Friday, April 11, 2008

Constitutionally Defined Roles must be Clearly Delineated

Constitutionally Defined Roles must be Clearly Delineated
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 11, 2008

Vice President elect Vincent Siew has been in the media spotlight lately. His visibility has been high. He will be attending the Boao Forum. Clearly he is no shrinking violet. Prior to the elections, Ma Ying-jeou announced that Mr. Siew would have a key role in Taiwan's economic reconstruction. He said that once the Blue camp returns to office, it would rely on his financial and economic expertise. He would participate in future economic planning. Here we would like to remind the incoming administration in advance to pay close attention to the constitutional issues, in order to avoid future problems.

Ever since March 20, Siew has consistently characterized himself as the man at the financial helm. A few days ago he told the media that after May 20, oil prices will be adjusted upward in a single step. We do not oppose such a policy, but it would be more appropriate to leave such specifics to the minister of economic affairs or the Premier. Siew also said that future Premiers ought to have such a tacit understanding. Soon after Siew made his remarks news emerged that Liu Chao-hsuang would be appointed Premier. Liu was once Siew's Deputy Premier. They have an understanding. But that is not the point. We have no objections to Ma's cabinet appointments. But we feel that even though co-operation between Ma, Siew, and Liu may be good, it is inappropriate for the Vice President elect to be setting all these pre-conditions for the future Premier.

After Ma Ying-jeou was elected President, he was interviewed by the media. He said that he would depend heavily on Mr. Siew to coordinate between the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, and KMT Party headquarters. We celebrate the harmonious and cooperative relationship between the President and Vice President. But we must demand that the roles of the President, Vice President, and Premier be clarified in accordance with the constitution. We would prefer to be gadflies, and faithfully express our concerns in advance. We would prefer not to wait until problems arise to engage in criticism.

The Vice President's role is to replace the President in the event of the President's death or resignation. Apart from that, the constitution does not specify his authority and duties. How his talents are used depends on a mutual understanding between him and the President. When appropriate, a President may rely on his Vice President. But a Vice President must remember his place. If the Vice President constantly issues policy directives, if a coordinator becomes a commander, if a Vice President becomes a de facto President, he has exceeded his authority. The President cannot authorize the Vice President to exercise greater authority than the President himself. According to the constitution the President is the chief executive. But according to the constitution the Executive Yuan is the highest-ranking executive body, and the Premier is the head of the Executive Yuan. Within the limits of the Executive Yuan's authority, the President must respect the Premier. The Vice-President even more so. Siew is merely Vice President elect. He must know his place. Whether oil prices should be adjusted upward in a single step does not sound like something that the President has the authority to decide. It is not among Ma Ying-jeou's campaign pledges. It is not something the Vice President has the constitutional authority to decide in place of the Premier.

The constitution authorizes the President to appoint the Premier. The President elect has not authorized the Vice President elect to set preconditions for the future Premier. And even if he had, it is inappropriate for the Vice President elect to be issuing these directives. This merely provokes suspicions that members of the incoming administration are jockeying for positions. Ma Ying-jeou may not mind if Vincent Siew plays an active part in his administration. But that doesn't mean the Executive Yuan must take orders from the Vice President. As Vice President, Mr. Siew may have been authorized by the President to act as a facilitator, to help ensure full cooperation with the Executive Yuan in matters of finance. But if he exceeds his authority, if he interferes with the Executive Yuan's authority, he will be acting contrary to the the President's intentions.

Political appointees must be treated with respect. The Premier is the head of the cabinet. The President must accord him due respect, particularly over cabinet appointments and policy formulation. The Premier must not be viewed as a subordinate who can be arbitarily ordered about. The Premier is the head of the cabinet. His cabinet members should be accorded all respect due political appointees. Only if they set policy, can they apply their extensive knowledge and take responsibility for any consequences. Only then will they be responsible policy makers, instead of mealy-mouthed Yes Men. Over the past eight years, cabinet members have been hired and fired according to whim. Hence their reluctance to fulfill their duties. The new government must not make the same mistake. The President and the Executive Yuan must know their place. The Vice President even more so.

The Vice President elect has announced specific personnel appointments and policy directions. This is micromanagement, and calls his leadership skills into question. He must not to set a bad example for the new administration.

Siew is a highly qualified financial and economic expert. He is the former boss of the new Premier. But Siew is the future Vice President. He has no constitutionally delegated authority. Nor can he usurp the authority of the Executive Yuan and the cabinet merely because the President trusts him. If he gives the impression that he is the financial and economic policy maker, and not merely an outside facilitator, the new administration may well undergo a crisis of leadership. That would be unfortunate. The incoming administration must proceed with caution.

中時電子報
中國時報  2008.04.11
千萬別混亂了憲政角色的分際
中時社論

 副總統當選人蕭萬長最近常在媒體曝光,能見度甚高,即將出席博鰲論壇,顯然不是沒有聲音的人。在大選之前,馬英九先生即曾宣布蕭先生將是台灣經濟重建的要角;表示藍軍執政之後,將會借重其財經長才,參與將來的經濟規畫。在此我們還是想提醒一下,儘早注意相關角色在憲政上的高度與分際,或許可以減少日後許多不必要的紛擾。

 三二○以來,蕭萬長曾不時以財經掌舵的角色自居。例如他日前向媒體表示,五二○之後油價將「一次漲足」,這樣的政策觀點,我們也許並不反對,但總是認為如此具體的政策,留給經濟部長或行政院院長加以決定為宣布,較為恰當。另外蕭也曾表示將來的閣揆最好能與他有若干默契;不久後即已傳出將由劉兆玄組閣的消息。劉曾是蕭院長的副院長,默契十足,不是重點;我們對閣揆的人事安排,也無意於此表示意見,只是覺得縱使馬蕭劉合作無間,由副總統當選人以自己為中心,公開對將來的行政院院長設定隱形的條件,實有諸多不妥。

 馬英九當選總統後接受媒體訪問時,確曾表示,將來行政、立法與政黨之間的協調,要多倚重蕭先生的長才。我們固然欣見正副總統與行政院長彼此水乳交融,合作無間,但仍不得不對總統、副總統、行政院院長之間的角色,提出憲法高度的釐清。我們寧可先做烏鴉,忠實地提出憂慮,而不希望在問題出現之後,再做事後的批評。

 副總統是備位元首,憲法上並無既定的職權與任務,如何適當發揮政治上的功能,要視其與搭檔之間的溝通與共識而定。總統可以在恰當的領域以恰當的方法借重副總統,但副總統自己一定要有分寸。如果副總統不時宣告政策指示,協調者成為施令者,備位成為元首分身,就會出現逾越尺度的顧忌。從制度上說,總統對副總統的授權,不會大過自己的權柄範圍。在憲法所列舉屬於總統的職權事項上,總統固然是最高的決策者;在憲法所列舉以外的事項上,行政院仍然是概括的最高行政機關,行政院院長才是行政院的首長。凡是行政院的職權範圍,行政院院長必須受到總統高度的尊重,副總統更是不在話下。蕭先生現在還是副總統當選人,誠宜深切體會此中應有的分際。油價是否一次漲足,怎麼說都不像是總統的職權,不在馬英九競選政見的範圍之內,看不出來如何可由副總統代替行政院行使憲法上的職權,加以決定。

 再如任命行政院院長,本是憲法明定專屬於總統的權力。不說總統當選人未曾授權副總統當選人開設閣揆人選條件;就算是確有授權,以副總統做為中心開設條件,也不恰當,徒然招惹人事卡位的聯想與是非而已。如果馬英九原不介意蕭萬長積極發揮政治上的功能,仍不該因此使得行政院聽命於副總統。蕭先生身為副總統,可經總統授權成為政治上的潤滑劑,在財經決策上恰如其分地與行政院團隊充分合作;如果落人口實,成為總統干預行政院決策的政治包袱,那絕不該是授權的本意。

 我們在此也要強調政務官受到尊重的重要,行政院院長是內閣之首,總統必須給予足夠的尊重,特別是內閣人事安排與政策形成,都不該將院長看作僚屬任意指使。行政院院長領導內閣,對於所任命的閣員,亦須給予政務官應有的尊重,由其掌握政策方向,才能集結器識恢宏,肯負政策責任,知所進退的方面大員,而不是受到唯唯諾諾的倖進之徒包圍。過去八年,閣員被招來揮去,五日京兆充斥,與此極有關連,新政府不該重蹈覆轍。總統與行政院院長尚且應該掌握分際,副總統更無越俎代庖之理。

 副總統當選人宣示具體人事與施政方向,制度上有所不宜,領導統御上也有商榷餘地,千萬不要壞了政治風範與規矩。

 蕭萬長確實財經資歷完整,經驗豐富,是未來可能閣揆的舊上司,但蕭先生將要擔任的是副總統,並不享有憲法實權,也不該因為總統信任有加,即可取代行政院院長及內閣閣員的職位角色。一旦予人成為財經政策太上領航人的印象,而不只是從旁照料協助而已,新政府財經團隊恐有領導系統分歧,政出多門的問題,不是國家之福,慎之慎之!

