Is Taiwan to be Ruled by a Regional Governor?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 8, 2009
Ever since the Lien Chan/Hu Jintao Meeting of 2005, terms such as "One China," "China's reunification," and "One Country, Two Systems" have been bandied about. They have also appeared in Hu's Six Points.
Hu Jintao's remarks invoked the 1979 "Message to Our Taiwan Compatriots" from 30 years ago. As one traces one's roots and acknowledges one's heritage, it is natural to invoke such language. The thinking behind such expressions is undoubtedly Hu's own. At the macro level, Hu Jintao's may be seeking "China's reunification." But his language reveals that when it come to process, Hu advocates the "peaceful development of cross-strait relations."
Reunification and independence issues are goal oriented. Immediate reunification and immediate independence are indifferent to process. They are concerned only with goals. Concern for process, on the other hand, means delaying the pursuit of one's goals. It means using a process to solve problems. Those concerned only with goals, do not accept the status quo. They advocate changing the status quo. Those concerned with process, respect the status quo. They advocate maintaining the status quo, improving the status quo. Hu Jintao has been goal oriented. But he is becoming process oriented. He has not given up his goals, but he has become more process oriented. He has gone from hailing "reunification," to acknowledging and respecting the reality of "special circumstances under which the nation is not yet reunified."
Goal oriention can easily lead one to an impasse. Take Beijing's long-standing Taiwan policy. The term "One Country, Two Systems" has not appeared in quite a while. What exactly does "One Country" mean? Hu Jintao's recent talk did not stipulate that "One China" is the People's Republic of China. That being the case, what exactly does "Two Systems" mean? Look at Hong Kong. "Two Systems" means an appointed Regional Governor. But the Republic of China has directly elected four presidents. Is Taiwan to be ruled by a Regional Governor?
Beijing was once goal oriented. It did not accept the status quo. It advocated changing the status quo, i.e., promoting reunification. But since 2000, Beijing and Washington have both advocated maintaining the status quo. They have both expressed opposition to "unilaterally changing the status quo." The reason is Taiwan independence had gained momentum. But how does one define the status quo? Does it mean recognizing and maintaining the Republic of China? Little progress has been made on this front. If one fails to maintain the Republic of China, how can one maintain the status quo? If one refuses to accept the Republic of China, then what is the status quo?
Beijing's recent interpretation is "Although the two sides have not been reunified, the mainland and Taiwan belong to One China. This has never changed." This interpretation can also be found within Hu's Six Points. In practical terms, this means that although the two sides are ruled separately by the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, they still belong to One China. This is the Roof Theory in which One China refers to a Third Entity that encompasses "Taiwan + Mainland China," or "Republic of China + People's Republic of China." But based on Beijing's real world practices, this is not what it really means.
In order to rebuild cross-strait relations, we must improve our understanding of both goals and processes. In terms of goals, the One China Roof Theory will remain deadlocked unless it is liberated from Beijing's unilaterally defined "One China means the People's Republic of China." In terms of process, Hu's Six Points include the signing of a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement, the establishment of a cross-Strait economic cooperation mechanism, the creation of a mechanism for Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation, a halt to internal conflict over foreign relations, a relaxation of restraints on Taipei's participation in international activities, the establishment of military security mechanisms, and a peace agreement. Although the nation has yet to be reunified, the two sides would explore the possibility of pragmatic political relations under special circumstances. These all stress process. These all stress "doing something positive, doing something concrete." These may be beneficial to reunification. But more importantly, they are beneficial to maintaining a status quo in which the nation has yet to be reunified.
Cross-strait interaction has moved from goal oriention to process orientation. This is a positive development. The best approach is to adopt the right process in order to spontaneously discover the right goal. To impose goals on the process will distort the process. If the goal is to return Taiwan to rule by an appointed Regional Governor, under "One Country, Two Systems," not only will the goal not be achieved, the process will be undermined as well.
In Hu's Six Points, Hu mentions "political relations under yet to be reunified special cross-Strait circumstances." Is Hu suggesting a new "Roof Theory?" Is Hu suggesting a neutral framework for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations? Does this respect history, reality, and the wishes of the people? Can it introduce a new process to cross-Strait relations? We will have to wait and see.
難道要台灣倒退回頭選特首？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.08 02:35 am
二○○五年「連胡會」以來，潛隱已久的「一個中國」、「中國統一」及「一國兩制」等兩岸語彙，又在胡六點中出現。
胡錦濤的談話，既是借一九七九年《告台灣同胞書》三十周年之題而發，為了追溯淵源，為了表彰傳承，自然要重新啟用這些歷史語彙。當然，這些語彙所蘊含的思 維無疑亦是胡錦濤個人的認知與追求；唯就大處來看，胡錦濤雖然是「中國統一」的「目的論」者，但他在通篇談話中，亦顯示他也是「兩岸關係和平發展」的「過 程論」者。
統獨議題，皆是「目的論」；急統急獨，更是不問「過程」、不擇手段之「唯目的論」。「過程論」，則是延緩對「目的」的追求，而主張以「互動過程」來累積解 決難題的資源與條件。亦即，目的論不接受現狀，主張改變現狀；過程論則主張尊重現狀，維持現狀，改善現狀。胡錦濤近幾年來的表現，應可視為從「目的論」， 向「過程論」移動；他未放棄「目的」，但向「過程」傾斜；也就是從高喊「統一」，轉移至承認並重視「尚未統一的特殊情況」。
目的論極易形成僵局。以在北京對台政策中好久沒有出現的「一國兩制」而言，「一國」作何定義？連胡錦濤此次都未說「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」。「兩制」又作何定義？對香港言，兩制是委選特首，但台灣卻已直選四屆總統，難道要台灣倒退回頭去選特首？
北京過去是「目的論」者，不接受現狀，主張改變現狀（推動統一）；但自二○○○ 年前後以降，則與美國一起主張維持現狀，反對「片面改變現狀」，原因是台獨聲勢上揚。但是，「現狀」作何定義，是否在某種程度上承認及維持「中華民國」， 卻是似有改變又迄無進展。然而，若不維持中華民國，如何維持現狀？若不接受中華民國，現狀是什麼？
北京近年來的說法是：「儘管兩岸尚未統一，但大陸與台灣同屬一個中國的事實從未改變。」此種理論這次也見諸胡六點。在現實上，這應當是指兩岸雖以「中華民 國」與「中華人民共和國」分裂分治，但仍同屬「一個中國」。倘係如此，就「屋頂理論」而言，「一個中國」即應是指「台灣／大陸」或「中華民國／中華人民共 和國」之上的「第三概念」。但是，在北京的實際操作中，顯然並非作此定義。
欲重建兩岸關係，須從「目的論」及「過程論」兩方面皆進行改善。就目的論言，例如，「一個中國」的「屋頂理論」，若不能跳出「一個中國就是中華人民共和 國」的「片面主義」，即生僵局。就過程論言，則胡六點此次多所著墨，包括簽定綜合性經濟合作協議、建立兩岸經濟合作機制、與亞太經濟合作機制相銜接、停止 涉外事務之內耗、鬆綁台灣參與國際組織活動、建立軍事安全機制、達成和平協議，及就國家尚未統一的特殊情況下的政治關係展開務實探討等等。這些均是強調 「多辦好事／多辦實事」的「過程主義」，辦了或許有利於「統一」，但更重要的是尤其有利於維持「尚未統一／統一不成」的「現狀」。
兩岸互動，從「目的論」朝「過程論」移動，應屬正向發展。最好是以正確的「過程」，自然帶出「目的」；而不是用強拗的「目的」，扭曲了「過程」。否則，倘若是以台灣倒退回頭選特首的「一國兩制」為「目的」，不僅「目的」不能達成，且將毀掉在「過程」中所產生的種種可能性。
在胡六點中，還看不出「尚未統一的特殊情況下的（兩岸）政治關係」究何所指。是否指一個新的「屋頂理論」？是否指一個「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」的「兩岸 關係和平發展框架」？是否有尊重歷史、尊重現實、尊重人民願望的新內涵？能否為兩岸關係帶入一個新的「過程」？在在似乎皆有想像空間。
Thursday, January 8, 2009
Wednesday, January 7, 2009
Hu's Three Forms of Respect: Peaceful Development is Democratic Development
Hu's Three Forms of Respect: Peaceful Development is Democratic Development
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 7, 2009
The theme of Hu Jintao's New Year's Eve talk was "peaceful development." Throughout his talk, Hu spoke of "establishing a framework for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations."
Actually, we are placing our hopes on "establishing a framework for the democratic development of cross-Strait relations."
Hu feels that three decades of cross-Strait relations reflect a respect for history, a respect for reality, and a respect for the aspirations of the people, for their effort to "seek truth from facts." These three forms of respect can be understood as follows: Historical evolution has changed reality, and a changed reality has led to changes in public opinion. We can of course reverse this formula as well. The evolution of public opinion has changed reality, and a changed reality has changed our understanding of history.
Hu Jintao spoke of "respect for history." He considers today's cross-Strait stand-off a continuation of the 1949 Chinese Civil War. Yes, the 60 year old Chinese Civil War was indeed a power struggle between two parties, the KMT and the CCP. But at a deeper level it was a struggle to determine the future of China. It was a the Chinese people's demand that China's rulers sho greater respect for democracy, and do more to improve people's lives. Sixty years later, the Chinese Civil War is no longer merely a narrowly defined KMT vs. CCP Civil War. Rather, given globalization, the "civil war" has evolved into a bilateral pursuit of universal values, of the people's well being, and of cooperation and competition. Sixty years ago, the KMT and CCP divided the people with a bloody civil war. Sixty years later, must the people still resort to civil war to achieve power?
Hu Jintao spoke of "respect for reality." But he seems to have revised history. In his talk, the term he invoked most was "pragmatism." He cited Beijing's loosening of restraints on Taipei's international space as evidence of Beijing's "respect for reality." He added that "the two sides can conduct pragmatic political relations under special circumstances, even though the nation is not yet reunified." His suggestion was unprecedented. First, he reaffirmed the "the nation is not yet reunified," and is "under special circumstances." That means reunification is future tense, and that the "special circumstances" under which the nation is "not yet reunified," ought to be acknowledged and maintained. That means the maintenance of the recent cross-Strait status quo. Secondly, he pointed out that "under special circumstances," in which the nation is "not yet reunified," the two sides should explore pragmatic cross-Strait political relations. That leaves considerable room for the imagination, including such notions as "pre-reunified," for "quasi-reunified," or "non-reunified" political relations. We may address this issue tomorrow. In short, Hu apparently acknowledged that today's cross-Strait reality is different from the "civil war" of 60 years ago.
Hu Jintao also demonstrated "respect for the people's aspirations." He mentioned that a "Taiwanese consciousness is not the same as a Taiwan independence consciousness." This is hardly new, but it does evince Hu's awareness of a "Taiwanese consciousness." He also repeated his message to the Democratic Progressive Party. He acknowledged Taiwan's pluralistic party politics. If Beijing evinces a psychological awareness of a "Taiwanese consciousness," and acknowledges the political reality of Taiwan's partisan politics, the two sides ought to be able to conduct pragmatic negotiations, and arrive at peaceful win/win solutions.
Now let's look at Hu's three forms of respect. Sixty years ago cross-Strait relations were predicated upon a civil war and a Cold War. Realistically speaking, calls to "Liberate Taiwan!" or "Retake the Mainland!" treated the people as tools and "straw dogs" in a cross-Strait civil war. But six decades later, democracy, the people's livelihood, and globalization reign supreme. Realistically speaking, the situation is "divided rule," the nation is "not yet reunified," and "reunification is difficult." Who has the heart to ask people on both sides to kill each for the sake of a 60 year old civil war?
In fact, ever since Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms and liberalization, both realpolitik and public aspirations have undergone substantial change. That is the significance of Hu's three forms of respect.
Chiang Ching-kuo single-handedly lifted martial law. He single-handedly authorized visits among relatives across the Strait, and initiated cross-Strait exchanges. He linked cross-Strait relations to Taiwan's democratic politics. Taiwan's leaders must promote cross-Strait relations in accordance with Taiwan's democracy. This is why the Taiwan independence movement lost power last year, and why cross-Strait exchanges have surged. Beijing must find a way to resolve cross-Strait problems that accords with Taiwan's democracy. This is why in recent years Beijing has turned from "halting separatism and accelerating reunification," to "maintaining a status quo" in which the nation is "not yet reunified." Deng Xiaoping reformed and liberalized the mainland, Broadly speaking, it was democratically oriented. The people's livelihood took precedence. Internationally the "peaceful rise" of China became Beijing's clarion call. Domestically, "class struggle" was abandoned. Under such circumstances it is impossible to define cross-Strait relations in such narrow terms as a "civil war."
Sixty years ago, history changed reality, and reality changed the meaning of public opinion. Sixty years later, public opinion changed reality, and reality changed our understanding of history. Hu Jintao speaks of a framework of "peaceful development of cross-Strait relations." Why not consider a framework of "democratic development of cross-Strait relations?"
