A Referendum on US Beef: The Ultimate Victim will be The Public
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 13, 2010
The Executive Yuan Referendum Commission has approved a Consumers' Foundation request for a referendum on US beef imports. The foundation will soon begin its second phase signature drive. This is the first time private individuals have initiated a referendum since the referendum process was opened up. We have already expressed our views on the matter. A referendum is unnecessary. A referendum is far from urgent. So why the relentless demand for such a referendum? The underlying reasons deserve examination.
The referendum states, "We demand that the Department of Health reinitiate talks with the United States regarding its November 2009 relaxing of restrictions on the importation of bone-in beef, ground beef, beef organ meats, and beef bone marrow less than 30 months old." When the Legislative Yuan passed its amendment to the Food Sanitation Management Law, this referendum's key demands had already been met. The resumption of talks over US beef imports was already a foregone conclusion. By the time the second phase signature drive nears completion, Taipei and Washington will already have restarted talks. This particular referendum will be utterly pointless. In terms of beef parts, bone-in beef is not a high-risk item. Beef industry importers are not really interested in it. The referendum is pointless and out of date. So why the stubborn insistence on holding it? Why the deetermination to overcome cumbersome procedural hurdles merely to see the referendum through? Three reasons come to mind.
The first is to send Washington a message. The second is to send the government a message. The third is to hold a referendum merely for the sake of holding a referendum.
If the point of the referendum is to send a message to Washington, we don't really see the point. Relations between Taipei and Washington have been negatively impacted by the US beef imports controversy. In principle, whether the Republic of China government has the approval of its citizens is a domestic affair. But if a protocol signed with a foreign nation is overturned by legislative means, that is an international affair. We are in the wrong. Even if the referendum passes, it will only prove that the protocol signed by the government does not meet with the approval of the public. It doesn't change the fact that we are still in the wrong. Using a referendum to send a message to Washington serves no useful purpose, other than letting off a little steam. Relations between Taipei and Washington have already been negatively impacted by the legislature's amendment of the law. Do we really wish to persist in anti-American populism to the bitter end? If we allow populist sentiment to get out of hand, undermining undermine Taipei/Washington relations, who will be the losers? The importation of bone-in beef is the only remaining issue. Is it really worth destroying Taipei/Washington relations over? This hardly seems like a wise decision. Even if the referendum passes, it proves nothing. It will merely lead to intensified diplomatic confrontation between Taipei and Washington. If on the other hand, the referendum fails to pass, it will prove that the Legislative Yuan's amendment of the law did not meet with public expectations. Does the Consumers' Foundation really want to shoot itself in the foot this way?
If the point of the referendum is to send a message to the government, that is equally incomprehensible. Haven't we learned our lesson from the Legislative Yuan's amendment of the law? Is the point of the referendum to teach the legislature a lesson? Is it to protest the legislature's failure to ban bone-in beef? If so, we are concerned that those behind the referendum are utterly intolerant of the slightest disagreement and unwilling to make the tiniest compromise. The Consumers' Foundation does not seem to fit this description. It has long been a highly professional consumer advocacy group. Such an obstinate and imperious attitude is irrrational and unrepresentative of the interests of consumers. It will merely leave the impression that those promoting the referendum have hidden political agendas.
The referendum process allows the public to express its opinions on matters of policy. It is a supplement that addresses inadequacies in the legislative process. It should not be used to "teach the government a lesson." It should not be used to further anyone's private agenda. The Consumers' Foundation said it would not allow political forces to take part in the signature drive. But if the referendum process is purely for the sake of "teaching the government a lesson," and not for any substantive policy purposes, it will be hard to determine whether it contains any political agendas. It will be hard to avoid undermining the hard-won reputation of the Consumers' Foundation for professionalism and impartiality.
If the referendum is being held merely for the sake of holding a referendum, without rhyme or reason. If it is being held for political rather than professional reasons, we needn't waste too much ink on it. The Consumers' Foundation raised a consumer rights issue. It convinced the legislature to amend the law. It made use of checks and balances in representative politics. This referendum has become redundant. If the Consumers' Foundation is demanding a referendum purely for the sake of holding a referendum, it will undermine its own credibility. Worse, it will undermine the credibility of the referendum process. It will retard the Republic of China's political maturation.
The legal threshold for U.S. Beef Referendum is high. Meeting it will be difficult. One can try to link it with the general election. But that won't ensure its passage. It may even substantiate allegations of hidden political agendas. The referendum is unlikely to pass. Concrete results from the referendum are a long way off. We urge its backers to cease and desist. Our main concern is the dark shadow of populist demagoguery undermining Taipei/Washington relations and the credibility of the Consumers' Foundation. The ultimate victims will be Republic of China citizens.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.13
社論－推動美牛公投 最終受害者是人民
本報訊
行政院公投審議委員會通過消基會提出的美牛公投案，消基會即將展開第二階段連署。對於台灣開放公投以來第一次由民間發動的公投，其必要性乃至急迫性何在，我們已經表達看法；為什麼繼續推動此項公投？其背後的現象也值得仔細思索。
正要進行連署的公投案內容是「要求否決衛生署在九十八年十一月開放美國卅月齡以下帶骨牛肉、絞肉、牛內臟、牛脊髓之政策，重啟美國牛肉輸台議定書談判」。眾所週知，當立法院通過修正食品衛生管理法與相關附帶決議之後，此一公投案的主要訴求，都已實現；其中美國牛肉輸台議定重啟談判，已成定局，而且應係在公投案連署階段完成之前，台美之間業已重新進行談判，此一公投案已乏實質意義。若從其針對的美國牛肉部位來看，亦只有帶骨牛肉一項，並非風險部位，也非業者進口主要興趣所在，那麼為什麼要將此一缺乏實質益處且已超過時間效益的提案，不辭程序繁複地交付公投呢？此中可能的背景目標可能有三。
第一，是為了要向華盛頓示威。第二，是為了要向政府示威。第三，是為要公投而公投。我們不妨分析一下，這三個可能究竟何者為是。
如果說是要向華盛頓示威而進行公投，我們看不出此中真正的用意何在。台美因美牛進口而關係生變，從道理上說，台灣的政府是否符合民意的期待，是台灣內部的事，將已經簽署的議定書用立法加以推翻，就外部關係而言，理虧在台灣。即使公投通過，也只不過證明政府簽署的議定書不符合民意，卻仍不能改變台灣理虧的態勢，用公投向美國示威，除了情緒發洩之外，亦無實益。台灣與美國之間的關係，因為立法院的修法已經生變，還需無限上綱地繼續民粹反美到底嗎？用民粹破壞台美關係以致不可收拾，受害者是誰？相對於進口帶骨牛肉的剩餘議題，值得用捐棄整體台美關係做為代價嗎？似乎不待智者而後決。公投案通過，並不能更加證明什麼，卻會招致更多更難的台美外交對峙；公投案不能通過，反而證明立法院的修法並不符合真正的民意，難道消基會想要證明這道理嗎？
如果是為了要向政府示威而進行公投，也難以理解。立法院修法給政府的教訓還不夠嗎？進行公投，是想用來教訓立法院的修法草案為何不包含帶骨牛肉嗎？真是如此，我們有點擔心此公投案背後，帶有某種絲毫不能寬容些許任何歧異或妥協的專橫，似乎不符合消基會如此一個專業的消費者團體一向的正面形象。這種睚眥必究、非如此不可的態度，既不理性，也不能真正代表消費大眾的利益，反而會予人一種私心自用的擔心。
公民投票是用來表達政策民意、補充立法不足的民主機制，不該是用來教訓政府或是任何人以逞快意的工具。消基會雖然表示拒絕政治勢力進入此次公投案的連署，但是如果公投案進行只是為了一逞教訓政府的快意而乏任何政策實益，將會很難解釋此中有無政治糾葛，也難免壞了消基會長久累積的專業公正形象。
至於為了公投而公投，其中的不理性乃至政治性過高而專業性缺乏的道理，也就不待費詞了。消基會提出消費者的議題，成功地帶動了立法院的修法，已經使得用來制衡代議政治的公民投票在此議題上成為多餘，為了公投而公投，如果成了消基會說不出口的訴求，既會傷害消基會的專業信用，也會傷害公民投票的制度信用，更會傷害台灣的民主發展。
坦率言之，美牛公投案如果要達到法定的通過門檻，難度極大；如果要與大選綁在一起，不但未必能夠通過，還會坐實了背後帶有政治算計的指控。對於這一起通過機會不大而且兌現時間還遠的公投案，我們苦口婆心地提出勸告，主要的擔心在於此中夾雜著揮之不去的民粹陰影，可能會反過來灼傷消基會的信譽與台美關係，最終的受害者，仍舊是台灣人民。
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
The 51% Rule: Why the Blue Camp Refuses to Vote
The 51% Rule: Why the Blue Camp Refuses to Vote
United Daily News editorial
A Translation
January 12, 2010
During last month's three in one local elections, and the three county legislator by-elections held last weekend, the most noteworthy political phenomenon was the low Blue Camp voter turnout. The Blue Camp vote count in the three in one local elections, was one million votes fewer than the Blue Camp vote count during Ma Ying-jeou's presidential election. The vote count for Anita Chan Lai-ling in the Taoyuan County Legislative Yuan by-election was about 37,000 votes. It was almost 40,000 less than Liu Cheng-ching's vote count in the previous election. In other words, it was merely half.
A string of elections held since the second change in ruling parties show that President Ma Ying-jeou has not won over any voters in the Green Camp. Instead he has suffered a serious loss of enthusiasm and support within the Blue Camp. The Green Camp is a monolith. Ma Ying-jeou cannot broaden his support by pandering to the Green Camp. He can only alienate his Blue Camp supporters by making them feel betrayed and abandoned. For Ma Ying-jeou, this amounts to a fatal erosion of his political base. Moreover, the less he is able to rally support within the Blue Camp, the more maneuveuring room he offers the Green Camp. Ma Ying-jeou's leadership position is increasingly tenuous. The Blue Camp is frustrated with the Ma administration's failure to fulfill its potential. Its sense of alienation and loss is more and more serious. This has led to a vicious cycle and generated divisions.
During the 2008 presidential election Ma Ying-jeou's campaign headquarters had a "51% rule." This was its election strategy. The so-called 51% rule meant that Ma Ying-jeou must be transformed into a political figure whom a majority of the public would award a score of 51% or more. In other words, their goal was to avoid transforming Ma Ying-jeou into a political figure whom a minority of the public would award a score of 90%, but whom others would award a score of only 5%. Their thinking was that as long as a majority of the public awarded Ma Ying-jeou a score of 51%, he would not become someone whose image was too sharply drawn, hence invite powerful reactions, either pro or con. This would allow him to break out of the Blue vs. Green dichotomy. This would allow him on the one hand to win Pale Green centrist votes, and on the other hand pave the way for social reconciliation after assuming office. The 51% rule was not entirely an electoral strategy. It probably reflected Ma Ying-jeou's moderate beliefs and introverted personality.
The Ma Ying-jeou administration apparently continued to use the 51% rule after it assumed office. It continued to walk on eggshells, eager to please all of the people all of the time. But as we can all see, it merely created a Green Camp monolith, and alienated his Blue Camp core support. As one can imagine, most Blue Camp supporters initially awarded Ma Ying-jeou a score well above 51%. But the reality now is that many Blue Camp supporters are awarding him a score lower than 51%. They refuse even to vote. Many more Blue Camp voters, regardless of whether they vote, feel alienated and adrift.
This is the Ma administration's plight. Green Camp momentum is strong. Blue Camp members' enthusiasm, sense of identification, sense of pride, sense of participation, sense of accomplishment, and degree of support have gone from bad to worse, and can go no lower. This is a deadlock. This is a crisis.
Compare this with the KMT. The absolute number of votes for the DPP may not have increased, but its supporters' enthusiasm and sense of identification with the party is high, well over 51%. From this we can see that the question is not whether the KMT can inspire the Green Camp and break down barriers between the Blue realm and the Green realm. The question is whether it can re-ignite the enthusiasm of its Blue Camp supporters. The question is how can it enable them to feel a sense of identification, a sense of pride, a sense of accomplishment, and a degree of support. Ma Ying-jeou cannot base his rule on such an alienated, even contemptuous political foundation. Blue Camp voters are not about to seek refuge in the DPP. But if they are so disillusioned they no longer expect anything from the Ma administration, is that not a frightening prospect?
What are the factors that led to our current situation? We have repeatedly tried to explain. The main reason is that the Republic of China is a nation divided by deep differences over national identity, communal group membership, cross-Strait policy, and social justice. This situation is not one that a "civil servant" such as the president can wave away with a magic wand. It requires a "national leader" to turn the tide. Alas, ever since President Ma took office, he has "retreated to the second line of defense," he has "refused party chairman status," he has "refused to issue emergency orders." His behavior has been that of an administator rather than a national leader. Ma Ying-jeou considers his behavior law-abiding and measured. But his supporters see it as cowardly and incompetent, as shirking responsibility. Ma Ying-jeou may consider his behavior consistent with his 51% rule. But the 51% rule is precisely what landed him in his current predicament.
Here we wish to avoid a possible misunderstanding. We are not saying that Ma Ying-jeou should cozy up to "Deep Blue" voters. We merely think that Ma Ying-jeou must respond to mainstream Blue Camp expectations. He must help his supporters recover their cohesiveness and pride. If he persists in abiding by his 51% rule, if he persists in binding himself hand and foot, if he persists in his efforts to be all things to all people, then most of his supporters will give him a score below 51%.
To make a percentage-based analogy, a person in office cannot expect 100% of the public to give him a score of 51% or more. Instead, he should enable 60% of the public to give him a score of 60% or more. This should be his goal. If he can get 60% of the public to give him a score of 60% or more, what reason is there to assume the nation's morale cannot be revitalized and restored?
If Ma Ying-jeou is unable to inspire enthusiasm and a sense of pride within the Blue Camp, he shouldn't even think of attempting to inspire enthusiasm in the Green Camp.
