A Tribute to Chen Shu-chu
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 10, 2010
Taitung grocery vendor Chen Shu-chu's name has made the honor role of Asian Pacific region philanthropists, alongside those of several famous international tycoons. She has watched over her tiny grocery stand for nearly fifty years. She makes a meager profit of five to ten NTD on each sale. Her three meals a day consist of plain rice flavored with a little soy sauce. A lunch box is considered a rare extravagance. Such hard work is how she underwrites her individual philanthropical efforts. Many impoverished students and families whom she has never met have had their lives changed by her generosity.
Forbes magazine recently published its list of Asia-Pacific Region philanthropists. Taitung central market grocery vendor Chen Shu-chu made the list. Chen Shu-chu is merely a common grocery vendor. Most of the philanthropists on the list have vast financial resources and international name recognition. The hundreds of millions of dollars they contributed, dwarf the amounts she contributed. But her type of comparison merely shows how uncommon Chen Shu-chu is. She is not famous. She does not have a vast and profitable business empire to support her philanthropy. She came from a poor family, and was forced to drop out of school because of financial hardship. The nickles and dimes she earns are the basis for her charitable giving. She has transmuted the hardships visited upon her by fate, into the adoption of orphans and the construction of libraries, all done quietly without self-promotion.
Chen Shu-chu is living testimony to the premise that man is by nature good. Chen Shu-chu's charitable contributions demonstrate the importance of "common man philanthropy." Approximately 80% of all contributions to non-profit organizations are made by ordinary people such as Chen Shu-chu. The average amount of each contribution is 600 NTD. Obviously many contributions are far less than 600 NTD. Small contributions and regular contributions eventually form a torrent. They enable non-governmental organizations to function and to implement their plans for the future.
By contrast, the large contributions from wealthy consortiums or tycoons often go to their college alma maters, to erect buildings in their own names, or to sponsor lecture series. A common practice is to set up a charitable foundation. This enables them to avoid taxes as well as enhance their public images.
We are convinced that those who promote progress in this less than perfect society are invisible people such as Chen Shu-chu. They do what they can. They do what they believe. They ignore the chaos of the outside world. They do what they are able to as individuals. Small individual charitable contributions are touching precisely because such individuals do not refuse to take action or to contribute because "It's not enough."
Chen Shu-chu's accomplishments are touching not because she had so much to give, but because she had so little to give. Many people think of philanthropy as something one does in one's spare time, with one's spare energy. They tell themselves they will become volunteers "after retirement." This is "surplus-based philanthropy." It takes into account the needs of the outside world only after taking account of one's own needs.
But Chen Shu-chu embodies the philosophy of "shortage-based philanthropy." Her life is spartan to the point of hardship. Yet she contributes more than most people to charity. This is the virtue of small charitable contributions by individuals. Small charitable contributions by individuals are valuable because they represent transcendent human values. They also have an important practical benefit. The Family Support Center and World Vision for example, can support a child for one month on only 1000 NTD. To jointly support a child requires only 300 NTD. Recently Ku Yu-wen won the international "Avant-garde Fashion Design Award." Li Chia-ju, from Tainan County, was the only person to achieve a perfect score on his college entrance exams. Both were children adopted by the Family Support Center. This shows that contributions need not be large. Small contributions can enable recipients to make new lives for themselves. For a mere 300 NTD, one can contribute to a poor child's monthly living expenses. Most people can afford to contribute that much. They merely lack the will or the initiative.
Amidst all the stage lights, Chen Shu-chu's response made her sound like a philosopher in the guise of a grocery vendor. She shared her view of money, opining that "Money to be useful, must be given to those who need it." In response to the accolades, she demurred, saying "It was nothing. Anyone could have done it. It all depends on whether one is willing or unwilling."
Our society has an abundance of clever people who know how to utter the same pretty words as Chen Shu-chu. It has an abundance of people far wealthier than Chen Shui-chu. But Chen Shu-chu's compassion eclipses these clever people with all their money. Eighty percent of all charitable contributions to non-profit organizations on Taiwan are made by individuals. The average amount is a mere 600 NTD. The philanthropical efforts of these anonymous counterparts of Chen Shu-chu restore our belief in human nature. Their simple faith and concrete actions make us realize that philanthropy does not turn its nose up at small contributions, and that the time to contribute is now.
向陳樹菊們致敬：八成慈善捐款每筆平均600元
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.10 02:01 am
台東菜販陳樹菊與多名國際富豪一齊登上了亞太慈善英雄榜。她守著五坪大的菜攤近五十年，手上進出是五元、十元的蠅頭小利，三餐吃的是醬油拌飯，便當已是難得的奢侈；就是這樣刻苦積攢出她的個人慈善功業，多少不曾謀面的學子、貧困家庭因她而生命改變。
「富比世」雜誌新近公布的亞太地區慈善英雄，在台東中央市場賣菜的陳樹菊赫然入列。英雄榜上的名字大多帶著顯赫的財力、國際性的知名度，及以億元起算的捐款金額，遠遠勝過陳樹菊這位女菜販。但這樣的排比，更襯托出陳樹菊的不凡：她沒有顯赫聲望，也沒有龐大的營利事業支持她行善，少時因家貧失學的她只是在個人生活上刻苦，累積三、五元的銅板小利成善款，將命運曾加諸她的折磨，昇華為付出，認養孤兒、興建圖書館，而且為善不欲人知。
陳樹菊以她的生命見證，讓人們相信人性的美好。把陳樹菊置放在台灣大眾的慈善捐助行為脈絡中，更可看出由小人物撐起「庶民善行」的重要性。台灣非營利組織的捐款中，約八成是來自像陳樹菊這樣的平凡人，每筆捐款金額平均只在六百元上下，當然許多捐款更少於六百元；一筆筆小額、定期捐助，涓滴成河，維持著民間慈善組織的動能及推展未來計畫的可能性。
相對地，來自財團或富豪的大手筆巨額捐助，不常見於公益團體的捐款名單，而是大抵流向大學母校，或建築留名、或贊助講座；更常見的慈善模式是企業成立基金會，行善之外亦有節稅規劃的功能，並兼公益形象的經營。
我們確信，推動這個不完美社會持續前進的，就是社會中眾多隱而不顯的陳樹菊們。他們總是在各自角落堅持著，做自己相信、做自己做得到的事情，不管它外界紛亂，善盡一己之力就是了。小戶小額慈善捐款的感動人處，正是因為「不因善小而不為」、「不因錢少而不捐」。
陳樹菊事蹟的動人之處，不是在於她的「有餘」，而在她的「不足」。不少人以為，樂善好施是行有餘力時才偶爾為之的點綴行動；投入志工，又常是開下「啊，等我退休之後」的長期支票。這是「有餘」的行善觀，是在滿足自身的需求之後，才考慮到「我」以外的世界。
但陳樹菊體現了「不足」的行善哲學。她生活簡單到幾近刻苦，卻捐出大多數人及不上的善款；這其實也是小戶小額慈善捐款者，共同擁有的德行。小額慈善捐款，非但含蘊了昇華的人性價值，而且也有重大的實際效益。例如家扶中心及世界展望會，認養一名兒童每月只要一千元，助養則只要三百元。最近傳出，榮獲國際「前衛服裝設計獎」的古又文，及台南縣唯一獲得大學學測滿分的李佳儒，皆是「家扶兒」。可見，捐款數額不在大，小額捐款也可能使一個受助者獲得新生。三百元，可以「認助」一位貧童一個月的生活費，也許大多數人都捐得起，只是有無捐輸的心志與行動而已。
面對鎂光燈的包圍，陳樹菊給的答案聽來更像隱身菜肆的哲學家。她看待金錢是：「錢，要給需要的人才有用。」面對得獎而來的讚譽，她則平淡地說：「這沒什麼，大家都可以做，捨得與不捨得而已。」
社會多的是比陳樹菊會說漂亮話的聰明人，也多的是比她有財力的有錢人；但陳樹菊的大慈悲，卻勝過這些聰明人與有錢人。台灣的非營利事業慈善捐款，八成皆是六百元上下的小戶小額，這些陳樹菊們的行善滋養了我們對人性的信心；他們的簡單信念與具體行動，讓我們明白：行善不辭涓滴，而且就在當下。
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
ECFA: A Variable in the Five Cities Election
ECFA: A Variable in the Five Cities Election
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 9, 2010
The Spring Festival is over. Five cities on Taiwan are caught up in election fever. The cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is about to be signed with a great deal of fanfare.
First Hu Jintao told Taiwan businessmen in Fujian that "We will give full consideration to our Taiwan compatriots, especially the interests of Taiwan farmers. This is a good thing that should be done well." Then Wen Jiabao spoke of "profit-sharing." He said ECFA would be signed this year. On the Taipei side, President Ma Ying-jeou publicly announced that he hoped ECFA could be signed in May or June of this year. The atmosphere was very different from what it was just before Chinese New Year.
Before the Spring Festival, President Ma said "There is no timetable for the signing of ECFA." SEF chairman Chiang Pin-kung said that ECFA consultation has entered "its most difficult stage." Rumors flew. Some said talks were stalled because Beijing wanted to ship agricultural products to Taiwan. Some said talks were stalled because of disagreements over WTO provisions. But now a timetable has emerged. ECFA will be signed in May or June of this year. Hu Jintao also gave assurances that the interests of Taiwan farmers would be protected. Wen Jiabao spoke of "profit sharing." This all suggests that the most difficult stage is already behind us.
The Five Cities Elections are a catalyst that has accelerated talks over ECFA. The Five Cities Elections will be held this year. The Presidential Election will be held next year. If a major cross-Straits issue such as ECFA remains unresolved during election season, the situation is likely to get out of control. President Ma hopes to sign ECFA in May or June. Clearly he wants to have it signed before the Five Cities Election Primaries. He wants to prevent ECFA from becoming an intractable election issue. Beijing naturally shares such concerns.
Such political calculations are understandable. But the impact of ECFA on the political situation is not limited to the Five Cities Elections. It will have a major impact on cross-Strait relations over the mid term and long term. Of course it will also have medium and long term impacts on the political situation on Taiwan. The point is not whether ECFA can be signed before the Five Cities Election. The point is whether the substance of the agreement is be acceptable to the public on Taiwan. Quite the contrary. If one hurriedly signs ECFA, but the substance of the agreement is unacceptable to the public on Taiwan, rushing to sign ECFA would be an unwise move that merely offends public sensitivities.
ECFA's linkage with the elections shows that democratic politics and public opinion on Taiwan have become constraints on cross-Strait relations. If one wants cross-Strait relations to "develop peacefully," Taipei must respond to public opinion. So must Beijing. Take ECFA. Hu Jintao's counterpart during consultations is not just the Ma administration, or even the DPP. It includes the public on Taiwan. They must be convinced of Beijing's sincerity and goodwill.
With ECFA, Hu Jintao established the principle of "good things should be done well." State Council Office for Taiwan Affairs Director Wang Yi reaffirmed this principle. He said "good things should be done well" means "doing the right things, and doing things right." This can be understood two ways. First, so-called "good things" means that ECFA should be considered a "good thing" because it is conducive to the peaceful development of cross-strait relations. But even more importantly it must be perceived as a "good thing" by the public on Taiwan. Secondly, so-called being "done well" should include communicating with the public before and during the signing. This will prevent a good thing from receiving bad reviews. For Beijing, this is something that must not be ignored.
For the Ma administration, this is an especially important test. After all, the Five Cities Elections and the Presidential Election have a bearing on the survival of the KMT regime. Hao Lung-ping has challenged Su Tseng-chang to a debate over ECFA. Clearly ECFA cannot help but become an election issue. For the KMT, failure to sign ECFA before the Five Cities Elections means that campaign debates will focus on whether or not to sign ECFA. But if ECFA is signed before the Five Cities Elections, campaign debates will be over "Was the substance of the agreement any good?" and "Did Beijing share enough of the profits?" In other words, the KMT will be forced to face the music either way.
The progress of ECFA has been accelerated by the Five Cities Elections. For the Ma administration, this represents both a crisis and an opportunity. If it can sell the public on the merits of the agreement, it will constitute an opportunity for the Ma adminstration. If, on the other hand, a powerful political controversy ensues, the Ma adminstration will find itself in an even worse crisis. Therefore, whether ECFA is a "good thing" and whether it can be "done well" is something the Ma administration cannot take lightly. After all, the Ma administration has a record of "doing good things badly."
ECFA affects Beijing. For the first time, the quality of Beijing's decision-making processes will directly impact elections on Taiwan. Whether this development is a "good thing" merits close observation by both sides.
好事辦好：ECFA是五都選舉的變數
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.09 03:16 am
春節過後，隨著台灣五都選舉進入疾風驟雨，兩岸經協（ＥＣＦＡ）的議簽也顯現密鑼緊鼓。
胡錦濤先在福建對台商說，「會充分考慮台灣同胞，特別是台灣農民弟兄的利益，要把這件好事辦好」，接著溫家寶即提出「讓利說」，並說ＥＣＦＡ將在今年簽署；台灣方面，馬英九總統更公開表示，希望ＥＣＦＡ能在今年五、六月簽訂。這種氛圍，已與春節前大相逕庭。
春節前，曾聽馬總統說，簽訂ＥＣＦＡ「沒有時間表」，海基會董事長江丙坤則稱，ＥＣＦＡ的協商已經進入「最艱辛的階段」；一時謠諑紛紛，有人說卡在北京爭取農產品輸台，有人說卡在與ＷＴＯ的規範牴觸。現在，「時間表」出來了（今年？五、六月？），胡錦濤也對「台灣農民弟兄的利益」作出保證，溫家寶又宣示「讓利」，在在顯示「最艱辛的階段」似乎已經度過。
五都選舉是ＥＣＦＡ加速的催化劑。台灣今年舉行五都選舉，明年進入總統大選，倘若兩岸之間存有ＥＣＦＡ這類不確定的重大議題，情勢極可能失控。馬總統希望在五、六月簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，顯然是希望能趕在五都選舉政黨提名之際完成簽署，以免ＥＣＦＡ一旦成為選戰議題，即不易收拾。北京方面當然同樣有此顧慮。
此種政治計算，雖可理解；但ＥＣＦＡ對台灣政局的影響，其實絕不只是影響一次五都選舉而已，而是將對中長期的兩岸關係皆有重大影響，因而也當然對中長期的台灣政局有長遠影響。倘能作如是觀，則是否搶在五都選舉前簽署ＥＣＦＡ絕非重點，重點仍在協議的內容能否說服台灣的主流民意；反過來說，如果只是趕簽ＥＣＦＡ，但協議內容不能說服民意，則趕簽恐怕反而將成為觸怒人民的不智動作。
從ＥＣＦＡ與選舉掛勾，可見台灣的民主政治與民意反映，已成為兩岸關係的制約因素。若欲兩岸關係「和平發展」，非但台灣的主政者必須回應台灣的民意，大陸的主政者亦知必須爭取台灣的民心。以ＥＣＦＡ為例，胡錦濤政權所面對的「協商」對象，其實不只是馬政府，也不只是民進黨，而是必須設法讓台灣主流民意能夠感知北京的誠心與善意。
胡錦濤對ＥＣＦＡ樹立了「好事辦好」的原則，國台辦主任王毅亦再申此論。所謂「好事辦好」，就是Do the right thing，and do things right。這可作兩方面說：一、所謂「好事」，是指ＥＣＦＡ應當被認為是對兩岸關係和平發展有利的「好事」，當然更重要的是要被台灣主流民意視為「好事」；二、所謂「辦好」，其中有一重要事項，應當是指簽署前、簽署中、簽署後的社會溝通必須「辦好」，以免落得「好事惡評」。這對於北京當局來說，皆是一個不可小覷的考驗。
對於馬政府而言，這尤其是重大考驗；畢竟，五都選舉與總統大選，皆與國民黨政權能否存續攸關。郝龍斌已向蘇貞昌挑戰辯論ＥＣＦＡ，可見ＥＣＦＡ不免成為選舉議題。就國民黨言，五都選舉前若未簽成ＥＣＦＡ，爭議將集中在「要不要簽」；但若在五都選舉前即已簽成，爭議將落在「簽的內容好不好」、「北京讓利夠不夠」。也就是說，國民黨橫豎都須面對這個議題。
ＥＣＦＡ的進度受到五都選舉的催迫，對馬政府而言，是危機也是轉機。倘若能簽成讓台灣主流民意認同的協議，這當然是馬政府的轉機；但若反而引發強烈的政治爭議，則對馬政府的困境就將是雪上加霜的危機。因而，ＥＣＦＡ究竟是否「好事」，以及究竟能否「辦好」，馬政府皆不可掉以輕心；畢竟，馬政府常有「好事辦砸」的紀錄。
由於ＥＣＦＡ牽動了北京政權，這可說也是首次北京政府的決策品質與台灣的選舉發生直接的連動關係；此事未來的發展，是否「好事」，能否「辦好」，皆是值得密切觀察的兩岸焦點。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 9, 2010
The Spring Festival is over. Five cities on Taiwan are caught up in election fever. The cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is about to be signed with a great deal of fanfare.
