Can President Ma Deliver on Carbon Reduction?
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 15, 2009
Nearly one hundred national leaders gathered in the Danish capital of Copenhagen to discuss new greenhouse gas emissions standards. President Ma Ying-jeou made public his latest entry in his "weekly journal." His theme was "carbon reduction, creating an environmentalist paradise." He called on people to do their utmost to conserve energy and reduce carbon, thereby transforming Taiwan into an "environmentalist paradise." But at such a critical juncture, President Ma's weekly journal utterly failed to mention his own most important environmental policy, an energy tax. Premier Wu Den-yih recently said the administration had "no timetable" for the implementation of an energy tax. This cast doubt on the government's determination to promote an energy tax. In the absence of any specific policy, the Republic of China is a long way from its ideal of an environmentalist paradise.
Global warming is a clear and present danger. It is threatening the survival of more than just polar bears. Island nations in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean are in danger of being inundated. Melting permafrost has forced Eskimos in Alaska to relocate villages. Residents in the Himalayas live in fear as a result of melting mountain glaciers. Barrier lakes may burst through their containment walls at any time. Time magazine pointed out that over the past five decades, the total area of glaciers in the Himalayas has diminished by one fifth, far more than in other areas. Glaciers in the Himalayas constitute the third most important glacial region outside the Arctic and Antarctic. It is the water source of the most important river system on earth. It affects the safety of the drinking water of half the world's population. If the situation cannot be reversed, it may lead to regional conflicts and wars.
Developed and developing nations have bickered endlessly over the past few days at the Copenhagen summit on climate change, over who bears the greatest responsibility for increased carbon emissions. The harsh reality is that wealthy, developed nations have long been largest emitters of carbon. The biggest victims meanwhile, have been poor, developing nations. Scientists estimate that it will cost about one per cent of the global GDP to slow global warming. Compare this to the financial tsunami. Governments have earmarked five per cent of their GDP to bail out banks. It costs less to fight global warming than one might imagine. Therefore, developed nations have a responsibility to provide financial aid to developing nations fighting climate change.
Poor and wealthy nations have bickered endlessly at the Copenhagen summit. The Republic of China is not a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Even if the Copenhagen summit reaches a new consensus on carbon reduction, the ROC has no obligation to comply. But global warming has already precipitated disasters on Taiwan. A few months ago the 8/8 Floods included the heaviest rainfall in a century. It caused serious landslides, and buried Hsiaolin Village under a mountain of mud. Haven't we learned our lesson? After such a massive disaster, can we still ignore international trends? Can we continue to engage in unbridled development of more high-pollution, high energy-consumption industries? Can we continue to emit even more carbon dioxide?
Carbon dioxide emissions on Taiwan over the past few years are an embarrassment. Carbon dioxide emmissions on Taiwan have grown at a rate among the fastest in the world. They have accelerated since 1999. Our carbon dioxide growth rate is higher than our economic growth rate. Not only have we failed to grow our economy, we have also failed to protect our environment. According to the Academia Sinica, we use energy less efficiently than the European Union and Japan, because our government has kept energy prices below international standards and has fostered high energy-consumption industries. If we refuse to change our development model, our exports are bound to face trade sanctions from the EU and other industrialized nations. High carbon emissions have become a hidden risk to our economic future.
The Ma administration trumpets its dedication to energy conservation and carbon reduction. Since taking office more than a year ago, just what has it done? Take the Executive Yuan's "Sustainable Energy Policy" for example. It set carbon reduction targets for 2008 to 2020, and 2000 to 2025. Internationally the base year is 1990. By contrast, we have used 2008 as our benchmark, a comparatively loose standard. Furthermore, the long-debated greenhouse gas emissions law remains stalled in the Legislative Yuan. As for the Tax Reform Commission's "energy tax" program, it has been sidelined by the administration without even undergoing debate.
In recent years, more and more international companies have come to realize that low-carbon, green energy policies offer commercial opportunities. Microsoft, Intel, and Hewlett-Packard have taken the lead in carbon reduction. TSMC, ASUS, Taiwan Delta Electronics, Chi Mei and other companies have aggressively sought low carbon footprint certification. In the face of this new trend toward green energy and reduced carbon emissions, we cling to our model of ultra-low energy prices and high energy-consumption industries. Presidential office and executive branch officials cling to the old fossil fuel model. They assume that energy conservation and reduced carbon emissions must harm economic development. In fact, energy conservation and reduced carbon emissions may pose new challenges, but they also offer new business opportunities. These await a joint initiative by the government and business. Since President Ma took office, he has assumed complete control of both the party and the government. If he fails to honor even his commitment to an "energy tax," can the Republic of China really talk about making itself into an environmentalist paradise?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.15
社論－馬總統的減碳政見 能否兌現
本報訊
全球近一百個國家領袖齊聚丹麥首都哥本哈根，討論新一輪溫室氣體減量規範之際，馬英九總統發表最新「治國週記」，以「落實減碳工作，營造環境大國」為題，呼籲國人為節能減碳盡一己之力，營造台灣為環境大國。不過，在這個關鍵時刻，馬總統的治國週記中，完全未提到自己最重要的環保政見｜能源稅，再加上行政院長吳敦義日前說，能源稅的實施「沒有時間表」，社會大眾對於政府推動能源稅的決心，已產生疑慮。在缺乏具體政策下，台灣距離環境大國的理想，恐怕越來越遠了。
氣候暖化所帶來的危害已迫在眉睫，不僅是北極熊的生存面臨威脅，太平洋與印度洋中的島國擔心被海水淹沒，阿拉斯加的愛斯基摩人已因凍土層融化而被迫遷村，喜瑪拉雅山區居民也因高山冰河融化，冰磧湖隨時可能潰堤而生活在恐懼中。《時代》雜誌指出，過去五十年來，喜瑪拉雅山上冰河面積減少了五分之一，遠超過其他地區。喜瑪拉雅山上的冰河是南北極之外，第三個最重要的冰河區，它是地球上主要河川體系的水源，關係著地球上二分之一人口的生命飲水安全。如果情勢無法扭轉，未來可能引爆區域衝突與戰爭。
這幾天，在哥本哈根氣候變化峰會中，已開發與開發中國家為了誰該減排更多的碳、誰該承擔較大的責任而爭吵不休。殘酷的現實是，富裕的已開發國家長期排放大量的碳，但受害最大的卻是貧窮的開發中國家。科學家計算出減緩暖化所需成本大約是全球ＧＤＰ的百分之一，相較於金融海嘯時各國政府為救銀行而消耗掉ＧＤＰ的百分之五，抗暖化的經費並不如想像中來得大。因此，已開發國家當然有責任金援開發中國家因應氣候變遷。
儘管哥本哈根會議中窮國、富國吵翻天，台灣由於非聯合國氣候變化綱要公約（ＵＮＦＣＣＣ）締約國，即使哥本哈根峰會達成新的減碳共識，事實上台灣也沒有遵守的義務。不過，對台灣而言，暖化所造成的災害早已發生。幾個月前的八八水災帶來百年來最大的雨量，造成嚴重的土石流與小林滅村的慘劇，這樣的教訓還不夠嗎？經歷了這麼大的災難，台灣還能夠無視於國際趨勢，肆無忌憚地發展更多的高汙染、高耗能產業，繼續排出更多二氧化碳嗎？
檢視台灣歷年來的排碳成績，實在令人汗顏。台灣的二氧化碳成長率是世界上成長最快的國家之一，自一九九九年之後更進一步惡化，二氧化碳成長率竟高於經濟成長率，不僅經濟沒搞好，連環境保護也沒顧到。依中研院的分析，因為政府長期實施低於國際水準的能源價格政策與扶植高耗能產業，台灣的能源使用效率比歐盟與日本都來得低。這樣的發展模式如果不設法調整，台灣的出口勢必面臨歐盟等工業國家的貿易制裁，碳風險反而成為台灣經濟發展新的隱憂。
標榜節能減碳的馬政府，上任一年多以來，究竟做了那些努力？以行政院通過的「永續能源政策綱領」為例，減碳目標是二○二 ○年達到二○○八年的標準，二○ 二五年回到二千年的標準。先看看這項目標，國際上是以一九九○年為基準，相形之下，台灣則是以二○○八年為基準，相對非常寬鬆。其次，研議已久的溫室氣體減量法仍躺在立法院，至於賦改會提出的「能源稅」方案，尚未經過政策辯論就被府院打入冷宮。
近年來國際上越來越多企業體認到低碳成長帶動的綠能商機，從微軟、英特爾到惠普已率先實施減碳，國內也有台積電、華碩、台達電、奇美等積極取得碳足跡認證。面對這股綠能減碳的新趨勢，台灣似乎仍沉醉於超低能源價格與發展高耗能產業的模式中，府院高層仍死抱著石化燃料舊思維，以為推動節能減碳即會傷害經濟發展。其實，節能減碳雖帶來新的挑戰，同時也帶來許多新商機，有待政府與企業共同努力開發。馬總統上任迄今，既然全面掌握黨政大權，如果連最基本的「能源稅」政見都無法兌現，不知台灣如何奢談邁向環境大國？
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
Monday, December 14, 2009
Taiwan's Real Crisis: An Inability to Get Beyond Mob Sentiment
Taiwan's Real Crisis: An Inability to Get Beyond Mob Sentiment
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 14, 2009
The recent election was the "closest race in the history of Blue vs. Green political rivalry." Following the elections, President Ma offered to debate DPP chairman Tsai Ing-wen. The Democratic Progressive Party said it had waited a long time for this, and that it did not fear debate. If the two parties can remain rational while debating ECFA, the result would be good for Taiwan. Many people are probably looking forward to it. If ECFA remains merely a political football during election campaigns, then Taiwan will continue to be inundated by waves of populist rumor-mongering. Society will continue to wallow in emotionalism that lead nowhere. That is Taiwan's real crisis.
The Democratic Progressive Party's confidence has gotten a boost from the election. Next week will be the fourth meeting between Chiang Ping-kuen and Chen Yunlin. The host, Taichung City Mayor Jason Hu, has repeatedly begged the Green camp to allow the summit to proceed without incident. Many business leaders have also expressed concern over potential trouble during the Chiang-Chen meeting. But they appear unable to move the Democratic Progressive Party, which is determined to do everything in its power to sabotage the meeting. It has already decided to widen the scope of its protests "in response to the Chiang/Chen meeting's seven-member group." It has vowed that it will stage "spectacular" protests. The Green camp intends to "make Chen Yunlin look bad." During the previous Chiang/Chen summit in Taipei, the DPP urged many of its supporters to butt heads with the police. They left the public unsettled. They left blood in the streets. Just exactly who made whom look bad may be a matter of opinion.
Amidst this atmosphere of tension, Democratic Progressive Party legislators shrilly demanded without success that the Mainland Affairs Council make public the name of the hotel where Chen Yunlin would be staying. It is of course not hard to imagine what might happen once Chen Yunlin's place of abode in Taichung was made public. That is why the MAC has remained tight-lipped, and has no intention of disclosing such information. DPP officials have harangued administration officials, demanding to know, "Chen Yunlin, where are you? Chen Yunlin, where are you?" In fact they ought to be asking, "Taiwan, where are you?" Other East Asian countries such as South Korea have signed FTAs or CEPAs with other countries. But the Republic of China has yet to take even the first step. What kind of future will it have?
Over the past decade, Taiwan's exports to major import markets have been declining year by year. In 1999, in its largest export market, the U.S., products from Taiwan accounted for 3.43% of all imports. It ranked seventh in the world. In 2008, those exports had declined to 0.72%. It no longer ranked in the Top 10. Its shares in the European Union and the Japanese import market during the same period also declined from 2.77% and 4.12%, to 1.55% and 2.86%. Taiwan's global exports market share declined from 2.19% in 1999 to 1.59% in 2008.
South Korea and Singapore have been actively signing FTAs and ECFAs with other countries. South Korea and mainland China began signing such agreements in 2006. Consider joint studies of FTAs. Once an FTA has been signed, the vast majority of South Korea's exports to Mainland China will be tax exempt. Currently exports from Taiwan to Mainland China are subject to an average tariff of 8.94%. It is not hard to imagine what impact such export competitiveness from South Korea will have on Taiwan. Singapore has signed more FTAs than any other country. In 2003, Singapore exported less than Taiwan. But over the past five years, its export growth rate has increased to 18.6%. In 2004 its exports overtook Taiwan's. Also of concern is ASEAN has become Taiwan's second largest export target. Its first is Mainland China. Exports from Taiwan to Mainland China and ASEAN already account for over 50% of total exports. In 2010, the "ASEAN 10 plus One" FTA will take effect. The "One" of course refers to Mainland China. Henceforth products from both regions will be tax-free. If Taiwan cannot participate, what will the consequences be? The DPP is unparalleled at urging crowds to take to the streets. But has it ever asked itself what is the point of expending all the DPP's energy on a single individual such as Chen Yunlin? Even assuming it succeeds in "making Chen Yunlin look bad," what of it? Consider another issue. Suppose we don't sign ECFA? What is the Democratic Progressive Party's alternative for improving Taiwan's economy? The DPP says it is not afraid to debate ECFA with the KMT, but that it wants to wait until ECFA becomes more concrete. If that is the case, why not give Chiang Ping-kuen and Chen Yunlin the chance to discuss it first? Why not give them a chance to hold the necessary consultations over ECFA? Isn't the whole point of consultations to make ECFA more concrete, thereby allowing the DPP to debate its merits with the KMT? When others want to consult over ECFA, the DPP won't let them. When others want to debate ECFA with the DPP, the DPP says it is unwilling to debate them until the issue is more concrete. What would the DPP have the KMT do? Tsai Ing-wen has served as MAC chairwoman. She was a member of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party administration. She need not be so passive. She need not wait until the KMT and CCP have concluded their consultations and arrived at concrete conclusions before she plans her next move. Why not take the initiative to develop the Democratic Progressive Party's own edition of ECFA, or whatever they wish to call it? The Democratic Progressive Party says it "loves Taiwan." Shouldn't it have confidence in its ability to work out a better solution than the KMT? A solution more favorable to Taiwan? A solution more feasible? We hope the DPP will not just keep insisting that other people's beef is toxic. For the good of Taiwan, the DPP should come out and tell us: "Where's the beef?"