51％法則：藍營為何不投票？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.12 03:25 am
在上個月的三合一地方選舉，與上周末的三縣立委補選中，最顯著的政治現象，就是藍營選民的投票率極低。藍軍在三合一選舉的得票數，較馬英九在總統大選的得票，少了一百餘萬票；此次立委補選，以桃園縣為例，陳麗玲的得票（約三萬七千票），竟較前次廖正井少了近四萬票，只剩對半。
二次政黨輪替以來的歷次選舉顯示：馬英九總統並未在綠營爭取到新的認同者與支持者，反而卻是藍營支持者的熱情與認同已見嚴重耗損流失。綠營如鐵板一塊，這只是顯示馬英九難有拓展的空間；但藍營支持者的疏離與背棄，對馬英九而言，卻是統治基礎的致命性鬆動。何況，愈是帶不起藍營的熱情，就使綠營愈有操作的空間；而馬英九的領導地位因而愈告吃緊，藍營恨鐵不成鋼的疏離感與失落感也愈形嚴重。惡性循環，遂告產生。
在二 ○○八總統大選期間，馬英九競選總部曾有一種「51％法則」，據為輔選主軸。所謂51％法則，就是要將馬英九塑造成大多數人對他存有51％認同的政治人物。換句話說，就是不要將馬塑造成一部分人極認同（比如說90％），但另一部分人極不認同（比如說5％）的明銳典型。在當時，此一構想或許是：只要大多數人認同馬英九51％，不使他成為形象太明銳而招致強烈愛憎的人物；即可打破藍綠界線，一方面爭取中間偏綠的選票，另一方面亦為當選執政後整合社會預做鋪墊。這個51％法則，也許並不純然是選舉策略，而也如實地反映了馬英九中庸內斂的信仰與人格。
這個51％法則，在馬英九當選總統執政後，似乎仍然沿用，於是一味謹小慎微，想要討好所有的人；然而，如所共見，卻造成了如今綠營鐵板一塊、藍營疏離背棄的局面。想像中，多數藍營的支持者，原本對馬英九認同與支持的「平均值」，應當是超逾 51％的；但現今的事實卻顯示，有些藍營選民的支持度已低於51％（不投票了），更多的藍營選民則不論投不投票，亦已陷於高度的疏離與失落之中。
這或許正是馬政府如今政治處境的寫照：綠營反對者的氣勢旺盛，藍營支持者的熱情、認同感、光榮感、參與感、成就感，及支持度皆每下愈況，趨低不起。這是僵局，也是危機。
若與國民黨對照，民進黨選票的絕對數雖未見增加，但其支持者的熱情與認同感卻十分熾烈（遠逾51％）；由此可知，國民黨現在的問題已然不在能否感化綠營、打開藍綠界際，而是在如何將幾乎已告熄滅的藍營支持者的熱情重新點燃，如何使他們產生足夠的認同感、光榮感、成就感及支持度。馬英九若將其國家治理，置於如此疏離、甚至對他帶有輕蔑嘲諷的社會支持之上，這些藍軍或許不會去投靠民進黨，卻亦對馬政府不抱期待，這是何其恐怖可怕的場景？
至於為何形成如今這個局面的原因，我們曾多次試作解析。主要的原因是：中華民國是一個在國家認同、族群關係、兩岸政策及社會正義上皆是遍體鱗傷的國家；這個局面絕對不是一個只以「高級公務員」自許的總統所能化解，而需要一個以「國家領袖」自命的總統來扭轉乾坤。但是，馬總統上任後，「退居第二線」、「不兼黨主席」、「不發布緊急命令」等作為，皆是一個「行政角色」的格局，而不是一個「國家領袖」的境界。馬英九自認是守法守分，中規中矩，但在支持者眼中卻是懦弱無能，自縛手腳。這種風格在馬英九的想像中也許符合51％法則，卻落至今日親痛仇快的下場。
討論至此，可能會產生一個誤解。本文並不認為馬英九應當向所謂的「深藍」靠攏，而只是認為馬英九必須努力回應藍營中的主流期待；使其支持者回復向心力與光榮感。倘若仍然維持51％法則，綁手綁腳，想要討好所有的人，多數支持者的熱情必將在51％以下低迴。
若仍以百分比作一概略的抽象比喻：主政者不可能教百分之百的國人對他皆有51％的認同；但應將能使60％左右的國人對他持有60％以上的認同，做為自我努力的目標。倘能獲得60％左右國人60％以上的認同，國家豈有不振興光大的道理？
馬英九若帶動不起藍營的熱情與光榮感，就更別談想要感化及帶動綠營了。
United Daily News editorial
A Translation
January 12, 2010
During last month's three in one local elections, and the three county legislator by-elections held last weekend, the most noteworthy political phenomenon was the low Blue Camp voter turnout. The Blue Camp vote count in the three in one local elections, was one million votes fewer than the Blue Camp vote count during Ma Ying-jeou's presidential election. The vote count for Anita Chan Lai-ling in the Taoyuan County Legislative Yuan by-election was about 37,000 votes. It was almost 40,000 less than Liu Cheng-ching's vote count in the previous election. In other words, it was merely half.
A string of elections held since the second change in ruling parties show that President Ma Ying-jeou has not won over any voters in the Green Camp. Instead he has suffered a serious loss of enthusiasm and support within the Blue Camp. The Green Camp is a monolith. Ma Ying-jeou cannot broaden his support by pandering to the Green Camp. He can only alienate his Blue Camp supporters by making them feel betrayed and abandoned. For Ma Ying-jeou, this amounts to a fatal erosion of his political base. Moreover, the less he is able to rally support within the Blue Camp, the more maneuveuring room he offers the Green Camp. Ma Ying-jeou's leadership position is increasingly tenuous. The Blue Camp is frustrated with the Ma administration's failure to fulfill its potential. Its sense of alienation and loss is more and more serious. This has led to a vicious cycle and generated divisions.
During the 2008 presidential election Ma Ying-jeou's campaign headquarters had a "51% rule." This was its election strategy. The so-called 51% rule meant that Ma Ying-jeou must be transformed into a political figure whom a majority of the public would award a score of 51% or more. In other words, their goal was to avoid transforming Ma Ying-jeou into a political figure whom a minority of the public would award a score of 90%, but whom others would award a score of only 5%. Their thinking was that as long as a majority of the public awarded Ma Ying-jeou a score of 51%, he would not become someone whose image was too sharply drawn, hence invite powerful reactions, either pro or con. This would allow him to break out of the Blue vs. Green dichotomy. This would allow him on the one hand to win Pale Green centrist votes, and on the other hand pave the way for social reconciliation after assuming office. The 51% rule was not entirely an electoral strategy. It probably reflected Ma Ying-jeou's moderate beliefs and introverted personality.
The Ma Ying-jeou administration apparently continued to use the 51% rule after it assumed office. It continued to walk on eggshells, eager to please all of the people all of the time. But as we can all see, it merely created a Green Camp monolith, and alienated his Blue Camp core support. As one can imagine, most Blue Camp supporters initially awarded Ma Ying-jeou a score well above 51%. But the reality now is that many Blue Camp supporters are awarding him a score lower than 51%. They refuse even to vote. Many more Blue Camp voters, regardless of whether they vote, feel alienated and adrift.
This is the Ma administration's plight. Green Camp momentum is strong. Blue Camp members' enthusiasm, sense of identification, sense of pride, sense of participation, sense of accomplishment, and degree of support have gone from bad to worse, and can go no lower. This is a deadlock. This is a crisis.
Compare this with the KMT. The absolute number of votes for the DPP may not have increased, but its supporters' enthusiasm and sense of identification with the party is high, well over 51%. From this we can see that the question is not whether the KMT can inspire the Green Camp and break down barriers between the Blue realm and the Green realm. The question is whether it can re-ignite the enthusiasm of its Blue Camp supporters. The question is how can it enable them to feel a sense of identification, a sense of pride, a sense of accomplishment, and a degree of support. Ma Ying-jeou cannot base his rule on such an alienated, even contemptuous political foundation. Blue Camp voters are not about to seek refuge in the DPP. But if they are so disillusioned they no longer expect anything from the Ma administration, is that not a frightening prospect?
What are the factors that led to our current situation? We have repeatedly tried to explain. The main reason is that the Republic of China is a nation divided by deep differences over national identity, communal group membership, cross-Strait policy, and social justice. This situation is not one that a "civil servant" such as the president can wave away with a magic wand. It requires a "national leader" to turn the tide. Alas, ever since President Ma took office, he has "retreated to the second line of defense," he has "refused party chairman status," he has "refused to issue emergency orders." His behavior has been that of an administator rather than a national leader. Ma Ying-jeou considers his behavior law-abiding and measured. But his supporters see it as cowardly and incompetent, as shirking responsibility. Ma Ying-jeou may consider his behavior consistent with his 51% rule. But the 51% rule is precisely what landed him in his current predicament.
Here we wish to avoid a possible misunderstanding. We are not saying that Ma Ying-jeou should cozy up to "Deep Blue" voters. We merely think that Ma Ying-jeou must respond to mainstream Blue Camp expectations. He must help his supporters recover their cohesiveness and pride. If he persists in abiding by his 51% rule, if he persists in binding himself hand and foot, if he persists in his efforts to be all things to all people, then most of his supporters will give him a score below 51%.
To make a percentage-based analogy, a person in office cannot expect 100% of the public to give him a score of 51% or more. Instead, he should enable 60% of the public to give him a score of 60% or more. This should be his goal. If he can get 60% of the public to give him a score of 60% or more, what reason is there to assume the nation's morale cannot be revitalized and restored?
If Ma Ying-jeou is unable to inspire enthusiasm and a sense of pride within the Blue Camp, he shouldn't even think of attempting to inspire enthusiasm in the Green Camp.
51％法則：藍營為何不投票？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.12 03:25 am
在上個月的三合一地方選舉，與上周末的三縣立委補選中，最顯著的政治現象，就是藍營選民的投票率極低。藍軍在三合一選舉的得票數，較馬英九在總統大選的得票，少了一百餘萬票；此次立委補選，以桃園縣為例，陳麗玲的得票（約三萬七千票），竟較前次廖正井少了近四萬票，只剩對半。
二次政黨輪替以來的歷次選舉顯示：馬英九總統並未在綠營爭取到新的認同者與支持者，反而卻是藍營支持者的熱情與認同已見嚴重耗損流失。綠營如鐵板一塊，這只是顯示馬英九難有拓展的空間；但藍營支持者的疏離與背棄，對馬英九而言，卻是統治基礎的致命性鬆動。何況，愈是帶不起藍營的熱情，就使綠營愈有操作的空間；而馬英九的領導地位因而愈告吃緊，藍營恨鐵不成鋼的疏離感與失落感也愈形嚴重。惡性循環，遂告產生。
在二 ○○八總統大選期間，馬英九競選總部曾有一種「51％法則」，據為輔選主軸。所謂51％法則，就是要將馬英九塑造成大多數人對他存有51％認同的政治人物。換句話說，就是不要將馬塑造成一部分人極認同（比如說90％），但另一部分人極不認同（比如說5％）的明銳典型。在當時，此一構想或許是：只要大多數人認同馬英九51％，不使他成為形象太明銳而招致強烈愛憎的人物；即可打破藍綠界線，一方面爭取中間偏綠的選票，另一方面亦為當選執政後整合社會預做鋪墊。這個51％法則，也許並不純然是選舉策略，而也如實地反映了馬英九中庸內斂的信仰與人格。
這個51％法則，在馬英九當選總統執政後，似乎仍然沿用，於是一味謹小慎微，想要討好所有的人；然而，如所共見，卻造成了如今綠營鐵板一塊、藍營疏離背棄的局面。想像中，多數藍營的支持者，原本對馬英九認同與支持的「平均值」，應當是超逾 51％的；但現今的事實卻顯示，有些藍營選民的支持度已低於51％（不投票了），更多的藍營選民則不論投不投票，亦已陷於高度的疏離與失落之中。
這或許正是馬政府如今政治處境的寫照：綠營反對者的氣勢旺盛，藍營支持者的熱情、認同感、光榮感、參與感、成就感，及支持度皆每下愈況，趨低不起。這是僵局，也是危機。
若與國民黨對照，民進黨選票的絕對數雖未見增加，但其支持者的熱情與認同感卻十分熾烈（遠逾51％）；由此可知，國民黨現在的問題已然不在能否感化綠營、打開藍綠界際，而是在如何將幾乎已告熄滅的藍營支持者的熱情重新點燃，如何使他們產生足夠的認同感、光榮感、成就感及支持度。馬英九若將其國家治理，置於如此疏離、甚至對他帶有輕蔑嘲諷的社會支持之上，這些藍軍或許不會去投靠民進黨，卻亦對馬政府不抱期待，這是何其恐怖可怕的場景？
至於為何形成如今這個局面的原因，我們曾多次試作解析。主要的原因是：中華民國是一個在國家認同、族群關係、兩岸政策及社會正義上皆是遍體鱗傷的國家；這個局面絕對不是一個只以「高級公務員」自許的總統所能化解，而需要一個以「國家領袖」自命的總統來扭轉乾坤。但是，馬總統上任後，「退居第二線」、「不兼黨主席」、「不發布緊急命令」等作為，皆是一個「行政角色」的格局，而不是一個「國家領袖」的境界。馬英九自認是守法守分，中規中矩，但在支持者眼中卻是懦弱無能，自縛手腳。這種風格在馬英九的想像中也許符合51％法則，卻落至今日親痛仇快的下場。
討論至此，可能會產生一個誤解。本文並不認為馬英九應當向所謂的「深藍」靠攏，而只是認為馬英九必須努力回應藍營中的主流期待；使其支持者回復向心力與光榮感。倘若仍然維持51％法則，綁手綁腳，想要討好所有的人，多數支持者的熱情必將在51％以下低迴。
若仍以百分比作一概略的抽象比喻：主政者不可能教百分之百的國人對他皆有51％的認同；但應將能使60％左右的國人對他持有60％以上的認同，做為自我努力的目標。倘能獲得60％左右國人60％以上的認同，國家豈有不振興光大的道理？
馬英九若帶動不起藍營的熱情與光榮感，就更別談想要感化及帶動綠營了。
A United States No Longer Certain and In Search of a Pretext
A United States No Longer Certain and In Search of a Pretext
by Chang Ya-chung
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 2, 2010
Foreign Affairs Quarterly enjoys an outstanding reputation among experts in international relations. The current January/February issue includes an article entitled, "Not So Dire Straits," by American scholar Bruce Gilley, which reveals how some members of the US intelligentsia see Washington's role in cross-Strait relations.
After World War II, Finland was extremely cautious about how it dealt with the Soviet Union. Based on geo-political and economic realities, the Finnish government, with the full support of its citizens, took measures to avoid foreign conflict in order to ensure the survival and prosperity of the Finnish nation. Finland's cautious foreign policy should have received affirmation and praise. Instead, during the Cold War, Western scholars and politicians coined the term "Finlandization" to ridicule smaller nations who succumbed to the Soviet Union and who were unwilling to become followers of the United States. Naturally the United States did not use the term "Finlandization" to describe the nations who succumbed to them.
The Term "Finlandization" Reveals US Egocentrism
The article "Not So Dire Straits" uses the derogatory term "Finlandization" to describe Taipei's policy of reconciliation with Beijing. Some scholars in the US are apparently unaware that historically, constitutionally, culturally, and ethnically, cross-Strait relations are completely different from the relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland. The two sides share close economic and social relationships the Soviet Union and Finland never did. The author's use of the term "Finlandization" to describe Taipei's actions is neither here nor there, and brims over with US egocentrism.
The article concluded that since 1949 the United States has played an important role In stabilizing the cross-Strait situation, but that today this historic task has come to an end. The United States should make strategic and diplomatic changes in response to Taipei's "Finlandization." For example, the United States must henceforth consult Beijing before expanding official contacts with Taipei. It must re-formulate its military alliances, to the exclusion of Taipei. On the diplomatic front, it will publicly support cross-Strait peaceful development. But it will reduce the transfer of sensitive technology to prevent leakage from Taiwan to the mainland.
Most importantly, it will belatedly begin honoring the commitment it made to Beijing in 1982 to significantly reduce arms sales to Taipei. The author concludes by giving a positive spin on his "abandon Taipei, cozy up to Beijing," or "shrug off Taipei, lean towards Beijing" policy recommendation. He characterizes the United States' hands-off position on Taiwan Strait affairs as respect for China's territorial integrity. He says it will help ease Sino-US relations, and slow down China's military expansion, thereby increasing the likelilhood of Mainland China's "peaceful rise." The article concludes, "Now is the time for Washington to make an historic shift."
