Restore the National Security Council to its Constitutionally Delegated Role
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 14, 2008
As a result of the PNG scandal, former head of the National Security Council Choiu I-jen is divorced and reduced to eating instant ramen noodles. The new administration's National Security Council appointments are being finalized. The recently announced National Security Council appointments consist almost exclusively of academics. The impression such appointments leave is that least scholars such as these are unlikely to perpetrate another Taiwan Goals scandal or PNG scandal.
This is a desirable reaction to the negative example set by the outgoing DPP. This has led to repeated warnings that President elect Ma Ying-jeou not allow the reincarnation of Chen Che-nan, Ma Yongcheng, and Chiou I-jen in his administration. Let this be the end of cliques close to the center of power, plotting behind the scenes, handing down orders from "The Man." As newly-appointed National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi said, the new National Security Council will be one with "integrity and professionalism." Or as newly-appointed Under Secretary-General Ho Shi-ying said, the new National Security Council will not be the Overlord of the Executive Yuan. These two statements are healthy responses to outside expressions of concern.
Actually, during the Democratic Progressive Party's eight years in office, the National Security Council had no shortage of professionals. Many of them were low-profile individuals responsible for key decisions. But under Chiou I-jen's control the system changed completely. The National Security Council became the Overlord of the Executive Yuan. It bypassed normal administrative procedures and implemented national defense and foreign policy, leading to dire consequences. Much of this will require cleanup by the incoming Ma administration.
The National Security Council's function was purely advisory. When it became a decision-maker and directly involved on the front lines, the inevitable result was national policy formulated by a bunch of amateurs, dumped in the laps of professionals to be implemented. For example, the euphemistically-named "Second Financial Reform Campaign," which severely harmed Taiwan's financial system, was based on just such a decision-making model. The Ministry of Finance, which should have been in charge, was reduced to executing National Security Council policy. President Chen Shui-bian's numerous attempts at "transit diplomacy" were another example. Chen's "transit diplomacy" was directed by the National Security Council. Professional diplomats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were relegated to taking orders and carrying them out.
Ignoring the system and the rules allowed Wu Nai-jen, who knew only how to run an election campaign, to organize the Taiwan Goals military arms procurement company. Department of Defense officials, who should have been in charge of submitting a defense budget, were kept totally out of the loop. This allowed the establishment of diplomatic relations with PNG to be entrusted to two middlemen of ill repute. The only duty the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was assigned was to obediently deposit one billion NT into their private bank accounts.
Can arms procurements related to national defense and national security be treated so lightly? Can the establishment of diplomatic relations affecting diplomatic strategy be handled so cavalierly? It's bad enough they violated professional decision-making procedures. Even more intolerable is that these operations often involve major conspiracies. Hundreds of millions in public funds simply evaporate. The executive branch is unable to investigate, and the legislative branch is unable to supervise. The Ministry of Audit remains in limbo. Even after major leaks appeared, the judicial branch still had difficulty prosecuting. The PNG scandal is a textbook case. Key figure Ching Chi-ju is nowhere to be found. The probability of recovering the one billion dollars embezzled is slim. The loss of public funds is bad enough. What's worse is that vital national interests may also have been sacrificed.
This is why the new administration's National Security Council appointments will be the subject of public attention. The public wants President elect Ma Ying-jeou to take these negative examples as a cautionary tale, and prevent them from happening again. Ma Ying-jeou knows what the community expects. Su Chi will lead the National Security Council. Academics dominate the council. This fact will determine the council's future. Theoreticians and analysts make ideal presidential advisors. Such a team will merely offer advice on cross-strait, diplomatic, defense, political and economic strategy. It will not become a shadow government directing the executive branch. It is unlikely to exceed its authority by attempting to execute policy.
To rehabilitate the National Security Council, we must restore it to its constitutionally-defined role. It must fulfill its original role as a national security think-tank. Integrity and Professionalism must be more than a slogan. It must be the constitutional norm.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.05.14
讓國安團隊回歸憲政上應有的角色
中時社論
就在昔日掌控綠營國安系統的邱義仁，因為巴紐弊案而淪為吃泡麵的宅男之際，新政府在國安系統的人事布局也陸續底定，日前公布的國安會諮詢委員名單，幾乎清 一色都是由學者出任，這樣的組合，至少給人的第一印象是：這群書生總不會再弄出個鐽震弊案，甚至再鬧出個巴紐弊案了吧！
沒錯，就是因為 負面的示範效應實在太強烈了，才會讓各界最近不斷的叮囑準總統馬英九，千萬別再讓類似陳哲男、馬永成、邱義仁這類型的角色，再在新政府中變身大復活。這個 由一群所謂「接近層峰」核心人士隱身幕後，頻頻交辦「老闆指示」的年代，應該讓它終結掉了。正如同準國安會祕書長蘇起所說的：未來的國安會一定會是「正派 經營、專業至上」！或是如準副祕書長何思因所說：未來的國安會絕不會是行政院的太上皇！這兩個特別的聲明，當然就是衝著外界的疑慮而來。
不諱言說，民進黨執政的這八年間，職掌國安系統的首長，並不乏專業人士，其中有不少人也曾相當低調主導若干關鍵的決策，但這一切都在邱義仁執掌期間「淋漓 盡致」的發揮下開始走調，不僅國安系統逐漸變成為凌駕行政院的太上皇，更經常繞過正常的行政程序來執行國防與外交政策，其所造成的負面效應，不少都必須要 等新政府上台後才能收拾了。
要知道，當一個原本僅具參謀諮詢功能的國安會，經常性的成為實質的決策單位，甚至還直接介入第一線執行，勢 必將造成國家許多重大政策的規畫，變成由一群並不專業的「核心人士」主導制定，然後再交由行政單位執行。例如當初關係台灣金融體制結構轉變的「二次金改」 政策，就是循這樣的模式拍板，而真正該負最後政治責任的財政部，卻只有照單執行的份。再例如陳水扁總統任內多次的「過境外交」，也幾乎大部分都由國安系統 主導，真正專業的外交部也只有聽命辦事的份。
也就是因為這一切既不顧體制也不講章法，才會出現一個原本只擅長輔選的吳乃仁，竟被找來籌 組軍火買賣的鐽震公司，而必須為國防預算負政治責任的國防部主管官員，竟然全在狀況外！同樣的也因為這樣，才會讓與巴紐建交這般重大的外交任務，竟然交給 兩個聲名狼藉的掮客去穿梭操作，外交部唯一的角色，就是乖乖的將十億元匯到他們私人的戶頭裡！
試問：事關國防安全的軍售事宜，能這樣輕 率的處理嗎？事涉外交戰略的建交事宜，能這樣的荒唐操作嗎？如果只是違反決策專業也就罷了，最讓人不能接受的是，這些操作的背後往往總是埋藏了重大的人謀 不臧，動輒數以億計的公帑可能就這麼從人間蒸發了，這中間不僅行政部門無從查核，立法部門無從監督、監察部門遲未開張，甚至在捅出重大紕漏後，連司法部門 的追訴都困難重重。巴紐弊案不就是現成例子？關鍵人物金紀玖已經找不到了，十億元追回機率更是渺茫。而如果僅只是鉅額公帑的損失那也還好，怕的是許多關係 重大的國家利益也一併賠進去了。
也因為這樣，新政府會怎麼布局國安系統的人事，才會受到各界的矚目，社會輿論也才會再三叮囑準總統馬英 九，務必以綠營的這些負面示範為戒，千萬別再讓類似情況重演。馬英九顯然也注意到了這個社會期待，以蘇起為首的國安諮詢委員團隊，學院出身背景的占了絕大 多數，這種組合當然也就決定了這個部門的性質，一群以理論思辨與形勢研判見長的團隊，最適合擔綱的角色當然就是總統諮詢的幕僚。換言之，這個組合只能夠就 兩岸、外交、國防的政經戰略提供建言，不可能有能耐成為幕後指揮行政部門的影舞者，更不可能越俎代庖介入實際的執行。
也可以說，讓國安系統重建其正面形象最好的機會，就是讓它回歸到憲政上的應然角色，忠實履行其國安智囊的功能，讓「正派經營、專業至上」不只是一口號，更是一種應然的憲政規範。
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Presidential Pardons Must Not Become Bargaining Chips
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 13, 2008
The DPP legislative caucus proposes amending the Accounting Law. It wants to use political sleight of hand to spare Chen Shui-bian and his wife from prosecution for the State Confidential Expenses case, by obliterating the distinction between that case and the Government Heads Special Expenses cases. In order to goad KMT legislators into supporting their proposal, the Green camp has demanded passage of the bill within the week. President Chen Shui-bian would then pardon Ma Ying-jeou's secretary Yu Wen before Chen leaves office. When the proposal provoked too much controversy, the Green camp stipulated there would be no preconditions to Chen's pardon for Yu Wen.
Whether some high-ranking DPP official or Chen Shui-bian himself cooked up this illegal and sleazy political quid pro quo, is of secondary importance. What's important is it reveals Chen Shui-bian's anxiety about the inevitable legal consequences once he leaves office.
The State Confidential Expenses case and the Government Heads Special Expenses case are not the same thing. The Special Expenses case involves two points. According to the evidence, Yu Wen harbored no criminal intent when he used false invoices to request reimbursement. There is no disagreement on this point. The only part that is unclear is the part that requires receipts. But according to the letter of the law, everyone is guilty. This is the part that is controversial and does not accord with the rule of law. This is the part of the Government Head Special Expenses issue that requires an amendment. The law should be amended to stipulate that Special Expenses paid to government heads, depending on their duties, require receipts for the estimated expenditure limit. According to the criminal code, once the new law is enacted, it will apply. Naturally such cases will no longer be prosecuted. As to false invoices, the part concerning forged documents was quite clear. Where is the need for a pardon? Are the State Confidential Expenses case and the Special Expenses case really the same? Can they really be equated? Using false invoices to requisition State Confidential Expenses is a criminal offense. Invoking the Special Expenses case to absolve State Confidential Expenses case violators is totally unwarranted.
The motives for the proposed political deal were suspect. If the intention was to amend the law so that a single standard would prevail, then according to existing laws Yu Wen's sentence could no longer be imposed. In which case, why would he need a Presidential Pardon?
This is not all we are concerned about. Yu Wen's offense was forgery. He used a small number of large fake invoices, instead of a large number of small invoices. He did it for administrative expedience. He was not guilty of graft. But the court ruled that he was guilty of forging official documents, therefore he was not entirely innocent. Yu Wen's one year sentence elicited public sympathy. . But that was due to the severity of the sentence. Particularly compared to the "Princes of the DPP," who were treated with kid gloves and who got off scot-free. Public outrage is understandable. Had Yu Wen insisted he was totally innocent, public support for his pardon would have been less passionate. No matter who is president, a commuted sentence or partial pardon for Yu Wen would be understandable. But if one pronounces him not guilty and grants him a presidential pardon, then controversy will be unavoidable.
Above all, the president may not pardon himself. President Chen Shui-bian does have the right to pardon Yu Wen. But absolutely no right to pardon himself. But what difference is there between pardoning himself, and using Yu Wen as a bargaining chip in exchange for a Legislative Yuan amendment that absolves Chen of responsibility for crimes committed? If such a scheme succeeds. then Ma Ying-jeou, who is about to take office, and anyone who follows, will be the biggest beneficiaries. They will be immune from prosecution for major crimes commited while in office. Then on the eve of their departure, they can either pardon themselves or make a political deal and get off scot-free. Anyone who becomes president will be above the law and get away with anything.
Why did someone as smart as Nixon not pardon himself, but instead wait for his successor President Ford to pardon him? How unfortunate, or perhaps fortunate, Taiwan is, not to have its counterpart to Nixon, a politician who knowing he could no longer cover up his crimes, stepped down and thereby received a pardon.
If President Chen Shui-bian is motivated exclusively by legitimate concerns about his presidential powers, rather than selfish motives, he should pardon Yu Wen. Although Yu Wen may be guilty, he deserves compassion. He does not deserve a one year in prison.
Chen can remedy an injustice before he steps down. He can even win public applause and leave a positive final impression. We don't know who proposed this sleazy political quid pro quo. We only know that it was a counterproductive move that left the impression President Chen was eager to reap a private benefit at public expense.
The President enjoys the right to pardon individuals because he is the head of state. The proposal that Chen be let off the hook in exchange for pardoning Yu Wen not only turned Yu Wen into a bargaining chip, it also diminished the stature of the president. Now the fear is that Yu Wen, who had a chance of being pardoned on the merits of his case, will lose that chance as a result of this abortive political deal.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.05.13
「特赦」絕不能淪為政治交易的籌碼
中時社論
民進黨立院黨團提案修正會計法，要和政治稀泥，將阿扁夫婦的國務機要費案，與其他政府首長的特別費案所引發的法律責任一起除罪化；為了使國民黨立委支持此議，綠營一度提出只要本周順利三讀修法，陳水扁總統就會於卸任前，特赦馬英九特別費案中遭到判刑的秘書余文。後來大概是發現爭議太大，又宣稱特赦余文沒有附加條件。
不論是民進黨高層，還是陳水扁本人，當初會想出這樣一樁有違法理、更欠格調的政治交易，多少透露出阿扁對卸任後難免司法究責一事心急如焚的程度。
先要講清楚的是，國務機要費案與首長特別費案，並不是一回事。特別費案涉及兩個部分，其中檢據報銷的部分，用假發票報銷，觸犯刑事，屬有無犯罪意圖的事實問題，法律上並無重大爭議；只有領據結帳的那一部分，才有支付屬性不明，單憑行政函令入人於罪，不合法治原則的爭議問題。需要修法解決的首長特別費就是領據結帳的這一部分，應改以法律明確規定，支領特別費的首長，需視其職務需要預估難以取得憑證的支出額度，概以領據方式結帳。新法一經制定，雖係未來適用，但依然符合刑事訴訟上「從輕從新」的法律原則，此類案件自然也就不會再予追究。至於檢據報銷使用假發票的問題，偽造文書的部分本來相當明確，哪有除罪的理由或必要？而且國務機要費與特別費性質是否相同，能否相提並論，很有爭議。使用假發票報帳支領國務機要費的偽造文書問題，本該追究刑責，更無理由依照特別費領據結帳的部分修法除罪。
原先擬議中的政治交易，居心似有可疑。如果真如所說修法一體除罪，余文判刑部分依現行法律已可不予執行，又何須總統特赦？
而我們所關心的尚不只此。余文觸犯的是偽造文書之罪，他用假的大額發票取代真的小額發票，圖個行政方便，並沒有犯貪瀆罪，但是法院論以偽造文書罪，並不完全冤枉。確實，余文判刑一年，引起了社會同情，我們就曾率先表示哀憐，但那還是因為情輕法重的緣故，尤其相對於其他政治天王們可以獲得檢方追訴高舉輕放的待遇言之，予人產生「情理」上的不平；從「法律」上言，余文事後若自以為無罪，恐怕原本主張特赦的社會支持也會變得稀薄起來。不管是哪位總統，若是給予余文減刑或是部分赦免，或還說的過去；要是逕以其為無罪而辦理特赦，恐怕難免非議。
最最不能放過的，則是總統絕不可以利用赦免權力赦免自己的原則。陳水扁總統確實有權特赦余文，但是絕對無權自己赦免自己。然而，不能赦免自己的總統，用赦免余文作為交易籌碼，換取立法院修法將自己可能觸犯的罪責除罪，和使用赦免權赦免自己，又有什麼分別呢？如果此計可以得逞，那麼甫將上任的馬英九先生，還有以後任何擔任總統的人，恐怕會是最大的受益者。他們若是犯下任何滔天大罪，不但在任內可以不受追訴，離職前夕還可動用赦免權赦免自己，或是援例從事政治交易，如此一來，「總統」可就真是無法無天、恣意妄為的職位了！
假如總統可以這麼做，聰明如尼克森者，當年為何還要由繼任的福特總統給予赦免而自不自我赦免呢？台灣何其不幸，又何其有幸，沒有出過一個自知難掩其罪而自行下台才獲赦免的尼克森總統！
陳水扁總統若是完全出於總統職權的正當考量，而不是任何自私自利的動機，只因悲憫余文固然有罪，卻罪不至於入監一年，單純地動用特赦權力，在下台前平撫一下社會上為政治弱勢抱屈的不平心理，或可博得許多掌聲，留下一個最後的行善身影。然而不知是誰提出了這樁不堪入目的政治交易，反而顯得陳總統是要以私害公，竟致壞了一件善舉？
總統所以享有赦免權，是因為身居國家元首的高度。用余文換總統的提議，不僅讓余文淪為籌碼，也把總統給做小了。如今只怕原本可
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 13, 2008
The DPP legislative caucus proposes amending the Accounting Law. It wants to use political sleight of hand to spare Chen Shui-bian and his wife from prosecution for the State Confidential Expenses case, by obliterating the distinction between that case and the Government Heads Special Expenses cases. In order to goad KMT legislators into supporting their proposal, the Green camp has demanded passage of the bill within the week. President Chen Shui-bian would then pardon Ma Ying-jeou's secretary Yu Wen before Chen leaves office. When the proposal provoked too much controversy, the Green camp stipulated there would be no preconditions to Chen's pardon for Yu Wen.
