The DPP: Why Not Become a Smart Opposition Party?China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 15, 2010
Does the legislature need dissent? Of course. But many of our legislators have a very different way of expressing dissent. The first is to hit people. The second is to walk out. Is it really impossible to strike a balance between the two? Of course it is. Striking a balance between the two is the norm. Only abnormal situations necessitate zero-sum games. During the recent emergency session of the legislature, the DPP opposed ECFA. Therefore DPP legislators first hit people, then walked out. For the DPP, this behavior was typical. As a result, the final resolution on ECFA included no dissenting views. Instead, bills pertaining to cross-Strait relations or other major issues passed during the emergency session reflected only the views of the ruling party. What should have been passed was passed. In this particular case, the result was not bad. But that raises a question, namely, what is the point of having opposition parties?
In its fight against ECFA, the DPP took a beating. The reason was simple. From beginning to end, it failed to offer a convincing case. It failed to offer an argument that would convince even itself. one that was free from the shackles of its own ideology. The Ah-Bian administration ruled for eight years. Whether it should have or not, it opened the doors to most Mainland agricultural produce. it opened the doors to cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, and large scale investments. Its policies and edicts made little attempt to prevent substantive private sector exchanges and investments. After eight years in power, the DPP experienced the bitter taste of losing power. Strangely enough, the DPP still could not bring itself to condemn Chen Shui-bian's corruption. Nor could it dissociate itself from its Taiwan independence voter base -- a voter base which had no hope of ever becoming an absolute majority.
As the party leadership launched its anti-ECFA protest march, local DPP officials openly proclaimed that ECFA would benefit many local industries. When the DPP convened an internal meeting, ECFA doves outnumbered ECFA hawks. But the DPP legislative caucus picked a fight anyway, and suffered even greater humiliation. Even more regrettably, as soon as it finished hitting people, the DPP withdrew from "this particular emergency session." It wanted to make clear that it was refusing to endorse the ruling party's cross-Strait policy. As a result, "this particular emergency session" continued to review bills. The bills had nothing to do with cross-Strait policy. Some were economic bills the DPP has long expressed concern over. They included bills pertaining to the appointment of civil servants, pension system reform, rural regeneration, and disaster prevention.
The DPP walked out of the emergency session. It allowed the Legislative Yuan to conduct its business with exceptional smoothness. In a single day, it passed an amendment to the Ba Wu New System Civil Service Retirement Act. It affirmed the legality of military participation in disaster relief. It enabled the Vice Premier to assume the chairmanship of the Disaster Prevention and Relief Committee, immediately elevating the status of the disaster prevention system. The amendments were responses to the suffering endured during Typhoon Morakot last year. Is the DPP truly unconcerned? Lest we forget, the hardest-hit regions were Pingtung County, Kaohsiung County, Chiayi County, all cities and counties under DPP control. The ruling administration is not about to show favoritism to counties and cities based on political affiliation. As long as the people are suffering, the government must address its inadequacies and must improve its performance. Every time a typhoon or flood occurs, the DPP thunders with indignation. But once the disasters pass, they suddenly develop amnesia. DPP legislators walked out of the emergency session. But which DPP legislator if any turned down overtime pay? Can a political party that knows only how to call others names, but has no idea how to improve disaster prevention, really boast about its solidarity with the people?
Consider the articles pertaining to agriculture. These are what the DPP finds most objectionable. Many of the counties and cities under DPP rule are agricultural regions. The heads of these agricultural counties must fight for everything they can get. Participating in the planning and distribution of the agricultural fund is even more desirable. But when the DPP walked out, it allowed others to reap the rewards. Faced with such a situation, the DPP nevertheless chose not to return. Instead, it held a press conference on the outside, and threatened to hold an all night vigil on Ketegelan Boulevard. If the DPP's opposition was genuine, it should have made its opposition official through a vote. Rural revitalization is a major issue on Taiwan. Unless the land can be revitalized, the population cannot be revitalized, and it will be nearly impossible to induce young people to return to rural areas. The DPP blasted the 150 billion NT agricultural fund as "cash bribes." Indeed, cash bribes may well be involved. But just exactly who is being bribed? Lest we forget, agricultural counties and cities make up the DPP's core support. The DPP has chosen to obstruct this 150 billion agricultural fund. Instead it should think up better uses for this huge sum of money.
The DPP has a limited number of seats in the legislature. Nevertheless it remains the largest opposition party. It represents 35 to 45 percent of the voting public. On social and economic issues, the DPP has the potential to garner considerable public support. Society on Taiwan has entered a more civilized stage. It empathizes with the underprivileged. It supports environmental protection. None of this will change. The direction is clear. Must the DPP remain bound by its own ideology? Must it relinquish opportunities to contribute, merely for the sake of its cross-Strait policies? Oversight does not mean hitting people. Opposition can be expressed more intelligently. They DPP is perhaps unwilling to become a loyal opposition party. But is there any reason it cannot become a smart opposition party?
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.15
社論－民進黨可以做個聰明的反對黨
本報訊
國會需不需要不同意見？答案毋庸置疑，顯然是肯定的；但是，我們的立法院在處理不同意見、或者不同意見尋求表達的方式格外特殊，一是打架，二是退出。在打與退之間，找不到平衡點嗎？當然找得到！而且，常態上是一定找得到，只是碰到「非常態」的時候，就是非打即退的零和遊戲。這次臨時會，民進黨為了兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，打一架後退出，就是典型，其結果沒讓ＥＣＦＡ審查做出不同意見的附帶決議，卻讓臨時會非關兩岸關係或政策的重大法案，完全依照執政黨的意思，該過則過。這個結果也沒什麼不好，問題是：那反對黨的存在還有意義嗎？
民進黨在ＥＣＦＡ議題上，一路吃癟，原因很簡單，即始終無法在兩岸政策論述上，說服自己擺脫意識形態的束縛。扁政府執政八年，不論該不該開放，在他們手上已經開放絕大多數的大陸農產品，以及兩岸經貿交流和重大投資，而政策法令上管制，也未曾防堵得了民間的實質交流和投資；八年執政，讓民進黨嘗到失去政權的苦果，但奇特的是，民進黨既棄絕不了貪腐的陳水扁，也依舊陷溺於完全無法過半的獨派票源而不可自拔。
當黨中央發動反ＥＣＦＡ大遊行的同時，民進黨基層首長已經提出警語，甚至還有首長毫不避諱的公開表明兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，對若干產業的確有利；即使民進黨召集會議，內部見解「不打」遠超過「打」，民進黨團還是無可避免肢體衝突，在一個贏不了的戰場上，輸得更徹底。更遺憾的是，打完一架，民進黨決定退出「這次臨時會」，不為執政黨的兩岸政策背書，結果，「這次臨時會」接續下來審議的法案，不但與兩岸政策無關，還是民進黨始終關心的民生重大法案，包括公務員的任用、退休、撫卹之修法案，還有從農村再生條例草案與災防法的修正案。
民進黨退出臨時會，讓立法院會議事格外順暢，一天就通過了公務員八五新制的退休法案修正、確立法源讓國軍主動投入救災任務的災防法，還讓行政院副院長兼任災害防救委員會主委，直接提高災防體系位階。這個修法案，緣於去年莫拉克風災之痛，民進黨人不關心嗎？不要忘了，災情最重的屏東縣、高雄縣、嘉義縣，都是民進黨執政縣市，執政者不會管縣市長屬於哪個政黨，只要人民有痛，而政府所為不足，就要改進，就要加強，風災雨災來臨時，民進黨人罵聲震天，天災過後難道就忘了嗎？聲言退出臨時會的民進黨立委，有誰拒領臨時會召集所給予的加班薪給？一個只會罵人，卻不會從制度面改善災防建制的政黨，如何還能聲稱自己貼近民意？
還有民進黨最介意的農再條例，民進黨執政縣市不乏農業縣，對這些農業縣市的首長而言，能爭取多少是多少，能參與農再基金規畫與利用更好，但民進黨聲言退出後則是將成果拱手讓人。面臨這種局面，民進黨卻依舊選擇不進場而在場外舉行記者會，揚言不排除夜宿凱道。如果民進黨的反對是貨真價實的，就該進場留下表決紀錄，讓大家知道民進黨的立場。農村活化是一個台灣必須面對的重大課題，土地不活化就不可能談人口活化，就很難吸引足夠的年輕人口回流農村，民進黨批評一千五百億的農再基金是「現金綁樁」，的確，現金綁樁不是不可能，但是，到底綁誰的樁？別忘了農業縣市多為民進黨的基本盤，民進黨與其阻擋一千五百億的農再基金，不如想想如何讓這筆龐大的經費，用在該用的地方。
雖然民進黨的國會席次有限，但終究是最大反對黨，代表至少三成五到四成五的民意，在民生社會議題上，民進黨有很大空間爭取中間選民的認同，畢竟台灣社會發展已經進入文明階段，聲援弱勢、支持環保是一條不可變易之路，方向如此明確，民進黨何須受困於意識形態，為了兩岸政策犧牲自己可以全力發揮的項目？監督，不表示非打架不可；反對，可以有更聰明的做法，民進黨即使不肯成為忠誠的反對黨，總可以當一個聰明的反對黨吧。
Thursday, July 15, 2010
Wednesday, July 14, 2010
Goodwill and Creativity Ensure Continued Cross-Strait Win/Win
Goodwill and Creativity Ensure Continued Cross-Strait Win/Win
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 14, 2010
Now that the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) has been signed, the KMT-CCP Forum is opening in Guangzhou. President Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP, met with Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung in Beijing. Hu did not follow-up. He did not clarify the one question Taipei is most concerned about -- FTAs with other countries. But what remains unchanged is closer relations and mutual goodwill. Wu Poh-hsiung publicly conveyed President Ma Ying-jeou's best wishes, and a 16 character statement of principle. This shows that cross-Strait relations have emerged from the fog of "secret emissaries." They have been institutionalized and are moving towards normalization.
It is widely known that during the Lee Teng-hui era, cross-Strait relations remained shaky. When Taipei and Beijing wanted close interactions, KMT and CCP higher-ups dispatched their most trusted emissaries. These secret emissaries added an air of intrigue to cross-Strait relations. But they really didn't improve cross-Strait relations. When Ah-Bian was in office he too sent secret emissaries. But the infamous "note" in Chen Shui-bian's suit pocket did nothing to increase trust between the Chen regime and Beijing. In 2005, People First Party Chairman James Soong visited the Mainland. His main consideration before departure, was how to normalize cross-Strait relations. He communicated with the Chen regime repeatedly in order to set up a Soong/Hu meeting. To win Soong's confidence, Chen Shui-bian presented him with a framed work of caligraphy reading "trust." But in the end it was all for naught.
The biggest difference between the Ma Ying-jeou era and the Lee and Chen eras is that Ma does not believe in secret emissaries. He insists on a transparent standard operating procedures agreed upon by the MAC, SEF, or other cross-Strait entities. Once he even considered allowing the KMT/CCP Forum to morph into a role besides cross-Strait policy trailblazer. In fact, Ma's thinking has already been incorporated into current cross-Strait policy. The rituals of the KMT/CCP Forum have been reinforced, even as its decision-making authority has been weakened. Apart from the two associations (MAC and ARATS), all cross-Strait agreements and consultations have been assigned to the government officials and agencies responsible. As for the KMT-CCP Forum, on Mainland China the party leads the government. All representatives are both party officials and key players assigned to Taiwan affairs. But none of the KMT representatives are officials of the Ma administration. None of them are charged with decision-making on Mainland affairs. They lack the right to speak. The most they can do is offer advice through party channels.
Ma Ying-jeou is not keen to participate in the KMT/CCP Forum. For Beijing, this has remained a nagging concern. But Ma has an intense desire to improve cross-Strait relations. That is an indisputable fact. The high-level KMT/CCP dialogue began when the KMT was out of office. KMT leaders occupied no official positions. In recent years, they have shuttled back and forth between Beijing and Shanghai, attending various activities and forums, increasing mutual trust and understanding. Now they have returned to power. The party can continue to conduct such a dialogue. But Ma Ying-jeou is president and party chairman. Obviously it is too early for him to meet with leaders of the other side.
The 16 character statement of principles Ma Ying-jeou asked Wu Poh-hsiung to convey to Hu Jintao reads: "Face up to reality. Increase mutual trust. Seek common ground. Ensure win-win." There is nothing special about it. The KMT-CCP Forum has reiterated this theme for years. The tune may be old. But it has not diminished in importance. Especially since cross-Strait relations have warmed so rapidly. "Face up to reality" cannot be a unilateral demand. Both sides must understand and accept it. Beijing's bottom line is that our side must oppose Taiwan independence, and adhere to the 1992 Consensus. Only this can "remove the obstacles standing in the way of improved cross-Strait relations, and help the two sides arrive at a feasible solution," Taipei must acknowledge this reality when dealing with Beijing. Taipei's bottom line is that Beijing must accept the reality of the Republic of China on Taiwan. If President Ma Ying-jeou cannot meet and speak with leaders from the other side at an international forum, how can he rise above internal conflict, and arrange a Ma/Hu Summit?"
When can Ma and Hu meet? That perhaps is not Ma Ying-jeou's most pressing concern. For Taipei, the most urgent question in the post-ECFA era, concerns FTAs. Will Taipei encounter resistance or assistance when it attempts to sign FTAs with foreign governments? Hu did not respond to this question directly. Wu Po-hsiung however did cite Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi. Wu said that President Hu endorsed Wang Yi's advocacy of "fair and reasonable treatment, pragmatic and proper handling." Cross-Strait relations are special and sensitive. Many issues can be mentioned only in passing. One must adopt a wait and see attitude. ECFA has increased cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation. The Ma administration now needs FTAs to make the progress more real. Only then can he reduce internal pressures, and assuage internal concerns.