Thursday, April 10, 2008

Don't Let the Man behind the Curtain remain in Hiding

Don't Let the Man behind the Curtain remain in Hiding
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 10, 2008

The ruling DPP is on its way out. But even the way it is closing up shop, with the Taipower vice presidential appointment scandal, is leaving people disgusted. Taipower's new vice president was forced upon the Taipower Board of Trustees against its judgment and without its approval. When Taipower chairman Chen Kui-min dared to speak out on the matter, Minister of Economic Affairs Steven Chen openly accused Chen of insubordination. Suspicions arose that the new vice presidency had been sold to the highest bidder. Yesterday Steven Chen conceded that Executive Yuan Secretary-General Chen Ching-chun was responsible for the appointment. This deplorable behavior has left people shaking their heads. Nor does it end here. Was Chen Ching-chun really as high as it went? Or does the scandal involve officials at the very apex of the ruling regime?

Why did the appointment of a mere deputy general manager of Taipower required the intervention of the Minister of Economic Affairs? What sort of pressures were brought to bear? Why was Steven Chen so apoplectic? What was the quid pro quo? Why was the active intervention of such a high-ranking official as Steven Chen in the official appointment of such a low-ranking official? What would motivate a regime already on its way out, to make "one last killing," in utter disregard of appearances?

Throughout the process, no one paid the slightest attention to the Taipower or Ministry of Economic Affairs personnel promotion and examination protocols. The code of ethics for state-owned enterprises was irrevelant. All that mattered was good "guanxi." Over the years the Ministry of Economic Affairs has energetically promoted sound corporate governance. Today however, because the Taipower Board of Trustees refused to approve a vice presidential appointment, Steven Chen wants Chen Kui-min's head. This is an open declaration that the board of directors of state-owned enterprises are rubber stamps. This amounts to taking the lead in violating the principles of corporate governance.

The most serious problem remains hidden. Throughout the entire personnel appointment scandal, the Man behind the Curtain has remained in shadow. The Huang Fu-jen appointment scandal broke over a week ago. Yet not a single political appointee has had the guts to point the finger at the Man behind the Curtain. By remaining tight-lipped, Steven Chen has thrown away his hard-earned 30 year reputation for integrity. This tells us how far up the ladder of power the scandal reaches. In short, the real question is: Who is the Man behind the Curtain? If we fixate on the claims and counterclaims bandied back and forth between Steven Chen, Chen Kui-min, and Chen Ching-chun, if no one is willing to identify the Man behind the Curtain, we will never learn the truth.

Traditionally, Taipower has always had only seven vice presidents. The Executive Yuan forced Taipower to accept and eighth -- Huang Fu-yuan. For his sake alone, the Executive Yuan violated company precedent. It directly promoted a deputy chief to the rank of vice president. His seniority, qualifications, and experience were questionable. The former Taipower chairman blocked this move for over a month. During this process people warned Steven Chen that this appointment was controversial. But Steven Chen ignored their warnings. Taipower chairman Chen Kui-min personally appealed to Hsieh Fa-ta, the vice chairman of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Chen said Huang Fu-yuan was suspected of buying official positions, bribery, and other violations. Hsieh Fa-ta questioned internal affairs, Huang Fu-jen, and Taipower directors. In the end, based solely on Huang Fu-jen's declaration that he would "commit hara kiri" if he was unqualified, Hsieh ordered the board of directors to approve Huang Fu-jen's appointment.

The majority of Taipower directors refused. They doubted the legality of Huang's appointment. Steven Chen responded by publicly accusing Chen Kui-min of "insubordination" and of "failure to implement orders." He went so far as to declare that he intended to replace him. The reasons he gave were: Chen Kui-min was openly insubordinate, therefore this amounted to a "disciplinary issue that no party in power could possibly tolerate." Steven Chen apparently forgot that as Minister of Economic Affairs, he had a far greater responsibility to uphold the code of ethics for state-owned enterprises and to safeguard the nation's justice system.

Steven Chen stated publicly several times that he did not know Huang Fu-jen. He said Huang was appointed "at the urging of a certain political figure." Under pressure of public opinion, Steven Chen admitted yesterday that the political figure in question was Chen Ching-chun. Only a week ago, Chen Ching-chun assured the media that the appointment had nothing to do with him. Yesterday he changed his tune. He said "many people" recommended Huang Fu-jen. He said he then informed the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which then made its decision in strict adherence with professional criteria. One cannot help wondering: Did Huang Fu-jen lobby "many people" who urged the Executive Yuan to approve his appointment? Did they coerce Taipower's CFO and senior board members to accept his nomination? Did the ruling regime's highest-ranking executives take the lead in violating the law?

A vice presidential appointment scandal has allowed the public on Taiwan to see just how thoroughly degenerate their government officials are. Internal discipline is one of the most basic requirements in the administration of a corporation or a government. Take the employees of state-owned enterprises for example. Officials must be promoted according to a fair evaluation process. Buying official positions is absolutely forbidden. So is acquiring an official position by means of "guanxi." The Minister of Economic Affairs is the chief supervisor of a nation's state-owned industries. He must maintain a fair and transparent system for personnel evaluations and appointments. Appointees must be individuals of integrity and meet objective standards of performance. Problemmatic candidates are out of the question. This is the very least one has a right to expect. Today however, the ruling DPP covers up for cronies, allowing them to climb to the top of the ladder. Political appointees have a responsibility to safeguard the fundamental values of the system. Instead, they make feeble excuses and neglect their duties. Meanwhile the Man behind the Curtain remains in hiding, preparing to escape all legal and political responsibility. What can one do but shake one's head?

中時電子報
中國時報  2008.04.10
別再讓黑手一直躲在幕後
中時社論

  為了一樁台電副總的人事案,讓即將關門熄燈的民進黨政府,連收攤的身影都讓人看不下去!從台電董事會未通過上級交辦的副總人事案,經濟部長陳瑞隆直接點名 台電董事長陳貴明「抗命」,接著疑似買官、求官指控赤裸裸的上演,到昨天陳瑞隆挑明就是行政院祕書長陳景峻所交代。這一幕幕令人搖頭嘆息的官場現形記,擺 明了還會有續集:陳景峻真的就是最高層嗎?沒有更高層的黑手或黑手集團了嗎?

 一個小小台電副總經理這等芝麻綠豆官,竟要勞動經濟部長橫 柴入灶護航!究竟什麼樣的壓力?讓陳瑞隆會如此氣急敗壞!是什麼樣的利益?會讓比陳瑞隆更高層次的人物,非要積極介入這樣的芝麻綠豆官人事案!又是什麼樣 的陰影?會讓一個即將下台的政府,在最後階段,公然演出如此被視為是「最後一撈」的不顧觀瞻!

 整個過程中,台電及經濟部內部人事升遷考 核制度沒人在乎,國營事業企業倫理好像根本不重要,一切似乎只要有政治關係力挺就好。多年來經濟部致力推動公司治理,如今陳瑞隆以台電董事會未通過這項人 事案,就要撤換陳貴明,等於擺明只把國營事業董事會當成橡皮圖章,帶頭違反公司治理。

 最嚴重的是隱藏在這整齣人事安插戲碼背後的黑手與 幽靈,即便黃傅源人事案爆發至少已一周,還是沒有個政務官敢全盤托出這背後黑手。甚至,陳瑞隆還把他卅年公職清譽賠進去,可見背後這黑手與幽靈權威之深 遠。換言之,真正的關鍵,是那隻「黑手」,如果只是攪和在陳瑞隆、陳貴明和陳景峻之間的是是非非,卻不願與不敢揪出這黑手,真相不會因此明朗!