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.14
社論－該在意的是 台灣根本走不出去
本報訊
在打完一場「史上藍綠得票率最接近」的選舉後，馬總統表示要跟民進黨主席蔡英文辯論，民進黨則表示已經等很久了，不怕辯論；如果兩黨確實能夠就ＥＣＦＡ進行理性的溝通或者辯論，對台灣來講終究是件好事，相信很多人衷心期待也樂見其成。畢竟，如果ＥＣＦＡ只是一直被當做選舉議題炒作，讓台灣一直囿於耳語氾濫的民粹中，整個社會浸泡在激昂的情緒裡走不出去，那才真是危機。
由於選後民進黨信心大增，下個禮拜登場的第四次江陳會將是綠營的第一個舞台。儘管做主人的台中市市長胡志強再三請求、甚至是哀求綠營讓大家好好開會，也儘管不少企業界人士對這次江陳會可能出現的亂局，數度表達憂心，但似乎都動搖不了民進黨要拉高杯葛、抵制江陳會行動規模的意志，「因應江陳會七人小組」已決定擴大抗爭路線，還保證會設計出「精采」的創意活動。綠營意在「給陳雲林好看」，但上次台北江陳會，民進黨動員大批民眾與警方對抗，造成人心不安、流血掛彩事件，到底讓誰好看了、讓誰難看了，恐怕見仁見智。
在山雨欲來的緊張情勢中，民進黨立委高分貝要求陸委會公布陳雲林將下榻的飯店而未果。當然大家不難想像，一旦陳雲林在台中的住宿處曝了光，可能會發生什麼事，此所以陸委會口風甚緊，絲毫不敢透露；然而，民進黨的民意代表在大聲拷問政府官員「陳雲林在哪裡、陳雲林在哪裡」的同時，他們為什麼不問：台灣在哪裡？隨著東亞各國、特別是韓國與各國簽定ＦＴＡ或者ＣＥＰＡ，到現在台灣卻連第一步都還沒有辦法跨出去，未來會在哪裡？
近十年來，台灣出口產品在主要國家進口市場的占有率已逐年衰退，一九九九年，台灣產品在最大出口市場、美國的進口占三.四三％，位居第七名；二○○八年降到一.七二％，排名也退出十名。在歐盟與日本進口市場的占有率，同時期也分別從二.七七％和四.一二％降到一.五五％與二.八六％。台灣出口在全球市場的占有率，自一九九九年的二.一九％減少到二○○八年的一.五九％。
韓國與新加坡這些年都積極與各國簽定ＦＴＡ與ＥＣＦＡ，韓國與大陸自二○○六年開始，就簽署ＦＴＡ有關事項進行共同研究，一旦簽署ＦＴＡ，韓國出口產品到大陸，絕大部分可享受免稅，而目前台灣產品出口大陸的平均關稅率是八.九四％，這對韓國與台灣的出口競爭力會造成怎樣的影響，實在不難想像。新加坡是全世界簽署ＦＴＡ最多的國家之一。二○○三年新加坡的出口低於台灣，但近五年來其出口增加率高達十八.六％，二○○四年出口開始超越台灣。另外值得關切的是，東協已成為台灣出口第二大對象，第一為大陸，台灣對大陸及東協出口，已超過總出口的五○％以上；「東協十加一」（中國大陸）ＦＴＡ在二○一○年生效，此後該兩地區的產品往來完全免稅，如果台灣不能參與，後果是什麼？帶領民眾上街嗆聲、抗爭功夫一流的民進黨，是否想過，民進黨以全黨腦力和精力拿來對付陳雲林這「一個人」，到底意義何在？羞辱了陳雲林又如何？換另一個問題，不簽ＥＣＦＡ，民進黨對台灣經濟更好的主張是什麼？ 民進黨強調不怕針對ＥＣＦＡ與國民黨進行辯論，但要等到ＥＣＦＡ有具體結論時再講，如果是這樣，卻又為什麼不給機會讓江陳會好好談談呢，針對ＥＣＦＡ進行必要的協商，不就是為了將來可以拿出讓民進黨願意一辯的具體內容嗎？怎麼人家要談，你不許，要跟你辯，你又說沒具體內容不辯，民進黨到底要國民黨怎麼做才對？話又說回來，做過陸委會主委的蔡英文、有過執政經驗的民進黨其實也不用那麼被動，一定要等到國共兩黨談出了個具體結論後才要看看別人打算怎麼做，民進黨何不主動擬定自己的ＥＣＦＡ（或其他名稱）的版本，愛台灣的民進黨應該有信心會訂出比國民黨更厲害、對台灣更有利、更有可行性的版本吧。希望民進黨不要只會說別人的牛肉有毒，為了台灣好，也端出自己的牛肉吧。
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 14, 2009
The recent election was the "closest race in the history of Blue vs. Green political rivalry." Following the elections, President Ma offered to debate DPP chairman Tsai Ing-wen. The Democratic Progressive Party said it had waited a long time for this, and that it did not fear debate. If the two parties can remain rational while debating ECFA, the result would be good for Taiwan. Many people are probably looking forward to it. If ECFA remains merely a political football during election campaigns, then Taiwan will continue to be inundated by waves of populist rumor-mongering. Society will continue to wallow in emotionalism that lead nowhere. That is Taiwan's real crisis.
The Democratic Progressive Party's confidence has gotten a boost from the election. Next week will be the fourth meeting between Chiang Ping-kuen and Chen Yunlin. The host, Taichung City Mayor Jason Hu, has repeatedly begged the Green camp to allow the summit to proceed without incident. Many business leaders have also expressed concern over potential trouble during the Chiang-Chen meeting. But they appear unable to move the Democratic Progressive Party, which is determined to do everything in its power to sabotage the meeting. It has already decided to widen the scope of its protests "in response to the Chiang/Chen meeting's seven-member group." It has vowed that it will stage "spectacular" protests. The Green camp intends to "make Chen Yunlin look bad." During the previous Chiang/Chen summit in Taipei, the DPP urged many of its supporters to butt heads with the police. They left the public unsettled. They left blood in the streets. Just exactly who made whom look bad may be a matter of opinion.
Amidst this atmosphere of tension, Democratic Progressive Party legislators shrilly demanded without success that the Mainland Affairs Council make public the name of the hotel where Chen Yunlin would be staying. It is of course not hard to imagine what might happen once Chen Yunlin's place of abode in Taichung was made public. That is why the MAC has remained tight-lipped, and has no intention of disclosing such information. DPP officials have harangued administration officials, demanding to know, "Chen Yunlin, where are you? Chen Yunlin, where are you?" In fact they ought to be asking, "Taiwan, where are you?" Other East Asian countries such as South Korea have signed FTAs or CEPAs with other countries. But the Republic of China has yet to take even the first step. What kind of future will it have?
Over the past decade, Taiwan's exports to major import markets have been declining year by year. In 1999, in its largest export market, the U.S., products from Taiwan accounted for 3.43% of all imports. It ranked seventh in the world. In 2008, those exports had declined to 0.72%. It no longer ranked in the Top 10. Its shares in the European Union and the Japanese import market during the same period also declined from 2.77% and 4.12%, to 1.55% and 2.86%. Taiwan's global exports market share declined from 2.19% in 1999 to 1.59% in 2008.
South Korea and Singapore have been actively signing FTAs and ECFAs with other countries. South Korea and mainland China began signing such agreements in 2006. Consider joint studies of FTAs. Once an FTA has been signed, the vast majority of South Korea's exports to Mainland China will be tax exempt. Currently exports from Taiwan to Mainland China are subject to an average tariff of 8.94%. It is not hard to imagine what impact such export competitiveness from South Korea will have on Taiwan. Singapore has signed more FTAs than any other country. In 2003, Singapore exported less than Taiwan. But over the past five years, its export growth rate has increased to 18.6%. In 2004 its exports overtook Taiwan's. Also of concern is ASEAN has become Taiwan's second largest export target. Its first is Mainland China. Exports from Taiwan to Mainland China and ASEAN already account for over 50% of total exports. In 2010, the "ASEAN 10 plus One" FTA will take effect. The "One" of course refers to Mainland China. Henceforth products from both regions will be tax-free. If Taiwan cannot participate, what will the consequences be? The DPP is unparalleled at urging crowds to take to the streets. But has it ever asked itself what is the point of expending all the DPP's energy on a single individual such as Chen Yunlin? Even assuming it succeeds in "making Chen Yunlin look bad," what of it? Consider another issue. Suppose we don't sign ECFA? What is the Democratic Progressive Party's alternative for improving Taiwan's economy? The DPP says it is not afraid to debate ECFA with the KMT, but that it wants to wait until ECFA becomes more concrete. If that is the case, why not give Chiang Ping-kuen and Chen Yunlin the chance to discuss it first? Why not give them a chance to hold the necessary consultations over ECFA? Isn't the whole point of consultations to make ECFA more concrete, thereby allowing the DPP to debate its merits with the KMT? When others want to consult over ECFA, the DPP won't let them. When others want to debate ECFA with the DPP, the DPP says it is unwilling to debate them until the issue is more concrete. What would the DPP have the KMT do? Tsai Ing-wen has served as MAC chairwoman. She was a member of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party administration. She need not be so passive. She need not wait until the KMT and CCP have concluded their consultations and arrived at concrete conclusions before she plans her next move. Why not take the initiative to develop the Democratic Progressive Party's own edition of ECFA, or whatever they wish to call it? The Democratic Progressive Party says it "loves Taiwan." Shouldn't it have confidence in its ability to work out a better solution than the KMT? A solution more favorable to Taiwan? A solution more feasible? We hope the DPP will not just keep insisting that other people's beef is toxic. For the good of Taiwan, the DPP should come out and tell us: "Where's the beef?"
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.14
社論－該在意的是 台灣根本走不出去
本報訊
在打完一場「史上藍綠得票率最接近」的選舉後，馬總統表示要跟民進黨主席蔡英文辯論，民進黨則表示已經等很久了，不怕辯論；如果兩黨確實能夠就ＥＣＦＡ進行理性的溝通或者辯論，對台灣來講終究是件好事，相信很多人衷心期待也樂見其成。畢竟，如果ＥＣＦＡ只是一直被當做選舉議題炒作，讓台灣一直囿於耳語氾濫的民粹中，整個社會浸泡在激昂的情緒裡走不出去，那才真是危機。
由於選後民進黨信心大增，下個禮拜登場的第四次江陳會將是綠營的第一個舞台。儘管做主人的台中市市長胡志強再三請求、甚至是哀求綠營讓大家好好開會，也儘管不少企業界人士對這次江陳會可能出現的亂局，數度表達憂心，但似乎都動搖不了民進黨要拉高杯葛、抵制江陳會行動規模的意志，「因應江陳會七人小組」已決定擴大抗爭路線，還保證會設計出「精采」的創意活動。綠營意在「給陳雲林好看」，但上次台北江陳會，民進黨動員大批民眾與警方對抗，造成人心不安、流血掛彩事件，到底讓誰好看了、讓誰難看了，恐怕見仁見智。
在山雨欲來的緊張情勢中，民進黨立委高分貝要求陸委會公布陳雲林將下榻的飯店而未果。當然大家不難想像，一旦陳雲林在台中的住宿處曝了光，可能會發生什麼事，此所以陸委會口風甚緊，絲毫不敢透露；然而，民進黨的民意代表在大聲拷問政府官員「陳雲林在哪裡、陳雲林在哪裡」的同時，他們為什麼不問：台灣在哪裡？隨著東亞各國、特別是韓國與各國簽定ＦＴＡ或者ＣＥＰＡ，到現在台灣卻連第一步都還沒有辦法跨出去，未來會在哪裡？
近十年來，台灣出口產品在主要國家進口市場的占有率已逐年衰退，一九九九年，台灣產品在最大出口市場、美國的進口占三.四三％，位居第七名；二○○八年降到一.七二％，排名也退出十名。在歐盟與日本進口市場的占有率，同時期也分別從二.七七％和四.一二％降到一.五五％與二.八六％。台灣出口在全球市場的占有率，自一九九九年的二.一九％減少到二○○八年的一.五九％。
韓國與新加坡這些年都積極與各國簽定ＦＴＡ與ＥＣＦＡ，韓國與大陸自二○○六年開始，就簽署ＦＴＡ有關事項進行共同研究，一旦簽署ＦＴＡ，韓國出口產品到大陸，絕大部分可享受免稅，而目前台灣產品出口大陸的平均關稅率是八.九四％，這對韓國與台灣的出口競爭力會造成怎樣的影響，實在不難想像。新加坡是全世界簽署ＦＴＡ最多的國家之一。二○○三年新加坡的出口低於台灣，但近五年來其出口增加率高達十八.六％，二○○四年出口開始超越台灣。另外值得關切的是，東協已成為台灣出口第二大對象，第一為大陸，台灣對大陸及東協出口，已超過總出口的五○％以上；「東協十加一」（中國大陸）ＦＴＡ在二○一○年生效，此後該兩地區的產品往來完全免稅，如果台灣不能參與，後果是什麼？帶領民眾上街嗆聲、抗爭功夫一流的民進黨，是否想過，民進黨以全黨腦力和精力拿來對付陳雲林這「一個人」，到底意義何在？羞辱了陳雲林又如何？換另一個問題，不簽ＥＣＦＡ，民進黨對台灣經濟更好的主張是什麼？ 民進黨強調不怕針對ＥＣＦＡ與國民黨進行辯論，但要等到ＥＣＦＡ有具體結論時再講，如果是這樣，卻又為什麼不給機會讓江陳會好好談談呢，針對ＥＣＦＡ進行必要的協商，不就是為了將來可以拿出讓民進黨願意一辯的具體內容嗎？怎麼人家要談，你不許，要跟你辯，你又說沒具體內容不辯，民進黨到底要國民黨怎麼做才對？話又說回來，做過陸委會主委的蔡英文、有過執政經驗的民進黨其實也不用那麼被動，一定要等到國共兩黨談出了個具體結論後才要看看別人打算怎麼做，民進黨何不主動擬定自己的ＥＣＦＡ（或其他名稱）的版本，愛台灣的民進黨應該有信心會訂出比國民黨更厲害、對台灣更有利、更有可行性的版本吧。希望民進黨不要只會說別人的牛肉有毒，為了台灣好，也端出自己的牛肉吧。
Friday, December 11, 2009
The Government Should Provide a Forum to Debate ECFA
The Government Should Provide a Forum to Debate ECFA
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 11, 2009
Last Saturday the ruling KMT lost the County and Municipal Elections. Naturally voices within the KMT have demanded a post mortem. The media has collectively pointed the finger at US beef imports and ECFA for arousing intense opposition in central and southern Taiwan. These were the Ma administration policies critics found the most objectionable. Minister of Economic Affairs Shih Yen-hsiang said he was willing to debate ECFA with the opposition DPP. Even Premier Wu said he was willing to participate. But the DPP announced it was unwilling to participate, frustrating the ruling KMT's efforts to resolve the issue or find any leverage. DPP's reluctance to debate the issue may reflect self-doubt and evasiveness. But the ruling party cannot avoid responsibility for facilitating communication and dialogue.
We realize of course that people have different views about government policy. But Ma administration officials did a poor job of communicating the benefits of ECFA to the public. The issues remained unclear. That is why once the DPP accused the KMT of "being in favor of selling out Taiwan," the KMT found it difficult to counter the charge in southern Taiwan. But suppose the KMT had made clear what ECFA was all about. Suppose an eloquent economic minister had debated the issue. Suppose the premier had joined the battle. Considerable controversy would have remained. ECFA involves dozens of industries. If one fails to break the issues into separate categories, but instead debates them in broad terms, one would still have trouble escaping charges of "toadying up to Beijing and caving in to foreign pressure." In the end, it would merely have intensified the confrontation, and made it more difficult to clarify the issue.
As a United Daily News editorial explained earlier, at this stage ECFA is merely a broad framework, a table of contents. At most it includes a brief summary of the contents. Frankly speaking, the framework is so vague there is really nothing to oppose. The public may have concerns about certain industries. Therefore all discussions must include industry consultation. All sorts of issues have all been put on the table, including our current predicament, the benefits of signing, the potential impact of signing, mutual interests, complementary niches, and job retraining. All require broad-based public participation. The Ministry of Economic Affairs can hardly settle the matter by itself. The ruling party considers ECFA beneficial to Taiwan, but finds itself unable to explain clearly to the public how it will benefit. Why? Because the ruling administration has underestimated the power of public sentiment within civil society.
Conceptually speaking, the government can play an active role as the final arbiter of policy. Alternatively it can provide a public forum and play a passive role as the neutral mediator of a policy debate. The ruling administration may have arrived at certain conclusions about the importance of signing ECFA in a timely manner. But ECFA is a far-reaching, many-faceted economic issue that affects the livelihoods and prospects of tens of thousands of people, including both the manufacturing and service sectors. How can can a single, solitary economic minister settle the issue all by himself?
ECFA must be discussed. It must be debated. In fact, it must be divided into a number of different industry sectors and properly explored. Industry associations for various industries must develop talking points, explaining the benefits of signing ECFA. If a particular industry association is unable to convince a majority of the public about the benefits of ECFA, then perhaps that particular industry sector should not be opened up. Perhaps conditions should be added. If a particular industry considers failure to sign ECFA tantamount to a death sentence, then it can make its appeal to the public, instead of hiding behind the government and getting a free ride.
