Foxconn and Honda Incidents Inspire Mainland Chinese Labor Movement
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 10, 2010
If a human being plunges to his death from the top of a building, it may evoke a few expressions of regret. But the sound of a dozen or so bodies hitting the pavement, one after another, may send tremors through the World's Factory. The suicide leaps from the roof of the Foxconn headquarters building, and the labor strikes at the Honda Foshan plant, recently led to substantial pay raises. They have stimulated demands for wage increases in both mainland Chinese and foreign owned enterprises. They have also increased awareness of the human rights issue among mainland Chinese laborers. They will eventually have a profound impact on mainland Chinese society.
Thousands of factory workers at the Shenzhen plant of the Merry Electronics Co., a manufacturer of mobile phone parts, went on strike. Influenced by events at Honda and Foxconn, they successfully demanded pay increases and concessions from their employers. Soon afterwards, laborers on mainland China went on strikes up and down the nation. Violent clashes erupted at a Taiwan owned plant in Kunshan, injuring dozens. At the same time, mainland China's National Federation of Trade Unions issued an emergency memorandum, asking Taiwan and foreign-funded enterprises to set up trade unions as soon as possible. It stressed the need to promote collective bargaining to defend the interests of assembly line workers.
The wave of strikes that have occurred during the spring and summer of 2010, can be expected to spread and lead to a wave of economic and social changes. Looking forward, the attractness of the Chinese mainland as the World's Factory will be diminished. Foreign and Taiwan-owned enterprises on mainland China may decide to relocate. In any event, those entrepreneurs who remain may need to change their thinking about cheap labor. The mainland Chinese government may also need to change its habit of blindly oppressing the labor movement.
History can often turned on an accident. A series of suicide leaps occurred at Foxconn. Actually Foxconn is not some notorious sweatshop. But the mainland Chinese practice of "surrounding villages with factories," the militarization of management, the dysfunctional culture of mechanized assembly lines, and the fragile psychology of the "Post Nineties" generation, have led to complications. Fortunately, Foxconn is a reputable company with enough redeeming virtues to ensure that the outside world will see the truth. It also has sufficient resources to respond to the demands of labor and society. The Foxconn Group's share prices fell despite the pay raises. But in the long run, Foxconn's rapid response was much more sensible than procrastination.
By contrast, the three week long strike at the Honda Foshan factory is making Beijing even more nervous. It is more organized in its form, and more radical in its methods. It has completely paralyzed Honda's mainland China production line, and cost the company 30 billion RMB in operational losses. It has forced management to change its hard-line stance and increase workers' wages. Compared to the dozen suicide leaps at Foxconn, the Honda workers strike is far more virulent. The workers' "plant walk" tactic has been widely emulated. Once it spreads, the government and businesses will find it difficult to deal with.
In ten short years mainland China has become the World's Factory. It is already the prime mover of the global economy. But this miracle has its downside. Foreign capital has created new jobs. It has turned surplus rural population into low-cost labor. But it has also increased society's sense of comparative deprivation. With mainland China becoming more open, such domestic and foreign class differences have become increasingly acute. If the wage system and trade unions fail to adjust, such forms of "soft exploitation" rooted in the division of labor and subcontracting will be difficult to sustain.
Now is a good time to take advantage of a booming economy and a positive economic outlook. Beijing should seek opportunities to gradually permit the formation of trade unions, giving them a greater say in labor disputes. Otherwise, once labor unrest intensifies, protesters will begin pointing the finger at the government, creating an unbearable burden on those in power. Take the Henan Pingmian Textile Group for example. Workers went on strike there around the same time as Honda. But because this mainland Chinese enterprise was located in the remote inland region, it was forcibly suppressed by local government. The group was once an SOE, restructured as a public company. During the restructuring process, workers were deprived of their equity rights. If the problem is swept under the rug, it will merely generate greater resentment.
For the past 10 years companies all over the world have competed to set up factories on mainland China. What matters to them is cheap local labor. But with economic growth and increased labor awareness, the boom will inevitably recede. Once the domestic market begins to grow, mainland China will have to find a way to shed its "World's Factory" label. After all, turning its people into cheap OEM labor for foreign manufacturers is merely the first phase of the "first become rich" strategy. Now it must turn its attention to matters of equity and justice.
The Foxconn and Honda incidents have inspired a mainland Chinese labor movement. This movement shows no signs of abating.
富士康和本田事件吹動了中國工運的風車
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.10 02:03 am
一個人體從高樓墜地，也許只能引起幾聲嘆息；但十幾個肉身連續撞擊地面的聲音，卻能震動整個世界工廠。富士康的跳樓事件和佛山本田廠的罷工事件，最近相繼以大幅加薪收場，不僅為中外資企業掀起了一股薪資漲風，也為中國勞工的人權意識打開了一片風景，最終將對社會變遷產生深遠的影響。
受本田和富士康事件影響，製造手機零件的美律深圳廠近日也爆發數千工人要求加薪的罷工，並成功迫使資方讓步。緊接著，中國從南到北都傳出罷工事件，昆山一家台資工廠甚至爆發衝突，造成數十人受傷。與此同時，中國全國總工會發出緊急通知，要求台商及外資企業儘快組建工會，強調應推動工資集體協商制度，保障生產線上工人的權益。
可以預期，這場發生在2010年春夏之交的工潮，將繼續擴散，牽引中國經濟和社會產生一波新的變化。往後，大陸作為世界工廠的誘因或將削弱，也許會有外資或台資企業開始從中國外移；無論如何，留下來的經營者對廉價勞動者予取予求的心態勢必修正，而中國官方對工運一味壓制的傳統手法也必須調整。
歷史軌跡的轉向，有時常出於偶然。富士康發生連續跳樓事件，其實並非因為它是惡名昭彰的血汗工廠；而是中國模式「圍鎮造廠」的超大型廠舍聚落的奇特生態，加上軍事化管理及機械式作業線的病態文化，和所謂「90後」世代的脆弱心理狀態碰撞，產生的複合併發症。所幸富士康是素負聲譽的企業，有足夠的正面條件讓外界看見真相，並有較充分的餘裕回應勞工及社會的要求。富士康加薪雖導致集團股價大跌，但從長期看，提早調整轉型總比遲誤來得明智。
相形之下，本田汽車佛山廠近三周的罷工，則更令中共心驚膽跳。形式上更有組織，手段也更強烈，不僅造成本田中國生產線的徹底癱瘓，並導致該公司卅億人民幣的營運損失，逼得原本姿態強硬的資方不得不俯首讓步調薪。比起富士康的十二跳，本田罷工對中國勞工絕對有更大的傳染力，勞工們在「工廠散步」的手法已廣泛流傳，一旦蔓延，政府和企業將窮於應付。
中國在短短十幾年間成為世界工廠，儼然已是全球經濟的重要引擎，但發展至今，此一奇蹟模式也暴露了它的內在問題。外國資本雖帶來工作機會，將農村過剩人口轉為廉價工人，但也為社會加重了相對剝奪感。隨著中國日漸開放，這樣的內外階級差異變得日益尖銳，薪資制度及工會組織若不相應調整，這種建立在分工、轉包上的軟性剝削終有難以支撐的一天。
事實上，趁著景氣暢旺、形勢大好，正是進行調整的好時機。中共應伺機逐步開放企業組建工會，並讓它們擁有較實質的勞資爭議交涉權；否則，一旦勞工抗爭風起雲湧，各種抗爭焦點都會指向政府，將變成主政者無法承受的負擔。以河南平棉集團為例，與本田約莫同時發生罷工，這家陸企卻因偏處內地遭到地方政府強行鎮壓。該集團從國營到股份的改制過程中吞掉了員工股權的問題，如果就此置之不理，不怕激起更大的民怨嗎？
十多年來，各國企業爭相赴中國設廠，看中的是當地廉價的勞動力；但隨著經濟成長及勞工意識的抬頭，那樣的熱潮走向冷卻，恐怕是必然的發展。從更高的角度看，在內需市場逐漸強大後，中國必須設法逐步摘掉「世界工廠」的帽子；畢竟，讓廣大人民為外國廠商充當廉價代工勞力，只是追求「先富起來」的階段性任務，現在該回頭照顧「均」和「正義」的問題了。
富士康和本田事件已經吹動了中國勞工維權的風車，這股風潮現在看來是停不下來了。
Thursday, June 10, 2010
Wednesday, June 9, 2010
Beijing Tied the Knot, Beijing Must Untie the Knot
Beijing Tied the Knot, Beijing Must Untie the Knot
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9, 2010
ARATS Vice Chairman Zhang Mingqing published an article in the June issue of "China Review." In it he responded to National Taiwan University Professor Chang Ya-chung's concept of "cross-strait integration." He attempted to open a new and important path for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. In the May issue of the "China Review" Zhang Nianchi of the Shanghai East Asia Institute published an article entitled 'Preconditions Necessary to Resolve the "Republic of China" Dilemma.' It was an attempt by the mainland side to break the political stalemate. It was a perspective with even more of an official stamp to it.
Professor Chang Ya-chung's "integration theory" states that "The two sides of the Taiwan Strait entail three entities." One is the "Republic of China." One is the "People's Republic of China." One is "China as a Whole." Taiwan is a part of "China as a Whole." The mainland is also part of "China as a Whole." As Chang Ya-chung explained, this is not the "two states theory." Instead it is predicated on the ultimate objective of "One Integrated China." But it also respects the current cross-Strait reality of one nation comprised of two entities.
Chang Ya-chung and others have advocated their "Integration theory" for years. Even President Chen Shui-bian echoed the theory in his 2000 New Year's Eve speech. He spoke of "Starting with cross-Strait economic and cultural integration," then jointly seeking "a new framework for political integration."
Zhang Nianchi called upon officials to confront the reality of the "Republic of China." Zhang Mingqing responded to Chang Ya-chung's "integration theory." This shows that that Beijing is making adjustments to its cross-Strait policy. One. Beijing seems to have already accepted the notion that "One China" or "China as a Whole" is a third concept that transcends both the ROC and the PRC. Two. Beijing apparently acknowledges that it must acknowledge the reality of the "Republic of China," or as Zhang Mingqing put it, "respect history, respect the reality, and be people-oriented."
On New Year's Day this year, this newspaper published a series of "Six New Year's Day Editorials." Professor Chang Ya-chung also offered a number of different views. We pointed out that the two sides do not have any insuperable differences. The two sides' views coincide in in two areas. One. The "Big Roof Theory." This defines "One China" or "China as a Whole" as a third entity or third concept. Two. The "Big Glass Theory." This defines Taiwan as water, and the Republic of China as the glass. As long as the glass remains intact, the water remains in the glass. But if the glass is broken, the water runs off. We feel that in order to ensure cross-Strait "peaceful development" these two pillars are indispensable.
In fact, over the past decade, Beijing has been thinking along the same lines. The only difference is it has waffled back and forth, and has been unable to make a conceptual breakthrough. For example, in 1997, ARATS Chief Wang Daohan pointed out that "One China does not mean the Peoples Republic of China. Nor does it mean the Republic of China. It means a unified China created by compatriots on both sides." He also proposed an "In Progress Style One China." In 1998, President Chen Qimao of the Shanghai Institute of International Relations pointed out that Beijing hoped Taipei would return to the "One China" policy. In other words, return to the "One China" defined in the Republic of China Constitution and the Guidelines for National Unification. In May 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected President of the Republic of China. Xin Qi, a political advisor to the Beijng authorities, again pointed out that Beijing hoped to see the new leader in Taipei return to the "One China defined in the ROC Constitution and the Guidelines for National Reunification." Recently the mainland authorities have repeatedly used a number of different channels, including Zhang Mingqing, to underscore Hu Jintao's declaration that "Although the mainland and Taiwan have yet to be reunified, this does not change the fact that the mainland and Taiwan both belong to on China." We consider these two theories the indispensable pillars of the "Big Roof Theory" and the "Big Glass Theory."
We have pointed out that the Beijing authorities should jettison their "Old One China Theory" and its "Annihilate the Republic of China" mindset. They should adopt a "New One China Theory" that acknowledges the existence of the "Republic of China." Cross-Strait solutions proliferate. Some are goal oriented. Others are process oriented. We feel that the "Big Roof Theory" is nothing less than our "chosen goal." But more importantly the "Big Glass Theory" is our "chosen process." Without the "Big Glass Theory," there can be no "Big Roof Theory."
To implement the "Big Glass Theory," the Beijing authorities have many options. To reach a far off destination one must begin by taking tiny steps. To reach elevated heights one must assume a humble attitude. Beijing may as well begin with tiny steps. It can begin by removing the scare quotes from mainland news reports about ROC "legislators," and the ROC "President." It can stop objecting to the presence of ROC flags and the use of ROC official titles when mainland VIPs visit Taiwan. It can allow Taipei to sign FTAs with other countries. If it cannot take even these tiny steps, what's the point of discussing bigger ones?
At a moment such as this, we may wish to recall this newspaper's "New Three Proclamations." To wit, "There is only one China in the world. Both the ROC and the PRC are part of China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity are not subject to division."
Zhang Mingqing's article deserves affirmation. But Beijing tied the knot. Beijing must untie the knot!
