The Politics of Spite and the Democracy of Hatred
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 13, 2009
DPP Taipei City Council Member Hung Chien-yi and an FTV reporter are suspected of destroying an entrance gate to the Maokung Cable Car. Their motive? To fabricate an excuse to lambast the Taipei City Government. The city government has reported the crime to the police and supplied evidence in the form of video recordings. That dirty politics has descended to this level is mind-boggling.
The City of Chicago failed to win its bid to hold the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. Amazingly conservatives in the United States were overjoyed. They shouted: "Obama lost! Obama lost!" Nobel laureate in economics Paul Krugman spoke of the "politics of spite." He likened it to the childish behavior of a 13-year-old child.
Because they hated Obama, conservatives wished his administration ill. They even viewed the U.S. defeat in its bid for the Olympics as an occasion for celebration. The sentiments of some in the Republican party can only be described as twisted. Such scenarios are unfortunately all too familiar to people on Taiwan. People on Taiwan have lived amidst the politics of spite for years. Their plight is a hundred times more serious. After all, the United States' bid for the Olympics failed. The Republicans had reason to deride Obama. By contrast Hung Chien-yi's act of sabotage was sheer spite.
Democracy has regressed. Its downward trajectory is not hard to trace. When Obama was elected president, the world felt the United States had reclaimed some of its lost spirit. But the defeated Republican Party began behaving ever more childishly. Its behavior is dong America's democracy no good whatsoever. On Taiwan, the second change in ruling parties was a big step for democracy. But the defeated Democratic Progressive Party seems to have forgotten that politics is a mission that is supposed to serve the people. Instead it does everything possible to make life difficult for the ruling administration. It even spreads rumors and fabricates incidents. It seems to feel that by doing so it can exact some measure of revenge. What becomes of the national interest when partisan infighting descends to such levels?
Over the past few months, the ruling and opposition parties have seldom reached a consensus on important national issues. They have seldom engaged in shared decision-making. Interaction between the two parties has involved making mountains out of molehills. The most obvious example is how the Green Camp took advantage of the 8/8 Floods to invite the Dalai Lama to Taiwan, hoping to make trouble for the ruling KMT and to undermine cross-Strait relations. In effect it "took advantage of the floods to engage in looting." Its appetite whetted by the Dalai Lama's visit, it then invited Rebiyah Kadeer and Li Hongzhi. During the DPP's eight years in office, it never even mentioned Xinjiang. Now, in an effort to embarrass the Ma administration, it is suddenly trumpeting Rebiyah Kadeer as a champion of human rights, as if by doing so it could add a little shine to the Green Camp's halo. But such short-sighted moves are just a little too heavy handed.
Democracy requires checks and balances. But checks and balances is not synonymous with obstructionism. That is an outright distortion of the meaning of checks and balances. The purpose of checks and balances to avoid the monopolization of political power by an elite. Taiwan's current problem is not any lack of checks and balances. Its problem is obstructionism running wild, and the politics of spite running amok. Its problme is political gridlock. Many national policies require rational discussion. But the opposition DPP refuses to engage in dialogue. Instead it invests all its energy in inciting artificial controversies over irrelevancies, squandering the energies of the nation and the people. Over time this has weakened the nation's momentum. Mutual hatreds and suspicions have been intensified, tarnishing the nation's reputation.
Such is the damage inflicted by the politics of spite. When politicians' hearts are consumed with jealousy and hatred, they forget the purpose of democracy. They even forget the value of right and wrong. When Chicago lost its bid for the Olympics, Republicans actually cheered. This is even more frightening than anti-American sentiment. Meanwhile, during the 8/8 Flood on Taiwan, the Green Camp accused the Ma administration of incompetence. The Blue Camp accused Green Camp led local governments of dereliction of duty. Under the politics of spite, who cares about the victims? Who bothers to uncover the causes of the disaster?
Now look at Chen Shui-bian. In order to escape incarceration, he has actually claimed that during his two terms in office, he was "acting on orders from the United States." He demoted Taiwan to the level of a territory administered by the United States Military Government. The "Son of Taiwan," after eight years of emptying out the nation's coffers, has in one fell swoop repudiated the nation's sovereignty. This sets a new low for the politics of spite.
The DPP was in power for eight years, during which it incited the "democracy of hatred." Now that it is again in the opposition, it is again resorting to "obstructionism motivated by spite." It refuses to play a constructive role within the framework of democracy. The Green Camp needs to engage in some serious soul-searching over Hung Chien-yi's antics. The "politics of spite" and the "democracy of hatred" have now reached new lows.
從「惡意政治」到「仇恨民主」
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.13 04:28 am
民進黨籍台北市議員洪健益，涉嫌率同民視記者破壞貓纜門禁，製造假新聞，攻擊台北市政府；市府已檢具錄影證據，向警方報案。政治鬥爭搞到這種地步，簡直匪夷所思。
芝加哥市未能爭取到二○一六年的夏季奧運主辦權，美國保守陣營人士竟大喜過望，歡呼：「歐巴馬輸了！歐巴馬輸了！」諾貝爾經濟獎得主克魯曼把這種現象稱為「惡意政治」，認為是十三歲孩童的幼稚行為。
因為討厭歐巴馬，所以不願看到他施政順利，乃至連美國申奧失利都當成可喜可賀之事，共和黨陣營如此扭曲的心情，只能以「錯亂」形容。然而，這樣的場景，對台灣而言一點都不陌生，民眾生活在這種惡意對立的政治氛圍中已經多年，情況且更嚴重百倍。美國申奧失敗，共和黨所揶揄者畢竟尚有所本；但洪健益製造這樣的「腳尾飯」，卻是居心叵測。
民主會退化，其軌跡不難追尋。歐巴馬當選總統，被世界認為是重拾了遺失的美國精神；但挫敗的共和黨因妒恨而出現幼稚的杯葛行為，而且愈演愈烈，這對美國民主不可能帶來什麼好處。在台灣，政黨兩度輪替原是民主的一大步，但失去政權的民進黨似乎渾然忘了政治志業旨在服務人民，只是千方百計要使對手難堪，甚至不惜造謠做假，彷彿如此自己即有扳回一城的快感。台灣的利益，能靠朝野相互羞辱來維持嗎？
回顧過去數月，朝野兩黨幾乎不曾在國家重要議題上有過共識或形成什麼共同決策；雙方的互動，大都在一些無足輕重的議題上作無謂的消耗。最明顯的例子，就是綠營趁著八八水災邀請達賴來台，為執政黨鋪陳的兩岸關係製造麻煩；「趁水打劫」後食髓知味，又陸續傳出邀訪熱比婭及李洪志訪台的計畫。其實，民進黨執政八年，從未談過新疆；如今只為了給馬政府難堪，立即將熱比婭奉為人權鬥士，好似如此即可誇耀綠營的民主光環。這種短線算計，未免太過粗糙。
的確，民主需要制衡，但若把制衡和杯葛畫上等號，那是完全曲解了制衡。制衡的目的，在避免權力的傾斜，避免政治被少數人壟斷；但台灣目前的問題不在缺乏制衡，而在杯葛氾濫、惡意政治橫行，使民主癱瘓變調。許多需要理性討論的國家政策，在野黨拒絕對話或溝通，卻把全副精神放在一些無足輕重的議題上挑激彼此的差異和對立，耗喪國家和人民的大量心力。久而久之，台灣前進的動力減弱，人民彼此猜忌仇恨的情緒變強，國家的光榮感也日漸消磨了。
「惡意政治」的禍害，便在於此。當政治人物的心志被妒恨、仇視的情緒淹沒，他們不僅會忘掉民主的初衷，有時連基本的是非價值都拋棄。芝加哥申奧失利，共和黨陣營竟鼓掌叫好，這簡直比仇美國家的反應更可怖。再看台灣，八八水患期間，綠營一味指控馬政府領導失利，藍營則歸咎地方綠色政權失職，在惡意政治下，誰真的在乎災民？誰認真追究災害的源頭為何？
再看陳水扁，為了想逃脫自己的牢獄之災，竟妄稱任內皆「聽命美國行事」把台灣貶為美國軍政府的管轄地。這位「台灣之子」八年貪瀆禍國後，竟連台灣主權都一舉否定，這豈不更是「惡意政治」的經典之作。
民進黨執政八年，煽動了仇恨式的民主；如今退居在野，它又頑固地堅守「惡意杯葛」的路線，不願在民主機制上扮演正面及積極角色。綠營應當深切省思洪健益的演出，「惡意政治」、「仇恨民主」將伊於胡底。
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
Monday, October 12, 2009
Is Former President Chen a Colonial Governor under a U.S. Military Government?
Is Former President Chen a Colonial Governor under a U.S. Military Government?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 12, 2009
According to the U.S. Military Court of Appeals, former President Chen Shui-bian has alleged that a U.S. Military Government has occupied Taiwan since the end of WWII, and continues to occupy Taiwan even today. He pleaded with the U.S. Military Court of Appeals to order the U.S. Military Government to instruct President Ma Ying-jeou to immediately release Chen Shui-bian and countermand his sentence of life imprisonment. His allegations were printed with black ink on white paper. Otherwise many people would have trouble believing that anyone would spout such arrant nonsense. Chen Shui-bian's latest move offers further proof that in order to escape justice, Chen is willing to do anything.
This differs from previous accounts. Chen Shui-bian did not "sue" U.S. president Barack Obama. Rather he filed a petition with the U.S. Military Court of Appeals. His argument is that according to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Taiwan remains under United States military occupation, and its status remains undetermined even today. Therefore during his eight years as president, he was in fact an agent of the United States Military Government, he was in effect Taiwan's Chief Executive/colonial governor.
Chen Shui-bian claimed that during his two terms as president, he was aware of the existence of the U.S. Military Government, and carried out its orders. On Taiwan-related matters, the United States Military Government was "paramount," and during his two terms he often received orders from the Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan. Now he faces political persecution. Therefore he is disclosing the existence of this U.S. Military Government to the U.S. Military Court and the world. He is calling upon this military government to come forward and protect him.
When Ah-Bian made these fantastic claims, he was not talking in his sleep. He was not speaking off the cuff. His claims were carefully drafted and formally submitted to the court. He claimed that Taiwan has secretly been occupied by a U.S. Military Government, and asked the true powers behind the throne to come forward and rescue him. Such claims from a former President of the Republic of China are absurd beyond belief, and are an affront to the dignity of the public on Taiwan.
First of all, the San Francisco Peace Treaty may not have specified who would hold sovereignty over Taiwan. But the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty confirmed that Taiwan's sovereignty belonged to the ROC government. Moreover, Japan and the United States both granted diplomatic recognition to the Republic of China. They United States and the Republic of China may have signed a mutual defense treaty, but the U.S. never occupied, ruled, or even administered Taiwan. So where is this still active U.S. Military Government Ah-Bian speaks of? Where is this military government that has supposedly been in existence for sixty years. Where is this government that nobody has ever heard of?
If this military government that rules over Taiwan exists, where are its officials? Where does its funding come from? Have both houses of congress and the media been kept in the dark, all these years? Have successive U.S. presidents from different political parties kept it a closely guarded secret? Ah-Bian has concocted a fantasy so patently absurd, people all over the world may die laughing.
Chen Shui-bian certainly has an active imagination. That he could concoct such an incredible story, and that he is being ridiculed as a madman is a small matter. That the public on Taiwan is being humiliated along with him is not. From its very inception, the Republic of China's status as a sovereign and independent nation has remained unchanged. We may have fewer diplomatic allies. We may be squeezed by international organizations. But those are merely incidents of unfair persecution. They are not the result of any deficiencies in the terms and conditions of our national sovereignty. The Republic of China has everything required for full nationhood. It has sovereignty, territory, people, and government. It has a democratically elected legislature and government. No one can deny that we are a sovereign nation, not even a former president who spouts nonsense in his sleep.
In fact Chen Shui-bian's move was utterly obtuse, because it is something a United States Military Court could not possibly accept. It would never want the specter of a non-existent military government to emerge as an agent of influence. Even assuming Ah-Bian merely wants to generate controversy in order to win popular support, it will not work. People will merely perceive his claims as the ravings of a lunatic. It won't even be able to delay the legal proceedings against him.
The only impact it will have is to hurt the feelings of the public on Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian once pledged to "fight to safeguard Taiwan's sovereignty." Now he is claiming that he was merely the Chief Executive of the United States Military Government, that all his decisions required Uncle Sam's seal of approval. One has to wonder what happened when he infuriated Washington with his "One Country, Each Side" thesis? Did he forget to obtain Uncle Sam's approval? The public on Taiwan supported him all the way, and allowed him to become president. They allowed him to rule for two terms and eight years, to exercise immense powers and receive a generous salary and pension. Now it turns out these taxpayer dollars were paid to an agent of colonial rule? If we follow his logic, he should ask the United States to pay his salary. Why is he taking hard-earned taxpayer dollars from citizens of the Republic of China? Ah-Bian embezzled vast sums from the nation's coffers. He abused the political authority delegated to him by the public to reap huge profits via government-business collusion. Shouldn't he cough up this money?
Looking back at Chen Shui-bian's actions, we see he often resorted to any means at his disposal to achieve his own selfish ends. He sacrificed his comrades, his friends, his family confidants, and his servants without a second thought. He even sacrificed the nation's sovereignty and dignity. Even his former Democratic Progressive Party comrades cannot rationalize away his behavior. Die hard Ah-Bian hero-worshipers support him unconditionally. But has Chen Shui-bian ever demonstrated the same loyalty towards Taiwan?
