The Party Chairmanship: Not Merely to Unify the Party and Administration
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 11, 2009
After a month or two of advance planning, President Ma Ying-jeou has basically decided to assume the party chairmanship. President Ma will personally make the announcement. The matter has not been finalized. Nevertheless we would like to make a few predictions about what may happen to the the party and the government. We would also like offer some timely reminders and warnings.
We favor President Ma assuming the ruling party chairmanship for two reasons. One. The Legislative Yuan has abused its right to approve the vice presidential nominee for the Control Yuan and other appointed offices. They rejected several well-qualified nominees. Two. The KMT is apparently doing nothing as poorly qualified candidates are being nominated for the year end county magistrates and city mayors elections, based solely on the coat tail effect. These two developments have one thing in common. The public sentiment is abundantly clear. Yet the party behaves like an automaton utterly out of touch with public opinion. Under the circumstances, the president, who is responsible to over seven million voters, must come forward. He must assume total responsibility. He must take concrete action. He must assume the ruling party chairmanship.
We must however remind the president that he is assuming the party chairmanship only to prevent the party from engaging in underhanded practices. He must not create a party/state complex. Recent media reports claim that once President Ma takes over as party chairman, he will appoint Vincent Siew, Liu Chao-hsuan, and Wang Jing-pyng as Vice-Chairmen. If so, then one should indeed be concerned about the loss of checks and balances and the risk of authoritarian leadership. Such an arrangement should inspire second thoughts.
The key to a viable democracy, whether a parliamentary system or a presidential system, is checks and balances. The public detests special interests using the party to practice selfish patronage. But the public still hopes government institutions will provide oversight and act as gatekeeper. The Legislative Yuan must not defy public opinion and reject highly qualified nominees. Nor should it become the ruling party's rubber stamp. Suppose important presidential appointments are once again made as they were during the martial law era, during sessions of the KMT Central Standing Committee? Suppose the President of the Legislative Yuan expresses support in his capacity as Vice Chairman? Suppose the Convener of the Legislative caucus expresses support in his capacity as a Member of the Standing Committee? Any appointments will breeze through. Legislative consent will be meaningless. The system will be 100% authoritarian. By the same token, suppose the Vice-President's Financial Advisory Group objects? Suppose the Executive Yuan drafts a resolution, only to have the Vice Chairman report to the Central Standing Committee and issue a memorandum to KMT public functionaries? That will undermine the system and constitute a return to authoritarianism.
The value of democracy lies in dialogue, negotiations, and compromise. Dialogue is not confined to various groups within the same party, such as the executive and legislative branches. Dialogue between the ruling and opposition parties is also an important part of the interaction. The KMT Central Standing Committee is a very traditional entity, preoccupied with status, ritual, and grandeur. It is not a suitable venue for intraparty dialogue. If one incorporates officials of the executive branch, the legislative branch, the Vice President and other government heads into the Central Standing Committee, then the party will control the state. Everything will be decided by the Central Standing Committee. If this happens, the power of the legislature will shrink. This is something opposition parties will find intolerable. Intense social conflict will be inevitable. All disputes will be referred to the KMT Chairman. He will be no room to maneuver. We can't believe this is what President Ma wants.
The KMT is no stranger to presidents serving as party chairmen. For decades, under Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Teng-hui, this was the rule. If President Ma considers only past history, and ignores the exigencies of the moment, then he is blinding himself to reality. Under the Two Chiangs and Lee Teng-hui, the Republic of China was authoritarian. Opposition forces posed no real threat. The heads of the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan were Members of the Central Standing Committee. Even the head of the Judicial Yuan and Control Yuan, which are supposed to be neutral, often attended Central Standing Committee meetings. But times have changed. A president assuming the party chairmanship no longer means what it did before. Today's ruling party ought to be nothing more than a glorified campaign committee. It should curb Legislators' arrogance. It should ensure cooperation from local party leaders. But it must not prevent party functionaries from providing checks and balances against the party. The Republic of China's constitutional system is imperfect. Impose upon it an all powerful Central Standing Committee, and the consequences will be disastrous.
President Ma's willingness to assume responsibility for reform, and to assume the party chairmanship, is a good thing. But the integration of the ruling party and the ruling administration must be limited. It must not expand the power of a party/state complex. The safest approach is to have the party chairman control the campaign machinery. It is not necessary to make one's party functionaries Vice-Chairmen. The ruling party can encourage party functionaries to check and balance the party. It should prohibit the formation of factions seeking to expand their power. The Party Chairman's only weapon is his right to nominate candidates for office. This should not intrude upon the detailed process of checks and balances. Ensuring checks and balances may be difficult. But the machinery of democracy and the rule of law, must not be monopolized by the executive.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.11
社論－兼黨主席不只是為了黨政一統
本報訊
經過了一兩個月的布局，馬英九總統兼任黨主席一事應該大致底定，並由馬總統親自對外宣布。此事雖已行將定案，我們仍要對於爾後黨政局勢的發展做些預測，並做若干的提醒與警示。
我們當初支持馬總統兼任執政黨主席，主要是基於兩方面的觀察。其一，是立法院對監察院副院長等人事同意權操作醜陋，使一些社會形象不差的被提名人中箭落馬。其二是年底若干縣市長提名作業，國民黨黨部似乎坐觀其變，任令民意形象極差、或裙帶關係曖昧的人霸王硬上弓。這兩件事都有一共通點：民意偏好極為清楚，但黨部卻有如自走炮，完全與民意脫節。面對這種情況，身上承擔七百多萬選票民意壓力的總統，就必須要挺身而出、概括承受，而具體的做法，就是由總統兼任黨主席。
然而，我們也要特別提醒，總統兼任黨主席其實是為矯治黨部掣肘之弊，而非為了一統黨政運作。近日媒體報導，馬總統在接任黨主席之後，將安排蕭萬長、劉兆玄、王金平等人接任副主席。果真如此，那就確有虛化制衡、威權領導的疑慮，這樣的安排也就值得三思。
在民主國家，不論是內閣制或總統制，最核心的關鍵就是「制衡」二字。總統提名的人事案，人民雖然討厭有心人結黨營私地予以蓄意杯葛，但絕對還是希望民意機關能夠嚴格審查、確實把關。立法院不能悖離民意將好人封殺，但更不宜變成橡皮圖章，淪為政黨背書的立法局。如果將來重要人事案都如戒嚴時代一樣，改在國民黨中常會拍板定案，而立法院院長以副主席名義支持、立院黨團召集人以中常委身分表態，然後就行禮如儀照案通過，那麼同意權就形同虛設，是百分之百的威權體制。同樣的，如果副總統財經顧問小組的意見或行政院提案以後都由副主席提報中常會，再發文「從政同志」執行，那就是紊亂體制、重返威權的象徵。
換個角度來看，民主制度的可貴就在於它的對話、折衝與妥協。這些對話折衝不只存在同一政黨各個團體（如行政與立法部門）之間，更是朝野政黨互動的重要一環。國民黨中常會是個極為傳統的會議，階級禮儀氣氛濃厚，法相莊嚴，卻絕不是一個適合黨內對話的場所。如果將行政、立法、副元首等各方霸主都涵納於黨務會議之下，那就很難不重蹈當年以黨領政的老路，一切的一切都以中常會定奪。果如此，當立法權在黨的體制下限縮了運作空間，則在野黨絕對會難以忍受，激烈的社會衝突恐怕就在所難免，而且所有紛爭的矛頭都將指向國民黨主席，再無迴旋空間。我們相信，這絕對不是馬總統所樂見的局面。
國民黨對於總統兼黨主席一事並不陌生；數十年來蔣中正、蔣經國、李登輝莫不如此。但馬總統如果只參看先前歷史卻忽略當前局勢，恐怕會產生相當的盲點。不論是兩位蔣總統或李登輝總統時代，台灣都還時處威權，而當時的在野勢力根本不成氣候。在那樣的時代背景下，不但行政立法院長是中常委，甚至連理當中立的司法、監察首長也經常赫然出席中常會。但是時代不同了，總統兼黨主席的布局也該有所不同。現在的執政黨，只適合以選舉機器的最終掌握權，去抑制立法委員的囂張、遙控地方首長的配合度，而不能把各路從政同志盡納麾下，壓縮制衡的空間。台灣的憲政體制原已不盡完善，若再加上一個太上中常會，其後果可能不堪設想。
總之，馬總統願意承擔改革責任、兼任黨主席，那是好事。但政與黨的結合應該僅止於減少掣肘，而不宜擴大為黨政一統。最安全的做法，則是黨主席掌握選舉機器，但不必將各路從政同志納為副主席。執政黨可以鼓勵各部門的從政同志扮演制衡角色，僅僅禁止結派營私式的擁權自重。黨主席唯一的制裁工具，只是選舉提名，卻不涉入制衡機構間的操作細節。我們要提醒的是：效率與制衡之間的分寸拿捏或許不易，但是民主法制的機制，是絕不能被行政效率所凌越的。
Thursday, June 11, 2009
Tuesday, June 9, 2009
Is President Ma Forbidden to Affirm the Mainland's Progress?
Is President Ma Forbidden to Affirm the Mainland's Progress?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9, 2009
President Ma Ying-jeou's reflections on the twentieth anniversary of the Tiananmen incident have inspired widely divergent reactions. The real issue however is whether it is permissible to affirm Beijing's political and economic progress?
The Democratic Progressive Party says it isn't. It calls Ma's remarks "capitulation." Former participants in the June 4th pro-democracy movement also expressed disappointment. They say Ma failed to uphold the requisite high standards. But others agree with Ma. Annette Lu said "[Mainland] China has indeed made progress over the past two decades. I hope everyone will refrain from sniping (at President Ma)."
Has Beijing improved over the past two decades? June 4th pro-democracy groups say that Beijing uses economic development to cover up political despotism. In other words, they are indirectly conceding that there has been successful economic development. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said (China) has made significant economic progress, and become a world leader. Such remarks can be regarded as representative of world opinion. As we can see, no one disputes that the Mainland China has made progress over the past two decades. The disagreement is over how to interpret the progress that has been made.
Beijing has made progress, but still has room for improvement. This is the global consensus. People disagree due to their differing backgrounds, either as individuals or as members of social movements. President Ma Ying-jeou's evaluations are not going to be the same as Hillary Clinton's, Tsai Ing-wen's, or Wang Dan's. They are not even going to be the same as his own evaluations prior to becoming president. A record 150,000 people gathered in Victoria Park in Hong Kong to commemorate June 4th. Meanwhile on Taiwan, the primary "expression of solidarity" was the Democratic Progressive Party denouncing Ma Ying-jeou for a "moral retreat" and denouncing his June 4th speech as a "shameful document." The public in Hong Kong felt a moral duty to speak out on behalf of 1.3 billion compatriots. The DPP, by contrast, has never had any desire to communicate with the 1.3 billion people on the Mainland. Its sole motive for expressing solidarity with June 4th was to harass Ma Ying-jeou.
As previously noted, Beijing has made progress, but has room for improvement. This is the global consensus. But the real question is whether President Ma is permitted to say so.
Objectively speaking, Ma Ying-jeou numbers among those on Taiwan who actually feel strongly about the June 4th Tiananmen Incident. But in his speech on June 4th, he was obligated to speak as the President of the Republic of China. He elevated the cross-Strait dialogue to a higher level. He spoke of the incident in terms of universal values such as "freedom", "democracy," "the rule of law" and "human rights." All these terms appear in President Ma's reflections on June 4th. He expressed hope that the two sides could move away from an arms race and diplomatic struggle, and instead compete to see who could best enhance the rule of law and human rights. He hoped the Chinese people as a whole could create a free and democratic future. June 4th pro-democracy groups denounced Ma's remarks as taking the easy way out. They said Ma Ying-jeou should address the issue of June 4th. He should not use the 2-28 Incident to talk about June 4th.
President Ma mentioned his hopes for Beijing. At the same time he offered a positive evaluation of developments on the Chinese Mainland. He said the success of economic reforms had greatly improved people's lives. He said Beijing now paid more attention to human rights than in the past. He said Beijing displayed a new level of openness and self-confidence compared to the past. But his remarks were denounced as "pro-[Mainland] China" and "capitulation."
Is the Chinese Mainland developing democracy and the rule of law? Can the two sides maintain peace across the Taiwan Strait? These are important questions. But the most important question of all, is whether the two sides can establish common values and pursue a common goal. If one day the Chinese Mainland achieves freedom and democracy, how will it rehabilitate the victims of June 4th? If freedom and democracy do not improve on Mainland China, can the victims of June 4th ever be vindicated?
Mainland China has progressed, but still has room for improvement. One should criticize its shortcomings, but affirm its improvements. This is only fair. Internally, Beijing suffers from corruption. But one must affirm three decades of reform and liberalization. Externally, Beijing's cross-Strait strategy leaves one apprehensive. But one must affirm that we are on the road to peace and to a win/win scenario. Affirming the progress Beijing has made and condemning its remaining shortcomings are equally important. They will help us eliminate the bad and increase the good. Would critics really have Ma Ying-jeou repudiate Mainland China's reforms, liberalization, and adoption of a win/win cross-Strait policy?
Don't the two sides wish to move away from the irreconcilable blood feud? Don't they wish to move toward democracy, the rule of law, peace, and a win/win scenario? If they do, then leaders on both sides must leave behind the confrontational era of Mao Zedong vs. Chiang Kai-shek, Jiang Zemin vs. Lee Teng-hui, Hu Jintao vs. Chen Shui-bian. They must encourage each other to improve. They must promote the public welfare and implement democratic rule. On this basis, President Ma's reflections on June 4th were befitting his role as President.
Is it permissible to affirm the improvements Mainland China has made over the past two decades? The answer is yes. One cannot say that because the mainland has improved so much, it has no more room for improvement. Conversely, one cannot say that because the mainland still has room for improvement, it has not improved at all.