繫鈴是北京 解鈴亦在北京
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.09 02:04 am
大陸海協會副會長張銘清，在《中國評論》六月號發表文章指出，台大張亞中教授提出的「兩岸統合」，不失為開創兩岸關係和平發展新局面的重要途徑之一。這是繼《中國評論》五月號刊出上海東亞研究所所長章念馳所撰〈創條件解「中華民國」難題〉的文章後，大陸方面對破解兩岸政治僵局，又一更具官方色彩的指標性論述。
張亞中教授「統合論」的主要觀點是：「兩岸有三個主體」，一個是「中華民國」，一個是「中華人民共和國」，另一個是「整個中國（第三主體）」。台灣是「整個中國」的一部分，大陸也是「整個中國」的一部分。張亞中解釋，這不是「兩國論」，而是在「一中統合」的終局目標下，尊重當前兩岸現實的一國兩體的運作設計。
「統合論」是張亞中等人倡議多年的理論，甚至陳水扁總統於二○○○年除夕談話也呼應指出，「從兩岸經貿與文化統合開始著手」，進而共同尋求「政治統合的新架構」。
章念馳呼籲面對「中華民國」，張銘清回應「統合論」，顯示北京正在嘗試調整其兩岸政策。主要的方向是：一、似乎已經接受「一個中國（整個中國）」是超越中華民國與中華人民共和國的第三主體或第三概念。二、顯然已經認知，在張銘清所說的「尊重歷史／尊重現實／以人為本」的前提下，「中華民國」是北京必須面對的課題。
本報在今年元旦發表〈元旦六論〉系列社論時，張亞中教授等曾提出不同見解。我們當時即指出，兩方的觀點並無絕對的歧異。最大的交集有二：一、皆是「泛屋頂理論」，將「一個中國（整個中國）」定位為第三主體或第三概念。二、亦皆是「泛杯子理論」（台灣是水，中華民國是杯子；杯在水在，杯破水覆）。我們認為，若要維持兩岸「和平發展」的進程，以上兩點是主要支柱，非此不成。
其實，十餘年來，北京方面也一直有此類思考，只是進進退退，迄無突破。例如：一九九七年，海協會長汪道涵即指出，「一個中國不等於中華人民共和國，也不等於中華民國，而是兩岸同胞共同締造統一的中國」，並提出「現在進行式的一個中國」的概念。再如，一九九八年，上海國際關係學會會長陳啟懋又指出，北京希望台灣回到「一個中國」的政策，就是回歸到台灣憲法及國統綱領中的「一個中國」。又如，二○○○年五月，陳水扁當選中華民國總統，北京智囊辛旗再度指出，希望見到台灣新的領導人能夠回到「在中華民國憲法及國統綱領定義下的一個中國」。尤其，近來，大陸方面更透過不同管道，包括張銘清此次，屢屢強調胡錦濤所說：「大陸和台灣雖尚未統一……這（並）沒有改變大陸和台灣同屬一個中國的事實。」我們認為，這些論述皆必須以「泛屋頂理論」及「泛杯子理論」為支柱，非此不成。
我們曾經指出，北京當局應當從「中華民國消滅」的「舊版一個中國」；改版到「中華民國存在」的「新版一個中國」。在各種兩岸解決方案中，有些強調「目的」，有些強調「過程」；我們認為，「屋頂理論」不失為「目的方案」，但更重要的是須以「杯子理論」為「過程方案」。沒有「杯子理論」，就不會有「屋頂理論」。
若要體現「杯子理論」，北京當局能為應為之事很多。行遠自邇，登高自卑，北京何妨先從幾件「小事」做起；小至將新聞報導中「立法委員」、「總統」的引號取消，再至大陸訪台賓客不避忌青天白日滿地紅國旗及政府官銜，再至不阻撓台灣與他國簽ＦＴＡ……。如果連這些「小事」都做不到，遑論其他？
值此省思時刻，何妨回味本報曾經提出的「新新三句」：「世界上只有一個中國，中華民國與中華人民共和國都是一部分的中國，中國的主權和領土不容分割。」
張銘清的文章應予肯定，但繫鈴是北京，解鈴也要看北京！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 9, 2010
ARATS Vice Chairman Zhang Mingqing published an article in the June issue of "China Review." In it he responded to National Taiwan University Professor Chang Ya-chung's concept of "cross-strait integration." He attempted to open a new and important path for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. In the May issue of the "China Review" Zhang Nianchi of the Shanghai East Asia Institute published an article entitled 'Preconditions Necessary to Resolve the "Republic of China" Dilemma.' It was an attempt by the mainland side to break the political stalemate. It was a perspective with even more of an official stamp to it.
Professor Chang Ya-chung's "integration theory" states that "The two sides of the Taiwan Strait entail three entities." One is the "Republic of China." One is the "People's Republic of China." One is "China as a Whole." Taiwan is a part of "China as a Whole." The mainland is also part of "China as a Whole." As Chang Ya-chung explained, this is not the "two states theory." Instead it is predicated on the ultimate objective of "One Integrated China." But it also respects the current cross-Strait reality of one nation comprised of two entities.
Chang Ya-chung and others have advocated their "Integration theory" for years. Even President Chen Shui-bian echoed the theory in his 2000 New Year's Eve speech. He spoke of "Starting with cross-Strait economic and cultural integration," then jointly seeking "a new framework for political integration."
Zhang Nianchi called upon officials to confront the reality of the "Republic of China." Zhang Mingqing responded to Chang Ya-chung's "integration theory." This shows that that Beijing is making adjustments to its cross-Strait policy. One. Beijing seems to have already accepted the notion that "One China" or "China as a Whole" is a third concept that transcends both the ROC and the PRC. Two. Beijing apparently acknowledges that it must acknowledge the reality of the "Republic of China," or as Zhang Mingqing put it, "respect history, respect the reality, and be people-oriented."
On New Year's Day this year, this newspaper published a series of "Six New Year's Day Editorials." Professor Chang Ya-chung also offered a number of different views. We pointed out that the two sides do not have any insuperable differences. The two sides' views coincide in in two areas. One. The "Big Roof Theory." This defines "One China" or "China as a Whole" as a third entity or third concept. Two. The "Big Glass Theory." This defines Taiwan as water, and the Republic of China as the glass. As long as the glass remains intact, the water remains in the glass. But if the glass is broken, the water runs off. We feel that in order to ensure cross-Strait "peaceful development" these two pillars are indispensable.
In fact, over the past decade, Beijing has been thinking along the same lines. The only difference is it has waffled back and forth, and has been unable to make a conceptual breakthrough. For example, in 1997, ARATS Chief Wang Daohan pointed out that "One China does not mean the Peoples Republic of China. Nor does it mean the Republic of China. It means a unified China created by compatriots on both sides." He also proposed an "In Progress Style One China." In 1998, President Chen Qimao of the Shanghai Institute of International Relations pointed out that Beijing hoped Taipei would return to the "One China" policy. In other words, return to the "One China" defined in the Republic of China Constitution and the Guidelines for National Unification. In May 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected President of the Republic of China. Xin Qi, a political advisor to the Beijng authorities, again pointed out that Beijing hoped to see the new leader in Taipei return to the "One China defined in the ROC Constitution and the Guidelines for National Reunification." Recently the mainland authorities have repeatedly used a number of different channels, including Zhang Mingqing, to underscore Hu Jintao's declaration that "Although the mainland and Taiwan have yet to be reunified, this does not change the fact that the mainland and Taiwan both belong to on China." We consider these two theories the indispensable pillars of the "Big Roof Theory" and the "Big Glass Theory."
We have pointed out that the Beijing authorities should jettison their "Old One China Theory" and its "Annihilate the Republic of China" mindset. They should adopt a "New One China Theory" that acknowledges the existence of the "Republic of China." Cross-Strait solutions proliferate. Some are goal oriented. Others are process oriented. We feel that the "Big Roof Theory" is nothing less than our "chosen goal." But more importantly the "Big Glass Theory" is our "chosen process." Without the "Big Glass Theory," there can be no "Big Roof Theory."
To implement the "Big Glass Theory," the Beijing authorities have many options. To reach a far off destination one must begin by taking tiny steps. To reach elevated heights one must assume a humble attitude. Beijing may as well begin with tiny steps. It can begin by removing the scare quotes from mainland news reports about ROC "legislators," and the ROC "President." It can stop objecting to the presence of ROC flags and the use of ROC official titles when mainland VIPs visit Taiwan. It can allow Taipei to sign FTAs with other countries. If it cannot take even these tiny steps, what's the point of discussing bigger ones?
At a moment such as this, we may wish to recall this newspaper's "New Three Proclamations." To wit, "There is only one China in the world. Both the ROC and the PRC are part of China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity are not subject to division."
Zhang Mingqing's article deserves affirmation. But Beijing tied the knot. Beijing must untie the knot!
繫鈴是北京 解鈴亦在北京
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.09 02:04 am
大陸海協會副會長張銘清，在《中國評論》六月號發表文章指出，台大張亞中教授提出的「兩岸統合」，不失為開創兩岸關係和平發展新局面的重要途徑之一。這是繼《中國評論》五月號刊出上海東亞研究所所長章念馳所撰〈創條件解「中華民國」難題〉的文章後，大陸方面對破解兩岸政治僵局，又一更具官方色彩的指標性論述。
張亞中教授「統合論」的主要觀點是：「兩岸有三個主體」，一個是「中華民國」，一個是「中華人民共和國」，另一個是「整個中國（第三主體）」。台灣是「整個中國」的一部分，大陸也是「整個中國」的一部分。張亞中解釋，這不是「兩國論」，而是在「一中統合」的終局目標下，尊重當前兩岸現實的一國兩體的運作設計。
「統合論」是張亞中等人倡議多年的理論，甚至陳水扁總統於二○○○年除夕談話也呼應指出，「從兩岸經貿與文化統合開始著手」，進而共同尋求「政治統合的新架構」。
章念馳呼籲面對「中華民國」，張銘清回應「統合論」，顯示北京正在嘗試調整其兩岸政策。主要的方向是：一、似乎已經接受「一個中國（整個中國）」是超越中華民國與中華人民共和國的第三主體或第三概念。二、顯然已經認知，在張銘清所說的「尊重歷史／尊重現實／以人為本」的前提下，「中華民國」是北京必須面對的課題。
本報在今年元旦發表〈元旦六論〉系列社論時，張亞中教授等曾提出不同見解。我們當時即指出，兩方的觀點並無絕對的歧異。最大的交集有二：一、皆是「泛屋頂理論」，將「一個中國（整個中國）」定位為第三主體或第三概念。二、亦皆是「泛杯子理論」（台灣是水，中華民國是杯子；杯在水在，杯破水覆）。我們認為，若要維持兩岸「和平發展」的進程，以上兩點是主要支柱，非此不成。
其實，十餘年來，北京方面也一直有此類思考，只是進進退退，迄無突破。例如：一九九七年，海協會長汪道涵即指出，「一個中國不等於中華人民共和國，也不等於中華民國，而是兩岸同胞共同締造統一的中國」，並提出「現在進行式的一個中國」的概念。再如，一九九八年，上海國際關係學會會長陳啟懋又指出，北京希望台灣回到「一個中國」的政策，就是回歸到台灣憲法及國統綱領中的「一個中國」。又如，二○○○年五月，陳水扁當選中華民國總統，北京智囊辛旗再度指出，希望見到台灣新的領導人能夠回到「在中華民國憲法及國統綱領定義下的一個中國」。尤其，近來，大陸方面更透過不同管道，包括張銘清此次，屢屢強調胡錦濤所說：「大陸和台灣雖尚未統一……這（並）沒有改變大陸和台灣同屬一個中國的事實。」我們認為，這些論述皆必須以「泛屋頂理論」及「泛杯子理論」為支柱，非此不成。
我們曾經指出，北京當局應當從「中華民國消滅」的「舊版一個中國」；改版到「中華民國存在」的「新版一個中國」。在各種兩岸解決方案中，有些強調「目的」，有些強調「過程」；我們認為，「屋頂理論」不失為「目的方案」，但更重要的是須以「杯子理論」為「過程方案」。沒有「杯子理論」，就不會有「屋頂理論」。
若要體現「杯子理論」，北京當局能為應為之事很多。行遠自邇，登高自卑，北京何妨先從幾件「小事」做起；小至將新聞報導中「立法委員」、「總統」的引號取消，再至大陸訪台賓客不避忌青天白日滿地紅國旗及政府官銜，再至不阻撓台灣與他國簽ＦＴＡ……。如果連這些「小事」都做不到，遑論其他？
值此省思時刻，何妨回味本報曾經提出的「新新三句」：「世界上只有一個中國，中華民國與中華人民共和國都是一部分的中國，中國的主權和領土不容分割。」
張銘清的文章應予肯定，但繫鈴是北京，解鈴也要看北京！
Monday, June 7, 2010
The Same Tired Rhetoric: Politics on Taiwan Spins Its Wheels
The Same Tired Rhetoric: Politics on Taiwan Spins Its Wheels
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 7, 2010
Political discourse on Taiwan has been plagued by the same tired rhetoric, repeated ad infinitum. Recently the situation has gotten worse. The level of political discourse has actually regressed. This warrants close consideration -- even alarm. First, the DPP announced their mayoral candidates for the five directly administered municipalities. Their slogan was "the second siege of the cities from the countryside." This was followed by a speech by Tsai Ing-wen, in which she said "the Republic of China is a government in exile," igniting intense controversy.
Slogans such as "besiege the cities from the countryside," and "government in exile" are fighting words. For some they may well inflame passions. For others they may cause anxiety and unease. What is most noteworthy about these slogans however, is not that they are so provocative, but that they are so stale and petty parochial. Two changes in ruling parties have taken place. Yet certain political parties still invoke them in an effort to incite voter sentiments. These slogans actually elicited a positive response. What does that tell us, if not that democracy on Taiwan has regressed?
The DPP first shouted the slogan "besiege the cities from the countryside" twenty years ago. Ten years it succeeded in "transforming the blue sky into the green earth." Ten years ago, it successfully effected a change in ruling parties at the central government level. Yet Tsai Ing-wen is singing a "besiege the city" marching song. She seems to be attempting to blank out eight years of unbridled Chen regime corruption and incompetence, in order to allow the DPP to make a comeback. The problem is that over the past twenty years politics on Taiwan has changed. It has undergone repeated ups and downs. Once society was filled with hope as it looked forward to democratic reforms. Today society finds itself mired in "ethnic" (communal) schisms and political and economic debacles. Society today has a totally different face. Society today has a totally different atmosphere. The Green Camp is now trotting out its old slogans. But besides provoking public frustration with democracy's problems, what sort of vision and inspiration can it offer for the future?
Even more shocking was Tsai Ing-wen's "government in exile" rhetoric. It was even more reactionary and retrograde than Lee Teng-hui's 1994 rhetoric about "alien regimes." It inadvertently revealed the fundamental thinking in her heart of hearts. Tsai Ing-wen was once seen as a rational and clear-headed leader. Her rise to the leadership of the DPP was viewed as a positive development. But ever since she revealed her hidden side, the public has become skeptical about her true character.