First Hu Jintao told Taiwan businessmen in Fujian that "We will give full consideration to our Taiwan compatriots, especially the interests of Taiwan farmers. This is a good thing that should be done well." Then Wen Jiabao spoke of "profit-sharing." He said ECFA would be signed this year. On the Taipei side, President Ma Ying-jeou publicly announced that he hoped ECFA could be signed in May or June of this year. The atmosphere was very different from what it was just before Chinese New Year.
Before the Spring Festival, President Ma said "There is no timetable for the signing of ECFA." SEF chairman Chiang Pin-kung said that ECFA consultation has entered "its most difficult stage." Rumors flew. Some said talks were stalled because Beijing wanted to ship agricultural products to Taiwan. Some said talks were stalled because of disagreements over WTO provisions. But now a timetable has emerged. ECFA will be signed in May or June of this year. Hu Jintao also gave assurances that the interests of Taiwan farmers would be protected. Wen Jiabao spoke of "profit sharing." This all suggests that the most difficult stage is already behind us.
The Five Cities Elections are a catalyst that has accelerated talks over ECFA. The Five Cities Elections will be held this year. The Presidential Election will be held next year. If a major cross-Straits issue such as ECFA remains unresolved during election season, the situation is likely to get out of control. President Ma hopes to sign ECFA in May or June. Clearly he wants to have it signed before the Five Cities Election Primaries. He wants to prevent ECFA from becoming an intractable election issue. Beijing naturally shares such concerns.
Such political calculations are understandable. But the impact of ECFA on the political situation is not limited to the Five Cities Elections. It will have a major impact on cross-Strait relations over the mid term and long term. Of course it will also have medium and long term impacts on the political situation on Taiwan. The point is not whether ECFA can be signed before the Five Cities Election. The point is whether the substance of the agreement is be acceptable to the public on Taiwan. Quite the contrary. If one hurriedly signs ECFA, but the substance of the agreement is unacceptable to the public on Taiwan, rushing to sign ECFA would be an unwise move that merely offends public sensitivities.
ECFA's linkage with the elections shows that democratic politics and public opinion on Taiwan have become constraints on cross-Strait relations. If one wants cross-Strait relations to "develop peacefully," Taipei must respond to public opinion. So must Beijing. Take ECFA. Hu Jintao's counterpart during consultations is not just the Ma administration, or even the DPP. It includes the public on Taiwan. They must be convinced of Beijing's sincerity and goodwill.
With ECFA, Hu Jintao established the principle of "good things should be done well." State Council Office for Taiwan Affairs Director Wang Yi reaffirmed this principle. He said "good things should be done well" means "doing the right things, and doing things right." This can be understood two ways. First, so-called "good things" means that ECFA should be considered a "good thing" because it is conducive to the peaceful development of cross-strait relations. But even more importantly it must be perceived as a "good thing" by the public on Taiwan. Secondly, so-called being "done well" should include communicating with the public before and during the signing. This will prevent a good thing from receiving bad reviews. For Beijing, this is something that must not be ignored.
For the Ma administration, this is an especially important test. After all, the Five Cities Elections and the Presidential Election have a bearing on the survival of the KMT regime. Hao Lung-ping has challenged Su Tseng-chang to a debate over ECFA. Clearly ECFA cannot help but become an election issue. For the KMT, failure to sign ECFA before the Five Cities Elections means that campaign debates will focus on whether or not to sign ECFA. But if ECFA is signed before the Five Cities Elections, campaign debates will be over "Was the substance of the agreement any good?" and "Did Beijing share enough of the profits?" In other words, the KMT will be forced to face the music either way.
The progress of ECFA has been accelerated by the Five Cities Elections. For the Ma administration, this represents both a crisis and an opportunity. If it can sell the public on the merits of the agreement, it will constitute an opportunity for the Ma adminstration. If, on the other hand, a powerful political controversy ensues, the Ma adminstration will find itself in an even worse crisis. Therefore, whether ECFA is a "good thing" and whether it can be "done well" is something the Ma administration cannot take lightly. After all, the Ma administration has a record of "doing good things badly."
ECFA affects Beijing. For the first time, the quality of Beijing's decision-making processes will directly impact elections on Taiwan. Whether this development is a "good thing" merits close observation by both sides.
好事辦好：ECFA是五都選舉的變數
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.09 03:16 am
春節過後，隨著台灣五都選舉進入疾風驟雨，兩岸經協（ＥＣＦＡ）的議簽也顯現密鑼緊鼓。
胡錦濤先在福建對台商說，「會充分考慮台灣同胞，特別是台灣農民弟兄的利益，要把這件好事辦好」，接著溫家寶即提出「讓利說」，並說ＥＣＦＡ將在今年簽署；台灣方面，馬英九總統更公開表示，希望ＥＣＦＡ能在今年五、六月簽訂。這種氛圍，已與春節前大相逕庭。
春節前，曾聽馬總統說，簽訂ＥＣＦＡ「沒有時間表」，海基會董事長江丙坤則稱，ＥＣＦＡ的協商已經進入「最艱辛的階段」；一時謠諑紛紛，有人說卡在北京爭取農產品輸台，有人說卡在與ＷＴＯ的規範牴觸。現在，「時間表」出來了（今年？五、六月？），胡錦濤也對「台灣農民弟兄的利益」作出保證，溫家寶又宣示「讓利」，在在顯示「最艱辛的階段」似乎已經度過。
五都選舉是ＥＣＦＡ加速的催化劑。台灣今年舉行五都選舉，明年進入總統大選，倘若兩岸之間存有ＥＣＦＡ這類不確定的重大議題，情勢極可能失控。馬總統希望在五、六月簽訂ＥＣＦＡ，顯然是希望能趕在五都選舉政黨提名之際完成簽署，以免ＥＣＦＡ一旦成為選戰議題，即不易收拾。北京方面當然同樣有此顧慮。
此種政治計算，雖可理解；但ＥＣＦＡ對台灣政局的影響，其實絕不只是影響一次五都選舉而已，而是將對中長期的兩岸關係皆有重大影響，因而也當然對中長期的台灣政局有長遠影響。倘能作如是觀，則是否搶在五都選舉前簽署ＥＣＦＡ絕非重點，重點仍在協議的內容能否說服台灣的主流民意；反過來說，如果只是趕簽ＥＣＦＡ，但協議內容不能說服民意，則趕簽恐怕反而將成為觸怒人民的不智動作。
從ＥＣＦＡ與選舉掛勾，可見台灣的民主政治與民意反映，已成為兩岸關係的制約因素。若欲兩岸關係「和平發展」，非但台灣的主政者必須回應台灣的民意，大陸的主政者亦知必須爭取台灣的民心。以ＥＣＦＡ為例，胡錦濤政權所面對的「協商」對象，其實不只是馬政府，也不只是民進黨，而是必須設法讓台灣主流民意能夠感知北京的誠心與善意。
胡錦濤對ＥＣＦＡ樹立了「好事辦好」的原則，國台辦主任王毅亦再申此論。所謂「好事辦好」，就是Do the right thing，and do things right。這可作兩方面說：一、所謂「好事」，是指ＥＣＦＡ應當被認為是對兩岸關係和平發展有利的「好事」，當然更重要的是要被台灣主流民意視為「好事」；二、所謂「辦好」，其中有一重要事項，應當是指簽署前、簽署中、簽署後的社會溝通必須「辦好」，以免落得「好事惡評」。這對於北京當局來說，皆是一個不可小覷的考驗。
對於馬政府而言，這尤其是重大考驗；畢竟，五都選舉與總統大選，皆與國民黨政權能否存續攸關。郝龍斌已向蘇貞昌挑戰辯論ＥＣＦＡ，可見ＥＣＦＡ不免成為選舉議題。就國民黨言，五都選舉前若未簽成ＥＣＦＡ，爭議將集中在「要不要簽」；但若在五都選舉前即已簽成，爭議將落在「簽的內容好不好」、「北京讓利夠不夠」。也就是說，國民黨橫豎都須面對這個議題。
ＥＣＦＡ的進度受到五都選舉的催迫，對馬政府而言，是危機也是轉機。倘若能簽成讓台灣主流民意認同的協議，這當然是馬政府的轉機；但若反而引發強烈的政治爭議，則對馬政府的困境就將是雪上加霜的危機。因而，ＥＣＦＡ究竟是否「好事」，以及究竟能否「辦好」，馬政府皆不可掉以輕心；畢竟，馬政府常有「好事辦砸」的紀錄。
由於ＥＣＦＡ牽動了北京政權，這可說也是首次北京政府的決策品質與台灣的選舉發生直接的連動關係；此事未來的發展，是否「好事」，能否「辦好」，皆是值得密切觀察的兩岸焦點。
Saturday, March 6, 2010
Liberation from Black Gold: The First Step towards a Healthy Democracy
Liberation from Black Gold: The First Step towards a Healthy Democracy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 6, 2010
The legislative by-elections have just ended. The five cities elections will soon be the focus of public attention. Most observers' attention is focused on the rival Blue and Green political camps, on how the outcome of the elections will affect the waxing and waning of their respective political power. The electoral success of the Blue and Green political parties will indeed have a huge impact on the future of Taiwan. But the impact of election practices on Taiwan's democracy is just as important, if not more important. It too, deserves our close attention.
Local factions dominate Taiwan's electoral politics. Will the results of the recent legislative by-elections result in a change in the rival camps' political fortunes? This deserves closer examination. Under KMT rule, local factions have dominated local elections since the last decade of the previous century. Their influence has even reached the central government level. The greatest impact has been the ascendance of Black Gold electoral politics. The constitution expressly stipulates that "election campaigns may not resort to either threats or bribes." It apparently anticipated money and violence interfering with the election process. This is a vexing political and cultural problem, one that may be difficult to guard against, but which must be overcome.
The Republic of China has undergone two changes in ruling parties. Has Black Gold involvement in the election process really killed off clean politics? What is the extent of underworld involvement in local and central government politics? How much vote-buying is there at the local and central government levels? Some progress has been made in eliminating such influences. But no one is about to express satisfaction with the situation. Black Gold politics is the result of the ruling KMT surrendering to local factions during the previous century. Those who removed the bell from around the cat's neck must put it back. Now that it has regained power during this century, we are of course justified in expecting the KMT to take effective measures. It must prevent local factions from using money and violence to influence the outcome of elections. It must allow the Republic of China to bid farewell to Black Gold politics.
The KMT lost during the recent legislative by-elections in several counties and municipalities. Clearly these losses were related to its refusal to be contaminated by local factions. In the overall development of democracy, winning and losing are fleeting. Upholding justice and standards is forever. The KMT may have lost the elections because it refused to compromise with local factions. But the public applauded its insistence on reforms beneficial to the elimination of Black Gold politics.
The five cities elections are about to begin. This election involves the election of chief executives. Voters are therefore more likely to reject Black Gold politics. The five cities elections will be followed by the legislative elections. Those will be the real litmus test of election reforms on Taiwan. The KMT must stick to its guns. Only then can it rid itself of local factions' negative influence on the central government. KMT election strategists must have the determination to stick to their reforms even if it means defeat at the polls. They must have the wisdom to realize that only by sticking to their guns can they eventually attain victory. Reforms are long overdue. Now is not too late. If it fails to act now however, it may be too late for regrets. It must rally voter support during the four years it is still in power. Corrupt election practices on Taiwan have led to an ineffectual legislature, an unhealthy democracy, and to a vicious cycle of corrupt politics. Only by acting now can the KMT save the day.
Once the KMT makes the decision to part company with local factions, the Democratic Progressive Party will begin to feel the heat. If the KMT refuses to knuckle under, local factions will lose the financial wherewithal to mobilize local connections. They will naturally seek out the KMT's political rivals. Will the DPP adhere to its stated principles? Will it say no to local factions' Black Gold election methods? The answers will determine the future of democracy on Taiwan. The DPP once blasted the KMT's authoritarian Black Gold politics. It rose to power by waving the banner of clean government. But eight years of Chen regime corruption following the first change in ruling parties seriously damaged the DPP's political image.
The Democratic Progressive Party tolerated the Chen Shui-bian family's corruption. Its tolerance for such wrongdoing cannot be blamed on the Chen Shui-bian family alone. How many people in the Green camp were contaminated? How many people refused to be contaminated? It is difficult to give a clear answer. The five cities elections, legislative elections, and presidential election will be held within the next two years. The Democratic Progressive Party wants the voters to return it to power. It has a real chance to do just that. The KMT has deliberately jettisoned local factional politics. Will the DPP embrace such politics, merely for the sake of short term electoral victory? Will it refuse to collude with the criminal underground and its vote-buying practices? The recent legislative by-elections have provided an abundance of alarming clues. Knowledgeable people within the DPP must reclaim the party's soul.
Both the Blue and Green parties must hold their ground. They must not make any concessions to Black Gold factional politics for the sake of short term electoral victories. Only then will democracy on Taiwan have a future.