馬總統能不能肯定中國的進步？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.10 02:58 am
馬英九總統的六四事件二十周年感言，引發了見仁見智的議論，那就是：對於北京政權在政治及經濟上的改善與進步，可不可以給予肯定？
民進黨反對，指馬的談話是「投降主義」；六四民運團體亦表失望，認為沒有「高度」。但也有認同者，呂秀蓮就說：「大陸近二十多年來的確有進步，希望大家不要在字裡行間挑（馬總統的）毛病。」
二十年來，中共政權是不是有進步？連六四民運團體都說，「以經濟發展掩飾政治專制」，可見亦承認「經濟發展」的成就；而美國國務卿希拉蕊也說，「（中國）在經濟上取得重大進展，並崛起為世界領袖」，可視為世界輿論的代表。可見，各方對中國大陸二十年來的進步與改善並無太大異議，歧見其實是在如何解讀這些進步與改善。
有進步，但仍大有改革空間；這應是對北京政權二十年來表現的世界輿論公約數。至於出現見仁見智，則是由於個體或社群的背景差異所致：例如：馬英九總統的評論不會與希拉蕊、王丹或蔡英文相同，也不會與當總統以前的馬英九相同。又如：香港有破紀錄的十五萬人聚集維多利亞公園紀念六四，但台灣最主要的「聲援活動」卻是民進黨指馬英九「道德退卻」，又謂其「六四感言」為「醜陋文件」；因為，香港人自認必須代替十三億「同胞」發聲，但民進黨從來未視十三億人為溝通對象，聲援六四的主要目的只是在「嗆馬」。
前文說，有進步，亦有改革空間，這是對中國二十年來表現的世界輿論公約數。問題是：馬總統可不可以也這樣說？
客觀而論，在台灣能為六四動了強烈的真感情者，馬英九絕對算得上一個。但他此次在六四感言中，站在中華民國總統的高度，將兩岸對話從六四事件提升放大到「自由」、「民主」、「法治」、「人權」等「普世價值」（這些語彙均見馬總統六四感言），而希望兩岸能從「軍備競賽」、「外交惡鬥」，轉為「法治人權的競相提升」，「為中華民族子孫開創一個自由、民主的未來」。這些談話被六四民運團體認為避重就輕；並認為馬英九應直指六四，不必藉二二八來喻六四。
馬總統在提出對北京政權的期許之同時，亦對中國大陸二十年來的發展有正面評價；指出「大陸經濟改革成功，人民生活大幅改善」、「大陸當局比過去更為注意人權議題」，「展現與過去完全不同的開放與自信」。這些談話，則被指為「肯定中國」、「投降主義」。
然而，必須正視的是：無論就中國大陸民主法治的發展而言，或兩岸和平交流的維護而言，最重要的關鍵皆在應當建立一個共同追求的價值目標。因為，倘若有一天中國大陸實現了自由民主，六四豈會不平反？而倘若中國大陸的自由民主不能點點滴滴地進步改善，六四又豈有平反的一天？
因而，面對這個「雖有進步，仍應大改革」的中國；批評其缺失，與肯定其進步，其實皆是應有之義。對內而言，中共政權的缺失及腐敗甚多，但不能不肯定其三十年改革開放的進取表現；對外而言，北京在兩岸策略上仍令人多所疑懼，但也不能不肯定漸漸走向和平雙贏之路。肯定中共政權的進步處，與批評譴責其敗壞處，其實同等重要，因為皆有助於在革惡向善中逐漸趨向正確的目標。否則，難道要馬英九否定大陸改革開放與兩岸共生雙贏？
兩岸若不想再回到誓不兩立的時代，而欲迎向一個民主、法治、和平、雙贏的未來；那麼，雙方領導人理應走出過去毛蔣、江李、胡陳相互叫囂詈罵的時代，而改為相互規過勸善以共同促進民生、民主的良性互動。準此以言，馬總統的六四感言，是符合他的角色與高度的。
那麼，究竟可不可以肯定中國二十年來的進步與改善？持平的答案是：不能因大陸「的確有進步」，而否認仍大有改革空間；亦不必因仍大有改革空間，而否定「的確有進步」。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9, 2009
President Ma Ying-jeou's reflections on the twentieth anniversary of the Tiananmen incident have inspired widely divergent reactions. The real issue however is whether it is permissible to affirm Beijing's political and economic progress?
The Democratic Progressive Party says it isn't. It calls Ma's remarks "capitulation." Former participants in the June 4th pro-democracy movement also expressed disappointment. They say Ma failed to uphold the requisite high standards. But others agree with Ma. Annette Lu said "[Mainland] China has indeed made progress over the past two decades. I hope everyone will refrain from sniping (at President Ma)."
Has Beijing improved over the past two decades? June 4th pro-democracy groups say that Beijing uses economic development to cover up political despotism. In other words, they are indirectly conceding that there has been successful economic development. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said (China) has made significant economic progress, and become a world leader. Such remarks can be regarded as representative of world opinion. As we can see, no one disputes that the Mainland China has made progress over the past two decades. The disagreement is over how to interpret the progress that has been made.
Beijing has made progress, but still has room for improvement. This is the global consensus. People disagree due to their differing backgrounds, either as individuals or as members of social movements. President Ma Ying-jeou's evaluations are not going to be the same as Hillary Clinton's, Tsai Ing-wen's, or Wang Dan's. They are not even going to be the same as his own evaluations prior to becoming president. A record 150,000 people gathered in Victoria Park in Hong Kong to commemorate June 4th. Meanwhile on Taiwan, the primary "expression of solidarity" was the Democratic Progressive Party denouncing Ma Ying-jeou for a "moral retreat" and denouncing his June 4th speech as a "shameful document." The public in Hong Kong felt a moral duty to speak out on behalf of 1.3 billion compatriots. The DPP, by contrast, has never had any desire to communicate with the 1.3 billion people on the Mainland. Its sole motive for expressing solidarity with June 4th was to harass Ma Ying-jeou.
As previously noted, Beijing has made progress, but has room for improvement. This is the global consensus. But the real question is whether President Ma is permitted to say so.
Objectively speaking, Ma Ying-jeou numbers among those on Taiwan who actually feel strongly about the June 4th Tiananmen Incident. But in his speech on June 4th, he was obligated to speak as the President of the Republic of China. He elevated the cross-Strait dialogue to a higher level. He spoke of the incident in terms of universal values such as "freedom", "democracy," "the rule of law" and "human rights." All these terms appear in President Ma's reflections on June 4th. He expressed hope that the two sides could move away from an arms race and diplomatic struggle, and instead compete to see who could best enhance the rule of law and human rights. He hoped the Chinese people as a whole could create a free and democratic future. June 4th pro-democracy groups denounced Ma's remarks as taking the easy way out. They said Ma Ying-jeou should address the issue of June 4th. He should not use the 2-28 Incident to talk about June 4th.
President Ma mentioned his hopes for Beijing. At the same time he offered a positive evaluation of developments on the Chinese Mainland. He said the success of economic reforms had greatly improved people's lives. He said Beijing now paid more attention to human rights than in the past. He said Beijing displayed a new level of openness and self-confidence compared to the past. But his remarks were denounced as "pro-[Mainland] China" and "capitulation."
Is the Chinese Mainland developing democracy and the rule of law? Can the two sides maintain peace across the Taiwan Strait? These are important questions. But the most important question of all, is whether the two sides can establish common values and pursue a common goal. If one day the Chinese Mainland achieves freedom and democracy, how will it rehabilitate the victims of June 4th? If freedom and democracy do not improve on Mainland China, can the victims of June 4th ever be vindicated?
Mainland China has progressed, but still has room for improvement. One should criticize its shortcomings, but affirm its improvements. This is only fair. Internally, Beijing suffers from corruption. But one must affirm three decades of reform and liberalization. Externally, Beijing's cross-Strait strategy leaves one apprehensive. But one must affirm that we are on the road to peace and to a win/win scenario. Affirming the progress Beijing has made and condemning its remaining shortcomings are equally important. They will help us eliminate the bad and increase the good. Would critics really have Ma Ying-jeou repudiate Mainland China's reforms, liberalization, and adoption of a win/win cross-Strait policy?
Don't the two sides wish to move away from the irreconcilable blood feud? Don't they wish to move toward democracy, the rule of law, peace, and a win/win scenario? If they do, then leaders on both sides must leave behind the confrontational era of Mao Zedong vs. Chiang Kai-shek, Jiang Zemin vs. Lee Teng-hui, Hu Jintao vs. Chen Shui-bian. They must encourage each other to improve. They must promote the public welfare and implement democratic rule. On this basis, President Ma's reflections on June 4th were befitting his role as President.
Is it permissible to affirm the improvements Mainland China has made over the past two decades? The answer is yes. One cannot say that because the mainland has improved so much, it has no more room for improvement. Conversely, one cannot say that because the mainland still has room for improvement, it has not improved at all.
馬總統能不能肯定中國的進步？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.10 02:58 am
馬英九總統的六四事件二十周年感言，引發了見仁見智的議論，那就是：對於北京政權在政治及經濟上的改善與進步，可不可以給予肯定？
民進黨反對，指馬的談話是「投降主義」；六四民運團體亦表失望，認為沒有「高度」。但也有認同者，呂秀蓮就說：「大陸近二十多年來的確有進步，希望大家不要在字裡行間挑（馬總統的）毛病。」
二十年來，中共政權是不是有進步？連六四民運團體都說，「以經濟發展掩飾政治專制」，可見亦承認「經濟發展」的成就；而美國國務卿希拉蕊也說，「（中國）在經濟上取得重大進展，並崛起為世界領袖」，可視為世界輿論的代表。可見，各方對中國大陸二十年來的進步與改善並無太大異議，歧見其實是在如何解讀這些進步與改善。
有進步，但仍大有改革空間；這應是對北京政權二十年來表現的世界輿論公約數。至於出現見仁見智，則是由於個體或社群的背景差異所致：例如：馬英九總統的評論不會與希拉蕊、王丹或蔡英文相同，也不會與當總統以前的馬英九相同。又如：香港有破紀錄的十五萬人聚集維多利亞公園紀念六四，但台灣最主要的「聲援活動」卻是民進黨指馬英九「道德退卻」，又謂其「六四感言」為「醜陋文件」；因為，香港人自認必須代替十三億「同胞」發聲，但民進黨從來未視十三億人為溝通對象，聲援六四的主要目的只是在「嗆馬」。
前文說，有進步，亦有改革空間，這是對中國二十年來表現的世界輿論公約數。問題是：馬總統可不可以也這樣說？
客觀而論，在台灣能為六四動了強烈的真感情者，馬英九絕對算得上一個。但他此次在六四感言中，站在中華民國總統的高度，將兩岸對話從六四事件提升放大到「自由」、「民主」、「法治」、「人權」等「普世價值」（這些語彙均見馬總統六四感言），而希望兩岸能從「軍備競賽」、「外交惡鬥」，轉為「法治人權的競相提升」，「為中華民族子孫開創一個自由、民主的未來」。這些談話被六四民運團體認為避重就輕；並認為馬英九應直指六四，不必藉二二八來喻六四。
馬總統在提出對北京政權的期許之同時，亦對中國大陸二十年來的發展有正面評價；指出「大陸經濟改革成功，人民生活大幅改善」、「大陸當局比過去更為注意人權議題」，「展現與過去完全不同的開放與自信」。這些談話，則被指為「肯定中國」、「投降主義」。
然而，必須正視的是：無論就中國大陸民主法治的發展而言，或兩岸和平交流的維護而言，最重要的關鍵皆在應當建立一個共同追求的價值目標。因為，倘若有一天中國大陸實現了自由民主，六四豈會不平反？而倘若中國大陸的自由民主不能點點滴滴地進步改善，六四又豈有平反的一天？
因而，面對這個「雖有進步，仍應大改革」的中國；批評其缺失，與肯定其進步，其實皆是應有之義。對內而言，中共政權的缺失及腐敗甚多，但不能不肯定其三十年改革開放的進取表現；對外而言，北京在兩岸策略上仍令人多所疑懼，但也不能不肯定漸漸走向和平雙贏之路。肯定中共政權的進步處，與批評譴責其敗壞處，其實同等重要，因為皆有助於在革惡向善中逐漸趨向正確的目標。否則，難道要馬英九否定大陸改革開放與兩岸共生雙贏？
兩岸若不想再回到誓不兩立的時代，而欲迎向一個民主、法治、和平、雙贏的未來；那麼，雙方領導人理應走出過去毛蔣、江李、胡陳相互叫囂詈罵的時代，而改為相互規過勸善以共同促進民生、民主的良性互動。準此以言，馬總統的六四感言，是符合他的角色與高度的。
那麼，究竟可不可以肯定中國二十年來的進步與改善？持平的答案是：不能因大陸「的確有進步」，而否認仍大有改革空間；亦不必因仍大有改革空間，而否定「的確有進步」。
DPP Infighting: Opening Pandora's Box behind Closed Doors
DPP Infighting: Opening Pandora's Box behind Closed Doors
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9, 2009
Chen Chu visited the Mainland. Taiwan independence elements bit their tongues. The reason was Taiwan independence elements were weak and in the minority. had they forced an open break, they would merely have exposed their own weaknesses and shortcomings. At this critical moment, they don't even have the courage to bluster. Their silence is deafening.
Chen Chu visited the Mainland. For Democratic Progressive Party pragmatists and reformists, this was tantamount to a gauntlet thrown down to the fundamentalists. Taiwan independence elements are aware the ship is changing course. But they feign ignorance and say nothing. The current struggle between pragmatist/reformists and fundamentalists is different from those in the past. One. Past struggles between the party and Lin Yi-hsiung, Hsu Hsin-liang, or Shih Ming-teh were confined to issues of ideology or style. Tsai Ing-wen on the other hand, allowed Chen Chu to set foot in Beijing and Shanghai. This involved concrete action. Two. During past struggles, Hsu Hsin-liang, Lin Yi-hsiung, and Shih Ming-teh were expelled from the Democratic Progressive Party or withdrew on their own. This time Tsai Ing-wen will not readily admit defeat or withdraw from the party. Of course, Taiwan independence elements will not withdraw from the Democratic Progressive Party either. Therefore the struggle is real. They have locked themselves behind closed doors. They now sit in the dark, waiting to see who can outlast the other.
Therefore viewed from the outside, the Democratic Progressive Party and mainstream society on Taiwan appear to have created a window of opportunity for communication with Beijing. However viewed from the inside, the DPP appears to have opened up a Pandora's Box behind closed doors.
Following its defeat in 2008, the Democratic Progressive Party realized it must rid itself of Ah-Bian influences and Taiwan independence ideology. This is probably Tsai Ing-wen's hope. It is also the only way out for the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen initially hoped to distance the DPP from Ah-Bian and Taiwan independence. She hoped to purge the party of Ah-Bian influences and Taiwan independence ideology. This would have strengthened the party's political appeal. But in a moment of weakness she chose to lie down in the same bed with Ah-Bian and Taiwan independence elements. In the end she was unable to rid the party of either. Chen Chu has now visited the Mainland. Her visit can be interpreted as a reversal in Tsai Ing-wen's strategy. Instead of first ridding the DPP of Ah-Bian influences, then Taiwan independence ideology, she is attempting to first rid the DPP of Taiwan independence ideology, then Ah-Bian influences.