  台電傳統上只有七個副總,行政院塞黃傅源進來變成八個副總。行政院等於為他一個人不惜打破所有行政慣例,由二級主管直升副總,由於年資、資格、歷練都有爭 議,台電老董擋就擋了一個多月,這過程中曾不斷有人提醒、警告陳瑞隆這樁人事安排有爭議,但陳瑞隆不是置之不理,就是未加重視,即便是在台電董事長陳貴明 親自向經濟部次長謝發達反映黃傅源涉嫌買官、賄賂等情事,謝發達還把政風、黃傅源、以及檢舉台電董事找來對質,最後只憑黃傅源「切腹保證」,仍照樣要求董 事會通過這項問題人事。

 由於台電多數董事在法律有疑義考量下未通過此人事案。陳瑞隆就立即在媒體面前指陳貴明「抗命」、「執行不力」、 「不成體統」,更進一步挑明要撤換陳貴明,理由是:公股就是要執行官方意志,陳貴明公然抗命,這是「紀律問題,任何一個政黨執政,都不會容忍這種事。」陳 瑞隆大概忘記,身為經濟部長,捍衛國營事業企業倫理、維護國家制度公正性,他有更大的責任。

 陳瑞隆幾度公開表示,他不認識黃傅源,這項 人事是由一位「政壇人士所推薦」。在輿論的強大壓力下,陳瑞隆才在昨天講出是陳景峻所交代,而才在一周前,陳景峻才對媒體說,這人事與他全然無干,昨日陳 景峻已改口,是有「很多人」向他推薦黃傅源,他轉而告知經濟部,再由經濟部依專業選才,綜合考量。外界不禁質疑:黃傅源是不是先動員很多人向行政院關說, 然後再有很多人向行政院推薦,然後行政院就接受這個人選?然後逼迫經長、台電老董接受這個人選?若果真如此,這個政府的最高行政首長們,不就真的是帶頭違 法亂紀?

 一個副總人事案,讓台灣人民見證了台灣官箴徹底的墮落!本來不論公司治理、國家治理,內部紀律化都是最基本的價值與要求。以國 營事業人事為例,紀律化即是所有官員人事升遷都應透過公平考核過程,買官、靠關係絕對是要禁止的;做為國營事業首長、經濟部部長,人事任用更應維護公平透 明考核機制,其品格及資歷要符合標準,問題人事絕對不能用,這是最起碼、最基本的價值與道理。如今為了掩護有關係的人爬上高位,有責任維護制度與基本價值 的政務官,還厚顏無恥地狡辯,完全忘記政務官的責任。而隱藏在背後的黑手,到現在都還意圖要逃脫所有法律與政治責任,這一切如何不讓人搖頭嘆息!

Wednesday, April 9, 2008

The Business Community also has a Responsibility to Save Taiwan

The Business Community also has a Responsibility to Save Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 9, 2008

Terry Guo said "The business community also has a responsibility to save Taiwan's economy." Was he wrong? Terry Guo told Ma Ying-jeou "Government is not a panacea. One cannot place all the responsibility on the shoulders of government. The business community also has a responsibility to save Taiwan's economy." When Terry Guo spoke of saving Taiwan's economy he didn't mean just saving his own Hon Hai Technology Group. He meant everyone on Taiwan must fight to save the island's economy.

Images of Monday evening's Formosa Plastics banquet have appeared in the media. The significance the images of Ma Ying-jeou, Vincent Siew, Wang Yung-ching, Morris Chang, Terry Guo, all seated in a row, needs no comment. Wang Yung-ching said "The election of Ma Ying-jeou and Vincent Siew is a great benefit of the people of Taiwan. In fact, it is a great benefit of Chinese people the world over!" Wang's comment may have been an exaggeration. But coming from Wang Yung-ching, who has been chafing at the bit for over a decade, it is perhaps understandable, and expressed his long suppressed hopes. Terry Guo said "The business community also has a responsibility to save Taiwan's economy." Kuo meant the business community must assume a greater responsibility for the nation and society.

Over the past decade, Taiwan's most prominent industrialists have been thoroughly frustrated. On the one hand they faced fierce competition in the global market place. On the other hand they were utterly helpless to unlock the ruling regime's Closed Door. Let's not accuse these businessmen of being deficient in patriotism. These captains of industry endured a decade or more of government corruption and economic decline. No one listened to their heartfelt admonitions. It should come as no surprise that they felt a deep sense of alienation at being unable to save their nation.

Over the past two decades the meaning of the term "tai shang" (Taiwan businesspersons) has changed dramatically. At first these industrialists who crossed the Strait to save their companies from bankruptcy were accused of being "traitors to Taiwan" or "Chi-Com fellow travelers." Today they are lauded as the "front guard of Taiwan's economy." Had the ruling regime made steady progress toward an Asian Pacific Trans-shipment Center a decade and a half ago, would Taiwan find itself so weak and marginalized today?

The differing fates of key industrialists over the past two decades tells the whole story. They show us the consequences of globalization on the one hand, and a Closed Door economic policies on the other. Contrast the legendary success of Master Kong, the instant noodles manufacturer which moved to the mainland, with the halting progress of Formosa Plastics, which was prevented from doing the same. Contrast Chang Yung-fa's change of course with Hsu Wen-lung's deafening silence. Their stories are not merely stories of industries struggling to survive. Their stories are stories of a nation, the Republic of China, struggling to survive.

We do not believe "businessmen have no national allegiance." An exceptional entrepreneur will surely have a greater than average sense of political and social responsibility. In fact, the struggle entrepreneurs such as Chang Jung-fa and Hsu Wen-lung went through with cross-strait relations reflects their struggle with the issue of national identity. Who wants to be "a businessman without a country?" National leaders must first establish a system that entrepreneurs can identify with and respect. Only then will entrepreneurs spontaneously and willingly assume the heavy burdens of the community.

Given the new political regime, we have four hopes for the business community. First, Do not corrupt the government. Do not corrupt the political process. Do not give out gift certificates. Do not give out diamond rings. To do so is to murder the government. To do so is to murder Taiwan. Second, do not become involved in political infighting. Do not contribute to dividing society. Do not use the power of commercial sponsorship to blackmail the media. Third, do not solve only Taiwan businessmens' problems. Help solve Taiwan's problems. Ease the problems plaguing an "M-shaped Society." Don't just walk away. Give back, and come back. Help Taiwan become an Asian Pacific Base of Operations. Fourth, Improve the image of entrepreneurs. Give back to the community. Turn the achievements of the business community into the hope and pride of the community as a whole.

"The business community also has a responsibility to save Taiwan's economy!" This means that everyone on Taiwan must help save Taiwan's economy. In fact "save the economy" fails to describe our current plight. In fact, we are already at the stage where we must "Save Taiwan." Help the public establish clean government and a system to which we cam remain devoted, that we will refuse to abandon, in which joys and sorrows are shared. Save Taiwan's economy. If not us, who? If not now, when?

救台灣,企業界也有責任!
【聯合報╱社論】 2008.04.09
「拚經濟,企業界也有責任!」郭台銘的這句話有沒有搞錯?

「企業界」哪裡有「不拚經濟」的?馬英九往訪郭台銘,郭台銘說:「政府不是萬能,不能把所有責任都推給政府,拚經濟,企業界也有責任!」郭台銘所說的「拚經濟」,顯然不止是指他的鴻海集團而已,他指的應當是「拚整個台灣與所有台灣人的經濟」。

台 塑大樓周一晚宴的圖像,出現在媒體上。馬英九、蕭萬長、王永慶、張忠謀及郭台銘,一字排開;其中深意,不言可喻。王永慶說:「馬蕭當選是台灣人的福氣,也 是全世界中國人的福氣!」這句話,當然有些誇大,但發抒了王永慶十餘年來的抑鬱,也表達了他蓄積已久的期待。郭台銘則說:「拚經濟,企業界也有責任!」這 裡所說的責任,應當是指企業界該承擔更大的國家責任與社會責任。

過去十餘年,應是台灣卓越企業家們內心相當鬱悶的歲月。他們一方面在專業 上面對全球激烈競爭,另一方面又無力化解鎖國的政治惡鬥。莫說商人無祖國,台灣的卓越企業家們十餘年來眼見政府貪腐、國家沉淪,說也無人聽,勸也無人理, 內心當然不免有一種救國無門、報國無路的落寞疏離之感!

不說別的,二十年來「台商」一詞的涵義變化即已道盡一切。一開始,這些「渡海自 救」的廠商,被指為「台奸/資匪」或「中共同路人」;如今,則被譽為「台灣經濟的尖兵」。倘若在十五年前,主政當局就朝「將台灣建設為亞太營運中心」穩步 前進,今天的台灣何至於耗弱及邊緣化到這種地步?