Rhetoric about so-called "alien regimes" or "governments in exile" maliciously incite social divisions. Worse still, they are fundamental betrayals of moral and political responsibility. Tsai Ing-wen was the chief policymaker behind the "avoid haste, be patient" and "closed door" policies. Does she feel no responsibility whatsoever for her "government in exile" rhetoric? Last year Chen Shui-bian took advantage of his status as a former Republic of China "president in exile" to go crying to Washington, raising both eyebrows and doubts about his sanity. Tsai Ing-wen openly abetted Ah-Bian's "government in exile" rhetoric. Just where does she hope to lead the DPP? Just where does she intend to push the ROC?
In fact the regression of political discourse on Taiwan did not begin this year. Symptoms of regression have been apparent for years. They have merely been drowned out by raucous political mobilization and overshadowed by facile political sophistry. One might say this exemplifies the degeneration of political thought and practice on Taiwan.
Take the death penalty controversy for example. It was the result of bipartisan "cooperation." Over the years, both blue and green administrations have taken a highly technical approach toward the abolition of the death penalty. The judicial, legislative and executive branches have made no effort to seek fundamental solutions rooted in the law. Only the Ministry of Justice made a half-hearted effort to abolish the death penalty through "non-implementation." Even the Taiwan Alliance to End the Death Penalty has made no effort to abolish the death on the basis of humanitarianism, or to convert the public on the basis of human rights. All it does is stubbornly delay the execution of death row inmates by demanding constitutional interpretations, in order to maintain Taiwan's "human rights image." Once such superficial efforts run up against public opinion, the cover provided by the judiciary is immediately blown.
Why does democracy on Taiwan continue to spin its wheels? For three main reasons. One. The Green Camp refuses to forsake its expedient strategy of inciting of "ethnic" (communal) animosities. This ensures that politics will continue to incite hatred and confrontation, rather than foster equality, freedom, and empathy. Two. The Blue Camp worships at the altar of pragmatism. It is adept at muddying the political waters, but terrified of debating higher principles. It has never been able to clarify the issues or assuage Green Camp doubts. Instead it has repeatedly danced to the Green Camp's tune, and repeatedly returned society to its starting point. Three. The meaning of democracy has been distorted. Democracy on Taiwan has been reduced to mere electioneering. After each election everyone immediately begins planning for the next round of competition. Implementation of policies and serving the public are lost amidst the smell of cordite.
Over the past twenty years, the public on Taiwan has endured painful democratic changes. They have listened to countless moving political slogans. They have participated in one town hall meeting after another, and one street protest after another. In the end, their reward has been anguish at seeing their society torn apart, frustration at witnessing their political leaders blowing hot and cold, and dismay at the realization that their vaunted democracy is going nowhere. After two changes in ruling parties, being forced to listen to politicians shouting the same tired old slogans truly is depressing.
論述輪迴：台灣政治的原地踏步現象
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.08 02:21 am
台灣政治上最近出現的論述輪迴與退化現象，值得深思與警惕。先是民進黨推出了五都選戰人選，喊出「第二次鄉村包圍城市」的口號；接著，蔡英文在演講時，提出「中華民國是一個流亡政府」的說法，引發強烈爭議。
「鄉村包圍城市」和「流亡政府」都是充滿挑戰意味的口號，可能勾起一些人重燃戰火的激情，也可能引發另一些人憂心動盪的焦慮。值得注意的其實不是口號本身的挑釁意味，而是其內容的陳腐與褊狹。經過兩次政黨輪替，政黨卻還在引用陳年老調來訴求選民，而且居然能迸出火花，台灣的民主豈不是在向後倒退？
民進黨最早喊出「地方包圍中央」，是廿一年前的事，並在十多年前實現「藍天變綠地」，更在十年前完成中央的政黨輪替。如今蔡英文高唱「包圍」戰歌，彷彿跳過扁政府貪腐無能的八年不提，民進黨即可捲土重來再造顛峰。問題是，台灣廿年來政治起伏，從當年整個社會對民主改革充滿渴望，到如今族群撕裂、政經顛躓，不僅面目全非，氛圍也大不相同。現在綠營重拾舊口號，除了勾起人們對民主磨難的嘆惋，能帶來對台灣前景的鼓舞嗎？
更令人吃驚的，是蔡英文的「流亡政府」說，比起李登輝一九九四年的「外來政權」說，還要更倒退千里，也不經意地反射出她心底的基本思維。作為民進黨領導人，蔡英文被認為理性清新，這是可喜的現象；但從她偶或流露的詭譎多變或刻意隱匿的一面，卻讓人對她的底蘊充滿疑慮。
所謂外來政權或流亡政府，其危險不僅是在刻意製造對立而已，更嚴重的，是從政治道德面根本背棄了自身應負的責任。蔡英文其實是從「戒急用忍」到「鎖國」政策的主要操刀手，對於她在「流亡政府」中的角色，難道毫無應負的責任嗎？再說，陳水扁去年藉前中華民國「流亡總統」之名向美國告狀，引起舉世側目，認為這絕非神智清明之舉；而蔡英文竟然公開跟進阿扁的流亡說，這想把民進黨帶向哪裡？又將把台灣推向何方？
其實，台灣的論述退化，並不是今年才發生的事，這樣的現象已經存在多年，只是一直被喧囂不寧的政治動員及華而不實的表層論述所掩蓋。甚至可以說，論述退化其實正是台灣政治思維退化及實踐無能的共同結晶。
以死刑的爭議為例，就是兩黨「合作」造成的結果。多年來，藍綠政府都採取高度技術主義的手法來處理「廢死」，司法、立法及行政部門無一企圖從法律面尋求根本解決，只讓法務部以消極的「不執行」來達成虛假的廢死。包括廢死聯盟，也不在人道訴求或人權教育上下功夫，只一味透過釋憲的程序杯葛讓死刑犯苟延殘喘，以維持台灣在「人權形象」上的評分。這些表面功夫，一碰到民意沸揚，司法的掩護當然要立刻破功。
台灣的民主為何原地踏步，從論述上看，主要原因有：一，綠營不願放棄族群動員的便宜戰略，使得政治持續被導向仇恨及對峙。一個被仇恨動員的社會，很難產生平等、自由的同理心。二，藍軍的現實主義作祟，擅於和稀泥而怯於論戰，始終無法釐清或化解綠營的質疑，卻一再隨綠營的戰歌起舞，讓社會反覆被帶回原點。三，由於對民主的曲解，台灣的民主政治被簡化到只剩下「選舉」，每次選舉結束，馬上又進入下一回合的爭逐；至於施政、服務人民的問題，完全被埋沒在煙硝中。
這廿年，台灣人民經歷了痛快淋漓的民主變革，聆聽過無數動人的政治口號，追逐過一場又一場的政見會及街頭運動；到最後，品嘗到社會撕裂的痛苦，見識了政治領袖翻雲覆雨的本事，同時也認清了民主停滯不前的窘境。兩次政黨輪替之後，聽到政治人物還在呼喊如此陳腐的口號，真是教人憂鬱不安。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 7, 2010
Political discourse on Taiwan has been plagued by the same tired rhetoric, repeated ad infinitum. Recently the situation has gotten worse. The level of political discourse has actually regressed. This warrants close consideration -- even alarm. First, the DPP announced their mayoral candidates for the five directly administered municipalities. Their slogan was "the second siege of the cities from the countryside." This was followed by a speech by Tsai Ing-wen, in which she said "the Republic of China is a government in exile," igniting intense controversy.
Slogans such as "besiege the cities from the countryside," and "government in exile" are fighting words. For some they may well inflame passions. For others they may cause anxiety and unease. What is most noteworthy about these slogans however, is not that they are so provocative, but that they are so stale and petty parochial. Two changes in ruling parties have taken place. Yet certain political parties still invoke them in an effort to incite voter sentiments. These slogans actually elicited a positive response. What does that tell us, if not that democracy on Taiwan has regressed?
The DPP first shouted the slogan "besiege the cities from the countryside" twenty years ago. Ten years it succeeded in "transforming the blue sky into the green earth." Ten years ago, it successfully effected a change in ruling parties at the central government level. Yet Tsai Ing-wen is singing a "besiege the city" marching song. She seems to be attempting to blank out eight years of unbridled Chen regime corruption and incompetence, in order to allow the DPP to make a comeback. The problem is that over the past twenty years politics on Taiwan has changed. It has undergone repeated ups and downs. Once society was filled with hope as it looked forward to democratic reforms. Today society finds itself mired in "ethnic" (communal) schisms and political and economic debacles. Society today has a totally different face. Society today has a totally different atmosphere. The Green Camp is now trotting out its old slogans. But besides provoking public frustration with democracy's problems, what sort of vision and inspiration can it offer for the future?
Even more shocking was Tsai Ing-wen's "government in exile" rhetoric. It was even more reactionary and retrograde than Lee Teng-hui's 1994 rhetoric about "alien regimes." It inadvertently revealed the fundamental thinking in her heart of hearts. Tsai Ing-wen was once seen as a rational and clear-headed leader. Her rise to the leadership of the DPP was viewed as a positive development. But ever since she revealed her hidden side, the public has become skeptical about her true character.
Rhetoric about so-called "alien regimes" or "governments in exile" maliciously incite social divisions. Worse still, they are fundamental betrayals of moral and political responsibility. Tsai Ing-wen was the chief policymaker behind the "avoid haste, be patient" and "closed door" policies. Does she feel no responsibility whatsoever for her "government in exile" rhetoric? Last year Chen Shui-bian took advantage of his status as a former Republic of China "president in exile" to go crying to Washington, raising both eyebrows and doubts about his sanity. Tsai Ing-wen openly abetted Ah-Bian's "government in exile" rhetoric. Just where does she hope to lead the DPP? Just where does she intend to push the ROC?
In fact the regression of political discourse on Taiwan did not begin this year. Symptoms of regression have been apparent for years. They have merely been drowned out by raucous political mobilization and overshadowed by facile political sophistry. One might say this exemplifies the degeneration of political thought and practice on Taiwan.
Take the death penalty controversy for example. It was the result of bipartisan "cooperation." Over the years, both blue and green administrations have taken a highly technical approach toward the abolition of the death penalty. The judicial, legislative and executive branches have made no effort to seek fundamental solutions rooted in the law. Only the Ministry of Justice made a half-hearted effort to abolish the death penalty through "non-implementation." Even the Taiwan Alliance to End the Death Penalty has made no effort to abolish the death on the basis of humanitarianism, or to convert the public on the basis of human rights. All it does is stubbornly delay the execution of death row inmates by demanding constitutional interpretations, in order to maintain Taiwan's "human rights image." Once such superficial efforts run up against public opinion, the cover provided by the judiciary is immediately blown.
Why does democracy on Taiwan continue to spin its wheels? For three main reasons. One. The Green Camp refuses to forsake its expedient strategy of inciting of "ethnic" (communal) animosities. This ensures that politics will continue to incite hatred and confrontation, rather than foster equality, freedom, and empathy. Two. The Blue Camp worships at the altar of pragmatism. It is adept at muddying the political waters, but terrified of debating higher principles. It has never been able to clarify the issues or assuage Green Camp doubts. Instead it has repeatedly danced to the Green Camp's tune, and repeatedly returned society to its starting point. Three. The meaning of democracy has been distorted. Democracy on Taiwan has been reduced to mere electioneering. After each election everyone immediately begins planning for the next round of competition. Implementation of policies and serving the public are lost amidst the smell of cordite.
Over the past twenty years, the public on Taiwan has endured painful democratic changes. They have listened to countless moving political slogans. They have participated in one town hall meeting after another, and one street protest after another. In the end, their reward has been anguish at seeing their society torn apart, frustration at witnessing their political leaders blowing hot and cold, and dismay at the realization that their vaunted democracy is going nowhere. After two changes in ruling parties, being forced to listen to politicians shouting the same tired old slogans truly is depressing.
論述輪迴：台灣政治的原地踏步現象
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.08 02:21 am
台灣政治上最近出現的論述輪迴與退化現象，值得深思與警惕。先是民進黨推出了五都選戰人選，喊出「第二次鄉村包圍城市」的口號；接著，蔡英文在演講時，提出「中華民國是一個流亡政府」的說法，引發強烈爭議。
「鄉村包圍城市」和「流亡政府」都是充滿挑戰意味的口號，可能勾起一些人重燃戰火的激情，也可能引發另一些人憂心動盪的焦慮。值得注意的其實不是口號本身的挑釁意味，而是其內容的陳腐與褊狹。經過兩次政黨輪替，政黨卻還在引用陳年老調來訴求選民，而且居然能迸出火花，台灣的民主豈不是在向後倒退？
民進黨最早喊出「地方包圍中央」，是廿一年前的事，並在十多年前實現「藍天變綠地」，更在十年前完成中央的政黨輪替。如今蔡英文高唱「包圍」戰歌，彷彿跳過扁政府貪腐無能的八年不提，民進黨即可捲土重來再造顛峰。問題是，台灣廿年來政治起伏，從當年整個社會對民主改革充滿渴望，到如今族群撕裂、政經顛躓，不僅面目全非，氛圍也大不相同。現在綠營重拾舊口號，除了勾起人們對民主磨難的嘆惋，能帶來對台灣前景的鼓舞嗎？
更令人吃驚的，是蔡英文的「流亡政府」說，比起李登輝一九九四年的「外來政權」說，還要更倒退千里，也不經意地反射出她心底的基本思維。作為民進黨領導人，蔡英文被認為理性清新，這是可喜的現象；但從她偶或流露的詭譎多變或刻意隱匿的一面，卻讓人對她的底蘊充滿疑慮。
所謂外來政權或流亡政府，其危險不僅是在刻意製造對立而已，更嚴重的，是從政治道德面根本背棄了自身應負的責任。蔡英文其實是從「戒急用忍」到「鎖國」政策的主要操刀手，對於她在「流亡政府」中的角色，難道毫無應負的責任嗎？再說，陳水扁去年藉前中華民國「流亡總統」之名向美國告狀，引起舉世側目，認為這絕非神智清明之舉；而蔡英文竟然公開跟進阿扁的流亡說，這想把民進黨帶向哪裡？又將把台灣推向何方？
其實，台灣的論述退化，並不是今年才發生的事，這樣的現象已經存在多年，只是一直被喧囂不寧的政治動員及華而不實的表層論述所掩蓋。甚至可以說，論述退化其實正是台灣政治思維退化及實踐無能的共同結晶。
以死刑的爭議為例，就是兩黨「合作」造成的結果。多年來，藍綠政府都採取高度技術主義的手法來處理「廢死」，司法、立法及行政部門無一企圖從法律面尋求根本解決，只讓法務部以消極的「不執行」來達成虛假的廢死。包括廢死聯盟，也不在人道訴求或人權教育上下功夫，只一味透過釋憲的程序杯葛讓死刑犯苟延殘喘，以維持台灣在「人權形象」上的評分。這些表面功夫，一碰到民意沸揚，司法的掩護當然要立刻破功。
台灣的民主為何原地踏步，從論述上看，主要原因有：一，綠營不願放棄族群動員的便宜戰略，使得政治持續被導向仇恨及對峙。一個被仇恨動員的社會，很難產生平等、自由的同理心。二，藍軍的現實主義作祟，擅於和稀泥而怯於論戰，始終無法釐清或化解綠營的質疑，卻一再隨綠營的戰歌起舞，讓社會反覆被帶回原點。三，由於對民主的曲解，台灣的民主政治被簡化到只剩下「選舉」，每次選舉結束，馬上又進入下一回合的爭逐；至於施政、服務人民的問題，完全被埋沒在煙硝中。
這廿年，台灣人民經歷了痛快淋漓的民主變革，聆聽過無數動人的政治口號，追逐過一場又一場的政見會及街頭運動；到最後，品嘗到社會撕裂的痛苦，見識了政治領袖翻雲覆雨的本事，同時也認清了民主停滯不前的窘境。兩次政黨輪替之後，聽到政治人物還在呼喊如此陳腐的口號，真是教人憂鬱不安。
ECFA Referendum: More Rationality, Less Politics
ECFA Referendum: More Rationality, Less Politics
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 7, 2010
Last week members of the the Executive Yuan Referendum Commission met for several hours. They voted 12 to four against the Taiwan Solidarity Union's proposed referendum, which asked "Do you agree or disagree with the government's intention to sign the Economic Framework Cooperation Agreement (ECFA)?" Green Camp members have expressed a great deal of dissatisfaction, leading to a high degree of controversy, and contributing to continued add more fuel to the political fires.