Take the financial industry for example. The two sides have signed an MOU authorizing banks on Taiwan to conduct business on the Mainland using Renminbi. The biggest beneficiary will of course be the banking industry. That being the case, naturally they, and not the government, should be the ones to step forward to convince opponents. If the public has doubts about the transparency of a branch bank on Mainland China, companies on Taiwan can address their concerns in a public forum and offer the appropriate assurances. If the chief beneficiaries, the bankers, are unable to address these public concerns, then opponents will have won a major victory. In which case, the government should perhaps go with the flow and hold off on its implementation.
As we see it, government officials should provide a forum to debate ECFA. The administration may have the final say, but at least during the policy formulation stage, the debate can be about the economic pros and cons of ECFA, instead of becoming a political struggle between the ruling and opposition parties. If the government is willing to provide a forum for various industry sectors to debate the pros and cons, then economic issues can remain economic issues, instead of being reduced to ideological confronations between diametrically opposed political parties.
ECFA is an economic issue that has a bearing on many industries. To invoke the DPP's own slogan, "No matter how barbaric the DPP might be... " It can hardly make enemies of all these industry sectors. The ruling administration should think things through. Perhaps then it will invite these industry sectors to explain the pros and cons of ECFA to the public. If they fail to explain ECFA clearly, but instead leave it a confused mess, then the Ma administration will find it difficult to escape the DPP's political attacks.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.11
社論－ECFA辯論 政府提供平台即可
本報訊
在上周六縣市長選舉執政黨挫敗之後，國民黨內當然也掀起了檢討之聲。綜合媒體報導，有指出是美牛與ＥＣＦＡ在中南部激起了極大的反對聲浪，也是外界對馬政府最不滿意之處。對此，經濟部長施顏祥隨後表示，願意就ＥＣＦＡ與在野黨辯論，甚至連吳揆都表態可親上火線。但民進黨隨後卻表示不想辯論，也讓執政黨修補善後的努力如擊敗絮，完全使不上力。民進黨不願辯論也許是心虛閃躲，但執政黨無論如何迴避不了溝通對話的責任。
基本上，我們當然尊重人民對於政府政策有不同意見，也認為馬政府官員並未對ＥＣＦＡ議題做好溝通。正由於事情沒有說清楚，所以一個「親中賣台」的大帽子扣下來，國民黨在南台灣就難以招架。但是即便要把ＥＣＦＡ講清楚，是否得由口才欠佳的經濟部長出面辯論，又是否得閣揆親上火線，則仍有相當的討論空間。此外，ＥＣＦＡ內容涉及數十個產業，如果不分子題而通盤涵蓋的辯論，八成也難以逃脫親中媚外與否的二分切割，最後只會激化對立，卻難以釐清問題。
誠如本報社論先前所分析，ＥＣＦＡ在目前這個階段只是一本書的框架目錄，頂多加上簡短的內容摘要；這麼空泛的框架坦白說根本也無從反對起。民眾或有的疑慮其實隨產業別不同而有異，故所有的討論必須要進入產業協商內涵，將目前的困境、簽署的好處、可能的衝擊、互惠的利益、利基的互補、轉業的輔導等問題一一攤在陽光下。這些都需要廣泛的社會參與對話，絕不是經濟部國貿局所能單獨成事。執政黨目前之所以自我評估簽ＥＣＦＡ對台灣有利、卻無法向外清楚說明何處有利，似乎也反映了主政者忽略民間力量與民間參與的粗疏。
就概念而言，政府既可以積極扮演決定一切政策的主導角色，也可以消極扮演提供思辯平台的中性媒介。即使主政者對於簽ＥＣＦＡ的重要性與時效性已有相當的看法，但是ＥＣＦＡ畢竟是一個影響數十個產業、牽動數萬人民生計前景的經濟議題，觸角龐雜、面向繁多，既有製造業、又有服務業，哪裡可能由經濟部長一個人包山包海去辯論？
我們認為，ＥＣＦＡ不但該談、該辯論，而且要切成若干個產業區塊好好的思辯探討。就每一個產業內容，如果簽ＥＣＦＡ真能使該產業獲利，則該產業公會就該研擬說帖、挺身為簽署ＥＣＦＡ而辯護。假若產業公會的正面觀點無法說服大多數人民，那麼也許那一個區塊就不該開放、或是簽署條件要加以設定。假若某個產業認為不簽ＥＣＦＡ就是死路一條，那麼就好好參與社會對話，而非躲在政府背後，撿現成的便宜。
以當前討論最多的金融業為例：兩岸簽署ＭＯＵ、要求ＥＣＦＡ中容許台灣的銀行赴對岸承做人民幣業務，這些事獲利最大的當然是銀行業者。既然如此，自然該由他們站出來說服反對者，而不是將政府推到第一線。若有人對中國大陸分行的金融監理透明度有疑慮，台灣業者也可以在對話平台中提出答辯與因應的承諾。如果受惠的銀行業者拚了命也難以釋社會疑慮，辯論的結果竟是反方大勝，那麼政府當然也許就該從善如流、暫緩實施。
我們認為，就ＥＣＦＡ議題而言，政府官員應該扮演的角色是平台提供者。雖然行政當局最後還是要做決策，但至少在政策形成的過程中，或有的意見對立不該是執政黨與在野黨之間的政治抗爭，而是正、反雙方民間經濟意見的交流。唯有政府敞開心胸，提供多個產業討論平台，將正反意見在平台中彙整對話，經濟議題才能回歸經濟，不再簡化為政黨間意識形態的針鋒相對。
總之，ＥＣＦＡ是個關乎多個產業的經濟議題。民進黨「再怎麼野蠻」，也不能與各行各業的產業利益為敵。想通了這一點，也許行政當局該請各行各業說清楚講明白，究竟簽ＥＣＦＡ對他們的利弊得失是什麼。如果不去細部討論，始終將ＥＣＦＡ視為一糰麵糊，那麼馬政府就很難在民進黨的政治攻擊中脫身了。
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 11, 2009
Last Saturday the ruling KMT lost the County and Municipal Elections. Naturally voices within the KMT have demanded a post mortem. The media has collectively pointed the finger at US beef imports and ECFA for arousing intense opposition in central and southern Taiwan. These were the Ma administration policies critics found the most objectionable. Minister of Economic Affairs Shih Yen-hsiang said he was willing to debate ECFA with the opposition DPP. Even Premier Wu said he was willing to participate. But the DPP announced it was unwilling to participate, frustrating the ruling KMT's efforts to resolve the issue or find any leverage. DPP's reluctance to debate the issue may reflect self-doubt and evasiveness. But the ruling party cannot avoid responsibility for facilitating communication and dialogue.
We realize of course that people have different views about government policy. But Ma administration officials did a poor job of communicating the benefits of ECFA to the public. The issues remained unclear. That is why once the DPP accused the KMT of "being in favor of selling out Taiwan," the KMT found it difficult to counter the charge in southern Taiwan. But suppose the KMT had made clear what ECFA was all about. Suppose an eloquent economic minister had debated the issue. Suppose the premier had joined the battle. Considerable controversy would have remained. ECFA involves dozens of industries. If one fails to break the issues into separate categories, but instead debates them in broad terms, one would still have trouble escaping charges of "toadying up to Beijing and caving in to foreign pressure." In the end, it would merely have intensified the confrontation, and made it more difficult to clarify the issue.
As a United Daily News editorial explained earlier, at this stage ECFA is merely a broad framework, a table of contents. At most it includes a brief summary of the contents. Frankly speaking, the framework is so vague there is really nothing to oppose. The public may have concerns about certain industries. Therefore all discussions must include industry consultation. All sorts of issues have all been put on the table, including our current predicament, the benefits of signing, the potential impact of signing, mutual interests, complementary niches, and job retraining. All require broad-based public participation. The Ministry of Economic Affairs can hardly settle the matter by itself. The ruling party considers ECFA beneficial to Taiwan, but finds itself unable to explain clearly to the public how it will benefit. Why? Because the ruling administration has underestimated the power of public sentiment within civil society.
Conceptually speaking, the government can play an active role as the final arbiter of policy. Alternatively it can provide a public forum and play a passive role as the neutral mediator of a policy debate. The ruling administration may have arrived at certain conclusions about the importance of signing ECFA in a timely manner. But ECFA is a far-reaching, many-faceted economic issue that affects the livelihoods and prospects of tens of thousands of people, including both the manufacturing and service sectors. How can can a single, solitary economic minister settle the issue all by himself?
ECFA must be discussed. It must be debated. In fact, it must be divided into a number of different industry sectors and properly explored. Industry associations for various industries must develop talking points, explaining the benefits of signing ECFA. If a particular industry association is unable to convince a majority of the public about the benefits of ECFA, then perhaps that particular industry sector should not be opened up. Perhaps conditions should be added. If a particular industry considers failure to sign ECFA tantamount to a death sentence, then it can make its appeal to the public, instead of hiding behind the government and getting a free ride.
Take the financial industry for example. The two sides have signed an MOU authorizing banks on Taiwan to conduct business on the Mainland using Renminbi. The biggest beneficiary will of course be the banking industry. That being the case, naturally they, and not the government, should be the ones to step forward to convince opponents. If the public has doubts about the transparency of a branch bank on Mainland China, companies on Taiwan can address their concerns in a public forum and offer the appropriate assurances. If the chief beneficiaries, the bankers, are unable to address these public concerns, then opponents will have won a major victory. In which case, the government should perhaps go with the flow and hold off on its implementation.
As we see it, government officials should provide a forum to debate ECFA. The administration may have the final say, but at least during the policy formulation stage, the debate can be about the economic pros and cons of ECFA, instead of becoming a political struggle between the ruling and opposition parties. If the government is willing to provide a forum for various industry sectors to debate the pros and cons, then economic issues can remain economic issues, instead of being reduced to ideological confronations between diametrically opposed political parties.
ECFA is an economic issue that has a bearing on many industries. To invoke the DPP's own slogan, "No matter how barbaric the DPP might be... " It can hardly make enemies of all these industry sectors. The ruling administration should think things through. Perhaps then it will invite these industry sectors to explain the pros and cons of ECFA to the public. If they fail to explain ECFA clearly, but instead leave it a confused mess, then the Ma administration will find it difficult to escape the DPP's political attacks.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.11
社論－ECFA辯論 政府提供平台即可
本報訊
在上周六縣市長選舉執政黨挫敗之後，國民黨內當然也掀起了檢討之聲。綜合媒體報導，有指出是美牛與ＥＣＦＡ在中南部激起了極大的反對聲浪，也是外界對馬政府最不滿意之處。對此，經濟部長施顏祥隨後表示，願意就ＥＣＦＡ與在野黨辯論，甚至連吳揆都表態可親上火線。但民進黨隨後卻表示不想辯論，也讓執政黨修補善後的努力如擊敗絮，完全使不上力。民進黨不願辯論也許是心虛閃躲，但執政黨無論如何迴避不了溝通對話的責任。
基本上，我們當然尊重人民對於政府政策有不同意見，也認為馬政府官員並未對ＥＣＦＡ議題做好溝通。正由於事情沒有說清楚，所以一個「親中賣台」的大帽子扣下來，國民黨在南台灣就難以招架。但是即便要把ＥＣＦＡ講清楚，是否得由口才欠佳的經濟部長出面辯論，又是否得閣揆親上火線，則仍有相當的討論空間。此外，ＥＣＦＡ內容涉及數十個產業，如果不分子題而通盤涵蓋的辯論，八成也難以逃脫親中媚外與否的二分切割，最後只會激化對立，卻難以釐清問題。
誠如本報社論先前所分析，ＥＣＦＡ在目前這個階段只是一本書的框架目錄，頂多加上簡短的內容摘要；這麼空泛的框架坦白說根本也無從反對起。民眾或有的疑慮其實隨產業別不同而有異，故所有的討論必須要進入產業協商內涵，將目前的困境、簽署的好處、可能的衝擊、互惠的利益、利基的互補、轉業的輔導等問題一一攤在陽光下。這些都需要廣泛的社會參與對話，絕不是經濟部國貿局所能單獨成事。執政黨目前之所以自我評估簽ＥＣＦＡ對台灣有利、卻無法向外清楚說明何處有利，似乎也反映了主政者忽略民間力量與民間參與的粗疏。
就概念而言，政府既可以積極扮演決定一切政策的主導角色，也可以消極扮演提供思辯平台的中性媒介。即使主政者對於簽ＥＣＦＡ的重要性與時效性已有相當的看法，但是ＥＣＦＡ畢竟是一個影響數十個產業、牽動數萬人民生計前景的經濟議題，觸角龐雜、面向繁多，既有製造業、又有服務業，哪裡可能由經濟部長一個人包山包海去辯論？
我們認為，ＥＣＦＡ不但該談、該辯論，而且要切成若干個產業區塊好好的思辯探討。就每一個產業內容，如果簽ＥＣＦＡ真能使該產業獲利，則該產業公會就該研擬說帖、挺身為簽署ＥＣＦＡ而辯護。假若產業公會的正面觀點無法說服大多數人民，那麼也許那一個區塊就不該開放、或是簽署條件要加以設定。假若某個產業認為不簽ＥＣＦＡ就是死路一條，那麼就好好參與社會對話，而非躲在政府背後，撿現成的便宜。
以當前討論最多的金融業為例：兩岸簽署ＭＯＵ、要求ＥＣＦＡ中容許台灣的銀行赴對岸承做人民幣業務，這些事獲利最大的當然是銀行業者。既然如此，自然該由他們站出來說服反對者，而不是將政府推到第一線。若有人對中國大陸分行的金融監理透明度有疑慮，台灣業者也可以在對話平台中提出答辯與因應的承諾。如果受惠的銀行業者拚了命也難以釋社會疑慮，辯論的結果竟是反方大勝，那麼政府當然也許就該從善如流、暫緩實施。
我們認為，就ＥＣＦＡ議題而言，政府官員應該扮演的角色是平台提供者。雖然行政當局最後還是要做決策，但至少在政策形成的過程中，或有的意見對立不該是執政黨與在野黨之間的政治抗爭，而是正、反雙方民間經濟意見的交流。唯有政府敞開心胸，提供多個產業討論平台，將正反意見在平台中彙整對話，經濟議題才能回歸經濟，不再簡化為政黨間意識形態的針鋒相對。
總之，ＥＣＦＡ是個關乎多個產業的經濟議題。民進黨「再怎麼野蠻」，也不能與各行各業的產業利益為敵。想通了這一點，也許行政當局該請各行各業說清楚講明白，究竟簽ＥＣＦＡ對他們的利弊得失是什麼。如果不去細部討論，始終將ＥＣＦＡ視為一糰麵糊，那麼馬政府就很難在民進黨的政治攻擊中脫身了。
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Wang Jin-pyng's Anger is Long Overdue
Wang Jin-pyng's Anger is Long Overdue
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 10, 2009
The election and controversy over U.S. beef imports have deadlocked the Legislative Yuan for nearly a month. Wang Jin-pyng, the normally even-tempered President of the Legislative Yuan, could no longer contain himself. He blasted the Democratic Progressive Party, saying "The DPP legislative caucus simply does whatever it damned well pleases." He said the Legislative Yuan's negative pubic image was a direct result of such legislative ineptitude paralyzing the democratic process. Wang Jin-pying should be angry. In fact, he should have gotten angry a long time ago.
A democratic society must reconcile different views. That is why it is inefficient. The advantage of a democratic society is that no matter how wide the gap between differing views, one can always reach some sort of compromise. But not so with our current Legislative Yuan. The tiniest difference invariably brings the entire legislature to grinding halt. A number of years ago a major controversy over the construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant deadlocked the legislature. The halting of construction caused further discord. A move to impeach the president could not be introduced. The legislature must be allowed to function normally. The public pays hard-earned taxes providing legislators with expensive vehicles, homes, and clothing. They dine in five-star restaurants. They bask in the public spotlight. Never mind that many of them are under indictment. They bear heavy responsibilities, including reviewing the national budget and setting major policies. Yet all it takes is a dispute over US beef imports to completely paralyze the legislature, leaving no room for dialogue, or even fisticuffs. Their jobs can be summed up in a single word: "sinecures."