其實,只要看幾位重要企業家二十年來的個人生涯動線,即可看出台灣這些年來「全球化VS.鎖國內鬥」的斑斑痕跡。康師傅的傳奇,與王永慶的跌跌撞撞;張榮發的調轉舵輪,與許文龍的緘口不語……。這些皆不只是企業拚生存的必然趨勢,也是國家拚生存的必然走向。

我 們不相信「商人無祖國」,一個卓越的企業家一定會有高於一般人的國家社會責任感。事實上,過去二十年台灣在國家認同及兩岸關係上「嘗試/錯誤」的過程,也 正是許多企業家個人跌宕曲折的心路歷程;張榮發是如此,許文龍亦是如此。誰願意作一個「無祖國的商人」?重點是,主政者必須建立一個讓企業家們共同認同的 「國家」,與共同敬重的「政府」,才能喚起他們對國家社會的愛,也才能使他們發自內心地願意承擔起對國家社會的重大責任。

面對政治新局, 我們對企業界有四點期待:一、不要汙染政府,不要汙染政治。不要再送禮券,不要再送鑽戒;那樣做,是在毒殺政府,也是在謀殺台灣。二、不要捲入政治內鬥, 不要助長社會撕裂,不要用「廣告主」對媒體進行政治迫害。三、不要只是解決「台商」的問題,更要協助解決「台灣」的問題,尤其應致力緩解M型社會的問題。 亦即,不能只是「出走/流血」,更要「回巢/循環」,協助台灣成為「亞太平台」。四、改善企業家的形象,把金錢化作社會愛,將企業的成就轉化成社會共同的 榮譽與希望。

「拚經濟,企業界也有責任!」這當然是指「拚整個台灣與所有台灣人的經濟」。其實,只說「拚經濟」已不足形容當前的情勢,事實已經到了必須「救台灣」的地步。企業界若有救國濟民的雄心壯志,請協助國人建造一個廉能的政府,以及一個全民同甘共苦、不離不棄的國家。
救台灣,是企業界捨我其誰的光榮責任。

Tuesday, April 8, 2008

The Boao Forum, One Small Step for Cross-Strait Dialogue

The Boao Forum, One Small Step for Cross-Strait Dialogue
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 8, 2008

Although Vincent Siew has attended the Boao Forum for Asia five years in a row, he has never before been the focus of public attention. Probably even Siew himself never expected that this time, because he is Vice President elect of the ROC, and because the forum is being held on Hainan Island, his participation would be assigned special significance. Boao Forum spokespersons stressed that the forum "does not discuss politics." Indeed, the forum might not discuss politics. The problem is Vincent Siew's identity. To expect his trip not to be interpreted politically is well-nigh impossible.

That is why this year's Boao Forum is certain to be seen as a preview of future cross-strait interactions. It could be a window of opportunity, a chance to initiate a virtuous circle. It could also trigger mutual suspicion and controversy. It is a test not only of Vincent Siew, but of Beijing. It will also test the DPP, which has a little over a month left in its term.

As you can imagine, Vice President elect Vincent Siew's trip will be examined under a microscope. What kind of reception will he receive when he arrives on Hainan Island? Where will he be seated at the conference table? How he will interact with Hu Jintao? Will Hu and Siew meet separately? If so, how? What will our representatives talk about at the round-table? What level of representation will the mainland will send? Each of these questions will be subject to political analysis. Because of this, both the delegations led by Beijing and by Vincent Siew should conduct rehearsals. After all, this event is unprecedented. Even former Vice President Lien Chan's visit to the mainland does not compare.

Vincent Siew may insist that he is merely the Chairman of the Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation. But everyone will surely fixate on his status as Vice President elect and judge how he is treated on that basis. Although the purpose of the Boao Forum is to discuss economic and trade issues, the participants are all government representatives. The vast majority are attending in their capacity as heads of state. Hu Jintao is attending as General Secretary of the mainland government. Vincent Siew may be attending as an NGO chairman. But we all know that a month from now he will be sworn in as the Vice President of the Republic of China. For someone of his quasi-official status to attend a summit for international heads of state, and even appear on the same podium as high-ranking mainland Chinese officials, is something that hasn't happened in several decades.

Siew's ambiguous status has provided participants of this "quasi-summit" a great deal of room to maneuver. It has also provided commentators a great deal of room for interpretation. This is the fifth time Vincent Siew has participated in the Boao Forum. He knows better than anyone how he must comport himself. Everyone's attention is focused on Beijing, whose challenge is how to express good will towards Taipei. In any case, if cross-strait relations are to move toward reconciliation and dialogue, it is a step which must be taken. Outside observers should not expect too much from the Baoa Forum. After all, it is merely a platform for the exchange of views.

More interesting is the anxiety expressed by the DPP. One minute they are worried that Vincent Siew will be demeaned by the mainland authorities. The next minute they are asking Vincent Siew to demand membership in the WHO on behalf of Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, the Boao Forum is also a test of the DPP's mettle. This is when the Democratic Progressive Party ought to reexamine its political path and the reasons for its debacle at the polls. Judging by the DPP hierarchy's reaction to Siew's trip, the DPP is unwilling to adopt a more mature attitude. Instead it remains captive to its own ideological fundamentalism.

From Vice President Lu on down, everyone in the Pan Green nomenklatura continues to accuse dissenters of "betraying Taiwan." They continue to accuse dissenters of being "Communists." The DPP has not ruled out more extreme measures once the Boao Forum formally opens.

In other words, whenever the KMT takes practical action to promote cross-strait exchanges, the DPP attempts to turn everything into a struggle for unification vs. independence for "domestic consumption." If the DPP refuses to awaken from its delusion, it will be relegated to the role of a supporting player. It will have relinquished the spotlight to the KMT.

Frankly we dare not expect too much from the Boao Forum. After all, this is merely the first step in our search for cross-strait dialogue. Numerous thorny issues remain unresolved, The road ahead remains a long one.

讓博鰲論壇成為兩岸啟動對話的小起步
中國時報
2008.04.08 

蕭萬長可能自己都沒料到,他連續五年都出席博鰲論壇,從來都不是輿論焦點,這回卻因為多了準副總統的身分,再加上舉行的地點選在海南島,使得他這趟受邀出席,被賦予多重的意義,特別是「政治」上的意義。儘管論壇發言人強調論壇「不談政治」,事實上可能也真的談不了什麼政治。問題是蕭萬長多了這個身分,要說此行不被「政治解讀」,怕也是不可能的。

或許也就是因為這樣,這屆的博鰲論壇,勢必被視為是考驗兩岸未來互動的一次預演。它可以是一次啟動良性循環的機會之窗,也可以是引發彼此猜忌與爭議的關鍵試煉,它所考驗不只是蕭萬長,也將考驗北京當局,當然,它其實也在考驗執政只剩一個月多一點的民進黨。

可想而知,多了準副總統的身分,蕭萬長此行的所有「議程」,都會被放大檢視。從抵達海南島會有怎樣的「接機」規格?在會場中會被安排怎樣的座位?他與胡錦濤會怎麼互動?要不要特別安排單獨的「胡蕭會」?安排的形式又將如何?我方所主辦的圓桌論壇將要談些什麼?大陸會派何種層級的代表參加等等,這其中的每一個環節,都可能包含了被過度政治解讀的空間。也因為這樣,可預見不論是北京當局亦或是蕭萬長所率領的代表團,事前都應做過縝密的沙盤推演。只不過這個場景畢竟是空前的,它與當年連戰以卸任副總統身分赴中國大陸訪問,其實是不能比擬的。

講再白一點,不論蕭萬長怎麼強調此行他的身分只是「兩岸共同市場基金會」的董事長,大概所有人還是會以「副總統當選人」的角度,鎖定蕭萬長會怎麼「被對待」。雖說博鰲論壇在性質上是以討論經貿議題為主,但不諱言與會者皆為各國的官方代表,而且絕大多數就是元首本人出席,胡錦濤就是以中國國家主席的身分與會。蕭萬長掛著頭銜固然是基金會的董事長,但所有人也都知道一個月後,他將宣誓就職為中華民國的副總統,以這個未來完成式的「準官方」身分,出席類如元首高峰會性質的國際會議,甚至出現兩岸高層同台的畫面,回顧台灣過去幾十年的經歷,其實是相當罕見的。

