule violations. Does the DPP have no desire whatsoever to regain public trust by investigating party primary malfeasance?
Even more incredibly, Lin Shufen, a member of the Su Tseng-chang camp, has accused Huang Chien-hui, a member of the Frank Hsieh camp, of using 1,000 telephones to influence public opinion polls. This result of this dispute was that Huang Chien-hui, along with three party elders, citing "larger considerations" announced his withdrawal from the race. The Central Party Committee attempts to sweep the candidates' dirty tricks under the rug, only made them more apparent.
Think about it. If Huang Chien-hui had a clear conscience, why did he refuse to be investigated? Doesn't quietly withdrawing his candidacy amount to a tacit admission that he cheated? Since the Central Party Committee could force him to withdraw from the race, that means they already had concrete evidence in their possession. But the party committee chose not to investigate the truth, to impose party discipline, and to shine a light on the matter. Instead it helped him pretend he was withdrawing because he was a "stand up guy" who sacrificed himself for the greater good of the party. This amounted to deceiving the voters. Huang Chien-hui's withdrawal from the race may have allowed the DPP to hide the skeletons in its closet. But in fact it buried the DPP's soul along with Huang Chien-hui. Is this what they consider the "greater good?"
The acquisition of extra telephones to inflate his own poll numbers may have been a new trick unique to this primary election. But other illegal methods such as issuing a flood of cell phone text messages smearing one's rivals, and entertaining local political bosses with illegal banquets and junkets, have popped up continuously. Especially serious examples include mobilizing the media to carry out simultaneous one-sided criticisms, smears, and malicious personal attacks. These tactics led to the annihilation of the Su Tseng-chang camp and the so-called "Eleven Brigands." These tactics reveal that the DPP, in its quest for victory, will resort to any means at its disposal. If they are willing to behave so viciously toward comrades within their own party, what aren't they willing to do to seize power amidst the Blue vs. Green political struggle?
After Huang Chien-hui withdrew from the election, rumors emerged that he joined the Frank Hsieh team to help with the 2008 presidential election. Based on his conduct during the party primary election, what kind of impression is Huang's participation going to give the public, in the event the campaign needs to rely on his "creativity,"
In recent years the DPP's election ploys have gradually moved toward a dead end of "technique over substance." This includes the unconstitutional "linkage" of plebiscites to elections, control of the Central Election Commission, the delivery of political pork by means of patronage, even the setting of election dates. Every one of these have become tools for the manipulation of elections. This has eroded not only the spirit of fair play, but even the substance of democratic politics. This is why the DPP's malfeasance during its party primary received so much attention. The public may be in no position to question the degeneration of morals within the DPP. But the problem is this party is currently the ruling party. If it is incapable of holding a free and fair election, what will become of Taiwan's democracy?
Original Chinese below:
民進黨初選舞弊：掩遮家醜，黨魂陪葬！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.23 03:34 am
若非民進黨因同志惡鬥而互揭瘡疤，一般人要知道黨內初選民調居然可以玩出那麼多造假花招，恐怕不是容易的事。然而，始作俑者的民進黨中央，面對難堪的民調弊端，殘局要如何收拾，卻仍在推拖拉。民進黨知不知道這是一場醜聞危機？
其所以會爆出民調造假風波，主要出在黨中央的「排藍」設計不當，大幅限縮了有效樣本的認定規模，使別有用心者找到鑽營的「巧門」。包括黃劍輝臨時申請了千支電話，包括曹來旺在自己經營的安養機構加裝特殊的電訊轉接裝置，都是為了在民調中灌水。民進黨民代將選舉舞弊玩到如此出神入化，用科學技術來滿足社會調查的形式要件、卻充分破壞它的內容，這款的手法，令人大開眼界。
一旦民調的科學根據遭到破壞，提名的公平性蕩然，這項選舉還能剩下什麼可以倖免受質疑的東西呢？但耐人尋味的是，民進黨中央對此事卻始終消極迴避：在同志舉發種種疑點時，黨中央擺明了無意主動介入調查；在舉發同志自行調查舉證後，黨中央仍無意作出進一步的調查或處分。這無論是為免弊端事態擴大，或希儘早平息謝蘇系之爭，都已留給外界「罔顧道德」、甚至「縱容造假」的觀感。
儘管只是黨內初選，但別忘記，民進黨是執政黨，它有義務證明自己有主持公平選舉的能力和決心。近幾年，民進黨在多次重大選戰中留下了重重懸疑，包括：總統大選的「兩顆子彈」、兩次高雄市長選舉的「錄音帶事件」及「指控賄選事件」、乃至台北縣長選舉的「走路工事件」，在在使人民對它能否以公平手段進行民主競賽產生嚴重懷疑。陳菊當選甫因違規操作被宣判為「無效」，民進黨難道連趁主動處理初選弊端以求扳回一點公眾信任的企圖都沒有？
更令人匪夷所思的是，謝系立委黃劍輝，被蘇系立委林淑芬指控以千支電話影響民調；此一紛爭，最後竟是黃劍輝在黨團三長陪同下，以「顧全大局」為由，宣布退讓。黨中央的和稀泥作法，簡直是欲蓋彌彰。
試想：黃劍輝若問心無愧，何不接受調查；把提名權拱手讓人，豈不等於承認「作弊」？黨中央既有辦法逼他退選，即表示已掌握具體證據；但黨部非但不追究真相、訴諸黨紀以昭炯戒，反而布置舞台讓他作「有情有義」的退選演出，不啻在欺騙選民。黃劍輝退選，也許使民進黨的「家醜」免於外揚，其實是民進黨拿「黨德」為黃劍輝陪葬。這就是他們所謂的「大局」嗎？
再看，增設電話虛灌民調，只是這次初選中手法比較「新穎」的招數，其他諸如濫發簡訊抹黑對手、招待樁腳宴飲出遊等違規手法，更是層出不窮。尤其嚴重的，例如動員媒體作一面倒地批判抹黑，乃至惡意的人身攻擊，最後導致蘇系及所謂十一寇的全軍覆滅。這些，都說明民進黨為求勝選不擇手段。對內同志相殘尚且如此狠毒，對外藍綠爭奪政權，還有什麼做不出來的事？
黃劍輝退選後，傳聞他將接受安排加入謝長廷團隊，協助二○○八大選的輔選工作。以他在初選的表現看，若大選要借重其「創意」，這將給民眾什麼觀感？
民進黨近年的選舉操作，已漸走向「技術重於本質」的末流，包括公投綁大選、對中選會的掌控、政策利多的放送，乃至於選舉時程的訂定，都變成左右選舉取向的技術性工具。在刻意的操作下，不僅選舉的公平競爭精神不斷遭到侵蝕，民主政治的公平與正義本質也一步步淪為虛無。民進黨這次初選弊端之所以深受矚目，原因正在於此。民進黨內部的道德墮落，民眾也許無力過問；問題是，在這個執政黨手中，如果已不可能辦出乾淨、公平的選舉，台灣的民主該怎麼辦？
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