Whether some high-ranking DPP official or Chen Shui-bian himself cooked up this illegal and sleazy political quid pro quo, is of secondary importance. What's important is it reveals Chen Shui-bian's anxiety about the inevitable legal consequences once he leaves office.
The State Confidential Expenses case and the Government Heads Special Expenses case are not the same thing. The Special Expenses case involves two points. According to the evidence, Yu Wen harbored no criminal intent when he used false invoices to request reimbursement. There is no disagreement on this point. The only part that is unclear is the part that requires receipts. But according to the letter of the law, everyone is guilty. This is the part that is controversial and does not accord with the rule of law. This is the part of the Government Head Special Expenses issue that requires an amendment. The law should be amended to stipulate that Special Expenses paid to government heads, depending on their duties, require receipts for the estimated expenditure limit. According to the criminal code, once the new law is enacted, it will apply. Naturally such cases will no longer be prosecuted. As to false invoices, the part concerning forged documents was quite clear. Where is the need for a pardon? Are the State Confidential Expenses case and the Special Expenses case really the same? Can they really be equated? Using false invoices to requisition State Confidential Expenses is a criminal offense. Invoking the Special Expenses case to absolve State Confidential Expenses case violators is totally unwarranted.
The motives for the proposed political deal were suspect. If the intention was to amend the law so that a single standard would prevail, then according to existing laws Yu Wen's sentence could no longer be imposed. In which case, why would he need a Presidential Pardon?
This is not all we are concerned about. Yu Wen's offense was forgery. He used a small number of large fake invoices, instead of a large number of small invoices. He did it for administrative expedience. He was not guilty of graft. But the court ruled that he was guilty of forging official documents, therefore he was not entirely innocent. Yu Wen's one year sentence elicited public sympathy. . But that was due to the severity of the sentence. Particularly compared to the "Princes of the DPP," who were treated with kid gloves and who got off scot-free. Public outrage is understandable. Had Yu Wen insisted he was totally innocent, public support for his pardon would have been less passionate. No matter who is president, a commuted sentence or partial pardon for Yu Wen would be understandable. But if one pronounces him not guilty and grants him a presidential pardon, then controversy will be unavoidable.
Above all, the president may not pardon himself. President Chen Shui-bian does have the right to pardon Yu Wen. But absolutely no right to pardon himself. But what difference is there between pardoning himself, and using Yu Wen as a bargaining chip in exchange for a Legislative Yuan amendment that absolves Chen of responsibility for crimes committed? If such a scheme succeeds. then Ma Ying-jeou, who is about to take office, and anyone who follows, will be the biggest beneficiaries. They will be immune from prosecution for major crimes commited while in office. Then on the eve of their departure, they can either pardon themselves or make a political deal and get off scot-free. Anyone who becomes president will be above the law and get away with anything.
Why did someone as smart as Nixon not pardon himself, but instead wait for his successor President Ford to pardon him? How unfortunate, or perhaps fortunate, Taiwan is, not to have its counterpart to Nixon, a politician who knowing he could no longer cover up his crimes, stepped down and thereby received a pardon.
If President Chen Shui-bian is motivated exclusively by legitimate concerns about his presidential powers, rather than selfish motives, he should pardon Yu Wen. Although Yu Wen may be guilty, he deserves compassion. He does not deserve a one year in prison.
Chen can remedy an injustice before he steps down. He can even win public applause and leave a positive final impression. We don't know who proposed this sleazy political quid pro quo. We only know that it was a counterproductive move that left the impression President Chen was eager to reap a private benefit at public expense.
The President enjoys the right to pardon individuals because he is the head of state. The proposal that Chen be let off the hook in exchange for pardoning Yu Wen not only turned Yu Wen into a bargaining chip, it also diminished the stature of the president. Now the fear is that Yu Wen, who had a chance of being pardoned on the merits of his case, will lose that chance as a result of this abortive political deal.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.05.13
「特赦」絕不能淪為政治交易的籌碼
中時社論
民進黨立院黨團提案修正會計法，要和政治稀泥，將阿扁夫婦的國務機要費案，與其他政府首長的特別費案所引發的法律責任一起除罪化；為了使國民黨立委支持此議，綠營一度提出只要本周順利三讀修法，陳水扁總統就會於卸任前，特赦馬英九特別費案中遭到判刑的秘書余文。後來大概是發現爭議太大，又宣稱特赦余文沒有附加條件。
不論是民進黨高層，還是陳水扁本人，當初會想出這樣一樁有違法理、更欠格調的政治交易，多少透露出阿扁對卸任後難免司法究責一事心急如焚的程度。
先要講清楚的是，國務機要費案與首長特別費案，並不是一回事。特別費案涉及兩個部分，其中檢據報銷的部分，用假發票報銷，觸犯刑事，屬有無犯罪意圖的事實問題，法律上並無重大爭議；只有領據結帳的那一部分，才有支付屬性不明，單憑行政函令入人於罪，不合法治原則的爭議問題。需要修法解決的首長特別費就是領據結帳的這一部分，應改以法律明確規定，支領特別費的首長，需視其職務需要預估難以取得憑證的支出額度，概以領據方式結帳。新法一經制定，雖係未來適用，但依然符合刑事訴訟上「從輕從新」的法律原則，此類案件自然也就不會再予追究。至於檢據報銷使用假發票的問題，偽造文書的部分本來相當明確，哪有除罪的理由或必要？而且國務機要費與特別費性質是否相同，能否相提並論，很有爭議。使用假發票報帳支領國務機要費的偽造文書問題，本該追究刑責，更無理由依照特別費領據結帳的部分修法除罪。
原先擬議中的政治交易，居心似有可疑。如果真如所說修法一體除罪，余文判刑部分依現行法律已可不予執行，又何須總統特赦？
而我們所關心的尚不只此。余文觸犯的是偽造文書之罪，他用假的大額發票取代真的小額發票，圖個行政方便，並沒有犯貪瀆罪，但是法院論以偽造文書罪，並不完全冤枉。確實，余文判刑一年，引起了社會同情，我們就曾率先表示哀憐，但那還是因為情輕法重的緣故，尤其相對於其他政治天王們可以獲得檢方追訴高舉輕放的待遇言之，予人產生「情理」上的不平；從「法律」上言，余文事後若自以為無罪，恐怕原本主張特赦的社會支持也會變得稀薄起來。不管是哪位總統，若是給予余文減刑或是部分赦免，或還說的過去；要是逕以其為無罪而辦理特赦，恐怕難免非議。
最最不能放過的，則是總統絕不可以利用赦免權力赦免自己的原則。陳水扁總統確實有權特赦余文，但是絕對無權自己赦免自己。然而，不能赦免自己的總統，用赦免余文作為交易籌碼，換取立法院修法將自己可能觸犯的罪責除罪，和使用赦免權赦免自己，又有什麼分別呢？如果此計可以得逞，那麼甫將上任的馬英九先生，還有以後任何擔任總統的人，恐怕會是最大的受益者。他們若是犯下任何滔天大罪，不但在任內可以不受追訴，離職前夕還可動用赦免權赦免自己，或是援例從事政治交易，如此一來，「總統」可就真是無法無天、恣意妄為的職位了！
假如總統可以這麼做，聰明如尼克森者，當年為何還要由繼任的福特總統給予赦免而自不自我赦免呢？台灣何其不幸，又何其有幸，沒有出過一個自知難掩其罪而自行下台才獲赦免的尼克森總統！
陳水扁總統若是完全出於總統職權的正當考量，而不是任何自私自利的動機，只因悲憫余文固然有罪，卻罪不至於入監一年，單純地動用特赦權力，在下台前平撫一下社會上為政治弱勢抱屈的不平心理，或可博得許多掌聲，留下一個最後的行善身影。然而不知是誰提出了這樁不堪入目的政治交易，反而顯得陳總統是要以私害公，竟致壞了一件善舉？
總統所以享有赦免權，是因為身居國家元首的高度。用余文換總統的提議，不僅讓余文淪為籌碼，也把總統給做小了。如今只怕原本可
Monday, May 12, 2008
A Little President -- a Big Catastrophe?
A Little President -- a Big Catastrophe?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2008
Ma Ying-jeou has been elected. The Republic of China has dodged a bullet. It has avoided a dilemma in which a "Little President" takes on a "Big Mission."
During the Legislative Yuan Elections, Yu Shyi-kun advocated "Comprehensive Rule." Frank Hsieh promised he would "create a [Pan Green] majority" by encouraging defections from the Blue camp. He said the power of the executive and the power of the legislature ought to be combined. But with the DPP's crushing defeat during the Legislative Elections, it suddenly changed its tune. We were suddenly bombarded with dire warnings about "Single Party Dominance" and proposals that the power of the executive be divided into "Presidential" and "Executive Yuan" powers.
During the Lee Teng-hui era, Taiwan endured "Single Party Dominance" and combined executive and legislative powers. During the Chen Shui-bian era, Taiwan endured "Divided Government" and separated executive and legislative powers. But neither situation was as extreme as the result of this year's Legislative Yuan Elections. During the Lee Teng-hui era, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party may have been small, but it was a rising force. During the Chen Shui-bian era, the DPP may have lacked a majority in the Legislative Yuan, but so did the opposition alliance. After the Legislative Elections however, the Pan-blue camp commanded over three-quarters of the seats in the legislature. The DPP retained a mere quarter of the seats. It lost much of its political legitimacy and has been swiftly relegated to the status of a weak opposition party. It was said that if the KMT were to win the presidency , the result would be an extreme case of "Single Party Dominance." Now that Ma Ying-jeou has been elected president, that is precisely what has happened.
This situation poses a constitutional risk. Because Frank Hsieh was not elected president, the risk is lower. During the election the Hsieh camp tried to make an issue of "Single Party Dominance," in the hope of retaining the presidency. Hsieh vowed that if elected president, he would "check and balance" Single Party Dominance. Hsieh vowed that if elected president, he would form a KMT Cabinet, but would retain the authority to make cross-strait, diplomatic, and national defense policy. He would "check and balance" the Cabinet and the Legislature. The result would have been Divided Government and Divided Policies -- divided between the Presidential Office and the Cabinet. Worse, if Hsieh was elected president by a wide margin, he could spin it as "the people's desire for checks and balances." He could refuse to allow the KMT to form a cabinet, and instead rule as a minority government. The consequences defy the imagination. Fortunately, Ma Ying-jeou was elected president, not Frank Hsieh. The people used their ballots to avoid a disastrous "Little President with a Big Mission."
This time we dodged a bullet. But the Constitution still contains booby traps, including a "Little President with Grant Checks and Balances." We don't know when a "Little President" may appear under this Constitution. But the powers and responsibilities of the President, the Executive Yuan, and the Legislative Yuan are not clearly defined. Even when the President and Premier belong to the same party, their powers remain unclear. If they belong to different parties, and the President aspires to "Presidential Powers" such as the power to determine cross-strait, foreign, and defense policy, how will he "check and balance" a cabinet and legislature belonging to a different political party?
A search of the Constitution confirms that the President has no right to check and balance the cabinet and the legislature. However, the current constitution provides no safeguards against a "Little President" resorting to "Grand Checks and Balances" or "Grand Gestures" to make trouble. Since the recent election, these have all come to pass. Future constitutional amendments must disarm these booby traps.
A previous constitutional amendment adopted direct presidential elections. This led to public expectations that the actual operations of government would be conducted by the president. But at the same time it failed to establish a sound framework for the President's exercise of powers and responsibilities. Lee Teng-hui originally wanted to upgrade the National Security Council, placing it under the authority of the president, but failed to get his way. He resorted to the "Organic Law for the National Security Council." This law allowed the President to usurp the authority to determine cross-strait, diplomatic, and national defense policy. It was a case of "Using Laws to Replace the Constitution." it was highly controversial. Moreover, after Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, the powers of the President became greater and greater, and responsibilities fewer and fewer. The system had become a constitutional abomination. Under such a system, suppose the cabinet and legislature find it necessary to check and balance a "Little President with a Big Mission?" Imagine the constitutional disaster.
Remedial measures. The current constitution is modeled on the French Fifth Republic Constitution. Whether we will move toward a presidential system or a cabinet system remains unknown. Therefore during the constitutional amendment process we just might want to fall back on the rule of law. First, we must restore the Legislative Yuan's authority to approve nominees for the position of Premier. After the new Premier takes office, the legislature retains the right to hold a vote of non-confidence. Second, we must set up a system by which executive power can change tracks. When the president and the legislature belong to the same party, the executive power belongs to the president. When they belong to different parties, the executive power belongs to the Premier, i.e., the President of the Executive Yuan. This must include the power to determine cross-strait, diplomatic, and national defense policy. Third, we must change the presidential election system to one requiring an absolute majority. Otherwise, the emergence of a president with a mere plurality, combined with Divided Government, is a formula for constitutional disaster.