Chen Shui-bian may spout nonsense. But he and his First Family accomplices in crime must still face the Republic of China justice system and be prosecuted according to the letter of the law. Chen Shui-bian may come up with a whole slew of gimmicks in the future. But the sympathy and solidarity he inspires will be less and less.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.10.12
社論－陳前總統是美國軍政府的行政長官？
本報訊
根據美國軍事上訴法院的資料，前總統陳水扁指稱有個美國軍政府占領台灣至今，他祈求美國軍事上訴法院下令這個美國軍政府指示馬英九總統，立即釋放陳水扁並撤銷無期徒刑判決。如果不是白紙黑字，誰相信會有人如此癡人說夢？而這些白紙黑字，更證明了陳水扁為求脫身，的確可以無所不用其極。
和之前傳出的說法不同，陳水扁並沒有「控告」美國總統歐巴馬，而是向美國軍事上訴法院提出請願。他的說法是，依據《舊金山和約》，美國在台灣行使軍事占領，迄今未變，台灣地位未定，因此八年總統任內，他其實是美國軍政府的代理人，也是實質的台灣民政長官。
陳水扁聲稱，他在擔任總統期間，知悉了美國軍政府存在的事實，也接受軍政府的命令。有關台灣之事，美國軍政府是「至高無上」的，他在任內經常接受美國在台協會主席的指示。如今他面臨政治迫害，因此向美國軍事法院及全世界披露這個美國軍政府的存在，要求軍政府出面保護他。
這些天方夜譚般的陳述，既非發自午夜囈語，也不是衝動胡扯，而是經過一番草擬撰述後正式向法院提交的。說台灣其實一直被一個祕密的美國軍政府占領至今，要求這個藏在幕後的真正主子出面救人，這種話，出自一位中華民國的前總統，不只是荒天下之大唐，更把台灣人的臉都丟光了！
首先，《舊金山和約》雖未言明將台灣主權移交給誰，但接著《中日和約》就已確定了台灣主權屬於中華民國政府，何況日本與美國都給予中華民國外交承認。美國雖然和中華民國政府簽有協防條約，卻從未占領統治過台灣，連託管都不曾，哪來的美國軍政府？而且說現在依然活躍，什麼樣的軍政府能夠既活躍至今又六十年沒人聽說過？
更何況，如果有這個治台軍政府的存在，其運作的人員、經費從何而來？國會參眾兩院與新聞界始終被蒙在鼓裡？美國不同政黨的歷屆總統也都祕而不宣？這種天方夜譚也想得出來，簡直笑掉全世界的大牙！
陳水扁的想像力實在非常人所能及，竟然編造得出如此匪夷所思又不合情理的故事來。他被人家當瘋子事小，台灣跟著一起丟臉事大。從過去到現在，我們的獨立主權國家地位始終未變，即使邦交國數目不多，被國際官方組織排擠，但那是因為受到不合理的打壓，而非我國在主權條件上有任何欠缺。主權、領土、人民、政府，台灣樣樣具備，包括由人民選舉產生的國會與政府，誰也不能否定我們是個主權國家，連前總統的癡人說夢也不能。
其實陳水扁這招笨得可以，因為美國軍事法院絕對不可能接受，遑論真要那個不存在的幽靈軍政府出面干預。即使只是想造成話題爭取聲援，都不會有效果，因為人家只會把這當成喪心病狂的胡扯，連拖延訴訟程序都做不到。
唯一的影響，是傷害了台灣人民的感情。陳水扁曾經信誓旦旦，說要為維護台灣主權而戰，結果現在聲稱自己只是美國軍政府的民政長官，以前做決策還要聽老美的，當年講「一邊一國」時美國氣得跳腳，不知是否忘了請示？台灣人民一路呵護他支持他，讓他能當上總統，兩任八年裡享有優渥薪酬強大權力，卸任後還有終身禮遇，這些民脂民膏，結果都付給了一位治台代理人？如果照他的邏輯，那麼他應該跟美國討薪水才對，幹嘛拿台灣納稅人的血汗錢？而且扁家還Ａ走國庫那麼多錢，外帶利用人民授予的政治權力從政商關係中謀取暴利。這些錢，如今更應該吐出來！
回顧陳水扁的所作所為，往往為達目的不擇手段，為了自己的利益，犧牲同志朋友家臣天下人都在所不惜，而今連台灣主權尊嚴都遭到他的羞辱，昔日民進黨同志，此時恐也無法再為他辯護。而始終情義相挺的死忠扁迷們，有看到阿扁對台灣又是如何有情有義嗎？
無論陳水扁再怎麼癡人說夢，他、以及第一家庭成員的貪瀆行為，都一樣要由中華民國的司法體系來依法處理。也許將來陳水扁還會想出各種奇招怪招，但他能鼓動的同情與認同，已經愈來愈少了。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 12, 2009
According to the U.S. Military Court of Appeals, former President Chen Shui-bian has alleged that a U.S. Military Government has occupied Taiwan since the end of WWII, and continues to occupy Taiwan even today. He pleaded with the U.S. Military Court of Appeals to order the U.S. Military Government to instruct President Ma Ying-jeou to immediately release Chen Shui-bian and countermand his sentence of life imprisonment. His allegations were printed with black ink on white paper. Otherwise many people would have trouble believing that anyone would spout such arrant nonsense. Chen Shui-bian's latest move offers further proof that in order to escape justice, Chen is willing to do anything.
This differs from previous accounts. Chen Shui-bian did not "sue" U.S. president Barack Obama. Rather he filed a petition with the U.S. Military Court of Appeals. His argument is that according to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Taiwan remains under United States military occupation, and its status remains undetermined even today. Therefore during his eight years as president, he was in fact an agent of the United States Military Government, he was in effect Taiwan's Chief Executive/colonial governor.
Chen Shui-bian claimed that during his two terms as president, he was aware of the existence of the U.S. Military Government, and carried out its orders. On Taiwan-related matters, the United States Military Government was "paramount," and during his two terms he often received orders from the Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan. Now he faces political persecution. Therefore he is disclosing the existence of this U.S. Military Government to the U.S. Military Court and the world. He is calling upon this military government to come forward and protect him.
When Ah-Bian made these fantastic claims, he was not talking in his sleep. He was not speaking off the cuff. His claims were carefully drafted and formally submitted to the court. He claimed that Taiwan has secretly been occupied by a U.S. Military Government, and asked the true powers behind the throne to come forward and rescue him. Such claims from a former President of the Republic of China are absurd beyond belief, and are an affront to the dignity of the public on Taiwan.
First of all, the San Francisco Peace Treaty may not have specified who would hold sovereignty over Taiwan. But the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty confirmed that Taiwan's sovereignty belonged to the ROC government. Moreover, Japan and the United States both granted diplomatic recognition to the Republic of China. They United States and the Republic of China may have signed a mutual defense treaty, but the U.S. never occupied, ruled, or even administered Taiwan. So where is this still active U.S. Military Government Ah-Bian speaks of? Where is this military government that has supposedly been in existence for sixty years. Where is this government that nobody has ever heard of?
If this military government that rules over Taiwan exists, where are its officials? Where does its funding come from? Have both houses of congress and the media been kept in the dark, all these years? Have successive U.S. presidents from different political parties kept it a closely guarded secret? Ah-Bian has concocted a fantasy so patently absurd, people all over the world may die laughing.
Chen Shui-bian certainly has an active imagination. That he could concoct such an incredible story, and that he is being ridiculed as a madman is a small matter. That the public on Taiwan is being humiliated along with him is not. From its very inception, the Republic of China's status as a sovereign and independent nation has remained unchanged. We may have fewer diplomatic allies. We may be squeezed by international organizations. But those are merely incidents of unfair persecution. They are not the result of any deficiencies in the terms and conditions of our national sovereignty. The Republic of China has everything required for full nationhood. It has sovereignty, territory, people, and government. It has a democratically elected legislature and government. No one can deny that we are a sovereign nation, not even a former president who spouts nonsense in his sleep.
In fact Chen Shui-bian's move was utterly obtuse, because it is something a United States Military Court could not possibly accept. It would never want the specter of a non-existent military government to emerge as an agent of influence. Even assuming Ah-Bian merely wants to generate controversy in order to win popular support, it will not work. People will merely perceive his claims as the ravings of a lunatic. It won't even be able to delay the legal proceedings against him.
The only impact it will have is to hurt the feelings of the public on Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian once pledged to "fight to safeguard Taiwan's sovereignty." Now he is claiming that he was merely the Chief Executive of the United States Military Government, that all his decisions required Uncle Sam's seal of approval. One has to wonder what happened when he infuriated Washington with his "One Country, Each Side" thesis? Did he forget to obtain Uncle Sam's approval? The public on Taiwan supported him all the way, and allowed him to become president. They allowed him to rule for two terms and eight years, to exercise immense powers and receive a generous salary and pension. Now it turns out these taxpayer dollars were paid to an agent of colonial rule? If we follow his logic, he should ask the United States to pay his salary. Why is he taking hard-earned taxpayer dollars from citizens of the Republic of China? Ah-Bian embezzled vast sums from the nation's coffers. He abused the political authority delegated to him by the public to reap huge profits via government-business collusion. Shouldn't he cough up this money?
Looking back at Chen Shui-bian's actions, we see he often resorted to any means at his disposal to achieve his own selfish ends. He sacrificed his comrades, his friends, his family confidants, and his servants without a second thought. He even sacrificed the nation's sovereignty and dignity. Even his former Democratic Progressive Party comrades cannot rationalize away his behavior. Die hard Ah-Bian hero-worshipers support him unconditionally. But has Chen Shui-bian ever demonstrated the same loyalty towards Taiwan?
Chen Shui-bian may spout nonsense. But he and his First Family accomplices in crime must still face the Republic of China justice system and be prosecuted according to the letter of the law. Chen Shui-bian may come up with a whole slew of gimmicks in the future. But the sympathy and solidarity he inspires will be less and less.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.10.12
社論－陳前總統是美國軍政府的行政長官？
本報訊
根據美國軍事上訴法院的資料，前總統陳水扁指稱有個美國軍政府占領台灣至今，他祈求美國軍事上訴法院下令這個美國軍政府指示馬英九總統，立即釋放陳水扁並撤銷無期徒刑判決。如果不是白紙黑字，誰相信會有人如此癡人說夢？而這些白紙黑字，更證明了陳水扁為求脫身，的確可以無所不用其極。
和之前傳出的說法不同，陳水扁並沒有「控告」美國總統歐巴馬，而是向美國軍事上訴法院提出請願。他的說法是，依據《舊金山和約》，美國在台灣行使軍事占領，迄今未變，台灣地位未定，因此八年總統任內，他其實是美國軍政府的代理人，也是實質的台灣民政長官。
陳水扁聲稱，他在擔任總統期間，知悉了美國軍政府存在的事實，也接受軍政府的命令。有關台灣之事，美國軍政府是「至高無上」的，他在任內經常接受美國在台協會主席的指示。如今他面臨政治迫害，因此向美國軍事法院及全世界披露這個美國軍政府的存在，要求軍政府出面保護他。
這些天方夜譚般的陳述，既非發自午夜囈語，也不是衝動胡扯，而是經過一番草擬撰述後正式向法院提交的。說台灣其實一直被一個祕密的美國軍政府占領至今，要求這個藏在幕後的真正主子出面救人，這種話，出自一位中華民國的前總統，不只是荒天下之大唐，更把台灣人的臉都丟光了！
首先，《舊金山和約》雖未言明將台灣主權移交給誰，但接著《中日和約》就已確定了台灣主權屬於中華民國政府，何況日本與美國都給予中華民國外交承認。美國雖然和中華民國政府簽有協防條約，卻從未占領統治過台灣，連託管都不曾，哪來的美國軍政府？而且說現在依然活躍，什麼樣的軍政府能夠既活躍至今又六十年沒人聽說過？
更何況，如果有這個治台軍政府的存在，其運作的人員、經費從何而來？國會參眾兩院與新聞界始終被蒙在鼓裡？美國不同政黨的歷屆總統也都祕而不宣？這種天方夜譚也想得出來，簡直笑掉全世界的大牙！
陳水扁的想像力實在非常人所能及，竟然編造得出如此匪夷所思又不合情理的故事來。他被人家當瘋子事小，台灣跟著一起丟臉事大。從過去到現在，我們的獨立主權國家地位始終未變，即使邦交國數目不多，被國際官方組織排擠，但那是因為受到不合理的打壓，而非我國在主權條件上有任何欠缺。主權、領土、人民、政府，台灣樣樣具備，包括由人民選舉產生的國會與政府，誰也不能否定我們是個主權國家，連前總統的癡人說夢也不能。
其實陳水扁這招笨得可以，因為美國軍事法院絕對不可能接受，遑論真要那個不存在的幽靈軍政府出面干預。即使只是想造成話題爭取聲援，都不會有效果，因為人家只會把這當成喪心病狂的胡扯，連拖延訴訟程序都做不到。
唯一的影響，是傷害了台灣人民的感情。陳水扁曾經信誓旦旦，說要為維護台灣主權而戰，結果現在聲稱自己只是美國軍政府的民政長官，以前做決策還要聽老美的，當年講「一邊一國」時美國氣得跳腳，不知是否忘了請示？台灣人民一路呵護他支持他，讓他能當上總統，兩任八年裡享有優渥薪酬強大權力，卸任後還有終身禮遇，這些民脂民膏，結果都付給了一位治台代理人？如果照他的邏輯，那麼他應該跟美國討薪水才對，幹嘛拿台灣納稅人的血汗錢？而且扁家還Ａ走國庫那麼多錢，外帶利用人民授予的政治權力從政商關係中謀取暴利。這些錢，如今更應該吐出來！
回顧陳水扁的所作所為，往往為達目的不擇手段，為了自己的利益，犧牲同志朋友家臣天下人都在所不惜，而今連台灣主權尊嚴都遭到他的羞辱，昔日民進黨同志，此時恐也無法再為他辯護。而始終情義相挺的死忠扁迷們，有看到阿扁對台灣又是如何有情有義嗎？
無論陳水扁再怎麼癡人說夢，他、以及第一家庭成員的貪瀆行為，都一樣要由中華民國的司法體系來依法處理。也許將來陳水扁還會想出各種奇招怪招，但他能鼓動的同情與認同，已經愈來愈少了。
Friday, October 9, 2009
Self-Confidence and Cross-Strait Relations
Self-Confidence and Cross-Strait Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 9, 2009
The 8/8 Floods occurred two months ago. DPP legislators browbeat Premier Wu Den-yih over the amounts contributed by Mainland China. Premier Wu reportedly replied "eight to nine hundred million NT." Pan Green legislators were clearly dissatisfied. They demanded that Premier Wu guarantee that the entire amount pledged by the Mainland would actually be received. Premier Wu said he could hardly stand behind the other side's pledges. He added that some of the contributions from the Chinese Mainland were earmarked for the reconstruction of the Shuang Yuan Bridge. He said it was inappropriate for the Executive Yuan to make such an assessment, therefore he had to decline.
Premier Wu broached this subject on his own initiative. He hoped to prevent Green Camp legislators from villifying him as "pro-China," and as a "China-lover." He wanted them to believe that the government would not unconditionally accept Mainland Chinese generosity and goodwill. Elements within the Green Camp have long demagogued such issues. Will Premier Wu's public declarations make these legislators cease and desist? The answer is still unknown. But Wu's response reveals two things. The first is that the public on Taiwan has a hard time accepting other people's goodwill, especially from the other side of the Taiwan Strait. We are always on the defensive. We assume that anything the Mainland does relative to Taiwan, is always done for some ulterior motive. We view the other side through colored glasses. Therefore all we see are problems. If the Mainland fails to contribute, it has no conscience, If the Mainland contributes too little, it has no conscience. If the Mainland's pledges have yet to be fulfilled, it is guilty of bad faith. If the Mainland wants to earmark its contributions a certain way, then it is meddling in our affairs. In short, we constantly find fault, no matter what they do.