這種藉由身分與角色的曖昧游移,所塑造的「準高峰會」場景,不僅提供了所有參與者很大的操作空間,也提供了所有評論者很大的詮釋空間。對蕭萬長而言,博鰲論壇是他已經參與了五屆的對話平台,該怎麼掌握分際不會有人比他自己更清楚。而對北京而言,怎麼藉由東道主的便利表達出對台灣的善意,大家也都在緊盯著看。無論如何,兩岸關係如果是要朝著和解對話的方向走,這一步終究是要踏出去的。外界也不必對博鰲論壇能達成什麼了不得的成果期待過高,畢竟這只是一個交換意見的平台而已。

比較有趣的倒是民進黨在這次博鰲論壇舉辦前夕所表現出的焦慮。一會擔心蕭萬長出席會被中共矮化,一會又建議蕭萬長應積極表達替台灣爭取加入WHO的心聲。前面提過,在這次博鰲論壇舉行的前夕,同樣在接受試煉的還有民進黨。恰恰好此時的民進黨正在為敗選啟動路線討論,而觀察民進黨上下怎麼看待蕭萬長的這趟出訪,正好可以檢視該黨願不願意以更成熟的態度,逐步調整以往深陷意識形態的執著。

很遺憾,截至目前為止,從呂副總統以降,多數綠營精英還是祭出了「出賣台灣」的制式論述,還是在竭盡所能的扣紅帽子,甚至不排除在博鰲論壇在正式召開後,民進黨可能還會有更大的動作。

換言之,當國民黨以實際行動逐步啟動兩岸互動之際,民進黨想著還是怎麼在統獨鬥爭的戰線上進行「內部消費」。如果民進黨永遠都不願從這個迷障中走出來,恐怕也只能在這個議題上繼續充當配角,把這個戰場拱手讓給國民黨去單獨表現了。

不諱言說,我們對博鰲論壇並不抱太高期待,畢竟這只是兩岸尋求對話試探的一個起步而已,諸多棘手的難題都還未解決,未來的路還長著呢!

Monday, April 7, 2008

Hu Siew Summit: Moving Towards Win/Win Through Change

Hu Siew Summit: Moving Towards Win/Win Through Change
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 7, 2008

Changes in the world's strategic scene have created pitfalls for the unwary. During the ROC Presidential Election, Vincent Siew's "Cross-Strait Common Market" was criticized mercilessly. Today, Vice President elect Vincent Siew, in his capacity as Chairman of the Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation Chairman, will attend the Boao Forum for Asia being held this weekend on Hainan Island. With with the eyes of the world upon him, he may take part in a "Hu Siew Summit."

The theme of the Boao Forum this year is "Green Asia, Moving towards Win-Win through Change." This theme suggests the possibility of exciting developments. Vice President elect Vincent Siew is willing to attend. The Beijing authorities have welcomed him. What is this, if not an opportunity to "move towards win-win through change?"

The two sides are undergoing major internal changes. These include how they govern their respective jurisdictions and how to cope with change, including changes in cross-strait policy. Mainland China's three decades of liberalization and reform need no comment. Mainland China is returning to the grass roots and the rule of law. It may even be testing the waters of democracy. Objectively speaking, Hu Jintao's handling of the mainland's "peaceful rise" has been remarkably skillful. So have Beijing's handling of changes in cross-strait policy. As soon as Ma and Siew were elected, Hu Jintao reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus and One China/Different Interpretations, without being asked. Today he has given the Hu/Siew Summit a boost. This is a sign of change and offers the promise of a win-win future.

Taiwan's changes are even more apparent. The election victory of the Ma/Siew ticket reflects a major backlash against a decade of "creeping independence" and Closed Door economic policies. The election foretells a major change in governing style and cross-strait policy. This is both heart-breaking and inspiring. It is heart-breaking because Taiwan wasted a decade of precious time. It is inspiring because it eventually led to introspection and change. Ten years of wasted time is a heavy price to pay for such a lesson. That is why it has left such a deep impression. This Legislative Elections and the Presidential Election have lent these changes greater legitimacy.

This change in cross-strait relations is the result of six decades of trial and error, beginning with the lifting of martial law 20 years ago. A heavy price has been paid in blood, sweat, and tears. Now, as a result of the Legislative Elections and Presidential Election, the Taipei side is returning to the "Path of the Republic of China." The Beijing side, meanwhile, has reaffirmed the "One China, Different Interpretations" stance. This opportunity was hard won. With the Boao Forum, the two sides now have an unprecedented platform. Let's hope the two sides do not retreat from their determination to change. Let's hope they do not give up on their efforts to establish a win/win scenario.

Let us hope that when Hu Jintao and Vincent Siew meet at the Boao Forum, they can establish a New Hu/Hsiao Era, or even a 2008 Cross-Strait Consensus. Hu and Siew are the ideal candidates to usher in this New Era. Hu Jintao has managed the mainland's "peaceful rise" with a steady hand. He has made room for One China, Different Interpretations. This offers the prospect of a cross-strait opening on a grand scale. In 2001 Vincent Siew established his Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation. Like Don Quixote, he may have been the first person of his prominence to establish a cross-strait platform. Now Siew is Vice President elect, and determined to promote a win-win cross-strait scenario. Seven years ago, who knew Vincent Siew would be in the catbird seat today? Who knew his foundation would become to the key that would open cross-strait relations? Heaven works in mysterious ways.

We believe Hu and Siew are capable of acting as agents of cross-strait change. We believe they are credible figures capable of promoting a win/win cross-strait scenario. Therefore, even though the two sides may be tentative about the current Boao Forum, we hope they will not waste this opportunity to make tectonic changes. They ought to make a concerted effort to create a "2008 Cross-Strait Consensus."

As we previously mentioned, both Taipei and Beijing have changed their cross-strait policies. These changes are rooted in the changes each side has made in its style of governance. Beijing's theme is "peaceful rise" and a return to the grass roots. Taipei's theme is "peaceful coexistence" and democracy. Taipei cannot adopt a Taiwan independence policy, a Closed Door economic policy, or a policy that "betrays Taiwan" by "immediate reunification." Beijing cannot adopt a "reunification by force" policy. Nor can it refuse to maintain the status quo, which is One China, Different Interpretations. This constitutes change and a win/win scenario.

For Hu Jintao and Vincent Siew, the theme for the Boao Forum this year ought to be "Cross-Strait Surprises leading to Win/Win" We look forward to Vincent Siew returning to Boao the same time next year.

胡蕭會博鰲:在變革中實現共贏!
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.07 02:50 am

世局變化,充滿玄機。總統大選期間,蕭萬長的「兩岸共同市場」被對手批評得體無完膚;如今,當選副總統的蕭萬長,卻將以「兩岸共同市場基金會董事長」的身分,出席周末在海南島舉行的博鰲亞洲論壇,並可能出現舉世矚目的「胡蕭會」。

今年博鰲論壇的主題是:「綠色亞洲:在變革中實現共贏。」這句標語的弦外之音,令人覺得彷彿早已預知會有今日的驚奇發展;準副總統蕭萬長願意出席,地主北京當局也表示歡迎,這難道不是海峽兩岸「在變革中實現共贏」的重要契機?

兩岸內部皆在進行重大的「變革」,包括各自「國家治理」的「變革」,與各自「兩岸政策」的「變革」。中國大陸三十年來「改革開放」的「變革」已無庸贅論,一方面回歸「民本」,一方面嘗試「法治」,另一方面亦試探微量的「民主」;客觀而論,胡錦濤主政以來,對於「和平崛起」的操持,頗見功力。至於北京當局對兩岸政策的「變革」,亦甚顯著,此次馬蕭當選後,胡錦濤主動在布胡熱線中提出「九二共識/一中各表」,如今又為「胡蕭會」順水推舟,這應是「變革」的徵兆,也是「共贏」的期待。

台灣方面的「變革」更是有目共睹。馬蕭勝選,反映了台灣社會對過去十餘年「政治傾台獨/經濟傾鎖國」之政策路線的大反省;選舉結果已預示了「國家治理」的「大變革」,也預示了「兩岸政策」的「大變革」。這是一個既傷感又可期待的場景:傷感是因台灣蹉跎了過去十餘年的黃金歲月;可期待則由於此次的反省與變革,因曾付出十餘年慘重的代價而特別深刻,又因是經立院及總統的民主選舉程序而形成,所以更具正當性。

然而,兩岸關係出現今日的「變革」契機,其實是經歷了過去近六十年(尤其是解嚴後二十年)的「嘗試錯誤」所形成,其間曾經付出「血/淚/汗」的慘重代價;一直到此刻,經由這次立院及總統大選,台北方面始又回到「中華民國路線」,北京方面也才試探性地釋出了「一中各表」的訊息。此一契機得來不易,如今雙方又藉博鰲論壇搭起空前規格的互動平台,切勿動搖「變革」的心志,更不可輕易放棄了「共贏」的期待!