The Referendum Commission had two reasons for rejecting the Taiwan Solidarity Union's referendum proposal. One was that the wording of the referendum proposal contradicted its intent. The second reason was that the wording of the referendum proposal adopted an affirmative position by posing a question, when it was in fact taking a stand against ECFA. Even if the referendum were to pass, it would not change the status quo. Therefore it failed to qualify as a referendum on a major policy issue, and could not be approved.
In arriving at this decision, the Referendum Commission was 100% correct. We said so before. Now that the referendum proposal has been rejected, its sponsors are clearly not going to let the matter rest. They are certain to try again. In this connection we would like to offer several observations.
The sponsors of the referendum are saying that by rejecting its referendum proposal, the Referendum Commission is obstructing the referendum process. In fact anyone with any iota of political sense knows that is not the issue. Actually the Referendum Commission's decision has clarified a fuzzy aspect of the Referendum Law. The wording of the Taiwan Solidarity Union's referendum proposal may have been intentional or unintentional. Either way, if it had passed, it would have resulted in a self-contradiction. The sponsors were clearly opposed to the signing of an ECFA agreement. Yet they reversed their wording. They worded their referendum proposal to make it look like a question and an affirmation. The result would have been voter confusion over the content of the proposal. The result would have been a bizarre paradox. Even assuming a majority of the public expressed opposition to ECFA, they would be unable to stop ECFA. If this was political calculation, it was a carefully calculated. If this was merely an unintentional blunder, then its sponsors need only reword it. That should not be easy enough. Two issues should be considered. The first is the right way to word a referendum proposal. The other is the right time to make a referendum proposal.
The norm in a democracy is representative politics. The role of a public referendum is merely to address inadequacies in respresentative politics. If those who are asking for a referendum on ECFA are asking the government to promote ECFA, they should be asking for an initiative, not a referendum. Since the government is already promoting ECFA, there is no need to demand an initiative on this major policy issue. If those who are asking for a referendum on ECFA are asking the government to stop promoting ECFA, then it can be classified as a referendum on a major policy issue. In which case, the referendum should simply ask whether the voter "opposes" or "disapproves of" ECFA. There is no reason to mislead the voters or to use contradictory wording in the referendum. Otherwise, to accuse the Referendum Commission of obstructing the referendum process is unfounded hyperbole.
The key to referenda on major policy issues is timing. Since the referendum concerns major policy, any referendum proposal should of course be made only after the major policy has actually been formulated. Take ECFA for example. No agreement has yet to be reached on its content. That means the target of the proposed referendum does not exist. Any referendum proposal would be premature. At best it would be political demagoguery.
In fact the two sides have many procedural problems to consider before they sign ECFA. One is that the draft of the agreement will go into effect only after approval by the Legislative Yuan. for Beijing, it must be approved by the NPC. How cross-Strait official government documents should be signed, and what formal procedures should be implemented, warrant careful consideration. If the process includes public referenda, one must find a more rational approach. Should a public referendum be considered when the Executive Yuan asks the Legislative Yuan to consider a draft? Or should it be considered only after the Legislative Yuan has given its approval? The Referendum Law leaves much room for interpretation. The referendum process is the final step in the democratic process. It must abide by the rule of law. One must not approach every issue by resorting to electoral politics and political mobilization. If one fails to determine what sort of referendum procedure is what the rule of law and democracy on Taiwan require, then one has betrayed the hopes and dreams of the public on Taiwan regarding democratic politics.
We of course have our own view on whether ECFA really requires a public referendum. But if some voters insist that the issue requires a referendum, they have the right to demand one, in accordance with legal procedures. Those who oppose a referendum cannot stop them. Therefore we are not addressing the political legitimacy or political wisdom of demanding an ECFA referendum. We are merely reminding the government and the Pan Green opposition that if a referendum on ECFA cannot be avoided, then we must proceed in a proper and logical manner. Selfish political calculations must not be allowed to bedevil the Republic of China's referendum process.
ECFA公投多些理性 少些政黨算計
2010-06-07
中國時報
行政院公投審議委員會上周經數小時反覆討論，依投票方式做成決定，結果票數十二比四，否決了台聯所提的「你是否同意政府與中國簽訂兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）」公投案。綠營人士對此表達高度不滿，醞釀昇高抗爭態勢，持續為相關議題添加政治柴火升溫。
公投審議委員會駁回台聯提案的理由有二：一是提案的主文與理由矛盾；二是以正面表述的疑問式命題主張反對ＥＣＦＡ的立場，即使公投通過，也不能改變現狀，因此並不屬於重大政策的複決，故無法通過。
公投審議委員會做此決定，十分正確，我們前已提出類似的看法。現在此案不能成立，提案者顯然不會就此罷休，捲土重來可想而知，就此我們想提出若干看法。
指控公投審議委員會否決此案是阻擋公投，其實稍具政治常識者，都知道問題並不在此。公投審議委員會的決定其實釐清了公投法上一個模糊不明的地帶，台聯提出的ＥＣＦＡ公投案，不論是無心插柳還是有意栽花，如果通過，就會形成一種吊詭，因為提案者明明反對兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ協議，卻反轉其辭，用一個看起來像是問句的肯定語法提案，其結果不但會形成選民對於提案內容的混淆，也會使得即使多數民眾表達反對ＥＣＦＡ也不能阻擋ＥＣＦＡ的怪異現象。如果這是一個有心的政治算計，那是一種用心甚深的政治算計；如果只是無心之失，用心加以調整，其實並不困難。此中應該思考的問題有二，一是公投提案的內容如何表述，一是公投提案的時機。
民主國家代議政治是常態，公民投票只具有補充代議政治不足的功能。將ＥＣＦＡ議題交付公投的人士，如果是要求政府推動ＥＣＦＡ，即是創制案的性質，政府既然要推動ＥＣＦＡ，就沒有提出重大政策創制的必要。如果是否決政府推動的ＥＣＦＡ，那是要複決這項重大政策；所提出的公投案只要以「反對」或「不同意」ＥＣＦＡ協議的形式提出，就不會有誤導選民或是主文與理由相互矛盾的顧慮。捨此不為，卻要指責公投審議委員會阻擋公投，不是欲加之罪，就是言過其辭。
複決重大政策的公投提案，時機也是重點。既然是複決重大政策，當然應該要等到重大政策形成之後提出才有意義。以ＥＣＦＡ協議的簽署而言，還未談定任何協議的內容，等於是複決案的複決標的尚不存在，提出任何複決案都是過早或不成熟的提案，充其量只是政治口水的操作而已。
兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ協議的程序本來還有許多應該思考的問題，其中一個題目就是協議的草案應經立法院通過始能生效，在對岸而言，則涉及是否需要人大通過的對應程序。兩岸未來要簽署正式的官方文件應經雙方怎樣的正式程序始能生效，其實很值得仔細斟酌。如果此中還要夾雜著公民投票的程序，就更該找出一種合理的辦法。是在行政院向立法院提出草簽版本請求審議時就可提出公民投票複決案，還是要等到立法院通過後才可複決，依照公民投票法，也有再討論的空間。公民投票是一種民主政治的終極程序，不能不伴隨著應有的法治理性，凡事皆以選舉政治社會動員的態度來對待，而不去設想怎樣的公民投票程序才是台灣需要的法治民主安排，其實對不起台灣人民對於民主政治的堅持與追求。
對於兩岸ＥＣＦＡ協議是否需要交付公投，我們當然不是沒有任何看法。不過，如果有的選民堅持這是一種需要交由公民投票的議題，其實本有權利依照法定程序加以提出，不是旁人反對就能阻攔得了的。因此我們今天不去討論追求ＥＣＦＡ公投的政治正當性或是政治智慧，而要在此提醒朝野，ＥＣＦＡ公投如果是台灣不能迴避的問題，就該找到正當而合理的程序讓它可以理性進行，政黨的私心算計，不該是台灣公民投票制度始終揮之不去的幽靈。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 7, 2010
Last week members of the the Executive Yuan Referendum Commission met for several hours. They voted 12 to four against the Taiwan Solidarity Union's proposed referendum, which asked "Do you agree or disagree with the government's intention to sign the Economic Framework Cooperation Agreement (ECFA)?" Green Camp members have expressed a great deal of dissatisfaction, leading to a high degree of controversy, and contributing to continued add more fuel to the political fires.
The Referendum Commission had two reasons for rejecting the Taiwan Solidarity Union's referendum proposal. One was that the wording of the referendum proposal contradicted its intent. The second reason was that the wording of the referendum proposal adopted an affirmative position by posing a question, when it was in fact taking a stand against ECFA. Even if the referendum were to pass, it would not change the status quo. Therefore it failed to qualify as a referendum on a major policy issue, and could not be approved.
In arriving at this decision, the Referendum Commission was 100% correct. We said so before. Now that the referendum proposal has been rejected, its sponsors are clearly not going to let the matter rest. They are certain to try again. In this connection we would like to offer several observations.
The sponsors of the referendum are saying that by rejecting its referendum proposal, the Referendum Commission is obstructing the referendum process. In fact anyone with any iota of political sense knows that is not the issue. Actually the Referendum Commission's decision has clarified a fuzzy aspect of the Referendum Law. The wording of the Taiwan Solidarity Union's referendum proposal may have been intentional or unintentional. Either way, if it had passed, it would have resulted in a self-contradiction. The sponsors were clearly opposed to the signing of an ECFA agreement. Yet they reversed their wording. They worded their referendum proposal to make it look like a question and an affirmation. The result would have been voter confusion over the content of the proposal. The result would have been a bizarre paradox. Even assuming a majority of the public expressed opposition to ECFA, they would be unable to stop ECFA. If this was political calculation, it was a carefully calculated. If this was merely an unintentional blunder, then its sponsors need only reword it. That should not be easy enough. Two issues should be considered. The first is the right way to word a referendum proposal. The other is the right time to make a referendum proposal.
The norm in a democracy is representative politics. The role of a public referendum is merely to address inadequacies in respresentative politics. If those who are asking for a referendum on ECFA are asking the government to promote ECFA, they should be asking for an initiative, not a referendum. Since the government is already promoting ECFA, there is no need to demand an initiative on this major policy issue. If those who are asking for a referendum on ECFA are asking the government to stop promoting ECFA, then it can be classified as a referendum on a major policy issue. In which case, the referendum should simply ask whether the voter "opposes" or "disapproves of" ECFA. There is no reason to mislead the voters or to use contradictory wording in the referendum. Otherwise, to accuse the Referendum Commission of obstructing the referendum process is unfounded hyperbole.
The key to referenda on major policy issues is timing. Since the referendum concerns major policy, any referendum proposal should of course be made only after the major policy has actually been formulated. Take ECFA for example. No agreement has yet to be reached on its content. That means the target of the proposed referendum does not exist. Any referendum proposal would be premature. At best it would be political demagoguery.
In fact the two sides have many procedural problems to consider before they sign ECFA. One is that the draft of the agreement will go into effect only after approval by the Legislative Yuan. for Beijing, it must be approved by the NPC. How cross-Strait official government documents should be signed, and what formal procedures should be implemented, warrant careful consideration. If the process includes public referenda, one must find a more rational approach. Should a public referendum be considered when the Executive Yuan asks the Legislative Yuan to consider a draft? Or should it be considered only after the Legislative Yuan has given its approval? The Referendum Law leaves much room for interpretation. The referendum process is the final step in the democratic process. It must abide by the rule of law. One must not approach every issue by resorting to electoral politics and political mobilization. If one fails to determine what sort of referendum procedure is what the rule of law and democracy on Taiwan require, then one has betrayed the hopes and dreams of the public on Taiwan regarding democratic politics.
We of course have our own view on whether ECFA really requires a public referendum. But if some voters insist that the issue requires a referendum, they have the right to demand one, in accordance with legal procedures. Those who oppose a referendum cannot stop them. Therefore we are not addressing the political legitimacy or political wisdom of demanding an ECFA referendum. We are merely reminding the government and the Pan Green opposition that if a referendum on ECFA cannot be avoided, then we must proceed in a proper and logical manner. Selfish political calculations must not be allowed to bedevil the Republic of China's referendum process.