不受黑金要脅 是健全民主體質第一步
2010-03-06
中國時報
立委補選甫結束，五都選舉立即成為政治輿情的注目焦點，一般的觀察，多偏向以藍綠兩大政治陣營角逐選舉的勝負以及政治實力的消長為著眼點。藍綠政黨選舉成敗固然關係台灣的未來甚鉅，選舉風氣對於台灣民主政治體質的影響，如果不是更為重要，也是同樣重要而值得關心的課題。
此次立委補選結果，與地方派系主宰台灣選舉政治命脈的現象，是否已有扭轉的契機，很有深入思考的價值。從國民黨前一世紀最後十年的執政期間，地方派系主導地方選舉並進入中央層級政治，最大的效應，就是黑金選舉政治的盛行。從憲法明文規定「選舉應嚴禁威脅利誘」來看，似乎早已預示了金錢與暴力介入選舉，已是歷史發展中難以免疫但卻必須克服的政治文化難題。
台灣已歷經兩次政黨輪替，黑金介入選舉的惡質政治文化是否真已弊絕風清？若問地方乃至中央議會黑道混跡的程度，地方與中央層級選舉買票文化殘存的現象如何，就算已經有些進步，但恐怕仍無人敢於提供令人滿意的答案吧！不過，黑金政治既然種因於國民黨在上世紀執政時期屈從或甚利用地方派系的錯誤，解鈴仍須繫鈴人，我們當然就有理由要求國民黨於本世紀重獲執政機會時，以實際而有效的作為，改革地方派系政治運用金錢與暴力影響選舉的惡劣風氣，讓台灣徹底告別黑金政治。
檢視國民黨此次在部分縣市立委補選失利，顯然就與堅持寧敗選也不與地方派系藉用金錢汙染選風妥協的決策有關。從民主政治的總體發展利益而言，勝負是一時的，正道與品質的堅持則是影響久遠的。對於選民大眾而言，國民黨儘管因為不與派系妥協而敗選，還是有益於黑金政治的改革，這毋寧還是該得到掌聲的。
即將揭開序幕的五都選舉，由於是都會行政首長的選舉，都會選民拒絕黑金勢力的汙染能力較為明顯。再下一場的國會選舉，則將是台灣選舉能否真正改革的試金石。國民黨必須繼續堅持原則，才能在中央的層級驅逐地方派系政治的惡質影響。國民黨的選舉操盤者，不但應有即使敗選也要堅持改革的決心，而且應秉持堅持改革就能贏得勝選的智慧與策略，深化早就該做、現在做還來得及、再不做就要噬臍莫及的努力，務必要在四年執政期間，號召選民的支持，將台灣從惡質選舉形成國會功能不彰，形成民主體質不良，形成政治風氣隳敗的惡性循環中，拉抬拯救回來。
國民黨一旦下定決心與地方派系說再見，民進黨的考驗也就將要開始。國民黨不與地方派系妥協，地方派系失去動員地方人脈的金錢來源，一個自然的出路也許就是向另一個政治陣營靠攏，民進黨是否亦能堅持既有的原則，拒絕接受地方派系靠攏的黑金選舉地盤，也就與台灣民主政治的前途息息相關。民進黨當年是靠著批判國民黨的黑金威權政治，撐著清廉的旗號起家。然而在第一次政黨輪替之後，陳水扁政府八年執政的貪腐作風，嚴重毀損了民進黨的執政形象。
其實，民進黨政府容得下陳水扁家族貪腐行徑的藏汙納垢，很難只將之視為陳水扁及其家人的作為，綠營中有多少人曾經受到了汙染，有多少人曾經拒絕汙染，是一個尚未回答清楚的問題。現在五都選舉、立委選舉以及總統選舉在未來兩年之內都要次第到來，民進黨要贏得選民的支持重新執政，並非沒有機會。但是，民進黨會不會為了短期的勝選利益，擁抱國民黨有意擺脫的地方派系政治，會不會拒與黑道或者賄選行徑掛鉤，在這次立委補選的過程中，已經不乏值得觀察與警覺的端倪，很需要民進黨內有意重振黨魂的有識之士有所惕勵。
只有藍綠兩黨都能堅持，絕不因短視的選舉勝負而與黑金派系政治做任何妥協，才能讓台灣的民主政治看到未來。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 6, 2010
The legislative by-elections have just ended. The five cities elections will soon be the focus of public attention. Most observers' attention is focused on the rival Blue and Green political camps, on how the outcome of the elections will affect the waxing and waning of their respective political power. The electoral success of the Blue and Green political parties will indeed have a huge impact on the future of Taiwan. But the impact of election practices on Taiwan's democracy is just as important, if not more important. It too, deserves our close attention.
Local factions dominate Taiwan's electoral politics. Will the results of the recent legislative by-elections result in a change in the rival camps' political fortunes? This deserves closer examination. Under KMT rule, local factions have dominated local elections since the last decade of the previous century. Their influence has even reached the central government level. The greatest impact has been the ascendance of Black Gold electoral politics. The constitution expressly stipulates that "election campaigns may not resort to either threats or bribes." It apparently anticipated money and violence interfering with the election process. This is a vexing political and cultural problem, one that may be difficult to guard against, but which must be overcome.
The Republic of China has undergone two changes in ruling parties. Has Black Gold involvement in the election process really killed off clean politics? What is the extent of underworld involvement in local and central government politics? How much vote-buying is there at the local and central government levels? Some progress has been made in eliminating such influences. But no one is about to express satisfaction with the situation. Black Gold politics is the result of the ruling KMT surrendering to local factions during the previous century. Those who removed the bell from around the cat's neck must put it back. Now that it has regained power during this century, we are of course justified in expecting the KMT to take effective measures. It must prevent local factions from using money and violence to influence the outcome of elections. It must allow the Republic of China to bid farewell to Black Gold politics.
The KMT lost during the recent legislative by-elections in several counties and municipalities. Clearly these losses were related to its refusal to be contaminated by local factions. In the overall development of democracy, winning and losing are fleeting. Upholding justice and standards is forever. The KMT may have lost the elections because it refused to compromise with local factions. But the public applauded its insistence on reforms beneficial to the elimination of Black Gold politics.
The five cities elections are about to begin. This election involves the election of chief executives. Voters are therefore more likely to reject Black Gold politics. The five cities elections will be followed by the legislative elections. Those will be the real litmus test of election reforms on Taiwan. The KMT must stick to its guns. Only then can it rid itself of local factions' negative influence on the central government. KMT election strategists must have the determination to stick to their reforms even if it means defeat at the polls. They must have the wisdom to realize that only by sticking to their guns can they eventually attain victory. Reforms are long overdue. Now is not too late. If it fails to act now however, it may be too late for regrets. It must rally voter support during the four years it is still in power. Corrupt election practices on Taiwan have led to an ineffectual legislature, an unhealthy democracy, and to a vicious cycle of corrupt politics. Only by acting now can the KMT save the day.
Once the KMT makes the decision to part company with local factions, the Democratic Progressive Party will begin to feel the heat. If the KMT refuses to knuckle under, local factions will lose the financial wherewithal to mobilize local connections. They will naturally seek out the KMT's political rivals. Will the DPP adhere to its stated principles? Will it say no to local factions' Black Gold election methods? The answers will determine the future of democracy on Taiwan. The DPP once blasted the KMT's authoritarian Black Gold politics. It rose to power by waving the banner of clean government. But eight years of Chen regime corruption following the first change in ruling parties seriously damaged the DPP's political image.
The Democratic Progressive Party tolerated the Chen Shui-bian family's corruption. Its tolerance for such wrongdoing cannot be blamed on the Chen Shui-bian family alone. How many people in the Green camp were contaminated? How many people refused to be contaminated? It is difficult to give a clear answer. The five cities elections, legislative elections, and presidential election will be held within the next two years. The Democratic Progressive Party wants the voters to return it to power. It has a real chance to do just that. The KMT has deliberately jettisoned local factional politics. Will the DPP embrace such politics, merely for the sake of short term electoral victory? Will it refuse to collude with the criminal underground and its vote-buying practices? The recent legislative by-elections have provided an abundance of alarming clues. Knowledgeable people within the DPP must reclaim the party's soul.
Both the Blue and Green parties must hold their ground. They must not make any concessions to Black Gold factional politics for the sake of short term electoral victories. Only then will democracy on Taiwan have a future.
不受黑金要脅 是健全民主體質第一步
2010-03-06
中國時報
立委補選甫結束，五都選舉立即成為政治輿情的注目焦點，一般的觀察，多偏向以藍綠兩大政治陣營角逐選舉的勝負以及政治實力的消長為著眼點。藍綠政黨選舉成敗固然關係台灣的未來甚鉅，選舉風氣對於台灣民主政治體質的影響，如果不是更為重要，也是同樣重要而值得關心的課題。
此次立委補選結果，與地方派系主宰台灣選舉政治命脈的現象，是否已有扭轉的契機，很有深入思考的價值。從國民黨前一世紀最後十年的執政期間，地方派系主導地方選舉並進入中央層級政治，最大的效應，就是黑金選舉政治的盛行。從憲法明文規定「選舉應嚴禁威脅利誘」來看，似乎早已預示了金錢與暴力介入選舉，已是歷史發展中難以免疫但卻必須克服的政治文化難題。
台灣已歷經兩次政黨輪替，黑金介入選舉的惡質政治文化是否真已弊絕風清？若問地方乃至中央議會黑道混跡的程度，地方與中央層級選舉買票文化殘存的現象如何，就算已經有些進步，但恐怕仍無人敢於提供令人滿意的答案吧！不過，黑金政治既然種因於國民黨在上世紀執政時期屈從或甚利用地方派系的錯誤，解鈴仍須繫鈴人，我們當然就有理由要求國民黨於本世紀重獲執政機會時，以實際而有效的作為，改革地方派系政治運用金錢與暴力影響選舉的惡劣風氣，讓台灣徹底告別黑金政治。
檢視國民黨此次在部分縣市立委補選失利，顯然就與堅持寧敗選也不與地方派系藉用金錢汙染選風妥協的決策有關。從民主政治的總體發展利益而言，勝負是一時的，正道與品質的堅持則是影響久遠的。對於選民大眾而言，國民黨儘管因為不與派系妥協而敗選，還是有益於黑金政治的改革，這毋寧還是該得到掌聲的。
即將揭開序幕的五都選舉，由於是都會行政首長的選舉，都會選民拒絕黑金勢力的汙染能力較為明顯。再下一場的國會選舉，則將是台灣選舉能否真正改革的試金石。國民黨必須繼續堅持原則，才能在中央的層級驅逐地方派系政治的惡質影響。國民黨的選舉操盤者，不但應有即使敗選也要堅持改革的決心，而且應秉持堅持改革就能贏得勝選的智慧與策略，深化早就該做、現在做還來得及、再不做就要噬臍莫及的努力，務必要在四年執政期間，號召選民的支持，將台灣從惡質選舉形成國會功能不彰，形成民主體質不良，形成政治風氣隳敗的惡性循環中，拉抬拯救回來。
國民黨一旦下定決心與地方派系說再見，民進黨的考驗也就將要開始。國民黨不與地方派系妥協，地方派系失去動員地方人脈的金錢來源，一個自然的出路也許就是向另一個政治陣營靠攏，民進黨是否亦能堅持既有的原則，拒絕接受地方派系靠攏的黑金選舉地盤，也就與台灣民主政治的前途息息相關。民進黨當年是靠著批判國民黨的黑金威權政治，撐著清廉的旗號起家。然而在第一次政黨輪替之後，陳水扁政府八年執政的貪腐作風，嚴重毀損了民進黨的執政形象。
其實，民進黨政府容得下陳水扁家族貪腐行徑的藏汙納垢，很難只將之視為陳水扁及其家人的作為，綠營中有多少人曾經受到了汙染，有多少人曾經拒絕汙染，是一個尚未回答清楚的問題。現在五都選舉、立委選舉以及總統選舉在未來兩年之內都要次第到來，民進黨要贏得選民的支持重新執政，並非沒有機會。但是，民進黨會不會為了短期的勝選利益，擁抱國民黨有意擺脫的地方派系政治，會不會拒與黑道或者賄選行徑掛鉤，在這次立委補選的過程中，已經不乏值得觀察與警覺的端倪，很需要民進黨內有意重振黨魂的有識之士有所惕勵。
只有藍綠兩黨都能堅持，絕不因短視的選舉勝負而與黑金派系政治做任何妥協，才能讓台灣的民主政治看到未來。
Friday, March 5, 2010
Outsiders Have Never Won: A Phony Proposition
Outsiders Have Never Won: A Phony Proposition
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 5, 2010
Following the KMT's defeat at the polls, some strange arguments have emerged from within the party. Blue camp legislators from Taipei County have argued that "Outsiders never win." They have used this as a pretext to poormouth Chu Li-lun's bid for Xinbei City mayor. In fact, this is a phony proposition. By the same token, the Kuomintang leadership has been taken hostage by local factions, yet boasts that it "remains committed to reforms." The Blue camp has repeatedly tripped over this huge stumbling block.
Blue camp legislator Luo Lie is a five time KMT candidate for Taipei County Executive. He said outsiders never win. He said Blue camp outsiders Li Hsi-kuen, Tsai Sheng-bang, Hsieh Sheng-shan, Wang Chien-hsuan and others all lost to Yu Ching and Su Tseng-chang. Only when the Blue camp nominated native son Chou Hsi-wei did it prevail over Luo Wen-chia. The biggest fallacy in this argument is its mischaracterization of Blue camp candidates as outsiders. It forgets completely that Yu Ching and Su Tseng-chang were themselves outsiders. If local leaders propagate such an ignorant argument merely because they are tired of losing that is one thing. But if they are doing it merely to undermine a fellow party member's election bid, that is simply pathetic.
The problem is phony propositions such as this do in fact influence the political situation. We all pretend to carry on serious political discussions. But many people are unaware of the facts, and accept such myths at face value. The Blue camp is rife with defeatism. It is also rife with selfishness. It lacks fighting spirit. Such specious arguments, phony issues, and false conclusions, are the KMT's biggest enemy.
Take the recent by-election for example. The Blue camp's defeat was due in part to ineffectual central government rule. The defeat should not be attributed to the candidates' "outsider" status. It should be attributed to the candidates' poor qualifications. Add to this sabotage by local leaders. Outsider Chen Hsueh-sheng entered the race for Taoyuan. If local leaders had made a concerted effort, how could Chen have lost by a mere 2000 votes? Lin Te-jui, after losing in Chiayi, lamented that she had only 47 days of political experience, how could she prevail over Chen Ming-wen, who had over 33 years years of experience? Lin Te-jui was indeed defeated because she lacked the qualifications and the experience, Ma Ying-jeou even got her name wrong while stumping for her. Suppose she had been a local? How could a political novice like her triumph against such odds? By contrast, Hsiao Bi-khim may have been an outsider in the Hualien race. But she had a high degree of name recognition. She had an outstanding political record. She, by contrast, posed a major threat to her opponent.
From this we can see that being an outsider is not the decisive factor in victory or defeat. The key is whether the candidates have won the hearts and minds of the local electorate. Take Jason Hu for example. He had no experience in local politics. Yet he reconquered Taichung City for the Blue camp in one fell swoop. This is an example of what an outsider can accomplish. Chen Shui-bian could be elected mayor of Taipei City. Frank Hsieh could be elected mayor of Kaohsiung. They too were outsiders. Their individual qualifications, together with the right political climate, broke down geographical barriers, and enable them to emerge victorious.