Eight constitutional amendments have already destroyed the ROC Constitution. Over the past 20 years, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian have thoroughly destroyed both the letter and spirit of constitutional rule. How will the Ma administration interpret the constitution? We will have to wait and see. Will the Ma administration be able to restore this tattered constitution via the amendment process? We will also have to wait and see.
修憲防範「小總統」的憲政災難！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.12 02:44 am
馬英九當選，使台灣躲過了一場「小總統／大使命」的災難！
立委選舉前，游錫?主張「完全執政」，謝長廷則主張「喬過半」，皆認為「行政權」與「立法權」應當「合體」；然而，民進黨在立委選舉慘敗後，突然改口猛攻「一黨獨大」，主張「行政權」應當分割成「總統」與「行政院」兩半。
在 李登輝時代，台灣經歷「一黨獨大」的「行政立法合體」；在陳水扁時代，台灣則經歷「朝小野大」的「行政立法分裂」。然而，這些經歷皆不如今年立委選舉後所 呈現的情勢那麼極端；因為，在李登輝時代，在野的民進黨雖小，卻是一個上升的勢力；在陳水扁時代，執政的民進黨在立院雖未過半，而在野聯盟亦未居絕對優 勢。但是，此次立委選舉後，泛藍在國會占逾四分之三席位，僅占四分之一席次的民進黨儼然已是一個「政治正當性」急遽耗弱的在野黨；倘若國民黨再贏得總統席 位，確會形成「一黨獨大」的極端形態。如今，馬英九當選，情勢已成。
然而，此一情勢可能形成的憲政風險，也許仍較倘若謝長廷當選總統所可 能形成者為低。謝營在選季猛攻「一黨獨大」，欲贏回「最後一席」；並稱若當選總統，將「制衡」一黨獨大。謝長廷稱，他當選總統，將由國民黨組閣；但總統擁 有「兩岸、外交、國防」之權，他將藉以「制衡」內閣及國會。倘係如此，將形成「總統府／內閣」的「分裂政府」，更將出現「總統府／內閣」的「分裂政策」。 何況，倘若謝長廷以極高票當選總統，他亦可能將選舉的勝利解讀為「人民主張制衡」，因此不願將組閣權交給國民黨，而逕組「少數政府」，那就更是不堪想像的 局面了。所幸，馬英九當選，人民用選票躲過了一場「小總統／大使命」的憲政災難。
然而，這次雖躲過了一場災難，但憲法中佈設的「小總統／ 大制衡」的陷阱仍在。因為，不知何年何月，在這部憲法下，不無可能會選出一個「小總統」。但是，這部憲法對「總統／行政院／立法院」的權責關係卻無妥適清 楚的規範，即使在「總統／閣揆」同黨時亦不清楚，何況倘若異黨，總統又欲以「總統三權」，即「兩岸／外交／國防」，來「制衡」不同黨的內閣與國會？
查遍憲法，總統並無「制衡」內閣及國會之權；但現行憲法對「小總統」的「大制衡」或「大攪局」卻無防範，經此次大選已經全盤呈現。未來若議及修憲，這個陷阱務須拆解。
過 去修憲，採「總統直選」，將社會期望及憲政實際運作皆導向總統，卻未建立周全的總統權責架構。李登輝原想在憲法中將國安會提升為總統的權力機構，未果；退 而以《國安會組織法》，將所謂「兩岸、外交、國防」割給總統。這是「以法代憲」，極有爭議。何況，經李登輝至陳水扁，總統的權力愈來愈大，責任愈躲愈遠， 簡直成了一個憲政惡魔。在這樣的憲政體制下，若出現「小總統／大使命」的場景，以「制衡」內閣及國會為能事，豈不會釀成難以想像的憲政災難？
亡 羊補牢。現行憲法既是以法國第五共和為藍本，未來倘非走向「總統制／內閣制」，即不妨在修憲時參考法制的補綴方法：一、恢復立法院的閣揆任命同意權。法制 是新揆上任後，國會就其政策行使不信任投票。二、設置「行政權換軌制」。當總統與國會同黨，行政權在總統；分屬異黨，則行政權歸內閣總理（即行政院長）， 且不宜將「兩岸、外交、國防」切出去。三、總統選舉制務須改為「絕對多數制」，否則倘出現一個「相對多數」且與國會異黨的「小小總統」，更難善了。
八次修憲，已在體制上毀了這部憲法；二十年來李登輝與陳水扁所領導的政治運作，更全盤毀了憲政的規程與精神。馬政府將如何詮釋這部憲法，可以拭目以觀；馬政府又能否以再次修憲來補救這部殘破的憲法，亦令人期待！
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2008
Ma Ying-jeou has been elected. The Republic of China has dodged a bullet. It has avoided a dilemma in which a "Little President" takes on a "Big Mission."
During the Legislative Yuan Elections, Yu Shyi-kun advocated "Comprehensive Rule." Frank Hsieh promised he would "create a [Pan Green] majority" by encouraging defections from the Blue camp. He said the power of the executive and the power of the legislature ought to be combined. But with the DPP's crushing defeat during the Legislative Elections, it suddenly changed its tune. We were suddenly bombarded with dire warnings about "Single Party Dominance" and proposals that the power of the executive be divided into "Presidential" and "Executive Yuan" powers.
During the Lee Teng-hui era, Taiwan endured "Single Party Dominance" and combined executive and legislative powers. During the Chen Shui-bian era, Taiwan endured "Divided Government" and separated executive and legislative powers. But neither situation was as extreme as the result of this year's Legislative Yuan Elections. During the Lee Teng-hui era, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party may have been small, but it was a rising force. During the Chen Shui-bian era, the DPP may have lacked a majority in the Legislative Yuan, but so did the opposition alliance. After the Legislative Elections however, the Pan-blue camp commanded over three-quarters of the seats in the legislature. The DPP retained a mere quarter of the seats. It lost much of its political legitimacy and has been swiftly relegated to the status of a weak opposition party. It was said that if the KMT were to win the presidency , the result would be an extreme case of "Single Party Dominance." Now that Ma Ying-jeou has been elected president, that is precisely what has happened.
This situation poses a constitutional risk. Because Frank Hsieh was not elected president, the risk is lower. During the election the Hsieh camp tried to make an issue of "Single Party Dominance," in the hope of retaining the presidency. Hsieh vowed that if elected president, he would "check and balance" Single Party Dominance. Hsieh vowed that if elected president, he would form a KMT Cabinet, but would retain the authority to make cross-strait, diplomatic, and national defense policy. He would "check and balance" the Cabinet and the Legislature. The result would have been Divided Government and Divided Policies -- divided between the Presidential Office and the Cabinet. Worse, if Hsieh was elected president by a wide margin, he could spin it as "the people's desire for checks and balances." He could refuse to allow the KMT to form a cabinet, and instead rule as a minority government. The consequences defy the imagination. Fortunately, Ma Ying-jeou was elected president, not Frank Hsieh. The people used their ballots to avoid a disastrous "Little President with a Big Mission."
This time we dodged a bullet. But the Constitution still contains booby traps, including a "Little President with Grant Checks and Balances." We don't know when a "Little President" may appear under this Constitution. But the powers and responsibilities of the President, the Executive Yuan, and the Legislative Yuan are not clearly defined. Even when the President and Premier belong to the same party, their powers remain unclear. If they belong to different parties, and the President aspires to "Presidential Powers" such as the power to determine cross-strait, foreign, and defense policy, how will he "check and balance" a cabinet and legislature belonging to a different political party?
A search of the Constitution confirms that the President has no right to check and balance the cabinet and the legislature. However, the current constitution provides no safeguards against a "Little President" resorting to "Grand Checks and Balances" or "Grand Gestures" to make trouble. Since the recent election, these have all come to pass. Future constitutional amendments must disarm these booby traps.
A previous constitutional amendment adopted direct presidential elections. This led to public expectations that the actual operations of government would be conducted by the president. But at the same time it failed to establish a sound framework for the President's exercise of powers and responsibilities. Lee Teng-hui originally wanted to upgrade the National Security Council, placing it under the authority of the president, but failed to get his way. He resorted to the "Organic Law for the National Security Council." This law allowed the President to usurp the authority to determine cross-strait, diplomatic, and national defense policy. It was a case of "Using Laws to Replace the Constitution." it was highly controversial. Moreover, after Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, the powers of the President became greater and greater, and responsibilities fewer and fewer. The system had become a constitutional abomination. Under such a system, suppose the cabinet and legislature find it necessary to check and balance a "Little President with a Big Mission?" Imagine the constitutional disaster.
Remedial measures. The current constitution is modeled on the French Fifth Republic Constitution. Whether we will move toward a presidential system or a cabinet system remains unknown. Therefore during the constitutional amendment process we just might want to fall back on the rule of law. First, we must restore the Legislative Yuan's authority to approve nominees for the position of Premier. After the new Premier takes office, the legislature retains the right to hold a vote of non-confidence. Second, we must set up a system by which executive power can change tracks. When the president and the legislature belong to the same party, the executive power belongs to the president. When they belong to different parties, the executive power belongs to the Premier, i.e., the President of the Executive Yuan. This must include the power to determine cross-strait, diplomatic, and national defense policy. Third, we must change the presidential election system to one requiring an absolute majority. Otherwise, the emergence of a president with a mere plurality, combined with Divided Government, is a formula for constitutional disaster.
Eight constitutional amendments have already destroyed the ROC Constitution. Over the past 20 years, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian have thoroughly destroyed both the letter and spirit of constitutional rule. How will the Ma administration interpret the constitution? We will have to wait and see. Will the Ma administration be able to restore this tattered constitution via the amendment process? We will also have to wait and see.
修憲防範「小總統」的憲政災難！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.12 02:44 am
馬英九當選，使台灣躲過了一場「小總統／大使命」的災難！
立委選舉前，游錫?主張「完全執政」，謝長廷則主張「喬過半」，皆認為「行政權」與「立法權」應當「合體」；然而，民進黨在立委選舉慘敗後，突然改口猛攻「一黨獨大」，主張「行政權」應當分割成「總統」與「行政院」兩半。
在 李登輝時代，台灣經歷「一黨獨大」的「行政立法合體」；在陳水扁時代，台灣則經歷「朝小野大」的「行政立法分裂」。然而，這些經歷皆不如今年立委選舉後所 呈現的情勢那麼極端；因為，在李登輝時代，在野的民進黨雖小，卻是一個上升的勢力；在陳水扁時代，執政的民進黨在立院雖未過半，而在野聯盟亦未居絕對優 勢。但是，此次立委選舉後，泛藍在國會占逾四分之三席位，僅占四分之一席次的民進黨儼然已是一個「政治正當性」急遽耗弱的在野黨；倘若國民黨再贏得總統席 位，確會形成「一黨獨大」的極端形態。如今，馬英九當選，情勢已成。
然而，此一情勢可能形成的憲政風險，也許仍較倘若謝長廷當選總統所可 能形成者為低。謝營在選季猛攻「一黨獨大」，欲贏回「最後一席」；並稱若當選總統，將「制衡」一黨獨大。謝長廷稱，他當選總統，將由國民黨組閣；但總統擁 有「兩岸、外交、國防」之權，他將藉以「制衡」內閣及國會。倘係如此，將形成「總統府／內閣」的「分裂政府」，更將出現「總統府／內閣」的「分裂政策」。 何況，倘若謝長廷以極高票當選總統，他亦可能將選舉的勝利解讀為「人民主張制衡」，因此不願將組閣權交給國民黨，而逕組「少數政府」，那就更是不堪想像的 局面了。所幸，馬英九當選，人民用選票躲過了一場「小總統／大使命」的憲政災難。
然而，這次雖躲過了一場災難，但憲法中佈設的「小總統／ 大制衡」的陷阱仍在。因為，不知何年何月，在這部憲法下，不無可能會選出一個「小總統」。但是，這部憲法對「總統／行政院／立法院」的權責關係卻無妥適清 楚的規範，即使在「總統／閣揆」同黨時亦不清楚，何況倘若異黨，總統又欲以「總統三權」，即「兩岸／外交／國防」，來「制衡」不同黨的內閣與國會？
查遍憲法，總統並無「制衡」內閣及國會之權；但現行憲法對「小總統」的「大制衡」或「大攪局」卻無防範，經此次大選已經全盤呈現。未來若議及修憲，這個陷阱務須拆解。
過 去修憲，採「總統直選」，將社會期望及憲政實際運作皆導向總統，卻未建立周全的總統權責架構。李登輝原想在憲法中將國安會提升為總統的權力機構，未果；退 而以《國安會組織法》，將所謂「兩岸、外交、國防」割給總統。這是「以法代憲」，極有爭議。何況，經李登輝至陳水扁，總統的權力愈來愈大，責任愈躲愈遠， 簡直成了一個憲政惡魔。在這樣的憲政體制下，若出現「小總統／大使命」的場景，以「制衡」內閣及國會為能事，豈不會釀成難以想像的憲政災難？
亡 羊補牢。現行憲法既是以法國第五共和為藍本，未來倘非走向「總統制／內閣制」，即不妨在修憲時參考法制的補綴方法：一、恢復立法院的閣揆任命同意權。法制 是新揆上任後，國會就其政策行使不信任投票。二、設置「行政權換軌制」。當總統與國會同黨，行政權在總統；分屬異黨，則行政權歸內閣總理（即行政院長）， 且不宜將「兩岸、外交、國防」切出去。三、總統選舉制務須改為「絕對多數制」，否則倘出現一個「相對多數」且與國會異黨的「小小總統」，更難善了。
八次修憲，已在體制上毀了這部憲法；二十年來李登輝與陳水扁所領導的政治運作，更全盤毀了憲政的規程與精神。馬政府將如何詮釋這部憲法，可以拭目以觀；馬政府又能否以再次修憲來補救這部殘破的憲法，亦令人期待！
Friday, May 9, 2008
Anything Goes: Chen Shui-bian's Method of Governance
Anything Goes: Chen Shui-bian's Method of Governance
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 9, 2008
The Chen Shui-bian regime is about to hand over political power. And yet three ministry heads were forced to resign on the same day due to corruption scandals. They threw wads of money around, ostensibly for the purpose of establishing diplomatic relations. But investigation revealed that it was nothing more than a pretext for graft. The Chen regime is like a house of cards. A single poke from a finger, and it comes tumbling down. The laughable irony is that the Democratic Progressive Party, which has been destroyed from within by Chen Shui-bian, is still standing up for him.
Chen Shui-bian's responsibility is threefold. First. Whether he was directly or indirectly involved in the scandal. Two. Whether he dealt with the scandal properly. Three. Whether he used people responsibly. No matter how you cut it, he cannot deny responsibilty. Yet he acts completely innocent, as if he were a disinterested observer watching a house burning down from the opposite side of a river.