This article sees U.S. interests as the sole consideration for U.S. policy in East Asia. It underscores the sense of powerlessness the US feels as it loses the ability to influence cross-Strait relations. It also reminds one of the "hands-off policy" the US adopted towards the Republic of China in 1949.
Do as the United States Says, or Fend for Yourself
More importantly, it reveals the United States' concern only for its self interest. Like its "China Policy White Paper" of 1949, it passes all the blame for the United States' policy of "unburdening itself of Taipiei" or "abandoning Taipei" onto the KMT government. It spins its irresponsible policy as "inevitable."
This article reveals how some American scholars and politicians are attempting to compare Taipei's efforts to promote cross-Strait reconciliation, with Finland's refusal to side with the West during the Cold War. It attempts to turn Taipei's efforts to pursue cross-Strait into a pretext for the United States to cease playing a stabilizing role in the cross-Strait scenario.
The article avoids making clear that in the future, Taipei must take responsibility for its own security. The United States is no longer concerned. Taipei no longer has a role in the United State's future security arrangments for East Asia, because it has already been "Finlandized." It is no longer "our man." From the article, we see how once again the U.S. appears to be "respecting Taiwan's choice," but is merely revealing its true face, its "Do as I say, or fend for yourself" posture.
Understanding Washington's Policy toward Taipei
Cross-Strait peaceful development is not to the strategic advantage of any given world power. But it is to the advantage of mankind as a whole. It is a moral choice that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have a right to make. The United States should help and encourage Taipei in its cross-Strait interactions. It should help Taipei make use of its advantages. It should help both sides move towards peace. It should help the Mainland become more open, more free, and better governed.
We are saddened seeing a Taiwan policy no longer rooted in idealism. We regret seeing an uncertain Taiwan policy in search of a rationale. We must understand the nature of US policy toward Taiwan over the past 60 years. What justification did the United States have in 1949 for its White Paper on China? What justification did the United States have in 1971 for not supporting the Republic of China in the United Nations? What justification did the United States have in 1979 for breaking off diplomatic relations with Taipei? What justification did the United States have in 1982 for its August 17 bulletin? We are now hearing about "Taiwan's Finlandization" in mainstream academic journals, about Washington's readiness to "abandon Taipei and cozy up to Beijing," about about "unburdening ourselves of Taipei and leaning toward Beijing." Under the circumstances, should we continue viewing "cozying up to the US" as our number one priority? Should we continue to appease the US? Or should we give serious consideration to a different direction?
The author is a Professor at the National Taiwan University Department of Political Science, and a Chairman of the Society for Cross-Strait Unification.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.11
面對尋找託辭而不再確定的美國
張亞中
在國際關係學界享有極高聲譽的《外交事務》季刊，這一期（2010年1、2月）刊登了美國學者季禮（Bruce Gilley）所撰寫的《不太危急的海峽》（Not So Dire Straits），傳達出美國知識界一些人如何看待未來美國在兩岸關係中的角色與作為。
二次大戰結束後，基於地緣政治經濟的現實，芬蘭為了自己的利益，在全民支持下，謹小慎微地處理與蘇聯的關係，從而避免衝突並確保芬蘭的生存與發展。芬蘭這種謹慎的外交政策本應受到肯定與讚揚，但是在冷戰期間，西方學者與政界，卻用「芬蘭化」一詞來嘲諷那些屈服於蘇聯、不願意追隨美國的小國。至於屈服與追隨美國的國家，美國是不會用「芬蘭化」來形容它們的。
芬蘭化一詞 顯示自我中心
在《不太危急的海峽》中，看似對台灣推動兩岸和解的理解，但是用「芬蘭化」一詞來為台北的和解政策做註腳，卻有相當的貶意。這些美國學者完全沒認知到，在歷史、憲政、文化與血緣紐帶上，兩岸關係完全不同於外國間的蘇芬關係；兩岸之間現有的經濟、社會的互動與緊密，更非當時的蘇芬所能比擬。作者用「芬蘭化」來形容台北作為，根本是不倫不類，充滿著美國自我中心的想像。
文章最後提到：1949年以來，在穩定兩岸局勢方面，美國扮演過重要角色，如今這個歷史任務差不多走到盡頭，美國應該在戰略和外交上作出調整，以配合台灣走向「芬蘭化」。例如：美國今後在擴大對台官方接觸前，須先諮詢北京；要重新制訂與盟國間的軍事計畫，剔除台灣的參與；在外交上公開支持兩岸和平發展；減少轉移敏感技術以免台灣洩漏給大陸。
最重要的是，重拾1982年對北京作出的承諾，大幅減少對台軍售。作者最後再美化其「棄台親中說」或「脫台傾中說」，表示美國撒手台海事務，是對中國領土完整的尊重，有助和緩中美關係，並可減緩大陸的軍事發展，從而增加中國「和平」崛起的機會。文章結語並呼籲「現在正是華府作出歷史性轉向的時機」。
這篇文章完全站在美國利益為出發點來思考美國的東亞政策。我們從中看到美國對兩岸關係發展已經失去影響力的無力感，也看到1949年美國對中華民國「袖手不管政策」（hands-off policy）的可能翻版。
不扈從美國 就請自生自滅
更重要的，看到了美國為了自己利益，像1949年發表《對華政策白皮書》一樣，不惜把美國「脫台」或「棄台」政策的一切責任推給國民黨政府，從而把自己偽裝成「不得不」改變政策的不負責任者。
這篇文章反應出一些美國學者與政客，企圖將台灣推動兩岸和解的行為比擬為當時芬蘭不願意追尋西方的背棄行為，把台北追求兩岸和平的努力扭曲成美國不再能扮演穩定兩岸局勢的說詞。
文章沒有明白寫出的是：台灣必須為自己未來的安全自我負責，美國已經不想再過問，台灣未來在美國的東亞安全架構中也不應該有地位與角色，因為台灣已經「芬蘭化」了，不再是「自己人」了。從文章中，我們看到美國再一次露出那看似「尊重台灣選擇」，本質卻是「不做扈從就請自生自滅」的真面目。
認清美國對台政策本質
兩岸和平發展不是有利於哪個強權的戰略選擇，而是人類，特別是兩岸人民應有也必須有的道德選擇。美國應該協助與鼓勵台灣在兩岸互動中，發揮台灣的優勢，促使兩岸走向更和平，大陸走向開放、自由與善治。
我們很遺憾看到一個不再有理想的對台政策正在醞釀，更遺憾地看到一個不確定的對台政策正在找尋立論基礎。我們應認清60年來美國對台政策的本質，1949 年美國以何種理由發表對華白皮書？1971年以什麼理由在聯合國不再支持台灣？1979年以什麼說辭與台北斷交？為何1982年會出現八一七公報？如今「台灣芬蘭化」的言論已經在主流學術期刊出現，華府可能準備「棄台親中」、「脫台傾中」，我們是要繼續將「親美視為對外關係的第一優先？繼續討好？還是應該認真思考一下真正的大方向？
（作者為台灣大學政治學系教授、兩岸統合學會理事長）
by Chang Ya-chung
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 2, 2010
Foreign Affairs Quarterly enjoys an outstanding reputation among experts in international relations. The current January/February issue includes an article entitled, "Not So Dire Straits," by American scholar Bruce Gilley, which reveals how some members of the US intelligentsia see Washington's role in cross-Strait relations.
After World War II, Finland was extremely cautious about how it dealt with the Soviet Union. Based on geo-political and economic realities, the Finnish government, with the full support of its citizens, took measures to avoid foreign conflict in order to ensure the survival and prosperity of the Finnish nation. Finland's cautious foreign policy should have received affirmation and praise. Instead, during the Cold War, Western scholars and politicians coined the term "Finlandization" to ridicule smaller nations who succumbed to the Soviet Union and who were unwilling to become followers of the United States. Naturally the United States did not use the term "Finlandization" to describe the nations who succumbed to them.
The Term "Finlandization" Reveals US Egocentrism
The article "Not So Dire Straits" uses the derogatory term "Finlandization" to describe Taipei's policy of reconciliation with Beijing. Some scholars in the US are apparently unaware that historically, constitutionally, culturally, and ethnically, cross-Strait relations are completely different from the relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland. The two sides share close economic and social relationships the Soviet Union and Finland never did. The author's use of the term "Finlandization" to describe Taipei's actions is neither here nor there, and brims over with US egocentrism.
The article concluded that since 1949 the United States has played an important role In stabilizing the cross-Strait situation, but that today this historic task has come to an end. The United States should make strategic and diplomatic changes in response to Taipei's "Finlandization." For example, the United States must henceforth consult Beijing before expanding official contacts with Taipei. It must re-formulate its military alliances, to the exclusion of Taipei. On the diplomatic front, it will publicly support cross-Strait peaceful development. But it will reduce the transfer of sensitive technology to prevent leakage from Taiwan to the mainland.
Most importantly, it will belatedly begin honoring the commitment it made to Beijing in 1982 to significantly reduce arms sales to Taipei. The author concludes by giving a positive spin on his "abandon Taipei, cozy up to Beijing," or "shrug off Taipei, lean towards Beijing" policy recommendation. He characterizes the United States' hands-off position on Taiwan Strait affairs as respect for China's territorial integrity. He says it will help ease Sino-US relations, and slow down China's military expansion, thereby increasing the likelilhood of Mainland China's "peaceful rise." The article concludes, "Now is the time for Washington to make an historic shift."
This article sees U.S. interests as the sole consideration for U.S. policy in East Asia. It underscores the sense of powerlessness the US feels as it loses the ability to influence cross-Strait relations. It also reminds one of the "hands-off policy" the US adopted towards the Republic of China in 1949.
Do as the United States Says, or Fend for Yourself
More importantly, it reveals the United States' concern only for its self interest. Like its "China Policy White Paper" of 1949, it passes all the blame for the United States' policy of "unburdening itself of Taipiei" or "abandoning Taipei" onto the KMT government. It spins its irresponsible policy as "inevitable."
This article reveals how some American scholars and politicians are attempting to compare Taipei's efforts to promote cross-Strait reconciliation, with Finland's refusal to side with the West during the Cold War. It attempts to turn Taipei's efforts to pursue cross-Strait into a pretext for the United States to cease playing a stabilizing role in the cross-Strait scenario.
The article avoids making clear that in the future, Taipei must take responsibility for its own security. The United States is no longer concerned. Taipei no longer has a role in the United State's future security arrangments for East Asia, because it has already been "Finlandized." It is no longer "our man." From the article, we see how once again the U.S. appears to be "respecting Taiwan's choice," but is merely revealing its true face, its "Do as I say, or fend for yourself" posture.
Understanding Washington's Policy toward Taipei
Cross-Strait peaceful development is not to the strategic advantage of any given world power. But it is to the advantage of mankind as a whole. It is a moral choice that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have a right to make. The United States should help and encourage Taipei in its cross-Strait interactions. It should help Taipei make use of its advantages. It should help both sides move towards peace. It should help the Mainland become more open, more free, and better governed.
We are saddened seeing a Taiwan policy no longer rooted in idealism. We regret seeing an uncertain Taiwan policy in search of a rationale. We must understand the nature of US policy toward Taiwan over the past 60 years. What justification did the United States have in 1949 for its White Paper on China? What justification did the United States have in 1971 for not supporting the Republic of China in the United Nations? What justification did the United States have in 1979 for breaking off diplomatic relations with Taipei? What justification did the United States have in 1982 for its August 17 bulletin? We are now hearing about "Taiwan's Finlandization" in mainstream academic journals, about Washington's readiness to "abandon Taipei and cozy up to Beijing," about about "unburdening ourselves of Taipei and leaning toward Beijing." Under the circumstances, should we continue viewing "cozying up to the US" as our number one priority? Should we continue to appease the US? Or should we give serious consideration to a different direction?
The author is a Professor at the National Taiwan University Department of Political Science, and a Chairman of the Society for Cross-Strait Unification.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.11
面對尋找託辭而不再確定的美國
張亞中
在國際關係學界享有極高聲譽的《外交事務》季刊，這一期（2010年1、2月）刊登了美國學者季禮（Bruce Gilley）所撰寫的《不太危急的海峽》（Not So Dire Straits），傳達出美國知識界一些人如何看待未來美國在兩岸關係中的角色與作為。
二次大戰結束後，基於地緣政治經濟的現實，芬蘭為了自己的利益，在全民支持下，謹小慎微地處理與蘇聯的關係，從而避免衝突並確保芬蘭的生存與發展。芬蘭這種謹慎的外交政策本應受到肯定與讚揚，但是在冷戰期間，西方學者與政界，卻用「芬蘭化」一詞來嘲諷那些屈服於蘇聯、不願意追隨美國的小國。至於屈服與追隨美國的國家，美國是不會用「芬蘭化」來形容它們的。
芬蘭化一詞 顯示自我中心
在《不太危急的海峽》中，看似對台灣推動兩岸和解的理解，但是用「芬蘭化」一詞來為台北的和解政策做註腳，卻有相當的貶意。這些美國學者完全沒認知到，在歷史、憲政、文化與血緣紐帶上，兩岸關係完全不同於外國間的蘇芬關係；兩岸之間現有的經濟、社會的互動與緊密，更非當時的蘇芬所能比擬。作者用「芬蘭化」來形容台北作為，根本是不倫不類，充滿著美國自我中心的想像。
文章最後提到：1949年以來，在穩定兩岸局勢方面，美國扮演過重要角色，如今這個歷史任務差不多走到盡頭，美國應該在戰略和外交上作出調整，以配合台灣走向「芬蘭化」。例如：美國今後在擴大對台官方接觸前，須先諮詢北京；要重新制訂與盟國間的軍事計畫，剔除台灣的參與；在外交上公開支持兩岸和平發展；減少轉移敏感技術以免台灣洩漏給大陸。
最重要的是，重拾1982年對北京作出的承諾，大幅減少對台軍售。作者最後再美化其「棄台親中說」或「脫台傾中說」，表示美國撒手台海事務，是對中國領土完整的尊重，有助和緩中美關係，並可減緩大陸的軍事發展，從而增加中國「和平」崛起的機會。文章結語並呼籲「現在正是華府作出歷史性轉向的時機」。
這篇文章完全站在美國利益為出發點來思考美國的東亞政策。我們從中看到美國對兩岸關係發展已經失去影響力的無力感，也看到1949年美國對中華民國「袖手不管政策」（hands-off policy）的可能翻版。
不扈從美國 就請自生自滅
更重要的，看到了美國為了自己利益，像1949年發表《對華政策白皮書》一樣，不惜把美國「脫台」或「棄台」政策的一切責任推給國民黨政府，從而把自己偽裝成「不得不」改變政策的不負責任者。
這篇文章反應出一些美國學者與政客，企圖將台灣推動兩岸和解的行為比擬為當時芬蘭不願意追尋西方的背棄行為，把台北追求兩岸和平的努力扭曲成美國不再能扮演穩定兩岸局勢的說詞。
文章沒有明白寫出的是：台灣必須為自己未來的安全自我負責，美國已經不想再過問，台灣未來在美國的東亞安全架構中也不應該有地位與角色，因為台灣已經「芬蘭化」了，不再是「自己人」了。從文章中，我們看到美國再一次露出那看似「尊重台灣選擇」，本質卻是「不做扈從就請自生自滅」的真面目。
認清美國對台政策本質
兩岸和平發展不是有利於哪個強權的戰略選擇，而是人類，特別是兩岸人民應有也必須有的道德選擇。美國應該協助與鼓勵台灣在兩岸互動中，發揮台灣的優勢，促使兩岸走向更和平，大陸走向開放、自由與善治。
我們很遺憾看到一個不再有理想的對台政策正在醞釀，更遺憾地看到一個不確定的對台政策正在找尋立論基礎。我們應認清60年來美國對台政策的本質，1949 年美國以何種理由發表對華白皮書？1971年以什麼理由在聯合國不再支持台灣？1979年以什麼說辭與台北斷交？為何1982年會出現八一七公報？如今「台灣芬蘭化」的言論已經在主流學術期刊出現，華府可能準備「棄台親中」、「脫台傾中」，我們是要繼續將「親美視為對外關係的第一優先？繼續討好？還是應該認真思考一下真正的大方向？
（作者為台灣大學政治學系教授、兩岸統合學會理事長）
Monday, January 11, 2010
Taiwan is Taiwan, Finland is Finland
Taiwan is Taiwan, Finland is Finland
The Apple Daily (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
Chao Chun-shan, Committee Member, National Policy Research Foundation
A Translation
January 02, 2010
In the latest issue of "Foreign Affairs," American scholar Bruce Gilley wrote that since the Ma administration came to power, its policy of reconciliation with the mainland has led the Republic of China in Taipei down the road toward "Finlandization." Gilley concludes that the United States must make some strategic and diplomatic changes. Before it expands official contacts with Taipei, it should consult with Beijing. Along with its allies, it must establish a new strategic plan. It must exclude Taipei, and make a thorough review of its policy of U.S. arms sales to Taipei.