Wang Jin-pying has been President of the Legislative Yuan for years. He has always attempted to reconcile differences. He never uses coercive methods to settle disputes. He has avoided pre-election disputes between the ruling and opposition parties. It is bad enough that problems have not been dealt with. What excuse is there for allowing the Legislative Yuan to remain deadlocked, when the election is already over? The DPP has only 27 seats. Take a look at the Legislative Yuan following the elections. DPP legislators did not use brute force to occupy the podium. They did not lock the President of the Legislative Yuan out of the legislature. All it took was a gathered mob to paralyze the legislature for an entire day. Such is the miracle of Taiwan's democracy.
Strangest of all, what happened to over 90 KMT legislators? Absent party mobilization, KMT legislators couldn't be bothered to show up. Only a handful of legislators were in attendance. Had the President of the Legislative Yuan called for a vote, no bill could have made it through. KMT legislators are paid their monthly salaries, allowances, and assistants fees no matter what they do. They show up on time at the legislature every day at 9:00 am. They hold press conference. They allow themselves to be interviewed by the electronic media as the opportunity arises. If they're not criticizing the president, they're criticizing the party chairman. They one thing they don't do is attend to the normal business of the legislature. Is this not strange? If attending to the business of the legislature is so difficult, why did they run so hard for the position of legislator?
Wang Jin-pying was right to blast the DPP. But let's not forget that the overwhelming majority of seats in the legislature are held by the Kuomintang. Paralyzing the Legislative Yuan may be an opposition party tactic. The DPP likes to say "No!" out of sheer orneriness. But shouldn't the ruling KMT show a little gumption? Shouldn't it settle any disputes that arise? The public cares nothing about legislative protocol. All it knows is that a single dissenting voice can force the legislature to conduct consultations, and that consultations can drag on for half a year. The public has only one question. Why can't the KMT, which commands over 90 seats, successfully promote its policies and pass its bills?
Every day, Blue Camp legislators ridicule President and Party Chairman Ma Ying-jeou for incompetence. They fail to see that they are one of the main reasons for the Ma administration's abysmal record and for President Ma's loss of prestige. Most of the policies the Ma administration wants to promote are stalled in the Legislative Yuan. They are stalled because KMT legislators have neither the motivation nor energy to guide them through the legislative process.
Take the controversy over U.S. beef imports for example. In response to public demand, Blue Camp legislators proposed an amendment. Coordination between party officials and the Ma administration led to another version, more in line with the Executive Yuan's. The DPP protested, and made public the Blue Camp legislators' cell phone numbers. Blue Camp legislators backed down and refused to sign the bill. If KMT legislators are this gutless, what can the Ma administration possibly promote in the way of policy? It cannot even promote a bill to resolve the dispute over United States beef imports, by amending the Food Sanitation Management Law. How can it push through a far more controversial cross-Strait bill? No wonder former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang is pessimistic about the Ma administration's chances of signing ECFA according to schedule.
The Department of Health loosened restrictions on US beef imports. This precipitated two months of controversy. Government and opposition legislators joined forces, trumpeting their determination to defend the peoples' health. There was no shortage of pundits to denounce the Ma administration. There was no shortage of agitators demanding a public referendum. There was no shortage of legislators demanding an immediate amendment to the laws. It was all so laughable. These initiatives allowed legislators to feign concern for public health. But they had no practical impact whatsoever. The only initiative that had any impact was one launched by the Taipei City Government, involving private oversight by the meat industry. So far not one business has applied for an import permit. In other words, legislators need not demagogue an issue, only to accomplish nothing of value. People have the ability to make decisions concering their own health. If every policy or bill leads to paralysis in the Legislative Yuan, what's the point of having a Legislative Yuan?
The Three in One Elections are over. The ruling and opposition parties each have their own interpretation of the results. Regardless of who won or lost, as long as the Legislative Yuan is paralyzed time and again, the public will reach its own conclusions. It will conclude that the Democratic Progressive Party knows only how to engage in obstructionism. It will conclude that the KMT only knows how to talk the talk, not how to walk the walk. Neither the ruling nor opposition party will be the winner.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.10
王金平早該生氣了
本報訊
為了選舉與美牛爭議，立法院癱瘓逾月，好脾氣的立法院長王金平終於按捺不住發飆痛批，「民進黨團想幹什麼就幹什麼，為所欲為」，立法院長期以來社會形象不佳，就是因為議事太無效能，讓民主政治裡最重要的國家運轉機制嚴重遲滯，王金平該生氣，而且，應該早點生氣。
民主社會的問題是必須調和不同意見，所以效率差；民主社會的好處是，不論意見差距多大，找不到解決的辦法，也找得到妥協的對策，豈能如現在的立法院，一言不合就癱瘓。過去，核四興建有再大爭議，還是大打一架才議事癱瘓；核四停建有再大齟齬，總統罷免案提不出來，就得讓立法院繼續運轉。身為國會議員，人民納稅點滴積累讓立委們行有車、住有房、身著衣裝、食在五星、出入有風，身負法案、預算與重大政策審查重責，放任一個美牛爭議，別說打架了，連討論都沒有，就癱瘓全部議事，此等行徑只能用四個字形容：尸位素餐。
王金平久任國會議長，素以調和鼎鼐見長，能協調他絕不用強制手段，避免選舉前釀成朝野重大爭端，不處理也就算了，哪有選舉都結束了，還放任立法院繼續空轉的道理？民進黨立委總數不過廿七席，看看選後第一次院會的場景，民進黨立委既沒罷占主席台，也沒鎖住議長出入門，聚眾閒坐議場，就能讓院會癱瘓一天，這真叫台灣民主之奇景！
最奇怪的是，九十多位國民黨立委到哪兒去了？國民黨沒動員就沒人來，議場內小貓兩三隻，院長若要表決處理，不用想都知道案子肯定過不了。國民黨立委不也一樣月領薪水、津貼、助理費嗎？每天九點準時出現在立法院，不是開記者會就是接受電子媒體隨機訪問，不是虧總統就是罵主席，偏偏就是不肯正常出席會議，這不是很奇怪嗎？如果出席開會這麼困難，為什麼拚了命要競選立委呢？
王金平怒飆民進黨，有道理，但也不要忘了占有國會席次最大多數的國民黨該負的責任！立法院癱瘓固是在野黨的杯葛戰術，沒事都要反對，身為執政黨總要有點能耐，擺平爭議吧！對全國民眾來說，他們不必費心了解立法院的議事規則，一人反對就得交付協商，交付協商就能一拖半年，他們只會問一個問題：九十多席國民黨立委為什麼不能順利推動政策與法案？
藍委們每天譏諷總統兼黨主席馬英九能力不足，卻沒看見他們正是造成馬政府效能不彰、馬總統威望下滑的主因之一，因為政府想推動的政策、法案，泰半卡在立法院動彈不得，國民黨立委也沒有強勢主導國會議事的動機和能量。
就以美牛風波為例，基於回應民意的需求，藍委提出修法案，黨政協調另提比較符合行政院意志的版本，民進黨抗爭並公布其手機電話，就讓藍委退縮撤簽，如果國民黨立委議事戰鬥力不過如此，馬政府還想推動什麼政策呢？連解決美牛爭議的食品衛生管理法的修法案都推動不了，誰會相信歧見更多的兩岸各種協議能順利通過立法院備查或審查？莫怪民進黨前主席許信良對馬政府要依既定時程簽署兩岸經貿架構協議如此不樂觀。
衛生署開放美牛進口，風波延燒快兩個月，朝野立委同仇敵愾要做維護國人健康的先鋒，講得口沫橫飛，天天當名嘴罵政府者有之、呼應公投連署者有之、立刻行動提出修法案者有之，可笑的是，這些舉措除了讓立委貌似很關心國民健康之外，完全沒有實際作用，還是當初北市府發動的業者自我控管發揮了效果，迄今沒有一家登記申請進口，換言之，不必立委講得天花亂墜卻一事無成，國人自會為自己的健康把關。試問：如果每一樁政策或法案，立法院都採取癱瘓策略，立法院還有存在的必要嗎？
三合一選舉結束，朝野對輸贏各有解讀，但是，不論誰輸誰贏，只要立法院空轉的畫面一再重演，當民眾刻板印象形成：民進黨只會杯葛、國民黨就是無能，朝野兩黨沒有人會是勝利者。
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 10, 2009
The election and controversy over U.S. beef imports have deadlocked the Legislative Yuan for nearly a month. Wang Jin-pyng, the normally even-tempered President of the Legislative Yuan, could no longer contain himself. He blasted the Democratic Progressive Party, saying "The DPP legislative caucus simply does whatever it damned well pleases." He said the Legislative Yuan's negative pubic image was a direct result of such legislative ineptitude paralyzing the democratic process. Wang Jin-pying should be angry. In fact, he should have gotten angry a long time ago.
A democratic society must reconcile different views. That is why it is inefficient. The advantage of a democratic society is that no matter how wide the gap between differing views, one can always reach some sort of compromise. But not so with our current Legislative Yuan. The tiniest difference invariably brings the entire legislature to grinding halt. A number of years ago a major controversy over the construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant deadlocked the legislature. The halting of construction caused further discord. A move to impeach the president could not be introduced. The legislature must be allowed to function normally. The public pays hard-earned taxes providing legislators with expensive vehicles, homes, and clothing. They dine in five-star restaurants. They bask in the public spotlight. Never mind that many of them are under indictment. They bear heavy responsibilities, including reviewing the national budget and setting major policies. Yet all it takes is a dispute over US beef imports to completely paralyze the legislature, leaving no room for dialogue, or even fisticuffs. Their jobs can be summed up in a single word: "sinecures."
Wang Jin-pying has been President of the Legislative Yuan for years. He has always attempted to reconcile differences. He never uses coercive methods to settle disputes. He has avoided pre-election disputes between the ruling and opposition parties. It is bad enough that problems have not been dealt with. What excuse is there for allowing the Legislative Yuan to remain deadlocked, when the election is already over? The DPP has only 27 seats. Take a look at the Legislative Yuan following the elections. DPP legislators did not use brute force to occupy the podium. They did not lock the President of the Legislative Yuan out of the legislature. All it took was a gathered mob to paralyze the legislature for an entire day. Such is the miracle of Taiwan's democracy.
Strangest of all, what happened to over 90 KMT legislators? Absent party mobilization, KMT legislators couldn't be bothered to show up. Only a handful of legislators were in attendance. Had the President of the Legislative Yuan called for a vote, no bill could have made it through. KMT legislators are paid their monthly salaries, allowances, and assistants fees no matter what they do. They show up on time at the legislature every day at 9:00 am. They hold press conference. They allow themselves to be interviewed by the electronic media as the opportunity arises. If they're not criticizing the president, they're criticizing the party chairman. They one thing they don't do is attend to the normal business of the legislature. Is this not strange? If attending to the business of the legislature is so difficult, why did they run so hard for the position of legislator?
Wang Jin-pying was right to blast the DPP. But let's not forget that the overwhelming majority of seats in the legislature are held by the Kuomintang. Paralyzing the Legislative Yuan may be an opposition party tactic. The DPP likes to say "No!" out of sheer orneriness. But shouldn't the ruling KMT show a little gumption? Shouldn't it settle any disputes that arise? The public cares nothing about legislative protocol. All it knows is that a single dissenting voice can force the legislature to conduct consultations, and that consultations can drag on for half a year. The public has only one question. Why can't the KMT, which commands over 90 seats, successfully promote its policies and pass its bills?
Every day, Blue Camp legislators ridicule President and Party Chairman Ma Ying-jeou for incompetence. They fail to see that they are one of the main reasons for the Ma administration's abysmal record and for President Ma's loss of prestige. Most of the policies the Ma administration wants to promote are stalled in the Legislative Yuan. They are stalled because KMT legislators have neither the motivation nor energy to guide them through the legislative process.
Take the controversy over U.S. beef imports for example. In response to public demand, Blue Camp legislators proposed an amendment. Coordination between party officials and the Ma administration led to another version, more in line with the Executive Yuan's. The DPP protested, and made public the Blue Camp legislators' cell phone numbers. Blue Camp legislators backed down and refused to sign the bill. If KMT legislators are this gutless, what can the Ma administration possibly promote in the way of policy? It cannot even promote a bill to resolve the dispute over United States beef imports, by amending the Food Sanitation Management Law. How can it push through a far more controversial cross-Strait bill? No wonder former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang is pessimistic about the Ma administration's chances of signing ECFA according to schedule.
The Department of Health loosened restrictions on US beef imports. This precipitated two months of controversy. Government and opposition legislators joined forces, trumpeting their determination to defend the peoples' health. There was no shortage of pundits to denounce the Ma administration. There was no shortage of agitators demanding a public referendum. There was no shortage of legislators demanding an immediate amendment to the laws. It was all so laughable. These initiatives allowed legislators to feign concern for public health. But they had no practical impact whatsoever. The only initiative that had any impact was one launched by the Taipei City Government, involving private oversight by the meat industry. So far not one business has applied for an import permit. In other words, legislators need not demagogue an issue, only to accomplish nothing of value. People have the ability to make decisions concering their own health. If every policy or bill leads to paralysis in the Legislative Yuan, what's the point of having a Legislative Yuan?