胡錦濤的三尊重：和平發展就是民主發展
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.07 03:32 am
胡錦濤除夕談話的主軸是「和平發展」，通篇用心在於「建構兩岸關係和平發展框架」。
我們認為，「和平發展」在運作層次應當落實在「民主發展」之上，亦即必須寄託於「建構兩岸關係民主發展架構」。
胡錦濤認為，三十年來兩岸關係的實踐，體現了尊重歷史、尊重現實、尊重人民願望的實事求是精神。這「三尊重」可順向演繹：歷史的演變，改變了現實；現實的演變，改變了民意的內涵。然而，亦可反溯詮釋：民意的演變，改變了現實；現實的演變，改變了對歷史的思考。
胡 錦濤談「尊重歷史」，他認為：今日兩岸情勢，是一九四九年「中國內戰遺留並延續的政治對立」。其實，六十年前的「中國內戰」，一方面是國共兩黨的政權之 爭，但更深一層的意義，卻是中國走哪條路之爭，更是中國人民要求統治者尊重民主、改善民生之爭；何況，六十年後，當歷史的進程演化至今日地步，所謂「中國 內戰」，當然已非「國共內戰」那種狹義，而是在全球化的趨勢下，所謂的「內戰」其實已經演化成兩岸在追求普世價值及民生福祉上的合作與競爭。六十年前，國 共用流血「內戰」來分割人民；六十年後，難道仍要讓人民用「內戰」來取捨政權？
胡錦濤談「尊重現實」，似乎已對歷史的詮釋有了修正。他在 談話中，使用最多的詞彙之一，就是「務實」，且對鬆綁台灣的國際空間表達善意，此皆顯示其「尊重現實」的態度。他又說，「兩岸可以就在國家尚未統一的特殊 情況下的政治關係展開務實探討」，這是過去未有的論述。第一，他再次確認了「國家尚未統一的特殊情況」之存在，這應是說，「統一」是「未來式」，而「尚未 統一」的「特殊情況」當予承認並維持；這應當就是近年兩岸所說「維持現狀」的意思。第二，他又指出，在「尚未統一的特殊情況下」，可以就兩岸的「政治關係 展開務實探討」；若依此論，兩岸是否可能出現「前統一」、「準統一」或「非統一」的「政治關係」，已予人極大想像空間。這一部分，明天可作續論。總之，胡 錦濤似乎承認，今日的兩岸現實，畢竟已與六十年前的「內戰」不同。
胡錦濤對「尊重人民願望」，亦有發揮。他提到「台灣意識不等於台獨意 識」，這雖不是新論述，但應是表示認知到「台灣意識」的主體性；至於他對民進黨再次喊話，也是回應台灣政黨政治所反映的多元民意。只要北京當局能夠體認 「台灣意識」（人民心理）與「政黨政治」（政治體制）這兩大塊，在務實協商下，兩岸關係即應可找到和平雙贏的道路。
回頭談「三尊重」。六 十年前，兩岸關係就歷史言，是內戰與國際冷戰；就現實言，是「解放台灣」與「反攻大陸」；就人民願望言，則兩岸人民皆是「內戰」的工具與芻狗。然而，六十 年後，就歷史言，則是民主與民生至上及全球化；就現實言，則是「分裂分治」、「尚未統一」、「統一不易」；就人民願望言，則誰敢又誰忍叫兩岸人民再像六十 年前那般因「內戰」而相互殘殺？
其實，自蔣經國宣布解嚴及鄧小平操持改革開放以來，兩岸的歷史詮釋、現實思維及人民願望皆已大幅改變；這應當即是「三尊重」的新內涵。
蔣 經國一手解嚴，一手以開放探親啟動兩岸交流；即已將兩岸關係與台灣的民主政治繫為一體。台灣主政者必須依民主運作來推動兩岸關係，這正是去年台獨失勢及兩 岸交流再起的原因；而北京當局亦必須在台灣的民主體制中，找到化解兩岸難題的條件，這則是近年來北京漸從「必須停止分裂，儘速統一」轉至「承認尚未統一的 特殊現狀」之原因。至於鄧小平的改革開放，廣義而言亦是民主取向，民生掛帥，對外「和平崛起」，對內揚棄「階級鬥爭」，當然亦不可能再用狹義的「內戰」來 定義兩岸關係。
六十年來，歷史改變現實，現實改變民意內涵；六十年後，則已是民意改變現實，現實改變歷史詮釋。胡錦濤的「兩岸關係和平發展框架」，何不落實於「兩岸關係民主發展架構」？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 7, 2009
The theme of Hu Jintao's New Year's Eve talk was "peaceful development." Throughout his talk, Hu spoke of "establishing a framework for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations."
Actually, we are placing our hopes on "establishing a framework for the democratic development of cross-Strait relations."
Hu feels that three decades of cross-Strait relations reflect a respect for history, a respect for reality, and a respect for the aspirations of the people, for their effort to "seek truth from facts." These three forms of respect can be understood as follows: Historical evolution has changed reality, and a changed reality has led to changes in public opinion. We can of course reverse this formula as well. The evolution of public opinion has changed reality, and a changed reality has changed our understanding of history.
Hu Jintao spoke of "respect for history." He considers today's cross-Strait stand-off a continuation of the 1949 Chinese Civil War. Yes, the 60 year old Chinese Civil War was indeed a power struggle between two parties, the KMT and the CCP. But at a deeper level it was a struggle to determine the future of China. It was a the Chinese people's demand that China's rulers sho greater respect for democracy, and do more to improve people's lives. Sixty years later, the Chinese Civil War is no longer merely a narrowly defined KMT vs. CCP Civil War. Rather, given globalization, the "civil war" has evolved into a bilateral pursuit of universal values, of the people's well being, and of cooperation and competition. Sixty years ago, the KMT and CCP divided the people with a bloody civil war. Sixty years later, must the people still resort to civil war to achieve power?
Hu Jintao spoke of "respect for reality." But he seems to have revised history. In his talk, the term he invoked most was "pragmatism." He cited Beijing's loosening of restraints on Taipei's international space as evidence of Beijing's "respect for reality." He added that "the two sides can conduct pragmatic political relations under special circumstances, even though the nation is not yet reunified." His suggestion was unprecedented. First, he reaffirmed the "the nation is not yet reunified," and is "under special circumstances." That means reunification is future tense, and that the "special circumstances" under which the nation is "not yet reunified," ought to be acknowledged and maintained. That means the maintenance of the recent cross-Strait status quo. Secondly, he pointed out that "under special circumstances," in which the nation is "not yet reunified," the two sides should explore pragmatic cross-Strait political relations. That leaves considerable room for the imagination, including such notions as "pre-reunified," for "quasi-reunified," or "non-reunified" political relations. We may address this issue tomorrow. In short, Hu apparently acknowledged that today's cross-Strait reality is different from the "civil war" of 60 years ago.
Hu Jintao also demonstrated "respect for the people's aspirations." He mentioned that a "Taiwanese consciousness is not the same as a Taiwan independence consciousness." This is hardly new, but it does evince Hu's awareness of a "Taiwanese consciousness." He also repeated his message to the Democratic Progressive Party. He acknowledged Taiwan's pluralistic party politics. If Beijing evinces a psychological awareness of a "Taiwanese consciousness," and acknowledges the political reality of Taiwan's partisan politics, the two sides ought to be able to conduct pragmatic negotiations, and arrive at peaceful win/win solutions.
Now let's look at Hu's three forms of respect. Sixty years ago cross-Strait relations were predicated upon a civil war and a Cold War. Realistically speaking, calls to "Liberate Taiwan!" or "Retake the Mainland!" treated the people as tools and "straw dogs" in a cross-Strait civil war. But six decades later, democracy, the people's livelihood, and globalization reign supreme. Realistically speaking, the situation is "divided rule," the nation is "not yet reunified," and "reunification is difficult." Who has the heart to ask people on both sides to kill each for the sake of a 60 year old civil war?
In fact, ever since Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms and liberalization, both realpolitik and public aspirations have undergone substantial change. That is the significance of Hu's three forms of respect.
Chiang Ching-kuo single-handedly lifted martial law. He single-handedly authorized visits among relatives across the Strait, and initiated cross-Strait exchanges. He linked cross-Strait relations to Taiwan's democratic politics. Taiwan's leaders must promote cross-Strait relations in accordance with Taiwan's democracy. This is why the Taiwan independence movement lost power last year, and why cross-Strait exchanges have surged. Beijing must find a way to resolve cross-Strait problems that accords with Taiwan's democracy. This is why in recent years Beijing has turned from "halting separatism and accelerating reunification," to "maintaining a status quo" in which the nation is "not yet reunified." Deng Xiaoping reformed and liberalized the mainland, Broadly speaking, it was democratically oriented. The people's livelihood took precedence. Internationally the "peaceful rise" of China became Beijing's clarion call. Domestically, "class struggle" was abandoned. Under such circumstances it is impossible to define cross-Strait relations in such narrow terms as a "civil war."
Sixty years ago, history changed reality, and reality changed the meaning of public opinion. Sixty years later, public opinion changed reality, and reality changed our understanding of history. Hu Jintao speaks of a framework of "peaceful development of cross-Strait relations." Why not consider a framework of "democratic development of cross-Strait relations?"
胡錦濤的三尊重：和平發展就是民主發展
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.07 03:32 am
胡錦濤除夕談話的主軸是「和平發展」，通篇用心在於「建構兩岸關係和平發展框架」。
我們認為，「和平發展」在運作層次應當落實在「民主發展」之上，亦即必須寄託於「建構兩岸關係民主發展架構」。
胡錦濤認為，三十年來兩岸關係的實踐，體現了尊重歷史、尊重現實、尊重人民願望的實事求是精神。這「三尊重」可順向演繹：歷史的演變，改變了現實；現實的演變，改變了民意的內涵。然而，亦可反溯詮釋：民意的演變，改變了現實；現實的演變，改變了對歷史的思考。
胡 錦濤談「尊重歷史」，他認為：今日兩岸情勢，是一九四九年「中國內戰遺留並延續的政治對立」。其實，六十年前的「中國內戰」，一方面是國共兩黨的政權之 爭，但更深一層的意義，卻是中國走哪條路之爭，更是中國人民要求統治者尊重民主、改善民生之爭；何況，六十年後，當歷史的進程演化至今日地步，所謂「中國 內戰」，當然已非「國共內戰」那種狹義，而是在全球化的趨勢下，所謂的「內戰」其實已經演化成兩岸在追求普世價值及民生福祉上的合作與競爭。六十年前，國 共用流血「內戰」來分割人民；六十年後，難道仍要讓人民用「內戰」來取捨政權？
胡錦濤談「尊重現實」，似乎已對歷史的詮釋有了修正。他在 談話中，使用最多的詞彙之一，就是「務實」，且對鬆綁台灣的國際空間表達善意，此皆顯示其「尊重現實」的態度。他又說，「兩岸可以就在國家尚未統一的特殊 情況下的政治關係展開務實探討」，這是過去未有的論述。第一，他再次確認了「國家尚未統一的特殊情況」之存在，這應是說，「統一」是「未來式」，而「尚未 統一」的「特殊情況」當予承認並維持；這應當就是近年兩岸所說「維持現狀」的意思。第二，他又指出，在「尚未統一的特殊情況下」，可以就兩岸的「政治關係 展開務實探討」；若依此論，兩岸是否可能出現「前統一」、「準統一」或「非統一」的「政治關係」，已予人極大想像空間。這一部分，明天可作續論。總之，胡 錦濤似乎承認，今日的兩岸現實，畢竟已與六十年前的「內戰」不同。
胡錦濤對「尊重人民願望」，亦有發揮。他提到「台灣意識不等於台獨意 識」，這雖不是新論述，但應是表示認知到「台灣意識」的主體性；至於他對民進黨再次喊話，也是回應台灣政黨政治所反映的多元民意。只要北京當局能夠體認 「台灣意識」（人民心理）與「政黨政治」（政治體制）這兩大塊，在務實協商下，兩岸關係即應可找到和平雙贏的道路。
回頭談「三尊重」。六 十年前，兩岸關係就歷史言，是內戰與國際冷戰；就現實言，是「解放台灣」與「反攻大陸」；就人民願望言，則兩岸人民皆是「內戰」的工具與芻狗。然而，六十 年後，就歷史言，則是民主與民生至上及全球化；就現實言，則是「分裂分治」、「尚未統一」、「統一不易」；就人民願望言，則誰敢又誰忍叫兩岸人民再像六十 年前那般因「內戰」而相互殘殺？
其實，自蔣經國宣布解嚴及鄧小平操持改革開放以來，兩岸的歷史詮釋、現實思維及人民願望皆已大幅改變；這應當即是「三尊重」的新內涵。
蔣 經國一手解嚴，一手以開放探親啟動兩岸交流；即已將兩岸關係與台灣的民主政治繫為一體。台灣主政者必須依民主運作來推動兩岸關係，這正是去年台獨失勢及兩 岸交流再起的原因；而北京當局亦必須在台灣的民主體制中，找到化解兩岸難題的條件，這則是近年來北京漸從「必須停止分裂，儘速統一」轉至「承認尚未統一的 特殊現狀」之原因。至於鄧小平的改革開放，廣義而言亦是民主取向，民生掛帥，對外「和平崛起」，對內揚棄「階級鬥爭」，當然亦不可能再用狹義的「內戰」來 定義兩岸關係。
六十年來，歷史改變現實，現實改變民意內涵；六十年後，則已是民意改變現實，現實改變歷史詮釋。胡錦濤的「兩岸關係和平發展框架」，何不落實於「兩岸關係民主發展架構」？
Tuesday, January 6, 2009
The Outlook for 2009: Meeting Taiwan's Economic Difficulties Head On
The Outlook for 2009: Meeting Taiwan's Economic Difficulties Head On
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 6, 2008
The financial crisis of the century has brought down the modern West's proud financial system. The global economy has dropped into a bottomless abyss. As we look forward to 2009, the economic outlook remains pessimistic. For Taiwan's economy, 2009 will definitely be a difficult year. But as the saying goes, a crisis is also an opportunity. Precisely because we face difficulties, we will be extra careful. Precisely because we face difficulties, we will try extra hard. Precisely because we face difficulties, we will display our resilience. For Taiwan's economy, 2009 will be difficult. But we have no choice but to meet these difficulties, head on.
International organizations and economic research institutes are in agreement about this year's global economy. Trade will shrink. Growth will slow. Unemployment and inflation will increase. Social problems will worsen. International tensions will increase. Calls for protectionism will surge. Voices will be raised for governments to take aggressive measures to save the economy. In recent years Taiwan's economic growth has been almost exclusively export driven. It is at risk in the current recession. Taiwan's domestic market is small, and highly dependent upon foreign trade. It will be harder hit than other Asian countries. For example, the Economist predicts that Taiwan's growth rate will shrink 2.9 percent this year. It will experience the lowest growth rate in Asia, the sixth lowest in the world.
This year, research institutes are unanimously bearish about Taiwan's economic performance. But their forecasts about the economic growth rate are about the same. Among them, the Economist's are the most pessimistic. The International Monetary Fund's are the most optimistic. The IMF's approximate the government's official forecast of 2.1 percent. The Academia Sinica, the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, and the Taiwan Research Institute all forecast a domestic growth rate of around 1 percent. Each of these agencies has its own forecasting model. But from a negative 2.9 percent, to a positive 2.1 percent, represents a 5% difference, and nearly 680 billion NT in GDP. This includes both controllable and uncontrollable variables. But these are exactly what we are working to address. Given Taiwan's economic strength, this is all doable.
The overall economic environment is relatively stable. This is Taiwan's most powerful defense against an economic recession. It is also a renewable resource. For example, Taiwan has a high savings rate. By contrast, the United States must first undergo a recovery process by accumulating savings. Taiwan already has the resources necessary for the expansion of economic activity. Interest rates in one country after another have fallen to zero. By contrast, Taiwan's relatively stable investment rates and interest rates have made it a sponge for capital. In terms of financial soundness, our government has kept its debt below 40% GDP. By contrast, the Eurozone's debt ceiling is 60%. Developed nations such as the United States and Japan have long maintained a debt ceiling of over 100%. This gives the government the ability to increase anti-recessionary measures. We have nearly 300 billion US in foreign reserves. This remains a cornerstone of our stable exchange rate and international credibility.
In addition, we have a solid industrial base. This will be crucial to any breakthrough in Taiwan's current economic circumstances. An industrial base is not built in a day. Our current achievements are the result of long-term efforts. The global economy finds itself in a downturn. Numerous industries are now at risk. But the downturn has also provided us with an opportunity for industry consolidation. The government is concerned above all about the integrity of Taiwan's industrial structure, its skilled labor, and its position in the international supply chain. None of these can be replicated quickly. When demand surges, Taiwan's industries must be able to respond swiftly.