On a more positive note, Beijing is willing to meet Taipei's calls for "fair and reasonable treatment." It is willing to take actions that are "pragmatic and appropriate." Basically Taipei has been presented with a golden opportunity. It should be able to sign FTAs with other governments in the foreseeable future. Taipei however, must be realistic. It cannot expect to sign FTAs with scores of governments. Beijing has certain conditions. For example, Taipei cannot start by attempting to sign FTAs with the Beijing's diplomatic allies, Only after Beijing has signed FTAs with them will Taipei be given the chance to follow up. These are all matters about which Taipei must be psychologically prepared. Following Mainland China's lead, the two sides can study the regional economy. How much latitude is there on Taiwan to express one's views on political reality? This must be addressed in advance. The two sides need goodwill. They also need creativity. Only then can they continue to create a win-win situation.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.14
社論－用善意、創意 為兩岸續創雙贏
本報訊
兩岸簽署經濟合作架構協議「ＥＣＦＡ」後，國共論壇在廣州召開。中共總書記、國家主席胡錦濤依例在北京接見國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄一行人，儘管胡錦濤並未對台灣最關切的後續與他國簽署ＦＴＡ之事，做出更明確而具體的表示，但不變的是兩岸善意和密切交流更堅實地推動下去；吳伯雄也高調、公開地傳達馬英九總統的致意和十六字原則，這也顯示兩岸關係已經走出「密使」陰霾，朝制度化、正常化邁進。
眾所皆知，李登輝執政時期，兩岸互動仍處於不穩定狀態，雙方互動密切時，國共最高層皆派出最親信的密使傳話，密使讓兩岸關係平添想像，卻無助於兩岸關係的正面發展；即使如此，扁政府執政時期也曾有意建立密使管道，但陳水扁西裝口袋的一張紙條，也無助於扁政府與北京方面互信往來；二○○五年，親民黨主席宋楚瑜赴大陸訪問，行前主要考量還是在於兩岸關係如何正常化，因此多次與扁政府溝通，建立宋、胡會的對話方向和原則，陳水扁贈字「誠信」以取信於宋，但結果依舊落空。
馬英九和李、扁時期的執政者最大不同是，他不相信密使管道這種事。他堅持執政下的海陸兩會或任何與兩岸相關的協商，在透明、正常的機制下運行；他甚至一度動念要讓國共論壇轉型，不再扮演兩岸政策先行者的角色。事實上，馬的想法部分也落實在目前兩岸關係和政策上，國共論壇的儀式性漸強，決策性趨弱，所有兩岸協議、磋商，除兩岸兩會外也納入政府相關官員、甚至機關。至於國共論壇，大陸以黨領政，所有與談代表，既有黨職也都是對台工作的要角，但國民黨方面出席者，無一在馬政府大陸決策體系中扮演任何角色，遑論發言權，充其量他們可以透過黨的管道提供建議。
馬英九不熱衷參與國共對話，是北京方面對馬一直存在的疑慮，但是，馬英九有強烈企圖心改善兩岸關係卻是不爭事實。國共高層對話，始自國民黨在野之後，無官一身輕的國民黨人，在這幾年往來北京、上海，出席各種活動與論壇，建立互信與了解，重新執政後，這樣的對話，在黨依舊可以進行，但身兼總統與黨主席的馬英九，顯然一時半刻還不可能與對岸領導人面對面對話。
馬英九這次請吳伯雄帶給胡錦濤的十六字：「正視現實，累積互信，求同存異、續創雙贏」，並不特殊，只是國共論壇數年來一談再談的論調，雖為老調，卻極為重要，特別是在兩岸關係直線升溫後，「正視現實」不能只是單方面的要求，必須為兩岸共同認知和接納。就北京方面而言，很難打破他們的原則；反對台獨、堅持九二共識，唯其如此才能為「解決制約兩岸關係發展的難題，找到可行的辦法」，這也是台灣面對北京必須認清的現實；就台灣方面而言，則是要對岸接受中華民國在台灣的現實，馬英九總統如果不可能在國際場合與對岸領導人對話，他又如何可能突破內部矛盾，創造「馬胡會」？
馬胡何時能會，還未必是馬英九最急迫的關切重點，對台灣而言，最重要的，反而是後ＥＣＦＡ時代，台灣尋求對外簽署ＦＴＡ，可能遭遇的是阻力或助力？胡錦濤並未正面回應這個問題，吳伯雄則以國台辦主任王毅的說法指，胡主席贊同王毅所提「合情合理對待，務實妥善處理」的說法。兩岸關係特殊、敏感，很多事點到為止，只能靜觀後續進展，ＥＣＦＡ讓兩岸經貿合作更緊密，馬政府就更需要在對外簽署ＦＴＡ取得實質進展，才能化解內部的壓力和疑慮。
從好的方面看，大陸願意「合情合理對待」台灣的需求，「務實妥善處理」台灣的行動，基本上，應該暗示台灣有很大機會，在可預見的時間內，與他國簽成ＦＴＡ。但是，台灣也不能不切實際地期待舖天蓋地簽成許許多多ＦＴＡ，大陸方面有前提的制約，比方說，大陸的邦交國，台灣不能先簽；大陸簽成ＦＴＡ者，台灣才有機會跟進等等，都是台灣必須做好心理準備的；至於在大陸領頭下，兩岸共同參考區域經濟，台灣還有多大的對政治現實各自表述的空間？也得提前因應，兩岸需要善意，也需要創意，才能真正續創雙贏。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 14, 2010
Now that the cross-strait economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) has been signed, the KMT-CCP Forum is opening in Guangzhou. President Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP, met with Honorary KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung in Beijing. Hu did not follow-up. He did not clarify the one question Taipei is most concerned about -- FTAs with other countries. But what remains unchanged is closer relations and mutual goodwill. Wu Poh-hsiung publicly conveyed President Ma Ying-jeou's best wishes, and a 16 character statement of principle. This shows that cross-Strait relations have emerged from the fog of "secret emissaries." They have been institutionalized and are moving towards normalization.
It is widely known that during the Lee Teng-hui era, cross-Strait relations remained shaky. When Taipei and Beijing wanted close interactions, KMT and CCP higher-ups dispatched their most trusted emissaries. These secret emissaries added an air of intrigue to cross-Strait relations. But they really didn't improve cross-Strait relations. When Ah-Bian was in office he too sent secret emissaries. But the infamous "note" in Chen Shui-bian's suit pocket did nothing to increase trust between the Chen regime and Beijing. In 2005, People First Party Chairman James Soong visited the Mainland. His main consideration before departure, was how to normalize cross-Strait relations. He communicated with the Chen regime repeatedly in order to set up a Soong/Hu meeting. To win Soong's confidence, Chen Shui-bian presented him with a framed work of caligraphy reading "trust." But in the end it was all for naught.
The biggest difference between the Ma Ying-jeou era and the Lee and Chen eras is that Ma does not believe in secret emissaries. He insists on a transparent standard operating procedures agreed upon by the MAC, SEF, or other cross-Strait entities. Once he even considered allowing the KMT/CCP Forum to morph into a role besides cross-Strait policy trailblazer. In fact, Ma's thinking has already been incorporated into current cross-Strait policy. The rituals of the KMT/CCP Forum have been reinforced, even as its decision-making authority has been weakened. Apart from the two associations (MAC and ARATS), all cross-Strait agreements and consultations have been assigned to the government officials and agencies responsible. As for the KMT-CCP Forum, on Mainland China the party leads the government. All representatives are both party officials and key players assigned to Taiwan affairs. But none of the KMT representatives are officials of the Ma administration. None of them are charged with decision-making on Mainland affairs. They lack the right to speak. The most they can do is offer advice through party channels.
Ma Ying-jeou is not keen to participate in the KMT/CCP Forum. For Beijing, this has remained a nagging concern. But Ma has an intense desire to improve cross-Strait relations. That is an indisputable fact. The high-level KMT/CCP dialogue began when the KMT was out of office. KMT leaders occupied no official positions. In recent years, they have shuttled back and forth between Beijing and Shanghai, attending various activities and forums, increasing mutual trust and understanding. Now they have returned to power. The party can continue to conduct such a dialogue. But Ma Ying-jeou is president and party chairman. Obviously it is too early for him to meet with leaders of the other side.
The 16 character statement of principles Ma Ying-jeou asked Wu Poh-hsiung to convey to Hu Jintao reads: "Face up to reality. Increase mutual trust. Seek common ground. Ensure win-win." There is nothing special about it. The KMT-CCP Forum has reiterated this theme for years. The tune may be old. But it has not diminished in importance. Especially since cross-Strait relations have warmed so rapidly. "Face up to reality" cannot be a unilateral demand. Both sides must understand and accept it. Beijing's bottom line is that our side must oppose Taiwan independence, and adhere to the 1992 Consensus. Only this can "remove the obstacles standing in the way of improved cross-Strait relations, and help the two sides arrive at a feasible solution," Taipei must acknowledge this reality when dealing with Beijing. Taipei's bottom line is that Beijing must accept the reality of the Republic of China on Taiwan. If President Ma Ying-jeou cannot meet and speak with leaders from the other side at an international forum, how can he rise above internal conflict, and arrange a Ma/Hu Summit?"
When can Ma and Hu meet? That perhaps is not Ma Ying-jeou's most pressing concern. For Taipei, the most urgent question in the post-ECFA era, concerns FTAs. Will Taipei encounter resistance or assistance when it attempts to sign FTAs with foreign governments? Hu did not respond to this question directly. Wu Po-hsiung however did cite Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi. Wu said that President Hu endorsed Wang Yi's advocacy of "fair and reasonable treatment, pragmatic and proper handling." Cross-Strait relations are special and sensitive. Many issues can be mentioned only in passing. One must adopt a wait and see attitude. ECFA has increased cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation. The Ma administration now needs FTAs to make the progress more real. Only then can he reduce internal pressures, and assuage internal concerns.
On a more positive note, Beijing is willing to meet Taipei's calls for "fair and reasonable treatment." It is willing to take actions that are "pragmatic and appropriate." Basically Taipei has been presented with a golden opportunity. It should be able to sign FTAs with other governments in the foreseeable future. Taipei however, must be realistic. It cannot expect to sign FTAs with scores of governments. Beijing has certain conditions. For example, Taipei cannot start by attempting to sign FTAs with the Beijing's diplomatic allies, Only after Beijing has signed FTAs with them will Taipei be given the chance to follow up. These are all matters about which Taipei must be psychologically prepared. Following Mainland China's lead, the two sides can study the regional economy. How much latitude is there on Taiwan to express one's views on political reality? This must be addressed in advance. The two sides need goodwill. They also need creativity. Only then can they continue to create a win-win situation.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.14
社論－用善意、創意 為兩岸續創雙贏
本報訊
兩岸簽署經濟合作架構協議「ＥＣＦＡ」後，國共論壇在廣州召開。中共總書記、國家主席胡錦濤依例在北京接見國民黨榮譽主席吳伯雄一行人，儘管胡錦濤並未對台灣最關切的後續與他國簽署ＦＴＡ之事，做出更明確而具體的表示，但不變的是兩岸善意和密切交流更堅實地推動下去；吳伯雄也高調、公開地傳達馬英九總統的致意和十六字原則，這也顯示兩岸關係已經走出「密使」陰霾，朝制度化、正常化邁進。
眾所皆知，李登輝執政時期，兩岸互動仍處於不穩定狀態，雙方互動密切時，國共最高層皆派出最親信的密使傳話，密使讓兩岸關係平添想像，卻無助於兩岸關係的正面發展；即使如此，扁政府執政時期也曾有意建立密使管道，但陳水扁西裝口袋的一張紙條，也無助於扁政府與北京方面互信往來；二○○五年，親民黨主席宋楚瑜赴大陸訪問，行前主要考量還是在於兩岸關係如何正常化，因此多次與扁政府溝通，建立宋、胡會的對話方向和原則，陳水扁贈字「誠信」以取信於宋，但結果依舊落空。
馬英九和李、扁時期的執政者最大不同是，他不相信密使管道這種事。他堅持執政下的海陸兩會或任何與兩岸相關的協商，在透明、正常的機制下運行；他甚至一度動念要讓國共論壇轉型，不再扮演兩岸政策先行者的角色。事實上，馬的想法部分也落實在目前兩岸關係和政策上，國共論壇的儀式性漸強，決策性趨弱，所有兩岸協議、磋商，除兩岸兩會外也納入政府相關官員、甚至機關。至於國共論壇，大陸以黨領政，所有與談代表，既有黨職也都是對台工作的要角，但國民黨方面出席者，無一在馬政府大陸決策體系中扮演任何角色，遑論發言權，充其量他們可以透過黨的管道提供建議。
馬英九不熱衷參與國共對話，是北京方面對馬一直存在的疑慮，但是，馬英九有強烈企圖心改善兩岸關係卻是不爭事實。國共高層對話，始自國民黨在野之後，無官一身輕的國民黨人，在這幾年往來北京、上海，出席各種活動與論壇，建立互信與了解，重新執政後，這樣的對話，在黨依舊可以進行，但身兼總統與黨主席的馬英九，顯然一時半刻還不可能與對岸領導人面對面對話。
馬英九這次請吳伯雄帶給胡錦濤的十六字：「正視現實，累積互信，求同存異、續創雙贏」，並不特殊，只是國共論壇數年來一談再談的論調，雖為老調，卻極為重要，特別是在兩岸關係直線升溫後，「正視現實」不能只是單方面的要求，必須為兩岸共同認知和接納。就北京方面而言，很難打破他們的原則；反對台獨、堅持九二共識，唯其如此才能為「解決制約兩岸關係發展的難題，找到可行的辦法」，這也是台灣面對北京必須認清的現實；就台灣方面而言，則是要對岸接受中華民國在台灣的現實，馬英九總統如果不可能在國際場合與對岸領導人對話，他又如何可能突破內部矛盾，創造「馬胡會」？
馬胡何時能會，還未必是馬英九最急迫的關切重點，對台灣而言，最重要的，反而是後ＥＣＦＡ時代，台灣尋求對外簽署ＦＴＡ，可能遭遇的是阻力或助力？胡錦濤並未正面回應這個問題，吳伯雄則以國台辦主任王毅的說法指，胡主席贊同王毅所提「合情合理對待，務實妥善處理」的說法。兩岸關係特殊、敏感，很多事點到為止，只能靜觀後續進展，ＥＣＦＡ讓兩岸經貿合作更緊密，馬政府就更需要在對外簽署ＦＴＡ取得實質進展，才能化解內部的壓力和疑慮。
從好的方面看，大陸願意「合情合理對待」台灣的需求，「務實妥善處理」台灣的行動，基本上，應該暗示台灣有很大機會，在可預見的時間內，與他國簽成ＦＴＡ。但是，台灣也不能不切實際地期待舖天蓋地簽成許許多多ＦＴＡ，大陸方面有前提的制約，比方說，大陸的邦交國，台灣不能先簽；大陸簽成ＦＴＡ者，台灣才有機會跟進等等，都是台灣必須做好心理準備的；至於在大陸領頭下，兩岸共同參考區域經濟，台灣還有多大的對政治現實各自表述的空間？也得提前因應，兩岸需要善意，也需要創意，才能真正續創雙贏。
Saturday, July 10, 2010
Two States Theory Repudiates the 1992 Consensus and ECFA
Two States Theory Repudiates the 1992 Consensus and ECFAUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 10, 2010
The cross-strait economic framework agreement (ECFA) has been signed. The DPP now faces a new political scenario. On the one hand, cross-Strait relations have progressed beyond the point of no return. Taiwan independence has become increasingly unlikely. On the other hand, it is too late for the DPP to call off its campaign to kill ECFA, and disassociate itself from Taiwan independence. In short, the DPP finds itself swimming against the tide, in diametric opposition to the larger currents of history.
The DPP's defeat in the 2008 presidential election led to Tsai Ing-wen's election as DPP chairman. The public and elements within the DPP, once entertained the illusion that the DPP would take advantage of this opportunity to reinvent itself, and get the Taiwan independence monkey off its back. But ECFA showed that the DPP is incapable of divorcing itself from the Taiwan independence movement. Tsai Ing-wen may be the person who finally dashes all hope that the DPP might remake itself. This is the effect ECFA has had on party politics on Taiwan. ECFA's importance should not be underestimated.
For the past two years, Tsai Ing-wen was the person the public hoped would transform the DPP. But as a result of ECFA, Tsai has backslid. She has adopted a scorched earth policy, and a hardline Taiwan independence posture. Any hope that the DPP might transform itself has been completely shattered. Actually, we should not be surprised. In fact, Tsai Ing-wen was the instigator of the "two states theory" during the Lee Teng-hui era, and the person responsible for the repudiation the 1992 Consensus during the Chen Shui-bian era. She was the main reason the cross-Strait policies of both the Lee and Chen regimes ran smack into a brick wall. But because Tsai Ing-wen was merely a staffer at the time, many believed that once she became party chairman she would change. She would help the DPP undergo a transformation. Tsai Ing-wen once said "The DPP is an opposition party with experience in governing." Some concluded that meant she could see the bigger picture, and would not revert to self-destructive policies of the Taiwan independence movement. ECFA however, has inspired the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen to revert to form. Tsai has totally blanked out the disastrous consequences her "two states theory" and her refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus had on cross-Strait relations. If anything, the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen have intensified their opposition to ECFA.