First, Chiou I-jen and Huang Chih-fang each reported back to Chen Shui-bian when the PNG diplomatic relations case was initiated. Later, when problems arose, Huang Chih-fang repeatedly appealed to Chen, asking him to do something about it. Clearly Chen Shui-bian knew about the case from beginning to end. As to whether Chen has an even more direct role in the case is a subject for further investigation by prosecutors and investigators. Based on currently available information, the initial attempt to establish diplomatic relations between the ROC and PNG occurred during the Red Shirt Army "Siege of the City" march. It was also the time when the State Confidential Expenses scandal "Southern Front" exploded on the scene. It is hard to avoid concluding that the PNG case was not what it seemed. Ten years ago PNG talked about establishing diplomatic relations with the ROC. Its asking price then was 500 million USD. Ten years later, the Chen Shui-bian regime wants us to believe that 30 million USD could seal the deal. Obviously this violates all common sense. It is simply not credible.
Knowing full well that the asking price and the market price were too far apart, the project was still swiftly approved, and immediately funded. Therefore when billions in NTD vanished into thin air, no matter whose pockets they wound up in, they must have known well in advance the funds were not for PNG. Chiou I-jen, Huang Chih-fang, and Ke Cheng-heng were in charge of national security, foreign affairs, and national defense. Their posts were unrelated and far removed from each other. If the trio was involved in the case, only one person could have brought them together - Chen Shui-bian. Three grasshoppers clinging to a single rope. All three were A-Bian's cronies. Therefore it is not going to be easy for Chen Shui-bian to shirk responsibility. Were Chiou, Huang, and Ke all taking their orders from the same man? From Chen Shui-bian?
Secondly, an alleged attempt to "establish diplomatic relations" turned out to be nothing but fraud, during which nearly two years went by. What was Chen Shui-bian doing? The President is the highest ranking diplomatic policy decision maker. Yet Chen Shui-bian sat back and watched idly as the Secretary-General of the National Security Council exceeded his authority and usurped control of diplomatic policy. After Huang Chih-fang's complaints were posted on the Net, Chen permitted Ke Cheng-heng, whose job description had nothing to do with diplomacy, to shuttle back and forth. Think about it. A-Bian's overbearing nature is well known. Who else could have delegated authority to Chiou I-jen without his prior approval? Huang Chih-fang submitted several reports of missing funds. Yet Chen Shui-bian never launched any official investigations, either domestically or abroad. What was he waiting for? Whom was he protecting?
Thirdly. Chen Shui-bian's use of people. Huang Chih-fang's previous rank in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was Section Chief. Over the past few years Chen Shui-bian promoted him three levels, to Minister of Foreign Affairs. This forced appointment, left Huang Chih-fang without any real authority. It made him blindly subservient to the Chief Executive, the source of his power. During Chen's "Lost Voyage," Huang Chih-fang's behavior proved all that mattered to him was orders from above, not professional judgment. During the PNG scandal, he obeyed Chiou I-jen implicitly. He only began to get suspicious when he realized his life might be in danger. How tardy an awakening is this? But if one observes his actions, what was he doing, if not replicating Chen Shui-bian and Chiou I-jen's lawless style? He overrode internal safeguards for the disbursement of funds, allowing public funds to enter private accounts. Even though he attempted to make amends afterwards, he did so by ordering his underlings to sweep the matter under the rug. He compounded his error, sacrificing any legitimacy he might once have had.
Over the past eight years Chiou I-jen has held every important post within the Presidential Office, Executive Yuan, and National Security Council. He has always answered to one person alone -- Chen Shui-bian. He has never had to face public opinion or endure systemic oversight. The result has been his unbridled style. As the President and Commander in Chief's shadow, his power as Vice Premier exceeded even that of the Premier. He could even direct foreign policy. How could Huang Chih-fang not obey? Ko Cheng-heng started out as Chen Shui-bian's assistant, eventually rising to Deputy Defense Minister. Clearly he was a climber with considerable ambition. Unfortunately he was merely a bag man and messenger boy for the big boys. That was his role in the Taiwan Goals scandal. It was also his role in the PNG scandal. How many unexposed secrets does the iron triangle of Chen Shui-bian, Chiu I-jen, Ko Cheng-heng still have? Inquiring minds want to know.
Two years ago the First Family scandals were boiling over. The chain of scandals involved "One Wife, Two Secretaries, and Three Doctors." The DPP backed A-Bian with all its might. It paid the price by losing power. The PNG scandal is the sequel to A-Bian's cronyism. The Democratic Progressive Party has already lost its soul. Yet it is betting all its chips on its revered A-Bian.
狗皮倒灶：陳水扁這樣治國！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.09 02:56 am
馬上就要交出政權，扁政府卻有三名部會首長同一天因弊案去職。撒大錢的建交案，一經追查，卻是謊言連篇的詐騙案；這個政權就像紙糊的一般，貼滿窗花，竟禁不起指頭一戳。可笑的是，輸到脫褲的民進黨至今還在護扁。
陳水扁與此案的瓜葛，可以分三個層次來看：一是他是否直間接涉案，二是他對此事的處理是否得宜，三是他的用人是否恰當。這三個層次，他若非難脫干係，就是責無旁貸，但他如今卻隔岸觀火作無辜狀。
從 第一層看，邱義仁和黃志芳在建交案發動之初，皆曾分別向陳水扁報告，後來出了問題，黃志芳亦陸續向他請示；可見，陳水扁對事件始終知情。至於他在此案是否 有更直接的角色，有待檢調深入追查。從既有的訊息看，台巴建交案的發動，是在紅衫軍圍城之際，又是國務費案爆出「南線專案」疑雲之時，難免令人懷疑本案的 背景並不單純。何況，十年前巴紐與我談建交，即要價五億美元；事隔十年，若說扁政府竟圖以三千萬美元達成建交，從外交常理判斷，顯然太過離譜。
如 果明知價格與行情相去太遠，卻仍快速拍板、迅即撥款；那麼，十億台幣最終不知去向，不管落入誰的口袋，恐怕也早就知道不是為了巴紐。再看，邱義仁、黃志 芳、柯承亨分別主管國安、外交、國防，職務關係南轅北轍；三人之所以共同參與此案，把他們拉在一起的線頭其實只有一個：三隻蚱蜢一條草繩，三人都是阿扁的 親信。如此一來，陳水扁在此案的角色，恐怕就不容輕縱。邱、黃、柯三人會不會主要是聽命於陳水扁的單線指揮？
再看第二層，一樁未遂的「建 交案」淪為「詐騙醜聞」，其間將近兩年，陳水扁又做了什麼？總統是外交決策的最高負責人，但陳水扁坐視國安會祕書長越權指揮外交在先，對黃志芳的申訴和請 示置若罔聞在後，更放任職務上毫不相干的柯承亨居間穿梭。試想，以阿扁的霸道性格，若非他主動，會隨便將權力授予邱義仁嗎？且黃志芳幾度報告失金狀況，陳 水扁仍不發動政府海內外部門協查，這又是在等待什麼，或在袒護什麼？
從第三層看陳水扁的用人。黃志芳過去在外交部的最高資歷，不過是一名 科長，幾年間卻在陳水扁拔擢下三級跳升任外長。勉強的任命，造成黃志芳威信不足、歷練不夠，也導致他對長官一味屈從。在「謎航事件」中的表現，黃志芳已顯 示出他「只有上意／罔顧專業」的底蘊。在巴紐醜聞中，他對邱義仁始於服從、終於起疑，甚至自覺身家性命陷於險境，這是多麼遲鈍的覺悟？但觀察其行事，何嘗 不是複製了扁、邱一貉的越軌作風：他跳過部內的安全撥款機制，讓公帑流入私帳；即使事後欲求彌補，也是採取單線指揮身旁親信意圖「私了」。一錯再錯，使他 正當性蕩然。
再看邱義仁，八年來歷任府、院及國安會所有重要職位，從來只向扁一人負責，而無需面對民意或制度的監察，造成他肆無忌憚的作 風。由於「總統軍師」的身影，他這個副閣揆看來權力比閣揆還大，他撈過界管到外交，黃志芳豈敢不從？再看柯承亨，從陳水扁的助理，一步步被升至國防部副部 長，也可謂登天有術。可惜，他的角色仍只是背後那個巨大人物的白手套和傳話人；在鐽震案中如此，在巴紐案亦復如是。「扁、邱、柯」的鐵三角，還有多少沒曝 光的祕密，人民都很好奇。
兩年前沸沸揚揚的第一家庭弊案，爆出「一妻二祕三師」的連環醜聞，民進黨極力挺扁，終於付出失去政權的代價。巴紐案作為阿扁「親信政治」的續集之一，看來連靈魂都丟掉的民進黨，似乎仍然把未來都押給他們所敬畏的阿扁。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 9, 2008
The Chen Shui-bian regime is about to hand over political power. And yet three ministry heads were forced to resign on the same day due to corruption scandals. They threw wads of money around, ostensibly for the purpose of establishing diplomatic relations. But investigation revealed that it was nothing more than a pretext for graft. The Chen regime is like a house of cards. A single poke from a finger, and it comes tumbling down. The laughable irony is that the Democratic Progressive Party, which has been destroyed from within by Chen Shui-bian, is still standing up for him.
Chen Shui-bian's responsibility is threefold. First. Whether he was directly or indirectly involved in the scandal. Two. Whether he dealt with the scandal properly. Three. Whether he used people responsibly. No matter how you cut it, he cannot deny responsibilty. Yet he acts completely innocent, as if he were a disinterested observer watching a house burning down from the opposite side of a river.
First, Chiou I-jen and Huang Chih-fang each reported back to Chen Shui-bian when the PNG diplomatic relations case was initiated. Later, when problems arose, Huang Chih-fang repeatedly appealed to Chen, asking him to do something about it. Clearly Chen Shui-bian knew about the case from beginning to end. As to whether Chen has an even more direct role in the case is a subject for further investigation by prosecutors and investigators. Based on currently available information, the initial attempt to establish diplomatic relations between the ROC and PNG occurred during the Red Shirt Army "Siege of the City" march. It was also the time when the State Confidential Expenses scandal "Southern Front" exploded on the scene. It is hard to avoid concluding that the PNG case was not what it seemed. Ten years ago PNG talked about establishing diplomatic relations with the ROC. Its asking price then was 500 million USD. Ten years later, the Chen Shui-bian regime wants us to believe that 30 million USD could seal the deal. Obviously this violates all common sense. It is simply not credible.
Knowing full well that the asking price and the market price were too far apart, the project was still swiftly approved, and immediately funded. Therefore when billions in NTD vanished into thin air, no matter whose pockets they wound up in, they must have known well in advance the funds were not for PNG. Chiou I-jen, Huang Chih-fang, and Ke Cheng-heng were in charge of national security, foreign affairs, and national defense. Their posts were unrelated and far removed from each other. If the trio was involved in the case, only one person could have brought them together - Chen Shui-bian. Three grasshoppers clinging to a single rope. All three were A-Bian's cronies. Therefore it is not going to be easy for Chen Shui-bian to shirk responsibility. Were Chiou, Huang, and Ke all taking their orders from the same man? From Chen Shui-bian?
Secondly, an alleged attempt to "establish diplomatic relations" turned out to be nothing but fraud, during which nearly two years went by. What was Chen Shui-bian doing? The President is the highest ranking diplomatic policy decision maker. Yet Chen Shui-bian sat back and watched idly as the Secretary-General of the National Security Council exceeded his authority and usurped control of diplomatic policy. After Huang Chih-fang's complaints were posted on the Net, Chen permitted Ke Cheng-heng, whose job description had nothing to do with diplomacy, to shuttle back and forth. Think about it. A-Bian's overbearing nature is well known. Who else could have delegated authority to Chiou I-jen without his prior approval? Huang Chih-fang submitted several reports of missing funds. Yet Chen Shui-bian never launched any official investigations, either domestically or abroad. What was he waiting for? Whom was he protecting?
Thirdly. Chen Shui-bian's use of people. Huang Chih-fang's previous rank in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was Section Chief. Over the past few years Chen Shui-bian promoted him three levels, to Minister of Foreign Affairs. This forced appointment, left Huang Chih-fang without any real authority. It made him blindly subservient to the Chief Executive, the source of his power. During Chen's "Lost Voyage," Huang Chih-fang's behavior proved all that mattered to him was orders from above, not professional judgment. During the PNG scandal, he obeyed Chiou I-jen implicitly. He only began to get suspicious when he realized his life might be in danger. How tardy an awakening is this? But if one observes his actions, what was he doing, if not replicating Chen Shui-bian and Chiou I-jen's lawless style? He overrode internal safeguards for the disbursement of funds, allowing public funds to enter private accounts. Even though he attempted to make amends afterwards, he did so by ordering his underlings to sweep the matter under the rug. He compounded his error, sacrificing any legitimacy he might once have had.
Over the past eight years Chiou I-jen has held every important post within the Presidential Office, Executive Yuan, and National Security Council. He has always answered to one person alone -- Chen Shui-bian. He has never had to face public opinion or endure systemic oversight. The result has been his unbridled style. As the President and Commander in Chief's shadow, his power as Vice Premier exceeded even that of the Premier. He could even direct foreign policy. How could Huang Chih-fang not obey? Ko Cheng-heng started out as Chen Shui-bian's assistant, eventually rising to Deputy Defense Minister. Clearly he was a climber with considerable ambition. Unfortunately he was merely a bag man and messenger boy for the big boys. That was his role in the Taiwan Goals scandal. It was also his role in the PNG scandal. How many unexposed secrets does the iron triangle of Chen Shui-bian, Chiu I-jen, Ko Cheng-heng still have? Inquiring minds want to know.
Two years ago the First Family scandals were boiling over. The chain of scandals involved "One Wife, Two Secretaries, and Three Doctors." The DPP backed A-Bian with all its might. It paid the price by losing power. The PNG scandal is the sequel to A-Bian's cronyism. The Democratic Progressive Party has already lost its soul. Yet it is betting all its chips on its revered A-Bian.