ECFA公投多些理性 少些政黨算計
2010-06-07
中國時報
行政院公投審議委員會上周經數小時反覆討論，依投票方式做成決定，結果票數十二比四，否決了台聯所提的「你是否同意政府與中國簽訂兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）」公投案。綠營人士對此表達高度不滿，醞釀昇高抗爭態勢，持續為相關議題添加政治柴火升溫。
公投審議委員會駁回台聯提案的理由有二：一是提案的主文與理由矛盾；二是以正面表述的疑問式命題主張反對ＥＣＦＡ的立場，即使公投通過，也不能改變現狀，因此並不屬於重大政策的複決，故無法通過。
公投審議委員會做此決定，十分正確，我們前已提出類似的看法。現在此案不能成立，提案者顯然不會就此罷休，捲土重來可想而知，就此我們想提出若干看法。
指控公投審議委員會否決此案是阻擋公投，其實稍具政治常識者，都知道問題並不在此。公投審議委員會的決定其實釐清了公投法上一個模糊不明的地帶，台聯提出的ＥＣＦＡ公投案，不論是無心插柳還是有意栽花，如果通過，就會形成一種吊詭，因為提案者明明反對兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ協議，卻反轉其辭，用一個看起來像是問句的肯定語法提案，其結果不但會形成選民對於提案內容的混淆，也會使得即使多數民眾表達反對ＥＣＦＡ也不能阻擋ＥＣＦＡ的怪異現象。如果這是一個有心的政治算計，那是一種用心甚深的政治算計；如果只是無心之失，用心加以調整，其實並不困難。此中應該思考的問題有二，一是公投提案的內容如何表述，一是公投提案的時機。
民主國家代議政治是常態，公民投票只具有補充代議政治不足的功能。將ＥＣＦＡ議題交付公投的人士，如果是要求政府推動ＥＣＦＡ，即是創制案的性質，政府既然要推動ＥＣＦＡ，就沒有提出重大政策創制的必要。如果是否決政府推動的ＥＣＦＡ，那是要複決這項重大政策；所提出的公投案只要以「反對」或「不同意」ＥＣＦＡ協議的形式提出，就不會有誤導選民或是主文與理由相互矛盾的顧慮。捨此不為，卻要指責公投審議委員會阻擋公投，不是欲加之罪，就是言過其辭。
複決重大政策的公投提案，時機也是重點。既然是複決重大政策，當然應該要等到重大政策形成之後提出才有意義。以ＥＣＦＡ協議的簽署而言，還未談定任何協議的內容，等於是複決案的複決標的尚不存在，提出任何複決案都是過早或不成熟的提案，充其量只是政治口水的操作而已。
兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ協議的程序本來還有許多應該思考的問題，其中一個題目就是協議的草案應經立法院通過始能生效，在對岸而言，則涉及是否需要人大通過的對應程序。兩岸未來要簽署正式的官方文件應經雙方怎樣的正式程序始能生效，其實很值得仔細斟酌。如果此中還要夾雜著公民投票的程序，就更該找出一種合理的辦法。是在行政院向立法院提出草簽版本請求審議時就可提出公民投票複決案，還是要等到立法院通過後才可複決，依照公民投票法，也有再討論的空間。公民投票是一種民主政治的終極程序，不能不伴隨著應有的法治理性，凡事皆以選舉政治社會動員的態度來對待，而不去設想怎樣的公民投票程序才是台灣需要的法治民主安排，其實對不起台灣人民對於民主政治的堅持與追求。
對於兩岸ＥＣＦＡ協議是否需要交付公投，我們當然不是沒有任何看法。不過，如果有的選民堅持這是一種需要交由公民投票的議題，其實本有權利依照法定程序加以提出，不是旁人反對就能阻攔得了的。因此我們今天不去討論追求ＥＣＦＡ公投的政治正當性或是政治智慧，而要在此提醒朝野，ＥＣＦＡ公投如果是台灣不能迴避的問題，就該找到正當而合理的程序讓它可以理性進行，政黨的私心算計，不該是台灣公民投票制度始終揮之不去的幽靈。
Sunday, June 6, 2010
If the Legislative Yuan Amends ECFA Line by Line, It Can Forget About Signing FTAsChina Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 6, 2010
Taipei and Beijing have signed the cross-strait economic cooperation framework (ECFA), and two agreements to protect intellectual property rights. Is the Legislative Yuan permitted to consider these on a line by line basis? Much fuss has been made over grudges between Ma Ying-jeou and Wang JIng-pyn. But suppose relations between the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan and the President were chummy? Would that mean ECFA could pass without a legislative review? During the Two Yings Debate Ma Ying-jeou declared that he would submit ECFA to the legislature for review. The only issue was sort of review it should be subjected to. To be fair, it is not the president's place to micro-manage the workings of the legislature. But Ma is also the ruling party chairman. Therefore the real question is how large a role should the ruling party play in the legislature.
Are the many agreements between Taipei and Beijing accords, treaties, or international agreements? Must they be sent to the Legislative Yuan for review? Seventeen years ago the signing of four agreements following the Koo-Wang talks provoked controversy. The ruling and opposition parties were of one mind then. They upheld the authority of the legislature. Several prominent legislators have petitioned for a constitutional interpretation. They include KMT heavyweights, Kuan Chung, the President of the Examination Yuan, New Party legislators, Jaw Shau-kong, a KMT consultant for the five cities mayoral campaigns, and Ker Chien-ming, the DPP's highest-ranking cadre. The Grand Justices' Interpretation Number 329 was laughable. It stated that treaties and agreements must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review, but that whether ECFA must be sent to the Legislative Yuan for review was "not within the scope of this particular interpretation." In other words, they left the problem unresolved.
But is the problem really insoluble? The Grand Justices said that ECFA was not within the scope of Interpretation Number 329. Their reasons were simple. First, the Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area is clearly defined. The Legislative Yuan must either "review" it, or "be kept informed." Either way, it must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan. Even if it is merely "being kept informed," the legislature can decide that it must be reviewed. Secondly, the Grand Justices implied that whether ECFA is an international treaty or agreement is a hot button issue, and that it wants nothing to do with it.
In fact, the same time the Grand Justices' interpretation emerged, others opined that the Judicial Yuan should not have accepted a petition to begin with. The Republic of China's international plight is unique and difficult. Foreign agreements are supposed to be the purview of the executive branch. Foreign agreements should not be submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review. To do so would be inconsistent with the intent of the constitution. If they must be sent to the legislature for review before they are signed, the national interest may at risk. That said, the Grand Justice believe the executive and legislative branches have legal means by which they can settle disputes. In short, if the Legislative Yuan really does not approve of the agreement or treaty the executive branch has negotiated, it can simply veto it. The Executive Yuan must either accept or reject within 10 days. If this fails, the premier simply resigns.
ECFA has been submitted to the Legislative Yuan for "review." The executive branch can hardly ask the Legislative Yuan not to review the bill line by line. But this is different from domestic legislation or the budget. Those can be changed or deleted by legislators at will. Treaties, agreements, or cross-Strait agreements are the prerogative of sovereign and independent nations. Only after long and difficult negotiations, and both sides make gains and concessions, can one arrive at a final decision. Unilaterally modifying one or two items may undermine the two parties' best interests. That is why for years, the Legislative Yuan has never violated precedent, why it has never made line by line changes. At most it has resolved that the executive should improve the agreement on its own initiative. This shows respect for the larger interests of the nation as a whole.
DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has attempted to refute President Ma Ying-jeou. She cited an FTA signed by the ROC with El Salvador, which was subjected to line by line review. She took unfair advantage of the KMT. When the Chen regime was in office, KMT legislators may have had a majority. But they could hardly refuse to approve a bill involving international agreements. The precedent of not refusing to approve bills involving international agreements was shattered with US beef imports. Screaming Democratic Progressive Party legislators were not the only ones resposible for violating established precedents. Many Blue Camp legislators were party to it as well. In the end, the Executive Yuan could not accept the Legislative Yuan's resolution. It re-negotiated the agreement with Washington, reducing the number of U.S. beef parts that could be imported.
Wang Jing-pyn is an experienced speaker of the legislator. He understands what the Legislative Yuan can and cannot do. The Legislative Yuan may insist on reviewing ECFA on a line by line basis. But it should not attempt to rewrite it line by line. Legislators may attempt to change the contents merely to gratify their own whims. But they will not be able to implement it on a piecemeal basis. At best, talks will have to be restarted. At worst, the consequences are unthinkable. One can forget about signing any FTAs with other nations. Given the U.S. beef fiasco, no nation one cares to mention is going to tolerate having the legislature overturn its agreements. Not Japan, not South Korea, and not Singapore.
When the Legislative Yuan tried to overturn the U.S. beef agreement, 30 DPP legislators were not enough. And so it is with ECFA. ECFA cannot be overturned unless KMT legislators share DPP objections. If this is the case, the Kuomintang would not be out of line to impose party discipline. As speaker Wang Jing-pyn must remain strictly neutral. But as a legislator without portfolio Wang represents the KMT and must fulfill his duties as legislator. The legislature will soon hold an emergency session. If the relationship between the ruling party and the ruling administration has not been clarified, one need not wait for the results of the five cities mayoral elections, and Ma Ying-jeou might as well resign as party chairman.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.06
社論－立院若逐條修改ECFA 也不必簽FTA了
本報訊
為了兩岸簽署經濟合作架構（ＥＣＦＡ）、及智財權保護兩項協議，送立法院到底能不能逐條審議，政壇又不斷在馬、王心結上做文章，難道國會議長與總統關係深厚，兩岸協議就能迴避審查嗎？馬英九早在ＥＣＦＡ雙英辯論時就宣告，一定送立法院審議，差別僅在於如何審查的議事程序。持平而論，總統對國會議事沒有指三道四的空間，但若是執政黨主席的身分，那就得看黨政運作平台到底能發揮多少功能。
兩岸之間的各種協議，到底是否比照條約或國際協定，交付立法院議決？早在十七年前，辜汪會談簽署四項協議時即引發爭議，當時，立法院朝野有志一同，伸張國會職權，數得出名字的立委都連署此一聲請釋憲案，包括國民黨重量級立委、現任考試院長關中，新黨立委、現任國民黨五都選戰顧問趙少康，還有民進黨最資深的幹事長柯建銘，大法官做成第三二九號解釋文，好笑的是，大法官解釋諸種型態與樣貌的條約、協定，當然要送立法院審議後，對於兩岸間協議是否該送立法院審議，竟以「不在本解釋範圍之內」帶過，讓這個老問題依舊無解。
但真的無解嗎？大法官之認定兩岸協議不在三二九號解釋範圍之內，理由很簡單：第一，兩岸人民關係條例已有明確規範，不是「審議」就是「查照」，但都得送立法院，即使是備查案，立委若獲多數共識經院會決議還是可改為審查案；第二，大法官隱而不宣的是，兩岸協議到底是不是國與國之間的條約或協定？屬高度政治性問題，不碰可也。
事實上，這號解釋出爐同時，還有不同意見書，認為司法院根本不該接受聲請釋憲案，因為台灣國際處境特殊且困難，涉外事務全部交由行政授權，不經立法院審議，於憲法意旨不符，但若全部送國會審議後才能簽定，又恐有危及國家利益之虞。但即使如此，大法官認為，行政、立法兩院還是有依法解決爭端的途徑。簡言之，立法院若真的不同意談判所簽署的協定或條約，可議決否決之，行政院收到否決案之後，十日內必須選擇接受或覆議，若覆議不成，很簡單，閣揆請辭走人！
ＥＣＦＡ既送立法院「審議」，行政部門很難要求立法院不可以逐條審查，但是，與國內法律案或預算案不同，立委改了就改了，刪了就刪了，條約、協定或兩岸之間的協議，都是主權獨立國家間的合意行為，經過一番漫長、甚至艱鉅的談判，彼此互有斬獲和退讓，才得以拍板定案，單方面修改其中一、二內容，都可能影響彼此考量的利益。因此，過去多少年來，立法院審查條約案或協定案，從來沒有破壞前例，進行個別條文或內容的更動，頂多附帶決議要求行政機關改善，這也是對國家整體利益的尊重。
民進黨主席蔡英文反駁馬英九總統，並舉出實例指台、薩簽定ＦＴＡ就是逐條審查，可謂大吃國民黨豆腐，因為扁政府執政時代，國民黨立委即使多數，也不會在國會杯葛涉外議案。但是，國會審查涉外議案的慣例，卻在審查美牛進口議定書時破壞了，破壞慣例的不只是罵聲衝天的民進黨立委，還有為數甚眾的藍營立委，最後讓行政院不能不接受立法院的議決，重新與美方磋商，減少了美牛進口的品項。
王金平是資歷深厚的國會議長，他不會不了解立法院可做與不宜做的事。立法院或許可以堅持選擇逐條審查ＥＣＦＡ，卻不宜逐條修改其內容，因為立委為了自己爽而增刪的內容，都不可能片面落實，最好的情況就是重啟談判，一個弄不好，就是甭談了，接下來與他國間的ＦＴＡ也不必奢想了，有美牛的前例，日本、南韓、新加坡…，隨便數吧，沒有哪一個國家能忍受與台灣談好的事，到了立法院翻盤。
就像美牛協定，立法院真要翻盤，靠區區卅席不到的民進黨立委是不可能的，除非國民黨立委對ＥＣＦＡ內容別有想法，果若如此，國民黨祭出黨紀也不為過。王金平是必須嚴守議事中立的國會議長，但也是政黨不分區立委，是代表國民黨的政黨角色執行立委職務，立法院臨時會召開在即，黨政運作若還不能把話講清楚，不必等到五都選後，馬英九這個黨主席不兼也罷。
A Translation
July 6, 2010
Taipei and Beijing have signed the cross-strait economic cooperation framework (ECFA), and two agreements to protect intellectual property rights. Is the Legislative Yuan permitted to consider these on a line by line basis? Much fuss has been made over grudges between Ma Ying-jeou and Wang JIng-pyn. But suppose relations between the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan and the President were chummy? Would that mean ECFA could pass without a legislative review? During the Two Yings Debate Ma Ying-jeou declared that he would submit ECFA to the legislature for review. The only issue was sort of review it should be subjected to. To be fair, it is not the president's place to micro-manage the workings of the legislature. But Ma is also the ruling party chairman. Therefore the real question is how large a role should the ruling party play in the legislature.