During an era of one-party government, the KMT and local factions established a peculiar symbiotic relationship. Several decades of political evolution have forced the two to reexamine their relationship. It is now time to clean house. Local political forces have taken shape. Local human and economic factors have changed. Each of them has its own peculiar nature. They cannot be lumped together and view negatively. Democracy has evolved, and society has liberalized. Monopoly interests, political alliances, and illegal favoritism must be changed or brought to an end. This is an irresistible trend. The Democratic Progressive Party continues to recruit deserters and collaborate with local bosses. But the trend should be clear even to them.
This does not mean the KMT must sever all relations with local factions. It can use both the carrot and the stick to pressure local factions. It can encourage them to respect democracy and the rule of law, and play by the rules of the game. Self-important troublemakers should be immediately be given a sharp rap on the head. They must not be treated the way the Cheng Yung-chin clan in Hsinchu County has been treated -- alternately punished and rewarded. Without firm principles, the party will lose both party discipline and the people's hearts. Based on the past several elections, a two-party political system is clearly taking form. Candidates who are neither True Blue nor True Green will be unelectable. This should be a clear warning to deluded local politicians who would blackmail the central party leadership. Members of modern political parties must abide by the norms of modern politics. Only then can political parties answer to society.
Consider the recent county council chief and city council chief elections. The Blue camp lost only four seats. But some county or city council chiefs may be using the county or city council merely to line their pockets or aggrandize themselves. If the Blue camp loses county or city council seats, it will be weakened. For the KMT this may be a good thing. This may enable other outside forces to check and balance local factions. The central party leadership may encounter less resistance in its effort to clean up local politics. From a broader perspective, this could be a blessing in disguise,
The KMT loudly promises reform. But in practice it makes all sorts of compromises. It takes two steps forward and one step back. This encourages local factions to stonewall and to blackmail the central party leadership. Is is really true that outsiders never win? Suppose outsider Su Tseng-chang wins in Taipei City? Suppose Chu Li-lun wins in Xinbei City? Will that be chalked up as "outsiders always win?"
「空降的從來沒贏過」是個偽命題
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.05 02:24 am
敗選後，國民黨內部傳出了一些奇怪的論調。藍軍北縣立委以「空降人選從來沒贏過」為由，唱衰朱立倫參選新北市，其實就是個不折不扣的假命題。這和國民黨中央屢遭地方派系挾持，卻誇口要「堅持改革」一樣，都說明了藍軍為何一再摔在派系這塊大絆腳石上。
藍軍立委羅列近五次台北縣長選舉名單，指藍營提名的李錫錕、蔡勝邦、謝深山、王建?等人，接連敗給尤清和蘇貞昌，直到當地出身的周錫瑋才贏了綠營的羅文嘉，足證「空降的」都不會贏。這個說法最大的謬誤，是把藍軍的敗北全部簡化為人選「空降」，卻忘了尤清和蘇貞昌一樣是飛象過河的外地人。如此昧於事實的論調，若只是因為地方人士「輸怕了」，倒還可以理解；但若只是藉題發揮扯同志的後腿，那就太可悲了。
問題是，這麼一個錯謬的敘述，居然也能在政壇大肆發酵，大家煞有介事地討論，許多不明就裡者還信以為真。可見，藍營內部目前除「失敗論」氣氛瀰漫，還充斥本位主義的自私心理，更缺乏一股「贏的意志」。這類似是而非的論調，錯認問題，找錯答案，才是國民黨最大的敵人。
以這次補選為例，藍軍的挫敗除了中央施政績效不彰外，就操作面而言，與其歸咎於空降，不如說是人選實力太弱，再加上派系掣肘之故。陳學聖空降桃園，若是地方能齊心，怎會以兩千多票落選？嘉義的林德瑞敗選後，感嘆自己僅四十七天的「從政資歷」，如何打得過經營卅三年的陳明文？林德瑞確實敗在資歷及經營不足，連馬英九輔選都叫錯他名字，就算是當地出身，但一個政治生手如何險中求勝？相對的，蕭美琴在花蓮也是空降，但她的知名度高、問政資歷出色，相形之下，就對對手構成了重大威脅。
由此可見，候選人是否空降，並非影響勝敗的決定性因素，關鍵在提名人選是否抓得住地方人心。以胡志強為例，過去也從未有地方政治的經驗，當年卻能一舉為藍軍奪回台中市，這不是奇兵空降之功嗎？包括陳水扁當選台北市長、謝長廷直取高雄，也都是跨區空降，在個人條件突出與特定政治氣氛配合下，突破了地域藩籬，創造了時勢。
在一黨獨大的年代，國民黨與地方派系建立了奇特的「共生」關係，歷經數十年的生態變化，雙方也到了必須重新調整、清理的時候了。事實上，地方政治勢力的形成，因各地人文及經濟條件的不同，各有其特殊性，誠然不可一概以負面眼光視之。但是，隨著民主的演進和社會的開放，許多利益壟斷、結幫營派、違法徇私的傳統操作必須改變或終止，這恐怕是時代所趨，不得不然。對於因不斷招降納叛與地方勢力勾結的民進黨而言，此一同樣的道理也是再清楚不過的。
對國民黨而言，這並不表示非要以決絕手段斬斷派系，而可用恩威並濟的手段，對派系施加壓力，促使他們尊重民主與法治的遊戲規則。對於妄自尊大的騷亂紀律者，則應立即給予當頭棒喝，而不應像對待新竹縣鄭永金家族那樣罰賞反覆、毫無原則，弄到黨紀與民心雙輸。事實上，從近幾次選舉看，兩黨政治的形勢已然相當明顯，非屬正藍或正綠的候選人幾無發展空間。這對於妄想挾個人勢力威脅黨中央的地方政治人物，不啻是一項清楚的警告：作為現代政黨的一員，就得接受現代政治的規範，如此政黨才能對社會負責。
以這次縣市議長改選為例，藍軍掌控的議會雖減少四席，但縣市議長若只是利用議會來圖利或壯大自己，那麼藍軍議長席次掉落、羽翼變弱，對國民黨未嘗不是一件好事。因為如此一來，地方派系有了其他不同勢力的制衡，黨中央改革地方生態的阻力也可能變小。從大處看，這是塞翁失馬，焉知非福。
國民黨口口聲聲改革，但實際行動卻往往是充滿妥協、進退失據，導致地方派系心存儌倖，藉機向中央勒索。空降的都不會贏嗎？年底蘇貞昌若「空降」台北市，朱立倫若「空降」新北市，難道會只因「空降」與否見勝負？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 5, 2010
Following the KMT's defeat at the polls, some strange arguments have emerged from within the party. Blue camp legislators from Taipei County have argued that "Outsiders never win." They have used this as a pretext to poormouth Chu Li-lun's bid for Xinbei City mayor. In fact, this is a phony proposition. By the same token, the Kuomintang leadership has been taken hostage by local factions, yet boasts that it "remains committed to reforms." The Blue camp has repeatedly tripped over this huge stumbling block.
Blue camp legislator Luo Lie is a five time KMT candidate for Taipei County Executive. He said outsiders never win. He said Blue camp outsiders Li Hsi-kuen, Tsai Sheng-bang, Hsieh Sheng-shan, Wang Chien-hsuan and others all lost to Yu Ching and Su Tseng-chang. Only when the Blue camp nominated native son Chou Hsi-wei did it prevail over Luo Wen-chia. The biggest fallacy in this argument is its mischaracterization of Blue camp candidates as outsiders. It forgets completely that Yu Ching and Su Tseng-chang were themselves outsiders. If local leaders propagate such an ignorant argument merely because they are tired of losing that is one thing. But if they are doing it merely to undermine a fellow party member's election bid, that is simply pathetic.
The problem is phony propositions such as this do in fact influence the political situation. We all pretend to carry on serious political discussions. But many people are unaware of the facts, and accept such myths at face value. The Blue camp is rife with defeatism. It is also rife with selfishness. It lacks fighting spirit. Such specious arguments, phony issues, and false conclusions, are the KMT's biggest enemy.
Take the recent by-election for example. The Blue camp's defeat was due in part to ineffectual central government rule. The defeat should not be attributed to the candidates' "outsider" status. It should be attributed to the candidates' poor qualifications. Add to this sabotage by local leaders. Outsider Chen Hsueh-sheng entered the race for Taoyuan. If local leaders had made a concerted effort, how could Chen have lost by a mere 2000 votes? Lin Te-jui, after losing in Chiayi, lamented that she had only 47 days of political experience, how could she prevail over Chen Ming-wen, who had over 33 years years of experience? Lin Te-jui was indeed defeated because she lacked the qualifications and the experience, Ma Ying-jeou even got her name wrong while stumping for her. Suppose she had been a local? How could a political novice like her triumph against such odds? By contrast, Hsiao Bi-khim may have been an outsider in the Hualien race. But she had a high degree of name recognition. She had an outstanding political record. She, by contrast, posed a major threat to her opponent.
From this we can see that being an outsider is not the decisive factor in victory or defeat. The key is whether the candidates have won the hearts and minds of the local electorate. Take Jason Hu for example. He had no experience in local politics. Yet he reconquered Taichung City for the Blue camp in one fell swoop. This is an example of what an outsider can accomplish. Chen Shui-bian could be elected mayor of Taipei City. Frank Hsieh could be elected mayor of Kaohsiung. They too were outsiders. Their individual qualifications, together with the right political climate, broke down geographical barriers, and enable them to emerge victorious.
During an era of one-party government, the KMT and local factions established a peculiar symbiotic relationship. Several decades of political evolution have forced the two to reexamine their relationship. It is now time to clean house. Local political forces have taken shape. Local human and economic factors have changed. Each of them has its own peculiar nature. They cannot be lumped together and view negatively. Democracy has evolved, and society has liberalized. Monopoly interests, political alliances, and illegal favoritism must be changed or brought to an end. This is an irresistible trend. The Democratic Progressive Party continues to recruit deserters and collaborate with local bosses. But the trend should be clear even to them.
This does not mean the KMT must sever all relations with local factions. It can use both the carrot and the stick to pressure local factions. It can encourage them to respect democracy and the rule of law, and play by the rules of the game. Self-important troublemakers should be immediately be given a sharp rap on the head. They must not be treated the way the Cheng Yung-chin clan in Hsinchu County has been treated -- alternately punished and rewarded. Without firm principles, the party will lose both party discipline and the people's hearts. Based on the past several elections, a two-party political system is clearly taking form. Candidates who are neither True Blue nor True Green will be unelectable. This should be a clear warning to deluded local politicians who would blackmail the central party leadership. Members of modern political parties must abide by the norms of modern politics. Only then can political parties answer to society.
Consider the recent county council chief and city council chief elections. The Blue camp lost only four seats. But some county or city council chiefs may be using the county or city council merely to line their pockets or aggrandize themselves. If the Blue camp loses county or city council seats, it will be weakened. For the KMT this may be a good thing. This may enable other outside forces to check and balance local factions. The central party leadership may encounter less resistance in its effort to clean up local politics. From a broader perspective, this could be a blessing in disguise,
The KMT loudly promises reform. But in practice it makes all sorts of compromises. It takes two steps forward and one step back. This encourages local factions to stonewall and to blackmail the central party leadership. Is is really true that outsiders never win? Suppose outsider Su Tseng-chang wins in Taipei City? Suppose Chu Li-lun wins in Xinbei City? Will that be chalked up as "outsiders always win?"
「空降的從來沒贏過」是個偽命題
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.05 02:24 am
敗選後，國民黨內部傳出了一些奇怪的論調。藍軍北縣立委以「空降人選從來沒贏過」為由，唱衰朱立倫參選新北市，其實就是個不折不扣的假命題。這和國民黨中央屢遭地方派系挾持，卻誇口要「堅持改革」一樣，都說明了藍軍為何一再摔在派系這塊大絆腳石上。
藍軍立委羅列近五次台北縣長選舉名單，指藍營提名的李錫錕、蔡勝邦、謝深山、王建?等人，接連敗給尤清和蘇貞昌，直到當地出身的周錫瑋才贏了綠營的羅文嘉，足證「空降的」都不會贏。這個說法最大的謬誤，是把藍軍的敗北全部簡化為人選「空降」，卻忘了尤清和蘇貞昌一樣是飛象過河的外地人。如此昧於事實的論調，若只是因為地方人士「輸怕了」，倒還可以理解；但若只是藉題發揮扯同志的後腿，那就太可悲了。
問題是，這麼一個錯謬的敘述，居然也能在政壇大肆發酵，大家煞有介事地討論，許多不明就裡者還信以為真。可見，藍營內部目前除「失敗論」氣氛瀰漫，還充斥本位主義的自私心理，更缺乏一股「贏的意志」。這類似是而非的論調，錯認問題，找錯答案，才是國民黨最大的敵人。
以這次補選為例，藍軍的挫敗除了中央施政績效不彰外，就操作面而言，與其歸咎於空降，不如說是人選實力太弱，再加上派系掣肘之故。陳學聖空降桃園，若是地方能齊心，怎會以兩千多票落選？嘉義的林德瑞敗選後，感嘆自己僅四十七天的「從政資歷」，如何打得過經營卅三年的陳明文？林德瑞確實敗在資歷及經營不足，連馬英九輔選都叫錯他名字，就算是當地出身，但一個政治生手如何險中求勝？相對的，蕭美琴在花蓮也是空降，但她的知名度高、問政資歷出色，相形之下，就對對手構成了重大威脅。
由此可見，候選人是否空降，並非影響勝敗的決定性因素，關鍵在提名人選是否抓得住地方人心。以胡志強為例，過去也從未有地方政治的經驗，當年卻能一舉為藍軍奪回台中市，這不是奇兵空降之功嗎？包括陳水扁當選台北市長、謝長廷直取高雄，也都是跨區空降，在個人條件突出與特定政治氣氛配合下，突破了地域藩籬，創造了時勢。
在一黨獨大的年代，國民黨與地方派系建立了奇特的「共生」關係，歷經數十年的生態變化，雙方也到了必須重新調整、清理的時候了。事實上，地方政治勢力的形成，因各地人文及經濟條件的不同，各有其特殊性，誠然不可一概以負面眼光視之。但是，隨著民主的演進和社會的開放，許多利益壟斷、結幫營派、違法徇私的傳統操作必須改變或終止，這恐怕是時代所趨，不得不然。對於因不斷招降納叛與地方勢力勾結的民進黨而言，此一同樣的道理也是再清楚不過的。
對國民黨而言，這並不表示非要以決絕手段斬斷派系，而可用恩威並濟的手段，對派系施加壓力，促使他們尊重民主與法治的遊戲規則。對於妄自尊大的騷亂紀律者，則應立即給予當頭棒喝，而不應像對待新竹縣鄭永金家族那樣罰賞反覆、毫無原則，弄到黨紀與民心雙輸。事實上，從近幾次選舉看，兩黨政治的形勢已然相當明顯，非屬正藍或正綠的候選人幾無發展空間。這對於妄想挾個人勢力威脅黨中央的地方政治人物，不啻是一項清楚的警告：作為現代政黨的一員，就得接受現代政治的規範，如此政黨才能對社會負責。
以這次縣市議長改選為例，藍軍掌控的議會雖減少四席，但縣市議長若只是利用議會來圖利或壯大自己，那麼藍軍議長席次掉落、羽翼變弱，對國民黨未嘗不是一件好事。因為如此一來，地方派系有了其他不同勢力的制衡，黨中央改革地方生態的阻力也可能變小。從大處看，這是塞翁失馬，焉知非福。
國民黨口口聲聲改革，但實際行動卻往往是充滿妥協、進退失據，導致地方派系心存儌倖，藉機向中央勒索。空降的都不會贏嗎？年底蘇貞昌若「空降」台北市，朱立倫若「空降」新北市，難道會只因「空降」與否見勝負？
Thursday, March 4, 2010
Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang are like Oil and Water
Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang are like Oil and Water
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 4, 2010
Su Tseng-chang says he is refusing to run for mayor of Xinbei City because he respects the precedent set by George Washington, who refused a third term as president. Do you believe his explanation? Does Su Tseng-chang believe his own explanation?