Taiwan has substantive strength. This year Taiwan also has something other countries do not have -- the opportunity to reap economic dividends from the normalization of cross-strait relations. Cross-strait restrictions were the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's economic straitjacket. They lost Taiwan many opportunities for economic expansion on the mainland. The two sides have now established direct links. This has reduced the cost of interaction. Taiwan is now a more open platform, a more open Asia-Pacific conduit. The mainland's economy will also face difficulties. Its landing and speed of recovery are still unknown. Any dividends may not be immediately apparent. But as long as we focus on the long-term, as long as we normalize Taiwan's economic development, as long as we move towards the next phase in economic growth, we have made a start, and we stand a chance.
Of course danger lurks throughout 2009. We must proceed cautiously. In particular, we predict a deterioration in the unemployment picture and a corresponding negative impact on social order during the the first quarter. The government must consider this its number one priority. It must not take the matter lightly. This year, there will be no surprises. Nor is there any need for surprises. This is a year to roll up our sleeves and get down to work. During the first quarter the government is issuing consumer vouchers. During the second quarter, it must follow up by expanding public works. It must not simply throw money at problems. It must restore confidence in our society. Confidence is intangible, but highly contagious. Furthermore, it is self-fulfilling. This is something the government must not overlook.
Difficulties and dangers abound. But if we meet difficulties head on, and deal with them, we can still look forward to a 2009 that opens low and closes high.
展望二○○九：台灣經濟，迎難而上
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.06 03:28 am
一場百年不遇的金融海嘯，掀垮了西方引以為傲的現代金融體系，也將世界經濟打落看不到底的深淵。從這個時點展望二○○九，所有的經濟預測都是悲觀的；二 ○○九對台灣經濟而言，絕對是困難的一年。但套句老話，危機就是轉機，正因為困難，我們會更小心，也因為困難，我們要更努力，更因為困難，才能展現韌性與 差異。二○○九，台灣經濟將迎難而上，也不得不迎難而進。
國際組織或經濟研究機構對今年全球經濟的預測頗為一致，大抵不脫貿易萎縮、成長遲滯、失業及通貨緊縮風險雙雙升高的基調，並由此擔心社會問題惡化、國際政 治趨於緊張、貿易保護主義再起等；進而呼籲各國必須採取積極的作為拯救經濟。在此大環境下，近年獨靠出口擴張支撐的台灣經濟，正承受極大的衰退風險，並因 台灣內需市場規模小，外貿比重相對高，所受衝擊將更甚於其他亞洲國家。例如，英國經濟學人就認為，今年台灣經濟將萎縮百分之二點九，是亞洲最低，在全球排 名倒數第六。
不過，各研究機構雖一致看淡今年台灣經濟表現，但對經濟成長率的預估差距不小。其中，經濟學人的預測最悲觀，最樂觀的是國際貨幣基金（ＩＭＦ），與政府的 官方預測百分之二點一相當；中研院、中經院、台綜院等國內經濟研究機構則預測在百分之一上下。各機構自有其估測模型，但單從負百分之二點九到正百分之二點 一而言，這五個百分點的差異，代表的是近六千八百億元的國民生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）能否被創造；其間固然存有可控與不可控的變數，但這正是我們要努力的目標， 而以台灣經濟的實力，這也是可以做得到的。
總體經濟環境的相對穩定，是台灣經濟力抗經濟衰退的最大後盾，更是待勢再起的推進器。例如台灣的高儲蓄率，相對於美國須先經累積儲蓄的復甦過程，我們已擁 有支持經濟活動擴張的資源；而在各國相繼走向零利率之際，台灣相對穩定的雙率更成了吸金利器。再如財政穩健度，目前我國政府債務餘額仍控制在GDP四成以 下，相對於歐元區的六成上限，以及美日等發達國家早已破百，也讓政府擁有相對較大的空間，來推動反景氣周期的擴張財政政策。至於近三千億美元的外匯存底， 更是穩定匯率及維持台灣國際信用的基石。
此外，堅實的產業基礎，則是台灣經濟突破成長困境的主要憑藉。產業的建立非一朝一夕之事，現有的成就是長時期的累積，如今雖因遭逢世界經濟逆流，導致部分 產業陷入險境，但也提供產業整合的契機，政府亦已關注；最重要的是，台灣產業的特色是結構的完整性、技術人力的匯集及在國際供應鏈上的地位；這些，皆非全 然可以快速複製的，當需求回潮，台灣產業也將能以最快的速度回應。
除了實力，台灣今年還擁有其他國家所沒有的機會酖酖兩岸關係正常化後的經濟紅利。兩岸設限曾是民進黨執政時期台灣經濟的緊身衣，也讓台灣失去許多隨大陸經 濟擴張的契機；如今兩岸實現大三通，互動成本的直接降低，更打通台灣建立亞太平台的渠道。儘管，大陸經濟今年也將面臨艱困，著陸及復甦速度未明，紅利不一 定立即可見；但著眼於長期，正常化是台灣發展新經濟型態、邁向下一階段成長高峰的前提和利基，有了開始，就有機會。
當然，二○○九的台灣經濟，絕對是險境處處，必須步步為營。尤其，第一季失業情勢的惡化及對社會秩序的影響，已可預見其發生，政府自必要當成第一要務因 應，不能掉以輕心。這一年，不太會有驚喜，也不需要驚喜，因為這該是實實在在做事的一年，除了第一季的消費券，第二季擴大公共建設必須即時接棒，而且不只 是把錢花出去，更重要的在於穩住民間信心。信心是看不到的意念，卻有很高的傳染性，更會自我實現；在這方面，政府尤其不能輕忽。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 6, 2008
The financial crisis of the century has brought down the modern West's proud financial system. The global economy has dropped into a bottomless abyss. As we look forward to 2009, the economic outlook remains pessimistic. For Taiwan's economy, 2009 will definitely be a difficult year. But as the saying goes, a crisis is also an opportunity. Precisely because we face difficulties, we will be extra careful. Precisely because we face difficulties, we will try extra hard. Precisely because we face difficulties, we will display our resilience. For Taiwan's economy, 2009 will be difficult. But we have no choice but to meet these difficulties, head on.
International organizations and economic research institutes are in agreement about this year's global economy. Trade will shrink. Growth will slow. Unemployment and inflation will increase. Social problems will worsen. International tensions will increase. Calls for protectionism will surge. Voices will be raised for governments to take aggressive measures to save the economy. In recent years Taiwan's economic growth has been almost exclusively export driven. It is at risk in the current recession. Taiwan's domestic market is small, and highly dependent upon foreign trade. It will be harder hit than other Asian countries. For example, the Economist predicts that Taiwan's growth rate will shrink 2.9 percent this year. It will experience the lowest growth rate in Asia, the sixth lowest in the world.
This year, research institutes are unanimously bearish about Taiwan's economic performance. But their forecasts about the economic growth rate are about the same. Among them, the Economist's are the most pessimistic. The International Monetary Fund's are the most optimistic. The IMF's approximate the government's official forecast of 2.1 percent. The Academia Sinica, the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, and the Taiwan Research Institute all forecast a domestic growth rate of around 1 percent. Each of these agencies has its own forecasting model. But from a negative 2.9 percent, to a positive 2.1 percent, represents a 5% difference, and nearly 680 billion NT in GDP. This includes both controllable and uncontrollable variables. But these are exactly what we are working to address. Given Taiwan's economic strength, this is all doable.
The overall economic environment is relatively stable. This is Taiwan's most powerful defense against an economic recession. It is also a renewable resource. For example, Taiwan has a high savings rate. By contrast, the United States must first undergo a recovery process by accumulating savings. Taiwan already has the resources necessary for the expansion of economic activity. Interest rates in one country after another have fallen to zero. By contrast, Taiwan's relatively stable investment rates and interest rates have made it a sponge for capital. In terms of financial soundness, our government has kept its debt below 40% GDP. By contrast, the Eurozone's debt ceiling is 60%. Developed nations such as the United States and Japan have long maintained a debt ceiling of over 100%. This gives the government the ability to increase anti-recessionary measures. We have nearly 300 billion US in foreign reserves. This remains a cornerstone of our stable exchange rate and international credibility.
In addition, we have a solid industrial base. This will be crucial to any breakthrough in Taiwan's current economic circumstances. An industrial base is not built in a day. Our current achievements are the result of long-term efforts. The global economy finds itself in a downturn. Numerous industries are now at risk. But the downturn has also provided us with an opportunity for industry consolidation. The government is concerned above all about the integrity of Taiwan's industrial structure, its skilled labor, and its position in the international supply chain. None of these can be replicated quickly. When demand surges, Taiwan's industries must be able to respond swiftly.
Taiwan has substantive strength. This year Taiwan also has something other countries do not have -- the opportunity to reap economic dividends from the normalization of cross-strait relations. Cross-strait restrictions were the ruling Democratic Progressive Party's economic straitjacket. They lost Taiwan many opportunities for economic expansion on the mainland. The two sides have now established direct links. This has reduced the cost of interaction. Taiwan is now a more open platform, a more open Asia-Pacific conduit. The mainland's economy will also face difficulties. Its landing and speed of recovery are still unknown. Any dividends may not be immediately apparent. But as long as we focus on the long-term, as long as we normalize Taiwan's economic development, as long as we move towards the next phase in economic growth, we have made a start, and we stand a chance.
Of course danger lurks throughout 2009. We must proceed cautiously. In particular, we predict a deterioration in the unemployment picture and a corresponding negative impact on social order during the the first quarter. The government must consider this its number one priority. It must not take the matter lightly. This year, there will be no surprises. Nor is there any need for surprises. This is a year to roll up our sleeves and get down to work. During the first quarter the government is issuing consumer vouchers. During the second quarter, it must follow up by expanding public works. It must not simply throw money at problems. It must restore confidence in our society. Confidence is intangible, but highly contagious. Furthermore, it is self-fulfilling. This is something the government must not overlook.
Difficulties and dangers abound. But if we meet difficulties head on, and deal with them, we can still look forward to a 2009 that opens low and closes high.
展望二○○九：台灣經濟，迎難而上
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.01.06 03:28 am
一場百年不遇的金融海嘯，掀垮了西方引以為傲的現代金融體系，也將世界經濟打落看不到底的深淵。從這個時點展望二○○九，所有的經濟預測都是悲觀的；二 ○○九對台灣經濟而言，絕對是困難的一年。但套句老話，危機就是轉機，正因為困難，我們會更小心，也因為困難，我們要更努力，更因為困難，才能展現韌性與 差異。二○○九，台灣經濟將迎難而上，也不得不迎難而進。
國際組織或經濟研究機構對今年全球經濟的預測頗為一致，大抵不脫貿易萎縮、成長遲滯、失業及通貨緊縮風險雙雙升高的基調，並由此擔心社會問題惡化、國際政 治趨於緊張、貿易保護主義再起等；進而呼籲各國必須採取積極的作為拯救經濟。在此大環境下，近年獨靠出口擴張支撐的台灣經濟，正承受極大的衰退風險，並因 台灣內需市場規模小，外貿比重相對高，所受衝擊將更甚於其他亞洲國家。例如，英國經濟學人就認為，今年台灣經濟將萎縮百分之二點九，是亞洲最低，在全球排 名倒數第六。
不過，各研究機構雖一致看淡今年台灣經濟表現，但對經濟成長率的預估差距不小。其中，經濟學人的預測最悲觀，最樂觀的是國際貨幣基金（ＩＭＦ），與政府的 官方預測百分之二點一相當；中研院、中經院、台綜院等國內經濟研究機構則預測在百分之一上下。各機構自有其估測模型，但單從負百分之二點九到正百分之二點 一而言，這五個百分點的差異，代表的是近六千八百億元的國民生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）能否被創造；其間固然存有可控與不可控的變數，但這正是我們要努力的目標， 而以台灣經濟的實力，這也是可以做得到的。
總體經濟環境的相對穩定，是台灣經濟力抗經濟衰退的最大後盾，更是待勢再起的推進器。例如台灣的高儲蓄率，相對於美國須先經累積儲蓄的復甦過程，我們已擁 有支持經濟活動擴張的資源；而在各國相繼走向零利率之際，台灣相對穩定的雙率更成了吸金利器。再如財政穩健度，目前我國政府債務餘額仍控制在GDP四成以 下，相對於歐元區的六成上限，以及美日等發達國家早已破百，也讓政府擁有相對較大的空間，來推動反景氣周期的擴張財政政策。至於近三千億美元的外匯存底， 更是穩定匯率及維持台灣國際信用的基石。
此外，堅實的產業基礎，則是台灣經濟突破成長困境的主要憑藉。產業的建立非一朝一夕之事，現有的成就是長時期的累積，如今雖因遭逢世界經濟逆流，導致部分 產業陷入險境，但也提供產業整合的契機，政府亦已關注；最重要的是，台灣產業的特色是結構的完整性、技術人力的匯集及在國際供應鏈上的地位；這些，皆非全 然可以快速複製的，當需求回潮，台灣產業也將能以最快的速度回應。
除了實力，台灣今年還擁有其他國家所沒有的機會酖酖兩岸關係正常化後的經濟紅利。兩岸設限曾是民進黨執政時期台灣經濟的緊身衣，也讓台灣失去許多隨大陸經 濟擴張的契機；如今兩岸實現大三通，互動成本的直接降低，更打通台灣建立亞太平台的渠道。儘管，大陸經濟今年也將面臨艱困，著陸及復甦速度未明，紅利不一 定立即可見；但著眼於長期，正常化是台灣發展新經濟型態、邁向下一階段成長高峰的前提和利基，有了開始，就有機會。
當然，二○○九的台灣經濟，絕對是險境處處，必須步步為營。尤其，第一季失業情勢的惡化及對社會秩序的影響，已可預見其發生，政府自必要當成第一要務因 應，不能掉以輕心。這一年，不太會有驚喜，也不需要驚喜，因為這該是實實在在做事的一年，除了第一季的消費券，第二季擴大公共建設必須即時接棒，而且不只 是把錢花出去，更重要的在於穩住民間信心。信心是看不到的意念，卻有很高的傳染性，更會自我實現；在這方面，政府尤其不能輕忽。
Monday, January 5, 2009
Calmly Address the Pre-Trial Detention Controversy
Calmly Address the Pre-Trial Detention Controversy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 5, 2009
Chen Shui-bian has again been detained on charges of corruption and money-laundering, This has provoked controversy over the legal process. Some say privileged individuals have been recipients of favoritism. But it would be more accurate to say that an unprecedented case has attracted unprecedented attention. Within this highly-charged political atmosphere, the justice system has been accused of all sorts of political bias.
The reason the justice system has come under suspicion is poor institutional arrangements. Chen Shui-bian should neither receive better treatment than ordinary citizens, nor worse treatment. We must re-evaluate the pre-trial detention system, in order to avoid anyone being subjected to unconstitutional treatment.