During the Lee and Chen era, not one day passed without Taiwan independence political maneuveurs leading to confrontation. For example, in 2000, Lee Teng-hui stumped for the Lien-Siew ticket. In order to appeal to supporters of "softcore Taiwan independence," he introduced his "two states theory." A few days later however, he publicly stated that "the two states theory would not be incorporated into the Constitution." In 2004, Chen Shui-bian launched his "anti-missile referendum," which later morphed into a half-baked "missile purchase referendum." In 2006, Chen Shui-bian launched his "end reunification" drive. As a result, Washington demoted his status during transit, and Ah-Bian enacted his "Journey to Nowhere" farce. In 2008, Ah-Bian launched his "referendum to join the UN," only to be publicly condemned by George W. Bush, and labeled a "Taiwan independence element" by the US State Department. Eventually the DPP lost power. The DPP's Taiwan independence tactics exhibit a common pattern. First, they experience a power crisis. Then they escalate their Taiwan independence rhetoric, digging themselves in deeper and deeper, to where they can no longer to turn back, can no longer brake, and wind up driving headlong into a wall.
The DPP's current tactics have followed the same pattern. At first they are unsure about how they should express opposition to ECFA. Tsai Ying-wen loses the debate over ECFA. Now she faces a power crisis. So she escalates her anti-ECFA rhetoric. She refers to the Republic of China as a "government in exile." She characterizes ECFA as a "duet between the KMT and the CCP," and a "class struggle between the rich and poor." She demonizes ECFA. But ECFA is signed, and when its contents are announced, the DPP's demonization campaign backfires. By now however, it is too late to turn back, it is too late to apply the brakes. Therefore they insist that ECFA is "not a treaty," they demand a "line item review," and begin scorched earth resistance tactics. They simultaneously launch a referendum campaign, sinking deeper and deeper in their own quagmire. They find themselves riding a tiger, and unable to get off. They find themselves swimming against the tide, unable to repudiate their anti-ECFA stance in order to win the five cities elections. They may not even be able to reverse their anti-ECFA stance for the 2012 presidential election. They may even find themselves forced to invoke Article XVI and proclaim that ECFA is invalid. The DPP and Tsai Ing-wen are now stuck to their own anti-ECFA tar baby. Under the circumstances, how can the DPP possibility undergo transformation?
Tsai Ing-wen takes a back seat to no one in the DPP when it comes to cross-Strait policy. After all, during her two terms in the Lee and Chen regimes, she racked up considerable hands-on experience in cross-Strait policy. Some people concluded that the tragic consequences of her two states theory" and repudiation of the 1992 Consensus gave Tsai Ing-wen all the more reason to transform the DPP. After all, she clearly knew Taiwan independence was a dead end. Her hands-on experience was painful and unforgettable. When Tsai Ing-wen was first elected party chairman, some of her words and deeds seemed to suggest a desire to transform the party. Who knew the ECFA controversy, followed by a power struggle within the DPP over the party's future, would persuade in Tsai Ing-wen to revert to the DPP's Taiwan independence, scorched earth path?
Within a single lifetime, Tsai Ying-wen led Taiwan to ruin three times. This may end up being Tsai Ing-wen's epitaph. Her "two states theory" spelled the end of the Lee Teng-hui regime. Her repudiation of the 1992 Consensus spelled the end of the Chen Shui-bian regime. Tsai Ing-wen is now holding high the anti-ECFA banner. She may enable the DPP to win the five cities elections. She may even enable the DPP to win the 2012 presidential election. But she cannot prevent Taiwan from running head on into a brick wall. Moreover, the consequences will be far more serious than the consequences of her "two-states theory" and her repudiation of the 1992 Consensus.
Tsai Ying-wen has erred, once, twice, thrice. Why is she unable to learn from her mistakes?
兩國論‧否認九二共識‧反ECFA
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.10
兩岸經濟協議（ＥＣＦＡ）簽訂後，民進黨面對新的政治局勢：一方面，兩岸關係已經超越了返折點，台獨已愈不可能；另一方面，民進黨追殺ＥＣＦＡ的政治操作，卻已煞不住車，無法從獨派路線上自我超脫。一句話說明：民進黨已與大局大勢南轅北轍，背道而馳。
二○○八年民進黨的慘敗，與蔡英文當選民進黨主席，曾經在社會上及民進黨內普遍引發一種幻想，認為那是民進黨跳脫台獨路線、轉型蛻變的契機。但是，經由ＥＣＦＡ的考驗，證明了民進黨已無可能從台獨路線跳脫，而蔡英文可能成為民進黨轉型領航者的想像亦告正式幻滅。這是ＥＣＦＡ對台灣政黨政治的重大影響，不容輕估。
無人可以否認，蔡英文是過去兩年民進黨可能轉型蛻變的寄託；如今卻證實她也因ＥＣＦＡ而走回焦土鬥爭的獨派路線，則民進黨轉型蛻變的想像亦告完全破滅。其實，蔡英文在李登輝時代倡議「兩國論」，在陳水扁時代堅持「否認九二共識」，皆是造成李扁二任兩岸政策推車撞壁的主要原因；但當時蔡英文只是幕僚身分，許多人覺得她在成為黨主席後，應當有所調整，引領民進黨轉型蛻變。蔡英文原本說：「民進黨是一個有執政經驗的反對黨。」這句話被解讀成，能識大體，不會回到玉石俱焚的台獨鬥爭。但是，ＥＣＦＡ卻使民進黨及蔡英文回復原形，她儼然完全忘記「兩國論」及「否認九二共識」對兩岸關係造成的慘重創傷；民進黨及蔡英文此時操作ＥＣＦＡ的手法，實已變本加厲。
在李扁二任，台獨操作沒有一次不是推車撞壁。例如：二 ○○○年，李登輝為「連蕭配」輔選，想拉攏「輕獨」選民，推出「兩國論」，後來在幾天之內就公開表示「兩國論不入憲」；二○○四年，陳水扁發動「反飛彈公投」，結果卻成了虎頭蛇尾的「買飛彈公投」；二○○六年，陳水扁發動「終統」，結果美國降低過境禮遇，扁演出「迷航」的鬧劇；二○○八年，扁又發動「入聯公投」，被小布希公開譴責，國務院則逕指其為「台獨分子」，最後民進黨輸掉了政權。這些台獨操作皆呈現一種共同程序：發生權力危機→升高台獨操作→愈陷愈深，不能回頭，煞不住車→推車撞壁。
現在，民進黨對ＥＣＦＡ的操作又進入同一程序：一開始，對如何對抗ＥＣＦＡ，有些猶豫→蔡英文辯論落敗，出現權力危機→升高反ＥＣＦＡ操作→指中華民國是流亡政府→指ＥＣＦＡ是「國共唱和／貧富鬥爭」，將之妖魔化→ＥＣＦＡ簽成，公布內容，民進黨的「妖魔化」操作失敗→不能回頭，煞不住車→主張「不是條約」，堅持「逐條審查」，焦土抗爭→另一路又發動公投，愈陷愈深→騎虎難下，逆向操作，五都反ＥＣＦＡ煞不住車，未來二○一二大選反ＥＣＦＡ也下不了車，甚至可能被迫主張動用第十六條宣布廢約→民進黨及蔡英文被自己的「反ＥＣＦＡ」路線綑綁住→民進黨豈再有轉型蛻變的可能性？
蔡英文對於兩岸政策的鑽研，在民進黨中不作第二人想，畢竟她在李扁二任兩岸政策上皆真正具有第一線的「執政經驗」。有些人曾認為，「兩國論」的失敗，與「否認九二共識」的悲劇後果，皆是蔡英文較有可能引領民進黨轉型蛻變的理由；畢竟，明明已知此路不通，這種「執政經驗」自是創鉅痛深且刻骨銘心。蔡英文任黨主席之初，有些言行也顯得不無轉型蛻變的用心；詎料，一場ＥＣＦＡ爭議，伴隨著民進黨內的權力與路線鬥爭，蔡英文又將民進黨帶向愈陷愈深的台獨焦土路線上。
以一身而竟將台灣連續三次帶上絕路，這或許將成為蔡英文的人生碑記。兩國論，結束了李登輝政權；否認九二共識，結束了陳水扁政權；現在蔡英文又高舉反ＥＣＦＡ的大旗，或許她能因而使民進黨贏得五都選舉，及二○一二總統大選，但她恐怕終究避免不了再將台灣推車撞壁的下場。而且，屆時的後果，必較兩國論及否認九二共識更嚴重萬倍。
一而再，再而三，寧有此理？
A Translation
July 10, 2010
The cross-strait economic framework agreement (ECFA) has been signed. The DPP now faces a new political scenario. On the one hand, cross-Strait relations have progressed beyond the point of no return. Taiwan independence has become increasingly unlikely. On the other hand, it is too late for the DPP to call off its campaign to kill ECFA, and disassociate itself from Taiwan independence. In short, the DPP finds itself swimming against the tide, in diametric opposition to the larger currents of history.
The DPP's defeat in the 2008 presidential election led to Tsai Ing-wen's election as DPP chairman. The public and elements within the DPP, once entertained the illusion that the DPP would take advantage of this opportunity to reinvent itself, and get the Taiwan independence monkey off its back. But ECFA showed that the DPP is incapable of divorcing itself from the Taiwan independence movement. Tsai Ing-wen may be the person who finally dashes all hope that the DPP might remake itself. This is the effect ECFA has had on party politics on Taiwan. ECFA's importance should not be underestimated.
For the past two years, Tsai Ing-wen was the person the public hoped would transform the DPP. But as a result of ECFA, Tsai has backslid. She has adopted a scorched earth policy, and a hardline Taiwan independence posture. Any hope that the DPP might transform itself has been completely shattered. Actually, we should not be surprised. In fact, Tsai Ing-wen was the instigator of the "two states theory" during the Lee Teng-hui era, and the person responsible for the repudiation the 1992 Consensus during the Chen Shui-bian era. She was the main reason the cross-Strait policies of both the Lee and Chen regimes ran smack into a brick wall. But because Tsai Ing-wen was merely a staffer at the time, many believed that once she became party chairman she would change. She would help the DPP undergo a transformation. Tsai Ing-wen once said "The DPP is an opposition party with experience in governing." Some concluded that meant she could see the bigger picture, and would not revert to self-destructive policies of the Taiwan independence movement. ECFA however, has inspired the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen to revert to form. Tsai has totally blanked out the disastrous consequences her "two states theory" and her refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus had on cross-Strait relations. If anything, the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen have intensified their opposition to ECFA.
During the Lee and Chen era, not one day passed without Taiwan independence political maneuveurs leading to confrontation. For example, in 2000, Lee Teng-hui stumped for the Lien-Siew ticket. In order to appeal to supporters of "softcore Taiwan independence," he introduced his "two states theory." A few days later however, he publicly stated that "the two states theory would not be incorporated into the Constitution." In 2004, Chen Shui-bian launched his "anti-missile referendum," which later morphed into a half-baked "missile purchase referendum." In 2006, Chen Shui-bian launched his "end reunification" drive. As a result, Washington demoted his status during transit, and Ah-Bian enacted his "Journey to Nowhere" farce. In 2008, Ah-Bian launched his "referendum to join the UN," only to be publicly condemned by George W. Bush, and labeled a "Taiwan independence element" by the US State Department. Eventually the DPP lost power. The DPP's Taiwan independence tactics exhibit a common pattern. First, they experience a power crisis. Then they escalate their Taiwan independence rhetoric, digging themselves in deeper and deeper, to where they can no longer to turn back, can no longer brake, and wind up driving headlong into a wall.
The DPP's current tactics have followed the same pattern. At first they are unsure about how they should express opposition to ECFA. Tsai Ying-wen loses the debate over ECFA. Now she faces a power crisis. So she escalates her anti-ECFA rhetoric. She refers to the Republic of China as a "government in exile." She characterizes ECFA as a "duet between the KMT and the CCP," and a "class struggle between the rich and poor." She demonizes ECFA. But ECFA is signed, and when its contents are announced, the DPP's demonization campaign backfires. By now however, it is too late to turn back, it is too late to apply the brakes. Therefore they insist that ECFA is "not a treaty," they demand a "line item review," and begin scorched earth resistance tactics. They simultaneously launch a referendum campaign, sinking deeper and deeper in their own quagmire. They find themselves riding a tiger, and unable to get off. They find themselves swimming against the tide, unable to repudiate their anti-ECFA stance in order to win the five cities elections. They may not even be able to reverse their anti-ECFA stance for the 2012 presidential election. They may even find themselves forced to invoke Article XVI and proclaim that ECFA is invalid. The DPP and Tsai Ing-wen are now stuck to their own anti-ECFA tar baby. Under the circumstances, how can the DPP possibility undergo transformation?
Tsai Ing-wen takes a back seat to no one in the DPP when it comes to cross-Strait policy. After all, during her two terms in the Lee and Chen regimes, she racked up considerable hands-on experience in cross-Strait policy. Some people concluded that the tragic consequences of her two states theory" and repudiation of the 1992 Consensus gave Tsai Ing-wen all the more reason to transform the DPP. After all, she clearly knew Taiwan independence was a dead end. Her hands-on experience was painful and unforgettable. When Tsai Ing-wen was first elected party chairman, some of her words and deeds seemed to suggest a desire to transform the party. Who knew the ECFA controversy, followed by a power struggle within the DPP over the party's future, would persuade in Tsai Ing-wen to revert to the DPP's Taiwan independence, scorched earth path?
Within a single lifetime, Tsai Ying-wen led Taiwan to ruin three times. This may end up being Tsai Ing-wen's epitaph. Her "two states theory" spelled the end of the Lee Teng-hui regime. Her repudiation of the 1992 Consensus spelled the end of the Chen Shui-bian regime. Tsai Ing-wen is now holding high the anti-ECFA banner. She may enable the DPP to win the five cities elections. She may even enable the DPP to win the 2012 presidential election. But she cannot prevent Taiwan from running head on into a brick wall. Moreover, the consequences will be far more serious than the consequences of her "two-states theory" and her repudiation of the 1992 Consensus.
Tsai Ying-wen has erred, once, twice, thrice. Why is she unable to learn from her mistakes?