狗皮倒灶：陳水扁這樣治國！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.09 02:56 am
馬上就要交出政權，扁政府卻有三名部會首長同一天因弊案去職。撒大錢的建交案，一經追查，卻是謊言連篇的詐騙案；這個政權就像紙糊的一般，貼滿窗花，竟禁不起指頭一戳。可笑的是，輸到脫褲的民進黨至今還在護扁。
陳水扁與此案的瓜葛，可以分三個層次來看：一是他是否直間接涉案，二是他對此事的處理是否得宜，三是他的用人是否恰當。這三個層次，他若非難脫干係，就是責無旁貸，但他如今卻隔岸觀火作無辜狀。
從 第一層看，邱義仁和黃志芳在建交案發動之初，皆曾分別向陳水扁報告，後來出了問題，黃志芳亦陸續向他請示；可見，陳水扁對事件始終知情。至於他在此案是否 有更直接的角色，有待檢調深入追查。從既有的訊息看，台巴建交案的發動，是在紅衫軍圍城之際，又是國務費案爆出「南線專案」疑雲之時，難免令人懷疑本案的 背景並不單純。何況，十年前巴紐與我談建交，即要價五億美元；事隔十年，若說扁政府竟圖以三千萬美元達成建交，從外交常理判斷，顯然太過離譜。
如 果明知價格與行情相去太遠，卻仍快速拍板、迅即撥款；那麼，十億台幣最終不知去向，不管落入誰的口袋，恐怕也早就知道不是為了巴紐。再看，邱義仁、黃志 芳、柯承亨分別主管國安、外交、國防，職務關係南轅北轍；三人之所以共同參與此案，把他們拉在一起的線頭其實只有一個：三隻蚱蜢一條草繩，三人都是阿扁的 親信。如此一來，陳水扁在此案的角色，恐怕就不容輕縱。邱、黃、柯三人會不會主要是聽命於陳水扁的單線指揮？
再看第二層，一樁未遂的「建 交案」淪為「詐騙醜聞」，其間將近兩年，陳水扁又做了什麼？總統是外交決策的最高負責人，但陳水扁坐視國安會祕書長越權指揮外交在先，對黃志芳的申訴和請 示置若罔聞在後，更放任職務上毫不相干的柯承亨居間穿梭。試想，以阿扁的霸道性格，若非他主動，會隨便將權力授予邱義仁嗎？且黃志芳幾度報告失金狀況，陳 水扁仍不發動政府海內外部門協查，這又是在等待什麼，或在袒護什麼？
從第三層看陳水扁的用人。黃志芳過去在外交部的最高資歷，不過是一名 科長，幾年間卻在陳水扁拔擢下三級跳升任外長。勉強的任命，造成黃志芳威信不足、歷練不夠，也導致他對長官一味屈從。在「謎航事件」中的表現，黃志芳已顯 示出他「只有上意／罔顧專業」的底蘊。在巴紐醜聞中，他對邱義仁始於服從、終於起疑，甚至自覺身家性命陷於險境，這是多麼遲鈍的覺悟？但觀察其行事，何嘗 不是複製了扁、邱一貉的越軌作風：他跳過部內的安全撥款機制，讓公帑流入私帳；即使事後欲求彌補，也是採取單線指揮身旁親信意圖「私了」。一錯再錯，使他 正當性蕩然。
再看邱義仁，八年來歷任府、院及國安會所有重要職位，從來只向扁一人負責，而無需面對民意或制度的監察，造成他肆無忌憚的作 風。由於「總統軍師」的身影，他這個副閣揆看來權力比閣揆還大，他撈過界管到外交，黃志芳豈敢不從？再看柯承亨，從陳水扁的助理，一步步被升至國防部副部 長，也可謂登天有術。可惜，他的角色仍只是背後那個巨大人物的白手套和傳話人；在鐽震案中如此，在巴紐案亦復如是。「扁、邱、柯」的鐵三角，還有多少沒曝 光的祕密，人民都很好奇。
兩年前沸沸揚揚的第一家庭弊案，爆出「一妻二祕三師」的連環醜聞，民進黨極力挺扁，終於付出失去政權的代價。巴紐案作為阿扁「親信政治」的續集之一，看來連靈魂都丟掉的民進黨，似乎仍然把未來都押給他們所敬畏的阿扁。
Thursday, May 8, 2008
Do Not Allow Cronyism to Raise Its Ugly Head
Do Not Allow Cronyism to Raise Its Ugly Head
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 8, 2008
The Papua New Guinea diplomatic relations scandal reached an interim high on Tuesday. Three cabinet members, Chiou I-jen, Huang Chih-fang, and Ko Cheng-heng submitted their resignations. This is merely an interim high. Many details have still not been made public. Whether future arrests will be made remains unknown. Leave aside the prospect of criminal prosecution. The political pressure alone is enough to give these politicians a sharp warning.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for the PNG case, for its operation and financing. Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Chih-fang says he was merely acting on orders from Deputy Premier Chiou I-jen. Compare this to the earlier Taiwan Goals arms procurement scandal and Sunny Bank funding scandal. The common denominator is Chiou I-jen. Minister of Defense Li Tian-yu was forced to step down because of the Taiwan Goals arms procurement scandal. Vice Minister of Transportation Ho Nuan-hsuen and Financial Supervisory Commission Chairman Hu Sheng-cheng approved the transfer of Postal Savings funds to Sunny Bank. Accord to reports all of them acted on orders from Chiou I-jen. The Executive Yuan was working as a tightly-knit team. It is not improper for government agencies to act on orders from the Vice Premier. But if they violate normal procedures on verbal commands from Chiou I-jen, without even bothering with written documentation, then there is a serious problem.
When Chiou I-jen said he wanted to tranfer funds for foreign power brokers, to transfer tens of billions of dollars in Postal Savings funds, to set up an arms manufacturing firm, not one minister dared ask him for written orders. Not one of them dared ask Chiou's superiors, the Premier or the President, to confirm Chiou's orders. This tells us that Chiou I-jen was a crony close to the center of power, a "Son of Heaven" who must not be crossed.
Once cronyism rears its ugly head, civil service procedures become irrelevant. They are merely FYI: For Your Information. Even Huang Chih-fang, Li Tian-yu, Hu Sheng-cheng considered the process defective, but dared not complain too loudly. They knew that even if they reported the matter to the emperor in person, in all probability he would cover for his crony. Everything would remain as it was. The only difference would be a blot on their own records. Knowing this in advance, officials outside the inner circle are not about to challenge orders from cronies inside the inner circle. Over time, as long as a crony issues verbal orders, or pretends that the orders were communicated from "higher up," lower echelon officials will not dare to ask for written documentation from their superiors. They will not dare to ask "higher ups" to confirm the orders. Needless to say, they will not dare to put forth different views. The damage has been done. When will new scandals come to light? It is only a matter of time.
Cronyism within Chinese political circles did not begin with the Chen regime. How much influence court officials and imperial relations have, has long depended upon how close they were to the emperor himself. Forget ancient history.
Wang Sheng, during the Chiang Ching-kuo era, and Su Chih-cheng, during the Lee Teng-hui era, were classic examples of cronies who wielded power not commensurate with their official positions. When Liu Tai-ying was at the height of his power, he controlled the KMT's party enterprises. It was said he could even humiliate then Premier Vincent Siew by "keeping him after school." Su Chih-cheng let it be known that older, higher-ranking officials answered to him. To Chiang Ching-kuo's credit, he ended Wang Sheng's reign once he was alerted to it. But Su Chih-cheng and Liu Tai-ying remained in power until Lee Teng-hui left office.
Chen Shui-bian era cronyism can be divided into two periods. Before Wu Shu-tseng, Chao Chien-min, Chao Yu-chu, and the "Ladies MacBeth" came under suspicion, Ma Yong-cheng was the Chen Shui-bian regime's most important crony. The young Ma was not only the President's Chief of Staff, he was an extension of the will of Wu Shu-chen. In addition, his wife was surrounded Huang Fang-yen, Michael Chang, Madame Luo and their ilk. Although they had no official status, they were immensely powerful. They had the power to broker deals at whim. They too were cronies, in the broader sense of the word. Following the "Ladies MacBeth" involvement in the State Confidential Expense case, their spokesman Ma Yong-cheng was forced to step down. The rest of the "Ladies MacBeth" and cronies then kept their heads down. As a result, for the past two years Chiu I-jen has been in charge. The PNG scandal, the Taiwan Goals scandal, and the Sunny Bank scandal, all happened on Chiu I-jen's watch. They all happened after crony Ma Yong-cheng stepped down. From this we can see the crucial role of cronies at the emperor's side.
Legislator Ker Chien-ming said that perhaps Chiou I-jen was "smart for a lifetime, but stupid for a moment." But the raison d'etre of standard operating procedures is to prevent officials from being "stupid for a moment." Whether Chiou I-jen was stupid, smart, or greedy is not the point. Once the workings of a government become palace intrigue, once official documents are replaced by verbal commands, once official procedures are replaced by "guanxi," then cronyism has already replaced constitutional government and the rule of law. In the history of mankind no one has ever been immune from Lord Acton's Iron Law: "Power corrupts." From a political science perspective, democracy requires the separation of powers, a restricted mandate, regular elections, and checks and balances. Their purpose is to prevent just the sort of abuses committed by Chiou Yi-jen. Chiou I-jen sat within the inner circle of power, immune from legislative oversight, immune from institutional constraints. Chiou I-jen and constitutional government parted company long ago. How could someone who studied political science be as stupid as this?
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.05.08
別再讓「親信政治學」當道了！
中時社論
巴紐假建交案醜聞的發展在周二產生階段性高潮，邱義仁、黃志芳與柯承亨三位閣員先後辭職下台獲准。我們說這只是階段性高潮，因為仍然有許多細節尚未公開， 而將來是否有哪一位大員會遭到收押禁見仍未可知。但是，拋開這些司法層面，即使是單從政治角度觀察，就已經足以給所有的政治人物極大的警惕。
巴紐案執行操作與付款的是外交部，但是部長黃志芳卻聲稱他是受副院長邱義仁之命而辦事。我們再把先前爆發的鐽震案與陽信銀行撥款案做比對，就發現其中的共 通點：因鐽震案下台的國防部長李天羽、同意郵政儲金轉存陽信的交通部次長何煖軒與金管會主委胡勝正，據報載也都是奉邱義仁之命而辦事。行政院團隊固為一 體，機關首長奉副院長之命辦事也不能說錯，但是若因邱義仁之口頭指示就跳過所有的標準作業程序，甚至連個書面文件都付之闕如，那就問題嚴重了。
當邱義仁說要撥款外交掮客、要轉存百億郵儲、要成立軍火公司時，沒有任何一位部長敢向長官要一份書面手諭、敢向長官的長官（如行政院長、總統）查證原意， 這就凸顯出邱義仁是今上親信、是權力核心、是惹不得的天子分身。一旦親信政治當道，所有的官僚標準作業程序就只能閒置一邊，僅供參考。即使黃志芳、李天 羽、胡勝正覺得程序上有瑕疵，也絕不敢多所造次，因為他們知道，就算把事情原委呈報聖上，天子袒護親信的機率也極高，到頭來一切回歸原點，只是徒然平添了 自己的一項汙點。預知事後如此，外圍官僚在事前就絕不敢對宮廷內圈的親信有所詢問。久而久之，只要是親信口頭交辦事項，甚至謊稱是「上面」的意思，下層官 員就不敢請長官書面下條子、不敢向「上面」查證、當然更不敢提出不同意見。發展至此，則親信政治之危害已經造成；至於何時會爆發弊案或醜聞，只是機運問題 而已。
華人政治圈的親信政治當然不是從扁政府開始；歷代皇帝身邊的宦官外戚近臣能有多大影響，就看他們與皇上「有多親近」。上古史不 談，蔣經國時代的王昇、李登輝時代的蘇志誠，顯然都是權力與官職極不相稱的親信典型。在劉泰英當紅時代，還曾經以黨營事業小主管的身分，聲言要把當時的行 政院長蕭萬長「留校察看」。而蘇志誠對外放話斥責年齡、輩分、官銜比他高得多的政壇大老，更是時有所聞。王昇的親信地位在蔣經國的警覺下告終，但蘇志誠與 劉泰英則是權傾一時，直到李登輝卸任為止。
回過頭來看看陳水扁時代的親信政治，大概可以分為兩個時期。在吳淑珍、趙建銘、趙玉柱這些夫 人派涉案之前，馬永成是扁政府最重要的親信。小馬不但是總統辦公室的主任，更是吳淑珍意志的延伸。除此之外，夫人身邊諸如黃芳彥、張兆順、羅太太之流，即 使完全不屬官僚體系，都有呼風喚雨、到處喬人事的能耐；他們也是廣義的親信。在夫人涉入國務機要費案件之後，其代言人馬永成下台，其餘夫人派親信稍事收 斂，於是最近兩年成就了邱義仁的天下。我們回顧巴紐、鐽震、陽信等諸多邱義仁所涉之案，都是在第一親信馬永成下台之後的發展，可見成為皇帝身邊第一親信之 關鍵。
立委柯建銘說，邱義仁也許是聰明一世、糊塗一時；然而從制度面來看，標準作業程序原本就是為了避免官員糊塗疏忽而設。邱義仁糊不 糊塗、聰不聰明、貪不貪心都不是重點；一但政治運作由行政官僚變為宮廷核心、由書面作業改成口頭指示、由體制運作轉為人際關係，則親信政治就已然成形。人 類歷史上從沒有人逃得過艾頓爵士「權力使人腐化」的鐵律，從政治學理來看，民主政治之權力分立、有限授權、定期改選、相互制衡等設計，就是要防堵像邱義仁 這樣的濫權。邱義仁身處權力核心之最內圈，不被國會監督、不受體制約束，走到這一步就已經是偏離了政治的常軌。一位念政治學的人糊塗至此，究竟聰明在哪裡 呢？
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 8, 2008
The Papua New Guinea diplomatic relations scandal reached an interim high on Tuesday. Three cabinet members, Chiou I-jen, Huang Chih-fang, and Ko Cheng-heng submitted their resignations. This is merely an interim high. Many details have still not been made public. Whether future arrests will be made remains unknown. Leave aside the prospect of criminal prosecution. The political pressure alone is enough to give these politicians a sharp warning.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for the PNG case, for its operation and financing. Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Chih-fang says he was merely acting on orders from Deputy Premier Chiou I-jen. Compare this to the earlier Taiwan Goals arms procurement scandal and Sunny Bank funding scandal. The common denominator is Chiou I-jen. Minister of Defense Li Tian-yu was forced to step down because of the Taiwan Goals arms procurement scandal. Vice Minister of Transportation Ho Nuan-hsuen and Financial Supervisory Commission Chairman Hu Sheng-cheng approved the transfer of Postal Savings funds to Sunny Bank. Accord to reports all of them acted on orders from Chiou I-jen. The Executive Yuan was working as a tightly-knit team. It is not improper for government agencies to act on orders from the Vice Premier. But if they violate normal procedures on verbal commands from Chiou I-jen, without even bothering with written documentation, then there is a serious problem.
When Chiou I-jen said he wanted to tranfer funds for foreign power brokers, to transfer tens of billions of dollars in Postal Savings funds, to set up an arms manufacturing firm, not one minister dared ask him for written orders. Not one of them dared ask Chiou's superiors, the Premier or the President, to confirm Chiou's orders. This tells us that Chiou I-jen was a crony close to the center of power, a "Son of Heaven" who must not be crossed.
Once cronyism rears its ugly head, civil service procedures become irrelevant. They are merely FYI: For Your Information. Even Huang Chih-fang, Li Tian-yu, Hu Sheng-cheng considered the process defective, but dared not complain too loudly. They knew that even if they reported the matter to the emperor in person, in all probability he would cover for his crony. Everything would remain as it was. The only difference would be a blot on their own records. Knowing this in advance, officials outside the inner circle are not about to challenge orders from cronies inside the inner circle. Over time, as long as a crony issues verbal orders, or pretends that the orders were communicated from "higher up," lower echelon officials will not dare to ask for written documentation from their superiors. They will not dare to ask "higher ups" to confirm the orders. Needless to say, they will not dare to put forth different views. The damage has been done. When will new scandals come to light? It is only a matter of time.
Cronyism within Chinese political circles did not begin with the Chen regime. How much influence court officials and imperial relations have, has long depended upon how close they were to the emperor himself. Forget ancient history.