Yesterday Su Tseng-chang publicly announced his bid for mayor of Taipei. He said that he would run to win. He said if he won he would serve out his full term. He said he would not run for president in 2012. People have long known that Su Tseng-chang would make such a declaration. They also consider such a declaration pointless, since those who believe him will continue to believe him, and those who disbelieve him will continue to disbelieve him. Besides, Su Tseng-chang's record when it comes to keeping his word is less than impressive.
Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang have very different strategic views of the five cities elections. Tsai Ing-wen wants to adopt a step by step approach. She wants Su Tseng-chang to take Xinbei City. But Su Tseng-chang has set his sights on Taipei City. He is gambling with his own political future and the future of the entire Democratic Progressive Party. Most people think the disagreement between Su and Tsai is merely over election strategy. But a deeper look reveals that their disagreement has affected their ongoing power struggle and the political paths mapped out for themselves and their party.
First, let's look at Su Tseng-chang's election strategy. Su must say that if he wins the mayoral race, he will not run for president. Otherwise, he may as well forget about running. But if Su wins by a sufficient margin in Taipei City, he will become the national leader of the Democratic Progressive Party. He will surely run for president, invoking the principle of "vox populi, vox dei." On the other hand, if he loses, having established himself as the leader of the DPP during the election campaign, it would only be natural for him to run for president. It is not hard to visualize the evening of the five cities elections. Win or lose, the crowds will surely chant, "Su for president!"
Su Tseng-chang is making a Machiavellian political gamble. By doing so, he has brought himself into conflict with Tsai Ing-wen's authority and political path. Tsai wants Su to play by her rules. But Su has essentially hijacked Tsai and is forcing her to play by his rules. By becoming a candidate for mayor of Taipei, Su has positioned himself at the head of the DPP's five mayoral candidates. He will now become the party's real power center. Chairman Tsai has had the rug pulled out from under her. Su Tseng-chang is also versed in the thinking and practices of the Kaoshsiung Incident era lawyers. Throughout the election campaign his presentation, his rhetoric, his thinking, and the atmosphere he has created have diverged widely from Tsai Ing-wen's expecations. The election campaign has revealed the contradiction between the two individuals' authority and political paths. This is inevitable. It is not something that the two individuals can change through the force of their will.
Two elements are fueling the fire. The first is, who will run for Xinbei City mayor? The second is, who will run for president in 2012? If Tsai Ing-wen runs for Xinbei City mayor, the game is more likely to play out according to Su Tseng-chang's plan. The result will be a "Su/Tsai ticket." But the probability that Tsai will run for Xinbei City mayor is low. Mainly because Tsai's vision differs from Su's. As a result, the Democratic Progressive Party candidates for Xinbei City mayor are likely to fall into two categories. The first category is "Yu Hsi-kuen/Frank Hsieh." This would precipitate controversy at the national level. It is also something Su Tseng-chang would be unhappy to see. The second category is "Chen Ching-chun / Su Jia-chuan." This would lead to Su Tseng-chang "selling Xinbei City short." It would expose his selfish use of the elections as a training process for his own troops. Therefore which DPP candidate runs for Xinbei City mayor, and which DPP candidate is capable of becoming Xinbei City mayor, will affect the ongoing power struggle between Su and Tsai.
At a deeper level, Su and Tsai have even more conflicts, both over ideology and political path. Tsai Ing-wen has lifted the Democratic Progressive Party out of the rubble, and elevated it to where it is today. The task was not an easy one. Her "Political Platform for the Decade" reveals her vision for the Democratic Progressive Party and Taiwan. It is one that requires far-sightedness unconstrained by short term considerations. Su Tseng-chang has turned the five cities elections into his own Machievellian political gamble. He has coopted the historic forum Tsai Ing-wen established, and crowded Tsai Ing-wen off the podium. Perhaps Tsai never intended to become embroiled in a power struggle. But if Su Tseng-chang, Frank Hsieh, Yu Shyi-kun and others set the agenda for the five cities election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen may respond to these challenges to her ideology and political path.
So who will run for president? Su said if he is elected mayor he will not run for president. If he means it, Tsai Ing-wen may become the Democratic Progressive Party's leading candidate. That is why Tsai Ing-wen has no reason to run for Xinbei City mayor. She wants to remain unencumbered. But if Su wins in Taipei City, he can say that he is "acquiescing to the popular will," and run for president. He could suggest a "Su/Tsai ticket" that Tsai Ing-wen would find difficult to refuse. Another possibility is that Su Tseng-chang might lose. Even the "Two Cities" would be lost. Would Su run for president? How would Tsai deal with the mess left behind?
Tsai Ing-wen lacks the clout to keep Su Tseng-chang from turning the election into an all out gamble. But she can still choose whether to bet her own chips on Su Tseng-chang. The biggest chip in her hand is her "Political Platform of the Decade," embodying her own vision for Taiwan.
Su Tseng-chang's momentum is now at its peak. Tsai Ing-wen does not dare launch a frontal assault. Therefore, the two must maintain an appearance of unity. Key indicators to watch for include whether Tsai Ing-wen runs for Xinbei City mayor. If Tsai Ing-wen adopts a hands off attitude, Chen Ching-chun or Yu Shyi-kun will run. The differences between Tsai and Su will be overlooked and covered up. Until then, Tsai and Su will be like oil and water.
蔡英文蘇貞昌皮合肉不合
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.04 02:49 am
蘇貞昌說，他不選新北市長，是因效法華盛頓不選第三屆。你信不信？蘇貞昌自己信不信？
蘇貞昌昨日公開宣布參選台北市長。他說，要選就要贏，贏就要做滿，不會選二○一二總統。事前，所有的人皆猜中蘇貞昌一定會這麼說，但是說了卻無異白說；因為，不信者恆不信，何況蘇貞昌過去的言語誠信紀錄實在並不好看。
蔡英文與蘇貞昌對五都選舉的戰略構想大相逕庭。蔡英文希能穩扎穩打、步步為營，期望蘇貞昌能拿下新北市；但蘇貞昌卻選擇了直指台北市，將個人的政治前程與整個民進黨的前景，操作成一場豪賭。一般人只看出，蘇蔡二人的歧見是在選舉戰略；但深一層看，此一歧見其實已然牽動了蔡蘇二人之間的權力競逐與路線爭衡。
先談蘇貞昌的選舉戰略。他此刻當然要說，若選贏即不選總統，否則就根本不必選了。但是，蘇若真能很漂亮地打下台北市，又在五都選舉中確立了他在民進黨中的全國性龍頭地位，屆時他「應人民要求」參選總統的機率極大。反過來說，倘若戰敗，卻已在選戰中確立其龍頭地位，則轉戰總統大選也是順理成章。想像中，五都選舉謝票之夜，無論勝負，蘇貞昌台下群眾的口號皆將是「選總統」。
蘇貞昌這場投機權謀的政治豪賭，已與蔡英文在權力及路線上出現相當尖銳的牴觸。蔡希望蘇照著她的布局落子，但蘇如今卻形同挾持著蔡按照他的棋譜下棋。蘇既以台北市長候選人取得了民進黨在五都選舉中的龍頭地位，勢必將成為黨的實際權力樞紐，蔡的主席地位即被架空；再以蘇貞昌所擅美麗島律師世代的思維及手法，在整個選戰中所表現及營造的論述、思維、氣質與氛圍，亦必然與蔡英文所期望者出現重大歧異。隨著選戰開打，兩人在權力與路線上的矛盾必是日趨顯著，這將是不隨蘇蔡二人個人意志為轉移的必然趨勢。
火上加油的因素有二：一、誰來選新北市？二、誰來選二○一二總統？如果蔡英文去選新北市，就較有可能一切隨蘇貞昌的棋譜發展，然後就是「蘇蔡配」；但蔡投入新北市的機率極低，主因是蔡有不同於蘇的願景。於是，新北市的民進黨市長候選人，有可能出現兩種類型：一、「游錫?／謝長廷類」，這非但有全國性的爭議，且亦是蘇貞昌自己所極不願見。二、「陳景峻／蘇嘉全型」，這又會使蘇貞昌「放空新北市」，藉選舉來為自己的轎夫「練兵」的自私心理充分暴露。因而，民進黨誰來選新北市、及民進黨能不能贏得新北市，皆將牽動蘇蔡之間的權力競逐。
再深一層看，蘇蔡之間更有理念及路線爭衡。蔡英文將民進黨從廢墟中帶到今日境地，確實不易；而她正在建構所謂的「十年政綱」，更顯示她對民進黨及台灣的願景，必有超越現實的襟抱。如今，蘇貞昌將整個五都選舉帶向投機權謀豪賭之路，形同是搶佔了蔡英文搭起的歷史講壇，並將搭台的蔡英文擠下台去。蔡也許原本並無權力之爭的意念，但倘若五都之戰被蘇貞昌、謝長廷、游錫?等把持了選戰主軸，蔡英文就極有可能為了她的理念與路線迎對權力挑戰。
如此問題就來到了誰選總統？蘇說選上台北市長就不選總統，如果此話當真，蔡英文即可能是代表民進黨選總統的第一人選。因而，蔡英文就更不能選新北市，以免折損。問題是，蘇若選上台北市，又「應人民要求」轉選總統，並主張「蘇蔡配」，蔡英文將如何因應？另一種發展是蘇貞昌敗選，甚至「雙城」皆敗，則蘇還要不要選總統？蔡在被蘇打亂的一盤殘棋中又將如何自處？
蔡英文如今沒有實力阻擋蘇貞昌將大局帶向一場豪賭，但是她卻仍能決定對她自己所能掌握的籌碼是否隨蘇貞昌下注。而其中最大的一筆籌碼，就是她自己與她將在「十年政綱」中所寄寓的台灣願景。
蘇貞昌如今氣焰正旺，蔡英文不敢攖其鋒，所以二人必然仍可維持表象上的整合。未來觀察的主要指標，將是蔡英文是否出戰新北市；如果蔡英文令其自然發展成游錫?或陳景峻參選，蔡蘇的瞻矚歧異亦就不遑掩飾了。在此以前，蔡蘇的關係是皮合肉不合。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 4, 2010
Su Tseng-chang says he is refusing to run for mayor of Xinbei City because he respects the precedent set by George Washington, who refused a third term as president. Do you believe his explanation? Does Su Tseng-chang believe his own explanation?
Yesterday Su Tseng-chang publicly announced his bid for mayor of Taipei. He said that he would run to win. He said if he won he would serve out his full term. He said he would not run for president in 2012. People have long known that Su Tseng-chang would make such a declaration. They also consider such a declaration pointless, since those who believe him will continue to believe him, and those who disbelieve him will continue to disbelieve him. Besides, Su Tseng-chang's record when it comes to keeping his word is less than impressive.
Tsai Ing-wen and Su Tseng-chang have very different strategic views of the five cities elections. Tsai Ing-wen wants to adopt a step by step approach. She wants Su Tseng-chang to take Xinbei City. But Su Tseng-chang has set his sights on Taipei City. He is gambling with his own political future and the future of the entire Democratic Progressive Party. Most people think the disagreement between Su and Tsai is merely over election strategy. But a deeper look reveals that their disagreement has affected their ongoing power struggle and the political paths mapped out for themselves and their party.
First, let's look at Su Tseng-chang's election strategy. Su must say that if he wins the mayoral race, he will not run for president. Otherwise, he may as well forget about running. But if Su wins by a sufficient margin in Taipei City, he will become the national leader of the Democratic Progressive Party. He will surely run for president, invoking the principle of "vox populi, vox dei." On the other hand, if he loses, having established himself as the leader of the DPP during the election campaign, it would only be natural for him to run for president. It is not hard to visualize the evening of the five cities elections. Win or lose, the crowds will surely chant, "Su for president!"
Su Tseng-chang is making a Machiavellian political gamble. By doing so, he has brought himself into conflict with Tsai Ing-wen's authority and political path. Tsai wants Su to play by her rules. But Su has essentially hijacked Tsai and is forcing her to play by his rules. By becoming a candidate for mayor of Taipei, Su has positioned himself at the head of the DPP's five mayoral candidates. He will now become the party's real power center. Chairman Tsai has had the rug pulled out from under her. Su Tseng-chang is also versed in the thinking and practices of the Kaoshsiung Incident era lawyers. Throughout the election campaign his presentation, his rhetoric, his thinking, and the atmosphere he has created have diverged widely from Tsai Ing-wen's expecations. The election campaign has revealed the contradiction between the two individuals' authority and political paths. This is inevitable. It is not something that the two individuals can change through the force of their will.
Two elements are fueling the fire. The first is, who will run for Xinbei City mayor? The second is, who will run for president in 2012? If Tsai Ing-wen runs for Xinbei City mayor, the game is more likely to play out according to Su Tseng-chang's plan. The result will be a "Su/Tsai ticket." But the probability that Tsai will run for Xinbei City mayor is low. Mainly because Tsai's vision differs from Su's. As a result, the Democratic Progressive Party candidates for Xinbei City mayor are likely to fall into two categories. The first category is "Yu Hsi-kuen/Frank Hsieh." This would precipitate controversy at the national level. It is also something Su Tseng-chang would be unhappy to see. The second category is "Chen Ching-chun / Su Jia-chuan." This would lead to Su Tseng-chang "selling Xinbei City short." It would expose his selfish use of the elections as a training process for his own troops. Therefore which DPP candidate runs for Xinbei City mayor, and which DPP candidate is capable of becoming Xinbei City mayor, will affect the ongoing power struggle between Su and Tsai.
At a deeper level, Su and Tsai have even more conflicts, both over ideology and political path. Tsai Ing-wen has lifted the Democratic Progressive Party out of the rubble, and elevated it to where it is today. The task was not an easy one. Her "Political Platform for the Decade" reveals her vision for the Democratic Progressive Party and Taiwan. It is one that requires far-sightedness unconstrained by short term considerations. Su Tseng-chang has turned the five cities elections into his own Machievellian political gamble. He has coopted the historic forum Tsai Ing-wen established, and crowded Tsai Ing-wen off the podium. Perhaps Tsai never intended to become embroiled in a power struggle. But if Su Tseng-chang, Frank Hsieh, Yu Shyi-kun and others set the agenda for the five cities election campaign, Tsai Ing-wen may respond to these challenges to her ideology and political path.