我們期盼,胡錦濤與蕭萬長能在此次博鰲論壇中正式會晤,為兩岸揭開一個「胡蕭會/新時代」,甚至奠定一個「兩岸○八共識」。其實,胡蕭二人正是為這個新時代揭幕的最佳人選。胡錦濤對「和平崛起」的穩健操持,與釋出「一中各表」的空間,皆顯示兩岸對他可有大開大闔的期待。蕭萬長在二○○一年創建「兩岸共同市場基金會」,猶如唐吉訶德,他可說是台灣以個人身分致力建構兩岸平台的第一人;如今蕭萬長竟然成了「準副總統」,亦仍以促進兩岸交流雙贏為職志;七年前,誰想到蕭萬長有今日?誰又想到他的這個「基金會」如今竟成了打開兩岸關係的鑰匙?冥冥之中,深藏天機。

我們願意相信:胡蕭二人在人格深處皆可作為兩岸「變革」的代表人物,亦是共同促進兩岸「共贏」的可信任人物。因此,兩岸當局對此次博鰲之會,或許仍採試探性的保留態度,但我們期望,不要虛耗了這天造地設的契機,應當共同努力營造出一種「兩岸博鰲○八共識」的高度。

前文論及,台北與北京各自「兩岸政策」的「變革」,其實是深植在各自「國家治理」的「變革」之中。當北京的「國家治理」是以「和平崛起」與「民本」為主軸,而台北的「國家治理」是以「和平共生」與「民主」為主軸;台北就不可能採「台獨/鎖國」或「統一/賣台」的兩岸政策;北京則不可能「武力統一」,也不可能不設法維持「一中各表」的「現狀」。這就是「變革」,也才是「共贏」。

對於胡錦濤及蕭萬長而言,今年博鰲論壇的主題應當是:「多彩兩岸:在變革中實現共贏!」明年此時,我們仍期待蕭萬長能到博鰲小鎮。

Friday, April 4, 2008

Chen Shui-bian is Laughing at Us from the Window of the Presidential Palace

Chen Shui-bian is Laughing at Us from the Window of the Presidential Palace
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 3, 2008

The Chen administration is usually not referred to as the Chen administration, but as the "Bian administration." The Chen Hsieh rivalry is usually not referred to as the Chen Hsieh rivalry, but as the "Bian Hsieh rivalry." The media long ago became accustomed to referring to Chen Shui-bian as "Bian" instead of his surname "Chen."

This manner of address may well be unique. The media never referred to Lee Teng-hui as "Hui." Nor is it likely ever to refer to the Ma administration as the "Jiu administration."

Chen Shui-bian will henceforth be known simply as "Bian." The word "Bian" is the most distinctive character in his name. It captures the essense of Chen Shui-bian, in form, in sound, and in meaning. The nicknames "A-Bian," "Bian Zai," and "Bian" have a ring to them, a folksy feeling. They have a rustic air about them. The nickname "Bian" can mean that Chen Shui-bian has been shaped involuntarily by outside forces, that he was flattened after being stepped on. It can also mean that he lacks depth, that he lacks a fixed shape, that he is not "foursquare," but instead can be molded into any shape required.

Ironically this sums up Chen Shui-bian's character. He has a knack for sensing the public mood and for exploiting the dark side of human nature. He knows how to manipulate that dark side, how to incite grass roots discontent, how to exploit that discontent to subvert right and wrong. That is his essence. It is impossible for him to masquerade as a responsible national leader. His chameleon like character compels him to act out victimization dramas, to prove that he is the victim, when obviously he is the victimizer.

In the popular imagination the earth has two universal meanings. One. The earth is our mother. It nurtures us and gives us life. Two. Buried deep within the bowels of the earth is a dark realm known as Hell. Chen Shui-bian is a person who has transformed life on earth into a living hell.

Chen Shui-bian has occupied the office of the president, the highest office in the land, for eight years. During these eight long years he has revealed his true character. Chen character represents a peculiar sort of evil, an infantile evil. To cover up their roles in the State Confidential Expenses scandal, First Lady Wu Shu-chen used phony invoices. Chen Shui-bian invoked a transparently phony "Southern Front." The manner in which they attempted to cover up their corruption, is the manner in which some rural precinct chief would cover up his corruption. This lies they told are the kind of lies a kindergarten student tells. When Chen Shui-bian linked his UN Plebiscites with the ROC Presidential Election, he prayed that Washington would look the other way and forgive his antics as "election rhetoric." He hoped Beijing would make angry threats. He hoped the public on Taiwan would polarize itself into two camps. These are the kinds of amateurish stunts some ward heeler would pull, all the while fancying himself a Sunzi or a Clausewitz. Chen was simply not up to the challenge of balancing the strategic relationship between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. Therefore when Chen Shui-bian was bad, he appeared bad to the bone. But from another angle, he may simply have been taking a few short cuts.

As a result, the public on Taiwan has been of two minds about A Bian. Nativists have long shouted "Way to go, A Bian!" Whereas the opposition has long shouted "Down with A Bian!"

After eight years in office however, Chen Shui-bian has been triply damned. He has been damned by the Democratic Progressive Party, he has been damned by the Taiwan independence movement, and he has been damned by political reformers. One. He was shamelessly corrupt. That goes without saying. Two. He has betrayed the Taiwan independence movement. He has thoroughly undermined the Taiwan independence movement's moral and political legitimacy. Three. He has betrayed political reform by engaging in ruthless political intrigue. He has betrayed constitutional government, the rule of law, even society's fundamental standards of right and wrong. He has set a negative example, persuading some segments of society that winning is everything and the end justifies the means. Chen Shui-bian is the embodiment not of constitutional rule, but of Machievellian deceit. Democracy to him is nothing more than a tool of deception. This is how A Bian and the DPP have lost the hearts and minds of the people.

In 2000, Blue camp support was divided between Lien Chan and James Soong, enabling Chen Shui-bian to squeak into the presidential office. At the time Chen promoted a "New Centrist Path." Before and after he was sworn in to office, he paid visits to the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, he presented a wreath at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial, he openly paid indirect homage to Chinese national unity by swearing to "defend to the death the Republic of China." As we can see, Chen Shui-bian is a highly malleable piece of clay, capable of assuming any shape. But poor performance and pressure from Taiwan independence forces caused him to backslide. During his 2004 reelection campaign, he returned to demagoguing "Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution." He illegally linked plebiscites to the presidential election, determined to tear the nation apart merely so he could be reelected.

Chen Shui-bian's real downfall began in 2004, following his "reelection by a 30,000 vote margin." His "Bulletgate" election ploy caused voters to lose confidence in him and the system. The "Bulletgate" incident was highly suspicious. Even Vice President Annette Lu does not believe the government's conclusions. When this all too convenient incident happened to Chen Shui-bian, a habitual practitioner of political dirty tricks, the public had good reason to suspect its veracity. They concluded that "Without the truth, we have no president." They concluded that Chen was a "counterfeit president."

Thereafter, a bizarre succession of corruption cases broke, like explosions in an illegal fireworks factory. The economy became mired in depression. Entire families committing suicide by starting charcoal fires or jumping from buildings became routine news. To avoid political responsibility and legal prosecution, Chen Shui-bian attempted to save his own hide by trumpeting Taiwan independence, by reaching out to "Nativists" and immersing himself in "Nativism."

First Chen Shui-bian used the "Rectification of Names and the Authoring of a New Constitution" to consolidate support from Deep Greens, using them to shield himself from reformist elements within the DPP. Then Chen demolished the plaque on the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall Ceremonial Gateway, slandered Chiang Kai-shek's reputation, purged traces of Chiang Kai-shek's legacy, and illegally linked his plebiscites to the legislative and presidential elections. He hijacked DPP legislators, the legislative elections, and the presidential election. His modus operandi was clear. Use Taiwan independence to polarize the DPP and the nation, in order shield himself from prosecution and evade justice.