Needless to say, the existing system of pre-trial custody labors under the authoritarian premise that one is "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent." We must not be cavalier about this. To prove either guilt or innocence requires fair trials. Presuming either guilt or innocence during the trial process, is the difference between a police state and a democratic nation under the rule of law. A system that clings to the premise that one is "guilty until proven innocent" does not meet the minimum standards for the rule of law. Fourteen years ago, the Grand Justices ruled that it was unconstitutional for prosecutors to detain suspects. This was the first step in getting rid of the premise of "guilty until proven innocent." Prosecutors who have decided to prosecute a suspect, are not going to presume that the suspect is innocent. Therefore, judges must make that presumption. Judges must examine the justifications for pre-trial detention. Pre-trial detention must be the exception, not the rule. The Grand Justices' interpretation of the Constitution led to changes in the system. Unfortunately, the justice system has yet to abandon the premise of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent."
Not long ago, the Grand Justices declared detention unconstitutional. Article entered into evidence number one: The legal system must not operate under the assumption of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent." It must not presume that the suspect is guilty before he is convicted but still under detention. In fact detention requires further justifications. The justifications for detention determine the methods of detention. For example, if there is no fear that the suspect may flee or commit suicide, then there is no need for restraints such as handcuffs. The purpose of pre-trial detention is to ensure the successful conduct of the trial. Not all suspects are automatically detained. Only those who obstruct the trial process should be detained. Current laws cling to the premise of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent."
First of all, pre-trial detention by the prosecution requires justifications. These justifications and evidence that a crime has been committed are two different matters. One cannot charge someone with a crime by relying solely upon accusations, without sufficient evidence. If one has sufficient evidence of guilt, one can indict. If one can prosecute, where is the need for detention? If the prosecution becomes accustomed to asking the court to detain suspects when the evidence is insufficient, it cannot escape the suspicion that suspects are being detained to extract evidence.
The most important reason for pre-trial detention is to prevent flight. If the defendant has flown the coop, obviously it will be difficult to conduct a trial. But even though a suspect has been indicted, one cannot always assume that the suspect will flee. The fact that Chen Chin-hsing or Wang You-tseng fled, can not be used to prove Chen Shui-bian or others will flee. Flight risk cannot be based merely on prosecutors' fears or suspicions. They must be based on evidence that the suspect is fleeing or preparing to flee. Barring the suspect from leaving the country or demanding bail are preferable to detention. Chou Chan-chung or Tsai Shou-hsiung may have been too lenient about detention in the past. But that is no reason to detain Chen Shui-bian or any other person. Instead, Chou and Tsai should be criticized for being lax gatekeepers in the past.
Detaining suspects to prevent collusion or the destruction of evidence is also plagued with problems. Practically speaking, the court has no clear definition of "collusion." To detain a suspect for fear of "collusion" is a serious threat to the suspect's rights. If we cannot clearly distinguish between the two, we may violate the suspect's constitutionally guaranteed rights. Destruction of evidence is itself a crime. But again, until the suspect has been tried, he must also be presumed innocent. If the prosecution can prove that the suspect is at risk of destroying evidence, it can seize the evidence or demand an indictment. The prosecution cannot detain suspects because it suspects the defendant might destroy evidence. For the same reason, the prosecution needs evidence to detain a felony suspect. It needs justifications to detain a suspect. Detaining everyone charged with a felony or accused of destroying evidence, negates the presumption of innocence, and is unconstitutional.
Pre-trial detention is a grave matter. Indiscriminate detention undermines fair trials. When the prosecution provides evidence to justify detention, it must give the suspect an opportunity to defend himself. The prosecution, not the defendant, is obliged to keep the investigation confidential to protect the defendant's reputation. Confidentiality cannot be used to prevent the defendant from arguing on his own behalf. If the prosecution denies the defendant the right of discovery, it has denied the defendant's right to defend himself, and is inconsistent with due process.
The power and responsibility to detain a suspect after indictment, rests with the trial court. If the court is unconcerned about whether the trial can continue, then it may not detain the suspect. Allowing the prosecution to appeal to a higher court, and consider whether to detain the suspect, is also a very strange arrangement. Frankly it is the same premise of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent."
Our remarks are not directed at the Chen Shui-bian corruption and money laundering case. Our remarks are an attempt to ensure that the trial process for everyone, innocent or guilty, remains fair. Suspects must not be put behind bards merely because they have been accused. The time has come for a comprehensive review of pre-trial detention. Just because Chen Shui-bian is about to stand trial, we should not turn a blind eye to the problem.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.01.05
平心靜氣談「審前羈押」爭議
中時社論
陳水扁因被控貪汙洗錢而被兩度審前羈押，引起不少司法程序爭論。與其說是特權人物使然，不如說是這樁空前的案件吸引了空前的檢視目光。這種高度敏感的政治氛圍，讓扁案的司法審判必須面對各種政治成見或質疑的考驗。
司法所以引起質疑，往往緣於制度安排不善。阿扁不該得到比他人更優越的司法待遇，其受審被押也不該出現比一般平民更差的待遇。我們必須重新檢視審前羈押制度，以免任何人受到不合憲法正當程序的對待。
不必諱言，現行審前羈押制度飽受「被控有罪就抓起來」的威權觀念支配；於是被控有罪的人被迫去證明自己清白；且在證明自己清白之前註定被關。然而此事不容 馬虎，證明有罪或是清白，需要公正審判的過程，過程之中假設有罪還是無罪，恰是警察國家與民主法治國家的分野。不能拋棄「被控有罪就該收押」的制度，就還 不符合法治國家的最低標準。十四年前大法官宣告檢察官有權羈押被告為違憲，就是破除觀念的第一步。檢方起心動念追訴犯罪，不會假設被告無罪；所以要讓法官 假設無罪，審視有無審前羈押的理由。審前羈押是刑事審判的異態，不是常態。當年的憲法解釋促成了制度改變，可惜改制後的審前羈押制度，仍未擺脫「被控有罪 就該收押」的觀念箝制。
不久前大法官又再宣告羈押法違憲，即為證明一例；法律不能受到「被控有罪就該收押」的影響，忽略審前羈押不在判處被告有罪。羈押其實需要另有理由；羈押的 理由足以決定羈押的手段。例如不虞逃亡、自殺的被告，就無施以手銬戒具的必要。審前羈押的目的，是保全審判的進行；不是所有被控有罪的人當然都該收押；而 是那些會阻礙審判進行的被告，才有羈押的理由。而現行法律規定的羈押事由，卻仍是「被控有罪就該收押」的思維產物。
首先，審前羈押要由檢方證明具羈押的理由，與犯罪的證據還是兩回事。有罪證據不足，當然不能只靠指控犯罪就要押人；如果有罪證據足可起訴，起訴即可，何必羈押？檢方如果總是起訴的證據尚不充分就慣於請求法院押人，當然難逃押人取供的懷疑與指責。
審前羈押最主要的理由是逃亡；被告逃亡，審判即難進行。但即使已起訴，也不能一概假設被告都會逃亡。陳進興或王又曾逃亡，不能用來證明陳水扁或無關的人也 會逃亡。虞逃羈押，不是基於檢方單純的擔心或猜想，而是被告確有逃亡可能（如正在逃亡或已準備逃亡）的證明。限制出境或具保，也恆應是取代虞逃羈押的優先 選擇！周占春或是蔡守訓過去，允許羈押過於寬鬆，不是羈押陳水扁或任何人的理由。他們該為過去把關不嚴受到批評指責。
串供或滅證羈押的制度也不大有問題。法院實務上並無「串供」的明確定義；「串供羈押」嚴重威脅被告的辯護防禦權利。如果不能畫出兩者的界限，就會違反憲法 保障的辯護權。「淹滅證據」本身就是犯罪，未經審判也該假設無罪。檢方如能證明被告有滅證之虞，可去扣押證據也可逕行起訴，制度下不能因檢方握有證據指被 告滅證就可押人。同理，重罪羈押也須在檢方舉證有罪之外，另有必要理由始可羈押。被控滅證或重罪者一概收押，否定無罪推定，即是違憲!
審前羈押事關重大，羈押過濫會動搖審判公平。檢方舉證聲押，要讓被告充分防禦。偵查不公開是檢方的法定義務，用來保護被告的名譽，不是被告的義務，更不能藉以限制被告辯護。檢方聲押時不許辯方閱卷質證，辯護權不能有效行使，不符正當程序。
起訴後的羈押，權責均在審判法院。法院不虞審判不能繼續，決定不予羈押時，讓檢方抗告到上級法院，越俎代庖思考應否羈押，制度安排也頗古怪。說穿了，仍是「被控有罪就該收押」的幽靈作祟。
我們不是針對陳水扁的個案說話，而是從審視個案中，看到所有的人──無論是否無辜，都該受到公平程序審判，不該因為被控有罪就要身陷囹圄。通盤檢討審前羈押制度的時候到了；請勿因為陳水扁正在受審，就對不該存在的現象，視而不見。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 5, 2009
Chen Shui-bian has again been detained on charges of corruption and money-laundering, This has provoked controversy over the legal process. Some say privileged individuals have been recipients of favoritism. But it would be more accurate to say that an unprecedented case has attracted unprecedented attention. Within this highly-charged political atmosphere, the justice system has been accused of all sorts of political bias.
The reason the justice system has come under suspicion is poor institutional arrangements. Chen Shui-bian should neither receive better treatment than ordinary citizens, nor worse treatment. We must re-evaluate the pre-trial detention system, in order to avoid anyone being subjected to unconstitutional treatment.
Needless to say, the existing system of pre-trial custody labors under the authoritarian premise that one is "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent." We must not be cavalier about this. To prove either guilt or innocence requires fair trials. Presuming either guilt or innocence during the trial process, is the difference between a police state and a democratic nation under the rule of law. A system that clings to the premise that one is "guilty until proven innocent" does not meet the minimum standards for the rule of law. Fourteen years ago, the Grand Justices ruled that it was unconstitutional for prosecutors to detain suspects. This was the first step in getting rid of the premise of "guilty until proven innocent." Prosecutors who have decided to prosecute a suspect, are not going to presume that the suspect is innocent. Therefore, judges must make that presumption. Judges must examine the justifications for pre-trial detention. Pre-trial detention must be the exception, not the rule. The Grand Justices' interpretation of the Constitution led to changes in the system. Unfortunately, the justice system has yet to abandon the premise of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent."
Not long ago, the Grand Justices declared detention unconstitutional. Article entered into evidence number one: The legal system must not operate under the assumption of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent." It must not presume that the suspect is guilty before he is convicted but still under detention. In fact detention requires further justifications. The justifications for detention determine the methods of detention. For example, if there is no fear that the suspect may flee or commit suicide, then there is no need for restraints such as handcuffs. The purpose of pre-trial detention is to ensure the successful conduct of the trial. Not all suspects are automatically detained. Only those who obstruct the trial process should be detained. Current laws cling to the premise of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent."
First of all, pre-trial detention by the prosecution requires justifications. These justifications and evidence that a crime has been committed are two different matters. One cannot charge someone with a crime by relying solely upon accusations, without sufficient evidence. If one has sufficient evidence of guilt, one can indict. If one can prosecute, where is the need for detention? If the prosecution becomes accustomed to asking the court to detain suspects when the evidence is insufficient, it cannot escape the suspicion that suspects are being detained to extract evidence.
The most important reason for pre-trial detention is to prevent flight. If the defendant has flown the coop, obviously it will be difficult to conduct a trial. But even though a suspect has been indicted, one cannot always assume that the suspect will flee. The fact that Chen Chin-hsing or Wang You-tseng fled, can not be used to prove Chen Shui-bian or others will flee. Flight risk cannot be based merely on prosecutors' fears or suspicions. They must be based on evidence that the suspect is fleeing or preparing to flee. Barring the suspect from leaving the country or demanding bail are preferable to detention. Chou Chan-chung or Tsai Shou-hsiung may have been too lenient about detention in the past. But that is no reason to detain Chen Shui-bian or any other person. Instead, Chou and Tsai should be criticized for being lax gatekeepers in the past.
Detaining suspects to prevent collusion or the destruction of evidence is also plagued with problems. Practically speaking, the court has no clear definition of "collusion." To detain a suspect for fear of "collusion" is a serious threat to the suspect's rights. If we cannot clearly distinguish between the two, we may violate the suspect's constitutionally guaranteed rights. Destruction of evidence is itself a crime. But again, until the suspect has been tried, he must also be presumed innocent. If the prosecution can prove that the suspect is at risk of destroying evidence, it can seize the evidence or demand an indictment. The prosecution cannot detain suspects because it suspects the defendant might destroy evidence. For the same reason, the prosecution needs evidence to detain a felony suspect. It needs justifications to detain a suspect. Detaining everyone charged with a felony or accused of destroying evidence, negates the presumption of innocence, and is unconstitutional.
Pre-trial detention is a grave matter. Indiscriminate detention undermines fair trials. When the prosecution provides evidence to justify detention, it must give the suspect an opportunity to defend himself. The prosecution, not the defendant, is obliged to keep the investigation confidential to protect the defendant's reputation. Confidentiality cannot be used to prevent the defendant from arguing on his own behalf. If the prosecution denies the defendant the right of discovery, it has denied the defendant's right to defend himself, and is inconsistent with due process.
The power and responsibility to detain a suspect after indictment, rests with the trial court. If the court is unconcerned about whether the trial can continue, then it may not detain the suspect. Allowing the prosecution to appeal to a higher court, and consider whether to detain the suspect, is also a very strange arrangement. Frankly it is the same premise of "guilty until proven innocent, thefore one must be detained until one is proven innocent."
Our remarks are not directed at the Chen Shui-bian corruption and money laundering case. Our remarks are an attempt to ensure that the trial process for everyone, innocent or guilty, remains fair. Suspects must not be put behind bards merely because they have been accused. The time has come for a comprehensive review of pre-trial detention. Just because Chen Shui-bian is about to stand trial, we should not turn a blind eye to the problem.