Frankly, there is nothing wrong with earmarking contributions. Contributors all want their contributions to be highly visible and long remembered. This is only human. When ordinary individuals make contributions they too think this way. But as long as the donation meets a real need and people are in fact helped, it is a good thing. Furthermore, earmarking contributions for certain high profile purposes such as major construction projects, makes it easier to solicit contributions. What's more, part of these contributions came from Taiwan businesses on the Mainland. They wanted to use the Shuang Yuan Bridge project to demonstrate their solidarity with Taiwan. Frankly there is nothing wrong with their way of thinking. When the Republic of China provides aid to other countries, doesn't it earmark its contributions the same way?
Secondly, regarding cross-Strait issues, isn't the Ma administration just a wee bit overcautious? It is deathly afraid of falling into traps set by the Green Camp. As a result, it second-guesses itself on every move. For example, the DPP alleged that rebroadcasting Mainland China's National Day troop review on local television was illegal. It demanded a Government Information Office (GIO) investigation. The GIO consulted experts and scholars, who concluded that it was not illegal. There was no need to impose fines on local rebroadcasters. The entire world has expressed an interest in Mainland China's National Day ceremonies. The Republic of China enjoys freedom of speech. How can rebroadcasting news footage of a troop review be considered illegal? Elements within the Green Camp are afflicted with a "No to everything Chinese" mentality that has left them bereft of common sense, and even their humanity. The Ma administration meanwhile, is "once bitten, twice shy." Premier Wu anxiously underscored the administration's refusal to accept contributions from the Mainland authorities. Clearly the DPP's Sinophobic propaganda has the Ma administration treading on eggshells. But the more the Ma administration cowers, the more the DPP tastes blood. The more it chomps down and refuses to let go. On cross-Strait issues, the thinnests of pretexts is enough to rally the Green Camp to arms. Why would it pass up any such opportunity? The more the Ma administration trembles before Green Camp intimidation, the more it encourages the DPP to demagogue every issue that comes along.
The Green Camp has repeatedly pummeled the Ma administration on cross-Strait issues. Clearly, it has had an impact. That is why it gleefully persists. Even more worth our attention is a certain collective mentality on Taiwan. Why is it so hard to view the other side with a normal state of mind? Why do we have so many negative feelings towards the Chinese mainland? Leave aside historical factors and the CCP regime's refusal to respond by removing its missiles. The public on Taiwan also feels unconsciously conflicted and bewildered over the gradual rise of Mainland China. Over the past three decades, Taiwan has experienced economic growth, social prosperity, democracy and freedom, diversity and openness. This has allowed the public to indulge in feelgood optimism in the face of a comparatively backward Mainland China. Now that Taiwan's economic outlook is less rosy, the public is experiencing confusion, and such feelings have faded.
When self-confidence on Taiwan becomes low, Mainland China's troop review is especially hard on the eyes. Chen Chao-jung's remark "China Will Be Strong" is especially hard on the ears. Mainland China's contribution to the 8/8 Flood relief is especially hard on the feelings. This is both sad and alarming. A lack of self-confidence may inspire some on Taiwan to adopt an Ah-Q "out of sight, out of mind" attitude toward Mainland China. It may encourage society to engage in unwarranted speculation, to constantly feel wounded and vulnerable. Frankly, such a mindset will lead to social contraction, squander energy, and yield nothing in return.
As we watch the massive 60th anniversary celebrations on the other side of the Strait, we hope the public on Taiwan will display the same confidence and proudly move ahead. The public on Taiwan must adopt a healthy attitude towards itself and toward cross-Strait relations. We must work toward a time when we too can walk with the same pride.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.10.09
社論－以更大自信看待自己 看待兩岸
本報訊
八八水災發生近兩個月，民進黨立委質詢行政院院長吳敦義，中國大陸的捐款來了多少，聽到吳揆說收到了八、九億元，綠營民意代表顯然很不滿意，直說要吳揆保證大陸捐的錢會全數到位，吳院長除了表示無法替對岸承諾些什麼之外，還說中國大陸的捐款部分指定要修建雙園大橋，但因行政院評估不適當，因此已予以婉拒。
吳揆主動把這段話說出來的目的，應是希望轉移綠營立委隨時會扣下的「親中」、「媚中」大帽子，讓這些人相信政府不會對中共「來者不拒」的，對岸的好意，台灣也不是照單全收。吳揆公開對民進黨立委做這樣一番表白，究竟能不能讓部分向來喜歡在這種議題上大開殺戒的綠營人士收歛、剎車也還未可知，倒是顯露了兩件事，第一是台灣對別人、特別是對對岸的善心好意，似乎很難心平氣和、很難就事論事的評估，總是帶著一個防衛心，認為中共如果對台灣要做什麼的話，就一定是帶著特定的目的；因為戴著有色眼鏡看對岸，所以看到的都是問題：大陸不捐款是沒良心，捐款太少一樣沒良心；捐款還沒到位是沒誠意，希望捐款用在什麼地方是干預…永遠都在挑剔。
老實講，捐款指定用途也並沒有那麼不對、不應該，一來，捐款做好事的人想做在一些明顯、容易被看見、被記住的事情上，算是人情之常，就是一般人捐款時也難免會有這種心態，只要被捐贈、被幫助的人與地方的確有此需要，就算是好事一樁；其次，捐款做一些明顯可見的事，例如重大工程，比較容易昭信，更何況，這批捐款也有些來自台商，他們希望透過像蓋雙園大橋這種比較大的工程，顯示根留台灣的心意，這種想法和做法，老實講無可厚非；當台灣對其他國家進行援助時，不也常常表明希望參與的是重要的建設嗎？
第二，關乎到兩岸議題的事，馬政府會不自覺有一種過了頭的小心翼翼，因為深怕掉進了綠營設下的陷阱，於是進行嚴格的自我檢查。如民進黨認為電視台轉播中國國慶閱兵違法，要求新聞局查處，新聞局就請了專家學者討論，結論是沒有違法，不需開罰。中國大陸的國慶典禮全世界都關注、轉播，在言論自由的台灣，人民透過新聞畫面看到閱兵畫面，竟然違法？部分綠營人士「逢中必反」的慣性已讓他們愈來愈缺乏常識，甚至於扭曲人性，而馬政府似乎也被「電」得有些矯枉過正，從吳揆主動爆料不接受中共的捐款來向反中勢力表明愛台灣、不受中共制約的心意做法看來，民進黨的反中策略的確已讓馬政府神經緊張；但愈是如此，民進黨食髓知味，愈是會緊咬不放，在兩岸議題上，任何風吹草動、任何蛛絲馬跡，綠營文章會愈做愈起勁，豈肯放手？馬政府愈是害怕，愈是讓民進黨看到出招機會。
綠營人士一再就兩岸議題猛打馬政府，顯然多少有些政治效益，因此才會如此樂此不疲，因此更值得關注的是台灣社會的某種集體心態：為什麼那麼難以平常心來看待對岸，為什麼會對中國大陸有這麼多負面感受？除了歷史性的因素以及中共政權至今仍不肯就台灣人民最在意的飛彈問題等予以正面友善的回應之外，還有一個潛在的心態是台灣面對著逐漸崛起的中國大陸有了種種矛盾和失落。台灣過去三十年因為經濟成長、社會繁榮、民主自由、多元開放，讓台灣在面對相對比較落後的中國大陸時自信樂觀、自我感覺良好；曾幾何時，這種光榮的感覺隨著台灣經濟表現不再那麼亮眼，社會又呈現某種混亂對立，有了轉淡的趨勢。
當台灣的自信心變得低落時，中國大陸的閱兵大典看起來就特別刺眼、陳昭榮的「中國一定強」聽起來就特別刺耳，捐給台灣八八風災的捐款也就特別扎心。可悲也可怕的是，沒有自信心不但會讓台灣一些人對中國大陸的現狀懷有「眼不見為淨」的阿Q心態，還會鼓動社會的集體情緒陷入不必要的敏感猜疑，動輒受傷並且脆弱；老實講，這真的會讓台灣的社會力萎縮，消耗能量、甚至於一事無成。
看到對岸的六十慶典如此聲勢浩大，我們的心裡多麼希望台灣也可以自信滿滿、昂首闊步前進！台灣應該要用健康的態度看待自己、看待兩岸關係，積極地為自己創造下一個走路有風的時代。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 9, 2009
The 8/8 Floods occurred two months ago. DPP legislators browbeat Premier Wu Den-yih over the amounts contributed by Mainland China. Premier Wu reportedly replied "eight to nine hundred million NT." Pan Green legislators were clearly dissatisfied. They demanded that Premier Wu guarantee that the entire amount pledged by the Mainland would actually be received. Premier Wu said he could hardly stand behind the other side's pledges. He added that some of the contributions from the Chinese Mainland were earmarked for the reconstruction of the Shuang Yuan Bridge. He said it was inappropriate for the Executive Yuan to make such an assessment, therefore he had to decline.
Premier Wu broached this subject on his own initiative. He hoped to prevent Green Camp legislators from villifying him as "pro-China," and as a "China-lover." He wanted them to believe that the government would not unconditionally accept Mainland Chinese generosity and goodwill. Elements within the Green Camp have long demagogued such issues. Will Premier Wu's public declarations make these legislators cease and desist? The answer is still unknown. But Wu's response reveals two things. The first is that the public on Taiwan has a hard time accepting other people's goodwill, especially from the other side of the Taiwan Strait. We are always on the defensive. We assume that anything the Mainland does relative to Taiwan, is always done for some ulterior motive. We view the other side through colored glasses. Therefore all we see are problems. If the Mainland fails to contribute, it has no conscience, If the Mainland contributes too little, it has no conscience. If the Mainland's pledges have yet to be fulfilled, it is guilty of bad faith. If the Mainland wants to earmark its contributions a certain way, then it is meddling in our affairs. In short, we constantly find fault, no matter what they do.
Frankly, there is nothing wrong with earmarking contributions. Contributors all want their contributions to be highly visible and long remembered. This is only human. When ordinary individuals make contributions they too think this way. But as long as the donation meets a real need and people are in fact helped, it is a good thing. Furthermore, earmarking contributions for certain high profile purposes such as major construction projects, makes it easier to solicit contributions. What's more, part of these contributions came from Taiwan businesses on the Mainland. They wanted to use the Shuang Yuan Bridge project to demonstrate their solidarity with Taiwan. Frankly there is nothing wrong with their way of thinking. When the Republic of China provides aid to other countries, doesn't it earmark its contributions the same way?
Secondly, regarding cross-Strait issues, isn't the Ma administration just a wee bit overcautious? It is deathly afraid of falling into traps set by the Green Camp. As a result, it second-guesses itself on every move. For example, the DPP alleged that rebroadcasting Mainland China's National Day troop review on local television was illegal. It demanded a Government Information Office (GIO) investigation. The GIO consulted experts and scholars, who concluded that it was not illegal. There was no need to impose fines on local rebroadcasters. The entire world has expressed an interest in Mainland China's National Day ceremonies. The Republic of China enjoys freedom of speech. How can rebroadcasting news footage of a troop review be considered illegal? Elements within the Green Camp are afflicted with a "No to everything Chinese" mentality that has left them bereft of common sense, and even their humanity. The Ma administration meanwhile, is "once bitten, twice shy." Premier Wu anxiously underscored the administration's refusal to accept contributions from the Mainland authorities. Clearly the DPP's Sinophobic propaganda has the Ma administration treading on eggshells. But the more the Ma administration cowers, the more the DPP tastes blood. The more it chomps down and refuses to let go. On cross-Strait issues, the thinnests of pretexts is enough to rally the Green Camp to arms. Why would it pass up any such opportunity? The more the Ma administration trembles before Green Camp intimidation, the more it encourages the DPP to demagogue every issue that comes along.
The Green Camp has repeatedly pummeled the Ma administration on cross-Strait issues. Clearly, it has had an impact. That is why it gleefully persists. Even more worth our attention is a certain collective mentality on Taiwan. Why is it so hard to view the other side with a normal state of mind? Why do we have so many negative feelings towards the Chinese mainland? Leave aside historical factors and the CCP regime's refusal to respond by removing its missiles. The public on Taiwan also feels unconsciously conflicted and bewildered over the gradual rise of Mainland China. Over the past three decades, Taiwan has experienced economic growth, social prosperity, democracy and freedom, diversity and openness. This has allowed the public to indulge in feelgood optimism in the face of a comparatively backward Mainland China. Now that Taiwan's economic outlook is less rosy, the public is experiencing confusion, and such feelings have faded.
When self-confidence on Taiwan becomes low, Mainland China's troop review is especially hard on the eyes. Chen Chao-jung's remark "China Will Be Strong" is especially hard on the ears. Mainland China's contribution to the 8/8 Flood relief is especially hard on the feelings. This is both sad and alarming. A lack of self-confidence may inspire some on Taiwan to adopt an Ah-Q "out of sight, out of mind" attitude toward Mainland China. It may encourage society to engage in unwarranted speculation, to constantly feel wounded and vulnerable. Frankly, such a mindset will lead to social contraction, squander energy, and yield nothing in return.