Are the many agreements between Taipei and Beijing accords, treaties, or international agreements? Must they be sent to the Legislative Yuan for review? Seventeen years ago the signing of four agreements following the Koo-Wang talks provoked controversy. The ruling and opposition parties were of one mind then. They upheld the authority of the legislature. Several prominent legislators have petitioned for a constitutional interpretation. They include KMT heavyweights, Kuan Chung, the President of the Examination Yuan, New Party legislators, Jaw Shau-kong, a KMT consultant for the five cities mayoral campaigns, and Ker Chien-ming, the DPP's highest-ranking cadre. The Grand Justices' Interpretation Number 329 was laughable. It stated that treaties and agreements must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review, but that whether ECFA must be sent to the Legislative Yuan for review was "not within the scope of this particular interpretation." In other words, they left the problem unresolved.
But is the problem really insoluble? The Grand Justices said that ECFA was not within the scope of Interpretation Number 329. Their reasons were simple. First, the Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area is clearly defined. The Legislative Yuan must either "review" it, or "be kept informed." Either way, it must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan. Even if it is merely "being kept informed," the legislature can decide that it must be reviewed. Secondly, the Grand Justices implied that whether ECFA is an international treaty or agreement is a hot button issue, and that it wants nothing to do with it.
In fact, the same time the Grand Justices' interpretation emerged, others opined that the Judicial Yuan should not have accepted a petition to begin with. The Republic of China's international plight is unique and difficult. Foreign agreements are supposed to be the purview of the executive branch. Foreign agreements should not be submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review. To do so would be inconsistent with the intent of the constitution. If they must be sent to the legislature for review before they are signed, the national interest may at risk. That said, the Grand Justice believe the executive and legislative branches have legal means by which they can settle disputes. In short, if the Legislative Yuan really does not approve of the agreement or treaty the executive branch has negotiated, it can simply veto it. The Executive Yuan must either accept or reject within 10 days. If this fails, the premier simply resigns.
ECFA has been submitted to the Legislative Yuan for "review." The executive branch can hardly ask the Legislative Yuan not to review the bill line by line. But this is different from domestic legislation or the budget. Those can be changed or deleted by legislators at will. Treaties, agreements, or cross-Strait agreements are the prerogative of sovereign and independent nations. Only after long and difficult negotiations, and both sides make gains and concessions, can one arrive at a final decision. Unilaterally modifying one or two items may undermine the two parties' best interests. That is why for years, the Legislative Yuan has never violated precedent, why it has never made line by line changes. At most it has resolved that the executive should improve the agreement on its own initiative. This shows respect for the larger interests of the nation as a whole.
DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has attempted to refute President Ma Ying-jeou. She cited an FTA signed by the ROC with El Salvador, which was subjected to line by line review. She took unfair advantage of the KMT. When the Chen regime was in office, KMT legislators may have had a majority. But they could hardly refuse to approve a bill involving international agreements. The precedent of not refusing to approve bills involving international agreements was shattered with US beef imports. Screaming Democratic Progressive Party legislators were not the only ones resposible for violating established precedents. Many Blue Camp legislators were party to it as well. In the end, the Executive Yuan could not accept the Legislative Yuan's resolution. It re-negotiated the agreement with Washington, reducing the number of U.S. beef parts that could be imported.
Wang Jing-pyn is an experienced speaker of the legislator. He understands what the Legislative Yuan can and cannot do. The Legislative Yuan may insist on reviewing ECFA on a line by line basis. But it should not attempt to rewrite it line by line. Legislators may attempt to change the contents merely to gratify their own whims. But they will not be able to implement it on a piecemeal basis. At best, talks will have to be restarted. At worst, the consequences are unthinkable. One can forget about signing any FTAs with other nations. Given the U.S. beef fiasco, no nation one cares to mention is going to tolerate having the legislature overturn its agreements. Not Japan, not South Korea, and not Singapore.
When the Legislative Yuan tried to overturn the U.S. beef agreement, 30 DPP legislators were not enough. And so it is with ECFA. ECFA cannot be overturned unless KMT legislators share DPP objections. If this is the case, the Kuomintang would not be out of line to impose party discipline. As speaker Wang Jing-pyn must remain strictly neutral. But as a legislator without portfolio Wang represents the KMT and must fulfill his duties as legislator. The legislature will soon hold an emergency session. If the relationship between the ruling party and the ruling administration has not been clarified, one need not wait for the results of the five cities mayoral elections, and Ma Ying-jeou might as well resign as party chairman.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.06
社論－立院若逐條修改ECFA 也不必簽FTA了
本報訊
為了兩岸簽署經濟合作架構（ＥＣＦＡ）、及智財權保護兩項協議，送立法院到底能不能逐條審議，政壇又不斷在馬、王心結上做文章，難道國會議長與總統關係深厚，兩岸協議就能迴避審查嗎？馬英九早在ＥＣＦＡ雙英辯論時就宣告，一定送立法院審議，差別僅在於如何審查的議事程序。持平而論，總統對國會議事沒有指三道四的空間，但若是執政黨主席的身分，那就得看黨政運作平台到底能發揮多少功能。
兩岸之間的各種協議，到底是否比照條約或國際協定，交付立法院議決？早在十七年前，辜汪會談簽署四項協議時即引發爭議，當時，立法院朝野有志一同，伸張國會職權，數得出名字的立委都連署此一聲請釋憲案，包括國民黨重量級立委、現任考試院長關中，新黨立委、現任國民黨五都選戰顧問趙少康，還有民進黨最資深的幹事長柯建銘，大法官做成第三二九號解釋文，好笑的是，大法官解釋諸種型態與樣貌的條約、協定，當然要送立法院審議後，對於兩岸間協議是否該送立法院審議，竟以「不在本解釋範圍之內」帶過，讓這個老問題依舊無解。
但真的無解嗎？大法官之認定兩岸協議不在三二九號解釋範圍之內，理由很簡單：第一，兩岸人民關係條例已有明確規範，不是「審議」就是「查照」，但都得送立法院，即使是備查案，立委若獲多數共識經院會決議還是可改為審查案；第二，大法官隱而不宣的是，兩岸協議到底是不是國與國之間的條約或協定？屬高度政治性問題，不碰可也。
事實上，這號解釋出爐同時，還有不同意見書，認為司法院根本不該接受聲請釋憲案，因為台灣國際處境特殊且困難，涉外事務全部交由行政授權，不經立法院審議，於憲法意旨不符，但若全部送國會審議後才能簽定，又恐有危及國家利益之虞。但即使如此，大法官認為，行政、立法兩院還是有依法解決爭端的途徑。簡言之，立法院若真的不同意談判所簽署的協定或條約，可議決否決之，行政院收到否決案之後，十日內必須選擇接受或覆議，若覆議不成，很簡單，閣揆請辭走人！
ＥＣＦＡ既送立法院「審議」，行政部門很難要求立法院不可以逐條審查，但是，與國內法律案或預算案不同，立委改了就改了，刪了就刪了，條約、協定或兩岸之間的協議，都是主權獨立國家間的合意行為，經過一番漫長、甚至艱鉅的談判，彼此互有斬獲和退讓，才得以拍板定案，單方面修改其中一、二內容，都可能影響彼此考量的利益。因此，過去多少年來，立法院審查條約案或協定案，從來沒有破壞前例，進行個別條文或內容的更動，頂多附帶決議要求行政機關改善，這也是對國家整體利益的尊重。
民進黨主席蔡英文反駁馬英九總統，並舉出實例指台、薩簽定ＦＴＡ就是逐條審查，可謂大吃國民黨豆腐，因為扁政府執政時代，國民黨立委即使多數，也不會在國會杯葛涉外議案。但是，國會審查涉外議案的慣例，卻在審查美牛進口議定書時破壞了，破壞慣例的不只是罵聲衝天的民進黨立委，還有為數甚眾的藍營立委，最後讓行政院不能不接受立法院的議決，重新與美方磋商，減少了美牛進口的品項。
王金平是資歷深厚的國會議長，他不會不了解立法院可做與不宜做的事。立法院或許可以堅持選擇逐條審查ＥＣＦＡ，卻不宜逐條修改其內容，因為立委為了自己爽而增刪的內容，都不可能片面落實，最好的情況就是重啟談判，一個弄不好，就是甭談了，接下來與他國間的ＦＴＡ也不必奢想了，有美牛的前例，日本、南韓、新加坡…，隨便數吧，沒有哪一個國家能忍受與台灣談好的事，到了立法院翻盤。
就像美牛協定，立法院真要翻盤，靠區區卅席不到的民進黨立委是不可能的，除非國民黨立委對ＥＣＦＡ內容別有想法，果若如此，國民黨祭出黨紀也不為過。王金平是必須嚴守議事中立的國會議長，但也是政黨不分區立委，是代表國民黨的政黨角色執行立委職務，立法院臨時會召開在即，黨政運作若還不能把話講清楚，不必等到五都選後，馬英九這個黨主席不兼也罷。
Friday, June 4, 2010
Beijing Must Not Oppose Taipei Signing FTAs with Other Countries
Beijing Must Not Oppose Taipei Signing FTAs with Other Countries
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 4, 2010
Beijing must not stand in the way of Taipei signing free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries. Doing so would run counter to the goal of improved cross-Strait relations that the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is attempting to establish. Doing so would seriously undermine the meaning and achievements of ECFA.
During a Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference, a reporter from Taiwan asked how Beijing felt about Taipei's desire to sign FTAs with other nations with the help of ECFA. Spokesperson Jiang Yu replied, "[mainland] China has no objection to Taiwan having non-official economic and trade exchanges with other countries. But for agreements of an official nature, we are opposed."
Some have concluded this means Beijing is opposed to Taipei signing FTAs with other countries. Others have concluded that "opposition to Taiwan signing official agreements" is not the same as "opposition to Taiwan signing FTAs."
For verification, a reporter from this paper, the United Daily News, asked a follow-up question. The Beijing official said that once ECFA is signed, if Taipei wants to sign FTAs with other countries, Beijing will be delighted. It would not stand in Taipei's way, as long as they are "purely economic agreements" that do not involve sovereignty, and are beneficial to the development of Taiwan's economy. We believe that given Beijing's concerns about Taipei, this is a reasonable and predictable response. Unless one is obtuse beyond belief, no other response is possible.
Beijing cannot possibly oppose Taipei signing FTAs with other countries. That's because ECFA is not merely a "cross-Strait economic agreement." It is also an important framework for cross-Strait "peaceful development." Was ECFA negotiated with sincerity and goodwill? The public on Taiwan has a single criterion. Will Taipei be allowed to sign FTAs with other countries. As this newspaper asked, is ECFA an "Invitation to a Funeral," or an "Invitation to a Dance?" The answer will depend on whether Taipei is allowed to sign FTAs with other countries. This affects not merely the hearts and minds of the public on Taiwan. It is also the key to the cross-Strait struggle between the two largest political parties on Taiwan. Beijing cannot possibly be unaware of this.
Taiwan has a "shallow dish economy." If Taipei hopes to sign FTAs with any other countries, they will have to "cut Taipei some slack." Otherwise the FTAs will exert dangerous pressure on Taiwan society. But once Taipei signs ECFA, it must demonstrate its autonomy by signing FTAs. Otherwise given internal struggles between the two largest parties on Taiwan, the ruling administration's policies would not pass muster. Failure to sign FTAs would cast a pall of skepticism over cross-Strait "peaceful development." It would seriously undermine the significance and achievements of ECFA. This why Taipei must attempt to sign FTAs. This is the reason Beijing is not opposed to Taipei signing FTAs.
Therefore one possibile future development is that Taipei will sign a number of FTAs with its major trading partners, such as the United States, as well as with certain nations such as Singapore, which poses no agricultural threat. On the one hand, this will help make Taiwan's economy more liberal and open. On the other hand, and more importantly, it will help win the hearts and minds of the public vis a vis cross-Strait exchanges. If the ROC can maintain diplomatic ties with a certain number of allies, that will be beneficial to cross-Strait relations. The same is true for FTAs. Surely Beijing sees how FTAs will stabilize and improve cross-Strait relations. What reason does it have to oppose them?
Let us review the comments made by Beijing's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They opposed Taipei signing "agreements of an official nature" with other countries. In fact, this was their "three standard comments," namely that "The People's Republic of China is the sole legal government and represents all of China." Have cross-Strait relations evolved no further than this? What is ECFA? Is it an "economic and trade exchange of a non-official nature?" Or is it an "agreement of a non-official nature?" Did Beijing sign an ECFA with Fujian Province? Will Fujian Province sign FTAs with other countries? We do not think Beijing can break through such contradictions and psychological barriers in the short term. But if cross-Strait relations are to "develop peacefully," why invoke such terms as "sovereignty?" when they merely muddy the waters?
Cross-Strait relations have transitioned from hostility and conflict to "peaceful development." Governments on both sides must respond in a timely manner to this rare historical opportunity. They must lay down important cornerstones for cross-Strait relations. ECFA is one of the most important. But ECFA alone is not enough. Most importantly, the two sides must understand the hearts and minds of the public. One might say that the reason for ECFA is to win the hearts and minds of the people. But if one loses the hearts and minds of the people, what good is ECFA?
The hearts and minds of the public on Taiwan have two main pillars -- self-esteem and trust. If we have ECFA but no FTAs, where is that self-esteem? Where is that trust? How can the meaning and achievements of ECFA remain intact?