中時電子報
中國時報 2009.01.05
平心靜氣談「審前羈押」爭議
中時社論
陳水扁因被控貪汙洗錢而被兩度審前羈押，引起不少司法程序爭論。與其說是特權人物使然，不如說是這樁空前的案件吸引了空前的檢視目光。這種高度敏感的政治氛圍，讓扁案的司法審判必須面對各種政治成見或質疑的考驗。
司法所以引起質疑，往往緣於制度安排不善。阿扁不該得到比他人更優越的司法待遇，其受審被押也不該出現比一般平民更差的待遇。我們必須重新檢視審前羈押制度，以免任何人受到不合憲法正當程序的對待。
不必諱言，現行審前羈押制度飽受「被控有罪就抓起來」的威權觀念支配；於是被控有罪的人被迫去證明自己清白；且在證明自己清白之前註定被關。然而此事不容 馬虎，證明有罪或是清白，需要公正審判的過程，過程之中假設有罪還是無罪，恰是警察國家與民主法治國家的分野。不能拋棄「被控有罪就該收押」的制度，就還 不符合法治國家的最低標準。十四年前大法官宣告檢察官有權羈押被告為違憲，就是破除觀念的第一步。檢方起心動念追訴犯罪，不會假設被告無罪；所以要讓法官 假設無罪，審視有無審前羈押的理由。審前羈押是刑事審判的異態，不是常態。當年的憲法解釋促成了制度改變，可惜改制後的審前羈押制度，仍未擺脫「被控有罪 就該收押」的觀念箝制。
不久前大法官又再宣告羈押法違憲，即為證明一例；法律不能受到「被控有罪就該收押」的影響，忽略審前羈押不在判處被告有罪。羈押其實需要另有理由；羈押的 理由足以決定羈押的手段。例如不虞逃亡、自殺的被告，就無施以手銬戒具的必要。審前羈押的目的，是保全審判的進行；不是所有被控有罪的人當然都該收押；而 是那些會阻礙審判進行的被告，才有羈押的理由。而現行法律規定的羈押事由，卻仍是「被控有罪就該收押」的思維產物。
首先，審前羈押要由檢方證明具羈押的理由，與犯罪的證據還是兩回事。有罪證據不足，當然不能只靠指控犯罪就要押人；如果有罪證據足可起訴，起訴即可，何必羈押？檢方如果總是起訴的證據尚不充分就慣於請求法院押人，當然難逃押人取供的懷疑與指責。
審前羈押最主要的理由是逃亡；被告逃亡，審判即難進行。但即使已起訴，也不能一概假設被告都會逃亡。陳進興或王又曾逃亡，不能用來證明陳水扁或無關的人也 會逃亡。虞逃羈押，不是基於檢方單純的擔心或猜想，而是被告確有逃亡可能（如正在逃亡或已準備逃亡）的證明。限制出境或具保，也恆應是取代虞逃羈押的優先 選擇！周占春或是蔡守訓過去，允許羈押過於寬鬆，不是羈押陳水扁或任何人的理由。他們該為過去把關不嚴受到批評指責。
串供或滅證羈押的制度也不大有問題。法院實務上並無「串供」的明確定義；「串供羈押」嚴重威脅被告的辯護防禦權利。如果不能畫出兩者的界限，就會違反憲法 保障的辯護權。「淹滅證據」本身就是犯罪，未經審判也該假設無罪。檢方如能證明被告有滅證之虞，可去扣押證據也可逕行起訴，制度下不能因檢方握有證據指被 告滅證就可押人。同理，重罪羈押也須在檢方舉證有罪之外，另有必要理由始可羈押。被控滅證或重罪者一概收押，否定無罪推定，即是違憲!
審前羈押事關重大，羈押過濫會動搖審判公平。檢方舉證聲押，要讓被告充分防禦。偵查不公開是檢方的法定義務，用來保護被告的名譽，不是被告的義務，更不能藉以限制被告辯護。檢方聲押時不許辯方閱卷質證，辯護權不能有效行使，不符正當程序。
起訴後的羈押，權責均在審判法院。法院不虞審判不能繼續，決定不予羈押時，讓檢方抗告到上級法院，越俎代庖思考應否羈押，制度安排也頗古怪。說穿了，仍是「被控有罪就該收押」的幽靈作祟。
我們不是針對陳水扁的個案說話，而是從審視個案中，看到所有的人──無論是否無辜，都該受到公平程序審判，不該因為被控有罪就要身陷囹圄。通盤檢討審前羈押制度的時候到了；請勿因為陳水扁正在受審，就對不該存在的現象，視而不見。
Wednesday, December 31, 2008
Chen Shui-bian Blames His Attorneys For Urging Him to Conceal Evidence
Chen Shui-bian Blames His Attorneys For Urging Him to Conceal Evidence
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 31, 2008
After a 12 hour 30 minute marathon session, Tsai Shou-hsuing and the Full Court have taken the Chen corruption case into a new realm. One. The Full Court ruled that Chen Shui-bian will be returned to custody, but that he may receive visitors. Two. Chen Shui-bian has admitted that Chen Chih-chung and his wife are seeking a plea bargain. Three. Chen Shui-bian alleges that he classified the "Southern Front Project" as Top Secret on the recommendation of his attorneys and advisors. These developments introduce new political and legal factors into the Chen corruption case.
The main impact of taking Chen back into custody, but allowing him to receive visitors, will be political. The last time the Special Investigation Unit took Chen Shui-bian into custody, prosecutors dispatched officials to meet with his defense attorneys and videotaped the meeting. It may continue using this approach. Even though it will be allowing Chen to receive visitors, this approach should enable prosecutors to reduce the possibility of collusion. But since the prohibition on receiving visitors has been lifted, the Taipei Detention Center is likely to become Chen Shui-bian's public relations center and bully pulpit. For example, visits by Wu Shu-chen, Chao Chien-ming and his wife, and Chen Chih-chung and his wife, will all become front page news. Also, whether Tsai Ing-wen or any Green Camp personalities visit him, or fail to visit him, will become a political issue.
Detention is not the same as imprisonment. Chen Shui-bian may still be able to post bail and obtain release. His current efforts are undoubtedly a fight for re-release or release on bail. Next year's county magistrates and city mayors elections are also targets. If Ah-Bian is unable to play a role in next year's county magistrates and city mayors elections, he will lose a lot of his political bargaining chips. Therefore, regardless of whether he is kept in custody, he will attempt to manipulate the outcome of the county magistrates and city mayors elections. The only difference will be whether he can emerge from detention to campaign on behalf of the candidates. Either that, or an endless stream of candidates will visit him while he remains in custody. Chen Shui-bian knows he can not be optimistic about the outcome of his trial. Therefore he must make a last ditch effort on the political front. Being taken into custody but not being prohibited from receiving visitors, may provide Ah-Bian with the perfect bully pulpit. To the Democratic Progressive Party however, Ah-Bian being allowed to receive visitors amounts to headache, because whether or not DPP leaders ought to visit him will become a new bone of contention.
Chen Shui-bian says Chen Chih-chung and his wife are seeking a plea bargain, and would like to return 570 million dollars from their overseas accounts. This was what the Special Investigation Unit referred to when it described Chen and his wife as "unrepentant," and meriting "heavy punishment." It said the 570 million dollars, whose whereabouts were unclear, was evidence in danger of disappearing. Only then was it able to smoke Chen Shui-bian out of his lair. In order to save his son and his daughter-in-law, under pressure of being returned to custody, Chen Shui-bian was already vulnerable. Chen Chih-chung and his wife's plea bargain, at this late date, is less a plea bargain than an attempt to get off scot-free. Investigative authorities should demand that the "Cape 700 million" and the 570 million in the bank vault be returned. They should order the Chen family to map out their entire money-laundering operation, Including their accounts in the United States and Japan. Otherwise, how can their "confession" be considered a genuine confession? A genuine plea bargain?
During the hearing, Chen Shui-bian confessed that the "Southern Front Project" was phony. He blamed his attorneys for urging him to classify the "Southern Front Project" as Top Secret. This amounted to a confession that his classification of evidence as Top Secret was phony, and that his motive was to conceal evidence of criminal wrongdoing and obstruct justice. In other words, Chen Shui-bian has confessed to instructing his attorneys to conceal evidence, and of abusing the power of his office to destroy evidence. This of course is something the Special Investigation Unit also ought to investigate immediately.
With these revelations, Chen Shui-bian's protestations of innocence rang utterly hollow. They further undermined whatever trust might have existed among Chen Shui-bian, his codefendants, witnesses, attorneys, and supporters. On the one hand, Chen Shui-bian confessed that he fabricated the "Southern Front Project." On the other hand, he blames his attorneys and advisors. He did something similar when he leaked that Wu Li-pei laundered money for a "nation-building fund," when he leaked that Tsai Chen-yuan arranged to stash Chen's money in a bank vault, when he blamed Premier Yu Shyi-kun for the Longtan scandal, and when he leaked information about Lee Teng-hui's own money laundering operations. In short, anyone can become Chen's sacrificial victim, as long as he can help Chen gain acquittal, including Lee Teng-hui, Yu Shyi-kun, or Ku Li-hsiung.
Chen Shui-bian's lack of trustworthiness, his lack of scruples, his willingness to betray his comrades, ought to have alerted witnesses and defense attorneys to the dangers of colluding with Chen. Yesterday, after the court dajourned, Cheng Wen-long actually said he was unaware of any "plea bargain." Even Chen's own defense attorneys have been kept in the dark.
Tsai Shou-hsuing has succeeded in getting Ah-Bian back into custody. Chen Shui-bian originally claimed he was completely innocent. Then he admitted that Chen Chi-chung was seeking a plea bargain. Finally he claimed his attorneys and advisors urged him to conceal evidence. Tsai has essentially forced Chen Shui-bian to reenact his defense strategy, from beginning to end, and forced him to reveal a number of major holes in his story. This is beneficial to the future progress of the trial. The court's decision to detain Chen, but not prohibit him from receiving visitors, has responded to "civil rights" demands. But it has also left Chen Shui-bian walking a legal and political tightrope. It may seem to have provided a political stage for Chen Shui-bian. But it also leaves Chen Shui-bian vulnerable, caught between legal and political battlelines. When Chen must appear before a judge, or can campaign on behalf of a candidate, is not up to him.
According to the western calendar, it is New Year's Eve. Chen Shui-bian is back in custody. For the public on Taiwan, isn't this a case of "out with the old, and in with the new?"
陳水扁供稱律師教唆隱匿證據
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.12.31 04:11 am
經過十二小時三十分鐘的審理馬拉松，蔡守訓的合議庭將扁案帶進了新情勢：一、合議庭裁定，陳水扁收押，不禁見；二、陳水扁供稱，陳致中夫婦正尋求認罪協 商；三、陳水扁又供稱，因律師團與幕僚建議，所以將虛假的「南線專案」核定為絕對機密。這類新發展，將使扁案在政治面及法律面皆出現新變數。
收押，不禁見；主要的效應將發生在政治面。由於特偵組在陳水扁前次羈押時，曾派有檢察事務官對律師會見進行錄音錄影；此一方法今後可能繼續採用，則雖開放 面會，串證風險應可管制。然而，禁見既解，北所即很可能成為陳水扁的新聞工廠與政治舞台。例如，吳淑珍、趙建銘夫婦、陳致中夫婦的探監，皆將成為新聞焦 點；再如，蔡英文是否探監，及綠營何人探監、何人不探監，亦將成為政治話題。
何況，羈押畢竟不是服刑，陳水扁仍有保釋或開釋的可能性；他當下的努力無疑是以再爭取開釋或保釋為首務，並以明年縣市長選舉前出監為目標。因為，扁若在明 年縣市長選舉中失去角色，他的政治籌碼將嚴重流失；所以，屆時不論他在押或出監，縣市長選舉皆將成為其政治操作的題材。差異僅在，若出監即可上台輔選，或 在押則可預見探監的候選人絡繹於途。陳水扁已知其訴訟結局無可樂觀，因而必將全力在政治面作最後拚搏；而「收押，不禁見」，對扁而言，也許正是吸引視聽焦 點的最佳舞台。但是，對民進黨而言，不禁見卻是頭痛的問題；因為，探監與否，勢將成為路線鬥爭的新標籤。
陳水扁供稱，陳致中夫婦正尋求認罪協商，並願將存在海外的五點七億匯回。這是在特偵組指陳致中夫婦「惡性不輕」並求「從重量刑」，及指五點七億下落未明而 有「湮滅證據之虞」的雙管濃煙齊下，將陳水扁這隻狐狸嗆出洞來。陳水扁為了拯救子媳，且在回押的壓力下，其無罪抗辯的防禦工事到此已崩裂了一個大缺口。但 是，陳致中夫婦至今日地步始有此舉，與其說是「認罪協商」，不如說是脫罪手段；偵審當局除應命其剋日將承諾匯回的海角七億及金庫五點七億匯到，亦當命其供 出全球洗錢的全圖，包括美日帳戶。否則，豈能視為「認罪」？又如何「協商」？
這次庭訊中，陳水扁供認「南線專案」是偽造的，並咬出是律師建議將「南線專案」核定為絕對機密；這不啻證實，其所稱絕對機密根本是假的，而核定為絕對機密 之目的，是在隱匿證據，干擾審判。換句話說，陳水扁供認了律師教唆他隱匿罪證，而他自己則利用職務湮滅證據；這當然是特偵組應立即追加偵訴的項目。
此一情節的揭露，進一步顯示陳水扁的無罪辯護已漸趨土崩瓦解，也可能進一步破壞了陳水扁與同案被告、證人、律師或支持者之間的信賴關係。其實，陳水扁可以 自己一肩承擔偽造「南線專案」的罪責，但他卻指控是律師及幕僚唆使；這與他主動洩漏吳澧培為「建國基金」洗錢，又主動爆料蔡鎮宇為他安排藏金庫，再主動指 控龍潭案是行政院長游錫?所指使，更演出「抓耙子」告發李登輝洗錢，皆可謂是異曲同工。反正，所有的人皆可能成為陳水扁自求脫罪的犧牲品，包括李登輝、游 錫?或顧立雄。
陳水扁如此不堪信任，翻臉即出賣戰友，證人應警覺與他「串供」的風險太大，為他擔任辯護律師亦有被他反咬一口的危險。昨晨庭畢，鄭文龍竟稱他不知「認罪協商」這一塊，可見連律師也被扁蒙在鼓裡。
蔡守訓的羈押庭頗有斬獲。一方面，從陳水扁一開始的「全盤無罪辯護」到最後的「陳致中認罪協商」及「律師教唆隱匿罪證」，可謂已將陳水扁的通盤辯護架構 「演習」了一遍，並逼出了幾個重大缺口，有利未來審判之順利進行。另一方面，「收押，不禁見」的裁定，回應了「人權」的部分主張，卻亦使陳水扁將處於司法 與政治兩條戰線互動的高度緊張之中；這雖然看似為陳水扁提供了舞台，但也可能使陳水扁在司法及政治兩條戰線上皆陷於被動；因為，法官傳他出庭，與候選人利 用他探監造勢，皆非操之在扁。
今日陽曆除夕，陳水扁入監，對台灣的新年，有無除舊布新的意義？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 31, 2008
After a 12 hour 30 minute marathon session, Tsai Shou-hsuing and the Full Court have taken the Chen corruption case into a new realm. One. The Full Court ruled that Chen Shui-bian will be returned to custody, but that he may receive visitors. Two. Chen Shui-bian has admitted that Chen Chih-chung and his wife are seeking a plea bargain. Three. Chen Shui-bian alleges that he classified the "Southern Front Project" as Top Secret on the recommendation of his attorneys and advisors. These developments introduce new political and legal factors into the Chen corruption case.