The term "Finlandization" has its roots in the relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland. In 1948, the two sides established a special relationship with a "Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance." The agreement stipulated that if Germany and its allies attacked the Soviet Union or transited through Finland in order to attack the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and Finland were obligated to assist each other. When faced with the threat of armed attack, the Soviet Union had the right to request military consultations with Finland. Finland could not organize or participate in any military alliance against the Soviet Union. Finland's actions had to be based on bilateral economic cooperation and a spirit of friendship with the Soviet Union. When the agreement was reached, then President of Finland Juho Kusti Paasikivi knew the Soviet Union might attempt to control Finland, but felt such an agreement was worth a try.
Without a doubt the Soviet Union acquired huge military and economic interests by signing the agreement. When Western scholars use the use "Finlandization," they mean that although a nation has complete sovereignty, its foreign policy-making powers have been severely curtailed. Another scholar characterized "Finlandization" as a "transitional stage between Western democracy and communism."
Hoping for Non-Confrontational Methods
Gilley claims that the Republic of China is similar to Finland during the late 1940s. For example, the area of the Republlc of China's active jurisdiction may be small, but it nevertheless posseses sovereignty. The Republic of China government in Taipei is geographically close to a major power. It shares common cultural and historical ties with its powerful neighbor. It has a strong "sense of independence," but is pragmatically required to accomodate the vital interests of a major power. More importantly, Republic of China political leaders and citizens currently seek security through integration rather than conflict.
The Republic of China's situation, as Gilley notes, bears some similarities with that of Finland. But cross-Strait relations are far more complex than relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. Taipei's current policy toward the Mainland is also significantly different from Finland's policy toward the Soviet Union. For starters, Finland shared a 1269 kilometer border with the Soviet Union. Finland faced a direct threat from the Soviet Union. It lacked strategic depth. It had little room to maintain its own security. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are separated by water. The Taiwan Strait acts a barrier. It offers defensive capabilities. Secondly, Finland was part of a different regional power structure than the Republic of China. When Finland turned to the Soviet Union the United States and its NATO allies voiced no objections. Beginning with the Cold War, the United States considered security in the Taiwan Strait an important part of its Asia-Pacific interests. The US-Japan security system even considered security in the Taiwan Strait as matters along its perimeter.
Thirdly, the Finnish general election 50 years later strengthened relations with the Soviet Union. It cemented a national consensus. Republic of China citizens have a strong desire to defend themselves. The defense of the Republic of China is the greatest common denominator. Republic of China citizens all hope to emerge into the sunlight of the international stage, and have no desire to impose limits on themselves. Fourth, Beijing's policy toward Taipei's strategic goal is "one country, two systems" and "peaceful reunification." Its handling of the "Taiwan issue" is very different from the Soviet Union's policy objectives for Finland. Finally, the Ma administration's "diplomatic truce" or "pragmatic diplomacy" does not mean giving up the pursuit of an independent foreign policy. We advocate reconciliation with the Mainland. At the same time we also hope to strengthen our relationship with the Washington, Tokyo, and others. The two are complementary, not mutually exclusive. That is why the government is concerned that the controversy over US beef imports will affect Taipei/Washington relations.
In 1995, the Taiwan Strait crisis erupted. Later the Chen administration adopted a "two part battle plan" for Mainland and foreign policy. The United States, to avoid entanglement, issued Taipei a warning. It demanded that the DPP government accept full responsibility for its aggressive policy. That is why Gilley's claims are no surprise. They reflect the rapid adjustments Washington has had to make in the face of rising Mainland power. They also reflect the hope that Taipei will play the role of catalyst in the democratization of the Chinese mainland. It hopes that it will continue to participate in Washington's strategy of engagement with Beijing.
Taipei is hardly the only one to adopt a conciliatory policy towards Beijing. Washington and Washington's other allies, including Tokyo and Seoul, are all committed to improving relations with Beijing. Therefore, we believe that Gilley's argument that the Republic of China is moving toward "Finlandization," is merely one man's opinion. Whether it accords with mainstream views in the United States remains to be seen. Until then, the Republic of China government in Taipei has no need to make any rash remarks or haphazard analogies.
台灣是台灣 芬蘭是芬蘭
(Commentary)
Source: The Apple Daily
國家政策研究基金會政策委員 趙春山
January 02, 2010
美國學者季禮（Bruce Gilley）在最近一期的《外交事務》期刊撰文指出，馬政府上台後對大陸採取的和解政策，已使台灣一步步走向「芬蘭化」的道路。因此季禮認為，美國必須進行戰略和外交調整，包括在與台灣擴大官方接觸前，應與北京進行磋商，在與盟邦重建一個新的作戰計劃時，把台灣排除在外，及徹底檢討美國的對台軍售政策等。
「芬蘭化」一詞源自於1948年蘇聯與芬蘭締結《友好合作與互助條約》時，雙方所建構的一個特殊關係。該約規定當德國及其盟友攻擊芬蘭或假道芬蘭攻擊蘇聯時，蘇芬有相互援助的義務；當面對武力攻擊威脅時，蘇聯有權要求芬蘭進行軍事磋商；芬蘭不得組織或參加任何對付蘇聯的軍事同盟，芬蘭的行動必須以發展雙方經濟與合作的友好精神為依據。該約締結時，芬蘭總統帕西基維意識到蘇聯可能藉此控制芬蘭，但認為締約之舉值得一試。
毫無疑問，蘇聯已因蘇芬條約的簽定而獲取鉅大軍事與經濟利益，而西方學界在使用「芬蘭化」一詞時，代表的是：一個國家對內雖具完全權威，但對外決策權力卻相當有限。另有學者將「芬蘭化」視為：「從西方民主制度到共產主義制度之間的一個過渡階段。」
盼整合非衝突手段
季禮認為，台灣和1940年代末期的芬蘭，有許多類似的特點：例如，台灣幅員雖小但對內享有主權；同時，台灣在地理上接近一個強權，並和這個強鄰分享共同的文化和歷史聯繫；除此之外，台灣強力的「獨立感」，也被一種需要與強權重大利益配合的「務實感」所抵銷；更重要的是，台灣的政治領袖和人民，目前都希望透過整合，而非衝突的手段來尋求安全。
台灣和芬蘭的處境如季禮所言，或有若干相似之處；但兩岸關係的複雜性，絕對超過當時的蘇芬關係。台灣目前採取的大陸政策，也和芬蘭當時的對蘇政策有明顯的不同。首先蘇芬邊界長達1269公里，芬蘭面對蘇聯的直接威脅，缺乏戰略縱深，在維護自身的安全方面，沒有多大的選擇空間；兩岸則隔台海遙遙相望，台灣有海峽作為屏障，有防守的能力；其次，芬蘭當時與台灣面臨的地區權力結構不同，芬蘭倒向蘇聯時，美國與北約盟國不表異議；而從冷戰時代開始，美國即把台海安全視為其亞太利益的重要部分，美日安保體制甚至把台海安全視為「周邊有事」的範圍。
第三，芬蘭50年代舉行大選後，強化與蘇聯關係幾乎成為一項全民共識；台灣有自我防衛的強烈意志，維護中華民國是全民最大公約數，在發展對外關係上，大家都希望「走出去」，不會自我設限；第四，中共對台政策的戰略目標是「一國兩制、和平統一」，其處理「台灣問題」的手法和蘇聯當時對芬蘭的政策目標大為不同；最後，馬政府的外交休兵或活路外交概念，並不表示放棄外交上追求獨立自主的立場。我們主張與大陸和解，同時也希望強化與美日等國的實質關係。兩者相輔相成，不是相互排斥。這就是政府為何擔心美牛事件會影響台美關係的主因。
在1995年台海危機爆發，尤其是扁政府採取「兩面作戰」的大陸與外交政策後，美國為了避免捲入麻煩，曾對台提出警告，要求民進黨政府應對其急進政策的代價「概括承受」。因此季禮的說法並不意外，它一方面反映出美國面對一個崛起的中國，必須盡速調整它的中國政策；另方面也希望台灣能扮演催化中國大陸民主化的角色，進一步參與美國對中共的接觸戰略。
在亞洲地區，並非只有台灣採取對大陸的和解政策，美國的其他盟國，包括日本和韓國在內，都致力改善與中國的關係。因此，我們相信季禮有關台灣走向「芬蘭化」的說法只是一家之言，是否成為美國的主流意見有待觀察。在此之前，台灣內部實在無須妄加論斷，隨意比附。
（本文刊載於99.01.02，蘋果日報，本文代表作者個人意見）
The Apple Daily (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
Chao Chun-shan, Committee Member, National Policy Research Foundation
A Translation
January 02, 2010
In the latest issue of "Foreign Affairs," American scholar Bruce Gilley wrote that since the Ma administration came to power, its policy of reconciliation with the mainland has led the Republic of China in Taipei down the road toward "Finlandization." Gilley concludes that the United States must make some strategic and diplomatic changes. Before it expands official contacts with Taipei, it should consult with Beijing. Along with its allies, it must establish a new strategic plan. It must exclude Taipei, and make a thorough review of its policy of U.S. arms sales to Taipei.
The term "Finlandization" has its roots in the relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland. In 1948, the two sides established a special relationship with a "Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance." The agreement stipulated that if Germany and its allies attacked the Soviet Union or transited through Finland in order to attack the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and Finland were obligated to assist each other. When faced with the threat of armed attack, the Soviet Union had the right to request military consultations with Finland. Finland could not organize or participate in any military alliance against the Soviet Union. Finland's actions had to be based on bilateral economic cooperation and a spirit of friendship with the Soviet Union. When the agreement was reached, then President of Finland Juho Kusti Paasikivi knew the Soviet Union might attempt to control Finland, but felt such an agreement was worth a try.
Without a doubt the Soviet Union acquired huge military and economic interests by signing the agreement. When Western scholars use the use "Finlandization," they mean that although a nation has complete sovereignty, its foreign policy-making powers have been severely curtailed. Another scholar characterized "Finlandization" as a "transitional stage between Western democracy and communism."
Hoping for Non-Confrontational Methods
Gilley claims that the Republic of China is similar to Finland during the late 1940s. For example, the area of the Republlc of China's active jurisdiction may be small, but it nevertheless posseses sovereignty. The Republic of China government in Taipei is geographically close to a major power. It shares common cultural and historical ties with its powerful neighbor. It has a strong "sense of independence," but is pragmatically required to accomodate the vital interests of a major power. More importantly, Republic of China political leaders and citizens currently seek security through integration rather than conflict.
The Republic of China's situation, as Gilley notes, bears some similarities with that of Finland. But cross-Strait relations are far more complex than relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. Taipei's current policy toward the Mainland is also significantly different from Finland's policy toward the Soviet Union. For starters, Finland shared a 1269 kilometer border with the Soviet Union. Finland faced a direct threat from the Soviet Union. It lacked strategic depth. It had little room to maintain its own security. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are separated by water. The Taiwan Strait acts a barrier. It offers defensive capabilities. Secondly, Finland was part of a different regional power structure than the Republic of China. When Finland turned to the Soviet Union the United States and its NATO allies voiced no objections. Beginning with the Cold War, the United States considered security in the Taiwan Strait an important part of its Asia-Pacific interests. The US-Japan security system even considered security in the Taiwan Strait as matters along its perimeter.
Thirdly, the Finnish general election 50 years later strengthened relations with the Soviet Union. It cemented a national consensus. Republic of China citizens have a strong desire to defend themselves. The defense of the Republic of China is the greatest common denominator. Republic of China citizens all hope to emerge into the sunlight of the international stage, and have no desire to impose limits on themselves. Fourth, Beijing's policy toward Taipei's strategic goal is "one country, two systems" and "peaceful reunification." Its handling of the "Taiwan issue" is very different from the Soviet Union's policy objectives for Finland. Finally, the Ma administration's "diplomatic truce" or "pragmatic diplomacy" does not mean giving up the pursuit of an independent foreign policy. We advocate reconciliation with the Mainland. At the same time we also hope to strengthen our relationship with the Washington, Tokyo, and others. The two are complementary, not mutually exclusive. That is why the government is concerned that the controversy over US beef imports will affect Taipei/Washington relations.
In 1995, the Taiwan Strait crisis erupted. Later the Chen administration adopted a "two part battle plan" for Mainland and foreign policy. The United States, to avoid entanglement, issued Taipei a warning. It demanded that the DPP government accept full responsibility for its aggressive policy. That is why Gilley's claims are no surprise. They reflect the rapid adjustments Washington has had to make in the face of rising Mainland power. They also reflect the hope that Taipei will play the role of catalyst in the democratization of the Chinese mainland. It hopes that it will continue to participate in Washington's strategy of engagement with Beijing.
Taipei is hardly the only one to adopt a conciliatory policy towards Beijing. Washington and Washington's other allies, including Tokyo and Seoul, are all committed to improving relations with Beijing. Therefore, we believe that Gilley's argument that the Republic of China is moving toward "Finlandization," is merely one man's opinion. Whether it accords with mainstream views in the United States remains to be seen. Until then, the Republic of China government in Taipei has no need to make any rash remarks or haphazard analogies.