The Three in One Elections are over. The ruling and opposition parties each have their own interpretation of the results. Regardless of who won or lost, as long as the Legislative Yuan is paralyzed time and again, the public will reach its own conclusions. It will conclude that the Democratic Progressive Party knows only how to engage in obstructionism. It will conclude that the KMT only knows how to talk the talk, not how to walk the walk. Neither the ruling nor opposition party will be the winner.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.10
王金平早該生氣了
本報訊
為了選舉與美牛爭議，立法院癱瘓逾月，好脾氣的立法院長王金平終於按捺不住發飆痛批，「民進黨團想幹什麼就幹什麼，為所欲為」，立法院長期以來社會形象不佳，就是因為議事太無效能，讓民主政治裡最重要的國家運轉機制嚴重遲滯，王金平該生氣，而且，應該早點生氣。
民主社會的問題是必須調和不同意見，所以效率差；民主社會的好處是，不論意見差距多大，找不到解決的辦法，也找得到妥協的對策，豈能如現在的立法院，一言不合就癱瘓。過去，核四興建有再大爭議，還是大打一架才議事癱瘓；核四停建有再大齟齬，總統罷免案提不出來，就得讓立法院繼續運轉。身為國會議員，人民納稅點滴積累讓立委們行有車、住有房、身著衣裝、食在五星、出入有風，身負法案、預算與重大政策審查重責，放任一個美牛爭議，別說打架了，連討論都沒有，就癱瘓全部議事，此等行徑只能用四個字形容：尸位素餐。
王金平久任國會議長，素以調和鼎鼐見長，能協調他絕不用強制手段，避免選舉前釀成朝野重大爭端，不處理也就算了，哪有選舉都結束了，還放任立法院繼續空轉的道理？民進黨立委總數不過廿七席，看看選後第一次院會的場景，民進黨立委既沒罷占主席台，也沒鎖住議長出入門，聚眾閒坐議場，就能讓院會癱瘓一天，這真叫台灣民主之奇景！
最奇怪的是，九十多位國民黨立委到哪兒去了？國民黨沒動員就沒人來，議場內小貓兩三隻，院長若要表決處理，不用想都知道案子肯定過不了。國民黨立委不也一樣月領薪水、津貼、助理費嗎？每天九點準時出現在立法院，不是開記者會就是接受電子媒體隨機訪問，不是虧總統就是罵主席，偏偏就是不肯正常出席會議，這不是很奇怪嗎？如果出席開會這麼困難，為什麼拚了命要競選立委呢？
王金平怒飆民進黨，有道理，但也不要忘了占有國會席次最大多數的國民黨該負的責任！立法院癱瘓固是在野黨的杯葛戰術，沒事都要反對，身為執政黨總要有點能耐，擺平爭議吧！對全國民眾來說，他們不必費心了解立法院的議事規則，一人反對就得交付協商，交付協商就能一拖半年，他們只會問一個問題：九十多席國民黨立委為什麼不能順利推動政策與法案？
藍委們每天譏諷總統兼黨主席馬英九能力不足，卻沒看見他們正是造成馬政府效能不彰、馬總統威望下滑的主因之一，因為政府想推動的政策、法案，泰半卡在立法院動彈不得，國民黨立委也沒有強勢主導國會議事的動機和能量。
就以美牛風波為例，基於回應民意的需求，藍委提出修法案，黨政協調另提比較符合行政院意志的版本，民進黨抗爭並公布其手機電話，就讓藍委退縮撤簽，如果國民黨立委議事戰鬥力不過如此，馬政府還想推動什麼政策呢？連解決美牛爭議的食品衛生管理法的修法案都推動不了，誰會相信歧見更多的兩岸各種協議能順利通過立法院備查或審查？莫怪民進黨前主席許信良對馬政府要依既定時程簽署兩岸經貿架構協議如此不樂觀。
衛生署開放美牛進口，風波延燒快兩個月，朝野立委同仇敵愾要做維護國人健康的先鋒，講得口沫橫飛，天天當名嘴罵政府者有之、呼應公投連署者有之、立刻行動提出修法案者有之，可笑的是，這些舉措除了讓立委貌似很關心國民健康之外，完全沒有實際作用，還是當初北市府發動的業者自我控管發揮了效果，迄今沒有一家登記申請進口，換言之，不必立委講得天花亂墜卻一事無成，國人自會為自己的健康把關。試問：如果每一樁政策或法案，立法院都採取癱瘓策略，立法院還有存在的必要嗎？
三合一選舉結束，朝野對輸贏各有解讀，但是，不論誰輸誰贏，只要立法院空轉的畫面一再重演，當民眾刻板印象形成：民進黨只會杯葛、國民黨就是無能，朝野兩黨沒有人會是勝利者。
Wednesday, December 9, 2009
The DPP is under Greater Pressure to change its Mainland Policy than the KMT
The DPP is under Greater Pressure to change its Mainland Policy than the KMT
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 9, 2009
Some people say the KMT's election defeat was the result of voter skepticism about its Mainland policy. They say the KMT will therefore change its Mainland policy. But other people say the Democratic Progressive Party has shown signs of turning itself around during this election. Therefore it has an even greater need to change its Mainland policy than the KMT.
The KMT formulated its current mainland policy for two main reasons. First, the eight year long DPP government's mainland policy was a total failure. It had to be jettisoned. Secondly, the international balance of power has changed. Taipei's Mainland policy had to change accordingly. In other words, to label the KMT's current policy as the "Ma Ying-jeou Path" is political rhetoric for domestic consumption. The reason Taipei arrived at its current position, is that the Democratic Progressive Party government's Mainland policy already proved to be a dead end. The international balance of power has left Taipei with no other options. No matter who assumes office, he or she can no longer return to the Chen Shui-bian Path. Instead, he or she must take the path currently taken by the Kuomintang. It makes no difference whether Ma Ying-jeou is in charge. If Ma Ying-jeou had a better alternative, he himself might not be taking his current path. He too is at the mercy of circumstances. It is a choice he had to make. This is not to say that the KMT's Mainland policy cannot be more circumspect and cautious. But the basic framework has already has been forced upon it by a radically changing international situation. It is not subject to the will of any one individual.
By contrast, if the DPP wants to interpret this election as foreshadowing the DPP's return to power in 2012, then it must change its Mainland policy. The better its chances of returning to power, the more it must change. If the DPP wants to return to power, it cannot possibly relate to Beijing on the basis of its demands for the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution," or "one country on each side," or "de jure Taiwan independence." It must re-establish the framework of the "Five Noes" or the "1992 Consensus." Even its "Taiwan Independence Party Constitution" and its "Resolution for a Normal Nation" must be changed or scrapped. The DPP cannot possibly stop cross-Strait direct flights, prohibit Mainland tourists from coming to Taiwan, or re-impose a "No Haste, Be Patient" policy. The triangular relationship between Washington, Tokyo and Beijing remains unchanged. As such, the Democratic Progressive Party cannot return relations between Taipei and Washington to what they were during the Cold War era. The DPP should probably change its stand on ECFA from outright opposition to demands for "amendment and reinforcement" and the addition of "safety measures." Otherwise, if one day it returns to power, it will be forced to renege on its promises. One can say with certainty that the more likely the Democratic Progressive Party is to return to power, the more it will have to change its policy toward the Mainland. For one, if it fails to change its policy, mainstream society cannot possibly support the Democratic Progressive Party's return to power. Also, if it fails to change its policy, once it returns to power it will precipitate a national disaster.
Beijing's interpretation of the recent elections on Taiwan and its reactions are worth pondering. If Beijing considers the DPP's return to power a possibility, this will naturally influence its cross-Strait policy thinking. If the DPP changes its Mainland policy, Beijing will draw certain conclusions. If the DPP doesn't change its Mainland policy. Beijing will draw different conclusions. This could well lead to a showdown between the DPP and Beijing. Beijing may make preparations for that day. The DPP should naturally make preparations as well. The election is forcing Beijing to consider other factors when formulating cross-Strait policy. This may affect the future of cross-Strait relations. Relations may become increasingly tense, or increasingly relaxed, increasingly amicable, or increasingly hostile. We will simply have to wait and see.
The KMT's cross-Strait policy had an impact on the current election. But it was not as significant as implied by some of the foreign media. For example, the impact of The Ilan Children's Festival was clearly greater than the impact of cross-Strait policy. The impact of loosened restrictions on US beef imports and the government response to the 8/8 Floods were also greater. Chen Tsung-ming's refusal to step down was also a source of public discontent. Even assuming voters have reservations about the KMT's cross-Strait policy, they are hardly demanding a return to Chen era cross-Strait policy. Besides, even though support for the KMT fell dramatically, and support for the DPP rose dramatically, the KMT and the Pan Blue Camp is still in the majority. It is too early to predict the overturning of cross-Strait policies in 2012. Most importantly, current and future cross-Strait relations are fully embedded within and subject to the larger international balance of power. Even the DPP cannot defy it. It can only capitalize on the trend.
Voters may have reservations about the KMT's cross-Strait policy. But the DPP is unlikely to be so deluded as to think that it if returns to power it can completely overturn the ruling Kuomintang's policy and the win-win cross-Strait relationship. The KMT's cross-Strait policy must be more mindful of public sentiment. But the KMT must not allow itself to be caught on the horns of a dilemma, not knowing whether to advance or retreat. It must not feel as if it is walking a tightrope. The international balance of power has left Taipei no choice. Beijing however, after observing this election, should realize that the right to speak on behalf of Taipei does not belong to either the KMT or the DPP, but an intelligent and flexible electorate.
Some people say this election will force the KMT to change its cross-Strait policy. The KMT must of course be circumspect and vigilant. But in the wake of this election, the Democratic Progressive Party is actually under greater pressure to change its Mainland policy than the KMT.
民進黨比國民黨更須調整大陸政策
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.09 03:57 am
有一種解讀，將國民黨此次選舉的挫敗說成是大陸政策受到選民質疑，因而猜測國民黨將調整其大陸政策。但另一種見解則認為，民進黨在此次選舉有了翻身的跡象，更須調整其中國政策。
國民黨形成今日大陸政策的主因有二：一、民進黨政府執政八年的大陸政策徹底失敗，必須改弦易轍。二、整個國際情勢的推移變化，更使台灣不得不調整大陸政策。也就是說，將國民黨現行政策說成是「馬英九路線」，這只是國內政爭的用語；其實，台灣走到今日關口，民進黨扁政府的那套大陸政策已證實為死路，且國際大局大勢亦已迫使台灣難有其他選擇，是以任何人執政都不可能再回返陳水扁路線，而必定會採取類如國民黨今日所採路線，不論是否馬英九主政。馬英九若有其他更好的選擇，他也未必會採今日路線；形格勢禁，這其實是不得不然的選擇。絕不是說國民黨今日的大陸政策沒有更求周延細緻的空間，但大經大緯已因迫於國際情勢的丕變而受到制約，非任何個人主觀的情感意志所能轉移。
相對而言，民進黨若將此次選舉視為可能在二○一二年重返執政的前兆，其必須調整大陸政策的壓力，必然隨其重返執政機會的升高而等比例增加。民進黨若再執政，不可能再用「正名制憲」、「一邊一國」、「法理台獨」與中國互動，勢須重新建立「四不一沒有」或「九二共識」之類的論述架構；甚至《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》皆須修或廢。民進黨也無可能停止兩岸直航或關閉陸客來台，或再採「戒急用忍」。在美日中三邊關係丕變的趨勢下，民進黨亦無可能使台美日的政治聯結重回冷戰時代的情態。或許，民進黨現在就應把對ＥＣＦＡ的立場，從「完全反對」，改成「修正補強」及關注「防衛機制」，否則若有一日執政，恐怕就必須面對廢約毀約的難題。可以斷言，民進黨愈有重返執政的可能性，其調整大陸政策的必要性也就愈大。一方面，若不調整，主流社會不可能支持民進黨重返執政；二方面，若不調整，執政後必釀成國家災難。
中共方面對台灣此次選舉的解讀與反應值得玩味。北京若認為民進黨有重返執政的可能，自會影響其兩岸政策的考慮；民進黨若有調整大陸政策的表現，北京是一種考慮，若無則是另一種考慮。民進黨若再執政，即形同民進黨與北京的再攤牌；北京會為可能到臨的那一天進行準備，民進黨自也應預作準備。這次選舉必已為北京的兩岸政策增添了考慮因素，勢會影響今後兩岸關係的發展變化；趨緊趨鬆、趨友趨敵，可待觀察。
國民黨兩岸政策對這次選舉的影響是有的，但未必如有些外國媒體所說的那麼大。比如，宜蘭童玩節的影響顯然大於兩岸政策，美牛事件及八八水災的影響也不遑多讓，甚至陳聰明未下台也是「民怨」；且即使選民對兩岸政策有疑慮，亦非主張回到扁政府時代的兩岸政策。何況，雖然國民黨的選票大落而民進黨大起，但國民黨及泛藍畢竟仍佔多數；若謂二○一二年會因兩岸政策翻盤變天，恐怕目前尚難作此論斷。最重要的是：兩岸關係在如今及未來，已經完全嵌入並受制約於國際情勢的大格局，即使民進黨也不可能逆勢而為，只能因勢利導。
所以，選民或許對國民黨的兩岸政策有疑慮，但民進黨應不至於昏瞶到認為，若再執政將全盤推翻國民黨的政策及兩岸雙贏共生的想像；而國民黨雖在兩岸政策上必須更加照顧民意，但也不可能自陷於進退失據的「瓦倫達走鋼絲效應」，何況國際情勢也使台灣別無選擇。倒是北京方面，經過觀察此次選舉，應當更能感知台灣的話語權，並非握在國民黨或民進黨手中，而是操在靈活且明智的選民手中。
有人說，這次選舉會使國民黨調整兩岸政策，當然，國民黨應有必須處理得更周延細緻的警惕；但我們卻認為民進黨經此選舉，其調整大陸政策的戰略壓力及時間壓力，都應當更逾於國民黨。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 9, 2009
Some people say the KMT's election defeat was the result of voter skepticism about its Mainland policy. They say the KMT will therefore change its Mainland policy. But other people say the Democratic Progressive Party has shown signs of turning itself around during this election. Therefore it has an even greater need to change its Mainland policy than the KMT.
The KMT formulated its current mainland policy for two main reasons. First, the eight year long DPP government's mainland policy was a total failure. It had to be jettisoned. Secondly, the international balance of power has changed. Taipei's Mainland policy had to change accordingly. In other words, to label the KMT's current policy as the "Ma Ying-jeou Path" is political rhetoric for domestic consumption. The reason Taipei arrived at its current position, is that the Democratic Progressive Party government's Mainland policy already proved to be a dead end. The international balance of power has left Taipei with no other options. No matter who assumes office, he or she can no longer return to the Chen Shui-bian Path. Instead, he or she must take the path currently taken by the Kuomintang. It makes no difference whether Ma Ying-jeou is in charge. If Ma Ying-jeou had a better alternative, he himself might not be taking his current path. He too is at the mercy of circumstances. It is a choice he had to make. This is not to say that the KMT's Mainland policy cannot be more circumspect and cautious. But the basic framework has already has been forced upon it by a radically changing international situation. It is not subject to the will of any one individual.
By contrast, if the DPP wants to interpret this election as foreshadowing the DPP's return to power in 2012, then it must change its Mainland policy. The better its chances of returning to power, the more it must change. If the DPP wants to return to power, it cannot possibly relate to Beijing on the basis of its demands for the "rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution," or "one country on each side," or "de jure Taiwan independence." It must re-establish the framework of the "Five Noes" or the "1992 Consensus." Even its "Taiwan Independence Party Constitution" and its "Resolution for a Normal Nation" must be changed or scrapped. The DPP cannot possibly stop cross-Strait direct flights, prohibit Mainland tourists from coming to Taiwan, or re-impose a "No Haste, Be Patient" policy. The triangular relationship between Washington, Tokyo and Beijing remains unchanged. As such, the Democratic Progressive Party cannot return relations between Taipei and Washington to what they were during the Cold War era. The DPP should probably change its stand on ECFA from outright opposition to demands for "amendment and reinforcement" and the addition of "safety measures." Otherwise, if one day it returns to power, it will be forced to renege on its promises. One can say with certainty that the more likely the Democratic Progressive Party is to return to power, the more it will have to change its policy toward the Mainland. For one, if it fails to change its policy, mainstream society cannot possibly support the Democratic Progressive Party's return to power. Also, if it fails to change its policy, once it returns to power it will precipitate a national disaster.
Beijing's interpretation of the recent elections on Taiwan and its reactions are worth pondering. If Beijing considers the DPP's return to power a possibility, this will naturally influence its cross-Strait policy thinking. If the DPP changes its Mainland policy, Beijing will draw certain conclusions. If the DPP doesn't change its Mainland policy. Beijing will draw different conclusions. This could well lead to a showdown between the DPP and Beijing. Beijing may make preparations for that day. The DPP should naturally make preparations as well. The election is forcing Beijing to consider other factors when formulating cross-Strait policy. This may affect the future of cross-Strait relations. Relations may become increasingly tense, or increasingly relaxed, increasingly amicable, or increasingly hostile. We will simply have to wait and see.
The KMT's cross-Strait policy had an impact on the current election. But it was not as significant as implied by some of the foreign media. For example, the impact of The Ilan Children's Festival was clearly greater than the impact of cross-Strait policy. The impact of loosened restrictions on US beef imports and the government response to the 8/8 Floods were also greater. Chen Tsung-ming's refusal to step down was also a source of public discontent. Even assuming voters have reservations about the KMT's cross-Strait policy, they are hardly demanding a return to Chen era cross-Strait policy. Besides, even though support for the KMT fell dramatically, and support for the DPP rose dramatically, the KMT and the Pan Blue Camp is still in the majority. It is too early to predict the overturning of cross-Strait policies in 2012. Most importantly, current and future cross-Strait relations are fully embedded within and subject to the larger international balance of power. Even the DPP cannot defy it. It can only capitalize on the trend.