So who will run for president? Su said if he is elected mayor he will not run for president. If he means it, Tsai Ing-wen may become the Democratic Progressive Party's leading candidate. That is why Tsai Ing-wen has no reason to run for Xinbei City mayor. She wants to remain unencumbered. But if Su wins in Taipei City, he can say that he is "acquiescing to the popular will," and run for president. He could suggest a "Su/Tsai ticket" that Tsai Ing-wen would find difficult to refuse. Another possibility is that Su Tseng-chang might lose. Even the "Two Cities" would be lost. Would Su run for president? How would Tsai deal with the mess left behind?
Tsai Ing-wen lacks the clout to keep Su Tseng-chang from turning the election into an all out gamble. But she can still choose whether to bet her own chips on Su Tseng-chang. The biggest chip in her hand is her "Political Platform of the Decade," embodying her own vision for Taiwan.
Su Tseng-chang's momentum is now at its peak. Tsai Ing-wen does not dare launch a frontal assault. Therefore, the two must maintain an appearance of unity. Key indicators to watch for include whether Tsai Ing-wen runs for Xinbei City mayor. If Tsai Ing-wen adopts a hands off attitude, Chen Ching-chun or Yu Shyi-kun will run. The differences between Tsai and Su will be overlooked and covered up. Until then, Tsai and Su will be like oil and water.
蔡英文蘇貞昌皮合肉不合
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.03.04 02:49 am
蘇貞昌說，他不選新北市長，是因效法華盛頓不選第三屆。你信不信？蘇貞昌自己信不信？
蘇貞昌昨日公開宣布參選台北市長。他說，要選就要贏，贏就要做滿，不會選二○一二總統。事前，所有的人皆猜中蘇貞昌一定會這麼說，但是說了卻無異白說；因為，不信者恆不信，何況蘇貞昌過去的言語誠信紀錄實在並不好看。
蔡英文與蘇貞昌對五都選舉的戰略構想大相逕庭。蔡英文希能穩扎穩打、步步為營，期望蘇貞昌能拿下新北市；但蘇貞昌卻選擇了直指台北市，將個人的政治前程與整個民進黨的前景，操作成一場豪賭。一般人只看出，蘇蔡二人的歧見是在選舉戰略；但深一層看，此一歧見其實已然牽動了蔡蘇二人之間的權力競逐與路線爭衡。
先談蘇貞昌的選舉戰略。他此刻當然要說，若選贏即不選總統，否則就根本不必選了。但是，蘇若真能很漂亮地打下台北市，又在五都選舉中確立了他在民進黨中的全國性龍頭地位，屆時他「應人民要求」參選總統的機率極大。反過來說，倘若戰敗，卻已在選戰中確立其龍頭地位，則轉戰總統大選也是順理成章。想像中，五都選舉謝票之夜，無論勝負，蘇貞昌台下群眾的口號皆將是「選總統」。
蘇貞昌這場投機權謀的政治豪賭，已與蔡英文在權力及路線上出現相當尖銳的牴觸。蔡希望蘇照著她的布局落子，但蘇如今卻形同挾持著蔡按照他的棋譜下棋。蘇既以台北市長候選人取得了民進黨在五都選舉中的龍頭地位，勢必將成為黨的實際權力樞紐，蔡的主席地位即被架空；再以蘇貞昌所擅美麗島律師世代的思維及手法，在整個選戰中所表現及營造的論述、思維、氣質與氛圍，亦必然與蔡英文所期望者出現重大歧異。隨著選戰開打，兩人在權力與路線上的矛盾必是日趨顯著，這將是不隨蘇蔡二人個人意志為轉移的必然趨勢。
火上加油的因素有二：一、誰來選新北市？二、誰來選二○一二總統？如果蔡英文去選新北市，就較有可能一切隨蘇貞昌的棋譜發展，然後就是「蘇蔡配」；但蔡投入新北市的機率極低，主因是蔡有不同於蘇的願景。於是，新北市的民進黨市長候選人，有可能出現兩種類型：一、「游錫?／謝長廷類」，這非但有全國性的爭議，且亦是蘇貞昌自己所極不願見。二、「陳景峻／蘇嘉全型」，這又會使蘇貞昌「放空新北市」，藉選舉來為自己的轎夫「練兵」的自私心理充分暴露。因而，民進黨誰來選新北市、及民進黨能不能贏得新北市，皆將牽動蘇蔡之間的權力競逐。
再深一層看，蘇蔡之間更有理念及路線爭衡。蔡英文將民進黨從廢墟中帶到今日境地，確實不易；而她正在建構所謂的「十年政綱」，更顯示她對民進黨及台灣的願景，必有超越現實的襟抱。如今，蘇貞昌將整個五都選舉帶向投機權謀豪賭之路，形同是搶佔了蔡英文搭起的歷史講壇，並將搭台的蔡英文擠下台去。蔡也許原本並無權力之爭的意念，但倘若五都之戰被蘇貞昌、謝長廷、游錫?等把持了選戰主軸，蔡英文就極有可能為了她的理念與路線迎對權力挑戰。
如此問題就來到了誰選總統？蘇說選上台北市長就不選總統，如果此話當真，蔡英文即可能是代表民進黨選總統的第一人選。因而，蔡英文就更不能選新北市，以免折損。問題是，蘇若選上台北市，又「應人民要求」轉選總統，並主張「蘇蔡配」，蔡英文將如何因應？另一種發展是蘇貞昌敗選，甚至「雙城」皆敗，則蘇還要不要選總統？蔡在被蘇打亂的一盤殘棋中又將如何自處？
蔡英文如今沒有實力阻擋蘇貞昌將大局帶向一場豪賭，但是她卻仍能決定對她自己所能掌握的籌碼是否隨蘇貞昌下注。而其中最大的一筆籌碼，就是她自己與她將在「十年政綱」中所寄寓的台灣願景。
蘇貞昌如今氣焰正旺，蔡英文不敢攖其鋒，所以二人必然仍可維持表象上的整合。未來觀察的主要指標，將是蔡英文是否出戰新北市；如果蔡英文令其自然發展成游錫?或陳景峻參選，蔡蘇的瞻矚歧異亦就不遑掩飾了。在此以前，蔡蘇的關係是皮合肉不合。
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
No Backtracking on the Road to Revolution
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 3, 2010
The KMT has suffered yet another legislative by-election defeat. KMT Secretary-General King Pu-tsung told this paper that the party's hard-line stance would not change. It would selectively "reform whatever local factions needed to be reformed." Many local political bosses have arrived at a watershed in their relationship with the KMT. This is true whether King Pu-tsung's hardline reforms represent the will of party chairman Ma Ying-jeou or not. For the KMT, such reforms are ten years overdue. They are something the KMT must do. The KMT's rot began with its roots. Because it is the ruling power, not a day goes by in which it is not hobbled or even threatened by local factional leaders.
Local factions are deeply rooted. They existed during the Two Chiangs Era. Back then local factions, both "black" and "gold" participated in politics only at the local level, no higher than the Provincial Assembly. It was impossible for them to gain entry to the central government. Local factional bosses were unable to gain entry to the legislature, never mind become political appointees. During the Lee Teng-hui era however, the political environment changed. Political participation was liberalized. Local political factions could no longer be artificially prevented from participating in central government elections. Lee Teng-hui rallied local factions against old school Kuomintang factions. This is how black gold factions were able to gain entry to the legislature. The Taiwan Provincial Government was "frozen/eliminated." The Taiwan Provincial Assembly was terminated. Locally elected representatives inundated the legislature. Professionalism at the central government level was seriously degraded. All the political tricks familiar to local factions, from political patronage to vote-buying became problems KMT party leaders had to confront and even accomodate.
The public welcomed the Republic of China's first Taiwanese president. Lee Teng-hui successfully integrated local factions within the party. Unfortunately he stopped at nothing in the process. As a result Lee Teng-hui's democratization was tainted by black gold politics. Eventually the KMT paid the price. It found itself in the political wilderness for eight years. Not a day passed without talk of reform. Not a day passed without talk of opposition to corruption and black gold. The KMT suffered for eight years. It regained political power on the basis of Ma Ying-jeou's reformist image. But less than two years later, all its bad habits have returned.
Local party bosses in charge of local party affairs prior to the KMT's loss of power, now open ask aspiring candidates questions such as, "How deep are your pockets? How much money can you lay on the line?" This money is needed for campaign publicity, and to provide political patronage for the candidates. It is even needed for party affairs. The KMT has regained political power. As its secretary general, King Pu-tsung must coordinate local party affairs. He never imagined coming face to face with candidates demanding to know who will reimburse them the 15 million NTD they already spent. These candidates show no embarrassment. They do not blush. They do not stammer. They ask "How can we fight a war on an empty stomach?"
King Pu-tsung has been KMT Secretary-General only briefly. The cause of his astonishment is the root of the Kuomintang's most terrifying problem. It is difficult to eradicate. It makes people wonder. What was the Kuomintang doing while in the opposition for eight years? Are its reforms for real or not? The KMT has been back in power two years. But what has it done? Is it having trouble overcoming political inertia? Did it fail to cultivate new talent? Will these matters be dealt with repeatedly with the most expedient and cavalier methods? Will the KMT cave in by accepting nomination standards demanded by local party factions? No matter what the answer, there is only one conclusion. It is also the reason King Pu-tsung has experienced two consecutive defeats. The KMT's long-standing problems have reached the stage where they must be resolved, or else.
The KMT's long-term problem is how to strengthen a party in which party loyalty is not that strong. King Pu-tsung has little to do with the party's outdated practices. To demand that he assume responsiblilty for them may strike outsiders as unfair. But this can't be helped. History has left King Pu-tsung with this cross to bear. He must assume responsibility for the success or failure of the party's reforms. He believes reform is essential. He has vowed not to compromise. He will have to pay the price.
Political reforms for any political party that aspires to govern long term, must enable it to succeed, and not to fail. Whether one is looking at the short-term political impact, or the long-term historical legacy, the inescapable reality is that "history is written by the victors." The KMT's victory or defeat is not the public's concern. The question that concerns the public is whether KMT reforms will be beneficial or harmful to the long-term development of the nation. The KMT must ask itself why its reforms have led to failure rather than success. This is an issue the Democratic Progressive Party must deal with as well. Has Taiwan's political culture deteriorated to the point of hopelessness? Bluntly speaking, no politician or political professional should compromise with a decadent political culture. Because today's compromises may be bitter fruit they must swallow tomorrow.
The KMT is no longer an authoritarian political party. It regards itself as a democratic political party dedicated to winning elections. As it transforms itself, the KMT must retain its innocence and maintain its discipline. If King Pu-tsung is serious, then we support the KMT's unyeilding commitment to reform. We hope the KMT will remember its fighting spirit during its eight years in the opposition. We hope it will reaffirm its belief that reform is the basis of success, and that success is the result of reform.
中時電子報 新聞
字體顯示：小│中│大 回上頁 │列印
中國時報 2010.03.03
社論－既已走上改革 就不能再回頭
本報訊
立委補選再失利，國民黨祕書長金溥聰接受本報專訪時，不改強硬姿態表明，他是有選擇性地，「值得整合的地方派系才整合。」對許多地方實力型人物而言，無論金溥聰的強勢整軍，是否代表黨主席馬英九意志的貫徹，他們與國民黨的關係，勢必已經走到抉擇的分水嶺；對國民黨而言，這卻是遲到十數年的「改革」，非做不可，否則，一個從根爛起的國民黨，即使掌握執政權，還是無一日不受派系文化的牽制，甚至要脅。
地方派系根深柢固，兩蔣時代早有之，兩蔣時代對地方派系不論是黑是金，唯一的準則是參政只限於地方，最多上達省議會，絕無可能進入中央，既無緣進入國會，遑論政務官；李登輝時代，政治環境丕變，民主政治既已全開放，就不可能人為限制地方派系直取中央的參政權，李登輝更援引地方派系牽制老國民黨的流派鬥爭，所謂黑金就堂而皇之進入國會殿堂；凍廢省之後，省議會終結，地方民代大舉進軍國會，中央問政素質嚴重衰弱不說，所有地方派系熟悉且慣用的政治伎倆，從搓圓仔湯到買票賄選，都成為黨中央不得不面對，甚至不得不適應的選舉文化。
當年，身為眾望所歸的第一位台灣人總統，李登輝成功地結合地方派系，遺憾的是，因為無所不用其極地結合地方勢力，讓李登輝的民主之功，無可避免地沾染黑金爭議，最終也讓國民黨付出失去政權的代價。令人錯愕的是，在野八年的國民黨，無一日不談改革，無一日不談反腐反黑金，臥薪嘗膽八年，國民黨靠著清廉改革形象的馬英九，以望風披靡之勢，爭回政權，兩年不到，過去執政惡習竟全部回籠！
失去政權前的國民黨，主持地方黨務者，可以大剌剌地跟有意參選者直問：口袋有多深？能拿多少錢？這些錢，既要應付文宣需求，還要應付其他參選者搓圓仔湯之用，甚至不乏應付黨務需索者；讓金溥聰想像不到的是，爭回政權的國民黨，身為祕書長的他，協調地方時，竟要面對參選者臉不紅氣不喘地直問，已經花掉的一千五百萬該向誰拿？還要面對地方黨務負責人，毫不害羞的問：糧草沒下如何打仗？
金溥聰接任國民黨祕書長時間有限，他的錯愕，正是國民黨恐怖的、除之難去的病根。讓人懷疑的是，那國民黨在野八年做了些什麼？到底是真改革還是假改革？國民黨重新執政兩年，又做了什麼？是政治惰性難改？還是國民黨忘記培養人才，這件事只能一而再、再而三，企圖用方便且隨便的方式，屈附於地方派系做為黨內提名的標準？但不論答案是什麼，結論只有一個，也是金溥聰輔選兩敗的心得：國民黨長期以來的問題，已經到了不能不解決的時候了。
國民黨長期的問題，要讓一個黨性其實並不那麼堅強，與黨務系統淵源或關係其實不那麼深厚的金溥聰擔負責任，外人看可能未盡公平；但是，沒有辦法，歷史機運如此，金溥聰此刻既擔此大任，就得負起成敗的責任，他認為非改不可、絕不妥協，就得付出必要的代價。
但是，對於志在永續執政的政黨而言，任何改革設定的目標都應該是成功，而非失敗。不論從短期的政治效果或長期的歷史評價，「以成敗論英雄」都是無法逃避的現實。國民黨勝選或敗選，並非社會大眾需要關切的問題，社會大眾關切的是改革於國家長遠發展到底是利是弊？但是，國民黨必須思考：為什麼改革帶來的竟是失敗、而非成功？這個問題連民進黨都必須嚴肅面對，難道台灣政治文化已經惡劣到如此不可救藥的地步嗎？更直接的講，每一個以政治為志業或職業的政治人物，都不能對政治愈趨惡劣的文化妥協，因為，今日妥協所產生的苦果，明日可能就是自己必須吞下的。
國民黨已不再是以黨領政的威權政黨，而是自許為選舉機器的民主政黨，在這個體質轉換的過程中，清白與紀律都是國民黨必須堅持的。如果金溥聰的改革理念是真的，我們支持國民黨咬牙踏上不可逆轉的改革之路，而且，期待國民黨重新回味在野八年的戰鬥意志，堅定信念：改革就是成功的基礎，成功將是改革的果實！
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 3, 2010
The KMT has suffered yet another legislative by-election defeat. KMT Secretary-General King Pu-tsung told this paper that the party's hard-line stance would not change. It would selectively "reform whatever local factions needed to be reformed." Many local political bosses have arrived at a watershed in their relationship with the KMT. This is true whether King Pu-tsung's hardline reforms represent the will of party chairman Ma Ying-jeou or not. For the KMT, such reforms are ten years overdue. They are something the KMT must do. The KMT's rot began with its roots. Because it is the ruling power, not a day goes by in which it is not hobbled or even threatened by local factional leaders.