台灣是台灣 芬蘭是芬蘭
(Commentary)
Source: The Apple Daily
國家政策研究基金會政策委員 趙春山
January 02, 2010
美國學者季禮（Bruce Gilley）在最近一期的《外交事務》期刊撰文指出，馬政府上台後對大陸採取的和解政策，已使台灣一步步走向「芬蘭化」的道路。因此季禮認為，美國必須進行戰略和外交調整，包括在與台灣擴大官方接觸前，應與北京進行磋商，在與盟邦重建一個新的作戰計劃時，把台灣排除在外，及徹底檢討美國的對台軍售政策等。
「芬蘭化」一詞源自於1948年蘇聯與芬蘭締結《友好合作與互助條約》時，雙方所建構的一個特殊關係。該約規定當德國及其盟友攻擊芬蘭或假道芬蘭攻擊蘇聯時，蘇芬有相互援助的義務；當面對武力攻擊威脅時，蘇聯有權要求芬蘭進行軍事磋商；芬蘭不得組織或參加任何對付蘇聯的軍事同盟，芬蘭的行動必須以發展雙方經濟與合作的友好精神為依據。該約締結時，芬蘭總統帕西基維意識到蘇聯可能藉此控制芬蘭，但認為締約之舉值得一試。
毫無疑問，蘇聯已因蘇芬條約的簽定而獲取鉅大軍事與經濟利益，而西方學界在使用「芬蘭化」一詞時，代表的是：一個國家對內雖具完全權威，但對外決策權力卻相當有限。另有學者將「芬蘭化」視為：「從西方民主制度到共產主義制度之間的一個過渡階段。」
盼整合非衝突手段
季禮認為，台灣和1940年代末期的芬蘭，有許多類似的特點：例如，台灣幅員雖小但對內享有主權；同時，台灣在地理上接近一個強權，並和這個強鄰分享共同的文化和歷史聯繫；除此之外，台灣強力的「獨立感」，也被一種需要與強權重大利益配合的「務實感」所抵銷；更重要的是，台灣的政治領袖和人民，目前都希望透過整合，而非衝突的手段來尋求安全。
台灣和芬蘭的處境如季禮所言，或有若干相似之處；但兩岸關係的複雜性，絕對超過當時的蘇芬關係。台灣目前採取的大陸政策，也和芬蘭當時的對蘇政策有明顯的不同。首先蘇芬邊界長達1269公里，芬蘭面對蘇聯的直接威脅，缺乏戰略縱深，在維護自身的安全方面，沒有多大的選擇空間；兩岸則隔台海遙遙相望，台灣有海峽作為屏障，有防守的能力；其次，芬蘭當時與台灣面臨的地區權力結構不同，芬蘭倒向蘇聯時，美國與北約盟國不表異議；而從冷戰時代開始，美國即把台海安全視為其亞太利益的重要部分，美日安保體制甚至把台海安全視為「周邊有事」的範圍。
第三，芬蘭50年代舉行大選後，強化與蘇聯關係幾乎成為一項全民共識；台灣有自我防衛的強烈意志，維護中華民國是全民最大公約數，在發展對外關係上，大家都希望「走出去」，不會自我設限；第四，中共對台政策的戰略目標是「一國兩制、和平統一」，其處理「台灣問題」的手法和蘇聯當時對芬蘭的政策目標大為不同；最後，馬政府的外交休兵或活路外交概念，並不表示放棄外交上追求獨立自主的立場。我們主張與大陸和解，同時也希望強化與美日等國的實質關係。兩者相輔相成，不是相互排斥。這就是政府為何擔心美牛事件會影響台美關係的主因。
在1995年台海危機爆發，尤其是扁政府採取「兩面作戰」的大陸與外交政策後，美國為了避免捲入麻煩，曾對台提出警告，要求民進黨政府應對其急進政策的代價「概括承受」。因此季禮的說法並不意外，它一方面反映出美國面對一個崛起的中國，必須盡速調整它的中國政策；另方面也希望台灣能扮演催化中國大陸民主化的角色，進一步參與美國對中共的接觸戰略。
在亞洲地區，並非只有台灣採取對大陸的和解政策，美國的其他盟國，包括日本和韓國在內，都致力改善與中國的關係。因此，我們相信季禮有關台灣走向「芬蘭化」的說法只是一家之言，是否成為美國的主流意見有待觀察。在此之前，台灣內部實在無須妄加論斷，隨意比附。
（本文刊載於99.01.02，蘋果日報，本文代表作者個人意見）
Friday, January 8, 2010
Referendum on US Beef: Neither Necessary Nor Urgent
Referendum on US Beef: Neither Necessary Nor Urgent
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 8, 2010
The Legislative Yuan amended the Act Governing Food Sanitation on its third reading, banning the importation of most US beef products apart from bone-in beef. Yesterday the Executive Yuan Referendum Committee gave its preliminary approval to a US Beef Referendum proposed by the Consumers' Foundation. The Consumers' Foundation then launched its second phase signature drive. This is the first time a referendum has been initiated by private individuals since the referendum process was instituted. It deserves attention. But it may also lead to all sorts of after-effects.
From a practical perspective, it was not easy for the Consumers' Foundation to collect 129,000 signatures and cross the first stage threshold in such a short time. Past referendum drives were initiated by political parties with considerable organizational strength. The "defensive referendum" or "referendum on United Nations membership" were all politically-oriented, Partisan political considerations far outweighed public welfare considerations. The Consumers' Foundation held an internal debate. Did it want political parties to participate? To ensure that the US Beef Referendum remained purely a public welfare issue, and did not degenerate into a partisan political issue, the Consumers' Foundation rejected political party involvement. It collected 129,000 signatures, proving that people power had arrived, and that the Republic of China was a mature democratic society.
But it is difficult to imagine crossing the second phase threshold of 860,000 signatures without organized assistance. Even if the Consumers' Foundation refuses to change its mind and declines political party intervention, political parties or political groups are likely to play an important role in the second stage signature drive, if only out of political necessity. The signature drive will probably take six months. If the review passes without any hiccups, the referendum will be held around the same time as the municipal elections for five major metropolises. The Consumers' Foundation may reject intervention by political parties and political groups. But political parties or political groups will use the U.S. Beef Referendum as a political tool in the general election. The public referendum is a public welfare issue. It is a symbol of the maturity of the Republic of China's democratic society. But it would inevitably fall victim to electioneering. The result would be less room for the rational discussion of U.S. beef imports.
The Consumers' Foundation US Beef Referendum reads: "We demand that the Department of Health reinitiate talks with the United States on its November 2009 relaxing of restrictions on the importation of bone-in beef, ground beef, beef organ meats, beef bone marrow less than 30 months old." If we examine the text of the referendum, we find that its demands are already covered in the provisions of the Legislative Yuan's amended Act Governing Food Sanitation. The act stipulates that any questionable beef parts are prohibited and may not be imported. The only beef part it allowed in was bone-in beef. There is no controversy over imports. Even assuming one has objections, the legislature has all sorts of bureaucratic hurdles it can invoke to prevent the meat industry from importing unsafe products. No company has yet to apply for an import permit. Even if some may wish to do so in the future, the number is apparently quite limited.
Furthermore, the content of the amended domestic law is already in conflict with the treaty signed by Taipei and Washington. The United States has issued a strongly-worded statement. Government agencies must immediately engage in diplomatic fence-mending. More importantly, relevant consultations must be restarted. Agencies concerned with economics, trade, and national security must immediately resume negotiations. The United States may be angry and unwilling to re-open negotiations at the moment. But the agreement stipulates that negotiations must be restarted every three months. In other words, soon after the Consumers' Foundation begins its second phase signature drive, government agencies will have restarted negotiations. Since the value of the United States beef products banned accounts for an insignificant proportion of the United States' interests, there is no reason to delay renegotiations. Taipei and Washington are likely to reach a new agreement even before the second phase signature drive is complete. Why then is it necessary to hold a referendum?
In more concrete terms, suppose the second stage signature drive succeeds. A referendum is held. According to the referendum law, it must be approved by over half the citizens of the nation. Achieving such a goal is "Mission Impossible." It is far more likely that the referendum will be rejected. In the event it is rejected, does that mean we must open the doors wide to US beef imports?
The US Beef Imports Referendum is a public welfare issue. But this particular public welfare issue is highly complex, because it involves negotiations between two governments. The United States vehemently objects to the Act Governing Food Sanitation. It has openly accused Taipei of bad faith. Once this becomes a precedent, coupled with a referendum, it will be seriously undermine Taipei's foreign negotiation and consultation position. It will seriously undermine Taipei's international image. Consumer awareness on Taiwan is increasing. Market mechanisms are highly evolved. As early as November last year, when Taipei and Washington signed the agreement, the public raised a hue and cry. Meat industry leaders even launched their own initiatives to reject US beef imports. Stores even designed labels clearly specifying that they did not stock US beef. Or else they notified consumers that they stocked only Australian beef or New Zealand beef. When consumers use their own judgment, and make their own decisions, the market will naturally force industry to play catch up. After all, who wants to lose money?
This is a vital public health and public welfare issue. The government can issue decrees. Government agencies can track consumer behavior. Solutions are available. They can be found even before the referendum is held. The US Beef Referendum is neither necessary nor urgent. Members of the public indignant over the U.S. beef issue should reflect upon the issue with cool heads.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.08
社論－美牛公投沒必要性 更無急迫性
本報訊
就在立法院三讀通過《食品衛生管理法修正條文》，阻絕了帶骨牛肉之外的大部分美牛進口範圍之後，行政院公投審議委員會昨日初審通過消基會提出的美牛公投，緊接著，消基會將展開第二階段連署。這是台灣開放公投以來，第一件由民間發動的公投，非常值得關注，但是，可能引起的後續效應，也不能輕忽。
從實務面看，消基會能在短短時間，連署達十二萬九千人，跨過第一階段門檻，實屬不易。過去的公投皆由政黨組織性的力量發動，不論是防禦性公投或入聯公投，都是政治議題，政治操作意味遠大過公益考量；為了讓連署順利跨過門檻，消基會內部也曾有不同爭論，到底要不要讓政黨力量介入，最後為了讓美牛公投這項單純的民生議題不要變質，消基會否決了，十二萬九千人連署，證明民間力量抬頭，更證明台灣是一個民主成熟的社會。
但是，要跨過第二階段八十六萬人的連署門檻，若無組織性的力量協助，很難想像如何成功。即使消基會婉拒政黨力量介入的初衷不改，但政黨或政治團體仍有很大可能，甚至勢必在第二階段連署扮演重要角色。以時程推算，半年為期的連署、審查，若同樣順利通過，屆時，正是五都選舉之際，即使消基會堅定地拒絕政黨和政治團體，都很難避免政黨或政治團體，刻意地結合美牛公投，做為綁大選以致勝的工具，那麼這樁展現台灣成熟公民社會的民生議題公投，幾乎將無可避免的淪為選戰砲火，也將使美牛進口的討論空間更壓縮。
消基會提出的美牛公投案內容為：「要求否決衛生署在九十八年十一月開放美國三十月齡以下帶骨牛肉、絞肉、牛內臟、牛脊髓之政策，重啟美國牛肉輸台議定書談判。」從提案文來看，公投案的訴求，在立院三讀通過《食品衛生管理法》修正條文後，幾乎可謂已不存在。因為，立院在法條明定，所有風險部位都禁止進口，唯一在開放之列的帶骨牛肉，並無進口爭議，即使有異議，因為立法院設下的三管五卡，讓業者卻步，迄無業者申請進口，即使未來要進口，為數顯然也很有限。
此外，由於國內法的修正，已經與已簽定的台美議定書內容牴觸，美方發表措詞強硬的聲明，政府部門一方面立即展開外交彌補工作，更重要的，相關的磋商勢必重新展開，經貿國安單位的目標就是立即重啟協商，即使美方在氣頭上，一時半刻不肯打開談判大門，根據議定書，三個月後也得強制重啟談判。換言之，在消基會第二階段連署才開始不多久，政府部門的談判即已開始，而且由於有風險禁止進口的美牛部位在產值上只佔極微小的比例，就美國單方面利益而言，也沒有延宕重議的理由，第二階段公投未完成前，台美就有可能達成新的議定書，那還有必要公投嗎？
更具體的說，即使跨過了第二階段門檻，舉辦了公投，根據公投法，要跨過二分之一以上的公民數認可，其難度直如登天，被否決的機率遠大於通過，萬一被否決，難不成就認可美牛大幅開放進口嗎？
美牛公投是一個民生議題，但卻是極為複雜的民生議題，因為涉及國家間的談判，美方此次對立法院修正《食品衛生管理法》極不以為然，直指台灣缺乏誠信，此例一開，再加上公投，對台灣對外談判磋商任何協定，都極為不利，也嚴重影響台灣的國際形象。另一方面，台灣社會消費者意識高漲，市場機制圓熟，早在去年十一月台美議定書簽定伊始，民情嘩然之際，即已有業者主動發起不進口美牛運動，店家甚至設計明確的標章，聲明說該店不用美國牛，或者清清楚楚昭告消費者，該店使用的是澳洲或紐西蘭牛肉，當消費者做出判斷與選擇的時候，市場機制自然會讓業者相應配合，誰要做賠錢的生意呢？
這個攸關民眾健康的民生議題，不論從政府的法令制度、行政查核手段或民眾的消費行為，都有解決之道，甚至在公投前就可以解決，美牛公投既無必要性，更無急迫性，對美牛議題激憤的民眾，應該更冷靜一點思考。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 8, 2010
The Legislative Yuan amended the Act Governing Food Sanitation on its third reading, banning the importation of most US beef products apart from bone-in beef. Yesterday the Executive Yuan Referendum Committee gave its preliminary approval to a US Beef Referendum proposed by the Consumers' Foundation. The Consumers' Foundation then launched its second phase signature drive. This is the first time a referendum has been initiated by private individuals since the referendum process was instituted. It deserves attention. But it may also lead to all sorts of after-effects.
From a practical perspective, it was not easy for the Consumers' Foundation to collect 129,000 signatures and cross the first stage threshold in such a short time. Past referendum drives were initiated by political parties with considerable organizational strength. The "defensive referendum" or "referendum on United Nations membership" were all politically-oriented, Partisan political considerations far outweighed public welfare considerations. The Consumers' Foundation held an internal debate. Did it want political parties to participate? To ensure that the US Beef Referendum remained purely a public welfare issue, and did not degenerate into a partisan political issue, the Consumers' Foundation rejected political party involvement. It collected 129,000 signatures, proving that people power had arrived, and that the Republic of China was a mature democratic society.
But it is difficult to imagine crossing the second phase threshold of 860,000 signatures without organized assistance. Even if the Consumers' Foundation refuses to change its mind and declines political party intervention, political parties or political groups are likely to play an important role in the second stage signature drive, if only out of political necessity. The signature drive will probably take six months. If the review passes without any hiccups, the referendum will be held around the same time as the municipal elections for five major metropolises. The Consumers' Foundation may reject intervention by political parties and political groups. But political parties or political groups will use the U.S. Beef Referendum as a political tool in the general election. The public referendum is a public welfare issue. It is a symbol of the maturity of the Republic of China's democratic society. But it would inevitably fall victim to electioneering. The result would be less room for the rational discussion of U.S. beef imports.