Voters may have reservations about the KMT's cross-Strait policy. But the DPP is unlikely to be so deluded as to think that it if returns to power it can completely overturn the ruling Kuomintang's policy and the win-win cross-Strait relationship. The KMT's cross-Strait policy must be more mindful of public sentiment. But the KMT must not allow itself to be caught on the horns of a dilemma, not knowing whether to advance or retreat. It must not feel as if it is walking a tightrope. The international balance of power has left Taipei no choice. Beijing however, after observing this election, should realize that the right to speak on behalf of Taipei does not belong to either the KMT or the DPP, but an intelligent and flexible electorate.
Some people say this election will force the KMT to change its cross-Strait policy. The KMT must of course be circumspect and vigilant. But in the wake of this election, the Democratic Progressive Party is actually under greater pressure to change its Mainland policy than the KMT.
民進黨比國民黨更須調整大陸政策
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.09 03:57 am
有一種解讀，將國民黨此次選舉的挫敗說成是大陸政策受到選民質疑，因而猜測國民黨將調整其大陸政策。但另一種見解則認為，民進黨在此次選舉有了翻身的跡象，更須調整其中國政策。
國民黨形成今日大陸政策的主因有二：一、民進黨政府執政八年的大陸政策徹底失敗，必須改弦易轍。二、整個國際情勢的推移變化，更使台灣不得不調整大陸政策。也就是說，將國民黨現行政策說成是「馬英九路線」，這只是國內政爭的用語；其實，台灣走到今日關口，民進黨扁政府的那套大陸政策已證實為死路，且國際大局大勢亦已迫使台灣難有其他選擇，是以任何人執政都不可能再回返陳水扁路線，而必定會採取類如國民黨今日所採路線，不論是否馬英九主政。馬英九若有其他更好的選擇，他也未必會採今日路線；形格勢禁，這其實是不得不然的選擇。絕不是說國民黨今日的大陸政策沒有更求周延細緻的空間，但大經大緯已因迫於國際情勢的丕變而受到制約，非任何個人主觀的情感意志所能轉移。
相對而言，民進黨若將此次選舉視為可能在二○一二年重返執政的前兆，其必須調整大陸政策的壓力，必然隨其重返執政機會的升高而等比例增加。民進黨若再執政，不可能再用「正名制憲」、「一邊一國」、「法理台獨」與中國互動，勢須重新建立「四不一沒有」或「九二共識」之類的論述架構；甚至《台獨黨綱》及《正常國家決議文》皆須修或廢。民進黨也無可能停止兩岸直航或關閉陸客來台，或再採「戒急用忍」。在美日中三邊關係丕變的趨勢下，民進黨亦無可能使台美日的政治聯結重回冷戰時代的情態。或許，民進黨現在就應把對ＥＣＦＡ的立場，從「完全反對」，改成「修正補強」及關注「防衛機制」，否則若有一日執政，恐怕就必須面對廢約毀約的難題。可以斷言，民進黨愈有重返執政的可能性，其調整大陸政策的必要性也就愈大。一方面，若不調整，主流社會不可能支持民進黨重返執政；二方面，若不調整，執政後必釀成國家災難。
中共方面對台灣此次選舉的解讀與反應值得玩味。北京若認為民進黨有重返執政的可能，自會影響其兩岸政策的考慮；民進黨若有調整大陸政策的表現，北京是一種考慮，若無則是另一種考慮。民進黨若再執政，即形同民進黨與北京的再攤牌；北京會為可能到臨的那一天進行準備，民進黨自也應預作準備。這次選舉必已為北京的兩岸政策增添了考慮因素，勢會影響今後兩岸關係的發展變化；趨緊趨鬆、趨友趨敵，可待觀察。
國民黨兩岸政策對這次選舉的影響是有的，但未必如有些外國媒體所說的那麼大。比如，宜蘭童玩節的影響顯然大於兩岸政策，美牛事件及八八水災的影響也不遑多讓，甚至陳聰明未下台也是「民怨」；且即使選民對兩岸政策有疑慮，亦非主張回到扁政府時代的兩岸政策。何況，雖然國民黨的選票大落而民進黨大起，但國民黨及泛藍畢竟仍佔多數；若謂二○一二年會因兩岸政策翻盤變天，恐怕目前尚難作此論斷。最重要的是：兩岸關係在如今及未來，已經完全嵌入並受制約於國際情勢的大格局，即使民進黨也不可能逆勢而為，只能因勢利導。
所以，選民或許對國民黨的兩岸政策有疑慮，但民進黨應不至於昏瞶到認為，若再執政將全盤推翻國民黨的政策及兩岸雙贏共生的想像；而國民黨雖在兩岸政策上必須更加照顧民意，但也不可能自陷於進退失據的「瓦倫達走鋼絲效應」，何況國際情勢也使台灣別無選擇。倒是北京方面，經過觀察此次選舉，應當更能感知台灣的話語權，並非握在國民黨或民進黨手中，而是操在靈活且明智的選民手中。
有人說，這次選舉會使國民黨調整兩岸政策，當然，國民黨應有必須處理得更周延細緻的警惕；但我們卻認為民進黨經此選舉，其調整大陸政策的戰略壓力及時間壓力，都應當更逾於國民黨。
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
To Win Back Hearts and Minds, Confront the Cause of Defeat
To Win Back Hearts and Minds, Confront the Cause of Defeat
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 8, 2009
By now just about everyone has held forth on the results of the just concluded County and Municipal Elections. Regardless of what their conclusions might be, there is one fact no one can deny. The election results show the KMT being put to a severe test. By contrast, the DPP is gradually turning the corner. Voters have used their ballots to issue the KMT a little warning, and to offer the DPP a little encouragement. This means the KMT's situation has not deteriorated to where it should be utterly despondent, and the DPP's situation has not improved to where it should break out the champagne. This was merely a mid-term exam. The finals are yet to come!
As President Ma himself concedes, the KMT, including himself, need to engage in "self-examination." But what is it they need to examine? Forget such weasel words as "an unfavorable political climate." Forget such technical quibbles as "an inappropriate nomination strategy." Those who lose elections should never offer excuses for why they lost. If you lost, you lost. If you are willing to admit, "We didn't do a very good job," then you must find out exactly what you did wrong. If all one does following an election is demand that the campaign committee hold a post-mortem and issue a report based on 20/20 hindsight, followed by "business as usual," then all we can say is the voters have given you fair warning, but apparently their warning wasn't painful enough.
Those attuned to public opinion know one must never underestimate the significance of local elections. Consider elections on Taiwan over the past several decades. The quadrennial county and municipal elections are often subtle leading indicators. During the 1997 county and municipal elections the DPP was in the opposition. Yet it swept the major county and municipality races throughout Taiwan. The ruling Kuomintang was humiliated. It was left holding Hualien, Taitung and the outer islands. The results of those elections foretold the first change in ruling parties in 2000. Similarly, during the 2005 county and municipal elections, the Kuomintang was in the opposition. Northern and central Taiwan went from Green to Blue. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party was left holding seven counties and cities in southern Taiwan. The results of those elections foretold the second change in ruling parties in 2008. In other words, we may not believe in historical inevitability. But history nevertheless provides us with clear lessons. Voters on Taiwan will not make endless allowances for any political party, Blue or Green!
President Ma and his team have worked hard over the past year. They made a real effort to do well. But in politics one never gets an A for effort. Politics is all about public perception and public sentiment. It's true that the past year has been unkind to the ruling administration. The price of raw materials has skyrocketed due to global inflation. Global financial turmoil has left us with a weak global economy. Global climate change has led to hurricanes and flooding. Taiwan has been subjected to unprecedented traumas. These, perhaps, are what President Ma meant by "an unfavorable political climate." But he must not underestimate the wisdom of the voters. Leaders the world over have all been coping with "an unfavorable political environment" for the past year. Many countries have yet to emerge from their crises. But many leaders have met with public approval. Put bluntly, blaming "an unfavorable political environment" is merely shirking one's responsibility. President Ma must be vigilant, especially since his halo has dimmed so rapidly from little more than a year ago. Even party members who have violated party discipline consider him a pushover -- someone they can pick on.
President Ma's reputation took a serious hit following the 8/8 Floods earlier this year. They revealed major problems with his administration's decision-making process. Many policies that should have been aggressively promoted long ago, were repeatedly withdrawn due to fear of the public reaction. Many controversial policies were repeatedly rejected or never presented to the public for discussion. The decisions were all made behind closed doors. As a result the opposition has monopolized the debate over policy. The Ma administration has lost even the rudimentary ability to defend its policies. Take the recent election for example. The opposition repeatedly demagogued the issue of U.S. beef imports. The ruling party knew it could not resist pressure from the U.S. It also knew there would be a backlash from the grass-roots. South Korea was the clearest example. So why did it allow the worst possible scenario to play out? This was a major policy decision. Yet it was made behind closed doors, by a handful of people in the national security council. The administration failed to coordinate with the KMT. Even relevant departments within the Executive Yuan were left out of the loop. Forget about communicating with the public. Is it any surprise that a closed decision-making and governance method such as this would provoke widespread criticism? Many commentators have blasted the Ma administration for being "arrogant" and "full of themselves." This is a perfect example.
Perhaps the Ma administration should be grateful. This election was merely a flesh wound. No bones were broken. No tendons were severed. The damage inflicted is manageable. Voters used their ballots to send the administration a warning. They left the administration a chance to do better. The administration has one chance to make things right. It had better realize there will not be a second.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.08
社論－坦然面對挫敗 才能贏回民心
本報訊
不論各界選擇多少角度去評論剛結束的縣市長投票結果，有一項基本的事實或許是任誰都不會否認的：這次選舉結果顯示，國民黨執政氣勢正面臨更嚴酷的考驗，而相對的民進黨則正逐漸走出谷底。簡單的說，選民用選票，向國民黨傳遞了若干警告，也給了民進黨若干鼓勵，這意味國民黨還不至於慘到要懷憂喪志的地步，民進黨也還稱不上可以從此歡欣鼓舞，畢竟，這只是期中測驗，真正的大考，還在後頭呢！
正如同馬總統自己都坦承，包括他本人及國民黨都需要「再檢討」。重點是，檢討什麼？不要再提什麼「大環境不佳」的空泛語言，也別再陷入「提名策略不當」的技術細節，選輸的人永遠不該找理由替自己辯護，輸了就是輸了，如果願意承認「我們的確做不好」，那就還必須找出「究竟那裡做不好」，對不對？如果選後的檢討，只是責求輔選單位開個會，寫篇「後見之明」的檢討報告，接下來還是一切照舊，那麼也只能說，選民所給的警告，還不夠有讓人痛的效果。
對民意走向敏感的人都清楚，永遠不能低估地方選舉所透露的訊息。打開近十數年的台灣選舉史，每四年一度的縣市長選舉，很微妙經常扮演著領先指標的角色。一九九七年的縣市長選舉，民進黨以在野之身，幾乎席捲了全臺主要縣市長席次，讓執政的國民黨難堪地退守到後山的花東與外島，那次選舉結果也預告了二○○○ 年首度的政黨輪替；二○○五年的縣市長選舉，國民黨同樣以在野之身，讓北台灣與中台灣全面綠地變藍天，中央執政的民進黨則退守到南台七縣市，那次選舉結果也同樣預告了二○○八年的二度政黨輪替。換言之，我們縱然不必迷信歷史會有什麼規律，但最起碼歷史提供了清楚的教訓：台灣的選民永遠不會刻意善待藍綠任何一個政黨！
我們當然知道，馬總統乃至執政團隊過去一年確實做得很辛苦，也確實很想把事情做好，但政治治理這檔事，從來不是「只問耕耘」的事業，它永遠都要在乎人民感受。沒錯，過去一年多的執政運勢確實不佳，全球原料飆漲所帶起的通貨膨漲、全球金融風暴所釀成的景氣衰退、乃至全球氣候變遷所造成的風災與水患等，都讓台灣接續受到空前的重創，這些因素或許就是馬總統所謂的「大環境」，但請千萬別低估選民的智慧，全球的領袖過去一年多誰沒遭逢「大環境」的挑戰？不少國家還不是挺了過來，許多領袖也照樣贏得民意的肯定，講白一點，歸咎「大環境」只是卸責的藉口。馬總統最該深自警惕的應該是：何以才一年多一點，昔日超高的人氣光環，竟然褪色得這麼快？連黨內違紀的同志都認為他「好欺負」！
其實，早從今年八八水災後馬總統聲望全面崩跌以來，已經透露了馬政府的決策模式出現了很大問題，若干早該積極推動的政策，一再因為懼怕民意反彈而處處綁手綁腳；而若干預期爭議頗高的政策，卻又一再閉門決策，拒絕甚至根本忽略與民意對話，結果不僅政策論述舞台被在野黨全面篡奪，連最起碼的政策辯護能力都逐步喪失。以這次選戰中被在野黨一再炒作的美國牛肉進口為例，執政黨明明知道根本擋不住美國的壓力，也明明知道基層民意肯定會反彈，韓國先前鮮活的例證已擺在那裡，怎麼還是一切任其朝最壞的劇本上演？這麼重大的決策，就讓國安單位幾個人閉門操盤，不僅事前未做任何黨政協調，行政團隊相關部門也全在狀況外，更不必提什麼與民意做好先期溝通了，這種封閉的決策與治理模式，會陷入全面挨打的境地，豈不是全在預料中？許多論者過去批評馬政府「傲慢」、「自我感覺良好」云云，這不就是個現成的例證？
或許馬政府還真該慶幸，這次的選舉結果，只是傷到皮肉，尚未深及筋骨，基本上還算是可控制範圍內的挫敗，選民只是用選票傳達了警告，但還預留了不少調整與再修正的空間，但機會也只有這一次了，下一回請真的記住：不可能再有任何閃躲與僥倖的空間了。
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 8, 2009
By now just about everyone has held forth on the results of the just concluded County and Municipal Elections. Regardless of what their conclusions might be, there is one fact no one can deny. The election results show the KMT being put to a severe test. By contrast, the DPP is gradually turning the corner. Voters have used their ballots to issue the KMT a little warning, and to offer the DPP a little encouragement. This means the KMT's situation has not deteriorated to where it should be utterly despondent, and the DPP's situation has not improved to where it should break out the champagne. This was merely a mid-term exam. The finals are yet to come!
As President Ma himself concedes, the KMT, including himself, need to engage in "self-examination." But what is it they need to examine? Forget such weasel words as "an unfavorable political climate." Forget such technical quibbles as "an inappropriate nomination strategy." Those who lose elections should never offer excuses for why they lost. If you lost, you lost. If you are willing to admit, "We didn't do a very good job," then you must find out exactly what you did wrong. If all one does following an election is demand that the campaign committee hold a post-mortem and issue a report based on 20/20 hindsight, followed by "business as usual," then all we can say is the voters have given you fair warning, but apparently their warning wasn't painful enough.
Those attuned to public opinion know one must never underestimate the significance of local elections. Consider elections on Taiwan over the past several decades. The quadrennial county and municipal elections are often subtle leading indicators. During the 1997 county and municipal elections the DPP was in the opposition. Yet it swept the major county and municipality races throughout Taiwan. The ruling Kuomintang was humiliated. It was left holding Hualien, Taitung and the outer islands. The results of those elections foretold the first change in ruling parties in 2000. Similarly, during the 2005 county and municipal elections, the Kuomintang was in the opposition. Northern and central Taiwan went from Green to Blue. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party was left holding seven counties and cities in southern Taiwan. The results of those elections foretold the second change in ruling parties in 2008. In other words, we may not believe in historical inevitability. But history nevertheless provides us with clear lessons. Voters on Taiwan will not make endless allowances for any political party, Blue or Green!