As we watch the massive 60th anniversary celebrations on the other side of the Strait, we hope the public on Taiwan will display the same confidence and proudly move ahead. The public on Taiwan must adopt a healthy attitude towards itself and toward cross-Strait relations. We must work toward a time when we too can walk with the same pride.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.10.09
社論－以更大自信看待自己 看待兩岸
本報訊
八八水災發生近兩個月，民進黨立委質詢行政院院長吳敦義，中國大陸的捐款來了多少，聽到吳揆說收到了八、九億元，綠營民意代表顯然很不滿意，直說要吳揆保證大陸捐的錢會全數到位，吳院長除了表示無法替對岸承諾些什麼之外，還說中國大陸的捐款部分指定要修建雙園大橋，但因行政院評估不適當，因此已予以婉拒。
吳揆主動把這段話說出來的目的，應是希望轉移綠營立委隨時會扣下的「親中」、「媚中」大帽子，讓這些人相信政府不會對中共「來者不拒」的，對岸的好意，台灣也不是照單全收。吳揆公開對民進黨立委做這樣一番表白，究竟能不能讓部分向來喜歡在這種議題上大開殺戒的綠營人士收歛、剎車也還未可知，倒是顯露了兩件事，第一是台灣對別人、特別是對對岸的善心好意，似乎很難心平氣和、很難就事論事的評估，總是帶著一個防衛心，認為中共如果對台灣要做什麼的話，就一定是帶著特定的目的；因為戴著有色眼鏡看對岸，所以看到的都是問題：大陸不捐款是沒良心，捐款太少一樣沒良心；捐款還沒到位是沒誠意，希望捐款用在什麼地方是干預…永遠都在挑剔。
老實講，捐款指定用途也並沒有那麼不對、不應該，一來，捐款做好事的人想做在一些明顯、容易被看見、被記住的事情上，算是人情之常，就是一般人捐款時也難免會有這種心態，只要被捐贈、被幫助的人與地方的確有此需要，就算是好事一樁；其次，捐款做一些明顯可見的事，例如重大工程，比較容易昭信，更何況，這批捐款也有些來自台商，他們希望透過像蓋雙園大橋這種比較大的工程，顯示根留台灣的心意，這種想法和做法，老實講無可厚非；當台灣對其他國家進行援助時，不也常常表明希望參與的是重要的建設嗎？
第二，關乎到兩岸議題的事，馬政府會不自覺有一種過了頭的小心翼翼，因為深怕掉進了綠營設下的陷阱，於是進行嚴格的自我檢查。如民進黨認為電視台轉播中國國慶閱兵違法，要求新聞局查處，新聞局就請了專家學者討論，結論是沒有違法，不需開罰。中國大陸的國慶典禮全世界都關注、轉播，在言論自由的台灣，人民透過新聞畫面看到閱兵畫面，竟然違法？部分綠營人士「逢中必反」的慣性已讓他們愈來愈缺乏常識，甚至於扭曲人性，而馬政府似乎也被「電」得有些矯枉過正，從吳揆主動爆料不接受中共的捐款來向反中勢力表明愛台灣、不受中共制約的心意做法看來，民進黨的反中策略的確已讓馬政府神經緊張；但愈是如此，民進黨食髓知味，愈是會緊咬不放，在兩岸議題上，任何風吹草動、任何蛛絲馬跡，綠營文章會愈做愈起勁，豈肯放手？馬政府愈是害怕，愈是讓民進黨看到出招機會。
綠營人士一再就兩岸議題猛打馬政府，顯然多少有些政治效益，因此才會如此樂此不疲，因此更值得關注的是台灣社會的某種集體心態：為什麼那麼難以平常心來看待對岸，為什麼會對中國大陸有這麼多負面感受？除了歷史性的因素以及中共政權至今仍不肯就台灣人民最在意的飛彈問題等予以正面友善的回應之外，還有一個潛在的心態是台灣面對著逐漸崛起的中國大陸有了種種矛盾和失落。台灣過去三十年因為經濟成長、社會繁榮、民主自由、多元開放，讓台灣在面對相對比較落後的中國大陸時自信樂觀、自我感覺良好；曾幾何時，這種光榮的感覺隨著台灣經濟表現不再那麼亮眼，社會又呈現某種混亂對立，有了轉淡的趨勢。
當台灣的自信心變得低落時，中國大陸的閱兵大典看起來就特別刺眼、陳昭榮的「中國一定強」聽起來就特別刺耳，捐給台灣八八風災的捐款也就特別扎心。可悲也可怕的是，沒有自信心不但會讓台灣一些人對中國大陸的現狀懷有「眼不見為淨」的阿Q心態，還會鼓動社會的集體情緒陷入不必要的敏感猜疑，動輒受傷並且脆弱；老實講，這真的會讓台灣的社會力萎縮，消耗能量、甚至於一事無成。
看到對岸的六十慶典如此聲勢浩大，我們的心裡多麼希望台灣也可以自信滿滿、昂首闊步前進！台灣應該要用健康的態度看待自己、看待兩岸關係，積極地為自己創造下一個走路有風的時代。
Thursday, October 8, 2009
Make the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region Part of the ECFA Pilot Program
Make the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region Part of the ECFA Pilot Program
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 8, 2009
The impact of the Dalai Lama's visit has receded. The Wu cabinet has assumed office. The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is again under discussion. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region on mainland China will become part of ECFA's pilot plan. This raises a new issue. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Mainland Affairs Council have each announced that ECFA and the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region are separate issues. But that is probably not true. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is closely related to ECFA. Making the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region part of ECFA's pilot plan may be the key to ECFA's successful implementation.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is primarily Fujian, but also includes part of Zhejiang, Guangdong and Jiangxi. It was first proposed in 2004. But it was only officially adopted by the PRC State Council in May this year. Its purpose is to "support economic development in Fujian Province and accelerate the building of a cross-Strait economic zone." Only then was the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region given a policy basis. Its content is rich and varied. But the key to its economic policy thinking is "total integration with Taiwan's economic resources, via a comprehensive interface." Industry, transportation, manpower, and the financial industry have all been mentioned, in an all out effort to attract Taiwan. During the same month, on the eve of the anniversary of President Ma's inauguration, Mainland China's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi announced eight measures to benefit Taiwan. A key element was the promotion of a dedicated service industry pilot program in the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region. This means Beijing intends to allow the Western Taiwan Strait Economic Region to lead the way, regardless of whether it is motivated by the strategic needs of the local economy, or the political implications of a "Fujian-Taiwan interface." From this perspective, the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region and ECFA are two different things that can be developed independently.
Now let's take a look at our side's single-minded promotion of ECFA. According to international trade practices, ECFA is a cross-Strait economic framework that includes a framework for full liberalization. Its ultimate goal is a free trade agreement (FTA). If we can achieve this, Taipei need not be concerned that its political status will be demoted to that of Hong Kong and Macao. In reality, whether Beijing is willing to take such a step remains to be seen. But as far as our side is concerned, we don't want ECFA to immediately implement such open market principles. For Taipei, this has both advantages and disadvantages. Pfficialdom and private industry may have different expectations, but everyone hopes consultations will result in ECFA. On the mainland, Taipei would enjoy "Super-WTO treatment." During cross-Strait economic and trade negotiations, Taipei would "get more and give less." Such contradictory attitudes have led to ECFA's linkage with the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region.
Another practical obstacle is that the two sides joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) under different auspices. Our side was highly liberalized and highly developed. The Mainland, on the other hand, was a developing economy with a buffer period. Today the two sides have agreed to discuss trade and economic liberalization via ECFA. Taipei must confront its outdated special defense mechanisms. It must fulfill its commitments to liberalization. It can no longer make an exception for Mainland China. Even if the other side "wants too much," and even it if wants only "normalization" of MFN treatment. Our side may find it difficult to fulfill its obligations regarding sensitive agricultural products. Under the circumstances, linking ECFA with the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is a necessity.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region's special regional provisions allow the two sides to avoid the WTO's MFN provisions. They allows our side to meet our super-WTO treatment obligations. They allow Taipei to establish buffer zones, even as the mainland fully normalizes its economy. When the two sides negotiate ECFA, they can determine how far to carry trade liberalization and normalization. They can gradually expand cooperation within the confines of the SAR. This will reduce the impact of immediate and total liberalization on sensitive industries on Taiwan, giving them time to adjust. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region will also provide a low threshold for certain industries, such as financial services. We may not be able to start late and finish first, but these provisions will offer us other advantages. They will at least allow us to regain some of the opportunities lost as a result of prohibitions against "going West." Therefore, linkage of the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region with ECFA is eminently worthwhile.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region has undeniably gotten off to a late start relative to the rest of the Mainland's coastal economic zone. This is the source of its future potential, but it also reflects its comparatively limited resources. Whether Beijing intends to exert extra effort on its behalf remains to be seen. Our side cannot treat it as a limitation. Since it is an SAR, our side should treat it as an SAR, in order to avoid being redefined as another Hong Kong and Macao. In practice, it should be classified as an ECFA cross-Strait economic cooperation pilot project. First, taxes should be lowered. Then trade should be liberalized. This will yield the most favorable outcome.
海西區應可考慮列入ECFA的試點
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.08 03:05 am
達賴效應降溫，吳內閣上任。兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）的討論將重回檯面，中國大陸的海西經濟區會否成為ＥＣＦＡ的先行先試區域，則引出了一條新的話題軸線。經濟部、陸委會異口同聲表示，ＥＣＦＡ和海西區是兩回事；但現實恐非如此，海西區與ＥＣＦＡ的關係不只緊密，海西區成為ＥＣＦＡ的試點，更可能是順利推展ＥＣＦＡ的關鍵之一。
海西經濟區的全稱是海峽西岸經濟區，以福建為主，並跨向浙江、廣東及江西的一部分，最早於二○○四年提出，但直到今年五月中共國務院正式通過「關於支援福建省加快建設海峽經濟區的若干意見」，才賦予發展海西經濟區的政策基礎。這份「若干意見」的內容洋洋灑灑，但其經濟政策的中心思維就是「與台灣經濟的資源整合、全面對接」，因而從產業、交通、人才到金融業，無一不談吸引台灣之法。同月，中共國台辦主任王毅在馬總統就職周年前夕宣布惠台八措施，其要項之一就是推銷特定服務業在海西區的試點。凡此皆說明，無論是基於其自身的地方經濟戰略需要，或隱含「閩台對口」的政治意圖，北京政府確實有意將海西經濟區做為兩岸先行、先試的經貿特區。從這點看，海西試點與ＥＣＦＡ是兩回事，可各自獨立發展。
現在來看看我方一心一意推動的ＥＣＦＡ。從國際經貿實務而言，ＥＣＦＡ是兩岸經濟走向全面自由化的初始框架，終極目標是有朝一日簽定自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）；果能如此，台灣自無「港澳化」的政治矮化疑慮。在現實狀態中，北京是否願意走到這一步尚未可知；但就我方而言，ＥＣＦＡ若採立即對等開放市場原則，卻絕非我方所願，對台灣更是利弊參半，因而無論官方或業界的主觀期待，都是希望透過協商所達成的ＥＣＦＡ，在大陸享有「超ＷＴＯ（世貿組織）待遇」，在兩岸經貿開放談判上「多拿少給」。這樣一個矛盾的心態，就讓ＥＣＦＡ與海西經濟區有了連結。
再一個現實的障礙是，當年兩岸加入世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）的身分不同，我方是自由化程度較高的已開發國家，中國大陸則是設有開放緩衝年限的開發中國家，如今兩方要洽商議定經貿自由化時程的ＥＣＦＡ，台灣就無法不面對過去以特別防衛機制，將中國大陸例外排除適用我方自由化承諾的問題；就算對方「要」的不多，只要求最惠國待遇的「正常化」，我方仍可能因涉及多項敏感性農產品而難以完全承諾。在此情況下，ＥＣＦＡ與海西經濟區的連結更成了必要。
海西經濟區的特區化及地區化，讓兩岸間不只可以避開ＷＴＯ的最惠國規定、滿足我方的超ＷＴＯ待遇期待，更可讓台灣在面對大陸的經貿完全正常化要求時，以此建立緩衝的地帶；亦即雙方在協商ＥＣＦＡ時，可評估在限定的特區內進行經貿易自由化、正常化及逐步擴大合作的試點，以降低立即全面自由化對台灣敏感產業的衝擊，爭取產業調適的時間。此外，運用海西經濟區對特定產業如金融業的低門檻、額外優惠等優勢，縱使無法後發先至，至少可追回一部分過往因禁足西進而流失的機會。因此，海西經濟區與ＥＣＦＡ的連結對我方是有其積極意義的，這一點，應予列入考慮。
不可諱言的是，海西經濟區的發展是中國大陸沿海經濟區中相對緩慢的，這固然是它的潛力所在，但相對也凸顯了它的客觀資源限制；北京的政策加持力量仍待觀察，我方自不能以此為限。此外，既是特區，我方也應以特區對應，以避免港澳化疑慮；在作法上，則應將兩岸試點列為ＥＣＦＡ的經濟合作項目，與先期降稅的早期收穫、後續的貿易自由化進程交互運用，爭取最有利的協商結果。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 8, 2009
The impact of the Dalai Lama's visit has receded. The Wu cabinet has assumed office. The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is again under discussion. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region on mainland China will become part of ECFA's pilot plan. This raises a new issue. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Mainland Affairs Council have each announced that ECFA and the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region are separate issues. But that is probably not true. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is closely related to ECFA. Making the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region part of ECFA's pilot plan may be the key to ECFA's successful implementation.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is primarily Fujian, but also includes part of Zhejiang, Guangdong and Jiangxi. It was first proposed in 2004. But it was only officially adopted by the PRC State Council in May this year. Its purpose is to "support economic development in Fujian Province and accelerate the building of a cross-Strait economic zone." Only then was the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region given a policy basis. Its content is rich and varied. But the key to its economic policy thinking is "total integration with Taiwan's economic resources, via a comprehensive interface." Industry, transportation, manpower, and the financial industry have all been mentioned, in an all out effort to attract Taiwan. During the same month, on the eve of the anniversary of President Ma's inauguration, Mainland China's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi announced eight measures to benefit Taiwan. A key element was the promotion of a dedicated service industry pilot program in the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region. This means Beijing intends to allow the Western Taiwan Strait Economic Region to lead the way, regardless of whether it is motivated by the strategic needs of the local economy, or the political implications of a "Fujian-Taiwan interface." From this perspective, the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region and ECFA are two different things that can be developed independently.
Now let's take a look at our side's single-minded promotion of ECFA. According to international trade practices, ECFA is a cross-Strait economic framework that includes a framework for full liberalization. Its ultimate goal is a free trade agreement (FTA). If we can achieve this, Taipei need not be concerned that its political status will be demoted to that of Hong Kong and Macao. In reality, whether Beijing is willing to take such a step remains to be seen. But as far as our side is concerned, we don't want ECFA to immediately implement such open market principles. For Taipei, this has both advantages and disadvantages. Pfficialdom and private industry may have different expectations, but everyone hopes consultations will result in ECFA. On the mainland, Taipei would enjoy "Super-WTO treatment." During cross-Strait economic and trade negotiations, Taipei would "get more and give less." Such contradictory attitudes have led to ECFA's linkage with the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region.
Another practical obstacle is that the two sides joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) under different auspices. Our side was highly liberalized and highly developed. The Mainland, on the other hand, was a developing economy with a buffer period. Today the two sides have agreed to discuss trade and economic liberalization via ECFA. Taipei must confront its outdated special defense mechanisms. It must fulfill its commitments to liberalization. It can no longer make an exception for Mainland China. Even if the other side "wants too much," and even it if wants only "normalization" of MFN treatment. Our side may find it difficult to fulfill its obligations regarding sensitive agricultural products. Under the circumstances, linking ECFA with the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is a necessity.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region's special regional provisions allow the two sides to avoid the WTO's MFN provisions. They allows our side to meet our super-WTO treatment obligations. They allow Taipei to establish buffer zones, even as the mainland fully normalizes its economy. When the two sides negotiate ECFA, they can determine how far to carry trade liberalization and normalization. They can gradually expand cooperation within the confines of the SAR. This will reduce the impact of immediate and total liberalization on sensitive industries on Taiwan, giving them time to adjust. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region will also provide a low threshold for certain industries, such as financial services. We may not be able to start late and finish first, but these provisions will offer us other advantages. They will at least allow us to regain some of the opportunities lost as a result of prohibitions against "going West." Therefore, linkage of the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region with ECFA is eminently worthwhile.