The Consumers' Foundation US Beef Referendum reads: "We demand that the Department of Health reinitiate talks with the United States on its November 2009 relaxing of restrictions on the importation of bone-in beef, ground beef, beef organ meats, beef bone marrow less than 30 months old." If we examine the text of the referendum, we find that its demands are already covered in the provisions of the Legislative Yuan's amended Act Governing Food Sanitation. The act stipulates that any questionable beef parts are prohibited and may not be imported. The only beef part it allowed in was bone-in beef. There is no controversy over imports. Even assuming one has objections, the legislature has all sorts of bureaucratic hurdles it can invoke to prevent the meat industry from importing unsafe products. No company has yet to apply for an import permit. Even if some may wish to do so in the future, the number is apparently quite limited.
Furthermore, the content of the amended domestic law is already in conflict with the treaty signed by Taipei and Washington. The United States has issued a strongly-worded statement. Government agencies must immediately engage in diplomatic fence-mending. More importantly, relevant consultations must be restarted. Agencies concerned with economics, trade, and national security must immediately resume negotiations. The United States may be angry and unwilling to re-open negotiations at the moment. But the agreement stipulates that negotiations must be restarted every three months. In other words, soon after the Consumers' Foundation begins its second phase signature drive, government agencies will have restarted negotiations. Since the value of the United States beef products banned accounts for an insignificant proportion of the United States' interests, there is no reason to delay renegotiations. Taipei and Washington are likely to reach a new agreement even before the second phase signature drive is complete. Why then is it necessary to hold a referendum?
In more concrete terms, suppose the second stage signature drive succeeds. A referendum is held. According to the referendum law, it must be approved by over half the citizens of the nation. Achieving such a goal is "Mission Impossible." It is far more likely that the referendum will be rejected. In the event it is rejected, does that mean we must open the doors wide to US beef imports?
The US Beef Imports Referendum is a public welfare issue. But this particular public welfare issue is highly complex, because it involves negotiations between two governments. The United States vehemently objects to the Act Governing Food Sanitation. It has openly accused Taipei of bad faith. Once this becomes a precedent, coupled with a referendum, it will be seriously undermine Taipei's foreign negotiation and consultation position. It will seriously undermine Taipei's international image. Consumer awareness on Taiwan is increasing. Market mechanisms are highly evolved. As early as November last year, when Taipei and Washington signed the agreement, the public raised a hue and cry. Meat industry leaders even launched their own initiatives to reject US beef imports. Stores even designed labels clearly specifying that they did not stock US beef. Or else they notified consumers that they stocked only Australian beef or New Zealand beef. When consumers use their own judgment, and make their own decisions, the market will naturally force industry to play catch up. After all, who wants to lose money?
This is a vital public health and public welfare issue. The government can issue decrees. Government agencies can track consumer behavior. Solutions are available. They can be found even before the referendum is held. The US Beef Referendum is neither necessary nor urgent. Members of the public indignant over the U.S. beef issue should reflect upon the issue with cool heads.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.08
社論－美牛公投沒必要性 更無急迫性
本報訊
就在立法院三讀通過《食品衛生管理法修正條文》，阻絕了帶骨牛肉之外的大部分美牛進口範圍之後，行政院公投審議委員會昨日初審通過消基會提出的美牛公投，緊接著，消基會將展開第二階段連署。這是台灣開放公投以來，第一件由民間發動的公投，非常值得關注，但是，可能引起的後續效應，也不能輕忽。
從實務面看，消基會能在短短時間，連署達十二萬九千人，跨過第一階段門檻，實屬不易。過去的公投皆由政黨組織性的力量發動，不論是防禦性公投或入聯公投，都是政治議題，政治操作意味遠大過公益考量；為了讓連署順利跨過門檻，消基會內部也曾有不同爭論，到底要不要讓政黨力量介入，最後為了讓美牛公投這項單純的民生議題不要變質，消基會否決了，十二萬九千人連署，證明民間力量抬頭，更證明台灣是一個民主成熟的社會。
但是，要跨過第二階段八十六萬人的連署門檻，若無組織性的力量協助，很難想像如何成功。即使消基會婉拒政黨力量介入的初衷不改，但政黨或政治團體仍有很大可能，甚至勢必在第二階段連署扮演重要角色。以時程推算，半年為期的連署、審查，若同樣順利通過，屆時，正是五都選舉之際，即使消基會堅定地拒絕政黨和政治團體，都很難避免政黨或政治團體，刻意地結合美牛公投，做為綁大選以致勝的工具，那麼這樁展現台灣成熟公民社會的民生議題公投，幾乎將無可避免的淪為選戰砲火，也將使美牛進口的討論空間更壓縮。
消基會提出的美牛公投案內容為：「要求否決衛生署在九十八年十一月開放美國三十月齡以下帶骨牛肉、絞肉、牛內臟、牛脊髓之政策，重啟美國牛肉輸台議定書談判。」從提案文來看，公投案的訴求，在立院三讀通過《食品衛生管理法》修正條文後，幾乎可謂已不存在。因為，立院在法條明定，所有風險部位都禁止進口，唯一在開放之列的帶骨牛肉，並無進口爭議，即使有異議，因為立法院設下的三管五卡，讓業者卻步，迄無業者申請進口，即使未來要進口，為數顯然也很有限。
此外，由於國內法的修正，已經與已簽定的台美議定書內容牴觸，美方發表措詞強硬的聲明，政府部門一方面立即展開外交彌補工作，更重要的，相關的磋商勢必重新展開，經貿國安單位的目標就是立即重啟協商，即使美方在氣頭上，一時半刻不肯打開談判大門，根據議定書，三個月後也得強制重啟談判。換言之，在消基會第二階段連署才開始不多久，政府部門的談判即已開始，而且由於有風險禁止進口的美牛部位在產值上只佔極微小的比例，就美國單方面利益而言，也沒有延宕重議的理由，第二階段公投未完成前，台美就有可能達成新的議定書，那還有必要公投嗎？
更具體的說，即使跨過了第二階段門檻，舉辦了公投，根據公投法，要跨過二分之一以上的公民數認可，其難度直如登天，被否決的機率遠大於通過，萬一被否決，難不成就認可美牛大幅開放進口嗎？
美牛公投是一個民生議題，但卻是極為複雜的民生議題，因為涉及國家間的談判，美方此次對立法院修正《食品衛生管理法》極不以為然，直指台灣缺乏誠信，此例一開，再加上公投，對台灣對外談判磋商任何協定，都極為不利，也嚴重影響台灣的國際形象。另一方面，台灣社會消費者意識高漲，市場機制圓熟，早在去年十一月台美議定書簽定伊始，民情嘩然之際，即已有業者主動發起不進口美牛運動，店家甚至設計明確的標章，聲明說該店不用美國牛，或者清清楚楚昭告消費者，該店使用的是澳洲或紐西蘭牛肉，當消費者做出判斷與選擇的時候，市場機制自然會讓業者相應配合，誰要做賠錢的生意呢？
這個攸關民眾健康的民生議題，不論從政府的法令制度、行政查核手段或民眾的消費行為，都有解決之道，甚至在公投前就可以解決，美牛公投既無必要性，更無急迫性，對美牛議題激憤的民眾，應該更冷靜一點思考。
Wednesday, January 6, 2010
Amending Laws and Abrogating Treaties is Blind Emotionalism
Amending Laws and Abrogating Treaties is Blind Emotionalism
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 6, 2010
It is pointless to say certain things in advance. Nobody listens. But afterwards, these things must be said. The US beef imports controversy has led to the amendment of a law and the abrogation of a treaty. But such blind emotionalism is not in the interest of the community and is inflicting further harm upon the nation.
The agreement signed by the Ma administration and Washington threw open the doors to beef imports. This political miscalculation provoked public anxiety and legislative opposition. For this, the Ma administration has only itself to blame. But once the storm passed, the legislature amended the law and abrogated the treaty. It was tantamount to rubbing salt into a wound, and can only increase the harm inflicted upon the nation.
After amending the law and abrogating the treaty, the ruling and opposition parties attempted to put a favorable spin on their actions. They declared that "the ruling and opposition parties must stand shoulder to shoulder with the executive branch to face down international pressure." In other words, the Blue and Green political parties would bear the consequences of their actions. In fact, their declaration was phony, bombastic, and hollow. It is phony because the whole point in the controversy is to prevent the importation of beef organ meats and ground beef. To do this one need only erect an array of bureaucratic hurdles. Why go to the extreme of amending the law and abrogating the treaty? Amending the law and abrogating the treaty may allow one to make domestic political hay. But when it comes to preventing the importation of beef organ meats and ground beef, it is gilding the lily. It is bombastic because there is no "international pressure" on the Legislative Yuan. What political consequences are there for the Legislative Yuan? None. The consequences of a breach of trust and breach of contract with Washington will be borne by the nation as a whole. They will be passed on to society as a whole. And yet the Legislative Yuan boasted that it would shoulder responsibility for the consequences of its breach of trust and breach of contract. Isn't that just a tad too bombastic? It is hollow because the amending of the law and the abrogation of the treaty has merely exposed the Democratic Progressive Party's real agenda -- to milk the issue in an effort to undermine President Ma. It also satisfies the KMT legislative caucus' desire to humiliate Chairman Ma. But in terms of crisis management for the entire nation, such a declaration amounts to rubbing salt in a wound. All it will do is undermine Taipei's image and credibility.
Is there really no way to prevent the importation of beef organ meats and ground beef besides amending the law and abrogating the treaty? Wouldn't erecting a series of bureaucratic hurdles do the trick. Do we really need to destroy our international credibility? Even assuming the treaty the Ma administration signed was defective, the Blue and Green political parties in the Legislative Yuan ought to be engaging in damage control. The Legislative Yuan has amended the law and abrogated the treaty. It has indulged in a bout of blind emotionalism. Is it safeguarding the nation, or is it harming the nation?
We must not underestimate the U.S. response. The American Institute in Taiwan said that the Legislative Yuan's unilateral abrogation of a bilateral agreement, signed in good faith by the United States, ignores Taipei's own risk assessment report. It said that the move would undermine Taipei's credibility among its trading partners. It said it would difficult for Washington and Taipei to reach any future agreements, or expand and strengthen bilateral economic relations. It said that the most disappointing aspect was that the United States has been one of Taipei's most important trading and investment partners. It strongly supported Taipei's participation in the global trading system. It supported Taipei's membership in WTO and participation in APEC. If we translate the AIT's comments into plain English, what it said was, "Does Taipei still want the United States as a friend? Is Taipei still a friend the United States can count on? Does Taipei still have a government qualified to sign international treaties?"
Were it not for blind emotionalism, it would be easy to interpret the United States' response and assess the harm inflicted upon the nation. The ruling and opposition parties have foolishly underestimated the significance of the United States' reaction. Some say "The United States may punish Taiwan. But everything will blow over in six months." Some say "At worst the TIFA will be affected." Some are even uttering such nonsense as, "The United States may injure my arm, but if it does, it will injure its finger." It is easy to spout such nonsense merely to justify ruling and opposition party "cooperation." Has the legislature made every effort to serve the nation, or has it merely rubbed salt in the nation's wounds, while making blindly emotionalistic political gestures? Was amending the law and abrogating the treaty the only option. Was it the best option? Or were there other, better ways to prevent the importation of beef organ meats?
In fact, "political permission" in conjunction with "administrative prohibition" is the most common method of dealing with such matters in international trade. This method would allow us to accomodate both political and diplomatic interests and administrative requirements. It is not necessary to sacrifice political or diplomatic interests for the sake of administrative requirements. We can have both substance and appearance. But our Legislative Yuan is the only one in the world that refuses to think this way. Instead, it insists on amending laws and abrogating treaties. It insists on destroying the nation's image, credibility, and international political and diplomatic interests. No one could restrain these irrational fools before they acted. Now that they have precipitated disaster, the least we can do is demand an accounting.
And lastly, we cannot absolve either President Ma or Chairman Ma of responsibility. On the one hand, he was wrong to underestimate the consequences of signing the treaty. On the other hand, once the storm broke, he was unable to dissuade the KMT legislative caucus from wallowing in blind emotionalism, and engaging in populist demagoguery. As such, he compounded his mistake.
修法廢約是濫情理盲
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.07 03:36 am
有些話在事前說沒有用，但在事後不能不說。本文要說的是：美牛事件鬧到修法廢約的地步，根本是濫情理盲；並未增加社會的利益，反而加重了對國家的傷害。
當然，馬政府與美國簽議定書，幾乎開放全牛進口，是錯估了政治後果，而致引發社會的疑慮及立法院的對抗，這些皆是咎由自取。但是，風暴發生後，至今竟然走到修法廢約的地步，形同傷口撒鹽，卻是愈發加重了對國家的傷害。
修法廢約後，朝野政黨說得好聽，謂是「朝野及行政機關應共同面對國際壓力」，也就是表示藍綠政黨將共同承擔後果。其實，這是一句「假／大／空」的話：假話，倘若爭議的焦點是在必須禁阻美國牛雜及絞肉進口，那麼只消「三管五卡」等「行政障礙」即可達到目的，則何必走到修法廢約的地步？修法廢約也許是政治鬥爭的「真議題」，但在禁阻牛雜絞肉上卻是畫蛇添足的「假議題」。大話，試問立法院有什麼「國際壓力」？立法院有什麼政治後果？對美國背信毀約的後果，其實是由整個國家來承受，亦將轉嫁由整個社會來承受；但立法院竟誇言其能承擔國家背信毀約的傷害，也未免太自負托大了吧？空話，這場修法廢約的意義，只是實現了民進黨藉題重挫馬總統之目的，也滿足了國民黨團羞辱馬主席之目的；但從整個國家的危機處理言，卻是傷口撒鹽，雪上加霜，只是自我掏空台灣的信譽與形象而已。
問題的關鍵在於：難道除了修法廢約，沒有其他禁阻牛雜絞肉進口的方法？如果「三管五卡」之類的「行政障礙」有效，難道一定要走到修法廢約、自殘國際信譽的極端地步？即使簽約是馬政府鑄成之錯，立法院的藍綠政黨倘是真心誠意為國家社會做善後的損害控制，其實只須共同建立「三管五卡」的「行政障礙」，即可實現禁阻牛雜絞肉於境外的實效；而為了維護國家的信譽、形象及利益，自當共同勉力不要走向修法廢約的地步。立法院演出這一場理盲濫情的修法廢約，究竟是維護了國家，或傷害了國家？
不可輕估美國的反應。美國在台協會說：立法院單邊終止了美方基於政治誠意而達成的雙邊協定書，等於是無視於科學標準和台灣自身的風險評估報告。並說：台灣此舉破壞了身為貿易夥伴的誠信，將使美國未來很難與台灣達成協定、擴展與強化雙邊經貿關係。又說：特別令人感到失望的是，美國長期以來一直都是台灣最重要的貿易與投資夥伴；而且也強力支持台灣積極參加全球貿易體系，包括支持台灣取得ＷＴＯ的會員資格，以及參加ＡＰＥＣ。若將這些評論譯成白話，簡直是說：台灣還要不要美國這個重要朋友？台灣還能不能做為美國的有誠信的朋友？台灣還有能夠簽約的政府嗎？
若不是理盲與濫情，當然能正確解讀美國的這類評論，並適切評估其對我們整個國家所造成的重大傷害。如今，朝野政黨竟皆相率阿Ｑ式地輕估或無視於美國反應，有人說「美國懲罰台灣，頂多半年」，又有人說「頂多只是ＴＩＦＡ受影響而已」，甚至妄言「美若傷害我一臂，也會自傷一指」。這些故做輕鬆的胡言亂語，只是要為朝野「合作」修法廢約解嘲止謗而已。但是，我們要問：不論修法廢約的代價有多大，立法院究竟曾否為國家竭智盡忠以力求避免，還是反而在理盲濫情的政治操作中往國家的傷口撒鹽？我們的問題是：修法廢約是否唯一的方案，或最佳的方案？還是另有不需修法廢約、但也能禁阻牛雜的更佳方案？
其實，「政治放／行政禁」，是國際貿易上最常見的壁壘手段；如此即可兼顧政治與外交上的形式利益及行政管控上的實際效果，也就不必因行政措施而犧牲了政治或外交上利益，得以內外兼籌，表裡並顧。但是，全世界唯有我們的立法院不作此想：修法廢約，非要搞到葬送國家的信譽、形象，及國際政治與外交之利益的地步不可。沒有人能在事前拉得住這些狂人蠢貨，但如今大錯鑄成，總該有人在事後把話說清楚。
最後，不能放過馬總統與馬主席的責任。一方面簽約時輕估後果，已鑄一錯；另一方面，風潮發生後，又無力扭轉國民黨團理盲濫情的民粹操作，更是一錯再錯。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 6, 2010
It is pointless to say certain things in advance. Nobody listens. But afterwards, these things must be said. The US beef imports controversy has led to the amendment of a law and the abrogation of a treaty. But such blind emotionalism is not in the interest of the community and is inflicting further harm upon the nation.