President Ma and his team have worked hard over the past year. They made a real effort to do well. But in politics one never gets an A for effort. Politics is all about public perception and public sentiment. It's true that the past year has been unkind to the ruling administration. The price of raw materials has skyrocketed due to global inflation. Global financial turmoil has left us with a weak global economy. Global climate change has led to hurricanes and flooding. Taiwan has been subjected to unprecedented traumas. These, perhaps, are what President Ma meant by "an unfavorable political climate." But he must not underestimate the wisdom of the voters. Leaders the world over have all been coping with "an unfavorable political environment" for the past year. Many countries have yet to emerge from their crises. But many leaders have met with public approval. Put bluntly, blaming "an unfavorable political environment" is merely shirking one's responsibility. President Ma must be vigilant, especially since his halo has dimmed so rapidly from little more than a year ago. Even party members who have violated party discipline consider him a pushover -- someone they can pick on.
President Ma's reputation took a serious hit following the 8/8 Floods earlier this year. They revealed major problems with his administration's decision-making process. Many policies that should have been aggressively promoted long ago, were repeatedly withdrawn due to fear of the public reaction. Many controversial policies were repeatedly rejected or never presented to the public for discussion. The decisions were all made behind closed doors. As a result the opposition has monopolized the debate over policy. The Ma administration has lost even the rudimentary ability to defend its policies. Take the recent election for example. The opposition repeatedly demagogued the issue of U.S. beef imports. The ruling party knew it could not resist pressure from the U.S. It also knew there would be a backlash from the grass-roots. South Korea was the clearest example. So why did it allow the worst possible scenario to play out? This was a major policy decision. Yet it was made behind closed doors, by a handful of people in the national security council. The administration failed to coordinate with the KMT. Even relevant departments within the Executive Yuan were left out of the loop. Forget about communicating with the public. Is it any surprise that a closed decision-making and governance method such as this would provoke widespread criticism? Many commentators have blasted the Ma administration for being "arrogant" and "full of themselves." This is a perfect example.
Perhaps the Ma administration should be grateful. This election was merely a flesh wound. No bones were broken. No tendons were severed. The damage inflicted is manageable. Voters used their ballots to send the administration a warning. They left the administration a chance to do better. The administration has one chance to make things right. It had better realize there will not be a second.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2009.12.08
社論－坦然面對挫敗 才能贏回民心
本報訊
不論各界選擇多少角度去評論剛結束的縣市長投票結果，有一項基本的事實或許是任誰都不會否認的：這次選舉結果顯示，國民黨執政氣勢正面臨更嚴酷的考驗，而相對的民進黨則正逐漸走出谷底。簡單的說，選民用選票，向國民黨傳遞了若干警告，也給了民進黨若干鼓勵，這意味國民黨還不至於慘到要懷憂喪志的地步，民進黨也還稱不上可以從此歡欣鼓舞，畢竟，這只是期中測驗，真正的大考，還在後頭呢！
正如同馬總統自己都坦承，包括他本人及國民黨都需要「再檢討」。重點是，檢討什麼？不要再提什麼「大環境不佳」的空泛語言，也別再陷入「提名策略不當」的技術細節，選輸的人永遠不該找理由替自己辯護，輸了就是輸了，如果願意承認「我們的確做不好」，那就還必須找出「究竟那裡做不好」，對不對？如果選後的檢討，只是責求輔選單位開個會，寫篇「後見之明」的檢討報告，接下來還是一切照舊，那麼也只能說，選民所給的警告，還不夠有讓人痛的效果。
對民意走向敏感的人都清楚，永遠不能低估地方選舉所透露的訊息。打開近十數年的台灣選舉史，每四年一度的縣市長選舉，很微妙經常扮演著領先指標的角色。一九九七年的縣市長選舉，民進黨以在野之身，幾乎席捲了全臺主要縣市長席次，讓執政的國民黨難堪地退守到後山的花東與外島，那次選舉結果也預告了二○○○ 年首度的政黨輪替；二○○五年的縣市長選舉，國民黨同樣以在野之身，讓北台灣與中台灣全面綠地變藍天，中央執政的民進黨則退守到南台七縣市，那次選舉結果也同樣預告了二○○八年的二度政黨輪替。換言之，我們縱然不必迷信歷史會有什麼規律，但最起碼歷史提供了清楚的教訓：台灣的選民永遠不會刻意善待藍綠任何一個政黨！
我們當然知道，馬總統乃至執政團隊過去一年確實做得很辛苦，也確實很想把事情做好，但政治治理這檔事，從來不是「只問耕耘」的事業，它永遠都要在乎人民感受。沒錯，過去一年多的執政運勢確實不佳，全球原料飆漲所帶起的通貨膨漲、全球金融風暴所釀成的景氣衰退、乃至全球氣候變遷所造成的風災與水患等，都讓台灣接續受到空前的重創，這些因素或許就是馬總統所謂的「大環境」，但請千萬別低估選民的智慧，全球的領袖過去一年多誰沒遭逢「大環境」的挑戰？不少國家還不是挺了過來，許多領袖也照樣贏得民意的肯定，講白一點，歸咎「大環境」只是卸責的藉口。馬總統最該深自警惕的應該是：何以才一年多一點，昔日超高的人氣光環，竟然褪色得這麼快？連黨內違紀的同志都認為他「好欺負」！
其實，早從今年八八水災後馬總統聲望全面崩跌以來，已經透露了馬政府的決策模式出現了很大問題，若干早該積極推動的政策，一再因為懼怕民意反彈而處處綁手綁腳；而若干預期爭議頗高的政策，卻又一再閉門決策，拒絕甚至根本忽略與民意對話，結果不僅政策論述舞台被在野黨全面篡奪，連最起碼的政策辯護能力都逐步喪失。以這次選戰中被在野黨一再炒作的美國牛肉進口為例，執政黨明明知道根本擋不住美國的壓力，也明明知道基層民意肯定會反彈，韓國先前鮮活的例證已擺在那裡，怎麼還是一切任其朝最壞的劇本上演？這麼重大的決策，就讓國安單位幾個人閉門操盤，不僅事前未做任何黨政協調，行政團隊相關部門也全在狀況外，更不必提什麼與民意做好先期溝通了，這種封閉的決策與治理模式，會陷入全面挨打的境地，豈不是全在預料中？許多論者過去批評馬政府「傲慢」、「自我感覺良好」云云，這不就是個現成的例證？
或許馬政府還真該慶幸，這次的選舉結果，只是傷到皮肉，尚未深及筋骨，基本上還算是可控制範圍內的挫敗，選民只是用選票傳達了警告，但還預留了不少調整與再修正的空間，但機會也只有這一次了，下一回請真的記住：不可能再有任何閃躲與僥倖的空間了。
Monday, December 7, 2009
Tsai Ing-wen Ought to Have Greater Respect for Press Freedom
Tsai Ing-wen Ought to Have Greater Respect for Press Freedom
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 7, 2009
On December 3rd, the United Daily News published an editorial urging the DPP not to use ECFA to divide Taiwan. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen read this editorial and wrote us a letter. She vehemently objected to our references to "divisiveness" and "anti-intellectual demagoguery."
This newspaper published Chairman Tsai's letter and our brief response in the December 4th Op-Ed Section. This exchange between a politician and the media is deeply regrettable. Nevertheless, we must set the record straight.
The editorial this newspaper published on the 3rd asked whether the Democratic Progressive Party and Tsai Ing-wen had oversimplified a complex issue like ECFA and reduced it to "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." We asked whether such practices were anti-intellectual demagoguery. We also asked whether the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen had maligned ECFA, a policy intended to protect Taiwan's future, and used it to divide the nation and society. Our editorial argued that agricultural issues must be addressed, but they must not be used as pretexts to divide the nation into "agricultural counties and cities" and "non-agricultural counties and cities," and incite farmers to hate society. We considered our comments fair and reasonable.
Chairman Tsai's letter denied the charges of "divisiveness" and "anti-intellectual demagoguery." On the issue of divisiveness, she ignored the expression "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." Our editorial pointed out that over the past two decades the Democratic Progressive Party has persistently divided the nation and society, through its "rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution" campaign, and its rejection of the Republic of China. It has divided citizens along the lines of "Taiwanese" vs. "Mainlanders," and "love for Taiwan" vs. "selling out Taiwan," and "Northerners" vs. "Southerners." It has constantly sought ways to divide people. Chairman Tsai evaded this issue entirely. Instead, she wrote "According to the logic of the editorial, raising objections to the government's policies divides society into two opposing camps, the pros and the cons. Therefore this too is a form of divisiveness." She asked provocatively whether "refusing to going along with the Ma government amounted to dividing Taiwan?" Chairman Tsai not only refused to address the issue of divisiveness. She attempted to change the subject. She accused the editorial of "attaching false labels" to the Democratic Progressive Party. She said the editorial "viewed opposition to the government's policies as some sort of scourge." She said it "prettified the government" and "acted as a mouthpiece for administration officials." Chairman Tsai wrote, using the most ascerbic language possible, "After reading your editorial, I was not angry. I was speechless."
This is hardly the attitude the chairman of a political party ought to adopt when discussing controversial matters. She evaded the real issues. She began by accusing the editorial of "viewing opposition to the government as some sort of scourge." She implied that the editorial "parroted the Ma administration." What sort of argumentation is this, that can't be bothered to distinguish between black and white, and truth and lies? Chairman Tsai said the editorial unfairly attached false labels on her. But on whom was she unfairly attaching false labels?
Leave other issues aside for the moment. Ever since Ma Ying-jeou became president, and Tsai Ing-wen became DPP party chairman, this newspaper's editorials and "In Black and White" column have been more critical of President Ma than of Chairman Tsai. Even in the three in one local elections, our editorials and our "In Black and White" column have been far harsher in their criticisms of the KMT and President Ma than they have of the DPP and Chairman Tsai, both in frequency and in intensity. Under the circumstances, was our editorial not a "dissenting opinion?" How can it be considered "parroting the Ma administration?" How can it be considered a case of "acting as the mouthpiece of administration officials?"
Let's return to the issue of "anti-intellectual demogoguery." Chairman Tsai's letter depicted farmers' anxieties over ECFA in deeply moving terms. We feel the same way. But she made no effort whatsoever to explain why so many DPP politicians have demagogued the issue as "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." She denied spreading rumors at the grassroots level. Chairman Tsai may claim that she herself has never used the expression "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." But has she forgotten that she is the chairman of the DPP. She bears responsibility for statements issued by her party's officials.
This perhaps, is Chairman Tsai's dilemma. She is unwilling to be the DPP's mask, or "persona." She wants to be a bona fide leader. But she sometimes thinks of herself as the DPP's mask. She thinks that rhetoric such as "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan" has nothing to do with her. The DPP's rhetoric has long been divorced from its core values. For example, its core value is Taiwan independence. Its championing of "democracy" is merely a pretext. And so it is with ECFA. First DPP leaders initiate a whisper campaign about "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." Then they play up "the tragic plight of farmers." Chairman Tsai scrupulously avoided using the term "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan" in her letter. But she did resort to demagoguing "the tragic plight of farmers." Is this how a responsible party chairman ought to behave? Does this constitute honest soul-searching by a party chairman?
This exchange between us and Chairman Tsai is merely one incident. What concerns us more is how to normalize politician/media interaction. Without the freedom to denounce the Lee Teng-hui regime ten years ago, the DPP could never have ruled the central government for eight years. Over the past two or three years, without a free press to uphold justice, the DPP would never have been able to extricate itself from corruption. The DPP's rise and fall is closely related to the rise and fall of media freedom. Even today, the media still holds out hope for the DPP. In fact, the reason our editorial urged the DPP not to use ECFA to divide Taiwan, was precisely because we still expect so much from the DPP. If Chairman Tsai truly understood this, she would not have responded the way she did. The Democratic Progressive Party won the recent local elections. Chairman Tsai and the Democratic Progressive Party have scaled new heights in the defense of democratic values in a free and open forum.
Freedom of the press is an important social value. Freedom of expression must be respected and protected. In the past Chairman Tsai has squabbled with other newspapers because she was unhappy with their editorial commentary. A party chairman should learn from public comments regarding her party's political moves. One may engage in rational debate. But one must never attempt to discredit the media through defamation, by unfairly labeling its editorial commentary as "prettifying the government" or as "acting as the mouthpiece of administration officials." A party chairman in a democracy should never adopt such an attitude with the free press.
Besides, from a realpolitik perspective, political parties, especially during elections, routinely float lies, spread rumors, spout heresy, and engage in sophistry and defamation. Political parties are a million times worse than the media when it comes to polluting the air with distortions. A chairman of a political party has failed to assume responsibility for her own party's public statements. She has failed to account to society for her party's breaches of ethics and abdications of responsibility. What right does she have to defame and distort the media's well-aimed comments regarding her party's political moves? On the one hand, she is abusing her right to free speech. On the other hand, she is suppressing others' right to free speech. Is this really something the chairman of an ostensibly "democratic and progressive" political party should be doing?
Chairman Tsai Ing-wen was once considered a cut above the average politician. We have always held high expectations for her. But if Chairman Tsai has has sunk to this level, the public may well give up on the Democratic Progressive Party. They may cease hoping that it will rehabilitate itself. This is a matter of far greater concern than the exchange between us and Chairman Tsai. Sound advice often grates on the ear. Surely Chairman Tsai is not going to characterize that as "parroting the Ma administration," is she?