Local factions are deeply rooted. They existed during the Two Chiangs Era. Back then local factions, both "black" and "gold" participated in politics only at the local level, no higher than the Provincial Assembly. It was impossible for them to gain entry to the central government. Local factional bosses were unable to gain entry to the legislature, never mind become political appointees. During the Lee Teng-hui era however, the political environment changed. Political participation was liberalized. Local political factions could no longer be artificially prevented from participating in central government elections. Lee Teng-hui rallied local factions against old school Kuomintang factions. This is how black gold factions were able to gain entry to the legislature. The Taiwan Provincial Government was "frozen/eliminated." The Taiwan Provincial Assembly was terminated. Locally elected representatives inundated the legislature. Professionalism at the central government level was seriously degraded. All the political tricks familiar to local factions, from political patronage to vote-buying became problems KMT party leaders had to confront and even accomodate.
The public welcomed the Republic of China's first Taiwanese president. Lee Teng-hui successfully integrated local factions within the party. Unfortunately he stopped at nothing in the process. As a result Lee Teng-hui's democratization was tainted by black gold politics. Eventually the KMT paid the price. It found itself in the political wilderness for eight years. Not a day passed without talk of reform. Not a day passed without talk of opposition to corruption and black gold. The KMT suffered for eight years. It regained political power on the basis of Ma Ying-jeou's reformist image. But less than two years later, all its bad habits have returned.
Local party bosses in charge of local party affairs prior to the KMT's loss of power, now open ask aspiring candidates questions such as, "How deep are your pockets? How much money can you lay on the line?" This money is needed for campaign publicity, and to provide political patronage for the candidates. It is even needed for party affairs. The KMT has regained political power. As its secretary general, King Pu-tsung must coordinate local party affairs. He never imagined coming face to face with candidates demanding to know who will reimburse them the 15 million NTD they already spent. These candidates show no embarrassment. They do not blush. They do not stammer. They ask "How can we fight a war on an empty stomach?"
King Pu-tsung has been KMT Secretary-General only briefly. The cause of his astonishment is the root of the Kuomintang's most terrifying problem. It is difficult to eradicate. It makes people wonder. What was the Kuomintang doing while in the opposition for eight years? Are its reforms for real or not? The KMT has been back in power two years. But what has it done? Is it having trouble overcoming political inertia? Did it fail to cultivate new talent? Will these matters be dealt with repeatedly with the most expedient and cavalier methods? Will the KMT cave in by accepting nomination standards demanded by local party factions? No matter what the answer, there is only one conclusion. It is also the reason King Pu-tsung has experienced two consecutive defeats. The KMT's long-standing problems have reached the stage where they must be resolved, or else.
The KMT's long-term problem is how to strengthen a party in which party loyalty is not that strong. King Pu-tsung has little to do with the party's outdated practices. To demand that he assume responsiblilty for them may strike outsiders as unfair. But this can't be helped. History has left King Pu-tsung with this cross to bear. He must assume responsibility for the success or failure of the party's reforms. He believes reform is essential. He has vowed not to compromise. He will have to pay the price.
Political reforms for any political party that aspires to govern long term, must enable it to succeed, and not to fail. Whether one is looking at the short-term political impact, or the long-term historical legacy, the inescapable reality is that "history is written by the victors." The KMT's victory or defeat is not the public's concern. The question that concerns the public is whether KMT reforms will be beneficial or harmful to the long-term development of the nation. The KMT must ask itself why its reforms have led to failure rather than success. This is an issue the Democratic Progressive Party must deal with as well. Has Taiwan's political culture deteriorated to the point of hopelessness? Bluntly speaking, no politician or political professional should compromise with a decadent political culture. Because today's compromises may be bitter fruit they must swallow tomorrow.
The KMT is no longer an authoritarian political party. It regards itself as a democratic political party dedicated to winning elections. As it transforms itself, the KMT must retain its innocence and maintain its discipline. If King Pu-tsung is serious, then we support the KMT's unyeilding commitment to reform. We hope the KMT will remember its fighting spirit during its eight years in the opposition. We hope it will reaffirm its belief that reform is the basis of success, and that success is the result of reform.
中時電子報 新聞
字體顯示：小│中│大 回上頁 │列印
中國時報 2010.03.03
社論－既已走上改革 就不能再回頭
本報訊
立委補選再失利，國民黨祕書長金溥聰接受本報專訪時，不改強硬姿態表明，他是有選擇性地，「值得整合的地方派系才整合。」對許多地方實力型人物而言，無論金溥聰的強勢整軍，是否代表黨主席馬英九意志的貫徹，他們與國民黨的關係，勢必已經走到抉擇的分水嶺；對國民黨而言，這卻是遲到十數年的「改革」，非做不可，否則，一個從根爛起的國民黨，即使掌握執政權，還是無一日不受派系文化的牽制，甚至要脅。
地方派系根深柢固，兩蔣時代早有之，兩蔣時代對地方派系不論是黑是金，唯一的準則是參政只限於地方，最多上達省議會，絕無可能進入中央，既無緣進入國會，遑論政務官；李登輝時代，政治環境丕變，民主政治既已全開放，就不可能人為限制地方派系直取中央的參政權，李登輝更援引地方派系牽制老國民黨的流派鬥爭，所謂黑金就堂而皇之進入國會殿堂；凍廢省之後，省議會終結，地方民代大舉進軍國會，中央問政素質嚴重衰弱不說，所有地方派系熟悉且慣用的政治伎倆，從搓圓仔湯到買票賄選，都成為黨中央不得不面對，甚至不得不適應的選舉文化。
當年，身為眾望所歸的第一位台灣人總統，李登輝成功地結合地方派系，遺憾的是，因為無所不用其極地結合地方勢力，讓李登輝的民主之功，無可避免地沾染黑金爭議，最終也讓國民黨付出失去政權的代價。令人錯愕的是，在野八年的國民黨，無一日不談改革，無一日不談反腐反黑金，臥薪嘗膽八年，國民黨靠著清廉改革形象的馬英九，以望風披靡之勢，爭回政權，兩年不到，過去執政惡習竟全部回籠！
失去政權前的國民黨，主持地方黨務者，可以大剌剌地跟有意參選者直問：口袋有多深？能拿多少錢？這些錢，既要應付文宣需求，還要應付其他參選者搓圓仔湯之用，甚至不乏應付黨務需索者；讓金溥聰想像不到的是，爭回政權的國民黨，身為祕書長的他，協調地方時，竟要面對參選者臉不紅氣不喘地直問，已經花掉的一千五百萬該向誰拿？還要面對地方黨務負責人，毫不害羞的問：糧草沒下如何打仗？
金溥聰接任國民黨祕書長時間有限，他的錯愕，正是國民黨恐怖的、除之難去的病根。讓人懷疑的是，那國民黨在野八年做了些什麼？到底是真改革還是假改革？國民黨重新執政兩年，又做了什麼？是政治惰性難改？還是國民黨忘記培養人才，這件事只能一而再、再而三，企圖用方便且隨便的方式，屈附於地方派系做為黨內提名的標準？但不論答案是什麼，結論只有一個，也是金溥聰輔選兩敗的心得：國民黨長期以來的問題，已經到了不能不解決的時候了。
國民黨長期的問題，要讓一個黨性其實並不那麼堅強，與黨務系統淵源或關係其實不那麼深厚的金溥聰擔負責任，外人看可能未盡公平；但是，沒有辦法，歷史機運如此，金溥聰此刻既擔此大任，就得負起成敗的責任，他認為非改不可、絕不妥協，就得付出必要的代價。
但是，對於志在永續執政的政黨而言，任何改革設定的目標都應該是成功，而非失敗。不論從短期的政治效果或長期的歷史評價，「以成敗論英雄」都是無法逃避的現實。國民黨勝選或敗選，並非社會大眾需要關切的問題，社會大眾關切的是改革於國家長遠發展到底是利是弊？但是，國民黨必須思考：為什麼改革帶來的竟是失敗、而非成功？這個問題連民進黨都必須嚴肅面對，難道台灣政治文化已經惡劣到如此不可救藥的地步嗎？更直接的講，每一個以政治為志業或職業的政治人物，都不能對政治愈趨惡劣的文化妥協，因為，今日妥協所產生的苦果，明日可能就是自己必須吞下的。
國民黨已不再是以黨領政的威權政黨，而是自許為選舉機器的民主政黨，在這個體質轉換的過程中，清白與紀律都是國民黨必須堅持的。如果金溥聰的改革理念是真的，我們支持國民黨咬牙踏上不可逆轉的改革之路，而且，期待國民黨重新回味在野八年的戰鬥意志，堅定信念：改革就是成功的基礎，成功將是改革的果實！
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Su Tseng-chang's Two Cities Strategy: Reasonable? Justified?
Su Tseng-chang's Two Cities Strategy: Reasonable? Justified?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 2, 2010
The evening the ballots were counted for the four county legislative by-elections, the Su Tseng-chang camp let it be known that Su intended to run for mayor of Taipei. When asked about the matter the following day, Tsai Ing-wen dismissed it as "mere rumor." She said she learned about it only after reading the newspaper, and hoped everyone would give Su more time to think about it. Su Tseng-chang would neither confirm nor deny the rumor. He said he would report to Chairman Tsai before commenting. Those in the know believe the two have yet to reach a consensus.
Su Tseng-chang announced his intention to run in advance. He hoped to force Tsai Ing-wen to accept a fait accompli. But clearly Tsai has reservations. Su Tseng-chang's "Two Cities Strategy" has numerous defects. The most egregious of which is that Su Tseng-chang is treating the five cities elections as a Machievellian political tool, when his real goal is to run for president in 2012.
The Su camp says that the number of seats the DPP wins in the five cities election is secondary. The Su camp says its primary concern is how many ballots the DPP receives. Only this will help the DPP return to power. In other words, Su Tseng-chang is "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City." His purpose is not to win a mayoral seat for the DPP. His purpose is to establish a coat tails effect, to create momentum, paving the way for a presidential run in 2012.
Before his strategy can be considered reasonable and justified, Su must answer two questions. One. Must Su Tseng-chang be the DPP's presidential candidate? Two. Su Tseng-chang is using the five cities election as a stepping stone in his presidential campaign. But suppose he resigns his position as mayor, only to lose his bid for the presidency? Can the Democratic Progressive Party really afford to pay such a heavy price?
Tsai Ing-wen hopes to take three cities out of five. Her goal is to win New Taipei. Su Tseng-chang would draw out Chu Li-lun. In terms of political responsibility, Su cannot refuse, since he is the one candidate most able to take on Chu Li-lun. If Su chooses not to run, the DPP would essentially be surrending Taipei City. Su may be trying to force Tsai Ing-wen to go up against Chu Li-lun. But if Tsai Ing-wen loses, the cost could be even greater than if Su Tseng-chang loses. In which case, how can Su justify exploiting Tsai Ing-wen?
Su may be able to emerge victorious over Chu Li-lun. But Su is unwilling to be drafted, and is refusing to do battle. Actually, if Su were to prevail over Chu Li-lun in New Taipei, he would still have two alternatives. One. He could announce that he is making a bid for the presidency, and hope the public approves. Two, He could announce his intention to quietly serve out his term as New Taipei mayor, and endorse others, such as Tsai Ing-wen, as the Democratic Progressive Party's presidential candidate. That however, is not Su Tseng-chang's calculus. Although Su has declared that the goal is to "take four out of five," he has adopted a strategy of "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City." He is unconcerned whether the DPP wins or loses. He is concerned only about his own bid for the presidency. Su Tseng-chang must explain why he wants to run for president, and why the DPP must go along with his strategy of "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City." Is it reasonable? Is it justified?
Su Tseng-chang's Two Cities Strategy may have won over some Green Camp supporters. But it is far too risky. It could be a lose/lose proposition. The benefits are difficult to assess. Who knows whether Su can get elected president in 2012? Should the DPP assume such a risk for the Su alone? Should it force the entire DPP to bear the risk for such an opportunistic move? Given the DPP's larger concerns, it may be unwise, and should be given careful consideration. Otherwise Su's Two Cities Strategy could leave the DPP in the lurch, both in New Taipei and in the Presidential Palace.
In terms of rational decision-making, if the DPP hopes to return to power, its best strategy is to take one step at a time. It needs to treat any victories in Taipei City and New Taipei as victories in their own right. Su Tseng-chang wants to run for president. If the DPP adopts a strategy of "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City" for his sake, wouldn't it be counterproductive? Wouldn't it amount to "licking blood from the blade of the knife?"
Su Tseng-chang's extremely tricky Two Cities Strategy is both opportunistic and risky. It may not withstand close scrutiny. Never mind DPP leaders such as Tsai Ing-wen, who may not agree with Su Tseng-chang's opportunistic attempt to treat the party as his own political instrument. Su's Two Cities Strategy has yet to meet with the approval of the entire nation. Will the general public countenance Su Tseng-chang manipulating the five cities elections so cavalierly, treating democracy as a game?
Su Tseng-chang may not wish to be locked in by the five cities elections. If so, he can choose not to run at all. He can choose not to run in New Taipei. He can choose not to run in Taipei City. But if he chooses to run, he can hardly announce beforehand that his real goal is to run for president. He cannot treat the five cities elections as a Machiavellian political tool. The Democratic Progressive Party has no reason to "short New Taipei, and transit Taipei City" for Su's sake. Nor can the general public allow Su to play them for fools. Su Tseng-chang's strategy is much too ego-centric. It exaggerates his own importance. It indulges in wishful thinking. Once reality rears its ugly head, his strategy could backfire. He could find himself denounced as an opportunistic politician, manipulating democratic elections for his selfish purposes.
Is the Two Cities Strategy reasonable and justified? One. Why has Su Tseng-chang's candidacy become a given, no longer subject to question? Two. Why must the five cities elections be treated as Su Tseng-chang's political too, paving the way for his presidental campaign? Three. Does Su really intend to adopt the strategy of "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City?" Four. Should the sanctity of democratic elections be debased in such a manner? If so, how do Su Tseng-chang and the DPP intend to answer to the public?