兩國論‧否認九二共識‧反ECFA
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.10
兩岸經濟協議（ＥＣＦＡ）簽訂後，民進黨面對新的政治局勢：一方面，兩岸關係已經超越了返折點，台獨已愈不可能；另一方面，民進黨追殺ＥＣＦＡ的政治操作，卻已煞不住車，無法從獨派路線上自我超脫。一句話說明：民進黨已與大局大勢南轅北轍，背道而馳。
二○○八年民進黨的慘敗，與蔡英文當選民進黨主席，曾經在社會上及民進黨內普遍引發一種幻想，認為那是民進黨跳脫台獨路線、轉型蛻變的契機。但是，經由ＥＣＦＡ的考驗，證明了民進黨已無可能從台獨路線跳脫，而蔡英文可能成為民進黨轉型領航者的想像亦告正式幻滅。這是ＥＣＦＡ對台灣政黨政治的重大影響，不容輕估。
無人可以否認，蔡英文是過去兩年民進黨可能轉型蛻變的寄託；如今卻證實她也因ＥＣＦＡ而走回焦土鬥爭的獨派路線，則民進黨轉型蛻變的想像亦告完全破滅。其實，蔡英文在李登輝時代倡議「兩國論」，在陳水扁時代堅持「否認九二共識」，皆是造成李扁二任兩岸政策推車撞壁的主要原因；但當時蔡英文只是幕僚身分，許多人覺得她在成為黨主席後，應當有所調整，引領民進黨轉型蛻變。蔡英文原本說：「民進黨是一個有執政經驗的反對黨。」這句話被解讀成，能識大體，不會回到玉石俱焚的台獨鬥爭。但是，ＥＣＦＡ卻使民進黨及蔡英文回復原形，她儼然完全忘記「兩國論」及「否認九二共識」對兩岸關係造成的慘重創傷；民進黨及蔡英文此時操作ＥＣＦＡ的手法，實已變本加厲。
在李扁二任，台獨操作沒有一次不是推車撞壁。例如：二 ○○○年，李登輝為「連蕭配」輔選，想拉攏「輕獨」選民，推出「兩國論」，後來在幾天之內就公開表示「兩國論不入憲」；二○○四年，陳水扁發動「反飛彈公投」，結果卻成了虎頭蛇尾的「買飛彈公投」；二○○六年，陳水扁發動「終統」，結果美國降低過境禮遇，扁演出「迷航」的鬧劇；二○○八年，扁又發動「入聯公投」，被小布希公開譴責，國務院則逕指其為「台獨分子」，最後民進黨輸掉了政權。這些台獨操作皆呈現一種共同程序：發生權力危機→升高台獨操作→愈陷愈深，不能回頭，煞不住車→推車撞壁。
現在，民進黨對ＥＣＦＡ的操作又進入同一程序：一開始，對如何對抗ＥＣＦＡ，有些猶豫→蔡英文辯論落敗，出現權力危機→升高反ＥＣＦＡ操作→指中華民國是流亡政府→指ＥＣＦＡ是「國共唱和／貧富鬥爭」，將之妖魔化→ＥＣＦＡ簽成，公布內容，民進黨的「妖魔化」操作失敗→不能回頭，煞不住車→主張「不是條約」，堅持「逐條審查」，焦土抗爭→另一路又發動公投，愈陷愈深→騎虎難下，逆向操作，五都反ＥＣＦＡ煞不住車，未來二○一二大選反ＥＣＦＡ也下不了車，甚至可能被迫主張動用第十六條宣布廢約→民進黨及蔡英文被自己的「反ＥＣＦＡ」路線綑綁住→民進黨豈再有轉型蛻變的可能性？
蔡英文對於兩岸政策的鑽研，在民進黨中不作第二人想，畢竟她在李扁二任兩岸政策上皆真正具有第一線的「執政經驗」。有些人曾認為，「兩國論」的失敗，與「否認九二共識」的悲劇後果，皆是蔡英文較有可能引領民進黨轉型蛻變的理由；畢竟，明明已知此路不通，這種「執政經驗」自是創鉅痛深且刻骨銘心。蔡英文任黨主席之初，有些言行也顯得不無轉型蛻變的用心；詎料，一場ＥＣＦＡ爭議，伴隨著民進黨內的權力與路線鬥爭，蔡英文又將民進黨帶向愈陷愈深的台獨焦土路線上。
以一身而竟將台灣連續三次帶上絕路，這或許將成為蔡英文的人生碑記。兩國論，結束了李登輝政權；否認九二共識，結束了陳水扁政權；現在蔡英文又高舉反ＥＣＦＡ的大旗，或許她能因而使民進黨贏得五都選舉，及二○一二總統大選，但她恐怕終究避免不了再將台灣推車撞壁的下場。而且，屆時的後果，必較兩國論及否認九二共識更嚴重萬倍。
一而再，再而三，寧有此理？
The DPP's Desire for Conflict has Wounded the ROC's Democracy
The DPP's Desire for Conflict has Wounded the ROC's Democracy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 10, 2010
Sure enough, physical violence erupted over the cross-strait economic framework agreement (ECFA) during an emergency session of the legislature. KMT Legislator Wu Yu-Sheng was hit in the head by an electric timer and left bleeding. After DPP Legislator Huang Wei-che, who threw the timer, offered an apology, the DPP delegation withdrew from the emergency session. But it continued making impossible demands, and prattled on about the "death of democracy" and "the biggest blot on the reputation of the legislature." The DPP refuses to admit that it undermined the dignity of the legislature, trampled on democratic values, and has been habitually unable to control its violent impulses.
Is the DPP truly unaware that violent behavior undermines its party image just as much as it undermined the dignity of the legislature? Julian Kuo is the spokesman for the DPP Legislative Caucus on ECFA. He said the DPP cannot win the current battle over ECFA, and should begin thinking about how it can establish an image of itself as a "tragic, heroic, but rational" political party. It should not persist in initiating physical violence. Instead, he said, "The DPP must think long and hard about how to deal with its imminent defeat."
Has the DPP thought long and hard? DPP Legislator Pan Meng-an revealed that those within the legislative caucus who oppose violence outnumber those who favor it. When interviewed, Ker Chien-ming, Executive Director of the DPP Policy Committee, said, "The ECFA controversy will not be allowed to persist until the five cities elections." In other words, the DPP knows full well that overdoing its protests will be extremely damaging to the party's image and to the party's effort to win over moderate voters.
The DPP should consider the potential impact on the upcoming elections. It should also consider the opinions of its own local level officials. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu recently visited Kaohsiung County. Spokesmen for the fish farming industry in Yung-an Township affirmed that ECFA was beneficial to fishermen and the fish farming industry. Tainan County Chief Su Huan-chih and Yunlin County Chief Su Chih-fen went to the Mainland to promote sales of agricultural products. Su Huan-chih declined to participate in the DPP's anti-ECFA protest march. He preferred to stay in Tainan and discuss the establishment of a Mainland base for the sale of Taiwan agricultural products. Even Ker Chien-ming spoke openly to the machinery industry. He said the DPP's protests helped Taiwan negotiate more benefits. But he added that the DPP had no objections to the 539 items on the early harvest list. It merely lamented the failure to win another 200 items. These views, expressed by DPP officials, show that the DPP cannot stubbornly insist that ECFA is harmful to Taiwan. If anything, the DPP must acknowledge that ECFA is more or less beneficial. That being the case, must the DPP persist in bloody violence before it is satisfied?
During ruling KMT and opposition DPP consultations, the DPP delegation demanded that President Ma report to the Legislative Yuan. But ECFA was not a treaty ratified by the president. Therefore there is no reason why he should be compelled to report to the legislature. Should the premier report to the legislature? That depends upon the Legislative Yuan, and whether it passes a resolution to that effect. But ever since the proceedings began, total chaos has prevailed. There has been no chance to discuss ECFA, let alone to listen to reports. How can one talk about any "early loss list?"
To be fair, it takes two to tango. During the recent violence in the legislature, Wu Yu-sheng was hit in the head and required eight stitches. But he was not the only one injured. Several DPP legislators fell from the podium. They may not have bled, but their contusions were just as painful. The opposition DPP's scorched earth tactics have proven effective in the past. They often brought the legislature to a standstill. KMT legislators had no choice but to respond in earnest, to prevent DPP legislators from approaching the podium and disrupting the proceedings. TV footage shows ruling party legislators on the podium and opposition party legislators below with stern expressions on their faces. But others had smiles on theirs. Were it not for the thrown timer, the entire altercation might well be dismissed as a vast charade.
After Wu Yu-Sheng was hospitalized, DPP legislators sneered, and accused him of "faking it." Huang Wei-che even denied that he was the one who injured Wu. Huang said he threw a book. But when the closed circuit video footage was made public, Huang Wei-che was forced to admit his guilt and apologize. Other DPP officials however, dug in their heels and continued protesting, accusing the KMT and President Ma of being "tyrannical behavior." But just exactly who was guilty of "tyrannical behavior?" Suppose a KMT legislator had thrown an electric timer and struck a DPP legislator? Would the DPP say the bleeding victim was "faking it?"
A nation's legislature is the benchmark of its democracy. The business of the legislature is to organize, discuss, and reach accomodations between differing views. People who hold differing views may not be able to persuade each other. But submitting to the majority decision is an unchanging principle of democracy. Besides, the DPP must not forget that although some industries on Taiwan may be negatively impacted by ECFA, most industries will benefit. And since the government has promised to compensate vulnerable industries, why can't the DPP view the matter from the perspective of maximizing the good, while minimizing the bad? Why can't it decide to oversee the government's measures, and do what it can on behalf of vulnerable industries?
The legislature must not be an ideological battleground. We may have Blue political parties and Green political parties. We may have pro-reunification parties and pro-independence parties. But public policy affects a nation's progress and the public interest. Cross-Strait policy is no exception. If every cross-Strait policy sent to the Legislative Yuan must be fought over, again and again, to where fists must fly and accusations that the other side is pro-reunification or pro-independence must be hurled back and forth, what hope is there for the nation? ECFA is a cross-Strait agreement. It is also a step Taipei must take during the globalization process in order to arrive at a level playing field. The DPP must put the interests and well-being of the majority of the people ahead of its party ideology. Only then can it win the public trust. No political party should seek victory by initiating physical violence.
民進黨的衝突欲望 撞傷台灣民主價值
2010-07-10
中國時報
果不其然，為了兩岸經濟架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ），立法院臨時會又大打一架，打到國民黨立委吳育昇流血，擲出記時器的民進黨立委黃偉哲道歉後，民進黨團決定退出臨時會，不過，還是強硬聲稱，「民主死亡，國會最大汙點。」民進黨依舊不願面對毀損國會尊嚴、踐踏民主價值的，其實正是他們永遠控制不了的衝突欲望。
民進黨難道不知：肢體衝突損害的除了國會議事的莊嚴性，還有他們的政黨形象嗎？民進黨ＥＣＦＡ因應小組發言人郭正亮直言，ＥＣＦＡ這場仗， 民進黨已經贏不了，該思考如何形塑「悲壯而理智」的形象，不該再製造爆衝，「要怎麼設定輸的場面，民進黨必須深思面對！」
民進黨沒有深思嗎？民進黨立委潘孟安透露，黨團內部「不打」的聲浪大過「打」。民進黨政策會執行長柯建銘受訪時也說，「不會讓ＥＣＦＡ議題燒這麼久，燒到五都選舉去。」換言之，民進黨太清楚，比例失衡的過度抗爭，對黨的形象、對爭取中間選民是大不利。
除選舉利害考量，更直接看看民進黨基層首長反應，高雄市長陳菊日前訪視高雄縣永安鄉石斑魚，肯定ＥＣＦＡ有利於漁民及養殖業；台南縣長蘇煥智和雲林縣長蘇治芬直接登陸推銷農產品，蘇煥智婉拒參與民進黨的反ＥＣＦＡ大遊行，寧可留在台南和業者商討如何建立台灣農產品行銷大陸的據點。包括柯建銘對機械等業界直言無隱，民進黨抗爭可為台灣爭取更多利益，而且民進黨對五百卅九項早收清單沒意見，只會對二百多項早損清單提出看法。從這些民進黨人的觀點和作為看來，民進黨其實無法硬生生地套說ＥＣＦＡ對台灣有害，甚至只能承認多少是有利的，既是如此，有什麼必要非打到頭破血流才罷手？
朝野協商時，民進黨團要求馬總統赴立院報告，但ＥＣＦＡ並非總統批准的條約案，沒道理強求總統赴國會報告。至於是否邀請行政院長報告，那得看立院全體議決，然議事程序一開始，場面立刻混亂，連討論空間都沒有，還聽取什麼報告？還談什麼關切早損清單？
持平而論，一個巴掌拍不響，這場國會衝突，受傷的不只是額頭流血縫八針的吳育昇，還有從議事台上摔落的民進黨立委，即使沒流血，皮肉之痛也夠嗆的了，但是，若非民進黨過去焦土抗爭策略頻頻奏效，讓國會議事嚴重遲滯，國民黨立委不可能採取全面防堵的戰術，不讓民進黨立委接近主席台。從電視畫面上看，主席台前後圍攏的朝野立委，有人神色慘烈，卻也不乏眉眼盡是笑意者，如果不是那個砸傷人的計時器，這場肢體衝突還有可能成為朝野累積相罵本的「消暑大秀」。
吳育昇送醫後，民進黨立委的反應是「嘜假了」，黃偉哲在第一時間甚至否認砸傷人的是他，說他砸出去的是書。當國會錄影帶公布後，黃偉哲倒不失正派地承認且道歉，但民進黨人依舊抗議，指國民黨和馬總統鴨霸，鴨霸的到底是誰？如今天砸出計時器的是國民黨立委，而受傷的是民進黨立委，民進黨做何反應？會說「嘜假了」嗎？
國會是民主政治的指標，國會議事就是整合、討論、協調不同意見的場域，不同見解有可能無法完全彼此說服，但服從多數決是基本不變的道理，更何況，民進黨不要忘記，即使台灣社會有部分產業會受到ＥＣＦＡ衝擊，但是，多數產業會因此得利，且政府已允諾會有配套措施輔助弱勢產業。民進黨為什麼不能從趨利避凶的角度，監督政府落實配套措施，也可為弱勢產業爭取到最大保障？
國會不該是意識形態的戰場，政黨容或有藍綠、統獨的分野，公共政策卻攸關國家社會發展和人民利益，包括兩岸政策亦然，如果任何兩岸政策送進立法院，都要一打再打，打到用拳頭標籤對方是統是獨，台灣還有何希望？ＥＣＦＡ是兩岸協議，也是台灣邁向全球化過程中，取得公平競爭利基必須走得一步，民進黨必須把台灣的利益、台灣多數民眾的福祉，擺在政黨意識形態之前，才能再取得民眾的信賴。打架，絕對不該是政黨爭勝的手段。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 10, 2010
Sure enough, physical violence erupted over the cross-strait economic framework agreement (ECFA) during an emergency session of the legislature. KMT Legislator Wu Yu-Sheng was hit in the head by an electric timer and left bleeding. After DPP Legislator Huang Wei-che, who threw the timer, offered an apology, the DPP delegation withdrew from the emergency session. But it continued making impossible demands, and prattled on about the "death of democracy" and "the biggest blot on the reputation of the legislature." The DPP refuses to admit that it undermined the dignity of the legislature, trampled on democratic values, and has been habitually unable to control its violent impulses.
Is the DPP truly unaware that violent behavior undermines its party image just as much as it undermined the dignity of the legislature? Julian Kuo is the spokesman for the DPP Legislative Caucus on ECFA. He said the DPP cannot win the current battle over ECFA, and should begin thinking about how it can establish an image of itself as a "tragic, heroic, but rational" political party. It should not persist in initiating physical violence. Instead, he said, "The DPP must think long and hard about how to deal with its imminent defeat."
Has the DPP thought long and hard? DPP Legislator Pan Meng-an revealed that those within the legislative caucus who oppose violence outnumber those who favor it. When interviewed, Ker Chien-ming, Executive Director of the DPP Policy Committee, said, "The ECFA controversy will not be allowed to persist until the five cities elections." In other words, the DPP knows full well that overdoing its protests will be extremely damaging to the party's image and to the party's effort to win over moderate voters.
The DPP should consider the potential impact on the upcoming elections. It should also consider the opinions of its own local level officials. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu recently visited Kaohsiung County. Spokesmen for the fish farming industry in Yung-an Township affirmed that ECFA was beneficial to fishermen and the fish farming industry. Tainan County Chief Su Huan-chih and Yunlin County Chief Su Chih-fen went to the Mainland to promote sales of agricultural products. Su Huan-chih declined to participate in the DPP's anti-ECFA protest march. He preferred to stay in Tainan and discuss the establishment of a Mainland base for the sale of Taiwan agricultural products. Even Ker Chien-ming spoke openly to the machinery industry. He said the DPP's protests helped Taiwan negotiate more benefits. But he added that the DPP had no objections to the 539 items on the early harvest list. It merely lamented the failure to win another 200 items. These views, expressed by DPP officials, show that the DPP cannot stubbornly insist that ECFA is harmful to Taiwan. If anything, the DPP must acknowledge that ECFA is more or less beneficial. That being the case, must the DPP persist in bloody violence before it is satisfied?