The DPP leadership appears to have accepted Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland and therefore Tsai Ing-wen's major course change. Tsai Ing-wen has not been ostracized the way Hsu Hsin-liang and Shih Ming-teh were in the past. For Taiwan independence elements and Chen Shui-bian however, this amounts to a political death knell. "China eats s**t!" has now become "Chen Chu Breaks Ice!" From henceforth the "Chen Chu Standard" will replace the "Wang Ting-yu Standard." Ah-Bian can no longer protect Taiwan independence elements. Taiwan independence elements can no longer protect Ah-Bian. Are Taiwan independence elements and Chen Shui-bian going to passively await their fates?
Emotionally and logically it is time for the DPP to distance itself from Taiwan independence elements and Ah-Bian, and to undergo a schism. But Taiwan independence elements cannot expel Tsai Ing-wen, and Tsai Ing-wen cannot expel Taiwan independence elements. On the upside, this means the Democratic Progressive Party remains "unified." This is Chen Shui-bian's hope. On the downside, this means the party will suffer internal injuries from serious infighting. It will remain on the verge of an internal schism.
Actually Taiwan independence elements have played a strategic role in cross-Strait relations. They have efficiently and effectively played the role of "bad cop." This has been fully confirmed in recent years. The question is: does the DPP intend to continue playing the role of a Taiwan independence party? One. The DPP commands 40 percent of the vote, virtually 40 percent of the population. It has played the Taiwan independence "bad cop" that tears society apart and undermines cross-Strait relations. Is such a role becoming and consistent with the larger interests of the public on Taiwan? Two. The DPP is the only effective "native" political party to rule in four hundred years. If it is hijacked by Taiwan independence elements, and ends up on the wrong side of history, won't this be a tragic loss for Taiwan and for democracy?
Tsai Ing-wen is now calling for a showdown with Taiwan independence elements. On May 17 Taiwan independence elements staged their own demonstration in Kaohsiung. This was a warning to Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen ended the protest march peacefully on May 17. She paved the way for Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland. This was a clear message to Taiwan independence elements. Tsai Ing-wen's goal of course was to rid the DPP of Taiwan independence ideology and Ah-Bian influences. The goal of Taiwan independence elements conversely, was to bring down the party leadership and expel Tsai Ing-wen. Pandora's Box has been opened. The doors and windows have been closed. Let us now see who can hold their breath the longest. Let us now see whom Lady Luck favors. The Democratic Progressive Party's debate over its "Party Officials Visit to [Mainland] China" stalled last week. The two sides reached an impasse.
From Taiwan's strategic framework, this remains a dilemma. Some people are unwilling to see Taiwan independence ideology drag the Democratic Progressive Party to its death. But others are unwilling to see Taiwan independence vanish as a strategic factor. Taiwan's problems truly are complex.
民進黨內鬥：打開魔盒，自閉門窗
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.09 03:49 am
陳菊登陸，獨派卻是悶不吭聲；原因是獨派本居少數及弱勢，若是撕破臉，只會自暴其弱、自暴其短，因而在這個關鍵時刻，連色厲內荏都做不到，遂是一片噤聲不語。
陳菊登陸，形同民進黨務實改革派已與基本教義派公然攤牌；獨派豈會不知大船正在轉彎，卻佯裝渾然未覺，一語不發。此次務實改革派與基本教義派的鬥爭，不同以往：一、過去許信良及施明德或林義雄與黨的鬥爭，皆尚只是在理念或風格的層次；但蔡英文卻讓陳菊一腳踏進北京、上海，已是具體行動。二、過去幾場鬥爭，皆以許信良、施明德或林義雄被逐出或自動退出民進黨收場，但此次蔡英文不會輕言認輸退場，當然獨派也不會與民進黨切割退出。所以，這才是一場真正的「內鬥」；關起門來無人退場，暗中蓄勢互比氣長。
因而，陳菊登陸，從外觀看，似乎打開了民進黨與台灣主流社會及與對岸的機會之窗；但從民進黨內部來看，卻像是在屋裡打開了潘朵拉魔盒，再將門窗緊閉。
民進黨經二○○八年的慘敗，必須「去扁化獨」；這應是蔡英文的自我期許，也是民進黨的唯一生路。蔡英文原本若能將扁與獨區隔，「先去扁再化獨」，理路自較流利；但她卻因一念之誤而使扁獨合流，終於面對扁不能去、獨亦不能化的困局。如今陳菊登陸，可以解讀為，蔡英文正在嘗試翻轉她的策略軸線，亦即由「先去扁再化獨」，改成「先化獨再去扁」。
從目前的效應來看，民進黨權力核心對陳菊登陸的大船轉彎汽笛聲，似乎相當接受；因此，蔡英文並未如當初許信良、施明德那般陷於孤立之中。但是，對獨派及陳水扁來說，這汽笛聲卻不啻是政治喪鐘；「中國吃屎」變成「陳菊破冰」，今後「王定宇基準」行將逐漸轉移至「陳菊基準」；扁將保不住獨，獨也保不住扁，難道獨派及阿扁會坐以待斃？
衡情論理，這是民進黨切割分裂的時機。但是，獨派驅逐不了蔡英文，蔡英文也趕不走獨派。從正面看，民進黨仍然「團結」（這也是陳水扁的期望）；但從負面看，這卻是必將「內傷」深重的「內鬥」，繼續「分而不裂」。
其實，台獨是台灣在兩岸角力中應有的戰略元素；其所扮演的「黑白臉」機能與效益，近年已充分展現。問題是：民進黨要不要繼續扮演台獨黨的角色？一、以百分之四十的得票實力，形同挾持百分之四十的人口，去扮演撕裂社會，及惡化兩岸關係的台獨「黑臉」，這是否符合比例原則及台灣總體利益？二、民進黨畢竟是台灣四百年來唯一有效能並曾主政的所謂本土政黨，倘若因挾持台獨或被台獨挾持，而就此走入歷史的錯誤面，難道不是一場台灣的民主悲劇？
現在，蔡英文儼然與獨派已經攤牌。五一七遊行，獨派在高雄市另闢南場，就是對蔡英文的警告；而蔡英文以五一七遊行和平收場，為陳菊訪陸送行鋪路，則是對獨派明示已有定見。蔡英文的目標當然是「化獨去扁」，所以獨派的目標也就當然是「拖垮黨中央／驅逐蔡英文」。魔盒打開，門窗緊閉；看誰的氣長，看誰的命大。民進黨「黨公職人員訪中注意事項」上周中常會擱淺，即是雙方相持不下的徵兆。
不過，就台灣的總體戰略架構言，這也是一個兩難的局面。有人不願見民進黨被台獨拖到死，但也有人不願見台獨這個「戰略元素」就此消失。台灣的問題，真是複雜啊！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9, 2009
Chen Chu visited the Mainland. Taiwan independence elements bit their tongues. The reason was Taiwan independence elements were weak and in the minority. had they forced an open break, they would merely have exposed their own weaknesses and shortcomings. At this critical moment, they don't even have the courage to bluster. Their silence is deafening.
Chen Chu visited the Mainland. For Democratic Progressive Party pragmatists and reformists, this was tantamount to a gauntlet thrown down to the fundamentalists. Taiwan independence elements are aware the ship is changing course. But they feign ignorance and say nothing. The current struggle between pragmatist/reformists and fundamentalists is different from those in the past. One. Past struggles between the party and Lin Yi-hsiung, Hsu Hsin-liang, or Shih Ming-teh were confined to issues of ideology or style. Tsai Ing-wen on the other hand, allowed Chen Chu to set foot in Beijing and Shanghai. This involved concrete action. Two. During past struggles, Hsu Hsin-liang, Lin Yi-hsiung, and Shih Ming-teh were expelled from the Democratic Progressive Party or withdrew on their own. This time Tsai Ing-wen will not readily admit defeat or withdraw from the party. Of course, Taiwan independence elements will not withdraw from the Democratic Progressive Party either. Therefore the struggle is real. They have locked themselves behind closed doors. They now sit in the dark, waiting to see who can outlast the other.
Therefore viewed from the outside, the Democratic Progressive Party and mainstream society on Taiwan appear to have created a window of opportunity for communication with Beijing. However viewed from the inside, the DPP appears to have opened up a Pandora's Box behind closed doors.
Following its defeat in 2008, the Democratic Progressive Party realized it must rid itself of Ah-Bian influences and Taiwan independence ideology. This is probably Tsai Ing-wen's hope. It is also the only way out for the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen initially hoped to distance the DPP from Ah-Bian and Taiwan independence. She hoped to purge the party of Ah-Bian influences and Taiwan independence ideology. This would have strengthened the party's political appeal. But in a moment of weakness she chose to lie down in the same bed with Ah-Bian and Taiwan independence elements. In the end she was unable to rid the party of either. Chen Chu has now visited the Mainland. Her visit can be interpreted as a reversal in Tsai Ing-wen's strategy. Instead of first ridding the DPP of Ah-Bian influences, then Taiwan independence ideology, she is attempting to first rid the DPP of Taiwan independence ideology, then Ah-Bian influences.
The DPP leadership appears to have accepted Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland and therefore Tsai Ing-wen's major course change. Tsai Ing-wen has not been ostracized the way Hsu Hsin-liang and Shih Ming-teh were in the past. For Taiwan independence elements and Chen Shui-bian however, this amounts to a political death knell. "China eats s**t!" has now become "Chen Chu Breaks Ice!" From henceforth the "Chen Chu Standard" will replace the "Wang Ting-yu Standard." Ah-Bian can no longer protect Taiwan independence elements. Taiwan independence elements can no longer protect Ah-Bian. Are Taiwan independence elements and Chen Shui-bian going to passively await their fates?
Emotionally and logically it is time for the DPP to distance itself from Taiwan independence elements and Ah-Bian, and to undergo a schism. But Taiwan independence elements cannot expel Tsai Ing-wen, and Tsai Ing-wen cannot expel Taiwan independence elements. On the upside, this means the Democratic Progressive Party remains "unified." This is Chen Shui-bian's hope. On the downside, this means the party will suffer internal injuries from serious infighting. It will remain on the verge of an internal schism.
Actually Taiwan independence elements have played a strategic role in cross-Strait relations. They have efficiently and effectively played the role of "bad cop." This has been fully confirmed in recent years. The question is: does the DPP intend to continue playing the role of a Taiwan independence party? One. The DPP commands 40 percent of the vote, virtually 40 percent of the population. It has played the Taiwan independence "bad cop" that tears society apart and undermines cross-Strait relations. Is such a role becoming and consistent with the larger interests of the public on Taiwan? Two. The DPP is the only effective "native" political party to rule in four hundred years. If it is hijacked by Taiwan independence elements, and ends up on the wrong side of history, won't this be a tragic loss for Taiwan and for democracy?
Tsai Ing-wen is now calling for a showdown with Taiwan independence elements. On May 17 Taiwan independence elements staged their own demonstration in Kaohsiung. This was a warning to Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen ended the protest march peacefully on May 17. She paved the way for Chen Chu's visit to the Mainland. This was a clear message to Taiwan independence elements. Tsai Ing-wen's goal of course was to rid the DPP of Taiwan independence ideology and Ah-Bian influences. The goal of Taiwan independence elements conversely, was to bring down the party leadership and expel Tsai Ing-wen. Pandora's Box has been opened. The doors and windows have been closed. Let us now see who can hold their breath the longest. Let us now see whom Lady Luck favors. The Democratic Progressive Party's debate over its "Party Officials Visit to [Mainland] China" stalled last week. The two sides reached an impasse.
From Taiwan's strategic framework, this remains a dilemma. Some people are unwilling to see Taiwan independence ideology drag the Democratic Progressive Party to its death. But others are unwilling to see Taiwan independence vanish as a strategic factor. Taiwan's problems truly are complex.
民進黨內鬥：打開魔盒，自閉門窗
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.09 03:49 am
陳菊登陸，獨派卻是悶不吭聲；原因是獨派本居少數及弱勢，若是撕破臉，只會自暴其弱、自暴其短，因而在這個關鍵時刻，連色厲內荏都做不到，遂是一片噤聲不語。
陳菊登陸，形同民進黨務實改革派已與基本教義派公然攤牌；獨派豈會不知大船正在轉彎，卻佯裝渾然未覺，一語不發。此次務實改革派與基本教義派的鬥爭，不同以往：一、過去許信良及施明德或林義雄與黨的鬥爭，皆尚只是在理念或風格的層次；但蔡英文卻讓陳菊一腳踏進北京、上海，已是具體行動。二、過去幾場鬥爭，皆以許信良、施明德或林義雄被逐出或自動退出民進黨收場，但此次蔡英文不會輕言認輸退場，當然獨派也不會與民進黨切割退出。所以，這才是一場真正的「內鬥」；關起門來無人退場，暗中蓄勢互比氣長。
因而，陳菊登陸，從外觀看，似乎打開了民進黨與台灣主流社會及與對岸的機會之窗；但從民進黨內部來看，卻像是在屋裡打開了潘朵拉魔盒，再將門窗緊閉。
民進黨經二○○八年的慘敗，必須「去扁化獨」；這應是蔡英文的自我期許，也是民進黨的唯一生路。蔡英文原本若能將扁與獨區隔，「先去扁再化獨」，理路自較流利；但她卻因一念之誤而使扁獨合流，終於面對扁不能去、獨亦不能化的困局。如今陳菊登陸，可以解讀為，蔡英文正在嘗試翻轉她的策略軸線，亦即由「先去扁再化獨」，改成「先化獨再去扁」。
從目前的效應來看，民進黨權力核心對陳菊登陸的大船轉彎汽笛聲，似乎相當接受；因此，蔡英文並未如當初許信良、施明德那般陷於孤立之中。但是，對獨派及陳水扁來說，這汽笛聲卻不啻是政治喪鐘；「中國吃屎」變成「陳菊破冰」，今後「王定宇基準」行將逐漸轉移至「陳菊基準」；扁將保不住獨，獨也保不住扁，難道獨派及阿扁會坐以待斃？
衡情論理，這是民進黨切割分裂的時機。但是，獨派驅逐不了蔡英文，蔡英文也趕不走獨派。從正面看，民進黨仍然「團結」（這也是陳水扁的期望）；但從負面看，這卻是必將「內傷」深重的「內鬥」，繼續「分而不裂」。
其實，台獨是台灣在兩岸角力中應有的戰略元素；其所扮演的「黑白臉」機能與效益，近年已充分展現。問題是：民進黨要不要繼續扮演台獨黨的角色？一、以百分之四十的得票實力，形同挾持百分之四十的人口，去扮演撕裂社會，及惡化兩岸關係的台獨「黑臉」，這是否符合比例原則及台灣總體利益？二、民進黨畢竟是台灣四百年來唯一有效能並曾主政的所謂本土政黨，倘若因挾持台獨或被台獨挾持，而就此走入歷史的錯誤面，難道不是一場台灣的民主悲劇？
現在，蔡英文儼然與獨派已經攤牌。五一七遊行，獨派在高雄市另闢南場，就是對蔡英文的警告；而蔡英文以五一七遊行和平收場，為陳菊訪陸送行鋪路，則是對獨派明示已有定見。蔡英文的目標當然是「化獨去扁」，所以獨派的目標也就當然是「拖垮黨中央／驅逐蔡英文」。魔盒打開，門窗緊閉；看誰的氣長，看誰的命大。民進黨「黨公職人員訪中注意事項」上周中常會擱淺，即是雙方相持不下的徵兆。
不過，就台灣的總體戰略架構言，這也是一個兩難的局面。有人不願見民進黨被台獨拖到死，但也有人不願見台獨這個「戰略元素」就此消失。台灣的問題，真是複雜啊！
Monday, June 8, 2009
A New Definition of National Defense: Peace and Democracy
A New Definition of National Defense: Peace and Democracy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 8, 2009
Recently, two military developments have made the news. These have underscored changes in the national defense posture. The first is that no live firing exercises have been held at the Fangshan Artillery Base for the past two years. The other is that the "Han Kuang Military Maneuveurs" will allegedly be renamed the "Cheng Chun Military Maneuveurs," and will be response to natural disasters or terrorism.