The DPP has long achieved victories by means of opportunism and trickery. But isn't the Two Cities Strategy just a little too opportunistic and a little too tricky?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.01
社論－藍連四敗 民心為何潰散這麼快
本報訊
二二七立委補選，民進黨再下三城，這已經是去年九月以來，國民黨的「連四敗」，也是馬政權兩年不到的「第五敗」！除了台北市大安區立委補選之外，從雲林立委補選、三合一基層選舉、農曆年前三席立委補選到農曆年後的四席立委補選，不論黨主席是吳是馬，黨秘書長是吳、是詹還是金，閣揆是劉或是吳，國民黨都找不到勝選基礎和理由。
特別在去年底三合一選舉之後，整體社會氣氛對馬政府的治理失能愈來愈不耐煩。可以想見，這個氣氛不變，年底五都選舉有可能提前吹響二○一二政權再更迭的號角。這是讓人難以想像的變化，回想二千年政黨輪替，扁政權從高點到低點，第一任的第三年開始，扁家弊案諸如企業行賄早已初露端倪，第二任從扁就任的第一天起，弊案如影隨形，愈滾愈大，從坊間傳聞檢調偵辦，涉入金額從十數億到數十億到上百億；二○○八政黨再輪替，推倒扁政權的不是馬英九，而是陳水扁自己；即使如此，扁政權的淪落，還是足足走了八年，涉及貪汙的實際金額到現在都還結清不了。
馬政權到底發生了什麼事？會讓民心潰散得這麼快？到底是馬英九總統的問題？還是國民黨的問題？但不論馬英九或國民黨，都不是政壇新人或新角色，相反的，不論馬個人或黨，都是台灣民眾熟悉的，馬英九為人熟悉的清廉厚道的特質，讓他在全民惡扁氛圍下快速竄起；然而，國民黨失去政權八年中，並未相應新的政治環境，調整體質，馬英九也未體會到他必須更強勢的領導，才能加速重建扁政府八年崩壞的政治道德和治理專業。馬英九沒有改變，但社會氣氛變了，而民眾對政府的期望顯然失落了。
當輿論批評國民黨的派系文化時，很容易就疏忽了，其實民進黨爭奪政權，也無法迴避派系牽制。以嘉義縣為例，立委補選勝出的陳明文，是李登輝時代典型的國民黨派系，扁政權時靠攏民進黨，竟就此漂白，縣長八年之後交棒給張花冠，自己再接續選立委，這叫派系接棒。類似案例，曾經發生在雲林縣的張榮味家族，但是張家既不能靠挺藍漂白，更無法靠挺藍搞派系或家族交棒。以新竹縣為例，鄭永金縣長八年還要欽點接班人，結果不為國民黨接受，竟拱出脫黨參選縣長者，違紀在前，竟還能再拱自己的親兄弟，代表國民黨角逐立委補選，敗選早可預期。
值得思考的是：為什麼身在藍營的地方派系就能死性不改，吃定國民黨必須對派系妥協讓步？否則江山寧可拱手讓人？為什麼身處綠營的派系對民進黨的向心力會一夕轉變成為黨性堅強？更諷刺的是，當年扁政權收編地方派系的手法可是威脅利誘、軟硬兼施，司法壓力伴隨行政資源。相比之下，無賞無懲的國民黨就只能讓派系予取予求，難堪的是，得者派系而失者政黨。
馬政府聲望下跌，從他就任第一天就已開始，他任用了專業內閣，卻讓老國民黨壓陣，不聽府院號令的國民黨，讓專業內閣寸步難行。莫拉克風災只是壓垮劉內閣的最後一根稻草；吳內閣上路後，卻又犧牲太多專業，政治與接續而來幾乎沒停過的大小選舉考量，讓吳內閣只能思考如何降低政策對選票的衝擊，儘管立法院上會期打一架通過地制法修正案，讓國民黨內小有團結士氣，但無可諱言，不論是中央黨團或地方派系，袖手看國民黨或馬總統笑話的人，遠多過團結一心拉抬府院黨聲勢的人。於是乎，入閣任官者難覓，競逐五都者難求；國民黨易選區眾人搶破頭，國民黨艱困區，無戰將肯披戰袍；在野八年，黨內還有為黨奉獻拚搏的悲壯士氣，執政短短兩年，這一丁點戰鬥意志都消弭於無形。
但凡領導者，最重要的特質就是要有死士願鼎力效忠，馬英九枯坐總統府，不能不深思何以賢士戰將俱遠矣？民進黨再下三城，於立法院不過取得卅三席，於國會議事容或無涉，但就大局卻顯見執政黨聲勢再挫。藍營內已有內閣改組之議，類似建議輿論一而再、再而三提出，若非建議如泥牛入海，無聲無息，就是內閣老人舊面孔搬風，愈搬愈糟，馬政權必須徹底警覺，新人新政新氣象的意義。一個「貪」字推倒扁政權，希望兩年後的二○一二年，不會出現一個「笨」字推倒馬政權的危機發生。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 2, 2010
The evening the ballots were counted for the four county legislative by-elections, the Su Tseng-chang camp let it be known that Su intended to run for mayor of Taipei. When asked about the matter the following day, Tsai Ing-wen dismissed it as "mere rumor." She said she learned about it only after reading the newspaper, and hoped everyone would give Su more time to think about it. Su Tseng-chang would neither confirm nor deny the rumor. He said he would report to Chairman Tsai before commenting. Those in the know believe the two have yet to reach a consensus.
Su Tseng-chang announced his intention to run in advance. He hoped to force Tsai Ing-wen to accept a fait accompli. But clearly Tsai has reservations. Su Tseng-chang's "Two Cities Strategy" has numerous defects. The most egregious of which is that Su Tseng-chang is treating the five cities elections as a Machievellian political tool, when his real goal is to run for president in 2012.
The Su camp says that the number of seats the DPP wins in the five cities election is secondary. The Su camp says its primary concern is how many ballots the DPP receives. Only this will help the DPP return to power. In other words, Su Tseng-chang is "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City." His purpose is not to win a mayoral seat for the DPP. His purpose is to establish a coat tails effect, to create momentum, paving the way for a presidential run in 2012.
Before his strategy can be considered reasonable and justified, Su must answer two questions. One. Must Su Tseng-chang be the DPP's presidential candidate? Two. Su Tseng-chang is using the five cities election as a stepping stone in his presidential campaign. But suppose he resigns his position as mayor, only to lose his bid for the presidency? Can the Democratic Progressive Party really afford to pay such a heavy price?
Tsai Ing-wen hopes to take three cities out of five. Her goal is to win New Taipei. Su Tseng-chang would draw out Chu Li-lun. In terms of political responsibility, Su cannot refuse, since he is the one candidate most able to take on Chu Li-lun. If Su chooses not to run, the DPP would essentially be surrending Taipei City. Su may be trying to force Tsai Ing-wen to go up against Chu Li-lun. But if Tsai Ing-wen loses, the cost could be even greater than if Su Tseng-chang loses. In which case, how can Su justify exploiting Tsai Ing-wen?
Su may be able to emerge victorious over Chu Li-lun. But Su is unwilling to be drafted, and is refusing to do battle. Actually, if Su were to prevail over Chu Li-lun in New Taipei, he would still have two alternatives. One. He could announce that he is making a bid for the presidency, and hope the public approves. Two, He could announce his intention to quietly serve out his term as New Taipei mayor, and endorse others, such as Tsai Ing-wen, as the Democratic Progressive Party's presidential candidate. That however, is not Su Tseng-chang's calculus. Although Su has declared that the goal is to "take four out of five," he has adopted a strategy of "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City." He is unconcerned whether the DPP wins or loses. He is concerned only about his own bid for the presidency. Su Tseng-chang must explain why he wants to run for president, and why the DPP must go along with his strategy of "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City." Is it reasonable? Is it justified?
Su Tseng-chang's Two Cities Strategy may have won over some Green Camp supporters. But it is far too risky. It could be a lose/lose proposition. The benefits are difficult to assess. Who knows whether Su can get elected president in 2012? Should the DPP assume such a risk for the Su alone? Should it force the entire DPP to bear the risk for such an opportunistic move? Given the DPP's larger concerns, it may be unwise, and should be given careful consideration. Otherwise Su's Two Cities Strategy could leave the DPP in the lurch, both in New Taipei and in the Presidential Palace.
In terms of rational decision-making, if the DPP hopes to return to power, its best strategy is to take one step at a time. It needs to treat any victories in Taipei City and New Taipei as victories in their own right. Su Tseng-chang wants to run for president. If the DPP adopts a strategy of "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City" for his sake, wouldn't it be counterproductive? Wouldn't it amount to "licking blood from the blade of the knife?"
Su Tseng-chang's extremely tricky Two Cities Strategy is both opportunistic and risky. It may not withstand close scrutiny. Never mind DPP leaders such as Tsai Ing-wen, who may not agree with Su Tseng-chang's opportunistic attempt to treat the party as his own political instrument. Su's Two Cities Strategy has yet to meet with the approval of the entire nation. Will the general public countenance Su Tseng-chang manipulating the five cities elections so cavalierly, treating democracy as a game?
Su Tseng-chang may not wish to be locked in by the five cities elections. If so, he can choose not to run at all. He can choose not to run in New Taipei. He can choose not to run in Taipei City. But if he chooses to run, he can hardly announce beforehand that his real goal is to run for president. He cannot treat the five cities elections as a Machiavellian political tool. The Democratic Progressive Party has no reason to "short New Taipei, and transit Taipei City" for Su's sake. Nor can the general public allow Su to play them for fools. Su Tseng-chang's strategy is much too ego-centric. It exaggerates his own importance. It indulges in wishful thinking. Once reality rears its ugly head, his strategy could backfire. He could find himself denounced as an opportunistic politician, manipulating democratic elections for his selfish purposes.
Is the Two Cities Strategy reasonable and justified? One. Why has Su Tseng-chang's candidacy become a given, no longer subject to question? Two. Why must the five cities elections be treated as Su Tseng-chang's political too, paving the way for his presidental campaign? Three. Does Su really intend to adopt the strategy of "shorting New Taipei, and transiting Taipei City?" Four. Should the sanctity of democratic elections be debased in such a manner? If so, how do Su Tseng-chang and the DPP intend to answer to the public?
The DPP has long achieved victories by means of opportunism and trickery. But isn't the Two Cities Strategy just a little too opportunistic and a little too tricky?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.03.01
社論－藍連四敗 民心為何潰散這麼快
本報訊
二二七立委補選，民進黨再下三城，這已經是去年九月以來，國民黨的「連四敗」，也是馬政權兩年不到的「第五敗」！除了台北市大安區立委補選之外，從雲林立委補選、三合一基層選舉、農曆年前三席立委補選到農曆年後的四席立委補選，不論黨主席是吳是馬，黨秘書長是吳、是詹還是金，閣揆是劉或是吳，國民黨都找不到勝選基礎和理由。
特別在去年底三合一選舉之後，整體社會氣氛對馬政府的治理失能愈來愈不耐煩。可以想見，這個氣氛不變，年底五都選舉有可能提前吹響二○一二政權再更迭的號角。這是讓人難以想像的變化，回想二千年政黨輪替，扁政權從高點到低點，第一任的第三年開始，扁家弊案諸如企業行賄早已初露端倪，第二任從扁就任的第一天起，弊案如影隨形，愈滾愈大，從坊間傳聞檢調偵辦，涉入金額從十數億到數十億到上百億；二○○八政黨再輪替，推倒扁政權的不是馬英九，而是陳水扁自己；即使如此，扁政權的淪落，還是足足走了八年，涉及貪汙的實際金額到現在都還結清不了。
馬政權到底發生了什麼事？會讓民心潰散得這麼快？到底是馬英九總統的問題？還是國民黨的問題？但不論馬英九或國民黨，都不是政壇新人或新角色，相反的，不論馬個人或黨，都是台灣民眾熟悉的，馬英九為人熟悉的清廉厚道的特質，讓他在全民惡扁氛圍下快速竄起；然而，國民黨失去政權八年中，並未相應新的政治環境，調整體質，馬英九也未體會到他必須更強勢的領導，才能加速重建扁政府八年崩壞的政治道德和治理專業。馬英九沒有改變，但社會氣氛變了，而民眾對政府的期望顯然失落了。
當輿論批評國民黨的派系文化時，很容易就疏忽了，其實民進黨爭奪政權，也無法迴避派系牽制。以嘉義縣為例，立委補選勝出的陳明文，是李登輝時代典型的國民黨派系，扁政權時靠攏民進黨，竟就此漂白，縣長八年之後交棒給張花冠，自己再接續選立委，這叫派系接棒。類似案例，曾經發生在雲林縣的張榮味家族，但是張家既不能靠挺藍漂白，更無法靠挺藍搞派系或家族交棒。以新竹縣為例，鄭永金縣長八年還要欽點接班人，結果不為國民黨接受，竟拱出脫黨參選縣長者，違紀在前，竟還能再拱自己的親兄弟，代表國民黨角逐立委補選，敗選早可預期。
值得思考的是：為什麼身在藍營的地方派系就能死性不改，吃定國民黨必須對派系妥協讓步？否則江山寧可拱手讓人？為什麼身處綠營的派系對民進黨的向心力會一夕轉變成為黨性堅強？更諷刺的是，當年扁政權收編地方派系的手法可是威脅利誘、軟硬兼施，司法壓力伴隨行政資源。相比之下，無賞無懲的國民黨就只能讓派系予取予求，難堪的是，得者派系而失者政黨。
馬政府聲望下跌，從他就任第一天就已開始，他任用了專業內閣，卻讓老國民黨壓陣，不聽府院號令的國民黨，讓專業內閣寸步難行。莫拉克風災只是壓垮劉內閣的最後一根稻草；吳內閣上路後，卻又犧牲太多專業，政治與接續而來幾乎沒停過的大小選舉考量，讓吳內閣只能思考如何降低政策對選票的衝擊，儘管立法院上會期打一架通過地制法修正案，讓國民黨內小有團結士氣，但無可諱言，不論是中央黨團或地方派系，袖手看國民黨或馬總統笑話的人，遠多過團結一心拉抬府院黨聲勢的人。於是乎，入閣任官者難覓，競逐五都者難求；國民黨易選區眾人搶破頭，國民黨艱困區，無戰將肯披戰袍；在野八年，黨內還有為黨奉獻拚搏的悲壯士氣，執政短短兩年，這一丁點戰鬥意志都消弭於無形。
但凡領導者，最重要的特質就是要有死士願鼎力效忠，馬英九枯坐總統府，不能不深思何以賢士戰將俱遠矣？民進黨再下三城，於立法院不過取得卅三席，於國會議事容或無涉，但就大局卻顯見執政黨聲勢再挫。藍營內已有內閣改組之議，類似建議輿論一而再、再而三提出，若非建議如泥牛入海，無聲無息，就是內閣老人舊面孔搬風，愈搬愈糟，馬政權必須徹底警覺，新人新政新氣象的意義。一個「貪」字推倒扁政權，希望兩年後的二○一二年，不會出現一個「笨」字推倒馬政權的危機發生。
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