The nickname "Bian" is as rustic as the land it comes from. It befits someone billed as the "Son of Taiwan." Does anyone remember that? Chen Shui-bian proclaimed himself the "Son of Taiwan," the rightful heir to 400 years of blood and tears, the embodiment of "Taiwanese values." But Taiwan has awoken from its pipe dream. The "Son of Taiwan" has become the "Shame of Taiwan." Chen has tarnished that 400 year heritage. Chen has nullified the Democratic Progressive Party's claim to the "Nativist" crown. Chen has discredited the DPP nomenklatura Chen has inflicted deep and lasting damage on Taiwan as a whole. The "Son of Taiwan" has become the "Prodigal Son of Taiwan," the wasteful playboy who squanders the family fortune. The nickname "A Bian" is no longer a folksy term of affection. It now emits the stink of decay.

In 2000 Lee Teng-hui destroyed the Kuomintang. For this he was drummed out of the KMT. In 2008 Chen Shui-bian destroyed the Democratic Progressive Party. He destroyed the Taiwan independence movement. He destroyed Taiwan. Yet he still presumes the right to determine Taiwan's future. He presumes the right to lead the DPP's reform, and aspires to the party chairmanship. Chen Shui-bian hopes to continue operating between cracks he himself created within his own party. He hopes to use the forces of Taiwan independence to shield himself from the consequences of his own corruption.

Chen Shui-bian is probably standing at the window of the presidential palace right this moment laughing at everyone. Chen Shui-bian likes to laugh at others' gullibility. He laughed at the gullibility of 23 million voters on Taiwan. He laughed at their eagerness to swallow his "Nativist" rhetoric. He laughed at their naive faith in "Taiwan's democracy." He laughed at the comrades in his own party. He laughed at the gullibility of True Believers in the Taiwan independence movement.

陳水扁在總統府窗後偷笑
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.04.03 04:05 am

「扁政府」,卻不稱作「陳政府」;「扁謝情結」,卻不說是「陳謝情結」……。新聞界早已習稱陳水扁為「扁」,而不稱名道姓。

這種稱謂方法,恐是空前絕後;以前新聞用語未稱李登輝為「輝」,以後也大概不會有人稱馬政府為「九政府」。

阿扁,然後乾脆稱作「扁」。這個「扁」字,是陳水扁姓名中最與眾不同的一個字,也似乎是在「形/音/義」上最能象徵陳水扁的一個字。阿扁,扁仔,扁,叫起來,聳擱有力,叫出一種鄉里的親密感,也叫出了一種土地的氣息。若從字義看,扁字可以象徵被外力踩踏後的形狀,也顯示它原本就沒有厚度,不是方方正正的形狀,但亦表示它可能捏成任何形狀。

這似乎正是陳水扁的氣質形象。他能挖出土地的氣味,也能深掘人性中最隱微的那一條神經。他能揉捏土地,捏成各種他所能想像的形態;他擅於挑激草根人性,隨意操作是非善惡的標準。他原本的素質就是「扁」,因此不可能長期偽裝成一個方方正正的總統;而正因他的本質是「扁」,亦使他非常精於演出那種被踩踏的形象,當他自己明明是加害者時,他也能以被害者的面目出現。

土地,在普世皆有兩種意義。一、土地是母親,哺育生靈。二、地層深處有難測的凶險與罪惡,地獄就在那裡。陳水扁正是將「土地」與「地獄」交替操作得十分精到的能手。

陳水扁做了八年總統,那是民主政治中至高無上的地位;但是,他在道德形象及治國運作上的表現,卻時常暴露出一種像是十分幼稚的邪惡,又像是一種來自「地層深處」的邪惡。比如說,國務機要費案中吳淑珍用假發票報假帳,陳水扁又用「南線工作」來圓謊;這是里長層級的貪汙手法,也是幼稚園程度的謊言。再如,陳水扁操弄「公投綁大選」,希望美國能容忍他的「選舉語言」,希望中共能再被他激怒,希望台灣社會能再被他撕裂,這其實是鄉里角頭大哥一廂情願的戰略構想,當然禁不起「台/美/中」這種大尺度、大格局舞台的考驗。所以,陳水扁做的一些「壞事」,有時看起來壞到骨子裡;但換個角度來看又覺得很膚淺,都只是「炒短線」。

於是,陳水扁在台灣社會出現了兩種評價。「阿扁,加油!」是一種土地的回響;「阿扁,下台!」則是對地層深處罪惡煉獄的聲討。

陳水扁走到今日,他是民進黨、台獨及台灣「三合一的罪人」。所以至此,原因有三:一、「大貪奇腐」,這就不必多說了。二、「玩弄台獨」,他已將台獨的道德形象及操作的可能性糟蹋淨盡。三、「唯權謀主義」及「泛權謀主義」,他將民主法治的準則,甚至文明社會的是非善惡標準完全毀棄,將「權謀」當作政治天地中的唯一權威與信仰。陳水扁未曾體現「民主政治」,他所經營的是「泛權謀政治」,民主只是其玩弄權謀的工具;這也正是他最後喪盡民心的原因。

其實,在二○○○年,陳水扁因連宋分裂而首度當選總統時,他確曾努力推行「新中間路線」。當年他在就任前後,進謁國父紀念館,向中正紀念堂獻花,甚至公開「遙祭黃陵」,再宣示「誓死捍衛中華民國」。可見,陳水扁這一塊扁扁的泥土,可以捏成任何形狀。但是,由於政績日趨惡化及台獨勢力向他擠兌,為了競選二 ○○四年連任,他又走回「正名制憲」的老路,並操作「公投綁大選」,決定要以撕裂國家贏得連任。

陳水扁的真正墮落及失敗,正是從二○○四年以三萬票的勝差贏得連任後開始。兩顆子彈使國人對他失去信任,也使他自己失去信心。兩顆子彈事件當然是疑竇重重,迄今的偵查結論連呂秀蓮都不相信;更深層的理由則是,這件奇案發生在陳水扁這個權謀家身上,使國人有了猜疑的權利,亦沒有不生猜疑的理由。於是,「沒有真相,沒有總統」的質疑四起,「偽總統」的說法流傳市井。

接著,就像地下爆竹工廠失火一般,一連串匪夷所思的貪腐大案轟隆轟隆地爆開;社會經濟又更趨惡化,燒炭、跳樓變成了例常新聞。陳水扁為了逃避政治責任及法律懲罰,竟然全面發動「以獨救貪」的大戰,不惜「毀國自救」。他伸手探入他熟悉的「土地」,再穿透「土地」,進入了地層深處的罪惡淵藪。

陳水扁先用「正名制憲」綁住了深綠勢力,藉深綠勢力抵擋了民進黨內改革派;再用「拆匾/鞭屍/去蔣」及「公投綁大選」,挾持了民進黨的立委及總統選舉……。他的手法是:用台獨來漂染貪腐,用撕裂黨及撕裂國家,企圖使自己在裂縫中逃過應受的天譴及現世報。

「扁」,是像土地那麼土的名字,也是最適配的「台灣之子」之名。仍記得否?陳水扁自封「台灣之子」,宣稱承繼著四百年來的移民血淚,宣稱自己代表台灣價值;但是,如今黃粱夢醒,陳水扁卻成了台灣之恥,台灣民間四百年的精神大旗也因他汙染;他不但玷汙了四百年的台灣民間傳承,更毀了民進黨所代表的「本土」冠冕,也毀了民進黨的幾代菁英;至於他對台灣整體所造成的傷害,尤是創巨痛深。「台灣之子」變成了「台灣的敗家子」。這個「扁」字,聽起來不再有土地的親密感,卻彷彿傳來陣陣地層深處的腥腐氣味。

李登輝在二○○○年毀了國民黨,最後他受到逐出國民黨的懲罰;但陳水扁如今毀了民進黨、毀了台獨,也毀了台灣,他卻仍然逍遙若此,三不五時仍要指點江山,似乎還要主導民進黨的「改革」,甚至傳出他將回鍋競選黨主席。陳水扁如今在自己所製造的裂縫中安然自得,未有報應,果然實現了他「以獨救貪」、「毀國自救」的大陰謀。

此刻的陳水扁也許正站在總統府的窗後偷笑。偷笑,正是陳水扁常有的反應。他對兩千三百萬人偷笑,對台灣的土地偷笑,對台灣的民主偷笑,對民進黨偷笑,也對台獨偷笑!