The first impression such news leaves one is that national defense has become more relaxed in attitude and less aggressive in substance. The live fire Fangshan Military Maneuveurs have allegedly been discontinued due to opposition from fishermen. The military estimates that the cessation of the Fangshan Military Maneuveurs has affected 15 air defense combat exercises. How serious is this? Is this the full exent of its impact? No solutions have been found for the past two years. Does the changed purpose of the military maneuveurs represent an overly optimistic assessment of the cross-Strait situation? Should this be a cause for concern?
Over the past sixty years, the national defense posture has undergone major changes. Why we are fighting and for whom we are fighting has changed with internal and external developments. The era of "Retaking the Mainland" and "Destroying the Communist Bandits," is over. The subsequent strategy of "seven tenths politics and three tenths military affairs," and the "Reunify China via the Three People's Principles" national defense posture remains unchanged. But cross-Strait hostility since the lifting of martial law has diminished. We no longer speak of a "Communist Rebellion." But on the other hand, cross-Strait hostility fluctuates. It is sometimes relaxed and sometimes tense. Because we failed to establish a new national defense posture, the Chen Shui-bian administration's "New Centrist Path" failed. The "Rectification of Names and the Authoring of a New Constitution" political project was revived. This left the armed forces of the Republic of China at the mercy of advocates of formal Taiwan independence, wondering what are we fighting for, and whom we are fighting for? This was a contradictory, dangerous, and confusing situation.
This confusion over the national defense posture has manifested itself in another form under the Ma administration. Over the past year the two sides have engaged in across the board exchanges. Direct flights have been established. Mainland tourists have visited Taiwan. No upper limit Mainland investments on Taiwan have made the daily headlines. Taipei has proposed a policy of "win/win" and "live and let live." Beijing has stressed its "framework for peaceful development." This situation has had a different impact on the national defense posture. Namely, how many troops do we need? Do we need additional arms purchases? What kind of military procurements do we need? We must engage in a completely different way of thinking. In particular, we have yet to resolve the national defense riddle of whom are we fighting for and what are we fighting for. This national defense dilemma, has remained unresolved since the lifting of martial law 21 years ago, and has manifested itself in different ways.
The affairs of the Republic of China Minister of Defense are virtually cross-Strait affairs. The Republic of China's national defense posture is undergoing fundamental change. Military confrontation has become democratic political and economic exchange. Cross-Strait issues are dealt with using democratic and economic, rather than military means. This national defense posture is consistent with the larger interests of the public on Taiwan. It reflects public expecations regarding democracy. Moreover, it goes hand in hand with the "framework for peaceful development" advocated by Beijing. In fact, today's relaxed cross-Strait situation is a kind of national defense achievement. Military factors have been downplayed. Economic and democratic factors have been emphasized. This will be our national defense posture for the forseeable future.
Nevertheless, the Republic of China needs to maintain a certain level of military defense. This is a symbol of its sovereignty and an expression of its democracy. It is also an essential bargaining chip in cross-Strait and international negotiations. The quantity and quality of military armanents may not be that difficult to determine. But what we are we fighting and whom we are fighting for remain questions that are difficult to answer but which must be answered.
Two new factors have emerged in national defense planning. First, cross-Strait trade, close cultural exchanges, and an atmosphere of reconciliation have diminished antipathy toward the CCP and the perception of the CCP as Communist rebels. That is why we no longer speak of the "Communist Rebellion." Secondly, the conscript military is now volunteer military. Troops no longer join the military out of national duty. They join the military in the capacity of government employees. These two new factors have had a major impact on the question of what we are fighting for and whom we are fighting for.
The military can be downsized. But national defense awareness must not be diminished. The cross-Strait situation has evolved. The national defense posture must be revised. The Republic of China's military defense is no longer for the purpose of "Counterattacking the Mainland and Eradicating the Bandits." Instead, it has a more fundamental and more important function. It must act as the guarantor of cross-Strait peace and the defender of democracy.
We may have a smaller military in the future. But this ought to be a "small is beautiful" military. If it is able to fulfill its self-proclaimed role as the guarantor of cross-Strait peace and defender of democracy, its officers and troops will feel a sense of honor, a sense of responsibility, a sense of direction, and a sense of idealism.
We must struggle on behalf of cross-Strait peace. But just in case, we must know what we are fighting for, and whom we are fighting for.
國防新義：和平後盾‧民主衛士
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.08 03:21 am
最近有兩則軍事消息，令人感覺國防情態的變化。一是枋山防砲基地已有兩年未見實彈射擊訓練；一是漢光兵推據稱將改為「政軍兵推」，以天災或反恐為主題。
這類消息給人的第一個印象是：在精神上及實務上，國防的經營有否趨於鬆弛或不積極的跡象？枋山實彈射擊據謂是因漁民反對而停擺，而軍方自估已影響了十五的防空戰力（這還不嚴重嗎？僅是如此嗎？），但兩年來卻未拿出解決辦法。至於一年一度的兵推主題改變，是否顯示當局對兩岸情勢的評價懷有一廂情願的樂觀，也令人關切。
六十年來，國防情勢經歷重大變化；為何而戰與為誰而戰的國防主題，亦隨內外情勢而變遷。最早年的「反攻大陸」、「消滅共匪」，已成過去；後來的「七分政治／三分軍事」及「三民主義統一中國」，雖是國防觀念的丕變，但仍是以兩岸敵對為架構；至解嚴後，一方面終止「動員戡亂」，但另一方面兩岸敵對情勢卻時弛時張，因而未能建立一個新的國防主題；再至扁政府主政，「新中間路線」失敗，正名制憲的政治操作大興，更使中華民國的軍隊掌握在主張「法理台獨」的主政者手中，究竟將為誰而戰、為何而戰？可謂矛盾已極、凶險已極、困惑已極。
這樣的「國防主題困惑」，至馬政府主政，似乎又以另一種面貌呈現。兩岸在這一年來儼然出現全面和解交流的局面，直航、陸客來台，「上不封頂」的大陸「熱單」日日皆成頭條新聞；我方主張「雙贏共生」，對岸標榜「和平發展框架」。這樣的情勢，對國防主題自是另一種情勢的衝擊；要維持多少武裝部隊？要不要軍購？軍購何種項目？在在進入全然不同的思維頻道之中。尤其，解嚴二十一年來，迄未解決的「為何而戰、為誰而戰」的「國防主題困惑」，更以另一種面貌呈現。
台灣的國防政務，其實幾乎就等於兩岸政務。中華民國的國防情態，正在發生並已經發生根本性的變化。「國防」的基本架構，已經由軍事對立，轉移至民主政治及經濟交流；亦即以民主及經濟的基調來處理兩岸問題，而避免訴諸軍事。此一「國防」路線，符合台灣的總體利益，反映了台灣的民主期待，何況也與北京當局所主張並維繫的「和平發展框架」並行不悖。今日兩岸情勢的和緩，其實正是一種「國防」成就。而軍事元素降低，經濟及民主的因素上升，亦是未來「國防」的必趨必至之勢。
雖然如此，中華民國仍須維持一定數量及實質的「軍事國防」。這是「主權」的象徵，也是民主主體性的表彰；當然也是在兩岸及國際折衝中不能不備的籌碼。然而，軍事武備的數量規模與質量規格應如何規劃，這或許並非難事；但「為何而戰／為誰而戰」的「國防主題困惑」，仍是不易解決而必須解決的難題。
現今的國防規劃已出現兩個新元素。一、兩岸因經貿、文化交流頻密，和解的氛圍日升，「動員戡亂」的「仇匪恨匪意識」行將愈趨消減，這也是終止「動員戡亂」的必然變化；二、徵兵制改募兵制，兵員由「國民義務」變成「僱傭關係」。這兩個新元素，皆將對「為何而戰／為誰而戰」的「國防主題困惑」發生重大衝擊。
國防的軍備可以縮編，但國防的意識不能迷亂。兩岸情勢演化至今，「國防的主題」亦須有新的創設。中華民國的軍事國防，已不再是為「反攻大陸／消滅共匪」；然而，我們認為，卻有一更基本及更重大的責任，那就是：為兩岸和平作後盾，為民主政治作衛士。
今後，或許我們將有一支編製較小的軍隊；但這應是一支「小而美」的軍隊。倘若能以「和平後盾／民主衛士」自期自命，將士們的榮譽感、責任心就有了寄託，方向感與理想性也有了基礎。
我們應以兩岸和平不開戰為努力目標；但在萬一之際，我們亦當知為何而戰、為誰而戰。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 8, 2009
Recently, two military developments have made the news. These have underscored changes in the national defense posture. The first is that no live firing exercises have been held at the Fangshan Artillery Base for the past two years. The other is that the "Han Kuang Military Maneuveurs" will allegedly be renamed the "Cheng Chun Military Maneuveurs," and will be response to natural disasters or terrorism.
The first impression such news leaves one is that national defense has become more relaxed in attitude and less aggressive in substance. The live fire Fangshan Military Maneuveurs have allegedly been discontinued due to opposition from fishermen. The military estimates that the cessation of the Fangshan Military Maneuveurs has affected 15 air defense combat exercises. How serious is this? Is this the full exent of its impact? No solutions have been found for the past two years. Does the changed purpose of the military maneuveurs represent an overly optimistic assessment of the cross-Strait situation? Should this be a cause for concern?
Over the past sixty years, the national defense posture has undergone major changes. Why we are fighting and for whom we are fighting has changed with internal and external developments. The era of "Retaking the Mainland" and "Destroying the Communist Bandits," is over. The subsequent strategy of "seven tenths politics and three tenths military affairs," and the "Reunify China via the Three People's Principles" national defense posture remains unchanged. But cross-Strait hostility since the lifting of martial law has diminished. We no longer speak of a "Communist Rebellion." But on the other hand, cross-Strait hostility fluctuates. It is sometimes relaxed and sometimes tense. Because we failed to establish a new national defense posture, the Chen Shui-bian administration's "New Centrist Path" failed. The "Rectification of Names and the Authoring of a New Constitution" political project was revived. This left the armed forces of the Republic of China at the mercy of advocates of formal Taiwan independence, wondering what are we fighting for, and whom we are fighting for? This was a contradictory, dangerous, and confusing situation.
This confusion over the national defense posture has manifested itself in another form under the Ma administration. Over the past year the two sides have engaged in across the board exchanges. Direct flights have been established. Mainland tourists have visited Taiwan. No upper limit Mainland investments on Taiwan have made the daily headlines. Taipei has proposed a policy of "win/win" and "live and let live." Beijing has stressed its "framework for peaceful development." This situation has had a different impact on the national defense posture. Namely, how many troops do we need? Do we need additional arms purchases? What kind of military procurements do we need? We must engage in a completely different way of thinking. In particular, we have yet to resolve the national defense riddle of whom are we fighting for and what are we fighting for. This national defense dilemma, has remained unresolved since the lifting of martial law 21 years ago, and has manifested itself in different ways.
The affairs of the Republic of China Minister of Defense are virtually cross-Strait affairs. The Republic of China's national defense posture is undergoing fundamental change. Military confrontation has become democratic political and economic exchange. Cross-Strait issues are dealt with using democratic and economic, rather than military means. This national defense posture is consistent with the larger interests of the public on Taiwan. It reflects public expecations regarding democracy. Moreover, it goes hand in hand with the "framework for peaceful development" advocated by Beijing. In fact, today's relaxed cross-Strait situation is a kind of national defense achievement. Military factors have been downplayed. Economic and democratic factors have been emphasized. This will be our national defense posture for the forseeable future.
Nevertheless, the Republic of China needs to maintain a certain level of military defense. This is a symbol of its sovereignty and an expression of its democracy. It is also an essential bargaining chip in cross-Strait and international negotiations. The quantity and quality of military armanents may not be that difficult to determine. But what we are we fighting and whom we are fighting for remain questions that are difficult to answer but which must be answered.
Two new factors have emerged in national defense planning. First, cross-Strait trade, close cultural exchanges, and an atmosphere of reconciliation have diminished antipathy toward the CCP and the perception of the CCP as Communist rebels. That is why we no longer speak of the "Communist Rebellion." Secondly, the conscript military is now volunteer military. Troops no longer join the military out of national duty. They join the military in the capacity of government employees. These two new factors have had a major impact on the question of what we are fighting for and whom we are fighting for.
The military can be downsized. But national defense awareness must not be diminished. The cross-Strait situation has evolved. The national defense posture must be revised. The Republic of China's military defense is no longer for the purpose of "Counterattacking the Mainland and Eradicating the Bandits." Instead, it has a more fundamental and more important function. It must act as the guarantor of cross-Strait peace and the defender of democracy.
We may have a smaller military in the future. But this ought to be a "small is beautiful" military. If it is able to fulfill its self-proclaimed role as the guarantor of cross-Strait peace and defender of democracy, its officers and troops will feel a sense of honor, a sense of responsibility, a sense of direction, and a sense of idealism.
We must struggle on behalf of cross-Strait peace. But just in case, we must know what we are fighting for, and whom we are fighting for.