The main impact of taking Chen back into custody, but allowing him to receive visitors, will be political. The last time the Special Investigation Unit took Chen Shui-bian into custody, prosecutors dispatched officials to meet with his defense attorneys and videotaped the meeting. It may continue using this approach. Even though it will be allowing Chen to receive visitors, this approach should enable prosecutors to reduce the possibility of collusion. But since the prohibition on receiving visitors has been lifted, the Taipei Detention Center is likely to become Chen Shui-bian's public relations center and bully pulpit. For example, visits by Wu Shu-chen, Chao Chien-ming and his wife, and Chen Chih-chung and his wife, will all become front page news. Also, whether Tsai Ing-wen or any Green Camp personalities visit him, or fail to visit him, will become a political issue.
Detention is not the same as imprisonment. Chen Shui-bian may still be able to post bail and obtain release. His current efforts are undoubtedly a fight for re-release or release on bail. Next year's county magistrates and city mayors elections are also targets. If Ah-Bian is unable to play a role in next year's county magistrates and city mayors elections, he will lose a lot of his political bargaining chips. Therefore, regardless of whether he is kept in custody, he will attempt to manipulate the outcome of the county magistrates and city mayors elections. The only difference will be whether he can emerge from detention to campaign on behalf of the candidates. Either that, or an endless stream of candidates will visit him while he remains in custody. Chen Shui-bian knows he can not be optimistic about the outcome of his trial. Therefore he must make a last ditch effort on the political front. Being taken into custody but not being prohibited from receiving visitors, may provide Ah-Bian with the perfect bully pulpit. To the Democratic Progressive Party however, Ah-Bian being allowed to receive visitors amounts to headache, because whether or not DPP leaders ought to visit him will become a new bone of contention.
Chen Shui-bian says Chen Chih-chung and his wife are seeking a plea bargain, and would like to return 570 million dollars from their overseas accounts. This was what the Special Investigation Unit referred to when it described Chen and his wife as "unrepentant," and meriting "heavy punishment." It said the 570 million dollars, whose whereabouts were unclear, was evidence in danger of disappearing. Only then was it able to smoke Chen Shui-bian out of his lair. In order to save his son and his daughter-in-law, under pressure of being returned to custody, Chen Shui-bian was already vulnerable. Chen Chih-chung and his wife's plea bargain, at this late date, is less a plea bargain than an attempt to get off scot-free. Investigative authorities should demand that the "Cape 700 million" and the 570 million in the bank vault be returned. They should order the Chen family to map out their entire money-laundering operation, Including their accounts in the United States and Japan. Otherwise, how can their "confession" be considered a genuine confession? A genuine plea bargain?
During the hearing, Chen Shui-bian confessed that the "Southern Front Project" was phony. He blamed his attorneys for urging him to classify the "Southern Front Project" as Top Secret. This amounted to a confession that his classification of evidence as Top Secret was phony, and that his motive was to conceal evidence of criminal wrongdoing and obstruct justice. In other words, Chen Shui-bian has confessed to instructing his attorneys to conceal evidence, and of abusing the power of his office to destroy evidence. This of course is something the Special Investigation Unit also ought to investigate immediately.
With these revelations, Chen Shui-bian's protestations of innocence rang utterly hollow. They further undermined whatever trust might have existed among Chen Shui-bian, his codefendants, witnesses, attorneys, and supporters. On the one hand, Chen Shui-bian confessed that he fabricated the "Southern Front Project." On the other hand, he blames his attorneys and advisors. He did something similar when he leaked that Wu Li-pei laundered money for a "nation-building fund," when he leaked that Tsai Chen-yuan arranged to stash Chen's money in a bank vault, when he blamed Premier Yu Shyi-kun for the Longtan scandal, and when he leaked information about Lee Teng-hui's own money laundering operations. In short, anyone can become Chen's sacrificial victim, as long as he can help Chen gain acquittal, including Lee Teng-hui, Yu Shyi-kun, or Ku Li-hsiung.
Chen Shui-bian's lack of trustworthiness, his lack of scruples, his willingness to betray his comrades, ought to have alerted witnesses and defense attorneys to the dangers of colluding with Chen. Yesterday, after the court dajourned, Cheng Wen-long actually said he was unaware of any "plea bargain." Even Chen's own defense attorneys have been kept in the dark.
Tsai Shou-hsuing has succeeded in getting Ah-Bian back into custody. Chen Shui-bian originally claimed he was completely innocent. Then he admitted that Chen Chi-chung was seeking a plea bargain. Finally he claimed his attorneys and advisors urged him to conceal evidence. Tsai has essentially forced Chen Shui-bian to reenact his defense strategy, from beginning to end, and forced him to reveal a number of major holes in his story. This is beneficial to the future progress of the trial. The court's decision to detain Chen, but not prohibit him from receiving visitors, has responded to "civil rights" demands. But it has also left Chen Shui-bian walking a legal and political tightrope. It may seem to have provided a political stage for Chen Shui-bian. But it also leaves Chen Shui-bian vulnerable, caught between legal and political battlelines. When Chen must appear before a judge, or can campaign on behalf of a candidate, is not up to him.
According to the western calendar, it is New Year's Eve. Chen Shui-bian is back in custody. For the public on Taiwan, isn't this a case of "out with the old, and in with the new?"
陳水扁供稱律師教唆隱匿證據
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.12.31 04:11 am
經過十二小時三十分鐘的審理馬拉松，蔡守訓的合議庭將扁案帶進了新情勢：一、合議庭裁定，陳水扁收押，不禁見；二、陳水扁供稱，陳致中夫婦正尋求認罪協 商；三、陳水扁又供稱，因律師團與幕僚建議，所以將虛假的「南線專案」核定為絕對機密。這類新發展，將使扁案在政治面及法律面皆出現新變數。
收押，不禁見；主要的效應將發生在政治面。由於特偵組在陳水扁前次羈押時，曾派有檢察事務官對律師會見進行錄音錄影；此一方法今後可能繼續採用，則雖開放 面會，串證風險應可管制。然而，禁見既解，北所即很可能成為陳水扁的新聞工廠與政治舞台。例如，吳淑珍、趙建銘夫婦、陳致中夫婦的探監，皆將成為新聞焦 點；再如，蔡英文是否探監，及綠營何人探監、何人不探監，亦將成為政治話題。
何況，羈押畢竟不是服刑，陳水扁仍有保釋或開釋的可能性；他當下的努力無疑是以再爭取開釋或保釋為首務，並以明年縣市長選舉前出監為目標。因為，扁若在明 年縣市長選舉中失去角色，他的政治籌碼將嚴重流失；所以，屆時不論他在押或出監，縣市長選舉皆將成為其政治操作的題材。差異僅在，若出監即可上台輔選，或 在押則可預見探監的候選人絡繹於途。陳水扁已知其訴訟結局無可樂觀，因而必將全力在政治面作最後拚搏；而「收押，不禁見」，對扁而言，也許正是吸引視聽焦 點的最佳舞台。但是，對民進黨而言，不禁見卻是頭痛的問題；因為，探監與否，勢將成為路線鬥爭的新標籤。
陳水扁供稱，陳致中夫婦正尋求認罪協商，並願將存在海外的五點七億匯回。這是在特偵組指陳致中夫婦「惡性不輕」並求「從重量刑」，及指五點七億下落未明而 有「湮滅證據之虞」的雙管濃煙齊下，將陳水扁這隻狐狸嗆出洞來。陳水扁為了拯救子媳，且在回押的壓力下，其無罪抗辯的防禦工事到此已崩裂了一個大缺口。但 是，陳致中夫婦至今日地步始有此舉，與其說是「認罪協商」，不如說是脫罪手段；偵審當局除應命其剋日將承諾匯回的海角七億及金庫五點七億匯到，亦當命其供 出全球洗錢的全圖，包括美日帳戶。否則，豈能視為「認罪」？又如何「協商」？
這次庭訊中，陳水扁供認「南線專案」是偽造的，並咬出是律師建議將「南線專案」核定為絕對機密；這不啻證實，其所稱絕對機密根本是假的，而核定為絕對機密 之目的，是在隱匿證據，干擾審判。換句話說，陳水扁供認了律師教唆他隱匿罪證，而他自己則利用職務湮滅證據；這當然是特偵組應立即追加偵訴的項目。
此一情節的揭露，進一步顯示陳水扁的無罪辯護已漸趨土崩瓦解，也可能進一步破壞了陳水扁與同案被告、證人、律師或支持者之間的信賴關係。其實，陳水扁可以 自己一肩承擔偽造「南線專案」的罪責，但他卻指控是律師及幕僚唆使；這與他主動洩漏吳澧培為「建國基金」洗錢，又主動爆料蔡鎮宇為他安排藏金庫，再主動指 控龍潭案是行政院長游錫?所指使，更演出「抓耙子」告發李登輝洗錢，皆可謂是異曲同工。反正，所有的人皆可能成為陳水扁自求脫罪的犧牲品，包括李登輝、游 錫?或顧立雄。
陳水扁如此不堪信任，翻臉即出賣戰友，證人應警覺與他「串供」的風險太大，為他擔任辯護律師亦有被他反咬一口的危險。昨晨庭畢，鄭文龍竟稱他不知「認罪協商」這一塊，可見連律師也被扁蒙在鼓裡。
蔡守訓的羈押庭頗有斬獲。一方面，從陳水扁一開始的「全盤無罪辯護」到最後的「陳致中認罪協商」及「律師教唆隱匿罪證」，可謂已將陳水扁的通盤辯護架構 「演習」了一遍，並逼出了幾個重大缺口，有利未來審判之順利進行。另一方面，「收押，不禁見」的裁定，回應了「人權」的部分主張，卻亦使陳水扁將處於司法 與政治兩條戰線互動的高度緊張之中；這雖然看似為陳水扁提供了舞台，但也可能使陳水扁在司法及政治兩條戰線上皆陷於被動；因為，法官傳他出庭，與候選人利 用他探監造勢，皆非操之在扁。
今日陽曆除夕，陳水扁入監，對台灣的新年，有無除舊布新的意義？
Tuesday, December 30, 2008
Taiwan 2008: From the Second Change in Ruling Parties to the Indictment of Chen Shui-bian
Taiwan 2008: From the Second Change in Ruling Parties to the Indictment of Chen Shui-bian
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 30, 2008
In 2008 the political scene on Taiwan underwent a dramatic change. At the beginning of 2008, the island underwent a second change in ruling parties. By the end of 2008, on December 12, Chen Shui-bian had been indicted for corruption and money-laundering. In 2008 cross-Strait relations also underwent a dramatic change. At the beginning of 2008, agitation for a "Join the UN Plebiscite." At the end of 2008, implementation of direct links.
These two threads: internal political struggle and cross-Strait relations affect each other. This article will address the first thread, internal political struggle. Cross-Strait relations will be addressed in a separate article.
The second change in ruling parties has totally replaced the nation's value system. With regards internal political struggles, Ma Ying-jeou's vision of our nation's future has replaced Chen Shui-bian's. Ma has adopted a no to reunification, no to Taiwan independence, no to nation-building, and no to war position. Ma has chosen to uphold the constitution, implement the constitution, amend the constitution, and to reject the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." With regards cross-Strait relations, Ma champions direct links and rejects confrontation. Ma champions ethnic harmony and rejects social divisiveness. Ma champions clean government and rejects corruption. Ma has rejected officials such as Tu Cheng-sheng, Chuang Kuo-jung, and Ye Sheng-mao. We can now look forward to the emergence of a new kind of public official.
Therefore this is not your ordinary, run of the mill, "second change in ruling parties." The nation's entire value system has been completely replaced. Of the 113 seats in the Legislature, the KMT won 82, over two-thirds. The Blue Camp won 86, over three-quarters. During the presidential election Ma Ying-jeou received over 58 percent of the vote, 7.65 million ballots. These results show that the nation's value system has been replaced, in toto. The Democratic Progressive Party, held hostage by Chen Shui-bian, was defeated in the legislative elections and the presidential election. It was defeated because voters punished it for its pro independence stance and rampant corruption. December 12th's indictment represents Chen Shui-bian being brought to justice for his crimes.
In fact, 2008 represents voters making a decisive, across the board choice about their future. The lifting of martial law was followed by two decades of political and economic turmoil. By promoting "nativist values," Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian unquestionably cultivated a "Taiwan-centric" mentality. Lee Teng-hui established a precedent for Taiwan independence. Chen Shui-bian raised the ante. Together, they tore society apart, closed the nation's doors, precipated political chaos, and deeply wounded the nation and society. Lee's black gold and Chen's unbridled greed, corrupted the body politic. As we have said before, Lee and Chen may have led Taiwan across a river, but they landed on the wrong shore. In 2008, voters attempted to heal the wounds caused by Lee and Chen's two decades of misrule. They are hoping for national rebirth and national reconstruction, and see the day Chen was indicted as a day of national rebirth and national reconstruction.
But shifting winds have taken everyone by surprise. The legislative elections and presidential election at the beginning of the year were political sanctions. The voters used the electoral system to punish Chen Shui-bian and the DPP. Chen's indictment at the end of the year, was the justice system's verdict against Chen Shui-bian's corruption. Alas, the electoral process has failed to clear the air, and the legal process has failed to distinguish right from wrong. Chen Shui-bian refuses to confess his crimes. He screams he is a "victim of political persecution." His supporters insist "Chen Shui-bian is innocent." The "reasoning" behind this equation is "If Chen Shui-bian falls, Taiwan falls!"
Meanwhile, the two elections at the beginning of the year produced two new leaders, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen. So far both have failed to meet the expecations their supporters had for them. Ma Ying-jeou still can't decide how to position himself. Does he want to stand on the front line, or hide out in the rear echelon? Does he want to be both president and party chairman, or does he feel the two roles should be filled by two different people? Does he want to remain an idol to his fans, or does he want to get his hands dirty in the political mud? He seems forever paralyzed by his own media image. When it comes to real world leadership, he often finds himself at a complete loss. As for Tsai Ing-wen, she attempted to initiate a "post-Chen Shui-bian era," only to find herself marginalized by the Green Camp and the DPP. Her hopes of transforming the Democratic Progressive Party have been dashed.
The year 2008 was an historic opportunity for reflection about the ROC's democracy. This golden opportunity is in danger of being frittered away. Ma Ying-jeou is unable to inspire the nation. Tsai Ing-wen is unable to change the DPP. The entire island remains caught in the maze of the Chen corruption case. A minority of Chen Shui-bian supporters have paralyzed the island, and are choking the life out of her.
Faced with such a situation, the public can not help wondering. What, if anything, can save democracy and constitutional government? America's has elected a black man president. India on the other hand, has been unable to change its caste system. Both are democracies. So why are the results so different?
Can the second change in ruling parties in 2008 save the ROC's democracy and constitutional government? Can the prosecution of the Chen corruption case save the ROC's democracy and constitutional government? And if not, what can?