During ruling KMT and opposition DPP consultations, the DPP delegation demanded that President Ma report to the Legislative Yuan. But ECFA was not a treaty ratified by the president. Therefore there is no reason why he should be compelled to report to the legislature. Should the premier report to the legislature? That depends upon the Legislative Yuan, and whether it passes a resolution to that effect. But ever since the proceedings began, total chaos has prevailed. There has been no chance to discuss ECFA, let alone to listen to reports. How can one talk about any "early loss list?"
To be fair, it takes two to tango. During the recent violence in the legislature, Wu Yu-sheng was hit in the head and required eight stitches. But he was not the only one injured. Several DPP legislators fell from the podium. They may not have bled, but their contusions were just as painful. The opposition DPP's scorched earth tactics have proven effective in the past. They often brought the legislature to a standstill. KMT legislators had no choice but to respond in earnest, to prevent DPP legislators from approaching the podium and disrupting the proceedings. TV footage shows ruling party legislators on the podium and opposition party legislators below with stern expressions on their faces. But others had smiles on theirs. Were it not for the thrown timer, the entire altercation might well be dismissed as a vast charade.
After Wu Yu-Sheng was hospitalized, DPP legislators sneered, and accused him of "faking it." Huang Wei-che even denied that he was the one who injured Wu. Huang said he threw a book. But when the closed circuit video footage was made public, Huang Wei-che was forced to admit his guilt and apologize. Other DPP officials however, dug in their heels and continued protesting, accusing the KMT and President Ma of being "tyrannical behavior." But just exactly who was guilty of "tyrannical behavior?" Suppose a KMT legislator had thrown an electric timer and struck a DPP legislator? Would the DPP say the bleeding victim was "faking it?"
A nation's legislature is the benchmark of its democracy. The business of the legislature is to organize, discuss, and reach accomodations between differing views. People who hold differing views may not be able to persuade each other. But submitting to the majority decision is an unchanging principle of democracy. Besides, the DPP must not forget that although some industries on Taiwan may be negatively impacted by ECFA, most industries will benefit. And since the government has promised to compensate vulnerable industries, why can't the DPP view the matter from the perspective of maximizing the good, while minimizing the bad? Why can't it decide to oversee the government's measures, and do what it can on behalf of vulnerable industries?
The legislature must not be an ideological battleground. We may have Blue political parties and Green political parties. We may have pro-reunification parties and pro-independence parties. But public policy affects a nation's progress and the public interest. Cross-Strait policy is no exception. If every cross-Strait policy sent to the Legislative Yuan must be fought over, again and again, to where fists must fly and accusations that the other side is pro-reunification or pro-independence must be hurled back and forth, what hope is there for the nation? ECFA is a cross-Strait agreement. It is also a step Taipei must take during the globalization process in order to arrive at a level playing field. The DPP must put the interests and well-being of the majority of the people ahead of its party ideology. Only then can it win the public trust. No political party should seek victory by initiating physical violence.
民進黨的衝突欲望 撞傷台灣民主價值
2010-07-10
中國時報
果不其然，為了兩岸經濟架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ），立法院臨時會又大打一架，打到國民黨立委吳育昇流血，擲出記時器的民進黨立委黃偉哲道歉後，民進黨團決定退出臨時會，不過，還是強硬聲稱，「民主死亡，國會最大汙點。」民進黨依舊不願面對毀損國會尊嚴、踐踏民主價值的，其實正是他們永遠控制不了的衝突欲望。
民進黨難道不知：肢體衝突損害的除了國會議事的莊嚴性，還有他們的政黨形象嗎？民進黨ＥＣＦＡ因應小組發言人郭正亮直言，ＥＣＦＡ這場仗， 民進黨已經贏不了，該思考如何形塑「悲壯而理智」的形象，不該再製造爆衝，「要怎麼設定輸的場面，民進黨必須深思面對！」
民進黨沒有深思嗎？民進黨立委潘孟安透露，黨團內部「不打」的聲浪大過「打」。民進黨政策會執行長柯建銘受訪時也說，「不會讓ＥＣＦＡ議題燒這麼久，燒到五都選舉去。」換言之，民進黨太清楚，比例失衡的過度抗爭，對黨的形象、對爭取中間選民是大不利。
除選舉利害考量，更直接看看民進黨基層首長反應，高雄市長陳菊日前訪視高雄縣永安鄉石斑魚，肯定ＥＣＦＡ有利於漁民及養殖業；台南縣長蘇煥智和雲林縣長蘇治芬直接登陸推銷農產品，蘇煥智婉拒參與民進黨的反ＥＣＦＡ大遊行，寧可留在台南和業者商討如何建立台灣農產品行銷大陸的據點。包括柯建銘對機械等業界直言無隱，民進黨抗爭可為台灣爭取更多利益，而且民進黨對五百卅九項早收清單沒意見，只會對二百多項早損清單提出看法。從這些民進黨人的觀點和作為看來，民進黨其實無法硬生生地套說ＥＣＦＡ對台灣有害，甚至只能承認多少是有利的，既是如此，有什麼必要非打到頭破血流才罷手？
朝野協商時，民進黨團要求馬總統赴立院報告，但ＥＣＦＡ並非總統批准的條約案，沒道理強求總統赴國會報告。至於是否邀請行政院長報告，那得看立院全體議決，然議事程序一開始，場面立刻混亂，連討論空間都沒有，還聽取什麼報告？還談什麼關切早損清單？
持平而論，一個巴掌拍不響，這場國會衝突，受傷的不只是額頭流血縫八針的吳育昇，還有從議事台上摔落的民進黨立委，即使沒流血，皮肉之痛也夠嗆的了，但是，若非民進黨過去焦土抗爭策略頻頻奏效，讓國會議事嚴重遲滯，國民黨立委不可能採取全面防堵的戰術，不讓民進黨立委接近主席台。從電視畫面上看，主席台前後圍攏的朝野立委，有人神色慘烈，卻也不乏眉眼盡是笑意者，如果不是那個砸傷人的計時器，這場肢體衝突還有可能成為朝野累積相罵本的「消暑大秀」。
吳育昇送醫後，民進黨立委的反應是「嘜假了」，黃偉哲在第一時間甚至否認砸傷人的是他，說他砸出去的是書。當國會錄影帶公布後，黃偉哲倒不失正派地承認且道歉，但民進黨人依舊抗議，指國民黨和馬總統鴨霸，鴨霸的到底是誰？如今天砸出計時器的是國民黨立委，而受傷的是民進黨立委，民進黨做何反應？會說「嘜假了」嗎？
國會是民主政治的指標，國會議事就是整合、討論、協調不同意見的場域，不同見解有可能無法完全彼此說服，但服從多數決是基本不變的道理，更何況，民進黨不要忘記，即使台灣社會有部分產業會受到ＥＣＦＡ衝擊，但是，多數產業會因此得利，且政府已允諾會有配套措施輔助弱勢產業。民進黨為什麼不能從趨利避凶的角度，監督政府落實配套措施，也可為弱勢產業爭取到最大保障？
國會不該是意識形態的戰場，政黨容或有藍綠、統獨的分野，公共政策卻攸關國家社會發展和人民利益，包括兩岸政策亦然，如果任何兩岸政策送進立法院，都要一打再打，打到用拳頭標籤對方是統是獨，台灣還有何希望？ＥＣＦＡ是兩岸協議，也是台灣邁向全球化過程中，取得公平競爭利基必須走得一步，民進黨必須把台灣的利益、台灣多數民眾的福祉，擺在政黨意識形態之前，才能再取得民眾的信賴。打架，絕對不該是政黨爭勝的手段。
Friday, July 9, 2010
Is the DPP helping Taiwan, or the CCP?
Is the DPP helping Taiwan, or the CCP?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2010
The Democratic Progressive Party's cross-Strait policy contains a glaring paradox. It shrilly proclaims that the Chinese Communist Party is its main enemy, but in practice it confines its battles to the island of Taiwan. It has never demonstrated any intention of confronting its ostensible opponent on the opposite shore of the Taiwan Strait.
The DPP has obstructed cross-Strait exchanges, the recognition of Mainland academic credentials, and the exchange of personnel. On the surface, its goal is to safeguard Taiwan's interests. In practice however, it has merely bound Taiwan hand and foot, without touching a hair on the CCP's head. In fact the target of the DPP's attacks has always been the KMT. Long ago, it locked onto this "surrogate enemy." This spares it from the necessity of direct clashes with the CCP. No longer content to lash out at its "pseudo enemy," the Green Camp is now advancing the absurd argument that "to strike a blow against the KMT is to strike a blow against the CCP."
The DPP's obstruction of ECFA has brought the problem into clear relief. The DPP opposes the expansion of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. It speaks of a "One China Market," and characterizes it as an evil transaction harmful to Taiwan. But the question is, if one jettisons ECFA, will that help Taiwan, or harm Taiwan? The answer is clear. Without the Mainland as its hinterland, Taiwan will have a hard time finding alternative financing and markets. Without Taiwan however, the impact on the Mainland will be extremely limited. In other words, the DPP's obstruction of ECFA will only harm Taiwan. It will not harm Mainland China. The DPP has engaged in endless obstructionism. First they say they are doing it to help vulnerable industries. Then they say they are doing it to oppose a "One China Market." Just exactly why are they doing it?
The DPP knows perfectly well what it is doing it. As far as the DPP is concerned, ECFA is an island-based battle, unrelated to cross-Strait competition and confrontation. It is merely a struggle over short-term political interests, unrelated to Taiwan's survival or long term interests. The DPP waves a borrowed "anti-China" banner, to add a little excitement, to make the DPP's political charade appear high-minded. But with a little thought, the public should have little difficulty discerning the glaring contradiction between the DPP's words and deeds. The DPP is systematically weakening and hobbling Taiwan, while aiding its ostensible "evil enemy." As it hides behind its deceptive mask, the DPP fills the air with shrill proclamations about how much it "loves Taiwan."
The DPP may argue that as an opposition party it is merely providing checks and balances against the ruling party. But the DPP ruled for eight years, during which it imprisoned Taiwan behind locked doors. It played an endless string of games involving the "rectification of names," the "changing of names," and the removal and destruction of road signs. All of these were part of a hollow charade for internal consumption. None of these games ever struck a blow against the opposite shore. None of these games ever harmed a hair on Beijing's head. Instead, the DPP relentlessly attempted to instill fear in people's hearts. It insisted that an giant boogeyman lived on the other side of the strait. But it never crossed the sea to challenge this monster. It merely sat at home shouting "Oh how frightening!" The DPP never kicked the football toward the opponent's goal. It merely kicked the ball back and forth in front of its own goal. It never scored a goal. What's worse, it frequently mistook its own goal for the opponent's goal, and gave the opponent extra points.
The DPP's obstructionism undeniably provided the government with a little additional leverage during negotiations with the other side. It lent the government a few more bargaining chips. But when the DPP equates obstructionism with a philosophy of life, and a reason for living, then the results can only be counterproductive. The DPP's obstructionism will not help contain the CCP. It can only bind Taiwan, hand and foot. Therefore the DPP must redefine is cross-Strait policy. Its strategy and tactics are full of flaws, and require major changes.
The DPP behaves belligerently with the KMT. But when confronted with the CCP, it is "fierce of mien but faint of heart." Furthermore, its empty expressions of "love for Taiwan" contradict its rhetoric about bolstering Taiwan's economy. The DPP is about to unveil its "Platform for the Coming Decade." The DPP should think long and hard about what it intends to say and do. It should acknowledge its self-contradictory, bigoted attitudes. It should find within itself the wisdom and courage to confront its real opponent on the opposite shore.
The DPP has long pretended that by "striking a blow against the Blue Camp," it was "striking a blow against the Red Camp." But that game is getting old. The DPP needs to find a new game.
Su Chih-fen made has just returned from a trip to the mainland. She confessed that the more she saw how skillfully Mainland businesses were being managed, the more depressed she became. Chen Chu admitted that ECFA would be help Kaohsiung's fish farming industry. Su Huan-chih cast doubt on his own party's ambiguous stand on ECFA. He said "We should enter any market in which we can make a profit." The DPP opposes cross-Strait trade. Actually, that's fine. What matters is to be clear about Taiwan's future direction. The DPP can no longer point to the opposite shore and prattle on about boogeymen. It can no longer hide at home and demonstrate its bravado by engaging in internecine warfare. The DPP's behavior has reached the height of absurdity.
The DPP must find a way to bridge the yawning chasm between its "nativist" rhetoric and a sensible cross-Strait policy. At the very least, it must offer a convincing argument. The DPP lacks a strategy for Taiwan's economic growth. The DPP lacks the courage to confront the CCP directly. Unless the DPP can overcome these deficiencies, it will never be anything more than a gang of political refugees and thugs, whose only trick is to surround the podium in the Legislative Yuan.
民進黨在幫台灣，還是在幫中共？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.09 03:26 am
民進黨的兩岸政策，存在一個極大的悖論是：它聲稱中共是主要敵人，但在操作上卻把戰場完全侷限在台灣島內，根本無意也無法碰觸到彼岸的敵手。
亦即，民進黨杯葛兩岸經貿流通、學歷承認、人員交流等，表面上說是為了維護台灣的利益，實際上只是限制了台灣手腳的伸展，卻絲毫傷不了對岸的中共。以民進黨的打法，其纏鬥對象一向只是國民黨，鎖定這個「替代敵人」，即可不必親身和中共交手過招。諷刺的是，不僅綠營以打擊「假敵」為滿足；連藍營對其「打國民黨就等於打中共」的邏輯似也逐漸習以為常，這真是嚴重的錯亂。
看民進黨對ＥＣＦＡ的杯葛，此一問題便格外清楚。民進黨反對兩岸經貿擴大交流，指控「一中市場」是危害台灣的邪惡貿易；問題是，如果推翻ＥＣＦＡ，那是在幫台灣，還是在害台灣？答案很清楚：少掉大陸這個腹地，台灣很難找到可資替代的經貿市場；但大陸少掉台灣這一隅，影響卻極其有限。換句話說，民進黨力阻ＥＣＦＡ只會傷害台灣，卻傷不到中國。那麼，民進黨在台灣對此進行無休無止的杯葛，忽而說為了弱勢產業，忽而說為了反一中市場，到底目的何在？
民進黨其實心知肚明，對它而言，ＥＣＦＡ徹頭徹尾只是一場島內戰役，與兩岸的競爭或對峙無關。本質上，這也只是政治利益的短期爭奪，而無關台灣生存發展的長程思考。這樣的政治盤算，藉著「反中」大旗的助興，好像也唱出了一番高調；但民眾只要稍微認真思考，不難發現其言行間的偌大矛盾：民進黨正一步步在削弱、阻滯台灣，而助長他口中的「邪惡敵人」。掩蓋此一矛盾假象的，正是喊得漫天價響的「愛台灣」口號。
民進黨可能會辯稱：作為在野黨，當然只能對執政黨進行制衡。問題是，民進黨執政的八年，緊閉台灣大門，不斷玩弄正名、改名、拆銜牌等的花招，完全皆是供內部消費用的「假動作」，而從未真正出手觸及對岸，何曾動到北京一根汗毛？矛盾的是，民進黨不斷恐嚇台灣人民，說海峽對岸住著一個大妖魔；自己卻從來不跨海去挑戰怪物，只會坐在家裡高喊「恐怖喔」！這就好像足球比賽，不把球帶向對方的半場進攻，只在自己的球門前踢來踢去，不僅未曾得分，且常常誤進烏龍球給對手加分。這道理不是很明顯嗎？
不可否認，民進黨的政治杯葛，對馬政府與對岸的談判確能產生若干槓桿作用，可使我方爭取到更多籌碼。然而，當民進黨誤將杯葛當成自己全部的生命哲學及存在樂趣，其結果必然適得其反，不僅無助於牽制中共，反而只是羈絆了台灣自己的腳步。從這點看，民進黨不僅兩岸政策需要重新定位，其戰略及戰術運用也已破綻百出，有待大幅調整。
簡言之，民進黨對付國民黨，表現得好勇鬥狠；但面對中共，卻是色厲內荏。而且，它對落實建設台灣的力氣，也和它喊愛台灣的虛假熱情背道而馳。在即將公布「十年政綱」之際，民進黨必須先思考如何平衡所言與所行，誠實面對自己的矛盾和褊狹，並運用智慧和勇敢去面對彼岸真正的對手。
至少，民進黨以「打藍軍」偽裝成「打紅軍」的手法，已經招式用老，必須另起爐灶了。
蘇治芬去了一趟大陸，對於大陸企業經營手法的精幹自承「愈看愈沉重」；陳菊則承認，簽ＥＣＦＡ對高雄石斑魚業者很有幫助；蘇煥智則質疑黨的ＥＣＦＡ政策模糊，並說「賺得到錢的市場都要去」。民進黨反對兩岸貿易，其實無所謂；重要的是，它要想清楚台灣的出路何在，不能指著對岸說外頭有惡魔，卻又一味躲在家裡以打自己人顯威風。荒唐離譜，莫此為甚。
民進黨必須在本土論述和兩岸政策的偌大鴻溝間搭起跨度夠強的橋梁，至少要說出自己能信服的道理。否則，發展台灣無謀，對付中共又無勇，民進黨永遠只是一群包圍立法院主席台的政治遊民與暴徒而已。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2010
The Democratic Progressive Party's cross-Strait policy contains a glaring paradox. It shrilly proclaims that the Chinese Communist Party is its main enemy, but in practice it confines its battles to the island of Taiwan. It has never demonstrated any intention of confronting its ostensible opponent on the opposite shore of the Taiwan Strait.