國防新義：和平後盾‧民主衛士
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.08 03:21 am
最近有兩則軍事消息，令人感覺國防情態的變化。一是枋山防砲基地已有兩年未見實彈射擊訓練；一是漢光兵推據稱將改為「政軍兵推」，以天災或反恐為主題。
這類消息給人的第一個印象是：在精神上及實務上，國防的經營有否趨於鬆弛或不積極的跡象？枋山實彈射擊據謂是因漁民反對而停擺，而軍方自估已影響了十五的防空戰力（這還不嚴重嗎？僅是如此嗎？），但兩年來卻未拿出解決辦法。至於一年一度的兵推主題改變，是否顯示當局對兩岸情勢的評價懷有一廂情願的樂觀，也令人關切。
六十年來，國防情勢經歷重大變化；為何而戰與為誰而戰的國防主題，亦隨內外情勢而變遷。最早年的「反攻大陸」、「消滅共匪」，已成過去；後來的「七分政治／三分軍事」及「三民主義統一中國」，雖是國防觀念的丕變，但仍是以兩岸敵對為架構；至解嚴後，一方面終止「動員戡亂」，但另一方面兩岸敵對情勢卻時弛時張，因而未能建立一個新的國防主題；再至扁政府主政，「新中間路線」失敗，正名制憲的政治操作大興，更使中華民國的軍隊掌握在主張「法理台獨」的主政者手中，究竟將為誰而戰、為何而戰？可謂矛盾已極、凶險已極、困惑已極。
這樣的「國防主題困惑」，至馬政府主政，似乎又以另一種面貌呈現。兩岸在這一年來儼然出現全面和解交流的局面，直航、陸客來台，「上不封頂」的大陸「熱單」日日皆成頭條新聞；我方主張「雙贏共生」，對岸標榜「和平發展框架」。這樣的情勢，對國防主題自是另一種情勢的衝擊；要維持多少武裝部隊？要不要軍購？軍購何種項目？在在進入全然不同的思維頻道之中。尤其，解嚴二十一年來，迄未解決的「為何而戰、為誰而戰」的「國防主題困惑」，更以另一種面貌呈現。
台灣的國防政務，其實幾乎就等於兩岸政務。中華民國的國防情態，正在發生並已經發生根本性的變化。「國防」的基本架構，已經由軍事對立，轉移至民主政治及經濟交流；亦即以民主及經濟的基調來處理兩岸問題，而避免訴諸軍事。此一「國防」路線，符合台灣的總體利益，反映了台灣的民主期待，何況也與北京當局所主張並維繫的「和平發展框架」並行不悖。今日兩岸情勢的和緩，其實正是一種「國防」成就。而軍事元素降低，經濟及民主的因素上升，亦是未來「國防」的必趨必至之勢。
雖然如此，中華民國仍須維持一定數量及實質的「軍事國防」。這是「主權」的象徵，也是民主主體性的表彰；當然也是在兩岸及國際折衝中不能不備的籌碼。然而，軍事武備的數量規模與質量規格應如何規劃，這或許並非難事；但「為何而戰／為誰而戰」的「國防主題困惑」，仍是不易解決而必須解決的難題。
現今的國防規劃已出現兩個新元素。一、兩岸因經貿、文化交流頻密，和解的氛圍日升，「動員戡亂」的「仇匪恨匪意識」行將愈趨消減，這也是終止「動員戡亂」的必然變化；二、徵兵制改募兵制，兵員由「國民義務」變成「僱傭關係」。這兩個新元素，皆將對「為何而戰／為誰而戰」的「國防主題困惑」發生重大衝擊。
國防的軍備可以縮編，但國防的意識不能迷亂。兩岸情勢演化至今，「國防的主題」亦須有新的創設。中華民國的軍事國防，已不再是為「反攻大陸／消滅共匪」；然而，我們認為，卻有一更基本及更重大的責任，那就是：為兩岸和平作後盾，為民主政治作衛士。
今後，或許我們將有一支編製較小的軍隊；但這應是一支「小而美」的軍隊。倘若能以「和平後盾／民主衛士」自期自命，將士們的榮譽感、責任心就有了寄託，方向感與理想性也有了基礎。
我們應以兩岸和平不開戰為努力目標；但在萬一之際，我們亦當知為何而戰、為誰而戰。
Saturday, June 6, 2009
Human Rights and Clean Government
Human Rights and Clean Government
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 6, 2009
As expected, President Ma expressed his thoughts on the June 4th Tiananmen Incident yesterday. Perhaps he hoped to maintain the posture appropriate for a President. Perhaps he hoped to preserve the friendly atmosphere between Beijing and Taipei. The tone of his statement was considerably more moderate than in years past. Nevertheless, President Ma was at least consistent. Interestingly enough the Democratic Progressive Party, which has always been conspicuously silent about June 4th in the past, suddenly took an interest in June 4th. They did not offer their own thoughts on June 4th. Instead they denounced President Ma's statement as "ugly evidence of [Ma's] betrayal of the victims." Clearly this harsh rhetoric was not a commemoration of June 4, but merely the same old partisan confrontation.
The Democratic Progressive Party has long advocated the protection of human rights. It did so before the Chen Shui-bian administration. It did so during the Chen Shui-bian administration. It continues to do so after the Chen Shui-bian administration. Perhaps based on the DPP's long held position on human rights, it felt Ma Ying-jeou should have blasted Bejing on the twentieth anniversary of June 4th. But if the Democratic Progressive Party really feels this way, won't it force people to question its sincerity about protecting human rights? Isn't this an unconvincing political strategy?
Human rights was once the Democratic Progressive Party's sole demand. As well as advocating human rights, the Democratic Progressive Party also advocated clean government. But ever since Chen Shui-bian came to power and became mired in corruption scandals, the Democratic Progressive Party has shrunk from demanding clean government. It has become virtually silent on the matter. It offers ritual lip service to clean government. But its declarations ring hollow. In response to Chen Shui-bian's corruption, the Democratic Progressive Party chose to forsake its demands for clean government. It refuses to use clean government benchmarks to evaluate Chen Shui-bian and his family. Instead it uses human rights to accuse the ruling administration of political interference with the justice system. It hopes to cover up the fact that it has forsaken its demands for clean government. But its actions cannot hide its fundamental betrayal of its political and moral principles. On the contrary, they merely leave its audience skeptical of its appeals to human rights. When people learn that the DPP's advocacy of human rights has become a fig leaf to cover up DPP corruption, they realize that for the DPP, advocacy of human rights has become a political tool. It is no longer a noble ideal. The DPP's refusal to apply standards for clean government to Chen Shui-bian, merely undermines the credibility of its advocacy of human rights. The DPP has made advocacy of human rights the servant of partisan political strategy. Listeners are going to find it hard not to be skeptical.
The Democratic Progressive Party accuses President Ma Ying-jeou of no longer demanding the rehabilitation of the victims of June 4th. If this proves that Ma Ying-jeou's past advocacy of human rights was mere hypocrisy, then it also proves that the DPP's advocacy of clean government and human rights is mere hypocrisy. If the DPP's motive for criticizing Ma Ying-jeou on human rights is merely to narrow the political and moral gap between Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian, then it merely proves that the DPP's human rights demands are insincere.
On the twentieth anniversary of June 4th, the DPP still refuses to apply its own standards for clean government to Chen Shui-bian. As a result, it has lost its right to use human rights to criticize its political opponents, whether Ma Ying-jeou or Beijing. This is a tragic development for human rights on Taiwan.
As the duly elected President of the Republic of China, Ma Ying-jeou should continue stressing that he was elected on the basis of his advocacy of human rights. Advocacy of human rights should be a political goal, not a political tool. The advocacy of human rights and the promotion of cross-Strait reconciliation are not either/or choices. They are both/and choices. The promotion of cross-Strait reconciliation is the advocacy of human rights. Human rights are universal values. They must transcend any demands arising from purely regional or nativist interests. Beijing must resolve the doubts of the public on Taiwan. It must deepen cross-Strait trust. The public on Taiwan cannot ignore the way the Tiananmen Square incident was handled. It wants to know that Beijing has the willingness to admit its errors and the determination to change its ways. The public on Taiwan has undergone two changes in ruling parties. This has enabled the ruling party to tolerate and respect opposition party criticism. The June 4th Tiananment Incident was a crackdown on dissent. Cross-Strait economic relations must be improved. But unless Beijing can confront and examine the rights and wrongs of June 4th, the two sides will have a hard time bridging the psychological divide.
On the eve of his inaugural anniversary, President Ma Ying-jeou signed two UN Conventions. The point of the signing was not to join the United Nations. The point of the signing was to to introduce international human rights norms and the rule of law into our system. It was to accelerate the implementation of international human rights standards on Taiwan. This gesture means Taipei has caught up with Beijing in signing economic and social conventions. It means Taipei is ahead of Beijing in signing the Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on Human Rights. The race to sign human rights conventions has transformed the cross-Strait struggle over sovereignty into a contest over human rights. This development should be regarded as a positive development for cross-Strait relations.
The public on Taiwan cares that President Ma Ying-jeou made the proper expressions of concern on the twentieth anniversary of June 4th, and called for healthy competition between the two sides on human rights protection as the long-term basis for cross-Strait relations.
At the same time, we hope the Democratic Progressive Party will talk not only about human rights, but have the courage and integrity to talk about clean government in the same breath. The sooner it finds its moral conscience, the sooner it can begin anew.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.06
社論－人權與清廉都該是朝野信守的價值
本報訊
一如預期，馬總統在日前發表了六四感言，或許是為了維持總統身分的高度，也或許是為了維持兩岸當下的友善氛圍，這篇感言的語氣較之往年溫和許多，無論如何，馬總統終究維持了他的一貫性，但耐人尋味的是，往年在論述六四上一貫缺席的民進黨，今年卻突然關心起六四來了，他們並未提自己對六四的論述，卻將馬總統的六四感言批為「出賣受害者的醜陋文件」，這種在修辭上鮮明的對比，所映照出的不是紀念六四，依舊是朝野對立。
民進黨一向主張保障人權，陳水扁主政之前如此，陳水扁主政時如此，陳水扁下台後似乎仍然如此。依照民進黨一貫的人權立場，或許認為馬英九該在六四廿周年強烈表態批判北京的立場。然而，民進黨果真如此主張，會不會讓人質疑其主張並非真誠的保障人權，而只是說服力不足的政治策略呢？
人權，本來不是民進黨唯一主張；在主張人權同時，民進黨一向也主張清廉。但自從陳水扁於主政後期貪腐醜聞纏身後，民進黨清廉主張退縮了，甚至消失了，偶而唱起清廉當作裝飾音，也是荒腔走板，虛弱無力。民進黨在陳水扁議題上，選擇放棄清廉的政治堅持，不肯使用清廉做為評價陳水扁及其政治家族的標竿，而只是一味借用人權做為批判台灣政治干涉司法的旗幟，遮蓋其清廉訴求的蒼白無力，不但不能掩飾其政治道德原則的根本失落，反而使得其人權主張也難以凝聚聽眾。當人們發現人權主張竟可成為清廉缺位的遮羞布時，遂知人權政策已成民進黨的政治工具，不再是高尚的理想目的。民進黨吝於使用清廉批判阿扁，其實削弱了人權主張的信用。只是為政黨策略服務的人權論述，很難不使人於傾聽之際帶有問號。
如果民進黨指出馬英九當了總統就不再要求平反六四，足以證明馬英九過去的人權立場只是虛矯作態，這種指責恰也說中了為什麼民進黨的清廉主張甚至人權主張顯得虛矯的要害。用人權批判馬英九，如果只是為了拉近馬英九與陳水扁在政治道德評價上的距離，正也同時證明了民進黨的人權政策主張不是出自真心。
因此，至今不肯標舉清廉主張評價陳水扁所作所為的民進黨，到了六四廿周年，也就失去了標舉人權來批判其政治對手（不管是馬英九還是北京）的道德位置。這其實是台灣人權發展道路上的悲哀。
做為台灣人民選出的總統，馬英九當然應繼續堅持他選上總統所憑藉的人權主張。保障人權該是政治目的，不能是策略工具。保障人權與促進兩岸關係不是二者擇一而是可以兼籌並顧的選項；既要發展兩岸關係，也要提倡人權保障。人權做為普世價值，甚至應超越任何單純地域觀念產生的本土利益訴求。北京須瞭解，要爭取台灣人民化解心中對於北京疑慮，改善兩岸的信賴關係，當年天安門事件的處理方式，以及北京對此有無幡然改悟的政治決心，台灣人民不會不以為意。台灣累積的政權輪替經驗，使得在野者批判意見極受容忍與尊重，六四是處置鎮壓異見的事件，兩岸改善經濟關係之後，若不能正視並檢討其間是非經過，兩岸之間也仍將有極難跨越的心理鴻溝存在。
馬英九總統在就職周年前夕，簽署了兩項聯合國人公約，這次他的重點不是在於是否藉此加入聯合國，而是要將國際人權規範體系引進內國法制，加速台灣人權保障的實踐能與國際人權標準接軌。此一舉動，不僅使得台灣簽署經濟社會公約迎頭趕上對岸，也使得台灣在公民政治權利公約上的進度超前。人權公約的競賽，乃已使兩岸從主權的鬥爭，轉向人權實踐決心的比較。此項發展，應該視為兩岸關係之中一種良性互動的軌跡。
台灣人民會在乎馬英九總統在六四廿周年表達應該表達的立場，呼籲北京在兩岸之間正式展開良性的人權競賽，作為長期發展兩岸關係的基礎。於此同時，我們也期待民進黨能夠走出只敢談人權不敢談清廉的心虛困境，早日振作政黨的道德體魄，重新出發。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 6, 2009
As expected, President Ma expressed his thoughts on the June 4th Tiananmen Incident yesterday. Perhaps he hoped to maintain the posture appropriate for a President. Perhaps he hoped to preserve the friendly atmosphere between Beijing and Taipei. The tone of his statement was considerably more moderate than in years past. Nevertheless, President Ma was at least consistent. Interestingly enough the Democratic Progressive Party, which has always been conspicuously silent about June 4th in the past, suddenly took an interest in June 4th. They did not offer their own thoughts on June 4th. Instead they denounced President Ma's statement as "ugly evidence of [Ma's] betrayal of the victims." Clearly this harsh rhetoric was not a commemoration of June 4, but merely the same old partisan confrontation.
The Democratic Progressive Party has long advocated the protection of human rights. It did so before the Chen Shui-bian administration. It did so during the Chen Shui-bian administration. It continues to do so after the Chen Shui-bian administration. Perhaps based on the DPP's long held position on human rights, it felt Ma Ying-jeou should have blasted Bejing on the twentieth anniversary of June 4th. But if the Democratic Progressive Party really feels this way, won't it force people to question its sincerity about protecting human rights? Isn't this an unconvincing political strategy?