台灣二○○八：從二次政黨輪替到扁案起訴
【聯合報社論╱社論】
2008.12.30 02:53 am
二○○八年的台灣內部政治，從年初「二次政黨輪替」，走到年底一二一二扁案大起訴；二○○八年的兩岸關係，則是從年初「入聯公投」，走到年底大三通。
這兩條軸線，一條台灣內部政治，一條兩岸關係，相激相盪，互為條件，互為表裡。本文先論台灣內部政治一線，兩岸關係留待另文。
這 番「二次政黨輪替」，可謂是國家整體價值體系的全面取捨。就人物風格言，取馬英九，捨陳水扁；就國家路線言，取不統、不獨、不武，捨台獨建國；就憲政架構 言，取護憲、行憲、修憲，捨正名制憲；就兩岸關係言，取大三通，捨尖銳對立；就社會號召言，取族群融合，捨撕裂社會；就政風品操言，取清廉，捨貪腐。甚至 就官員品類言，亦是對杜正勝、莊國榮、葉盛茂之輩的否決，而期待新典型出現……。
因而，這不是一般的「二次政黨輪替」，而是國家整體價值 體系的大取捨、大換置，與大抉擇。一一三席立委選舉，國民黨贏得八十二席，逾三分之二；泛藍得八十六席，逾四分之三。總統選舉，馬英九得票率為五十八%， 得票數七六五萬。這些皆顯示選民對國家價值體系的大取捨、大換置與大抉擇。至於被陳水扁所挾持的民進黨，在立委選舉及總統大選皆遭大敗，正是因其台獨路線 及貪腐行徑受到選民的制裁；直至一二一二大起訴，則是將陳水扁的罪行交付司法審判。
其實，二○○八年的台灣，形同選民對解嚴後二十年來的 政經激盪，作出了總結性的反省與抉擇。李登輝與陳水扁，對於本土意識的鼓吹，確曾充實並鞏固了台灣的主體性；但由李登輝始作俑、再經陳水扁變本加厲的台獨 路線，撕裂社會、鎖國亂政，卻使國家社會創巨痛深。尤其，李的黑金，與扁的貪腐，更使政治體質沉淪敗壞。我們曾說，李陳二人也許帶領台灣過了河，卻上錯了 岸；選民遂在二○○八年為二十年來的扁李路線療傷止痛，並期待國家社會得以新生再造。尤其，在原本的想像與期待中，扁案起訴之時，即應是國家社會新生再造 之日。
但是，情勢的演變卻出乎想像與期待之外。年初的立委選舉及總統大選，可謂是選舉制度及選民對陳水扁與民進黨的政治制裁；年底的大起 訴，則是司法體制將對陳水扁的貪腐進行審判。但是，如今顯現的情勢卻是，選舉投票不能激濁揚清，司法似也不能澄明是非；陳水扁仍不認錯，四處呼號「政治迫 害」，而其支持者仍然主張「阿扁無罪」。這一股勢力的主軸論述是：「阿扁若倒，台灣就倒！」
相對而言，年初兩次大選後出現的兩位新領袖， 馬英九與蔡英文，卻迄今未能在各自的領域中，發揮其自我期許與受社會付託的角色與功能。馬英九迄今仍在「第一線／第二線」、「黨政同步／黨政分離」、「粉 絲偶像／戰場領袖」之間不知如何自我定位；似乎始終沉浸在他自成一格的思維與論述中，卻在實際的領導統御上往往不得要領，搔不著癢處。至於蔡英文，亦從朝 向「沒有陳水扁的時代」的道路中，被綠營與民進黨邊緣化及無意義化，民進黨的轉型再造亦已落空。
二○○八年原本存有台灣民主大反省、大轉型的歷史機遇，但此種期待卻有失落的危機。馬英九帶不動台灣，蔡英文改變不了民進黨；整個台灣遂仍陷於扁案的迷障之中。少數挺扁者，反而掐住了台灣的神經與命脈。
面對此情此境，人們不禁要問：民主憲政的最後救贖究竟是什麼？美國的民主，黑人當選了總統；印度的民主，卻不能改變種姓制度。同樣是民主，何以效應如此不同？
二○○八年，如果二次政黨輪替不能成為台灣民主憲政的救贖，年底的扁案起訴也不能成為台灣民主憲政的救贖，則台灣這個大難題的答案究竟是什麼？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 30, 2008
In 2008 the political scene on Taiwan underwent a dramatic change. At the beginning of 2008, the island underwent a second change in ruling parties. By the end of 2008, on December 12, Chen Shui-bian had been indicted for corruption and money-laundering. In 2008 cross-Strait relations also underwent a dramatic change. At the beginning of 2008, agitation for a "Join the UN Plebiscite." At the end of 2008, implementation of direct links.
These two threads: internal political struggle and cross-Strait relations affect each other. This article will address the first thread, internal political struggle. Cross-Strait relations will be addressed in a separate article.
The second change in ruling parties has totally replaced the nation's value system. With regards internal political struggles, Ma Ying-jeou's vision of our nation's future has replaced Chen Shui-bian's. Ma has adopted a no to reunification, no to Taiwan independence, no to nation-building, and no to war position. Ma has chosen to uphold the constitution, implement the constitution, amend the constitution, and to reject the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution." With regards cross-Strait relations, Ma champions direct links and rejects confrontation. Ma champions ethnic harmony and rejects social divisiveness. Ma champions clean government and rejects corruption. Ma has rejected officials such as Tu Cheng-sheng, Chuang Kuo-jung, and Ye Sheng-mao. We can now look forward to the emergence of a new kind of public official.
Therefore this is not your ordinary, run of the mill, "second change in ruling parties." The nation's entire value system has been completely replaced. Of the 113 seats in the Legislature, the KMT won 82, over two-thirds. The Blue Camp won 86, over three-quarters. During the presidential election Ma Ying-jeou received over 58 percent of the vote, 7.65 million ballots. These results show that the nation's value system has been replaced, in toto. The Democratic Progressive Party, held hostage by Chen Shui-bian, was defeated in the legislative elections and the presidential election. It was defeated because voters punished it for its pro independence stance and rampant corruption. December 12th's indictment represents Chen Shui-bian being brought to justice for his crimes.
In fact, 2008 represents voters making a decisive, across the board choice about their future. The lifting of martial law was followed by two decades of political and economic turmoil. By promoting "nativist values," Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian unquestionably cultivated a "Taiwan-centric" mentality. Lee Teng-hui established a precedent for Taiwan independence. Chen Shui-bian raised the ante. Together, they tore society apart, closed the nation's doors, precipated political chaos, and deeply wounded the nation and society. Lee's black gold and Chen's unbridled greed, corrupted the body politic. As we have said before, Lee and Chen may have led Taiwan across a river, but they landed on the wrong shore. In 2008, voters attempted to heal the wounds caused by Lee and Chen's two decades of misrule. They are hoping for national rebirth and national reconstruction, and see the day Chen was indicted as a day of national rebirth and national reconstruction.
But shifting winds have taken everyone by surprise. The legislative elections and presidential election at the beginning of the year were political sanctions. The voters used the electoral system to punish Chen Shui-bian and the DPP. Chen's indictment at the end of the year, was the justice system's verdict against Chen Shui-bian's corruption. Alas, the electoral process has failed to clear the air, and the legal process has failed to distinguish right from wrong. Chen Shui-bian refuses to confess his crimes. He screams he is a "victim of political persecution." His supporters insist "Chen Shui-bian is innocent." The "reasoning" behind this equation is "If Chen Shui-bian falls, Taiwan falls!"
Meanwhile, the two elections at the beginning of the year produced two new leaders, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen. So far both have failed to meet the expecations their supporters had for them. Ma Ying-jeou still can't decide how to position himself. Does he want to stand on the front line, or hide out in the rear echelon? Does he want to be both president and party chairman, or does he feel the two roles should be filled by two different people? Does he want to remain an idol to his fans, or does he want to get his hands dirty in the political mud? He seems forever paralyzed by his own media image. When it comes to real world leadership, he often finds himself at a complete loss. As for Tsai Ing-wen, she attempted to initiate a "post-Chen Shui-bian era," only to find herself marginalized by the Green Camp and the DPP. Her hopes of transforming the Democratic Progressive Party have been dashed.
The year 2008 was an historic opportunity for reflection about the ROC's democracy. This golden opportunity is in danger of being frittered away. Ma Ying-jeou is unable to inspire the nation. Tsai Ing-wen is unable to change the DPP. The entire island remains caught in the maze of the Chen corruption case. A minority of Chen Shui-bian supporters have paralyzed the island, and are choking the life out of her.
Faced with such a situation, the public can not help wondering. What, if anything, can save democracy and constitutional government? America's has elected a black man president. India on the other hand, has been unable to change its caste system. Both are democracies. So why are the results so different?
Can the second change in ruling parties in 2008 save the ROC's democracy and constitutional government? Can the prosecution of the Chen corruption case save the ROC's democracy and constitutional government? And if not, what can?
台灣二○○八：從二次政黨輪替到扁案起訴
【聯合報社論╱社論】
2008.12.30 02:53 am
二○○八年的台灣內部政治，從年初「二次政黨輪替」，走到年底一二一二扁案大起訴；二○○八年的兩岸關係，則是從年初「入聯公投」，走到年底大三通。
這兩條軸線，一條台灣內部政治，一條兩岸關係，相激相盪，互為條件，互為表裡。本文先論台灣內部政治一線，兩岸關係留待另文。
這 番「二次政黨輪替」，可謂是國家整體價值體系的全面取捨。就人物風格言，取馬英九，捨陳水扁；就國家路線言，取不統、不獨、不武，捨台獨建國；就憲政架構 言，取護憲、行憲、修憲，捨正名制憲；就兩岸關係言，取大三通，捨尖銳對立；就社會號召言，取族群融合，捨撕裂社會；就政風品操言，取清廉，捨貪腐。甚至 就官員品類言，亦是對杜正勝、莊國榮、葉盛茂之輩的否決，而期待新典型出現……。
因而，這不是一般的「二次政黨輪替」，而是國家整體價值 體系的大取捨、大換置，與大抉擇。一一三席立委選舉，國民黨贏得八十二席，逾三分之二；泛藍得八十六席，逾四分之三。總統選舉，馬英九得票率為五十八%， 得票數七六五萬。這些皆顯示選民對國家價值體系的大取捨、大換置與大抉擇。至於被陳水扁所挾持的民進黨，在立委選舉及總統大選皆遭大敗，正是因其台獨路線 及貪腐行徑受到選民的制裁；直至一二一二大起訴，則是將陳水扁的罪行交付司法審判。
其實，二○○八年的台灣，形同選民對解嚴後二十年來的 政經激盪，作出了總結性的反省與抉擇。李登輝與陳水扁，對於本土意識的鼓吹，確曾充實並鞏固了台灣的主體性；但由李登輝始作俑、再經陳水扁變本加厲的台獨 路線，撕裂社會、鎖國亂政，卻使國家社會創巨痛深。尤其，李的黑金，與扁的貪腐，更使政治體質沉淪敗壞。我們曾說，李陳二人也許帶領台灣過了河，卻上錯了 岸；選民遂在二○○八年為二十年來的扁李路線療傷止痛，並期待國家社會得以新生再造。尤其，在原本的想像與期待中，扁案起訴之時，即應是國家社會新生再造 之日。
但是，情勢的演變卻出乎想像與期待之外。年初的立委選舉及總統大選，可謂是選舉制度及選民對陳水扁與民進黨的政治制裁；年底的大起 訴，則是司法體制將對陳水扁的貪腐進行審判。但是，如今顯現的情勢卻是，選舉投票不能激濁揚清，司法似也不能澄明是非；陳水扁仍不認錯，四處呼號「政治迫 害」，而其支持者仍然主張「阿扁無罪」。這一股勢力的主軸論述是：「阿扁若倒，台灣就倒！」
相對而言，年初兩次大選後出現的兩位新領袖， 馬英九與蔡英文，卻迄今未能在各自的領域中，發揮其自我期許與受社會付託的角色與功能。馬英九迄今仍在「第一線／第二線」、「黨政同步／黨政分離」、「粉 絲偶像／戰場領袖」之間不知如何自我定位；似乎始終沉浸在他自成一格的思維與論述中，卻在實際的領導統御上往往不得要領，搔不著癢處。至於蔡英文，亦從朝 向「沒有陳水扁的時代」的道路中，被綠營與民進黨邊緣化及無意義化，民進黨的轉型再造亦已落空。
二○○八年原本存有台灣民主大反省、大轉型的歷史機遇，但此種期待卻有失落的危機。馬英九帶不動台灣，蔡英文改變不了民進黨；整個台灣遂仍陷於扁案的迷障之中。少數挺扁者，反而掐住了台灣的神經與命脈。
面對此情此境，人們不禁要問：民主憲政的最後救贖究竟是什麼？美國的民主，黑人當選了總統；印度的民主，卻不能改變種姓制度。同樣是民主，何以效應如此不同？
二○○八年，如果二次政黨輪替不能成為台灣民主憲政的救贖，年底的扁案起訴也不能成為台灣民主憲政的救贖，則台灣這個大難題的答案究竟是什麼？
Monday, December 29, 2008
Wearing a Helmet, Welcoming the Pandas
Wearing a Helmet, Welcoming the Pandas
United Daily News editorial
A Translation
December 29, 2008
Cross-strait links have been kicked off amidst an air of festivity. The KMT-CPC forum concluded with much to show. A pair of pandas from Sichuan named Tuan Tuan and Yuan Yuan are coming to Taiwan as ambassadors of peace. Yet at a time when the Taiwan Strait is filled with the atmosphere of reconciliation, President Ma Ying-jeou donned an army helmet while reviewing the troops during live-fire exercises.
President Ma said that cross-Strait relations may be improving, but that does not mean we no longer need a military capability. We still need to make military preparations and enhance up our military capabilities. We must not negotiate out of fear.
President Ma is not raining on everyones' parade. He is merely reminding us that we must remain vigilant amidst peace. Indeed, the government must not reduce its military preparedness. Although the mainland has repeatedly stated that it desires a peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem, it has not changed its position on the use of force. The public must be aware of this, and remain cautious.
During decades of cross-Strait confrontation, the mainland's policy toward Taiwan has gradually softened. Early rhetoric calling for a "Taiwan bloodbath" and "the liberation of Taiwan" has changed to "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems," and to "maintaining the status quo," and finally to implicit recognition of "One China, Different Interpretations." This shows that the mainland authorities have adopted a calmer attitude. The "Anti-Secession Law" reserves the right to use of force against "de jure Taiwan independence." Nevertheless the mainland ought to make clear that it will not use force against Taiwan, for at least three reasons.
One. Those who support and participate in the Taiwan independence movement are a minority. The vast majority of the public on Taiwan want peaceful coexistence. It is unfair for the mainland to intimidate everyone on Taiwan in response to the behavior of a small number of radical Taiwan independence advocates. It also runs counter to the mainland's policy of "pinning its hopes on the people of Taiwan."
Two. Modern weapons of mass destruction are extraordinarily destructive. If the mainland attacks Taiwan, it could turn Taiwan into a wilderness. Would the mainland really want such a result? People may disagree about how many died during the 228 Incident in 1947. But bad blood lingers 60 years later. If the mainland is determined to attack Taiwan, the result may be corpses everywhere. How will they deal with the aftermath? How will they answer to history?