Wednesday, April 2, 2008

Beijing is the Key to the 1992 Consensus

Beijing is the Key to the 1992 Consensus
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 2, 2008

The protagonists were the same. The setting was the same. When Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou met yesterday, it was virtually a scene by scene reenactment of their meeting two years ago. Especially in terms of the total lack of consensus between them over the 1992 Consensus. The result of this closely watched "Chen Ma Meeting" was a "Chen Ma Debate" that resulted in "One 1992 Consensus, Two Different Interpretations."

The only difference is that two years ago, Chen Shui-bian was a sitting president who wielded full power. Now he is a lame duck with less than two months left in his term. Only two years ago, Ma Ying-jeou was a humble opposition party chairman. Now he is president elect. President Chen again insisted "There is no so-called 1992 consensus," and in any event it was "a thing of the past." Ma Ying-jeou on the other hand, maintains that "There was a 1992 Consensus" and that it may become "a thing of the future."

This total lack of consensus between the Blue and Green camps over cross-strait policy has been the norm for years. The KMT has repeatedly cited a series of messages between the two sides, proving there was a verbal consensus concerning "One China, Different Interpretations," and confirming that the two sides subsequently conducted a number of cross-strait talks predicated on this consensus. The DPP maintains that there is no written record showing that the two sides signed a 1992 Consensus. The Blue and Green camps have never reached a consensus in this eight year long dispute. Instead their exchanges have been an endless round of "Says you? says me!" This situation, in which each side expresses its own view, is itself a case of "Different Interpretations."

The Democratic Progressive Party would like to reduce the 1992 Consensus to a matter of textual research. There was no formal document with the two words "1992 Consensus" on the cover. Therefore, they argue, "The 1992 Consensus doesn't exist." For the Kuomintang the 1992 Consensus is an issue of hermeneutics. Although the communiques between the two sides may be scattered, ultimately they add up to a tacit understanding. This allows different perceptions on each side, and allows each side to set aside its differences. Hence "Different Interpretations." This mutual tolerance, this rhetorical expediency is a solution to the insoluble dispute over sovereignty. After all, if we don't proceed on this basis, then talks will remain stalled on issues of reunification vs. independence. Of course, if one wishes to engage in legal sophistry, one can simply claim that the consensus does not exist. This of course is what President Chen is doing, with an air of righteousness.

If each side refuses to yields to the other, then whose view is adopted depends entirely upon who is in office. The DPP has been in office for nearly eight years. Cross-strait relations have been conducted on the basis that "There is no 1992 Consensus." The outcome of this approach is clear to see -- an eight year cross-strait stalemate. The SEF and ARATS have ceased interacting. Direct flights, mainland tourism, currency exchanges have all remain stalled. Besides satisfying the requirements of their fundamentalist ideology, the DPP has never offered any alternative.

The KMT is back in office. Ma Ying-jeou has reintroduced the 1992 Consensus which the DPP kept stuffed in the bottom of a chest for eight years. He has announced that the SEF and ARATS will soon resume their dialogue. The Bush/Hu Meeting reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus. The world has been paying close attention, hoping that the cross-strait freeze can be further melted.

Frankly, whether there was in fact any 1992 Consensus is no longer the point. The point is whether both sides felt they had arrived at an mutally acceptable understanding. Chen Shui-bian pointed out a problem. Since Beijing recognizes the 1992 Consensus, that means it recognizes the "Different Expressions" clause. During their Chen/Ma Meeting Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian declared that if Beijing refuses to recognize "Different Expressions," then all bets are off. In other words, the ball is now in Beijing's court. If Beijing wishes to underscore only "One China" to the exclusion of "Different Interpretations," then Ma Ying-jeou will face tough resistance from the Green Camp when it comes to cross-strait policy. Beijing must be clear on this point.

Similarly, if the two sides can interact on the basis of the "One China, Different Interpretations" consensus reached in 1992, then the DPP will have to get past its resistance to "One China." At the very least the DPP must adopt Chen Shui-bian's "Return to the Spirit of 1992" approach. The DPP must stop seeing its struggle with the KMT over cross-strait policy as a zero sum game. It must see it as a win/win game. If the DPP remains mired in its ideological fundamentalism, if it refuses to emerge from its self-imposed isolation, if it refuses to walk into the light, then Taiwan will continue to spin its wheels for years to come.

「九二共識」落實與否的關鍵在北京
中國時報
2008.04.02 

同樣的主角,近似的場景,陳水扁與馬英九昨日的會面,簡直形同拿著兩年前雙方會面的劇本,重新再對了一遍詞。特別是針對當初到底有沒有九二共識這回事,雙方的對話完全未見交集,結果讓這場眾所矚目的「扁馬會」,結結實實的演成了「扁馬辯」,成為「一個九二共識,各自表述」的局面。

唯一不同的是,兩年前陳水扁還是權傾一時的總統,如今則是剩沒兩個月就要卸任,而馬英九兩年前只是個在野的陽春黨主席,如今則是即將接棒的準總統,陳總統再怎麼堅持「根本沒有所謂九二共識」,也即將會是「過去完成式」,而馬英九所堅持的「確有九二共識這回事」,則可能成為「未來進行式」。

這場沒有交集的對話,其實就是過去幾年藍綠陣營在兩岸政策上,劃開彼此分歧的最大焦點。國民黨一再舉出一連串兩岸往來函電的文件,證明雙方確曾有過「各自表述一中」的口頭共識,也根據這個共識進行過多次兩岸兩會的商談;而民進黨則是強調根據所有的書面文獻,根本沒有任何正式紀錄,顯示雙方有白紙黑字簽下宣稱為「九二共識」的文件。這項爭議在過去八年藍綠陣營從來沒有達成過「共識」,一直就是你說你的「有九二共識」,我說我的「沒有九二共識」,這種各說各話的狀態,呈現的其實就是「各自表述」的狀態。

在民進黨看來,九二共識是個文獻考據學的問題,既然沒有一份正式文書協議找得到有「九二共識」這四個字,當然就可振振有詞的宣稱九二共識根本不存在。但對國民黨而言,九二共識是個詮釋學的問題,儘管許多文字散見雙方往來的函電中,但最終它其實是一種不直接形諸文字的「默契」,這當然涉及雙方主觀認知可能有所不同,但也預留了彼此「求同存異」的曖昧空間,所以才說是「各自表述」。這種彼此容忍對方「各執一詞」的操作,是在雙方主權爭議根本無解的狀態下,所設想出的一種修辭學上的權宜,畢竟不這麼做,什麼問題就全卡在這統統不必談了。當然若是依「律師性格」的角度思考,當然可以主張其根本不存在,這也就是陳總統到現在都理直氣壯的原因。

如果誰也說服不了誰,結論就變成由誰執政,就採取誰的立場,再看看究竟是誰的觀點較為管用了。如今民進黨執政即將滿八年,在兩岸問題上這八年一路堅持的就是「沒有九二共識」,結局倒是也很清楚,兩岸就是這麼僵持了八年,海基海協兩會的互動完全凍結,什麼直航、觀光、通匯等統統都在原地踏步,而民進黨也從未證明,他們的堅持除了能滿足意識形態上的需求,還能有其它的出路。

如今換做國民黨再度執政了,馬英九將八年前已經被塵封在箱底的「九二共識」論述再度提出來,而且表明要很快啟動海基海協的對話平台,再加上「布胡會」的對話也提及了九二共識,因而也等於說全球都在睜大眼睛看,已經形同被鎖緊的兩岸關係,能不能在這種論述的復活上,重新再見到鬆綁。

不諱言說,如今到底有沒有九二共識早已不是重點,重點在於各方究竟有無認可這個共識?陳水扁確實點出了一個問題,即北京當局所認知的「九二共識」,是否已包含了認可「各表」在內?馬英九也在扁馬會中表明,如果北京未來根本不承認「各表」,那他也談不下去了!這也等於說,這個球已經踢到北京那裡了,如果北京方面未來只願意強調「一中」,卻對「各表」不願表態,那麼講實在話,馬英九未來在推動兩岸政策上,走勢將面臨來自綠營強硬的抵制。這一點,北京真的不能再模糊了。

同樣的,如果兩岸未來真能在「一中各表」的九二共識基礎上展開互動,那麼民進黨也就該選擇超越了,至少民進黨完全可以依據陳水扁當年所提出的「回歸九二精神」原則,對國民黨未來的兩岸政策進行非零和的制衡,這也是我們所樂見的良性循環。畢竟如果民進黨永遠只讓自己停留在意識形態的糾纏上,不願意積極走出來,那麼台灣未來恐怕也將持續在同樣的爭議中原地踏步下去。