The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region has undeniably gotten off to a late start relative to the rest of the Mainland's coastal economic zone. This is the source of its future potential, but it also reflects its comparatively limited resources. Whether Beijing intends to exert extra effort on its behalf remains to be seen. Our side cannot treat it as a limitation. Since it is an SAR, our side should treat it as an SAR, in order to avoid being redefined as another Hong Kong and Macao. In practice, it should be classified as an ECFA cross-Strait economic cooperation pilot project. First, taxes should be lowered. Then trade should be liberalized. This will yield the most favorable outcome.
海西區應可考慮列入ECFA的試點
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.08 03:05 am
達賴效應降溫，吳內閣上任。兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）的討論將重回檯面，中國大陸的海西經濟區會否成為ＥＣＦＡ的先行先試區域，則引出了一條新的話題軸線。經濟部、陸委會異口同聲表示，ＥＣＦＡ和海西區是兩回事；但現實恐非如此，海西區與ＥＣＦＡ的關係不只緊密，海西區成為ＥＣＦＡ的試點，更可能是順利推展ＥＣＦＡ的關鍵之一。
海西經濟區的全稱是海峽西岸經濟區，以福建為主，並跨向浙江、廣東及江西的一部分，最早於二○○四年提出，但直到今年五月中共國務院正式通過「關於支援福建省加快建設海峽經濟區的若干意見」，才賦予發展海西經濟區的政策基礎。這份「若干意見」的內容洋洋灑灑，但其經濟政策的中心思維就是「與台灣經濟的資源整合、全面對接」，因而從產業、交通、人才到金融業，無一不談吸引台灣之法。同月，中共國台辦主任王毅在馬總統就職周年前夕宣布惠台八措施，其要項之一就是推銷特定服務業在海西區的試點。凡此皆說明，無論是基於其自身的地方經濟戰略需要，或隱含「閩台對口」的政治意圖，北京政府確實有意將海西經濟區做為兩岸先行、先試的經貿特區。從這點看，海西試點與ＥＣＦＡ是兩回事，可各自獨立發展。
現在來看看我方一心一意推動的ＥＣＦＡ。從國際經貿實務而言，ＥＣＦＡ是兩岸經濟走向全面自由化的初始框架，終極目標是有朝一日簽定自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）；果能如此，台灣自無「港澳化」的政治矮化疑慮。在現實狀態中，北京是否願意走到這一步尚未可知；但就我方而言，ＥＣＦＡ若採立即對等開放市場原則，卻絕非我方所願，對台灣更是利弊參半，因而無論官方或業界的主觀期待，都是希望透過協商所達成的ＥＣＦＡ，在大陸享有「超ＷＴＯ（世貿組織）待遇」，在兩岸經貿開放談判上「多拿少給」。這樣一個矛盾的心態，就讓ＥＣＦＡ與海西經濟區有了連結。
再一個現實的障礙是，當年兩岸加入世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）的身分不同，我方是自由化程度較高的已開發國家，中國大陸則是設有開放緩衝年限的開發中國家，如今兩方要洽商議定經貿自由化時程的ＥＣＦＡ，台灣就無法不面對過去以特別防衛機制，將中國大陸例外排除適用我方自由化承諾的問題；就算對方「要」的不多，只要求最惠國待遇的「正常化」，我方仍可能因涉及多項敏感性農產品而難以完全承諾。在此情況下，ＥＣＦＡ與海西經濟區的連結更成了必要。
海西經濟區的特區化及地區化，讓兩岸間不只可以避開ＷＴＯ的最惠國規定、滿足我方的超ＷＴＯ待遇期待，更可讓台灣在面對大陸的經貿完全正常化要求時，以此建立緩衝的地帶；亦即雙方在協商ＥＣＦＡ時，可評估在限定的特區內進行經貿易自由化、正常化及逐步擴大合作的試點，以降低立即全面自由化對台灣敏感產業的衝擊，爭取產業調適的時間。此外，運用海西經濟區對特定產業如金融業的低門檻、額外優惠等優勢，縱使無法後發先至，至少可追回一部分過往因禁足西進而流失的機會。因此，海西經濟區與ＥＣＦＡ的連結對我方是有其積極意義的，這一點，應予列入考慮。
不可諱言的是，海西經濟區的發展是中國大陸沿海經濟區中相對緩慢的，這固然是它的潛力所在，但相對也凸顯了它的客觀資源限制；北京的政策加持力量仍待觀察，我方自不能以此為限。此外，既是特區，我方也應以特區對應，以避免港澳化疑慮；在作法上，則應將兩岸試點列為ＥＣＦＡ的經濟合作項目，與先期降稅的早期收穫、後續的貿易自由化進程交互運用，爭取最有利的協商結果。
Wednesday, October 7, 2009
When will Deng Xiaoping's Portrait be Displayed at Tiananmen Square?
When will Deng Xiaoping's Portrait be Displayed at Tiananmen Square?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 7, 2009
The Beijing authorities have been preoccupied with a number of major events. The 10/1 celebration and the Beijing Olympics convey very different notions. To the outside world, the synchronized placard displays during the Beijing Olympics hinted at peaceful development. The large scale troop review during the 10/1 celebration meanwhile, contained more than a hint of swagger.
Ideally a major power should promote peace abroad and maintain harmony at home. But prior to the Cold War, major powers used their superior might to exploit or bully smaller or weaker nations. China suffered grievously. From the Opium War of 1840, though the eight year long Japanese invasion, the Chinese people shed oceans of blood and wept rivers of tears. Mainland China's military capability now enables it to "just say no." It has minimized the likelihood of foreign aggression. This is a prerequisite for a major power. Meanwhile the evolution of human civilization makes it difficult to imagine any country ever again becoming a major aggressor. The U.S. invasion of Iraq may be the last instance of a war of aggression by a major power. In other words, instead of committing aggression and engaging in slaughter, the major powers are now forstalling conflict. In this regard, Beijing's "peaceful development" or even "peaceful rise," may constitute a new paradigm for developing nations.
Let's talk about internal harmony. Within a globalized economy, nations that refuse to open themselves up to the rest of the world cannot become major powers. Nations that open themselves up to the outside world inevitably experience an increase in freedom of thought and awareness of civil rights. They can no longer be ruled by totalitarian dictatorships. In other words, for social harmony to prevail inside a major power requires democracy and human rights.
The People's Republic of China established its authority 60 years ago. The development most worth celebrating is the transformation of the Chinese Communist Party from Mao Zedong's Communist Party to Deng Xiaoping's Communist Party. If this were not the case, today's Mainland would be little more than the Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea) writ large. Internationally, there would be no possibility of "peaceful development." Domestically, Kim Jong-il style measures would be necessary to maintain a semblance of social harmony. Given the peace and prosperity the CCP and China enjoy today, it is not Mao Zedong's portrait that ought to be displayed at Tiananmen Square, but Deng Xiaoping's.
During the 10/1 celebration, Hu Jintao continued to pay lip service to "Marxism" and "Mao Zedong Thought." The CCP "annihilated the Gang of Four" in 1976. It launched a movement to discredit Mao Zedong. It initiated three decades of reform and liberalization. The result? Today's Chinese Communist Party constitutes the largest collection of "capitalist roaders" and "revisionists" the world has ever seen. The problem is that the CCP has essentially repudiated Mao Zedong, but continues to display his portrait in Tiananmen Square. If it publicly criticized Mao, it might undermine the legitimacy of the CCP. The CCP continues to display Mao's portrait, even after it has turned its back on Mao and repudiated him. This gap between theory and practice is a major issue that the CCP must address but has yet to address. Every day the CCP refuses to talk about Mao Zedong's 30 year long debacle, is a day that it delays its own transformation and the transformation of Mainland China.
Sun Yat-sen's portrait can still be seen in Tiananmen Square. It remained on display during this year's 60th anniversary 10/1 celebration. Meanwhile, the portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are already gone. This says that the CCP hopes to distance itself from Mao Zedong and Communism. Instead, it is attempting to preserve another grander, more open political tradition. Having evaluated their internal and external circumstances, they continue to argue that "Mao's merits outnumber his demerits, seven to three." But this is not a position they can maintain long-term. Mao Zedong is not an appropriate national icon for China, anymore than Adolf Hitler is an appropriate national icon for Germany. If the CCP and Mainland China wish to undergo gradual transformation, they should adopt a gradual strategy for transformation. They should gradually elevate the political status of Deng Xiaoping. They should gradually relieve themselves of the historical baggage of Mao Zedong. This is a viable approach. In fact, Deng Xiaoping and lower level CCP leaders such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang liberated themselves from the bonds of Mao Zedong some time ago. If the CCP hopes to transform the party and the nation, it must liberate itself from the bonds of Mao Zedong, in form as well as in substance. This is an inevitable process. Otherwise it will be difficult to undergo rebirth. If the CCP seeks rebirth in an increasingly democratic Chinese society, it must negotiate this passage, sooner if not later. If it cannot repudiate Mao as a national icon, he will forever remain an obstacle to the transformation of the CCP and Mainland China.
The CCP and Mainland China have a long way to go in their transformation. They must gradually rid themselves of old baggage. They must gradually give themselves a makeover. The day Mao Zedong's portrait comes down at Tiananmen Square will be the day the CCP and Mainland China complete their political tranformation.
天安門城樓該掛鄧小平像？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.07 03:32 am
同為北京當局全神貫注的大活動，十一與京奧的演示意象旨趣迥異。京奧的主題，是用活字演出多彩多姿的「和」字，對外象徵「和平發展」，對內意指「和諧社會」；十一則以大閱兵為主場景，當然有「耀武揚威」的意味。
理想的大國境界，就是對外「和平」，對內維持「和諧」。人類在二十世紀冷戰以前的「大國」，皆是仗恃武力剝削或欺凌弱小。中國受害甚劇，自一八四○鴉片戰爭至日本侵華八年，山河血淚，委實創鉅痛深。中國大陸如今擁有這般武備，已具說「不」的實力，大抵已使外患外侮的可能性降至最低，這是成為「大國」的條件。但人類歷史文明演化至今，已難想像任何國家再能以窮兵黷武而成為「大國」；美國侵辱伊拉克可能是最後一個「大國侵略戰爭」。也就是說，大國的武力在「止戈」，而不是用在侵略及殺戮。就此而言，北京政權能以「和平發展」為對外的立國基調（甚至不說「和平崛起」），不無可能成為「大國」的新思潮與新典範。
再言對內「和諧」。在全球化的經濟情境中，國家不對外開放不可能成為「大國」；而對外開放的國家，國內自由思潮與民權意識必是有增無已，殆不可能再以專制極權為治國手段。也就是說，大國之內的「和諧社會」，終究須以民主及人權來維繫。
中華人民共和國建政六十周年，最值得慶幸者是：今日的中國共產黨已從「毛澤東的共產黨」，變成「鄧小平的共產黨」。倘非如此，今日的中國大陸也許只是大一號的「朝鮮民主主義人民共和國」（北韓）而已；對外不可能「和平發展」，對內則須以金正日那一套始能維持所謂的「和諧社會」。就此而言，中共與中國有今日，掛在天安門城樓上的巨像，不該是毛澤東，而應是鄧小平。
胡錦濤十一文告中，仍高舉「馬克思主義」及「毛澤東思想」。但是，今天的中共，其實是出自一九七六年中共舉黨透過「粉碎四人幫」而對毛澤東發動的鞭屍政變；三十年來的「改革開放」，已使現在的中共成為共產黨史上最大的「走資派」與「修正主義」。問題正在於此：現在的中共實質上是否定了毛澤東，卻又在天安門上掛著毛像。因為，如果發動公開批毛，中共的正當性亦可能動搖；但是，掛著毛像的中共，現在的實際作為卻是對毛的背離與否定。這種理論與實際乖離的異象，一直是中共必須解決但迄未解決的重大的議題。對毛澤東「三十年浩劫」的議論只要被中共捂著一天，中共即難望有使自己及中國轉型過渡的一天。
直至今年六十周年的十一，天安門廣場仍見豎起孫中山巨像，但「馬克思／恩格斯／列寧／斯大林」的巨像則早已不見，這顯示中共欲在毛澤東及共產主義以外，試圖保留另一個更開闊恢宏的政治傳承；但盱衡內外情勢，若對毛澤東的評價永遠停留在「功過七三開」的說法，其實仍非長久之計。中國之不宜以毛澤東為國家象徵，正如德國不宜以希特勒為國家象徵。中共與中國若欲一步一步轉型，逐漸升高鄧小平的政治象徵地位，相對地慢慢放下毛澤東的包袱，應是可以採行的過渡性作法。事實上，鄧小平以降的兩個梯隊的中共領導人，包括胡耀邦及趙紫陽等，已然相當程度地超越並跳脫了毛澤東的綑綁；未來中共欲進一步帶動黨及國家的轉型，最後必須一併解脫掉在形式上仍然存在的毛澤東束縛，這是一必經的過程，否則難以脫胎換骨。中共想在日漸民主化的中國社會尋求新生，恐怕早晚必須要過這一關。若不能否棄毛澤東的國家象徵地位，中共與中國轉型過渡的障礙始終存在。
中共及中國的轉型還有很長的路要走，舊包袱要慢慢地放下，新面貌要慢慢地形塑；當天安門城樓的毛像可以卸下的那一天，也許就是中共及中國政治轉型瀕近成功之日。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 7, 2009
The Beijing authorities have been preoccupied with a number of major events. The 10/1 celebration and the Beijing Olympics convey very different notions. To the outside world, the synchronized placard displays during the Beijing Olympics hinted at peaceful development. The large scale troop review during the 10/1 celebration meanwhile, contained more than a hint of swagger.
Ideally a major power should promote peace abroad and maintain harmony at home. But prior to the Cold War, major powers used their superior might to exploit or bully smaller or weaker nations. China suffered grievously. From the Opium War of 1840, though the eight year long Japanese invasion, the Chinese people shed oceans of blood and wept rivers of tears. Mainland China's military capability now enables it to "just say no." It has minimized the likelihood of foreign aggression. This is a prerequisite for a major power. Meanwhile the evolution of human civilization makes it difficult to imagine any country ever again becoming a major aggressor. The U.S. invasion of Iraq may be the last instance of a war of aggression by a major power. In other words, instead of committing aggression and engaging in slaughter, the major powers are now forstalling conflict. In this regard, Beijing's "peaceful development" or even "peaceful rise," may constitute a new paradigm for developing nations.
Let's talk about internal harmony. Within a globalized economy, nations that refuse to open themselves up to the rest of the world cannot become major powers. Nations that open themselves up to the outside world inevitably experience an increase in freedom of thought and awareness of civil rights. They can no longer be ruled by totalitarian dictatorships. In other words, for social harmony to prevail inside a major power requires democracy and human rights.