The agreement signed by the Ma administration and Washington threw open the doors to beef imports. This political miscalculation provoked public anxiety and legislative opposition. For this, the Ma administration has only itself to blame. But once the storm passed, the legislature amended the law and abrogated the treaty. It was tantamount to rubbing salt into a wound, and can only increase the harm inflicted upon the nation.
After amending the law and abrogating the treaty, the ruling and opposition parties attempted to put a favorable spin on their actions. They declared that "the ruling and opposition parties must stand shoulder to shoulder with the executive branch to face down international pressure." In other words, the Blue and Green political parties would bear the consequences of their actions. In fact, their declaration was phony, bombastic, and hollow. It is phony because the whole point in the controversy is to prevent the importation of beef organ meats and ground beef. To do this one need only erect an array of bureaucratic hurdles. Why go to the extreme of amending the law and abrogating the treaty? Amending the law and abrogating the treaty may allow one to make domestic political hay. But when it comes to preventing the importation of beef organ meats and ground beef, it is gilding the lily. It is bombastic because there is no "international pressure" on the Legislative Yuan. What political consequences are there for the Legislative Yuan? None. The consequences of a breach of trust and breach of contract with Washington will be borne by the nation as a whole. They will be passed on to society as a whole. And yet the Legislative Yuan boasted that it would shoulder responsibility for the consequences of its breach of trust and breach of contract. Isn't that just a tad too bombastic? It is hollow because the amending of the law and the abrogation of the treaty has merely exposed the Democratic Progressive Party's real agenda -- to milk the issue in an effort to undermine President Ma. It also satisfies the KMT legislative caucus' desire to humiliate Chairman Ma. But in terms of crisis management for the entire nation, such a declaration amounts to rubbing salt in a wound. All it will do is undermine Taipei's image and credibility.
Is there really no way to prevent the importation of beef organ meats and ground beef besides amending the law and abrogating the treaty? Wouldn't erecting a series of bureaucratic hurdles do the trick. Do we really need to destroy our international credibility? Even assuming the treaty the Ma administration signed was defective, the Blue and Green political parties in the Legislative Yuan ought to be engaging in damage control. The Legislative Yuan has amended the law and abrogated the treaty. It has indulged in a bout of blind emotionalism. Is it safeguarding the nation, or is it harming the nation?
We must not underestimate the U.S. response. The American Institute in Taiwan said that the Legislative Yuan's unilateral abrogation of a bilateral agreement, signed in good faith by the United States, ignores Taipei's own risk assessment report. It said that the move would undermine Taipei's credibility among its trading partners. It said it would difficult for Washington and Taipei to reach any future agreements, or expand and strengthen bilateral economic relations. It said that the most disappointing aspect was that the United States has been one of Taipei's most important trading and investment partners. It strongly supported Taipei's participation in the global trading system. It supported Taipei's membership in WTO and participation in APEC. If we translate the AIT's comments into plain English, what it said was, "Does Taipei still want the United States as a friend? Is Taipei still a friend the United States can count on? Does Taipei still have a government qualified to sign international treaties?"
Were it not for blind emotionalism, it would be easy to interpret the United States' response and assess the harm inflicted upon the nation. The ruling and opposition parties have foolishly underestimated the significance of the United States' reaction. Some say "The United States may punish Taiwan. But everything will blow over in six months." Some say "At worst the TIFA will be affected." Some are even uttering such nonsense as, "The United States may injure my arm, but if it does, it will injure its finger." It is easy to spout such nonsense merely to justify ruling and opposition party "cooperation." Has the legislature made every effort to serve the nation, or has it merely rubbed salt in the nation's wounds, while making blindly emotionalistic political gestures? Was amending the law and abrogating the treaty the only option. Was it the best option? Or were there other, better ways to prevent the importation of beef organ meats?
In fact, "political permission" in conjunction with "administrative prohibition" is the most common method of dealing with such matters in international trade. This method would allow us to accomodate both political and diplomatic interests and administrative requirements. It is not necessary to sacrifice political or diplomatic interests for the sake of administrative requirements. We can have both substance and appearance. But our Legislative Yuan is the only one in the world that refuses to think this way. Instead, it insists on amending laws and abrogating treaties. It insists on destroying the nation's image, credibility, and international political and diplomatic interests. No one could restrain these irrational fools before they acted. Now that they have precipitated disaster, the least we can do is demand an accounting.
And lastly, we cannot absolve either President Ma or Chairman Ma of responsibility. On the one hand, he was wrong to underestimate the consequences of signing the treaty. On the other hand, once the storm broke, he was unable to dissuade the KMT legislative caucus from wallowing in blind emotionalism, and engaging in populist demagoguery. As such, he compounded his mistake.
修法廢約是濫情理盲
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.01.07 03:36 am
有些話在事前說沒有用，但在事後不能不說。本文要說的是：美牛事件鬧到修法廢約的地步，根本是濫情理盲；並未增加社會的利益，反而加重了對國家的傷害。
當然，馬政府與美國簽議定書，幾乎開放全牛進口，是錯估了政治後果，而致引發社會的疑慮及立法院的對抗，這些皆是咎由自取。但是，風暴發生後，至今竟然走到修法廢約的地步，形同傷口撒鹽，卻是愈發加重了對國家的傷害。
修法廢約後，朝野政黨說得好聽，謂是「朝野及行政機關應共同面對國際壓力」，也就是表示藍綠政黨將共同承擔後果。其實，這是一句「假／大／空」的話：假話，倘若爭議的焦點是在必須禁阻美國牛雜及絞肉進口，那麼只消「三管五卡」等「行政障礙」即可達到目的，則何必走到修法廢約的地步？修法廢約也許是政治鬥爭的「真議題」，但在禁阻牛雜絞肉上卻是畫蛇添足的「假議題」。大話，試問立法院有什麼「國際壓力」？立法院有什麼政治後果？對美國背信毀約的後果，其實是由整個國家來承受，亦將轉嫁由整個社會來承受；但立法院竟誇言其能承擔國家背信毀約的傷害，也未免太自負托大了吧？空話，這場修法廢約的意義，只是實現了民進黨藉題重挫馬總統之目的，也滿足了國民黨團羞辱馬主席之目的；但從整個國家的危機處理言，卻是傷口撒鹽，雪上加霜，只是自我掏空台灣的信譽與形象而已。
問題的關鍵在於：難道除了修法廢約，沒有其他禁阻牛雜絞肉進口的方法？如果「三管五卡」之類的「行政障礙」有效，難道一定要走到修法廢約、自殘國際信譽的極端地步？即使簽約是馬政府鑄成之錯，立法院的藍綠政黨倘是真心誠意為國家社會做善後的損害控制，其實只須共同建立「三管五卡」的「行政障礙」，即可實現禁阻牛雜絞肉於境外的實效；而為了維護國家的信譽、形象及利益，自當共同勉力不要走向修法廢約的地步。立法院演出這一場理盲濫情的修法廢約，究竟是維護了國家，或傷害了國家？
不可輕估美國的反應。美國在台協會說：立法院單邊終止了美方基於政治誠意而達成的雙邊協定書，等於是無視於科學標準和台灣自身的風險評估報告。並說：台灣此舉破壞了身為貿易夥伴的誠信，將使美國未來很難與台灣達成協定、擴展與強化雙邊經貿關係。又說：特別令人感到失望的是，美國長期以來一直都是台灣最重要的貿易與投資夥伴；而且也強力支持台灣積極參加全球貿易體系，包括支持台灣取得ＷＴＯ的會員資格，以及參加ＡＰＥＣ。若將這些評論譯成白話，簡直是說：台灣還要不要美國這個重要朋友？台灣還能不能做為美國的有誠信的朋友？台灣還有能夠簽約的政府嗎？
若不是理盲與濫情，當然能正確解讀美國的這類評論，並適切評估其對我們整個國家所造成的重大傷害。如今，朝野政黨竟皆相率阿Ｑ式地輕估或無視於美國反應，有人說「美國懲罰台灣，頂多半年」，又有人說「頂多只是ＴＩＦＡ受影響而已」，甚至妄言「美若傷害我一臂，也會自傷一指」。這些故做輕鬆的胡言亂語，只是要為朝野「合作」修法廢約解嘲止謗而已。但是，我們要問：不論修法廢約的代價有多大，立法院究竟曾否為國家竭智盡忠以力求避免，還是反而在理盲濫情的政治操作中往國家的傷口撒鹽？我們的問題是：修法廢約是否唯一的方案，或最佳的方案？還是另有不需修法廢約、但也能禁阻牛雜的更佳方案？
其實，「政治放／行政禁」，是國際貿易上最常見的壁壘手段；如此即可兼顧政治與外交上的形式利益及行政管控上的實際效果，也就不必因行政措施而犧牲了政治或外交上利益，得以內外兼籌，表裡並顧。但是，全世界唯有我們的立法院不作此想：修法廢約，非要搞到葬送國家的信譽、形象，及國際政治與外交之利益的地步不可。沒有人能在事前拉得住這些狂人蠢貨，但如今大錯鑄成，總該有人在事後把話說清楚。
最後，不能放過馬總統與馬主席的責任。一方面簽約時輕估後果，已鑄一錯；另一方面，風潮發生後，又無力扭轉國民黨團理盲濫情的民粹操作，更是一錯再錯。
US Beef Imports: A Lesson in Communications
US Beef Imports: A Lesson in Communications
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 6, 2010
Yesterday, despite intense U.S. pressure, the Legislative Yuan amended its Act Governing Food Sanitation on a Third Reading. It prohibited the importation of six high-risk types of U.S. beef. President Ma followed up with a low-keyed press conference. The controversy over U.S. beef imports is not over. If anything, the aftershocks have just begun.
In all fairness, the Ma administration never wanted to loosen restrictions on US beef imports. The Chen administration loosened import restrictions when it was in office. Was its action controversial? Yes it was. But everyone ignored it. US beef continued to enter. People continued to eat it. The Ma administration is now allowing in bone-in steak and organ meats. The Legislative Yuan amended its Act Governing Food Sanitation. It allowed in only one item, bone-in beef. This move provoked the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and economic and trade ministries to issue a statement, saying that Washington will now find it difficult to cooperate with Taipei on economics and trade in the future.
That the controversy has come to this is indeed regrettable. Given President Ma's cautious style, how did he wind up with today's mess? Especially considering the fact that whenever problems crop up, the first thing President Ma does is ask what he may do and what he may not do. Unfortunately, even though touches all the bases, legally, institutionally, and humanistically, he always ends up the loser. Why?
The Legislative Yuan found the agreement between Taipei and Washington objectionable a long time ago. It objected to the agreement during the three in one county and municipal elections. Green Camp legislators were not the only ones who refused to support it. Even Blue Camp legislators were in full revolt. The KMT legislative caucus reversed the Executive Yuan. Blue Camp legislators unanimously supported Huang Yi-chiao's version. They insisted that any questionable US beef be banned. If Huang Yi-chiao had been a trouble-maker who never took anything seriously, it would be one thing. But he was not. When the Blue Camp and Orange Camps were struggling against each other, he wanted to join the battle. He could have run against Jason Hu for Taichung Mayor. Even now, he would love to run for Taichung City Mayor. He could run against Hu, Liao, and Lu. But he doesn't like confrontation. When even someone like this voices objections, it shows one thing. The reason President Ma has been criticized is his failure to communicate.
Furthermore, former Director of Health Yeh Chin-chuan admitted that he failed to handover the case to current Director of Health Yang Chih-liang. Yang was left completely out of the loop regarding matters settled during Yeh's term of office. If a government is functioning normally, Yang would accept agreements Yeh already made. Why didn't he? Just exactly what have the National Security Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs been doing?
Taipei's international situation has long been less than ideal. But shouldn't Taipei show a little backbone? This is merely about eating a little beef. Whom did the Chen administration consult before it loosened restrictions on U.S. beef? Chen Shui-bian did not bother to consult any member of the public on Taiwan. Apparently he did not even consult anyone in the Department of Health. He decided to import beef, so the government imported beef. The Ma administration was more transparent than the South Korean government. So why did it provoke such controversy? President Ma Ying-jeou is a gentleman. The only lesson he has never learned is how to develop a thick skin and black heart. Ground beef can be made into hamburgers. But who dares to eat beef brains or organ meats? Even if the government dared to loosen restrictions, no one would dare import them. Even if someone dared import them, they couldn't make any money on them, What is there to be afraid of? Curiously, from the decision-making stage to the Legislative Yuan, no one dared say anything. Former Director of Health Yeh Chin-chuan admitted that the U.S. beef imports agreement was hammered out during his term. Yeh resigned to run for Hualien County Executive three or four months ago. Is the Ma administration afraid to speak up? Is it incapable of communicating with the people? How can a government that habitually keeps secrets communicate with the public?
The Legislative Yuan passed amendments to the Act Governing Food Sanitation. That evening President Ma Ying-jeou was forced to hold a press conference explaining his position. The amended law was inconistent with the agreement reached between Taipei and Washington. Both the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan will have to answer for the consequences. His remarks were utterly superfluous. Who is willing to answer for the consequences alongside the president? The Legislative Yuan? Forget Blue and Green Camp legislators. What about Legislative Yuan President Wang Jing-pyng? The president is in trouble. Is he willing to open his heart to the Legislative Yuan president?