Wang Sheng, during the Chiang Ching-kuo era, and Su Chih-cheng, during the Lee Teng-hui era, were classic examples of cronies who wielded power not commensurate with their official positions. When Liu Tai-ying was at the height of his power, he controlled the KMT's party enterprises. It was said he could even humiliate then Premier Vincent Siew by "keeping him after school." Su Chih-cheng let it be known that older, higher-ranking officials answered to him. To Chiang Ching-kuo's credit, he ended Wang Sheng's reign once he was alerted to it. But Su Chih-cheng and Liu Tai-ying remained in power until Lee Teng-hui left office.
Chen Shui-bian era cronyism can be divided into two periods. Before Wu Shu-tseng, Chao Chien-min, Chao Yu-chu, and the "Ladies MacBeth" came under suspicion, Ma Yong-cheng was the Chen Shui-bian regime's most important crony. The young Ma was not only the President's Chief of Staff, he was an extension of the will of Wu Shu-chen. In addition, his wife was surrounded Huang Fang-yen, Michael Chang, Madame Luo and their ilk. Although they had no official status, they were immensely powerful. They had the power to broker deals at whim. They too were cronies, in the broader sense of the word. Following the "Ladies MacBeth" involvement in the State Confidential Expense case, their spokesman Ma Yong-cheng was forced to step down. The rest of the "Ladies MacBeth" and cronies then kept their heads down. As a result, for the past two years Chiu I-jen has been in charge. The PNG scandal, the Taiwan Goals scandal, and the Sunny Bank scandal, all happened on Chiu I-jen's watch. They all happened after crony Ma Yong-cheng stepped down. From this we can see the crucial role of cronies at the emperor's side.
Legislator Ker Chien-ming said that perhaps Chiou I-jen was "smart for a lifetime, but stupid for a moment." But the raison d'etre of standard operating procedures is to prevent officials from being "stupid for a moment." Whether Chiou I-jen was stupid, smart, or greedy is not the point. Once the workings of a government become palace intrigue, once official documents are replaced by verbal commands, once official procedures are replaced by "guanxi," then cronyism has already replaced constitutional government and the rule of law. In the history of mankind no one has ever been immune from Lord Acton's Iron Law: "Power corrupts." From a political science perspective, democracy requires the separation of powers, a restricted mandate, regular elections, and checks and balances. Their purpose is to prevent just the sort of abuses committed by Chiou Yi-jen. Chiou I-jen sat within the inner circle of power, immune from legislative oversight, immune from institutional constraints. Chiou I-jen and constitutional government parted company long ago. How could someone who studied political science be as stupid as this?
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.05.08
別再讓「親信政治學」當道了！
中時社論
巴紐假建交案醜聞的發展在周二產生階段性高潮，邱義仁、黃志芳與柯承亨三位閣員先後辭職下台獲准。我們說這只是階段性高潮，因為仍然有許多細節尚未公開， 而將來是否有哪一位大員會遭到收押禁見仍未可知。但是，拋開這些司法層面，即使是單從政治角度觀察，就已經足以給所有的政治人物極大的警惕。
巴紐案執行操作與付款的是外交部，但是部長黃志芳卻聲稱他是受副院長邱義仁之命而辦事。我們再把先前爆發的鐽震案與陽信銀行撥款案做比對，就發現其中的共 通點：因鐽震案下台的國防部長李天羽、同意郵政儲金轉存陽信的交通部次長何煖軒與金管會主委胡勝正，據報載也都是奉邱義仁之命而辦事。行政院團隊固為一 體，機關首長奉副院長之命辦事也不能說錯，但是若因邱義仁之口頭指示就跳過所有的標準作業程序，甚至連個書面文件都付之闕如，那就問題嚴重了。
當邱義仁說要撥款外交掮客、要轉存百億郵儲、要成立軍火公司時，沒有任何一位部長敢向長官要一份書面手諭、敢向長官的長官（如行政院長、總統）查證原意， 這就凸顯出邱義仁是今上親信、是權力核心、是惹不得的天子分身。一旦親信政治當道，所有的官僚標準作業程序就只能閒置一邊，僅供參考。即使黃志芳、李天 羽、胡勝正覺得程序上有瑕疵，也絕不敢多所造次，因為他們知道，就算把事情原委呈報聖上，天子袒護親信的機率也極高，到頭來一切回歸原點，只是徒然平添了 自己的一項汙點。預知事後如此，外圍官僚在事前就絕不敢對宮廷內圈的親信有所詢問。久而久之，只要是親信口頭交辦事項，甚至謊稱是「上面」的意思，下層官 員就不敢請長官書面下條子、不敢向「上面」查證、當然更不敢提出不同意見。發展至此，則親信政治之危害已經造成；至於何時會爆發弊案或醜聞，只是機運問題 而已。
華人政治圈的親信政治當然不是從扁政府開始；歷代皇帝身邊的宦官外戚近臣能有多大影響，就看他們與皇上「有多親近」。上古史不 談，蔣經國時代的王昇、李登輝時代的蘇志誠，顯然都是權力與官職極不相稱的親信典型。在劉泰英當紅時代，還曾經以黨營事業小主管的身分，聲言要把當時的行 政院長蕭萬長「留校察看」。而蘇志誠對外放話斥責年齡、輩分、官銜比他高得多的政壇大老，更是時有所聞。王昇的親信地位在蔣經國的警覺下告終，但蘇志誠與 劉泰英則是權傾一時，直到李登輝卸任為止。
回過頭來看看陳水扁時代的親信政治，大概可以分為兩個時期。在吳淑珍、趙建銘、趙玉柱這些夫 人派涉案之前，馬永成是扁政府最重要的親信。小馬不但是總統辦公室的主任，更是吳淑珍意志的延伸。除此之外，夫人身邊諸如黃芳彥、張兆順、羅太太之流，即 使完全不屬官僚體系，都有呼風喚雨、到處喬人事的能耐；他們也是廣義的親信。在夫人涉入國務機要費案件之後，其代言人馬永成下台，其餘夫人派親信稍事收 斂，於是最近兩年成就了邱義仁的天下。我們回顧巴紐、鐽震、陽信等諸多邱義仁所涉之案，都是在第一親信馬永成下台之後的發展，可見成為皇帝身邊第一親信之 關鍵。
立委柯建銘說，邱義仁也許是聰明一世、糊塗一時；然而從制度面來看，標準作業程序原本就是為了避免官員糊塗疏忽而設。邱義仁糊不 糊塗、聰不聰明、貪不貪心都不是重點；一但政治運作由行政官僚變為宮廷核心、由書面作業改成口頭指示、由體制運作轉為人際關係，則親信政治就已然成形。人 類歷史上從沒有人逃得過艾頓爵士「權力使人腐化」的鐵律，從政治學理來看，民主政治之權力分立、有限授權、定期改選、相互制衡等設計，就是要防堵像邱義仁 這樣的濫權。邱義仁身處權力核心之最內圈，不被國會監督、不受體制約束，走到這一步就已經是偏離了政治的常軌。一位念政治學的人糊塗至此，究竟聰明在哪裡 呢？
Wednesday, May 7, 2008
Diplomatic Truce: End Checkbook Diplomacy
Diplomatic Truce: End Checkbook Diplomacy
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 7, 2008
The one billion NT Papua New Guinea (PNG) scandal is a mirror that reveals who the vampires are. It prevents the Chen Shui-bian regime from stonewalling and getting off scot-free. It proves that Chen's "Scorched Earth Diplomacy" has become a hotbed for corruption. The incoming administration must prosecute this case to the fullest extent of the law. It must also learn a lesson from its predecessor's mistakes. In order for cross-strait relations to develop in a peaceful manner, the pointless contest in checkbook diplomacy must end.
The prolonged diplomatic struggle between the two sides is a remnant of the Cold War. Taipei has long believed that maintaining diplomatic with a given number of nations is essential to survival. Beijing believes that if it fails to aggressively suppress Taipei diplomatically, Taiwan will take advantage of the opportunity to declare independence. But times have changed. The world is now flat. Barriers between nations are coming down. Cross-strait economic and trade exchange obstacles are gradually being removed. How can the two sides not change their thinking on the diplomatic front?
The KMT's checkbook diplomacy was the object of harsh criticism. Once in power, the Democratic Progressive Party adopted its "Scorched Earth Diplomacy," a reckless strategy of butting heads with Beijing, in order to underscore the difference between "Us" and "Them." Actually its real raison d'etre was to give Chen Shui-bian a stage on which to perform his "Head of State Diplomacy." It was a means of shifting political struggles on the island of Taiwan onto a more lavish international stage. In terms of the larger interests of the nation, it was a losing proposition. Over the past eight years, the ROC has left the international community an image of itself as a troublemaker. It has alienated the always friendly United States. The ROC has not made any breakthroughs or joined any international organizations via this head on approach. It has merely strengthen the mainland's efforts at containment. Meanwhile, the ROC's regional interests have been steadily eroded.
The PNG graft scandal shows that the DPP's diplomatic strategy was wrong. It degenerated into a cover for corruption, for diplomatic amateurism, for money-oriented international relations, and poorly-defined goals. Everyone from top to bottom has paid the price, and our national dignity has been sacrificed. Remove the cloak of "Scorched Earth Diplomacy" and all you will find is naked greed.
Over the past eight years, the Chen regime succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with only three nations. Nine nations broke off relations with the ROC. The damage inflicted is serious. The Chen regime was overconfident and provocative, and Beijing retaliated. Take two examples on Huang Chih-fang's watch. Last year we established relations with of St. Lucia, with a population of 10 million. One month later Beijing established relations with key Central American ally Costa Rica. Two years ago, Chen Shui-bian embarked on his infamous "Lost Voyage." When his plane wound up in Libya, North Africa, he spun the fiasco as a major diplomatic breakthrough. A few months later, Beijing retaliated by establishing relations with Chad. At the same time he deliberately timed his visit to coincide with the eve of Su Tseng-chang's state visit, causing Su embarrassment. The Chen Shui-bian regime has made tiny gains at the cost of huge losses. Its monumental folly has merely underscored its shortcomings.
Checkbook diplomacy has degenerated from a "necessary evil" to a "noxious evil." Leave aside the fact that many nations, once they tasted blood, played Beijing and Taipei off each other. As these nations evolve politically, they no longer stay bought. In recent years checkbook diplomacy has become the target of opposition party and international news media attacks. The money corrupts our allies' political process and props up authoritarian rulers. Used improperly, it can become an tool to suppress democracy and human rights. In recent years, Taipei's checkbook diplomacy has become a major factor in undermining our image. The PNG scandal has swallowed up hard-earned taxpayers dollars and turned us into an international laughing stock. Aren't the defects of checkbook diplomacy clear enough by now?
To speculate about a cross-strait diplomatic truce may seem Quixotic. But in fact all it would take is a shift in perspective. Lee Teng-hui's Two States Theory and Chen Shui-bian's Rectification of Names movement led cross-strait relations into a blind alley. Because of them, we wasted over 10 years on pointless confrontation, The two sides need to realize that such a zero-sum game does nothing to improve the overall situation. From an historical perspective, the melting of cross-strait ice is an unprecedented opportunity. Not only have leaders in Taipei and Beijing established a high degree of mutual goodwill, the results of elections on Taiwan have shown that most people look forward to peaceful exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. Under the circumstances, professional diplomats on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should have no difficulty finding a modus vivendi. There is simply no need to persist in this life and death struggle.
The new strategic scenario requires new thinking. President elect Ma Ying-jeou and his newly-appointed foreign minister Ou Hung-lian both advocate a diplomatic truce. This is a wise decision. How to implement such a truce in a manner that the two sides can accept and abide by, will require wisdom and creativity. The basic foundation should be the "1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations." Since the Taiwan region is proudly ruled by the Republic of China government, there is no need to "Rectify Names and Author a New Constitution." The mainland will then be less inclined to undermine our support, to exclude us from international activies, to contain us, and to reduce our international breathing room. The two sides can then put their money and energy to far better domestic and international use. This is a win/win proposition.
The ice between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is melting. The scent of spring fills the air. But economic and trade exchanges must include a diplomatic truce. Only then will cross-strait policy be complete. If billion dollar scandals can lead to a diplomatic truce, then the price paid will not be in vain.
兩岸休兵：停止金錢外交競賽
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.07 03:02 am
巴紐十億詐財案像一面照妖鏡，讓扁政府的擅權、無能和耍賴全部無所遁形，如今證明「烽火外交」甚至淪為貪瀆弊案的溫床。新政府除了追查善後，亦須記取教訓，在兩岸關係中開拓一條可行的和平外交途徑，停止無謂的金錢外交競賽。
兩 岸在外交陣線的長年纏鬥，是冷戰年代的餘緒。台灣一直堅信，維持一定數目的邦交國是生存之必要；而中共則認為，若不在外交陣線極力打壓，台灣就會趁隙宣布 獨立。但時移勢易，當整個世界變得更平坦，當國與國之間的藩籬不斷後撤，兩岸經貿及交流的壁壘也逐漸拆除，雙方在外交上豈能不轉換一下思維？
對 內來看，國民黨的「金錢外交」曾飽受詬病，民進黨執政後改採「烽火外交」，不斷利用「衝撞戰略」激化敵我意識；其實，主要只是提供了陳水扁一個藉「元首外 交」延伸內鬥的豪奢舞台，從國家整體利益看卻是得不償失。八年來，台灣不僅在國際上留下「麻煩製造者」的形象，對我素來友善的美國更漸感不耐；此外，台灣 並未因「強攻」而得以突破加入任何國際組織，反而使中共加強圍堵，台灣在區域間益形邊緣化。
巴紐詐財案的發生，說明民進黨外交戰略不僅全盤皆錯，且墮落至與貪腐政治互為掩護；外行領導，金錢掛帥，目標曖昧，上下交征其利，國家尊嚴盡喪。揭開衝撞外交的外衣，內裡只剩下投機和空洞。
過 去八年，扁政府僅僅新增了三個友邦，卻丟了九個邦交國，可謂損傷慘重。其間，有多次是不自量力地挑釁，而遭到北京報復性的拔樁。只舉最近黃志芳任內的兩個 例子，一是去年我國與十幾萬人口的聖露西亞建交，一個多月後，中共即強取我中美洲重要友邦哥斯大黎加。二是兩年前陳水扁為遂行其全球大謎航降落北非的利比 亞，自以為是一大突破；但不數月，中共便奪取我非洲友邦查德作為報復，同時刻意將時間點選在閣揆蘇貞昌出訪前夕，使其難堪。扁政府這種因小失大、得一失三 的戰法，不僅愚不可及，簡直是自暴其短。
對外而言，金錢外交也逐漸由「必要之惡」淪為「可恥之惡」。撇開許多國家食髓知味在兩岸間游移要 索不談，隨著邦交國的民主進展，金錢所能買到的「邦交效期」也已越來越短，且近幾年不時成為反對黨及國際新聞媒體揭弊、攻伐的對象。金錢的介入，不僅汙染 對手國的政治，助長其貪官的威權，運用不當的話，更可能變成壓制對手國民主和人權的工具。近年來，金錢外交已成拖累台灣形象的一大因素，巴紐騙案除了糟蹋 納稅人的血汗錢，更讓我們淪為國際笑柄；金錢外交的為禍還不夠嗎？
兩岸之間要談「外交休兵」，看似艱難，其實也不過是一念之轉罷了。從李 登輝的「兩國論」到陳水扁的「正名運動」，將兩岸關係帶進了一個窄巷；也正因為這十多年的對峙與虛耗，兩岸更應深刻認識這種「零和遊戲」無助於彼此的大 局。而從歷史的縱深看，當前兩岸融冰的契機具備了前所未見的條件：不僅台北和北京領導人均抱高度的交流善意，台灣的民主選舉結果也顯示多數人民樂見兩岸和 平交往。有了這樣的基礎，兩岸外交人員應不難找到一個合適的和平共存之道，而沒有必要再繼續你死活我的廝殺。
新局的開創，需要新的思維。 新總統馬英九和新外長歐鴻鍊都主張「外交休兵」，這是對外交路線的務實反省；但如何將此一概念具體化，落實為兩岸可以接受並遵守的共識，則有賴雙方的智慧 和創意。基本的概念可包括：在「九二共識／一中各表」的基礎上，台灣原即是堂堂正正的中華民國，因此不須再有「正名制憲」；中共則停止挖我牆腳，停止在國 際活動中對台灣打壓圍堵，不再阻撓台灣拓展「國際空間」。如此一來，兩岸皆可將金錢與精力用於經營更有益於自己內部及國際社會的事務，這便是雙贏的棋局。
兩岸融冰的善意嗅得到春天的氣味，但經貿的交流應把外交止戰納入思考，才是完整配套。若十億醜聞能促成外交休兵，這個代價就不算枉費了。
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 7, 2008
The one billion NT Papua New Guinea (PNG) scandal is a mirror that reveals who the vampires are. It prevents the Chen Shui-bian regime from stonewalling and getting off scot-free. It proves that Chen's "Scorched Earth Diplomacy" has become a hotbed for corruption. The incoming administration must prosecute this case to the fullest extent of the law. It must also learn a lesson from its predecessor's mistakes. In order for cross-strait relations to develop in a peaceful manner, the pointless contest in checkbook diplomacy must end.