The People's Republic of China established its authority 60 years ago. The development most worth celebrating is the transformation of the Chinese Communist Party from Mao Zedong's Communist Party to Deng Xiaoping's Communist Party. If this were not the case, today's Mainland would be little more than the Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea) writ large. Internationally, there would be no possibility of "peaceful development." Domestically, Kim Jong-il style measures would be necessary to maintain a semblance of social harmony. Given the peace and prosperity the CCP and China enjoy today, it is not Mao Zedong's portrait that ought to be displayed at Tiananmen Square, but Deng Xiaoping's.
During the 10/1 celebration, Hu Jintao continued to pay lip service to "Marxism" and "Mao Zedong Thought." The CCP "annihilated the Gang of Four" in 1976. It launched a movement to discredit Mao Zedong. It initiated three decades of reform and liberalization. The result? Today's Chinese Communist Party constitutes the largest collection of "capitalist roaders" and "revisionists" the world has ever seen. The problem is that the CCP has essentially repudiated Mao Zedong, but continues to display his portrait in Tiananmen Square. If it publicly criticized Mao, it might undermine the legitimacy of the CCP. The CCP continues to display Mao's portrait, even after it has turned its back on Mao and repudiated him. This gap between theory and practice is a major issue that the CCP must address but has yet to address. Every day the CCP refuses to talk about Mao Zedong's 30 year long debacle, is a day that it delays its own transformation and the transformation of Mainland China.
Sun Yat-sen's portrait can still be seen in Tiananmen Square. It remained on display during this year's 60th anniversary 10/1 celebration. Meanwhile, the portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are already gone. This says that the CCP hopes to distance itself from Mao Zedong and Communism. Instead, it is attempting to preserve another grander, more open political tradition. Having evaluated their internal and external circumstances, they continue to argue that "Mao's merits outnumber his demerits, seven to three." But this is not a position they can maintain long-term. Mao Zedong is not an appropriate national icon for China, anymore than Adolf Hitler is an appropriate national icon for Germany. If the CCP and Mainland China wish to undergo gradual transformation, they should adopt a gradual strategy for transformation. They should gradually elevate the political status of Deng Xiaoping. They should gradually relieve themselves of the historical baggage of Mao Zedong. This is a viable approach. In fact, Deng Xiaoping and lower level CCP leaders such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang liberated themselves from the bonds of Mao Zedong some time ago. If the CCP hopes to transform the party and the nation, it must liberate itself from the bonds of Mao Zedong, in form as well as in substance. This is an inevitable process. Otherwise it will be difficult to undergo rebirth. If the CCP seeks rebirth in an increasingly democratic Chinese society, it must negotiate this passage, sooner if not later. If it cannot repudiate Mao as a national icon, he will forever remain an obstacle to the transformation of the CCP and Mainland China.
The CCP and Mainland China have a long way to go in their transformation. They must gradually rid themselves of old baggage. They must gradually give themselves a makeover. The day Mao Zedong's portrait comes down at Tiananmen Square will be the day the CCP and Mainland China complete their political tranformation.
天安門城樓該掛鄧小平像？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.07 03:32 am
同為北京當局全神貫注的大活動，十一與京奧的演示意象旨趣迥異。京奧的主題，是用活字演出多彩多姿的「和」字，對外象徵「和平發展」，對內意指「和諧社會」；十一則以大閱兵為主場景，當然有「耀武揚威」的意味。
理想的大國境界，就是對外「和平」，對內維持「和諧」。人類在二十世紀冷戰以前的「大國」，皆是仗恃武力剝削或欺凌弱小。中國受害甚劇，自一八四○鴉片戰爭至日本侵華八年，山河血淚，委實創鉅痛深。中國大陸如今擁有這般武備，已具說「不」的實力，大抵已使外患外侮的可能性降至最低，這是成為「大國」的條件。但人類歷史文明演化至今，已難想像任何國家再能以窮兵黷武而成為「大國」；美國侵辱伊拉克可能是最後一個「大國侵略戰爭」。也就是說，大國的武力在「止戈」，而不是用在侵略及殺戮。就此而言，北京政權能以「和平發展」為對外的立國基調（甚至不說「和平崛起」），不無可能成為「大國」的新思潮與新典範。
再言對內「和諧」。在全球化的經濟情境中，國家不對外開放不可能成為「大國」；而對外開放的國家，國內自由思潮與民權意識必是有增無已，殆不可能再以專制極權為治國手段。也就是說，大國之內的「和諧社會」，終究須以民主及人權來維繫。
中華人民共和國建政六十周年，最值得慶幸者是：今日的中國共產黨已從「毛澤東的共產黨」，變成「鄧小平的共產黨」。倘非如此，今日的中國大陸也許只是大一號的「朝鮮民主主義人民共和國」（北韓）而已；對外不可能「和平發展」，對內則須以金正日那一套始能維持所謂的「和諧社會」。就此而言，中共與中國有今日，掛在天安門城樓上的巨像，不該是毛澤東，而應是鄧小平。
胡錦濤十一文告中，仍高舉「馬克思主義」及「毛澤東思想」。但是，今天的中共，其實是出自一九七六年中共舉黨透過「粉碎四人幫」而對毛澤東發動的鞭屍政變；三十年來的「改革開放」，已使現在的中共成為共產黨史上最大的「走資派」與「修正主義」。問題正在於此：現在的中共實質上是否定了毛澤東，卻又在天安門上掛著毛像。因為，如果發動公開批毛，中共的正當性亦可能動搖；但是，掛著毛像的中共，現在的實際作為卻是對毛的背離與否定。這種理論與實際乖離的異象，一直是中共必須解決但迄未解決的重大的議題。對毛澤東「三十年浩劫」的議論只要被中共捂著一天，中共即難望有使自己及中國轉型過渡的一天。
直至今年六十周年的十一，天安門廣場仍見豎起孫中山巨像，但「馬克思／恩格斯／列寧／斯大林」的巨像則早已不見，這顯示中共欲在毛澤東及共產主義以外，試圖保留另一個更開闊恢宏的政治傳承；但盱衡內外情勢，若對毛澤東的評價永遠停留在「功過七三開」的說法，其實仍非長久之計。中國之不宜以毛澤東為國家象徵，正如德國不宜以希特勒為國家象徵。中共與中國若欲一步一步轉型，逐漸升高鄧小平的政治象徵地位，相對地慢慢放下毛澤東的包袱，應是可以採行的過渡性作法。事實上，鄧小平以降的兩個梯隊的中共領導人，包括胡耀邦及趙紫陽等，已然相當程度地超越並跳脫了毛澤東的綑綁；未來中共欲進一步帶動黨及國家的轉型，最後必須一併解脫掉在形式上仍然存在的毛澤東束縛，這是一必經的過程，否則難以脫胎換骨。中共想在日漸民主化的中國社會尋求新生，恐怕早晚必須要過這一關。若不能否棄毛澤東的國家象徵地位，中共與中國轉型過渡的障礙始終存在。
中共及中國的轉型還有很長的路要走，舊包袱要慢慢地放下，新面貌要慢慢地形塑；當天安門城樓的毛像可以卸下的那一天，也許就是中共及中國政治轉型瀕近成功之日。
Tuesday, October 6, 2009
A Passing Grade on Typhoon Parma: But What About the Future?
A Passing Grade on Typhoon Parma: But What About the Future?
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 6, 2009
The 8/8 Flood taught us some painful lessons. Typhoon Parma has the Ma administration on tenterhooks. It mobilized in advance. Central and local governments are on full alert. President Ma Ying-jeou has repeatedly stressed that his administration "prepared for any eventuality," and that its defenses are "tight as a drum." Judging by their performance over the past two days, disaster prevention measures by government at all levels have passed muster. Local governments and members of the public have for the most part cooperated by evacuating danger zones. The Ma administration's clueless and inept behavior during Typhoon Morakot is hopefully a thing of the past.
Typhoon Parma did not result in disaster. Nevertheless it forced officials and civilians in threatened areas to run around in circles. The Yilan region in particular bore the brunt of the storm. The county government made four different announcements regarding school closures before finally getting it right. The main reason was that Typhoon Parma's path was erratic. It was a "peculiar typhoon."
Typhoon Parma was so peculiar, American, Japanese and our own weather services all found it difficult to track. Neither its path nor the amount of rainfall could be accurately predicted. According to typhoon reports issued by our own Central Weather Bureau over the weekend, Parma was downgraded to a standard typhoon on October 2. The radius of the typhoon however, increased from 200 kilometers to 250 kilometers, expanding its sphere of influence.
After Typhoon Parma battered Taiwan, it was affected by Typhoon Melor in waters surrounding the Philippine Islands. Typhoon Melor drew Typhoon Parma toward the Bashi Channel, where it hovered for a time, leading to a "Fujiwara Effect." Melor repeatedly altered Parma's path. It caused Parma to make a 180 degree about face, from northeast to southwest. Weather services in the Philippines were even worried that Parma might draw Melor back, to batter the Philippines a second time.
Another factor affecting Parma was a "combined effect," leading to rainfall variations. Parma was clearly far to the south, in the Bashi Channel. Yet the heaviest rainfall was in Yilan, on the northern coast of Taiwan. The Bureau of Meteorology had to amend its forecast five times, a record in typhoon forecasting. Parma's strange behavior inspired experts to characterize it as the most difficult to forecast typhoon so far this year.
Under the impact of climate change, Taiwan has experienced many "peculiar typhoons" in recent years. Last year's Typhoon Sinlaku and Typhoon Kalmaegi were not super typhoons. But heavy rains led to disaster. Looking at the larger picture, the entire world faces dramatic climate change. In recent years some regions have received 50 or even 100 year record rainfalls. The Philippines, Vietnam, and Turkey have experienced major floods. Arid regions such as the Deccan Plateau in northern India have experienced major floods -- even after the conclusion of the rainy season. Hurricane Katrina, which struck the US in 2005, was a major disaster seldom seen in North America.
Not long ago, Nature Magazine published a study by a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, who said that the world is currently experiencing a once in a millennium "storm peak." Global warming has not increased not merely the frequency of storms, but also their strength. Mankind faces an angry planet, whose anger has yet to fully erupt.
Nature is cruel, and its wrath unpredictable. Weather forecasting and disaster prevention systems in the twenty-first century face an unexpected challenge. As for Taiwan, the threat of typhoons looms especially large. Nearby Guam is an infamous Pacific Ocean "Typhoon nest." Due to the earth's rotational effect, most typhoons generated in this nest head towards Taiwan. People are therefore increasingly concerned about the accuracy of typhoon weather forecasts.
The accuracy of Central Weather Bureau typhoon forecasts has long been in dispute. The CWB's explanations have seldom satisfied the public. The accuracy of its typhoon forecasts affects "typhoon holidays." If CWB reports are inaccurate, if the standards are unclear, local governments don't know whether to declare typhoon holidays. For years the sole criterion for typhoon holidays was wind strength. After years of urging from experts, it finally added rainfall volume, an even greater threat. Recently there have been calls to add landslide predictions forecasts. For mountain regions hard hit by mudslides, this is a necessary correction.
The government has been slow to invest in disaster prevention technology. For example since Typhoon Xangsane in 2000, it has become clear that rainfall is more and more often the cause of serious damage. But domestic rainfall measurement stations are too few and too unevenly distributed. Most stations are established by county and municipal governments. It was only early this year, that the CEPD approved one billion NT in funding for rainfall measurement station improvements, mainly in villages and towns. Increasing the density of rainfall measurement stations is long overdue.
The public has long been in the habit of criticizing the government for ineffectiveness in disaster prevention. But the public must increase its own understanding as well. For example, Typhoon Morakot finally forced people living in threatened areas to acknowledge the need for village relocation. Yet during Typhoon Parma some people in threatened areas still refused to leave. The government was forced to spend money and manpower helping them pile sandbags. Some mocked these efforts as useless. But if people don't know enough to look after themselves, what gives them the right to waste precious public resources?
The government received a passing grade during Typhoon Parma. But what about in the future? Natural disasters never sleep. Heaven's blessings are capricious. The blood and tears shed during natural disasters must be translated into lessons. They must be integrated into the system and into our lives. That is the only way to prepare for natural disasters.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.10.06
這次芭瑪颱風過關 但未來呢？
本報訊
經過八八風災的慘痛教訓，這次面對芭瑪颱風，馬政府上下繃緊神經，提早動員，從中央到縣市政府全面進入防颱備戰狀態，務求做到馬英九總統一再強調的「料敵從寬，禦敵從嚴」。從這兩天的結果看來，各級政府的防災動作還算到位，該撤離的危險區域，地方政府與民眾也多半能配合執行，馬政府終於不再像莫拉克颱風來襲時一般，全無章法，徹底失能。
不過，芭瑪雖未釀災，卻仍讓預警區內的政府及民眾手忙腳亂，尤其是首當其衝的宜蘭地區，為了是否停班停課，縣政府發布了四次新聞，才算全部搞定。主因就是，芭瑪行徑詭異，又是一個「怪颱」。
芭瑪之怪，讓美、日各國氣象單位都難以捉摸，它的路徑和雨量都「測不準」。根據我國中央氣象局上周末發布的颱風消息，芭瑪在十月二日減弱為中颱，但暴風半徑反而由二百公里增加到二百五十公里，影響範圍擴大。
而芭瑪侵台後，又受菲律賓海域上另一個強颱米勒的牽引、拉扯而在巴士海峽滯留踱步，徘徊不去，形成若有似無的「藤原效應」，一再影響芭瑪的路徑，使它一度出現由東北轉向西南的一八○度大轉變；而菲律賓氣象單位還擔心芭瑪是否會被米勒拉回去，二度侵菲。
另一個影響芭瑪的因素是「共伴效應」，主要反映在雨量變化，明明颱風遠在南邊的巴士海峽，但最大雨量落在宜蘭，氣象局連續上、下修正達五次之多，創歷年颱風預報僅見。這麼怪異的表現，使芭瑪被學者定義為今年至今最難預報的颱風。
在氣候變遷的影響下，台灣近年多次面臨「怪颱」，去年的辛樂克、卡玫基都不是強颱，但都因雨量超大而成災。放大範圍看，這幾年，全球都面臨劇烈氣候變異，動輒降下以五十年、甚至百年為頻率周期的大雨，菲律賓、越南、土耳其最近都出現大水災，連向來是乾旱地區的印度北部德干高原，都在雨季結束後出現大洪水，而二○○五年美國卡崔娜風災，更是北美洲少見的巨災。
不久前，《自然雜誌》刊登的一篇由美國賓州大學教授進行的研究指出，目前地球正處於千年一次的「風暴高峰期」，而全球暖化不但提高了風暴形成的頻率，也加驟其強度。人類面臨的是一個發怒的地球，而且怒氣顯然尚未完全爆發。
大地無情，天威難測，氣象預報與防災體系成為各國進入廿一世紀後一個始料未及的挑戰。對台灣而言，颱風的威脅尤其大；關島附近的太平洋海域是有名的「颱風窩」，因地球自轉效應，這個颱風窩生成的颱風，多會往台灣方向前進。因此國人愈來愈關心颱風氣象預報的準確與否。
但中央氣象局的颱風預報準頭，一直是一個爭議，氣象局的解釋和民眾的感受始終有極大落差。尤其，颱風預報準確與否，關係到放「颱風假」與否，如果氣象局報不準、標準不明，地方政府面對是否放颱風假時，就更感到為難。多年來，國內放颱風假的唯一標準是風力，學者呼籲多年後，總算加入威脅性更大的雨量，最近則出現應加入土石流預測的討論，對飽受土石流重創的山區而言，應是必要的修正。
在防災體系方面，政府對防災科技的整體投入與相關建置，仍慢了好幾拍。舉一例，從二○○○年的象神颱風開始，颱風因雨成災的趨勢就愈來愈明顯而劇烈，但國內的雨量測站不足、地點又分配不均，多是以縣市為設站規畫。直到今年初，經建會才通過十多億的經費，用於改善雨量測站設站問題，將落實到以鄉鎮為主，加強防災網格的密度。其實，這個工作早就應該進行了。
另一個需要指出的是，長久以來，社會習慣批評政府防災不力，但民眾的防災意識也要加強。譬如，莫拉克終於使危險地區的民眾認識到遷村的必要性。而在芭瑪颱風中，仍然有災區民眾不願撤離，政府只好出錢出力替他們堆沙包，但又有人站在旁邊譏諷「沒用啦」。自己不知保護自己，又憑什麼浪費社會國家資源呢？
這次面對芭瑪颱風，政府或許過關了，但未來呢？天災不會休止，天佑也不牢靠，歷次災難的血淚一定要化為教訓，落實到制度與生活中，才是防災之道。
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 6, 2009
The 8/8 Flood taught us some painful lessons. Typhoon Parma has the Ma administration on tenterhooks. It mobilized in advance. Central and local governments are on full alert. President Ma Ying-jeou has repeatedly stressed that his administration "prepared for any eventuality," and that its defenses are "tight as a drum." Judging by their performance over the past two days, disaster prevention measures by government at all levels have passed muster. Local governments and members of the public have for the most part cooperated by evacuating danger zones. The Ma administration's clueless and inept behavior during Typhoon Morakot is hopefully a thing of the past.