For the past year and a half, President Ma has placed high hopes on public opinion. He has repeatedly lamented that the expression "hating iron for not becoming steel" (being exasperated with someone for failing to realize his potential) has become an expedient way to criticize the president, a cheapshot. Is Ma's lament reasonable? A head of state must not engage in corruption. On this count, Ma passes with flying colors. But that is merely the minimum requirement. We also expect a president to be decisive. Many people have expressed dissatisfaction. The President may not act selfishly for his own benefit. The president must solicit dissenting opinions. Has President Ma heard them? As head of state, as commander in chief of 23 million people, President Ma must ask himself, from the administration's perspective, who can help him communicate its views to the Legislative Yuan, and persuade voters at the grassroots level? From a political perspective, who can help him solve problems, and cozy up to elected officials? From a partisan perspective, who can help him erect a big tent, collecting all the votes? The king is in trouble. Why? Because we know right from wrong in our hearts. Who should be consulted. Who should be replaced. One has standards. Whether to consult a person and whether to replace a person, must not be decided on the basis of personal likes or dislikes. The president is like a sea that collects waters from a hundred rivers. These hundred rivers are not just one or two people. This is not just the president's problem. This is Taiwan's problem. The president says he wants to listen to the Legislative Yuan's views. If so, he should walk the walk, and not just talk the talk. From this day forward, he must communicate major policies in advance. This is a mission he must accomplish.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.06
社論－美牛教訓：重大政策須先溝通好
本報訊
儘管面臨美國龐大壓力，立法院昨天依舊三讀修正食品衛生管理法，禁止六項高風險美牛部位進口，馬總統隨後召開記者會低調接受了這個事實。美牛風波至此還不能算是真正落幕，後續效應恐怕才剛開始！
平心而論，美國牛肉，並不是馬政府要進口的，當年開放進口的是扁政府，有沒有爭議？有！沒人理，照開放，國人吃不吃？照吃！此時此刻，馬政府開放的是帶骨牛排和內臟絞肉等等，結果立法院三讀食品衛生管理法修正案，允許開放的只有一項：帶骨牛肉。此舉，讓美國在台協會（ＡＩＴ）和經貿部都發表聲明，宣稱未來和台灣很難再談經貿合作事宜。
這樁風波發展到今天這個地步，確實令人遺憾！以馬總統行事風格的慎重，怎麼會走到今天這個結果？特別是馬總統的行事風格之一，就是遇事第一時間，總是想究竟能做什麼，不能做什麼？但最終結果就算從法理到制度、從制度到人情都面面俱全了，最後輸家還是只有他一人，這究竟是什麼緣故？
不諱言說，國會對台美議定書不以為然，不是一時半刻之事。從三合一選舉前吵到選舉後，不要說綠營立委不肯支持，藍營立委甚至全數倒戈，行政院版被國民黨立院黨團翻案，藍營立委全數支持黃義交版：有風險的美牛內容全數不准進口！黃義交如果是調皮搗蛋成習的立委也罷，他不是！藍橘之爭的時候，他想爭，可以是和胡志強爭台中市長之人，即使此時此刻，他想爭大台中市長，他照樣可以和胡、廖、盧爭，他是一個不與人爭之人，連這樣的人都有異議，只說明一件事，馬總統被批評，因為：溝通不夠！
再者，前衛生署長葉金川承認此事沒和現任衛生署長楊志良交接，他任內談好的事，楊完全狀況外。如果政府運轉正常，即使葉談好的事，楊也該欣然接受之，為什麼沒辦法？請問：國安會、外交部一直以來究竟在幹什麼？
台灣的國際處境不佳，不是從今天才開始，台灣不能有一點點骨氣嗎？也不過就是吃個牛肉吧。扁政府開放美國牛問了誰？不要說陳水扁沒問哪一個台灣人，衛生署彷彿沒事人般，進口就進口了，馬政府比照南韓政府開放，為什麼引發這麼大爭議？馬英九總統溫柔敦厚，唯一學不會的一門學科叫做：厚黑學！除了絞肉可能做成漢堡外，牛腦牛內臟誰敢吃？就算開放都沒人敢進口，即使進口都沒辦法賺錢，誰怕誰啊？奇怪的是，從決策到國會，沒人敢講任何話，前衛生署長葉金川認了，美國牛進口是他任內談定的事，葉為了選花蓮縣長卸任是三、四個多月前的事啊，馬政府是一個不敢開口說話的政府嗎？一個不敢與民溝通，動輒以機密相對的政府如何溝通？
立法院通過食品衛生管理法修正案，馬英九總統還得在傍晚親上火線，舉行記者會說明：修法案與台美議定書不符，後果由行政、立法兩院共同承擔！一句話，說了等於沒說，誰和總統共同承擔？立法院肯嗎？不要說藍綠立委，立法院長王金平肯與總統共同承擔嗎？總統有難，肯與立法院長剖心剖腹誠實以對嗎？
一年半多以來，對馬總統寄予厚望的輿論，已經多次發出悲鳴，恨鐵不成鋼的義憤之詞，車載斗量，罵總統成為最便利的批評法則，有道理嗎？身為國家元首，基本要求是：不貪汙，馬絕對做得到，但是，這叫基本要求，我們還要求身為總統之人，當斷則斷。多少人提出諍言：總統不能私心自用，總統必須廣納異言，馬總統聽進去了嗎？做為國家元首，是兩千三百萬人的統帥，馬總統應該想想：從府的角度，誰能幫你溝通國會、說服基層？從政的角度，誰能幫你解決麻煩、拉攏民代？從黨的角度，誰能幫你湖海一家、黑白通吃？為君難，為什麼難？因為是非在胸中，該用誰、該換誰，一把尺，用不用、換不換，不能有個人私誼與好惡，總統海納百川，百川者非一、二人，這不只是總統的問題，而是台灣的問題，總統既說要聽取國會之言，那就得言之行之，從今爾後，重大政策務必溝通先行，使命必達。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 6, 2010
Yesterday, despite intense U.S. pressure, the Legislative Yuan amended its Act Governing Food Sanitation on a Third Reading. It prohibited the importation of six high-risk types of U.S. beef. President Ma followed up with a low-keyed press conference. The controversy over U.S. beef imports is not over. If anything, the aftershocks have just begun.
In all fairness, the Ma administration never wanted to loosen restrictions on US beef imports. The Chen administration loosened import restrictions when it was in office. Was its action controversial? Yes it was. But everyone ignored it. US beef continued to enter. People continued to eat it. The Ma administration is now allowing in bone-in steak and organ meats. The Legislative Yuan amended its Act Governing Food Sanitation. It allowed in only one item, bone-in beef. This move provoked the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and economic and trade ministries to issue a statement, saying that Washington will now find it difficult to cooperate with Taipei on economics and trade in the future.
That the controversy has come to this is indeed regrettable. Given President Ma's cautious style, how did he wind up with today's mess? Especially considering the fact that whenever problems crop up, the first thing President Ma does is ask what he may do and what he may not do. Unfortunately, even though touches all the bases, legally, institutionally, and humanistically, he always ends up the loser. Why?
The Legislative Yuan found the agreement between Taipei and Washington objectionable a long time ago. It objected to the agreement during the three in one county and municipal elections. Green Camp legislators were not the only ones who refused to support it. Even Blue Camp legislators were in full revolt. The KMT legislative caucus reversed the Executive Yuan. Blue Camp legislators unanimously supported Huang Yi-chiao's version. They insisted that any questionable US beef be banned. If Huang Yi-chiao had been a trouble-maker who never took anything seriously, it would be one thing. But he was not. When the Blue Camp and Orange Camps were struggling against each other, he wanted to join the battle. He could have run against Jason Hu for Taichung Mayor. Even now, he would love to run for Taichung City Mayor. He could run against Hu, Liao, and Lu. But he doesn't like confrontation. When even someone like this voices objections, it shows one thing. The reason President Ma has been criticized is his failure to communicate.
Furthermore, former Director of Health Yeh Chin-chuan admitted that he failed to handover the case to current Director of Health Yang Chih-liang. Yang was left completely out of the loop regarding matters settled during Yeh's term of office. If a government is functioning normally, Yang would accept agreements Yeh already made. Why didn't he? Just exactly what have the National Security Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs been doing?
Taipei's international situation has long been less than ideal. But shouldn't Taipei show a little backbone? This is merely about eating a little beef. Whom did the Chen administration consult before it loosened restrictions on U.S. beef? Chen Shui-bian did not bother to consult any member of the public on Taiwan. Apparently he did not even consult anyone in the Department of Health. He decided to import beef, so the government imported beef. The Ma administration was more transparent than the South Korean government. So why did it provoke such controversy? President Ma Ying-jeou is a gentleman. The only lesson he has never learned is how to develop a thick skin and black heart. Ground beef can be made into hamburgers. But who dares to eat beef brains or organ meats? Even if the government dared to loosen restrictions, no one would dare import them. Even if someone dared import them, they couldn't make any money on them, What is there to be afraid of? Curiously, from the decision-making stage to the Legislative Yuan, no one dared say anything. Former Director of Health Yeh Chin-chuan admitted that the U.S. beef imports agreement was hammered out during his term. Yeh resigned to run for Hualien County Executive three or four months ago. Is the Ma administration afraid to speak up? Is it incapable of communicating with the people? How can a government that habitually keeps secrets communicate with the public?
The Legislative Yuan passed amendments to the Act Governing Food Sanitation. That evening President Ma Ying-jeou was forced to hold a press conference explaining his position. The amended law was inconistent with the agreement reached between Taipei and Washington. Both the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan will have to answer for the consequences. His remarks were utterly superfluous. Who is willing to answer for the consequences alongside the president? The Legislative Yuan? Forget Blue and Green Camp legislators. What about Legislative Yuan President Wang Jing-pyng? The president is in trouble. Is he willing to open his heart to the Legislative Yuan president?
For the past year and a half, President Ma has placed high hopes on public opinion. He has repeatedly lamented that the expression "hating iron for not becoming steel" (being exasperated with someone for failing to realize his potential) has become an expedient way to criticize the president, a cheapshot. Is Ma's lament reasonable? A head of state must not engage in corruption. On this count, Ma passes with flying colors. But that is merely the minimum requirement. We also expect a president to be decisive. Many people have expressed dissatisfaction. The President may not act selfishly for his own benefit. The president must solicit dissenting opinions. Has President Ma heard them? As head of state, as commander in chief of 23 million people, President Ma must ask himself, from the administration's perspective, who can help him communicate its views to the Legislative Yuan, and persuade voters at the grassroots level? From a political perspective, who can help him solve problems, and cozy up to elected officials? From a partisan perspective, who can help him erect a big tent, collecting all the votes? The king is in trouble. Why? Because we know right from wrong in our hearts. Who should be consulted. Who should be replaced. One has standards. Whether to consult a person and whether to replace a person, must not be decided on the basis of personal likes or dislikes. The president is like a sea that collects waters from a hundred rivers. These hundred rivers are not just one or two people. This is not just the president's problem. This is Taiwan's problem. The president says he wants to listen to the Legislative Yuan's views. If so, he should walk the walk, and not just talk the talk. From this day forward, he must communicate major policies in advance. This is a mission he must accomplish.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.01.06
社論－美牛教訓：重大政策須先溝通好
本報訊
儘管面臨美國龐大壓力，立法院昨天依舊三讀修正食品衛生管理法，禁止六項高風險美牛部位進口，馬總統隨後召開記者會低調接受了這個事實。美牛風波至此還不能算是真正落幕，後續效應恐怕才剛開始！
平心而論，美國牛肉，並不是馬政府要進口的，當年開放進口的是扁政府，有沒有爭議？有！沒人理，照開放，國人吃不吃？照吃！此時此刻，馬政府開放的是帶骨牛排和內臟絞肉等等，結果立法院三讀食品衛生管理法修正案，允許開放的只有一項：帶骨牛肉。此舉，讓美國在台協會（ＡＩＴ）和經貿部都發表聲明，宣稱未來和台灣很難再談經貿合作事宜。
這樁風波發展到今天這個地步，確實令人遺憾！以馬總統行事風格的慎重，怎麼會走到今天這個結果？特別是馬總統的行事風格之一，就是遇事第一時間，總是想究竟能做什麼，不能做什麼？但最終結果就算從法理到制度、從制度到人情都面面俱全了，最後輸家還是只有他一人，這究竟是什麼緣故？
不諱言說，國會對台美議定書不以為然，不是一時半刻之事。從三合一選舉前吵到選舉後，不要說綠營立委不肯支持，藍營立委甚至全數倒戈，行政院版被國民黨立院黨團翻案，藍營立委全數支持黃義交版：有風險的美牛內容全數不准進口！黃義交如果是調皮搗蛋成習的立委也罷，他不是！藍橘之爭的時候，他想爭，可以是和胡志強爭台中市長之人，即使此時此刻，他想爭大台中市長，他照樣可以和胡、廖、盧爭，他是一個不與人爭之人，連這樣的人都有異議，只說明一件事，馬總統被批評，因為：溝通不夠！
再者，前衛生署長葉金川承認此事沒和現任衛生署長楊志良交接，他任內談好的事，楊完全狀況外。如果政府運轉正常，即使葉談好的事，楊也該欣然接受之，為什麼沒辦法？請問：國安會、外交部一直以來究竟在幹什麼？
台灣的國際處境不佳，不是從今天才開始，台灣不能有一點點骨氣嗎？也不過就是吃個牛肉吧。扁政府開放美國牛問了誰？不要說陳水扁沒問哪一個台灣人，衛生署彷彿沒事人般，進口就進口了，馬政府比照南韓政府開放，為什麼引發這麼大爭議？馬英九總統溫柔敦厚，唯一學不會的一門學科叫做：厚黑學！除了絞肉可能做成漢堡外，牛腦牛內臟誰敢吃？就算開放都沒人敢進口，即使進口都沒辦法賺錢，誰怕誰啊？奇怪的是，從決策到國會，沒人敢講任何話，前衛生署長葉金川認了，美國牛進口是他任內談定的事，葉為了選花蓮縣長卸任是三、四個多月前的事啊，馬政府是一個不敢開口說話的政府嗎？一個不敢與民溝通，動輒以機密相對的政府如何溝通？
立法院通過食品衛生管理法修正案，馬英九總統還得在傍晚親上火線，舉行記者會說明：修法案與台美議定書不符，後果由行政、立法兩院共同承擔！一句話，說了等於沒說，誰和總統共同承擔？立法院肯嗎？不要說藍綠立委，立法院長王金平肯與總統共同承擔嗎？總統有難，肯與立法院長剖心剖腹誠實以對嗎？
一年半多以來，對馬總統寄予厚望的輿論，已經多次發出悲鳴，恨鐵不成鋼的義憤之詞，車載斗量，罵總統成為最便利的批評法則，有道理嗎？身為國家元首，基本要求是：不貪汙，馬絕對做得到，但是，這叫基本要求，我們還要求身為總統之人，當斷則斷。多少人提出諍言：總統不能私心自用，總統必須廣納異言，馬總統聽進去了嗎？做為國家元首，是兩千三百萬人的統帥，馬總統應該想想：從府的角度，誰能幫你溝通國會、說服基層？從政的角度，誰能幫你解決麻煩、拉攏民代？從黨的角度，誰能幫你湖海一家、黑白通吃？為君難，為什麼難？因為是非在胸中，該用誰、該換誰，一把尺，用不用、換不換，不能有個人私誼與好惡，總統海納百川，百川者非一、二人，這不只是總統的問題，而是台灣的問題，總統既說要聽取國會之言，那就得言之行之，從今爾後，重大政策務必溝通先行，使命必達。
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