北京不可反對台灣與他國簽FTA
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.04 03:05 am
北京不可反對台灣與其他國家簽定自由貿易協定（FTA）。因為，這不啻與兩岸經濟協議（ECFA）所欲追求的兩岸關係之氛圍與境界是背道而馳的，反而將嚴重摧毀ECFA的意義與成就。
在北京外交部記者會上，台灣記者問，大陸對台灣希望ECFA有助於與其他國家簽定FTA持何態度？發言人馬朝旭答稱：「……中方對於台灣同其他國家開展非官方經貿往來不持異議，但對官方性質的協議，我們是反對的。」
有人認為，此說表示北京反對台灣與他國簽FTA；也有人認為，在「反對台灣簽官方協議」與「反對台灣簽FTA」之間，不能劃上等號。
本報記者後續的查證指出，北京涉台官員表示：在簽定ECFA後，台灣若要與其他國家洽簽FTA，只要是「純經濟協議」，不涉及主權，對發展台灣經濟有利，北京樂觀其成，不會阻撓。我們認為，面對台灣方面的疑慮，這是北京方面一個合理且可以預期的解釋，倘非至愚至昏，不可能有第二種答案。
北京不可能反對台灣與他國簽定FTA。因為ECFA不止是一個「兩岸經濟協議」，更是兩岸奠定「和平發展」的氛圍與境界的重要架構；而ECFA是否存有誠意與善意，對台灣主流社會而言，能否與他國簽定FTA，已成為主要的指標。若用本報的兩岸語彙來說，ECFA究竟是「請君入甕」或「與卿共舞」，就看能否與他國簽FTA；這非僅影響台灣主流社會的民心向背，更是台灣兩黨兩岸政策鬥爭的勝敗關鍵。凡此種種，北京豈會不知？
其實，以台灣的淺碟經濟，欲簽定任何FTA，對方若不「讓利」，對台灣社會皆會造成壓力與風險。但在簽定ECFA後，台灣若不能展現可以簽定FTA的自主權，這不但在內部兩黨鬥爭上過不了關，且必為兩岸關係抹上一層有害「和平發展」的不信任陰影，因而勢將嚴重摧毀了簽定ECFA的意義與成就。這是台灣必須設法簽ＦＴＡ的原因，也是北京不可反對的原因。
因而，未來的可能發展是：台灣與主要貿易夥伴如美國，及選擇性的對象如新加坡（無農業威脅）簽定幾個FTA；一方面固然可藉以錘煉台灣經濟體質的更趨自由開放，另一方面更重要的則是藉以印證兩岸關係的更符民心。此與中華民國能夠維持若干邦交國之對兩岸關係有利，是同一道理。北京方面不會看不到FTA對穩固及改善兩岸關係的種種重大利益，豈有反對之理？
現在回頭看北京外交部的相關談話。宣稱反對其他國家與台灣簽定「官方性質的協議」，其實仍是「老三句」（中華人民共和國是代表中國的唯一合法政府）的思維。如果在兩岸關係演化至今日地步仍持此說，則莫非ECFA也是「非官方的經貿往來」，或「非官方性質的協議」？難道北京會與福建省簽ECFA？或福建省會與他國簽FTA？我們不認為北京能夠在短期內破解此種矛盾與心障；但若欲使兩岸關係「和平發展」，豈宜動輒即用「主權」這類言詞來攪渾一池好不容易才沉澱下來的春水？
兩岸關係正從衝突敵對朝往「和平發展」的轉型階段。兩岸政府適時回應了此一珍貴的歷史機遇，為兩岸關係奠定了諸多重要的基石，ECFA即其中大者；但徒有 ECFA尚不足以自行，重要的是，必須因勢利導民心的趨向。也可以說，為了民心而有ECFA；若失民心，ECFA有何用？
台灣民心的二大支柱是自尊心及信任感。但倘若只可有ECFA而不可有FTA，自尊心何在？信任感何在？而ECFA的意義及成就，更將如何維繫？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 4, 2010
Beijing must not stand in the way of Taipei signing free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries. Doing so would run counter to the goal of improved cross-Strait relations that the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is attempting to establish. Doing so would seriously undermine the meaning and achievements of ECFA.
During a Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference, a reporter from Taiwan asked how Beijing felt about Taipei's desire to sign FTAs with other nations with the help of ECFA. Spokesperson Jiang Yu replied, "[mainland] China has no objection to Taiwan having non-official economic and trade exchanges with other countries. But for agreements of an official nature, we are opposed."
Some have concluded this means Beijing is opposed to Taipei signing FTAs with other countries. Others have concluded that "opposition to Taiwan signing official agreements" is not the same as "opposition to Taiwan signing FTAs."
For verification, a reporter from this paper, the United Daily News, asked a follow-up question. The Beijing official said that once ECFA is signed, if Taipei wants to sign FTAs with other countries, Beijing will be delighted. It would not stand in Taipei's way, as long as they are "purely economic agreements" that do not involve sovereignty, and are beneficial to the development of Taiwan's economy. We believe that given Beijing's concerns about Taipei, this is a reasonable and predictable response. Unless one is obtuse beyond belief, no other response is possible.
Beijing cannot possibly oppose Taipei signing FTAs with other countries. That's because ECFA is not merely a "cross-Strait economic agreement." It is also an important framework for cross-Strait "peaceful development." Was ECFA negotiated with sincerity and goodwill? The public on Taiwan has a single criterion. Will Taipei be allowed to sign FTAs with other countries. As this newspaper asked, is ECFA an "Invitation to a Funeral," or an "Invitation to a Dance?" The answer will depend on whether Taipei is allowed to sign FTAs with other countries. This affects not merely the hearts and minds of the public on Taiwan. It is also the key to the cross-Strait struggle between the two largest political parties on Taiwan. Beijing cannot possibly be unaware of this.
Taiwan has a "shallow dish economy." If Taipei hopes to sign FTAs with any other countries, they will have to "cut Taipei some slack." Otherwise the FTAs will exert dangerous pressure on Taiwan society. But once Taipei signs ECFA, it must demonstrate its autonomy by signing FTAs. Otherwise given internal struggles between the two largest parties on Taiwan, the ruling administration's policies would not pass muster. Failure to sign FTAs would cast a pall of skepticism over cross-Strait "peaceful development." It would seriously undermine the significance and achievements of ECFA. This why Taipei must attempt to sign FTAs. This is the reason Beijing is not opposed to Taipei signing FTAs.
Therefore one possibile future development is that Taipei will sign a number of FTAs with its major trading partners, such as the United States, as well as with certain nations such as Singapore, which poses no agricultural threat. On the one hand, this will help make Taiwan's economy more liberal and open. On the other hand, and more importantly, it will help win the hearts and minds of the public vis a vis cross-Strait exchanges. If the ROC can maintain diplomatic ties with a certain number of allies, that will be beneficial to cross-Strait relations. The same is true for FTAs. Surely Beijing sees how FTAs will stabilize and improve cross-Strait relations. What reason does it have to oppose them?
Let us review the comments made by Beijing's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They opposed Taipei signing "agreements of an official nature" with other countries. In fact, this was their "three standard comments," namely that "The People's Republic of China is the sole legal government and represents all of China." Have cross-Strait relations evolved no further than this? What is ECFA? Is it an "economic and trade exchange of a non-official nature?" Or is it an "agreement of a non-official nature?" Did Beijing sign an ECFA with Fujian Province? Will Fujian Province sign FTAs with other countries? We do not think Beijing can break through such contradictions and psychological barriers in the short term. But if cross-Strait relations are to "develop peacefully," why invoke such terms as "sovereignty?" when they merely muddy the waters?
Cross-Strait relations have transitioned from hostility and conflict to "peaceful development." Governments on both sides must respond in a timely manner to this rare historical opportunity. They must lay down important cornerstones for cross-Strait relations. ECFA is one of the most important. But ECFA alone is not enough. Most importantly, the two sides must understand the hearts and minds of the public. One might say that the reason for ECFA is to win the hearts and minds of the people. But if one loses the hearts and minds of the people, what good is ECFA?
The hearts and minds of the public on Taiwan have two main pillars -- self-esteem and trust. If we have ECFA but no FTAs, where is that self-esteem? Where is that trust? How can the meaning and achievements of ECFA remain intact?
北京不可反對台灣與他國簽FTA
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.04 03:05 am
北京不可反對台灣與其他國家簽定自由貿易協定（FTA）。因為，這不啻與兩岸經濟協議（ECFA）所欲追求的兩岸關係之氛圍與境界是背道而馳的，反而將嚴重摧毀ECFA的意義與成就。
在北京外交部記者會上，台灣記者問，大陸對台灣希望ECFA有助於與其他國家簽定FTA持何態度？發言人馬朝旭答稱：「……中方對於台灣同其他國家開展非官方經貿往來不持異議，但對官方性質的協議，我們是反對的。」
有人認為，此說表示北京反對台灣與他國簽FTA；也有人認為，在「反對台灣簽官方協議」與「反對台灣簽FTA」之間，不能劃上等號。
本報記者後續的查證指出，北京涉台官員表示：在簽定ECFA後，台灣若要與其他國家洽簽FTA，只要是「純經濟協議」，不涉及主權，對發展台灣經濟有利，北京樂觀其成，不會阻撓。我們認為，面對台灣方面的疑慮，這是北京方面一個合理且可以預期的解釋，倘非至愚至昏，不可能有第二種答案。
北京不可能反對台灣與他國簽定FTA。因為ECFA不止是一個「兩岸經濟協議」，更是兩岸奠定「和平發展」的氛圍與境界的重要架構；而ECFA是否存有誠意與善意，對台灣主流社會而言，能否與他國簽定FTA，已成為主要的指標。若用本報的兩岸語彙來說，ECFA究竟是「請君入甕」或「與卿共舞」，就看能否與他國簽FTA；這非僅影響台灣主流社會的民心向背，更是台灣兩黨兩岸政策鬥爭的勝敗關鍵。凡此種種，北京豈會不知？
其實，以台灣的淺碟經濟，欲簽定任何FTA，對方若不「讓利」，對台灣社會皆會造成壓力與風險。但在簽定ECFA後，台灣若不能展現可以簽定FTA的自主權，這不但在內部兩黨鬥爭上過不了關，且必為兩岸關係抹上一層有害「和平發展」的不信任陰影，因而勢將嚴重摧毀了簽定ECFA的意義與成就。這是台灣必須設法簽ＦＴＡ的原因，也是北京不可反對的原因。
因而，未來的可能發展是：台灣與主要貿易夥伴如美國，及選擇性的對象如新加坡（無農業威脅）簽定幾個FTA；一方面固然可藉以錘煉台灣經濟體質的更趨自由開放，另一方面更重要的則是藉以印證兩岸關係的更符民心。此與中華民國能夠維持若干邦交國之對兩岸關係有利，是同一道理。北京方面不會看不到FTA對穩固及改善兩岸關係的種種重大利益，豈有反對之理？
現在回頭看北京外交部的相關談話。宣稱反對其他國家與台灣簽定「官方性質的協議」，其實仍是「老三句」（中華人民共和國是代表中國的唯一合法政府）的思維。如果在兩岸關係演化至今日地步仍持此說，則莫非ECFA也是「非官方的經貿往來」，或「非官方性質的協議」？難道北京會與福建省簽ECFA？或福建省會與他國簽FTA？我們不認為北京能夠在短期內破解此種矛盾與心障；但若欲使兩岸關係「和平發展」，豈宜動輒即用「主權」這類言詞來攪渾一池好不容易才沉澱下來的春水？
兩岸關係正從衝突敵對朝往「和平發展」的轉型階段。兩岸政府適時回應了此一珍貴的歷史機遇，為兩岸關係奠定了諸多重要的基石，ECFA即其中大者；但徒有 ECFA尚不足以自行，重要的是，必須因勢利導民心的趨向。也可以說，為了民心而有ECFA；若失民心，ECFA有何用？
台灣民心的二大支柱是自尊心及信任感。但倘若只可有ECFA而不可有FTA，自尊心何在？信任感何在？而ECFA的意義及成就，更將如何維繫？
Thursday, June 3, 2010
Songshan, Hongqiao and Haneda: Su Tseng-chang and the Capital Airport
Songshan, Hongqiao and Haneda: Su Tseng-chang and the Capital Airport
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 3, 2010
The Democratic Progressive Party once demanded that the Songshan Airport, once in decline, be decommissioned and turned into a public park. Now however, Songshan Airport has been revitalized by direct cross-Strait flights. It will soon connect directly with Shanghai's Hongqiao, Tokyo's Haneda, and Seoul's Gimpo airports. It has been transformed into the business airport for a national capital in the East Asian economic circle. Su Tseng-chang's opposition to the DPP's "anti-Songshan Airport" line has reportedly mired him in a major showdown. His election campaign asks the question: Can Songshan Airport really be wiped off the map?
That Su Tseng-chang is mired in a major showdown means he realizes that circumstances have changed, and are not something he or the DPP can resist. After all, the Songshan Airport's current resurrection is a living reality to people traveling to and from the airport daily. Even assuming Su Tseng-chang had superhuman abilities, he could not take a bouncing baby and stuff it back into its mother's womb.
For DPP leaders, the Songshan Airport project, like so many other controversial construction projects, has been nothing more than a sword to attack their political enemies, rather than a plowshare to till the earth. When Huang Ta-chou was Taipei Mayor, the Democratic Progressive Party called for Songshan Airport's relocation. It pressured the Civil Aviation Authority to commit to relocating it within five years. When Chen Shui-bian was Taipei Mayor, he avoided the issue altogether. When Lee Ying-yuan and Frank Hsieh were running against each other for Taipei Mayor, they again campaigned for the elimination of Sung Shan Airport. They argued that since the MRT system would soon link Taoyuan Airport, Songshan Airport was no longer necessary.
Ironically, by that time, the DPP was already in power. But the Chen administration never made plans to either eliminate or preserve Songshan Airport. Instead, as the Green Camp shouted "Eliminate Songshan" at deafening volume, Chen Shui-bian embarked on a major campaign to build local airports across the island in the name of "Love for Taiwan." Today "mosquito airports" (unused airports infested with mosquitoes) can be found all over the island, the product of the "politics of wishful thinking." No trace of an MRT link to CKS Airport could be found during Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office. Chen renamed the CKS International Airport the "Taoyuan International Airport." But that did nothing to change its fortune. It merely became eight years older and shabbier. Over the years, the airport's decline has ironically become a clear reflection of our national decline.
Songshan Airport has now gotten a new lease on life. It has been the beneficiary of warming cross-Strait relations. It has also benefitted from recent changes in international airport operations. Take mainland China, South Korea, and Japan, for example. Many years ago airport noise pollution and traffic congestion forced major metropolises to build new international airports and transform existing airports into domestic airports. But more recently this rigid pattern of "one domestic airport, one international airport" for major metropolises has been shattered. Take Shanghai's Hongqiao Airport for example. In March of this year, following runway expansions and the construction of a new terminal building, it was redefined as a "regional airport." It now allows flights to select Asian cities. For one thing, it helps reduce congestion at Pudong Airport. For another it takes advantage of its proximity to the city, increasing its convenience for business travelers.