The DPP has obstructed cross-Strait exchanges, the recognition of Mainland academic credentials, and the exchange of personnel. On the surface, its goal is to safeguard Taiwan's interests. In practice however, it has merely bound Taiwan hand and foot, without touching a hair on the CCP's head. In fact the target of the DPP's attacks has always been the KMT. Long ago, it locked onto this "surrogate enemy." This spares it from the necessity of direct clashes with the CCP. No longer content to lash out at its "pseudo enemy," the Green Camp is now advancing the absurd argument that "to strike a blow against the KMT is to strike a blow against the CCP."
The DPP's obstruction of ECFA has brought the problem into clear relief. The DPP opposes the expansion of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges. It speaks of a "One China Market," and characterizes it as an evil transaction harmful to Taiwan. But the question is, if one jettisons ECFA, will that help Taiwan, or harm Taiwan? The answer is clear. Without the Mainland as its hinterland, Taiwan will have a hard time finding alternative financing and markets. Without Taiwan however, the impact on the Mainland will be extremely limited. In other words, the DPP's obstruction of ECFA will only harm Taiwan. It will not harm Mainland China. The DPP has engaged in endless obstructionism. First they say they are doing it to help vulnerable industries. Then they say they are doing it to oppose a "One China Market." Just exactly why are they doing it?
The DPP knows perfectly well what it is doing it. As far as the DPP is concerned, ECFA is an island-based battle, unrelated to cross-Strait competition and confrontation. It is merely a struggle over short-term political interests, unrelated to Taiwan's survival or long term interests. The DPP waves a borrowed "anti-China" banner, to add a little excitement, to make the DPP's political charade appear high-minded. But with a little thought, the public should have little difficulty discerning the glaring contradiction between the DPP's words and deeds. The DPP is systematically weakening and hobbling Taiwan, while aiding its ostensible "evil enemy." As it hides behind its deceptive mask, the DPP fills the air with shrill proclamations about how much it "loves Taiwan."
The DPP may argue that as an opposition party it is merely providing checks and balances against the ruling party. But the DPP ruled for eight years, during which it imprisoned Taiwan behind locked doors. It played an endless string of games involving the "rectification of names," the "changing of names," and the removal and destruction of road signs. All of these were part of a hollow charade for internal consumption. None of these games ever struck a blow against the opposite shore. None of these games ever harmed a hair on Beijing's head. Instead, the DPP relentlessly attempted to instill fear in people's hearts. It insisted that an giant boogeyman lived on the other side of the strait. But it never crossed the sea to challenge this monster. It merely sat at home shouting "Oh how frightening!" The DPP never kicked the football toward the opponent's goal. It merely kicked the ball back and forth in front of its own goal. It never scored a goal. What's worse, it frequently mistook its own goal for the opponent's goal, and gave the opponent extra points.
The DPP's obstructionism undeniably provided the government with a little additional leverage during negotiations with the other side. It lent the government a few more bargaining chips. But when the DPP equates obstructionism with a philosophy of life, and a reason for living, then the results can only be counterproductive. The DPP's obstructionism will not help contain the CCP. It can only bind Taiwan, hand and foot. Therefore the DPP must redefine is cross-Strait policy. Its strategy and tactics are full of flaws, and require major changes.
The DPP behaves belligerently with the KMT. But when confronted with the CCP, it is "fierce of mien but faint of heart." Furthermore, its empty expressions of "love for Taiwan" contradict its rhetoric about bolstering Taiwan's economy. The DPP is about to unveil its "Platform for the Coming Decade." The DPP should think long and hard about what it intends to say and do. It should acknowledge its self-contradictory, bigoted attitudes. It should find within itself the wisdom and courage to confront its real opponent on the opposite shore.
The DPP has long pretended that by "striking a blow against the Blue Camp," it was "striking a blow against the Red Camp." But that game is getting old. The DPP needs to find a new game.
Su Chih-fen made has just returned from a trip to the mainland. She confessed that the more she saw how skillfully Mainland businesses were being managed, the more depressed she became. Chen Chu admitted that ECFA would be help Kaohsiung's fish farming industry. Su Huan-chih cast doubt on his own party's ambiguous stand on ECFA. He said "We should enter any market in which we can make a profit." The DPP opposes cross-Strait trade. Actually, that's fine. What matters is to be clear about Taiwan's future direction. The DPP can no longer point to the opposite shore and prattle on about boogeymen. It can no longer hide at home and demonstrate its bravado by engaging in internecine warfare. The DPP's behavior has reached the height of absurdity.
The DPP must find a way to bridge the yawning chasm between its "nativist" rhetoric and a sensible cross-Strait policy. At the very least, it must offer a convincing argument. The DPP lacks a strategy for Taiwan's economic growth. The DPP lacks the courage to confront the CCP directly. Unless the DPP can overcome these deficiencies, it will never be anything more than a gang of political refugees and thugs, whose only trick is to surround the podium in the Legislative Yuan.
民進黨在幫台灣，還是在幫中共？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.09 03:26 am
民進黨的兩岸政策，存在一個極大的悖論是：它聲稱中共是主要敵人，但在操作上卻把戰場完全侷限在台灣島內，根本無意也無法碰觸到彼岸的敵手。
亦即，民進黨杯葛兩岸經貿流通、學歷承認、人員交流等，表面上說是為了維護台灣的利益，實際上只是限制了台灣手腳的伸展，卻絲毫傷不了對岸的中共。以民進黨的打法，其纏鬥對象一向只是國民黨，鎖定這個「替代敵人」，即可不必親身和中共交手過招。諷刺的是，不僅綠營以打擊「假敵」為滿足；連藍營對其「打國民黨就等於打中共」的邏輯似也逐漸習以為常，這真是嚴重的錯亂。
看民進黨對ＥＣＦＡ的杯葛，此一問題便格外清楚。民進黨反對兩岸經貿擴大交流，指控「一中市場」是危害台灣的邪惡貿易；問題是，如果推翻ＥＣＦＡ，那是在幫台灣，還是在害台灣？答案很清楚：少掉大陸這個腹地，台灣很難找到可資替代的經貿市場；但大陸少掉台灣這一隅，影響卻極其有限。換句話說，民進黨力阻ＥＣＦＡ只會傷害台灣，卻傷不到中國。那麼，民進黨在台灣對此進行無休無止的杯葛，忽而說為了弱勢產業，忽而說為了反一中市場，到底目的何在？
民進黨其實心知肚明，對它而言，ＥＣＦＡ徹頭徹尾只是一場島內戰役，與兩岸的競爭或對峙無關。本質上，這也只是政治利益的短期爭奪，而無關台灣生存發展的長程思考。這樣的政治盤算，藉著「反中」大旗的助興，好像也唱出了一番高調；但民眾只要稍微認真思考，不難發現其言行間的偌大矛盾：民進黨正一步步在削弱、阻滯台灣，而助長他口中的「邪惡敵人」。掩蓋此一矛盾假象的，正是喊得漫天價響的「愛台灣」口號。
民進黨可能會辯稱：作為在野黨，當然只能對執政黨進行制衡。問題是，民進黨執政的八年，緊閉台灣大門，不斷玩弄正名、改名、拆銜牌等的花招，完全皆是供內部消費用的「假動作」，而從未真正出手觸及對岸，何曾動到北京一根汗毛？矛盾的是，民進黨不斷恐嚇台灣人民，說海峽對岸住著一個大妖魔；自己卻從來不跨海去挑戰怪物，只會坐在家裡高喊「恐怖喔」！這就好像足球比賽，不把球帶向對方的半場進攻，只在自己的球門前踢來踢去，不僅未曾得分，且常常誤進烏龍球給對手加分。這道理不是很明顯嗎？
不可否認，民進黨的政治杯葛，對馬政府與對岸的談判確能產生若干槓桿作用，可使我方爭取到更多籌碼。然而，當民進黨誤將杯葛當成自己全部的生命哲學及存在樂趣，其結果必然適得其反，不僅無助於牽制中共，反而只是羈絆了台灣自己的腳步。從這點看，民進黨不僅兩岸政策需要重新定位，其戰略及戰術運用也已破綻百出，有待大幅調整。
簡言之，民進黨對付國民黨，表現得好勇鬥狠；但面對中共，卻是色厲內荏。而且，它對落實建設台灣的力氣，也和它喊愛台灣的虛假熱情背道而馳。在即將公布「十年政綱」之際，民進黨必須先思考如何平衡所言與所行，誠實面對自己的矛盾和褊狹，並運用智慧和勇敢去面對彼岸真正的對手。
至少，民進黨以「打藍軍」偽裝成「打紅軍」的手法，已經招式用老，必須另起爐灶了。
蘇治芬去了一趟大陸，對於大陸企業經營手法的精幹自承「愈看愈沉重」；陳菊則承認，簽ＥＣＦＡ對高雄石斑魚業者很有幫助；蘇煥智則質疑黨的ＥＣＦＡ政策模糊，並說「賺得到錢的市場都要去」。民進黨反對兩岸貿易，其實無所謂；重要的是，它要想清楚台灣的出路何在，不能指著對岸說外頭有惡魔，卻又一味躲在家裡以打自己人顯威風。荒唐離譜，莫此為甚。
民進黨必須在本土論述和兩岸政策的偌大鴻溝間搭起跨度夠強的橋梁，至少要說出自己能信服的道理。否則，發展台灣無謀，對付中共又無勇，民進黨永遠只是一群包圍立法院主席台的政治遊民與暴徒而已。
Thursday, July 8, 2010
ECFA: Ruling and Opposition Parties Should Return to Reason
ECFA: Ruling and Opposition Parties Should Return to Reason
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 8, 2010
Taipei and Beijing have signed the cross-strait economic framework agreement (ECFA). Once ECFA has been reviewed by the Legislative Yuan, the DPP should cease its obdurate opposition, and adopt a new and more rational attitude, by helping oversee ECFA.
Ever since ECFA negotiations began, the DPP has been obstinately opposed to it. It opposed it upon completion of negotiations. It opposed it when the early harvest list was announced. It opposed it even though the government negotiated favorable terms for our side. It opposed it even though Beijing made generous concessions. It opposed it even after internationally renowned financial experts affirmed its value. On this point at least, the DPP can claim the dubious distinction of "being consistent from beginning to end." Having mired itself in this "opposition to the bitter end" quagmire however, the DPP now finds it even more harder to fulfill its proper role as the loyal opposition providing legislative oversight.
In retrospect, the Democratic Progressive Party's justifications for opposing ECFA can be divided into the political and the economic. The political justifications it cited include concern for sovereignty. But if one pores over the text of ECFA, one cannot find a single word touching on politics or sovereignty. What can one say except that the DPP has scared itself and its supporters to death, for no reason.
The DPP cited many more economic justifications, but every one of them equally absurd. They failed to withstand careful scrutiny, and even contradicted one other. Early during negotiations, the DPP said ECFA would allow Mainland workers to flood the island, putting Taiwanese out of work. Even though the government repeatedly made clear that Mainland workers would not be permitted to work on Taiwan, the DPP continued to make this claim in their propaganda. Free trade agreements (FTAs) the world over direct themselves at goods and services. Services involve small numbers of high-end white-collar service positions. No FTA has ever opened up a nation's borders to unrestricted immigration. If the DPP is actually wringing its hands over such concerns, then it is ignorant beyond belief. If the DPP knows the truth but is deliberately deceiving the public, then it is unethical beyond belief.
The DPP says it is afraid that more vulnerable industries and workers will be harmed. That was why it opposes ECFA. But the DPP has simultaneously demanded that the government sign FTAs with European nations, the United States, Japan, ASEAN nations, and other major nations. It has even suggested that the government first sign FTAs with the United States and Europe, then sign ECFA with the Mainland. Clearly, the DPP is guilty of a gross contradiction.
All FTAs involve the two parties opening their markets to each other. Most FTAs make over ninety percent of their goods tariff free. Every economy will negatively impact some weaker, less competitive industries. But country A's comparatively weaker industry may be country B's comparatively stronger industry. During the bargaining process, some industries will be winners, and others will be losers. FTAs will eventually force weaker industries to face competitive pressures from abroad. Therefore, if the DPP's justification for opposing ECFA is to protect weaker industries, it ought to oppose FTAs. After all, the industries vulnerable to ECFA are the industries vulnerable to FTAs. If the DPP is urging the government to swiftly sign FTAs with other major nations, then the DPP's rhetoric is utterly incoherent and flatly self-contradictory.
During the Two Yings Debate, DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen issued a dire warning. She said that Hong Kong was experiencing a widening gap between rich and poor because of CEPA, and that ECFA would exacerbate the wealth gap on Taiwan. In fact during the past decade, the gap between rich and poor in all nations has continued to increase. The main reason is that with globalization the "winners circle" has gotten smaller. Governments have yet to compensate for changes in the domestic distribution of wealth. Taipei has yet to sign an FTA with any major nation, yet the gap between rich and poor has widened steadily over the past ten years. On the other hand, Japan has signed FTAs with many other nations, yet its domestic gap between rich and poor has not gotten worse. Obviously allegations that ECFA will lead to a widening gap between rich and poor is utterly beside the point. FTAs are merely one facet of globalization. Refusing to become part of the larger circle of globalization leads to greater losses, and makes economic growth even more difficult.
When ECFA was submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review, the DPP demanded a line by line review instead of a package review. Even then its justifications were utterly unconvincing. In 2007 the United States and South Korea signed an FTA. The U.S. Congress objected to the articles pertaining to U.S. beef and automobiles. As of today, the bill has yet to pass. But neither nation's legislators demanded a line by line review. If the FTA was unacceptable, they would simply have rejected it in toto. In fact ECFA is an FTA. If the DPP considers it a poorly drafted FTA, it can simply urge its rejection. Should an FTA be subjected to line by line review by members of the legislature? Should it be custom tailored according to the whims of individual legilslators? Should even the early harvest list be subjected to a vote? In one's dreams maybe, but not the real world. If one is willing only to approve what is to one's benefit, and unwilling to approve anything that is not, who is going to be willing to negotiate with you?