Typhoon Parma did not result in disaster. Nevertheless it forced officials and civilians in threatened areas to run around in circles. The Yilan region in particular bore the brunt of the storm. The county government made four different announcements regarding school closures before finally getting it right. The main reason was that Typhoon Parma's path was erratic. It was a "peculiar typhoon."
Typhoon Parma was so peculiar, American, Japanese and our own weather services all found it difficult to track. Neither its path nor the amount of rainfall could be accurately predicted. According to typhoon reports issued by our own Central Weather Bureau over the weekend, Parma was downgraded to a standard typhoon on October 2. The radius of the typhoon however, increased from 200 kilometers to 250 kilometers, expanding its sphere of influence.
After Typhoon Parma battered Taiwan, it was affected by Typhoon Melor in waters surrounding the Philippine Islands. Typhoon Melor drew Typhoon Parma toward the Bashi Channel, where it hovered for a time, leading to a "Fujiwara Effect." Melor repeatedly altered Parma's path. It caused Parma to make a 180 degree about face, from northeast to southwest. Weather services in the Philippines were even worried that Parma might draw Melor back, to batter the Philippines a second time.
Another factor affecting Parma was a "combined effect," leading to rainfall variations. Parma was clearly far to the south, in the Bashi Channel. Yet the heaviest rainfall was in Yilan, on the northern coast of Taiwan. The Bureau of Meteorology had to amend its forecast five times, a record in typhoon forecasting. Parma's strange behavior inspired experts to characterize it as the most difficult to forecast typhoon so far this year.
Under the impact of climate change, Taiwan has experienced many "peculiar typhoons" in recent years. Last year's Typhoon Sinlaku and Typhoon Kalmaegi were not super typhoons. But heavy rains led to disaster. Looking at the larger picture, the entire world faces dramatic climate change. In recent years some regions have received 50 or even 100 year record rainfalls. The Philippines, Vietnam, and Turkey have experienced major floods. Arid regions such as the Deccan Plateau in northern India have experienced major floods -- even after the conclusion of the rainy season. Hurricane Katrina, which struck the US in 2005, was a major disaster seldom seen in North America.
Not long ago, Nature Magazine published a study by a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, who said that the world is currently experiencing a once in a millennium "storm peak." Global warming has not increased not merely the frequency of storms, but also their strength. Mankind faces an angry planet, whose anger has yet to fully erupt.
Nature is cruel, and its wrath unpredictable. Weather forecasting and disaster prevention systems in the twenty-first century face an unexpected challenge. As for Taiwan, the threat of typhoons looms especially large. Nearby Guam is an infamous Pacific Ocean "Typhoon nest." Due to the earth's rotational effect, most typhoons generated in this nest head towards Taiwan. People are therefore increasingly concerned about the accuracy of typhoon weather forecasts.
The accuracy of Central Weather Bureau typhoon forecasts has long been in dispute. The CWB's explanations have seldom satisfied the public. The accuracy of its typhoon forecasts affects "typhoon holidays." If CWB reports are inaccurate, if the standards are unclear, local governments don't know whether to declare typhoon holidays. For years the sole criterion for typhoon holidays was wind strength. After years of urging from experts, it finally added rainfall volume, an even greater threat. Recently there have been calls to add landslide predictions forecasts. For mountain regions hard hit by mudslides, this is a necessary correction.
The government has been slow to invest in disaster prevention technology. For example since Typhoon Xangsane in 2000, it has become clear that rainfall is more and more often the cause of serious damage. But domestic rainfall measurement stations are too few and too unevenly distributed. Most stations are established by county and municipal governments. It was only early this year, that the CEPD approved one billion NT in funding for rainfall measurement station improvements, mainly in villages and towns. Increasing the density of rainfall measurement stations is long overdue.
The public has long been in the habit of criticizing the government for ineffectiveness in disaster prevention. But the public must increase its own understanding as well. For example, Typhoon Morakot finally forced people living in threatened areas to acknowledge the need for village relocation. Yet during Typhoon Parma some people in threatened areas still refused to leave. The government was forced to spend money and manpower helping them pile sandbags. Some mocked these efforts as useless. But if people don't know enough to look after themselves, what gives them the right to waste precious public resources?
The government received a passing grade during Typhoon Parma. But what about in the future? Natural disasters never sleep. Heaven's blessings are capricious. The blood and tears shed during natural disasters must be translated into lessons. They must be integrated into the system and into our lives. That is the only way to prepare for natural disasters.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.10.06
這次芭瑪颱風過關 但未來呢？
本報訊
經過八八風災的慘痛教訓，這次面對芭瑪颱風，馬政府上下繃緊神經，提早動員，從中央到縣市政府全面進入防颱備戰狀態，務求做到馬英九總統一再強調的「料敵從寬，禦敵從嚴」。從這兩天的結果看來，各級政府的防災動作還算到位，該撤離的危險區域，地方政府與民眾也多半能配合執行，馬政府終於不再像莫拉克颱風來襲時一般，全無章法，徹底失能。
不過，芭瑪雖未釀災，卻仍讓預警區內的政府及民眾手忙腳亂，尤其是首當其衝的宜蘭地區，為了是否停班停課，縣政府發布了四次新聞，才算全部搞定。主因就是，芭瑪行徑詭異，又是一個「怪颱」。
芭瑪之怪，讓美、日各國氣象單位都難以捉摸，它的路徑和雨量都「測不準」。根據我國中央氣象局上周末發布的颱風消息，芭瑪在十月二日減弱為中颱，但暴風半徑反而由二百公里增加到二百五十公里，影響範圍擴大。
而芭瑪侵台後，又受菲律賓海域上另一個強颱米勒的牽引、拉扯而在巴士海峽滯留踱步，徘徊不去，形成若有似無的「藤原效應」，一再影響芭瑪的路徑，使它一度出現由東北轉向西南的一八○度大轉變；而菲律賓氣象單位還擔心芭瑪是否會被米勒拉回去，二度侵菲。
另一個影響芭瑪的因素是「共伴效應」，主要反映在雨量變化，明明颱風遠在南邊的巴士海峽，但最大雨量落在宜蘭，氣象局連續上、下修正達五次之多，創歷年颱風預報僅見。這麼怪異的表現，使芭瑪被學者定義為今年至今最難預報的颱風。
在氣候變遷的影響下，台灣近年多次面臨「怪颱」，去年的辛樂克、卡玫基都不是強颱，但都因雨量超大而成災。放大範圍看，這幾年，全球都面臨劇烈氣候變異，動輒降下以五十年、甚至百年為頻率周期的大雨，菲律賓、越南、土耳其最近都出現大水災，連向來是乾旱地區的印度北部德干高原，都在雨季結束後出現大洪水，而二○○五年美國卡崔娜風災，更是北美洲少見的巨災。
不久前，《自然雜誌》刊登的一篇由美國賓州大學教授進行的研究指出，目前地球正處於千年一次的「風暴高峰期」，而全球暖化不但提高了風暴形成的頻率，也加驟其強度。人類面臨的是一個發怒的地球，而且怒氣顯然尚未完全爆發。
大地無情，天威難測，氣象預報與防災體系成為各國進入廿一世紀後一個始料未及的挑戰。對台灣而言，颱風的威脅尤其大；關島附近的太平洋海域是有名的「颱風窩」，因地球自轉效應，這個颱風窩生成的颱風，多會往台灣方向前進。因此國人愈來愈關心颱風氣象預報的準確與否。
但中央氣象局的颱風預報準頭，一直是一個爭議，氣象局的解釋和民眾的感受始終有極大落差。尤其，颱風預報準確與否，關係到放「颱風假」與否，如果氣象局報不準、標準不明，地方政府面對是否放颱風假時，就更感到為難。多年來，國內放颱風假的唯一標準是風力，學者呼籲多年後，總算加入威脅性更大的雨量，最近則出現應加入土石流預測的討論，對飽受土石流重創的山區而言，應是必要的修正。
在防災體系方面，政府對防災科技的整體投入與相關建置，仍慢了好幾拍。舉一例，從二○○○年的象神颱風開始，颱風因雨成災的趨勢就愈來愈明顯而劇烈，但國內的雨量測站不足、地點又分配不均，多是以縣市為設站規畫。直到今年初，經建會才通過十多億的經費，用於改善雨量測站設站問題，將落實到以鄉鎮為主，加強防災網格的密度。其實，這個工作早就應該進行了。
另一個需要指出的是，長久以來，社會習慣批評政府防災不力，但民眾的防災意識也要加強。譬如，莫拉克終於使危險地區的民眾認識到遷村的必要性。而在芭瑪颱風中，仍然有災區民眾不願撤離，政府只好出錢出力替他們堆沙包，但又有人站在旁邊譏諷「沒用啦」。自己不知保護自己，又憑什麼浪費社會國家資源呢？
這次面對芭瑪颱風，政府或許過關了，但未來呢？天災不會休止，天佑也不牢靠，歷次災難的血淚一定要化為教訓，落實到制度與生活中，才是防災之道。
Monday, October 5, 2009
The Problem is Factional Style, not Factions
The Problem is Factional Style, not Factions
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 5, 2009
After being out of power for eight years, the Kuomintang has finally regained power. But it now faces a serious crisis with its political support at the local level.
The KMT lost the Miaoli County legislative by-election, and the Yunlin County legislative by-election. Yunlin County Magistrate Chang Li-shan announced her withdrawal from the election. The KMT failed to win passage of its referendum on legalized gambling in Penghu. This was only the beginning. Factional infighting soon erupted in the Hualien, Taitung, Hsinchu, Nantou and Chiayi county elections. This is shaking the very foundations of the party, and its structure is in danger of collapse.
The Conventional Wisdom is that the problem is with "local factions." But that is only half the answer. Democracies throughout the world must cope with local factions. Factions can actually help political integration. They can actually help the public evaluate party performance. The real problem is factional style, quality, and image. The faction headed by Chang Jung-wei, the "King of Yunlin," is now ridiculted as "qing pu gong / zheng wan peng" (hogging everything for itself). Lin Ping-kun is the "King of Penghu." What government and business interests stand behind his investments in the gaming industry? Voters have their doubts. The Chang/Lin merger crystalizes public perceptions of the KMT's factional politics. Chang and Lin are both "non-partisan." Yet they are able to hijack the KMT. Such factions are clearly tails wagging the dog.
In 2008 the central government experienced a change in ruling parties. The main reason Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party lost power was their handling of corruption and Taiwan independence. They lost the people's trust. The KMT was presented with an opportunity to regain power. Now, however the KMT's local political machine faces a test of legitimacy. Kuang Li-chen in Taitung, Fu Kuen-chi in Hualien, Chang Yung-wei in Yunlin, and Lin Ping-kun in Penghu all represent the same problem.
Why has the KMT's local political machine broken into so many pieces? Let's compare the KMT to the DPP. One. The DPP's rise was due to national level political campaigns, to a strong, clear-cut political platform. Therefore its first and second generation political leaders have national level name recognition. They characterized themselves as "spokespersons for Taiwanese values." By contrast, the KMT central government and local government have long been two separate worlds. Local political leaders have long been concerned only with the distribution of political benefits. Almost none of them are "spokespersons for Taiwan." Almost none of them offer spiritual or ideological inspiration. They represent no political values, only the distribution of political benefits. This is one reason why the KMT finds it difficult to upgrade the quality of its local political leadership. Two. The DPP has national level political factions such as the Justice Alliance and the New Wave Faction. To a considerable extent, these national level political factions are able to moderate and control local factions. By contrast, today's KMT lacks the ideological fervor to generate political factions. The party's central leadership suppresses political factions, even as it remains incapable of restraining local factions. Three. The DPP's political factions have a training function. For example, they help city and county council members to become national legislators, their assistants to become council members, national legislators to become county executives and city mayors, and their assistants to become national legislators. Local KMT factions, on the other hand, are predominantly family enterprises that help spouses or offspring run for office, or worse, allow the family to hog everything for itself. Therefore the problem is not factions, but factional style. The public has seen Wang Yu-yun and Yu Teng-fa style factions come and go. The Chang Jung-wei and Lin Ping-kun style factions will also eventually run their course.
Take Yunlin for example. The KMT can no longer consider Chang Jung-wei its spokesperson. By the same token, Chang Yung-wei is no longer the KMT's political tool. This is not a question of who is willing to do business with whom. Society has evolved to the point where such games are no longer acceptable.