Human rights was once the Democratic Progressive Party's sole demand. As well as advocating human rights, the Democratic Progressive Party also advocated clean government. But ever since Chen Shui-bian came to power and became mired in corruption scandals, the Democratic Progressive Party has shrunk from demanding clean government. It has become virtually silent on the matter. It offers ritual lip service to clean government. But its declarations ring hollow. In response to Chen Shui-bian's corruption, the Democratic Progressive Party chose to forsake its demands for clean government. It refuses to use clean government benchmarks to evaluate Chen Shui-bian and his family. Instead it uses human rights to accuse the ruling administration of political interference with the justice system. It hopes to cover up the fact that it has forsaken its demands for clean government. But its actions cannot hide its fundamental betrayal of its political and moral principles. On the contrary, they merely leave its audience skeptical of its appeals to human rights. When people learn that the DPP's advocacy of human rights has become a fig leaf to cover up DPP corruption, they realize that for the DPP, advocacy of human rights has become a political tool. It is no longer a noble ideal. The DPP's refusal to apply standards for clean government to Chen Shui-bian, merely undermines the credibility of its advocacy of human rights. The DPP has made advocacy of human rights the servant of partisan political strategy. Listeners are going to find it hard not to be skeptical.
The Democratic Progressive Party accuses President Ma Ying-jeou of no longer demanding the rehabilitation of the victims of June 4th. If this proves that Ma Ying-jeou's past advocacy of human rights was mere hypocrisy, then it also proves that the DPP's advocacy of clean government and human rights is mere hypocrisy. If the DPP's motive for criticizing Ma Ying-jeou on human rights is merely to narrow the political and moral gap between Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian, then it merely proves that the DPP's human rights demands are insincere.
On the twentieth anniversary of June 4th, the DPP still refuses to apply its own standards for clean government to Chen Shui-bian. As a result, it has lost its right to use human rights to criticize its political opponents, whether Ma Ying-jeou or Beijing. This is a tragic development for human rights on Taiwan.
As the duly elected President of the Republic of China, Ma Ying-jeou should continue stressing that he was elected on the basis of his advocacy of human rights. Advocacy of human rights should be a political goal, not a political tool. The advocacy of human rights and the promotion of cross-Strait reconciliation are not either/or choices. They are both/and choices. The promotion of cross-Strait reconciliation is the advocacy of human rights. Human rights are universal values. They must transcend any demands arising from purely regional or nativist interests. Beijing must resolve the doubts of the public on Taiwan. It must deepen cross-Strait trust. The public on Taiwan cannot ignore the way the Tiananmen Square incident was handled. It wants to know that Beijing has the willingness to admit its errors and the determination to change its ways. The public on Taiwan has undergone two changes in ruling parties. This has enabled the ruling party to tolerate and respect opposition party criticism. The June 4th Tiananment Incident was a crackdown on dissent. Cross-Strait economic relations must be improved. But unless Beijing can confront and examine the rights and wrongs of June 4th, the two sides will have a hard time bridging the psychological divide.
On the eve of his inaugural anniversary, President Ma Ying-jeou signed two UN Conventions. The point of the signing was not to join the United Nations. The point of the signing was to to introduce international human rights norms and the rule of law into our system. It was to accelerate the implementation of international human rights standards on Taiwan. This gesture means Taipei has caught up with Beijing in signing economic and social conventions. It means Taipei is ahead of Beijing in signing the Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on Human Rights. The race to sign human rights conventions has transformed the cross-Strait struggle over sovereignty into a contest over human rights. This development should be regarded as a positive development for cross-Strait relations.
The public on Taiwan cares that President Ma Ying-jeou made the proper expressions of concern on the twentieth anniversary of June 4th, and called for healthy competition between the two sides on human rights protection as the long-term basis for cross-Strait relations.
At the same time, we hope the Democratic Progressive Party will talk not only about human rights, but have the courage and integrity to talk about clean government in the same breath. The sooner it finds its moral conscience, the sooner it can begin anew.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.06
社論－人權與清廉都該是朝野信守的價值
本報訊
一如預期，馬總統在日前發表了六四感言，或許是為了維持總統身分的高度，也或許是為了維持兩岸當下的友善氛圍，這篇感言的語氣較之往年溫和許多，無論如何，馬總統終究維持了他的一貫性，但耐人尋味的是，往年在論述六四上一貫缺席的民進黨，今年卻突然關心起六四來了，他們並未提自己對六四的論述，卻將馬總統的六四感言批為「出賣受害者的醜陋文件」，這種在修辭上鮮明的對比，所映照出的不是紀念六四，依舊是朝野對立。
民進黨一向主張保障人權，陳水扁主政之前如此，陳水扁主政時如此，陳水扁下台後似乎仍然如此。依照民進黨一貫的人權立場，或許認為馬英九該在六四廿周年強烈表態批判北京的立場。然而，民進黨果真如此主張，會不會讓人質疑其主張並非真誠的保障人權，而只是說服力不足的政治策略呢？
人權，本來不是民進黨唯一主張；在主張人權同時，民進黨一向也主張清廉。但自從陳水扁於主政後期貪腐醜聞纏身後，民進黨清廉主張退縮了，甚至消失了，偶而唱起清廉當作裝飾音，也是荒腔走板，虛弱無力。民進黨在陳水扁議題上，選擇放棄清廉的政治堅持，不肯使用清廉做為評價陳水扁及其政治家族的標竿，而只是一味借用人權做為批判台灣政治干涉司法的旗幟，遮蓋其清廉訴求的蒼白無力，不但不能掩飾其政治道德原則的根本失落，反而使得其人權主張也難以凝聚聽眾。當人們發現人權主張竟可成為清廉缺位的遮羞布時，遂知人權政策已成民進黨的政治工具，不再是高尚的理想目的。民進黨吝於使用清廉批判阿扁，其實削弱了人權主張的信用。只是為政黨策略服務的人權論述，很難不使人於傾聽之際帶有問號。
如果民進黨指出馬英九當了總統就不再要求平反六四，足以證明馬英九過去的人權立場只是虛矯作態，這種指責恰也說中了為什麼民進黨的清廉主張甚至人權主張顯得虛矯的要害。用人權批判馬英九，如果只是為了拉近馬英九與陳水扁在政治道德評價上的距離，正也同時證明了民進黨的人權政策主張不是出自真心。
因此，至今不肯標舉清廉主張評價陳水扁所作所為的民進黨，到了六四廿周年，也就失去了標舉人權來批判其政治對手（不管是馬英九還是北京）的道德位置。這其實是台灣人權發展道路上的悲哀。
做為台灣人民選出的總統，馬英九當然應繼續堅持他選上總統所憑藉的人權主張。保障人權該是政治目的，不能是策略工具。保障人權與促進兩岸關係不是二者擇一而是可以兼籌並顧的選項；既要發展兩岸關係，也要提倡人權保障。人權做為普世價值，甚至應超越任何單純地域觀念產生的本土利益訴求。北京須瞭解，要爭取台灣人民化解心中對於北京疑慮，改善兩岸的信賴關係，當年天安門事件的處理方式，以及北京對此有無幡然改悟的政治決心，台灣人民不會不以為意。台灣累積的政權輪替經驗，使得在野者批判意見極受容忍與尊重，六四是處置鎮壓異見的事件，兩岸改善經濟關係之後，若不能正視並檢討其間是非經過，兩岸之間也仍將有極難跨越的心理鴻溝存在。
馬英九總統在就職周年前夕，簽署了兩項聯合國人公約，這次他的重點不是在於是否藉此加入聯合國，而是要將國際人權規範體系引進內國法制，加速台灣人權保障的實踐能與國際人權標準接軌。此一舉動，不僅使得台灣簽署經濟社會公約迎頭趕上對岸，也使得台灣在公民政治權利公約上的進度超前。人權公約的競賽，乃已使兩岸從主權的鬥爭，轉向人權實踐決心的比較。此項發展，應該視為兩岸關係之中一種良性互動的軌跡。
台灣人民會在乎馬英九總統在六四廿周年表達應該表達的立場，呼籲北京在兩岸之間正式展開良性的人權競賽，作為長期發展兩岸關係的基礎。於此同時，我們也期待民進黨能夠走出只敢談人權不敢談清廉的心虛困境，早日振作政黨的道德體魄，重新出發。
Friday, June 5, 2009
From Flexible Diplomacy to Normal Diplomacy
From Flexible Diplomacy to Normal Diplomacy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 5, 2009
President Ma Ying-jeou has concluded his state visit to Central America and returned home. His "Voyage for Harmony" consolidated the support of ROC allies. It also demonstrated, through concrete action, Ma's new diplomatic thinking and practices.
President Ma, his wife Christine Chow, and over 100 members of his delegation visited Belize, El Salvador, and Guatemala. On the way there they transited Los Angeles. On the way back they transited Seattle. This is the second state visit President Ma has embarked upon since taking office. It is also the first time the First Lady Christine Chow took part in a state visit.
Compared to last time, this visit was much livelier. A number of surprises arose. Belize experienced a power failure. President Ma's armed bodyguard was detained by Guatemalan security services. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega postponed his meeting with President Ma three times, and the ROC decided to cancel the meeting altogether. When Ma greeted U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, he introduced himself as "Taiwan's president." This also provoked domestic political debate.
In fact the incident over Ma's bodyguard was minor. Once it was over, it was over. It was merely the result of a miscommunication between the security services of both nations, and a mishandling of the situtation by Guatemalan officials. It will not affect relations between the two nations. President Ma introduced himself as "Taiwan's president." This is also very common. After all, the international community more is familiar with the name Taiwan. It is not necessary to read too much into this.
President Ma Ying-jeou took office a year ago. During this visit his "huo lu wai jiao," i.e., "Viable Diplomacy," or "Flexible Diplomacy," clearly distinguished itself from the diplomacy of the past. Past "Scorched Earth Diplomacy" called for the playing of zero-sum games and the fighting of battles that cannot be won. It was a strategy of reckless provocation. Taipei butted its head against a brick wall until it was left broken and bleeding. Its plight within the international community worsened. President Ma's foreign policy reversed this manner of thinking and operating. It moved toward cross-Strait reconciliation. It allowed the two sides to renounce their life or death zero-sum game. It allowed Taipei to stop squandering resources fighting over allies with Beijing. It allowed Taipei to stop writing huge checks to buy allies.
While In Belize, President Ma explained his five major foreign aid goals. These include eliminating extreme poverty and hunger, strengthening human resources development, fighting infectious diseases, promoting environmentally sustainable development, and strengthening global partnerships. Foreign aid programs require money. Only money that must be spent will be spent. Diplomacy will be forthright. Its "goals must be legitimate, its procedures must be lawful, its implementation must be effective." Only this will win others' respect.
Such a change has come at just the right time. Our past policy of checkbook diplomacy often reduced us to victims of blackmail. Large contributions often lined the pockets of local politicians. They failed to achieve their goal as foreign aid. In the spate of ensuing corruption scandals, they tainted Taipei's image. The result was a loss of both wealth and honor.
Beijing knew Taipei would be forced to compromise in order to retain its allies. Beijing and Taipei would often both offer money and deliver ultimatums. Taipei would spend freely. Oversight of these aid packages would be difficult. One could never determined where the aid would wind up. We never knew who had embezzled the funds and never dared to demand an accounting.
Vast sums were paid out to retain diplomatic allies. But all we received in return was a loss of national dignity, damage to our international image, and the loss of hard-earned taxpayer dollars. The result was clearly harmful to our overall national interests. We had to make a fresh start. But in the past Beijing stood in Taipei's way. We were forced to continue playing this meaningless game.
The main reason President Ma can now say no to such unreasonable demands, is the easing of cross-Strait relations. The two sides have now reached a tacit understanding not to steal each others' allies. Beijing has given the cold shoulder to several nations which have habitually threatened to break relations with Taipei and establish relations with Beijing. Beijing has also turned down El Salvador's invitation to send representatives to its presdential inauguration. When President of El Salvador Mauricio Funes expressed the desire to develop economic and trade relations with mainland China, Ma Ying-jeou made clear he has "no objections," and that Taipei and Beijing have such relations too. Clearly the two sides have jettisoned their previous zero-sum competition in the international arena. Other countries must understand this and adapt to it.
Such a change, has allowed both sides to forsake checkbook diplomacy. It has allowed the relationship between Taipei and its allies to finally return to normal, The two sides must seek substantive consensus, and demonstrate mutual respect. Beijing must also understand that a diplomatic truce is not a favor to Taiwan, but rather a fresh start for cross-Strait relations.
The spotlight was on Christine Chow. During her first state visit she made a concerted effort to fulfill her assigned role. She threw herself into her interactions with the local population. Chow, who has long maintained a low profile and has never attempted to curry favor with the media, demonstrated an authentic and natural style of her own. This is something rare in the political arena, and something the people deeply appreciate.