Three. The mainland has always referred to the public on Taiwan as compatriots. What is the rationale behind using modern weapons to kill one's fellow countrymen? Two decades after the Tiananmen incident, mainland officials still refuse to face the truth. One reason is they want to maintain social stability. The other is probably inner guilt. How can even one such mistake be allowed to occur on Taiwan?
Of these three reasons, we would like to place special emphasis on the third. On the 24th of this month, the United Daily News' "Public Forum" published an editorial entitled "Three times Chiang Kai-shek prevented the the United States from using nuclear weapons against the Chinese mainland." According to Chiang's diary, the United States was secretly preparing to attack the Chinese mainland during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. It was considering dropping atomic bombs. Chiang Kai-shek clearly expressed his opposition, and sought to dissuade or discourage advocates of such a move.
Ever since the Communist Party defeated Chiang Kai-shek and forced him to retreat to Taiwan, he thought of nothing but "retaking the mainland," and "avenging a national humilation." But the ROC's military power was far from sufficient. Since the United States was willing to help, by using its bombs, in principle Chiang should have been pleased. He should have taken the easy way out. But Chiang Kai-shek was determined not to do so, and made this quite clear in his diary. A nuclear strike against the mainland "would have an adverse impact on the people." Many who have read this article feel that the mainland authorities' attitude toward Taiwan ought to be the same as Mr. Chiang's. Only then can cross-Strait relations improve.
During the Spring and Autumn Period, warlords fought each other tooth and nail, year after year. Corpses filled the trenches. King Xiang of Wei asked Mencius, "How can we achieve peace?" Mencius replied, "By promoting unity." King Xiang of Wei asked "But who can promote unity?" Mencius replied, "He who is unwilling to kill others can promote unity."
During the ROC's 2008 presidential election one of the primary planks in Ma Ying-jeou's campaign platform was a peace agreement with the mainland. Following his election and inauguration he has continued to promote this proposal. This sort of unwillingness to kill others is the proper basis for cross-Strait interaction. A peace agreement offers people on both sides of the Strait the hope of peace. It offers a long-term framework for win/win cross-Strait interaction.
If the mainland relinquishes the use of force against Taiwan, that will help convince the public on Taiwan that the mainland has put humanism and human rights above political struggle. When the panda ambassadors for peace arrived on Taiwan, President Ma wore an army helmet and spoke of war and peace. The dramatic contrast reflects Taiwan's hopes and fears for cross-Strait relations.
戴鋼盔迎貓熊的心情
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.12.29 03:01 am
兩岸大三通於喜氣洋溢中開航，國共論壇在豐收中落幕，四川一對貓熊以「和平大使」的身分來台灣「團圓」；際此兩岸和解氛圍瀰漫的時刻，馬英九總統戴上鋼盔，校閱國軍部隊實彈演習。
馬總統說：兩岸關係雖正逐漸改善，但不表示我們就不要武力；我們仍要做好建軍備戰的準備，不在恐懼中談判。
馬總統的這番話，想不是潑大家冷水，而是「居安思危」的應有之義。實際上，台灣的確不應鬆懈軍備，因為大陸雖一再聲言以和平方式解決台灣問題，但迄仍未改變「不排除使用武力」的說法。國人對這一點，理應有所認知，加以警惕。
兩岸對峙數十年來，大陸對台政策一步步往和緩的方向演進，從早期的「血洗台灣」、「解放台灣」到「和平統一，一國兩制」，以迄目前「維持現狀」的說詞，以 及對「一中各表」的默認，在在顯示大陸當局已漸走向理性。至於《反分裂國家法》所保留的動武條件，亦只是針對「法理台獨」。但是我們仍然認為，大陸應當明 言不對台灣動武，理由至少有三點：
第一、支持和從事台獨運動的人，畢竟是少數，絕大多數台灣民眾皆希望兩岸和平共處。大陸若因一小部分激進台獨者的行徑而對全體台灣人民恫嚇，這對他們是不公道的，也是與大陸自己所稱「寄希望於台灣人民」的政策相違背的。
第二、現代武器殺傷力特強，大陸如進攻台灣，可能使台灣變成廢墟荒原。這樣的一塊土地，難道是大陸想要的嗎？再說，一九四七年一次意外的「二二八事件」， 死亡人數尚眾說紛紜，而仇恨之結已六十年難解；若大陸立意攻台，結果或將是「屍橫遍野」，那將如何善後？又如何向歷史交代？
第三、大陸向來稱台灣人為同胞手足，是則哪裡有用現代武器殺戮自己「同胞」的道理？「六四事件」過了二十年，大陸官方到現在還不願說明真相，一則可能是顧及社會安定，另外恐怕也是內疚於心吧？這樣的錯誤，一之為甚，豈可在台灣重演？
這三點理由，我們願特別強調第三點。本月廿四日本報《民意論壇》有一篇〈蔣介石三次阻美用核武攻擊大陸〉的評述，根據蔣的日記，美國曾在韓戰、越戰及台灣私下準備進攻大陸時，都曾考慮向中國投擲核子彈。對此，蔣介石明確表示反對，並一一設法勸阻或打消。
蔣介石自從敗於共產黨退守台灣，無時無刻不以「反攻大陸」、「雪恥復國」為念。但台灣自身軍力遠遠不足，既有美國拔「彈」相助，理應喜出望外、因利乘便才 對。但蔣介石堅決不為，並在日記中明言，核襲大陸「對於民心將有不利之影響」。很多閱過此文的讀者都認為，大陸對台灣的態度，應向蔣先生看齊，庶幾兩岸關 係能有進一步發展的空間。
春秋戰國時期，群雄分據，刀兵連年，人民輾轉於溝壑，梁襄王會孟子，兩人有一段對話：王：「天下惡乎定？」孟：「定於一。」王：「孰能一之？」孟：「不嗜殺人者能一之。」
二○○八年台灣大選，馬英九主要政見之一即是與大陸簽署《和平協議》，他當選就職後並繼續推動，這正是將「不嗜殺人」作為兩岸互動的基本準則。《和平協議》倘能呈現兩岸民眾共同的和平期望，自能對兩岸的雙贏提供可大可久的互動架構。
總之，大陸放棄對台用武，才能使台灣人民相信大陸確是把人道、人權置於政治紛爭之上。當貓熊和平大使來台之際，馬總統戴著鋼盔談和戰之道；此種強烈對比反差的場景，反映了台灣對兩岸關係的既期待、又怕受傷害。
United Daily News editorial
A Translation
December 29, 2008
Cross-strait links have been kicked off amidst an air of festivity. The KMT-CPC forum concluded with much to show. A pair of pandas from Sichuan named Tuan Tuan and Yuan Yuan are coming to Taiwan as ambassadors of peace. Yet at a time when the Taiwan Strait is filled with the atmosphere of reconciliation, President Ma Ying-jeou donned an army helmet while reviewing the troops during live-fire exercises.
President Ma said that cross-Strait relations may be improving, but that does not mean we no longer need a military capability. We still need to make military preparations and enhance up our military capabilities. We must not negotiate out of fear.
President Ma is not raining on everyones' parade. He is merely reminding us that we must remain vigilant amidst peace. Indeed, the government must not reduce its military preparedness. Although the mainland has repeatedly stated that it desires a peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem, it has not changed its position on the use of force. The public must be aware of this, and remain cautious.
During decades of cross-Strait confrontation, the mainland's policy toward Taiwan has gradually softened. Early rhetoric calling for a "Taiwan bloodbath" and "the liberation of Taiwan" has changed to "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems," and to "maintaining the status quo," and finally to implicit recognition of "One China, Different Interpretations." This shows that the mainland authorities have adopted a calmer attitude. The "Anti-Secession Law" reserves the right to use of force against "de jure Taiwan independence." Nevertheless the mainland ought to make clear that it will not use force against Taiwan, for at least three reasons.
One. Those who support and participate in the Taiwan independence movement are a minority. The vast majority of the public on Taiwan want peaceful coexistence. It is unfair for the mainland to intimidate everyone on Taiwan in response to the behavior of a small number of radical Taiwan independence advocates. It also runs counter to the mainland's policy of "pinning its hopes on the people of Taiwan."
Two. Modern weapons of mass destruction are extraordinarily destructive. If the mainland attacks Taiwan, it could turn Taiwan into a wilderness. Would the mainland really want such a result? People may disagree about how many died during the 228 Incident in 1947. But bad blood lingers 60 years later. If the mainland is determined to attack Taiwan, the result may be corpses everywhere. How will they deal with the aftermath? How will they answer to history?
Three. The mainland has always referred to the public on Taiwan as compatriots. What is the rationale behind using modern weapons to kill one's fellow countrymen? Two decades after the Tiananmen incident, mainland officials still refuse to face the truth. One reason is they want to maintain social stability. The other is probably inner guilt. How can even one such mistake be allowed to occur on Taiwan?
Of these three reasons, we would like to place special emphasis on the third. On the 24th of this month, the United Daily News' "Public Forum" published an editorial entitled "Three times Chiang Kai-shek prevented the the United States from using nuclear weapons against the Chinese mainland." According to Chiang's diary, the United States was secretly preparing to attack the Chinese mainland during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. It was considering dropping atomic bombs. Chiang Kai-shek clearly expressed his opposition, and sought to dissuade or discourage advocates of such a move.
Ever since the Communist Party defeated Chiang Kai-shek and forced him to retreat to Taiwan, he thought of nothing but "retaking the mainland," and "avenging a national humilation." But the ROC's military power was far from sufficient. Since the United States was willing to help, by using its bombs, in principle Chiang should have been pleased. He should have taken the easy way out. But Chiang Kai-shek was determined not to do so, and made this quite clear in his diary. A nuclear strike against the mainland "would have an adverse impact on the people." Many who have read this article feel that the mainland authorities' attitude toward Taiwan ought to be the same as Mr. Chiang's. Only then can cross-Strait relations improve.
During the Spring and Autumn Period, warlords fought each other tooth and nail, year after year. Corpses filled the trenches. King Xiang of Wei asked Mencius, "How can we achieve peace?" Mencius replied, "By promoting unity." King Xiang of Wei asked "But who can promote unity?" Mencius replied, "He who is unwilling to kill others can promote unity."
During the ROC's 2008 presidential election one of the primary planks in Ma Ying-jeou's campaign platform was a peace agreement with the mainland. Following his election and inauguration he has continued to promote this proposal. This sort of unwillingness to kill others is the proper basis for cross-Strait interaction. A peace agreement offers people on both sides of the Strait the hope of peace. It offers a long-term framework for win/win cross-Strait interaction.
If the mainland relinquishes the use of force against Taiwan, that will help convince the public on Taiwan that the mainland has put humanism and human rights above political struggle. When the panda ambassadors for peace arrived on Taiwan, President Ma wore an army helmet and spoke of war and peace. The dramatic contrast reflects Taiwan's hopes and fears for cross-Strait relations.
戴鋼盔迎貓熊的心情
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.12.29 03:01 am
兩岸大三通於喜氣洋溢中開航，國共論壇在豐收中落幕，四川一對貓熊以「和平大使」的身分來台灣「團圓」；際此兩岸和解氛圍瀰漫的時刻，馬英九總統戴上鋼盔，校閱國軍部隊實彈演習。
馬總統說：兩岸關係雖正逐漸改善，但不表示我們就不要武力；我們仍要做好建軍備戰的準備，不在恐懼中談判。
馬總統的這番話，想不是潑大家冷水，而是「居安思危」的應有之義。實際上，台灣的確不應鬆懈軍備，因為大陸雖一再聲言以和平方式解決台灣問題，但迄仍未改變「不排除使用武力」的說法。國人對這一點，理應有所認知，加以警惕。
兩岸對峙數十年來，大陸對台政策一步步往和緩的方向演進，從早期的「血洗台灣」、「解放台灣」到「和平統一，一國兩制」，以迄目前「維持現狀」的說詞，以 及對「一中各表」的默認，在在顯示大陸當局已漸走向理性。至於《反分裂國家法》所保留的動武條件，亦只是針對「法理台獨」。但是我們仍然認為，大陸應當明 言不對台灣動武，理由至少有三點：
第一、支持和從事台獨運動的人，畢竟是少數，絕大多數台灣民眾皆希望兩岸和平共處。大陸若因一小部分激進台獨者的行徑而對全體台灣人民恫嚇，這對他們是不公道的，也是與大陸自己所稱「寄希望於台灣人民」的政策相違背的。
第二、現代武器殺傷力特強，大陸如進攻台灣，可能使台灣變成廢墟荒原。這樣的一塊土地，難道是大陸想要的嗎？再說，一九四七年一次意外的「二二八事件」， 死亡人數尚眾說紛紜，而仇恨之結已六十年難解；若大陸立意攻台，結果或將是「屍橫遍野」，那將如何善後？又如何向歷史交代？
第三、大陸向來稱台灣人為同胞手足，是則哪裡有用現代武器殺戮自己「同胞」的道理？「六四事件」過了二十年，大陸官方到現在還不願說明真相，一則可能是顧及社會安定，另外恐怕也是內疚於心吧？這樣的錯誤，一之為甚，豈可在台灣重演？
這三點理由，我們願特別強調第三點。本月廿四日本報《民意論壇》有一篇〈蔣介石三次阻美用核武攻擊大陸〉的評述，根據蔣的日記，美國曾在韓戰、越戰及台灣私下準備進攻大陸時，都曾考慮向中國投擲核子彈。對此，蔣介石明確表示反對，並一一設法勸阻或打消。
蔣介石自從敗於共產黨退守台灣，無時無刻不以「反攻大陸」、「雪恥復國」為念。但台灣自身軍力遠遠不足，既有美國拔「彈」相助，理應喜出望外、因利乘便才 對。但蔣介石堅決不為，並在日記中明言，核襲大陸「對於民心將有不利之影響」。很多閱過此文的讀者都認為，大陸對台灣的態度，應向蔣先生看齊，庶幾兩岸關 係能有進一步發展的空間。
春秋戰國時期，群雄分據，刀兵連年，人民輾轉於溝壑，梁襄王會孟子，兩人有一段對話：王：「天下惡乎定？」孟：「定於一。」王：「孰能一之？」孟：「不嗜殺人者能一之。」
二○○八年台灣大選，馬英九主要政見之一即是與大陸簽署《和平協議》，他當選就職後並繼續推動，這正是將「不嗜殺人」作為兩岸互動的基本準則。《和平協議》倘能呈現兩岸民眾共同的和平期望，自能對兩岸的雙贏提供可大可久的互動架構。
總之，大陸放棄對台用武，才能使台灣人民相信大陸確是把人道、人權置於政治紛爭之上。當貓熊和平大使來台之際，馬總統戴著鋼盔談和戰之道；此種強烈對比反差的場景，反映了台灣對兩岸關係的既期待、又怕受傷害。
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