When addressing ECFA, the DPP should not blindly play the role of naysayer. Instead, it should adopt a more active and constructive role. For example, once ECFA comes into force, it will inevitably harm some domestic industries. When the government comes up with a budget providing relief for victimized industries, the DPP should to play a more professional role. It should help determine the appropriate compensation, instead of indulging in demogogic obstructionism. Such antics do a disservice to society and the public, to the vulnerable industries and workers the DPP purports to care so much about, and even to the DPP itself.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.08
看待ECFA 在野黨應回歸理性專業
本報訊
在兩岸正式簽署兩岸經濟架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ），同時ＥＣＦＡ也在立法院審議後，民進黨是應該改變過去全力反對的立場，而是以新的態度面對，理性的監督ＥＣＦＡ。
民進黨從洽商ＥＣＦＡ開始，就一路反對；在完成洽商、早收清單公布，台灣有攻有守，大陸也實現了「讓利」，還是反對。甚至，在國際諸多財經大師肯定ＥＣＦＡ後，仍堅持反對態度。這點，倒算是「一路走來，始終如一」。但在陷入這種「誓死反對」的漩渦後，民進黨更難以在野黨的立場，扮演好監督角色。
回頭看，民進黨反對ＥＣＦＡ的理由可分政治與經濟面；政治面是擔心主權問題，但看看ＥＣＦＡ內文，從頭到尾無一字涉及政治與主權，只能說，這是自己嚇自己兼嚇唬人民。
而經濟方面的理由更多，但都荒腔走板，沒有一個禁得起分析，甚至彼此自相矛盾。在洽談初，民進黨說ＥＣＦＡ會開放大陸勞工來台工作，台灣人都沒工作；即使政府再三澄清強調，絕對不會開放大陸勞工來台，民進黨還是拿此項目作宣傳。更何況，全世界的自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ），談的貿易是貨品與服務，而服務則是少數高階白領的服務業，從來就沒有一個ＦＴＡ，是開放讓另一國的勞工無限制的入境工作。民進黨如果真有此擔心，是無知了。如果知道實情卻仍蓄意以此欺騙社會大眾，那就是不道德了。
民進黨也說擔心弱勢產業與勞工受傷，因此要反對ＥＣＦＡ。但我們也同時聽到民進黨要求政府儘快與其它歐、美、日、東協等主要國家簽ＦＴＡ，甚至提出該先與美、歐先簽ＦＴＡ，再來與大陸簽ＥＣＦＡ的看法。但這兩者間存在著本質上嚴重的矛盾。
所有ＦＴＡ都是雙方彼此開放市場給對方，多數是把九成以上的貨品降到零關稅。每個經濟體必然有較弱勢、較不具競爭力的產業。但Ａ國的相對弱勢產業，很可能就是Ｂ國相對強勢產業，談判過程必然有得有失，ＦＴＡ最後必定造成部分弱勢產業必須面對更國外更大競爭壓力。因此，如果民進黨反對ＥＣＦＡ的重要理由是為國內弱勢產業發聲，坦白說，就該反對所有的ＦＴＡ─因為弱勢產業就是那些產業，但民進黨卻又催促政府趕快與其它主要國家簽ＦＴＡ。民進黨的主張，可說前言不對後語，夠矛盾的。
此外，雙英辯論中，民進黨主席蔡英文提出警語，說香港因為ＣＥＰＡ而拉大貧富差距，ＥＣＦＡ也會加劇台灣的貧富差距。但事實上近十多年來，全球各國貧富差距不斷擴大，其主要成因在全球化帶來的「贏者圈」變小，各國政府又未在國內分配上作調整所致。台灣未與任何主要國家簽署ＦＴＡ，這十多年來，貧富差距還是一路拉大；反倒是日本與許多國家簽署ＦＴＡ，但國內貧富差距狀況未惡化。顯然，說ＥＣＦＡ會導致國內貧富差距擴大，是未抓住問題焦點。ＦＴＡ只是全球化中的一個面相，但問題是不加入全球化的大圈圈，損失更大、經濟更難發展。
甚至到立法院審議時，對到底要包裹表決還是逐條表決，民進黨堅持的逐條表決，都毫無說服力。看看美國與南韓在二○○七年簽署ＦＴＡ後，因美國國會對美國牛肉與汽車的條件有意見，延擱至今未通過。可沒有那個國會議員說要逐條表決審議美韓ＦＴＡ；真是內容簽得不好，就完全不讓它通過。ＥＣＦＡ其實就是ＦＴＡ，民進黨認為簽得差，就主張不讓它通過即可。如果ＦＴＡ是靠國會議員逐條表決─或甚至如有些立委要求的，連早收清單都表決，那世界就太美了，如果大家只要通過對自己有利、否決對自己有害的項目，那以後誰還敢跟你談？
在ＥＣＦＡ的議題中，民進黨其實不該只扮演一味反對的角色，而是應選擇更積極而有建設性的角色。例如，ＥＣＦＡ生效後，國內必然有受損的產業，在政府編列損害救濟預算，及如何評估、發放損害救濟金上，民進黨應該能扮演更專業的監督角色。一味陷於民粹的反對，對社會、對民眾，對民進黨「念茲在茲」關切的弱勢產業與勞工，甚至對民進黨本身，都毫無益處。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 8, 2010
Taipei and Beijing have signed the cross-strait economic framework agreement (ECFA). Once ECFA has been reviewed by the Legislative Yuan, the DPP should cease its obdurate opposition, and adopt a new and more rational attitude, by helping oversee ECFA.
Ever since ECFA negotiations began, the DPP has been obstinately opposed to it. It opposed it upon completion of negotiations. It opposed it when the early harvest list was announced. It opposed it even though the government negotiated favorable terms for our side. It opposed it even though Beijing made generous concessions. It opposed it even after internationally renowned financial experts affirmed its value. On this point at least, the DPP can claim the dubious distinction of "being consistent from beginning to end." Having mired itself in this "opposition to the bitter end" quagmire however, the DPP now finds it even more harder to fulfill its proper role as the loyal opposition providing legislative oversight.
In retrospect, the Democratic Progressive Party's justifications for opposing ECFA can be divided into the political and the economic. The political justifications it cited include concern for sovereignty. But if one pores over the text of ECFA, one cannot find a single word touching on politics or sovereignty. What can one say except that the DPP has scared itself and its supporters to death, for no reason.
The DPP cited many more economic justifications, but every one of them equally absurd. They failed to withstand careful scrutiny, and even contradicted one other. Early during negotiations, the DPP said ECFA would allow Mainland workers to flood the island, putting Taiwanese out of work. Even though the government repeatedly made clear that Mainland workers would not be permitted to work on Taiwan, the DPP continued to make this claim in their propaganda. Free trade agreements (FTAs) the world over direct themselves at goods and services. Services involve small numbers of high-end white-collar service positions. No FTA has ever opened up a nation's borders to unrestricted immigration. If the DPP is actually wringing its hands over such concerns, then it is ignorant beyond belief. If the DPP knows the truth but is deliberately deceiving the public, then it is unethical beyond belief.
The DPP says it is afraid that more vulnerable industries and workers will be harmed. That was why it opposes ECFA. But the DPP has simultaneously demanded that the government sign FTAs with European nations, the United States, Japan, ASEAN nations, and other major nations. It has even suggested that the government first sign FTAs with the United States and Europe, then sign ECFA with the Mainland. Clearly, the DPP is guilty of a gross contradiction.
All FTAs involve the two parties opening their markets to each other. Most FTAs make over ninety percent of their goods tariff free. Every economy will negatively impact some weaker, less competitive industries. But country A's comparatively weaker industry may be country B's comparatively stronger industry. During the bargaining process, some industries will be winners, and others will be losers. FTAs will eventually force weaker industries to face competitive pressures from abroad. Therefore, if the DPP's justification for opposing ECFA is to protect weaker industries, it ought to oppose FTAs. After all, the industries vulnerable to ECFA are the industries vulnerable to FTAs. If the DPP is urging the government to swiftly sign FTAs with other major nations, then the DPP's rhetoric is utterly incoherent and flatly self-contradictory.
During the Two Yings Debate, DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen issued a dire warning. She said that Hong Kong was experiencing a widening gap between rich and poor because of CEPA, and that ECFA would exacerbate the wealth gap on Taiwan. In fact during the past decade, the gap between rich and poor in all nations has continued to increase. The main reason is that with globalization the "winners circle" has gotten smaller. Governments have yet to compensate for changes in the domestic distribution of wealth. Taipei has yet to sign an FTA with any major nation, yet the gap between rich and poor has widened steadily over the past ten years. On the other hand, Japan has signed FTAs with many other nations, yet its domestic gap between rich and poor has not gotten worse. Obviously allegations that ECFA will lead to a widening gap between rich and poor is utterly beside the point. FTAs are merely one facet of globalization. Refusing to become part of the larger circle of globalization leads to greater losses, and makes economic growth even more difficult.
When ECFA was submitted to the Legislative Yuan for review, the DPP demanded a line by line review instead of a package review. Even then its justifications were utterly unconvincing. In 2007 the United States and South Korea signed an FTA. The U.S. Congress objected to the articles pertaining to U.S. beef and automobiles. As of today, the bill has yet to pass. But neither nation's legislators demanded a line by line review. If the FTA was unacceptable, they would simply have rejected it in toto. In fact ECFA is an FTA. If the DPP considers it a poorly drafted FTA, it can simply urge its rejection. Should an FTA be subjected to line by line review by members of the legislature? Should it be custom tailored according to the whims of individual legilslators? Should even the early harvest list be subjected to a vote? In one's dreams maybe, but not the real world. If one is willing only to approve what is to one's benefit, and unwilling to approve anything that is not, who is going to be willing to negotiate with you?
When addressing ECFA, the DPP should not blindly play the role of naysayer. Instead, it should adopt a more active and constructive role. For example, once ECFA comes into force, it will inevitably harm some domestic industries. When the government comes up with a budget providing relief for victimized industries, the DPP should to play a more professional role. It should help determine the appropriate compensation, instead of indulging in demogogic obstructionism. Such antics do a disservice to society and the public, to the vulnerable industries and workers the DPP purports to care so much about, and even to the DPP itself.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2010.07.08
看待ECFA 在野黨應回歸理性專業
本報訊
在兩岸正式簽署兩岸經濟架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ），同時ＥＣＦＡ也在立法院審議後，民進黨是應該改變過去全力反對的立場，而是以新的態度面對，理性的監督ＥＣＦＡ。
民進黨從洽商ＥＣＦＡ開始，就一路反對；在完成洽商、早收清單公布，台灣有攻有守，大陸也實現了「讓利」，還是反對。甚至，在國際諸多財經大師肯定ＥＣＦＡ後，仍堅持反對態度。這點，倒算是「一路走來，始終如一」。但在陷入這種「誓死反對」的漩渦後，民進黨更難以在野黨的立場，扮演好監督角色。
回頭看，民進黨反對ＥＣＦＡ的理由可分政治與經濟面；政治面是擔心主權問題，但看看ＥＣＦＡ內文，從頭到尾無一字涉及政治與主權，只能說，這是自己嚇自己兼嚇唬人民。
而經濟方面的理由更多，但都荒腔走板，沒有一個禁得起分析，甚至彼此自相矛盾。在洽談初，民進黨說ＥＣＦＡ會開放大陸勞工來台工作，台灣人都沒工作；即使政府再三澄清強調，絕對不會開放大陸勞工來台，民進黨還是拿此項目作宣傳。更何況，全世界的自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ），談的貿易是貨品與服務，而服務則是少數高階白領的服務業，從來就沒有一個ＦＴＡ，是開放讓另一國的勞工無限制的入境工作。民進黨如果真有此擔心，是無知了。如果知道實情卻仍蓄意以此欺騙社會大眾，那就是不道德了。
民進黨也說擔心弱勢產業與勞工受傷，因此要反對ＥＣＦＡ。但我們也同時聽到民進黨要求政府儘快與其它歐、美、日、東協等主要國家簽ＦＴＡ，甚至提出該先與美、歐先簽ＦＴＡ，再來與大陸簽ＥＣＦＡ的看法。但這兩者間存在著本質上嚴重的矛盾。
所有ＦＴＡ都是雙方彼此開放市場給對方，多數是把九成以上的貨品降到零關稅。每個經濟體必然有較弱勢、較不具競爭力的產業。但Ａ國的相對弱勢產業，很可能就是Ｂ國相對強勢產業，談判過程必然有得有失，ＦＴＡ最後必定造成部分弱勢產業必須面對更國外更大競爭壓力。因此，如果民進黨反對ＥＣＦＡ的重要理由是為國內弱勢產業發聲，坦白說，就該反對所有的ＦＴＡ─因為弱勢產業就是那些產業，但民進黨卻又催促政府趕快與其它主要國家簽ＦＴＡ。民進黨的主張，可說前言不對後語，夠矛盾的。
此外，雙英辯論中，民進黨主席蔡英文提出警語，說香港因為ＣＥＰＡ而拉大貧富差距，ＥＣＦＡ也會加劇台灣的貧富差距。但事實上近十多年來，全球各國貧富差距不斷擴大，其主要成因在全球化帶來的「贏者圈」變小，各國政府又未在國內分配上作調整所致。台灣未與任何主要國家簽署ＦＴＡ，這十多年來，貧富差距還是一路拉大；反倒是日本與許多國家簽署ＦＴＡ，但國內貧富差距狀況未惡化。顯然，說ＥＣＦＡ會導致國內貧富差距擴大，是未抓住問題焦點。ＦＴＡ只是全球化中的一個面相，但問題是不加入全球化的大圈圈，損失更大、經濟更難發展。
甚至到立法院審議時，對到底要包裹表決還是逐條表決，民進黨堅持的逐條表決，都毫無說服力。看看美國與南韓在二○○七年簽署ＦＴＡ後，因美國國會對美國牛肉與汽車的條件有意見，延擱至今未通過。可沒有那個國會議員說要逐條表決審議美韓ＦＴＡ；真是內容簽得不好，就完全不讓它通過。ＥＣＦＡ其實就是ＦＴＡ，民進黨認為簽得差，就主張不讓它通過即可。如果ＦＴＡ是靠國會議員逐條表決─或甚至如有些立委要求的，連早收清單都表決，那世界就太美了，如果大家只要通過對自己有利、否決對自己有害的項目，那以後誰還敢跟你談？
在ＥＣＦＡ的議題中，民進黨其實不該只扮演一味反對的角色，而是應選擇更積極而有建設性的角色。例如，ＥＣＦＡ生效後，國內必然有受損的產業，在政府編列損害救濟預算，及如何評估、發放損害救濟金上，民進黨應該能扮演更專業的監督角色。一味陷於民粹的反對，對社會、對民眾，對民進黨「念茲在茲」關切的弱勢產業與勞工，甚至對民進黨本身，都毫無益處。
Wednesday, July 7, 2010
Even More Important is Keeping Our Roots on Taiwan
Even More Important is Keeping Our Roots on Taiwan
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2010
ECFA has been signed. Taiwan's economic situation has now entered a new phase. This does not mean immediate tariff reductions on the 539 goods and 11 services our side negotiated. The other side's 267 products will soon run their course. Everything must wait until January 1 next year before taking effect. Tariffs will not be fully eliminated until late 2012. How will this transitional period differ from the previous one or two years?