The prolonged diplomatic struggle between the two sides is a remnant of the Cold War. Taipei has long believed that maintaining diplomatic with a given number of nations is essential to survival. Beijing believes that if it fails to aggressively suppress Taipei diplomatically, Taiwan will take advantage of the opportunity to declare independence. But times have changed. The world is now flat. Barriers between nations are coming down. Cross-strait economic and trade exchange obstacles are gradually being removed. How can the two sides not change their thinking on the diplomatic front?
The KMT's checkbook diplomacy was the object of harsh criticism. Once in power, the Democratic Progressive Party adopted its "Scorched Earth Diplomacy," a reckless strategy of butting heads with Beijing, in order to underscore the difference between "Us" and "Them." Actually its real raison d'etre was to give Chen Shui-bian a stage on which to perform his "Head of State Diplomacy." It was a means of shifting political struggles on the island of Taiwan onto a more lavish international stage. In terms of the larger interests of the nation, it was a losing proposition. Over the past eight years, the ROC has left the international community an image of itself as a troublemaker. It has alienated the always friendly United States. The ROC has not made any breakthroughs or joined any international organizations via this head on approach. It has merely strengthen the mainland's efforts at containment. Meanwhile, the ROC's regional interests have been steadily eroded.
The PNG graft scandal shows that the DPP's diplomatic strategy was wrong. It degenerated into a cover for corruption, for diplomatic amateurism, for money-oriented international relations, and poorly-defined goals. Everyone from top to bottom has paid the price, and our national dignity has been sacrificed. Remove the cloak of "Scorched Earth Diplomacy" and all you will find is naked greed.
Over the past eight years, the Chen regime succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with only three nations. Nine nations broke off relations with the ROC. The damage inflicted is serious. The Chen regime was overconfident and provocative, and Beijing retaliated. Take two examples on Huang Chih-fang's watch. Last year we established relations with of St. Lucia, with a population of 10 million. One month later Beijing established relations with key Central American ally Costa Rica. Two years ago, Chen Shui-bian embarked on his infamous "Lost Voyage." When his plane wound up in Libya, North Africa, he spun the fiasco as a major diplomatic breakthrough. A few months later, Beijing retaliated by establishing relations with Chad. At the same time he deliberately timed his visit to coincide with the eve of Su Tseng-chang's state visit, causing Su embarrassment. The Chen Shui-bian regime has made tiny gains at the cost of huge losses. Its monumental folly has merely underscored its shortcomings.
Checkbook diplomacy has degenerated from a "necessary evil" to a "noxious evil." Leave aside the fact that many nations, once they tasted blood, played Beijing and Taipei off each other. As these nations evolve politically, they no longer stay bought. In recent years checkbook diplomacy has become the target of opposition party and international news media attacks. The money corrupts our allies' political process and props up authoritarian rulers. Used improperly, it can become an tool to suppress democracy and human rights. In recent years, Taipei's checkbook diplomacy has become a major factor in undermining our image. The PNG scandal has swallowed up hard-earned taxpayers dollars and turned us into an international laughing stock. Aren't the defects of checkbook diplomacy clear enough by now?
To speculate about a cross-strait diplomatic truce may seem Quixotic. But in fact all it would take is a shift in perspective. Lee Teng-hui's Two States Theory and Chen Shui-bian's Rectification of Names movement led cross-strait relations into a blind alley. Because of them, we wasted over 10 years on pointless confrontation, The two sides need to realize that such a zero-sum game does nothing to improve the overall situation. From an historical perspective, the melting of cross-strait ice is an unprecedented opportunity. Not only have leaders in Taipei and Beijing established a high degree of mutual goodwill, the results of elections on Taiwan have shown that most people look forward to peaceful exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. Under the circumstances, professional diplomats on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should have no difficulty finding a modus vivendi. There is simply no need to persist in this life and death struggle.
The new strategic scenario requires new thinking. President elect Ma Ying-jeou and his newly-appointed foreign minister Ou Hung-lian both advocate a diplomatic truce. This is a wise decision. How to implement such a truce in a manner that the two sides can accept and abide by, will require wisdom and creativity. The basic foundation should be the "1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations." Since the Taiwan region is proudly ruled by the Republic of China government, there is no need to "Rectify Names and Author a New Constitution." The mainland will then be less inclined to undermine our support, to exclude us from international activies, to contain us, and to reduce our international breathing room. The two sides can then put their money and energy to far better domestic and international use. This is a win/win proposition.
The ice between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is melting. The scent of spring fills the air. But economic and trade exchanges must include a diplomatic truce. Only then will cross-strait policy be complete. If billion dollar scandals can lead to a diplomatic truce, then the price paid will not be in vain.
兩岸休兵：停止金錢外交競賽
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.07 03:02 am
巴紐十億詐財案像一面照妖鏡，讓扁政府的擅權、無能和耍賴全部無所遁形，如今證明「烽火外交」甚至淪為貪瀆弊案的溫床。新政府除了追查善後，亦須記取教訓，在兩岸關係中開拓一條可行的和平外交途徑，停止無謂的金錢外交競賽。
兩 岸在外交陣線的長年纏鬥，是冷戰年代的餘緒。台灣一直堅信，維持一定數目的邦交國是生存之必要；而中共則認為，若不在外交陣線極力打壓，台灣就會趁隙宣布 獨立。但時移勢易，當整個世界變得更平坦，當國與國之間的藩籬不斷後撤，兩岸經貿及交流的壁壘也逐漸拆除，雙方在外交上豈能不轉換一下思維？
對 內來看，國民黨的「金錢外交」曾飽受詬病，民進黨執政後改採「烽火外交」，不斷利用「衝撞戰略」激化敵我意識；其實，主要只是提供了陳水扁一個藉「元首外 交」延伸內鬥的豪奢舞台，從國家整體利益看卻是得不償失。八年來，台灣不僅在國際上留下「麻煩製造者」的形象，對我素來友善的美國更漸感不耐；此外，台灣 並未因「強攻」而得以突破加入任何國際組織，反而使中共加強圍堵，台灣在區域間益形邊緣化。
巴紐詐財案的發生，說明民進黨外交戰略不僅全盤皆錯，且墮落至與貪腐政治互為掩護；外行領導，金錢掛帥，目標曖昧，上下交征其利，國家尊嚴盡喪。揭開衝撞外交的外衣，內裡只剩下投機和空洞。
過 去八年，扁政府僅僅新增了三個友邦，卻丟了九個邦交國，可謂損傷慘重。其間，有多次是不自量力地挑釁，而遭到北京報復性的拔樁。只舉最近黃志芳任內的兩個 例子，一是去年我國與十幾萬人口的聖露西亞建交，一個多月後，中共即強取我中美洲重要友邦哥斯大黎加。二是兩年前陳水扁為遂行其全球大謎航降落北非的利比 亞，自以為是一大突破；但不數月，中共便奪取我非洲友邦查德作為報復，同時刻意將時間點選在閣揆蘇貞昌出訪前夕，使其難堪。扁政府這種因小失大、得一失三 的戰法，不僅愚不可及，簡直是自暴其短。
對外而言，金錢外交也逐漸由「必要之惡」淪為「可恥之惡」。撇開許多國家食髓知味在兩岸間游移要 索不談，隨著邦交國的民主進展，金錢所能買到的「邦交效期」也已越來越短，且近幾年不時成為反對黨及國際新聞媒體揭弊、攻伐的對象。金錢的介入，不僅汙染 對手國的政治，助長其貪官的威權，運用不當的話，更可能變成壓制對手國民主和人權的工具。近年來，金錢外交已成拖累台灣形象的一大因素，巴紐騙案除了糟蹋 納稅人的血汗錢，更讓我們淪為國際笑柄；金錢外交的為禍還不夠嗎？
兩岸之間要談「外交休兵」，看似艱難，其實也不過是一念之轉罷了。從李 登輝的「兩國論」到陳水扁的「正名運動」，將兩岸關係帶進了一個窄巷；也正因為這十多年的對峙與虛耗，兩岸更應深刻認識這種「零和遊戲」無助於彼此的大 局。而從歷史的縱深看，當前兩岸融冰的契機具備了前所未見的條件：不僅台北和北京領導人均抱高度的交流善意，台灣的民主選舉結果也顯示多數人民樂見兩岸和 平交往。有了這樣的基礎，兩岸外交人員應不難找到一個合適的和平共存之道，而沒有必要再繼續你死活我的廝殺。
新局的開創，需要新的思維。 新總統馬英九和新外長歐鴻鍊都主張「外交休兵」，這是對外交路線的務實反省；但如何將此一概念具體化，落實為兩岸可以接受並遵守的共識，則有賴雙方的智慧 和創意。基本的概念可包括：在「九二共識／一中各表」的基礎上，台灣原即是堂堂正正的中華民國，因此不須再有「正名制憲」；中共則停止挖我牆腳，停止在國 際活動中對台灣打壓圍堵，不再阻撓台灣拓展「國際空間」。如此一來，兩岸皆可將金錢與精力用於經營更有益於自己內部及國際社會的事務，這便是雙贏的棋局。
兩岸融冰的善意嗅得到春天的氣味，但經貿的交流應把外交止戰納入思考，才是完整配套。若十億醜聞能促成外交休兵，這個代價就不算枉費了。
Tuesday, May 6, 2008
Chen Shui-bian Should Quit the DPP to Save the DPP!
Chen Shui-bian Should Quit the DPP to Save the DPP!
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 6, 2008
Chao Tien-lin, official spokesman for Frank Hsieh's office, said that Chen Shui-bian was in on the PNG corruption case from beginning to end, therefore he cannot escape responsibility. He said that the DPP is now entering a crucial period of reform, and called on Chen Shui-bian to resign from the party on his own initiative.
Chao Tien-lin's statement reflects what many DPP members are thinking but not saying. The DPP's belated "reform" reflects their dawning awareness of the need to make amends for Chen Shui-bian's eight years of misrule and malfeasance. If the DPP cannot bring itself to condemn Chen Shui-bian's crimes, it will be never be able to rehabilitate the DPP or repay its debt to society. The biggest debt the Democratic Progressive Party owes Taiwan is none other than Chen Shui-bian himself. How should the DPP repay its debt and rebuild its credibility?
Condemning Chen Shui-bian is not enough to reform the DPP. But refusing to condemn Chen Shui-bian will prevent them from ever reforming the DPP. If a bottom-up, grass roots movement condemns Chen Shui-bian, it may split the DPP. Only if Chen Shui-bian takes the initiative to quit the party, can a divisive internal struggle be avoided. It would be the biggest gift Chen Shui-bian could give the DPP.
Chen Shui-bian should repay the DPP by resigning from the party. Ever since the 2004 "Bulletgate" hoax, a minefield of corruption cases have exploded beneath the DPP's feet. The entire DPP, nay, the entire nation, has paid the price for this corruption. Those who backed Chen Shui-bian unconditionally have destroyed their own party, along with the entire nation. The DPP covered for Chen Shui-bian's crimes. It is an accomplice to his misdeeds. In the end however, not only was the DPP unable to save Chen Shui-bian, it enabled him to take the entire party down with him. It enabled him to inflict irreparable harm to the entire nation.
Now that the DPP belatedly hopes to engage in "reform," it must repent for eight years of Chen Shui-bian's misrule and malfeasance. Short of that, It cannot repay its debt to society. Short of that, it cannot restore the DPP's political credibility. It is time for Chen Shui-bian to repay his debt to the DPP. He should sacrifice himself to save the party. He should quit the party to save the party. He should establish a foundation for the DPP's reform and enable its rehabilitation and rebirth. This is what Chao Tien-lin has in mind. It is the consensus within the DPP. It is also the hope of many on Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian once maintained that "I cannot bear all of the DPP's burdens." Is the DPP now supposed to bear all of Chen Shui-bian's burdens?
Actually calls for Chen Shui-bian to quit the party did not begin today. Once Chen's corruption scandals began coming to light, even Wang Hsing-nan advocated that Chen Shui-bian quit the party. Because Chen Shui-bian had hijacked the Deep Greens, or because the DPP still hoped to ride to victory on Chen Shui-bian's coattails, the situation continued to deteriorate to where it is today, to the legislative and presidential election debacles. The PNG scandal finally exposed the entire Presidential Office as a den of thieves. From Chen Che-nan, Wu Shu-chen, Chao Yu-tsu, Yu Lian-fa, Chen Cheng-hui, to Ma Yong-cheng. Now add Chiou I-jen, and more importantly, Chen Shui-bian himself. Every last one of them, rotten to the core. Is the DPP still afraid to demand Chen Shui-bian's resignation from the party? Is Chen Shui-bian still reluctant to quit the party to save the party?
Chiou I-jen took the initiative to quit the party on his own initiative, adding that "There is nothing unfair" about this. To some degree he is still willing to resign to save the party. If Chang Chun-hsiung remains unwilling to fire Chiou I-jen and Huang Chih-fang, he should at least accept their voluntary resignations. Chang Chun-hsiung needs to realize that this is necessary to clear the DPP's political debts. On then can the DPP rebuild its credibility.