In conclusion, President Ma's "Voyage of Harmony" could be termed a ringing success. We hope he will continue implementing his new foreign policy, and correcting outdated foreign aid practices. We hope the two sides can deepen cross-Strait reconciliation. We hope both sides will demonstrate mutual respect, and contemplate the future with vision and courage.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.05
社論－從活路外交到正常外交
本報訊
馬英九總統一行結束中美洲的訪問行程返抵國門，這次的「久睦之旅」不僅鞏固了友邦的邦誼，更以具體行動展現出全新的外交思維與作為。
馬總統偕夫人周美青與一百多位訪問團成員，此行先後走訪貝里斯、薩爾瓦多與瓜地馬拉，去程過境美國洛杉磯，回程過境西雅圖。這是馬總統就任後第二次出訪，也是第一夫人周美青首次參與國事訪問。
和上次比較，這次的訪問「熱鬧」得多，也出現若干意外狀況。不但在貝里斯遇上停電，還在瓜地馬拉發生馬總統的配槍隨扈遭到瓜國安全單位阻擋事件。而尼加拉瓜總統奧蒂嘉三度延宕與馬總統的會晤後，我方主動取消會面。在與美國國務卿希拉蕊寒暄時，馬總統自我介紹為「台灣的總統」，也引發國內政壇議論紛紛。
其實隨扈的衝突事件，比較是雙方安全單位溝通不良與瓜國相關人員處理不當的問題，只是枝節，過了就過了，不致影響到兩國關係。而馬總統自我介紹為「台灣的總統」，也是很常見的用語，畢竟國際對台灣之名較熟識，不必太予政治解讀。
比較值得注意的是，就任一年以來，馬英九總統所推行的「活路外交」，在這次出訪中，更加清楚明確地表達出和以往迥然不同的理念。往昔堅持零和遊戲的「烽火外交」，總是選擇成功率最低的戰場，以莽撞挑釁的策略，把台灣衝撞得頭破血流，國際處境也日益退縮。而馬總統扭轉了外交政策的基本思維模式和操作策略，藉著兩岸走向和解，也讓和兩岸關係一體兩面的外交揚棄你死我活的零和遊戲，不再和中共耗費資源搶奪邦交國，也不再拿著支票簿任邦交國予取予求。
在貝里斯時，馬總統也親自說明了援外五大策略，以消除極度貧窮及飢餓、加強人力資源開發、對抗傳染病、推動環境永續發展、強化全球發展夥伴為主要方向。任何援外支出必須先有計畫才有預算，不會有不該花的錢，依循「目標要正當、過程要合法、執行要有效」原則，正派辦外交，才會贏得尊重。
這樣的改變來得正是時候。因為，台灣過去的支票簿外交，不但常淪為被敲詐的冤大頭，大筆捐款還常常被當地政客納入私囊。既沒有達到援助目的，又在連番爆發貪汙醜聞後，台灣的形象也無辜遭到牽連，落得名財兩失。
而之所以如此，歸根結柢，是對方吃定了台灣為保邦交而不得不委屈求全，經常兩邊開價要脅。而花了大錢的台灣，對援助計畫的執行難以監督，援助款項的去向也無從考核，即使最後錢不知道被Ａ到哪裡去了，也不敢翻臉追查。
這種只為了維持邦交國數字，而損失國家尊嚴、國際形象及納稅人血汗錢的做法，加減相抵，顯然已經對整體國家利益造成了負面的損傷，亟待改弦更張。但過去因為中共全力封殺台灣外交空間，我們不得不勉力繼續這樣缺乏意義的遊戲。
馬總統現在之所以有本錢對不合理的需索說不，主要還是兩岸關係和緩，雙方達成互不挖牆腳的默契。幾個仍然習慣性放話要和中共建交的國家，至今未獲中共搭理，薩爾瓦多邀請中國共產黨派代表出席總統就職典禮，也遭到婉拒。當薩爾瓦多總統富內斯表示希望和中國大陸發展經貿關係時，馬英九還明確表示「不反對」，而且台灣和大陸也有交流。很顯然的，兩岸在國際間已經拋下了過去的零和競爭，其他國家必須重新理解及適應。
這樣的改變，除了讓兩岸擺脫金錢外交外，也讓台灣與友邦的關係終於能回歸到正常的基本面，就雙方實質需要尋求共識，在平等尊重中相互扶持。而中共也應該理解到，外交休兵不是在給予台灣恩惠，而是在給兩岸關係一個重新開始的機會。
這次鋒頭最健的，可能反而是周美青了。第一次出訪的她努力扮好自己的角色，手舞足蹈地投入表演並親切地與當地民眾互動。低調而且無意討好媒體的她，所展現的真實與自然作風，為政壇所少見，因此很能得到民眾的欣賞。
總結而言，馬總統這次的「久睦之旅」堪稱圓滿成功，我們希望新的外交政策能繼續落實，矯正已過時的援外作法。也期望兩岸和解的氣氛能繼續深化，讓雙方都能以尊重、視野與勇氣思考全新的未來。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 5, 2009
President Ma Ying-jeou has concluded his state visit to Central America and returned home. His "Voyage for Harmony" consolidated the support of ROC allies. It also demonstrated, through concrete action, Ma's new diplomatic thinking and practices.
President Ma, his wife Christine Chow, and over 100 members of his delegation visited Belize, El Salvador, and Guatemala. On the way there they transited Los Angeles. On the way back they transited Seattle. This is the second state visit President Ma has embarked upon since taking office. It is also the first time the First Lady Christine Chow took part in a state visit.
Compared to last time, this visit was much livelier. A number of surprises arose. Belize experienced a power failure. President Ma's armed bodyguard was detained by Guatemalan security services. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega postponed his meeting with President Ma three times, and the ROC decided to cancel the meeting altogether. When Ma greeted U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, he introduced himself as "Taiwan's president." This also provoked domestic political debate.
In fact the incident over Ma's bodyguard was minor. Once it was over, it was over. It was merely the result of a miscommunication between the security services of both nations, and a mishandling of the situtation by Guatemalan officials. It will not affect relations between the two nations. President Ma introduced himself as "Taiwan's president." This is also very common. After all, the international community more is familiar with the name Taiwan. It is not necessary to read too much into this.
President Ma Ying-jeou took office a year ago. During this visit his "huo lu wai jiao," i.e., "Viable Diplomacy," or "Flexible Diplomacy," clearly distinguished itself from the diplomacy of the past. Past "Scorched Earth Diplomacy" called for the playing of zero-sum games and the fighting of battles that cannot be won. It was a strategy of reckless provocation. Taipei butted its head against a brick wall until it was left broken and bleeding. Its plight within the international community worsened. President Ma's foreign policy reversed this manner of thinking and operating. It moved toward cross-Strait reconciliation. It allowed the two sides to renounce their life or death zero-sum game. It allowed Taipei to stop squandering resources fighting over allies with Beijing. It allowed Taipei to stop writing huge checks to buy allies.
While In Belize, President Ma explained his five major foreign aid goals. These include eliminating extreme poverty and hunger, strengthening human resources development, fighting infectious diseases, promoting environmentally sustainable development, and strengthening global partnerships. Foreign aid programs require money. Only money that must be spent will be spent. Diplomacy will be forthright. Its "goals must be legitimate, its procedures must be lawful, its implementation must be effective." Only this will win others' respect.
Such a change has come at just the right time. Our past policy of checkbook diplomacy often reduced us to victims of blackmail. Large contributions often lined the pockets of local politicians. They failed to achieve their goal as foreign aid. In the spate of ensuing corruption scandals, they tainted Taipei's image. The result was a loss of both wealth and honor.
Beijing knew Taipei would be forced to compromise in order to retain its allies. Beijing and Taipei would often both offer money and deliver ultimatums. Taipei would spend freely. Oversight of these aid packages would be difficult. One could never determined where the aid would wind up. We never knew who had embezzled the funds and never dared to demand an accounting.
Vast sums were paid out to retain diplomatic allies. But all we received in return was a loss of national dignity, damage to our international image, and the loss of hard-earned taxpayer dollars. The result was clearly harmful to our overall national interests. We had to make a fresh start. But in the past Beijing stood in Taipei's way. We were forced to continue playing this meaningless game.
The main reason President Ma can now say no to such unreasonable demands, is the easing of cross-Strait relations. The two sides have now reached a tacit understanding not to steal each others' allies. Beijing has given the cold shoulder to several nations which have habitually threatened to break relations with Taipei and establish relations with Beijing. Beijing has also turned down El Salvador's invitation to send representatives to its presdential inauguration. When President of El Salvador Mauricio Funes expressed the desire to develop economic and trade relations with mainland China, Ma Ying-jeou made clear he has "no objections," and that Taipei and Beijing have such relations too. Clearly the two sides have jettisoned their previous zero-sum competition in the international arena. Other countries must understand this and adapt to it.
Such a change, has allowed both sides to forsake checkbook diplomacy. It has allowed the relationship between Taipei and its allies to finally return to normal, The two sides must seek substantive consensus, and demonstrate mutual respect. Beijing must also understand that a diplomatic truce is not a favor to Taiwan, but rather a fresh start for cross-Strait relations.
The spotlight was on Christine Chow. During her first state visit she made a concerted effort to fulfill her assigned role. She threw herself into her interactions with the local population. Chow, who has long maintained a low profile and has never attempted to curry favor with the media, demonstrated an authentic and natural style of her own. This is something rare in the political arena, and something the people deeply appreciate.
In conclusion, President Ma's "Voyage of Harmony" could be termed a ringing success. We hope he will continue implementing his new foreign policy, and correcting outdated foreign aid practices. We hope the two sides can deepen cross-Strait reconciliation. We hope both sides will demonstrate mutual respect, and contemplate the future with vision and courage.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.06.05
社論－從活路外交到正常外交
本報訊
馬英九總統一行結束中美洲的訪問行程返抵國門，這次的「久睦之旅」不僅鞏固了友邦的邦誼，更以具體行動展現出全新的外交思維與作為。
馬總統偕夫人周美青與一百多位訪問團成員，此行先後走訪貝里斯、薩爾瓦多與瓜地馬拉，去程過境美國洛杉磯，回程過境西雅圖。這是馬總統就任後第二次出訪，也是第一夫人周美青首次參與國事訪問。
和上次比較，這次的訪問「熱鬧」得多，也出現若干意外狀況。不但在貝里斯遇上停電，還在瓜地馬拉發生馬總統的配槍隨扈遭到瓜國安全單位阻擋事件。而尼加拉瓜總統奧蒂嘉三度延宕與馬總統的會晤後，我方主動取消會面。在與美國國務卿希拉蕊寒暄時，馬總統自我介紹為「台灣的總統」，也引發國內政壇議論紛紛。
其實隨扈的衝突事件，比較是雙方安全單位溝通不良與瓜國相關人員處理不當的問題，只是枝節，過了就過了，不致影響到兩國關係。而馬總統自我介紹為「台灣的總統」，也是很常見的用語，畢竟國際對台灣之名較熟識，不必太予政治解讀。
比較值得注意的是，就任一年以來，馬英九總統所推行的「活路外交」，在這次出訪中，更加清楚明確地表達出和以往迥然不同的理念。往昔堅持零和遊戲的「烽火外交」，總是選擇成功率最低的戰場，以莽撞挑釁的策略，把台灣衝撞得頭破血流，國際處境也日益退縮。而馬總統扭轉了外交政策的基本思維模式和操作策略，藉著兩岸走向和解，也讓和兩岸關係一體兩面的外交揚棄你死我活的零和遊戲，不再和中共耗費資源搶奪邦交國，也不再拿著支票簿任邦交國予取予求。
在貝里斯時，馬總統也親自說明了援外五大策略，以消除極度貧窮及飢餓、加強人力資源開發、對抗傳染病、推動環境永續發展、強化全球發展夥伴為主要方向。任何援外支出必須先有計畫才有預算，不會有不該花的錢，依循「目標要正當、過程要合法、執行要有效」原則，正派辦外交，才會贏得尊重。
這樣的改變來得正是時候。因為，台灣過去的支票簿外交，不但常淪為被敲詐的冤大頭，大筆捐款還常常被當地政客納入私囊。既沒有達到援助目的，又在連番爆發貪汙醜聞後，台灣的形象也無辜遭到牽連，落得名財兩失。
而之所以如此，歸根結柢，是對方吃定了台灣為保邦交而不得不委屈求全，經常兩邊開價要脅。而花了大錢的台灣，對援助計畫的執行難以監督，援助款項的去向也無從考核，即使最後錢不知道被Ａ到哪裡去了，也不敢翻臉追查。
這種只為了維持邦交國數字，而損失國家尊嚴、國際形象及納稅人血汗錢的做法，加減相抵，顯然已經對整體國家利益造成了負面的損傷，亟待改弦更張。但過去因為中共全力封殺台灣外交空間，我們不得不勉力繼續這樣缺乏意義的遊戲。
馬總統現在之所以有本錢對不合理的需索說不，主要還是兩岸關係和緩，雙方達成互不挖牆腳的默契。幾個仍然習慣性放話要和中共建交的國家，至今未獲中共搭理，薩爾瓦多邀請中國共產黨派代表出席總統就職典禮，也遭到婉拒。當薩爾瓦多總統富內斯表示希望和中國大陸發展經貿關係時，馬英九還明確表示「不反對」，而且台灣和大陸也有交流。很顯然的，兩岸在國際間已經拋下了過去的零和競爭，其他國家必須重新理解及適應。
這樣的改變，除了讓兩岸擺脫金錢外交外，也讓台灣與友邦的關係終於能回歸到正常的基本面，就雙方實質需要尋求共識，在平等尊重中相互扶持。而中共也應該理解到，外交休兵不是在給予台灣恩惠，而是在給兩岸關係一個重新開始的機會。
這次鋒頭最健的，可能反而是周美青了。第一次出訪的她努力扮好自己的角色，手舞足蹈地投入表演並親切地與當地民眾互動。低調而且無意討好媒體的她，所展現的真實與自然作風，為政壇所少見，因此很能得到民眾的欣賞。
總結而言，馬總統這次的「久睦之旅」堪稱圓滿成功，我們希望新的外交政策能繼續落實，矯正已過時的援外作法。也期望兩岸和解的氣氛能繼續深化，讓雙方都能以尊重、視野與勇氣思考全新的未來。
Thursday, June 4, 2009
The NCC's Cognitive Dissonance
The NCC's Cognitive Dissonance
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 4, 2009
The National Communications Commission (NCC) passed a seven-point amendment changing the directors and supervisors of Chung Tien Television (CTI TV) and the China Television Company (CTV). This provoked intense official and public criticism. Charges and countercharges of "illegal abuse of power" and "immoral behavior" were bandied back and forth. Serious doubts were cast on the NCC's authority. The China Times Group's public image was also damaged.
The main reason the "Twin Chinas Case" has come to this is that a small number of NCC Commissioners acted willfully. They failed to operate within to the law. They exceeded the limits of the law. As a result applicants were disgruntled. They also failed to gain the support of the community. This is the NCC's biggest problem. It wields immense power and has grand ambitions. But it refuses to operate within the law. Consequently its ideals have remained unfulfilled. It can neither advance nor retreat. It has lost its focus.
The China Times Group launched a counter-attack. Through proxies, it published ads lambasting specific Commissioners. Its methods were unorthodox. This led the NCC to criticize its "manner of doing business." But the root of the problem was the NCC's hasty decision-making. It even disparaged new investors, referring to them as "rice dumpling vendors." Why else would the concerned parties launch such a fierce counter-attack? The NCC criticized the China Times Group coverage of the controversy as "irrational and unbalanced." But one reaps what one sows. The NCC cannot escape blame.
Suppose the NCC had allowed the Tu family to simultaneously own the "Three Chinas?" Why does it have a problem with the Tsai family taking them over now? The provisions of the Broadcasting Law have not changed. Can NCC Commissioners make up their own regulations? Can they allow their individual whims to override the law? The NCC feels it must speak out against investors from other industries buying into the media. But even so, it must offer a logical and persuasive case for its position. The NCC exceeded its authority. It insulted new investors. It insulted many people within the media industry. This hardly accords with the NCC's role as a neutral mediator.