This is not the only example. The roles of Tokyo's Narita Airport and Haneda Airport have changed. For years "Narita was primarily international, Haneda was primarily domestic." But the Japanese government was shocked to discover that Incheon International Airport in Seoul, South Korea had replaced Tokyo as Japan's major international hub. The crux of the matter is that Incheon Airport not only has a greater take off and landing capacity, it also allows direct flights to 28 cities in Japan. By contrast, Narita Airport allows direct flights to only eight cities in Japan. Travelers in Japan who wish to go abroad must first fly to Haneda. From there they must travel over an hour by car to Narita, dragging along their luggage, in order to make their connecting flight. Under the circumstances, many Japanese prefer to fly directly from their hometowns to Incheon, where they can board an international flight to any destination in the world, saving considerable waiting and transit time.
In other words, Incheon Airport's openness and dense network of international connections greatly enhance its competitiveness. For passengers in neighboring countries, Incheon Airport can provide services even more convenient than those in their home countries. Japan is not the only one threatened. So is mainland China. Tourists from Shandong traveling to the West Coast of the US can save 17 full hours by transiting through Inchon instead of through Pudong. As we can see, in order to become a competitive airport, one must establish the right conditions, and not hide behind closed doors shouting angry slogans.
Songshan will connect with Hongqiao by the middle of this month. Not only does this symbolize a closer relationship between the two sides, it also suggests Taipei may soon be upgraded to the status of an East Asian transportation hub. In retrospect, we have gotten off to a late start. In fact, we squandered over a decade of valuable time. We would like to remind the Ma administration to maintain a balance between Songshan Airport and Taoyuan Airport, We would like to remind Su Tseng-chang that he must properly define the role of Songshan Airport in his campaign appeals, since this will have a bearing on his cross-Strait and regional appeals.
松山、虹橋、羽田：蘇貞昌與首都機場
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.03 02:08 am
一度沒落的松山機場，曾遭民進黨要求廢掉改建公園，如今卻因兩岸直航重振活力，更將進一步與上海虹橋、東京羽田、首爾金浦等機場直接對飛，蛻變為東亞經濟圈的首都商務機場。據說，蘇貞昌正為要不要延續黨內的「反松山機場」戰線而陷入天人交戰，他的首都選戰論述，真的能把松山機場從地圖上塗銷嗎？
蘇貞昌陷入天人交戰，顯示他知道大形勢已然改變，絕非他個人或民進黨可以抵擋。畢竟，松山機場今天的「復活」，已是每天人來機往的活生生現實。蘇貞昌縱使有天大的本事，也無法把一個活潑亂跳的孩子，再塞回母親的子宮裡吧？
像許多建設爭議一樣，對民進黨而言，松山機場的議題始終是一支用來攻擊的矛，而不是拿來耕耘的鋤頭。黃大洲時代，民進黨即曾提出遷移松山機場的主張，並迫使民航局承諾五年內提出遷建計畫；隨後陳水扁出任市長，卻絕口不提此事。直到李應元和謝長廷角逐台北市長，再度發動廢松山機場的攻擊，認為桃園機場捷運即將通車，松山機場已無存在必要。
諷刺的是，當時民進黨已經執政，扁政府並未就松山機場的去留提出任何相應計畫，反而就在綠營高喊「廢松山」最喧天價響之際，陳水扁以「愛台」之名在島內大肆興建地方機場。今天全台「蚊子機場」林立，正是這種「空想政治」的產物。何況，扁任內八年，不僅中正機場捷運無影無蹤，甚至改名為「桃園國際機場」，但並未使機場改運，只是愈發顯得老態龍鍾罷了。過去多年，機場的沒落，竟然成為綜合國力衰退的明顯指標。
松山機場得以重燃生機，除了拜兩岸關係融冰之賜，其實也與近年國際間經營機場理念的轉變有關。以中韓日等國為例，幾個大都會早年都因市區機場噪音及運量不勝負荷，而覓地另建國際機場，舊機場則皆轉為國內線之用。最近幾年，這種雙機場「一主內、一主外」的呆板分工，已逐漸被打破。以上海虹橋機場為例，今年三月擴建跑道和航廈後重新定位為「區域機場」，選擇對亞洲城市定點對飛，一則疏散浦東機場的壅塞，二則利用其接近市區的優越條件，為商務旅客創造便利。
更有對比價值的例子，則是東京成田機場與羽田機場的角色變化。在「成田主國際、羽田主國內」模式運作多年後，日本政府赫然發現，南韓首爾的仁川機場已取代東京，變成了日本最主要的國際樞紐機場。其中癥結在：仁川機場不僅起降容量更大，更開放對廿八個日本城市直飛；相對的，日本僅有八個城市能直飛成田機場，旅客若要出國，需先飛到羽田，再拖著行李花一個多小時搭車到成田去轉機。在這種情況下，許多日本人寧可選擇從居住地直接飛往仁川，再從那裡轉搭國際班機前往世界各地，以省下可觀的轉乘及等待時間。
換句話說，仁川機場的開放性以及它綿密的國際連接網絡，大大提升了它的競爭能力；對鄰國旅客而言，仁川甚至比自己的國家機場還更能提供便利的服務。受到威脅的不僅是日本，中國亦然，山東旅客要前往美國西岸，從仁川轉機要比經浦東轉機足足省下十七個小時。可見，要成為有競爭力的機場，必須要先創造條件，而不是關起門在家中吶喊即可成事。
松山與虹橋月中即將對飛，不僅象徵兩地的關係更形密切，更意味著台北在東亞交通樞紐的展望也更上層樓。驀然回首，遲至今日始走出這一步，其實已耗掉了十多年的寶貴時光。此際，我們除提醒馬政府要注意松山與桃園機場的平衡，也要提醒蘇貞昌：在他的選戰論述上，必須對松山機場妥適定位；而松山機場的定位，也必將牽動其兩岸論述及區域論述。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 3, 2010
The Democratic Progressive Party once demanded that the Songshan Airport, once in decline, be decommissioned and turned into a public park. Now however, Songshan Airport has been revitalized by direct cross-Strait flights. It will soon connect directly with Shanghai's Hongqiao, Tokyo's Haneda, and Seoul's Gimpo airports. It has been transformed into the business airport for a national capital in the East Asian economic circle. Su Tseng-chang's opposition to the DPP's "anti-Songshan Airport" line has reportedly mired him in a major showdown. His election campaign asks the question: Can Songshan Airport really be wiped off the map?
That Su Tseng-chang is mired in a major showdown means he realizes that circumstances have changed, and are not something he or the DPP can resist. After all, the Songshan Airport's current resurrection is a living reality to people traveling to and from the airport daily. Even assuming Su Tseng-chang had superhuman abilities, he could not take a bouncing baby and stuff it back into its mother's womb.
For DPP leaders, the Songshan Airport project, like so many other controversial construction projects, has been nothing more than a sword to attack their political enemies, rather than a plowshare to till the earth. When Huang Ta-chou was Taipei Mayor, the Democratic Progressive Party called for Songshan Airport's relocation. It pressured the Civil Aviation Authority to commit to relocating it within five years. When Chen Shui-bian was Taipei Mayor, he avoided the issue altogether. When Lee Ying-yuan and Frank Hsieh were running against each other for Taipei Mayor, they again campaigned for the elimination of Sung Shan Airport. They argued that since the MRT system would soon link Taoyuan Airport, Songshan Airport was no longer necessary.
Ironically, by that time, the DPP was already in power. But the Chen administration never made plans to either eliminate or preserve Songshan Airport. Instead, as the Green Camp shouted "Eliminate Songshan" at deafening volume, Chen Shui-bian embarked on a major campaign to build local airports across the island in the name of "Love for Taiwan." Today "mosquito airports" (unused airports infested with mosquitoes) can be found all over the island, the product of the "politics of wishful thinking." No trace of an MRT link to CKS Airport could be found during Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office. Chen renamed the CKS International Airport the "Taoyuan International Airport." But that did nothing to change its fortune. It merely became eight years older and shabbier. Over the years, the airport's decline has ironically become a clear reflection of our national decline.
Songshan Airport has now gotten a new lease on life. It has been the beneficiary of warming cross-Strait relations. It has also benefitted from recent changes in international airport operations. Take mainland China, South Korea, and Japan, for example. Many years ago airport noise pollution and traffic congestion forced major metropolises to build new international airports and transform existing airports into domestic airports. But more recently this rigid pattern of "one domestic airport, one international airport" for major metropolises has been shattered. Take Shanghai's Hongqiao Airport for example. In March of this year, following runway expansions and the construction of a new terminal building, it was redefined as a "regional airport." It now allows flights to select Asian cities. For one thing, it helps reduce congestion at Pudong Airport. For another it takes advantage of its proximity to the city, increasing its convenience for business travelers.
This is not the only example. The roles of Tokyo's Narita Airport and Haneda Airport have changed. For years "Narita was primarily international, Haneda was primarily domestic." But the Japanese government was shocked to discover that Incheon International Airport in Seoul, South Korea had replaced Tokyo as Japan's major international hub. The crux of the matter is that Incheon Airport not only has a greater take off and landing capacity, it also allows direct flights to 28 cities in Japan. By contrast, Narita Airport allows direct flights to only eight cities in Japan. Travelers in Japan who wish to go abroad must first fly to Haneda. From there they must travel over an hour by car to Narita, dragging along their luggage, in order to make their connecting flight. Under the circumstances, many Japanese prefer to fly directly from their hometowns to Incheon, where they can board an international flight to any destination in the world, saving considerable waiting and transit time.
In other words, Incheon Airport's openness and dense network of international connections greatly enhance its competitiveness. For passengers in neighboring countries, Incheon Airport can provide services even more convenient than those in their home countries. Japan is not the only one threatened. So is mainland China. Tourists from Shandong traveling to the West Coast of the US can save 17 full hours by transiting through Inchon instead of through Pudong. As we can see, in order to become a competitive airport, one must establish the right conditions, and not hide behind closed doors shouting angry slogans.
Songshan will connect with Hongqiao by the middle of this month. Not only does this symbolize a closer relationship between the two sides, it also suggests Taipei may soon be upgraded to the status of an East Asian transportation hub. In retrospect, we have gotten off to a late start. In fact, we squandered over a decade of valuable time. We would like to remind the Ma administration to maintain a balance between Songshan Airport and Taoyuan Airport, We would like to remind Su Tseng-chang that he must properly define the role of Songshan Airport in his campaign appeals, since this will have a bearing on his cross-Strait and regional appeals.
松山、虹橋、羽田：蘇貞昌與首都機場
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.06.03 02:08 am
一度沒落的松山機場，曾遭民進黨要求廢掉改建公園，如今卻因兩岸直航重振活力，更將進一步與上海虹橋、東京羽田、首爾金浦等機場直接對飛，蛻變為東亞經濟圈的首都商務機場。據說，蘇貞昌正為要不要延續黨內的「反松山機場」戰線而陷入天人交戰，他的首都選戰論述，真的能把松山機場從地圖上塗銷嗎？
蘇貞昌陷入天人交戰，顯示他知道大形勢已然改變，絕非他個人或民進黨可以抵擋。畢竟，松山機場今天的「復活」，已是每天人來機往的活生生現實。蘇貞昌縱使有天大的本事，也無法把一個活潑亂跳的孩子，再塞回母親的子宮裡吧？
像許多建設爭議一樣，對民進黨而言，松山機場的議題始終是一支用來攻擊的矛，而不是拿來耕耘的鋤頭。黃大洲時代，民進黨即曾提出遷移松山機場的主張，並迫使民航局承諾五年內提出遷建計畫；隨後陳水扁出任市長，卻絕口不提此事。直到李應元和謝長廷角逐台北市長，再度發動廢松山機場的攻擊，認為桃園機場捷運即將通車，松山機場已無存在必要。
諷刺的是，當時民進黨已經執政，扁政府並未就松山機場的去留提出任何相應計畫，反而就在綠營高喊「廢松山」最喧天價響之際，陳水扁以「愛台」之名在島內大肆興建地方機場。今天全台「蚊子機場」林立，正是這種「空想政治」的產物。何況，扁任內八年，不僅中正機場捷運無影無蹤，甚至改名為「桃園國際機場」，但並未使機場改運，只是愈發顯得老態龍鍾罷了。過去多年，機場的沒落，竟然成為綜合國力衰退的明顯指標。
松山機場得以重燃生機，除了拜兩岸關係融冰之賜，其實也與近年國際間經營機場理念的轉變有關。以中韓日等國為例，幾個大都會早年都因市區機場噪音及運量不勝負荷，而覓地另建國際機場，舊機場則皆轉為國內線之用。最近幾年，這種雙機場「一主內、一主外」的呆板分工，已逐漸被打破。以上海虹橋機場為例，今年三月擴建跑道和航廈後重新定位為「區域機場」，選擇對亞洲城市定點對飛，一則疏散浦東機場的壅塞，二則利用其接近市區的優越條件，為商務旅客創造便利。
更有對比價值的例子，則是東京成田機場與羽田機場的角色變化。在「成田主國際、羽田主國內」模式運作多年後，日本政府赫然發現，南韓首爾的仁川機場已取代東京，變成了日本最主要的國際樞紐機場。其中癥結在：仁川機場不僅起降容量更大，更開放對廿八個日本城市直飛；相對的，日本僅有八個城市能直飛成田機場，旅客若要出國，需先飛到羽田，再拖著行李花一個多小時搭車到成田去轉機。在這種情況下，許多日本人寧可選擇從居住地直接飛往仁川，再從那裡轉搭國際班機前往世界各地，以省下可觀的轉乘及等待時間。
換句話說，仁川機場的開放性以及它綿密的國際連接網絡，大大提升了它的競爭能力；對鄰國旅客而言，仁川甚至比自己的國家機場還更能提供便利的服務。受到威脅的不僅是日本，中國亦然，山東旅客要前往美國西岸，從仁川轉機要比經浦東轉機足足省下十七個小時。可見，要成為有競爭力的機場，必須要先創造條件，而不是關起門在家中吶喊即可成事。
松山與虹橋月中即將對飛，不僅象徵兩地的關係更形密切，更意味著台北在東亞交通樞紐的展望也更上層樓。驀然回首，遲至今日始走出這一步，其實已耗掉了十多年的寶貴時光。此際，我們除提醒馬政府要注意松山與桃園機場的平衡，也要提醒蘇貞昌：在他的選戰論述上，必須對松山機場妥適定位；而松山機場的定位，也必將牽動其兩岸論述及區域論述。
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