Chen Shui-bian's greatest sin against the DPP was to discredit "Taiwan values" per se. Chiou I-jen has taken the initiative to quit the party because of the PNG scandal. Chen Shui-bian should take the intiative to quit the party for eight years of misrule and malfeasance. After all, the DPP backed Chen Shui-bian unconditionally for eight years. Now that the party is undergoing painful reform, assuming Chen Shui-bian feels any sense of obligation toward the DPP, any sense of repentance or atonement, he should cease holding the DPP hostage. He should spare the DPP. He should take the initiative to quit the party. He should give the DPP chance to clear its debt to society and the chance to start anew.
As long as Chen Shui-bian takes the initiative to quit the party, the DPP's circumstances will immediately change for the better. If Chen Shui-bian quits the party, that will provide a foundation for the DPP's reform. Isn't this something Chen Shui-bian ought to do? Is Chen Shui-bian really willing to allow the entire party bear the burden for one individual? Is Chen Shui-bian really willing to bankrupt the entire party, destroy the entire party?
Those within the Democratic Progressive Party who share Chao Tien-lin's views should speak up in one voice. This is the DPP's moment of truth. Chen Shui-bian must quit the party to save the party! If Chiou I-jen can, why can't Chen Shui-bian?
陳水扁應以退黨救黨來報答民進黨！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.06 02:54 am
謝長廷辦公室發言人趙天麟說，陳水扁對巴紐案始終知情，因此難辭其咎。他說，民進黨正進入改革關鍵時期，他呼籲陳水扁主動退黨。
趙 天麟的呼籲，或許正是許多民進黨人椎心泣血、心照不宣之言。民進黨如今所謂的「改革」，其實就是要對陳水扁八年失政敗德進行反省與悔罪。若不能對陳水扁的 罪咎進行徹底批判，非但無以重建民進黨的價值體系，且將使民進黨形同永遠不能向台灣社會清償這八年失政敗德的主體債務，而陳水扁正是民進黨欠台灣社會最大 的一筆「政治債」。前債未清，如何重建民進黨的政治債信？
雖然批扁不是改革的全部，但不批扁就絕不可能完成改革。然而，倘是「由下而上」發動批扁，民進黨就可能分裂；唯若陳水扁能主動退黨，即可免於內鬥分裂，亦是陳水扁對民進黨改革工程的最重大獻禮。
陳 水扁應以退黨報答民進黨！自二○○四年「兩顆子彈」以來，繼之以雷區全面引爆一般地炸開了種種重大貪腐案件；四年來，民進黨可謂是賠上了整個黨、賠上了整 個國家，全面力挺陳水扁遂行其「毀黨自救」、「毀國自救」的工程。就此以論，民進黨對陳水扁已是「仁至義盡」，亦是「惡至罪盡」，可謂肝腦塗地；然而，最 後民進黨非但未救回貪腐無狀的陳水扁，也斷送了整個黨，重傷了國家社會。
現在，民進黨要「改革」了，也就是必須對陳水扁八年的失政敗德進 行徹底反省及悔罪了。非如此，不能對台灣社會償清舊債；非如此，不可能重建民進黨的政治債信。所以，現在也到了陳水扁應當誠心報答民進黨的時機；陳水扁應 當捨己救黨，退黨救黨，為民進黨的改革提供前提與基礎，為民進黨的更生再造創造契機。這不但是趙天麟的思考，亦是民進黨內有心人的共識，更是眾多對民進黨 有期待的台灣人民的心思。陳水扁曾是「不可民進黨負我一人」，如今難道仍是「寧可我一人負盡整個民進黨」？
其實，要「陳水扁退黨」的呼籲 非自今始，在貪案頻爆之際，連王幸男都曾主張阿扁退黨。當時或因陳水扁挾持深綠，或因黨內仍有陳水扁可能帶領全黨過關的僥倖心理，遂使情勢繼續惡化至如今 這種立委、總統選舉慘輸狂敗卻猶然見不到底的地步；而巴紐案的爆發，終於暴露出整個總統府已經形同一個賊窩匪窟，自陳哲男、吳淑珍、趙玉柱、余連發、陳鎮 慧，至馬永成，如今再添一個邱義仁，更不可漏掉陳水扁那個本尊，每一張臉孔都是非貪即腐、可鄙可憎；然則，難道民進黨還不敢命陳水扁退黨？而陳水扁亦仍吝 於退黨救黨？
邱義仁主動退黨，並認為這「沒有什麼不公平」，多少尚存「退黨救黨」之心；而張俊雄若不能主動將邱義仁及黃志芳免職，至少亦應接受二人的主動辭職。張俊雄應知，這些都是必須即時清償的「政治債」，此時不清，民進黨即再難重建社會債信。
陳 水扁對民進黨所造成的最大罪孽，就是摧毀了整個「台灣價值」。邱義仁已為巴紐案主動退黨，陳水扁更應為八年的失政敗德主動退黨。畢竟，民進黨已因八年挺扁 護貪而殘敗至此，如今正在改革更生的痛苦之中；陳水扁若對民進黨尚有一絲感恩圖報、知恥悔罪，或將功贖罪之念，就不應再挾持民進黨，就應饒了民進黨，就應 主動退黨，就應還給民進黨一個清償前債、脫胎換骨的生機。
只要陳水扁能主動退黨，民進黨的內外情勢必可立即豁然開朗。陳水扁一人退黨，即能為民進黨的改革再造提供前提與基礎；這難道是陳水扁所不應為？難道陳水扁真是不可全黨負我一人，寧可我一人負盡全黨，又寧可我一人毀盡全黨？
民進黨內的「趙天麟們」應當同聲疾呼：這是民進黨改革關鍵時刻，請陳水扁退黨救黨！邱義仁能，難道陳水扁不能？
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 6, 2008
Chao Tien-lin, official spokesman for Frank Hsieh's office, said that Chen Shui-bian was in on the PNG corruption case from beginning to end, therefore he cannot escape responsibility. He said that the DPP is now entering a crucial period of reform, and called on Chen Shui-bian to resign from the party on his own initiative.
Chao Tien-lin's statement reflects what many DPP members are thinking but not saying. The DPP's belated "reform" reflects their dawning awareness of the need to make amends for Chen Shui-bian's eight years of misrule and malfeasance. If the DPP cannot bring itself to condemn Chen Shui-bian's crimes, it will be never be able to rehabilitate the DPP or repay its debt to society. The biggest debt the Democratic Progressive Party owes Taiwan is none other than Chen Shui-bian himself. How should the DPP repay its debt and rebuild its credibility?
Condemning Chen Shui-bian is not enough to reform the DPP. But refusing to condemn Chen Shui-bian will prevent them from ever reforming the DPP. If a bottom-up, grass roots movement condemns Chen Shui-bian, it may split the DPP. Only if Chen Shui-bian takes the initiative to quit the party, can a divisive internal struggle be avoided. It would be the biggest gift Chen Shui-bian could give the DPP.
Chen Shui-bian should repay the DPP by resigning from the party. Ever since the 2004 "Bulletgate" hoax, a minefield of corruption cases have exploded beneath the DPP's feet. The entire DPP, nay, the entire nation, has paid the price for this corruption. Those who backed Chen Shui-bian unconditionally have destroyed their own party, along with the entire nation. The DPP covered for Chen Shui-bian's crimes. It is an accomplice to his misdeeds. In the end however, not only was the DPP unable to save Chen Shui-bian, it enabled him to take the entire party down with him. It enabled him to inflict irreparable harm to the entire nation.
Now that the DPP belatedly hopes to engage in "reform," it must repent for eight years of Chen Shui-bian's misrule and malfeasance. Short of that, It cannot repay its debt to society. Short of that, it cannot restore the DPP's political credibility. It is time for Chen Shui-bian to repay his debt to the DPP. He should sacrifice himself to save the party. He should quit the party to save the party. He should establish a foundation for the DPP's reform and enable its rehabilitation and rebirth. This is what Chao Tien-lin has in mind. It is the consensus within the DPP. It is also the hope of many on Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian once maintained that "I cannot bear all of the DPP's burdens." Is the DPP now supposed to bear all of Chen Shui-bian's burdens?
Actually calls for Chen Shui-bian to quit the party did not begin today. Once Chen's corruption scandals began coming to light, even Wang Hsing-nan advocated that Chen Shui-bian quit the party. Because Chen Shui-bian had hijacked the Deep Greens, or because the DPP still hoped to ride to victory on Chen Shui-bian's coattails, the situation continued to deteriorate to where it is today, to the legislative and presidential election debacles. The PNG scandal finally exposed the entire Presidential Office as a den of thieves. From Chen Che-nan, Wu Shu-chen, Chao Yu-tsu, Yu Lian-fa, Chen Cheng-hui, to Ma Yong-cheng. Now add Chiou I-jen, and more importantly, Chen Shui-bian himself. Every last one of them, rotten to the core. Is the DPP still afraid to demand Chen Shui-bian's resignation from the party? Is Chen Shui-bian still reluctant to quit the party to save the party?
Chiou I-jen took the initiative to quit the party on his own initiative, adding that "There is nothing unfair" about this. To some degree he is still willing to resign to save the party. If Chang Chun-hsiung remains unwilling to fire Chiou I-jen and Huang Chih-fang, he should at least accept their voluntary resignations. Chang Chun-hsiung needs to realize that this is necessary to clear the DPP's political debts. On then can the DPP rebuild its credibility.
Chen Shui-bian's greatest sin against the DPP was to discredit "Taiwan values" per se. Chiou I-jen has taken the initiative to quit the party because of the PNG scandal. Chen Shui-bian should take the intiative to quit the party for eight years of misrule and malfeasance. After all, the DPP backed Chen Shui-bian unconditionally for eight years. Now that the party is undergoing painful reform, assuming Chen Shui-bian feels any sense of obligation toward the DPP, any sense of repentance or atonement, he should cease holding the DPP hostage. He should spare the DPP. He should take the initiative to quit the party. He should give the DPP chance to clear its debt to society and the chance to start anew.
As long as Chen Shui-bian takes the initiative to quit the party, the DPP's circumstances will immediately change for the better. If Chen Shui-bian quits the party, that will provide a foundation for the DPP's reform. Isn't this something Chen Shui-bian ought to do? Is Chen Shui-bian really willing to allow the entire party bear the burden for one individual? Is Chen Shui-bian really willing to bankrupt the entire party, destroy the entire party?
Those within the Democratic Progressive Party who share Chao Tien-lin's views should speak up in one voice. This is the DPP's moment of truth. Chen Shui-bian must quit the party to save the party! If Chiou I-jen can, why can't Chen Shui-bian?
陳水扁應以退黨救黨來報答民進黨！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.06 02:54 am
謝長廷辦公室發言人趙天麟說，陳水扁對巴紐案始終知情，因此難辭其咎。他說，民進黨正進入改革關鍵時期，他呼籲陳水扁主動退黨。
趙 天麟的呼籲，或許正是許多民進黨人椎心泣血、心照不宣之言。民進黨如今所謂的「改革」，其實就是要對陳水扁八年失政敗德進行反省與悔罪。若不能對陳水扁的 罪咎進行徹底批判，非但無以重建民進黨的價值體系，且將使民進黨形同永遠不能向台灣社會清償這八年失政敗德的主體債務，而陳水扁正是民進黨欠台灣社會最大 的一筆「政治債」。前債未清，如何重建民進黨的政治債信？
雖然批扁不是改革的全部，但不批扁就絕不可能完成改革。然而，倘是「由下而上」發動批扁，民進黨就可能分裂；唯若陳水扁能主動退黨，即可免於內鬥分裂，亦是陳水扁對民進黨改革工程的最重大獻禮。
陳 水扁應以退黨報答民進黨！自二○○四年「兩顆子彈」以來，繼之以雷區全面引爆一般地炸開了種種重大貪腐案件；四年來，民進黨可謂是賠上了整個黨、賠上了整 個國家，全面力挺陳水扁遂行其「毀黨自救」、「毀國自救」的工程。就此以論，民進黨對陳水扁已是「仁至義盡」，亦是「惡至罪盡」，可謂肝腦塗地；然而，最 後民進黨非但未救回貪腐無狀的陳水扁，也斷送了整個黨，重傷了國家社會。
現在，民進黨要「改革」了，也就是必須對陳水扁八年的失政敗德進 行徹底反省及悔罪了。非如此，不能對台灣社會償清舊債；非如此，不可能重建民進黨的政治債信。所以，現在也到了陳水扁應當誠心報答民進黨的時機；陳水扁應 當捨己救黨，退黨救黨，為民進黨的改革提供前提與基礎，為民進黨的更生再造創造契機。這不但是趙天麟的思考，亦是民進黨內有心人的共識，更是眾多對民進黨 有期待的台灣人民的心思。陳水扁曾是「不可民進黨負我一人」，如今難道仍是「寧可我一人負盡整個民進黨」？
其實，要「陳水扁退黨」的呼籲 非自今始，在貪案頻爆之際，連王幸男都曾主張阿扁退黨。當時或因陳水扁挾持深綠，或因黨內仍有陳水扁可能帶領全黨過關的僥倖心理，遂使情勢繼續惡化至如今 這種立委、總統選舉慘輸狂敗卻猶然見不到底的地步；而巴紐案的爆發，終於暴露出整個總統府已經形同一個賊窩匪窟，自陳哲男、吳淑珍、趙玉柱、余連發、陳鎮 慧，至馬永成，如今再添一個邱義仁，更不可漏掉陳水扁那個本尊，每一張臉孔都是非貪即腐、可鄙可憎；然則，難道民進黨還不敢命陳水扁退黨？而陳水扁亦仍吝 於退黨救黨？
邱義仁主動退黨，並認為這「沒有什麼不公平」，多少尚存「退黨救黨」之心；而張俊雄若不能主動將邱義仁及黃志芳免職，至少亦應接受二人的主動辭職。張俊雄應知，這些都是必須即時清償的「政治債」，此時不清，民進黨即再難重建社會債信。
陳 水扁對民進黨所造成的最大罪孽，就是摧毀了整個「台灣價值」。邱義仁已為巴紐案主動退黨，陳水扁更應為八年的失政敗德主動退黨。畢竟，民進黨已因八年挺扁 護貪而殘敗至此，如今正在改革更生的痛苦之中；陳水扁若對民進黨尚有一絲感恩圖報、知恥悔罪，或將功贖罪之念，就不應再挾持民進黨，就應饒了民進黨，就應 主動退黨，就應還給民進黨一個清償前債、脫胎換骨的生機。
只要陳水扁能主動退黨，民進黨的內外情勢必可立即豁然開朗。陳水扁一人退黨，即能為民進黨的改革再造提供前提與基礎；這難道是陳水扁所不應為？難道陳水扁真是不可全黨負我一人，寧可我一人負盡全黨，又寧可我一人毀盡全黨？
民進黨內的「趙天麟們」應當同聲疾呼：這是民進黨改革關鍵時刻，請陳水扁退黨救黨！邱義仁能，難道陳水扁不能？
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