蔡英文應知如何尊重評論自由
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.07 03:18 am
本報三日社論主張「不要再用ＥＣＦＡ來撕裂台灣」，民進黨主席蔡英文閱後投書本報，對社論所指民進黨「撕裂」及「反智愚民」的操作，提出疾言厲色的反駁。
本報已將蔡主席的投書及我們的簡答刊登在四日的民意論壇版；此一過從是一樁令人極度遺憾的政媒互動事件，仍有再作申論以正視聽的必要。
本報三日社論提問：民進黨及蔡英文將一個利害錯綜複雜的ＥＣＦＡ，簡化成「傾中賣台」四字，此種手法是不是反智愚民？再質疑：民進黨及蔡英文將ＥＣＦＡ這個救治台灣整體發展的政策，扭曲醜化成撕裂國家社會的政治議題。社論並明確主張：農業問題必須照應，但不宜藉此將國家撕裂成「農業縣市／非農業縣市」，並誤導農民去仇恨社會。我們認為，這是一篇平允的評論。
蔡主席的投書，一駁「撕裂」，再談「反智愚民」。關於撕裂，她完全迴避了「傾中賣台」四字。社論指出，民進黨過去二十年來始終撕裂國家社會，「正名制憲／中華民國」是撕裂，「台灣人／外省人」是撕裂，「愛台灣／不愛台灣」、「愛台／賣台」、「南部／北部」，在在皆是撕裂……；蔡主席避此不談，卻竟一躍而稱：「若依該社論邏輯，對政策提出反對意見，因此將社會分為贊成與反對的兩方，就是一種撕裂手法。」並為投書下了一個「不附和馬政府，就是撕裂台灣？」的聳動標題。尤有甚者，蔡主席非但未就是否「撕裂」進行針對性的討論，話題一轉，竟稱社論是對民進黨「扣帽子」，並誣指社論「把對政策的反面思辯視為洪水猛獸，美化政府，為官喉舌」，又稱：「吾人（蔡英文）閱（社論）後不感憤怒，只是難免瞠目結舌」。用語措辭極盡尖刻之能事。
這恐怕不是一個黨主席討論議題的應有風格與水準。迴避正題，開口就稱社論是「將反面思辯視為洪水猛獸」，「美化政府，為官喉舌」，又暗喻社論是「附和馬政府」。這是何其不分青紅皂白的辯論手法？蔡主席說社論對她扣帽子，但她是在對誰扣帽子？
不說別的，馬英九任總統及蔡英文任民進黨主席以來，本報社論與黑白集對馬總統的評論也許尚銳利嚴格過對蔡主席；即使在此次三合一地方選舉期間，社論及黑白集對國民黨及馬總統的評論，在篇數及尖銳度上，亦遠逾於對民進黨及蔡主席的評論。由此可見，社論豈是不會作「反面思辯」？豈是「附和馬政府」？豈是「為官喉舌」？
再談「反智愚民」。蔡主席的投書，將農民對ＥＣＦＡ的焦慮及困境描寫得情辭動人，我們亦深有同感；但她未用一字來解釋何以極多民進黨的政要用「傾中賣台」來操作此一議題，更諱言在基層撒佈的政治耳語是什麼。蔡主席也許會說，至少她自己未說過「傾中賣台」；但她難道不知自己是民進黨主席，應當一肩挑起概括承受的責任。
這也許正是蔡主席的困境，她不願只作民進黨的面具，而希望成為實質領袖；但有時她又以為自己只是民進黨的面具，而視「傾中賣台」這類操作與她無關。民進黨的論述操作向來是「體用分離」，例如：「台獨」是體，「民主」是用；在ＥＣＦＡ議題上亦復如此，先用明示及耳語建立了「傾中賣台」的體，再發動「農民悲情」的用。蔡主席在投書中迴避了「傾中賣台」的體，而只是訴諸「農民悲情」的用；這是一個負責任的黨主席應有的擔當嗎？這又是一個誠實的黨主席應有的自我反省嗎？
這件社論與投書的往復畢竟只是一宗個案，我們更關切的是政治人物與媒體評論應當如何建立正常的互動關係。十年前，若無自由媒體嚴責李登輝政權，民進黨不可能在中央執政八年；過去二、三年來，若無自由媒體操持正義，民進黨亦不可能從貪腐禍國中自拔。民進黨的起伏興衰，可謂皆與台灣的自由媒體息息相關；即使在今日，媒體仍對民進黨抱有期許，「不要再用ＥＣＦＡ來撕裂台灣」一文，其實亦是對民進黨寄以期待的勸諫，蔡主席若有此種正確認識，即不致如此反應。民進黨在此次地方選舉獲勝後，蔡主席及民進黨在護守民主價值的自由論壇上亦當更上層樓。
新聞自由是重要社會價值，評論自由尤應受到維護與尊重。蔡主席過去亦曾因對評論不滿而與其他報紙發生勃谿，一位黨主席對於輿論就該黨政治操作提出的意見，應當借鏡參考，亦可理性辯解，但絕不可對任何自由媒體汙蔑抹黑，扣上什麼「美化政府，為官喉舌」的帽子。一位黨主席對自由媒體若持此種態度，絕非民主政治的正確示範。
再者，就現實政治運作來說，一個政黨在日常操作中，尤其在選舉時，可謂日日時時皆可能放出謊話、謠言、妄論、穢語、邪說；因而，政黨對言論空間的汙染及扭曲，恐較一般媒體嚴重萬倍。既是如此，則一黨主席在政黨自身的言論倫理及言論責任皆無以向社會交代及彌償的實況下，更豈可對自由媒體就關於政黨操作的適當公評，逕加汙蔑扭曲？一面汙染言論空間，一面箝制自由評論，這豈是一位「民主／進步」的黨主席所應為？
蔡英文主席原本是社會認為能夠有別於傳統類型的政治人物，我們一向對她亦有高度的期許。倘若蔡主席竟亦沾染了那種習氣，也許會使國人對民進黨的改造更生失去了期待；這才是這次「社論／投書」往復更令人關切的大事。良言逆耳，蔡主席不會將本文也說成是「附和馬政府」吧？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 7, 2009
On December 3rd, the United Daily News published an editorial urging the DPP not to use ECFA to divide Taiwan. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen read this editorial and wrote us a letter. She vehemently objected to our references to "divisiveness" and "anti-intellectual demagoguery."
This newspaper published Chairman Tsai's letter and our brief response in the December 4th Op-Ed Section. This exchange between a politician and the media is deeply regrettable. Nevertheless, we must set the record straight.
The editorial this newspaper published on the 3rd asked whether the Democratic Progressive Party and Tsai Ing-wen had oversimplified a complex issue like ECFA and reduced it to "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." We asked whether such practices were anti-intellectual demagoguery. We also asked whether the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen had maligned ECFA, a policy intended to protect Taiwan's future, and used it to divide the nation and society. Our editorial argued that agricultural issues must be addressed, but they must not be used as pretexts to divide the nation into "agricultural counties and cities" and "non-agricultural counties and cities," and incite farmers to hate society. We considered our comments fair and reasonable.
Chairman Tsai's letter denied the charges of "divisiveness" and "anti-intellectual demagoguery." On the issue of divisiveness, she ignored the expression "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." Our editorial pointed out that over the past two decades the Democratic Progressive Party has persistently divided the nation and society, through its "rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution" campaign, and its rejection of the Republic of China. It has divided citizens along the lines of "Taiwanese" vs. "Mainlanders," and "love for Taiwan" vs. "selling out Taiwan," and "Northerners" vs. "Southerners." It has constantly sought ways to divide people. Chairman Tsai evaded this issue entirely. Instead, she wrote "According to the logic of the editorial, raising objections to the government's policies divides society into two opposing camps, the pros and the cons. Therefore this too is a form of divisiveness." She asked provocatively whether "refusing to going along with the Ma government amounted to dividing Taiwan?" Chairman Tsai not only refused to address the issue of divisiveness. She attempted to change the subject. She accused the editorial of "attaching false labels" to the Democratic Progressive Party. She said the editorial "viewed opposition to the government's policies as some sort of scourge." She said it "prettified the government" and "acted as a mouthpiece for administration officials." Chairman Tsai wrote, using the most ascerbic language possible, "After reading your editorial, I was not angry. I was speechless."
This is hardly the attitude the chairman of a political party ought to adopt when discussing controversial matters. She evaded the real issues. She began by accusing the editorial of "viewing opposition to the government as some sort of scourge." She implied that the editorial "parroted the Ma administration." What sort of argumentation is this, that can't be bothered to distinguish between black and white, and truth and lies? Chairman Tsai said the editorial unfairly attached false labels on her. But on whom was she unfairly attaching false labels?
Leave other issues aside for the moment. Ever since Ma Ying-jeou became president, and Tsai Ing-wen became DPP party chairman, this newspaper's editorials and "In Black and White" column have been more critical of President Ma than of Chairman Tsai. Even in the three in one local elections, our editorials and our "In Black and White" column have been far harsher in their criticisms of the KMT and President Ma than they have of the DPP and Chairman Tsai, both in frequency and in intensity. Under the circumstances, was our editorial not a "dissenting opinion?" How can it be considered "parroting the Ma administration?" How can it be considered a case of "acting as the mouthpiece of administration officials?"
Let's return to the issue of "anti-intellectual demogoguery." Chairman Tsai's letter depicted farmers' anxieties over ECFA in deeply moving terms. We feel the same way. But she made no effort whatsoever to explain why so many DPP politicians have demagogued the issue as "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." She denied spreading rumors at the grassroots level. Chairman Tsai may claim that she herself has never used the expression "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." But has she forgotten that she is the chairman of the DPP. She bears responsibility for statements issued by her party's officials.
This perhaps, is Chairman Tsai's dilemma. She is unwilling to be the DPP's mask, or "persona." She wants to be a bona fide leader. But she sometimes thinks of herself as the DPP's mask. She thinks that rhetoric such as "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan" has nothing to do with her. The DPP's rhetoric has long been divorced from its core values. For example, its core value is Taiwan independence. Its championing of "democracy" is merely a pretext. And so it is with ECFA. First DPP leaders initiate a whisper campaign about "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." Then they play up "the tragic plight of farmers." Chairman Tsai scrupulously avoided using the term "toadying up to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan" in her letter. But she did resort to demagoguing "the tragic plight of farmers." Is this how a responsible party chairman ought to behave? Does this constitute honest soul-searching by a party chairman?
This exchange between us and Chairman Tsai is merely one incident. What concerns us more is how to normalize politician/media interaction. Without the freedom to denounce the Lee Teng-hui regime ten years ago, the DPP could never have ruled the central government for eight years. Over the past two or three years, without a free press to uphold justice, the DPP would never have been able to extricate itself from corruption. The DPP's rise and fall is closely related to the rise and fall of media freedom. Even today, the media still holds out hope for the DPP. In fact, the reason our editorial urged the DPP not to use ECFA to divide Taiwan, was precisely because we still expect so much from the DPP. If Chairman Tsai truly understood this, she would not have responded the way she did. The Democratic Progressive Party won the recent local elections. Chairman Tsai and the Democratic Progressive Party have scaled new heights in the defense of democratic values in a free and open forum.
Freedom of the press is an important social value. Freedom of expression must be respected and protected. In the past Chairman Tsai has squabbled with other newspapers because she was unhappy with their editorial commentary. A party chairman should learn from public comments regarding her party's political moves. One may engage in rational debate. But one must never attempt to discredit the media through defamation, by unfairly labeling its editorial commentary as "prettifying the government" or as "acting as the mouthpiece of administration officials." A party chairman in a democracy should never adopt such an attitude with the free press.
Besides, from a realpolitik perspective, political parties, especially during elections, routinely float lies, spread rumors, spout heresy, and engage in sophistry and defamation. Political parties are a million times worse than the media when it comes to polluting the air with distortions. A chairman of a political party has failed to assume responsibility for her own party's public statements. She has failed to account to society for her party's breaches of ethics and abdications of responsibility. What right does she have to defame and distort the media's well-aimed comments regarding her party's political moves? On the one hand, she is abusing her right to free speech. On the other hand, she is suppressing others' right to free speech. Is this really something the chairman of an ostensibly "democratic and progressive" political party should be doing?
Chairman Tsai Ing-wen was once considered a cut above the average politician. We have always held high expectations for her. But if Chairman Tsai has has sunk to this level, the public may well give up on the Democratic Progressive Party. They may cease hoping that it will rehabilitate itself. This is a matter of far greater concern than the exchange between us and Chairman Tsai. Sound advice often grates on the ear. Surely Chairman Tsai is not going to characterize that as "parroting the Ma administration," is she?
蔡英文應知如何尊重評論自由
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.12.07 03:18 am
本報三日社論主張「不要再用ＥＣＦＡ來撕裂台灣」，民進黨主席蔡英文閱後投書本報，對社論所指民進黨「撕裂」及「反智愚民」的操作，提出疾言厲色的反駁。
本報已將蔡主席的投書及我們的簡答刊登在四日的民意論壇版；此一過從是一樁令人極度遺憾的政媒互動事件，仍有再作申論以正視聽的必要。
本報三日社論提問：民進黨及蔡英文將一個利害錯綜複雜的ＥＣＦＡ，簡化成「傾中賣台」四字，此種手法是不是反智愚民？再質疑：民進黨及蔡英文將ＥＣＦＡ這個救治台灣整體發展的政策，扭曲醜化成撕裂國家社會的政治議題。社論並明確主張：農業問題必須照應，但不宜藉此將國家撕裂成「農業縣市／非農業縣市」，並誤導農民去仇恨社會。我們認為，這是一篇平允的評論。
蔡主席的投書，一駁「撕裂」，再談「反智愚民」。關於撕裂，她完全迴避了「傾中賣台」四字。社論指出，民進黨過去二十年來始終撕裂國家社會，「正名制憲／中華民國」是撕裂，「台灣人／外省人」是撕裂，「愛台灣／不愛台灣」、「愛台／賣台」、「南部／北部」，在在皆是撕裂……；蔡主席避此不談，卻竟一躍而稱：「若依該社論邏輯，對政策提出反對意見，因此將社會分為贊成與反對的兩方，就是一種撕裂手法。」並為投書下了一個「不附和馬政府，就是撕裂台灣？」的聳動標題。尤有甚者，蔡主席非但未就是否「撕裂」進行針對性的討論，話題一轉，竟稱社論是對民進黨「扣帽子」，並誣指社論「把對政策的反面思辯視為洪水猛獸，美化政府，為官喉舌」，又稱：「吾人（蔡英文）閱（社論）後不感憤怒，只是難免瞠目結舌」。用語措辭極盡尖刻之能事。
這恐怕不是一個黨主席討論議題的應有風格與水準。迴避正題，開口就稱社論是「將反面思辯視為洪水猛獸」，「美化政府，為官喉舌」，又暗喻社論是「附和馬政府」。這是何其不分青紅皂白的辯論手法？蔡主席說社論對她扣帽子，但她是在對誰扣帽子？
不說別的，馬英九任總統及蔡英文任民進黨主席以來，本報社論與黑白集對馬總統的評論也許尚銳利嚴格過對蔡主席；即使在此次三合一地方選舉期間，社論及黑白集對國民黨及馬總統的評論，在篇數及尖銳度上，亦遠逾於對民進黨及蔡主席的評論。由此可見，社論豈是不會作「反面思辯」？豈是「附和馬政府」？豈是「為官喉舌」？
再談「反智愚民」。蔡主席的投書，將農民對ＥＣＦＡ的焦慮及困境描寫得情辭動人，我們亦深有同感；但她未用一字來解釋何以極多民進黨的政要用「傾中賣台」來操作此一議題，更諱言在基層撒佈的政治耳語是什麼。蔡主席也許會說，至少她自己未說過「傾中賣台」；但她難道不知自己是民進黨主席，應當一肩挑起概括承受的責任。
這也許正是蔡主席的困境，她不願只作民進黨的面具，而希望成為實質領袖；但有時她又以為自己只是民進黨的面具，而視「傾中賣台」這類操作與她無關。民進黨的論述操作向來是「體用分離」，例如：「台獨」是體，「民主」是用；在ＥＣＦＡ議題上亦復如此，先用明示及耳語建立了「傾中賣台」的體，再發動「農民悲情」的用。蔡主席在投書中迴避了「傾中賣台」的體，而只是訴諸「農民悲情」的用；這是一個負責任的黨主席應有的擔當嗎？這又是一個誠實的黨主席應有的自我反省嗎？
這件社論與投書的往復畢竟只是一宗個案，我們更關切的是政治人物與媒體評論應當如何建立正常的互動關係。十年前，若無自由媒體嚴責李登輝政權，民進黨不可能在中央執政八年；過去二、三年來，若無自由媒體操持正義，民進黨亦不可能從貪腐禍國中自拔。民進黨的起伏興衰，可謂皆與台灣的自由媒體息息相關；即使在今日，媒體仍對民進黨抱有期許，「不要再用ＥＣＦＡ來撕裂台灣」一文，其實亦是對民進黨寄以期待的勸諫，蔡主席若有此種正確認識，即不致如此反應。民進黨在此次地方選舉獲勝後，蔡主席及民進黨在護守民主價值的自由論壇上亦當更上層樓。
新聞自由是重要社會價值，評論自由尤應受到維護與尊重。蔡主席過去亦曾因對評論不滿而與其他報紙發生勃谿，一位黨主席對於輿論就該黨政治操作提出的意見，應當借鏡參考，亦可理性辯解，但絕不可對任何自由媒體汙蔑抹黑，扣上什麼「美化政府，為官喉舌」的帽子。一位黨主席對自由媒體若持此種態度，絕非民主政治的正確示範。
再者，就現實政治運作來說，一個政黨在日常操作中，尤其在選舉時，可謂日日時時皆可能放出謊話、謠言、妄論、穢語、邪說；因而，政黨對言論空間的汙染及扭曲，恐較一般媒體嚴重萬倍。既是如此，則一黨主席在政黨自身的言論倫理及言論責任皆無以向社會交代及彌償的實況下，更豈可對自由媒體就關於政黨操作的適當公評，逕加汙蔑扭曲？一面汙染言論空間，一面箝制自由評論，這豈是一位「民主／進步」的黨主席所應為？
蔡英文主席原本是社會認為能夠有別於傳統類型的政治人物，我們一向對她亦有高度的期許。倘若蔡主席竟亦沾染了那種習氣，也許會使國人對民進黨的改造更生失去了期待；這才是這次「社論／投書」往復更令人關切的大事。良言逆耳，蔡主席不會將本文也說成是「附和馬政府」吧？
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