The NCC was established over three years ago. Yet it is still referred to by its English acronym. It still lacks a catchy sounding name in Chinese. This suggests it still has not found public acceptance. Ever since the NCC was established, the public has had high expectations. But the NCC has failed to understand its role, and has failed to fulfill its duties. The "Twin Chinas case" is one example. The earlier TVBS case is another. It mishandled the case of provocative video game commercials. The crux of the problem is that although the NCC has enormous power, it lacks managerial experience and expertise. As a result, whenever it draws its sword, it wounds either someone else or itself.
Take the "Twin Chinas case." Only three Commissioners were able to dicate the rulings of the seven member Commission. Clearly its organization contains a number of structural defects. These have led to defective judgments. For an entity that wields such immense power, this is a serious problem. It is rumored that one or two Commissioners obssessed with "media reform" were the cause of its arbitrary decision-making. If so, the NCC must find ways to address the problem of its own biases. The public of course would like to see officials retain their reformist ideals. But the NCC is not a social reform group. It is a government agency. Its Commissioners may harbor reformist ideals. But they must have the patience to change the media and change the laws. They must not resort to arbitrary means outside the system.
Furthermore, if NCC Commissioners focus only on "monitoring the media," they are defining their duties too narrowly. Society and times change. The NCC's management responsibilities in the world of the Internet are now greater than ever. They include coping with rampant telephone fraud, all-pervasive spam, and the appropriate allocation of telecommunications resources and the rational setting of telecommunications fees. These are all huge issues that affect the livelihood of the general public. They have attracted public attention. They require greater effort by NCC Commissioners. The problem of pirate radio stations has remained unresolved for years. The content of many television shows is vulgar or even fraudulent. But the NCC has turned a blind eye to them. So-called media reformers are concerned about "rice dumpling vendors" buying into the television industry. Yet they have absolutely no reaction to the corruption that threatens to indundate them. Doesn't this indicate some cognitive dissonance regarding their job definition?
The NCC treated the new investors in the "Twin Chinas case" as delinquents. It violated the spirit of the law. This led to today's asymmetrical warfare. This is hardly something the public wants to see. We recommend that the two sides return to the table. The China Times Group may seek administrative relief. The NCC should make a stronger case or re-examine the case. Only then can this conflict between the government and the public end in a lawful and reasonable manner.
NCC的不對稱認知引發不對稱戰爭
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.04 06:02 am
國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ）以七點「附帶決議」通過中天、中視董監事變更案，引發官民猛烈攻防。在你罵我「違法濫權」、我罵你「不道德」的砲火中，ＮＣＣ的權威受到嚴重質疑，中時集團的媒體形象也不無損傷。
「雙中案」之所以演變至此，主要原因在少數ＮＣＣ委員意欲有所作為，卻未能持守依法行政的基本原則。超越法制勉強而為的結果，不僅申請人難以心服，也未能爭取到社會大眾的支持。這恐怕正是ＮＣＣ本身最大的困境：握有偌大的權力，也懷抱大志，卻不知依法行政，終致理想蹈空，進退失據。
就媒體而言，中時集團除多方發動反擊，並以刊登人頭廣告的方式大肆抨擊特定委員，作法殊非尋常，已引致ＮＣＣ對其「經營風格」的批評。但從源頭看，若非ＮＣＣ草率決策，甚至以「賣米?的」之貶抑詞歧視新投資人，當事人怎會採取如此激烈的反擊？ＮＣＣ批中時集團的報導「違反理性衡平」，但惡質引發惡質，ＮＣＣ亦難辭其咎。
試想，如果上次ＮＣＣ核准余家可同時持有「三中」，為何這次蔡家接手就有問題？如果廣電法的規定未變，ＮＣＣ委員憑什麼可以自創規定，將個人意志置於法律之上？就算ＮＣＣ認為有必要對「異業」跨業投資媒體作出表態，也應提出符合外界認知的論述和邏輯，而不是訂出不符常情的附帶規範。何況，ＮＣＣ表態過當，除羞辱了新投資人，更傷及眾多相關媒體工作者的自尊，這又豈符合ＮＣＣ作為管理人應有的中立原則？
成立逾三年的ＮＣＣ，如今還在使用英文縮寫，仍未產生一個全民琅琅上口的本土稱呼，可見其移植而來的概念仍未融入台灣的水土。成立以來，ＮＣＣ承受社會極高的期待，但其角色認知及決策作為有時卻與期待有所落差，除了雙中案，過去的ＴＶＢＳ案，乃至日前的清涼電玩廣告處分案均如此。癥結就在，ＮＣＣ雖握有極大的權力，卻缺乏成熟的管制文化，以致刀一出鞘，不是傷人就是自傷。
以這次的「雙中案」為例，不過是三個委員的堅持，卻能左右七人委員會的決定，可見其內部某種結構性的不對稱，導致其終極決策的不對稱。這對一個握有偌大權力的機構而言，其實是嚴重的問題。若果真如傳言，因一二委員特別執著於「媒體改造」，而造成決策的專斷與失衡，則ＮＣＣ自需設法改善其自身偏倚的問題。外界當然樂意看到官員抱持改革的理想，但ＮＣＣ畢竟不是社會運動團體，而是政府公權力機構；委員的改革理想，必須耐心打造足以改變媒體生態的法律環境，而不是任意訴諸體制外手段。
進一步說，ＮＣＣ委員若只將關注焦點放在「監督媒體」，亦未免太窄化了己身的職責。隨著社會及時代的變遷，ＮＣＣ對於通訊及網路世界的管理職責也越來越重大，包括詐騙電話的猖獗，垃圾郵件的無孔不入，乃至電信資源的合理分配及電信資費的合理化，在在都是影響民生大眾更鉅的議題，也更受民眾關注，值得ＮＣＣ委員多下功夫。何況，地下電台林立的問題多少年懸而未決，遑論許多電視節目內容低俗、充斥偽詐，ＮＣＣ卻視若無睹。所謂媒體改造派的委員若對一位「賣米? 的」商人入主電視耿耿於懷，卻對現實環境中四溢的腥臭腐敗毫無反應，這豈非職務認知太過失衡？
ＮＣＣ將雙中案新投資人當成「虞犯」對待，並不符合依法行政的精神；雙方演成今天的不對稱戰爭，更非外界所樂見。我們建議，雙方不妨回歸體制，中時集團可以尋求行政救濟，ＮＣＣ則補強論述或重新審核。如此，這齣官民衝突大戲，才有可能合法合理地收場。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 4, 2009
The National Communications Commission (NCC) passed a seven-point amendment changing the directors and supervisors of Chung Tien Television (CTI TV) and the China Television Company (CTV). This provoked intense official and public criticism. Charges and countercharges of "illegal abuse of power" and "immoral behavior" were bandied back and forth. Serious doubts were cast on the NCC's authority. The China Times Group's public image was also damaged.
The main reason the "Twin Chinas Case" has come to this is that a small number of NCC Commissioners acted willfully. They failed to operate within to the law. They exceeded the limits of the law. As a result applicants were disgruntled. They also failed to gain the support of the community. This is the NCC's biggest problem. It wields immense power and has grand ambitions. But it refuses to operate within the law. Consequently its ideals have remained unfulfilled. It can neither advance nor retreat. It has lost its focus.
The China Times Group launched a counter-attack. Through proxies, it published ads lambasting specific Commissioners. Its methods were unorthodox. This led the NCC to criticize its "manner of doing business." But the root of the problem was the NCC's hasty decision-making. It even disparaged new investors, referring to them as "rice dumpling vendors." Why else would the concerned parties launch such a fierce counter-attack? The NCC criticized the China Times Group coverage of the controversy as "irrational and unbalanced." But one reaps what one sows. The NCC cannot escape blame.
Suppose the NCC had allowed the Tu family to simultaneously own the "Three Chinas?" Why does it have a problem with the Tsai family taking them over now? The provisions of the Broadcasting Law have not changed. Can NCC Commissioners make up their own regulations? Can they allow their individual whims to override the law? The NCC feels it must speak out against investors from other industries buying into the media. But even so, it must offer a logical and persuasive case for its position. The NCC exceeded its authority. It insulted new investors. It insulted many people within the media industry. This hardly accords with the NCC's role as a neutral mediator.
The NCC was established over three years ago. Yet it is still referred to by its English acronym. It still lacks a catchy sounding name in Chinese. This suggests it still has not found public acceptance. Ever since the NCC was established, the public has had high expectations. But the NCC has failed to understand its role, and has failed to fulfill its duties. The "Twin Chinas case" is one example. The earlier TVBS case is another. It mishandled the case of provocative video game commercials. The crux of the problem is that although the NCC has enormous power, it lacks managerial experience and expertise. As a result, whenever it draws its sword, it wounds either someone else or itself.
Take the "Twin Chinas case." Only three Commissioners were able to dicate the rulings of the seven member Commission. Clearly its organization contains a number of structural defects. These have led to defective judgments. For an entity that wields such immense power, this is a serious problem. It is rumored that one or two Commissioners obssessed with "media reform" were the cause of its arbitrary decision-making. If so, the NCC must find ways to address the problem of its own biases. The public of course would like to see officials retain their reformist ideals. But the NCC is not a social reform group. It is a government agency. Its Commissioners may harbor reformist ideals. But they must have the patience to change the media and change the laws. They must not resort to arbitrary means outside the system.
Furthermore, if NCC Commissioners focus only on "monitoring the media," they are defining their duties too narrowly. Society and times change. The NCC's management responsibilities in the world of the Internet are now greater than ever. They include coping with rampant telephone fraud, all-pervasive spam, and the appropriate allocation of telecommunications resources and the rational setting of telecommunications fees. These are all huge issues that affect the livelihood of the general public. They have attracted public attention. They require greater effort by NCC Commissioners. The problem of pirate radio stations has remained unresolved for years. The content of many television shows is vulgar or even fraudulent. But the NCC has turned a blind eye to them. So-called media reformers are concerned about "rice dumpling vendors" buying into the television industry. Yet they have absolutely no reaction to the corruption that threatens to indundate them. Doesn't this indicate some cognitive dissonance regarding their job definition?
The NCC treated the new investors in the "Twin Chinas case" as delinquents. It violated the spirit of the law. This led to today's asymmetrical warfare. This is hardly something the public wants to see. We recommend that the two sides return to the table. The China Times Group may seek administrative relief. The NCC should make a stronger case or re-examine the case. Only then can this conflict between the government and the public end in a lawful and reasonable manner.
NCC的不對稱認知引發不對稱戰爭
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.04 06:02 am
國家通訊傳播委員會（ＮＣＣ）以七點「附帶決議」通過中天、中視董監事變更案，引發官民猛烈攻防。在你罵我「違法濫權」、我罵你「不道德」的砲火中，ＮＣＣ的權威受到嚴重質疑，中時集團的媒體形象也不無損傷。
「雙中案」之所以演變至此，主要原因在少數ＮＣＣ委員意欲有所作為，卻未能持守依法行政的基本原則。超越法制勉強而為的結果，不僅申請人難以心服，也未能爭取到社會大眾的支持。這恐怕正是ＮＣＣ本身最大的困境：握有偌大的權力，也懷抱大志，卻不知依法行政，終致理想蹈空，進退失據。
就媒體而言，中時集團除多方發動反擊，並以刊登人頭廣告的方式大肆抨擊特定委員，作法殊非尋常，已引致ＮＣＣ對其「經營風格」的批評。但從源頭看，若非ＮＣＣ草率決策，甚至以「賣米?的」之貶抑詞歧視新投資人，當事人怎會採取如此激烈的反擊？ＮＣＣ批中時集團的報導「違反理性衡平」，但惡質引發惡質，ＮＣＣ亦難辭其咎。
試想，如果上次ＮＣＣ核准余家可同時持有「三中」，為何這次蔡家接手就有問題？如果廣電法的規定未變，ＮＣＣ委員憑什麼可以自創規定，將個人意志置於法律之上？就算ＮＣＣ認為有必要對「異業」跨業投資媒體作出表態，也應提出符合外界認知的論述和邏輯，而不是訂出不符常情的附帶規範。何況，ＮＣＣ表態過當，除羞辱了新投資人，更傷及眾多相關媒體工作者的自尊，這又豈符合ＮＣＣ作為管理人應有的中立原則？
成立逾三年的ＮＣＣ，如今還在使用英文縮寫，仍未產生一個全民琅琅上口的本土稱呼，可見其移植而來的概念仍未融入台灣的水土。成立以來，ＮＣＣ承受社會極高的期待，但其角色認知及決策作為有時卻與期待有所落差，除了雙中案，過去的ＴＶＢＳ案，乃至日前的清涼電玩廣告處分案均如此。癥結就在，ＮＣＣ雖握有極大的權力，卻缺乏成熟的管制文化，以致刀一出鞘，不是傷人就是自傷。
以這次的「雙中案」為例，不過是三個委員的堅持，卻能左右七人委員會的決定，可見其內部某種結構性的不對稱，導致其終極決策的不對稱。這對一個握有偌大權力的機構而言，其實是嚴重的問題。若果真如傳言，因一二委員特別執著於「媒體改造」，而造成決策的專斷與失衡，則ＮＣＣ自需設法改善其自身偏倚的問題。外界當然樂意看到官員抱持改革的理想，但ＮＣＣ畢竟不是社會運動團體，而是政府公權力機構；委員的改革理想，必須耐心打造足以改變媒體生態的法律環境，而不是任意訴諸體制外手段。
進一步說，ＮＣＣ委員若只將關注焦點放在「監督媒體」，亦未免太窄化了己身的職責。隨著社會及時代的變遷，ＮＣＣ對於通訊及網路世界的管理職責也越來越重大，包括詐騙電話的猖獗，垃圾郵件的無孔不入，乃至電信資源的合理分配及電信資費的合理化，在在都是影響民生大眾更鉅的議題，也更受民眾關注，值得ＮＣＣ委員多下功夫。何況，地下電台林立的問題多少年懸而未決，遑論許多電視節目內容低俗、充斥偽詐，ＮＣＣ卻視若無睹。所謂媒體改造派的委員若對一位「賣米? 的」商人入主電視耿耿於懷，卻對現實環境中四溢的腥臭腐敗毫無反應，這豈非職務認知太過失衡？
ＮＣＣ將雙中案新投資人當成「虞犯」對待，並不符合依法行政的精神；雙方演成今天的不對稱戰爭，更非外界所樂見。我們建議，雙方不妨回歸體制，中時集團可以尋求行政救濟，ＮＣＣ則補強論述或重新審核。如此，這齣官民衝突大戲，才有可能合法合理地收場。
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