Only one thing will be different. Before ECFA was signed, the Ma administration and the opposition DPP were engaged in a tug of war. To promote their agendas, one side painted an overly rosy picture. The other side resorted to political intrigue, electioneering sleight of hand, and ideological demagoguery in an all-out campaign to demonize ECFA.
That is all in the past. The two parties must immediately end their war of words. They must work on behalf of the nation and the people. The ruling and opposition parties must pursue the same goal. They must ensure that ECFA works to our full advantage, and reduce any ill effects to the minimum.
Green Camp politicians allege that ECFA will merely enrich the wealthy, widen the gap between rich and poor, and strengthen the strong while weakening the weak. Lee Teng-hui is screaming that ECFA will hollow out Taiwan's industrial base, and that people will starve. Such scenarios are alarmist and exaggerated. But they are scenarios those in authority must be prepared to deal with. The new economic situation may lead to inequities, and the government must ensure a smooth transition.
The gap between rich and poor may increase for three reasons. The first is the dumping of low cost products produced by cheap labor on Taiwan. Manufacturers on Taiwan may be forced to engage in desperate price-cutting. The second is changes in industrial structure. Capital-intensive and technology-intensive companies will profit handsomely. Traditional production-based SMEs will shrink endlessly. The former will hire fewer workers at higher wages, leading to the polarization of rich and poor. The third is tariff reductions, large scale liberalization, and industry-wide corporate relocations. These will lead to capital outflows, a brain drain, and the hollowing out of industry.
Of the three, the third is the most frightening, but also the least likely. For two decades, we have watched companies pick up stakes on Taiwan to relocate on the Mainland. The most critical factors are the lack of direct links, which increase transportation costs; too high tariffs, which reduce the competitiveness of exports when compared to Mainland products; and cheap and abundant Mainland labor, against which Taiwan simply cannot compete. Now, given direct links and ECFA, the first two reasons have ceased to exist. For upstream industries not reliant on cheap labor, the reason for relocation has also disappeared. The industrial chain on Taiwan is more complete. The service sector is stronger. The basic infrastructure is better. The rule of law is more deeply rooted. Upstream vendors who relocated earlier may well return. Cheap Mainland labor may tempt manufacturers. But the wave of Foxconn pay raises is rapidly diminishing this temptation. If the ROC government can plan a "special economic zone" as soon as possible, and establish an attractive economic and trade environment, what reason does it have to fear the hollowing out of Taiwan's economy?
Low cost Mainland products may force wage cuts in weaker Taiwan industries -- if the government does nothing. But low cost Mainland products are of notoriously poor quality. Taiwan manufacturers offer far better quality, creativity, and design. Given a level playing field, at home and abroad, we have a comparative advantage. The problem is that in the past the government did nothing. It allowed inferior quality brands, counterfeit brands, deceptive business practices, and "big box stores" to run amok. It allowed local goods to be squeezed out by inferior quality goods, leaving Taiwan manufacturers nowhere to go. Only recently has it responded properly.
In terms of industrial structure, those most likely to benefit from tax cuts and liberalization are highly competitive big businesses. Those most likely to be harmed are small and medium enterprises unable to engage in multinational operations. This is the biggest detriment to the equitable distribution of jobs and income. But the true strength of Taiwan lies in this group of SMEs. The Ma administration should make timely use of its 95 billion in capital. It should support and promote tens of thousands of promising small and medium enterprises. If the scale of these businesses can be doubled, hundreds of thousands of new jobs can be created. Creating job opportunities is the best way to solve economic problems. It is the most important goal of economic development.
In short, ECFA does far more than solve problems for Taiwan companies. More importantly, it improves Taiwan's economic health. In other words, it benefits us not merely by "advancing into [Mainland] China." Even more importantly, it helps us keep our roots on Taiwan.
更重要的是根留台灣
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.07 02:34 am
ＥＣＦＡ完成簽署，台灣經濟情勢進入新階段。這並不意味我方的五三九項商品及十一項服務業立刻即可享受減免關稅，對方的二六七項產品也會馬上長驅直入；因為一切都要等到明年一月一日才開始發動，而且要遲至後年年底關稅方可降至零。然則，在這個過渡期間，與過去一、兩年有何不同？
真正的不同，只在一件事上：ＥＣＦＡ簽署之前，是馬政府與在野黨的拉鋸戰；一邊為了促其成功，將種種好處說得天花亂墜；另一邊則基於政治權謀、選戰操作，或是意識形態作祟，極盡可能地將ＥＣＦＡ妖魔化。
俱往矣。如今兩黨應當立刻結束口水戰，為台灣計、為台灣人民計，朝野只能追求同一個目標：讓ＥＣＦＡ創造的效益達到最大，而將一切衝擊、傷害，都可藉完善的對策未雨綢繆，降至最小。
綠營政治人物認為，ＥＣＦＡ將造成財富重分配、擴大貧富差距，使強者更強、弱者更弱；李登輝更高喊，ＥＣＦＡ將使台灣產業空洞化，許多台灣人民將會沒有飯吃。這些訴求或許危言聳聽，或許過度渲染，卻仍是主政當局必須面對的問題；務須做到縱然經濟新局會出現損益不平均的情勢，仍然能在政府的掌握下平順轉型。
其實，損益差距之可能擴大，不外三個原因：其一是對方廉價勞工的低價產品傾銷台灣，逼迫台灣產品走投無路削價以應。其二是產業結構改變，資本與技術密集的大型企業大獲利市，傳產型的中小企業則相形見絀，不斷萎縮；前者用人少而薪酬高，貧富乃朝向兩極發展。其三則為隨著關稅減免、大幅開放，企業群起外移，導致資金、人才大失血，產業空洞化。
三者之中，第三個原因最可怕，但也最不可能。因為二十年來，我們眼見大批台灣企業出走對岸，最關鍵的理由，無非是無法直航、運輸成本高昂；關稅太高、出口產品在對岸競爭力受挫；以及大陸勞工低廉而充沛，遠非台灣可及。但透過直航與ＥＣＦＡ，前兩個原因皆已不復存在，對那些不仰賴廉價勞工的中上游產業而言，外移理由已消失。相反地，由於台灣產業鍊完整而周密、周邊服務業強大、基礎設施優良，以及民主法治環境遠勝對岸，已經外移的中上游廠商還有可能回流。至於大陸廉價勞工對廠商的誘惑，隨富士康掀起加薪潮之後，正在快速降溫。倘若台灣能從速規畫「經貿特區」，建構近悅遠來的經貿環境，豈會空洞化？
至於台灣弱勢產業受低價大陸產品衝擊，迫使工資調降；若政府對此一無作為，的確可能發生。但大陸產品價低質差的名聲遠颺；台灣廠商的品質、創意、設計能力，都遠過於彼；只要放在同樣通路上公平競爭，在國內外，我們都有相對優勢。問題出在，長久以來政府的確一無作為，任由劣質品剪標、偽標，魚目混珠，而大賣場又唯利是圖，捨本土貨而就劣質品，使台灣廠商行銷無門。直到最近，才見到若干正確行動。
再就產業結構而言，減稅開放，最易獲利者當然是競爭力大增的大企業，最可能受創者多為無力跨國經營、自守一隅的中小企業，這對就業及所得分配最為不利。但台灣真正的實力，卻多潛藏在這一群中小企業之中。藉此時機，馬政府若能善用其九五○億資金，在中小企業中挑選數萬可造之才，全力扶持、提升，若其規模可因而倍增，新增的就業機會即可達數十萬。創造就業機會，是解決經濟問題的標本兼治之術，也是最重要的經濟發展目標。
總之，ＥＣＦＡ不止要解決「台商」的經營問題，更重要的是要改善整個「台灣」的經貿體質。也就是說，不只要從「前進中國」獲利，更要有利於「根留台灣」。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 7, 2010
ECFA has been signed. Taiwan's economic situation has now entered a new phase. This does not mean immediate tariff reductions on the 539 goods and 11 services our side negotiated. The other side's 267 products will soon run their course. Everything must wait until January 1 next year before taking effect. Tariffs will not be fully eliminated until late 2012. How will this transitional period differ from the previous one or two years?
Only one thing will be different. Before ECFA was signed, the Ma administration and the opposition DPP were engaged in a tug of war. To promote their agendas, one side painted an overly rosy picture. The other side resorted to political intrigue, electioneering sleight of hand, and ideological demagoguery in an all-out campaign to demonize ECFA.
That is all in the past. The two parties must immediately end their war of words. They must work on behalf of the nation and the people. The ruling and opposition parties must pursue the same goal. They must ensure that ECFA works to our full advantage, and reduce any ill effects to the minimum.
Green Camp politicians allege that ECFA will merely enrich the wealthy, widen the gap between rich and poor, and strengthen the strong while weakening the weak. Lee Teng-hui is screaming that ECFA will hollow out Taiwan's industrial base, and that people will starve. Such scenarios are alarmist and exaggerated. But they are scenarios those in authority must be prepared to deal with. The new economic situation may lead to inequities, and the government must ensure a smooth transition.
The gap between rich and poor may increase for three reasons. The first is the dumping of low cost products produced by cheap labor on Taiwan. Manufacturers on Taiwan may be forced to engage in desperate price-cutting. The second is changes in industrial structure. Capital-intensive and technology-intensive companies will profit handsomely. Traditional production-based SMEs will shrink endlessly. The former will hire fewer workers at higher wages, leading to the polarization of rich and poor. The third is tariff reductions, large scale liberalization, and industry-wide corporate relocations. These will lead to capital outflows, a brain drain, and the hollowing out of industry.
Of the three, the third is the most frightening, but also the least likely. For two decades, we have watched companies pick up stakes on Taiwan to relocate on the Mainland. The most critical factors are the lack of direct links, which increase transportation costs; too high tariffs, which reduce the competitiveness of exports when compared to Mainland products; and cheap and abundant Mainland labor, against which Taiwan simply cannot compete. Now, given direct links and ECFA, the first two reasons have ceased to exist. For upstream industries not reliant on cheap labor, the reason for relocation has also disappeared. The industrial chain on Taiwan is more complete. The service sector is stronger. The basic infrastructure is better. The rule of law is more deeply rooted. Upstream vendors who relocated earlier may well return. Cheap Mainland labor may tempt manufacturers. But the wave of Foxconn pay raises is rapidly diminishing this temptation. If the ROC government can plan a "special economic zone" as soon as possible, and establish an attractive economic and trade environment, what reason does it have to fear the hollowing out of Taiwan's economy?
Low cost Mainland products may force wage cuts in weaker Taiwan industries -- if the government does nothing. But low cost Mainland products are of notoriously poor quality. Taiwan manufacturers offer far better quality, creativity, and design. Given a level playing field, at home and abroad, we have a comparative advantage. The problem is that in the past the government did nothing. It allowed inferior quality brands, counterfeit brands, deceptive business practices, and "big box stores" to run amok. It allowed local goods to be squeezed out by inferior quality goods, leaving Taiwan manufacturers nowhere to go. Only recently has it responded properly.
In terms of industrial structure, those most likely to benefit from tax cuts and liberalization are highly competitive big businesses. Those most likely to be harmed are small and medium enterprises unable to engage in multinational operations. This is the biggest detriment to the equitable distribution of jobs and income. But the true strength of Taiwan lies in this group of SMEs. The Ma administration should make timely use of its 95 billion in capital. It should support and promote tens of thousands of promising small and medium enterprises. If the scale of these businesses can be doubled, hundreds of thousands of new jobs can be created. Creating job opportunities is the best way to solve economic problems. It is the most important goal of economic development.
In short, ECFA does far more than solve problems for Taiwan companies. More importantly, it improves Taiwan's economic health. In other words, it benefits us not merely by "advancing into [Mainland] China." Even more importantly, it helps us keep our roots on Taiwan.
更重要的是根留台灣
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.07.07 02:34 am
ＥＣＦＡ完成簽署，台灣經濟情勢進入新階段。這並不意味我方的五三九項商品及十一項服務業立刻即可享受減免關稅，對方的二六七項產品也會馬上長驅直入；因為一切都要等到明年一月一日才開始發動，而且要遲至後年年底關稅方可降至零。然則，在這個過渡期間，與過去一、兩年有何不同？
真正的不同，只在一件事上：ＥＣＦＡ簽署之前，是馬政府與在野黨的拉鋸戰；一邊為了促其成功，將種種好處說得天花亂墜；另一邊則基於政治權謀、選戰操作，或是意識形態作祟，極盡可能地將ＥＣＦＡ妖魔化。
俱往矣。如今兩黨應當立刻結束口水戰，為台灣計、為台灣人民計，朝野只能追求同一個目標：讓ＥＣＦＡ創造的效益達到最大，而將一切衝擊、傷害，都可藉完善的對策未雨綢繆，降至最小。
綠營政治人物認為，ＥＣＦＡ將造成財富重分配、擴大貧富差距，使強者更強、弱者更弱；李登輝更高喊，ＥＣＦＡ將使台灣產業空洞化，許多台灣人民將會沒有飯吃。這些訴求或許危言聳聽，或許過度渲染，卻仍是主政當局必須面對的問題；務須做到縱然經濟新局會出現損益不平均的情勢，仍然能在政府的掌握下平順轉型。
其實，損益差距之可能擴大，不外三個原因：其一是對方廉價勞工的低價產品傾銷台灣，逼迫台灣產品走投無路削價以應。其二是產業結構改變，資本與技術密集的大型企業大獲利市，傳產型的中小企業則相形見絀，不斷萎縮；前者用人少而薪酬高，貧富乃朝向兩極發展。其三則為隨著關稅減免、大幅開放，企業群起外移，導致資金、人才大失血，產業空洞化。
三者之中，第三個原因最可怕，但也最不可能。因為二十年來，我們眼見大批台灣企業出走對岸，最關鍵的理由，無非是無法直航、運輸成本高昂；關稅太高、出口產品在對岸競爭力受挫；以及大陸勞工低廉而充沛，遠非台灣可及。但透過直航與ＥＣＦＡ，前兩個原因皆已不復存在，對那些不仰賴廉價勞工的中上游產業而言，外移理由已消失。相反地，由於台灣產業鍊完整而周密、周邊服務業強大、基礎設施優良，以及民主法治環境遠勝對岸，已經外移的中上游廠商還有可能回流。至於大陸廉價勞工對廠商的誘惑，隨富士康掀起加薪潮之後，正在快速降溫。倘若台灣能從速規畫「經貿特區」，建構近悅遠來的經貿環境，豈會空洞化？
至於台灣弱勢產業受低價大陸產品衝擊，迫使工資調降；若政府對此一無作為，的確可能發生。但大陸產品價低質差的名聲遠颺；台灣廠商的品質、創意、設計能力，都遠過於彼；只要放在同樣通路上公平競爭，在國內外，我們都有相對優勢。問題出在，長久以來政府的確一無作為，任由劣質品剪標、偽標，魚目混珠，而大賣場又唯利是圖，捨本土貨而就劣質品，使台灣廠商行銷無門。直到最近，才見到若干正確行動。
再就產業結構而言，減稅開放，最易獲利者當然是競爭力大增的大企業，最可能受創者多為無力跨國經營、自守一隅的中小企業，這對就業及所得分配最為不利。但台灣真正的實力，卻多潛藏在這一群中小企業之中。藉此時機，馬政府若能善用其九五○億資金，在中小企業中挑選數萬可造之才，全力扶持、提升，若其規模可因而倍增，新增的就業機會即可達數十萬。創造就業機會，是解決經濟問題的標本兼治之術，也是最重要的經濟發展目標。
總之，ＥＣＦＡ不止要解決「台商」的經營問題，更重要的是要改善整個「台灣」的經貿體質。也就是說，不只要從「前進中國」獲利，更要有利於「根留台灣」。
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