President Ma has assumed the party chairmanship. The central government is already stretched to its limits. It is in no position to deal effectively with the fragmentation of its local political machine. Chang Li-shan, Fu Kun-chi, and Kuang Li-chen are giving Ma headaches. Former Hualien and Hsinchu county executives have opposed the party's primary candidates. As we can see, the KMT Central Committee is neither able to deter local political bosses, nor inspire the party leadership to do better. Chang Jung-wei is hardly alone. Anyone can confidently declare "I no longer want to do business with the party leadership."
The KMT cannot eliminate local factions. But it should ask itself a fundamental question. Why are local DPP leaders, even low-ranking ones, afraid to criticize the mess Chen Shui-bian left behind, while simultaneously boasting that they represent "Taiwan's values?" Why can't bona fide, local KMT grass-roots leaders claim that they represent "Taiwan's values" and "Taiwan's spirit?" Why can't they extricate themselves from their quagmire? Why are they content to do nothing except distribute benefits? When the KMT handles local disputes, why can't it appeal to the voters on a higher level, and force local political bosses to back down? Why is even Chang Hui-yuan able to "campaign on behalf of his son" and hold the KMT leadership in utter contempt
Both are Taiwanese. So why are "DPP Taiwanese" more equal than "KMT Taiwanese?" This is a question for which the KMT has no answer. Even if it had an answer, it feels no urgency concerning the answer. But this is one of the most fundamental questions confronting the KMT, and one for which it must find an answer, sooner or later.
派系不是問題，問題在派系的風格
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.05 11:58 am
剛爭回喪失了八年中央執政權的國民黨，現正面臨地方根基動搖的嚴重危機。
輸掉苗栗立委補選，再輸掉雲林立委補選，雲林縣長提名候選人張麗善又宣布退選，澎湖博弈公投亦告失敗……。事情還沒完，花蓮、台東、新竹、南投及嘉義的縣長選舉皆出現分裂內訌……。根基動搖，大廈亦岌岌告危。
一般認為，問題出在「地方派系」。此說似只說對了一半。在全世界的民主政治中，地方派系皆不能免，且派系有助政治整合及政績的累積；所以，問題其實出在派系的風格、品質與形象。「雲林王」張榮味的派系，如今落得「青埔宮／整碗捧」的譏評，引起了選民的質疑；「澎湖王」林炳坤對博弈產業的投入，其背後的政商結構也使選民疑懼。而張、林二人的派系形象，可謂正是一般國人對國民黨地方派系的既成印象。何況，張、林皆是「無黨籍」，卻能挾制國民黨，可見派系已是尾大不掉。
二○○八年中央政權的政黨輪替，主要是因陳水扁的民進黨政權在貪腐失政及操作台獨上，失去了國人的信任；國民黨因而有了取而代之的機遇。現在眼前出現的問題則是：國民黨在地方政治上的正當性面臨了社會的考驗，從台東鄺麗貞、花蓮傅?萁、雲林張榮味到澎湖林炳坤，皆是同樣的課題。
為什麼國民黨的地方政治會出現這種四分五裂、捉襟見肘的現象？試與民進黨相較，探其隱微。一、民進黨崛起於全國性的政治運動，一直有強烈鮮明的政治號召，因而第一、二代的地方政治人物亦有全國性的知名度，皆以「台灣價值的代言人」自居；反觀國民黨，中央與地方幾乎一直是井水不犯河水的兩個世界，因而地方政治人物一向以利益分配為政治操作的主題，幾乎無人能在精神感召或意識形態上成為「台灣的代言人」。沒有政治號召的精神主題，只有利益分配，這是國民黨地方政治人物及地方派系難以提升的因素之一。二、民進黨內有全國性的「政治派系」（如正義連線、新潮流），相當程度地疏導及節制了「地方派系」；相對而言，國民黨的精神主題不足以分化出政治派系，黨中央亦壓制政治派系，卻無力節制地方派系。三、民進黨的「政治派系」亦有人才培訓的功能；例如：議員選上立委，助理即選議員；立委選上縣市長，助理即選立委。反觀國民黨，比較凸顯的印象是家族世襲，代夫出征、代子出征，甚至「青埔宮／全碗捧」。因而，派系不是問題，問題在於風格。王玉雲、余登發那類的派系，國人都眼看它樓起樓塌；張榮味、林炳坤之類的派系亦必有強弩之末的時候。
以雲林的例子來看，國民黨再也不能以張榮味為「代理人」，張榮味亦再也不能以國民黨為「政治工具」。這不是誰不跟誰玩的問題，而是社會發展至今日，已經不容許這樣的玩法。
馬英九總統兼黨主席，中央大局已是捉襟見肘，遑論有效處理分崩離析的地方政治。現在不只張麗善、傅?萁、鄺麗貞給他出難題，連花蓮及新竹縣也出現老縣長力挺否定初選者；可見，國民黨中央既無強人以威懾地方，又無精神號召或優異的中央政績以感召地方，何只張榮味，任何人皆可理直氣壯地宣示：「不跟黨中央玩下去！」這般情狀，如何了得？
國民黨不可能終結地方派系，但應當回頭問一個最根本的問題：為什麼民進黨的地方人物，不論什麼小蘿蔔頭，都敢不問陳水扁的爛攤子，而大言不慚地說：我代表台灣價值！而為什麼國民黨的真正草根地方人物卻不能說：我代表台灣價值，我代表台灣精神？為什麼不能從利益分配的泥淖中走出來？又為什麼國民黨在處理地方傾軋時，不能向選民訴諸一個更高遠的價值目標，使地方投機人物知難而退？以致連張輝元也敢玩「代子出征」，視黨中央如無物。
平平是台灣人，難道「國民黨的台灣人」不如「民進黨的台灣人」？這個問題很大，且現在也找不出答案，即使找出答案亦已無濟於燃眉之急。但是，這卻是一個最根本的問題，對國民黨而言，不找出答案不行。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 5, 2009
After being out of power for eight years, the Kuomintang has finally regained power. But it now faces a serious crisis with its political support at the local level.
The KMT lost the Miaoli County legislative by-election, and the Yunlin County legislative by-election. Yunlin County Magistrate Chang Li-shan announced her withdrawal from the election. The KMT failed to win passage of its referendum on legalized gambling in Penghu. This was only the beginning. Factional infighting soon erupted in the Hualien, Taitung, Hsinchu, Nantou and Chiayi county elections. This is shaking the very foundations of the party, and its structure is in danger of collapse.
The Conventional Wisdom is that the problem is with "local factions." But that is only half the answer. Democracies throughout the world must cope with local factions. Factions can actually help political integration. They can actually help the public evaluate party performance. The real problem is factional style, quality, and image. The faction headed by Chang Jung-wei, the "King of Yunlin," is now ridiculted as "qing pu gong / zheng wan peng" (hogging everything for itself). Lin Ping-kun is the "King of Penghu." What government and business interests stand behind his investments in the gaming industry? Voters have their doubts. The Chang/Lin merger crystalizes public perceptions of the KMT's factional politics. Chang and Lin are both "non-partisan." Yet they are able to hijack the KMT. Such factions are clearly tails wagging the dog.
In 2008 the central government experienced a change in ruling parties. The main reason Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party lost power was their handling of corruption and Taiwan independence. They lost the people's trust. The KMT was presented with an opportunity to regain power. Now, however the KMT's local political machine faces a test of legitimacy. Kuang Li-chen in Taitung, Fu Kuen-chi in Hualien, Chang Yung-wei in Yunlin, and Lin Ping-kun in Penghu all represent the same problem.
Why has the KMT's local political machine broken into so many pieces? Let's compare the KMT to the DPP. One. The DPP's rise was due to national level political campaigns, to a strong, clear-cut political platform. Therefore its first and second generation political leaders have national level name recognition. They characterized themselves as "spokespersons for Taiwanese values." By contrast, the KMT central government and local government have long been two separate worlds. Local political leaders have long been concerned only with the distribution of political benefits. Almost none of them are "spokespersons for Taiwan." Almost none of them offer spiritual or ideological inspiration. They represent no political values, only the distribution of political benefits. This is one reason why the KMT finds it difficult to upgrade the quality of its local political leadership. Two. The DPP has national level political factions such as the Justice Alliance and the New Wave Faction. To a considerable extent, these national level political factions are able to moderate and control local factions. By contrast, today's KMT lacks the ideological fervor to generate political factions. The party's central leadership suppresses political factions, even as it remains incapable of restraining local factions. Three. The DPP's political factions have a training function. For example, they help city and county council members to become national legislators, their assistants to become council members, national legislators to become county executives and city mayors, and their assistants to become national legislators. Local KMT factions, on the other hand, are predominantly family enterprises that help spouses or offspring run for office, or worse, allow the family to hog everything for itself. Therefore the problem is not factions, but factional style. The public has seen Wang Yu-yun and Yu Teng-fa style factions come and go. The Chang Jung-wei and Lin Ping-kun style factions will also eventually run their course.
Take Yunlin for example. The KMT can no longer consider Chang Jung-wei its spokesperson. By the same token, Chang Yung-wei is no longer the KMT's political tool. This is not a question of who is willing to do business with whom. Society has evolved to the point where such games are no longer acceptable.
President Ma has assumed the party chairmanship. The central government is already stretched to its limits. It is in no position to deal effectively with the fragmentation of its local political machine. Chang Li-shan, Fu Kun-chi, and Kuang Li-chen are giving Ma headaches. Former Hualien and Hsinchu county executives have opposed the party's primary candidates. As we can see, the KMT Central Committee is neither able to deter local political bosses, nor inspire the party leadership to do better. Chang Jung-wei is hardly alone. Anyone can confidently declare "I no longer want to do business with the party leadership."
The KMT cannot eliminate local factions. But it should ask itself a fundamental question. Why are local DPP leaders, even low-ranking ones, afraid to criticize the mess Chen Shui-bian left behind, while simultaneously boasting that they represent "Taiwan's values?" Why can't bona fide, local KMT grass-roots leaders claim that they represent "Taiwan's values" and "Taiwan's spirit?" Why can't they extricate themselves from their quagmire? Why are they content to do nothing except distribute benefits? When the KMT handles local disputes, why can't it appeal to the voters on a higher level, and force local political bosses to back down? Why is even Chang Hui-yuan able to "campaign on behalf of his son" and hold the KMT leadership in utter contempt
Both are Taiwanese. So why are "DPP Taiwanese" more equal than "KMT Taiwanese?" This is a question for which the KMT has no answer. Even if it had an answer, it feels no urgency concerning the answer. But this is one of the most fundamental questions confronting the KMT, and one for which it must find an answer, sooner or later.
派系不是問題，問題在派系的風格
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.05 11:58 am
剛爭回喪失了八年中央執政權的國民黨，現正面臨地方根基動搖的嚴重危機。
輸掉苗栗立委補選，再輸掉雲林立委補選，雲林縣長提名候選人張麗善又宣布退選，澎湖博弈公投亦告失敗……。事情還沒完，花蓮、台東、新竹、南投及嘉義的縣長選舉皆出現分裂內訌……。根基動搖，大廈亦岌岌告危。
一般認為，問題出在「地方派系」。此說似只說對了一半。在全世界的民主政治中，地方派系皆不能免，且派系有助政治整合及政績的累積；所以，問題其實出在派系的風格、品質與形象。「雲林王」張榮味的派系，如今落得「青埔宮／整碗捧」的譏評，引起了選民的質疑；「澎湖王」林炳坤對博弈產業的投入，其背後的政商結構也使選民疑懼。而張、林二人的派系形象，可謂正是一般國人對國民黨地方派系的既成印象。何況，張、林皆是「無黨籍」，卻能挾制國民黨，可見派系已是尾大不掉。
二○○八年中央政權的政黨輪替，主要是因陳水扁的民進黨政權在貪腐失政及操作台獨上，失去了國人的信任；國民黨因而有了取而代之的機遇。現在眼前出現的問題則是：國民黨在地方政治上的正當性面臨了社會的考驗，從台東鄺麗貞、花蓮傅?萁、雲林張榮味到澎湖林炳坤，皆是同樣的課題。
為什麼國民黨的地方政治會出現這種四分五裂、捉襟見肘的現象？試與民進黨相較，探其隱微。一、民進黨崛起於全國性的政治運動，一直有強烈鮮明的政治號召，因而第一、二代的地方政治人物亦有全國性的知名度，皆以「台灣價值的代言人」自居；反觀國民黨，中央與地方幾乎一直是井水不犯河水的兩個世界，因而地方政治人物一向以利益分配為政治操作的主題，幾乎無人能在精神感召或意識形態上成為「台灣的代言人」。沒有政治號召的精神主題，只有利益分配，這是國民黨地方政治人物及地方派系難以提升的因素之一。二、民進黨內有全國性的「政治派系」（如正義連線、新潮流），相當程度地疏導及節制了「地方派系」；相對而言，國民黨的精神主題不足以分化出政治派系，黨中央亦壓制政治派系，卻無力節制地方派系。三、民進黨的「政治派系」亦有人才培訓的功能；例如：議員選上立委，助理即選議員；立委選上縣市長，助理即選立委。反觀國民黨，比較凸顯的印象是家族世襲，代夫出征、代子出征，甚至「青埔宮／全碗捧」。因而，派系不是問題，問題在於風格。王玉雲、余登發那類的派系，國人都眼看它樓起樓塌；張榮味、林炳坤之類的派系亦必有強弩之末的時候。
以雲林的例子來看，國民黨再也不能以張榮味為「代理人」，張榮味亦再也不能以國民黨為「政治工具」。這不是誰不跟誰玩的問題，而是社會發展至今日，已經不容許這樣的玩法。
馬英九總統兼黨主席，中央大局已是捉襟見肘，遑論有效處理分崩離析的地方政治。現在不只張麗善、傅?萁、鄺麗貞給他出難題，連花蓮及新竹縣也出現老縣長力挺否定初選者；可見，國民黨中央既無強人以威懾地方，又無精神號召或優異的中央政績以感召地方，何只張榮味，任何人皆可理直氣壯地宣示：「不跟黨中央玩下去！」這般情狀，如何了得？
國民黨不可能終結地方派系，但應當回頭問一個最根本的問題：為什麼民進黨的地方人物，不論什麼小蘿蔔頭，都敢不問陳水扁的爛攤子，而大言不慚地說：我代表台灣價值！而為什麼國民黨的真正草根地方人物卻不能說：我代表台灣價值，我代表台灣精神？為什麼不能從利益分配的泥淖中走出來？又為什麼國民黨在處理地方傾軋時，不能向選民訴諸一個更高遠的價值目標，使地方投機人物知難而退？以致連張輝元也敢玩「代子出征」，視黨中央如無物。
平平是台灣人，難道「國民黨的台灣人」不如「民進黨的台灣人」？這個問題很大，且現在也找不出答案，即使找出答案亦已無濟於燃眉之急。但是，這卻是一個最根本的問題，對國民黨而言，不找出答案不行。
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